<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0" xmlns:itunes="http://www.itunes.com/dtds/podcast-1.0.dtd"><channel><title><![CDATA[Volts]]></title><description><![CDATA[Volts is a podcast about leaving fossil fuels behind. I've been reporting on and explaining clean-energy topics for almost 20 years, and I love talking to politicians, analysts, innovators, and activists about the latest progress in the world's most important fight. (Volts is entirely subscriber-supported. Sign up!) <br/><br/><a href="https://www.volts.wtf?utm_medium=podcast">www.volts.wtf</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/podcast</link><generator>Substack</generator><lastBuildDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 05:57:38 GMT</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/193024.rss" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><author><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></author><copyright><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></copyright><language><![CDATA[en]]></language><webMaster><![CDATA[david@volts.wtf]]></webMaster><itunes:new-feed-url>https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/193024.rss</itunes:new-feed-url><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:subtitle>A newsletter, podcast, &amp; community focused on the technology, politics, and policy of decarbonization. In your inbox once or twice a week.</itunes:subtitle><itunes:type>episodic</itunes:type><itunes:owner><itunes:name>David Roberts</itunes:name><itunes:email>david@volts.wtf</itunes:email></itunes:owner><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:category text="News"><itunes:category text="Politics"/></itunes:category><itunes:category text="News"><itunes:category text="Tech News"/></itunes:category><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/9759d6c6bdb48d0b6d52469456f303bf.jpg"/><item><title><![CDATA[The PAC taking out clean energy opponents]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>Clean energy is the cheapest, fastest-growing source of power in the country, yet politically it barely registers. Republicans gutted its tax credits last year without fearing any consequences. The Invest in Tomorrow Coalition, a super PAC backed by clean energy investors, is trying to change that the old-fashioned way: by punishing the industry’s enemies. It went six for six in this year’s primaries; it’s now spending at least $15 million against seven Republican House candidates in the midterms. Its chair, Tom Matzzie, makes the case for fear as a political asset, explains why the industry has been so slow to throw elbows, and describes what it would take for clean energy to become a lion instead of a gazelle.</em></p><p>Chapters:</p><p>00:00 - Introduction</p><p>02:55 - How the Invest in Tomorrow Coalition started</p><p>06:23 - Why a super PAC, and the idea of mythic power</p><p>09:50 - Punishing opponents to send a message to Congress</p><p>12:55 - Proving impact, and the permitting bill</p><p>17:13 - How ITC picks its general election races</p><p>21:41 - Does knocking out extremists help Republicans?</p><p>24:53 - Free riders and barriers to industry politics</p><p>28:58 - Who funds ITC, and why the industry underinvests</p><p>32:44 - Why clean power stays politically weak</p><p>38:28 - Did the IRA’s red-state investments pay off?</p><p>40:35 - Fear of Trump’s retaliation</p><p>45:05 - Avoiding the Democratic PAC label</p><p>49:30 - Presidential primaries and the ethanol playbook</p><p>53:20 - Gas inside the clean power trade groups</p><p>58:37 - Where ITC goes after November</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-pac-taking-out-clean-energy-opponents</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:220144098</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 10:06:33 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/220144098/c68373734182de4f85c3e5b10e6112dc.mp3" length="82173927" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4089</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/220144098/a94cf0a076d758a60ec9febc922d8aa5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Building our piece of the electric stack]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>Collectively, the electric stack (batteries, motors, chips, power electronics) has gotten about 99% cheaper since 1990. It is quietly remaking every machine that turns electricity into motion, heat, or work. Problem is, China makes most of it. Sam D’Amico, co-author of “The Electric Slide” and founder of Impulse Labs, is betting the US can still claim a piece of that stack. He’s starting with a battery-powered induction cooktop. We talk about why domestic manufacturing matters, what America would actually have to build to compete, and how Silicon Valley’s founder world really thinks about climate change, geoengineering included.</em></p><p><strong>Chapters:</strong></p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction</p><p><strong>02:52</strong> – From VR headsets to kitchen appliances</p><p><strong>07:07</strong> – How a pizza oven inspired a battery stove</p><p><strong>10:07</strong> – Peak demand, at home and on the grid</p><p><strong>13:25</strong> – Which appliances could use a built-in battery</p><p><strong>16:46</strong> – Electric stack 1: the four technologies</p><p><strong>20:28</strong> – Electric stack 2: power electronics and motors</p><p><strong>25:21</strong> – China bets on hardware, the US bets on AI</p><p><strong>30:08</strong> – Why not just buy it all from China?</p><p><strong>33:51</strong> – Why engineers need to be near the factory</p><p><strong>38:39</strong> – How much does the US need to make at home?</p><p><strong>45:19</strong> – US EV policy and letting Chinese cars in</p><p><strong>47:49</strong> – Batteries in appliances vs. one home battery</p><p><strong>52:04</strong> – Impulse’s plan: its tech in other brands’ stoves</p><p><strong>55:17</strong> – What’s next after the stove</p><p><strong>57:14</strong> – Has Silicon Valley stopped caring about climate?</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/building-our-piece-of-the-electric</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:219826765</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 10:08:33 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/219826765/8055d8fbc58896700fa10240357d07ce.mp3" length="80140896" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3987</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/219826765/51805418b5c642e476511e75b3391e6d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Can distributed energy work around American utilities?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>American homes are filling up with batteries, EVs, and smart thermostats that could be coordinated to make the grid cheaper and more reliable — but almost none of them are. To understand why, it helps to watch what happens when the company best in the world at this tries to do it here. In Britain, Octopus Energy has built a giant virtual power plant out of its customers' devices. In the US, it has spent six years running into walls. Now it’s bought Uplight, which runs customer programs for 85 utilities. I talked with Nick Chaset, who runs both, about what's in the way and whether distributed energy can ever scale with US utilities … the way they are.</em></p><p>Chapters:</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction</p><p><strong>02:02</strong> – Octopus’s past year and the Uplight investment</p><p><strong>05:18</strong> – What makes the UK market work for Octopus</p><p><strong>11:12</strong> – Texas: fast growth, flattened volatility</p><p><strong>14:57</strong> – Will flexibility put itself out of business?</p><p><strong>19:16</strong> – Why Octopus stays out of Pennsylvania and New York</p><p><strong>22:17</strong> – Does residential retail competition have a future?</p><p><strong>24:41</strong> – Why utility programs trail Octopus on participation</p><p><strong>32:17</strong> – The demand stack and what planners can count on</p><p><strong>39:11</strong> – Kraken, Uplight and the overlap</p><p><strong>46:04</strong> – Consumer protection and the aggregator model</p><p><strong>51:17</strong> – Data centers and the social license to operate</p><p><strong>55:11</strong> – Do we need dynamic pricing?</p><p><strong>58:30</strong> – Five years out</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/can-distributed-energy-work-around</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:219499602</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 10:09:33 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/219499602/8f6b2328d83a3a91449d87bdedf6d068.mp3" length="75486480" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3758</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/219499602/baca573442a2616e185450ab8ebcb5fb.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What’s up with Denmark? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>Denmark gets a large share of its power from wind and other renewables and has cut its emissions roughly in half since 1990, but independent analysts doubt it will hit its 70 percent target for 2030. Kristian Jensen, CEO of Green Power Denmark and a former Danish minister of taxation, foreign affairs, and finance, argues the next stage is electrifying how Denmark uses energy: heat, transport, and industry. I talk with him about district heating and heat pumps, EVs and vehicle-to-grid, municipally owned grid companies and hourly power prices, biomass, carbon capture, power-to-X, solar’s “fields of iron” backlash, a grid oversubscribed with data center requests (an October 1 agreement has since put most data centers at the back of the queue), and whether the country’s political consensus will hold.</em></p><p></p><p>Chapters</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction: Denmark and industrial symbiosis</p><p><strong>02:44</strong> – Is the 70% target for 2030 out of reach?</p><p><strong>06:24</strong> – Carbon capture and storage, and the peatlands lag</p><p><strong>09:57</strong> – Why electrification has lagged: biomass and wood pellets</p><p><strong>14:45</strong> – Few batteries, many interconnectors</p><p><strong>16:48</strong> – Data centers and the grid-connection prioritization bill</p><p><strong>21:34</strong> – Municipally owned grid companies</p><p><strong>24:32</strong> – Smart meters, hourly prices, and thermal batteries</p><p><strong>28:40</strong> – The solar backlash and local ownership</p><p><strong>35:04</strong> – Agrivoltaics and biodiversity</p><p><strong>37:24</strong> – District heating: heat pumps, geothermal, and finance</p><p><strong>43:24</strong> – The EV transition and vehicle-to-grid</p><p><strong>47:45</strong> – Road pricing and fiscal room</p><p><strong>50:07</strong> – Power-to-X and eSAF</p><p><strong>54:21</strong> – Can Denmark build enough clean power?</p><p><strong>57:12</strong> – Will the political consensus hold?</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-up-with-denmark</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:218979470</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 10:05:36 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/218979470/6e726058a1405d5c86e41044f3b991d3.mp3" length="76502131" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3809</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/218979470/07357ebf088f1188dc024dd5190b14aa.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Checking back in with Greenlight America]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>On this episode, recorded live at Climate Week NYC, I talk with Matt Traldi. He’s the founder and CEO of Greenlight America, which finds the local meetings where clean energy’s fate is being decided and recruits supporters to attend. Traldi argues that siting and permitting approvals turn on who shows up, and that local partners, conservative groups included, outperform outside advocates. We discuss how to measure impact, recent wins and losses, blue-state resistance, data center backlash, and Greenlight’s growth.</em></p><p>Chapters:</p><p>00:00 – Introduction</p><p>02:09 – What Greenlight does and why Matt started it</p><p>04:41 – How Greenlight finds the decisions that matter</p><p>07:27 – Growth, and the tax credit deadline sprint</p><p>13:38 – Who shows up to local hearings</p><p>19:39 – Winning in conservative communities</p><p>22:35 – Bodies in the room, measuring impact, and win rates</p><p>27:46 – Losses, wins, and “there is no bag”</p><p>32:44 – Blue-state obstacles and organized opposition</p><p>36:31 – When data center backlash spills over onto clean energy</p><p>42:31 – Which projects Greenlight won’t back</p><p>45:38 – Lessons from housing and growing an organization</p><p>50:17 – Audience Q&A: disinformation and state permitting reform</p><p>54:39 – Audience Q&A: developers and elections</p><p>59:30 – Audience Q&A: funding local groups and designing community input</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/checking-back-in-with-greenlight</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:216852432</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 10:07:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/216852432/5e5a3c53cdd21ca7972c3d0cac6083fc.mp3" length="80802513" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4022</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/216852432/0313005d72c518ce4c57b7bbfc36870c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What’s up with the new federal permitting reform bill?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>The proposed bipartisan federal permitting bill is 417 pages filled with extremely consequential provisions that have left the climate community some mix of excited, infuriated, and confused. In an attempt to bring some clarity, I asked Daniel Palken of Arnold Ventures, a veteran of Senate permitting fights, to walk through what’s in it. We cover the blockbuster transmission reforms, the rule making data centers pay more than their share of grid costs, the wins for geothermal, and the fossil carve-outs. Then we get into NEPA reforms that render the act toothless, limits on state water permits, and the permit-certainty sections that have lawyers worried about “forever permits.” And finally: whether it restrains Trump, why Democrats shouldn’t wait for a better deal, what the modeling says about emissions impacts, and Daniel’s odds of passage. This is a long one, folks. Buckle up.</em></p><p></p><p>Chapters:</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Intro: the bipartisan permitting bill</p><p><strong>04:15</strong> – Why permitting reform matters</p><p><strong>12:23</strong> – Agency staffing and capacity</p><p><strong>16:59</strong> – Past permitting attempts</p><p><strong>20:26</strong> – Transmission 1: planning and federal backstop</p><p><strong>28:28</strong> – Transmission 2: who pays and grid upgrades</p><p><strong>38:17</strong> – Data centers 1: paying more for grid access</p><p><strong>43:20</strong> – Distributed energy and geothermal</p><p><strong>49:06</strong> – Oil, gas, and mining provisions</p><p><strong>57:06</strong> – Data centers 2: will they go off-grid?</p><p><strong>1:00:19</strong> – NEPA 1: courts can’t halt projects</p><p><strong>1:08:57</strong> – NEPA 2: the main objections</p><p><strong>1:17:10</strong> – State water permits</p><p><strong>1:23:35</strong> – Endangered species</p><p><strong>1:27:37</strong> – Permit certainty 1: limits on revoking permits</p><p><strong>1:36:43</strong> – Permit certainty 2: lawsuits and damages</p><p><strong>1:48:12</strong> – Politics 1: Trump’s wind blockades</p><p><strong>1:52:57</strong> – Politics 2: why not wait for a better deal?</p><p><strong>1:58:33</strong> – Politics 3: elections, courts, and modeling</p><p><strong>2:10:57</strong> – Politics 4: next steps and odds of passage</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-up-with-the-new-federal-permitting</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:219044857</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 09 Oct 2026 10:01:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/219044857/13be0d4e4176cf3c7dc2f604e44d1d94.mp3" length="170023627" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>8466</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/219044857/e7f44c3c10888026cb7bebae4752086f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The grueling fight to pass the Inflation Reduction Act]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>On September 14, I sat down with Leah Stokes in front of a live audience at Seattle’s Town Hall to talk about her new book, </em>The Carbon Wave<em>. It’s an insider account of how the Inflation Reduction Act got made, braided with the story of the high-risk twin pregnancy she went through while helping to make it. We get into why electrification is the heart of decarbonization, the enduring mystery of what’s going on in Joe Manchin’s head, what it means to trade your carbon footprint for a carbon wave, and how much of the IRA survives. It was followed by questions from the audience.</em></p><p></p><p>Chapters:</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Welcome and housekeeping</p><p><strong>03:05</strong> – The twins, the NICU, and writing the book</p><p><strong>08:51</strong> – Carbon footprint vs. carbon wave</p><p><strong>13:39</strong> – Sam Ricketts and 100% clean electricity</p><p><strong>18:13</strong> – Why electricity is the core of the solution</p><p><strong>23:28</strong> – Utilities and the politics of change</p><p><strong>26:18</strong> – Tech companies and data centers</p><p><strong>29:11</strong> – Inside the Manchin negotiations</p><p><strong>33:57</strong> – Why Manchin got to yes</p><p><strong>38:46</strong> – Trump, setbacks, and where things stand</p><p><strong>42:55</strong> – Clean energy politics and the global shift</p><p><strong>46:25</strong> – Audience Q&A: the transmission gridlock</p><p><strong>48:59</strong> – Institutions, speed, and structural reform</p><p><strong>53:27</strong> – If Democrats win the House, what next</p><p><strong>55:43</strong> – Permitting reform</p><p><strong>59:06</strong> – State utilities, coal, and getting involved</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-grueling-fight-to-pass-the-inflation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:211085923</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 10:06:44 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/211085923/3d4189e9236f571dc7302fd3bc17e78d.mp3" length="77472008" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3874</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/211085923/f5bfa20ff07adca2773a961dafc624c5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Best of September 2026]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_7">www.volts.wtf</a><br/><br/><p><em>Volts published seven conversations in September, which is a lot for anyone to listen to. We’ve rounded up the highlights into less than an hour. Enjoy!</em></p><p></p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/best-of-september-2026</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:218404455</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 10:24:33 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/218404455/ad7e7edde61a9ced1ec65dd88b273d0b.mp3" length="16394508" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>815</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/218404455/9759d6c6bdb48d0b6d52469456f303bf.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What’s up with heat-pump water heaters?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>Heat pump water heaters use a fraction of the energy of conventional electric resistance heaters — which use more electricity in a year than an EV — but they're only 2 percent of the market, mainly because they tend to cost more, be slow and loud, and require a plumber and an electrician. Reservoir is a Boston company trying to fix all that, with a smarter, quieter machine and its own plumbers. I talk with CEO Luke Winston-Almanzar about how it works, what it costs, and its potential role in demand response programs.</em></p><p>Chapters:</p><p>00:00 – Introduction</p><p>03:06 – Why water heaters</p><p>06:34 – How gas, resistance, and heat pump water heaters work</p><p>09:33 – Size and slow recovery: predictive heating and party mode</p><p>15:31 – Installation and vertical integration</p><p>22:19 – Cutting electric resistance backup</p><p>20:31 – What Reservoir builds and what it sources</p><p>23:41 – Tankless gas, virtual capacity, and the booster heater</p><p>27:11 – Recirculation, freeze protection, leak detection, and Legionella</p><p>32:03 – What it costs and what it saves</p><p>36:01 – Placement: small rooms, basements, and cold climates</p><p>42:37 – Noise and durability</p><p>48:19 – Demand response and virtual power plants</p><p>53:22 – A. O. Smith’s CO2 split system and Reservoir’s moat</p><p>55:54 – Policy headwinds after the IRA</p><p>59:29 – What’s next for Reservoir</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-up-with-heat-pump-water-heaters</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:214991493</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 10:04:52 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/214991493/eb2ef09c5a94b2fc310b47d10686b38a.mp3" length="78277469" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3893</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/214991493/ed18eb8b4a3168530b200a4f2979170e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Do small residential batteries make sense? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>Home batteries like the Tesla Powerwall are nice, but what about people who can’t afford them, or renters who aren’t allowed to install them, or people who just don’t want the hassle of dealing with a permit and an electrician? A company called Pila is selling small (1.6 kWh) batteries that simply plug into a normal electrical socket. They can serve as backup for a refrigerator or other appliance in the event of a blackout, but they can also “mesh” with one another to form a network, pair with rooftop solar, or participate in VPP programs. CEO Cole Ashman explains the value proposition.</em></p><p>Chapters:</p><p>00:00 Introduction</p><p>02:26 Lessons from Powerwall and Span</p><p>05:33 What Pila is and how it works</p><p>07:14 How long a fridge runs on one battery</p><p>09:28 Fire risk, LFP chemistry, and New York City</p><p>16:02 Why the price went up, and cost per kilowatt hour</p><p>19:55 Who is actually buying Pila</p><p>23:00 Financing models and free batteries</p><p>27:04 Do the bill savings add up?</p><p>32:05 Why utilities want small batteries in VPPs</p><p>36:58 Pilots with Holy Cross Energy and Brooklyn SolarWorks</p><p>41:09 Solar pairing and the Pila mesh network</p><p>47:14 Camping batteries and built-in storage</p><p>54:19 Utilities and visibility at the grid edge</p><p>55:58 Bidirectional outlets and the next five years</p><p>1:00:10 Clean energy as invisible infrastructure</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/do-small-residential-batteries-make</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:215930201</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 10:10:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/215930201/2f8c26130bce6a47cff2083cca5265b4.mp3" length="79225205" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3943</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/215930201/a59fcd2c34890e8f4fe72b1e389e8846.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How energy politics work inside DC]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_7">www.volts.wtf</a><br/><br/><p><em>Back in 2011, I wrote that fossil fuel interests had a much better media game than clean energy. My example was Frank Maisano, a media relations guy for coal utilities and the natural gas industry. Thirty years on, he’s still at it — still writing his newsletter, still connecting reporters to sources, still better at it than anyone on the clean side (sigh). So I’m finally talking to him about it: clean energy trade groups nobody in Washington fears, Trump’s daft efforts to kill renewables, the PAC picking off dirty-energy Republicans, permitting and data center fights, and the climate denial shop he worked for in the ‘90s. Spoiler: he regrets nothing.</em></p><p>Chapters:</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction</p><p><strong>03:46</strong> – What a DC media strategist actually does</p><p><strong>09:50</strong> – Republicans, Trump, and a narrow House majority</p><p><strong>15:29</strong> – Why tax cuts beat energy in the OBBBA fight</p><p><strong>18:54</strong> – Competing with China on AI without the electric stack</p><p><strong>21:15</strong> – Paying $4 billion to hand back offshore wind leases</p><p><strong>28:07</strong> – Red-state wind and the orders keeping coal plants open</p><p><strong>32:52</strong> – Clean energy trade groups and the building trades</p><p><strong>38:41</strong> – Gas as a bridge, and what longer term means</p><p><strong>44:55</strong> – Whether a half-gas trade group can serve clean energy</p><p><strong>48:43</strong> – A coherent clean vision against an incoherent coalition</p><p><strong>51:14</strong> – Do the green groups still scare anyone</p><p><strong>55:18</strong> – Permitting reform and the Whitehouse-Capito path</p><p><strong>59:46</strong> – Data centers, animal spirits, and the midterms</p><p><strong>1:06:48</strong> – The revenge PAC, and whether it is working</p><p><strong>1:12:31</strong> – Congress, the courts, and what Democrats could do</p><p><strong>1:18:53</strong> – COP, climate change, and the client he would turn down</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-energy-politics-work-inside-dc</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:216226037</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 10:04:22 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/216226037/e72273bc2da578c7ab18510ca1b377ca.mp3" length="17700286" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>881</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/216226037/c94b7339035d04a6447d83da6afeb39f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to build a more flexible, quieter, less obnoxious data center]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>Verrus is building data centers designed to address every objection the public has raised: they use batteries instead of diesel generators, which makes them grid assets that help hold down power prices; they use closed-loop cooling, which uses a tiny fraction of the water; their equipment is quieter; and as a bonus, they squeeze more servers into the same grid connection. Yet both of Verrus’s proposed sites, in Michigan and Oregon, are mired in fierce local opposition. In this episode, CEO Nelson Abramson walks through the engineering — and the politics that the engineering hasn’t quite solved.</em></p><p><strong>Chapters:</strong></p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction</p><p><strong>02:43</strong> – Three decades in data centers</p><p><strong>05:05</strong> – What a Verrus data center looks like</p><p><strong>07:39</strong> – The medium voltage power plane</p><p><strong>12:13</strong> – UPS batteries vs. the big LFP battery</p><p><strong>17:27</strong> – Priority aware capping and provisioned utility capacity</p><p><strong>22:31</strong> – Why not buy the pieces off the shelf?</p><p><strong>25:42</strong> – Duration: what happens when four hours runs out</p><p><strong>34:28</strong> – Diesel backup and what customers ask for</p><p><strong>37:15</strong> – How flexible is compute, really?</p><p><strong>42:37</strong> – Noise, fans, and the sound studies</p><p><strong>48:42</strong> – Water use and the 12 million gallon question</p><p><strong>52:19</strong> – Industrial land and by-right zoning</p><p><strong>56:07</strong> – Public opposition, recall petitions, and community benefits</p><p><strong>1:00:07</strong> – Oregon, Salem, and the moratorium</p><p><strong>1:03:56</strong> – Ride-through, NERC, and losing the moat</p><p><strong>1:07:11</strong> – What V2 looks like</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-build-a-more-flexible-quieter</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:213629050</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 16 Sep 2026 10:08:30 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/213629050/edc83ae7704770cc1148d932decec9b2.mp3" length="90141642" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4487</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/213629050/d58358d0f633ae0726f0141a33f1ddfe.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Building a big, abundant, clean grid]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Jane Flegal has worked inside philanthropy at the Hewlett Foundation, industrial emissions policy at the Biden White House, and carbon-removal market development at Frontier; she's now a senior fellow at the Searchlight Institute, writing some of the smartest climate policy analysis around. We cover a lot of ground: industrial policy versus market approaches, what the IRA got right and wrong, philanthropy's proper role, data centers and the case for an infrastructure fund, and behind-the-meter gas, among other things. This is a long one, and spicy!</p><p>Chapters:</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction</p><p><strong>03:11</strong> – Flegal's thesis: building a clean grid fast enough to power growth</p><p><strong>06:29</strong> – Why she rejects degrowth</p><p><strong>09:27</strong> – The Roosevelt essay: climate as more than a market failure</p><p><strong>13:30</strong> – Why clean energy underuses its political muscle</p><p><strong>15:24</strong> – Industrial policy and the green spiral theory of change</p><p><strong>20:40</strong> – Was IRA the right approach?</p><p><strong>22:12</strong> – Lily Bermel's paper and the fight over what survived</p><p><strong>23:21</strong> – What she would have done differently under IRA</p><p><strong>30:11</strong> – Philanthropy, Silicon Valley, and what government is for</p><p><strong>33:29</strong> – The epistemic crisis inside environmental NGOs</p><p><strong>39:09</strong> – The abundance movement and what each faction misses</p><p><strong>44:16</strong> – What establishment Democrats get wrong on climate</p><p><strong>46:06</strong> – Why issue polling misleads</p><p><strong>50:34</strong> – Republicans and the Cold War analogy</p><p><strong>52:47</strong> – Data centers and the American Grid Infrastructure Fund</p><p><strong>59:13</strong> – Affordability politics and who pays for the grid</p><p><strong>1:08:14</strong> – Emissions, behind-the-meter gas, and flexible load</p><p><strong>1:13:57</strong> – The clean firm debate: storage plus transmission?</p><p><strong>1:20:14</strong> – Capacity markets, ERCOT, and the case for planning</p><p><strong>1:24:32</strong> – Utility incentives, public power, and affordability fixes</p><p><strong>1:35:55</strong> – Permitting reform and the land footprint asymmetry</p><p><strong>1:41:05</strong> – NEPA reform and the political window</p><p><strong>1:48:21</strong> – Where fresh policy thinking comes from</p><p></p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/building-a-big-abundant-clean-grid</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:213659165</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 11 Sep 2026 10:04:30 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/213659165/36ca88b37ac7875880ad8410d1755c44.mp3" length="145454795" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>7245</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/213659165/56f945c6dd1d9fb9d0c61088066f5273.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Is there way more conventional geothermal than we thought? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Zanskar argues that the US is badly underestimating its conventional geothermal resources — that there are far more undiscovered hydrothermal systems, and that each one can produce far more power, than people think. They think AI can help find those resources, and they have drilled three sites to back it up, including a “blind” discovery in Nevada with no surface signs and no prior exploratory wells. If they're right, terawatts of firm, carbon-free power are reachable with off-the-shelf drilling technology. Co-founders Carl Hoiland and Joel Edwards make the case.</p><p>Chapters:</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction</p><p><strong>03:29</strong> – Heat, permeability, and how resources have been found</p><p><strong>04:49</strong> – Why conventional geothermal stalled, and why the estimate is stale</p><p><strong>09:22</strong> – Applying AI to old exploration data</p><p><strong>11:10</strong> – The data Zanskar works with</p><p><strong>13:09</strong> – Models, field testing, and the feedback loop</p><p><strong>15:02</strong> – How much more resource is really out there</p><p><strong>20:22</strong> – Lightning Dock: reviving a written-off field</p><p><strong>22:14</strong> – What has changed in drilling technology</p><p><strong>28:37</strong> – Pumpernickel and the permeability question</p><p><strong>31:08</strong> – Natural permeability vs. enhanced geothermal</p><p><strong>34:21</strong> – Big Blind, the first blind discovery in 30 years</p><p><strong>37:09</strong> – Improving the models to keep getting better</p><p><strong>40:51</strong> – Financing exploration: the development capital facility</p><p><strong>44:38</strong> – The NV Energy PPA and data center demand</p><p><strong>47:42</strong> – The skeptical case and geographic limits</p><p><strong>54:20</strong> – Policy dependence and public lands</p><p><strong>58:11</strong> – What's next for Zanskar</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/is-there-way-more-conventional-geothermal</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:213358365</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 09 Sep 2026 10:09:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/213358365/82b352762e2471416c0163348856c5f7.mp3" length="77686175" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3870</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/213358365/d566d656e6953b66e9eb3149efecbad1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Best of August 2026]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Volts published eight conversations in August — with two Idaho state legislators, a grid cybersecurity expert, the architect of Uruguay's energy transition, an EV charging exec, and more — which is a lot for anyone to listen to. We've rounded up the highlights into a single hour. Enjoy!</p><p>Chapters:</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction and how the best-of series works</p><p><strong>01:59</strong> – Saleem Chapman on why every market design fails ratepayers the same way</p><p><strong>07:51</strong> – Patrick Miller on Chinese inverters and commodity boards</p><p><strong>12:22</strong> – Ben Toews and Megan Egbert on how Idaho's housing bills happened</p><p><strong>18:34</strong> – Seth Cutler on why an IONNA site is technically a bakery</p><p><strong>22:52</strong> – Ramón Méndez Galain on getting every Uruguayan party to sign one plan</p><p><strong>28:00</strong> – Quinn Nakayama on why a utility would adopt something that saves money</p><p><strong>34:16</strong> – Varun Sivaram on workload tiers and who pays when flexing goes wrong</p><p><strong>38:44</strong> – Todd Tucker on the Defense Production Act precedent</p><p><strong>44:20</strong> – Closing note and what to send in</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/best-of-august-2026</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:214076740</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2026 10:04:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/214076740/deb9dfc2ec46d33804dc996b0e279edd.mp3" length="54436362" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2712</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/214076740/9759d6c6bdb48d0b6d52469456f303bf.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to respond to disinformation about clean energy, at scale]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Disinformation about clean energy is showing up everywhere — online after every blackout, at county commission meetings about siting new projects, in regulatory dockets stuffed with fake comments. GoodPower, which combines a C3 education arm with a C4 advocacy arm, is trying to fight back with a network of thousands of content creators, rapid-response campaigns around storms and grid failures, and an AI tool that detects manufactured public comments. I talk with CEO Leah Qusba about what they've tried, what they've measured, and what actually works.</p><p>Chapters:</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction</p><p><strong>03:06</strong> – What the disinformation claims, and who spreads it</p><p><strong>05:57</strong> – From Action for the Climate Emergency to GoodPower</p><p><strong>08:38</strong> – Building a creator network in non-political verticals</p><p><strong>14:17</strong> – Competing with talk radio and Fox News</p><p><strong>18:26</strong> – Winter Storm Fern and the rapid response system</p><p><strong>23:26</strong> – Measuring whether a deployment actually worked</p><p><strong>27:24</strong> – Pre-bunking and the 80-county experiment</p><p><strong>33:18</strong> – Getting people off the couch and into the room</p><p><strong>38:10</strong> – AI agents and where human judgment sits</p><p><strong>42:05</strong> – Keeping the C3 and the C4 distinct</p><p><strong>47:13</strong> – Battery fires, Moss Landing, and talking to fire chiefs</p><p><strong>50:54</strong> – TrueVoice and manufactured public comment</p><p><strong>56:13</strong> – Whether AI will overwhelm the comment process</p><p><strong>58:11</strong> – The best messages that actually land</p><p><strong>1:04:22</strong> – Super PACs, budgets, and what comes next</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-respond-to-disinformation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:212801895</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 10:04:47 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/212801895/d921386ace42c5d431216ca325b1423c.mp3" length="86417851" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4309</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/212801895/f6fa7fdfd7e349db8c1e182f3061cdf9.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Could we use Trump's tricks to make good green policy?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Even as he has torn down climate policy, Donald Trump has normalized the use of more powerful & aggressive tools of economic statecraft, like equity stakes in private companies, new federal authorities, and sovereign wealth funds. The Roosevelt Institute recently issued a collection of 17 essays exploring how a future administration could use the tools Trump has assembled for decarbonization. I talk with Todd Tucker, editor of and contributor to the volume, about these new industrial planning tools.</p><p>Chapters:</p><p>00:00 – Introduction</p><p>02:32 – Did Biden's green policy prove durable?</p><p>09:39 – The Defense Production Act and the Sable pipeline</p><p>14:59 – Whether to leave the DPA on the table</p><p>15:35 – Executive orders and the durability problem</p><p>19:01 – Whether the Supreme Court treats Democrats differently</p><p>22:03 – Executive power and a disempowered Congress</p><p>25:05 – Senate malapportionment and filibuster reform</p><p>29:43 – Court reform and the major questions doctrine</p><p>34:13 – Manufacturing vs. deployment</p><p>42:52 – Permitting, abundance, and theory of power</p><p>49:20 – Public ownership and the U.S. Steel golden share</p><p>55:22 – What state capitalism could look like for green ends</p><p>59:56 – Shelley Welton on utilities as planning tools</p><p>1:02:42 – Speed vs. deliberation before 2029</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/could-we-use-trumps-tricks-to-make</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:212365293</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2026 10:05:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/212365293/e64f4144031da4df490415a2525ddce1.mp3" length="82807218" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4124</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/212365293/a3e7b8ef794d0a58d90abf08b0ea3c10.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Making data centers flexible so they can serve the grid rather than stress it out]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Typically, AI data centers are large, inflexible loads that the grid has to build around, which is one reason utilities take so long to connect them. Emerald AI has designed a “digital brain” that can ramp down, move, or delay computing jobs in a data center on demand, making a data center a flexible asset to the grid. I talk with CEO Varun Sivaram about how the software works, what flexibility costs the compute, why it beats just installing batteries, whether utilities can enforce it, and what it would mean for clean energy.</p><p>Chapters:</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction</p><p><strong>03:05</strong> – Temporal, spatial, and resource flexibility</p><p><strong>06:26</strong> – What Emerald Conductor touches on site</p><p><strong>08:35</strong> – Who decides which workloads can flex</p><p><strong>10:55</strong> – Who is liable when a job slows down</p><p><strong>13:45</strong> – Who actually signs the contract</p><p><strong>14:49</strong> – Larger and faster grid connections</p><p><strong>18:02</strong> – Enforcing the flexibility promise</p><p><strong>19:05</strong> – What broke in the demos, from bad nodes to slow telemetry</p><p><strong>26:41</strong> – What flexing costs the compute jobs</p><p><strong>29:21</strong> – Why not just use batteries, and the demand merit order</p><p><strong>35:44</strong> – Training, inference, and substation-scale data centers</p><p><strong>40:23</strong> – PJM, ERCOT, and legal enforceability</p><p><strong>44:50</strong> – Renewables, gas, and consumer bills</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/making-data-centers-flexible-so-they</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:210712351</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 10:10:28 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/210712351/1828749a5f93f8f23742b611a9558cc3.mp3" length="64316560" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3204</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/210712351/ed2ac33e624a213f118390cd4b5e8162.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why can't utilities innovate?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>When it comes to innovative new grid technologies, every utility wants to be the third in line to try them. None of them want to be the first to take risks and iron out new processes. That's one reason grid-enhancing technologies, better software, and smarter internal procedures stay stuck in pilot purgatory, even as the industry faces the biggest buildout since rural electrification. PG&E's Quinn Nakayama and Microsoft's Hanna Grene discuss what's actually blocking utility innovation — and Quinn offers a novel proposal for paying someone to go first.</p><p>Chapters:</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction</p><p><strong>03:44</strong> – Why grid-enhancing technologies stall in the US</p><p><strong>07:54</strong> – Selling grid software into utilities: what goes wrong</p><p><strong>11:08</strong> – From a pipes-and-wires company to a technology company</p><p><strong>12:38</strong> – Pilot program hell and the last 30 percent</p><p><strong>15:04</strong> – Innovation as a bolt-on, and the three muscles</p><p><strong>17:47</strong> – The digital spine, data quality, and smart meters</p><p><strong>23:56</strong> – Org chart versus work chart</p><p><strong>25:09</strong> – Strategy, structure, people, process, technology</p><p><strong>29:24</strong> – Build, buy, and the ecosystem skill set</p><p><strong>36:15</strong> – Data leakage, shadow AI, and paying twice</p><p><strong>41:12</strong> – Why utility product cycles run five to seven years</p><p><strong>46:27</strong> – Human in the loop, and EPRI's SAFERai.power</p><p><strong>49:06</strong> – Advanced market commitments and the kingmaker problem</p><p><strong>53:22</strong> – EPIC, and whether software counts as infrastructure</p><p><strong>01:00:05</strong> – The CapEx incentive problem and final advice</p><p><strong>1:04:34</strong> – Digital Infrastructure as Capital Spend</p><p><strong>1:06:53</strong> – Final Advice</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-cant-utilities-innovate</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:210433048</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 08:08:36 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/210433048/48bf158e386774fcb43ac22b2af7ed8b.mp3" length="86696117" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4319</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/210433048/b0030d98b11a90278ee4033d1ad9085d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[He helped Uruguay decarbonize. Can he help other countries do the same?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Ramón Méndez Galain helped Uruguay decarbonize its grid (today it’s 98% fossil-free) while keeping the utility public and letting private capital foot the bill. Now he’s trying to export the same playbook across the global South. We talk through how Uruguay pulled it off — the hydro “battery” for wind & solar “baseload,” the cross-party political deal, the market redesign — and what actually transfers to countries without the same advantages.  We also discuss why, seven years on, no other country has followed Uruguay’s path.</p><p>Chapters:</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction</p><p><strong>03:09</strong> – From particle physics to a nuclear proposal</p><p><strong>05:46</strong> – Taking the job as energy secretary</p><p><strong>07:00</strong> – The 2008 crisis: drought, expensive oil, blackouts</p><p><strong>09:26</strong> – Getting every party to sign the same plan</p><p><strong>12:51</strong> – Why climate was not the lead argument</p><p><strong>15:42</strong> – Attracting private capital without privatizing</p><p><strong>20:22</strong> – What a public utility made possible</p><p><strong>23:06</strong> – Planning a grid where wind and solar are the base load</p><p><strong>29:26</strong> – Thermal plants as insurance, and the last 2 percent</p><p><strong>32:36</strong> – EVs, smart meters, and building an electrostate</p><p><strong>37:33</strong> – Why bills fell less than generation costs</p><p><strong>39:46</strong> – What transfers to other countries</p><p><strong>44:15</strong> – Optimum curtailment, Colombia, and Haiti</p><p><strong>50:51</strong> – The political work, and the argument against the dominant narrative</p><p><strong>56:36</strong> – The Global South and the NDC as development catalyst</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/he-helped-uruguay-decarbonize-can</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:209879549</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 10:03:31 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/209879549/1fbfb564dddfc6ea895a95729f099dd9.mp3" length="75021523" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3733</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/209879549/a8002ca36934700237a2d697741ef456.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Can public EV chargers be as reliable as gas stations? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>As the U.S. EV market slows and federal charging support recedes, IONNA, a fast-charging network backed by eight major automakers, is still expanding. On Volts, CEO Seth Cutler makes the case that public charging is entering a new phase focused on reliability and customer experience, but the economics remain difficult, with low utilization and demand charges squeezing margins. With roughly 1,300 bays live and a target of 30,000, IONNA is testing whether a multi-brand network can offer a Tesla-like charging experience while building a sustainable business.</em></p><p><strong>Chapters:</strong></p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction: can public EV charging be as reliable as a gas station?</p><p><strong>02:30</strong> – Public charging’s four phases, and IONNA’s phase-four bet</p><p><strong>08:17</strong> – IONNA’s origin story</p><p><strong>09:55</strong> – Scale, footprint & site strategy</p><p><strong>11:52</strong> – Rechargery @ vs. freestanding: the two site formats</p><p><strong>18:45</strong> – Can DC fast charging make money? Unit economics</p><p><strong>21:29</strong> – Demand charges & why fast charging is expensive</p><p><strong>23:57</strong> – Getting power: permitting, interconnection & utilities</p><p><strong>29:18</strong> – Site design, amenities & the monetization question</p><p><strong>34:14</strong> – Regional site customization: the gas station turned bakery</p><p><strong>36:35</strong> – The charging experience: apps & Plug&Charge</p><p><strong>39:03</strong> – Reliability strategy & metrics</p><p><strong>42:47</strong> – Headwinds: the EV market downturn & policy risk</p><p><strong>46:54</strong> – Business model, profitability & the IONITY comparison</p><p><strong>50:09</strong> – Geographic rollout: the chicken-and-egg problem</p><p><strong>54:07</strong> – Competitive position vs. Tesla</p><p><strong>56:37</strong> – Closing: vision, fears & timeline</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/can-public-ev-chargers-be-as-reliable</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:209344659</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 14 Aug 2026 10:06:04 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/209344659/e8b879faa7785663c3c5051749964477.mp3" length="74481566" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3716</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/209344659/32fcc49acbc8d432d27388e40ffeeba9.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Another bipartisan housing miracle, this time in Idaho]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Last year I did a pod on Montana’s surprising burst of bipartisan housing legislation. Turns out Idaho was watching. This year its legislature passed six housing bills of its own (two others failed). Republican state Sen. Ben Toews and Democratic state Rep. Megan Egbert join me to walk through what passed, what didn’t, and what they gave away to get it done — plus the property tax cap that quietly works against all of it, and why duplexes turned out to be the red line.</p><p><strong>Chapters:</strong></p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction and the Idaho housing package</p><p><strong>02:43</strong> – How each guest came to the housing issue</p><p><strong>06:39</strong> – Inside the interim housing study committee</p><p><strong>09:05</strong> – SB 1354, ADUs by right, and Dillon’s Rule</p><p><strong>12:52</strong> – The 5,000 to 10,000 compromise, and HOAs</p><p><strong>15:03</strong> – SB 1352 starter homes, manufactured homes, lot splits</p><p><strong>16:28</strong> – HB 706 and single-stair buildings</p><p><strong>18:11</strong> – The permitting shot clock and the 6-day rule</p><p><strong>19:48</strong> – Living with the compromises, and why counties were left out</p><p><strong>22:54</strong> – The two bills that died: duplexes and YIGBY</p><p><strong>28:41</strong> – HB 389, the property tax cap, and the growth undertow</p><p><strong>34:41</strong> – What the public understands about growth</p><p><strong>37:23</strong> – Regulatory reform on supply side vs. incentives for housing</p><p><strong>43:59</strong> – The February deadline and city resistance</p><p><strong>48:52</strong> – Horizontal vs. vertical density</p><p><strong>56:03</strong> – What comes next for the committee & Idaho housing</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/another-bipartisan-housing-miracle</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:209056927</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 10:04:02 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/209056927/4718c3cf19737129a8a192f29880e7a0.mp3" length="74344897" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3708</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/209056927/b67e0168b3a9bac3962abb7117fb6f1e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Grid cybersecurity: how big is the threat & what should we do about it?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Could the US grid be brought down by Chinese hackers? To find out, I talked with Patrick Miller, who helped write the cybersecurity rules for the bulk power system and became the first person with federal authority to enforce them. We get into what's actually been hacked, why those "rogue devices" in Chinese inverters are less sinister than they sound, and why squirrels still do more damage than hackers.</p><p><strong>Chapters:</strong></p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction</p><p><strong>02:47</strong> – What state utility commissioners get wrong about cyber risk</p><p><strong>04:50</strong> – Real attacks on the grid so far: Ukraine, Poland, and the US</p><p><strong>06:57</strong> – IT versus OT, and why grid devices are hard to protect</p><p><strong>10:30</strong> – The NERC CIP standards: scope, requirements, enforcement</p><p><strong>17:40</strong> – Distributed resources outside the CIP perimeter</p><p><strong>20:54</strong> – Dropping the threshold to 20 MVA, and federal jurisdiction</p><p><strong>29:12</strong> – Chinese inverters and the commodity board</p><p><strong>36:09</strong> – Volt Typhoon, Salt Typhoon, and China's intent</p><p><strong>39:26</strong> – Data centers as a new attack surface</p><p><strong>43:19</strong> – The trade-off between security and speed</p><p><strong>47:44</strong> – Cyber-informed engineering and analog safeguards</p><p><strong>54:05</strong> – AI on offense and defense</p><p><strong>1:02:21</strong> – Squirrels, balloons, and physical threats</p><p><strong>1:04:24</strong> – CISA cuts, CIRCIA, and harmonizing the rules</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/grid-cybersecurity-how-big-is-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:208421116</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 07 Aug 2026 10:08:24 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/208421116/08c9ec005e1deba415e3c5dee53d3c63.mp3" length="87057659" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4343</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/208421116/d47af9ee5f56374508a21706da027312.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What should state policymakers do about data centers?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>State legislatures are writing data center rules faster than they can verify the demand forecasts underneath them. Fifteen states accounted for 80 percent of data center electricity demand in 2023, a single hyperscale campus can arrive as 15 to 20 percent of a utility's demand, and the transmission to serve it takes five to 15 years to build. On this episode of Volts, David Roberts works through Climate Cabinet's Taming Data Center Turmoil series with Saleem Chapman, who leads the group's electricity affordability policy work, on why Georgia's regulated utility, PJM's capacity market, and ERCOT's competitive market each left ratepayers holding the risk, and what a state can require before it approves a project, while the facility operates, and after the deal is done.</em></p><p><em>Chapters:</em></p><p><strong>00:00</strong> – Introduction</p><p><strong>02:49</strong> – How Climate Cabinet came to the data center fight</p><p><strong>03:58</strong> – Three things that make hyperscalers unlike past industrial loads</p><p><strong>07:51</strong> – Warning signals: forecast opacity, gas dependency, unconditional subsidies</p><p><strong>13:44</strong> – Siting near overburdened communities and the Memphis case</p><p><strong>15:34</strong> – State preemption versus local control</p><p><strong>18:31</strong> – The same failure pattern in Georgia, PJM, and ERCOT</p><p><strong>23:52</strong> – Why not just ban data centers outright</p><p><strong>28:07</strong> – The framework, and what to require before approval</p><p><strong>34:54</strong> – While operating: real cost pricing and on-call load flexibility</p><p><strong>37:39</strong> – Scenario-based planning and the utility incentive problem</p><p><strong>39:37</strong> – After the deal: new and matched clean energy</p><p><strong>43:48</strong> – Siting standards and performance-tied incentives</p><p><strong>50:27</strong> – Existing facilities and the threat to build elsewhere</p><p><strong>55:41</strong> – Which states are ahead, and step one for lawmakers</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-should-state-policymakers-do</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:208012439</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 05 Aug 2026 10:14:19 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/208012439/1694049d482a8eddd82d81435e174796.mp3" length="76269784" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3806</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/208012439/08f0e677de7c184eda1388f1b5d1f014.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Best of July 2026]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Volts published eight conversations in July on subjects with nothing obvious in common: an Arizona utility board election, Minnesota smart meters, land value taxes in Spokane, silicon battery anodes. Yet six of them arrived at the same constraint. What stops energy infrastructure from getting built in the United States is more often written into law than into physics. On this episode, David Roberts pulls one stretch from each July conversation into a single hour, with two Minnesota utility regulators, a Spokane city council member, a Hawaii state senator, a co-founder of a battery materials company, and more.</em></p><p>Chapters:</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> Introduction: a new format for Volts</p><p><strong>01:22</strong> Arizona: winning the utility elections nobody watches</p><p><strong>07:04</strong> Minnesota: the smart meter data nobody uses</p><p><strong>12:40</strong> Spokane: how property taxes reward empty lots</p><p><strong>17:31</strong> Hawaii: the education gap in state energy policy</p><p><strong>22:13</strong> The data center backlash is a politics story</p><p><strong>27:41</strong> Why America can't build transit: procurement</p><p><strong>32:41</strong> Clean energy after the IRA: the glass debate</p><p><strong>38:26</strong> Silicon anodes: the other half of the battery</p><p><strong>44:47</strong> Closing: tell me if this worked</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/best-of-july-2026</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:209169921</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 02 Aug 2026 12:03:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/209169921/5ea084cd5e8bf081e7ccfb65e707de77.mp3" length="55238399" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2746</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/209169921/9759d6c6bdb48d0b6d52469456f303bf.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Silicon anodes for batteries unlock greater energy density and faster charging times]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Materials in lithium-ion battery cathodes have continuously evolved since the 1990s, but anodes have stubbornly remained graphite. Now, finally, there’s some innovation on that side: silicon anodes, which engineers have struggled to master for a decade, are finally coming into wide commercialization. They enable up to five times the energy density of graphite anodes, charge many times faster, and are poised to revolutionize the battery market. In this episode, I talk with Rick Costantino, co-founder and CTO of Group14, which is selling a silicon-carbon composite material for anodes. They’re already selling to dozens of large battery manufacturers and expect silicon anodes to completely take over the market by 2030.</p><p>Chapters:</p><p>00:00 – Introduction and the graphite anode problem</p><p>01:54 – Why silicon, and why it kept failing</p><p>06:26 – From pharma to batteries: Rick's path</p><p>09:24 – How SCC55 works: silicon in a carbon scaffold</p><p>14:38 – The payoff: energy density and charge speed</p><p>18:59 – A drop-in material, and scaling in South Korea</p><p>21:11 – Where the batteries go: phones, EVs, drones</p><p>24:29 – Cost versus graphite</p><p>26:20 – Cycle life, calendar life, and safety</p><p>31:26 – Supply chain and the silane bottleneck</p><p>36:26 – Pairing with LFP, DOE support, and phones</p><p>40:30 – Bringing the cost down, and competitors</p><p>43:27 – The five-year outlook</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/silicon-anodes-for-batteries-unlock</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:206964630</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2026 10:20:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/206964630/bd69f13b83a85fdf77ed86f2d7149ac9.mp3" length="55148204" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2750</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/206964630/d76fff24d186223a99fa49ed9952d740.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Should we feel good about the trajectory of clean energy post-Trump? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) established substantial tax credits for wind and solar power. Trump’s One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) eliminated those tax credits. How much damage did that do to the overall trajectory of clean energy in the post-Trump world? A new research commentary argues that the damage was less than many had feared and that the road forward for clean energy is less about restoring those credits than about easing the permitting and interconnection constraints inhibiting renewable energy. Today I talk with author Lily Bermel about the modeling her commentary is based on and the somewhat controversial conclusions she draws from it.</p><p>Chapters:</p><p>00:00 The IRA, the OBBBA, and the case for optimism</p><p>03:25 OBBBA - Why Bermel ran the analysis</p><p>05:50 The headline numbers: 74, 71, 67</p><p>08:07 Decomposing clean: solar and batteries hold, wind takes the hit</p><p>12:14 The lag analysis, and the 'glass half full' perspective</p><p>15:27 2.8 gigatons, and losses you can't get back</p><p>18:01 The third scenario, and Trump I versus Trump II</p><p>21:49 What the model leaves out: manufacturing, LPO, loans</p><p>23:07 Interior's permitting campaign against wind and solar</p><p>27:22 The demand surge and behind-the-meter gas</p><p>32:15 Nuclear restarts, geothermal, and clean firm</p><p>35:31 Booms, busts, and the electrification wave</p><p>42:22Transmission, interconnection, and the ceiling</p><p>46:41 Tax credits versus permitting reform</p><p>51:46 Durability, polarization, and preemptive surrender</p><p>60:01 Can enough storage make renewables firm?</p><p>66:48 Grid utilization versus building new grid</p><p>70:52 Final reflections: 2021, and what Bermel would do with a trifecta</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/should-we-feel-good-about-the-trajectory</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:207516379</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2026 10:06:08 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/207516379/db699ae228e5a4fe0de42d316fb52f6c.mp3" length="105607200" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5270</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/207516379/670e79011d4c767e742018c97aa59304.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The US is terrible at building public transit. Here's how to get better.]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>America once led the world in building transit and now leads the world in what transit costs, roughly three times the international average per mile, measured not against authoritarian megaprojects but against Italy, Spain, and Japan. On this episode of Volts, David Roberts talks with Will Poff-Webster of the Institute for Progress, who put together the new Transit Abundance Playbook, and Stephanie Pollack, former head of the Massachusetts Department of Transportation and former acting administrator of the Federal Highway Administration. Their argument is that the costs are a policy choice: federal funding rules teach transit agencies to plan on a napkin and do the real work years later, to hire the lowest bidder over the one they know will deliver, and to defer to anyone holding a veto, while highways operate under looser versions of the same rules. As Pollack puts it, "if you hate transit, you should spend less on it." A surface transportation reauthorization bill is coming, and two of the playbook's proposals have already reached the House version.</em></p><p><strong>Chapters:</strong></p><p>00:00 Introduction: why cars work against cities</p><p>03:25 Agency culture or federal law: where does the fix come from</p><p>11:31 Planning: how federal funding enforces bad habits</p><p>20:10 Overdesign: the Green Line stations and the frequency-first test</p><p>23:40 Buses: why every agency orders a custom fleet</p><p>26:53 Procurement: lowest bid versus best value</p><p>32:56 Veto points and Italy’s conference of services</p><p>39:56 Permitting: environmental review as a NIMBY tool</p><p>45:28 State capacity: why consultant brain took over</p><p>51:46 Labor costs, automation, and Section 13(c)</p><p>56:19 Is any of this politically achievable?</p><p>1:03:28 Final question: one reform each</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-us-is-terrible-at-building-public</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:206656745</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 10:25:08 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/206656745/93b6e00d8829121a4d5c6a36fbd6dab8.mp3" length="81324803" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4061</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/206656745/9718aa2cd593d51ebd9241f19a7ecaa3.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Making sense of the data center backlash]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>Data center opposition has gone from nonexistent to organized in about two years, roughly 120 moratoriums across 38 states, and it does not track proximity: Gallup finds 70% of Americans oppose a data center near them, while only 8% of opponents live near one. On this episode of Volts, David Roberts joins Energy Empire hosts Jigar Shah and Jamie Nolan, along with Arnab Pal of Deploy Action, for a crossover conversation, and his argument is that everyone is solving the wrong problem. The hyperscalers could buy their way to consent for a rounding error, batteries in basements, solar on roofs, funded schools, lower bills, and they refuse, which David reads as a symptom of low social trust that no amount of better modeling touches. “This is not a technocratic problem that you can just solve with a few switches,” he says. Thirty-six governors go to the ballot this fall having to answer for it.</em></p><p>Chapters:</p><p>00:00 Intro: a Volts and Energy Empire crossover</p><p>01:25 Has the AI case been made? Energy vs. AI as the real revolution</p><p>04:23 The backlash by the numbers, and hyperscalers' botched PR</p><p>08:20 Animal spirits, low social trust, and the information environment</p><p>12:46 Enshittification, lost jobs, and why governors still want data centers</p><p>15:50 The local playbook: schools, bioswales, batteries in basements</p><p>17:18 Bespoke industrial rates without setting a bad precedent</p><p>22:33 How utilities earn: spend-to-earn, the distribution black box, efficiency</p><p>30:11 Gendering the grid: gas as firm, renewables as soft</p><p>37:57 NERC's level-three alert and the case for more batteries</p><p>39:29 Both/and: distributed capacity as serious supply</p><p>45:33 Abundance's missing half: state capacity, staffing, NEPA</p><p>48:55 The midterms: 36 governors and the politics of affordability</p><p>53:33 Hope vs. fear: the Mamdani lesson and the information environment</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/making-sense-of-the-data-center-backlash</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:203843406</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 16:19:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/203843406/19680cafaec905148a505c7b28513779.mp3" length="72781496" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3638</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/203843406/8ef0aeb9eac5ed47efa38163b15c05fa.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Spreading the good news about electrification]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>Most of the energy decisions that touch daily life in America get made in state legislatures, and the people making them are increasingly new to the job. In smaller states, a freshly elected lawmaker gets a pad of paper, no staff, and about 150 lobbyists at the door, then votes on billion-dollar energy budgets in a landscape where the technology changes faster than anyone can track. On this episode of Volts, David Roberts talks with Hawaii state Senator Chris Lee, co-founder of the Electric Innovation Initiative, a bipartisan network betting that education moves electrification faster than mandates: put lawmakers in front of working technology, connect them across state lines, and let affordability carry the argument where climate framing will not. As Lee puts it, "nine times out of ten, people just don't know what they don't know."</em></p><p><em>Chapters:</em></p><p><strong>00:00</strong> Introduction</p><p><strong>03:39</strong> How electrification clicked: the 2008 iPhone moment</p><p><strong>06:10</strong> The education gap: why the initiative exists</p><p><strong>11:35</strong> Proxy staff and cross-state validation</p><p><strong>15:44</strong> What lands on the tours: eVTOL to the data-center win-win</p><p><strong>20:51</strong> Plain 'electrification': the bipartisan framing bet</p><p><strong>26:28</strong> Climate hushing and Hawaii's two-track proof</p><p><strong>30:17</strong> Policy that spreads: e-buses, heat pumps, RFPs</p><p><strong>37:37</strong> Utility business-model reform: Hawaii's PBR law</p><p><strong>42:03</strong> Affordability after the federal subsidies</p><p><strong>45:22</strong> Hawaii under pressure: LNG and the Lahaina grid</p><p><strong>51:53</strong> State power against federal hostility</p><p><strong>55:19</strong> The ten-year vision and the closing advice</p><p></p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/spreading-the-good-news-about-electrification</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:206242032</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 10:11:17 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/206242032/1dcc5bc912553253cd30650d0a054938.mp3" length="75842426" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3785</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/206242032/712fe60076e70d2f0dccf3b791f6a683.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Want less sprawl and more urban infill? Try a land value tax!]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>Property taxes are two taxes stapled together: one on the land, one on whatever gets built on it. Put up an apartment building and the bill goes up. Pave the lot for parking and it stays low. It discourages building and rewards land speculation. The answer? Tax the buildings less and the land more. The idea of a “land value tax” goes back 150 years, but implementing it today involves navigating tricky constitutional issues. In this episode, I talk with Greg Miller of the Center for Land economics about the rationale for such taxes, and with Kitty Klitzke, a Spokane, Washington council member, about the difficulties of putting it in practice in a real city. </em></p><p><strong>Chapters:</strong></p><p>00:00 Introduction</p><p>03:22 Henry George and the case for taxing land</p><p>08:12 How property taxes work now, and what a split rate changes</p><p>11:26 Land value taxes and upzoning as complements</p><p>15:18 The Pennsylvania record and the reassessment problem</p><p>18:51 Vancouver, and why homeowners outlast the policy</p><p>24:03 Estonia, Singapore, and the Scottish Islands</p><p>26:53 Washington's uniformity clause and the building exemption</p><p>33:18 Kitty Klitzke on twenty years of Spokane infill</p><p>43:27 What Spokane needs from the state legislature</p><p>45:25 Single family homeowners and the Division corridor</p><p>48:34 The assessor objection</p><p>52:45 What the Spokane modeling shows</p><p>59:31 The plan for next session</p><p>1:01:44 Virginia, Kentucky, and cross-partisan momentum</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/want-less-sprawl-and-more-urban-infill</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:204794985</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 10:16:10 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/204794985/8c3944941b501cb04f361883a49b6f23.mp3" length="84045910" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4196</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/204794985/bd2f6e8caf9dad61f0623a2e1430d2da.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Forcing utilities to justify their distribution-system spending]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Minnesota regulators Sydnie Lieb and Pete Wyckoff on why utility distribution spending — now a third of capital budgets and the biggest driver of rising bills — escapes the scrutiny the rest of the grid faces, and how to fix that.</p><p><strong>00:00</strong> - Introduction</p><p><strong>04:23</strong> - How distribution is regulated differently than generation and transmission</p><p><strong>09:25</strong> - Why distribution matters now: an aging system and the build-more incentive</p><p><strong>14:00</strong> - Contestable “mandatory” spending: undergrounding, DERMS software, capitalization</p><p><strong>22:19</strong> - Reliability standards and the cost of chasing 100 percent</p><p><strong>28:42</strong> - The MISO comparison: valuing a lost hour, and the scale of the numbers</p><p><strong>35:12</strong> - Non-wires alternatives: batteries, the Xcel project, and modeling gaps</p><p><strong>40:31</strong> - What regulators should require: AMI forecasts and beyond the prudence test</p><p><strong>47:22</strong> - The speed objection: does more analysis slow things down?</p><p><strong>50:10</strong> - Why spending caps and rate freezes are the wrong fix</p><p><strong>52:40</strong> - Spending more anyway, and recent Minnesota PUC disappointments</p><p><strong>55:09</strong> - Restructured markets: does the same logic apply?</p><p><strong>58:38</strong> - The vision of a well-functioning process and scaling it nationally</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/forcing-utilities-to-justify-their</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:204075064</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jul 2026 10:07:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/204075064/e0a7091ff03e4780499bb34f0599ff62.mp3" length="81885135" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4094</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/204075064/cc8c26f8de5e7db1ed5b933e480ec346.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A key Arizona race will test clean energy's electoral power]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Following a stunning clean energy victory over right-wing donors on an obscure Arizona utility board, organizers are setting their sights on a much bigger prize: the state’s powerful utility commission. I chat with Charlie Fisher and Ning Mosberger-Tang about how they used disciplined messaging to overcome massive opposition spending and historically abysmal voter turnout. We discuss whether this localized ground game can scale to a massive statewide electorate and help build a durable, nationwide clean energy political machine.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-key-arizona-race-will-test-clean</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:203350563</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jul 2026 16:02:05 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/203350563/dcb0df9c469b593958ceda540d046ad1.mp3" length="66239251" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3304</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/203350563/30bd597c3c2c86db57b6458f87d95e21.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to keep people cool without making the planet even hotter]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>You might have noticed that it’s kind of hot out there. And it’s only going to get worse: global demand for cooling is projected to triple by 2050. Finding a way to cool spaces and people without frying the planet is a crucial climate challenge. I’m joined by RMI’s Ankit Kalanki to unpack the hidden world of AC refrigerants and testing standards, the crucial distinction between lowering temperatures and dehumidifying, new AC technologies on the horizon, and the building and urban design changes that can take some of the pressure off.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-keep-people-cool-without-making</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:197633007</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 16:05:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/197633007/9fa695d338a8fd3d53b566dc8801f23f.mp3" length="79167310" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3951</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/197633007/00fdadb2f965291a8baa81f401a68df2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[America's flagship automaker enters the home energy market]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>In this episode, I talk with GM Energy executive Aseem Kapur about General Motors’ move into bidirectional EV charging and home energy management. We dig into the practicalities of turning hundreds of thousands of EVs into mobile backup generators, how to navigate a patchwork of 4,000 different utilities, and what it takes to get everyday consumers to see their cars as grid assets.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/americas-flagship-automaker-enters</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:200857510</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2026 16:03:42 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/200857510/1104a56aec2f65812615c7d120d0202d.mp3" length="67246624" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3355</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/200857510/7d1bb56ab9455406b6b130d79d11d735.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Can the UK stay the course with its climate plans?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>The UK has just released its seventh carbon budget, recommitting to the aggressive climate targets suggested by its nonpartisan Climate Change Committee. Can the Labour government actually hit those targets while keeping energy prices for the British people under control, even amidst a newly hostile political landscape? In this episode, I talk with the UK’s new climate minister, Katie White, about those challenges and more.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/can-the-uk-stay-the-course-with-its</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:199947376</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 16:03:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/199947376/9662e7086eaf96d72969c9b43659362e.mp3" length="74070363" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3696</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/199947376/4d8ea2c3a6302e91a29b827dba7ce294.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why is NERC so worried about data centers?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>The North American Electric Reliability Corporation has issued a historic warning about AI data centers. I chat with energy experts Colin McCormick and Doug Bryan about the unique electrical engineering challenges of giant computational loads that can abruptly drop hundreds of megawatts of power in the blink of an eye. We dive into the upcoming regulatory battle between hyperscalers and operators, the sudden rush for firm gas generation, and how software updates and battery storage could eventually make data centers a tool for grid stability instead of a liability.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-is-nerc-so-worried-about-data</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:199556943</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 16:02:28 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/199556943/fe1f3b5ef2472a31990f3adac30cefea.mp3" length="88524994" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4419</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/199556943/4ff96f6326c36a136609a2ab85ad2581.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[This oil shock won't be like the others]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_7">www.volts.wtf</a><br/><br/><p>Why is the latest fossil fuel crisis pushing the world toward rapid electrification instead of a drilling boom? To find out, I chat with Tim Sahay and Kate Mackenzie, hosts of the <a target="_blank" href="https://phenomenalworld.org/newsletter/the-polycrisis/">Polycrisis newsletter and podcast</a>, about the concept of “polycrisis” and the global rise of manufacturing-heavy electrostates. We examine the massive global diffusion of cheap electrotech and discuss why American climate wonks need to look past domestic policy and start paying attention to international macroeconomics.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/this-oil-shock-wont-be-like-the-others</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:196748401</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jun 2026 16:02:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/196748401/41323bdf035a476c4ea252d9ee1b198a.mp3" length="30952188" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1540</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/196748401/99db76e2da36d10c73d77872063910c7.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Are plug-in DERs going to spark a grid revolution?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>In the US, clean energy tends to get bogged down in red tape, but there’s one category that you can install immediately, with no one’s permission, because it plugs right into your wall outlet. This week, I chat with James McGinniss of David Energy about plug-in DERs — specifically, small batteries that commercial tenants can install without permits or landlord sign-offs. We explore the economics behind these micro-projects, look at how they aggregate into virtual power plants, and break down why this hyper-local approach could eventually outcompete massive utility infrastructure.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/are-plug-in-ders-going-to-spark-a</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:199278095</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jun 2026 16:03:22 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/199278095/1fde91b090825bf836faf5f4ddfec280.mp3" length="88694855" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4427</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/199278095/fab96da51e261ccf957e8aa36b034547.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Giving clean electricity a political voice of its own]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Why is clean electrification, the most exciting, dynamic, hopeful sector of the US economy, still such a 98-pound weakling in DC backroom fights? In this episode, I talk with investor and entrepreneur Steve McBee about Amped, his new effort to boost the industry’s political influence and give it a little swagger — by telling a more compelling story, getting better information to lawmakers, and pulling hundreds of billions of dollars in stranded capital off the sidelines.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/giving-clean-electricity-a-political</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:197450764</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 16:03:06 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/197450764/fe7363366020152694bd619b235fa1ef.mp3" length="121658283" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>6075</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/197450764/e58bad047afb9404630db27df678c994.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A limited defense of Biden's everything-bagel industrial policy]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Conventional punditry loves the narrative that woolly-headed progressive standards over-burdened federal climate spending and slowed everything to a crawl. In this episode, I talk with Betony Jones about her time designing labor policies at the DOE and what she learned from interviewing dozens of companies that received federal funding. We explore the difference between bad rules and weak administrative capacity, how the DOE successfully streamlined century-old Davis-Bacon compliance, and why creating high-quality jobs is essential for global competitiveness.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-limited-defense-of-bidens-everything</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:196078183</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 16:02:55 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/196078183/8076a128d3f345c01399d39624c434a1.mp3" length="81783442" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4082</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/196078183/9e561a9e96974e9db414018e9456d114.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to phase out residential gas equitably]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>As affluent homeowners defect to heat pumps, the massive costs of maintaining America’s aging gas pipelines are being concentrated onto a shrinking base of customers who can afford it least. To understand how to prevent an impending utility death spiral, I talk with the Building Decarbonization Coalition’s Kristin George Bagdanov and Panama Bartholomy. We discuss the legal limits of a utility’s “obligation to serve,” the potential for gas companies to transition into geothermal thermal energy networks, and why the US has suddenly become the global leader in heat pump sales.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-phase-out-residential-gas</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:195201754</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2026 16:03:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/195201754/03d3e61c48b66a4438ae5fe8a592d106.mp3" length="81442315" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4065</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/195201754/6f65798bfdbb7f63005c530277c401d4.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Sooner than you think, electricity is going to be cheap, abundant, and boring]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Are data centers and electrification going to break the US power grid, or are they the secret to making it cheaper for everyone? In this episode, I talk with Pier LaFarge of Sparkfund about Minnesota’s landmark decision to let Xcel Energy deploy batteries directly into local distribution networks. We look past the politics and map out how a battery-saturated system can socialize the benefits of load growth, ushering in an era of boringly reliable, low-cost energy by 2030.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/sooner-than-you-think-electricity</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:195714283</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 16:03:10 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/195714283/2d5f4212aadbb3dda66a0f49b2301dcf.mp3" length="126918919" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>6339</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/195714283/7ba2c19d5c6596dee426862da2814b8f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Telling the story of the grid]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_7">www.volts.wtf</a><br/><br/><p>Ben Eidelson and Anay Shah run the Stepchange podcast, which recently put out a magisterial four-hour (!) episode on the history of the US electricity grid. I talk with them about some of the colorful characters and stories involved, the big fights and broad lessons learned, and how the history echoes in today’s political and technological struggles.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/telling-the-story-of-the-grid</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:196387741</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 16:03:18 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/196387741/de2b811aa4561c30e0dc12c16305ce46.mp3" length="40352284" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2010</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/196387741/c51c1fa687a888c5524209b79ff4a79c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Electrifying industrial steam with heat pumps]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Boiling water to make steam for industrial processes consumes an enormous amount energy around the globe, yet it has proven remarkably resistant to electrification. In this episode, I talk with Addison Stark of AtmosZero about why replacing the standard fossil-gas boiler requires an entirely new approach to industrial heat pumps. We discuss the engineering behind his high-temperature system, the challenges of scaling up, and the growing imperative to get free of global LNG markets.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/electrifying-industrial-steam-with</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:193860186</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 16:03:18 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/193860186/6e113f35281d70cbff9779f1b182c396.mp3" length="77462397" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3866</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/193860186/dd6d706afd757b2d8cc46acd0846ea30.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The case for using prices rather than VPPs to coordinate distributed energy]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Most people think that coordinating the behavior of thousands of distributed energy resources requires some kind of third-party middleman, like an aggregator managing a VPP. My guest today, veteran research scientist Bruce Nordman, believes there’s a better way: dynamic, time- and location-specific retail prices, communicated directly to consumer devices, which would cut out the middleman and leave more value with customers. </p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-case-for-using-prices-rather</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:186481235</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 08 May 2026 16:03:20 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/186481235/83171891a6c5b6d5035063ca5f5f1cea.mp3" length="108378871" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5412</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/186481235/e887ddf29064b01e01b08faab1eb1c4f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Streamlining the difficult work of whole-home retrofits]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Today, coordinating a whole-home retrofit — or even just getting a heat pump — involves confusing research, a parade of contractors, and wildly varying quotes. It’s a broken system that practically pushes people to just buy another gas furnace. In this episode, I’m joined by Zero Homes CEO Grant Gunnison to discuss ways to improve this system for both customers and contractors.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/streamlining-the-difficult-work-of</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:193385795</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 16:03:21 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/193385795/44fd7af7324aa2f055e746a315b19fbc.mp3" length="76980764" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3842</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/193385795/01e2eb760df765feea3d161fe1cc7653.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Enabling ordinary people to invest in renewable energy projects]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>Historically, investing in energy infrastructure has been the exclusive province of wealthy individuals and large institutions. But that’s changing, and my guest today is part of it. I’m joined by Energea co-founder Mike Silvestrini to discuss how his platform allows retail investors to back international solar projects with buy-in as low as $100. We talk about the unique risks and rewards of building microgrids in emerging markets and why an unapologetic, yield-driven approach might be the best way to do real good in the world.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/enabling-ordinary-people-to-invest</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:192927978</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2026 16:02:58 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/192927978/184e8b9a87050bb68d520a13b80bbd64.mp3" length="78600911" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3923</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/192927978/ad7ca7c38615caa9ae3b806b8ae72cf8.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Tom Steyer wants to be California's climate governor]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I sit down with financier Tom Steyer to discuss his 2026 run for governor of California. We dig into his pledge to cut the state’s notoriously high electricity bills by 25 percent, how he plans to break the stranglehold of investor-owned utilities through local competition and smarter grid utilization, and the delicate politics of pushing a climate-forward agenda when voters are primarily focused on the immediate cost of living.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/tom-steyer-wants-to-be-californias</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:194482545</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2026 16:03:15 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/194482545/66928300156391a9c9ae27d1c55aecd1.mp3" length="65968650" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3291</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/194482545/b04c1a448269db6dba414f2048a9d588.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The big stories from the last year in electricity]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The think tank Ember just released its yearly Global Electricity Review. In this episode, I chat with co-authors Nicolas Fulghum & Kostantsa Rangelova about the biggest stories in the global power sector in 2025. We geek out over the record-breaking scale of solar deployment, the game-changing role of batteries in shifting midday power to the evening, and the tantalizing possibility that India will not follow China’s coal-heavy development path and that global fossil fuel generation has finally plateaued.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-big-stories-from-the-last-year</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:193321382</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 16:03:33 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/193321382/204539ae452cab0dbd544071bedba48d.mp3" length="80895572" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4038</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/193321382/1c9e7c97e4be7d6b23f1fc1ff6b0f167.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Life as a clean energy journalist in an age of madness]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_7">www.volts.wtf</a><br/><br/><p>Heatmap’s Robinson Meyer joins me to unpack the sheer madness of the current news landscape. We discuss the energy implications of the Iran war, the vexed politics of permitting reform, Microsoft’s retreat from carbon dioxide removal, the lessons of the IRA, the lingering pastoralism of the environmental movement, and much more.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/life-as-a-clean-energy-journalist</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:194153071</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 16:03:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/194153071/579cedc8172bc498d3e45fd2d94327b8.mp3" length="24287194" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1214</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/194153071/4bd74c0790f856bc3fbce5679192c74a.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Climate finance, interrupted]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Beth Bafford spent years designing Climate United, a revolving fund meant to push out $7 billion of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund money to underserved communities. She had barely begun sending out grants when Trump shut the program down and rescinded all the money. In this episode, I talk with her about that experience, the ongoing legal fight to reclaim some of the money, and the central importance of finance in clean energy policy.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/climate-finance-interrupted</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:192176874</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 16:03:17 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/192176874/584c1f338c20bdf46ce413f1b9b664c4.mp3" length="71625824" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3574</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/192176874/9edcbd7fc90e38ab6712f48f1eb379cb.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Doing data centers the not-dumb way]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I welcome back my old friend Jigar Shah to discuss the current hullabaloo around explosive electricity demand from new data centers. We dig into why its stupid for tech companies to build their own behind-the-meter natural gas plants, how this approach is wrecking equipment and destabilizing the grid, and a better, smarter, faster path forward.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/doing-data-centers-the-not-dumb-way</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:192696684</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 16:03:05 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/192696684/0f8f6182e95310dbb9c3c6b3c4bfe540.mp3" length="109288681" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5457</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/192696684/eec1fcff4950a1320f19270811a52190.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ruggedized solar power for the hard places]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p>There are some circumstances — think disaster recovery zones or forward military bases — that cry out for portable, reliable, resilient power. I talk with Lauren Flanagan about Sesame Solar’s self-contained nanogrids, which use solar PV, batteries, and hydrogen storage to provide energy that works around the clock in remote or inclement environments.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/ruggedized-solar-power-for-the-hard</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:191448753</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 16:02:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/191448753/1a1b9b1200032b4d9f0fdd044b034815.mp3" length="62663274" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3126</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/191448753/7183011af7fbffe44e3da02504e07c0c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why climate funders don't fund housing policy, and why they oughtta]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a><br/><br/><p><em>Why do climate funders prefer cutting checks for electric vehicles over fighting for dense, transit-oriented housing? I talk to Ben Holland, who recently interviewed major climate foundations about their anti-urbanism bias, and returning guest Caroline Spears, who is working to pass climate-friendly housing policy at the state level. We discuss why obsessing over easily quantifiable emissions reductions is blinding the movement to massive, tractable wins, and why ignoring zoning reform is no longer an option for serious climate advocates.</em></p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-climate-funders-dont-fund-housing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:193499222</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 02:12:58 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/193499222/e3979443b57c607bcb5653fb98804f32.mp3" length="79733807" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3980</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/193499222/74d0779284494f3b58dc40b7232dc322.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Rethinking climate regulation from the ground up]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>It can be stomach-turning, watching the Trump administration torch federal climate policy. But what if some of what's burning wasn't working particularly well to begin with? Hannah Safford and Loren Schulman of the Federation of American Scientists' Center for Regulatory Ingenuity make the case, not for defending or trying to rebuild the status quo regulatory regime, but for imagining something better.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/rethinking-climate-regulation-from</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:191218519</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 03 Apr 2026 16:03:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/191218519/d702d903fecb25dcb56e2e6bc50afc04.mp3" length="97136093" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4850</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/191218519/eb949b01f2debdec78f63ba49a5e979e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Using more of the grid we’ve already built]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The US power grid runs at about 50% capacity on average — built for its worst day, underutilized every other day. As demand surges from data centers and electrification, utilities are racing to build more infrastructure. But Ian Magruder, who heads the new industry-backed Utilize Coalition, argues there's a cheaper, faster path: better use what we've already built — it will enable faster growth and bring down ratepayer bills, potentially by billions.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/using-more-of-the-grid-weve-already</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:191952543</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 01 Apr 2026 16:02:44 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/191952543/6a726c07161955e6f6c98723b348db59.mp3" length="78551570" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3920</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/191952543/2fb50d39827080cf0544476f9953f856.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Should we block some sunlight to cool the planet?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Dakota Gruener of Reflective walks me through her organization's new project, which maps the gaps in our scientific understanding of stratospheric aerosol injection — currently the leading candidate for directly cooling the planet. We get into what we don't know (including a factor-of-two disagreement on basic aerosol physics), who's already doing this without oversight, and the unsettling governance question of who controls the Earth's thermostat once humanity has grabbed it.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/should-we-block-some-sunlight-to</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:189960878</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 16:03:18 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/189960878/4c7910d477110f8ca3f9a109e86efe7a.mp3" length="79628370" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3974</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/189960878/acf648f64043eb9552297c144af3fcd8.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[For data centers, a little flexibility goes a long way]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The explosive energy demand from data centers is breaking our grid, pushing desperate developers to build their own on-site gas plants just to get online. To figure out how we avoid locking in decades of new fossil fuels, I’m joined by Camus CEO Astrid Atkinson and Princeton’s Jesse Jenkins to break down their proposed alternative. We dig into how adopting flexible grid interconnections and clean, battery-backed “power parks” can meet this massive load growth without abandoning our decarbonization goals.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/for-data-centers-a-little-flexibility</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:190472892</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2026 16:03:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/190472892/17871009edb6d47271a43ba165131bc4.mp3" length="84887896" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4237</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/190472892/c8eae49ecef2789b193a0ec447ed2141.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The high-stakes battle over energy affordability in New York]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>New York Governor Kathy Hochul is trying to delay or roll back the state’s landmark climate law in the name of affordability. I’m joined by activist Pete Sikora to discuss the governor’s claims, what would actually serve affordability, and the larger politics behind this puzzling own-goal of a fight.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-high-stakes-battle-over-energy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:190993520</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 20 Mar 2026 16:03:30 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/190993520/e303c5269f40f0b4841059673c3c6ae4.mp3" length="74685023" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3727</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/190993520/c370c3ef95c32b249fe8d008df08b3cf.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A Tesla vet tries to master the VPP market]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I’m joined by Kunal Girotra, who helped start and run Tesla’s residential energy business before leaving to start his own company. With Lunar, he has tried to create the most consumer-friendly possible battery and software ecosystem, which can seamlessly plug into solar panels, other devices, or VPPs. We talk about lessons learned and the future of residential electrification. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-tesla-vet-tries-to-master-the-vpp</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:188947606</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 18 Mar 2026 16:03:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/188947606/eaf4be61f4d95e868263548ea3495f2f.mp3" length="91982296" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4592</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/188947606/d416488adffc01a5126d304a18f78e66.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to design a brand-new city]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>I’m back with part two of my conversation with Jan Sramek, founder of California Forever, about his plan to build a brand-new city in Solano County. We get into the nuts and bolts of the urban design, discuss affordability and sustainability, get into governance issues, and look forward to what might happen next.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-design-a-brand-new-city</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:190696595</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 16:03:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/190696595/9c6e9826b1e9c20f9e617122d359d896.mp3" length="86960026" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4341</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/190696595/9a9c68238f419e93cd166c73b6875d66.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Is the brand new city in California for real?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I’m joined by Jan Sramek to discuss California Forever, the much-debated proposal to build a brand-new, sustainably designed city in Northern California. We explore the urbanist vision at the heart of the project, including a street grid inspired by Barcelona superblocks, and address the elephant in the room — the stealthy land acquisitions and the billionaire backers. Is this an urbanist utopia in the making or a grandiose con job?</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/is-the-brand-new-city-in-california</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:186947051</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2026 16:03:17 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/186947051/510d80411e6f0239622de43dab6b5bec.mp3" length="76163128" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3801</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/186947051/91f0232648ffe4179d99b44d7ffd3c58.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The fate of fossil fuel systems in the "mid-transition"]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>If the world takes its climate targets seriously, the coming decades will see fossil fuel systems shrinking as clean energy systems grow. In this episode, I talk with associate professor Emily Grubert about the issues that may arise during this “mid-transition” period. She has fascinating new study on the physical and financial cliffs that fossil fuel systems may go over as they decline and reach their “minimum viable scale” — and argues that public ownership of these dying industries might be the only way to gracefully phase them out.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-fate-of-fossil-fuel-systems-in</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:188014421</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 04 Mar 2026 17:03:14 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/188014421/b81495751a3f10f1c78b58d4e1d445f8.mp3" length="89724063" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4479</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/188014421/1fd3df7fc18a8d350f7874e083e7f208.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts/Catalyst pod crossover: the biggest questions in clean energy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I chat with Catalyst host Shayle Kann about the most pressing unresolved questions in the clean energy world today. We explore whether data center gigantism will break the grid, if the smart home revolution is destined for platform enshittification, whether billionaires should start testing solar geoengineering, and more.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscatalyst-pod-crossover-the-biggest</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:188227637</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2026 17:03:08 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/188227637/52e069d4d004fa7dc6cafc56a1bbf18f.mp3" length="76009287" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3794</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/188227637/9c56023f9be3b00665303e476df58d5d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What is PJM and why is everyone so mad about it? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>PJM is the largest wholesale power market and transmission planning region in the US. Currently, it is stuck between a rock and a hard place: on one side, rising demand from data centers; on the other, a choked and congested interconnection queue that can’t keep pace. The result: rising prices and political discontent. I talk with Clara Summers of the Citizens Utility Board about how PJM can solve this dilemma and get prices under control.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-is-pjm-and-why-is-everyone-so</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:187602549</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 20 Feb 2026 17:02:48 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/187602549/1a781c4ae351fd36328eb948c6c9c5ba.mp3" length="90698495" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4528</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/187602549/8364a3364b7d3cc7b346f63c9305804c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Can fake meat help solve climate change? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Meat is responsible for roughly a fifth of climate change, the lion’s share of deforestation, 70% of our antibiotic use, and quite possibly the next pandemic — and consumption is going up every single year, with no end in sight. In this episode, Bruce Friedrich of the Good Food Institute joins me to argue that the only way out of this mess is better meat: plant-based and cultivated alternatives that can compete on price and taste, the way renewables now compete with fossil fuels.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/can-fake-meat-help-solve-climate</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:187266740</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 18 Feb 2026 17:03:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/187266740/809f769dc0dc8f3684075c7d015a5428.mp3" length="105552275" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5271</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/187266740/2f9bd53d75272286ce91f44369be65f2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Are utilities making too much money?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Utilities and their regulators are often protected by a "force field of tedium," but in this episode, I pierce the veil to discuss the complex machinery of utility profit-making. I’m joined by Joe Daniel of RMI to unpack the critical distinction between "return on equity" and "cost of equity," and why the former is almost always higher than necessary. We discuss how regulators can close this gap to lower consumer costs without hindering essential grid upgrades.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/are-utilities-making-too-much-money</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:186053010</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2026 17:02:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/186053010/36bce008ae8c1334c3fc68ccde2102be.mp3" length="90929483" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4540</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/186053010/c744e0b231e99fadc173a2668eda89c6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[So, how's the climate doing?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I chat with Dr. Sarah Kapnick about the core of climate science and the wild variables that have emerged in the last decade. We discuss the “accidental geoengineering” experiment of reducing shipping aerosols, the newfound ability to pinpoint methane leaks from space, and the legal implications of being able to attribute financial losses to climate change.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/so-hows-the-climate-doing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:185270894</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2026 17:03:14 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/185270894/257ae373ffda4d29b7195e1c7d4f5e6a.mp3" length="77963376" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3891</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/185270894/c5f5cffed28e8425a22aa65549628ced.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Taiwan's energy dilemma]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>How does a small, mountainous island with no interconnections and a massive industrial load clean up its grid? In this episode, I speak with Yeh-Tang “Ricky” Huang about the technical and political bottlenecks holding back Taiwan’s energy transition. We explore why the country has struggled to deploy wind and solar, the realistic prospects for advanced geothermal, and the absolute necessity of demand-side flexibility in such a constrained system.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/taiwans-energy-dilemma</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:185697418</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 04 Feb 2026 17:02:43 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/185697418/d03f3a6b9f7d15977d13c4ccab3cfb2e.mp3" length="83840437" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4185</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/185697418/df52cd3f12b2aa7c57678b928ba4507e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[All about "reactionary centrism"]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Why do so many influential voices spend their time policing the manners of the left while the right dismantles democracy? In this episode, Michael Hobbes — cohost of the much-celebrated “If Books Could Kill” podcast —  joins me to discuss the “reactionary centrist,” a type of commentator who believes that both sides are to blame for everything and demonstrates this by spending every waking moment scolding Democrats. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/all-about-reactionary-centrism</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:183522421</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 30 Jan 2026 17:02:59 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/183522421/9a598f3a1e27a6185965c3c24a9004f0.mp3" length="129981596" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>6492</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/183522421/36e802ad1d69b532381356c3049ef01e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to make rooftop solar power as cheap in the US as it is in Australia]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Rooftop solar costs nearly three times as much in the US as it does in Australia, largely due to the "paperwork tax" imposed by thousands of fragmented local jurisdictions. I talk with Nick Josefowitz of Permit Power and solar veteran Andrew Birch about how to slash these soft costs through automated permitting and standardized interconnection. We discuss how these bureaucratic fixes could unlock dirt-cheap energy for American families without the need for subsidies.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-make-rooftop-solar-power-as</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:184930187</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 28 Jan 2026 17:03:43 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/184930187/c45102b09dc953105f0f2912fdf9010e.mp3" length="82152470" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4101</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/184930187/464628bdb0cb1d9989720ff3a8ae8868.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Let's dig a little deeper into virtual power plants (VPPs)]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Everyone is talking about virtual power plants, but as I discuss with EnergyHub CEO Seth Frader-Thompson, not all VPPs are created equal. We get nerdy on the various stages of VPP maturity and the specific technical requirements that VPPs must meet to truly compete with conventional power plants rather than just acting as “enhanced demand response.”</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/lets-dig-a-little-deeper-into-virtual</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:183641517</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2026 17:02:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/183641517/ae41a574ae0623cd5ee130258a17574c.mp3" length="90497057" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4518</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/183641517/6c84dc19938dd08cb773382c978b8881.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Making the electricity grid work like the internet]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>I’In this episode, I chat with Swedish tech entrepreneur Jonas Birgersson about his radical plan to apply the architecture of the internet—packet switching, buffering, and decentralized routing—to the electricity grid. We explore how his “EnergyNet” concept uses power electronics to create galvanically separated microgrids that stop cascading failures and allow neighbors to share power directly. It is a mind-bending look at how treating electrons like data could lead to unlimited energy for a low fixed fee.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/making-the-electricity-grid-work</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:181963008</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 14 Jan 2026 17:03:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/181963008/d041a43f9c7681f6cb2e818bed312b48.mp3" length="107145448" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5351</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/181963008/5ab68cd6ba05c8db159ad20bc62350b3.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with closed-loop geothermal?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Conventional geothermal energy is limited to specific hot spots, but “closed-loop” geothermal, by going deeper and confining water to sealed boreholes, promises to work almost anywhere; it amounts to building a giant radiator, deep underground. I’m joined by Jeanine Vany and Mark Fitzgerald of pioneering closed-loop startup Eavor to discuss their newly operational plant in Germany and the many advantages of a system that requires no fracking and consumes no water. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-closed-loop-geothermal</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:181763608</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 09 Jan 2026 17:03:05 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/181763608/abe43fbf35cf7bee0fc9db2136b60d4c.mp3" length="78195015" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3903</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/181763608/f9049f3ae559d63aa372a9299e207869.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[NYC's congestion pricing has been running for a year now. How's it doing?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I’m joined by Kate Slevin of the Regional Plan Association to discuss the triumphant first year of congestion pricing in Manhattan. We explore how the program defied its critics by boosting business and pedestrian traffic while reducing gridlock, without evident traffic spillover onto adjacent streets. We also cover the money that’s been raised for public transit and what the future holds for the congestion relief zone.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/nycs-congestion-pricing-has-been</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:180935221</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 07 Jan 2026 17:02:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/180935221/567e35f047b3a8b5d6df9a26bd9602d9.mp3" length="71366117" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3562</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/180935221/b2c331319c16a2edc5e35bf554f2ecfc.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Sen. Brian Schatz wants permitting reform, but not like this]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Hawaii Senator Brian Schatz joins me to discuss the energy policy landscape facing Democrats and how they should respond. We touch on the shift in messaging from “climate” to “affordability,” current Congressional Republican efforts on permitting reform in light of Trump’s anti-renewables crusade, the role of green groups in climate politics, and much more. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/sen-brian-schatz-wants-permitting</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:181309430</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 18:02:39 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/181309430/62104acea3089978a2487633edd625ea.mp3" length="68169806" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3402</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/181309430/5184ce00a3fb548141c4e24f662e8ea7.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the real story with Australian rooftop solar?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Why can Australian homeowners get rooftop solar installed in a week or less, for roughly 50 cents a watt, while Californians pay $3.30/w and wait months for interconnection? In this episode, I ask inimitable Australian energy expert Saul Griffith to walk us through the entire process — from quote to interconnection — to pinpoint exactly where the US system is broken and how we could fix it.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-real-story-with-australian</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:180476747</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 26 Dec 2025 17:02:36 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/180476747/75db058204190da34e07caaa84c9cca4.mp3" length="105157169" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5251</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/180476747/4cb77d768a5c266db61ee3e01b92e99f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The cure for misinformation is not more information or smarter news consumers]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The problem of misinformation in the current age, argues political scientist Samuel Bagg, is not that reliably truth-producing institutions and practices don’t exist, but that people have ceased to trust them. Changing that requires something deeper than factchecking or media literacy. It’s a matter of social identity, and solving it will mean reconfiguring the social identity landscape. I talk with Bagg about that daunting conclusion and its implications for democracy. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-cure-for-misinformation-is-not</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:181116892</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 19 Dec 2025 17:03:01 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/181116892/31254b6f717ade30da6bbe83b6faddc4.mp3" length="84544990" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4221</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/181116892/cb83abb0a747713c1658409a3c665891.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Sen. Ruben Gallego has a new energy plan]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Senator Ruben Gallego (AZ) joins me to discuss his new energy plan, which combines elements of the Inflation Reduction Act with a new focus on permitting reform and small modular nuclear reactors. We get into all of it, from the promise of nuclear energy to the role community consultation.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/sen-ruben-gallego-has-a-new-energy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:180678487</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 17 Dec 2025 17:03:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/180678487/2eac99a2117a2673c561814ca704285c.mp3" length="57092447" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2848</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/180678487/54095c6e9050208aa46d9f8ec14bd085.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Advocating for decarbonization in 2026]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Aliya Haq unpacks how her two decades in the climate movement have reshaped her view of what works. After six years working at Bill Gates’ Breakthrough Energy initiative, she has launched the Clean Economy Project, which will push for grid upgrades, market reforms, and innovation to make clean energy cheaper and more abundant. We wrestle with the politics of it all.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/advocating-for-decarbonization-in</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:180297782</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 12 Dec 2025 17:03:08 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/180297782/068c30451330b094d157dee674d7573a.mp3" length="89112858" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4449</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/180297782/ae3ab691ac8c87ca493f6ae738169c1b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[California warms up to a larger Western energy market]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>I’m joined by Brian Turner and Kathleen Staks to unpack the details of the newly authorized Regional Organization for Western Energy (ROWE), a unique “à la carte” RTO designed to unify the western US grid without trampling on state independence. We discuss the transition from the existing imbalance market to a full day-ahead market, the safeguards built into the bylaws to protect state clean-energy policies, and the politics of getting 38 separate balancing authorities to cooperate.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/california-warms-up-to-a-larger-western</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:179221567</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 10 Dec 2025 17:03:26 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/179221567/706fb2ae6ef0571a95b267b586f06be6.mp3" length="69836091" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3485</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/179221567/4a4463bbc0ebd53f5394bd14b86ca64b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How Illinois passed its third big clean-energy bill in a decade]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Why is a deregulated state like Illinois suddenly embracing central planning? In this episode, I talk with Kady McFadden and John Delurey about the state’s decision to empower its utility commission to directly procure clean energy. We discuss why capacity markets are too slow for the current environment and their strategy of aggressively framing renewables and storage not just as green, but as the only “fast and cheap” way to protect ratepayers from price spikes.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-illinois-passed-its-third-big</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:179024807</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 03 Dec 2025 17:03:15 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/179024807/927b638cae64402015ec5648af7fc8fe.mp3" length="103670964" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5177</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/179024807/8284b44f8a2e9b7363c2221a3f484e54.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's going on in electricity world?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_7">www.volts.wtf</a><br/><br/><p>With load growth projections all over the map and politicians zeroing in on high electricity prices, I take a step back in this audio essay to ask how we should build the grid in the face of massive uncertainty. The answer lies in modular, distributed technologies that strengthen the system regardless of whether the AI bubble eventually bursts.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-going-on-in-electricity-world</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:173158962</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 17:03:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/173158962/ea9d4d38a4d58c6fd71e7924605a8aa6.mp3" length="12089666" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>598</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/173158962/bdd403e13d164edb0fe7b945dd2965b7.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with balcony solar?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Will cheap, DIY solar reach American renters? In Germany, millions of people plug solar panels directly into wall outlets like any other appliance, but in the US, red tape makes it ludicrously costly. I chat with Cora Stryker of Bright Saver about how “balcony solar” (AKA “plug-in solar”) is booming in Europe and making its way to America, starting in Utah. We discuss the technical and safety issues, the regulatory hurdles, and the solar “gateway drug” effect.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-balcony-solar</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:178768482</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 17:03:02 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/178768482/55e93bb98ef6fc90c4a7d7282c89e2ad.mp3" length="80934539" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4040</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/178768482/f6208a8c6fbdb2be9b9143382ae4e926.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Clean electrification is inevitable]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Energy strategist Kingsmill Bond joins me to explain why the transition to “electrotech” is unstoppable, whether or not politicians care about climate change. It’s not the reduced emissions, it’s physics (electrotech is more efficient) and economics (it’s cheaper). Despite political headwinds in the US, China and emerging economies are racing ahead with electrification and sector after sector is seeing peak fossil fuel consumption. There’s no stopping it: electrons will triumph over </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/clean-electrification-is-inevitable</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:178545865</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2025 17:03:28 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/178545865/591125e4623e7e2a466270bbf7d40717.mp3" length="99202033" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4954</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/178545865/1c6e34905a2dd16bbdff2ce3f5683238.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with indoor air quality?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Environmentalism has typically focused on outdoor air quality, but climate change is pushing more people indoors more of the time, even as airborne pathogens and wildfire smoke challenge indoor air quality. I discuss the fight for better indoor air with Dr. Georgia Lagoudas, who recently coordinated a global pledge declaring it a basic human right. We dig into what pollutes indoor air, the technologies that can keep it clean, and the enormous social and economic benefits clean air in schools.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-indoor-air-quality</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:177774632</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2025 17:03:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/177774632/3488e0e03112f2f7a585ae06e2a33b3f.mp3" length="75789037" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3783</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/177774632/4273c3e136eb4f9f028dd19a4be73439.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to make a market for distributed energy flexibility]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Distributed energy resources are everywhere, but connecting buyers and sellers is a coordination nightmare; I talk with James Johnston, whose company Piclo is tackling that problem head-on. He explains how they’ve built a transparent, open marketplace where utilities and other buyers can procure flexibility as a simple commodity from a wide range of sellers. We discuss how this model is already working in the UK and how it could allow data centers to pay for faster grid access in the US — potentially unlocking billions in private investment for VPPs.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-make-a-market-for-distributed</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:177540567</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 12 Nov 2025 17:03:22 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/177540567/b9ca6039e7853fc52578912ed68be448.mp3" length="80291012" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4008</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/177540567/9453c1a654cccb90d1733bc8c03a062e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[So, there were some elections. How'd they go?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I welcome back Caroline Spears from Climate Cabinet for a post-election debrief that, unlike last year’s, is full of good news. We explore how a slate of pro-climate candidates defied expectations in tough districts across the country, driven by a powerful backlash against the Trump administration.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/so-there-were-some-elections-howd</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:178018042</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 Nov 2025 17:03:28 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/178018042/a2bad9bb3c34b7ac2a043dfc49749db3.mp3" length="74274522" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3707</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/178018042/3bb9fff969f6171c5fd85a6fe16d521e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Octopus extends its tentacles into America]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I chat with Nick Chaset, CEO of Octopus Energy US, about bringing the company’s customer-focused, tech-forward model to America. We get into the details of how Octopus simplifies home energy management for its retail customers and its plan to help regulated utilities do the same. We also touch on ambitious ideas like the “Zero Bills” home and how to build gigawatt-scale virtual power plants that benefit both consumers and the grid.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/octopus-extends-its-tentacles-into</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:177244102</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 07 Nov 2025 17:02:59 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/177244102/0878680bb3d8a87a273329d4752b5bcb.mp3" length="64733591" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3230</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/177244102/7993b012b594318528e209957b1065af.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Hey governors: you can salvage sustainable transportation, but you need to do it quick!]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>With the White House actively dismantling clean transportation policy, what can states do to salvage progress? I talk with former DOT policy advisor Liya Rechtman about a little-known authority that lets states transfer highway dollars to fund transit, EV charging, and bike lanes. We explore how governors can use this tool, but only if they act quickly.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/hey-governors-you-can-salvage-sustainable</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:176863699</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 05 Nov 2025 17:03:29 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/176863699/1e22921b3be6d507a6c1b48b10df6cac.mp3" length="64053918" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3196</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/176863699/ae024dcac601b6e5ca11491b1f919da6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Michael Liebreich on a "pragmatic climate reset"]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Lately, everyone from Tony Blair to Daniel Yergin is calling for a “climate reset,” so I brought on clean-energy analyst Michael Liebreich to discuss his own, very different version. While others push expensive distractions, Liebreich argues that the inexorable growth of cheap renewables is already on track to displace fossil fuels, a “tortoise” strategy that will win without the need for crisis politics.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/michael-liebreich-on-a-pragmatic</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:174079134</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 31 Oct 2025 16:03:28 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/174079134/6ea63b19d0e4f510553f680f6ed04e36.mp3" length="51703253" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2579</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/174079134/c43cfa6d58f68f936d9d8278ba3477d2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The escalating battle over renewable energy certificates (RECs)]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode I’m joined by Wilson Ricks and Killian Daly, who are involved in the process of updating the Greenhouse Gas Protocol that governs (among other things) corporate clean-energy procurement. We explore the proposed shift to requiring hourly, local matching for Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs), a change designed to end the “race to the bottom” where companies buy cheap, low-impact RECs to paper over the fact that being “100 percent clean” is genuinely difficult.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-escalating-battle-over-renewable</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:176583782</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2025 16:04:23 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/176583782/b1ace5def8e7c5ed3791b4fb1a7247f8.mp3" length="83481770" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4168</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/176583782/3f6be938731c99541a4124672541d9c5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Can "second life" EV batteries work as grid-scale energy storage?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Redwood Materials has long dominated EV battery recycling, but what if they could drain every last drop of energy from those batteries before recycling them? I talk with the company’s CTO, Colin Campbell, about Redwood Energy, a new division doing just that by deploying used batteries as grid-scale storage at a massive scale. This isn’t just a side project; it’s a plan to turn a massive wave of incoming used batteries into a key resource for the grid.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/can-second-life-ev-batteries-work</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:174736218</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2025 16:03:06 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/174736218/d5b687d97f72f0808c54cb1cdc337e57.mp3" length="71076742" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3548</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/174736218/b38ba273a0ba63d12fd48a6aceafbcf6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Yes, you weenies: a war on cars]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>I chat with Sarah Goodyear and Doug Gordon, the hosts behind the unapologetic podcast “The War on Cars,” about their new book and the fight to reveal our car-dominated world as a political choice, not an inevitability. We explore the many ways automobiles suck, from the “motonormativity” that makes us angrier and more isolated behind the wheel to the devastating impact on children’s freedom and development. We also get into the positive, radical vision that animates their work: a future with fewer cars, where our streets are reclaimed for human connection and community.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/yes-you-weenies-a-war-on-cars</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:170061682</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 20 Oct 2025 18:22:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/170061682/c37220955cc5f2a029db247bb2533919.mp3" length="83142766" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4151</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/170061682/9db4661b0c096fc72f2ca853198c584f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to get New York back on track toward its climate targets]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>New York passed one of the most ambitious climate laws in the country, but is now struggling to meet its goals. I’m joined by Doreen Harris, president of NYSERDA, the agency on the front lines of implementing the law. We explore what’s working, from community solar to new transmission lines, and what isn’t, including the slow pace of scaling up renewables and decarbonizing transportation.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-get-new-york-back-on-track</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:174370032</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 17 Oct 2025 16:02:55 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/174370032/5fc7f6827f8e4fc247a558a7f801f14f.mp3" length="60022370" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2995</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/174370032/8200df3fe800d2e0a8d1672b0d8d7702.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Seattle mayoral candidate Katie Wilson on governing a blue city in 2025]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Seattle mayoral candidate Katie Wilson, a longtime transit and housing organizer who scored a surprise primary victory against the city’s establishment-friendly incumbent. Wilson makes the case for why her deep experience as a community organizer and coalition-builder is precisely the kind of leadership needed to restore faith in government and get big things done.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/seattle-mayoral-candidate-katie-wilson</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:175085251</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2025 16:03:01 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/175085251/d758ec5d70903a2f68eeabec7e374380.mp3" length="82054602" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4097</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/175085251/bb86ebfa0b28e73d56627220903e6b26.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Super-deep geothermal drilling ... with microwaves]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I chat with Quaise CEO Carlos Araque about unlocking geothermal energy on a planetary scale by drilling miles into the Earth’s crust. He explains how his company’s technology vaporizes rock with microwaves to reach depths where intense heat sends the water supercritical, packing ten times the energy density of conventional geothermal. The ultimate goal: persuading the oil and gas industry to put its capital and expertise toward mining heat rather than fuels.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/super-deep-geothermal-drilling-with</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:174143710</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 10 Oct 2025 16:02:58 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/174143710/cae19fc22933b88bd885691188b66ea5.mp3" length="53722223" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2680</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/174143710/dcab5242979d6dbc784020335987bd1a.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Pay attention to the most important political race of 2025]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Why should you care about a utility commission race in Georgia? Because it’s a national bellwether, a sign of how voters are going to react to skyrocketing power prices and a test of whether Democrats can get their act together. I talk with candidate Peter Hubbard and activist Brionté McCorkle about the state’s Public Service Commission, its coziness with utilities, and what reform would look like.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/pay-attention-to-the-most-important</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:174990432</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2025 16:03:20 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/174990432/3f26eeaf13a02dcdd034ab6bd89938a9.mp3" length="76337508" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3811</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/174990432/81145bb8ba81875254ae712da2a99895.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Can advance market commitments jumpstart climate’s hardest sectors?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I chat with investor Clay Dumas of Lowercarbon Capital about the growing use of “advance market commitments” (AMCs). We discuss how this simple idea — a group of buyers commits to purchasing a set amount of a product if it can be produced — can derisk investment and jumpstart innovation in the climate economy’s toughest sectors. Clay explains what makes for a well-designed AMC and how it can accelerate the path to commercialization for everything from carbon removal to green steel.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/can-advance-market-commitments-jumpstart</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:174143039</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 03 Oct 2025 16:02:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/174143039/abfca50de15c3c31bad64b1064088633.mp3" length="44442100" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2216</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/174143039/77dfb55ad5957e595438f3367e54da30.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Could we get hyperscalers to buy heat pumps for households?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Data centers are creating a grid crunch, so what if they paid to solve it by upgrading our homes? I chat with Rewiring America’s Ari Matusiak and PG&E’s Carla Peterman about a new report proposing that hyperscalers fund household electrification to free up the grid capacity they desperately need. We explore how this reframes households as crucial energy infrastructure and creates a win-win-win for tech companies, utilities, and everyday people.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/could-we-get-hyperscalers-to-buy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:173915892</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2025 23:50:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/173915892/5febebcc0983989e95f165a46c05c170.mp3" length="80470144" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4018</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/173915892/176ca87b8bb097a062007d2aad4cedf2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to clean up beer brewing and other low-temperature industries]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>High-temperature industrial heat for things like steel gets a lot of attention in clean energy world, but its somewhat less sexy cousin <em>low</em>-temperature industrial heat could use a little more. In this episode, I talk with Teresa Cheng (Industrious Labs) and Richard Hart (ACEEE) about how industries like beer, milk, and paper can decarbonize with industrial heat pumps and thermal storage. We dig into how electrified industry could help the grid, confront the hidden costs of sticking with gas, and talk through how grants and financing can tip the scales.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-clean-up-beer-brewing-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:173728172</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2025 16:02:51 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/173728172/6aa1735b2a37ae3b21f91dc6a837d109.mp3" length="72891282" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3639</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/173728172/a4caf749bf1090dbe070f5abe3c871f3.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How can Africa benefit from the critical-minerals rush? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In the past, Africa's natural resources have often proven to be a curse, leading to exploitation, corruption, and immiseration of indigenous people. Now it finds itself at the center of another resource boom, this time around the critical minerals that will fuel the clean energy transition (lithium, copper, etc.). Will this time be different? Patrick Kipalu argues that indigenous land rights and informed community consent are not barriers to investment, but the only way to ensure stable, equitable development. We explore how African nations can leverage their resources to benefit their own people.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-can-africa-benefit-from-the-critical</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:173459578</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 19 Sep 2025 16:03:17 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/173459578/1353e7637b6462b0a46b2685b81c9020.mp3" length="47876254" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2388</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/173459578/a0961c62c43ab1522d3a18d4f7d102ac.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Are we finally getting 3D-printed batteries?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Dry printing of battery electrodes can avoid the toxic solvents and industrial ovens involved in the conventional wet process, which means a smaller physical and environmental footprint, but engineers have struggled to make it work at the needed scale and speed. Now a company called Sakuu says it has cracked the code. It is selling machines it claims will be able to print multiple battery chemistries, at competitive costs and speeds. I talk with CTO Karl Littau about the details and what 3D printing could enable in future batteries.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/are-we-finally-getting-3d-printed</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:172746138</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2025 16:06:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/172746138/211484c076e24307a8336634e74bf00a.mp3" length="65313441" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3260</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/172746138/f19cd14b4ea993077508f87f2ec938fe.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The debate over renewable energy certificates (RECs)]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I dig into the debate over reforming renewable energy certificates (RECs), the instruments that allow companies to claim they're "100% renewable." I'm joined by Michael Leggett of Ever.green and Peggy Kellen of the Center for Resource Solutions to discuss the push for a "24/7" system that matches RECs to the exact time and place of consumption. We explore whether this seemingly intuitive change is the best path forward or if going too far, too fast could drive buyers from the market and slow decarbonization</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-debate-over-renewable-energy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:172147314</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 10 Sep 2025 16:03:19 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/172147314/3cf2a22ba5c284274e4323e994d5f4f0.mp3" length="91139694" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4551</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/172147314/c264e0e5bc9f8f1163376e8104da5bc6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How inverters can stabilize a renewables-heavy grid]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Today's electricity grids are kept stable by the inertia of spinning masses — mostly fossil fuel generators. But what happens when those spinning masses are replaced by inverter-based resources like wind, solar, and batteries? The answer is that inverters must take over the stabilizing job, becoming "grid-forming" rather than merely “grid-following.” I chat with two experts about how grid-forming inverters work, how many are out there, and what the future holds for them.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-inverters-can-stabilize-a-renewables</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:166505662</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 05 Sep 2025 16:03:29 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/166505662/1d5a215fe45920c0f6b806f6e41a57c7.mp3" length="74878535" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3738</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/166505662/31069d7bcc189fd64146fd769284f002.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with sodium-ion batteries?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Lithium-ion dominates the battery world, but alternative chemistries are finding their niches. I talk with Landon Mossburg, CEO of Peak Energy, about using sodium-ion batteries for large-scale grid storage. They trade some energy density for a longer life and radically lower operating costs, thanks to an innovative, passively cooled design. We also explore the geopolitical opportunity of competing in a battery market that China doesn't already completely own.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-sodium-ion-batteries</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:171110217</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2025 16:03:32 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/171110217/3b46842d8d071a868ea1dd0b94ed7732.mp3" length="94365915" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4712</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/171110217/202eebaa861fd192700fdc1ef098d24d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Climate philanthropy in a time of Trump]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>This week I talk with Dan Stein, whose organization Giving Green seeks to align climate philanthropy with the principles of effective altruism. But what does "effective" mean in the face of fossil fuel autocracy? We discuss the difficulties of measuring systems change and debate the limits of technocratic solutions.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/climate-philanthropy-in-a-time-of</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:170753283</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 27 Aug 2025 16:03:22 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/170753283/24e161eafa8f2653f12ce8af0f44caff.mp3" length="67161997" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3352</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/170753283/0209179ee5d7684754e8162e4c04fa78.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What does clean energy activism look like?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Movement veterans Bill McKibben and Jamie Henn have been thinking about where climate activism goes from here. They argue for a new focus on celebrating and accelerating the miraculous global boom in solar power. We get into what it looks like to fight for building stuff, how to win the online information war for clean energy, and why the sun offers not just cheaper power, but a form of liberation.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-does-clean-energy-activism-look</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:170658066</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 20 Aug 2025 16:03:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/170658066/9f2d24c5da605b7f13e532bd6568cd6d.mp3" length="93015482" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4645</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/170658066/c436fa0ff63e6f27a695a5fe4f9715cc.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Trump's latest attempt to save coal]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I'm joined by Frank Rambo of the Horizon Climate Initiative to discuss "uneconomic dispatch" — the costly and polluting practice of running coal plants even when cheaper, cleaner options are available. We dig into why utilities get away with this, how the Trump administration is now trying to force them to continue via bogus "reliability" claims, and why fighting this practice at the state level is a huge, bipartisan win for both the climate and consumer pocketbooks.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/trumps-latest-attempt-to-save-coal</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:169352110</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 13 Aug 2025 16:02:57 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/169352110/87f065984379c4c9f07c9f0aa8300221.mp3" length="66185669" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3304</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/169352110/f28196e7a054972bb49d0ab1ef4aae47.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What the FEOC?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I'm joined by Jake Higdon and Isabel Munilla, who helped develop the original "foreign entity of concern" (FEOC) standards for the Inflation Reduction Act, which sought to encourage domestic supply chains. We explore the security risks that prompted FEOC policy, the delicate balance required to do it right, and the absolute hash that Republicans made of it in their recent budget bill, to the point that it may kill the domestic manufacturing they claim to support. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-the-feoc</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:169017921</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 06 Aug 2025 16:03:07 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/169017921/04041bebdb5c9377cd2f89b9af202374.mp3" length="71775383" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3583</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/169017921/53258c7ebc2877c8176e6a6be73d0369.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A fireside chat with Jigar Shah]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, recorded live back in May, I'm joined by the one and only Jigar Shah to discuss Washington state climate policy and post-IRA policy in general. Jigar argues that to build political durability, the climate movement must shift its focus from shiny tech to solving everyday cost-of-living problems and that smart finance is the real key to scaling the energy transition for everyone.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-fireside-chat-with-jigar-shah</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:163811375</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 01 Aug 2025 16:04:28 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/163811375/92456f01bf754fa4494fd68f37e2238d.mp3" length="81025898" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4046</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/163811375/e3ebeaf97a4973bf368c0799e094e16b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[US transit costs and how to tame them]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>I'm joined by Alon Levy of NYU's Transit Costs Project, whose work documents how expensive it is to build transit in the US relative to the rest of the world. We discuss how countries like Spain and Italy build cheaply by relying on in-house public expertise and standardized designs, while the Anglosphere is captured by a costly ideology of privatization. Levy explains how applying these lessons could make ambitious projects like high-speed rail in the Northeast not just possible but affordable.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/us-transit-costs-and-how-to-tame</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:167499695</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 30 Jul 2025 16:04:48 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/167499695/27fa0e2588ac8709756092af71caba98.mp3" length="115969962" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5793</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/167499695/180d16e75b3b7659c254a14df735ab57.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Ann Arbor's experiment with a new kind of utility]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Ann Arbor voted to create a parallel, municipal electric utility that offers only distributed renewables, and Missy Stults is the woman making it real. We explore the nuts and bolts: buying existing solar for seed revenue, building microgrids in a city still served by DTE, and why DTE is — so far — more curious than threatened. If it works, the SEU could become the blueprint for every climate-ambitious town trapped in IOU territory.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/ann-arbors-experiment-with-a-new</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:167967533</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 23 Jul 2025 16:03:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/167967533/f33f0251079a7804136327d253fc2a6d.mp3" length="78670795" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3928</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/167967533/2920b410c11e5a30b2fd67b506346465.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's going on with electric boats?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Arc CEO Mitch Lee explains why the jump from gas-powered boats to electric boats is even bigger, in terms of quality and user experience, than the jump from gas-powered cars to EVs. EBs are strikingly quieter, have greater torque, and require much less maintenance. Oh, and despite what Trump says, they are also much safer and less likely to strand their occupants.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-going-on-with-electric-boats</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:166869430</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 18 Jul 2025 16:03:06 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/166869430/538c91d2323508613e2c0200c8422911.mp3" length="74910240" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3740</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/166869430/d7ccf5c0b2df89cd1f7ff3a44bea75c5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Solar+storage is so much farther along than you think]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>I chat with Kostantsa Rangelova and Dave Jones, authors of a new Ember report, who find that solar-plus-storage costs have declined so much that it can now provide baseload-level power in sunny cities for less than the cost of new nuclear or even new gas. We discuss why even energy pros are behind the curve on this, how quickly the technology is improving, and why most of the world doesn't see natural gas as a viable option the way the US does.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/solarstorage-is-so-much-farther-along</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:167237805</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 16 Jul 2025 16:02:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/167237805/793f32bd6a7cf13fabdff8cc6073fb5d.mp3" length="78162484" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3903</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/167237805/72e542294ae6c39b059872d51452f8ea.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Trump's big bill: How bad is it and what comes next?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_7">www.volts.wtf</a><br/><br/><p>In this "What the F is Happening" episode, I'm joined by Jane Flegal and Jesse Jenkins to perform a wake for the Inflation Reduction Act after the passage of the GOP's "Big Beautiful Bill." We sift through the wreckage to see what was saved versus what was buried, analyze the political forces that determined the outcome, and debate the core theory of change behind the IRA — and what lessons advocates should and shouldn't learn as they chart a path forward.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/trumps-big-bill-how-bad-is-it-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:167881582</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2025 16:03:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/167881582/5841fda776136eb7032125712ea3b0e5.mp3" length="18049428" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>902</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/167881582/6f7ffd0c06b8cc0790e929365e1bb0cc.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A closer look at Montana's housing "miracle"]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Montana state senators Forrest Mandeville (R) and Ellie Boldman (D) about the bipartisan housing reforms their state has passed over the last two legislative sessions — reforms so sweeping YIMBYs have dubbed them the "Montana miracle." We discuss the unlikely coalition supporting the bills, the impact of the policies, and the generational divide that increasingly separates YIMBYs from NIMBYs. Also: why "housing is the new weed"!</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-closer-look-at-montanas-housing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:167026055</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 09 Jul 2025 16:02:58 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/167026055/53ee2fc0025101353dde75f9f7604c2e.mp3" length="92510043" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4620</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/167026055/b4a7121b8cad76147cbf77586a8ab16f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[PG&E tries to prove that a big utility can innovate]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>PG&E, California's notoriously troubled utility, is trying to prove it can innovate, so I invited Quinn Nakayama, head of its new GRiD program, to explain how. We discuss its strategy of publicly outlining its problems to attract partners and its shift toward faster, more flexible interconnection for new loads like EVs and data centers.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/pg-and-e-tries-to-prove-that-a-big</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:166302853</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 04 Jul 2025 16:02:49 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/166302853/3240fc085f7bc87f2cf59a6eb114f065.mp3" length="92148541" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4602</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/166302853/0cf0301b574951d368fee50c843b8126.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Can data centers be good grid citizens? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The frantic buildout of AI data centers is threatening to overwhelm electric grids, but what if they could be part of the solution? I chat with Jeff Bladen of Verrus, a company designing data centers to be "good grid citizens" from the ground up. We discuss how their novel architecture, combining large-scale batteries with a more efficient internal power network, provides flexibility that helps utilities and allows more compute to be built with less grid impact.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/can-data-centers-be-good-grid-citizens</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:165763528</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 02 Jul 2025 16:12:15 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/165763528/35ef5bb4e628fc31a6536d0cf2f4ac6b.mp3" length="63182954" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3154</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/165763528/9a3883f3da5db18b93641e0ff08801c0.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Reducing the climate impacts of food and farming]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I chat with fellow energy nerd-turned-ag-reporter Michael Grunwald about agriculture’s climate impact. We explore the folly of biofuels, the promise of meat alternatives, and the central importance of increasing yields. While we can imagine a future of energy abundance, land is a zero-sum game — no one’s making more — so the choices here are uniquely difficult and important.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/reducing-the-climate-impacts-of-food</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:163609216</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 27 Jun 2025 16:02:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/163609216/65b11d9a54c9a3b81d8a93293ebcd19f.mp3" length="96183479" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4804</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/163609216/17da044cda7f308953f820cdf9fd7246.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The fight to build faster in California]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I'm joined by two of California's leading housing champions, Assemblymember Buffy Wicks and Senator Scott Wiener, to discuss their bills to reform the state's notorious environmental review law, CEQA. We explore how a well-intentioned 1970s environmental protection has become a tool for NIMBYs, unions, and even oil companies to delay or kill housing projects — and why the politics have finally shifted enough to make progress possible.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-fight-to-build-faster-in-california</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:165842692</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 25 Jun 2025 16:02:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/165842692/0d33e5cf62d6d5c1f92477153cd460bf.mp3" length="72261585" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3608</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/165842692/f944434b3983756a4650f9cb36af4d10.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Rep. Mike Levin reflects on the Republican budget bill]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Rep. Mike Levin and I discuss the “Big Beautiful Bill” that raises energy bills, kills 830,000 jobs, and gifts China the next industrial revolution. We unpack the fossil-fuel cash behind the carnage, the paradox of red districts cutting their own subsidies, and the optimistic playbook — centered on transmission and real climate economics — for the next Democratic majority.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/rep-mike-levin-reflects-on-the-republican</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:165321338</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 20 Jun 2025 16:05:01 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/165321338/f461e1f27ed3581dd7d14df5af5b92a4.mp3" length="75618353" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3775</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/165321338/0b24451ae724081b500c4754dccb7f08.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A win for transit-oriented development in Washington state]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Washington state just passed one of the strongest transit-oriented development bills in the nation, and in this episode, I talk with Rep. Julia Reed and Alex Brennan from Futurewise about how they got it done. We discuss why building more housing near transit is so important, what this landmark legislation entails for density and affordability, and how it positions Washington as a leader in pro-housing reform.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-win-for-transit-oriented-development</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:165521491</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 18 Jun 2025 16:02:51 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/165521491/b6bd89c82ff0a29612abbd530638e4f8.mp3" length="83554908" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4172</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/165521491/d9bea67f8ac82f40d9a6363d578843ed.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Sen. Martin Heinrich on the fight over clean energy in the Senate]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>On June 4, at a Canary Media event in Washington, DC, I sat down with Senator Martin Heinrich to dissect the GOP’s so-called “Big Beautiful Bill” — a sledgehammer aimed at the Inflation Reduction Act, public-lands protections, and US science. We talk about the handful of Republican votes that could still save key tax credits, why bipartisan permitting reform isn’t dead yet, and how the bill’s self-inflicted grid squeeze would jack up energy prices right when AI is poised to spike demand.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/sen-martin-heinrich-on-the-fight</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:164901103</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 13 Jun 2025 16:12:30 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/164901103/c35ae6d9d6ccc0fcb9dde1e9a2f42f21.mp3" length="50750888" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2532</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/164901103/da5e376b2dc3ce3bc3c0f4e9f07d1e0d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Making electric motors better]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I'm digging into the surprisingly overlooked world of electric motors with Ankit Somani of Conifer, a startup aiming to revolutionize these unsung workhorses of the energy system. We explore their ambitious approach to making motors lighter, more efficient, and cheaper to build, all while ditching problematic rare-earth magnets.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/making-electric-motors-better</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:164534725</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 11 Jun 2025 16:03:16 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/164534725/083735c1edfb89ac5b687d21e468b650.mp3" length="65260376" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3258</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/164534725/c94314754948491d77a8dbf7e01b9194.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A journey from clean-energy wonkery to influencer fame]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Taylor Krause, who went from working on hydrogen policy at RMI to finding a quantum physicist husband and unexpected fame on Netflix's <em>Love Is Blind</em>. We unpack her surreal journey from clean-energy wonk to popular influencer and how she's navigating using her newfound influence.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-journey-from-clean-energy-wonkery</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:163451759</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 06 Jun 2025 16:02:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/163451759/93960075d360e0f8c5676f892be0a2d5.mp3" length="72637389" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3627</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/163451759/7075accc99ba60892010e70aab9d7863.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to reduce the impact of mining]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I chat with Johanna Wolfson, co-founder of Azolla Ventures, about their unique philanthropic-backed VC model tackling the tough problem of sustainable mining for the clean energy transition. We explore the promising tech Azolla is backing to reduce mining's impact, from using electrochemistry to refine copper without dirty smelting to advanced techniques for processing low-grade ores and even waste.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-reduce-the-impact-of-mining</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:164137935</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 04 Jun 2025 16:03:04 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/164137935/4846a79ec3aaaf47f034f3a08aeff853.mp3" length="73036572" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3646</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/164137935/19d26061bad79840135ea7f49299afa6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What the F is happening? Part 3]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_7">www.volts.wtf</a><br/><br/><p>This week on "What the F is Happening" (periodic episodes in which we reluctantly discuss current events) we talk with Adrian Deveny, a former Senate aide who was in the trenches for the IRA's creation, about the House GOP's "Big Beautiful Bill." In its current form, it amounts to wholesale destruction of the last four years of climate policy. We ponder the bill's chances of becoming less catastrophic in the Senate amid the lack of meaningful pushback from the industries being kneecapped and the predictable folding of "moderate" Republican opposition.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-the-f-is-happening-part-3</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:164454914</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 30 May 2025 16:02:57 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/164454914/4f39d2c2f1efe98158fa7c54e8b7469c.mp3" length="23855609" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1192</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/164454914/24000608beeec9ba5dda8715dec8b2f5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Parking reform in Washington, parking reform everywhere!]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Catie Gould and Alan Durning of the Sightline Institute about the "dark matter" of urban land use: parking — specifically, the municipal parking mandates that help make housing more expensive and scarce. We discuss a landmark new parking reform bill in my home state of Washington, what it does and the coalition that made it possible, and point to other places where parking reform is coming soon.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/parking-reform-in-washington-parking</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:163758638</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 28 May 2025 16:02:52 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/163758638/72abf609485cf39bcac473c9032cd0b9.mp3" length="77390694" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3864</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/163758638/b06e12fe62678c2cee8979ee32ecafc4.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The past and future of community choice aggregation]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>This week, I chat with Dawn Weisz of MCE Clean Energy about the nitty-gritty of community choice aggregation, where local governments take control of their electricity procurement. We get into issues like navigating utility obstruction, the complexities of rising grid costs they don't control, and their push for smarter, more autonomous regulation.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-past-and-future-of-community</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:163310363</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 23 May 2025 16:03:28 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/163310363/33e64f524f4f7830f560aa3197ccc4b3.mp3" length="74966073" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3743</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/163310363/3570b8ad413952b18b530c3717a0e3bb.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A "Google Maps for electrons"]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I sit down with Page Crahan, who leads Tapestry, an audacious effort to “make the grid visible.” We explore how disparate, scattered data sources can be stitched together by AI into a coherent realtime map of the grid, to slash operation and maintenance costs and speed up the grid interconnection process. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-google-maps-for-electrons</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:162864583</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 May 2025 16:02:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/162864583/badb5a45e7ad005f864a21b5da5d86ed.mp3" length="62003621" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3095</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/162864583/cd983cac95c4d64f4cea3db1bad2afde.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Embedding intelligence at the edge of the grid]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I’m joined by Marissa Hummon, whose team partnered with NVIDIA to tuck a credit-card-sized GPU computer with AI software into the humble electricity meter. We discuss how that edge computing digests 32,000 waveform samples per second, spots failing transformers, and orchestrates VPPs — plus the guardrails that keep it from becoming Skynet.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/embedding-intelligence-at-the-edge</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:161720656</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 16 May 2025 16:02:55 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/161720656/686658bbd78f83de310cfe0674635042.mp3" length="69235918" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3457</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/161720656/5440ddc053030db6d710772955f46daa.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Taming the hydrogen hype]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The hype about hydrogen is back with a vengeance, and thus, so is Joe Romm, who just issued a revised and updated version of his 2003 book <em>The Hype About Hydrogen</em>. We discuss the persistent economic and technical hurdles that make widespread hydrogen adoption unrealistic, explain why most applications are better served by direct electrification, and scrutinize the massive investments and motivations behind the current hydrogen push.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/taming-the-hydrogen-hype</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:162515891</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 14 May 2025 16:03:15 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/162515891/fa3c56ae26d47305c64a3d791bc23b4a.mp3" length="94395003" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4715</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/162515891/1a296be96bdb25a54a75820233b02bbc.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Trying to bring geothermal heat pumps to scale ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I chat with Kathy Hannun of Dandelion Energy about ground-source heat pumps, which are twice as efficient as air-source units but still more expensive up front. Dandelion has designed its own drills and heat pumps, and with a new 1,500-home partnership with a developer in Colorado, it’s looking to scale up and bring costs down.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/trying-to-bring-geothermal-heat-pumps</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:161440563</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 09 May 2025 16:03:02 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/161440563/2e1b50ee598c08d052a87c31306a93d1.mp3" length="75507983" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3770</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/161440563/696905dbd9e3e266f395e15cf625736a.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How is public transit doing in the US?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I’m joined by consultant Jarrett Walker to take the pulse of US transit in a world of empty downtown office towers, surging weekend ridership, and the tech elite’s dream of transit without strangers. We unpack the myths that plague buses, reveal why Canada’s transit abundance should be our model, and map the policy battles that will determine whether US transit systems shrink or soar.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-is-transit-doing-in-the-us</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:161657343</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 07 May 2025 16:03:02 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/161657343/2dfa12732bb03ada1253e1c7bc11544d.mp3" length="76690317" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3829</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/161657343/fd3bbb51c1d8ab54a5bd21a6754426bf.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The coolest new home electrification widget]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>I catch up with Span CEO Arch Rao to discuss the company's expansion from consumer panels to the utility-focused Span Edge which can be used to create a true distributed power plant. We discuss why this is key to accelerating electrification and examine how the system works to respect consumer choices while managing grid constraints.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-coolest-new-home-electrification</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:160839504</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 02 May 2025 16:02:57 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/160839504/05a328a2a303e4ff7b528329f92707c7.mp3" length="80467688" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4018</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/160839504/528a674317681168813bbbba5b8d5e7f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The governor of Illinois discusses decarbonization in the era of Trump]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I speak with Illinois Governor JB Pritzker, one of the depressingly few Democratic leaders showing real fight in the face of Trumpism. We get into the weeds on how Illinois is defending its climate laws, advancing clean energy and manufacturing, and tackling thorny challenges like the housing crisis, the transition away from natural gas, and the looming “fiscal cliff” facing transit agencies. Oh, and the governor explains what quantum computing is.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-governor-of-illinois-discusses</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:161944219</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 2025 16:02:48 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/161944219/917f4eab5bbbf8082720b4cfb28aee5a.mp3" length="57749024" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2882</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/161944219/8e93f85e7862b1e0e0f43dd6b02efa2a.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Me, on the Climate Papa podcast]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, the tables are turned: I'm the guest of the Climate Papa podcast, interviewed by host Ben Eidelson. We discuss the nested fractal puzzle of decarbonization, the critical importance of the grid and urban land use, and why now is the most exciting time to jump into climate work. Plus, I share some thoughts on parenting and avoiding tech-bro culture as the climate space evolves.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/me-on-the-climate-papa-podcast</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:160168142</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 25 Apr 2025 16:02:49 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/160168142/37a6071c21ead0df6be987dde33ef40f.mp3" length="102483753" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5119</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/160168142/07463e6711b48bbc85c3076aebb051c0.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's up with hydrogen-electric aviation?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>My guest, Val Miftakhov of ZeroAvia, argues that hydrogen fuel cells paired with electric motors are the key to decarbonizing aviation. We discuss why he prefers his solution to sustainable aviation fuels or batteries, the challenges and misconceptions around supplying and refueling with hydrogen, and the tech roadmap from today's small retrofits to tomorrow's large jets.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-up-with-hydrogen-electric-aviation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:160476029</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 2025 16:02:55 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/160476029/2c4f56188a237165fa91d0eee612727d.mp3" length="86367247" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4313</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/160476029/597897016689f375a7ccb5cf053a91d2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What the F is happening? Part 2]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_7">www.volts.wtf</a><br/><br/><p>I talk to Emily Pontecorvo (Heatmap) and Jeff St. John (Canary Media) to grapple with the latest Trump administration moves impacting climate and energy policy. We discuss the executive orders targeting state climate programs and propping up coal plants, the baffling new tariffs threatening energy supply chains, and the flurry of lawsuits challenging the administration's actions.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-the-f-is-happening-part-2</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:161360865</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 21 Apr 2025 16:03:06 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/161360865/a640da2bcc2bbbaec12c0065038314dd.mp3" length="18490890" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>924</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/161360865/03581d894a5b3c5ef9c8bc17f451b37f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How is decarbonization going in the UK? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I dive into the UK's decarbonization journey with Lucy Yu of the Centre for Net Zero. We discuss how the UK has become a world leader in offshore wind while lagging in heat pump adoption, why electricity market reform is essential to prevent gas from setting electricity prices, and how community ownership models overcome NIMBY resistance to wind projects.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-is-decarbonization-going-in-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:160169014</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 18 Apr 2025 16:03:11 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/160169014/78d311175421896496a51fc8ffd3b07f.mp3" length="81027883" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4046</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/160169014/7798574d016c70977b975962f43d81a8.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What in tarnation is going on in Texas?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>I'm joined by “Texas Doug” Lewin to unpack the fascinating contradictions of a state that inadvertently became the nation's renewable energy powerhouse through a free market electricity system that its politicians now seem bent on strangling. Bills before the legislature would require solar and wind developers to also build gas plants, impose extreme setback requirements only on renewables, and potentially cripple the state's economy just as data centers drive unprecedented demand growth.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-in-tarnation-is-going-on-in</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:160686861</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 16 Apr 2025 16:02:58 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/160686861/258e9791d95e78ceec5490644d6f9559.mp3" length="99879442" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4989</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/160686861/8d1975a39856c37759825a1eebc42b97.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's up with clean energy in Finland?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I'm joined by Helena Sarén to discover how Finland achieved a nearly 95% carbon-neutral electricity mix and set the ambitious goal of carbon neutrality by 2035. We dig into the country's pragmatic approach to nuclear power, how its relationship with neighboring Russia has shaped its energy independence and security strategies, and how Finnish industry is actively pushing for more aggressive climate targets rather than resisting them.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-up-with-clean-energy-in-finland</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:159657448</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 2025 16:03:42 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/159657448/e778340461156e0a231c1f1cc4061af8.mp3" length="69262397" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3458</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/159657448/03aac4a81336625826f2d8c838411ec3.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How is clean electricity doing globally? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I dig into the just-released <a target="_blank" href="https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/global-electricity-review-2025/">Global Electricity Review</a> from the think tank Ember, with founder Bryony Worthington and lead author Nicolas Fulghum. Clean electricity surpassed 40 percent of global generation in 2024, driven by record solar deployment. We explore solar's rapid doubling, the pace of demand growth, and the way China's clean energy decisions shape global trends.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-is-clean-electricity-doing-globally</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:160318859</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 09 Apr 2025 16:03:23 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/160318859/b0776c04e316d238e70671701677ca4c.mp3" length="94016585" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4696</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/160318859/eb594bbf3b69aaa7a63b12ec7eb56c1d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's up with clean-energy supply chains and global trade?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Antoine Vagneur-Jones, head of clean energy, trade, and supply chains for BloombergNEF, about the messy world of global clean energy supply chains. We explore China's manufacturing dominance, the faltering quest to "onshore" production in Western countries, and why blanket tariffs often undermine the very goals they're supposed to achieve.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-up-with-clean-energy-supply</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:159392739</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 04 Apr 2025 16:03:23 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/159392739/c8d3f50ce378cd5a4085e280da030761.mp3" length="81135635" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4052</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/159392739/2b3ff42a95c70a79b77711321617b32d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The view from inside DC, with Rep. Sean Casten]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I sit down with my old friend Sean Casten for a frank insider's take on the precarious state of clean energy policy amid our ongoing constitutional meltdown. We dive into the political knife fight over IRA tax credits (some Republicans support them), why transmission reform remains frustratingly partisan despite economic logic, and the fossil industry's fear of competition. Despite the dire political landscape, Casten makes a compelling case for why clean energy developers should keep building through the storm.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-view-from-inside-dc-with-rep</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:159850448</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 02 Apr 2025 16:03:58 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/159850448/51db4b46fb9c0ca4d3f2551fc1ecd6f1.mp3" length="84779716" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4234</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/159850448/71898301d04c2f8f95e697bb9a73c8b2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Mailbag episode - March 2025]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_7">www.volts.wtf</a><br/><br/><p>In this month's mailbag, I rave about my new EV (despite my lifelong aversion to cars), explain why our political system would never permit a "decarbonization Trump", wrestle with solar geoengineering, and share my thoughts on why home batteries are so much pricier than the ones rolling around in our cars.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/mailbag-episode-march-2025</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:159312633</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 28 Mar 2025 16:03:42 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/159312633/a07ac6076c57eb1c225081982ba58062.mp3" length="14145174" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>707</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/159312633/7debffc8a389578db5f97207220539fb.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's going on with public power in New York? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Patrick Robbins of Public Power NY and Johanna Bozuwa of the Climate and Community Institute about New York's groundbreaking Build Public Renewables Act, which empowers the state's public utility to build clean energy at scale. We explore how this surprising legislative victory happened, the challenges of implementation, and why public ownership might be the key to making renewable energy both politically resilient and economically accessible.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-going-on-with-public-power</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:159162027</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2025 15:55:18 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/159162027/49c55a64cb295f129a5f3cd998f05760.mp3" length="73342851" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3662</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/159162027/277ec7d9e9c2f203432660556afe1fc1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Canada's largest sustainable community takes shape]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I'm joined by Toms Lumsden and Young (development manager and urban planner, respectively) to explore Blatchford, an ambitious sustainable community being built on the grounds of a former municipal airport in Edmonton, Alberta (Canada’s most conservative province). We dig into how this city-led, mixed-use development is creating a carbon-neutral community with pedestrian-first streets, a variety of housing forms, and a district energy system, right in the heart of oil country.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/canadas-largest-sustainable-community</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:158896535</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 19 Mar 2025 16:03:26 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/158896535/50df5ad773f56799bb4329fbd2650501.mp3" length="73581089" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3679</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/158896535/d75d1504de1e8f75e13e8d6584b6908a.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Making sure smart devices can talk to each other and the grid]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Devrim Celal from Kraken about ensuring all our smart home energy devices can actually talk to the grid. We discuss how Mercury will certify devices to create reliability standards, preventing your fancy EV charger or heat pump from becoming useless if a manufacturer disappears while helping utilities manage load growth.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/making-sure-smart-devices-can-talk</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:158349432</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 14 Mar 2025 16:03:39 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/158349432/31dbaa228716da704e658027f87c06f8.mp3" length="67979454" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3394</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/158349432/06f15f4518c49e10fb0ae75fd37794c6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Who is paying for all that data center power?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Harvard Law's Eliza Martin and Ari Peskoe join me to unpack how data centers' skyrocketing electricity demand could leave ordinary customers subsidizing Big Tech's power bills. Most chilling is the potential alliance between utilities and tech giants that threatens to derail much-needed utility reforms while entrenching fossil-fueled infrastructure.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/who-is-paying-for-all-that-data-center</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:158496528</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 12 Mar 2025 16:03:34 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/158496528/0c2ab6c1b3679de11f8825cf77bb8e9b.mp3" length="72344516" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3612</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/158496528/9a657f054c00efa172aacc6a52cdfd52.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why housing is a pass/fail question for climate]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Why are housing and urban land use so central to climate policy? In this episode, I try to answer the question squarely, in dialogue with Matthew Lewis of California YIMBY. We discuss why EVs alone can't decarbonize transportation fast enough, how the climate-driven insurance crisis will bankrupt states, why the climate movement’s own internal NIMBYs are its greatest impediment, and when green philanthropists and leaders will finally catch up.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-housing-is-a-passfail-question</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:157048864</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 07 Mar 2025 17:01:02 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/157048864/eb051e1ff8ff8a320bc1e73abb4c287e.mp3" length="99808984" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4986</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/157048864/3f0cc2f5cba335d8a90f92c54d583695.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The fate of the EV tax credits]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I'm joined by Albert Gore to discuss the fate of the electric-vehicle tax credits under the Trump administration. Gore explains how the consumer credit provides a demand-side signal to complement the supply-side manufacturing credits, and why eliminating either would primarily benefit Chinese manufacturers.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-fate-of-the-ev-tax-credits</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:157493728</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 05 Mar 2025 17:03:19 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/157493728/76c121f290cdda5a1ace43a8b18f8121.mp3" length="82167666" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4104</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/157493728/20918992bebebe8cf9325d44d1002b6f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What the F is happening?]]></title><description><![CDATA[This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_7">www.volts.wtf</a><br/><br/><p>In this episode, I speak with Canary Media journalists Clare Fieseler and Julian Spector to assess the early impacts of Trump's executive orders on clean energy. We explore what's actually happening with offshore wind projects, manufacturing investments, and tax credits from the Inflation Reduction Act.</p>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-the-f-is-happening</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:157913423</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 28 Feb 2025 17:01:57 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/157913423/e3bbe56e890deda0077fb717b9e7b8fb.mp3" length="10698579" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>535</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/157913423/92cf9ea7b8d61de80f74f9bc501581bd.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Pakistan's solar boom ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I speak with Mustafa Amjad and Waqas Moosa about Pakistan's extraordinary solar boom -- nearly 30 gigawatts of panels have flooded into the country since 2020! We explore how punishingly high grid electricity prices combined with dramatically cheaper Chinese solar panels have created a bottom-up energy revolution that could become the blueprint for energy transitions worldwide.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/pakistans-solar-boom</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:156720229</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2025 17:01:38 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/156720229/2836eb8c84d59736a9317578189627df.mp3" length="73583862" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3674</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/156720229/9991fa48d9a05e08d925837520f61448.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Massachusetts utility regulator trying to orchestrate a shift away from gas ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I'm joined by James Van Nostrand. He is the top utility regulator in Massachusetts, the first state to explicitly tell gas utilities to plan their own phase-out. We explore this complex transition, including the fate of existing gas infrastructure, the potential of networked geothermal as an alternative, and protections for both workers and ratepayers.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-massachusetts-utility-regulator</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:155217300</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 21 Feb 2025 17:02:38 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/155217300/4c9b2cb3f8b4172cb9002aeb220ffc9b.mp3" length="80541837" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4022</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/155217300/dff6f557e7595e4b88e437e0e283c7d7.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What YIMBYs are learning from their victories across the country]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode I'm joined by Annemarie Gray and Felicity Maxwell to discuss how the YIMBY movement is finally cracking the code on housing reform in major American cities. We examine the recent groundbreaking victories in New York City and Austin, exploring how pro-housing groups are learning from each other through networks like Welcoming Neighbors Network, and wrestle with the challenge of increasing housing supply while protecting existing communities.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-yimbys-are-learning-from-their</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:156354516</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 19 Feb 2025 17:02:39 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/156354516/7e5e96ad188461816e1892a856aeb509.mp3" length="88358229" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4413</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/156354516/a230950ec811bb0e8051e4585c3530c1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Austin's quest to reach net zero]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>At this live event in Austin, Texas, I was joined by Austin Energy executives Lisa Martin and Michael Enger to discuss how a progressive municipal utility charts a course to clean energy in Texas. We explore their multi-pronged approach to reaching 100 percent carbon-free electricity by 2035, from expanding distributed energy resources and battery storage to piloting first-of-its-kind geothermal technology.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/austins-quest-to-reach-net-zero</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:155817675</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 14 Feb 2025 17:03:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/155817675/4b91b2493fcd21246cf2b32efbd2b6c0.mp3" length="70261151" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3508</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/155817675/36293bf9bee34ff969dcb808a32de50a.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Catching up with enhanced geothermal]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, recorded at a live event in Houston, I catch up with Tim Latimer, the CEO of Fervo Energy. Since the last time I interviewed him, almost two years ago, the company has proven out its technology, reduced its costs, started construction on a large-scale commercial power plant in Utah, and signed contracts for many more. We discuss enhanced geothermal’s benefits, its momentum, and its bipartisan support.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/catching-up-with-enhanced-geothermal</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:156076090</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 12 Feb 2025 17:03:41 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/156076090/ecc69e53a4bab30a20f6b5937e072d2a.mp3" length="83743992" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4183</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/156076090/91761eb2e3d8fb3034b921a769aea9a2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with enhanced rock weathering to store CO2?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with climate scientist Zeke Hausfather about how enhanced rock weathering (ERW) turbocharges a natural process to permanently store CO₂. We dig into how it profits from existing infrastructure, and the big questions around measuring and verifying the carbon captured. Zeke also explains why farmers might actually benefit from spreading all those rocks — and why ERW could become a key, if limited, piece of the broader climate puzzle.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-enhanced-rock</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:155317780</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 07 Feb 2025 17:03:36 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/155317780/587b8097498cd8e419c89d7385e8cb77.mp3" length="80994963" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4045</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/155317780/9b9a74b0056d9305a88f2fc6189d3b5e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The cybersecurity implications of a clean-energy grid]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I speak with Harry Krejsa of Carnegie Mellon about why cybersecurity experts and clean energy advocates need to work together. Drawing from his White House experience, Krejsa explains how a modernized clean energy grid could actually help defend against China's cyberthreats — for the benefit of both peaceniks and natsec hawks.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-cybersecurity-implications-of</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:155508374</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 05 Feb 2025 17:03:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/155508374/9aa4483fdf6c4b765e2cc5f33c727038.mp3" length="83584252" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4175</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/155508374/4d724d558d98294410683bf469eb50d0.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Chris Hayes on the attention economy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Chris Hayes — author, MSNBC host, and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-chris-hayes-on-how">previous guest on Volts</a> — is just out with a new book, <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/4fQb50p"><em>The Sirens Call</em></a>, about the corrosive effects of the modern attention economy. In this episode, he and I dive deep into attention: what it is, when it became commodified, why it is so easy to steal, where industry is looking for new supplies, and how the harried and distracted can defend themselves from the onslaught. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/chris-hayes-on-the-attention-economy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:154523724</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 29 Jan 2025 15:01:55 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/154523724/7bc36e727e98050f95ff0ccdbe2c5913.mp3" length="84620334" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4226</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/154523724/970410b6f4d6ef37a4f2cb74d6b34d51.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with pumped-hydro energy storage?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Erik Steimle of Rye Development about the new wave of "closed loop" pumped-hydro storage projects. Unlike traditional systems that rely on rivers and dams, these projects use two artificial reservoirs — providing reliable long-duration storage without impacting natural waterways. We explore the economics of these billion-dollar facilities, their 100+ year lifespans, and how they compare to lithium-ion storage.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-pumped-hydro</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:154804184</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 22 Jan 2025 17:03:30 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/154804184/3d8791e5040d62ea8b6d8c0188fe0457.mp3" length="69132889" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3452</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/154804184/f6b5df829e30c0a01aed8ddb31201e80.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Assembling diverse resources into super-powered "energy parks"]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>I'm joined by Eric Gimon to discuss "energy parks" — essentially large-scale microgrids that combine renewable generation, storage, and industrial loads behind a single grid connection. We explore how this model could accelerate clean energy deployment while creating new economic opportunities, despite some complex regulatory hurdles.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/assembling-diverse-resources-into</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:153009424</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 15 Jan 2025 17:03:23 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/153009424/141c34d6a50ce6885ce5a07df1c09aee.mp3" length="83327860" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4162</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/153009424/8974caf2dfd9ae7dbb57a7e08622ec5e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Organizing local support for clean energy projects]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Matt Traldi, co-founder of Greenlight America, about the fight for clean energy at the local level. We discuss how small groups of opponents are successfully blocking renewable projects across the country, and how his organization is working to turn the tide by mobilizing local supporters and giving them the tools to advocate effectively at critical government meetings.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/organizing-local-support-for-clean</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:153149393</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 08 Jan 2025 17:03:06 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/153149393/c31774388e99564b527847ae335f50c6.mp3" length="83745851" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4183</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/153149393/91242a9907879799ecb2692e7c26695c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Thermal energy networks are the next big thing]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I revisit thermal energy networks with HEET's Zeyneb Magavi and Eversource's Eric Bosworth. What was once a novel concept - replacing gas networks with shared ground-source heat pumps - is now being piloted across the country. We explore the technology's remarkable efficiency and its potential to revolutionize heating and cooling — and give gas utilities a second life as thermal utilities.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/thermal-energy-networks-are-the-next</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:152878898</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 17:02:30 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/152878898/9fe4aabd3ed61ea53cb48b3181461ca0.mp3" length="99636725" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4977</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/152878898/61d720d2f872eaee122d28ba818f2a69.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The promise of residential VPPs]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I speak with Ben Brown, CEO of Renew Home, about the company's groundbreaking 1-gigawatt virtual power plant deal with NRG Energy in Texas. It will be the nation’s largest VPP, leveraging existing smart thermostats to control millions of residential HVAC systems. We discuss customer experience, data privacy, and the ability of VPPs to rapidly scale to meet rising electricity demand.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-promise-of-residential-vpps</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:152602082</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 20 Dec 2024 17:03:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/152602082/9bececf3ff0d0f49ac17d8d970414f46.mp3" length="82288871" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4110</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/152602082/940b00976af03cb09299893c82f018df.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Should we put utilities in charge of distributed energy? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I speak with Pier LaFarge, CEO of Sparkfund, who challenges the traditional antagonism between utilities and distributed energy advocates. While investor-owned utilities have long been seen as obstacles to clean energy adoption, LaFarge argues that they're actually essential to scaling DERs in an era of explosive electricity demand.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/should-we-put-utilities-in-charge</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:152781935</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 18 Dec 2024 17:03:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/152781935/225c7ddb87c5c4d7911f909d02af0b61.mp3" length="136224446" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>6807</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/152781935/5ec0df87f53fef1eb8a57606e7c069c0.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Time to stop taking hydropower for granted?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I speak with Malcolm Woolf and Connor Nelson about hydropower's underappreciated role in America's clean energy landscape. While providing most of our energy storage and thus supporting solar and wind deployments, hydropower faces significant challenges, with a decade-long relicensing processes and inadequate market compensation. We discuss why preserving and expanding this reliable, clean firm energy source is crucial as we transition to renewables.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/time-to-stop-taking-hydropower-for</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:152167786</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 13 Dec 2024 17:09:05 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/152167786/fa69a7f720e88706f66f357c9089a014.mp3" length="75511205" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3771</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/152167786/ba7a9870e76fb1c19072686f7fcdedef.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Can we avoid the enshittification of clean-energy tech?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I chat with author Cory Doctorow about "enshittification," his viral term for how digital platforms and smart technologies inevitably get worse over time. We explore how monopoly power, aggressive IP protections, and lax privacy law enable companies to capture and exploit users — and what that might mean for the clean energy transition as our homes and vehicles become increasingly software-dependent.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/can-we-avoid-the-enshittification</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:151199735</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 11 Dec 2024 17:03:21 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/151199735/ac96f179607eac8bf720ff8d1c346dec.mp3" length="116791228" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5835</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/151199735/0a6991df8afcbb1ef301b38e1723a6db.jpg"/><itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType></item><item><title><![CDATA[Climate change and insurance: a growing fustercluck]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Kate Gordon, CEO of California Forward, about how climate change is breaking the insurance industry. We discuss why insurers are fleeing high-risk states, the limitations of government backstops, and the looming political and financial crisis as communities face hard choices about where people can safely live.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/climate-change-and-insurance-a-growing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:151949866</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 04 Dec 2024 17:03:34 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/151949866/1a141b4cf286c28a555fa42db3e562e2.mp3" length="80239956" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4008</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/151949866/68765d020b2746a7ef66c9a33c606ed0.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Checking in on local and state climate races]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Caroline Spears of Climate Cabinet about the results of the state and local climate races her organization tracked in 2024. We discuss the importance of these often-overlooked state and local races for climate progress, the challenges of the current political information environment, and Climate Cabinet's strategy for building power at the state level through 2030 and beyond. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/checking-in-on-local-and-state-climate</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:151902205</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 27 Nov 2024 17:03:11 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/151902205/5caeb23ea5844ab8b9a009984f2881cf.mp3" length="66325115" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3312</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/151902205/522512ccdfa66b6e3aace36b39227845.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Electrifying big trucks]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Ray Minjares of ICCT and Jacqueline Torres of Forum Mobility about the electrification of heavy trucks, from drayage at ports to long-haul big rigs. We dig into charging challenges, innovative financing models, and the massive pollution cuts possible by transitioning fleets. Electric trucks are here — but they need the right policies and partnerships to scale.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/electrifying-big-trucks</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:151767289</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 22 Nov 2024 17:03:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/151767289/e050932ab7f0ef0f1bf719eaa456277c.mp3" length="85889329" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4290</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/151767289/23632b3e24c51380d14ce3ab99c5aa3f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Dan Savage on blue America in the age of Trump]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with activist, sex advice columnist, and progressive journalist Dan Savage about the legacy of “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.thestranger.com/news/2004/11/11/19813/the-urban-archipelago">The Urban Archipelago</a>,” a groundbreaking piece he commissioned and edited two decades ago in the wake of GW Bush’s reelection, urging Democrats to embrace cities as their political base and future. We explore how NIMBY-captured Democratic city leadership has stifled urban potential — and why improving and growing cities isn’t just policy; it’s party building.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/dan-savage-on-blue-america-in-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:151469081</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 20 Nov 2024 17:03:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/151469081/49f8ded6ebe85e2a630d347998c190cc.mp3" length="83282523" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4160</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/151469081/729b1ef68856c9c286d0399d2a24ca69.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Residential solar is becoming residential solar + storage + VPP]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I chat with Sunrun CEO Mary Powell about how residential solar is evolving into much more than just panels. We dive into Sunrun’s expansion as a “clean energy lifestyle” brand, Mary’s belief in a customer-led energy transition, and alternatives to the tech bros' virile obsession with nuclear power.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/residential-solar-is-becoming-residential</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:151394934</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 13 Nov 2024 17:02:53 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/151394934/564148d6fc507e9daf61b668cd2ce661.mp3" length="57682934" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2880</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/151394934/90afd1b195b014f9a2f7b031eed99601.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How railroads could boost the US energy transition]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with Bill Moyer, founder of the Reconnect America campaign, about the huge, untapped potential of U.S. railroads to support the clean energy transition. Bill makes the case that our privately owned rail system, focused on short-term profits, is missing out on big public benefits—like shifting freight from roads to rails, reducing emissions, and even using rail corridors to carry high-voltage transmission lines for renewable energy. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-railroads-could-boost-the-us</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:150822285</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 06 Nov 2024 17:02:02 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/150822285/76defa0cb82ecb7bb24cd9624e136821.mp3" length="87936869" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4393</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/150822285/0da14b3b849032ff54017e56cc887126.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How is electrification going?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I chat with Ari Matusiak, co-founder and head of Rewiring America, which recently received a $2 billion grant from the feds to take home electrification mainstream. We dig into the practical challenges — getting local contractors on board, simplifying rebate access — and the enormous opportunities.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-is-electrification-going</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:150164024</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2024 16:03:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/150164024/7c7726c0e3628807b2bc3d9d28f24ea9.mp3" length="62704778" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3131</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/150164024/b3599133e11eb6e09f1bbaa2340f1e97.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Tying utility profits to actually doing a good job]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, we’re diving into the wonky but vital topic of performance-based utility regulation (PBR) with Cara Goldenberg and Laura Gonzalez. We discuss how traditional utility regulation creates perverse incentives for utilities — and the tools PBR offers to better align incentives with modern priorities to like resilience, equity, and decarbonization. Dozens of states have adopted some form of PBR or other, and Virginia might be next.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/tying-utility-profits-to-actually</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:149951986</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 23 Oct 2024 16:26:39 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/149951986/294b1fe2622b619374fe8948ecb8b27e.mp3" length="74489652" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3720</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/149951986/ed4aedb9a79a42e4d68a0f4b7123c979.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Department of Energy has gotten serious about technology commercialization]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I sit down with Dr. Vanessa Chan, DOE’s Chief Commercialization Officer, to discuss the challenges of commercializing new clean energy technologies. Her office has helped develop a common vocabulary among stakeholders (“adoption readiness levels”) and concentrated the attention of public and private capital on certain key technologies (“pathway to liftoff” reports). It’s wonky stuff, but it has transformed and turbocharged DOE’s commercialization efforts.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-department-of-energy-has-gotten</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:149850929</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 16 Oct 2024 16:02:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/149850929/9ebd53c5cdacdfa2b67d22555837c25a.mp3" length="77079987" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3850</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/149850929/b22c47488af6e33b41c4c594fcf6780e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Digging into one of this year's most important-but-overlooked clean energy elections]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Ylenia Aguilar joins me to discuss her candidacy for the Arizona Corporation Commission. We examine the ACC’s history of rubber stamping rate hikes, dismantling renewable energy initiatives, and generally pandering to utilities. Three ACC seats are up for election this year and the outcomes could have a profound impact on the state's energy future.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/digging-into-one-of-this-years-most</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:149742390</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 11 Oct 2024 16:02:56 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/149742390/e55d69d8297e0685128c50c624740536.mp3" length="61597839" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3076</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/149742390/8af6ffe998f019f67f09f798be23bb9d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What Allison Clements thinks about the grid]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I sit down with Allison Clements, former FERC commissioner, to discuss her time at the commission and the challenges of grid modernization. We dive into the complexities of integrating clean energy, reforms to interconnection queues, and how the commission can take a more active role in the energy transition.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-allison-clements-thinks-about</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:149594005</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 09 Oct 2024 16:03:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/149594005/dff868100e955a0f66571ecb0115e333.mp3" length="84428820" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4217</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/149594005/7b3f040a9effa7870774cefa83fe4379.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with the Texas Railroad Commission?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I explore the controversial Texas Railroad Commission with Virginia Palacios of Commission Shift. We discuss the commission's history, its misleading name, its cozy relationship with the oil & gas industry it's meant to oversee, and its role before and after the devastating Winter Storm Uri, where lax regulation contributed to widespread power outages and deaths.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-the-texas-railroad</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:149331673</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 04 Oct 2024 16:03:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/149331673/177477a05d8e87c832e64e5929405a16.mp3" length="71503463" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3571</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/149331673/befadedac04ae0076b134c4f1e745766.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A closer look at Pennsylvania, the swingiest of swing states]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I explore the political landscape of Pennsylvania with state Rep. Leanne Krueger. We discuss the state's nail-biting elections, the outsized political influence of fracking, and the uphill battle for clean energy legislation in a divided legislature. Krueger provides a boots-on-the-ground perspective on climate and energy politics in this key swing state.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-closer-look-at-pennsylvania-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:149377243</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 02 Oct 2024 16:03:21 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/149377243/66251dbe3a04ea42fdbb94ef1c31c68b.mp3" length="67634271" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3378</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/149377243/d89fd0fe7b0b59a4cd44c74a744e65e1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A new way to retrofit old buildings ... from the outside]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I geek out with David Goldstein, founder of Hydronic Shell Technologies, about a novel building retrofit technology that wraps old multifamily structures in insulated panels with built-in HVAC systems. Goldstein's approach allows for energy-efficient upgrades without interior disruption, potentially solving a major challenge in building decarbonization. We dive into how the system combines exterior insulation, air sealing, and centralized heat pumps with individual window units to dramatically reduce energy demand and emissions.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-new-way-to-retrofit-old-buildings</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:148522343</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 25 Sep 2024 16:02:53 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/148522343/5f36972334338019f6a52ea78408be9e.mp3" length="84291022" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4211</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/148522343/14f6b0daf79617ced53eb59ca6ebea85.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How the Biden investments are changing America]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, we explore the Biden administration's ambitious industrial investment strategy with Heather Boushey, a member of the President's Council of Economic Advisors and chief economist for his Invest in America Cabinet.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-the-biden-investments-are-changing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:148436695</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 18 Sep 2024 16:02:56 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/148436695/7c42e210034efe67e20b375142d04a46.mp3" length="73958549" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3694</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/148436695/51420ff59391f671868889669867eecf.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A tool that enables solar-first home electrification]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>California homeowners face a complex puzzle in decarbonizing their homes: electrification without rooftop solar could increase bills due to expensive electricity, while installing solar first risks oversizing or underutilizing the system. Balto Energy, a startup founded by James Quazi, uses AI to analyze utility bills and recommend the most cost-effective clean energy strategy. In this episode, we discuss Balto's tool, its potential to empower contractors, and what California's situation reveals about the future of clean energy policy nationwide.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/a7toj69gvozjyhzos9b90/volts24.09.13-james.quazi.pdf?rlkey=l174nz93rsue7ctt81mnkf9vx&#38;st=8i7hhunq&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/a-tool-that-enables-solar-first-home-electrification"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hello everyone. This is Volts for September 13, 2024, "A tool that enables solar first home electrification." I'm your host, David Roberts. Californians who want to decarbonize their homes face something of a conundrum. If they electrify their cars and appliances without getting rooftop solar, they could end up paying higher overall bills thanks to California's notoriously expensive electricity and cheap natural gas. </p><p>If they install rooftop solar before electrifying their cars and appliances, they could either undersize the system for their eventual needs or oversize it and over-produce and export solar power to the California grid. Thanks to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sunrun.com/go-solar-center/solar-articles/nem-3-0-what-it-is-and-how-it-affects-california-home-solar">California's recent NEM 3.0 decision</a> on rooftop solar compensation, utilities pay much less for that exported rooftop solar power than they used to.</p><p>The most economical strategy for most homeowners is likely to be some mix of electrification, batteries, and rooftop solar. The more a California homeowner stores and consumes their own cheap rooftop solar power, the more value they get out of that solar and the lower their total bills. It is a complex calculation, though, that most homeowners are in no position to make. That's where the startup <a target="_blank" href="https://www.baltoenergy.com/">Balto Energy</a> comes in. Founder James Quazi, a longtime energy modeler and entrepreneur, has built a tool that can use a home's utility bills to create a model of its consumption patterns, predict what they will be as appliances are electrified, and recommend the maximally economical approach.</p><p>It's part of a larger effort to help contractors and solar companies navigate a post-net-metering world. I'm excited to talk to Quazi about why his tool is needed and how it works, how it will empower contractors, and what California's present says about the future of clean energy policy in the rest of the country.</p><p>With no further ado, James Quazi, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Thank you for having me. That was a great intro.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thanks. So, you know, I sort of went over it a little quickly in the intro there. But let's talk a little bit about this conundrum for Californians who are trying to decarbonize. So, just by background — I don't even know if everyone's been following the California rooftop solar wars, I kind of assume everybody has — but just by way of background, California recently basically issued a new policy on rooftop solar, and the long and short of it is that they're going to compensate homeowners much less. It used to be that basically you could get paid the retail rate for your excess solar, and now they're just going to pay much, much less than that.</p><p>On the surface, this really damages the economical case for solar for homeowners, they'll get compensated much less. This has resulted in a huge blow to the solar industry in California. There are solar companies shutting down, jobs being lost, etcetera, etcetera. So, talk a little bit about the conundrum and how you think about solving it.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, so about a year ago, the net energy metering policy in California changed from NEM 2.0 to NEM 3.0, now called Net Billing Tariff. The difference is, as you mentioned, that now customers get paid on a schedule. Each hour per year is a different rate. But generally, you can think of it as between like $0.05 and $0.08 for exported energy, while imported energy for me in San Diego is between $0.38 and $0.52 an hour. So it degrades the value proposition for residential solar for a homeowner. For contractors, it's also proven really difficult. So in the past, it was really easy to have rule of thumb sizing or heuristics, or if you took annual energy over the last twelve months and you designed a system that produced around that same amount of energy, it was generally going to be a good value proposition for the homeowner.</p><p>But now, what you need to understand is, like, how much of that solar production is actually coincident with the load on the house, because the export of energy is devalued.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, the economics now have shifted to make it so that, I mean, maybe this was true already, but more true now that the ideal thing for Californians with rooftop solar to do is to consume as much of the generated power as conceivably possible.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>That's absolutely correct. So, if you can think of it as, and I'm sure your listeners are familiar with the terminology, like LCOE. So, the cost of solar, residential rooftop solar, is somewhere between, let's say, $0.10 and $0.12 a kilowatt-hour to produce, whereas the retail rate is much higher depending on the IOU that you're a part of. To the extent that you can consume cheap on-site electricity, you are hugely benefited as a customer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So then the question becomes, well, there's a bunch of different ways of approaching this question, but from this sort of like, if I'm trying to sell solar, right, I need a little bit of a new pitch, right? Because before, with full retail compensation, it's kind of a no-brainer, you could make a lot of money, but now you can make a lot less money. So this changes the value proposition for solar. So, explain exactly how the sort of calculation shifts.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Sure, I would actually reframe it a little bit in terms of, like, I believe so in the previous net metering paradigm. We often saw simple solar paybacks in the five to seven years. I believe that those paybacks are still available to homeowners, but it's just a different set of products and services than simply rooftop solar on the roof. So, I think our goal is to help retool the solar industries, to help look at a house as a whole, maybe converting a lot of the energy on site that we previously ignored, whether that's natural gas or gasoline, and then power that all with cheap onsite renewables, and that will drive the value proposition for that homeowner.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. It's still worthwhile getting solar, even maybe still a comparable payoff period, but a different approach. And basically, it's going to be a little bit more of a complicated approach. Right? Like, it's one thing just to stick solar on the roof. Like, how much energy do I use, let's stick that much solar on the roof. Pretty easy. Once you bring in the whole home, just the combinatorial, you know what I mean? Just the calculations get a lot more complicated.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>For sure. So, like, I think in two respects. One, it's more complicated for the contractor to feel confident in the system that they're proposing and the financial outcome for the homeowner. And then two, from a homeowner's perspective, it's more complicated to understand and digest and comprehend a suite of services that might include solar and a battery and a heat pump and an EV, than it is simply like panels on a roof. Our goal at Balto Energy is to sort of do the modeling and ingest the complexity and then deliver it in a way that's consumable for both a contractor and a homeowner.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, talk briefly about what your tool does. What is the outcome supposed to be? What is it trying to accomplish?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, so our perspective on it is that oftentimes in the past, if you asked for a solar quote, you would get maybe one option, two options, or three options, max. Really, like, if I take my own house as an example, so I live in San Diego, I can fit up to 30 panels on the roof, which is constrained by roof geometry, area shading, what have you. So let's call it maybe 20 to 30 different flavors of solar systems that I could possibly engage in. If I layer on batteries, I could have 1, 2, 3, 4 batteries. And then EVs, one or two EVs, and heat pump or not heat pump, water heater or not water heater.</p><p>And our first step in the process is to ingest an address and then interval bill data. So, we need hourly electric reads and daily gas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that, just to be clear, this is the sort of raw information that's going into the model?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's utility bills. And this, these are available from the utility. There's no, it's not difficult to get this information.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Somewhat loaded question. It should be available. I just finished listening to your podcast on "Free the energy data." I have —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's why I ask. I'm wondering how straightforward it is to get the raw data that you need.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>I would say that having been in this industry for 20 years, it's much easier now than it has ever been before. That being the case, there are still hurdles. There's a lot of missing intervals. There's patchwork to be done. There are services that provide synthetic intervals. It's not as clean of a dataset as I would ideally like, but it's generally like the authorization, and there are a couple of third-party companies now that do it and are making it easier.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it notably easier in California than it is in other states? Different in California than in other states? Or is this just a utility by utility thing across the country?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Our focus is in California right now. So, I have the most depth and experience there for this problem. Even within California and the IOUs, it is utility by utility.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So are you restricted geographically where you can sell your product based on the utilities, whether you can get these to utility information or not?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Our position is that to accurately model a home's energy use and consumption profiles, you need two things. One is you need a physics-based model of the building, and then you need to be able to calibrate that with what is actually happening in the home. I've done a lot of energy modeling, auditing, that sort of thing. I think the one definitive thing that I've learned is that the best site observed data is actually bills. It will help you ferret out how people use their home, what their preferences are, and is actually the ground truth data.</p><p>So, our position as a company is because we want to be able to confidently project — like, let's say if I converted a gas furnace to a heat pump, and I want to know on an hourly basis, what is the energy input to that system. To do that accurately, I believe that you need interval data.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you are in some sense beholden to utilities here or dependent on utilities to be forthcoming?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think, unfortunately. And then to "Free the energy data" podcast. Yes, this is true, and it is being in some ways held hostage, and that's not great for the industry. I would say that our success rate right now is like, it's significant enough that we see this as somewhat of a hurdle, but not a deal breaker.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, right. So, I mean, getting utility bills seems straightforward enough. You just ask the homeowner and they give them to you. But when you say a physics-based model of the house, you have to go do that in person. Can you construct that from publicly available data?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yes, you can. We've done this in several iterations in the past. So, the background engine that does this is an NREL product called EnergyPlus. And it has, let's say, a full set of data requirements, which you can imagine has a lot of physical attributes of the specific house. And what we do ourselves and through partners, is comb, let's say, permit record databases and MLS listings. And we can get close enough with that set of information to build the first model. And then it's really, in comparing that model to the billing data, what's actually happening on an hourly basis, that allows us to calibrate it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So, you don't have to do a site visit to do any of this, really. You could theoretically do all of this modeling remotely?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yep. Everything like roof geometry, shading, building modeling, tariff engines, all the things that are sort of the processes to get to an output, can be done remotely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right. And so, you put all this information into the model, and then what is the model supposed to do? And here's a question I had also: Am I the homeowner, interacting with this model in any way, or is the model a tool for contractors?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Our plan, at the very start, we're working with a set of contractors, and we're in Napa and Sonoma to start, most notably Northern Pacific. Our plan is to deliver a tool to a solar contractor that they can use to propose a wide range of solutions that a homeowner might want. I think that this will become a customer-facing tool or exploratory tool in the future, but we are definitely starting with solar contractors.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Yeah, because one of the questions I had about this is just that I'm sure I'm not telling you anything as someone who's worked in energy for a long time, but just like, people are pretty lazy, and the way people make decisions about appliances and stuff like that is generally to ignore it until it breaks and then go to Home Depot. So, like this comprehensive, long-term, holistic planning, I'm just like, wondering, like, how many homeowners are really that committed?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>So, let me give you an idea of, like, what the output of the tool is, then where I see this going. So, you know, back to my house, 30 panels, batteries, EV's, all the things. What we want to do is expand the solution set for all possible outcomes for that house. So, if I permutate those things, it ends up being a set of maybe like a couple hundred to a thousand different individual pathways. It could be 28 panels —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And these are like mixes of the number of panels, the number of batteries, what kind of appliances, that kind of thing.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>That's absolutely correct. And then what we've created is sort of a decision-making framework that allows you to search that space for the thing that's right for you. At first, contextualized in one of three goal seeks. So the first one being a very standard solar approach, which is "Deliver me the best financial outcome." The second one, which we're seeing a sort of increasing adoption around, is like, "Yeah, I want a great financial outcome, but I also want to power this set of critical loads or my entire house through an outage of this duration. And I'm not cost-sensitive around that."</p><p>So, like, if I need to add a battery or two batteries and it provides that service, that's fine. And then the third one is a sort of immersion. Ten years ago, when I was in the solar industry, it was like there was a time when we thought we had to deliver day one savings to get adoption. And it turned out there was a segment of the population, mostly retirees or people that were about to retire, who, let's say, had a $150 utility bill. And they're like, "You know, saving money isn't as important to me as, you know, I experienced the grid cost is volatile, but always volatile in the upward direction.</p><p>And if you are going to put on the system and it has a 20-year lifespan, can you lock in this $150 for 20 years? And I don't experience any increase in costs." So those are starting points. I will say that I think there's more out there. So, there are a segment of customers that could be interested in just like the environmental outcome, and there's ways to calculate that based on grid dynamics. That's where we're starting, and I think we'll kind of learn our way into the solution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so you can tweak the model depending on what your goals are, depending on what your aims are. And I guess one of the questions I had about it is, like, in California at least, grid electricity is so expensive and natural gas is so cheap, and solar compensation is now so low, that it seems like the most economical outcome for homeowners is always going to be to electrify all your appliances and put a bunch of rooftop solar to power your appliances. It seems like that's always going to be the cheapest outcome, is it not? And that's also always going to be the most environmentally preferable outcome, right?</p><p>Because it's zero carbon. In other words, what if I, as a contractor, just came to you and said, "Look, I can do all these complicated calculations, but trust me, you want to electrify all your appliances and put rooftop solar on your roof. That's what it's going to end up showing you." Does it ever show otherwise?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>So, if we were to implement generalized or rules of thumb, I think that would be a good one. What I have seen is there are time when your're roof constrained, so you might not have the roof capacity to power all the things, and then you'd want to make better decisions. To the extent that you have vast plains of south-facing, west-facing roof area, we want to make sure that we're installing the right amount of solar and batteries. So, I think that there's an optimization problem there. But, I think you're right in the sense that to the extent that you can self-consume a ton of energy that you generated on-site, that will be the best outcome for you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then, if I'm a homeowner and I run this model, or a contractor comes to me and runs this model, and the outcome of the model is the most economical approach for you, the homeowner, is to buy a heat pump, buy a heat pump water heater, buy an induction stove, et cetera, buy a bunch of batteries and put a bunch of rooftop solar on the roof. On the one hand, I might believe, I might find it perfectly plausible that that is the end state that will yield the lowest ongoing operating costs for my house. But on the other hand, that's a daunting upfront investment. Do you know what I mean?</p><p>In a sense, if I'm a homeowner and a contractor comes to me, he's like, "I'm selling solar. And by the way, I have this fancy tool that shows me that you also need to buy a bunch of other stuff from me." I guess I'm just a little suspicious.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>I think the intent of the tool is to allow a homeowner to make the best decision for them. To the extent that the best decision is, in fact, a larger PV system, more batteries, maybe a heat pump, and all of those things in aggregate end up being expensive directionally , but have great payback. I think that hits on like sort of the second vein of Balto. So the first is like, how do we create a decision framework and compute engine to give you the scenarios and help you make a decision? Once you've made a decision —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Will the model also crank out a preferred order of operations for that? You know what I mean? Not just like an end state that would be best, but like, what steps in what order are economical?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>This is getting back to the solar-led electrification vision for this. Our position is that solar and storage should lead always , and we should be building 20 or 25-year products for the future energy consumption. The tool is there to say, can we share a vision of the future and what applies and things you'll be engaged in, whether that's EVs or heat pumps or whatever. Once we have that, can we build 25-year renewable infrastructure on site to support those things over time? We think that there are interesting ways. And I'll touch on the financing in a little bit about how to transact this and make it consistent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I want to get to the financing in a minute, but before I leave this question. So, why always solar and batteries first? Or put it this way, why shouldn't I put a little bit of solar and batteries on, enough to power my current appliances? And then, you know, when I switch out my furnace for a heat pump, just stick a couple more solar panels on the roof. Why not do it incrementally like that?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yes, I myself have a background, and then we've got some deep partnerships with contractors. They are not a fan of that approach for a number of reasons. One is if I take a five-kilowatt system and then I append a three-kilowatt system on later, that is not the cost of an eight-kilowatt system. It's much more costly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because just coming out to the site again and all—</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Redesign, permitting. Yeah, all the things. And then separately, depending on the time lag between system one and system two, there are at times, compatibility issues with modules that make it more difficult. I think solar's gotten inexpensive enough where if you were going to engage in one of maybe the three big electrification projects, which would be EV, heat pump, heat pump water heater, I mean, you should be sizing for at bare minimum that. And I would argue for the whole thing if that's what you intend to do, on day one. And then if you're doing other things, let's say that have a more de minimis impact on your meter or your electrical consumption, like a stove, then maybe it's fine to wait.</p><p>But to the extent that, like, you're considering solar and storage and one of the other things, I think it makes a lot of sense to size appropriately for future loads.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, you would say to any homeowner contemplating solar that the financially smartest thing to do is to size a system for your projected total need in the future, not your current need.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, I feel strongly that that is the case. I will take myself as an example again. I have an EV. I am considering a heat pump. I have a tankless hot water heater that is in a closet and is not easily replaceable with a heat pump water heater given form factor. But given those things, I did size the PV to the anticipated heat pump. Even if that doesn't happen on day one, it might happen on year one, three, five, or seven, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, are you not then, while you have the solar that's oversized for your current needs, are you not sort of financially losing out in the interim, in the meantime?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>So, I think that again, the export value for solar today directionally is much lower. So, there is some value, it's not a lot. I would categorize it as you're not optimizing the system today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Suboptimal, then let's see.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>But I think that what you're really doing is putting together the infrastructure to adopt more products in the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. A contractor comes to me as a homeowner, says, "Let's look at how much solar you will need once you've electrified your home," basically, and install that amount. Do you envision these same contractors who are trying to sell solar, selling these other things to homeowners as well? Sort of like offering, like moving beyond solar to offer kind of total home electrification packages type of things.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>I think there's going to be a couple of different flavors, and we'll see what sorts out. In San Diego, one of the biggest residential installers actually has historically had a heat pump division of their company. That's probably not the norm. I do see a lot of solar installers — I mean, certainly, a solar installer is now installing storage by default. A lot of them install EV chargers. I've seen some interest in heat pump water heaters as the installation is quite a bit easier than heat pumps, HVAC. So, I think that we'll see some adoption of product over time.</p><p>I do believe that the heat pump is probably the one thing that is a set of expertise that is probably different than what solar providers have in-house. What they can do, and we anticipate doing, is a lot of pre-wiring work. It's taken as an industry axiom that HVAC products get replaced when they break. To the extent that that infrastructure, whether it's a 240 circuit to the existing furnace location, is not in place, it's very likely that the existing thing gets replaced with something very similar, and then we're locked into this pattern for 15 years.</p><p>So, we're very interested in, again, sizing appropriately, but then also doing some of the pre-work that allows these things to be adopted.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Trey, interesting. And so, from your perspective, you're going to put the tool in the hands of contractors, and then to some extent, the contractors are going to figure out exactly how best to use it and what kind of packages to offer and stuff like that. Is Balto out being a contractor, like running this, interacting with homeowners?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>No, we are not. So, what we're doing is providing a toolset, which is computational tools, finance tools that allow existing contractors today to be more effective.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. And so, talk about the financial side of this. So, I'm guessing I'm borderline illiterate when it comes to money issues. But I'm guessing that part of the promise of this is that if you can more accurately and reliably project future energy needs in a home, you're going to have an easier time financing the sort of oversized solar system that you want in anticipation of those loads. Is that right? Part of this is like giving confidence to financial institutions to finance these things, right?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's exactly right. So, I would say that the first step is having a shared vision of what the future of this home looks like. So, what are the appliances that are on the list and off the list? EVs, whatever the case is. And then, from past learnings at Solar City and Dandelion, really what you have to do is package it in a way that people can experience the savings at the same rate as they chunk off the capital cost of these projects. And then, in terms of energy savings over time and confidence, I think the goal there is, and we could think of it as if you were getting a loan.</p><p>One factor in the loan might be your debt-to-income ratio. How much debt do you have, and can you actually service this loan over time? And our position is, to the extent that these suite of products actually lowers your obligations to pay, so your utility bills, that should be factored into any financial product as well. Does that make sense?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, it's almost like future income increases, almost like.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, so if I had, like, if my obligations to pay a loan provider were $1,000 a month, just randomly, and I made x amount of income, if the obligation was less, if it was $500 a month, given all these energy savings, I would have a greater ability to pay back that loan, and that should be factored in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, I see, I see. So, is the idea here just for this tool you've created to give confidence to homeowners who are going to banks and stuff, or are you getting in the finance game at all?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Our intention is to provide the financing for it as well. I mean, like, I think any time we're trying to make the process as seamless as possible. So, it's sort of like a one-stop shop in terms of assessing what's right, what's the best fit for you in terms of these projects, and then packaging it in a way that — we're hoping it incentivizes people to do more sooner, but to the extent that they want to do things over time, it is also like a flexible facility that allows you to adopt a heat pump water heater in year three, if that's what you want.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the contractors are the ones offering the homeowners this sort of financing package?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yep, that's correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And the contractors are able to do it because they have this information from your tool that gives them confidence?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Hand in glove.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, just having gone over all this, let's rewind and just imagine I'm a homeowner, and a contractor knocks on my door. What do you envision the contractor sort of like, what is the homeowner facing pitch from the contractor? Because there's a lot of complicated stuff going on behind the scenes for the contractor. What is the homeowner hearing? What is the pitch to the homeowner?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, we see it as a stepwise process. So, because our go-to market is through solar contractors, the first step is to say, if I were any other solar contractor, and you called me for a solar and potentially storage system, what I would have done is looked at your current electrical bills and size the system this way, and this is what... "You want a five kilowatt solar array and one battery, 110 kilowatt hour battery." The next step is to say, "Hey, listen, we're actually in that world. We're only looking at one of probably three silos of energy that you're using."</p><p>So, we're ignoring the natural gas side of the bill. We're ignoring everything that's happening at the pump. But, if we look at your energy spend holistically, here are a suite of options that are available to you. And this is the differential sort of financial outcome versus just a solar system, versus, like, resiliency versus bill stability kind of thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, the idea here is, I go to the contractor and say, "Hey, I've been thinking about solar and battery," and the contractor says to me, "Well, hey, what about this larger package? You could have even bigger savings, and you could have resilience," and stuff like this. So, it's a little bit like an upsell for a contractor.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, I would think of it as like, being able to more holistically address energy spend. Like, that's our goal, is to say, "It's not just one flavor that we're dealing with. We're looking at the entire house and things, and we want the best solution for you."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It makes me wonder how long it will be before homeowners think that way, or if they ever will. Because homeowners just think of products as separate products. I don't know that a lot of homeowners, especially outside our world, even sort of think of the home as a system, right? With certain energetic inputs and outputs that should be dealt with as a holistic system. Like, that's just — I'm not even sure homeowners are at all accustomed to thinking that way.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>I wonder if I myself am, like, blinded by sort of a friend group or whatever the case is. But I would say that, like, I don't know of a lot of people that aren't at least considering an EV, right? Even if they're not, like, actively join in. But it's like, "Hey, listen, this is actually a real option." I don't think that heat pumps are very far behind that curve. It's interesting, like when people, like historically, when people inquire about solar, we often times have thought of that as they want bill savings. But I am not entirely sure that that is the reason.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do we know? Have we done surveys and polls? I'm so curious. I would also assume, just out of a sort of, I guess, a low, like a background degree of cynicism, that that's going to be the dominant motivation. But is it? Like, I don't feel confident about that at all.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Well, I don't either. My belief is that bill savings are part of a decision-making process, but probably very rarely the primary driver. And that is the thing. And even if you look at, like, the funnel conversion metrics of, like, the solar industry as a whole, it's just like, for every hundred people that inquire, single-digit people actually do the things. And our perspective is like, you know, they're getting stuck somewhere in the process. And it's oftentimes with questions that cannot be answered, and that's when they stall out. And that is our reason for expanding the set to everything that's possible in your home and letting you search that, because we think we'll figure out what are the motivations. I think that there's a strong cohort of people that are just anti-utility.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a piece of it. There's an environmental piece of it. There's a sort of independence, anti-utility piece of it. There's a vague mix. There's just social contagion, there's just peer pressure. You see it around you. It's the whole stew of motivations. I'd love to understand that better. So, I mean, it kind of seems like what you'd want is for your tool to be in the hands of everybody involved in any of those products. Do you know what I mean? Like, if I want an EV and I go to the car dealership, you know, it'd be cool if the car dealer could say to me, "Hey, you know, save even more money if you threw in a heat pump with this and a solar panel."</p><p>You know, like if, or the heat pump, people are like, "Hey, throw in an EV and solar panels." Like, it'd be nice if homeowners confronted the idea of total electrification everywhere they looked, right? I mean, that'd be ideal.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, 100%. I really think that's the vision, and that's where we're going. I think the entry point into a lot of this stuff will be varied. Like, it will be through an EV at the start, or a broken furnace that gets replaced by a heat pump or whatever the case is. I think our goal is to engage homeowners in a way where we have a persistent bill connection. I think that this is why that episode resonated so much with me. If we have an address and a persistent daily, hourly, monthly, whatever the case is, bill connection, you can drive insights over time to a homeowner at very meaningful times to intercept them.</p><p>Right now, I think this business, like solar in general, is very transactional. We think of it as like, we get leads in the top of the funnel, we set them at this rate, we convert them at this rate, we install them. It's a 30% gross margin, and then that's the end. Whereas, I don't believe that that's the way the products will be adopted and people will have to, I mean, internally we call it energy literacy. Like, how do I start to understand the problem and the solutions?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, in the same way, you sort of have a financial advisor, you could have like a home advisor, basically. A home energy advisor.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>And we also think it's got to be low impact, so it can't be like, "Hey, you've got to go do this detailed sort of appliance audit or whatever the case is." So it's bills and address, and then, you know, this is a great state of change problem where utility rates are constantly changing, prices of products are changing, incentives are changing, and there's always a chance to message. I very viscerally feel this in the sense that, like, when I took four years off and then reengaged with the industry, I was like, "Wow, we like, crossed the threshold, like, the point of no return, where electrification now makes sense for everyone," and I had missed it, and this is the only thing I'd ever done.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, it's moving so quickly. I will say, though, one thing I hear from, you know, and there's been articles written about this. It's just like, it's all out there from people who have tried to do this total electrification thing. It's just incredibly difficult, just incredibly difficult to synchronize everything and arrange everything. And so, in that context, the idea of having a kind of home advisor where, like, your hot water heater breaks and you just call your home advisor, you figure out, like, what's the right approach here, what's the economical approach, where to look, what kind of thing to get?</p><p>A lot of people would very much welcome having one of those, I feel like.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>And I think that this speaks to the general funnel conversion in the industry, but generally, a lead comes in, and then what we're trying to do is furiously convert them to a sale and install as quickly as possible, hopefully within 30 days, hopefully in one set. And I just don't believe that that's the way that people will consume products. It will be through a bunch of different experiences over time. And I think that's a meaningful difference. Like, you know, we're in such a rush to do all the things. Like, I'm in a rush to do all the things at once, but I think we have to also meet people where they are and, like, engage them in some way over time so they can make a decision, so they can make another decision.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I hope it changes because, honestly, like, you know, I've thought about solar. Ten years ago, we did one of those sort of, like, online audit things, and it was like, "No, you're too shaded." But I think it's just changed since then. Uh, just like, what's possible. But, like, I know that if I got a solar contractor and sat down at a table with that person, that they would just be sweaty and desperate, you know what I mean? To sell me just like it, exactly like I feel at the auto dealership, which is just like, "Ew," kind of uncomfortable, you know what I mean?</p><p>And rushed and don't feel like I have a full sense of all the pieces in play, and that I can't trust the person I'm talking to, to help me out, you know what I mean? I'm sort of, like, adversarial. I hate that whole model, you know what I mean? And just like, I would be, I don't know how representative I am, but I'd be inclined to spend more money if I just had a person who was like, had the big picture, had the model, had the data in hand, said, "You know, like whenever you're ready, this is the right first step."</p><p>Just like a better environment for homeowners to deal with these things and think about these things.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, I get it. I feel very similarly. I totally understand from the other perspective, like solar sales reps are expensive and they're hired to do one thing. I just don't know that it's the way that most people want to adopt the things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I can't believe that it's going to go to truly, truly mass penetration running on this model. It's going to have to evolve into something else. As we near the end here, let's pull the camera back a little bit and talk about the Agile Electrification project. My understanding basically is that the NEM 3.0 decision in California threw the solar contracting world into a bit of a tizzy. And there are efforts now to organize and figure out how to move forward and how to help contractors and what the right approach for contractors is in this new world.</p><p>So, tell us a little bit about what the Agile Electrification project is.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>It is an industry-sponsored project that's hosted at the Design and Innovation Center at UCSD. The genesis of it was a lot of, quite honestly, hammering around NEM 3.0. It was like if you read Canary or any of these publications, a lot of it is doom and gloom. This industry is down 70%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's a lot of "sky is falling" sentiment flying around.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think there have been. And you know, a lot of people are like, "Hey, listen, a lot of the bad actors are going to get flushed out with this," which I believe. I also believe a lot of some good actors will go out of business. So this is like a real issue. In times of turmoil, there's oftentimes opportunity and there's a group of people, contractors, manufacturers, investors, who have come together in this venue where sometimes it would be competitive or driven by business interests and they're coming together to solve problems for the industry. So right now it's a series of three projects to expand from there.</p><p>One is like energy modeling for the entire state of California. It's something that everyone needs. We want to do it and open source it. Another one that we touched on earlier is understanding customer motivations and understanding where they got stuck and how to unstick them, because our general sense is they want to save money. And I don't know if that's the primary motivation. And then the third one is around incentives and rebates and how to, like, it's a constantly evolving landscape and just staying on top of it is like a challenge and maybe a full-time job.</p><p>So, it's how to open-source that aspect of it, and how to qualify people for rebates and make sure that they're up to date, make sure they're not over-allocated, and deliver that information to the people on the ground that are actually installing the systems.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so, I'm stuck on this point. I just wanted to reiterate one more time. So, it's your belief that, because I think this sort of popular belief is that the NEM 3.0 decision has radically reduced homeowner incentives to get solar power, that it's just not as worth it anymore to get solar power. What you're saying is, with the right holistic approach, solar power is as valuable as ever and just as worth getting as ever. Is that your position?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>That is my position, yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you think that that is widely, like solar contractors believe that, or are you having to sort of buck them up and convince them of that?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Well, I think we're in a stage right now where, I mean, we set up the simplest possible website, have done very little marketing. We've had directionally 75 to 100 contractors sign up and say they're interested. I believe that the contractors are looking for solutions. For sure. That is definitively true. I think they should believe this because it is true that there is a great value proposition in homeowners. I think the issue here, maybe the persistent issue that's undeniable, is that it's more complex. Describing the value proposition has become more complex. For sure. There's no way around that.</p><p>So, we're trying to find ways to — I mean, the back-end compute engine is great. The real challenge is finding ways to deliver that information to customers in a way that's actionable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>For sure. Final question then. A lot of this seems very Californian. The fears and the solutions and all of it seems sort of very customized to California's current circumstances. How applicable is all of this, do you think, outside of California? Would your model be helpful to a homeowner in, I don't know, like Arkansas?</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, I would take it in two flavors. One is, I think there's the expectation, for good reason, that these policies in California will get exported to other states. So, it will become hugely relevant soon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You mean rooftop solar compensation getting cut way back? It's already happened in a couple of other states. I mean, it's definitely a trend.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, that's true. NEM 3.0, or like the difference between export energy valuation and import and parity, does not have to be true for this general value proposition to hold true. So, to that extent, I would say that it's portable anywhere. We chose to start in California because it is by far the biggest solar market. It accounts for about 50% of solar and there was a demonstrated need. I will say that it's a very complex problem to solve and it has geographic sides to it. So, as you move location, utilities change and their tariffs change and the way that they charge and weather changes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The information they make available.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Exactly, exactly. So, we've tactically started it in California for those reasons and constrained it. But there's no reason why this shouldn't be applicable to, like, any other place.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. It's sort of interesting. The big fear, or I guess the thing that solar people used to say to utilities when warning them away from NEM 3.0, is like, "Look, if you cut compensation too much, we're just going to self-consume and then install more electric appliances and then slowly wean ourselves off the grid and then not need the grid anymore. And then you're losing customers." The much-fabled death spiral. It seems like you're organizing to make that real, to make that happen.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>I have some thoughts on this. I really do think, and I don't know the answer, but at some point down the road, we're going to have a fork. That fork will be either we find a way to use essentially distribution resources to cooperate, and I think that is the best societal outcome, or we find that we can't cooperate and everyone has to be their own, like a little micro picogrid, and that we have to build the infrastructure to do it. And, you know, I think that it's probably more likely that that's going to happen, which is unfortunate, but I do think that, as always, the affluent will serve themselves first and make good decisions and the rest of the costs will be pushed on to everyone else. And actually, in my heart of hearts, what I think will happen is we'll find a way to cooperate, but only after we've sort of incurred a huge amount of pain.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That sounds like the American approach that I know and love. We'll stumble through some disasters and then eventually get our act together.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Yeah, you end up doing the right thing when you're forced to. So, I think that that's the way I see it happening.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, well, cool. James, this is really interesting. I've been meaning to look into solar in California, how they're dealing with all this. And this is a really interesting approach. I mean, it's never funny. Until I sort of read about this, it never occurred to me, even though it's really obvious, that like, of course, electrifying your appliances and getting your battery and getting your solar panels are — that's like the same thing. You know what I mean? Like, that's all one. That's all one thing. Like I said, it's like a switch that kind of flips in your mind.</p><p>You're like, "Oh, like, it's a holistic system." It would be interesting to try to train homeowners to think that way more. Thank you so much, James. Thanks for taking the time.</p><p><strong>James Quazi</strong></p><p>Thank you. Appreciate it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to Volts. It takes a village to make this podcast work. Shout out, especially to my super producer, Kyle McDonald, who makes my guests and I sound smart every week. And it is all supported entirely by listeners like you. So, if you value conversations like this, please consider joining our community of paid subscribers at volts.wtf. Or, leaving a nice review or telling a friend about Volts, or all three. Thanks so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-tool-that-enables-solar-first-home</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:146946710</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 13 Sep 2024 16:01:43 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/146946710/d92caf21942b542abc054b6b91d79c0c.mp3" length="60779388" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3035</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/146946710/71ffe71e4c3cd45abf4ff334e47105de.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[This new organization wants to remake PUCs for the energy transition]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Public utility commissions (PUCs) wield enormous influence in the US energy transition — they regulate the monopolistic utilities at the heart of America's electricity system but face little public scrutiny. Now, energy analyst Charles Hua is launching PowerLines, a nonprofit that aims to pull PUCs into the spotlight. In this episode, we discuss the problems with PUCs, opportunities for reform, and the coalition the group aims to organize.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/this-new-organization-wants-to-remake</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:148200855</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 11 Sep 2024 16:02:56 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/148200855/132bb4dec8b9c6a73e6c02c779433b24.mp3" length="88812915" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4437</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/148200855/8baee9217c8940d9c3bab70ef75b7339.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Developing a supply chain for American-made batteries]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>There has been an epic battle over the past 20 years between two types of lithium-ion batteries: nickel manganese cobalt (NMC) and lithium iron phosphate (LFP). While NMC still boasts better energy density, LFP is making a major comeback thanks to its safer, more accessible materials and improving performance. However, China still dominates the LFP supply chain. In this episode, CEO Vivas Kumar of startup Mitra Chem weighs in on why America needs domestic production of LFP materials.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/developing-a-supply-chain-for-american</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:147836657</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 06 Sep 2024 16:02:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/147836657/c1dce7fd312fd21403d19852b5deff8c.mp3" length="68480278" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3420</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/147836657/8bdb50fe14680c8cce84d72b72932595.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to activate climate voters]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The Environmental Voter Project has a unique approach: rather than convincing people to care about climate change, it identifies people who already do, but don't consistently vote, and works to get them to the polls. In this episode, EVP founder Nathaniel Stinnett discusses how to find these voters, keep them engaged, and measure their impact.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-activate-climate-voters</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:148029230</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 04 Sep 2024 16:00:12 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/148029230/78b4efd50796a15c0c916489a1d996d8.mp3" length="80499250" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4021</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/148029230/ebce402a0520e03f41aa1386ef4961f2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[EV charging for urban neighborhoods]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Access to charging is a barrier to EV adoption for folks without a driveway or a garage, but what if charging your car in an urban area was as easy as charging your phone? Enter startup Itselectric, which has developed curbside level-2 chargers that connect to building electric panels, making installation quick and efficient. In this episode, co-founder and COO Tiya Gordon discusses the company’s award-winning charger design and vision for a future of ubiquitous urban charging.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/ev-charging-for-urban-neighborhoods</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:147952808</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 28 Aug 2024 16:00:48 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/147952808/dbc0b14b614ac8fc3e8576aeb451a8f7.mp3" length="66841421" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3338</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/147952808/606e36ca2e9608b7bbe7c39fda5e0ec6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How is new clean-energy manufacturing affecting red & purple states?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Through the passage of IRA and CHIPS, the Biden administration has invested billions of dollars and created more than 100,000 manufacturing jobs in purple and red districts that have been hard-hit by globalization and disinvestment. In this episode, Julian Spector of Canary Media, reporting from these communities, shares about local reactions to this influx of new money and opportunities, and the reality that Trump’s Project 2025 wants to roll back the tax credits fueling this growth.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-is-new-clean-energy-manufacturing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:147732039</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Aug 2024 17:05:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/147732039/3dc7b88d9077d6576272bde1573b7ea6.mp3" length="71637045" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3578</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/147732039/63cd66b2c4625a6fe16d440068103c4d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The prospects for offshore wind in California]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>After decades of talk about offshore wind, California seems closer than ever to actually supporting an industry. But to meet the state’s goal of five gigawatts of offshore wind power by 2030, a lot of as-yet-nascent pieces need to fall into place. In this episode, Adam Stern of Offshore Wind California and Jocelyn Brown-Saracino of the US Department of Energy discuss California's recent policy efforts and the state of floating-wind technology.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-prospects-for-offshore-wind-in</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:147058114</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 14 Aug 2024 16:01:07 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/147058114/f2267e037134163b41451a5ec13178a0.mp3" length="83470547" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4170</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/147058114/f6f0d2735482f38f1ccf0bede32867d7.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Free the smart-meter data!]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Most electricity ratepayers in the US have a smart meter generating real-time data about their power usage, which could theoretically be used to reduce consumption and save money, but in most cases, utilities have locked up the information in inaccessible formats. In this episode, Michael Murray, leader of business coalition <a target="_blank" href="https://www.missiondata.io/">Mission:data</a>, describes the potential value of smart meter data and the group’s ongoing efforts to pry it from utilities.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/free-the-smart-meter-data</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:147226732</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 09 Aug 2024 16:02:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/147226732/acf07f2c3050f427af88111b126f3d6e.mp3" length="78433649" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3918</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/147226732/24b23faa18694a1df3c6705e0a606b40.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Colorado governor Jared Polis on recent climate, energy, & housing wins]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Over the past five years, Colorado’s Democratic trifecta has produced a cascade of legislation on climate, energy, housing, and land use (among other things). In this episode, we dive into some of these achievements and the politics behind them with Gov. Jared Polis and his top climate policy advisor (and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-will-toor-on-colorados">previous Volts guest</a>) Will Toor.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/colorado-governor-jared-polis-on</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:147083181</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 07 Aug 2024 16:01:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/147083181/a75d5bbfb16b14c509feda30962d51c1.mp3" length="57845639" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2889</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/147083181/50820f966e32a95579d4964abda33dd5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to cram EV fast chargers into tight urban spaces]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>NYC’s Revel is trying to build urban EV fast chargers and demand for those chargers (in the form of its own EV rideshare network) simultaneously. In this episode, Revel’s Tobias Lescht discusses the challenges of urban fast charging and the company’s plans to expand beyond NYC.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-cram-ev-fast-chargers-into</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:146777325</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 02 Aug 2024 16:01:41 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/146777325/ce3e560c16926ee067543e3c3742f6f3.mp3" length="85457028" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4269</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/146777325/c2cf1714425948e9366374bda98f7c56.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with perovskite solar?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>For years, perovskite solar cells have been the Next Big Thing in solar. In this episode, Joel Jean, co-founder and CEO of Swift Solar, explains what exactly perovskites are, the performance and weight advantages they promise, the challenges they face, and when they might actually reach market.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-perovskite-solar</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:146906122</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 31 Jul 2024 16:01:41 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/146906122/62e9c8e47937e9dd240e16fdd01547c2.mp3" length="73043672" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3649</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/146906122/b5cd647281723b3879b5b6bc122b2982.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with burning wood pellets for energy?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>An enormous amount of wood is harvested from forests in the southern US to be burned in Europe as “renewable energy.” Now the industry wants to open more wood-pellet facilities in the Pacific Northwest. In this episode, Rita Frost of NRDC and Brenna Bell of 350 PDX explain why that’s a bad idea and why wood pellets aren’t as renewable as they look.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-burning-wood</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:146642874</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 24 Jul 2024 16:01:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/146642874/23c6bc611289d6dbd3ed28e0c597c62b.mp3" length="73551558" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3674</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/146642874/7dfc04f76ba6b2600c2f91177caf3e46.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with Passive House?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Beverly Craig of the Massachusetts Clean Energy Center discusses what passive house building principles entail, the benefits they generate for building occupants and the grid, and what it would take to persuade more US builders and policymakers to adopt them.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-passive-house</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:146388974</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jul 2024 16:01:21 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/146388974/4c81998a61d95448bdee5b4f3963430d.mp3" length="73417321" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3667</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/146388974/890c08c0a408e57008cc8babe6db7bf4.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[EV charging for those without a garage]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>EVs are great for people with garages to charge them in, but what about everyone else? In this episode, Gabe Klein of DOE’s Joint Office of Energy and Transportation talks us through new approaches to EV charging for people in multifamily residences in urban settings, including new business models, new technologies, and even new vehicles.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/ev-charging-for-those-without-a-garage</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:145048977</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jul 2024 16:01:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/145048977/f3214c4f7555a11de6732cda8a65e58b.mp3" length="65075933" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3250</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/145048977/c98b7892d9bb47240b5a045262986f33.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How are we going to decarbonize shipping?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, David Wooley and Ed Carr, lead authors of recent papers outlining policy and technology options for reducing emissions in the shipping industry, discuss the fuels (and batteries?) that could power ships of the future, the policies needed to move forward, and California's pivotal role.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-are-we-going-to-decarbonize-shipping</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:145685448</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jul 2024 16:01:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/145685448/5942179fadbd947eeed1fa5f829f1318.mp3" length="74984210" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3746</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/145685448/e51fa0a4919087e3a42a3bcc8319c5e9.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Electrolyze everything!]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>A startup called Mattiq is using a combination of nanotechnology, AI, and electrolysis to produce novel materials that could eventually substitute for carbon-intensive materials in sectors from chemicals to plastics to fuels. In this episode, CEO Jeff Erhardt and I dig into the technological and business details.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/electrolyze-everything</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:145785381</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jul 2024 16:00:35 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/145785381/8e88cebf6cbc3dcfcbb461de03713e7b.mp3" length="80327851" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4013</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/145785381/c42800e0aa975c40b70b6ed1896562fc.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's up with solid-state batteries?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, CEO Siyu Huang of Factorial Energy talks through recent advancements in solid-state batteries, which promise significant improvements in energy density and safety and are paving the way for electric vehicles with substantially increased range to hit the market within the next few years. </em></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-up-with-solid-state-batteries</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:145629472</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 05 Jul 2024 16:01:06 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/145629472/8df4547271a35b6e25dba3383d4cda29.mp3" length="64667507" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3230</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/145629472/b752b97460f3eec31eb5137acff9cf7e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A clever new way to distribute storage on the grid]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>A new startup called Base Power aims to bring more stability to the volatile Texas grid by selling customers oversized home batteries at minimal costs and then using the excess capacity to trade on the market. In this episode, co-founders Zach Dell and Justin Lopas discuss their innovative business model and its potential impact in Texas and beyond.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-clever-new-way-to-distribute-storage</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:145433356</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 03 Jul 2024 16:02:21 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/145433356/d8644267007963f8191b74f1fe975d87.mp3" length="87408772" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4367</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/145433356/b818399852d0de7feed7bd416219941d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Hey schools, go get your IRA tax credits!]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>US public education infrastructure faces significant challenges due to years of deferred maintenance and the growing impacts of climate change. Luckily, the Inflation Reduction Act offers substantial, easily accessible financial assistance to schools in the form of direct-pay tax credits for climate-friendly upgrades. Many schools don’t even know about them. In this episode, Sara Ross and Jonathan Klein of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.undauntedk12.org">UndauntedK12</a> discuss their efforts to spread the word.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/hey-schools-go-get-your-ira-tax-credits</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:145326062</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 28 Jun 2024 16:00:19 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/145326062/542ec150c532b28e8a040ddfaa575720.mp3" length="63989571" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3196</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/145326062/771feb901ed023de51da39b593fcf6dd.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Heat pumps with thermal batteries]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode: more heat pumps! Jane Melia, co-founder and CEO of Harvest, discusses the advantages of teaming a high-end eat pump with a large thermal battery, to coordinate the timing of electricity consumption. Shifting the heat pump load can help reduce both costs and emissions.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/heat-pumps-with-thermal-batteries</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:145562868</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 26 Jun 2024 16:01:14 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/145562868/d752541e95dddb4e54b2dd5d7f033b6f.mp3" length="68962763" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3445</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/145562868/df9acf8ba97762e3360178785c6a9f16.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[New York's congestion pricing fiasco]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>New York City was on the cusp of (finally) implementing a congestion pricing program when Governor Kathy Hochul announced earlier this month that it would be “indefinitely delayed.” In this episode, NY State Sen. Liz Krueger and Evergreen Action’s Justin Balik, both with deep history in New York’s congestion pricing drama, discuss Hochul’s mysterious and possibly illegal move, the apocalyptic budget implications, and what might happen next.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/new-yorks-congestion-pricing-fiasco</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:145742511</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 21 Jun 2024 16:01:33 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/145742511/d9e7fe280daf844a7ebb2bb284ac58f1.mp3" length="76950517" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3844</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/145742511/60fe918cf418c6f8ed112bd9b610b44f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's up with electric aviation?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, CEO Kyle Clark of BETA Technologies walks us through the details of how to design, build, and operate electric planes — first for relatively short light-cargo flights, but eventually, he says, for all of aviation. I loved this conversation so much.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-up-with-electric-aviation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:145216670</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 19 Jun 2024 16:01:28 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/145216670/1088ca0fd8239b3a75a47dbf133fb257.mp3" length="69974811" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3496</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/145216670/2670a25bf0adfc41d7860893c0f79f5d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Washington Governor Jay Inslee on his last big climate fight]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, recorded at a live event, Washington State Governor Jay Inslee discusses his multiple decades of climate advocacy, his political successes, and the upcoming threat to one of his crowning achievements.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/washington-governor-jay-inslee-on</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:145475576</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 14 Jun 2024 16:02:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/145475576/9cabfd7098944f65184d2164c2372526.mp3" length="96977957" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4846</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/145475576/0f353cd07d61e3edc6926a66ec24b1d1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Are markets the right tool for decarbonizing electricity?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In his book <em>The Price Is Wrong</em>, Brett Christophers argues that, contrary to recent economic triumphalism among renewables advocates, wind and solar are not profitable enough to attract the private capital necessary to scale as fast as they need to scale. In this episode, he and I dig deep (extremely deep) into the details.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/are-markets-the-right-tool-for-decarbonizing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:145106586</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2024 16:01:28 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/145106586/c1e7d588e58b0bc8e9847de843219995.mp3" length="114674565" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5731</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/145106586/a5e3daf7003233d9e63105e0d2f795ad.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Wrapping our heads around AI and climate]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I have a lively conversation with Alp Kucukelbir, co-author of a recent “Artificial Intelligence for Climate Change Mitigation Roadmap,” about the strengths and limits of AI in relation to climate, where it all might be headed, and how concerned we should be about the energy use of data centers.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/wrapping-our-heads-around-ai-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:144898601</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 07 Jun 2024 16:02:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/144898601/f71c2dfcf62c4e375ece6dae16a23a26.mp3" length="96702353" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4832</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/144898601/6092db54aa90ecd5b52c89706d1ac90e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Making mini-grids work in sub-Saharan Africa]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>More than half a billion people on the African continent lack access to electricity, and the number is only growing. In this episode, Tombo Banda of CrossBoundary’s Mini-Grid Innovation Lab discusses the longstanding barriers to electricity access in sub-Saharan Africa, why current business models haven’t been effective, and the mini-grid innovations that could turn the tide.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/making-mini-grids-work-in-sub-saharan</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:144744106</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 05 Jun 2024 16:01:59 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/144744106/a75a45571f0b3657620e2568af6b9cb4.mp3" length="56861994" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2840</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/144744106/35288cc88d369e0a065b79ae31998e58.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Making carbon-free steel with clean electricity]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Steel production generates almost 10 percent of global carbon emissions and has long been considered “hard to abate.” Enter Boston Metal, a startup that aims to make carbon-free steel using only (sing it with me!) clean electricity. In this episode, CEO Tadeu Carneiro explains “molten oxide electrolysis” and its potential to transform the industry.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/making-carbon-free-steel-with-clean</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:144064532</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 29 May 2024 16:01:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/144064532/6b82abd26cbe9fc0f6cc3b7398b596bb.mp3" length="62002924" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3097</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/144064532/12f1e46c94fd72f50694ab8e5b9c753e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[FERC's new rule and other exciting transmission news]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Rob Gramlich of Grid Strategies comes back on the pod to discuss the suddenly sizzling transmission world, where both President Biden and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have recently announced significant updates to transmission planning, permitting, and funding.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/fercs-new-rule-and-other-exciting</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:144647984</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 16:01:06 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/144647984/b648e9c67ae8ffdf122d5ef8034705c8.mp3" length="82401487" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4117</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/144647984/a15141c9628c99b1c35c0dde18a5a668.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Using a Moneyball approach to elect state & local climate champions]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Which political races should climate advocates focus on to get the most bang for their buck? (Hint: not the presidency.) In this episode, executive director Caroline Spears of Climate Cabinet explains how her organization uses data science to identify state and local races with high potential to impact climate progress. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/using-a-moneyball-approach-to-elect</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:144525803</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 16:02:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/144525803/780f932d62f19ced22d8d2e6064faeab.mp3" length="67596360" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3377</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/144525803/97bc09084b10c669558a14c4d54d0352.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Making heat pumps better, easier, and a little sexier]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I talk with CEO Paul Lambert of startup Quilt, which came out of stealth this week with heat pumps that are not ugly. They perform well too, and are easy to buy and install, but mostly they’re not ugly.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/making-heat-pumps-better-easier-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:144323391</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2024 16:01:41 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/144323391/30e1acad06b40295ec1d7e6e22ad7a2e.mp3" length="78572001" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3926</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/144323391/83e2c22c285d99f1f9ac39c60b1887b1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Envisioning a more democratic, bottom-up energy system]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, California electricity guru Lorenzo Kristov shares his vision of a just, democratic, “bottom-up” grid based in distributed local energy.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/envisioning-a-more-democratic-bottom</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:143772399</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2024 16:01:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/143772399/2590ee4d1f50446c61885ac554dd5a50.mp3" length="107614972" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5378</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/143772399/6ce6e03b659073f7b42d64e3c51350c9.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How climate change is portrayed in popular culture]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Climate awareness is growing in the real world, but it remains rare in popular entertainment, as illustrated by some <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theclimaterealitycheck.com/">new research</a> on climate in film. In this episode, Anna Jane Joyner discusses the efforts of her nonprofit, Good Energy, to help screenwriters tell climate stories better (or at all).</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-climate-change-is-portrayed-in</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:143930504</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2024 16:02:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/143930504/e7e69155f16959384679e6a1027833cb.mp3" length="75321420" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3763</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/143930504/3179e4a957b978b57e2a22cd237ee451.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What you need to know about the new EPA power plant standards]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Grace Van Horn and Jonas Monast of the Center for Applied Environmental Law and Policy do a deep analysis on the EPA’s recently finalized carbon pollution standards for power plants.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-new</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:144159311</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2024 17:15:42 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/144159311/065caf5aee312b2b12e3e7fe1e0ffa57.mp3" length="77501633" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3872</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/144159311/c7376bb352526ff1693cb238c368e2aa.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The energy transition's 5 supervillains and 5 superheroes]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, longtime clean-energy analyst Michael Liebreich assesses five causes for pessimism about the net-zero transition, alongside five causes for optimism.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-energy-transitions-5-supervillains</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:143376633</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 01 May 2024 16:01:59 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/143376633/ebfa0954a7ea545f08648a72cd39d8a0.mp3" length="86260032" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4310</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/143376633/60f0bc3bb33929fbd9c6b371749f9ecb.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Making geothermal heat pumps work for big buildings]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Joselyn Lai of Bedrock Energy describes hardware and software improvements that enable geothermal heat pumps to be installed more quickly and less expensively, even in large commercial and industrial buildings in tight urban spaces.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/making-geothermal-heat-pumps-work</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:143564786</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 26 Apr 2024 16:01:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/143564786/d91bbb1a8352e32edd7db71e8db0780a.mp3" length="84412685" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4218</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/143564786/610fae1eba6e4182875d76dbf5e12cc4.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Rising electricity demand requires new gas plants? Not so fast. ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>What’s the best way to handle rising US electricity demand? Contrary to what some large utilities and regulators think, it’s not building new fossil gas plants. In this episode, Eric Gimon and Michelle Solomon, coauthors of a new report from policy shop Energy Innovation, make the case that utilities have more effective options to address both short- and long-term demand.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/rising-electricity-demand-requires</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:143662490</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 24 Apr 2024 16:00:38 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/143662490/2310c95277e20a12082c4fbe5d3da73d.mp3" length="70961183" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3545</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/143662490/0bea7ad96a57d50862a7fb31c5a145d6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why "transferable" tax credits are such a big deal]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The Inflation Reduction Act made it much easier for companies to sell clean energy tax credits that they cannot make use of themselves. In this episode, CEO Alfred Johnson of Crux Climate explains how this seemingly wonky tweak has created a market that is already providing billions in new clean-energy investment.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-transferable-tax-credits-are</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:143066759</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 19 Apr 2024 16:02:17 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/143066759/711ddecd3097304fe86403c3d5c8e785.mp3" length="89765686" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4486</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/143066759/8fb1453810aff36a51331d0365c48ff4.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's going on with China these days? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Is China on track to reduce its carbon emissions? If so, why is it building so much coal power? In this episode, researcher Lauri Myllyvirta brings data to bear on China’s recent decarbonization efforts and helps demystify the country’s larger intentions.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-going-on-with-china-these-days</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:143212794</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 17 Apr 2024 16:01:36 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/143212794/4cbb945304b52865f3744c2de44428e3.mp3" length="79731672" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3984</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/143212794/61edc8d2ae20950adbc1b11c8bdd751b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Fashion's climate impact and how to reduce it]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I speak with Maxine Bédat, a former fashion startup CEO and founder of the nonprofit New Standards Institute. We talk about the source of the fashion industry's emissions, what can be done to reduce them, the need for regulation, and the right way to think about fast fashion.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/fashions-climate-impact-and-how-to</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:142879235</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 12 Apr 2024 16:01:44 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/142879235/fe5c65f9fffe690c994f99e64ed3fab3.mp3" length="69998970" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3497</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/142879235/f870ea4ded5e334d78deb4ab6524cdb2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How much can urban land use policy do for the climate? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I speak with Heather House, a manager in RMI’s carbon-free transportation program, and Rushad Nanavatty, the head of Third Derivative, an early-stage climate tech accelerator co-founded by RMI, to better understand the role of urban land use in the overall climate picture.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-much-can-urban-land-use-policy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:142963017</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 10 Apr 2024 16:00:43 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/142963017/9889960903e5baf9ef322d0eced9e1a3.mp3" length="66678839" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3331</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/142963017/4d31189e01ffd80adfd9231922acbcbd.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How the EPA will spend $27 billion in carbon-reduction funds]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The Inflation Reduction Act included a Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, $27 billion to be disseminated primarily in vulnerable and under-resourced communities for clean energy and climate mitigation projects. In this episode, EPA’s Jahi Wise discusses how the program was designed, who the recipients are, and what the funding will accomplish.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-the-epa-will-spend-27-billion</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:143181629</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 05 Apr 2024 16:01:32 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/143181629/c262376aeab4e10f58953f490b59f52e.mp3" length="70822382" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3538</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/143181629/36e53f3c0677d79fdf5f4ed9b2c86754.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Now is the time for distributed energy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Duncan Campbell of Scale Microgrid Solutions makes the case that distributed energy resources (DERs) — solar panels, EVs, home batteries, etc. — are, thanks to rising electricity demand and constraints on grid expansion, poised for a tsunami of deployment. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/now-is-the-time-for-distributed-energy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:142748050</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 03 Apr 2024 16:01:23 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/142748050/e8b521f4152ccab5549e4d3d24d2274d.mp3" length="81987704" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4097</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/142748050/e150f4345cf9e2c50c23ead5fdb5a52c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Biden sets out to supercharge industrial decarbonization]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>This week, the Biden administration announced billions of dollars in grants for industrial emissions-reduction projects. In this episode, Rebecca Dell of the ClimateWorks Foundation and Evan Gillespie of Industrious Labs describe the types of projects being funded and assess the potential impact of this significant investment in a sector notoriously difficult to decarbonize.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/biden-sets-out-to-supercharge-industrial</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:142931209</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 27 Mar 2024 16:01:55 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/142931209/8d4e21715e3d19575e009ae2853136fa.mp3" length="89196030" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4457</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/142931209/2e902af0a50d98f53d8c8051a6084164.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with these methane satellites?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I discuss the newly launched MethaneSAT — a satellite that can detect methane emissions on the ground — with Mark Brownstein of the Environmental Defense Fund. We cover how it came to be, its technical capacities, and the ways satellite detection might serve global efforts to reduce emissions. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-these-methane</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:142589138</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 22 Mar 2024 16:01:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/142589138/2251732e5a7983b53a7de3ab03d468ea.mp3" length="67496176" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3372</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/142589138/b82e6a056deb7faa0a57a4edf163aa89.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with "scope 3" emissions? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>“Scope 3” greenhouse gas emissions — those that companies are indirectly responsible for, via supply chain, product disposal, investments, etc. — are an imprecisely measured but significant source of impact. In this episode, Laura Draucker of the nonprofit Ceres shares her expertise on all things scope 3, including the recent decision by the Securities and Exchange Commission to drop the requirement that companies disclose them.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-scope-3-emissions</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:142474093</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 20 Mar 2024 16:01:21 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/142474093/b2d36ead21327b17b02d9e328f95b78d.mp3" length="69055719" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3450</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/142474093/181c2b809d8fff69bd8b5a2f55f0be7f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Getting ready for IRA 2]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In his recent role as Chief Advisor for the Clean Energy Transition in the White House Office of Science and Technology, Costa Samaras helped roadmap the cleantech future laid out by Democrats’ legislative achievements. In this episode, he reflects on his experience and offers a clear-eyed view of where climate policy needs to go next.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/getting-ready-for-ira-2</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:142257912</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2024 16:01:26 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/142257912/5de3718c33c4397624474584c6726a5e.mp3" length="82452911" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4120</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/142257912/6a68fc62eb4e62aaf292cc32da7021a5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How's IRA doing?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Is the Inflation Reduction Act, passed nearly two years ago, doing what it set out to do? In this episode, Trevor Houser of the Rhodium Group compares the predictions of pre-IRA energy-sector models to the real-world data on clean-energy investment since its passage.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/hows-ira-doing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:142383650</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 13 Mar 2024 17:05:20 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/142383650/c4be19f0796daedcade9ed7ba19ef0e0.mp3" length="81487425" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4072</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/142383650/e422dc0beb661299f3df930c19eb9d9c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Industrial policy: what it is, how Biden's doing it, and how it could be done better]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, we go deep on industrial policy with Todd Tucker of the Roosevelt Institute. We discuss what it is, why it’s needed, what Biden’s particular version of it looks like, and how it could evolve if he wins a second term.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/industrial-policy-what-it-is-how</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:142161524</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 08 Mar 2024 17:01:26 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/142161524/bb536ad4fb68ce3e6c963513f9e1fd31.mp3" length="89380649" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4467</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/142161524/a171348df6f7df8384890bbdaca9f9f5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The obscure but extremely important battle over building codes]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Huffington Post reporter Alexander Kaufman traces the recent history of US building codes, a surprisingly compelling and twisty tale of efforts at reform meeting stiff resistance from builders and natural gas companies.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-obscure-but-extremely-important</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:141954027</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 06 Mar 2024 17:01:49 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/141954027/99d3e191cfdc8fd192f4968b9c089747.mp3" length="76473057" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3821</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/141954027/db8340910a33d948eb60a6112f62ed63.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[So you want to electrify your home]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Cora Wyent walks us through Rewiring America’s “<a target="_blank" href="https://homes.rewiringamerica.org/personal-electrification-planner">personal electrification planner</a>,” a step-by-step how-to for homeowners (and renters!) looking to electrify their homes.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/so-you-want-to-electrify-your-home</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:141853227</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 28 Feb 2024 17:01:11 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/141853227/02acae796bbbc7dcdc220640912a340b.mp3" length="70824404" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3539</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/141853227/43bd8fdd3ce6e13a7614573e1e930438.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Nuclear? Perhaps!]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I speak with Jigar Shah (head of DOE’s Loan Programs Office) about all things nuclear, including its recent performance, the strategies that could revive and accelerate it, new nuclear technologies and what small modular reactors actually are, and the role that nuclear will play in a decarbonized economy.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/nuclear-perhaps</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:141452873</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Feb 2024 17:00:35 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/141452873/ba0e7964141ecdb78d668961cd9cb32a.mp3" length="88506199" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4423</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/141452873/c8c86d283c27a050bc64318a5216cf77.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Democrats' new consensus bill would supercharge transmission]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Reps. Sean Casten (D-Ill.) and Mike Levin (D-Calif.) discuss their Clean Electricity and Transmission Acceleration Act, explaining where Democrats have found consensus around transmission permitting and community engagement.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-democrats-new-consensus-bill</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:141332589</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 14 Feb 2024 17:01:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/141332589/0d263ea56afa3dbea1286d8b1e09b813.mp3" length="73809219" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3688</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/141332589/25e403d5605a1e78eea5433f34877cac.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The current state of unions in America]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, journalist Hamilton Nolan shares about his upcoming book The Hammer, a deep dive into the current tattered state of unions in the US and the prospects for their future.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-current-state-of-unions-in-america</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:141227402</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 09 Feb 2024 17:01:51 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/141227402/278bf1e924de4261e7950da403434604.mp3" length="68940027" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3445</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/141227402/aefa5fd58b4c232d84cb62eed1d6dc91.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Another hot rocks company gets in the storage game]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, I interview Fourth Power CTO Asegun Henry and CEO Arvin Ganesan, who bring high-profile experience in energy research, policy, and regulation to their new and promising thermal storage startup.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/another-hot-rocks-company-gets-in</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:141024175</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 07 Feb 2024 17:00:59 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/141024175/295451517606a6924b0f66b73390093e.mp3" length="69405532" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3468</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/141024175/42f4ae8146b4dbaa6b53ac463db605f5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[One easy way to boost the grid: upgrade the power lines]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Upgrading power lines — “reconductoring,” in the biz — is a straightforward way to boost the capacity of the electrical grid by enabling it to transmit more power and leak less of it. In this episode, TS Conductor CEO Jason Huang and researcher Emilia Chojkiewicz speak to the great potential of reconductoring, if balky utilities can be convinced to deploy the new technology.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/one-easy-way-to-boost-the-grid-upgrade</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:140919013</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 31 Jan 2024 17:01:09 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/140919013/3532872b519e1ea07a8cecfa41800295.mp3" length="67239491" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3360</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/140919013/36931f5a9db01597d33281caefaa3efa.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Electrifying battery recycling]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Given the trajectory of the electric vehicle industry and the expected lifespan of an EV’s lithium-ion battery, the US is only a few years out from needing large-scale, cost-effective, decarbonized ways to recycle batteries. In this episode, Steve Cotton, CEO of Aqua Metals, describes regenerative electro-hydrometallurgy — the new battery recycling method that’s not only fun to say, but run on clean, cheap renewable electricity too.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/electrifying-battery-recycling</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:140760338</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 24 Jan 2024 17:00:39 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/140760338/ad9ffaf4a8f7eabe0512071e63611614.mp3" length="78799229" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3938</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/140760338/269458f16071994c6a86694182220e9e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Michigan targets clean electricity and faster permitting]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Michigan State Senator Sam Singh details the ambitious clean energy policies that have been enacted since Democrats won a legislative trifecta in 2022, including some bold reforms of clean-energy permitting.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/michigan-targets-clean-electricity</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:140505561</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jan 2024 17:01:01 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/140505561/6a1962ad415e0b905bbba7fec22a1484.mp3" length="70399915" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3518</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/140505561/5c52f3aea6f3a6f2730d2d0cbc9fb88c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Transitioning off of fossil gas in Australia]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The Australian state of Victoria, home to the city of Melbourne, is the country’s most densely populated state and also its most dependent on fossil gas. In this episode, Lily D’Ambrosio, Victoria’s Minister for Energy, Environment, and Climate Change, shares about the state government’s aim to shift away from fossil gas, its aptly named Gas Substitution Roadmap, and the current status of its decarbonization push.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/transitioning-off-of-fossil-gas-in</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:140273868</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jan 2024 17:15:04 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/140273868/f25e48f2e730cafa631928cba5f42ef1.mp3" length="74111947" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3704</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/140273868/c4e816709db36b3706051a3a77a43608.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Chevron Doctrine: what it is and why it matters that the Supreme Court might kill it]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, David Doniger of the Natural Resources Defense Council explains what the Chevron doctrine is, why the federal judiciary has traditionally been deferential to agencies’ regulatory reasoning, and the potential fallout in the very real chance that the current Supreme Court does away with the doctrine entirely.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-chevron-doctrine-what-it-is-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:140437889</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 12 Jan 2024 17:01:08 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/140437889/509360459ea39545090ddb9c191f1dc1.mp3" length="88414543" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4419</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/140437889/5bb90390abd757b8af6d6af0a64c530f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A Connecticut reformer is shaking up utility regulation]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Chairman Marisa Gillett of Connecticut’s Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) talks about her aim to reform the cozy regulatory environment enjoyed by the state’s big utilities, PURA’s new Equitable Modern Grid Initiative, and how ratepayers benefit from a shakeup of the status quo.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-connecticut-reformer-is-shaking</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:140215853</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jan 2024 17:00:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/140215853/8dbadb2c7a6b1618fd325ab00791e392.mp3" length="73128763" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3654</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/140215853/374e6284df44dfab5f802915c0de480f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Decarbonizing a sprawling university system]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>As Chief of Energy, Sustainability, and Transportation at the Chancellor’s Office of California State University, Lindsey Rowell is charged with developing and implementing a plan to decarbonize every aspect of the school system, on all 23 campuses, with minimal use of offsets, by 2045. In this episode, she lays out what it will take to tackle this ambitious goal.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/o425gq34yl868li90yf1g/volts24.01.03-lindsey.rowell.pdf?rlkey=6e6onj3l4782bvdht76cor2ge&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/decarbonizing-a-sprawling-university-system"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Contemplate, if you will, the California State University system. It is the largest public-university system in the country — by some accounts, the largest in the world — with more than a half-million students and some 55,000 faculty and staff, spread across a sprawling network of 23 campuses, from the top of the state to the bottom.</p><p>What if I told you that it was your job to decarbonize that entire system — the buildings, the energy infrastructure, the transportation, the food, the construction materials, all of it — and you had just over 20 years to do it. Would you panic? Possibly short circuit? I'm pretty sure I would.</p><p>As it happens, though, that <em>is</em> someone's job. Her name is Lindsey Rowell and she is the Chief of Energy, Sustainability, and Transportation at the Chancellor’s Office. She is on the hook for developing and implementing a plan to make the entire CSU system carbon neutral by 2045, with minimal use of offsets.</p><p>You might think, to accomplish something so vast, she would have a team of dozens and a budget of billions. But this is a public university system, so of course she doesn't — instead it's duct tape, baling wire, and ingenuity. I had a great time talking with her about how to approach this unwieldy project. I think you will find her pragmatism and good humor refreshing.</p><p>Every policy or regulation ultimately must be implemented by someone on the ground. This is what that looks like. </p><p>All right then. Lindsey Rowell, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is really interesting, a lot of really interesting stuff here — I have a million questions to get through to ask you. But for starters, why don't you just tell us a little bit about the California State University system, which is different than the University of California system. Just getting that right up front.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Let's get that out of the way. We are so different. Sure thing. So, California State University system, whether you realize it or not, you probably know it. We are the largest public university system in the country, by some metrics in the world, depending on who you ask on which day. So we have 23 campuses in the system spread across the state, from the very tippy top up in Humboldt and down to the very, very bottom of the state in San Diego. So we cover the entire space in California, and we've been educating students for about 150 years.</p><p>So we have really old universities. We also have a few satellite locations that offer specialty coursework in nursing or business. And we educate about half a million students with about 55,000 faculty and staff. So we are a huge, hug organization, and the schools, probably people are most familiar with without realizing that they are CSU schools, are the California Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo — it's one that a lot of folks don't realize as part of our system. And we have three Cal Polys now, Humboldt is a Cal Poly and Cal Poly Pomona, and then, of course, San Diego State is one of our biggest.</p><p>San Diego, Fullerton, and Long Beach are three of our biggest institutions in Southern California. Reason?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are they all four-year undergrad colleges, or are there some vocational stuff or community colleges?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>So no community colleges. The community college system is a separate but friendly sister organization, complete state organization. And the CSU is a four-year institution and graduate program. So we have masters, and we do have educational doctorate programs at a few of the campuses. So four-plus years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So 23 campuses?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Across the state. That's a lot. So tell us, then, what laws you are like — what are your mandated goals here? And are they mandated by the state of California, or does CSU have its own separate goals, or are these all just sort of state goals that you're implementing?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>So, without getting too boring into the legislative dynamic of the CSU, we're sort of a quasi-state agency. So what that usually means is that most regulatory and legislative mandates are applicable to us where we're mentioned specifically. Part of that is due to the fact that we are called out specifically in the government code. So we are our own authority having jurisdiction, if you want a technical term, and then we are self support — a portion of our work is self support through student tuition and endowments and so forth. So what that means is the CSU often sets more ambitious goals.</p><p>I cannot think of anything off the top of my head where we are not, at the very least, meeting California's goals. As California gets more robust in its challenges towards climate change, I think the gap between California requirements and CSU requirements is closing. But, yes, we align with the state in pretty much everything we do, either by intent or by statute.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The broad framework I've been thinking about this in know, I think a lot about policy and laws and politics and getting laws passed, but every law that passes, someone has to do it, right? Someone has to implement it. And so I've just been giving a lot of thought to, who are the people out on the front lines implementing these things? So part of why I'm asking is, what happens if you don't meet them. Are these self imposed goals where if you don't meet them, for whatever reason, you're just like, "Ah, we swung and missed. Bummer." Or is there some legal penalty if you don't reach them?</p><p>Like, what happens if you don't meet these goals?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>That's a fun question because my first answer is the world ends. That's what happens. So government, as you know, is generally a carrot sort of organization, not a stick organization. I mean, punitive response to not meeting legislation is usually reserved for the private sector. And government agencies are, you know, sort of pressured to respond to these mandates, but without, you know, punitive expectations if they don't make them. That said, though, and I'm going to offer a little prediction — this is Lindsey Rowell's prediction, this is not the CSU's prediction, disclaimer — that because the intensity of the climate crisis just ever increases. And it's funny that we're doing this today, David, because I just saw all the news of the massive waves in hitting the California coastline.</p><p>I don't think I've ever seen that in my lifetime due to Pacific storms. And so what I predict is going to happen is there's going to be this sort of the incentive approach, right, where there's programs to support government agencies meeting these standards and goals, and then there'll start to be some hand slapping, maybe there will be some tightening of the purse strings with regard to funding that comes our way. And then I do think eventually there will be punitive damages in the form of carbon taxes or more direct funding cut offs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So sticks will show up eventually.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>I think they've got to. I mean, I think at some point you can't rely on folks to do this work voluntarily. And I think governments often have to choose between the two pennies that they have to rub together, as one of my staff likes to say, which I think is a great metaphor.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, actually, wait, we have to rewind because we skipped what the goals actually are, right. CSU imposes its own goals, but what is the goal? I forgot to get that on record.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>That's actually a great one. We should talk about that. So, the CSU, we have a new sustainability policy. And I say new. Actually, I'm thinking that it's not so new anymore. So we passed a new sustainability policy right after I came back to the CSU. So this is January of 2022. And the new sustainability policy, the overarching goal, is carbon neutrality by 2045.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And is that the same as the state?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yes, that's the same goal as the state. Now, campuses have individual goals that might be more aggressive. Some are targeting as early as 2030, which is terrifying, but great to see that ambition out there. So that's the overarching goal. But within that, mostly what we've done is aligned with the AASHE STARS program, if you're not familiar. AASHE is the Association for the Advancement of Sustainability in Higher Education, and they have a tracking system, and it sort of captures everything with regard to sustainability across the board, in curriculum, in student basic needs, in diversity, equity, inclusion.</p><p>So we've sort of aligned our policy to tackle all of those overarching umbrella criteria and then the various credits underneath those. So we have a lot of goals, but the overarching one that is sort of the point to it all is this carbon neutrality by 2045 as a system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what's your job? You have to do that.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Explaining that to my mother for like 15 years, we just had Christmas: "What do you do for a living?" Basically, our role at the chancellor's office is to sort of advise and facilitate and implement these goals through policy, through programs. So we do a lot of program development and more recently, a lot more advocacy. So you were talking about your interest in policy and legislation. We have gotten very heavily involved on the state and federal legislative side, trying to express the need that the CSU has to inform the powers that be of the group of individuals that we serve, which is, generally speaking, disadvantaged communities, underrepresented minorities, first-generation college students.</p><p>So, as we sort of pursue all of this, our jobs kind of touch everything. We also do broad-scale procurement. We do direct access energy procurement for 14 of the campuses, meaning we buy energy on the wholesale market, then transmission and distribution to the utilities, and then bundled service for the rest of the campuses. So we have all of that. We do climate action planning for the campuses, water conservation, sustainable procurement, waste management, sustainable foods.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to say, I mean, this is the point of all this setup, is to get this in readers' minds, is that you are sitting in your office having to think about how to get 23 campuses, physical campuses across the state, to carbon neutrality by 2045.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And when I start thinking about that —</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>It gives you anxiety?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>— it causes a pain behind my right eye. My hands start to shake. To me, that's just like a huge — maybe you've grown accustomed to it over time, but to me, it just seems like such a huge, sprawling thing. It kind of makes my brain short circuit.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>It does that to us. We spend a lot of time sort of mentally advocating for each other, just going, "We can do this. We can do this. We got to just fly forward and it's eating the elephant just one bite at a time."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, no kidding. The first thing I wanted to ask is just, this seems like, among other things, it's going to take a lot of resources. It's going to take a lot of money to do this. So I was just like, what is your budget? Do you have the budget to achieve this?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>To all legislators and decision-makers listening, we do not. So we have about a $7 billion deferred maintenance backlog.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, goodness.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah. And that's not, "woe is us", sort of — that's not that kind of a comment because the UC and the community colleges of the state at large, this is something we deal with. They're chronically underfunded organizations, as government organizations tend to be. I mean, when we talk about the numbers needed for this type of work, especially decarbonization, just electrification. So let's just talk about electrification plans. The numbers aren't even real numbers, David. They're not numbers that you and I — and we hear them. We hear Jeff Bezos has $65 trillion or whatever. We know that's a figure. But when someone says to you, "Oh, just to electrify your central plant, that serves a campus that occupies, I don't know, let's say, 4 million square feet, is going to cost you, for starters, $350 million for the engineering and the basic equipment change out."</p><p>So that doesn't include things like switching everything over to the proper coils that can take the lower temperature hot water to circulate to buildings. That doesn't include any of the offsetting renewable energy and all of that that's required to actually get to net zero. That's an insane number. So when you start to think about that across a whole campus, the number is probably closer to 500 million, a billion per campus and then 23 campuses.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it adds right up.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Huge numbers. They're huge numbers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I guess that's kind of where I want to start before getting into the details. Just like, how am I not to conclude that this is just impossible what they're asking you to do? The scale of what they're asking you to do with the money you have available to do it, how do you get around that basic —</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Let me give you some of my —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Coping strategies?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>I was going to say my coping strategies, the little things I hang on to as signs of progress. First of all, so for the CSU, we have managed to keep our energy use level over the past almost two decades, despite adding thousands and thousands of square feet. So we're good at energy efficiency, and we've managed to do it with no direct — we have no direct budget assigned for that kind of work. So this is usually nickel and diming an operational budget. This is capturing incentives through utility programs or federal grant programs.</p><p>So we do a lot of sort of little things where we chip away at the problem, and that actually is tremendously effective. One of our campuses, one of our energy managers, his name is Kenny Seeton, and I can take his name in vain because we're good friends and he's been around for as long as I have in the CSU. And one of the things he does so well is he'll do things like he'll have $1,000 left on his purchasing, his pro card, at the end of the month, and he'll buy a bunch of lamps or he'll buy a bunch of meters and he'll just keep them in his office until he's got 100 of them. And then he'll rally his team and be like "All right, guys, this weekend we're going to go through and we're going to install all of these."</p><p>He'll probably be the first campus to meet the net zero goals, and he's done it all without a dedicated energy budget.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Amazing.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>So, the answer to your question is so fluid. I think the federal government is finally starting to put some real money behind these efforts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to ask, like, IRA, the Inflation Reduction Act, actually just showering money down on everything. Are you going to be able to harvest some of that?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're really, really trying. So that's a big part of our advocacy program. We've kind of got a two-path, two-pronged approach. One is sort of short term, what can we capture from the Inflation Reduction Act? Which includes stuff that we're kind of already doing, centered around investment tax credits for renewable energy. It also includes the energy efficiency tax credits, things like that, that have traditionally not — we've had to capture through third-party developers. The difficulty, and this is the second prong, the sort of longer-term approach in making legislators understand what it's like to have this money on the ground is a couple of things.</p><p>One, we don't have the upfront cash for this type of work. So when a campus has to make a decision, when they say, "Oh, 40% of this or 60% even of this renewables project, the solar project that we want to do is going to come back to us." We still have to come up with the $7-$10 million upfront to do the project.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because you get it back in tax —</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Under taxes. Right.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>And the problem that we have with that is that that money takes away from something else. And every time I sort of bring this question up with folks, let's just say "the folks," the question is always sort of like, "Well, why don't you have money?" The question is always like, "Well, why don't you just take some money from somewhere else?" It's like, no, you don't understand. That's like saying, "I have $0 in my checking account, write a check, and then —" it doesn't work like that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Haven't some of the tax credits been made direct pay?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>They are, but they're still reimbursable. And so the issue with that upfront capital means that for us, it's typically not that much more advantageous for us to own one of — a solar system is just the easiest example because power purchase agreements have been around for a million years. When campuses do that, the benefit they have, I mentioned our $7 billion deferred maintenance backlog. Well, what does that tell you? We don't have the money to maintain things. So the last thing we need is to own a sophisticated piece of equipment. That we may or may not have the staff who really knows how to manage it other than basic maintenance.</p><p>We're still going to have to contract out to switch out the inverters every 5-10 years, whatever, as they degrade. So we haven't found that particular element of the program as directly advantageous. I don't want to disparage the program because I think it's incredible that this amount of money and effort is getting put towards this work, but we need bigger chunks of money available to really invest.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are you asking the state government? I assume you're up in Sacramento —</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>— nagging the relevant people.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>We're working with legislators in Sacramento and in DC because a lot of this money — this amount of money has got to come from the federal level. Right. The state has, California has a lot of money —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But a lot of debt, too.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Has a lot of debt and it has a huge population that it has to serve and we need big federal dollars that are coming. And so just trying to help folks understand the actual set of circumstances when someone needs to cut a check —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's what it comes down to.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, what it comes down to because we don't want to lose a lot of money through administrative processes. And the other thing with that that I think is really important to mention that I think does not get understood on the Hill, for example, is that when you have a rigorous process for these programs, the institutions that get left behind are the same institutions and the same people that get left behind for every other social economic climate program there is: It's the poor people with no resources. They don't have the money to contract for consultants to help them do these applications.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the application process itself is a barrier.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, yeah. So there needs to be some streamlining, and I think the federal government has heard that. But, of course, when these statutes are written, they come with a lot of legal constraints that they have. So it's just tremendously complicated. It's not like someone on the Hill can wave a magic wand and just go "Oh, we'll just do it like this." Because they also are responsible for taxpayer dollars, and they better make sure that if they're going to put a trillion dollars towards something, it's going to get spent where they said it's going to get spent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, let's talk some nuts and bolts. So you said you have a $7 billion with a B deferred maintenance backlog. I'm wondering if there are things you can do that would serve the dual purpose of maintenance and decarbonization. In other words, could you try to dig out of that hole in a way that also serves your carbon goals?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yes, 100%. That is actually our approach and has been forever. So we really look at opportunities to dovetail energy projects with maintenance projects for the simple reason that if you're going to cut into a hard lid and send some tradesperson up there crawling around, like, why do that twice?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, right.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Just the simple economics of that, of patching and painting and laying down equipment and bringing contractors out, is a lot cheaper to do one time than multiple times. One of the things we like to say in our unit is that all maintenance is energy efficiency. Right. You make pipes stop leaking, you make equipment more efficient, you change out fans that aren't working and dampers that are stuck and fix economizers, you're not only addressing your maintenance issues, but you are making things operate more efficiently. So we look at that approach, and luckily, this is an advantage that the CSU has with regard to how we spend our funding.</p><p>We have this operational budget, and we don't have to say this money is going specifically for this project. We make that designation ourselves in our office. So as long as we're capturing it completely for the purposes of the Department of Finance, the scope can be the scope. So there's a little bit of flexibility there to make sure that money is being spent where it's supposed to be spent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I'm going to guess, as I was thinking about this, 23 campuses getting to zero carbon. My intuition was that buildings must be the big ticket item in terms of the heating and cooling, the amount of infrastructure required to heat and cool them, the construction budget itself, the embedded. Because one thing I thought was important to mention, I forgot to mention it earlier, but we should put this in the context of your goals, is that when you talk about carbon neutrality, you're also talking about scope 3 emissions.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>It's so scary.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's the most mind-blowing part to me, and I'm going to return to this later because for readers who are not familiar, scope 1 and 2 emissions are sort of the emissions from the energy that you're directly using. But scope 3 is the emissions sort of embedded in the materials you use, the energy that people use to transport themselves to the campus, like all sorts of sprawling stuff that goes well beyond the campuses. So we'll return to that later. But I'm assuming that. Am I right to say that buildings are sort of item one on the list here in terms of emissions?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think so. I mean, the estimates from the Department of Energy are all kind of — they shift a little bit, but generally we say between 30 and 40% of our emissions in the United States are attributable to buildings. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You think that's true of your system, too?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, I would say campuses are easiest to understand if you think of them as little cities, right. There's big buildings with various operations. All in all, it's operating on a curve that is similar to a city, right? Like early morning to midday and some into late night. And then there's a variety of practices between labs or a library or an office, whatever that's happening in there. And then they're spread out. Right. There's geography and landscaping and agriculture. There's everything.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Food. We're going to get to that later, too. But let's talk buildings. You must have some really old. You've been around a century. You must have some big old, drafty buildings, I'm guessing.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, Chico and San Jose have been around a very long time. Sacramento State just celebrated its 75th birthday, so there's a few things that have gotten taken care of through sort of seismic updates. After the 1989 quake, a lot of buildings across, not just for the CSU, but across the state, really got retrofitted to accommodate the moving and shaking that is our lovely state out here on the west coast. And at that time, windows, building skins, rooftops were replaced. Insulation was making buildings more efficient as part of just a general practice of making them more safe.</p><p>But that said, there are still buildings from the 1980s and even the early 90s, when we were still kind of getting hip to a lot of these sort of efficiency practices. So, yeah, there's a lot of just general work to do. And then on top of that, the big thing, obviously, is the distribution of energy around the system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Can you even generalize across 23 campuses? How are they generally heated and cooled?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, I can actually generalize. So pretty much every campus, in fact, I can't think of one off the top of my head, has a core campus that's served by a central, like a district energy system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, all of them?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Some of them have buildings that are sort of off the loop based on where they are on the campus property or who owns them, you know, if it was a public-private partnership or something like that. But, yeah, generally speaking, we have a district energy system at every campus. Some of them have co-generation. Although we had three campuses as part of the cap and trade program in California, we now are down to one. The other two have successfully decarbonized to get under the threshold for emissions to no longer need to be a part of that program. So that's really tremendous.</p><p>And then we did have our one campus, Channel Islands, had a large 25 megawatt co-generation system that was partnered with the southern California energy utility for grid stability and parity. So that's generally the situation. Some campuses have really sophisticated tunnel systems, which are awesome because it makes maintenance and protection systems really great. But of course —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, it just like shelters the infrastructure, basically.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>It does. And it means everything runs underground where temperatures stay more stable, access.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what are these district heating systems running on? You said there were three that were co-generation. What are the rest of them? Are most of them natural gas?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Natural gas boilers, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are there any geothermal?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>No, we have no geothermal. In fact, didn't think that geothermal would really be a feasible option for us, but have recently learned that some of the newer geothermal technology, as it relates to ocean chilling could really maybe be something we use.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I'm familiar and excited about those developments.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>This is the best thing about this job. Right. There's always something changing in the technology that you get to learn.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you have lots of natural gas based district heating systems. What do you do to a natural gas based district heating system to decarbonize it? Do you just switch out the natural gas boiler for what, a big heat pump? What do you do?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah. So that's where sort of the individual campus dynamic is going to become a bigger factor depending on how far they're moving heating — so our chilling is almost all electric. Most campuses have electric chilling, and that can be offset with renewables, which is fantastic. And then a lot of campuses have and or are looking at thermal energy storage, allowing them to benefit from that. So that's been really exciting. I love that work, and it's really just a good old fashioned energy project that's really solid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can I ask what kind of thermal storage people are looking at?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Campuses have like a two phase ice system. Most of them have chilled water.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Like water tanks, which works fantastic for 99% of the state. Humboldt is our little outlier up there — the place that never gets warm.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, the non-warm California campus.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, the one non-warm or San Francisco, I guess, could be —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I guess this should have occurred to me earlier, but I guess heating itself is not a big issue. Mostly you're dealing with air conditioning.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Right. So, the boiler replacement is mostly — so, you know, our temperate climate gives us a couple of benefits. One, the boilers that are out there on the market can serve our purposes if we can figure out a way to lower temperature and circulation without causing major issues with our distribution system, like leaking Victaulics and other valves in the system. And also if we have coils throughout our units, our air handlers and units throughout buildings that can function on that lower temperature hot water. If they can't, then we're talking about — there's major engineering you're having to take out, replace a natural gas boiler with electric heating boiler.</p><p>Can't get the water up to circulating at 185 degrees. It's circulating at 145, maybe 155. And you've got coils in your units that maybe are only thresholded at 165. All of that stuff has to get replaced.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So if you switch out the boiler, there's a bunch of other reengineering —</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>There can be. And for most of our campuses, it seems like that all of those secondary effects are needed, although I don't know, if it keeps getting warmer, maybe we won't need to heat at all.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do all of your campuses have, like, energy people, managers, somebody whose job it is to?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yes, aside from vacancies that occur through attrition and things like that, part of our requirement is that every campus have an energy manager. They do a tremendous amount of work on this. But like the central plant, the district heating question with the boilers, a lot of these campuses, their domestic hot water is tied to their district hot water, their heating hot water. So for them to just — they can't just turn off their boilers in the summer. For example, one of our mechanical review board members loves to — he's like, "Why are they running the boilers in the summer?</p><p>It's like, "Well, you still got to have hot water in your labs and your lavatories." So sort of this, like, well, I guess I would say lack of foresight, but it's not really that. Right? Lack of crystal ball, when years ago, these systems were created.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So if you can get the systems onto electricity, basically, you can call that carbon neutral by buying renewable energy certificates, basically, by vouchsafing that the electricity is clean. Is that the idea?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Not allowed in the CSU.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really? You guys are really playing on the hard setting, then.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>That's not true. It's not not allowed in the CSU. It's not allowed by Lindsey. So if someone else comes along and says, "You're stupid and this is impractical", they can —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>"Good God, woman, make things easier for yourself for once."</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>I know this is a deep, dark hole that we've dug ourselves, but my feeling about offsetting is that our points of pride in the CSU are that the community that we serve stays here. So our students tend to live and work in the communities where they go to school. One in ten workers in California has a CSU degree. I feel that buying credits is a misrepresentation of our obligation to the people that we serve. And so, our working policy now, within my group and with the support of my team, our team, is that we will not purchase offsets until we get to that point where we just, like, can't.</p><p>We don't have the money, or that we're at that last 5% or 10% to get over the hump. And realistically, we'd like to keep it in the family. Right. Where we have a CSU fence line, and we go, okay, if we're buying offsets, it's through a campus over generating, and we're accounting for it at another campus that can't.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We might be talking about two different things. Two things to keep distinct. One is carbon offsets.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Sure. And one is renewable energy credits, and...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One is renewable energy credits. Offsets. I can see absolutely the case for not relying on offsets. I get. But for your electricity, if you don't rely on renewable energy credits, you are having to self generate in real time the electricity you're using —</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>That is what we're angling for.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is super hard.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, it is super hard. I'm kind of conflating the two. Because —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You don't want to do either.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, they're interchangeable in my mind. So really, what we want to see happen is that we exhaust all opportunity to generate on our campuses the offset that we need and own those credits. Now, the fact I was born at night but not last night, I know that that is a huge undertaking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, as part of this, you must be trying to install quite a bit of —</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>We are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Renewable energy on your campuses.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>We are. Tremendous amounts of renewable. And also looking at, like I said, maybe an opportunity for geothermal, like large scale geothermal that a single campus wouldn't be able to use. But we could sort of account for that again in the family.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Sort of sell it to another campus, more or less, kind of. I mean, surely if you have 23 campuses in California, some of them are sitting on top of some geothermal.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Oh, for sure. Especially up north, and then it looks like down south and in the Imperial Valley, there's possibly some opportunities, and we're starting to investigate that as how do we do a partnership on that in a way to afford it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Would be nice to get like a real power plant sized power plant.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Oh, it'd be so cool. If anyone out there wants to write me a check...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Because everything else is just like little bits here and there. So I guess you're like covering all your roofs with solar panels. Parking...</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, mostly parking. Roofs are tricky just because of warranties and access and that kind of thing, and the age of our buildings. But we're really trying to do this to where the CSU is in and of itself, carbon neutral and net zero. And we've set the goal that way, knowing that getting to 0% is like, that's not a real thing, right? Functional zero. And knowing that we're probably going to hit a wall at some point where it's like we're constrained by finances, we're constrained by property, we're constrained —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, yeah, land.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah. There's a whole bunch of potential hurdles there that might just put up a brick wall that we can't get through.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Could you theoretically own a big solar field that's not on one of your campuses, like somewhere else?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>I mean, some of the campuses. Cal Poly SLO has actually done that through the RES-BCT program for the PG&E. They've put in a large — you know, now, for the purposes of this discussion, don't quote me, because I can't remember if the campus actually owns the property or if it's a lease agreement, but it's off the campus proper. They've got a large system that they installed to serve, like their equine center and their ag center that are off the campus grid, basically.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there a campus that is generating as much electricity as it is using yet?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>There's a couple campuses that are close. So Long beach is actually pretty close. I think Fullerton is pretty close. Sac State is going to be pretty close. Several of the campuses are under contract for solar and microgrid systems that are going to get them close, at the very least, going to position themselves for meeting those longer term goals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I do see now why a geothermal power plant would really come in.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>That'd be cool. It'd come in super handy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Speaking of microgrids, I love me some microgrids. And campuses are sort of kind of the iconic place to do it. You have control of the whole system. So do you have microgrids, islandable microgrids set up anywhere yet?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>So, we don't have islandable microgrids. The regulatory environment in California to actually come off grid is extremely, I'll say, complicated. You could do a whole show on that, David. Actually, it would be really interesting to hear how people characterize that situation, but we're really approaching it right now through the lens of resiliency, because since the paradise fire in northern California in 2017, the public safety shut offs that the utilities are allowed to enact to protect the grid during inclement weather has affected campuses pretty severely. They've lost power for five, six, seven days.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it occurs to me that you must have some labs and stuff where a blackout is a big deal.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yes, that's very true. We have labs, we have vivariums, we have critical ops. We have archives, all kinds of stuff that needs to be protected. And obviously, we have generators, but no one designs a generator to run for ten days. So even on e-circuits, it's still more than we're capable of supporting over a long period of time. So, we're looking at a lot of this as an opportunity to reconfigure our electrical system so that only the appropriate operations are served by emergency circuits, and that we have battery backup that offers some longer term, and then also, at least in the interim, pair it with our — some campuses have fuel cells. All of them have generators. So use that microgrid operation for a resiliency purpose. Not so much for islanding right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So is there a campus currently where if the grid goes down for one of these planned outages, it can stay on? Is that, like, up and running anywhere, or is this just a gleam in your eye?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Well, I guess I should ask a clarifying question. If you mean are there any campuses that could continue business as usual?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well. How about continue some modified, reduced version of business as usual. So their vivariums, right, and labs can stay going, let's say.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah. So every campus can do that to a degree. Right. So every campus has enough backup. But I wouldn't say — I'm going to infer what you're asking and basically say, could you go to minimal operations where some classes or some research?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, yeah, yeah.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Basically the answer to that is "no." There's enough backup generation to allow enough time so that a faculty member, for example, could make alternative arrangements for their critters that they're researching somewhere or something like that. Or make a note on their data that there was a disruption. There's enough time to kind of get your affairs in order.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Okay, we're going minimal ops, and this one room is going to be available. Ideally, we'd have something like that, although I would say, interestingly, the pandemic has changed that. Right. Our ability to pivot to an online pedagogy has, like, wow, suddenly we can do that. So a very few classes that can't just go, "okay, we're going to catch up on labs when we get through this outage in a few days."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, beefing that up, it seems to me, was mostly about installing more solar and more batteries. Are you just going nuts on storage?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>We are. We're really trying. It's difficult because, again, we're doing that through third party power purchase agreements. But we have a few campuses, actually, that are under contract right now for solar and battery. So kind of the building blocks of their microgrids. And then we'll look towards expanding into microgrid controllers and all of the secondary electrical work. Actually, we have quite a few. Several of the Sonoma State has broken ground on theirs. Cal Poly Humboldt, Cal State San Marcos, they're all moving forward with their microgrid plans, and that's just to name a few.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Final electricity/building question is, since you have these semi self-contained campuses, can they serve as virtual power plants? Can they sell grid services? Is that even up and running yet in California? Is that doable yet, or is that something you have on the horizon?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>I'm so glad you asked that question. I'm super duper, duper excited about virtual power planting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Me too. I need to do an episode just on them.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, yeah, you really should, because I'm just learning about this — yes. So the answer to your question is yes, no, yes, yes. It's not happening yet in California. There's definitely some regulatory hurdles here. There used to be sort of virtual net metering and aggregated net metering programs in place with the utilities that have gone away over the time or morphed into different things and so there's some regulatory issues to deal with there. But my team and I have really been talking about the coordination between our microgrids and our thermal energy storage as a real opportunity to virtual power plant among our campuses and also —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Demand shift.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, demand shift. And also as an opportunity as we're talking about these sort of what do we do with the campuses that can't put renewable energy right. Can we help support each other in this sort of regional way? So, we're just in our infancy sort of investigating this, but so excited about the possibilities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I wonder and maybe things aren't far enough along for you to know this, but I don't have any sense of what the scale could be on that. Would you imagine being compensated for grid services in your various campuses being a real substantial income stream? Or is this more like a frill? Do you know what I mean? Like how are you thinking about it?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>So my first response to that is I don't know, but my second response is based on California's history with how it operates within the confines of utility regulation and with our new NEM 3.0 requirements, I cannot see this being an income stream. That's me and my crystal ball. I would be very surprised, but I would say maybe the benefits would be more like "grid stability is good for everybody" kind of a thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. VPPs are great just for their —</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>For their own merits. Right. Just the purpose.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So one final question about buildings, which is just something that occurred to me as I was thinking about this, is, are you out building new anything, new campuses or new —? Because I would imagine building new stuff that works for these goals is a lot easier than retrofitting stuff. But are you even doing any new stuff? And is sort of tightening requirements for new stuff a big piece of this?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think we're in an interesting time for that. I mean, we are building new buildings in alignment with our master plans for campuses. Post-COVID, though, I think there's a need to analyze the asset and real estate needs. Are they the same as they were? What is the next generation going to expect with regard to their on campus experience versus their online experience? And then, you know, looking at population growth in California, which has slowed, do we look at building new institutions to serve communities that know rural or have a long commute to a four year institution?</p><p>Or does that not make much sense? Do we do satellites or do we do remote learning centers? So I think there is a lot of uncertainty there. Not in a bad way, but just in a "Jeez, everybody, this was a global pandemic. What a weird thing to have happened. And now it's brought up all these questions." And then I think the other thing is, there's a very real understanding among our capital team, of which my group is a part, that the most sustainable building is the building that's already built.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>So all of the folks that I work with, my peers in the executive leadership sort of group, are very aware of this. And instead of being like, well, we're going to just do business as usual. Everybody's really cohesively talking about, do we need to rethink our strategy? Do we need to start thinking about what buildings can be saved? How can we reduce waste?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Infill, versus sprawl.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yes, that risk is — the liability that we have. The further out we spread our boundaries in terms of our assets is real. Right. This is all stuff, space that has to be insured. And then we've got space that if it's not serving its function anymore, do we really need to demo it or should it be retrofitted? So, I think that's a conversation we're having, and I think we're probably going to be seeing maybe a shift in how we evaluate whether a new building needs to be constructed versus an old building being rehabbed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Let's talk a little bit about scope 3.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>No.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Honestly, for any institution, scope 3 is a little bit overwhelming and baffling. But for something like campuses, like you say, they are little cities. So, scope 3 involves a lot. The first question is just, do you feel like you have reliable tools to measure and assess scope 3 emissions? Because the whole field around scope 3 emissions seems a little bit nascent to me. What's your take on that?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was just going to say no, I don't feel like we have the tools and go farther to say that anyone that tells you that they do is lying.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>People are working on them, allegedly.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>The colleagues, the folks that I work with, we all sit around the tables going, "What are you guys doing with scope 3? What are you doing with scope — ?" Or somebody called it scope 4, because we've got scope 3, like transportation, and scope 4 is the embodied carbon piece, or scope 3a, whatever. And everybody is just going "Where do you even start?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Where do you begin?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>It's so massive. The transportation piece is getting a little bit better configured. Although I think the definition of what is our responsibility and what is other people's responsibility and how do we avoid double counting or not counting is still a question. But we're trying to do better on sort of our programmatic elements of that related to alternative transportation and fuels and that kind of thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, if any student at any one of your 23 campuses drives their car to the campus —</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>That's us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Boom, you've got some scope 3 emissions there. So you have to theoretically get all however many thousand students. You said some mind-boggling number. You have to get them all to the campuses without driving. That alone is like, how on earth do you do that? I mean, I know you can do some carpool programs, but you don't control public transit. You don't control zoning decisions —</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Boundary responsibility. Well, it's the same thing with embodied carbon. Right? Like, I don't control how lumber is milled and where it comes from.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This was my other question, which is, even if you could measure the amount of embodied carbon coming in through building materials, say, that doesn't necessarily mean that there's a source of carbon-free building materials even available to you.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>So where we are with this now, which is to say, not far. So there are some firms, like, working on sort of software tools to help start tracking this. The state of California does require environmentally preferable purchasing or reporting on construction materials and things like that. So we do do that. The cynic in me is like, is this even close to, like, is this even accurate enough to merit tracking?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, right.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>But the optimist in me is like, okay, well, we got to start somewhere. So tracking what you're using is a place to start, and then at least you can put rules of thumb to it. Right? Like, how many pounds of steel do we use? How many pounds of lumber, how many pounds of concrete? And as a rule, regardless of where it comes from, what is the carbon impact of those materials, even though the specifics of where they come from and how they're milled and all that stuff has an impact, it at least gives you some framework to start from, because where it is right now is just like pulling numbers out of the damn sky. Just don't know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's a lot of dreamed up numbers in that general vicinity.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>I mean, for organizations like mine, or ours, not mine, right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you even have the staff? Do you have the staff to do this?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Exactly. Like, the administrative and transactional costs associated with tracking that information is — I couldn't even begin to. You could have someone in every unit for every project doing only that. Only that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Really seems like a place where you really badly need better tools, like standardized, off the shelf.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Very, very much. I feel like this is a supply chain matter, right, ideally. But because it doesn't work to rely — we have to try and take responsibility on our own. We can't force industry to make these adjustments.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It does seem like, though, especially in scope 3, you are, to some unavoidable degree, dependent on developments that you have no control over. Right. Like what the state does or even what the federal government does.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Right, so at this point, it's more about just understanding what we use. When we feel like we can track that with some degree of accuracy, we'll feel like we've made a tremendous success. We are including scope 3 as part of our carbon reduction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's crazy; that's just crazy.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>I'm going to retire before all this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In your mind's eye, when 2045 rolls around and CSU is carbon neutral, how are people getting to school? What does the zero carbon, just the transport alone, just the transport angle alone, what would it look like for that to be truly carbon free? No more gas cars, I guess. No more gas cars on the street.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>We have the best chance of it in California, right. Like we're moving away from petrol, as it were, in California. So my thought is that if things were to go my way, it'd be a combination of things. Obviously, where — we have good public transit, we have good programs for students, shuttle systems and stuff that aren't necessarily related to the community programs, regional transit and things like that, that we have a little bit more control over, and then electric vehicles and mobility devices which have their own issues. I mean, we've got concerns related to lithium ions, and everything is a rabbit hole but —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Once you scope 3 it, all of a sudden, EVs are not as uncomplicated as they seem.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Exactly. And I think the other combination with that is, do we have students coming to school when they don't need to be?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Like, are students coming to school for classes where they really don't need to be? Could you be doing this class once a week instead of three times a week, and the rest of the class is held online? I don't know the answer to that. I don't know that that is the answer. But I think all of those avenues need to be investigated so that we understand what students need, what they want, and how we can meet these goals while giving them both of those things. The college experience that they want, and the education they need. Think about how much reduction that would be to just have someone for one class going, well, I only have to come to campus one day a week.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. That's an easy lever to pull. For sure.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, for sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One can imagine ways of decarbonizing that do not serve resilience, that leave campuses sort of brittle or vulnerable. Talk a little bit about just the effects you've seen of climate and severe weather on your campuses and how you're thinking about resilience as part of decarbonization.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Well, so this is such a hard question because we just had fairly recently in California a hurriquake. Have you heard of this?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>New weather phenomenon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, good. Have fun.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Our campus, San Bernardino, out in the inland empire, was hit by torrential rains from a hurricane. At the same time, there was an inland earthquake — and they had like four inches of water on their gym. And they're out in what we would refer to as kind of the low desert. They're not in a place where you think of flooding exactly. You definitely don't think of being impacted by a hurricane. And then they also suffer the wildfires from sweeping through the valley there. Poor campus. We use them as an example. And they're such good sports about it, but so there's that.</p><p>And then, like I said, we had a couple of days ago, now I've got phone calls out to our campuses in San Jose to see if their Moss Landing Institute was impacted by these waves coming in off the coast. They've got research right up butted up against the ocean where they impacted by that? So wildfires and public safety shut offs are the main impacts. Right. And then, of course, drought across California because this is a desert state, most of it. And we go through decade long periods of drought. One of the things we're trying to do is we've developed a resilient infrastructure guidelines model.</p><p>So it's a tool to allow campuses, when they're planning projects and capital construction to think about their designs in terms of the resiliency hazards, potential climate hazards and resiliency impacts their campus might face as a result of where they are geographically, their age, the condition of their infrastructure, so on and so forth, and then use that for those projects, but then also for their utility master planning efforts and their critical infrastructure reports to kind of help prioritize how they should be looking at their infrastructure upgrades. Because if you're a campus that has been experiencing drought, you're not necessarily going to think about prioritizing your stormwater plan, stormwater infrastructure. But if you don't and you find out that three other institutions in your immediate area have had massive millions and millions and millions of dollars worth of damage and shutdown resulting from water intrusion because they didn't have a good stormwater infrastructure. Maybe you need to be thinking about that a little bit more.</p><p>That needs to be bumped up the priority list, perhaps more. So that's one of the tools we're using. It's actually pretty sophisticated and we've been working on it for a couple of years, and then it's intended to stay kind of a living document because the climate is changing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Indeed.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Universities are changing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's truly a moving target. I've burned up all my time, so I don't have time to talk about food. But obviously I feel like I should at least mention it because among all the many other things that you have to worry about, once you're talking about decarbonization and scope 3, and everything else is food incoming food service, food waste. Could you give us like a one or two line how you're thinking about food, answer?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>I can summarize food by saying it is almost as difficult as scope 3.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, we should talk about this at another time. We can get into some of this, David, but it is tremendously difficult. It's another thing that crosses those boundary lines. And then the one thing that I think people in your audience definitely will not know is that the way most, this is true of most universities, not just ours, is that the way food works on their campuses is through auxiliary services, meaning they have contracts for food providers through their 501(c)(3).</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So once again, you're dependent on, you need someone to provide carbon free food service or else what can you do?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Right, right. And then you've got all the safety policies. Right. Because we spend a lot of time on the food waste side, too, going, okay, we have students who are food insecure and you're going to throw away all this food from some box lunch thing, can we give it away? And you got to go through risk management for all that. Like everything else, it's just a rabbit hole. And that is. Oh, man, that is a tough one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Yeah, it's something that I think my sort of like, energy nerd world crowd doesn't think about a ton. Same with kind of agriculture.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah. Interesting to see how they cross.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Final question here is, just as I said earlier, it is sort of, I don't know, like amusing and poignant to me to imagine you sitting in your office thinking about basically how to transform a decent chunk of the state in the next few years. So you've been given this mandate, which, you know, thanks a lot. So what when you think about California politicians now and regulators, what do they not get? And if you had to sort of prioritize a couple of things that you would ask from them besides money, like give me some money, obviously. But in terms of law or regulatory support, are there a couple of top line items that would make your life easier?</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think the government really needs to facilitate partnerships a bit more. I don't know that any one organization like ours, or even the UC, which is obviously a huge and well recognized, world renowned organization, has an easy time developing relationships with nonprofits, with commercial interests, supply chain groups, and those partnerships are imperative. And I think the thing that frustrates me with the money question is, the money is out there. We know it exists; like, the actual physical pieces of paper are available. And I tend to think that there's probably a lot more interest among the community, be it business, be it private philanthropy, anywhere, that they would like to know how they can help, how they can be a part of this.</p><p>And I don't feel like the government does anything to try and facilitate those partnerships. And so we're all sort of feeling around in the dark in this room, trying to find who we are and then also not waste each other's time. Right. Do I have what you want? Do you have what I want? There is some organization that could happen here that I think would be really helpful —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are not duplicating efforts. It seems like there's got to be lots of big organizations that need roughly the same things you need.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>And there's services, there's firms that do this kind of work, certainly, that have a lot of these contacts. But for organizations like the community colleges and the CSUs, they don't have the funding to go out and hire people for these sort of theoretical connections. So I would really like to see, other than the money — don't forget the money — but other than the money, sort of that. And then also related to these programs, just streamlining, what do you, as a legislator and your aides and the people within the organizations over whom you are responsible, what do they really need to see?</p><p>Are we doing reporting? Are we punching numbers? Are we investing time and staff and money in information that you're never going to look at, is never going to get verified? It's not useful to anybody. And can that be simplified?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, a lot of it. Just about. It seems like communication between legislators and regulators and people like you who are out in the implementation swamp, better communication would be a great thing.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you so much, Lindsey. This is just fascinating. Like decarbonization in general is just a giant puzzle, and every little piece of it is a puzzle, but you've got your hands on a really big piece of the puzzle. So I'm sure it feels overwhelming and slightly ridiculous what you're being asked to do. But I will say it comforts me to know that there are people like you out there really doing the ground, the block and tackle work of making this happen.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Yes, it's comforting to me to know that there's people like you out there spreading the word that this work is going on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, good. Well, we've comforted one another in the storm.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>The marginal success of the day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Beautiful. All right, thanks so much, Lindsey.</p><p><strong>Lindsey Rowell</strong></p><p>Thank you, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/decarbonizing-a-sprawling-university</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:139714530</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 06 Jan 2024 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/139714530/6f0dafddf62608916a4727a3e2b66889.mp3" length="75303228" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3763</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/139714530/e90e13ba91f4da3c494904dd1babfc10.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[We are closing in on zero-carbon cement]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>The cement industry, responsible for roughly 8 percent of total global carbon emissions, is notoriously difficult to decarbonize. But a new startup, Sublime Systems, aims to manufacture zero-carbon cement that can easily be substituted for the traditional version. In this episode, Sublime CEO Leah Ellis talks through the company’s vision and process.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/2fmd8w5feggqopto7og0k/volts23.12.27-leah.ellis.pdf?rlkey=8ejypx5kdv6yfknlv5mjagtwp&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/we-are-closing-in-on-zero-carbon-cement"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Of all the so-called “difficult to decarbonize” sectors, cement is among the most vexing. Making cement produces CO2 not merely through fuel combustion (in kilns that reach temperatures of up to 1400 C), but also through chemical processes that split CO2 off from other molecules. It is responsible for roughly 8 percent of total global carbon emissions.</p><p>Most gestures at decarbonizing cement to date are fairly desultory — things like adding special additives or injecting a little CO2 when the cement is mixed into concrete. The only widely available method that could theoretically produce no- or low-carbon cement is post-combustion carbon capture and sequestration. And there are plenty of people who would question whether that's actually viable at all, much less widely available, given that it would roughly double operational costs for a cement plant.</p><p>There are lots of startups out there attempting to solve this problem (as <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/clean-industry/6-innovative-startups-that-are-kicking-co2-out-of-cement-and-concrete">reported by Canary</a> last month). Perhaps the most intriguing is <a target="_blank" href="https://sublime-systems.com/">Sublime Systems</a>, a team that has developed something truly new and exciting: a system for manufacturing cement that requires no high heat (thus no combustion emissions) and uses inputs that contain no carbon (thus no chemical emissions). That makes the cement, at least potentially, not just low-carbon but <em>zero</em>-carbon. What’s more, the company says that, in form and performance, its product is a perfect drop-in substitute for traditional Portland cement, so it wouldn't even require any changes in the construction industry.</p><p>A carbon-free drop-in cement substitute — at scale and at competitive cost — would be genuinely transformative. I contacted Sublime CEO Leah Ellis to talk about cement chemistry, the company’s process, and the plan for reaching megaton scale. This one was truly fascinating and educational for me; I think you will really like it.</p><p>All right then. Leah Ellis, CEO of Sublime Systems, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm excited today to talk about concrete, everybody's favorite subject. But first I wanted to ask you, I know you and your partner originally were trained as and educated as battery scientists. I'm just curious how you ended up here. What drew you into this area, this problem?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, my co-founder is a professor at MIT, Yet-Ming Chiang, and he's in the material science department, and I'm a chemist by training. I like to think of chemistry as the central science that combines everything from physics to biology. All of the good stuff you can sort of spread into anything from a foundation in chemistry. So I did my PhD in lithium-ion batteries. I worked with a prolific inventor, Jeff Dahn, and after that I wanted to continue working with an inventor. As you may know, in academia, there are so many different styles of research.</p><p>I mean, some people like microscopy and mechanisms, but I really like the creative aspect, like discovering something that could be useful or to solve problems. And not many academics and professors think through that lens. So I've always been very lucky to work with prolific inventors, both in my master's and my PhD. So for my postdoc, I sought to work with people who thought like that. So my co-founder, Yet-Ming Chiang at MIT, is a prolific inventor and also a serial entrepreneur. So Sublime is his 7th startup, and five of the previous six have been very successful.</p><p>So I didn't join him with the aspiration of becoming a founder. I really knew nothing about entrepreneurship or anything like that, but I did want to invent, and I did love the way he approaches his work from a problem-solving standpoint. So that's what brought us together.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And he's the one who sort of flagged the problem of concrete to you.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>That's right. So I was always aware that cement was one of the biggest levers for decarbonization. But I suppose after my PhD, where I'd worked with one of the most illustrious battery scientists, I sort of always had thought that my career would be in batteries. Like, I thought I'd painted myself into a corner. And so when I first met Yet-Ming Chiang, he asked a question that at first I thought was a trick question. He was, "Hey, Leah, like, you've got this Canadian grant to come work with me, and I know you're a battery scientist, but aren't you a little bit bored of batteries?"</p><p>And I thought that was a trick question because he's the battery guru and I didn't want to insult him, but honestly, I sort of shared his opinion that, well, maybe this isn't his opinion, maybe it's just my opinion. But I think batteries are exciting, but I think there's like sigmoidal growth in any technology where it starts out slow to build momentum, and then it goes through a period where it's super hyped, and then you sort of squeeze all of the innovations out of things. And I think with lithium-ion batteries, which was my expertise, it comes to making the cans a bit bigger and the separators a little bit thinner and tweaks. And you know — I don't know, I just want to do something totally outside the box.</p><p>And I think that's what Yet offered me the chance to do when he said, "If you're bored with batteries, why don't we think of a way to apply our electrochemical toolbox to cement?" And so the way he came up with that electrochemical cement tagline was he spends a lot of time thinking about reducing the emissions in the utility sector. And I think we have all of the technology needed to do that. I mean, not saying it will be easy to deploy solar, wind, long duration storage, but at least we have the technology. So that's not necessarily where most of the early stage R&D is needed.</p><p>And so he was thinking at the time, like, how do we use low cost renewables, assuming that we'll figure out all of the utility stuff and really get to low cost intermittent renewables? And how do we take intermittent renewables and apply that to decarbonizing the next biggest tranche of emissions, which is cement? So cement, if it were a country, would be the third largest emitter after China and the US. So it's 8% of global CO2 emissions back in 2018, it fluctuates, but it's like 7% or 8%. So it's big game hunting when it comes to decarbonization. So we've always worked backwards from that electrochemical cement tagline.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it's 8% of current emissions. But also, you make the point that's just going to go up, right? There's just going to be more and more cement as far as the eye can see.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Right. And as everything else, I hope, goes to zero. I think these so-called hard to abate sectors like cement and steel, they may be both seven or 8% now, but in coming years, as the grid gets decarbonized, these numbers are just going to get larger because neither cement nor steel are going to go away. And in fact, we're going to use more cement, especially in places like India and Africa, that will undergo a phase of dirty growth unless we develop and deploy these clean technologies in time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, let's talk about cement then. I mean, if you're looking for the big problem with no solution yet, it seems like you really nailed this one. So, let's talk about cement. I've been reading sort of the background materials of your company and reading about cement in preparation for this. I have tripled my knowledge about cement over the last 72 hours, starting from an extremely low baseline. What is interesting to me is that the process whereby cement is made, the emissions mostly come from trying to get lime. So, let's talk a little bit about how cement is made.</p><p>So, cement, the recipe for cement, as you say on the website and in all these briefing materials, is calcium silicate hydrate (CSH). There are, I'm sure, details that matter, but that's the basic recipe for the basic kind of cement that we've been using for hundreds of years. CSH, they call it calcium silicate hydrate, and that is made of lime and silica and water. We can talk about silica and water later, but they're pretty easy to come by. So, mostly it's about getting lime, it's about how do you get lime? And the way we get lime now is starting with limestone.</p><p>So, maybe you can just briefly describe the process whereby conventional cement is made. How do we get from those raw materials to the cement that we are familiar with in bags, mixing with water, et cetera?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, as you say, cement, the principal ingredient is lime, calcium oxide. And fun fact is, that's where Sublime Systems got their name. I was looking in a rhyming dictionary for something that rhymed. No shortage of cement puns. I can keep them coming if you like. Or maybe you don't like.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's excellent.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>So, lime is calcium oxide or hydroxide. It's a reactive calcium that reacts with silica and water to make cement. Or when cement reacts with water, then it becomes concrete, that calcium silicate hydrate phase you mentioned. So, today, and historically, the path to making cement has been by thermally decomposing limestone, which is calcium carbonate, which is 50% by weight CO2.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that kind of blew my mind. I don't know anything about chemistry, so all chemistry blows my mind.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, it is mind-blowing. I mean, you think of cement, which is the world's largest industry by mass. So we use more cement than any other material besides water. And the prime ingredient in cement, it's about 65% weight calcium oxide. And then that comes from limestone, which is 50% by weight, CO2. So you just do the math. It's very easy to visualize. Just the massive CO2 emissions is staggering.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the emissions from cement are almost all around this process of getting lime. They're 50/50 — you break it down 50/50. So 50% is getting the kiln hot enough to break limestone down, which requires extremely high temperatures. What is it, 1400?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the way we make Portland cement, which is the modern cement that we've been using for the past almost 200 years, is you take limestone and then heat it first to 900 degrees Celsius. And that is the temperature at which limestone decomposes into reactive lime and CO2, and then to make Portland cement, which is a specific chemistry of cement, you heat it further to 1400 degrees Celsius, at which point the lime and the silica fuse together to make a phase called alite tricalcium silicate. And then that is quenched. So it's dropped very quickly from that hot kiln and sort of freezes that phase.</p><p>That when you grind the cement into a powder that now reacts very vigorously with water, it releases a lot of that extra heat and that turns into the hardened concrete.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So just to give people a visual here, a conception, this process of heating lime up and getting the lime out of the limestone, that's where all the emissions come from. They're about 50/50 the emissions.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, about 50/50. And of course, it depends on the design of the kiln. Some of them are more efficient than others, but it's about 50% limestone emissions, 50% fossil emissions. And to get to that very high temperature, you often require a very high caloric, luminous flame, which requires bituminous coals — is often the primary fuel for this type of kiln.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So it's 50% this special kind of coal heating up this special kind of kiln to the extraordinarily high temperature of 1400 C. And then the other 50% is the CO2 in the limestone being broken out and then vented, I guess emitted. Which is just the reason I'm harping on this point, is just that I think a lot of people think of decarbonization as primarily an energy thing. But it's worth noting here that even if you find a decarbonized way to get that heat, that 1400 C heat, you're still left with 50% of the emissions. Right, because you still have CO2 coming out of the limestone as it's heated.</p><p>Because we've talked a lot on this pod about alternative sources of heat and about heat batteries, thermal storage batteries that conceivably could get up to 1400. They have that in their sights. But I just want to emphasize that even if that problem is solved, you still got 50% of the problem left, which is all the CO2 that's embedded in limestone attached to the lime. So that's our current cement. 50/50, heating up lime, breaking the lime out of the limestone. Let's talk about ways that people have tried to approach, before we get to Sublime's approach, let's talk about other ways people have thought about this.</p><p>It's a big problem. And if you think about decarbonization long enough, you end up here. What else have people tried to do with cement? I know there are a couple of things floating around, but maybe you just tell us sort of like, what are the other alternatives here?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, there are, as you say, not many technologies, if any, besides Sublime's, that can address both halves of the cement CO2 problem, the limestone and the fossil fuel, simultaneously. So you could electrify the heat in some way with a thermal battery or find some sort of electric kiln. And electric kilns have material problems. It's difficult to get things that withstand that temperature — the heating elements — if you're using resistive heating, for example.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is anyone doing that yet? Is there an electrified heat source specifically making cement yet, or is that just an idea?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Not that I know of. I mean, I think that would be the obvious solution, I think is to electrify the kiln. And I know there's some efforts with plasmas and solar concentrators and stuff like that, but I think that one would be, if it was easy, someone would already be doing it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Getting extremely high heat with electricity is vexing.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Right. And you can do it. The challenge is, like, can you do it efficiently? And then even if you do it, have you really solved the whole problem?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>So, there's that. And then I'd say, like, what the industry is doing right now. And to their credit, they are doing everything they can to decarbonize, especially in the past three to five years. So there's a focus on alternative fuel. So, cement actually plays an interesting role in the garbage ecosystem because it's such a high temperature. It's just a really great place to dispose of things because everything at that temperature vaporizes into CO2 within a matter of seconds. So it's a great place to burn tires. It's a very clean way to burn tires.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What, in cement kilns?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They're throwing tires in there?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, I've actually visited a kiln that had this tire injection port, and I was able to stand on top of it and watch them drop tires into this kiln. About every 20 seconds, a hatch in the kiln, rotary kiln, would open, and it would drop in. I actually have a video I can send you a link to. It's one of the coolest things I've ever seen, but, yeah. The plant manager told me that the tire turns entirely to CO2 within 20 seconds. I think many of us have seen a tire fire which creates, like, black, choking smoke.</p><p>But if you get to 1400 degrees C, it just undergoes complete combustion almost instantaneously. So tires, like tar shingles, unrecyclable plastic, medical waste, solvent waste. The list goes on. In fact, I have an employee that used to work at a cement kiln close to the US-Mexican border, and they would bring all kinds of contraband that was seized at the border and they would just unload pallets of contraband into the kiln. So, almost anything goes. But that can't be your entire fuel source. So that's a supplementary fuel source.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Does anything except coal work here? Like, is there a substitute for this specialized coal here that can get to that kind of heat?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, some of them use like a blend of natural gas and other things. And often it takes a blend of fuels to really get up to that temperature. So first you have to start with propane and get it to a certain temperature, and then you add more oxygen. More coal is the typical fuel that's used. And so besides all of these giant cement plants, if you look at them on Google maps or something, there's usually you can see a little mountain of coal besides the kiln.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, but for decarbonizing that, you basically just have to capture the CO2 after it's emitted, right? From the kiln.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the ways the industry is decarbonizing now include alternative fuels and then what's called supplementary cementitious materials. And then of course, post-combustion carbon capture, which hasn't yet been proven at scale. But there are plenty of pilot plants because that's really the only other way, in my opinion, besides Sublime Systems that can get you to a fully decarbonized cement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, theoretically, right, that there's no carbon capture working even close to 100%, as far as I know, on any industrial facility. Theoretically, we could get to mostly decarbonized.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Theoretically. And I'm afraid to share your opinion that post-combustion carbon capture has never been successfully demonstrated at scale for cement and for coal either. I mean, I sure hope it works because I think that is, if it worked, it would be the most expedient way to decarbonize existing assets. But I think there have been many challenges in employing post-combustion carbon capture at scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Among other things, it basically doubles the operating cost, right? I mean, it's just like adding another industrial facility onto your industrial facility. And I just come back just on first principles. I was like, however we solve this problem, it's not going to be through some Rube Goldberg system where we double the cost of every single concrete plant and then bury kajillion tons of — and then build CO2 pipelines to all of them and then carry all that CO2 and bury it. It's just like, there's no way that's going to be it.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Although that's kind of where people are going. That's sort of the only option.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>I like to use the leaky tap analogy when talking about climate change. So imagine you have a tap that's leaking or gushing water. There's really three ways to fix it. And one is to stop this flow of emissions and through carbon avoidance technologies like Sublime Systems like renewable energy. And then the other thing you could do is put a bucket right underneath the tap and collect it point source. And of course, that's just a patch solution if you don't have the means or the ability to fix the tap right away. And that, of course, is point source carbon capture.</p><p>And then the third way you could go about fixing this problem is mopping the water off the floor. And in this case, the analogy is director carbon capture, which is collecting the water in a much less efficient, more energy-intensive, more dilute way. And I don't think it makes sense to mop the water off the floor unless you've done steps one and two to mitigate the stem of the flow of CO2.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I just want to mention these materials you're talking about adding to the process.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yes, that's important.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just to explain that. So you want the lime to react with the silicates. That's the point of all this. But through this process, you end up with a lot of lime sort of left over that has not reacted with a silicate. And so you add these supplemental materials and that kind of boosts more of the lime to react. Is that basically right?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. So that phase that I mentioned that is made in the kiln is called tricalcium silicate, or alite. And that is three calciums, tricalcium to one silica. And then that hardened phase of concrete that cement turns into as it hardens into concrete is calcium silicate hydrate. One calcium to one silica to one water, approximately. So Portland cement has three times more calcium than it really needs. Those two extra molecules of calcium are just on for the ride. They don't significantly contribute to the strength or to the durability — in fact, they make today's cement maybe less durable than, let's say, Roman concrete was.</p><p>So this actually started decades ago. Let's say in the '60s, '70s and '80s, people started using coal fly ash, which is a silicate, and blending that into cement. And at first they did it to save cost, because at that time, coal, fly ash, people would pay you to take it off their hands and it dilutes the cement, so — they did it for cost saving reasons. But really it makes better cement when you balance out that calcium to silica ratio and you also can lower your CO2 emissions. But that being said, you can only lower the CO2 emissions of your concrete by about 30% before you start having too much silica to calcium, and then that starts deteriorating your performance.</p><p>So, there's fly ash, and that is going away. So the cement industry is now moving, trying to find other sources of supplementary cementitious materials. These include natural sources of silicates like the Romans used, volcanic ash, so pumice, certain types of calcined clays. All of these are being developed as ways to dilute the Portland cement with no or low emitting minerals, which do in fact make better concrete at the end of the day. But again, these supplementary cementitious materials can't, like, they can only solve 30%. Maybe you could get to 50% if you accept some differences in performance, but they can't get you to zero because these are bringing silicates, they're not bringing that lime, and there's no way to decarbonize lime, unless I think you're going about our process, which uses renewable energy and non-carbonate sources of calcium.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. These materials you add, they're going to come back into our story later. A little Chekhov's gun there. All right, so I've made you and the audience wait for 20 minutes now. So let's talk about how you solve this dilemma. So we've got limestone that has to be broken down into lime. And right now, the only way we know how to do that is heating it up extremely high with a fossil fuel kiln, which emits things, and then you break it out of limestone and it gets emitted. So you need basically what you and your partner came to, where all of this sort of leads you as you sort of analyze this process, is we need some other way to get lime.</p><p>Basically, that's the nub of the concrete problem. Basically, we need a way to get lime that does not involve emitting a bunch of CO2 as we break it out of limestone and does not involve super, super, super high temperatures. We need a room temperature way to create decarbonized lime. So I think anybody who sort of reviews the process of how cement is made from a carbon perspective, is going to end up there, right? Lime is the thing. So then you say in your Medium post, once the goal was clear, it took us less than a year of focused effort to invent a way to make carbon neutral lime at ambient temperature, which kind of like, blew my mind a little bit.</p><p>I guess it's just that no one had looked before. Or it's just crazy to me that once you started looking, there it is. Which to me indicates that they must not have been looking very hard before.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>I think that's true. I don't think people had been looking very hard before, maybe for two reasons: So, one reason is that never before have we had a pathway to low cost renewable energy. Which is why something like this may have been invented decades ago, but it wouldn't have made sense. So I like to call Sublime the electric vehicle of cement making, because we're replacing these high temperature fossil fueled kilns with something at ambient temperature that avoids combustion but —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I love this. Can I just pause and clap here? Because I swear, like, almost every one of my pods, no matter what technology you're talking about in terms of modern technology you're talking about, it's super, super, super cheap renewables that are unlocking these possibilities, like one after the other. Stuff that it would have been too energy-intensive and expensive to do up until very recently. But renewables getting so, so, so cheap is just like one after the other, unlocking all sorts of possibilities in all sorts of areas. You wouldn't even necessarily think, right, like cement. The first thing you would think is like, renewable energy can do that, right?</p><p>But it turns out there it is again. There's cheap renewables coming to our rescue yet again. Sorry, go ahead.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, totally. I mean, it expands your toolbox and just like an electric vehicle, if you were to power your Tesla with a coal fired power plant, I mean, there's really no point. Same with us. We use the same or similar number of kilowatt hours in terms of energy for our process. But if you're going to power that with a coal fired grid or just fuel it with coal directly, there's really no point. And so I don't think I'm really that smart. I think someone 30 or 40 years ago would have arrived at this conclusion. I think it's obvious in retrospect.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So many discoveries seem that way, right?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah. And then the other reason why I think my co-founder and I were special in being the ones to discover this obvious in retrospect pathway is that we blurred the lines. I think many people, especially in academia, they're sort of pigeonholed into their area of expertise. And I don't even credit myself for this move. I think it was my co-founder, who's a tenured professor at MIT, very celebrated. He's already made his career, so he's quite comfortable putting it on the line, being exploratory and cross-pollinating two disciplines that don't see each other. Like civil engineering, is where cement lives.</p><p>Electrochemistry is in material science or in the chemistry or physics departments, and those often don't touch. And the grad students may not even meet each other on campus. And so I do think it required a certain degree of boldness and courage on the part of my co-founder. And I was just trying to make him happy and be his conspirator and co-inventor, but that original concept definitely came from him.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's talk about how you do it, then, how you make lime with an ambient room temperature process that does not produce CO2. It turns out to involve another theme that comes up a lot on Volts, turns out to involve an electrolyzer. So, walk us through a little bit how you end up with lime.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I have to say, it may be quite simple in retrospect, although there's a lot of high tech technology and patent applications will be filed. But at a high level, it is so simple. I can explain this to someone with high school chemistry. So, when you do water splitting, you make hydrogen at one electrode, oxygen at the other electrode. But if you start with neutral pH, water or a brine, you make acidic solution at one electrode and an alkaline solution at the other electrode as a function of that water splitting reaction. Now, once you have that pH gradient, you can use it to drive a chemical reaction.</p><p>In this case, the dissolution of calcium from a mineral. If you're using limestone as a source of calcium, which we don't, you can think of this as like a Mentos and Coke reaction, where you have a carbonate reacting with acid to dissolve those minerals and release the CO2. So we could use limestone, and we could capture all that CO2, which, just like the Mentos and Coke, the CO2 would be cold, clean, and compressed. If we do this in a pressurized unit, and we could likely collect a lot of money for 45Q tax credits. But we chose to abandon that path and go for that true zero approach of using a non-carbonate source of calcium.</p><p>So, there are many calcium silicates, both natural minerals and also waste materials that are calcium silicates. We can dissolve the calcium from those minerals, leaving behind a reactive silicate. Those calcium silicates are inert. You put it through a reactor, the acidic side of the electrode dissolves the calcium, leaving behind a — so we've broken those inert bonds — leaving behind a reactive silicate. Then the calcium swings over to the negative electrode, precipitates as a hydroxide. Now you have reactive calcium, aka lime, and you have a reactive silicate and you dry those off into free flowing powders, blend them together, and now you have a cement that is very much like Roman cement where Romans, they didn't make Portland cement at 1400 degrees Celsius.</p><p>They made what's now called a pozzolanic cement, where they took volcanic ash, the silicate, and they took lime, which they made at 900 degrees Celsius, that first step. And they blended those together with water to make a cement that has evidently stood the test of time. So we're following that old recipe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's all lime, silica and water.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>At the end of the day, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>At the end of the day you're getting your lime. So you're precipitating lime out of lime containing calcium silicates.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so that would be your raw material instead of limestone. So just on the materials side, you're going to need a lot of whatever that is. What is that going to be? What is that material that you're going to break the calcium out of that you're going to be able to find in bulk that does not contain CO2?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, broadly, it's basaltic minerals. So anything with 10% calcium, more or less could be a suitable input material. So basaltic minerals, this is the type of rocks that are typically used as aggregate in concrete. So we can almost use the same supply chain that people use for aggregate can be used as input for our material as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there's no choke point there. That's an abundant material. There's no worries about finding enough stuff, basically.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. There are no worries about finding stuff. Although of course, even for cement plants today, making sure that your quarries are in close proximity to your market, it is a big exercise to site a plant and to minimize transportation costs because cement is so massively produced, which makes it very cheap and it's also very heavy. So there is a game here that we are also playing alongside any other cement company about siting your plants in proximity to market or in a way that you could float it by boat, since that way it travels very inexpensively. So you find cement plants on the Mississippi River, on the Hudson, near ports where the cement can float.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. You know, you're talking about using just sort of aggregate, just sort of like junk rock as an input. Is there any input you could use where getting rid of it would actually be an extra value stream? Like some sort of waste that you could dispose of by doing this.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>We have looked at loads of waste. So we have an ARPA-E grant that looks at ponded bottom ash. So there's billions of tons of ponded bottom ash. Like historical. So this isn't the fly ash, the stuff that comes out of the top of the smokestack. This is like the bottom ash, like the stuff with heavy metals that sort of is at the bottom. It's the icky stuff that they've ponded for hundreds of years. So there's billions of tons of this that needs remediation. This is the stuff they'll pay you to take it away. And with our process of dissolving the metals, extracting it, leaving behind a silicate, and then precipitating the metals and isolating them, could be a way to clean up bottom ash.</p><p>We've also looked at other things, like you could even use our system to recycle demolition debris. So dissolving the cement and turning it into fresh cement. We've looked at eggshells, we've looked at municipal incinerated waste, we've looked at clamshells, I don't know. For s***s and giggles we've tried out a laundry list of things to make sure they work. But really what we're going for is to optimize our process around materials that are widely abundant, and especially in places like India and Africa. Because Sublime's stated mission is to have a swift and massive impact on global CO2 emissions.</p><p>And we know that both India and Africa are going to undergo a period of dirty growth if their population is going to grow and enjoy the same quality of life that we do, and if they build carbon intensive cement and steel plants. Those plants are designed to last 50 to 100 years. So if we work quickly to scale up this technology, we want to make sure that all greenfield cement plants in these developing regions are made with technologies that will avoid CO2 emissions for decades to come. So we really have a small window of opportunity to really get ahead of generations worth of CO2.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So you need a cheap and abundant feedstock, which makes sense. But getting back to this, like, say you're using bottom ash, the way you're getting lime out of this stuff is that lime precipitates out at a particular pH level, right? Sort of like a threshold. And presumably other chemicals will precipitate out of that mess that you throw in there at other pH levels.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Different pH. Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So could you, if you're just dumping a bunch of sort of bottom ash slurry into your machine, you can pull out the lime. Can you also pull out some of the other, like those heavy metals you're discussing that we don't want in our water or soil? Could you precipitate those out too? Like, can you isolate other things other than lime if you wanted to repurpose this in the future for some reason?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, you could. And in fact, if we're using basaltic minerals, those aren't only containing calcium and silica. Those are also containing iron, magnesium, aluminum, which we are isolating as a function of our process, like you say. And what my director of R&D likes to say is, "We use the whole rock just like hunters use the whole deer." So all of these things are coproducts. And in fact, things like magnesium are actually worth more than cement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>We're actually not — yeah, I mean, it's a fine chemical.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are you pulling out enough magnesium out of these materials that that could be a —</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>So it could offset the cost?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, like a meaningful value stream.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>I mean, we think so. Although our focus is cement, we know that people invest in us to have that swift and massive thing. So we are focused on doing this cement work. And everything else is just gravy. We actually haven't factored those costs in and done that business development work to see how much it sweetens our cost, because we're just focused on making the cement. And I have to say one of the reasons why Sublime has a cost advantage over other ways of decarbonizing cement is that, as you said before, we're not adding on to a Portland cement kiln.</p><p>Adding carbon capture is going to at least double the cost of making cement. And because our technology is carbon avoidance, it's green cement, not blue cement. We are replacing the kiln with a new technology. Now, we may not be able to compete on cost with our first plant because cement has undergone almost 200 years of improvements and redesigns of the kiln where they had wet kilns, semi-wet kilns, and dry kilns. And finally, these five-stage preheater, precalcinator kilns, which I won't get into, but they've undergone tremendous efficiency improvements over the past 200 years. And so we think we can get really, really close.</p><p>And I don't think any other technology can do that because they're always adding on to a Portland cement kiln.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, it seems like if you could sell the magnesium, you bring down the cost of your cement and make it more competitive.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So instead of a kiln, you have an electrolyzer, which does not require high heat. All this process you're talking about with the metals precipitating out is an ambient room temperature process. Yes?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yup.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you end up with lime. And then you can mix lime with the silicates that you also got out of your raw material. Or do you have to bring in extra silicates to mix with the lime? Once you've got the lime. And what are they?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>No, we're using our own silicates. And of course, if we want to get the desired calcium to silica ratio, it may mean blending in certain inputs to get to the right ratio. But yeah, it's just a tweak to get the input ratios to match the output ratios of what we want.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so this cement that you are producing with electricity and non-CO2 containing rocks, I assume you have produced it. And it has been through whatever tests, whatever governing bodies put cement through?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>It has. So our cement meets what's called ASTM C1157, the performance-based specification for hydraulic cement. This was a standard that was created 30 years ago. And really this standard is so important because previously cement was defined by the crystal structure of what was made in the kiln. So that alight tricalcium silicate phase that you can only make, it's only thermodynamically stable at those volcanic temperatures. So you cannot solve for alite, you know, unless you go through that thermal process. So, actually, when we were at MIT, my co-founder and I, we believed that if you weren't making Portland cement, nobody would use it.</p><p>That was the prevailing myth at the time. I got out and networked with the industry and spoke to the customers and realized that people who work at a readymix concrete producer, those folks running the spinning trucks, they don't know what alite is. They've never heard of tricalcium silicate. They talk about slump, they talk about alkali silica reactivity and set time and finishing properties. And so we realized that it was the performance of this cement that matters. It's not the chemistry and the standard bodies have prepared for this moment. And all of this work with supplementary cementitious materials, which are gaining traction, especially in Europe, is just winds of change that are blowing in the right direction.</p><p>Because as you start blending cement with other things, it becomes much less about the chemistry that you're making in the kiln and more about the ultimate performance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the standard is about performance.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>There are multiple standards. So there are three standards baked into the international building code. One is for pure Portland cement. The second one is 50% Portland cement, 50% SEM. So a blended cement. And then the third one is pure performance-based. So we don't care what you do, as long as whatever you have performs this way. And there's an exhaustive list of tests that you have to do. You want durability and strength and freeze-thaw and chloride ingress and all these different things that you test to make sure that your cement is performant. So we've done those tests.</p><p>We do them in-house. We have a world-class cement testing lab, but that's not good enough. We send it out to an accredited third-party lab, we test it again, and then — just so that we don't waste our customers' time — and then the third test is done by our customers. And that's really the test that matters. And so this quarter, we finished our pilot plant early January this year, and then spent a few months optimizing our production, ramping it up, testing it in-house, testing it with the third party, and now we're testing it with the customer, and the results have come back very strong, positive, and we're working with some of the best people at Boston Sand and Gravel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, presumably, what you would want to hear from a customer is just nothing. They just used the cement and it worked fine and —</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>It works exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's nothing to report. I said those supplementary —</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Cementitious materials.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, thank you. I said they would come back into the story. Those supplementary materials that are being added into traditional cement to incrementally lower its carbon intensity, those are the silicates that you're using to mix with your lime. So you're actually just using the lime and the supplementary materials and just skipping, basically, the Portland cement kiln part of it.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so you've produced this cement that is now passing performance tests being used in the field. It's working well. One point I did want to make before we leave behind the process part is if you use a feedstock that doesn't have CO2 in it and you use renewable energy to power your electrolyzer, then you've got bona fide zero carbon cement, the holy grail. But you make the point. And I think this is maybe just worth pointing out. Even if your process uses limestone as its feedstock and thus has CO2 in it, and even if it uses average US grid electricity.</p><p>Right, which is not clean. Even if you do both those things, you still end up with cement that's lower CO2 than conventional cement.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So basically, switching to this process immediately improves the carbon performance of cement, even if you don't have your electricity and your feedstock dialed in perfectly yet.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>That's true, although we will accept nothing less than perfection.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, you say in the medium post that you're currently 70% decarbonized. Does that just mean there's still some limestone in the process?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. But it is our goal to get to 90%. And so when we model our megaton plant with optimized feedstocks, optimized electricity, we just did a lifecycle assessment with Climate Earth, which is the cement industry's preferred lifecycle assessment partner. So we did show that we can get to 90% lower emissions than today's Portland cement using our process at scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Why 90 though? What's the 10% left over?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Oh, I believe that was from the mining and transportation. And those are sort of outside of our gates. So again, if you're traveling by truck or going back and forth between the quarry and the kiln and that type of thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Ah, interesting, interesting.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>But I'm sure those will go to zero too, as all those heavy trucks get electrified.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, your big plant that you are envisioning here, your mega-scale plant, your full-sized plant to be certified as basically super low carbon, let's say 10%, 90% carbon-free, you're going to have to find the right quantity of feedstock, a non CO2 containing feedstock, a steady, large supply of that, and you're going to have to somehow certify that your electricity is completely clean, which is going to get you in the same sort of tricky situation that the hydrogen people are in right now, which is how do you certify that electricity is totally clean? You can't just use grid electricity, right? Because then you're taking the clean electricity from someone else. You basically are going to have to like — it's additionality.</p><p>You end up with the additionality problem. I don't know, that's probably way down the road for you. Maybe you haven't even thought about that.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Well, we do think about this. So we have a kick-ass head of project development and strategic sourcing. So shout out to Becky and she's doing the work to cite our megaton plant. And we're looking at places that have renewables. And I know the hydrogen folks, as you say, struggle with this too. So we require — anything six cents a kilowatt hour or less is fine with us. And we're looking to site first in places with a high degree of renewables. And again, it doesn't have to be zero, although zero would be great, but it's just as low as reasonably possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Would you ever build your own renewables attached?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, we might. We're looking at that too. And then to your question of additionality, we're actually gearing up to publish something recently that shows that because Sublime Systems is a great way to use a renewable electron because it has similar embodied energy as today's kiln. But you're not just using that renewable electron to replace a fossil electron, you're also getting avoided carbon through avoiding the limestone as well. And so when you calculate the amount of CO2 avoided per kilowatt hour, you compare that over many other technologies using that the highest and best use of a renewable kilowatt hour could be for Sublime cement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>According to our calculations.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So let's talk a little bit about scale and about cost. Right now you've got basically a little lab set up. You're producing this stuff, but on a very small scale.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Well, I wouldn't call it little. It is a fully functioning, continuous pilot plant that can do up to 250 tons a year. But it is small. And we affectionately call it our cement plant for ants, if you know the Zoolander reference.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is just to say that scale will bring lower costs.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>But totally, it's all about scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Insofar as you know, the costs now, currently, because as you say, traditional cement is very cheap. So are you currently in the ballpark or what's the sort of timeline? How do you see getting into the ballpark? Where are you now and where are you kind of targeting?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Right. So where we are now is definitely less than cement plus post-combustion carbon capture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a low bar, but yes.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Well, is it a low bar? So one of the things is that cement is very inexpensive, and that is a double-edged sword for us. So that makes it very difficult for us to compete on cost with a new technology that hasn't yet achieved scale. But on the other hand, that makes it — the so-called green premium — really that small. Especially when you compare it to other things like direct air carbon capture or sustainable aviation fuels. And also, if you think about the total installed cost of concrete. So 80% of the total installed cost of concrete is labor, and it's often unionized labor.</p><p>The cement is 10% of that, and the aggregate is the remaining 10% so even if we were to charge a two to four x green premium, really, it doesn't really affect the overall cost of a building that much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>But your carbon savings are huge. So, again, if you're thinking all across clean tech, that green premium or the carbon credits, if you think of dollars per ton of CO2 captured or avoided, I think Sublime cement is really attractive. When you do that analysis, especially as we come to scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How big does the green premium need to be currently to bring you down to Portland cement costs?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah. So presently we're scaling up. I mean, I don't even dare calculate what it costs at pilot scale because it's so handmade. But at this next level of scale that we're doing. So between where we are now, which is pilot scale, and where we need to be at megaton scale, we do have to build what we're calling the kiloton plant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>An in-between plant.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Exactly. An in-between plant. And that is to validate the product, the process, the economics, the performance, to enable us to attract low-cost project finance so that we can build the megaton plant, ideally many megaton plants, and work with partners to deploy this all over. So at that megaton plant, you don't have the economies of scale that we would have at the megaton.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Kiloton</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, at the kiloton. You know, we like to say the megaton plant is like achieving Costco level status. And at the megaton plant, I do think we'll be able to compete on costs.</p><p>At the very least, we'll be able to undercut cement decarbonized by post-combustion carbon capture by a long shot. So I'm very confident saying we'll be the cheapest low carbon cement, especially after we crunch the numbers with all the co-products that you mentioned. But at the kiloton scale, I think this is at the farmers market pricing. So the people who will be taking offtake from our cement, from that plant, they will realize that they're paying a higher price for something that's special, for something that comes with the added value of a lower profile of harm against the planet.</p><p>And the premium that they're paying is reinvested into our technology, into the people that are making this happen, and that it is very much catalyzing this technology that I believe will be obvious in retrospect in a post-carbon world.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, they'll have warm feelings, but I think there are also — we'll talk about this in a second — but there are also some entities who are under sometimes self-imposed, sometimes legally imposed requirements to find low carbon cement. Some people are doing it because they need it, not just because they'll feel good about it. So, scale wise, the kiloton plant is roughly when?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>So that depends on a lot of things, but we're ready to have that. We are on track to have that built and commissioned and operational by early 2026. But of course, that timeline requires everything to go perfectly. But we're all geared up for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that will be a working, like, you'll be selling concrete. It'll be a full-size selling concrete plant. No longer just a test or a demonstration.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>That's right. We'll be selling cement to concrete producers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then, assuming everything goes well. Of course, everything never goes well. Assuming everything goes well, you have your kiloton plant in early 2026, you're selling cement, it's working, your customers are happy, your financiers get more confident. They extend to you some low-cost capital for you to scale up. Then you build your megaton plant, everything goes well. When does that happen?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>That could be as soon as 2028. Again, these are very aggressive timelines, and this assumes everything goes well. But once that kiloton plant is built and validated, assuming we have sites ready to go, those megaton plants could be built as quickly as within two years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then a megaton plant produces how much?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>A million tons a year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A million tons a year. And so to replace any meaningful amount of cement supply, you would need a bunch —</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Hundreds of them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hundreds of those eventually. Have you thought about, I mean, you're selling cement. Have you thought about licensing the process and just having other people work on joining you and trying to scale up?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>We do all the time. So, like I said before, we're capitalists around here, as you know. So I hope we'll make a healthy profit for the investments. But the goal is to have a swift and massive impact on global CO2 emissions as quickly and as bigly as possible. And I hope we'll make money along the way, and I expect we will, because that's how value is measured. But really, it's all about speed and scale, because we could do this ourselves. But really, I'll just be honest here, we're nerds. What gets us fired up is this technology and the product that we're making.</p><p>There's a lot that we don't know. One of the reasons why the cement industry has taken so long to change is because innovation is not part of their DNA, per se. They run operations like nobody's business. They keep these megaton plants up and running around the clock with high-quality, reliable material that's distributed in the most efficient way to get everything built with minimal disruptions. It's really, truly remarkable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you pretty quickly get beyond the science part to just logistics and stuff like that. There's like a whole set of those considerations for large-scale businesses that are unique to scale, I think.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Exactly. So the operational know-how is there. And I think we would be foolish to try and reinvent the wheel entirely by ourselves. And I mean, would we be able to build? So let's just say we address half a gigaton of CO2 emissions per year. So cement is 8%. Let's say we set our expectations low, aim for 1% of CO2 emissions or half a gigaton. That's like 500 megaton plants. So how will we get to 500 megaton plants by 2050, if that's our goal, working backwards, we would need at least ten up and running by 2030, let's say.</p><p>So I really think if we're going to get this s**t done, we have to take what we do well and merge it with what the industry evidently does well, which is the operational logistics and know-how. And so, we speak to cement majors almost every week, and they're coming to us, and they have a legitimate desire to not be the world's largest CO2 emitters. And this is also an interesting fact. So cement companies, they have the highest scope one emissions of any company. You would think it's Aramco or Exxon, but no, they're making fuel that other people are burning. It's cement companies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Scope three, that gets the oil companies.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, totally. But cement companies, it's their scope one, so they have a great big X on their back, especially in Europe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it also seems like, I know there are improvements. It's not fair to say that you're sort of stuck with what you're stuck with when you're using fossil fuels. I know there have been improvements in the kiln process and in the input and the kind of kiln, but there's a certain sort of baseline, like when you're using limestone and you're using Portland cement process, there's a certain floor, right? Whereas when you're using electrolyzers technology and you have a bunch of different feedstocks to choose from and a bunch of different metals that you can pull out of those feedstocks, it just seems like you're opening up a lot of new areas for innovation.</p><p>Basically, the runway for cost declines seems huge here.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, I believe so too. And I think what's really exciting is that if Sublime succeeds, and I believe we will, that technology that we're starting to build now, and that will continue to improve over time, will be the way we make cement for the post-carbon world, like, for the next millennia. So I feel like this is a really cool place to be where cement innovation happened with the Romans. And we still go back and visit those monuments that they made. And then cement was innovated a second time by the British with Portland Cement. And now we're creating new cement in America that's for this post-carbon world.</p><p>And so often when you think of buildings and the architecture, the way you make a building is often a representation of the values of the people who've built it. And so I think it's a very exciting time for us to be making this new material and to be incorporating it into the most cutting-edge buildings that we're building today. For some of the best and most forward-thinking companies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>These electrolyzers, are they a special kind of electrolyzer that you need custom built, or are these just normal, off-the-shelf electrolyzers? What is there to say about the electrolyzers?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>They leverage a lot of existing technology. So electrolyzers broadly are very similar. You've got electrodes, often with a carbon backing, often with a rare earth catalyst, you've got separators. There's kind of like assembling a sandwich of electrode, separator, electrode. And so many components of our electrolyzer exist and have been scaled up to megaton scale, and we're simply taking that and leveraging that for our own purposes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So like your own kind of sandwich, but made with standard ingredients.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Exactly. We're taking the bread and the mayo and the lettuce, and we're just slapping them together in our own special way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, but in terms of electrolyzers for your process, you're the one making them. So that'll scale up too, and presumably get cheaper too.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. And I think many of the trends we see with hydrogen and all these other electrochemical things taking off, I mean, we do anticipate that as well — we've got the dropping price of renewable electricity, especially intermittent renewable electricity — and I believe we'll also see electrolyzers come down in price as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, yeah. I talked to the woman in Iceland who's making ammonia directly with electrolyzers. I clearly need to wrap my head around electrolyzers better and do a whole episode on electrolyzers, because I had thought they were just for hydrogen, but now people are doing all sorts of other things with them. Anyway, so final, I promise, question: What sort of policies would help you? I mean, I think some of them are obvious, just like lowering, requiring lower CO2 emissions, maybe requiring government procurement. Like government could say, we're going to buy lower cost cement. What are the other sort of big buckets of policy that you think would help accelerate this process?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Government procurement would go a long way because the US government, in its various forms, army, GSA, federal highway administration, DoT, procures 60% of the cement produced in the US.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, wow.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>So if we don't have a commitment from them that they want this cement, it makes it more than twice as hard. But the policy change that I would really like to see, and what really grinds my gears is that when you look at tax incentives and production tax credits and also the voluntary carbon market, they reward disproportionately direct air carbon capture. For example, I'm forgetting the acronym. Is it 42? Oh my gosh. Can you remind me what?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>45Q? That's the carbon capture one.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>C three. Anyway, the carbon capture one, it's $180 a ton for direct air carbon capture, $80 a ton for point source carbon capture, and zero for carbon avoidance. And we applied for a production tax credit for our low carbon production of cement and we were discouraged from submitting a full application. And I think it's unfair, using that leaky tap mop bucket analogy, that you should be incentivized more for mopping up CO2 than for fixing the tap. And I believe there should be a technology agnostic implementation of the tax credit to put all of these things on a level playing field and then let the invisible hand of capitalism choose the most efficient way to decarbonize.</p><p>I don't think the government should be picking winners.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is the danger of industrial policy, right, is that once you get down in the gears, you're going to inevitably sort of get some things and skip other things and get out of balance. Presumably there are other policies besides carbon capture, policies that would help you, right?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Yeah, I actually think direct carbon capture is great. I'm definitely not anti-direct carbon capture. I'm just advocating for carbon avoidance to be valued the same as a ton of carbon removed from the air, especially when the carbon avoidance is technology enabled, like Sublime Systems. I think there's a role for this premium, this farmers market stage that we're at, to get that added boost so that we can get to a stage where we don't need that incentive anymore. But you will never get there with DAC. It'll always need to be propped up somehow.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I know. Have you gotten help from the LPO? From the loans office?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>No, they haven't helped us yet. Although had some interesting conversations with Jigar Shah and others from the LPO. And I do hope that once our kiloton plant is built, we will definitely work with LPO.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It seems so obvious this is such a huge opportunity here and exactly at the stage of business that they're designed to help. Okay, so some sort of production tax credit would be great. Some sort of government procurement strategy. Is there anything like that in place? Is there demand pull? I know that a bunch of companies are saying they want to reduce their own emissions. A bunch of concrete companies are saying, where are we at on demand pull? Like, is there a big developing market for low carbon concrete that's going to help pull you through this?</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>I am seeing huge demand for low carbon cement and I would say that our customers are leaning into us just as much as we're leaning into them and they want more of it sooner. It's one of those things, though, that's difficult to manage. And I think maybe like setting up a carbon market, people are not used to seeing new products in the cement world and so getting these advanced market commitments and these offtakes. Right now, when people build a new cement plant, cement is vertically integrated with concrete, oftentimes. So you never need an offtake for building a new cement plant and even the supplementary cementitious materials.</p><p>The industry just knows that if the product meets a certain quality, that there will be, at a certain price, it will be bought.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, right.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>So these offtake agreements have sort of never been done before until now. But, yeah. so we're still in the stage of figuring that out and standardizing those agreements. And one day I hope there will be a sort of book and claim model for selling our material as well as other low carbon cements.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it does seem like, especially once it's wider known that this is available and that it performs as well, it just seems like there's just going to be huge demand from every which way. Leah, this has been absolutely fascinating. I've been meaning to dive into concrete forever and this was a good excuse to learn. It's funny. I'm going to finally learn how it works right on the cusp of it changing to a new process. But thank you so much for — I feel like you've really found the right target here. This is such a leverage point for so much change.</p><p>So thank you for coming on and walking us through it.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me, and for being an enthusiastic listener as I talk about my favorite subject for a full hour.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. That's what we're here for. All right, thanks so much.</p><p><strong>Leah Ellis</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/we-are-closing-in-on-zero-carbon</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:139878486</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2024 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/139878486/c059381dbb9f8c81b0eeffe81f4ca521.mp3" length="82724126" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4134</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/139878486/2f23453537588fe59e39430c5167d3d4.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Getting better at mining the minerals needed for clean energy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>To create a clean-energy economy, the US badly needs an advanced mining industry that can provide huge amounts of key minerals for batteries and other technologies — and it’s nowhere close to where it needs to be. In this episode, KoBold Metals CEO Kurt House describes the current state of mineral exploration, the significant changes it needs to make, and how machine learning and artificial intelligence can help it get there.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/8hlvkovrmb14hvnxny8hk/volts23.12.20-kurt.house.pdf?rlkey=crl50jq6j3jo6ji690ak0lb5o&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/getting-better-at-mining-the-minerals-needed-for-clean-energy"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Building the machines and batteries needed to decarbonize the economy will require enormous amounts of a few key minerals. The proven reserves of those minerals, sitting in mines now operating, are nowhere close to enough to satisfy what is expected to be skyrocketing demand.</p><p>Without the minerals, we can’t make the clean-energy economy. And we don't know where the minerals are going to come from.</p><p>What's worse, exploring for new mineral deposits has been getting less and less efficient over the last several decades, as the amount of investment needed per successful discovery has risen. We seem to be getting worse at finding this stuff right when we badly need to be getting better.</p><p>That state of affairs has drawn in several new startups that endeavor to use machine learning and artificial intelligence to improve mining’s hit rate. The most talked-about is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.koboldmetals.com/">KoBold Metals</a>. With financial backing from Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, and other big-name investors, KoBold is now <a target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/billionaire-backed-kobold-metals-widens-lithium-hunt-across-four-continents-2023-12-14/">exploring for minerals on four continents</a>.</p><p>To get a better handle on mining and how we can improve at it, I contacted KoBold CEO Kurt House. We talked about the projected gap between supply and demand, the somewhat primitive way current exploration works, the massive data-gathering and coordination project the company has undertaken, and the role of justice and equity in this AI-accelerated future of mining.</p><p>Kurt House, CEO of KoBold Metals, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>I'm so pleased to be here. I'm a huge fan. I listen to the podcast all the time, so it's fun to talk to you live.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We're going to talk about something that is of great interest these days, which is finding the stuff that we need to build the clean energy economy. This is something I did a series of articles on a couple of years ago, and it's come up repeatedly over the years. People talk about possible shortages of materials as one of the bottlenecks that might slow the clean energy transition. So maybe let's just start there with setting some context, talk a little bit about the big four minerals that you focus on and sort of what we know about how much we have access to and how much we project we're going to need.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Perfect setup question. So, the energy transition is fundamentally about getting off fossil fuels. It's fundamentally about electrifying the economy to the greatest extent possible. So we electrify transport, all electric generation becomes renewable, et cetera, et cetera. That requires a lot of very specific materials and very specific materials because different elements have different physical properties, obviously, and they do different things better and worse than others. And some of those elements are really difficult to substitute for, for very, very deep physical reasons. So KoBold is focused on what we call "the materials of the future," and those are lithium, cobalt, copper and nickel.</p><p>That's not at all to say that there aren't other important materials for the energy transition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are those four the most important? By just mass, just, we need most of those —</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>No, by total mass, it'd probably be aluminum and steel, iron for steel. The reason these are so important, there's two orthogonal reasons that we focus on these. One is how difficult they are to substitute for in specific applications. And I'll talk about that. And then the orthogonal element to it is that they are exploration problems. So aluminum is really useful in a whole bunch of reasons, but it's not an exploration problem. There's just gobs of bauxite, aluminum silicon oxide on the planet, and we know where it is. It's just a matter of processing it in more efficient and less carbon intensive ways.</p><p>So, it's a metallurgical challenge. It's not an exploration challenge. In the case of lithium, cobalt, copper and nickel, you could take any forecast you want, but basically the end state is something like 2 billion electric vehicles on the planet, plus a whole bunch of renewable energy build out. And any way you slice it, those are just gigantic numbers, and they require gigantic amounts of lithium, cobalt, copper and nickel. And then you can say, "Okay, that's how much we need at, say, 2050 to be mostly off fossil fuels by 2050, how much exists in the reserves of current mines?"</p><p>So if we take all the mines that are producing today, and they're going to produce out for the next several decades, that's another number. That's another quantity. And that you also have to add in all of the other uses for these minerals. Right. If the economy just goes on, and there's lots and lots of uses for nickel and copper, in particular in stainless steel and all manner of electrical applications for copper that just happen anyway. So you have to add up those, plus the energy transition metals and compare them to existing mine supply and existing mine reserves, and you get a gap.</p><p>And then, if you multiply by current commodity prices, that gap is about $15 trillion.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good Lord.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>We call that — exactly — the "missing metals gap". And so it's not the total amount of metal we need. We actually need a lot more. But that's the value of the metal that we need to find, right? We need to find and then develop into mines.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That represents metal we need, but we don't yet know where it is or where it's going to come from?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Exactly. Because I've subtracted out existing mine supply. Right. And not just existing mine supply, but existing mine supply, plus mines that are in late stages of development. We know they're going to be mines. We've just included that in existing mine supply. So it's really the things that we need to find new deposits that no one in the world knows where they are right now. And then we need to develop them into operating mines — to build new mines. And then those mines need to go into production, and they need to operate for many, many years to produce the necessary amount of metal.</p><p>And the value of that metal, roughly speaking, is $15 trillion.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that all needs to happen — if you look, like, 2050 used to be a lot farther away than it is these days. And now if you look at those lines, they're going up and to the right pretty steeply. So all of that stuff needs to happen much more quickly than it has in the past.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Exactly right, David. And that is what makes this so difficult. So, in round numbers, in very round numbers, it's about 1000 new deposits need to be found, and then 1000 new mines need to be developed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wow.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>And that, obviously, that's a function of I'm using sort of median mine production. It could be 700 if they're bigger or whatever, but it's order of magnitude 1000. It's a huge number. And then you can say, "okay, well, how fast are we building new mines today? Finding new discoveries and building new mines today?" And the answer is, "not nearly fast enough."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is something you told me about last time we talked, which has stuck in my head ever since. You called it "Eroom's law of mining," which is Moore's law backward. Explain what you mean by that.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, precisely. So, Moore's law. The audience will be very familiar with Moore's law. Right. One of the most remarkable demonstrations of human ingenuity of all time, which is that the density of transistors on chips has doubled every 18 to 24 months for 55 years now. And the result is a ten to the 10th order of magnitude increase in computational speed, computational power. So we get better and better and better computation, and that's why you and I can talk remotely in real time from far — everything else that people know. Okay, that's Moore's law. So go back to 1990 and look at how much money the industry was spending in aggregate on exploration, and then divide that number by the number of good new discoveries they were making per year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? Dollars per discovery.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Dollars per discovery. And by good discovery, I just mean a discovery that definitely becomes a mine. It's a good tier one, tier two discoveries, we'd say, in the industry, but it becomes a mine. That number was about $300 million in today's dollars. In 2023 dollars, that was about $300 million per good discovery. Today, that number is about $3 billion. It's gotten an order of magnitude more expensive to find the next deposit. We're getting worse. So we call this Eroom's law, because over the last 40 years, we've gotten ten x worse at exploration, we have to put in ten times the amount of resources to find the same amount of stuff.</p><p>Or put it another way, we'll find one 10th the stuff if we invest the same amount in exploration. And exploration expenditure is basically flat, roughly speaking. So we are way, way, way behind and we're spending roughly half a percent a year of what would be needed based on the current exploration effectiveness, dollars per discovery. So on the current rates and current expenditure investment, it will take about 200 years for humanity to find enough deposits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>$3 billion. If you think about 1000 new mines needed —</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>There you go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>1000 times $3 billion adds up to some large —</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>$3 trillion. And that's just exploration expenditure. That's not including the cost to actually build the mines, which is a lot more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's break this down a little bit or unpack this a little bit, because with Moore's law, I think people get, on the one hand, getting more computing power out of tinier and tinier spaces gets harder and harder. Like the job gets harder and harder because you're working with just less space and tighter materials and et cetera. But our improvement at doing it is growing faster than the difficulty, basically. Like, we're getting better faster than it's getting harder, I guess, is the way you would put it. If we just remained the same good at doing that, productivity would be declining because it would be getting harder and harder and we wouldn't be getting better.</p><p>That seems to be what's happening in mining. It's not that we're getting dumber or worse at mining, it's just that finding the stuff is harder because we've already found the easiest stuff. So finding stuff gets harder and harder, but we're just not getting better at it.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>You explained it perfectly. That's exactly right. Another example that I've used, that's even a better example because you just took Moore's law a step further. But another example I use is like fastballs in Major League Baseball were like 85 miles an hour in 1970, and then today they're like close to 100 mph. It's objectively harder to hit that fastball, but batting averages are about the same. Right? So pitchers got better, batters got better. Right. And your point is exactly right is that — are we actually getting dumber? I don't think so. We're not actually getting dumber. It's that the search space is getting way harder because, as you say correctly, the easy things have been found.</p><p>And what is an easy thing? It's actually really easy to understand. An easy thing is a deposit, an ore body that's going to be mined, that's sticking out of the ground that a skilled field geologist walks up to the outcrop, looks at the outcrop, identifies ore minerals in the outcrop, and says, "These are ore minerals right here. We should explore this because there might be enough of them to constitute a mine here."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you told me that when we talked before, and it blew my mind a little bit because one of the things I'm finding out about this as I do this job more and more is just like normal american consumers are so used to everything going digital and everything being sort of like fancy and computerized now that when I go ask about other areas, I'm often struck by how analog they remain, sort of how kind of primitive they remain. And something you told me is that almost all, like literally almost all of the discoveries we've had and the mines we now have come from someone just seeing something on the surface, like literally the same way they found stuff to mine in 1800.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's absolutely right. If you were to build a time machine and bring the best exploration geologists from 1960 to today, they would be very comfortable working in the industry. Very comfortable. You have to teach them email. Right. You have to teach them a few things —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Zoom meetings.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Exactly. Zoom meetings. But in terms of the field work and the techniques, they would be very similar.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so should we envision groups of people out walking around looking, or how do we search the surface today?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, field geology is a skill, and it's a hard skill to learn. It takes a lot of practice. And there are very skilled field geologists that KoBold employs, and they're absolutely essential to our business. They're fantastic. And just because a technology or technique is old doesn't mean it's bad. There's a lot tried and true methods just sort of continue for some good reason. Right. And so field mapping, for instance, which is basically, if you walk along the ground, think about, you're either walking along bedrock that's an exposed outcrop, or you're walking along soils or something else that's kind of covering the bedrock.</p><p>And so field mapping exercises are, there's actually a lot of kind of tricky geometry to it, and it's about identifying the outcrops. It's about making measurements about where the outcrops go underground and then extrapolating in a kind of heuristic way what those rock bodies would look like underneath the cover. Those are sort of useful techniques, and that's what historic field geology is all about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so, historically, when someone finds something sticking out of the surface and they say, "hey, this looks like an ore concentration. This looks like a concentration of some ore that we would like to mine" at that point, then what, the mining company just goes in and just starts poking holes down, digging down and looking?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah. Once you find an occurrence, you might call that an occurrence, mineral occurrence. Then you go and explore to see if it's large enough and sufficiently high concentration to be an economic deposit. It's a good lead. Not every occurrence turns into a mine, but every mine at one point was an occurrence. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. That's what I'm trying to get my head around is, what does that look like? What do those holes look like? Are they narrow, little pokey holes, or is this, like, a big operation when you're digging down, exploring?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>So, for the exploration component, they're very narrow holes. Think a few inches in diameter that you drill. And what you're trying, you're extracting core samples. Right. You're extracting to characterize the full geologic body and to characterize the deposit. Right. And understand what the composition is, what the grade is, how extensive it is. Does it keep going at 100 meters deep, at 500 meters deep, or does it stop at 20 meters deep? Those are all the questions that you try to answer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of the occurrences that geologists find and say, "Hey, mining company, this looks promising." What percentage of those pan out into a mine?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Very low. Yeah, very low.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah. Well, less than 1%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No shoot. No kidding.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>No shoot. No kidding.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>1%! I guess that explains the $3 billion.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. I'm glad you came full circle back to that, because the reason we've gotten on an underlying cause for Eroom's law, but a more directly observable cause, is that the success rate has dropped. And so you're spending — the individual success cases are sort of just as economic as ever, and they're wildly economic. The difference is your false positive rate has increased or your success rate has decreased. And so you spend more small investments on things that don't pan out. To make the numbers simple, imagine each little small investment characterization effort is $10 million.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's to go poke all the little holes and look, that's $10 million.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Exactly. That's to go see if that occurrence is actually an economic deposit. Right. And we're using round numbers here. 40 years ago, you might have gotten 1 out of 30, and today you get 1 out of 300.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So $10 million. If you're having to do it 100 times to find metals —</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>That's the problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This isn't in danger of making mining overall uneconomic. Right. If you find the minerals, you're going to —</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Right. So the individual success cases are still as good as ever. Actually better than ever, really, because you still spend, say, $10 million, roughly, and then you fail, fail, fail. And then the person that succeeds — and these are often different groups, right — the one that succeeds spends $10 million and then has something that's worth billions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>And all of the successes, sort of, by definition, have to pay for the failures or the industry just won't attract any capital at all in the aggregate. So you can kind of assume that the successes are worth something like $3 billion, and that's about right. And so the success cases do incredibly well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A bit of a lottery vibe to it.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>For sure. I mean, this is where the word eureka comes from. Literally. The unit economics of exploration are just superb. They're fantastic. They've always been fantastic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>And so if you can imagine, okay, if you could build a technology or a set of technologies to increase your success rate just marginally, just a little bit better, maybe two or three times better than the industry, then you'd have an incredibly valuable set of technology and company because you could turn exploration into a science. Yes, you're going to fail a lot, but if you fail nine out of ten times, as opposed to 99 out of 100 times, then you make superb money. Because every success —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If you think of it as a lottery, I mean, winning the lottery twice out of 100 times is a lot more than winning it 1 out of 100 times, right?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because the winnings are very large. And I just want to get this on the record before we move past. As we're talking about exploration, just by way of background-background. None of the things we're discussing in terms of the difficulty of finding and extracting minerals are about absolute scarcity.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All four of the minerals you cite —</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>are, on an absolute basis, far more common than we could ever use, right?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Absolutely. There's roughly in the top kilometer of the earth's crust, there's enough nickel to give every man, woman, and child on the planet about a million electric vehicles. So it has nothing to do with the number of atoms in the earth's crust. That's not a problem at all. In fact, right below your feet right now, below your house, or wherever you are, I would bet long odds that the concentration of nickel, say, in the ground below you is about 100 parts per million. That's about what it is in the background concentration of the earth. And so that's there.</p><p>And we could mine it. We could do it. We could go and mine 100 ppm. In fact, that would be a spectacularly good platinum mine if you had it in that concentration. But it would cost us like $100,000 a kilogram to extract it. The current nickel price is $16 a kilogram.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So what you need to find is concentrations of these things. And the reason that the vast, vast, vast majority of the concentrations we found of these minerals are close to the surface is just that the surface is where we're looking. So what we find tends to be adjacent to the surface.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Exactly right. And it is the mother of all selection biases. Right. Understandably so. You could pose an alternative hypothesis: You could say, "Okay, yes, we found all these things at zero meter elevation, but how do we know? Maybe that's just where they form. Maybe they form when the right minerals contact the atmosphere or something." You can make up a scientific hypothesis.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Maybe they drift up toward the surface for some reason.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. That would be a reasonable scientific hypothesis. We know for certain it's not true for these four minerals. We know for certain because we know the pressures, temperatures, and oxidation conditions in which these minerals form, and they form deep in the subsurface. So actually, that's really good news, because that tells us that as we descend into the subsurface, take 100 meters depth slice as opposed to a zero meter depth slice. Your strong expectation should be that the aerial density of deposits increases because since they form deep in the subsurface, a kilometer deeper, it's only the rare few that have been moved to the surface through tectonics and erosion and then been exposed.</p><p>Right. And so we really have high confidence they're there in high concentration form. They're just way, way harder to find.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And talk a little bit before we get to how your company is making that easier. Talk a little bit about what we're looking for. We talked before; you mentioned composition, depth and grade; just quickly sort of go over those. What makes for a good deposit? A promising deposit.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, those are sort of the big three. There's lots of small details, but grade is king. That's a phrase you hear in the industry all the time. And the reason that grade is king is really obvious. Like concentration really matters. So imagine this. Imagine you're looking at two different deposits, let's call them copper deposits. Okay. One copper deposit — so the average grade coming out of copper mines around the world today is 0.6%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I've heard about it. And that's been declining, pretty sharply declining. Right. I've been reading about that. It's very alarming.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, it has —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because we need a lot of copper.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>We need a lot of copper. And we've been creaming the curve. We've been getting the lowest cost stuff first.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>So 0.6%. So that means if you mine a ton of rock, you do all the work to get a ton of rock out of the ground. You get 1000 kilograms rock. Right. And you get 6 kilograms copper. 0.6%. So you get 6 kilograms of copper for every one ton of rock that you mine.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>God, that just seems crazy.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>It is crazy, seems crazy, but stay with me on this. So the ton of rock, all your costs go into mining the ore. The rock. Right. The costs scale with ore. Revenue scales with metal, because you don't sell the ore, you sell the metal. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>So now imagine a different deposit that is 6% copper instead of 0.6% that deposit. Now you spend the same amount of money to get that one ton of rock out of the ground. So their costs are the same. But now you get to sell 60 kilograms copper instead of 6. So you sort of, by definition, have a 90% plus profit margin because the costs — the other operator was there and maybe breaking even at 0.6%. And now you're selling 54 more kilograms of copper for no incremental cost.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So find distinctions in the concentration of the mineral in the ore make a huge difference.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>An enormous difference.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's great.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah. So grade is king. The second most important variable is composition, which really gets down to the ore minerals themselves. Right. So a good example here is nickel. And so you actually can find relatively high grade nickel in silicate form. So olivine is a nickel silicate mineral that can get relatively high concentrations. It's not uncommon to get 1% nickel silicates, but it's very hard to process, very expensive to process that. Alternatively, you can get nickel sulfides at 1% or 2% that are very easy to process, relatively speaking, very easy. So a 1% nickel sulfide deposit is way better than 1% nickel and silicate deposit.</p><p>And then depth obviously matters a lot. It matters kind of less than you might think. Believe it or not, there's a big distinction between whether it's an open pit mine, i.e. just a big hole that you're digging in the ground, versus an underground mine where you're digging tunnels. There's a relatively large distinction there in terms of cost of operations. But once you go underground, depth doesn't actually matter that much. I mean, up to a point, you can't go 10 km below the earth, but the difference between 300 meters and 700 meters doesn't matter that much, actually.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So digging that additional 100 meters down is not a huge cost.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>It doesn't matter a lot. Yeah. I'd much rather have higher grade deeper than lower grade, shallower.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what would be like a really high grade, say, for copper? You say 0.6 is the average these days. That seems — I mean, what do I know about. I have nothing to compare it to, but it sounds low.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>It is low.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What's a really good grade?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Over 3% is superb. Like superb, superb.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Over 5% is absolutely world class. And there's almost nothing like it out there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Okay. What we've established is currently we're finding minerals based on some exploration geologist on the surface, squinting at rocks, finding good rocks. And then you poke a bunch of holes. If you find a decent looking rock, you poke a bunch of holes around it, find out if it's down there in the 1 out of 100 times that you find suitable deposits down there. You dig down there and open a mine. And this is why 98%, 99% of mines and deposits have been near the surface or close to the surface.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this is all background for current mining. And the productivity of that is declining, presumably just because the big obvious surface concentrations that we could find, we've mostly found. And so now we're like squinting, we're going after harder to find stuff, et cetera. And the whole productivity of the sector is declining, even as we desperately need it to 10x its output in the next 20 years. All in all, an alarming situation.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>That was a perfect summary.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then along comes KoBold. So just tell us, how is KoBold going to help that situation? What is it you do to help miners?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yes. So KoBold's main objective is to improve the success rate of exploration, right? Exactly. This problem. The declining success rate of exploration is Eroom's law that's resulting in the higher cost, the more cumulative expense to make a discovery. And so our objective is to improve the overall success rate or really the exploration efficiency or effectiveness, which is dollars per discovery. That's our real goal. We want to have our own exploration success rate of closer to $100 million per discovery, as opposed to $3 billion per discovery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's the money side. What about the percentage side? Like you said, 1% success rate. Now, we're skipping ahead a little bit here, but if KoBold continued to advance and miners really took it up and took it seriously, what would a really good success rate look like?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, let me actually correct you on one thing. We're not a service company or a SaaS company at all. We don't provide, we don't sell anything to mining companies. Yeah, we are a full stack exploration, development and mining company ourselves, started in Silicon Valley. We are Silicon Valley's mining company, so to speak. Right. Your confusion is totally understandable, and it's common.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I thought you were striking deals with big mining companies.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>We do, but only on co investment into particular projects. We own — we don't get paid anything for services or anything for software. We make money by making discoveries, and we partner with mining companies on their properties as well as we have our own. So we have something like 60 projects worldwide, and about half of those we own 100% by ourselves, and about half of those we own in partnership with other companies. Partnerships are very important to us because we want to extend the reach of our technology. And lots of companies own a lot of ground that they're not exploring.</p><p>And so we can sort of leverage that opportunity and say, "Okay, this is interesting ground. It's actually worth more in our hands than it is in your hands, because we can deploy our technology, let's work it together, and we'll both benefit from any discovery."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're co-mining those, you're both involved in the mining?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Very common misconception and very understandable, because if you look at our team, it's about two thirds of the technical staff have never worked in the mining business before. They come from Google and Apple and Meta and Silicon Valley and all the tech monopolies that you know and love or hate, and they probably never will again. Right. They don't think of themselves necessarily as working for a mining company. I mean, of course they do. They understand the business, but they think of themselves as working for a tech company. And they are deploying their skills as data scientists, software engineering, software engineers for this purpose.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So you own big machines that dig up the earth.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Principal asset are licenses to deposits. Right. Our principal assets are the deposit itself or the deposit itself. And then, of course, we use all kinds of capital equipment to explore and ultimately develop the deposits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so if you own these yourself, then you don't have to speculate what better discovery rate would look like. Presumably, you have established one. 1 out of 100 is the baseline here. What does your discovery rate look like?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I prefer dollars per discovery. And the reason I prefer — I'm going to answer your question, but it's important to think about the different metrics. The reason I prefer dollars prefer discovery is we encourage lots of little projects that falsify their hypotheses fast and for low money. Right. So, there was a project we had recently where one of our scientists had a hypothesis about a particular deposit. They came up with a clear falsification criteria. We staked the property for probably $1,000. We went out to the field. They made several measurements, geochemical measurements. It falsified the hypothesis.</p><p>We moved on from the project at something like $5,000. Right. It's an extremely efficient condemnation. And that's really important because there is an enormous amount of uncertainty in this business. That is the nature of the data science problem is it's a sparse data problem, and we're making inference on very select data about the physics and chemistry of the Earth crust, trying to make predictions with quantified uncertainty and then seeing how accurate those predictions are and then updating our models accordingly. So we want lots and lots and lots and lots and lots of shots on goal. So I don't actually track total number of attempts because actually the numerator is high.</p><p>But dollars per discovery, I very much do track. And we are on track for we have made one major discovery, which is public. It's in northern Zambia. Cumulative exploration expenditure up to the point of that discovery was actually less than 50 million.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's quite a bit better than 3 billion.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. So we're very much on track in that sense, except that we only have one that's totally unambiguous, and then we have a lot more that we're working toward. So we'll see. It'll take time, we'll see over the next five or ten years. But I'm very encouraged that we are on track at this point.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, well, so let's back up. What the company does is gather data, use AI, machine learning to analyze the data in order to predict where you're going to find concentrations, basically.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's the nutshell. So let's talk about the data. I think when people hear this, their first thought is like, "Well, if the data was there, why weren't other people using it to find these things?" Do you know what I mean? If the data was publicly available, what's your magic sauce? So, first of all, let's just talk about, and this struck me, too, the last time we talked, is just the wild range of data that you guys are gathering. Talk a little bit about your data gathering.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>For sure. So that is the right question for any kind of AI/ML technology ever, any application is, what is the data? Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What are you learning from?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Right. The algorithms, with all due respect, the algorithms are pretty straightforward, actually. They're brilliant, but they're easy to replicate and they're kind of a commodity at this point. What the real secret sauce of any AI company is, do they have superior data source?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I should mention, I was going to mention later, but I'll just mention now, obviously, KoBold is not alone in this. There are several companies now trying to use basically data gathering and AI to improve success rates in mining exploration. There's a bunch in Australia, I think there's one in Europe. So insofar as you're competing, I mean, it's probably a giant market, and there's room for plenty more entrants, I would imagine. But insofar as you're competing, that's going to be the arena in which you're competing is who can find the cleverest new sources of data to improve their results.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah. There's a lot of truth to what you just said. I will mention on competition — this is useful — I am really rooting for those other companies. And the reason is I literally never think about competitors. And that sounds cocky, but it's not really, because let's say we need 1000 new mines for the energy transition. If KoBold is responsible for 50 of those new mines, we are going to be wildly successful beyond my possible imagination. And that's 5% of the problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>And so we still need other people to find and develop the other 900-plus mines. And so what is it that's going to stop KoBold from getting from 1 to 50? It is not that someone finds that one first because there's another 950 we need to find. Right. What it is, is that we just fail to find it. Right. So we are fundamentally just kind of competing with ourselves, in a sense.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. More of a pass-fail than a grade relative to competitors.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, totally. It's just like, if you're like what I tell my son in track, you're just focusing on your own pr. Just get your own time down and the rest will work out. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, so let's talk about data.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, so, data. So this is really interesting. Right? So humans have been collecting information about the physics and the chemistry of the earth's crust for a very long time. Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Mining is real old.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Really, really old. Right. In some ways, they've been doing this for. I mean, we've been doing this for millennia. In some ways, certainly in the last century, been collecting information in more and more sophisticated ways. And virtually all of that information is in the public domain, actually. And the reason it's in the public domain is either it was actually collected at the public's expense in the form of various state geologic surveys around the world and then made public. That's thing one. Thing two: It was collected by academics and then made public.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>That's thing two. Thing three is created by private companies, but almost always, with some exceptions, the rules. The laws in every jurisdiction out there are that when you have an exploration license or a mining license, you are required to submit the data that you collect.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting. That's by law. Everywhere by law.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>That's right. And these are really good rules, actually, because what you don't want, if you want efficient exploration of resources, you don't want everyone collecting the same data, proving the false positive again and again and again. Right. That's bad. So usually the way the rules work is the company gets a couple of years to husband the data by themselves, and then they have to make it public. Right. And that's true in basically every jurisdiction we operate in. So there's a huge amount of information. We'll get to what the information is in a moment. But the challenge is that this is the messy data of all messy data problems.</p><p>Right? So it has been collected. You're talking about everything from modern worldview three, high resolution, high spatial, high band resolution spectral imagery all the way to 1920s handwritten drilling reports. Right? That's all the information. And there's everything in between. And so it's every media, every storage media, from paper to cloud storage, every storage media you can imagine.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Microfiche?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Microfiche, you know, magnetic tape, you name it — it's all out there. And then it's every jurisdiction; every sub-jurisiction has different formatting requirements over time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To what extent has there been a kind of shared format for this? Or is it all completely disparate?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Basically none. I mean, people could quibble with me and they could point out some standardization efforts in the past, which is not wrong. But basically, to first order, if I show you 100 data sets that we found in the public domain, they're going to be in 100 different formats.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, good grief.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the first thing that we do, and this is a major effort, we've been doing this for five years, and we're going to continue to do it for many more years, is we identify these data stores, and then we ingest the data, bring it into our system. Which could mean, it could mean, digitizing paper records, right? And we have those operations around the world, including a very extensive one in Zambia, which is really cool. We digitize the paper records, we do various optical character recognition techniques on those records, and then we use various extraction, NLP and other extraction technologies to extract the data, transform it into what we call our universal data schemas.</p><p>So we are the major effort to create a standardized format for all of this data, which is our own proprietary format.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When I'm thinking about this process, how much of that is done by AI and machine learning versus some poor schmuck squinting at two columns of numbers and typing things in?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Great question. So I like to say that KoBold runs on AI, HI and HS. So that's artificial intelligence, human intelligence, and human sweat. And the last one may be the most important. It's hugely important. And we're automating things all the time. There's all kinds of methods of automation, but these are really hard problems, because not just is the data in all these myriad formats, but what the data is requires real scientific judgment. Right? Different. A magnetic survey collected in 1965 is just hugely different than a magnetic survey collected in 1990.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this is not something like, you can't hire like a teenager to do data entry kind of thing. You need an expert to be looking at.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah. The things that you could easily outsource to a low skilled person that's automated, we just automate those things. But then there's lots and lots and lots of areas where human judgment is really needed. And the technology basically makes the humans much more productive. Right. Because it enables them to see, like, kinds of data fast, to see what the units were, to see what the data collection method was. It highlights the relevant information for humans, but it is definitely a human in the loop process, and it's, for all intent and purposes, will stay that way for a very long time. It requires a lot of investment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So this sounds like the bulk of your value add then, mainly like this precisely. Gathering and standardizing information.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>I would say it slightly differently. But I think it's a reasonable assertion. I would say it's the least ambiguous value add. Right. Like, it's clearly really valuable to get all the information and make it all usable. That is like, nobody will disagree with that. Right. And so that's definitely the case, then, once we have the information, I should talk about what the data types are in a second. Once we have the information in accessible form, then there's just a huge number of scientific computing and AI algorithms that interrogate the data and do all manner of things to predict where we're likely to find compositional anomalies and concentration anomalies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what are some of the kinds of data like? Presumably people have dug down and pulled up cores.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah. So we'll start with geophysics. So the earth's gravitational field changes from place to place on the planet because the density of the rocks beneath you change from place to place. Yeah, it's really cool. And you can actually measure these changes with gravitometers that existed in terms of sufficient precision for 50 years. People have been doing gravitational surveys for many, many decades in different places and different evolving technology platforms. But that's one type of geophysical data. The earth's magnetic field changes from place to place as you go around the earth because the background field gets distorted by the magnetic properties of the rocks in the near surface.</p><p>There's various types of electromagnetic data that tell you something about the distribution of conductivity of the rocks in the subsurface. Right? And there's electromagnetic data that's based on active surveys as well as it's based on passive surveys. There is all manner of imagery. Right? So aircraft and satellite imagery in the visual and in the wider non visual bands. And that can tell you lots about both outcropping rocks as well as the materials overlying outlying rocks. There's all manner of chemistry. Right? So you referenced this just now. There's groundwater chemistry, there's soil chemistry, there's sediment chemistry and streams.</p><p>And then there's rock chemistry, both from outcrops and from deep drill holes. Then there's mineralogic data. So chemistry tends. We use that as a shorthand for the elemental concentrations in a rock sample. So the percentage of copper, the percentage of nickel, the percentage of cobalt, et cetera, and the percentage of weird stuff, too. And those trace elements are really important. The percentage of caesium, the percentage of tantalum. Right. This stuff tells you a lot. So you end up getting, if you have 50 or 60 element concentrations, you can do some very sophisticated high dimensionality sort of machine learning to predict how the rocks are changing in the subsurface.</p><p>And then there's mineralogic data, which tells you about not just the elemental concentrations, but what minerals they're in, the forms of the molecules themselves. Right. Is it nickel in silicate, which would be less interesting than nickel in sulfur? Right. And you need to actually understand the molecular form, not just the elemental concentration.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So how close — and maybe this is like too sprawling of a question to answer, but how close are you? Well, a) are you still finding new sources of information? And b) how close are you to ingesting and systematizing and standardizing all the data that you do have?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>The last question, I would say we're way ahead of anyone else in terms of aggregating all of the information about the earth's crust. And we got a long way to go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really? It's still early days with the information that's available.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>That's available. Yeah. I would be shocked if we've already fully aggregated a few percentage points.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>There's a huge amount, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's good reason then to think that there's lots of Runway for improvement here as more and more information comes into the system.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>For sure. Maybe the neatest innovation we have, data science innovation, kind of foundational innovation, is something we call efficacy of information. And what this is is we ingest all of this legacy information and we make these predictions. We have, in most cases, very sparse data, we have little hints of data here and there. So we have a huge amount of uncertainty. And the game now is to make a set of decisions that will decrease our uncertainty. That will maximally decrease our uncertainty. Right. And so that's actually the way we think of exploration. We think of it as an information problem.</p><p>That's about the maximum reduction of uncertainty. No other mining company talks that way. Right? Talks about sort of information theory and maximally reducing uncertainty. But it's fundamentally the way we think of exploration, of the exploitation process. So efficacy of information technology, what it does is it actually indicates what information we should collect that will reduce our uncertainty the most. Right. Which is different than what information you should collect to find a deposit. Like, it's a different question. It's no, how do we decrease our uncertainty the most? I'll give you a fun example, a very tangible example of this.</p><p>So we have a lithium prospect in Quebec. And the way we got on to this prospect was by initially searching old records for the lithium mineral that we're looking for is called spodamine. So that's an aluminum silicate lithium mineral. And so you can imagine that you'd go look for spodamine, and there's the word in old geologic records, but it turns out that that's not very fruitful. And the reason that's not very fruitful is because unlike copper and nickel, people have not been looking for lithium for all of human history. In fact, they weren't even really looking for lithium ten years ago.</p><p>It is an extremely new thing, and that makes it really interesting. So most geologists weren't even thinking about it. They weren't thinking about spodamine 40 or 50 years ago. So if they weren't thinking about it, they were less likely to see it also. And this is non obvious at all, but it turns out that the spodamine mineral is really, really hard to detect in rocks, which some minerals are easy to see for a skilled geologist, and some are really hard, and spodamine just turned out to be really hard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're looking for proxies, then it's what you end up doing.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Exactly. So we're looking for proxies, things that we have figured out through basic science and through data science that correlate with the presence of spodamine. So we found some old reports that were just littered with those proxies. So we send people out, but we didn't send them. We actually staked a big claim, 300 square kilometers of area, and this is an area that has snow on the ground most of the year. So you have a narrow window to send people out and collect new information. And it's expensive. Right. This is another cool element of the data science challenge of exploration, is that the marginal cost of data is very high.</p><p>Right. And that's really different than like a SaaS company or a social media company that's getting swamped with data, and they're trying to find subtle signals in the noise. We have this high marginal cost of data, so the whole game is to collect the most useful next piece of information. So we have this big area, we have maybe two weeks in the field, helicopter supported. So this is not cheap. Ten highly skilled people supported by a helicopter for ten days. And so we use machine learning algorithms to tell them where they're likely to find the right rock sticking out of the ground.</p><p>Okay? And so the algorithms were trained on data that we had a priori, and the team goes out there and they find a couple of good examples, and they say, "Yeah, this is good. This is a pegmatite. This is the sort of rock type we're looking for." And it had this white moss growing on it, it's a white like rock and has this white moss growing on it. Most of the places that the ML sent them, most of the places were not the right rocks with that white moss growing on them. They were just fields of white moss.</p><p>It was bad, it was false positives all over the place. So we sent them to all. So it was really bad, right? So they're in the field and they're on satellite, and they're like, "You guys, data scientists, this is not right, this is moss, these aren't pegmatites." But that's okay, that's the way this iterative process works. So the team goes, "Okay, we have a few true positives in the pegmatites you did find, and we have lots of true negatives now, right? Those false positives are the same thing as true negatives, right? We know those are not the right things."</p><p>So that's really, really good training data.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Somebody's going to go write a moss algorithm now.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Exactly right. So we include that into the model as not the thing we're looking for, as well as some positive cases of the thing we're looking for. The model gets way better, way more predictive in just a couple of days, inside the window of the field campaign. So then the new model, while the people are still out there, the new model says, "Okay, here's a much more precise model. Many fewer predictions, some novel new predictions, many fewer predictions. Go check out these that are like 50 km away." And they were spot on. They were exactly right.</p><p>And now, the model was really predictive. Just a little bit of high quality training data made the model way, way better and got people to not just the right pegmatype deposits, but pegmatite deposits that were rich in spodamine, which is the lithium bearing mineral. So that could be a new lithium discovery, and we're able to make it way faster and for way less expense because we directed the team so efficiently in the field.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. This kind of gets up. My next question, which is most of what you're doing, is assessing and analyzing existing data sources that you've gathered. And the next thing I was going to ask is, are you yourself producing another data set? Are you doing any sort of large scale scanning or, I don't know, whatever it would be to produce another data set. But it sounds like you're doing something much more targeted than that.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yes, both. So, yes and yes. So the targeted exploration is critical for efficient exploration, and then we are collecting new data, highly selective, high quality data, like I just described, like those moss covered fields good, strong, true negatives, okay? But here's what we also did, and it was really cool. We actually have a whole hardware program where we're developing new measurement techniques and new data types, and we have something we've invented called the KoBold hyperpod, which is a camera that we designed that is the highest spatial resolution and highest spectral resolution of any camera used in mineral exploration.</p><p>We mount it to the side of a Cessna aircraft or a helicopter. So after we found this remote, good outcrop, we then flew over it with the hyperpod. And the hyperpod, to make this really clear, so the satellite imagery has a pixel resolution of about four meters. So it's about a four meter spatial resolution, okay. And then it had a band resolution, spectral resolution of eight different bands. So eight different wavelengths of light. The intensity was being measured. So you can imagine for a four x four pixel, you would get eight numbers, okay? The hyperpod. The new hyperpod has, in a four x four area, 20 pixels, so it has 20 times the spatial resolution.</p><p>So you get 20 different pixels for every one pixel, and then every pixel has 80 times the number of bands. So it's 80 times the band resolution going all the way up to three microns, like really long wavelength. So we collect much more rich information, 1600 times as much information about that outcrop than you had from the satellite imagery. And then we fly a wide area, we fly that camera around a wide area, looking for more of the same. So in this way, the whole exploration machine becomes much more effective at every stage, because the software enabled the more effective exploration, which found the better training data.</p><p>And the novel hardware then collected really good quality data, which then gets used to find the next prospect after that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're laddering up then, and ought to be getting better and better at this, basically, because.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The more information you get, the better data you have. So we're getting close to the end. One or two other things I wanted to get before we're done. One is just about what you found so far. You said you're relatively new at this. You found one big demonstrated deposit of what is the —?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Copper and cobalt, mostly copper, a little bit of cobalt in Zambia.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it's new that you're looking for lithium. That was a relatively recent announcement, I thought.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, we've been — so we started looking for nickel, copper, and cobalt. And for the first two years of the company, actually, for the first three years of the company, we exclusively looked for those three. We started our lithium program about a year and a half ago, and it's a very different search space in really interesting ways, but we've spun up a really exciting lithium program. Now we're exploring on four continents. We're exploring in Asia, Australia, North America, and Africa for lithium, and we have projects on all four.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, wow. So you have one big demonstrated find on your record now, and you're exploring in other places. You're exploring in a bunch of other places.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah. We have nickel, copper, and lithium projects in twelve jurisdictions, I think Greenland, Quebec, Ontario, Saskatchewan, Nevada, Alaska, Western Australia, Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, South Korea. So, yeah, we're exploring all over the world for those key metals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, and final question, and this is, I'll get yelled at by my audience if I don't ask you this, which is just, we've been discussing all this as a sort of purely mechanical kind of a technical challenge, but obviously, anytime you talk about mining, I'm sure you're very familiar, having been in the space for a while, first thing that leaps to people's mind is environmental degradation and social problems. The mining there are, quite famously, a lot of bad mines, a lot of bad conditions at a lot of mines. How do you think about the equity justice angle in your work?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm so glad you asked. It's so, so important. Right. So the mining industry has a spotted history, for sure. For sure. There's some good stories and there's some very bad stories, for sure. These are things we take enormously seriously for a whole host of reasons. Sort of with the giant picture, the big picture, which, of course, we started with in the beginning, which is just humanity has a choice, right? We either get off fossil fuels or we fry the planet. And I don't think that's an acceptable choice. And so what does it mean to get off fossil fuels?</p><p>It means massive electrification, and that, just because of physics, requires a lot more of these key materials. If we're going to solve climate change, we need to find and develop these materials one way or another. My view is very strong, that if the mining industry doesn't act exceptionally well in development over the next ten years, then reasonable local stakeholder opposition to any projects will thwart that effort. Right. It'll thwart the effort to get the materials. So we have to be absolutely best in class, and we strive to lead in that way. So most companies will start a major community relations program once they're there to actually develop a deposit.</p><p>We start it earlier. We start when we're exploring. Right. Even though we know most of our projects won't actually come to fruition, we want to make sure the places we are exploring are places that we are welcomed and we want to be, we want to be welcomed by the locals and we want to work with the locals so that we remain welcomed by the locals. And that means a huge number of things. But it means fundamentally, it means a really serious investment, right. With an entire group inside the company that's dedicated exactly to that. And people that spend all day, every day talking to the local community about their concerns.</p><p>At this point, KoBold, the majority of KoBold employees are actually in Zambia. And so one of the things we are trying to lead on heavily is to mostly hire Zambians for our major project in Zambia. It is kind of standard operations that when there's a big project like this, western companies move in and bring in a lot of expats to do the high priced jobs. We have a strong commitment to not do that. Right. We have some expats, of course, for very specific technical expertise, but mostly we're hiring local and we're training local very aggressively. And that's in our long term interest.</p><p>We want to have the best zambian workforce that we can possibly have because we don't want to just develop one project in Zambia. We want to develop ten projects in Zambia. And we're investing in all the neighboring countries. And so the more capabilities we have in that country, the more effective we'll be in the neighboring countries.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let me ask you this, since I discovered that you're an actual mining company. It's nice that you are making efforts to do this, right in terms of dealing well with the locals and labor standards and stuff like that. Is there demand side pull for better standards? Is there now a market force pushing for better standards, as one would hope?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Great question, and this is a great coda here for the conversation, because I think your audience can help here. I think demanding high environmental standards and high labor standards in your key critical materials in end use products is something that every listener can do. You guys should actually tell when you buy your next iPhone, you should ask, right? Like you should ask about these things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are there programs or standards or certificates or something? Like what can a consumer use to know?</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yes, there are programs they're starting. They're nascent. Right. And so they need just grassroots consumer support. Right. So right now, no products that you buy — you don't have two different prices. Like a price for a —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>"Dirty phone."</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>Yeah, dirty phone or a clean phone. Maybe that's impossible because maybe no one would want to advertise their phone as a dirty phone. But you definitely want companies advertising their phones as clean phones, right? You definitely want that. And honestly, I would say the diamond industry, even though I think diamond exploration is kind of stupid and wasteful, they've actually done a pretty good job here with the so called Kimberley process and things like that, because blood diamonds were a horrendous issue.</p><p>Still are. But they did a pretty darn good job with that. Such that the provenance can be relatively tracked. So there are techniques, but it really requires sustained consumer engagement so that all the companies involved, so the entire industry takes it up. The providence of our metals will be exceptional. You'll be able to track every — once we're producing, our mines aren't producing yet, but once they're producing — you will be able to track every gram all the way back in the entire supply chain in an extremely transparent way. And we hope we can set an example that way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Well, that's something listeners can do, especially if listeners are associated with institutions. Try to get institution procurement or government procurement aimed in the right direction is a big piece of the puzzle, too. Well, Kurt, this has been absolutely fascinating. Mining is not something I thought I would ever have to get into or care about. But as you say, you pull this string and here's where you end up. So I'm glad somebody's out there working on it. Thanks for coming on and walking us through it.</p><p><strong>Kurt House</strong></p><p>It was a great conversation. Thanks so much for having me, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/getting-better-at-mining-the-minerals</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:139742790</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 24 Dec 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/139742790/f4c37f5725995fe4b3d4151280bb3a94.mp3" length="71437179" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3570</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/139742790/9de4709fb5cef4f409e4f428766f4488.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's going on with offshore wind?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, wind industry analyst Samantha Woodworth speaks to the growing pains of the offshore wind industry and what its future may hold.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/rr1po1iims4ht6s6fczp1/volts23.12.13-samantha.woodworth.pdf?rlkey=7wbxrht68uxyisxqooqio3ntt&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/what-s-going-on-with-offshore-wind"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Last week, for the first time ever, <a target="_blank" href="https://apnews.com/article/offshore-wind-farm-orsted-eversource-biden-south-fork-new-york-a94722b3f4a52e93580ad15a2de257a0">a commercial offshore wind farm delivered power to the US grid</a>. It was an important milestone — and also the rare bit of good news for an otherwise beleaguered industry. Everywhere else, costs are up, contracts are being renegotiated, and projects are getting canceled. It all sounds pretty bad, especially for a sector that barely even exists yet. </p><p>What’s going on? How much of this turmoil is temporary and how much reflects lasting structural changes? Is the US offshore wind industry going to die before it even leaves its crib? </p><p>To gain a little clarity on these questions, I contacted <a target="_blank" href="https://www.woodmac.com/profiles/people-profiles/samantha-woodworth/">Samantha Woodworth</a>, a senior wind industry analyst at Wood Mackenzie. We talked about the converging difficulties facing the industry right now, efforts to renegotiate contracts that were signed in the Before Times, the odd role that ships play in the whole mess, and the industry's prospects in coming years and decades.</p><p>Samantha Woodworth, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Well, thank you so much for having me. I'm happy to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is exciting. I have 411,000 questions. The more I dig, the more questions I have. So I'm excited to get into this. It seems like we're really at a hinge point here for offshore wind in the U.S., and there's lots of sort of contradictory signals happening. On the one hand, literally today, the day we're recording, we heard that the first power from an offshore wind turbine is being delivered in New York today. So I think, unless, correct me if I'm wrong, that marks the first actual power from offshore wind being used in the U.S.</p><p>Is that correct?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Essentially, yeah. I mean, it's the first commercial-scale offshore wind farm in the U.S. flowing power to the grid. It is a super-duper exciting day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that is exciting. And also, I think just a couple of days ago or maybe yesterday or very recently, there were some announcements of new offshore wind procurement. But then on the other hand, we have all these other stories coming. So let me just, in terms of the quote unquote crisis of U.S. offshore wind, let me summarize quickly what it seems like what I've gathered is going on, and you can fill in the details and tell me if I'm missing anything.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Basically, a bunch of contracts were signed for offshore wind amidst a period of great enthusiasm in the Before Times, like pre-2019, back when things were normal, I don't know.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Were they normal?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>More or less.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What's normal? But economic circumstances, let's say, were a lot better back then. So you sign these contracts, you sign up, and these projects take a long time to build. So in between the signing and today, we've had a pandemic. Inflation. Russia invaded Ukraine and screwed up the entire globe's supply chains. Now everything looks much, much, much more expensive than it did then. And so now these wind companies are stuck with these contracts premised on much lower prices, much lower inflation, much lower interest rates, et cetera, et cetera. And they're sort of scrambling.</p><p>Some of them are getting canceled, they're trying to renegotiate, et cetera, et cetera. Is that roughly accurate as a summary?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, yeah, definitely the shortlist of things that has kind of compounded to be a perfect storm of issues within the U.S. offshore space. And unfortunately, it's hitting hard everywhere. It's not just the U.S. offshore wind space that's getting absolutely derailed by these issues, but because the U.S. offshore wind space is so new and so young and doesn't have the robust foundation like even U.S. onshore wind does, they're definitely feeling the effects a lot harder with a higher magnitude.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. So this is a global phenomenon, though. These are not U.S. specific trends here?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>That's correct, yeah. Inflation, the pandemic recovery. There's a couple of U.S. specific things related to treasury guidance and that sort of thing. But for the most part, offshore wind is feeling these effects globally. Onshore wind is feeling these effects globally. It stinks — the timing for U.S. offshore, just because we were so close to getting all of these projects greenlit, and it just was the perfect storm of poor timing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really terrible. Really, really terrible timing for this industry in particular. They were just like a toddler, just sort of standing up and taking their first steps and like, now this.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We're talking about all these different things converging. If you had to rank them, what's the sort of biggest? Is it interest rates that are the main thing here, or could you rank them? Is it all just a mess?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Project costs and the effect of inflation are probably the biggest issue that we've been seeing with the offshore space. That's obviously what's causing the projects to come to the table and ask to renegotiate contracts or even just eating those massive termination penalties with a plan to rebid in subsequent tenders. Even local governments, the states that are soliciting offshore wind, are beginning to include clauses in these solicitations that allow for projects to index their bid price with inflation as a way —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, to help mitigate that potential for, God forbid, inflation keep going up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I want to get back to those tenders and the renegotiations and all that in a little bit. There's some interesting details here, but I guess one of my big questions is, if you listen to a skeptic, an offshore wind skeptic, what they will say is this shows basically that offshore wind was an artifact of weirdly low interest rates. The sort of weirdly low interest rates that held sway for the past decade. And basically, they can't compete in a world of normal interest rates. Does that seem true to you? And did no one see interest rates coming?</p><p>Was all this done on the assumption that interest rates were going to stay weirdly low, near zero, forever?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>I would disagree with that. I mean, we've had the sort of foundational pieces in place to make offshore wind into a successful industry, including tax credits, financing regimes and that sort of thing. It is not unreasonable to think that interest rates would increase, but I don't think anyone could have predicted that they were going to just so rampantly go out of control post pandemic. The magnitude to which this issue happened is really what was causing the projects to no longer be viable. Interest rates fluctuate a lot anyway, but it's one of those things where I think this isn't something that anybody could have really predicted or should have been able to predict.</p><p>It's obviously going to cause a good amount of revisiting of how these contracts are scoped and how they're written, whether that is including index bids and whatnot. But it really is one of those things where I don't think anybody could have possibly predicted, you know. 7%, 8%, 9% —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. The severity of it.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah. And if you look at Europe, too, you have commercially viable projects there that have similar remuneration mechanisms to what's being set up in the U.S., and they remained economically viable. So again, it just has to do with the nascence of the industry and not having as robust of a foundation or backbone or infrastructure as, say, in locations in Europe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Speaking of that infrastructure, let's talk a little bit about the supply chain. So there's sort of two supply chain stories, and I'm curious how they apply to offshore wind. One is just Russia invading Ukraine, you know, and then cut off the gas from Russia, and then everybody's scrambling for clean energy, and basically supply chains get jammed up in a way that is screwed up everybody for a while, screwed up all industries for a while, but particularly this industry. That's one story. And then the other story is just specific to offshore wind in the U.S., which is just, we don't have the supply chain in the U.S. yet, just because, as you say, the industry is nascent.</p><p>And now we have these laws sort of mandating that we have to use domestic content or use domestic manufacturing or use domestic ships, which we'll return to later. So now the industry is having to wait on a supply chain standing up. Which of those is responsible for the current woes?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>I think it's a combination of both, really. I mean, like I had said, the whole renewables industry is feeling the effects of the supply chain disruptions caused by the pandemic, as well as caused by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As you mentioned, the local supply chain, especially for offshore wind in the U.S., is pretty non-existent. As it stands now, there are a number of idle facilities and newly proposed facilities that are being thought of to help address that. Unfortunately, even if all of those come online, we would need more to be able to meet demand.</p><p>But it's a very good start. That being said, I think it was Siemens Gamesa announced that they're no longer planning on building a blade manufacturing facility in the U.S. because of just how volatile the offshore wind market has become here and how —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Ugh.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, I know, it's a huge bummer — how projects are no longer guarantees at this point.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is a chicken and egg thing, right? I mean, the problem with the supply chain.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah. And no one wants to spend millions of dollars to create a new manufacturing facility if the demand isn't going to be there for several years later if the project's delayed, God forbid, the project gets canceled. Right. So that's definitely one of the big issues that we're running into in the U.S. as far as just even establishing that local supply chain. We have a decently robust supply chain for onshore, but obviously we really don't have anything that can quite cater to offshore yet, just the scale and the scope. So we really need to make sure, especially this latest tranche of projects that are getting awarded, like New York's third auction, that the preliminary winners were announced a couple months ago, I think.</p><p>That as well as New Jersey, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, you know, the onus really is to get the pricing of those contracts right so that we can have that certainty in the project pipeline again, and therefore convey that certainty into establishing a robust supply chain of labor, of manufacturing, of port infrastructure, of ships, of everything we could possibly need to really foundationally have it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>At the same time, if you're proposing a project whether and how much that stuff will be available is very germane to the price you can ask. Right, this gets back to the chicken and egg thing. In a sense, you need that stuff around, or at least some idea that it's going to be around before you can properly assess your own project.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, but you know, we kind of knew going into creating this industry that we were going to be heavily reliant on Europe for not even just best practices, but being able to source these components because they have most of the offshore wind manufacturing in Europe and we were already going to be reliant on them for vessels, installation vessels anyway. So you can kind of get an idea of what these projects are going to cost. Just knowing where you would have to source supply chain at first, really the kind of question becomes, "all right, if we were to build these in the U.S., how would the costs be different? And what certain standards do these local supply chain and these local manufacturers have to adhere to?"</p><p>Actually, with regard to that Siemens Gamesa cancellation of that facility, they're still planning on honoring all their contracts and their firm orders with U.S. projects. They're just saying that they're going to have to be imported from Europe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So on the one hand, you have this perfect storm, right? You have interest rates making everything more expensive, you have inflation making parts, et cetera, more expensive, all this stuff. But on the other hand, you also have, just a couple, a year ago, the passage of IRA, which contained — the Inflation Reduction Act — which contained kajillions of dollars for green projects, I assume has a lot of money available for offshore wind, a lot of money available for onshoring of manufacturing. Like all that stuff is getting showered with money right now. Is that money just not enough to — is the support in IRA just not enough to sort of offset the severity of all this stuff that's happening?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>There's definitely a piece of that. I think, again, nobody wants to be the 100% footing the bill for all of this. Right? And I don't think that the way that the feds are looking at it is necessarily the same way that each state individually is looking at funding and getting all of these programs and infrastructure in place. And a lot of states are kind of acting in a vacuum too. Until very recently, with that three state, at least procurement, consortium that Rhode Island and Massachusetts and Connecticut are doing. That's the first regional agreement to actually do these projects together and will likely spur regional supply chain development, as opposed to just state by state supply chain development, which is going to be really good.</p><p>But it seems like in trying to get all of this stuff established again, nobody wants to be the only one footing the bill, but it seems like each entity that's trying to get it established is operating kind of within its own vacuum.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. For a policy head like me, when I hear this, like, all these chicken and egg problems like, this can't happen until this happens. This can't happen until this happens. I think, hey, what about government?" What about some planning? What about some policy here? This seems like a great. But I thought IRA would have done some of that.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, and that's the thing. It obviously promised a whole bunch of money towards it, but ultimately, we haven't really seen anything like an offshore wind working group or like a supply chain working group, or there haven't been any sort of results like that that have stemmed from the Inflation Reduction Act. So I would agree and say there needs to be more actual action taken. I mean, yes, you can try and throw money at problems and hope they go away, but really, there needs to just be a whole bunch of stakeholders sat down at this table to figure out, okay, realistically, how is this going to work?</p><p>And realistically, where is the money going to come from?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's like, the bill looks a lot bigger than it did, and now you got to get back together and figure out how to divvy it up. I want to return to policy in a little bit, but in the context of all this other stuff, how big a problem is NIMBYism for offshore wind specifically? I know sort of legendarily the first offshore wind project off of Cape Wind.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Oh, the Cape Wind project yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just got mired in NIMBY BS for years and eventually died.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yep.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I know there's been fights like that. Is that a big piece of the puzzle in the current woes?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>So actually, it's kind of funny you bring Cape Wind up. I was an intern at the New Bedford Economic Development Council back when that project ultimately got mothballed. And I had asked the same questions, too, because it seemed like policy wise, everything was in place; they were ready to break ground. This was going to be such a boon for the New Bedford economy, and then, as you know, it just kind of fizzled out and died. And NIMBYism was a large piece of that. The reason that it is a bit less of a piece now when we're talking about U.S. offshore wind today is just purely based on the location of the projects.</p><p>Cape Wind was going to be in state waters within sight of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard instead of out on the outer continental shelf where it'll be visible somewhat, but not as in your face as the location for Cape Wind would have been.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, these are like 40 miles out or something crazy like that, right?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Surely you can't see a turbine that's 40 miles away, can you? I don't know.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm not sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It doesn't seem like it would be particularly oppressive in your visual field.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think you would need some binoculars or a telescope or something if you want to be that mad about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are there problems where — because it does seem like the one place where NIMBYism could happen is all these farms need cables going to the shore at some point and that is some degree of disruption. And I remember reading — I don't remember the specific project, but I remember reading about a community that was rallying to fight having a cable from an offshore wind farm come under their town. Like at the end of the project, it literally wouldn't even have been visible. Just digging up and burying it. They fought and fought and blocked. Is that a pattern or is it?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, the NIMBYism has definitely evolved away from the "I don't want to see the turbines" piece — obviously that still exists. But a lot of the NIMBYism pieces that we're hearing about are exactly what you said: Local towns, municipalities not wanting gigantic cables put underneath their lands, having the disruption of that construction as well as there have been a whole bunch of unexplained whale deaths and people are trying to attribute those to the pre-development sonar activities and things that are done for site assessment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I was going to ask later about the whales, but let's just talk about the whales. Is that BS? Is there anything to that?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>So NOAA has been documenting an unexplained mortality event in humpback whale populations in the northeast for years and years and years now, well before even Block Island Wind Farm was developed. You know, I personally don't believe that offshore wind farms are killing whales, but you could make the argument that because a lot of these whale deaths are attributed to ship strikes, increased construction activities in offshore wind project areas could, in theory, cause more ship strikes, which then would cause more whale deaths. There has not been any sort of research or tracking that has said that that is the case. But it is also such a new thing that there's also not a ton of data monitoring ship strikes at offshore wind project sites.</p><p>And I mean, no one in the offshore wind industry wants to kill whales. Let's be real.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are there ways to — I mean, I guess if we don't have a lot of data and a lot of science about this we probably don't also have a great idea how to avoid it. But are there better and worse ways to do this, ways that are more or less whale friendly?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>All these projects have contracted with biologists and researchers and that sort of thing to analyze whale migratory patterns. What sort of marine life of all kinds is going to be impacted by these activities? It's kind of just more monitoring and making sure that if all of a sudden you're getting a ping that there's a whale in the vicinity, you make sure you give it a wide berth until it's gone on its way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about the disruption of fisheries? Because that's been a thing, too, isn't it?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, definitely. And I think, obviously, again, the offshore wind industry isn't in it to make it so fishermen can't make their livelihood scalloping — whatever they might be fishing. But at the same time, there's always going to be some sort of impact, right, to marine life, to fisheries, to anything in the ocean when you put up these massive projects. The onus is obviously on the developer to make sure that they're mitigating as much of the disruption as possible. And that's why they have — it's called the NEPA process — that's why all these projects go to open comments multiple times, they get redesigned multiple times to try and minimize that impact on user groups as well as actual, like, the environment.</p><p>So obviously, we have to have trust in the developers that they're doing everything they possibly can here to minimize that impact on user groups and the environment. But at the same time, they have a legal responsibility to do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I've heard sort of, like, vaguely over the years also that sometimes offshore turbine platforms can sort of induce fish. I'm so out of my depth here. I have no idea what I'm talking about.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Like, create new marine ecosystems?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Create a habitat. Thank you. That's what I was looking for. Create a habitat for fish. Is that true?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>It's not something I don't think really gets considered very often. But you figure in a lot of areas, they will strip down and sink aluminum car frames to create new reefs. If you're creating a new stable, kind of unmoving foundation down there, the ecosystem will adapt. And if it likes the components, I guess there's no reason to think that the ecosystem wouldn't grow around the foundation of an offshore wind turbine. It wouldn't create a new reef somewhere, or that sort of thing is definitely something that can happen. And I think it will. I think it's one of those things that it kind of gets overlooked that these will create additional habitats once they're put in.</p><p>It's not like we're going to be pulling them out every ten years for maintenance or anything.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the things I've been talking about a lot on the pod lately is this problem of NIMBYism and preparing developers better for it and how current practice is not great among developers. They're not particularly sensitive. They're not doing the early outreach that they need to be doing. They're not cognizant of the political climate into which they are wandering unprepared. So they're getting chewed up. What's the story there in the offshore wind industry? Does it seem like they are sensitive to the NIMBY issue and doing what they need to do to avoid it? Or are they kind of like stepping on rakes because they're not clued in about this?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>It kind of depends, developer to developer. We have definitely seen some developers that do a better job of it than others. I think it was really hard for the industry to conceptualize NIMBYism as it's evolved away from the "I just don't want to see the turbines." And once that became no longer the issue, I think there was a little bit of a pause. Kind of a "oh, there are other issues that people have with this?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, I can't believe people have an issue with a cable going under their town, even though I know it. So I can imagine trying to anticipate that could be difficult.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I think that's really what it was, is once we all thought that the turbines were so far offshore you can't see them, so it shouldn't be an issue anymore. I don't think anyone was really able to anticipate what other sort of local opposition stances there would be. Naturally, the grassroots environmental concerns exist across the board, but that's something that all renewable energy developers have a decent amount of expertise with at this point.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, also, as I keep pounding the table, this is not spontaneous resistance that is happening in these places.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's very well funded. You just have to assume it's going to be there because there's a giant well-funded movement making sure it is there.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I think there probably was a little bit of the industry being taken aback by all the new local opposition stances that came up. But again, the onus is on the developers to make sure that they are doing an adequate job of mitigating disruptions to stakeholders due to these projects, as well as making sure that they are designing their project in a way that tries to make everyone happy. Obviously, it's not really entirely feasible to make everyone happy, but you want to get darn close.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. What would make a wealthy community happy about something underneath their town? If you can't even imagine why they're mad, it's hard to imagine what would make them happy.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>That's definitely a piece of it, too. Those sorts of —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just money? Like, they already have money. Right? They're rich.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Well, and you figure that's, I think, when you start to see the developers coming out with pledges as far as, like, economic development and we'll build a school.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Benefit sharing. I have a whole pod coming out on that. Yeah. I was just wondering if that, how sort of evolved that thinking is in this particular industry.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's, I think, the next step at that point when you're like, I can't not put the cable underneath your town, but here I will do something good to bolster the town's economy and the town's resources and whatever. That's when you start getting into that benefit sharing piece and honestly negotiating permit approvals, especially at the local and municipal level, based on that sort of benefit sharing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just for listeners' benefit: So some of these wind farms, the proposals in various stages, some are in areas with wholesale energy markets, restructured utilities, as they say, where there's competition among utilities, and some of them are taking place in old school, vertically integrated monopoly utilities. And I think this is an interesting difference. So right now, the ones that are in the restructured areas, listeners will know if you're in a competitive wholesale market, you're just bidding your power, you're offering your power, and the state is choosing the lowest bid. It's a competitive process. So in those areas —</p><p>So what's happened, as we said, is these big farms came in, they entered these auctions, won these auctions by saying, "we will offer our power to you, New York, at x per kilowatt hour." And now everything's gone wrong, and they cannot possibly sell power at those prices anymore. And they've been trying to renegotiate those PPAs, those off take contracts that they settled, but, like, New York, for instance, just said "no," refused to renegotiate, and now these two projects in New York have gotten canceled. So I guess one of the things I'm wondering is, what are the dynamics there?</p><p>Why wouldn't New York renegotiate? What is the source of the resistance? I guess if you have an auction, and someone wins with a deceptively low price and then comes back to you afterwards, it's like, "actually, I want more money." It kind of screws the other participants in the auction. But what are the dynamics there? Why don't states want to renegotiate?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>To your point: That's a good piece of it is — you don't want to discourage the competition by allowing somebody who bids, let's say, an unrealistically low price, which I don't necessarily believe any of the winners of the previous New York auctions did. I think they bid prices that worked at the time. But part of that is maintaining that competitive process. I know that NYSERDA has been batting around the idea of doing a very quick fourth solicitation; they're calling it like a "fire" solicitation, that would allow those projects to essentially rebid as soon as that solicitation is opened.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's just review the facts real quick. If people have not been keeping up, there's two big projects, both by Ørsted that just got canceled.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Right. Are you talking about the ones that the PUC denied their renegotiation, or are you talking about the ocean wind projects that Ørsted just came out a couple weeks ago and said, "we're not doing these anymore."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, are those different?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yes. Yeah. So the two projects, the Ocean Wind projects that Ørsted just recently canceled, are located in New Jersey.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, New Jersey. That's what I meant. Right, right. Those are the two big canceled projects that everybody's very angsty about. And they got canceled because New Jersey wouldn't renegotiate the PPA, right? So is the idea to have another auction, is the idea that these same canceled projects might bid into this new auction and win it and then be able to go forward after all?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>So I don't believe that the Ocean Wind projects got canceled because of the PUC. So the ones that got canceled because the New York PUC denied renegotiation, that was Empire Wind, Sunrise Wind, and Beacon Wind 1 were the projects that had petitioned the Public Service Commission in New York to renegotiate the contracts. The Public Service Commission said, "nope, we're not letting you do that." Then they announced the winners of the third solicitation, and there had been some mention of a very quick follow up solicitation to, in theory, let those projects that wanted to renegotiate, cancel, eat the contract termination fees and rebid in such a quick succession that it, in theory, wouldn't affect their project timelines.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, assuming they win.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly. Assuming they win.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So those projects are not 100% for sure canceled.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They're just in limbo-ish?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Essentially, yes. Developers haven't come out and said we're canceling. They haven't come out and said we're breaking our contracts and hoping to rebid. There's just been kind of radio silence from those projects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm sure there's a lot of angsty meetings happening in a —</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>I'm certain, I'm certain.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When we talk about these contract cancellation fees, is that a substantial hit to them? Like, is that something they would really rather avoid?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Oh, definitely. I believe Commonwealth Wind is likely to pay something along the lines of $50 million, close to it, for terminating those contracts. South Coast, I believe, is paying a little bit more than that. So, yeah, it really highlights just how much project costs have become an issue with a lot of these projects and how bad the inflation problem has affected these projects, because if you're willing to eat $50 million —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I was going to say you have to be pretty desperate. So those three New York projects are right now trying to figure out, "do we just cancel and eat everything, or do we just eat the contract cancellation cost and rebid and try to keep moving forward?"</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Exactly. Yeah. And I think that all hinges upon, obviously, whether or not NYSERDA does this flash solicitation that they'd been hinting at.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I have no idea how long that process takes. Could they do it quickly?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>They're going to have to get their ducks in a row really fast if they want to do it in the kind of near future. Generally, the RFP process can take anywhere from, I don't know, like eight-ish months to over a year just because you're in theory, supposed to release a draft and then allow for public comments. So it is a long process by design. So it'll be interesting to see, you know, kind of what they can do in a very quick timeframe or what they're expecting to be a quick timeframe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So those three New York projects are in limbo. The two New Jersey Ørsted projects are just flat canceled?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yes, those are flat out canceled. Ørsted cited project delays, permitting timelines, and inflation as the primary reasons.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Permitting timelines. I thought that had, like, I thought by the time they were at this stage, they would have had the land, or I guess it's not land, ocean land. What do they call it out there? They would have had what they need in terms of permitting, like they're still waiting for?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>I think generally when they say permitting in that regard, they're looking for those state municipal, local level permits for that interconnection infrastructure where it makes landfall, especially if it has to go through any sort of sensitive habitats like marshlands and that sort of thing. Ocean Winds, neither of those projects had gotten altogether that far in the BOEM permitting process. They were still doing environmental reviews. Their construction operations plan hadn't been approved yet, so they were still kind of in the middle of that whole permitting process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just for listeners. BOEM is the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. That's in charge of federal waters. And all of these post Cape Wind, all these projects are far enough out that they're in federal waters, right?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So here's a thought I had, or a question I had. If you're in a wholesale energy market and you're in a competitive market and all your costs go up and you have to renegotiate your contracts, you're just like, it's a mess for you. But if you're in a vertically integrated regulated monopoly utility area, isn't this a little easier for you because you can just offload the increased costs onto your captive ratepayers? Is that — are they having an easier time?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>So in theory you can. It's the Public Utility Commission's job to make sure that you're not unduly burdening ratepayers with your cost recovery. But as we kind of saw with the Coastal Virginia project, there are a number of cost overruns, and unfortunately, they are going to end up ultimately passed to the customer. And that is kind of the big difference there, is that the utility still has to go through the process of proving need and necessity and public good of the project and getting the cost recovery approved by the Public Service Commission. So the burden of proof is on the developer, on the utility at that point.</p><p>But ultimately, if that gets approved, the effect is going to be felt by ratepayers, whether, you know, up or down.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's like the Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia. Right?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They weren't competing with anyone. There was no auction. It was just them and the regulators. And they're, "ah, costs are going up again." And the regulators are very chummy with them. They're like, "yeah, take it out of the ratepayers," but at least then the projects go forward, right? At least those projects would go and get built.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah. So that at least at the very end there, you have a pretty much guarantee that the project is going to get built in some form or fashion because generally the utilities, too, will also tie in other, a bit more contingency planning into it in that regard. They're going to kind of tend to — I would say err on the high side of costs — when they present their numbers, as opposed to when you're in a competitive bidding scenario. You want to bid low cost.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, right, right. You say now that they're talking about doing a process where bids are tied in some way to inflation rates. You say that's standard in Europe?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Well, there isn't much, actually that's standard in Europe as far as remuneration mechanisms go. It really varies market to market and country to country. But at least in the Massachusetts, the most recent tender that they released, as well as the draft materials for the upcoming Rhode Island and Connecticut tenders that are being put out as part of that tri-state consortium or tri-state regional procurement, those all allow for developers to submit — you can either submit a fixed bid like you normally would, or you can submit an indexed bid. There's different stipulations around each that are very, very in the weeds, so I won't bother going into them.</p><p>There are certain criteria you have to meet and to do if you want to do an indexed bid versus a fixed bid. But allowing for that indexation to inflation is obviously a good option, especially considering no one wants to think about it. But God forbid, like I said, inflation keeps going up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. If we've demonstrated anything in the past few years is that no one, including the alleged experts, has any friggin idea what's going to happen to it. So it does seem like indexing is good, although I have to say from a state's perspective, you want to be careful saying "we'll pay no matter what happens with inflation."</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Well, that's why I'm saying there's other stipulations around it that, like I said, it goes really into the weeds. But that's just one way that some states are trying to address the issue of "if inflation skyrockets again, none of these projects are getting built." They want to obviously avoid that. The states have already said — they have targets, they want offshore wind energy. They've put a lot of money and investments into the industry already. So having projects get scrapped is really not good on them or for them either.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, the backdrop to all this, I mean, maybe you and I probably know this, but it's just worth saying. It's just like the northeast in particular really needs some new power. It's very congested and very — this is not some luxury for them. They badly need these things. Tell us, what is the deal with ships and the Jones Act? What's going on there?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Sure. Yeah. So, the reason the Jones Act was such a big talking point for the offshore industry is that it essentially precludes foreign vessels from being able to go into U.S. waters, U.S. ports, pick up components, and bring them to the project site for the offshore wind projects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What exactly does it say? It's illegal for a foreign ship to carry from a U.S. manufacturer to a U.S. consumer, like a U.S. to U.S. trip. Is that specifically?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Essentially, yes. So, the whole point of it was to kind of prop up the U.S. shipping and shipbuilding industry years and years ago by making it so that any shipping activity that happens within U.S. waters between U.S. ports has to be done by U.S.-built and U.S.-flagged vessels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And so now what's happening is you need special ships for these things, yes?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And we don't have them?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is like a real problem.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>So, you know, we have the one vessel that Dominion's building, Charybdis, that was supposed to be done this year; unfortunately, due to supply chain troubles —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Doh!</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yep. I don't know, did you see that one coming? You know, the timeline for that has been delayed somewhat, I think, to next year, maybe even 2025. I'm not entirely sure on that one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One ship is not going to do the job, presumably.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>That's the thing. And so there was a proposition at one point that was going to say all the foreign installation vessels that we bring over have to have either a full U.S. crew or a crew flagged from the vessel's hailing port. Obviously, that's like another bunch of hurdles to jump through when we're trying to attract European vessels to come across the pond and do these projects for us. That provision never passed, thank goodness, because honestly, it probably would have choked the offshore industry a lot.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, how is this not just going to bring everything to a halt? Is there any way around this? You can't build one without a ship? We don't have the ships. It's illegal to bring a ship over from where they're building ships. What's the solution to this puzzle?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>So there's two hypothetical workarounds. The first is what was used to do Block Island Wind Farm, the Coastal Virginia Demonstration Project, which was to basically ferry things back and forth from a foreign port. So they set up in Halifax. And —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Ah!</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, obviously not really a very good solution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not economically ideal, let's say.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Especially if you're trying to build an 800-megawatt wind farm, as opposed to a 20-megawatt wind farm.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>So that was the first of the suggested workarounds. Scalability, obviously, huge concern with that one. The current workaround that's being used for the Vineyard Wind Project is to have U.S.-flagged feeder barges and a foreign installation vessel. So instead of having the installation vessel come to port and pick up components, the installation vessel just stays stationed at that project site, while the U.S.-flagged feeder barges are the ones going from project site to port to pick up these components. Then you transfer them to the installation vessel and then it gets installed that way. Obviously not ideal either, but —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Every economist in the audience right now is getting hives.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>I know, I know, I'm sure. Obviously not ideal, but when we look at Vineyard Wind specifically, actually, another piece of good news for today is that the first five turbines of that project already installed, and they're planning to flow power very soon. That project wasn't really adversely affected, timeline-wise, by using this feeder barge workaround.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They did the barge thing and it worked.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yes. It didn't seem to really impact the actual construction timeline at all. Obviously, it's going to be a bit more expensive because not only are we paying a premium on getting the foreign installation vessels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you have to get the vessels anyway. Like, you still have to get them.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah. And so obviously we have to pay a premium to incentivize European vessels coming over here because they have a ton of demand in Europe anyway. So it's going to be a bit more expensive using that workaround because you're paying a higher day rate for the installation vessel as well as the day rates for the barges. But at least it's not impacting timelines detrimentally. Or at least it hasn't in the one example we have. So it is a viable workaround is what we've learned.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Seems so crazy, though. Is there no prospect or chance of Congress just like for once doing a think, you know, they could just sit down and in five minutes pass an amendment to the Jones Act. You know, saying, "except for offshore wind." Is that not even on the table?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's not really on the table. It is funny, and a little sad, because obviously the whole point of it was to prop up the shipping and shipbuilding industries in the U.S. The U.S. shipbuilding industry has just continued to decline. But that was always the question when this issue first got brought up was whether or not they would ever pass an amendment. And it was a pretty emphatic no, because it is a policy that is rooted in nationalism and a lot of people in government still believe that it is a good policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then are we going to get a shipbuilding industry? Like, is there anything on the horizon other than the one, the one ship?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>That's the interesting piece. Right. So we have the one ship that is going to be done within the next year or so. There haven't been any contracts signed about or like to build additional Jones Act installation vessels. There have been a lot of proposals and potential contracts, expected contracts around other hybrid vessels related to maintenance and that sort of thing, which, you know, obviously equally as important, once the industry gets off the ground, you don't need the installation vessel really anymore. You need those Jones Act compliant operations and maintenance vessels. So having those is going to be really important because we know that feeder barge workaround works.</p><p>We can get these projects built even if we don't have more Jones Act installation vessels. A lot of the problem, though, has to do with just shipyards being able to build these. So there is a continuous kind of arms race going on in the offshore industry right now about bigger and better turbines.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to ask this. What are you even building the ships for? Right. It seems like a moving target.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah. So most of the fleets that would be available to the U.S. right now can install turbines anywhere between 12 and 14 gigawatts in size. But we're already hearing talk of 16, 18, 20 gigawatt platforms coming in the future. So obviously, the bigger the turbine platform, the bigger the ship is going to need to be. In theory, Charybdis is supposed to be able to install those 16-megawatt turbines. But Keppel AmFELS, the shipyard where it's being built, is one of only a handful that can handle ships that big. And the other ones are contracted for military contracts and are unlikely to want to pick up a commercial vessel contract.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>They've already got cushy navy contracts, so why would they bother building a commercial vessel of that size.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Especially in an industry that is in spectacular turmoil.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Exactly, it is kind of another chicken and egg problem, in a way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is just — what a dumb, what a dumb problem to have. It's just so dumb. So, long story short, you anticipate us hacking our way around this for the foreseeable future with barges.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, that's ridiculous. But such is life. One question that comes up a ton, especially as I live out here in Seattle, is about west coast wind. You know, all the action and all the news stories are coming out of the east coast, they're way ahead. But there's a lot of thinking, dreaming out here on the west coast about offshore wind. Where is that? Is it just a gleam in our eye? Is somebody doing something? Are there laws being passed? Are there companies bidding on anything? What's happening on the west coast?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>So we had the California auction — I think that was towards the end of last year, and that was a pretty well received, well subscribed auction. California has its super ambitious offshore wind targets. Oregon has their more realistic, I'd say, offshore wind target. So obviously, the whole industry out there is expected to be floating, just given the water depth.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Just for listeners' benefit, on the east coast, they have a nice little shelf off the coast that's relatively shallow, so you can just put concrete foundations on the floor of the ocean. West coast of the U.S., it drops off like a mile or two offshore to be very deep. So you can't put anything on the floor.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Exactly. So, you know, the option for technology would be floating wind turbines that are just anchored to that deep, deep, deep seabed. Floating technology is still kind of in the commercialization phase in Europe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there an operating commercial floating wind turbine anywhere?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>There's a few, I believe, in Denmark and maybe Germany. But overall, the technology itself is still in the commercialization phase, still trying to figure out, "okay, is this economical? How can we do this economically?" Especially just because floating, it takes so much more of everything than fixed bottom does. More labor, more steel, more concrete, literally everything, more space.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Why is that exactly?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>The technology is a bit more complicated because you need to make sure that you're ballasting everything right, so it's not going to capsize in the first heavy gale. And as far as needing more space, you are constructing these turbines port side and towing them to where they're going to be anchored. You're not constructing them at the project site.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But then you don't have the ship problem, right?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>That's true. You don't have the ship problem because we have lots of U.S. flag tugboats. But, yeah, you don't have the ship problem. But then you run into the issue of you just need exponentially more port space to be able to construct these massive turbines and then tow them out of the harbor. So it has its own specific set of constraints and problems and idiosyncrasies, if you will.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How close is that? Is there a port that could do it? Obviously, based on everything we've said to date, no one really knows, and it's very up in the air. But when might this happen?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>A lot of retrofitting would need to happen to any port to be able to construct floating offshore wind. But we have some very good, large ports on the west coast that are already hubs of wind energy imports, like Long Beach, Los Angeles, even like Vancouver, Washington, Portland, that sort of thing. You know, it's definitely doable. It's going to take time, though, and I think it's going to take a lot more time than anyone really wants it to, naturally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, you have to get the ports ready. You have to settle this technology question, I guess. You got to get bids like all that just based on how long it took on the east coast. It's hard to be super optimistic.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>And, I mean, I know California has tried very hard to implement policies that would allow for fast tracking of these projects, at least through the paperwork phase, as it were, so they can start getting more focused on the physical infrastructure needed. But I think they're also still trying to figure out how the contracting mechanisms are going to work in CAISO. And frankly, they have enough problems with their electricity grid as a whole with integrating the exceptional amount of renewables that they're targeting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, like some steady baseload offshore wind would be super helpful.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>In theory, yeah, as long as the existing wires can handle that much power. So California has its own grid struggles that it needs to address first, I think before it can really think about actually making these projects into a reality, I think they're going to be able to do it. I think it's going to take —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When is the target in law? Like, what are we saying we're aiming for?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>5 megawattts operational by 2030, and I think it was —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is California?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yes. 5 gigawatts, rather, by 2030 and 25 gigawatts by 2045.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>2030 is not very far away.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>No, it is not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you think there's going to be 5 gigawatts of operational offshore wind off of California by 2030?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>I do not think so. I think we will have one to two projects operational by then, but I don't believe we will be hitting 5 gigawatts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It just seems like on both coasts, there's just this hump you need to get over. You need to get the supply chain going and then build a few projects, and the costs come down each time you build a project. And the costs come down each time you scale up your manufacturing. And it just seems like there's this hump we need to get over, and things will get smoother once we're on the other side of it. But, man, it's a big hump.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I mean, obviously the hump got a lot bigger with all of these unforeseen circumstances, post pandemic and whatnot. But we all kind of have to remember that these are the same, or at least similar growing pains that the U.S. onshore industry went through in its infancy. Storage is seeing similar growing pains right now. Solar had their fair share, too, in the infancy of that technology. So the growing pains, I think, seem a little greater in offshore just because the projects are so much bigger and so much more expensive and require so much more —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And we have less time and we have ambitious targets and we have a lot more media attention on the whole thing.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Exactly, exactly. But as we've seen before in all the other technologies, you know, we can get these industries going in the U.S. and we can get them going in a sustainable way. So I don't really have any doubt that that's what's going to happen with offshore. We're just really in the growing pains phase right now, and it just happened to coincide with a really, really, really bad bunch of macroeconomic issues.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about the Great Lakes? Is that a real thing?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>So the Great Lakes is kind of interesting. I know that Icebreaker — Ohio regulators, I think, early last year approved the project, which was totally not expected by anyone, including the developers of the project, who said, "oh, no, we need to do this now. We got to get the wheels spinning again."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If you were building on the Great Lakes, would that be a standard platform hooked to the seabed, like just the kind they're building off the east coast? It wouldn't be any special technology or anything?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a fixed bottom. It's also state jurisdiction, obviously, instead of federal jurisdiction. So these are all — would be significantly smaller projects. I think Icebreaker, at most, it was going to be 20 something megawatts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. But they're doing it. They're moving forward.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, in theory, that one's moving forward. It's been radio silence since that approval. But Canada, Manitoba had looked into doing Great Lakes offshore wind way, way, way back in the day and then kind of tabled the whole thing because they said they needed to do more environmental reviews, since obviously the Great Lakes are a source of water for —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I can only imagine the NIMBYism that's going to take hold when this gets well.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>And that's why Manitoba has a moratorium on offshore wind development in the Great Lakes at this point, while they do more research and that sort of thing. But that moratorium has been in place for, I think, like ten years now. So that one's going to come with its own set of hurdles, especially as it pertains to the fact that those lakes are drinking water for millions of people. So you're definitely going to have, permitting wise, a significant number more hurdles. But for powering load centers like Chicago and that sort of thing, I think it would be very, very beneficial.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Very handy. But if I had to pick one that's going to take longer than anybody thinks. That would be my bet.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One other thing. What about, and this is something I wrote about, jeez, when I was back at Grist, I want to say in, like, the mid-2000s, this idea of an east coast transmission backbone out in the ocean, that you just sort of hang projects off, because obviously, if every project has to build its own connection to the shore, that's NIMBYism, that's money, that's time. And if you could just connect to this backbone, and there could just be one or a small number of big connections to the shore, then it seems like you'd open up, you'd make things a lot easier for subsequent projects. I've heard talk about that for ages.</p><p>Is that real? Is that going to happen?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>So that's definitely something that we've heard from both, like, New Jersey and New York. We're talking about doing a meshed grid system for their projects. And there are a lot of positives, let's say, about doing it that way because it's beneficial both to grid reliability, but it's also beneficial to the project, like asset owners as well, because essentially the way it works is that you have that grid interconnecting at multiple points on land and also connected to multiple projects. And so basically, if one point on land has too much power flowing to it at one time and it's congested, but another point needs more power, you can shift what point that power is getting or where that power is getting flowed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The whole east coast becomes one big shared grid.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah. And honestly, I frankly think that is a brilliant idea, and I hope that it gets built, because I think —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I loved it back in the 2000s when I wrote about it.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>I think it makes a lot of sense, because then the asset owners aren't having their generation curtailed and losing money that way. While we're not adversely affecting grid reliability by injecting excess electrons into an overly congested location.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And plus, you just cut the whole NIMBY thing out completely. It's all taking place out in the middle of the ocean where nobody's going to see it.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Well, sort of —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Except for the big connection spots.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You're reducing your NIMBY battles to a couple of key central battles.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I mean, you still have that NIMBYism about where the lines interconnect underneath, or any sort of onshore grid expansion that would be needed to flow the power, which is just super difficult to get approval for any upgrades or new transmission lines, even if they're underground these days. So that's definitely a huge piece that needs to be addressed. And honestly, that's kind of the big piece that I always harp on is the fact that our existing onshore infrastructure needs to get addressed and those projects getting fast tracked. But as far as the mesh grid goes, overall, I think that idea makes a lot of sense.</p><p>The reason that there hasn't been a ton of movement on it, I don't think is just purely because of cost.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We'll talk about planning. I mean, that's like multiple states, the federal government. That's a lot of planning.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah. And God forbid that everybody talk to each other.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know you'd have to have a lot of jurisdictions working together to get that going.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yes. So I think that's a big piece of it is like getting everybody together and getting all of the permitting and stuff, getting it done easily. I think also, again, it goes back to that question of "who's going to foot the bill?" Generally, the asset owner is the one that is paying for the lines to connect their project to land or to whatever point of interconnection. So. Okay, well, I only want to pay for the line that connects my project to one point. Who's going to pay for the interconnected interconnection?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Clearly that's something the States would have to get together and somewhat pay for.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It would pay itself back so richly over time.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>But it's the time value of the dollar. Right. The dollar later doesn't mean as much as the dollar right now. So the states, they should have a hand in funding pieces of that, probably most of it. But as it stands now, the way that it's always worked for onshore and for solar is just the developer pays for those upgrades.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We know how well that's going.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How well that system is working.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah. So there definitely needs to be a paradigm shift, I think, if we're going to get these mesh grids built. I think, again, they are a fantastic idea, but it's just the complexities there and then, yeah, where's the money going to come from?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just on the technology side, I mean, you have sort of two buckets here. You have the fixed and the floating. Floating, as you say, is still somewhat in the technology development stage. Is fixed — is there a set technology now or are we still in a place where we might see big, fundamental, new, different kinds of technologies come into play? Or do you think on the fixed side, is that like they know what they're doing now and they're just replicating?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>There's multiple different ways that fixed bottom is done and construction methods, let's say. And obviously, which ones get used it depends on the project location and all the characteristics of the seafloor and that sort of thing. I think that we'll continue to see technological developments on the fixed bottom side, but generally, as far as overall design goes, I think we're pretty well established as far as you have these handful of designs to choose from based on your project site characteristics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we'll get incremental improvements.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And some scale, some learning from scale, maybe. What about on the floating side? Because I've seen some cool, sort of like, animated demos of exciting, completely new, like the turbines that are sort of laying kind of on their side and then get blown erect by the wind when they need it, and all sorts of crazy stuff on the floating side. Where is that in terms of figuring out what we're doing?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>It's definitely more in the technology development phase. I think there's kind of the one overall design that is being kind of used as the baseline for most of these projects, but there are definitely lots of creative designs out there that are being posited. And ultimately, though, I think the one that we are currently seeing as most often used as the rendering is still proving to be what would be the most economical option.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's just like some buoys to keep it steady and cables to the seafloor?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Essentially, yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this notion of offshore wind turbines sitting out in the middle of the ocean, not connected to any grid, but instead just making hydrogen or making ammonia and serving as kind of like an ammonia gas station for ships, is that anything other than like, a dreamy idea in someone's head? Is anyone seriously doing that?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>So there are a couple of projects that are in development in Europe that are going to be directly tied to hydrogen production. So it is not entirely a pipe dream. I know that that's also something they're talking about in Canada, because Canada wants to be a net hydrogen exporter.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>So they're proposing a couple of gigawatt scale onshore projects to power those. But then Nova Scotia is also talking about interconnecting offshore projects as part of that, because Canada itself, you know, especially in the east, in the maritimes, doesn't really need any more renewable energy. They have so much hydro power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, they need to figure out how to sell it in various forms.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Right, exactly. But I could also see them putting in these big offshore projects, using them to power their electrolyzers, but also becoming a net energy exporter to New England. We already buy hydro from them why wouldn't we buy offshore wind?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or buy ammonia?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Or ammonia. Yeah, exactly. So in other countries, that's definitely materializing. The hydrogen economy in the U.S. is kind of a little bit on the slower side. But I think we could definitely see, especially once state targets have started to be met and there's no longer a push to have these solicitations and have these projects directly tied to the grid, I could definitely see some of these projects contracting for providing power to electrolyzers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's probably a ways out.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, that's definitely, you figure right now these projects are being proposed to sort of help with the decarbonization goals of all these states. So really I think we're going to just continue to see there be utility contracting and offtake until those goals are either within reach or met, and then we'll start seeing the offtake landscape changing for offshore wind as it is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We still need a lot of clean electricity —</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>— around here. Summing up, I mean, you sort of touched on this, but I guess the big question on most people's mind, and the big question on my mind, the big question on everybody's mind is just sort of which of these troubles that have all converged on this industry at once, which are temporary and which are structural? In other words, how temporary is this versus are we, in some way, to some degree, permanently downgrading our hopes for offshore wind? Or do you think this is all in some sense temporary?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>I think in some sense this is kind of all temporary. When all of these kind of macroeconomic problems kind of came together, I know that we were talking, "oh, inflation will be back to normal next year." And obviously that wasn't the case. Obviously, I think that volatile piece of it that'll eventually return to normal. But I also think that it kind of has provided us a good lens with which to look at the future for offshore wind development. And knowing that these are things that should be considered as part of the due diligence process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like interest rates particularly — probably going to stay. It's not going to go back down, I don't think, anytime soon.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yeah. So in order to adapt to what is kind of our new normal, to use a super cliché phrase, it is definitely requiring our understanding of how our own power markets work kind of be revisited and how getting these projects to fruition, how we revisit that as well. I think in some ways the renewable industry as a whole will be forever changed by all of these issues. But I don't think that it's going to be changed in such a way that is going to be irreversible or overly detrimental to the health of the industries. I think it's just going to force us to adapt, and I think ultimately we're going to be able to.</p><p>We've seen these growing pains before in all the other technologies. It stinks that those normal growing pains are converging with unexpected exterior stressors. But overall, I think really what it's shown us over and above how susceptible these projects can be to unexpected stressors like inflation or a pandemic, I think it's really shown us to temper our expectations as far as timelines go. I don't personally believe that we're going to see a ton of these projects get canceled. I think we're just going to see a lot of timelines get extended. As far as getting those projects online.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are there policy tools? One of the things — it comes up for me again and again, and is it would just be crazy of us to let high interest rates strangle the clean energy transition or substantially slow it down. Are there ways to carve out cheaper money for something like offshore wind? Or just more broadly, are there obvious policy steps that could be taken here to make things somewhat easier on this industry during its time of trouble?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>That's kind of a little out of my realm of expertise. I think, though, given the fact that a lot of this is tied to tax credits and essentially government subsidies, it's going to be really hard to sort of disentangle funding from the health of the economy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Okay. Literally, final question, which is just the reason we're talking about all this, is that the potential for offshore wind in the U.S. is big. Just give us, by way of wrapping up, really wrapping up. Just give us some sense of like, what is the prize out there that makes it worth fighting through this tangle to get there?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Renewable energy. It really is kind of that light at the end of the tunnel, right. We've seen in the other technologies, we've watched it go from not technologically viable, to technologically viable, to outright economic on its own without subsidies. Offshore wind has the potential to do that as well. And it is on just such a larger scale that it really does have the potential to green our grid in an incredibly huge way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Do we have any numbers on that? I mean, I should have told you beforehand so you could grab some, but when we talk about the potential for offshore wind in the U.S., do we have gigawatt estimations of what's out there?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>At the end of the day, we're still expecting close to 15 gigawatts operational by 2030, which is not a small number.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and that's all east coast. That's what we expect by 2030. Is all east coast or is there —</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Yep, it's all east coast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so is there another 15 waiting for us on the west coast? Like, is the potential on the west coast as big as it is on the east coast?</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Again, because of the technology, I think the implementation is going to take a lot longer. But floating farms are generally larger just because the economy of scale is there. So, having successful floating wind on the west coast, it has the potential to be a huge impact on the overall energy transition in the U.S.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Despite all these troubles, just the hope is pretty amazing. It's just like steady, around the clock, power generated way out where you don't have to see it. That just shows up in your cables. That seems worth fighting for.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, well, thank you. I'm sorry I kept you so long. I've been digging into this stuff and it's very interesting.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Don't apologize. I could talk about this for another 2 hours.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So many moving parts here, like social stuff, political, economic. It's just all in chaos right now. Really fascinating story to watch develop. So, thanks for coming on and walking us through it.</p><p><strong>Samantha Woodworth</strong></p><p>Not a problem. Thank you again for having me, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-going-on-with-offshore-wind</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:139457588</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 24 Dec 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/139457588/b339d1ccabdd3e50858944f4eba498a8.mp3" length="92351889" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4616</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/139457588/85b09eeaa31285cbd0f795b6abd52e90.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Getting local communities on board with renewable energy, Australia edition]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Jarra Hicks of the Australian nonprofit Community Power Agency talks about addressing rural resistance to clean energy infrastructure through effective community engagement.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/x6iarc3m7v74cq4rhvjs3/volts23.12.08-jarra.hicks.pdf?rlkey=dbc9kmn8vab3cl6xwr1bewz1m&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/getting-local-communities-on-board-with-renewable-energy-australia-edition"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To hit its climate targets, the US must build an enormous amount of new clean energy infrastructure. Much of that infrastructure is going to be built in rural communities, and the resistance of those communities to that infrastructure is one of the greatest threats to the clean energy transition.</p><p>I've done a couple of pods on this subject and will probably do more. Today, we're going to get something of an international perspective. </p><p>When I was in Australia, I interacted with a broad network of scholars and activists who are thinking seriously about the social mechanics of community buy-in. One of those scholars and activists is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/jarra-hicks-phd-56208729/?originalSubdomain=au">Jarra Hicks</a>, who got her PhD at the University of New South Wales with a dissertation on community-owned wind farms in rural (or as they call them in Australia, “regional”) communities. She now runs the <a target="_blank" href="https://cpagency.org.au/">Community Power Agency</a>, a nonprofit organization that is working to ensure a “faster and fairer transition to clean energy.”</p><p>Among other things, Hicks has co-authored a <a target="_blank" href="https://assets.cleanenergycouncil.org.au/documents/advocacy-initiatives/community-engagement/guide-to-benefit-sharing-options-for-renewable-energy-projects.pdf">benefit-sharing guide</a> and runs an <a target="_blank" href="https://cpagency.org.au/our-work/workshops-training/social_redev_course/">online benefit-sharing course</a>, both meant to help renewable energy developers better navigate this tricky territory.</p><p>I've been meaning catch up with Hicks ever since I returned from Australia. Last week I finally got the chance — we talked about the problem of rural resistance, the balance between community engagement and speed, and the many varieties of benefit sharing. I think it will be clear to everyone how this knowledge transfers into the US context. I enjoyed it immensely and hope you do too.</p><p>All right then. Jarra Hicks, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>Yeah, thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is a topic of great, great interest in the U.S. right now, but I thought it would be interesting to get a perspective from another country as well, especially since you seem to have devoted your life to learning about this. So I think there are going to be some lessons that are transferable, but let's just start maybe with how you came to this subject of your PhD and of your professional work.</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>Yeah, sure. So I was really lucky. I got the chance to visit a lot of communities that were doing renewable energy projects, and these were communities that were really embracing renewables. They loved renewables and they were getting great outcomes for their communities and for the planet. And I wanted to see more of that. I wanted to see more communities who were really passionate about renewables and able to get a lot of great benefits from being involved in the energy transition. And I wanted to see more communities who felt positive about this change. And if we go back, I first got involved in this in the early two thousands.</p><p>And at that time, there were a lot of communities who were pushing for more renewable energy uptake. And in Australia at that time, there really wasn't a ton of renewable energy, and probably similar in the states, communities were really wanting to get behind renewable energy as a means of taking action on climate change. And at that time, there was an absence of national policy supporting renewables. So it was about a grassroots movement to get renewables up and running. So we saw programs like communities coming together to organize a bulk purchase and install of solar panels at a community scale.</p><p>So helping reduce the barriers for people, helping them understand the technology, helping them install it in their homes. But we also saw communities coming together to establish commercial-scale projects like little two-turbine wind farms. And this was really motivated by communities wanting to take positive action on climate change.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Did that switch at some point to resistance? Because that's the opposite of the problem we have now.</p><p>Right, well, I guess, yeah. So what we're seeing now is there is emerging resistance to large scale renewable energy projects. And so it is, it's a really different landscape. But what I've learned through my years of being involved is that it's really possible for communities to not only accept renewable energy projects but to really love them and to welcome them in their communities. And it's about the way we go about these projects, and it's about the way we make opportunities for people to really be involved and to genuinely participate in that process.</p><p>What was the PhD work, what was the specific focus of your PhD?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>So, my PhD looked at small community-owned wind farms. So using commercial-scale turbines, 900-megawatt turbines, 1 MW turbines, but just one or two or three of them at a time. So these are small wind farms that are owned by the community. And those projects, they've emerged from a community desire to have their own energy or to have clean energy to take action on climate change. And these communities went through different processes to set up these enterprises so that they could have community-owned wind farms. And my PhD was really looking at what are the social outcomes that can occur in a community when they go through this process together.</p><p>And ultimately, what I was looking at is how can we do renewable energy development in a way that brings people along and that helps people to feel positive and confident and comfortable about renewable energy, and that creates a business model that delivers benefit back into communities as well. And through my career now, I've been able to learn about what is it that helps to create a positive relationship between communities and large scale renewable energy projects and to translate some of those learnings into the commercial large scale renewable energy practice of development.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Social license, as they call it. Talk a little bit about how you think about social license, just sort of in the abstract. What is social license and why is it particularly so important for renewables?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>Yeah, so it's a term that's used to describe the ongoing relationship between a project, the project proponent, and the local community or the society hosting that project. It's a dynamic relationship. It's not a once-off license that you might get for other aspects of project approval. It's not a once-off stamp, and there it is. It's dynamic and ongoing. It's constant. It's through the development process, it's through the operation phase of the project. It's lifelong. And it's about creating and maintaining a level of acceptance and approval for a project in the community that is hosting that project.</p><p>And at its strongest, it's about actually embedding that project into a place so well and so much that people can identify positively with it. Like it can even become a symbol of that place, or it can become a characteristic that people feel proud of. But when it's missing, or if there is no social license to operate, that's when we see broad-scale opposition and protests that can hamstring a project or stall it for years or even sometimes kill a project in the water.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I want to spend a little bit of time on that, on the negative side on bad process. Starting with just: Is it as big a problem in Australia as it is in the US right now? Because in the mean, I think I would rank it on top of the forces pushing back against the spread of renewables right now. I would put community opposition rank it number one. There are projects dying right and left of this stuff. Is it that big a problem in Australia? Like, is the Australian renewables community as gripped by this problem as they are over here?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>It's definitely a big concern, and I would say it's becoming a more difficult thing by the day in Australia. Part of what's going on is that communities are getting sick of the relationship with a company that is extractive. They're getting sick of that scenario where a big company comes in and takes something in a way that feels extractive, it doesn't feel fair, and it doesn't provide a benefit, a genuine, lasting benefit in that community. And it doesn't engage with people in a way that helps them to feel like they're being treated with respect. I have a three-year-old kid and if I just try telling him what's going on and being like, "Right, we're leaving the house now. Come on." He doesn't really like it. People don't really like just being told what to do. People respond much more positively if you're like, "Hey, it's going to be important for us to go and do this thing soon. And we could ride the bike there or we could drive the car there. And while we're there, we could do something fun for you as well." taking the example of my three-year-old kid. The renewable energy equivalent is about working with communities through a process that feels fair and good. So it's about doing your engagement well. It's about doing your engagement early enough so that communities genuinely have a role to play in designing a project that is going to be appropriate and well received in that place.</p><p>It's about doing engagement in a way that allows people genuinely to influence some outcomes of the project. And it's about doing your engagement in a way that is appropriate for that community too. Like, are they online literate or do they rely really on the newspaper and the radio and face-to-face engagement? it's about all those things. But it's also about delivering positive and tangible benefits. So there's really two elements. It's about it being done well in terms of the process and done well in terms of local people's experience of the outcomes from that project. In the academic research on this that's been done across the US, Europe, and Australia, the language is around procedural fairness and distributional justice.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you in Australia, as we do in the US, have an active and well-funded political force pushing against you on this? In other words, trying to sow confusion where you're trying to remove it, trying to raise fears where you're trying to calm them, that kind of thing. Is there something organized like that nationwide, or is this spontaneous community pushback?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>There is both. I would say that there's definitely organized, particularly anti-wind sentiment that has deep links politically within conservative politics and that historically has been proven to have links with the fossil fuel industry as well. And that's been the case for over a decade with regards to the anti-wind movement in Australia. So that is a really difficult political context and they are often really good at doing fear-based campaigning and also capturing the media, and it's a real concern. Part of my way of thinking and strategy for how to address that is if we can be doing our practice well as renewable energy developers, if we can be engaging people well and with respect, we've got good process and we've got good strategies for delivering benefit locally, delivering local jobs and local procurement and other benefits, and we're in those communities having good relationships and good conversations, then that's the only thing really that we can do to inoculate against that fear-based and organized campaigning.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Another thing that comes up when I hear this, and I've talked to some renewable energy developers about this and they feel caught in a dilemma, I guess you would say, which is there's this incredible need for speed and this incredible demand for what they want to do from the sort of nation at large, but this incredible pushback at the local level. So when they go fast they run into problems, right? They're told if they go too fast they run into problems. But the only alternative is going very slow. And going slow A, costs more money and B, doesn't serve that interest of speed that's built into the sort of climate targets that the US has.</p><p>So how do you wrestle with this dilemma between process and speed? When I hear more process, more engagement with the community, especially on a bespoke — as you say, every community is different, and if you really want to do this well, you're going to do research beforehand, you're going to do polls or surveys, you're going to have someone who's there on a full-time basis. I mean I can imagine how to do it very well. All of that to me sounds very slow. How do you think about the relationship of quality, I guess, and speed when it comes to community engagement?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>I have a bunch of thoughts on that. I think at a project level, if you have dedicated engagement staff working alongside your project development team and they are able to be on the ground doing the good work in the community, like there every step of the way with your project development team from when that project is first conceived and you're first doing feasibility studies, I don't think this needs to take any more time. In fact, the experience that I have seen with projects in Australia is that it can actually speed up the project development and approval process. So doing good engagement and good benefit sharing.</p><p>You know, I've spoken to projects whose experience is that it has sped up their approval process and that that's had a really substantial dollar value for them because it's made it easier and faster. And this one particular project I'm thinking of, there had been no wind projects approved in that state for two years because wind energy projects had become quite controversial and political and they got their project approved really without a hitch because they had done great engagement, good benefit sharing, and also because it was a well-placed project, it was a strategically placed project. So I think that good practice does not need to slow you down. I guess the other points that I would make, I think that a lot is to do with the practice of developers on the ground in communities.</p><p>But the scale and the pace at which we need to do this transition as whole countries and as a whole planet requires that we put some emphasis on creating the right social context for this transition so that our society and our communities really understand why it's needed, they feel comfortable with the technologies, but even more than that, they are enabled and supported to participate themselves. So what I've seen with community energy and what I really believe is that if we have policies that support people to get involved with renewables in their homes, in their businesses, in their communities, that that's going to create a social context of support that will assist us with getting large scale projects happening faster as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I meant to mention as you went past that, that these community engagement people at the renewable energy developers who I talk to also always say that they're underfunded relative to their opposition, that they go in completely unprepared for the scale and intensity of opposition, and that their bosses don't yet understand how important or significant their job is or how the kind of fight they're fighting. Do you have a sense that renewable energy developers are starting to get the significance of this and resource it appropriately?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>I do feel like that's a change that's very much underway in Australia, also globally, but there's a long way to go. I think there's a recognition now that social license and the social aspects of this energy change are really important. I think people are starting to use the right words, but I think people are still learning what that means in practice, particularly when it does need to be quite nuanced and locally appropriate in different contexts. But the things that I've seen helping to shift that practice and that sort of emphasis and that resourcing towards more community engagement in Australia, the things that are helping, I think, are industry bodies who are helping people do peer-to-peer learning, and policies that reward better practice.</p><p>So, for example, in Australia, we have a range of merit-based criteria that companies need to report against in order to be able to access renewable energy incentives or to be able to have grid access to new transmission lines. So that puts like weighting criteria around social outcomes and around community engagement practice, benefit sharing, local procurement, all of those things. Increasingly as well, in the private power purchase agreement market, we're seeing criteria around those social aspects included as well, like say a university who wants to sign a direct power purchase agreement. They want to know that the community has been happy with that project and it's delivering some good social outcomes as well as has good environmental credentials as well.</p><p>That's also like a market thing that's helping change behavior.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A little demand pull there.</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I think those things are helping. One gap that my organization has helped to address as well is like writing a bunch of guides and guidelines, working with policymakers to write those guidelines, doing research to inform those guidelines. But also we have set up a professional development course that is targeted specifically to renewable energy developers and training them up in community engagement and benefit sharing practice.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to say, what do you do if you're a developer? I mean, if you got into renewable energy to do renewable energy, this is not necessarily something you understand or have any strength in or — besides the guides are your guides the only guides you're aware of in terms of just like off the shelf help? Because I know a lot of developers are looking for help now, but it's hard to standardize, as you say, it's hard to standardize this stuff.</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, I think the industry bodies play a role there. So in Australia, it's the Clean Energy Council. They have written guides, we've written guides with them. They've also funded research that's helped us to understand better what type of practice is creating better social outcomes. And that's a piece of research that we did a few years ago. I think it is difficult because the energy industry is dominated by engineers and technical people for sure, but we need to increase the awareness that people with a community development training, community engagement training, even social work, those types of skill sets can be brought in and skilled up enough into the renewable development process that they can help on those social aspects of developing a project.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So talk just a little bit about what a good process looks like because it seems like it would be easy, when you're talking about community benefits, it seems how it would be easy for this to look like you're just coming into a community and saying, "if you let us build this, we'll buy you a bridge." Just sort of like very transactional. So what does good community engagement look like? And what are the sorts of things that you can offer a community that don't just look like you're trying to pay them off?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the key there is that it needs to be relational. So good engagement is all about forming good relationships locally. That starts with your host landowners, and it broadens out to the neighbors and then the near community and then the broader community around a project site. It's about spending as much time as possible face to face, and even if that needs to be online, but ideally in person, face to face, having direct conversations, having some of those conversations one on one, having some of them in group environments, and building that up over time, sustaining your engagement and offering a range of different ways that people can engage with the project.</p><p>So, don't just do one focus group. Think about doing a few focus groups in a few different areas. Think about having an online survey. Think about having a stall in the street where people can have casual conversations with you and fill out a physical survey. Think about pairing your online comms with a letter mail out. So one of the keys, I think, is sustaining the comms and engagement over time and through a diversity of methods, but starting that conversation with the community early enough so that the input can inform the project as it develops. Like, I understand a lot of stuff is commercial decisions, but there are going to be things that actually will be useful if you incorporate local knowledge.</p><p>And those are things like really obvious places in the landscape that are special to people or that have First Nations heritage and significance. If you can access local knowledge early on to know where those are, your project is going to be better off. You're going to avoid the costs of maybe making a mistake in terms of sighting. There's going to be micro sighting decisions that you can include local people in. Like you might reach out to local biodiversity or land care groups to help you understand the nuances of local riparian zones or connectivity among different areas of different vegetation types locally.</p><p>These are pretty niche local knowledge — things that can really help if you reach out to local groups. And I would say every single point of connection you can make with a local person and a local organization builds up a richer, stronger network of relationships between the project and the community. And that, that gives you more resilience, I think, against the challenges when they emerge. People know who to come to if they're hearing whispers about something that doesn't sound quite right. All of those things help over time. And in terms of benefit sharing, I think the key really is that it's paired with good engagement and that that conversation starts early.</p><p>So when you're first speaking to the neighbors and you're first speaking to local groups, you're saying, "Hey, we don't know exactly what it's going to look like yet, but we are going to offer a per megawatt amount to a community fund. And the amount we can offer will vary based on the commercial aspects and the generation profile of this project. But where that money goes and how it contributes to the community, we want that to be a decision we make with the community. And so we're going to be setting up a local reference group, we're going to be talking to people, and we're going to be working with you to design that benefit sharing package and then to govern it and make the decisions about where that money goes over time."</p><p>So, it's really about creating opportunities for people to be involved, to participate. Fundamentally, I think that's it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What do communities tend to ask for when they are allowed to be involved? Are there patterns? Are there predictable things that work?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>A lot of projects end up setting up some kind of grant fund, like an annual grant fund, because it is really flexible and it can be really responsive to whatever it is that the community is wanting to do, or whatever the need is at the time. But I've also seen really great programs like allocating a portion of the benefit fund into a revolving loan program that can support low-income households to install solar panels or solar hot water or heat pumps, and that money is brought back and then recycled over time and can go on to help the next household. I've also seen programs where a portion is allocated to an annual grant fund and a portion is allocated to a sort of longer-term legacy fund where it might go into an interest-earning account for a few years, and then after five or so years, it's got a bigger chunk of money to do a bigger strategic project in the community, and to go out and seek matching funding from state government or whatever it is, so that the community can achieve something that is a bigger, more strategic need, that has a longer-lasting impact. So I think really it's about being able to work with a community to identify what are the things that are going to have a significant impact on the challenges that are being faced by that community, that are unique to that place, that will really help to create a step change.</p><p>You know, for a lot of small regional communities renewable energy is a really unique opportunity that comes once in multiple generations. And if we can use this opportunity well, we can deliver some really awesome outcomes. And some of the great examples I've seen are renewable energy developers partnering with domestic violence organizations to be able to repurpose worker accommodation into temporary accommodation for people experiencing domestic violence. So after the project has been built, that accommodation is then able to be gifted or co-owned by a local service and a local government to be able to have an ongoing positive benefit in a community.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And these are all just things that developers are coming up with. Communities —</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>No, well, in conversation with the community. It takes being on the ground, having conversations, going through a process that is basically like a community development process or a community planning process, thinking about having local conversations with people, thinking about what are the real needs here and what could we do and who could we work with to make a great impact.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This also brings me to something that I was glad to see that you are working on and writing about, which is it seems there are going to be places where these projects are concentrated and there's going to be a bunch of projects in particular regions. And it just seems like developers going one by one by one by one by one to each of these little communities and working out bespoke deals — it seems like you could do something more regional, more regional in impact, something a little bit more with a little bit more structure and something that could pool the benefits of multiple projects and maybe do bigger things for public benefit, things that you couldn't do with the revenue from a single project. And you've been writing a little bit about that.</p><p>So just describe what regional benefit sharing, what that means.</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>Sure. So it's exactly that. It's in areas where there's going to be a high density of projects: How can we coordinate benefits, but how can we also coordinate other things that are going to have a significant impact but also a significant possible positive benefit for communities like coordinating housing, coordinating jobs and training, coordinating employment opportunities and local procurement opportunities? But in terms of the benefits, it's about saying, "yeah, how can we work together?" first of all, to administer our programs so that we don't overwhelm the community and confuse everyone and create engagement fatigue.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, you can imagine communities like, "What did you get? Well, what did you get?" And just all the rumors going back and forth. There's just a lot of process happening over and over and over again.</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>Yeah, and totally. And if there's ten different grant funds all in the same area, how do you remember which one are we applying for now? And all the time that goes into those applications? So there's a way of streamlining the administration of the benefit sharing and streamlining the governance as well. So if you've got a local committee involved in helping to make the decisions about what gets funded, being able to have one committee that might oversee a number of different grant programs that are all in the same geographic region, that makes a ton of sense, being able to have some common resourcing of the administration.</p><p>So rather than having one staff person in every company, you pool that and you do it together. That makes sense. It makes it easier for the community, probably. It also makes it less cost for the company. But then there's also a whole other level is like, how do we pool some of that funding at a regional scale to do something strategic, bigger, with more lasting impact on the real issues? So with benefit sharing, there needs to be layers, right? Benefit sharing is partly about creating a positive relationship and an experience that is of fairness from a project.</p><p>And so that does need to relate to the community that is most immediately affected by that project. So you need to make sure that your benefits are experienced by the neighbors and by the immediate community who are hosting the project. If it was all going to the region, that probably wouldn't feel fair for the people who are literally the ones who see it every day. So, a portion of the benefit sharing from any project needs to stay in that most immediate community. But I think a portion of the benefit sharing budget, there's an opportunity to pool it with other projects within that region so that you can have that bigger fund and you can do those more strategic projects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But who's doing that? Is that developers coordinating with one another? Because that seems — I don't know how well that's going to work. Is this like a nonprofit entity? Is this a government, a regional governmental thing? How would you structure this so that it feels fair to all the individual communities involved and to all the individual developers involved?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>I think that's a great question, and to my knowledge, we're still very much figuring that out the world over. I'm not aware of examples of where this has actually been done yet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>I am aware of foundations, like existing foundations that are providing some administrative and governance services to developers around their benefit sharing programs. But I'm not aware of anybody who is regionally coordinating a bunch of projects to do something more strategic. And that's the work that we are thinking through right now. And we're basically out there seeking partnerships with other people who want to figure that out with us. But I imagine we're going to see a bunch of different models. And I think this is partly the role of the state. When we talk about needing to coordinate renewable energy development so that we can keep the lights on and meet our climate targets and our net zero emissions targets, there is a role for the state to coordinate that process, and this is part of that coordination that needs to happen.</p><p>It is not just a technical change. It's also a social process. We need the state. In Australia, this is definitely the case. I can understand why it's happened, but we've been mostly focused on the technical and the market aspects of setting up this renewable energy transition, rather than resourcing and trying to coordinate or putting as much emphasis onto the social aspects. Within that, I include the impacts on housing, the need for additional training and jobs, and workforce development. There are just so many layers to it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is what I always come back to as I think about these things: I can imagine things developers can do individually and in individual communities, and even some regional sharing if they can figure out models to do it. But I just keep coming back to the role of the state. It would just be so much easier, I mean, if there were a sort of prescribed minimum of here's how much you have to share with the community you're located in, or something like that. Just some baselines, just so people aren't tempted to cheat, because every developer now has to be thinking like, how can I get around this?</p><p>You need everyone's cooperation to sort of lift the boat. And it would just be easier if there were some force of law behind it, don't you think?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>Yeah. So there are definitely some really strong guidelines that have emerged in Australia now and some really strong norms that are emerging, and some of that is through state governments issuing guidelines, and some of it is through the merit-based criteria for being able to access transmission lines or access renewable energy incentives. Part of it also is just like industry norms that are emerging and communities also knowing about those and holding developers to account on them. The norms that are emerging in Australia are like a per megawatt contribution that is standard for a wind farm, and per megawatt contribution that's standard for a solar farm.</p><p>It's emerging now like it was still figuring it out, but emerging in terms of transmission and batteries as well. I think it's great that there's a norm around that dollar figure. It's also great that it isn't regulated, that it has to be spent in certain ways, because I'm a strong believer in the need for that to be a conversation that is led by the local community and needs to be adaptable to the local context.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Has anybody figured out what I have always thought just instinctively would be the best tool for social license: Which is, once you've been doing this a while and you have some happy communities who have your renewable energy in them and are benefiting from it and are happy that they did it. Why don't you get them to talk to the next community? Do you know what I mean? Like all of this, so much of this, is outsiders coming in. But if I'm in a regional community and someone else from a nearby regional community is talking to me, it seems like you just cut through so many layers of skepticism and doubt with that.</p><p>Is that a big piece of the puzzle?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>I think it totally is. I think people are always more receptive to a message when they hear it from someone that they trust and someone they can relate to. That has been a tactic that's been used in Australia, like taking people on bus trips to go and visit an existing wind or solar farm and talk to the farmer who owns that land, talk to them about their experience of that project. There's also nothing better than actually experiencing something for yourself. If you've heard a bunch of really quite crazy claims about what a wind turbine can do, if you're able just to go and experience it yourself, you can probably make up your own mind about whether or not those things are true or not.</p><p>But I also think this points to the really important role for advocacy organizations and not-for-profit organizations. Our organization is a not-for-profit that works in this space. And there are a number of other great not-for-profits that work across Australia. It's just important to remember that we need to resource those types of organizations who do help to fill the gaps and who do help to do that kind of positive advocacy. I think there's an onus on philanthropy and governments and developers all to support those kinds of organizations and their role within this ecosystem that is going to help us achieve the transition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the things that emerges from reading your discussion papers especially, is if you want to do this right, such that you get both a positive community experience and you get scale and speed: You need a bunch of different groups of people working together who haven't always necessarily including like local governments, nonprofits, developers, maybe whatever. These possible regional organizations are just a lot of different jurisdictions and levels of things to work together. Do you feel like from the 30,000-foot perspective, things are moving in the right direction in Australia? Are people coming together around a model that is actually going to scale and go quickly?</p><p>Do you feel optimistic about that?</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>I feel quite mixed about it. I think there's some really great stuff happening and I think there's some good examples of that starting to happen more and more, but there's also some really concerning trends. And part of me feels like it's probably going to get a little bit more messy before we really figure it out. I think that's often the way that change happens, and maybe to some extent that's okay. But I do think I am seeing more collaborations and more partnerships and more conversation between all those different parties trying to figure it out. For me, what I think would really help to unlock the pace and the fairness and the speed of our transition to clean energy is if we really unlock the ability for everybody to play their role in it.</p><p>In Australia, we've had households keen to get behind solar for a really long time. We've now got 3.3 million solar roofs in our country that account for gigawatts of generation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and that's just an incredible amount of personal experience with solar power too, just at a base level.</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>Yeah, and we've got a bunch of community energy projects as well, and we've got even more that want to get up and running, but there haven't been consistent efforts to enable and support that scale of action. I think one of the big missing pieces for me in this is really thinking about how we can enable small and medium scale projects to tap into the distribution network. We know we need massive transmission upgrades, but they are pretty hard and they take a long time and they're expensive. How can we optimize the distribution network, and how can we support communities to do mid-scale projects in that distribution network as part of our big picture thinking towards this?</p><p>Because that's going to get more people involved, more people active and understanding more people behind the transition. I heard a story just yesterday of a guy who's a dairy farmer in an area where it's called a renewable energy zone, which is the state government's way of coordinating a high density of large scale projects and planning new transmission lines into a region so that it can accommodate lots of large scale projects. So while the government and industry are planning big transmission lines and big projects and asking that local community to host those projects, this local dairy farmer is still on a really weak part of the distribution network. So much so that he cannot rely on the grid to supply his electricity, to be able to milk his cows.</p><p>So, he has two diesel generators to be able to meet that need. I think these are the types of discrepancies we need to address because they lead to major community frustration. Instead, we need to be finding ways to enable people to participate. We should not be in a situation where somebody is being asked to host large-scale generation without also themselves being enabled to get involved with the renewable energy transformation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, well said. Thank you so much for coming on and sharing your experience. And thank you also, I know I mentioned this up at the top, but I'll just mention it again that you and your organization have written a guide to social license for developers and others. Just people to think through how it works and some steps in how to do it well and some best practices and some examples which I think would be great if someone could do that over here too. But I think it would be valuable for everyone to look at it.</p><p>So thank you for doing that as well. And thank you for taking the time.</p><p><strong>Jarra Hicks</strong></p><p>Yeah, no worries at all. I'll just mention as well that I mentioned that socially responsible renewable energy professional development course that we run. It's an online course and we're in the process of redeveloping it. So, it could be an online, self-paced course that could be accessible for people no matter where they are in the world. So you can go onto our website, sign up for our updates if you're interested in that course. I'm sure a lot of that content would be relevant no matter where you are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/getting-local-communities-on-board</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:139224663</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 15 Dec 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/139224663/711c92875d7af2913cd52308b3a2c9f9.mp3" length="50767073" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2536</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/139224663/5a771e4caa43d300b1798f0fa92fd93f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Farm Bill is the most important climate bill this Congress will pass]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Peter Lehner, head of the food and farming sustainability program at Earthjustice, gives his expert perspective on the upcoming Farm Bill and its potential impact on agricultural decarbonization in the US.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/2r4zi3o2f6b48mzsg8dvy/volts23.12.06-peter.lehner.pdf?rlkey=u9nawuh6rj1t0x31l8eg0wyzq&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/the-farm-bill-is-the-most-important-climate-bill-this-congress-will-pass"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As longtime subscribers know — indeed, as the name makes plain — Volts is primarily focused on the energy side the climate fight. I haven't paid much attention to agriculture over the years. I understand that agriculture is a huge piece of the puzzle, both for decarbonization and for sustainability more generally. It's just not really been my jam.</p><p>However! The Farm Bill — which requires reauthorization every five years — is likely to pass in coming months, and it is arguably the most important climate bill Congress will address this session.</p><p>To talk me through the agriculture/climate nexus and discuss opportunities in the upcoming Farm Bill, I contacted Peter Lehner. He is the head of Earthjustice’s food and farming sustainability program, and the author of <a target="_blank" href="https://earthjustice.org/from-the-experts/2022-january/farming-for-our-future-climate-change-agriculture"><em>Farming for Our Future: The Science, Law, and Policy of Climate-Neutral Agriculture</em></a>.</p><p>We talked about how US agriculture has evaded environmental laws and become the source of 30 percent of US greenhouse gas emissions, ways that the upcoming Farm Bill can be tweaked to better fight climate change, and what's next for agriculture decarbonization.</p><p>Peter Lehner of Earthjustice, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming on.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Great to be here, Dave.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As you may know, if you have read my work over the years or followed me at all, I'm pretty heavily, deeply into the energy world as the source of most of my time and attention in the climate fight. I know on some level, partially because I've been lectured by people numerous times over the years, that agriculture is a big piece of the puzzle — and land use and oceans, which are other things that I also don't spend much time on. And I fully acknowledge that they're important, they're just not my personal passion. However, I've felt vaguely guilty about that for years.</p><p>And I know the Farm Bill is coming up, which is a significant marker, I think, possibly the source of some significant action. We'll discuss that in a while. But at the very least a good excuse, I think, for me to check in and just sort of see like, what's the state of climate and agriculture, you know, action stuff, what's going on there? So, that's what you're here for, Peter, because you are the expert author of a book on the subject, numerous podcasts, been studying this for a long time. So before we get into the Farm Bill, just maybe — I know that the subject of the ties between agriculture and climate and carbon and methane greenhouse gases is very complicated.</p><p>You've written entire books on the subject. But I wonder, for people like me who have had their nose mostly in the energy world, if you could just summarize relatively quickly what are the big kind of buckets where agriculture overlaps with carbon and decarbonization and climate generally? What are the big areas of concern that people should have their eyes on?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Sure, you know, I should say, Dave, that I came to this really the same as you. I'd been working on energy issues for a very long time. For three decades, I've sued many power plants. I've worked on many different environmental laws dealing with regulation of the power sector. And what happened is, over time, doing general environmental law for New York State, for NRDC, for Earthjustice where I am now, I kept seeing the impact of agriculture as really being enormous and impeding our ability to achieve our environmental and health goals unless it was addressed. So that's why I'm focusing on this now.</p><p>But like you, I think most environmentalists focus much more on the industrial sector, the power sector, the transportation sector. And part of what I've come to realize is that we all should pay a lot more attention to the agriculture sector. And we'll talk about the Farm Bill coming up. But really the Farm Bill is the biggest environmental law Congress will address that most people have never heard of. Now why is that? So, I'll tell you quickly. First, agriculture uses most of our land. It uses about two thirds of the contiguous U.S.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can I pause you there?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That took me two or three seconds to catch up with that before my mind blew. Two thirds of the land of the contiguous United States is devoted to agriculture?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>62%, yeah. And that's about using rounder numbers, about 400 million acres of cropland. About half of that is used to grow food that people eat, and about half of that is growing food that animals eat. And close to 800 million acres of grazing land, some of that is federal land, some of that is state land. A lot of that is private land. But all told, it's over a billion acres of land, almost all in the lower 48 is used for agriculture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is wild.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>So think about it. If you fly anywhere and look out the window, what do you see? You really see agriculture, whether it be the irrigation circles or just the fields or whatever. That's what has transformed our landscape. And part of the result of that, of course, is agriculture is really the biggest driver of biodiversity loss. So much of biodiversity loss is habitat loss. And look, I've spent decades working on issues like grizzly bears and wolves. But what those issues are at bottom is agriculture because we are grazing in grizzly and wolf territory. And so much of habitat loss, whether it be land or polluted waters, is driving other biodiversity loss.</p><p>So in addition to that, what I was going to mention is the environmental laws that you're probably familiar with, Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act have actually done a pretty good job of addressing air and water pollution from industrial sources, from the energy sector. But they really have not done a very good job addressing air and water pollution from agriculture, whether it be these hundreds of millions of acres of row crops. Or these hundreds of million acres of grazing. Or these more industrial scale facilities where thousands or tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of animals are crammed together into buildings — those are called concentrated animal feeding operations. Those are now the largest source of water pollution in the country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Did the laws pass over them or just inadequately address them?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>A little bit of both. What happened was in 1972, say, when the Clean Water Act was passed, Congress really wasn't thinking that much about agriculture. But also agriculture has changed tremendously since then. It has become so much more industrial. So that a small number of facilities that are gargantuan produce, for example, almost all of our meat, but those didn't exist in 1970. And as you probably know, in the Clean Water Act, it did a good job dealing with pollution coming out of a pipe. But pollution, say, coming off of city streets, that's called non-point source pollution.</p><p>The regulation was much less strong, and they relied more on grants and education and sort of nudges, as we say. And much of agriculture — 400 million acres of cropland, 800 million acres of grazing land — that's not, by and large, water pollution coming out of a pipe. So essentially, the Clean Water Act doesn't cover it. And similarly, the Clean Air Act does a great job of addressing stuff coming out of smokestacks. And while there's some, like from these concentrated animal feeding operations, there's very concentrated air pollution coming out of the vents. But out of all of those acres of cropland and grazing land, those are called area sources under the Clean Air Act and are addressed much, much less.</p><p>But still, air pollution from agriculture, I bet this would surprise most of your readers, kills about 17,000 people a year. It's a major source of air pollution in this country.</p><p>And that is mostly methane or other criteria pollutants?</p><p>Methane is actually one of the ways agriculture drives climate change. It's actually other pollutants, largely ammonia and hydrogen sulfide, which come from overfertilization and animal waste. And ammonia is a major precursor to the fine particulate matter that gets into our lungs and causes disease and kills us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which we're finding out, as I've covered on the pod, is worse. You known, every time a new round of science comes out, we find out it's worse than we thought.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Yeah. And in a place like, say, the San Joaquin Valley in central California, which has some of the worst air quality in the country, almost all of that PM, that fine particulate matter, is driven by animal agriculture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I'm also going to guess maybe you're going to get to this, but that when you take wild land and make it into agricultural land, the land subsequently captures and holds less carbon.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Much less carbon. So one of the reasons why I think people don't realize that agriculture drives about as much climate change as our transportation sector is — and think about that for a minute, it drives as much climate change as our transportation sector — and yet most of the time there are conversations about climate change and conversations about agriculture. But until recently, those have been two separate conversations. Say in 2018, when we were working on the Farm Bill then, there was virtually no discussion of climate change in the 2018 Farm Bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'll admit I don't think of it that way in the mental category in my head when I'm thinking about major sources.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, why is that? I think that's because when we think about climate change, most people think about climate change, you think about burning fossil fuels and releasing carbon dioxide.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>And that's climate change for most people. Agriculture's contribution to climate change has some of that. Agriculture uses actually a fair amount of energy for, say, irrigation and tractors and of course, food processing later on down the road. But most of agriculture's contribution to climate change is from other sources.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Which is to say that even if we clean up energy sources, which everybody is working on, and even if the energy inputs to agriculture, you drive the tractors with whatever, electric tractors or electric irrigators, whatever, even if it's zero carbon energy fueling agriculture, that still leaves most of agriculture's contribution to climate change untouched.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Exactly, that's true. And even more frightening, even if we do clean up our energy system and our industrial system to a no carbon situation where we hope to of course, that's where we're putting so much effort into, we will still almost certainly face catastrophic climate change because of the contribution of agriculture alone. In other words, if we do everything else perfectly and we don't change our agriculture system and don't address agriculture's contribution to climate change, we are blowing past 1.5 degrees centigrade, blowing past two degrees.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you think just taking the U.S.: The U.S. can't meet its stated Paris climate targets without reforming agriculture?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>That's basically correct. So let me explain a minute why this is the case. Agriculture's contribution to climate change: First, think about methane, which you've mentioned most people think about methane, oil and gas, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Actually, cows and animal agriculture emit more methane in the U.S. and around the world than the oil and gas sector. Most of that methane is called enteric methane. It's essentially belching and exhaling of cows. And their stomachs are different than ours. That's why they can eat grass in a way that you and I can't. But every time they breathe out, they're breathing out a lot of methane. So that is an enormous source of methane, which I'm sure your listeners know is more than 80 times more potent a greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide over 20 years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Nobody thought they're innovating a better cow, are they? That seems like fewer cows is the only solution to that. I mean, maybe we're going to touch on solutions later so maybe we should save this. But just like that doesn't seem like a technologically solvable problem. You just need fewer cows.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Most studies have shown that fewer cows, and therefore the consequent part of that is shifting diets to less beef-heavy is one of the fastest, most effective and cost-effective climate strategies and really has to be a part of any strategy. There are things you can do. Breeding has reduced the methane emissions per pound of beef. The way you raise the cows can make a difference. The way you graze them can make a difference. How long they live before they're slaughtered can make a difference. There is some research into feed additives that you'd feed cows, and that changes the bacteria in their gut to produce a little less methane.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>And all of these are important. There's not one solution. But I think what is unfortunate is sometimes it's viewed by industry as only a technical solution. And the reality is it has to be both technical and essentially demand side. So, the other way methane is produced is manure. There's all those animals. We've got about 50 times more waste produced by animals than by humans in the United States.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>50 times more?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Yeah. Those animals produce a lot of waste. One dairy cow, for example, can produce about as much waste as 200 people.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Jesus Christ.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>So all that waste, most of it sits in lagoons or essentially is handled in such a way that it creates a lot of methane. So that's another way that methane is produced and agriculture contributes to climate change.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When people talk about lagoons, I just want to clarify here, they just take all the manure and slough it into a giant pond of manure where it then sits. Is that what people are talking about when they talk about lagoons? There's not any fancy technical. It's just a big pool full of crap.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>That's basically correct. And that's the dominant way in both pig farms and dairy farms, we handle our waste. To get technical, when you put the manure into a big pit like this, because it's wet, there's water, it's transported by water, it is anaerobic. That means it doesn't have oxygen. So as it decomposes, it releases methane. And that is a really significant source of methane all around the country and contributes both locally, but also obviously, majorly to climate change. And I should say rice, also, rice production, also, if you think about it again, you have the image of a rice patty, it's flooded. So you have organic matter decomposing in an anaerobic, without oxygen, system releasing methane. But by far, most methane is from cow belching.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's the big source.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Bigger than manure.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Bigger than manure. Although manure is also very big, I don't want to minimize that. And the two together, again, are more than the oil and gas sector.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is wild. There's so much attention going to oil and gas methane right now, EPA rules coming, there's international treaties being signed, like on and on.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Yep. And there should be. We obviously need to address those sources of methane. I think that what is often forgotten is we also have to address these other sources of methane. So the other reason it gets confusing is the other two ways agriculture contributes to climate change are also very different than burning fossil fuels. The second is that almost all of that cropland uses a lot of fertilizer. By and large, in the U.S. and around the world, people put on a lot more fertilizer than the plants take up, and a lot of nitrogen is added to the ground that is not absorbed by the plant.</p><p>So where does that nitrogen go? Some of it runs off into the water, and then it causes eutrophication, algae outbreaks. It causes the dead zone in the Gulf of Mexico. It seeps into groundwater: You have heard of blue baby syndrome, which is too much nitrate in the groundwater. But some of it also goes into the air. And some of it goes into the air as NOx, which is sort of a local smog causing pollution. And some of it goes into the air as nitrous oxide. N2O nitrous oxide, which is about 300 times more potent than carbon dioxide as a greenhouse gas and also one of the major drivers of ozone depletion, stratospheric ozone depletion.</p><p>So this is a major source of climate change, nitrous oxide pollution alone, virtually all of which comes from agriculture, virtually all of which is this overfertilization and some coming from these manure pits that we talked about before. That alone is about 5% or six percent of U.S. greenhouse gases.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, wow.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>So again, it's not burning fossil fuels, but a major contribution to climate change. And then the last way agriculture contributes to climate change is what you alluded to earlier. When you convert land, say, native grasslands or forest in Brazil or forest in the U.S. to cropland, you take this carbon that is in those healthy soils or in the grass or in the trees, and you release it, and that goes into the atmosphere as carbon dioxide. So you get two things: One is you get this slug of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere when you convert land, this conversion of land from grassland to forest.</p><p>But then the second part, which EPA is only beginning to really pay attention to, is what you can think of as the lost sequestration capacity. Healthy land, grassland, forest, land is this very dynamic, wonderful system that is sequestering carbon and storing carbon. And by contrast, cropland is really — the way we treat it often is largely biologically dead. It has very little carbon life in it. And that's why we have to put so many fertilizers in it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that just because of monocrops? Is that just an inevitable result of monocrops?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>I'm not sure it's absolutely inevitable. It's in large part because of the way we grow in these sort of chemical dependent monocultures, for sure. So you have both this slug of carbon when you convert land. But, hey, look, a lot of our cropland in the U.S. was converted 100 years ago. Every year, that is not sequestering nearly as much as it could. So you were losing the sequestration capacity. That 800 million acres of grazing land — think about that, it's about 40% of the contiguous U.S. And it has been overgrazed for decades. There are reports of John Wesley Powell going out west and saying, "Whoa!"</p><p>He was sent out to look after exploring some more remote areas. But everywhere he saw cattle, he said the land is getting degraded. In 1934, Congress tried to address overgrazing and erosion and soil degradation. And then 1976, they tried to do it again, so far, really not to much avail, with the result that you have hundreds of millions of acres that aren't sequestering the carbon they could.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this came up in our Biofuels discussion a few weeks ago, too. A lot of new thinking about biofuels is taking that sort of counterfactual sequestration into account.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Exactly. And you did a great podcast with my colleague Dan Lashof, and we're working together on biofuels. That was a great podcast you did there. So if you add all of this up, what you see is that agriculture has this enormous contribution to climate change, but it's so different than the way most people think about climate change. And what happens also is EPA sort of thinks about it differently. So, first of all, their classic greenhouse gas inventory puts, say, on farm energy in a different category. They don't put that in agriculture. They put that in energy, or they put that in the manufacturer fertilizer, which itself is enormously energy intensive and releases a lot of CO2.</p><p>That's in a different chapter. Land use conversion, that carbon that I was telling you about, they put that in a different chapter, and they don't even think about, in their greenhouse gas inventory about the lost sequestration capacity, this opportunity cost. So if you just look at the inventory, EPA says that agriculture contributes about 11% of U.S. greenhouse gases. But if you actually think of agriculture as a sector all, what really goes into agriculture, and you include the land use impacts, which, as I said, are usually left out, that's where you get that agriculture is basically in a par with transportation and is about a quarter drives about a quarter of climate change.</p><p>And then, if you include the rest of the food system, the processing, et cetera.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Food waste.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>And food waste, of course, rotting in landfills, you've got about a third or more of climate change is driven by our food system. And that's why unless we change our food system, we're not going to address climate change adequately.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wild, okay. I want to get to the Farm Bill, but one final question, which is just my — and again, this is sort of my impression from the outside over the year — is that the agriculture industry has a level of power and influence in political circles that I think most people don't appreciate. That sort of makes the oil and gas sector look like patty cakes. It's amazing. I will never forget that Oprah — I don't know if other listeners are old enough to remember this — but Oprah said on her show once, basically, "You know, beef's bad, it's not very healthy and it destroys the environment."</p><p>And got taken to task by the agriculture industry and they basically took her down and forced her to publicly apologize. And if you can take Oprah down, you've got muscle.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it is certainly true. There's no question that the conventional or industrial agriculture lobby is very powerful in Congress. I would point out that there's a lot of great farmers who are trying to do things right and are working to produce food, healthy food, in a sustainable way. And we work with groups like the National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition, which is itself a coalition of a lot of these groups, I wish they had the political power that conventional AG does because they do great stuff and they are really examples of what we want to be doing, how we can produce food in a way that doesn't pollute our air and water and that rebuilds soil health.</p><p>But unfortunately, the political power is with the agrochemical industries, which are very dominant. They say the meat processing companies, four companies control 85% of the beef market. These are enormously politically powerful.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the Farm Bill then, before we get into the details of what the Farm Bill might do or what you want it to do, let's just talk about the Farm Bill as such. This is something that they pass every year or a set number of years because it just like comes up periodically. Is this something they have to do every session?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>No. So, the Farm Bill is so important, and for a long time, really, when it comes up, it's really only the farm community that pays attention to it. And I think what I hope you've heard is that everybody should pay attention to it. And that's why the Farm Bill is far more important than people realize. For all of us who eat, for all of us who breathe, for all of us who drink, the Farm Bill has an enormous impact. So what is the Farm Bill? The Farm Bill was first passed actually in the Depression in 1933. There was the Depression and hunger.</p><p>There was the Dust Bowl, there was the crisis on farms. And so Congress stepped in. And I can give you a long history and I won't. But basically Congress did two things. One, they tried to address the hunger and they also tried to restrict supply, pay farmers not to produce, to keep prices high. And sometimes also buy some surplus to give that to the hungry also, but as a way of keeping the surplus off the market and keeping prices high.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's why the Farm Bill has this weird structure where it has food subsidies for the poor in it, which I think, on the surface, seems like just an odd artifact.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it's also essentially a political marriage. So, the Farm Bill, on one hand, provides nutrition assistance, now called SNAP, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance, formerly Food SNAP, that helps feed about 45 million Americans every year, and that right now provides about $75-80 billion a year. It also then provides about $20 billion a year in farm subsidies. And ever since it was passed in 1933, it was amended a few times. But basically, it has to get reenacted, reauthorized every five years. And if it doesn't, these programs on which so many people depend basically stop. They won't continue without being reauthorized.</p><p>So the last Farm Bill that was fully enacted was in 2018, and so it expired September 30, 2023. There was still a little extra money hanging around, so we had a couple of months. But then what Congress just did a couple of weeks ago in the continuing resolution that funded the government up to January 19, they also agreed to extend the Farm Bill until September 30, 2024.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Such a rational —</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. We're covered right now. But it ends up being enormously important because it provides this nutrition assistance for, as I said, 45 million Americans. Really important. And it also has a series of different programs that provide enormous subsidies to farmers. And those subsidies, when you put them together, have an enormous impact on what is grown, where it's grown, how it's grown, and all of that for the reasons I was just explaining about how agriculture affects our environment, and climate change has an enormous impact on the environment. And that's why the Farm Bill is actually the most important environmental law Congress is going to address in the next couple of years.</p><p>And unlike our other environmental laws that haven't been amended for decades, this one is amended every five years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm so interested in the SNAP thing. I mean, it's a big safety net program, correct? That's been around since 1933, I am assuming, in fact, I know to be the case that conservatives hate social safety programs generally, and I bet they hate SNAP. So what is the magic sauce that has allowed this extremely large subsidy for poor people to survive what I can only assume are repeated conservative attempts to weaken or get rid of it? Is there some reason it has stayed in? How has it survived, I guess, is what I'm asking.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Look, I'm not the super political expert here, but what people have said who know this and have worked with this is, you essentially have a marriage. You have the Democrats that support the Nutrition Assistance Program, and by and large, Republicans support the farmer subsidies and neither has enough support to get either of those through separately. And in some ways there's something good there, which is that the Farm Bill has always been pretty bipartisan. And for example, right now Senator Stabenow, who is the Democratic Chair of the Senate AG Committee, and Senator Boozman who's the Republican ranking member of the Senate AG Committee, are really trying to work together because history is that this Farm Bill doesn't get passed unless it's bipartisan.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Definitionally it will have to be this time, right?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's going to have to go through a Republican House and a Democratic Senate. I mean, is it viewed is it widely accepted as sort of must pass, like they are going to figure something out or is there any chance at all that it could just lapse?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>I don't think there's really any chance it would just lapse because that would largely end these programs on which so many Americans, both the Americans who need it for food — and by the way, it's often thought of as though those are urban Americans and rural Americans are the farmers. That's not the case. There are people all around the country and in many places rural communities at even higher rates that depend on SNAP assistance, on food assistance. So this is really important to everybody. And of course producing food is important. So the farm safety net is important.</p><p>What could happen is, I suppose, even though I think both the House and the Senate agriculture leaders are saying they're going to work very hard to get a new Farm Bill out in the spring of 2024, if that doesn't happen, potentially they could just extend it for another year the way they just did.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That does seem like the way we do things.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Right. It's not ideal, but I don't think, and people who know this area better than I do, I don't think the chances of the law just ending completely is really in the cards.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So they're going to figure something out, so they're going to pass something. So this is a chance to get some good things through.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Right. And there's some good things in. And I should say one of the important elements here is the Inflation Reduction Act. And you've probably talked about that a lot and mostly focused on the many billions of dollars that went to clean energy programs. But the Inflation Reduction Act also put $20 billion into essentially Farm Bill programs, preexisting Farm Bill programs, which pay farmers to implement conservation measures. And those have always been oversubscribed, which means more farmers apply for this assistance than can get it. So the Inflation Reduction Act put an extra close to $20 billion over four years into these conservation programs, but with a twist, which we think is terrific.</p><p>Most of these conservation programs are for a wide range of resource concerns: water quality, air quality, habitat, and others. In the Inflation Reduction Act these have to be conservation practices focused on reducing net greenhouse gases.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>So this was the first time — in the Inflation Reduction Act — that Congress really, in any way, really linked agriculture and climate change and said, "Here's $20 extra billion, but you got to spend it on climate change."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So AG did not get completely overlooked then, in this last session, in this last round, because yeah, I hadn't really paid attention to that. I had kind of thought it was like the redheaded stepchild that got passed over. So there is $20 billion is not pocket change either.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>No, it's a lot of money. As I said, right now, the core Farm Bill gives farmers about $20 billion in subsidies every year. But most of those subsidies are not for conservation programs. A lot of that is for what are called either commodity support, where essentially a farmer gets paid, based on what he grew in the past, if the market price or his revenue goes below a certain price. So it's essentially a price guarantee called the reference price.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's an extremely Soviet sector of our economy.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it's largely almost three-quarters of that goes to corn and soybean, which of course, is largely used either for animal feed or for ethanol. And then we also have crop insurance, which, again, that makes a lot of sense. We all want to eat. We need food security, there should be crop insurance. In this case, the premiums are very heavily subsidized by the taxpayer. Over 60% subsidized. And again, over about three-quarters of crop insurance went to corn, soy, wheat and cotton, those four big crops. And what happens, the environmental impact of that is it encourages farmers to essentially plant in riskier areas, which tend to be the more ecologically sensitive areas, because if it works out, they get all the benefit, and if it doesn't work out, the taxpayer funded crop insurance pays them off.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Little moral hazard there.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Right, exactly. And then the last bit is these conservation programs, which got this big boost in the Inflation Reduction Act.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there any reason to think that that 20 billion is threatened in some way, or is that pretty secure? Is that part of the Farm Bill fight those subsidies?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>You nailed it. Absolutely. Much of what we've been hearing are ideas of how to essentially — we think of it as a raid on that money, that $20 billion. And some would say, well, let's put it to a broader range of conservation issues like irrigation or something, and others would say keep it within agriculture, but instead let's use it to sort of lift, say, the price guarantee that peanut farmers get. And we have been pushing very hard to try to keep this money and keep it climate focused. And fortunately, Senator Stabenow, who, as I said, is the chair of the Senate AG Committee, has been very, very firm.</p><p>She has repeatedly said that it's not going to happen that we're going to lose this. Because this is really an extraordinary investment. It's big boost in conservation funding and the fact that it is climate focused is really important because this is where there has not been enough attention over the past and where there's really great opportunities. I think it's important just to pause for a moment and just remind there's a lot of things farmers can do, and some farmers are already doing, that can make a big difference in how much nitrous oxide you release, how much methane you release, how much carbon is stored in your soil. And the trouble is most of those practices are only used on about 2% or 3% of American farmland.</p><p>So we know what we want to do and this is a way to really accelerate the adoption of those practices.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So would you say that's the biggest priority here, the biggest fight, the biggest priority for the Farm Bill is preserving that money for its intended purpose?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Yes, with a slight caveat. One is we definitely want to save the Inflation Reduction Act money, but the Farm Bill money is separate. The Inflation Reduction Act directed additional money into Farm Bill programs. But the Farm Bill itself provides money. And so we're going to want to be sure that we continue what's called the baseline amount of funding for the conservation programs in the Farm Bill and ideally make sure that those are better targeted, also more closely targeted to climate issues. And actually the federal government itself, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Natural Resource Conservation Service has studied these practices that they're funding and they themselves have found that some of them are actually counterproductive.</p><p>Needless to say, we'd like to say let's not have the taxpayer subsidize practices that the government itself recognizes are counterproductive. Let's focus on the best practices, the ones that have the best climate and environmental impact. And since there's a lot of farmer interest in these, let's really put our money where it can make the biggest difference.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So fights over the money and you mentioned also in your blogs on this subject, speaking of research, that AG research in general is undercooked, underfunded. Is there a chance to get more of that in the Farm Bill?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>We are certainly hoping. And again, there's two or three elements of that under President Obama, he started these climate hubs which were really areas to focus on climate aspects of agriculture. There's been a lot of research but most of it has been on productivity and what you can think of as just classic conventional agriculture chemicals. So one is to get more research. Unfortunately, publicly funded research has dropped in the U.S. And when that gets its place taken by private funded research; it's not on things like climate change, it's on things like seeds that you can sell.</p><p>And then the other is that that research — so, we need more, we need it to be better focused on sustainable practices rather than on unsustainable practices. And we need it to be essentially guaranteed because research is a long-term process. If you just do it for a couple of years, you may not, especially in agriculture, things take time. And so, we need a long-term commitment to these climate hubs and to research and sustainable agriculture. There was a study done by, I think it was UC Davis — I'm not sure — that every dollar in agricultural research has over $20 in payback.</p><p>It's one of the most cost-effective ways we can spend research dollars. So that's a real opportunity for us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you also mentioned the crop insurance program, which I think most — even if you just explain that to a person on the street, the opportunities for that to encourage bad behavior seem quite obvious from the structure of the thing. Are substantial reforms to that on the table at all, or is that a subject of discussion?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>I think it's a subject of some discussion and a lot of people in different ways want to make sure we get the best benefit. They recognize we do want crop insurance because it's important to recognize crops are sort of different. Most insurance is sort of trying to pool risk. So if my house burns down, I get covered. But if my house burns down, it probably doesn't mean your house is burning down. But with crops, if I have a bad crop, chances are my neighbor does too. That's why I think some amount of government involvement in crop insurance makes sense.</p><p>You really have to sort of spread the risk around. And of course, food security is really important for our country. So we want to keep crop insurance, but we also want to do it to incentivize behavior that minimizes risk. And in particular, as climate change is affecting farmers more and more with droughts and floods and changing weather patterns and increased pests, we'd like to ensure that our crop insurance system is encouraging farmers to use practices that minimize risk. Unfortunately, right now a lot of the practices that farmers use actually enhance risk. They make them more vulnerable to floods and droughts.</p><p>And the good news here is that many of the same practices that the Inflation Reduction Act will be funding that will help mitigate or curb climate change will also help farmers adapt or prepare for climate change or better respond and manage climate change. The same ones that mitigate can help build resilience. And that's a real opportunity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what about the Rural Energy for America program, REAP as it's called? This came up when I raised the subject on Twitter. This came up a couple of times. Is that on your radar?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>It is not as much. So, I'm not an expert. But there again, there was money in the Inflation Reduction Act to help convert some of the rural energies, which I remember from my time working on energy are some of the dirtiest parts of the power sector and there's great opportunity in rural communities. One thing they have is a lot of land. And so it's a great opportunity to shift from, say, an old dirty coal plant to solar and wind. And I think that's what the Inflation Reduction Act funding will help accelerate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the final thing you mentioned in your blogs was transparency. This is another thing where on the energy side I've been following, there's a lot of talk about this, a lot of talk about like California just passed a law that forces large industrial users to report their scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. So there's a lot of work on transparency on the energy side, I'm guessing giant AG corporations are not super transparent. What can be done on that front?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Well, we need to keep pushing that. That is a real problem. And I think it's a problem both in the specifics that there's very little transparency and it's not over agriculture's contribution to climate change, but agriculture's conventional air pollution. I mentioned earlier that say these concentrated animal feeding operations are the country's largest sources of hydrogen sulfide and ammonia, which are poisonous gases. And EPA for a long time exempted them from reporting under the federal statutes. And we actually sued EPA and said that exemption was illegal and the court agreed with us. And then the industry was powerful enough during the Trump administration to get Congress to amend the environmental laws —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Holy crap.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>to exempt them from — and again, this is just reporting their poisonous emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there any plausible cover story for that or is that just a pure power play like we don't want to?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>It's hard not to see it as a power play because of course, reporting is, I think, by industry seen as the first step to potential oversight or regulation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Heaven forbid.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>We were talking earlier how nobody really understands how much agriculture contributes to climate change. And of course, if they don't understand that, there's going to be no pressure politically to address that contribution. And unfortunately, right now, agriculture doesn't have to report their greenhouse gas emissions. There's been a rider in Congress for almost a decade prohibiting EPA from making industrial agriculture report its greenhouse gas emissions. And there's already proposals in Congress that if the SEC rule requiring reporting ever comes out to try to exempt agriculture from that, there has been pushback in almost every way of having agriculture to report their emissions.</p><p>And the sad reality is these emissions are real. They're either causing climate change or they're causing local air pollution or both. And not reporting them doesn't mean they don't cause climate change. It just means we're not going to address them as effectively. So it's really important that people begin to understand that this is a sector that has tremendous impact and we've got to be much more open about it so that we can address it in a way that makes sense. And look, we all eat: We need to have a food sector. Nobody is saying that we should get rid of the food sector in any way.</p><p>Agriculture is super important, not only to the country overall, but to every state. But we also know enough today to be able to produce healthier food in a much more sustainable way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you've laid out some specific stuff that sort of climate aware people are pursuing here. Preserving the IRA money for conservation programs, beefing up those conservation programs, aiming those conservation programs more at climate change, beefing up research, reforming the federal crop insurance program, increasing transparency. Give me a sort of realpolitik assessment. How should we think about the chances of these good things happening? Unlike on the energy side, where nothing passing at all was always an extremely real and looming possibility here, something's got to pass. Right? So what do you think are the chances of this good stuff getting in there?</p><p>Like what's? Sort of the balance of political forces? And I'm thinking specifically about the House, the Republican House, which is, as you might have heard, insane and incompetent.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>So I think breaking it into two pieces: Senator Stabenow is so strong on protecting the climate focused conservation funding of the Inflation Reduction Act that I would like to feel that we can think that that will remain. And that's really important. And that, of course, is going to be helping. I think it's important to remember this is money that then goes to hundreds of thousands of farmers who want to spend the money in good ways.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is not against farmers. None of this is against farmers.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Not at all. More farmers have applied for these programs than could get it. Two out of three farmers in the past have been turned away because we didn't have enough money. So this is money that is going right to farmers doing exactly what they want and what we as a country want. So that's really great. I think 2018 may be a bit of a lesson for us. In 2018, the House of Representatives passed a Farm Bill with one party. The Republicans passed a very extreme Farm Bill, unlike any before. It had always been bipartisan in both houses.</p><p>And then the Senate sort of ignored that and passed a bipartisan bill that was really much, much better. And then the House came around and adopted the Senate bill. So I hope something like that may happen again. I think the Senate is going to be working hard to come up with a bipartisan bill that will make some climate improvements along the way. There's also, I should say, a long history of discrimination and of unequal access to Farm Bill programs for farmers of color. And this administration is doing a lot to try to address that, to really make sure the money is getting to farmers that have been underserved in the past.</p><p>And I think we will see some improvements on that score in the Senate Farm Bill. And my guess is that although there may be some noise at the House beforehand, one can be hopeful that at the end of the day, the House will go in the direction of a more reasonable bill from the Senate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it seems like clowning around and embarrassing themselves for a while and then just sheepishly doing what they should have done all along seems to be the pattern they've set so far. So maybe that'll happen again.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Yeah, that happened in 2018.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I know. It's like the House Republican special. I hate to be in a position where I'm depending on the U.S. Senate for anything good in life, but here we are. So a lot of this seems like I don't want to say small ball, but let's say there's nothing fundamental here on the table in the Farm Bill. We're nibbling around the edges, beefing up existing programs, tweaking existing programs. So I want you to imagine — free yourself from the fetters of politics for a while — imagine some bright future day when Democrats have another trifecta and they have, for whatever reason, power to do big things, another big swing at climate, because there are a lot, I think everybody sort of acknowledges, IRA was a big deal, but there are definitely pieces of the puzzle that IRA did not get to.</p><p>And so say there's Democratic majorities and Democratic will to do big things on climate in the next Farm Bill. Think big for me here, just for a few minutes. What kind of things would you like to see that would be more transformative?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Well, I would focus on two. One, I mentioned earlier we would have a crop insurance program that really benefits crop risk reducing behavior, which also is climate change mitigating behavior. And so instead of just having the conservation programs encouraging behavior or practices on farms that we want to encourage, you have the much bigger and much more important crop insurance program doing that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's stuff like just rotating crops and —</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Rotating crops, cover crops, adding trees to pasture land and to crops. Having a diversity. Part of the way you can be more resilient is having a diversity of crops if you have nothing but one crop, if there's any problem there, you're in big trouble. And diversity is both biologically much more stable, but it's also economically a lot more stable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And we should note and this is, I guess, implied and obvious, but I'm just going to say it explicitly anyway if farmers were not completely insured against the risks of giant monocropping, they would naturally be moving towards more variety just to protect themselves, right? It's only because they are protected entirely by this crop insurance program that they're not buffering themselves more against risk in this way.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>That's certainly what you're seeing, that the farmers that are using more sustainable approaches tend to be growing a much wider range of crops and products. So they have that economic as well as biological diversity. But the other big thing that would be great to change right now, the Farm Bill directly and indirectly, very heavily supports animal agriculture. And for the reasons that I mentioned, that is where most of the climate change contribution from agriculture comes from. It's the animal manure, it's the cows belching, it is the production of animal feed. And it's animal feed is very inefficient.</p><p>It takes about 15 pounds of grain to get a pound of beef. And corn is the most heavily fertilized with nitrogen fertilizer crop. And all of that nitrogen fertilizer, as I mentioned, not all of it, but a lot of it is running off as nitrous oxide. So all of this animal agriculture, which also uses up that 800 million acres of grazing land and therefore losing carbon, has this huge climate impact. It also, frankly, is unhealthy. It also isn't great for biodiversity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, beef is bad. People hate to hear this and no one wants to say it publicly, but beef is bad down the line. Pick your lens: health, you know, ecology, economics, concentration of wealth. I mean, name it.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>WRI has some great charts. They're a great organization that compares the climate, water and land use footprint of different foods. And you will see that beef is just far more than any other food that we have. So right now, the Farm Bill really heavily supports that and provides almost no support to plant-based alternatives to a healthier diet. And if you think of what we've done in the energy system, we tried to clean up coal plants, we tried to switch to inherently clean energy like solar and wind, and we tried to reduce demand by energy efficiency.</p><p>Right now, most of what we talk about in agriculture is just that first one, just trying to clean up existing production. We have to think about both shifting to inherently cleaner way of getting food and that is, for example, a plant-based diet or plant-based alternatives. And it doesn't have to be going vegan. This is just Americans eat many times more meat than any other culture. We could still have plenty of meat and eat much less than we are now, with much less of an impact. And the Farm Bill can make a big difference there.</p><p>People love to think that this is all cultural, but it's also economic. Right now, meat is cheap because taxpayers pay for a lot of the bill. And that can be balanced in a Farm Bill where taxpayer subsidies, the subsidies in the farm Bill are supporting a healthier, more climate friendly food system rather than a food system that is so focused on these products that have a very big climate impact.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I hate that cultural argument. I just have to say you see that in transportation too. You have decades of public policy supporting automobile infrastructure such that average people just living normal lives have to drive all the time. And then you get a bunch of people saying, "oh, it's just cultural, Americans just like their cars." That's not really it. And I think it's really the same with beef. This whole idea that Americans just have some sort of inherent love of big steaks, big meat, it's so ridiculous. I always find that absurd, although that is a real third rail.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's where economics makes a difference. And right now, as I said, we're subsidizing foods that tend to have a larger environmental impact and frankly, are less healthy, and we could and should be subsidizing food that is healthier. For example, good old fruits and vegetables get comparatively much, much less support in the Farm Bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's crazy. When do you think, and this will really be the final question, but when I think about all the kind of cultural hot button issues that are involved in climate change and decarbonization, I mean, there are millions. Like, we just went through this gas stove nonsense last year. But no hot button issue is hotter of a button for some reason than diets and meat. Meat in diets is just like — we're talking about Oprah — just like you can't go there. So when do you think we'll reach a point where a mainstream politician will actually broach the subject, "hey, we should encourage Americans to eat less meat" and just say it outright?</p><p>Is that ever going to happen?</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Well, Cory Booker is already saying that to some extent, and he's very aware of this impact. Part of the reason it gets so derailed is people tend to view it as an all or nothing. And we make food choices three times a day. There are a lot of chances to just slightly shift to a diet with more fruits and vegetables. And it doesn't have to mean you're going 100% vegan and just in the same way that we can shift our transportation system — and maybe you drive a little less and you take mass transit a little more — it doesn't mean you will never, ever get into a car again.</p><p>So I think the conversation about diets has been, unfortunately, torqued, and actually it makes even less sense. You will only buy a car maybe once every ten years, but, as I said, you make dietary choices three times a day, and you also have the health benefits of eating more fruits and vegetables. So it's a great opportunity. But again, I think it's important in terms of what policy can do is partly it's what foods say, for example, the federal government itself buys. But it's also in the farm Bill, which is so important to every environmental matter that we care about.</p><p>It can also be supporting healthier foods and more so than it does today. That way you'd have a farm Bill that is encouraging farmers to grow different foods in places with less environmental impact in a way that is more sustainable. And that's, again, it's why this Farm Bill, most people don't think about, has this environmental impact far in excess of virtually anything else that Congress will be addressing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Well, Peter, thanks so much for coming on. I've been meaning to do this for ages, and it sounds like this was the right time to do it. So thank you so much for clarifying this whole subject matter for me more. As you could tell, I wandered into it more or less ignorant. So this has been absolutely fascinating. Thank you for taking the time.</p><p><strong>Peter Lehner</strong></p><p>Thank you for your interest. It's great to spread the word on this; it's so important.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-farm-bill-is-the-most-important</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:139291578</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 08 Dec 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/139291578/2a581218098734c490607fb001e3ed59.mp3" length="71400693" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3568</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/139291578/f0dd1f3a0c31c8784653d9cc17adffee.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A note to subscribers on Volts' third anniversary]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/welcome-to-volts">first Volts post</a> went up on Dec. 7, 2020. Believe it or not, that was almost three years ago. I want to mark Volts’ third birthday with a few reflections, a couple of fun announcements, and a request. I hope you will indulge me. </p><p>Volts is subscriber-supported</p><p>There have been a lot of new subscribers since the last time I sent out one of these notes and it occurs to me that some of you more recent arrivals — or some of you who have only heard the pod through Apple or Spotify or whatever — might not know what the basic deal is around here. So here’s the short version. </p><p>I left Vox to start Volts three years ago with three goals in mind. </p><p>First, I want to be useful. Clean energy is getting tons of attention these days and lots of people are curious about it, or want to get involved, or are involved and are curious what’s going on in other parts of it. I want to arm those folks with ideas and information. I’ve read and seen enough dire warnings about climate change; I want to show what people are doing about it, and by proxy, all the things <em>you</em> can do about it. The clean-energy transition is a vast puzzle made of many, many smaller puzzles, and they all need people working on them. </p><p>Second, I want to keep myself (and my subscribers) from spiraling into climate doom, and I’ve found that the No. 1 best way to do that is to highlight all the clever, thoughtful, ambitious, good-hearted people out there trying to help. It’s like Mr. Rogers said: when you’re feeling down about looming fascism and climate chaos, look for the helpers. </p><p>And third, I want to remain independent, to do this work without being obligated to or constrained by any big media organization, or the hedge-fund bros who own so many of the media organizations, or advertisers, or think tanks, or NGOs, or wealthy patrons. I don’t want to owe anything to anyone except you, the readers and listeners. </p><p>So I don’t take advertising and I have no sponsors. Volts operates, and I survive, entirely thanks to the income I receive from paid subscribers. This is, I have been reliably informed more than once, a bonkers way to do things from a financial perspective, but I’m a stubborn old Gen Xer and this is how I wanna do it. </p><p>But I’ll be honest: while the number of Volts subscribers has risen with gratifying consistency — there are more than 53,000 of you now and I love each and every one of you as individuals! — the number of paid subscribers not kept pace.</p><p>So this is my once-annual direct ask to everyone reading or listening: if Volts has helped inform or inspire you over the last three years, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe">consider paying to support it</a>, and me, so that it can continue. A subscription is $6 a month or $60 a year (or you can make a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/donate-to-volts">one-time donation</a>). For the price of one night out with your family or friends, I’ll give you a whole year’s worth of podcasts! It’s like a dollar a podcast! That’s an amazing price for a free podcast. </p><p>Why should you pay to subscribe? The main reason is simple: pay if you find the work valuable, you want me to be able to continue doing it, and you’re in a financial position to do so. Pay so that those who aren’t in a position to pay can still benefit from it, so the ideas and information can reach the broadest audience.</p><p>But just to sweeten the pot a bit, let’s discuss some changes in the works!</p><p>Ch-ch-ch-changes</p><p>We’re giving Volts a few little upgrades in the coming year. </p><p>Why do I say “we”? Because I’ve brought on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/samraasch/">Sam</a> — a longtime Volts subscriber and climate professional — to advise and help with these upgrades so I can continue to focus on the main work. You’ll be seeing his name around in the comments and on emails coming from Volts. Be nice to him!</p><p>I mentioned looking for the helpers. We also want the helpers to find one another. So we’re going to do more to help subscribers connect with, learn from, and collaborate with one another.</p><p>We also want to add some benefits for paid subscribers. 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Word of mouth is how we’ve grown so far!</p><p>Finally, I want to conclude by expressing my endless, unbounded gratitude. Volts is the work of a lifetime for me, not only the best job I’ve ever had but the best one I can imagine. And it’s only possible because of you. So to everyone who has read it, listened to it, or otherwise engaged with or supported it: thank you, thank you, thank you. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-note-to-subscribers-on-volts-third</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:138629121</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 04 Dec 2023 17:00:23 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/138629121/a383569d16490f1ea35bbfebf4a50e72.mp3" length="10774191" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>537</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/138629121/bcd8de00722fbb95d2788bd4d3669410.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Checking in on solar power]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, longtime solar industry analyst Jenny Chase, author of </em>Solar Power Finance Without the Jargon<em>, catches us up on the current state of the global solar industry and looks to where it’s going.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/kc7ieiuwal0dlu74rzvp7/volts23.11.29-jenny.chase.pdf?rlkey=7omwkbuztwrinbqx6iunljtll&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/checking-in-on-solar-power"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Jenny Chase went to work for the London-based startup New Energy Finance in 2005, straight out of university in Cambridge. She founded its solar analysis team and helped establish some of the first reliable indexes of prices in the solar supply chain, as well as some of the first serious industry models and projections. </p><p>The solar power industry barely existed then. Now solar is the cheapest source of new power in most markets and the International Energy Agency expects it to dominate global electricity by 2050. Throughout that heady transition, Chase has run and grown the solar analysis team, even after the company was bought by Bloomberg and became Bloomberg NEF in 2009. It has become one of the most respected teams in the business and a widely cited arbiter of industry data.</p><p>In 2019, Chase wrote a book summarizing what she learned over her years analyzing the industry. It is called <em>Solar Power Finance Without the Jargon</em>, but the title is somewhat misleading — it covers solar power finance but also solar power history, technology, and policy. It is leavened here and there with droll bits of biography or advice from Chase and contains an incredible amount of information in a highly compact and readable package, just over 200 pages. </p><p>A heavily updated second edition was released this month. Also this month came Chase's yearly <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/solar_chase/status/1718295988421456087">“opinions about solar” Twitter thread</a>, which is highly anticipated among a certain kind of energy dork [waves].</p><p>I figured it would be fun to have Chase on the pod to talk about the current state of the solar industry, whether anything but standard-issue solar PV is ever going to flourish, and what the world needs to help balance out increasing penetrations of solar. </p><p>Okay then. Jenny Chase from Bloomberg NEF. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for inviting me, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I read your book over the past week and it's just delightful. I really recommend it to anyone. I feel like the title is a little well, I guess it does say without the jargon, but I just feel like the word finance is going to scare off some readers. But it's really just a nice, extremely approachable introduction to this whole thing of solar in the markets and how it's funded and how it's proceeded over the years. So I really was charmed by it. I noticed actually that it had a little bit of kind of autobiography in the first few chapters and I thought it was really kind of funny.</p><p>I had never really thought about it, but you and I have some parallels in our history. We sort of snuck into what was at the time a relative backwater in the world right around 2004, I think, both of us, and then just kind of hung around.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And I can't get another job, so I'm stuck doing solar at Bloomberg NEF now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Same, we've been doing this for so long now that I couldn't really do anything else, but we just kind of planted ourselves and stuck around until the area we were in suddenly became huge around us.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>It's a pretty good place to be planted, though. I mean, back in 2004, I was looking at this industry, and I started specializing in solar in late 2005. And I was like, "One day this might be 1% of global electricity supply, but, you know, that's worth working on. Even 1%, it's worth working on if we can make it clean." And last year, it was 5%, and it isn't done growing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Same, I started covering climate change during the George W. Bush administration. I was like, maybe someday someone will do something about this. Maybe someday we'll pass legislation. And then here we are. PV dominates the world. People are targeting net zero. How things change.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I want to ask you, you have been following now the solar industry. I mean, honestly, one of the coolest, most fun, most sort of, like, optimistic of all the dark things happening in the world. I know so many people who basically are pinning, like, 98% of their hopes for the future of humanity on this market that you follow. So what a fun thing to be following. But here I'll start with a very big, broad question. A big part of the history of solar that you recount in your book, and I've written on this before, too, and there's been academic papers on it is a series of public supports.</p><p>Basically, you get the German feed-in tariffs. You get huge Chinese manufacturing subsidies. Spain had a little period of insane feed-in tariffs for a while. So it was definitely public policy that brought solar from obscurity, where it was when you first started following it, to borderline ubiquity now. And I just wonder, could solar survive now? Could solar PV would solar PV survive and thrive now without public supports?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Oh, absolutely. You couldn't stop solar if you wanted to stop solar, David, at this point. Those subsidies, yes, they were needed in the early years. They drove growth. They drove companies to actually make these things. But the thing about humans is that when they make things, they get better at making things. And that has been an incredibly powerful story. Solar modules cost over $100 per watt in the 1970s, in today's money. By the time we started in 2004, they cost about — it was about $4 a watt. Stayed that way for about four years because there was very strong demand, again, driven by subsidies, and then started falling again.</p><p>And, you know, last week they were 12.8 U.S. cents per watt. And I am super annoyed that didn't get into the book, because, of course, I had to lock down the book four or five months ago.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What was the cutoff price that you managed to squeak into the book?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I think it was 24 in the end. And I hope anyone reading the book realizes that I knew that was not the final price.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is the insane thing about this market, about this whole technology, is it's such a moving target. And the reason I started with that question is that I think to people in our industry at this point that has sunk in. It's clear that this is a juggernaut, that this is the cheapest thing going now and that you couldn't stop it if you want to. But I honestly don't know if that alone just that basic fact has penetrated this sort of general public consciousness. I feel like people generally still see solar as kind of a nice liberal extra whipped cream on top kind of treat you get with some extra subsidies.</p><p>But it really is the cheapest source of energy now, which is such a fundamental break from when we started, that I just feel the need to repeat it.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I mean, it is. I would slightly clarify that by saying it's the cheapest source of bulk electricity generation in many countries. There are some countries in northern Europe where it actually probably should be wind that's slightly cheaper. And also it is bulk electricity production. In 17 years of covering the solar sector, I have learned that the sun doesn't shine at night.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How many years into your career were you when this sank in, when you discovered this horrendous fact?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Not very many, but I have to admit that here in Switzerland, I only realized when I had a solar system installed in 2018, quite how bad it can be in the northern European winter.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we'll discuss how to get around that. So, PV is now a juggernaut, is growing at crazy rates. Prices are falling at crazy rates. It seems like every week or two brings a new record low price of modules, some sort of record in deployment, some sort of wild new forecast. Just actually, right here, tell us, because you just came out with a forecast, did you not, for solar for next year?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Yeah. So annoyingly, it's my job, or my team's job, to keep our forecast to 2030 updated. And apparently, we're going to have to start doing 2035 soon, which is just great because we have not nailed 2030 yet, I can tell you. We haven't nailed 2023. So, this week I've been publishing our latest update of the forecast, and our estimate for 2023 rose 5% on last quarter. So, we're now thinking that 413 gigawatts of solar modules will get installed worldwide this year, and 240 gigawatts of that will be in China.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wild. Have you ever in the 20, almost 20 years you've been doing this, forecasted too high? Like, have you ever overshot on PV?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Slightly, yes, actually.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You did?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>We had a bit of a moment of over-enthusiasm in 2018, I think. And, like for specific markets, we get it wrong sometimes. I mean, I thought South Africa was going to be five gigawatts this year because of the rate they appeared to be going in May and June, but that has actually slowed down a bit and I dropped that from five gigawatts to 3.5 gigawatts. So you can be quite wrong in the granular sense. And of course, when you're covering the market quarterly, you have to cover that sort of thing. You can't just say, "oh, it all comes out in the wash," even though in the long run it kind of does.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, it does all seem to be coming out in the wash in the long run. The line is only pointing in one direction, as they say. So I guess one of the things I'd like to talk about then is it seems like in terms of continued and accelerated growth in PV, the technology is in place, it's cheap enough now, the manufacturing is in place, the market is fairly robust, there's a lot of supportive public policy now. There's a lot of money, you know IRA being the notable example.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Yes, I mean, you Americans love throwing money at things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, we can't do anything else. Our government is so broken that throwing money is literally the only public policy tool remaining to us that cannot be sort of mired in process. So everything's a nail. So yeah, we're throwing a lot of money at solar.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Creates a lot of green jobs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, that's a lot of wind at the back of solar. So let's talk about then, what are the restraints now on solar going forward? What are the constraining factors? I don't think it's any longer money and I don't think it's any longer policy, at least big picture climate policy, what's now holding it back?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>So, at the moment, it's grid. If you're sitting there with a pot of money and you're trying to put it into solar projects that will generate and sell electricity and there are a lot of people who are in that position, many of whom are my clients. The problem actually is finding somewhere where you've got land, where you can get permission, and where you can get a grid connection, and it's mostly actually the grid connection we really need to build out the grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that true everywhere? Is that true in every market you look at? Or is the U.S. particularly bad on that for some reason?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>No, it's everywhere. It's literally everywhere. If you were to go to a solar conference anywhere in the world, walk into the room and say, "oh, here in South Africa" or "here in Turkey, grid is the main constraint" and everyone will say "this person knows their stuff."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You can sound smart everywhere now. That's interesting. It sort of bespeaks, I think, something then maybe universal then, rather than some quirk of U.S. policy or something like that.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Exactly, I mean, basically, around the world, we've built grids for centralized power plants which made a certain amount of sense when we had centralized power plants. But to get all this cheap electricity from wind and solar to market, we are going to have to build some more wires.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And is permitting just securing land in and of itself, is that also a universal thing, or is that somehow uniquely U.S.? Because we really do have a tangle.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>You do, but challenges with land, they look different in every country, but it is quite universal that it's not easy to just grab a patch of land and have the rights to long term build a project on it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Where are the markets where buildout is happening fastest? And is that —</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>China. It is China.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I guess China is always the answer to that question, it's kind of a cheat. Are they doing something with their grid that like — I mean, are they just building, is that the simple answer? They're just building a lot of it.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>There's two things that China is doing. First of all, it's got a very coordinated rooftop program, so a lot of the provinces are building a lot of residential and commercial solar. And secondly, and separately, it's building energy megabases out in the desert and building ultra high voltage transmission lines out to them. So it's got this two pronged strategy. Plus it's got a bit of other utility scale being built as well. I mean, basically, China is just building everything it's got.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Who's building fastest? The answer is China, on more or less everything.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Always is. I mean, 240 gigawatts, we think will be built this year in China and the entire world market last year was 252.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's wild. You look at these models that say we need X amount of PV to hit our targets, to hit net zero by 2050 or 1.5 or whatever it is, and they look so big and eye-popping, they look to the naked eye sort of like impossible, especially when you break them down. Like, we have to build a utility scale solar plant every five minutes from now till the end of time and they seem impossible. But China is moving at that pace. It is moving at the crazy pace we need to. It's possible.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>It absolutely is. Yes, China is moving at that crazy pace. And to be honest, solar modules are super cheap and solar is actually quite easy to build compared with everything else we've built.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, it's just Legos, right? I mean, it's more like Legos than a nuclear plant, for instance.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Very much more like Legos than a nuclear plant. I mean, I think that the engineers working on solar plants would probably say that there is a certain amount of skill to doing it properly. And there is, of course, but I think you can build a decent solar plant with relatively limited technology.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In terms of all the constraints or headwinds that you mention in the book, let's talk about these trade disputes and trade barriers, because we're hearing now about tariffs. Talk about tariffs as flying everywhere. Trump put a bunch of tariffs in place.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Actually, it was Obama that put the first tariffs in place.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>On solar?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>On solar, yes. 2012.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. And they've been in place ever since. And I'm just wondering, on the macro level, is this just going to change where the panels go and when? Or is this going to be a constraint on absolute growth, do you think?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>So, trade barriers are the reason that we generally regard the U.S. as this weird little market, not really a proper one. The U.S. would definitely be installing more solar if it hadn't been for constraints, particularly last year. First of all, modules do cost two to three times as much in the U.S. as in Europe and other markets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's just because we're not buying the super cheap Chinese ones. Is that so?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>You're not buying Chinese. But also, last year there was the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which means that anything coming into the U.S. has to have a pretty strong verification chain showing that every part of the value chain was made outside the province of Xinjiang in China. And functionally, it seems to have stopped a lot of Chinese brands getting in at all, although Indian brands possibly using the same wafers don't have so much trouble.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you think? Because you know IRA, and recent Democratic legislation in the U.S. puts a big emphasis on trying to onshore or friendshore things, not just solar panels, but also the materials that go into them, EVs, batteries, etc. Do you think that these trade barriers, which are more I think the U.S. probably has the most of them around solar at this point, or at least as much as anybody else, are going to — like, is that price differential going to settle out? Is it possible, I guess what I'm asking is, do you think it's likely that the U.S. is going to bulk up its own manufacturing or the manufacturing of its friend countries, whoever those turn out to be, that that price will even out relatively quickly, or is it going to take a while?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I think that the U.S. will probably have a lot of its own manufacturing, maybe even for the more complex parts of the value chain, because most of the solar capacity announced in the U.S. so far has just been for the module stage. And you can make a solar module in a garage if you have to. That's not the high tech bit of the chain. I don't think that the price differential will even out. I don't think that the U.S. will get to the scale and the integration of manufacturing bases that China has anytime soon. I mean, China is genuinely good at this.</p><p>This is not a matter of cheap labor. It's not a matter of not even cheap energy. It's that it does the whole thing there. And they've got very, very good at it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, so this is not just a matter of their stuff is cheaper because they have I mean, I think that's the sort of popular perception, right, is that they just have cheap labor and lower standards, etc., etc. But there's genuine technological expertise that's difficult for us to replicate.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I mean, China is the reason why solar is not a cottage industry anymore. The Chinese manufacturing industry is a juggernaut. It's viciously competitive within itself. The companies hate each other. If you're imagining some kind of monolith, that is not the case.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, China is very big. There's plenty of room inside it for competition.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>There certainly is. So now the skill to ring out final tenths of a cent out of the cost of making a module, it's high tech engineering, it's very careful, but it's also something you've just got to have done a lot of and know exactly how it works.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is this something you lose sleep about? Do you think the U.S. energy balance in 2030 is going to be substantially changed by the presence of these tariffs?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I think that the one reason the U.S. isn't having as much of a boom as other countries in solar is the tariffs. So I hope the IRA can shift it. I mean, from an external perspective, the IRA looks like pushing down the accelerator really hard on a car that has the handbrake on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, the handbrake being the trade barrier and the permitting.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>And the permitting. And the grid. To be fair, there's stuff in the IRA about the grid as well, about building that out, and I know Jay Gashar(sic.) is working on it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the final question about trade barriers: Are these more or less consensus — is there any prospect of these going away? Or do you think these are more or less kind of a permanent feature at this point? This is how we're going to do it?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I think, in the U.S. and India — that's the other weird little market — they are not going away anytime soon. These are two countries that are quite committed to building a domestic manufacturing industry, even if it costs more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you think it'll be a long time before either of those are at the level of cost and technical expertise of Chinese companies?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>It'll be a long time. I mean, you could say that at this point, even just making modules as good as China was making three years ago is actually all right. You could say that's good enough.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One other constraining factor which I have been interested in for a long time and think is controversial, at least in my little corner of the world, is this notion of renewables in general, but especially solar, eating its own lunch, as they say. Price cannibalization, as you call it, in the book, which is a simple — I don't think there's anything particularly technical about — it's, just that all the solar is producing at the same time when the sun's out. So the next solar plant you build is going to be directly competing with the existing solar plant, producing solar at the exact same time and thus mildly bringing down the price. The more you build, the more the price comes down.</p><p>I feel like the conventional wisdom, call it like five years ago or ten years ago, was that this phenomenon of renewables eating their own lunch is going to kick in at a lower level than has turned out to be the case. And I just wonder if you agree with that — if you agree that this is maybe less severe of a problem than we thought a while back?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I think what we've realized is that most grids actually have a fair amount of flexible capacity. So you can turn down gas plants in the daytime and of course you want to because it's good if you can turn down the gas plants and burn less gas. It is starting to be a problem though we do have zero or negative power pricing events quite regularly on sunny weekends in Europe. Now California has them, bits of Australia have them. There are times of the day when power on the spot power market doesn't cost anything and you could say, well, what's the problem?</p><p>And like, as a first approximation, there isn't actually really a problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, free power doesn't seem like the worst thing that could happen to you.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>But it does, of course, mean that if you want to build another power plant that's the same, you are competing with free power a lot of the time. And you can do it to an extent, because while solar is getting cheaper, you still build for those — they call them shoulder periods when solar is not at maximum and the power price is not zero. But it is still a concern. And, to be honest, that's what keeps me up at night. The fact that we will get stronger negative feedback mechanisms kicking in, particularly in places that don't have a lot of flexible capacity, who are maybe doing coal and nuclear rather than gas and hydro.</p><p>On the other hand, one big update between the first edition of my book and the second is that batteries are just a thing now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Which is newish in the world, I think. New enough that we don't totally know how it's going to affect things.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Yeah. And batteries have to be built and obviously they have to be manufactured, they have to be built. They are actually really expensive. I mean, when we try and calculate the economics of batteries, I'm not entirely sure why most people in Europe are building them, but they are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you seem skeptical of the economics of residential batteries too.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I am very skeptical. I attempted to calculate the payback period on my parents' battery system in the UK, and it's more than 20 years. I'm like, "Mum, did you know this was that bad when you bought it?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And yet you also say that you've underestimated batteries. What do you mean by that? What are they doing more than anticipated?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Getting bought. No, I mean over 70% of residential solar systems in Germany and Italy added this year now have batteries attached. And that does make a huge difference to this power price cannibalization problem because it does mean that you can shift your output to the evening and the night. And then what keeps me up at night is the seasonality thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, so you feel "okay" then about the, sort of, sun going down problem, the diurnal problem, smoothing out, like Jesse Jenkins and I did this a few weeks ago about the sort of timing of intermittency of solar and there's second by second swings, there's minute by minute swings, there's hour to hour swings. And it sounds like you think and I think he thinks that batteries are going to sop up most of the sort of short term variability. You're more confident than that than you used to be, let's say.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I certainly am, yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is another question I have about this. And maybe as someone who's watched markets grow and develop, you have some insight into this naively. I would think if we have this problem in a capitalist society, in a market where during certain periods of the day, we're producing this valuable commodity for free. And so it's just sitting there. It seems to me naively, that you're going to get a stampede of people finding ways to use that power, finding ways to use that excess solar power. Not just you could shift demand under those periods of high sunlight and just use it directly, or you can find new ways to store it or shift it or move it around or something.</p><p>But this seems like the kind of problem that markets ought to be very good at solving. So why should I worry rather than just thinking like this will solve itself? You say high prices are the solution to high prices. It seems like free power ought to be the solution to free power also.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>So I think it is. But historically, people have not always responded to power price signals. I mean, certainly on the residential level, people have not always responded to power price signals quite the way you would expect them to. And on the commercial and industrial level, you often have to spend a lot of capex to take advantage of these low prices. Like for making hydrogen, for example. You can make hydrogen with electricity, but the electrolyzer, which is the equipment that makes the hydrogen, is really expensive. So you don't want to buy all that equipment and run it for like 1000 hours a year.</p><p>You want to be running it at least 50% to 80% of the year. And there's a lot that we can probably do with stuff we already have, like flexible charging of electric vehicles is an obvious thing that we should all be doing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Water heaters, hot water heaters.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Water heaters are good. Yes, heat pumps. Although again, in northern Europe, the issue with heat pumps and heat pumps are brilliant, and I have one, but the issue is that they do run a lot more in the winter, and that is when we do not always have the sun.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, this is back to balancing out solar, which we'll return to later. So I want to ask about — it's funny, normal people, when they get excited about solar, there are a bunch of call them sort of exotic forms of solar that people love to get excited about. And at some point in your book or Tweet threads, you have poured cold water on all of the following: thin film solar, thermal electricity, floating solar on water, agrivoltaics (i.e., solar on the farm building), integrated solar, perovskite solar. And I guess I'm just wondering, do you think that standard PV built in the standard way is such a juggernaut that all of these things are going to turn out to be more or less kind of like frivolous extras?</p><p>Are any of those going to be real? Because you've broken a lot of hearts. There's a lot of people who love — in each of those categories there's a lot of fans whose feelings are hurt when you come along and say, "It's just solar PV on a boat, don't get so excited." Are any of those worth getting excited about?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>No, I wouldn't get excited about any of those, sorry. I mean, some of them are worse than others. I think the best thing I could say about solar thermal electricity generation is it's not quite dead yet and floating — so the big thing about floating solar is that you could put it on water and sometimes it's really easy to get the grid and the use of the site on water. So, for example, our hydroelectric dams, the water is usually already zoned as electricity production and there's a grid connection and there's generally anticorrelation between the output from the hydro dam and the solar panels.</p><p>So, like in summer, the solar panels are going into the grid so you can save some water. So it's good, but it is still solar on a boat. And agrovoltaics, I'm worried that people are a little bit overexcited about that because, if you do it wrong, it is bad solar subsidizing bad farming. There are some crops, like berries, maybe berries you can grow under things with shading, but how many berries do we want to eat as a civilization?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But thin film, more energy dense, but higher cost.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Less energy dense, I would say.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, wait, is that —</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>First Solar is — So the only thin film player of any significance left is First Solar.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, right. Less energy dense, but allegedly cheaper to crank out because you can do it on a sheet.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>No, it's more expensive now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, then what the hell?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>The reason First Solar is having a great time now is because plants in the U.S. are going to get 17 U.S. cents per watt under the IRA as a production tax credit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good grief.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>And because the U.S. has trade barriers on imports.</p><p>So does thin film — I mean, if it's less energy dense and more expensive, then it's hard for me to think of an obvious application for it. What's left for it to do?</p><p>Lower embodied carbon, actually. But when we talk about thin film, we really are talking about First Solar at this point because everyone else has failed. And to do credit to First Solar, it's a company that has met its milestones, scaled up meticulously, has a great recycling program, and has a pretty plausible claim to having lower embodied carbon per watt than crystalline silicon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Who's using that?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Americans. Nobody else would buy them. They're more expensive and less efficient.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But on their roof or where — ?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>It's ground mounted mainly. There's no reason why you couldn't put them on the roof, but because they're less efficient, you would tend to go for the crystalline silicon option.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then the one that really hurt my feelings was this about — I used to get so excited about all these ways of integrating solar into building materials, right. Like, they say you can put solar cells in windows so that they're sort of ambiently generating all the time. They say they can put it in concrete. Like you can put them on fabrics now. Like if you read the lab stuff, the MIT press release world, there's all kinds of cool stuff you can do. Integrating solar into other materials. You just poo-poo all that — is there nothing to any of that?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Don't put them on fabrics. You know the really great thing about glass, it's one of the oldest materials we've got and it doesn't degrade, it doesn't flex. It's pretty hard, it stays transparent. It's a really great material to encapsulate your modules on. Every attempt to make flexible solar has ended up with worse encapsulants that will almost certainly degrade after a few years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you haven't seen anything in the building integrated world that you think even on the long term has a chance of surviving.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>People say it's pretty. I mean, if you want to pay more for pretty. Personally, I'm interested in electricity generation. But like most of these solar windows, they are just bad. They are just bad PV that is being sold as a gimmick and it's barely worth wiring up, in all probability.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, that's just a bummer. I love this sort of Sci-Fi vision of your entire infrastructure sort of ambiently generating power all the time because it's all sort of got solar cells in it.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>But just put proper solar panels on the roof, it's the same thing, except it probably works better and it certainly costs a lot less.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Fine. Ruin my Sci-Fi vision. And perovskites, the other great white hope of this whole world at this point are competing with SMRs to be the perpetual next big thing. The next big thing in a few years, forever? Is that going to happen? Is it happening? Is it getting closer? Are we closer now than we were three years ago? Or is it still at the pure hype level?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Well, I was walking around the world's biggest solar conference in Shanghai in May, and I was having a little bit of a panic because I thought I'd more or less finalized the book saying some relatively uncharitable things about perovskites. And every single company was like, "perovskites!" I actually saw my first perovskite, and then the Chinese manufacturers were like, "oh, our research arm has got perovskites." "Oh," Hanwha Qcells was like, "oh, we've made an investment." First Solar was like, "we've made an investment." I was like, "oh, god, is this going to make my book look stupid in six months?"</p><p>But to be honest, nothing has come of that. Which doesn't mean that nothing will, because it was relatively recently. But personally, I think they were just having a little moment of, "oh, everyone's saying this. We have to seem like we're ahead of the curve." And they all have a skunk works where they're investigating this sort of thing, and so they basically release some of the lab results. And I think it's at least five years away.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also, one thing I've come to appreciate more looking at this stuff over time is even if the perovskite tech proves out faster and better than we expect, it's just like you're so far behind the eight ball at this point trying to catch up with PV or squeeze in past PV anywhere. That the tech thing is not even the main problem. It's just your scale wise. Like, where do you start? Where do you find a foothold?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>No, really, the tech thing is the problem. The problem is that this stuff does not have a lifetime of years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, it degrades quickly?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Exactly. I mean, the problem with perovskite is it degrades really quickly. And I don't think anyone is claiming that they have a completely stable product that's ready for commercialization at any price. But the other thing is that if perovskite does succeed, it won't be as a standalone product. It will be as a second layer on top of crystalline silicon. So it will backpack.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting. So it will be like an improvement to existing panels.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Exactly. And it will make a lot of money for the company that figures it out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Again, sort of from the outside, it looks like your basic PV panel, your basic solar photovoltaic panel looks a lot today like it did ten years ago or 20 years ago, to my eye. But one of the things you describe in your book is that there's actually lots of micro improvements happening. There's lots of improvements happening within these PV products. So maybe just talk a little bit about sort of like what tech improvement looks like within the PV category and how much headroom is left for just the standard PV panel to get better.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>So the first thing I would say is that the layperson doesn't need to know anything about exactly how a solar panel works.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank goodness.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>That said, obviously, there are incredibly talented engineers who are working really hard to make that panel more efficient and produce the same output or more output with fewer materials. And so the big improvements over the last 15 years have been wafers have got thinner, so there's much less polysilicon used per watt. It used to be about 10 grams per watt in 2008, and today it's 2.6 grams per watt.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's just a cost-saving.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>It's a cost-saving. It's also an embodied carbon saving, if you care about that, because polysilicon is a very energy-intensive step of the value chain. The wafers have got bigger, so you can make them out of bigger ingots and then they're easier to handle and they have a lower ratio of the gaps between them. So the standard wafer used to be what we call 156 mm, which is the side length, and now the standard one is 182 mm. So that saves all kinds of costs. There's been a move in cell architecture, first of all, from aluminium back surface field to passivated emitter rear contact (PERC), which is currently the standard.</p><p>But we're just moving to TOPCon (tunnel oxidated, passivated contact).</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>And to be honest, I can barely remember what that stands for. I never know what the difference is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But from the layperson's point of view, the upshot here is that they're getting cheaper and they're working a little better.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>And more efficient. And there are theoretical limits to how efficient they are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And where are we at now? Like 20 — state of the art is like 22%. Is that right?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>State of the art is probably 24 or 25% of commercial production. Obviously, most modules are a bit worse than that. I think it's about 22% for the typical module this year. And it will be a bit better next year because next year the typical one will be TOPCon, not PERC.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that 25 could get to — ?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>34, perhaps. I think we've got a roadmap to 34%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No kidding. That's not a small amount.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I think we hit that by 2050. It's not a small amount.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a third more power coming out of our panels.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>The same space, yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's more room for improvement than I thought. And that's just with polysilicon PV?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Just with crystalline silicon? No, that involves a heterojunction that does involve a second junction on top of that. So another layer of another sort of semiconductor, whether that is perovskites or something else. Because when you stack your layers of semiconductor, you absorb different wavelengths of light with different semiconductors and so you get a higher efficiency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. I didn't know there was that much headroom left. And whatever happened to concentrating? I always thought that it was very clever the concentrating solar panels, where you just use a cheap plastic lens to concentrate the light, and then you get more intense light and you can get more sort of, comparatively more power out of the light with a special kind of solar cell. Did that come to anything?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Cells got cheap and lenses stayed expensive. Also, if you're doing that, you've got to make sure that the angle that your panel is mounted at is correct, because otherwise it's focusing the light on the wrong place and it turns out to be way cheaper to use ordinary solar cells. And it doesn't matter that much if they're oriented right, rather than have a super duper lens thing that has to point the exact right direction. So, CPV is dead.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Another clever tech, RIP. And what about — these are you know, we're mostly talking about improvements to the panel and the cell. What about, you know, I saw a company that is using steel for framing instead of aluminum. I think I could be getting that wrong, but I think that was it. The stuff around the panel, the brackets, and the frames and the mounts, is there a lot of headroom for improvement in that stuff?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I think there probably is. So steel is heavier than aluminium, so I think this is for the frame of the module. And module frames used about 2.8% of world aluminium production last year, so it's not actually small. Now, steel is lower carbon than aluminium, but it is heavier. So I suspect the maths on that might be a little bit complicated. But if you don't have to transport them very far, that's good. And of course, when you've got solar sitting in a field held up on steel structures, then there are improvements to be made to the design of that.</p><p>So it catches the wind less, so it's more sturdy with the same amount of materials.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And just in terms of mounting and tracking the sun, what's the state of the art? I always wondered, is it going to end up being cheaper to just make the cheapest possible panels with the cheapest possible installation? Or is it worth spending the extra money to get fiddly precise tracking of the sun throughout the day?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>So modern trackers are not particularly precise, actually. They just more or less follow it from east to west, because, unlike concentrated photovoltaics, they don't have to be precise. So the really rough rule of thumb we have is that tracking costs about 4 cents per watt more in Capex and gives you 25% more output, which does mean that you put tracking in in sunny places, because 25% more output is more powerful in sunny places.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>So we reckon that you don't really use tracking anywhere, like further from the equator than France, and you use tracking in sunnier places. Tracking also takes more land, but it also gives you a nicer output profile. It gives you like a table of output profile throughout the day, because you start generating first thing in the morning, whereas if you just make them south facing, you get this peak.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You get more into those shoulder periods.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what about people who think that AI and machine learning is going to revolutionize anything? Is AI or machine learning any help at all in PV, in tracking or anything like that? Or is dumb and simple better?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>This is machinery tracking moves. It's stuff that's got to be reliable, it's got to be rugged. I'm sort of inclined to say that AI can't revolutionize it, but maybe machine learning can do a little bit around the edges.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In terms of markets, one of the things you say in the book is that while the sort of macro growth has been relatively steady and predictable, there's been some surprises on where this happens. And it's funny, I thought in your forecast now you have this category "rest of the world," outside of the major markets, which you are sort of using as kind of a buffer. You're just sort of like adding a bunch of capacity in the rest of the world category just as a buffer because you keep underestimating; everyone keeps underestimating how fast things are going to go. And I know you said —</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>We don't do that anymore. Now we call it buffer/unknown. And then people ask me, "what's buffer/unknown?" And I'm like, "we don't know."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>They go away after that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This to me is funny as we've been underestimating growth in PV so long that at this point we're just like, "Here's our forecast... plus some. We don't know where or why, but there's probably going to be more."</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Exactly. And we need it as well. Even within a single year, we tend to find it gets taken up by existing markets being more than anyone thought.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, funny.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>But my clients do tend to get mad at me if that's more than about like 30% of world demand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wow, 30% is a substantial amount of like, "we don't know" buffer.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I mean, that is by 2030. So, there's a lot of "we don't know" by 2030.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, true. I wonder, I was going to ask about this later, but this seems like a good opportunity: Why is it, and this, I guess, is kind of a sociological or maybe even like a psychological question, why is it that it is so much easier and safer to make a conservative forecast that ends up being wrong on the downside, which is like 99% of solar forecasts to date, than it is to try to be as optimistic as reality? Like the one thing I come back to over and over again, and you mentioned it in the book, is like the one solar forecast that's been even close to reality was Greenpeace's sort of wild forecast early in the 2000s, where all they did — it was viewed as wildly optimistic — but all they did is just say, "Well, here's the improvement rate, here's the learning rate. What if that just keeps happening?"</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>No, they just took the growth rate of build and extrapolated that. Oh, it was simpler than that. They don't know what a learning rate is. And yes, it was the best mainly because it was the highest. I'm just going to say it's also not particularly useful if you're trying to decide what world markets to go into or sort of adjust your expansion strategy if someone's just telling you, well, it will be 40% growth per year forever.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, you want something more granular than that, I guess, if you're in the business —</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>And more regularly updated and where someone is actually sitting behind it, being somewhat responsible for being wrong.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. But why is it, why do we always under predict? And why is there no like, people seem to feel safe under predicting, whereas clearly there's a much greater fear of overestimating such that everyone's underestimated every time forever. What explains that?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I mean, you can't predict complete transformation and the more you know about a market, the less you can predict that it will totally change, I think. So obviously, if you are an expert on the energy market, you can't predict it. You don't want to predict that everything becomes totally different. Also, like if you go around with wild numbers, everyone just calls you boosters and says that you're just selling something which is not entirely untrue. But mostly what I've been trying to sell is accuracy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a little crazy. People would almost rather be inaccurate than risk that than risk being viewed as a booster. It seems like in a biz where you're literally predicting and projecting seems like the social penalty for inaccuracy ought to be maybe higher than the social penalty for being optimistic.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>The thing is that there are no prizes for just coming up with the biggest number. I mean, you can do it, but it's not particularly helpful. I mean, throw a pin at the dartboard and if you happen to be the closest, it doesn't give you any real insight. And also, solar is weird. It's the first form of bulk electricity we ever have had that doesn't involve turning something, turning a generator. So it is a little bit unique. It's the first ever semiconductor form of electricity, so it is unique. But it's also you cannot extrapolate a growth rate forever because you end up with the whole world covered in solar panels."</p><p>So you do have to recognize that there are limits to this and there are negative feedback mechanisms. And on the local level, we already see some of those negative feedback mechanisms.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I get all that, but just at a certain point, like the IEA, if I'm wildly under predicting solar again and again and again and again and again and again, eventually those arguments have to lose some of their power, don't they? Like whatever limit you're worried about or trying to predict, it's not happening statistically on the odds it's probably not going to happen next year either. There will be limits, obviously, like the learning rate and the growth rate and all that can't project out to the future the way they are forever.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>The learning rate, you can actually, because it's an exponential decay, so you can double capacity as many times as you like. You're never going to get the price to zero. So the learning rate, you can theoretically go out forever. Don't ask me what's happening to my experience curve this quarter because the price is way below the experience curve, and this is causing some real construction difficulties.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I feel some sympathy for the IEA as well, because what they were trying to do was not make a prediction of solar. What they were trying to do was model world energy supply in a sort of continuous way that had worked when the world electricity, worldwide energy supply was fossil fuels and nuclear. And then they were trying to tweak the sensitivities of that model and bring it to the future. It was not a model that was designed for transformative change, and they have changed that around, and they have got whatever their equivalent to the net zero scenario is called, and they have changed that, to be fair.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, people do seem to be trying to catch up, but even the people running faster and getting more optimistic are still, as far as I know, undershooting.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>It's more complicated, though, than just drawing a line on the chart. At least, I mean, for my team, it isn't actually that much more complicated, but when you've got to put things together and make sense of it, be like, "okay, what is power price volatility in California in 2030 if we project this out?" Then you do get some very strange-looking effects. And you can either spend your life analyzing those strange-looking effects and trying to figure out where you should put your money in that, or you could be a little bit on the conservative side.</p><p>And, I mean, we've been talking like it's all people in developed countries. And the biggest problem my team has is that analysts who have become experts on the energy of, say, Indonesia or Brazil find it very difficult to imagine this strange thing coming here and knocking it all over. And I don't feel like I can go into emerging markets and say, "guys, you're all wrong, it's going to look like this." At least not as forcibly as I maybe would like to.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's something to that. Like, psychologically, the more you know about a particular thing, the more sort of skeptical you are about radical change happening to it, the more reasons that change won't happen that you can cite. So when someone just comes in and says, like, "I don't know, I just got a gut feeling that miracles are going to happen and it's going to be more than that," I can understand why they're greeted with skepticism. But again, if that goofball turns out to be right over and over again, repeatedly for 20 years, at a certain point you have to accept that miracles are going to happen.</p><p>They keep happening. Speaking of that, where are the markets? Like you mentioned that some markets have sort of like taken you by surprise. And that's one of the things that's kind of skewed your forecast in the past, is that things take off where you don't necessarily expect. What are some examples of that? Where is solar taking off now that people might not popularly know that it's happening and where might be next?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>So, I have no idea what's happening in Pakistan, but it is importing a load of modules from China, four gigawatts a year. Something's going on in Pakistan, and I have not spent enough time, but I've spent a little bit of time looking at the licensing website. It looks like there's a lot of commercial scale going in there. I am still super excited about South Africa because this is a major medium income economy that has been having crippling blackouts and one of the best solutions is just to buy a solar system and a battery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is this distributed that's happening there?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Mostly, but there's also a bunch of commercial and probably mining scale because there is actually no limit now on how big a system you can put in and have it feed into the grid. So there will be some big stuff, but so far it's been mostly rooftop, I think. So, South Africa is exciting. I'm quite excited about Nigeria because Nigeria removed its fossil fuel subsidies earlier this year, and Nigeria has about 15 gigawatts of on-grid power capacity and about 50 gigawatts, very roughly, of generators that run on diesel and gasoline.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Whoa, wait, they have more than twice the amount of personal generators than they do actual grid-connected power generation.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>So the sources are not great, but it's probably more like three times.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's wild.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>It's called "I Better Pass My Neighbour," and basically, the idea is that you've got a generator when your neighbor doesn't. And running those generators became extremely expensive when the subsidy was removed. So there has been an upswing in small solar and small batteries.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Yeah, I was going to ask I don't know that we have time to get into it much, but I was going to ask what your sort of general temperature is on the whole enthusiasm around kind of like distributed off-grid for people in severe poverty. This idea that you can get distributed PV to people before you can get the grid to them, practically speaking. Do you put a lot of stock in that?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I've been excited about that for the last 18 years. And if we're honest, the growth has not been —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>It's grown, but it's been steady and it's still pretty small. And I'm really the only member of the team that spends a lot of time on it because most people have better things to do. It is one to watch, though, and I deeply hope that what does happen with this latest fall in prices is that simple module battery systems and things that can just power a house become so affordable that just a wave of them goes in across Africa and Southeast Asia.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you think there's still the possibility that we could hit the S curve on that that could substantially tick up?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Yes, I do. I think there's still the possibility that things get so cheap that we can leapfrog over the need to build a centralized fossil fuel infrastructure to bring power to Africa.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. As a way of wrapping up the main experience, you've had everybody who's watched this market, but I assume it's more visceral for you being so close to it. The main experience you've had is just headlong growth and PV crashing through purported limits on PV, PV crashing through forecasts, crashing through markets, just crashing through things, doing things people said it couldn't do, being bigger, selling more, getting cheaper, et cetera, et cetera. It's really a wild success story. So, I mean, one of the things you address is actually, I'm going to quote your tweet here because I thought it was interesting.</p><p>"When you tell an energy future model to optimize a power portfolio for clean power adequacy, it will give you more wind and less solar than when you tell it to optimize for a least cost electricity sector development." In other words, if you just want your model to do the cheapest thing possible to get you as much power as possible, it's going to do a lot of solar. If you want sort of adequacy and backup and resilience, you put more wind in. First, just to say why that is.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>So wind blows at night and in the winter. And it's not just better system adequacy, it's that the wind pathway is actually better if you want to get to net zero.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Better literally for reaching the goal itself?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>And for economics like it's probably cheaper to reach net zero building a mix of solar and wind in nearly all of the world. I mean, there may be a few countries that have so low seasonality that you could just do it with solar, but for most of the world, the lower cost scenario will be at least 50% wind, 50% solar. And if you let the solar get built first, it will cannibalize the daytime and summer revenues of the wind, and the wind might not get built.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting. And then you'll be stuck — you'll whatever, get up to 80% and get stuck. Is that the —</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>And then you're stuck on a solar pathway. Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Yeah. So that was my next question. What do we make of the fact that — because as Bloomberg NEF, their latest big forecast shows that — we're actually on track to build as much PV as we need under a net zero by 2050 scenario. We're actually on track ahead of schedule, even mildly on PV, but behind on wind. And I sort of have been wondering, there's two ways you could interpret that. One is we've overshot on public policy supporting solar, we're overdoing solar, we're making a mistake basically, and we will regret this later. The other way to look at it is just solar is doing what it keeps doing over and over again, which is doing more than we think it can do and solving more than we think it can solve.</p><p>And eventually, just like sheer bulk, sheer low cost is going to overwhelm these intermittency problems. And in the end, solar will just be a bigger role in the final mix than we have forecast. That solar is going to beat our forecasts again, that solar is telling us that it can do it, rather than we're making a mistake. Do you see what I mean? Which of those do you come down on there?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I'm going to be really disappointing and say it's a regional story. I think we're underestimating the impact of solar in sunny places. I think solar in sunny places can absolutely go along with it. Build some transmission, build some batteries, it'll all be good. I think for places like Northern Europe, we really should be building some wind and probably, to be honest, and nuclear as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Why aren't we, why are we out of balance in those places? Why is PV doing so well and those other things aren't?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>So nuclear is hard. It's not popular, it's big projects. Nobody really wants to take the risk. It's not cheap. There are many reasons why it's hard to build nuclear and it will really require government determination to get nuclear built and probably not be particularly popular, but that may be changing a little bit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That I get. Wind is a little bit more of a mystery to me though. Why that's — ?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Yeah, wind is more difficult than solar, especially offshore wind, because you've got to do a more difficult thing than building a solar plant and you've got to do it out in the ocean and it's got moving parts and things. Also, because the individual projects are so big and things like the cost of steel impact it. So, I think a lot of the issues recently have been that someone's agreed to build a wind project and then found that they couldn't do it at the cost expected and that has caused the contracts to be canceled, companies to pull out. It's all been a bit rough lately. And then for onshore wind, there's just often a permitting issue that some of the, they're called easements,</p><p>the amount of space you've got to leave between the wind turbine and something else is probably further than it needs to be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Would you take that to mean if you were talking to national policymakers, that they should dial back on support for PV or just dial up support for wind?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I mean, if I was a policymaker, I would probably be dialing back support for PV.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Would you? Interesting.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I mean, depending on which one I was, if I had none, I might not be, but I'm not sure I would bring in extra support for PV right now. But also it saved our bacon. I mean, last year, in 2022, in the energy crisis, PV and wind, but also new PV, saved our bacon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a really underappreciated story, too. I feel like somehow out of that episode, the powers that be somehow took the lesson "we need more gas from different places." But that doesn't seem to be like what the lesson they should have learned?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Well, last year we did because there were so many uncertainties and last year could have 2022, the energy crisis could have gone so much worse for Europe if we'd had bad weather. Bad weather is a big one because if it gets cold, then gas demand would have gone right up. And of course, what Europe does is buys gas all summer to fill up its reserves for the winter. So you have to be making accurate projections some way in advance. And in the end, demand destruction was much more than expected as well. So high prices meant lower demand apparently.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's another lesson I feel like we learn over and over again and can't seem to make it stick in our heads, is that demand is much more — I've seen academic papers on this — you can get much more out of demand in emergency situations than people think.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Sometimes you can and sometimes you can't. That's the frustrating thing. And sometimes it takes an emergency situation to get that out. I mean, I think maybe Europeans are maybe a bit fatigued now with the whole saving electricity thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I've kept you long enough. As a final sort of looking ahead, if I read your book and I take just what you've said here today into account, I'm going to guess when I think about what's next for solar, it's not going to be any weird exotic offshoot, or twist, or brand new use, or brand new placement, or brand new technology. It's just going to be more and more and more of what we've got. Is there anything when you look ahead to the next five years of solar, do you just see more, more and more? Are there potential surprises?</p><p>I mean, obviously them being surprises you don't know in advance.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>But that's the problem. Everyone's like, "what are the things you've not predicted?" I don't know if I could predict them, I would predict them. But I think higher volumes, lower prices, more or less the same tech.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Same thing that's been happening then?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Wave of bankruptcy is probably coming.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's in manufacturers or installers or residential installers.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Manufacturing, installers. Installers tend to go bankrupt after a boom. And there's been a bit of a boom in Europe. I think there's a little bit of a hangover in some markets and maybe some — nobody ever notices when installers go bankrupt, though, it's one of the problems with a very fragmented sector.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If it's really been commoditized, which is, I think, sort of kind of the theme coming out of this whole area for years now. If we've really settled on a commoditized, basically standardized form of PV, isn't it the case that most commodity markets consolidate over time? There's going to be a few big players? Do you expect that to happen?</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I don't know. The installation end is more like plumbing. And if you have a good plumber, then keep their number and give it to your friends. I think that locally skilled work people will never quite be a commodity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. But in the manufacturing, on the manufacturing side.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>On the manufacturing, that's a commodity, and that is vicious.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. It doesn't sound like after reading your book, I'm like, "why would anyone want to go into this business?"</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>I know. I mean the U.S. is like, "oh, we should make our own modules." And I'm thinking, why? Horrible business.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's low margin, frequent bankruptcies. Yeah, well, we'll see how it plays out. Thank you so much, Jenny. And I will just say again that the book was so approachable and readable and interesting, and even I learned I mean, this is like, as you say at the beginning of the book, this is the book I wish I'd had at the beginning. I agree with that completely. Like, if you're just getting into this whole area, it's just such a nice plain language introduction to the various aspects of it, all of which I think are less — they seem complex and daunting because of the terminology and jargon that surrounds them.</p><p>But I think your book makes plain, like, there's nothing in here that you need a PhD in engineering to understand. These are all relatively simple concepts if someone just lays them out for you. So I appreciate your book and your threads.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Thank you so much. And I appreciate the work you do on your podcast explaining a wide variety of things I had no idea about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right. All right, have a good one, Jenny. Thanks so much.</p><p><strong>Jenny Chase</strong></p><p>Have a good one. Bye. Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/checking-in-on-solar-power</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:139096359</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 01 Dec 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/139096359/0945f829231b3958af3f188c8e6c9b1b.mp3" length="76685864" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3833</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/139096359/428cd170551a5168344f830b2ad8e9af.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Managing a distributed grid]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Astrid Atkinson, co-founder of Camus Energy, talks about her company’s “grid orchestration” work of helping utilities see, track, and coordinate the distributed energy resources in their territories.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/4tuzafgyc0jimc9whnh9q/volts23.11.22-astrid.atkinson.pdf?rlkey=gh8g3932fvhtqmf7uq2p3pu6a&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/managing-a-distributed-grid"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of my favorite things I ever wrote was <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/11/30/17868620/renewable-energy-power-grid-architecture">a 2018 piece for Vox on grid architecture</a> — the basic structure of the electricity transmission and distribution networks. It was about how a top-down system, with one-way power delivery from big power plants to passive consumers, might evolve into a bottom-up system, driven by local distributed energy resources. </p><p>Thanks to all-star illustrator <a target="_blank" href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/javier-zarracina-7966901/">Javier Zarracina</a>, it even has awesome animated illustrations. </p><p>One person who read that piece was <a target="_blank" href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/astridatkinson/">Astrid Atkinson</a>, who at the time was a senior software engineer at Google. She had managed a team that shifted Google search from a top-down system to a massively distributed system, back before the term “the cloud” existed and there was no template available. She and her team had to develop the principles and best practices of getting reliable performance out of millions of unreliable, loosely coordinated machines. By doing so, they radically expanded the scale and speed of what search could do.</p><p>She thought, wouldn’t it be cool if the power grid could make the same shift? Unlike some people, though, she didn’t just blog about it — in 2019, she left Google to co-found and run <a target="_blank" href="https://www.camus.energy">Camus Energy</a>, a software company that helps utilities see, track, and coordinate the distributed energy resources in their territories. The company calls what it does “grid orchestration.”</p><p>Atkinson has been a thought leader in pushing for a new grid architecture. (See Camus’ <a target="_blank" href="https://www.camus.energy/the-rise-of-local-grid-management">white-paper series</a> on “the rise of local grid management.”) So I was super-excited to geek out with her on this stuff. We talked about the conceptual shift from centralized to distributed and the drivers making that shift inevitable, plus getting more out of the grid we’ve already built through coordination and efficiency, and how the utility sector can evolve to better manage local resources. I really loved this one.</p><p>Okay, then. Astrid Atkinson. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Thank you so much. I'm really excited to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm so excited for this. Astrid, I have to tell you just by way of preface that I had a weirdly difficult time preparing for today's pod because I'm just so excited by this whole area, and I'm so jazzed. I have so many things to ask you about, so many things I want to say about all this stuff, and I'm kind of overwhelmed and fried my circuits. But let's start here: Let me describe for listeners what you did at Google and tell me if this is an accurate description. So you were part of a team, I think, leading a team that was shifting the way Google did things away from a model where computing was done on a relatively limited set of high-quality, extremely reliable data centers, tightly centrally controlled, to a model where computing is done not on a small set, but on thousands, millions of distributed computers living all over the place, any one of which might be unreliably connected or off periodically or weak or otherwise glitchy.</p><p>So basically, moving from a model of tightly coordinated, central control, limited number of entities, to loosely coordinated millions of entities, somehow getting aggregate reliability out of massively distributed, individually unreliable machines. Is that more or less accurate?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's about right. So my role was in the site reliability engineering team at Google, which is a function that nobody's ever heard of outside of the kind of tech industry. But you can think of reliability engineering as being basically Google's systems engineering function. It's the entity that's kind of responsible for pulling all of the pieces together between sort of software and operations and networking and hardware and everything, and making sure that you can get them to kind of work as a reliable system overall. And I was part of the original team that kind of — it wasn't a function that existed in the industry before Google made that transition.</p><p>I was part of that original team at Google and then led a lot of Google's work around scaling out that model.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so now the idea, more or less is to oversee or encourage a parallel evolution of the electricity grid, basically, from a limited number of tightly centrally controlled entities to a loosely coordinated, massively distributed, huge number of smaller entities, basically.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, that's definitely the hope. And that's partly derived from the utility industry and the grid space's sense of the changes that are needed and also partly derived from my sense that there are a fair number of parallels between some of the approaches that we took and kind of had to make up on the spot to support massive growth and really significant changes in the way that we managed systems for that work at Google. And there are parallels with the changes that we need to go through on the grid side. So it's less like "there's this one piece of technology that we built at Google that will totally solve the problems" and more like "we had to develop a set of approaches and a set of kind of integrative and system level perspectives to figure out how to make that change happen."</p><p>And I think a lot of those can be helpful in the grid space.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, I think one of the most intriguing things about this is in doing that work, you extracted a set of principles for how to design systems like this such that they are reliable, et cetera. And it's those principles, I think it's like conceptually those principles apply to the grid. Obviously, the individual technologies might be different, circumstances are different, but the principles of how to make it work, I think are a weirdly neat fit. The reason I think we should maybe pull out, the reason that this is not something that the utility really can choose to do or not to do.</p><p>Utilities kind of have to do it for a couple of reasons. One is all these distributed energy resources, Volts listeners are familiar with these distributed — with these solar panels and hot water heaters that can store energy and batteries, et cetera, et cetera. All these sort of behind the meter distribution side, distributed resources are coming online. Whether the utilities like it or not, they are swarming —</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>It's happening.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>online, it's happening. And right now utilities are just like kind of hoping it works out, we'll get into that. That's one reason. But the other reason is we're expecting, like you could say of Google, like it couldn't have scaled to the size it got, it couldn't do the amount of computing it's doing without going through this transition.</p><p>You just can't at a certain point with a centrally controlled system where you're tightly controlling a limited set of entities, you just can't get big beyond a certain level. You run into sort of computational limits of your computational resources for a central controller. And we're expecting a lot more out of the electricity system in coming years, as Volts listeners are also very familiar with. We're going to two or three x the demand that it has to satisfy in a much more complex way. So I think it could be argued, and you have argued, and I think it's pretty self-evident, that the electricity system cannot achieve the scale we want out of it without going through this evolution.</p><p>There's just no way for the way it's currently run to get as big as we want it to get.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, and if you want some simple examples of why that is, utilities have spent a lot of money and a lot of time in the last 10 to 15 years installing smart meters. Right? They were supposed to give us the kind of universal visibility into customer activity that I think we can all intuitively think that we would need to manage a rapidly changing grid with a lot more complexity. But most utilities don't really have particularly high-scaled data infrastructure. And so the idea of actually being able to do something useful with all of that meter data, SCADA data, kind of everything at scale on an ongoing basis in real time, using that as a foundation for analysis and visibility and those kinds of things.</p><p>It's really hard for them because usually the software systems that gather and process that data, they're on premise within the utility's own data center. They're typically not really using any kind of modern scalability approaches beyond downsampling the data, which means losing some of it. And they're usually running on a single machine. So it gets really difficult to incorporate very large amounts of data when you can only use one computer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, if you talk to them, they're like, "Oh my God, we've got all this data. It's overwhelming. The reason we're not doing more with it is like, we can't do more with it, we're overwhelmed." And then you look at the scale of data involved, and to a Google it's a tiny amount of data. The scales are completely different.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah. Just as a back-of-the-envelope calculation, I was trying to figure out how many data points do Google's monitoring systems collect on a daily basis? And it should be somewhere in the order of 6 to 10 trillion.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good God. That's like whatever atoms in the universe. I don't know what the right comparison is.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Google is where I learned the term exabyte. They sort of just came into this with a perspective on scale that was sort of orders of magnitude larger. And you don't really think about the amount of computing work that's required to get you the right answer in under a second to any question that you might have through search, but the short answer is hundreds of thousands of computers all at once.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>You can just do more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so the current way utilities are running this with sort of a single machine on premises chewing through this data serially is just not going to get anywhere close to that scale.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, and to be fair, they'll scale up to five or ten machines. But the systems that we had to build to kind of manage the Google scale tech computing, they weren't five to ten machines, they were 50 to 500,000 machines.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Which you're not going to do on premises. You have to basically move to the cloud to widely distributed resources. So, Astrid, all this sort of preface, conceptual preface, is so my jam. You probably know this because I wrote a big article about grid architecture a few years ago.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yes. And that article, if you're talking about the one from 2018, was really influential in how we started thinking about the space a little bit before starting the company.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, that was literally my dream, writing that article, is that some smart person who understands how this works with computers will come over to the utility industry and bring it to the electricity system. Literally. Like, you're the answer to my prayer. But what you may not know is that this is my jam going even way farther back, like back in the midst of time, back in the midst of prehistory. I was getting a philosophy degree, I was working on a PhD in philosophy, and my whole thing was studying cognitive science and consciousness and sort of cognition and how cognition works.</p><p>And one of the things I was deep into is this shift of people describing cognition as distributed and describing the human identity as distributed. Sort of this illusion of a unity that actually comes out of massively distributed, relatively dumb nodes coordinating to produce this emergent behavior that we call consciousness. So the whole idea of moving from centralized to distributed, that was in my bones even as far back as grad school. So now it's like popping up all over the world. These are really just thrilling times for me personally, I guess, is what I'm saying. It's so cool to see all this stuff come together.</p><p>So one of the things you say in your presentations and such is the first — step one, if you want to do this, if you want to coordinate massive numbers of nodes to get a desired set of behaviors as an outcome, the very first thing you need is knowledge of the nodes. You need to know what's out there and what it's doing and what its capacity is. And in the computer world, we have the system on the Internet, we have the system of IP addresses, an individual address for every single computer that's connected to the Internet. And there are, as we say, millions and millions of them.</p><p>So right there, it seems like right there, your attempt to pull this over into electricity looks like it grounds out because we just don't have that. Like when I hook a water heater up to the grid, I don't think it gets an individual identifier, does it? Or a solar panel, or an EV battery or EV charger, et cetera, et cetera. This is the whole problem, right, is all these devices are hooking up to the grid and utilities don't know where they are or what they're doing or when they're going to do what they're doing. And I can't — have trouble imagining a system that would individually identify them.</p><p>So right there, right off the bat, how do you overcome this first and most difficult problem? Because as you say in one of your presentations, the pyramid, you show the pyramid of reliability. And the base level, the bottom, the level upon which the rest of the levels are built is monitoring. You have to know what's going on out there on the edge of your network. And in electricity we don't. So how the heck do we overcome that problem to even get to the other problems?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, so there's really, from a technical perspective, kind of two questions buried in the one that you just asked. One is about addressing. And it's true that we don't really have an IP address system for the grid. But the reason that we need that for the Internet is that we ultimately need each individual piece of work to end up at a specific location. Like an email needs to end up at a certain address or a DNS query needs to go to a certain server in order to get a response. Whereas in the electrical system, we're really sort of thinking more generally about managing need for work to ability to do work.</p><p>So, managing supply to demand, it doesn't really matter which particular electron serves the need. One of the primary goals is just that there are always exactly the right number, always exactly the right amount. So the problem space is a little bit different in that perspective. It doesn't mean we don't need to know what's on the grid and where it is. But you don't have quite the same need for an absolutely universal addressing system. Just as an example: One of the ways that one could tackle this is there's a bunch of really interesting work happening in the grid management and grid architecture space in Australia, which I'd love to talk about a little bit more when we get further through this.</p><p>But as part of that, they basically extended a universal identifier system that applies both to meters for one set of identifiers and then to generators for another set. And that's just kind of the country deciding to do things a certain way. And it definitely, I think, can be a helpful enabler to have that. In the absence of that, you can correlate it across multiple sources because within any given utility, they do actually have a way to identify specific assets. Typically that's something associated with the meter number. So it's usually like a site identity or like a site number or something like that that identifies a particular customer location that associates with a billing relationship and associates usually with a specific physical meter and is like kind of the identity component that ties those things together.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, but isn't the problem that behind any one of those meters might be multiple devices that behave very differently and have very different timing and etc.?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yes, and should you want to be able to tie together the activity of those devices with the utilities identification mechanism, you're going to need to write some software. So one could do this today by basically just like writing software to link together the program identifier or the device asset identifier. Let's say you're talking to ChargePoint chargers. You can get like a ChargePoint charger ID, and with a modest amount of software, you can link that together with a meter ID. It's all kind of a pain in the ass, but it's doable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Would it not be easier with something like an IP system, though? I mean, is there any talk about is that a gleam in anyone's eye?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, I do like the Australian model, I think they call it. It's like a distributed generation ID and then there's like a meter ID. It's basically just an agreement that those things are going to be unique across multiple systems. I think one of the sorts of things that could be easily extracted as an example and it certainly would help. I think there's a lot you can do without it, but it would help. The other thing that's kind of buried in your question, though, is "how can we see what's out there and know what's happening?" And when we talk about monitoring in the Internet space, as you mentioned from my diagram, which is actually drawn by a former colleague of mine, Mikey Dickerson, who went to go lead up — I don't know if you remember, but the healthcare.gov rescue team under the Obama administration.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Heroes.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Mikey was a colleague of mine at Google, and he went to go lead up that rescue effort. And so the diagram you're mentioning, which is a lovely one. It's just like a little pyramid of — kind of like Maslow's pyramid of needs, but for reliable computing — it does have monitoring and system visibility as its foundation. And what that looks like in the Internet computing space is that for every systems component, whether you're talking about an individual server or a network router or a piece of software or whatever that's operating within the construct of a larger system, you kind of want to know what it's doing.</p><p>That's why Google collects so many data points for their systems, because they have quite a lot of them. But this is common across the entire modern computing industry. If you're running a large system, you would typically have a monitoring system that would pick up ongoing telemetry, so like heartbeat information and activity information from literally every component and then assemble that. Firstly store that data and then assemble it into some operator friendly dashboards and ways to keep an eye on what the system is doing. We don't really have that, particularly the distribution grid today. We do have it on the transmission side, but that's not really how the distribution grid rolls at the moment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and so absent a system like that being put into place with unique identifiers for every little piece, ultimately it seems like you're in the end modeling, basically estimating on some level, are you not?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>It's a mix usually. So in practice what that looks like is you do end up with unique identifiers for those assets because if you're bringing in a data stream from an EV charger or a battery or a solar inverter or something like that, you want to know which one it comes from. So in the absence of like a universal addressing scheme, the way that we would do that from a technical perspective is we'd say we've correlated this battery with this site ID, so its identity is now site-id.battery or something like that in our database. So you're actually creating that notion of identity to do that.</p><p>And then we're pulling in data, or whoever is pulling in data from ideally every one of those things. Now those things are all exporting data all the time anyway. Like their vendors, their installers are always installing them along with some kind of remote monitoring capability.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Just not to the utility.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>No. And as mentioned, partly that's because the utility in general is not very good at dealing with very large amounts of data, but it's also because that's a lot of vendors to talk to and a lot of devices to talk to.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, and I would imagine a lot of different data formats and it must be a mess of information.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>This is where the modeling stuff comes in because in general, there's lots of data available, but it's almost never universal, it's almost never consistent across every utility or device type or whatever. Sometimes you'll have utilities that have smart meters with 20% of their customers, but not the others. Or you might have ones where they have meters that give you a monthly read for most customers and then a small subset that can give you more frequent data. You might have utilities that know where all their rooftop solar is and have even production meters that tell you what it's doing, but most have an interconnection record that's kind of separate from any other data set.</p><p>Maybe it's in their GIS. And most don't have a production meter to tell you what's happening there. And so if you want to make sense of all of that, you do need to use a fair bit of modeling so that can be from everything. Like this meter data has a bunch of drops where the network dropped out and I need to fill it in so that the time series is complete to like the meter data has a different frequency, like it's sampled every 15 minutes and SCADA data is sampled every minute and I want to compare them.</p><p>So now, I need to fill in minutely data points using a model. Or it might be I want to have some idea of what rooftop solar is up to, but I don't have any production meters. I do know where there are rooftop solar installations on my system though. And we do have modeling tools that can do a forecast for rooftop solar. So then, what you can do is forecast the likely output of a panel that's yay big at location X, match that against the data that you actually have from the meter, and then form more complex and more complete machine learning models, which can then give you a model-based view of what's probably happening.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So this is where the machine learning and the AI comes in.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Taking the data you do have and extrapolating to a more complete —</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Absolutely, and that's really valuable, not just for things like forecasting, which is kind of the most common use case for it, but it's also useful for understanding what might be happening right now because most utilities don't really have great visibility in real time. To anything that's sort of below the substation or feeder circuit or maybe they have reclosers or something on the line but they don't really have any visibility at the distribution transformer or at the meter that is anything like real time. Meter data usually trails by between 2 and 48 hours.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As I was reading about this and thinking about this, my mind kept bumping up against one thing, which is that a model like this in, I don't know, like global shipping of goods, where maybe you lack certain information sets and you're deriving them from other information and making a model. A sort of like extremely educated guess. And you get close enough for government work, you get close enough to make the thing work. But in electricity systems, you really got to get it exactly right. Like the supply and demand have to be exactly matched at every second. Can you get from the limited data we have now, add a bunch of machine learning and AI to derive a global picture of what's happening? Is that global picture going to be accurate enough to meet the sort of reliability standards we require of electricity specifically? Like people are not very forgiving if you have little gaps.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>So the key question is "reliable enough." Is it going to be perfectly reliable? Absolutely not. And for high fidelity low latency applications, you need high fidelity low latency data. But a lot of our applications are not high fidelity and low latency. And so there's a lot to unpack in terms of how much data you need for particular use cases. But broadly speaking, for things like maintaining frequency of the bulk system, that's something that needs to be done on like a subsecond basis. Obviously, it's kind of a 60 Hz basis, but we have that visibility on the transmission system, and we have transmission operators whose job it is to maintain that frequency.</p><p>So if you don't have that kind of fidelity on the distribution side, that's not necessarily going to impact stability from a frequency maintenance perspective, especially if you do have fast response assets like batteries and stuff like that, that the transmission operator can call on to provide services. And there the distribution operator, even if it's distribution connected, doesn't really need to know about that as long as somebody knows that they need it and can call on it. So when we think about what we need in terms of data completeness on the distribution side, it kind of depends on the use cases, right? If we want to be able to just use flexible load to move our peak usage around so that you're not running up huge demand charge bills on behalf of the utility at peak usage times in the evening, you don't really need real-time data for that.</p><p>You can just kind of move it around on a day ahead basis, right? If you want to be able to manage, let's say you've got a house with five powerwalls and you want to make sure that when you charge those powerwalls, they don't blow up the transformer that house is connected to. That's also something that benefits from more real-time data, but doesn't strictly require it because you can just kind of put a bit of a margin for error on your calculation of transformer capacity and make sure you operate within it. What you lose is a lot of additional efficiency and the more you want to actually use that active management to manage reliability and grid capacity conditions, the more you do really need the actual real-time data.</p><p>But it can be a process. It doesn't have to be perfect from day one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. I mean, a lot of this is just about how to get started with the crappy systems we have in front of us. I'm sort of like —</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>I like to refer to it as real world data.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, which anyone who's dealt with the real world knows is generally pretty crappy. So what's the sort of balance of efforts of trying to organize people to produce more data on these things, right. Or harmonize data, or come up with some sort of harmonized transferable, mutually communicatable data systems versus effort put into the machine learning and AI that can make hay out of existing data? Does that make sense? Are you just running with the data you got? Or are there also efforts underway to produce better data or to harmonize data across all these systems?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's really both. So there's a bunch of really good work that's happening in the industry to try to get much higher fidelity data collection and reporting at either the meter or an equivalent kind of customer side component. So companies like Sense do this, SPAN panels can do this. The meter manufacturers are all working on it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are the smart meters that got installed in that first wave of smart meter installs, are they useful for this? Like, are they producing good data for this kind?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>The real issue with smart meters, especially in the US, at least from my perspective, is not actually the meters themselves: They collect data every 15 minutes, which is pretty sparse in general —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Smart meters do?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, sometimes. Often it's every hour and sometimes it's every month.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's not super smart.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>It's not very fast. No. And a lot of times it really has to do with the amount of data that the head end system, which is like the software system that picks up the data, can bring back. It also has to do with the bandwidth of the network that's available to the meter to bring data back to the meter as well. So in general, we collect and store a lot less data than we could. And a lot of that has to do with limitations of the communications network and of — not enough computers to bring in the data.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you could theoretically get more out of those in the future if you built up the infrastructure.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yes. The big issue with the data collection from smart meters today, from my perspective, is that most of them in the US communicate via an RF mesh network, which basically uses kind of a — I don't know, you could think of it as like a bucket brigade for data. It's like kind of tossing from one meter to a repeater to an upline repeater, to an upline repeater. And God knows what it's doing out there on the network, but it takes like often 6 hours to get a message back. I like to picture the data, like, having a little picnic out there on the line because it's very slow.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's like The Hobbit. It's like trudging through fields and over mountains.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, and most of those systems will let you get a single point read from a single meter more quickly. But if you wanted universal, somewhat real-time visibility into what's happening at every meter today, for anyone who has those systems, the only way to get that is to forecast it. And so that's where you're really sort of looking at the role of real-time forecasting to try to fill that gap. Now, the issue with getting more instrumentation out there or even getting those kinds of technologies in place isn't really a technical one. It's more that most utilities have never had it and they haven't really felt a need for it.</p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like, moving around large amounts of data is a solved problem, let's say technologically.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>It is something that we have great technologies for.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But they're just not using it. And just as a general comment — and this is something I'd say frequently — I feel like ordinary people who are out there very familiar with tech and the Internet and all that kind of stuff would be surprised if they knew how comparatively low tech the grid is compared to the systems that they're using day to day life. It's wild that there are still people finding out about outages by getting a phone call from Bob, who's walking his dog, and that causes Jerry to have to go throw a physical switch somewhere. Like, the whole thing just seems incredibly like the more you learn about it, you're like, still in 2023?</p><p>I don't know if this was your impression when you started getting into it.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>I remember going to do a tour at San Diego Gas and Electric for their operations center not that long after starting the company. And the difference between data fidelity and kind of amount of real-time operations on the transmission side versus the distribution side is pretty shocking. The transmission side is everything you'd expect. Right. I remember when we did that tour, they walked us into a conference room, gave us a little advanced talk, and then flipped a switch and the entire frosted glass wall of the conference room went transparent. And you could see their transmission operations room with their gigantic screens and all these operators in their little consoles with each one has half a dozen computers around them and it looks really high tech.</p><p>You go over to the distribution side and it's like a bunch of desks people maybe have two monitors, and it's mostly people taking calls and making calls to roll trucks to fix outages. We have the technology. We even have it in the grid. We just need to scale it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Distribution systems basically have been neglected and badly need now to be beefed up in a number of different ways because of the aforementioned flood of DERs coming.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, and if I can mention one of the parallels with my past life doing operations at Google, because part of my job was actually like on-call operations. I led the team that was responsible for Google's homepage for about five years. So you went to Google.com to see if your Internet was on between 2007 and 2012. That was my team and I carried a pager myself for it. One of our big strategic efforts as we were doing that work was really thinking critically about building tools to help operators understand system scale. So if you think about not only a very large system, but also one that's undergoing constant change, where there might be dozens or hundreds or thousands or tens of thousands of individual systems interacting, changes are happening all the time that you don't know about.</p><p>And that's true even in a Google type environment where you'd think it would be all coordinated. But Google has like 100,000 software engineers. It might be 200,000 by now. And good God, they can generate new things quickly. And so from the operations side, one of your big challenges is making sure that what's happening within that changing system is comprehensible to a small group of people.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Can't change human bandwidth.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>That's right. And so one of our kind of core philosophies about that was we wanted to have tooling that would let us support exponential growth in the system with sublinear growth of the operations workforce required to support it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>And so that means you're making a lot of ongoing investments in tooling and stuff like that. But it also means that that technology investment is a fundamental part of how you scale the system and that operations function is kind of intrinsically tied to how and whether you can scale the system. So, you know, when I saw that room at San Diego Gas and Electric of their distribution operators working really hard to manage the complexity of the system that they have, I kind of look at that from a systems engineering perspective and kind of a large systems perspective.</p><p>And just think, like, wow, making sure that those folks have the tools that they need to understand what's happening as we go through all these changes. That's actually really close to the heart of the problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And is there an industry doing that? Do the utilities just cook all that stuff in house? Where are the 100,000 engineers that are helping utilities?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Well, I have a company of about 30, so we're short a few. No, there are people, of course, across the industry that are working on this. And that's typically a mix though, of the existing kind of large scale vendors and folks within the utility trying to kind of roll their own, which is good in the sense that they know the problem space, but bad in the sense that very large scale, real-time operations, cloud computing is sort of a specialty that doesn't have a lot of overlap, necessarily with utility systems training. So we could use a lot more person power on this problem, for sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the point of all this, and this is a point I thought you made it really well in one of your talks is one way we could deal with the growth in demand that we know is coming is just to build more and more grid. But building grid is hard. There are NIMBY problems and capacity problems, money problems. And our ability to build out physical grid is rapidly going to be outstripped by rising demand. So our only real alternative here is to make more use of the grid we've got, is to use the grid we've got more efficiently.</p><p>And basically what that means is coordinating the behavior of all of these millions of distributed devices so that they work in concert with generation and everything works in a big happy system together. But right now, I think Volts listeners will be familiar with crude proto versions of this, like demand response systems where the aforementioned phone calls are like someone calls you and says, "hey, will you not run your boiler on x hours of x day?" And they're like, "okay," so that's a form of coordination of those machines. But I think anyone can tell with a little bit of thinking that that's not going to scale up to millions of them.</p><p>So the key here, the heart of all this is beginning to automate these things is to beginning to automate the behavior of these thousands and millions of distributed devices. And so here again, I think your experience in Google transfers pretty well since automating tasks, automating work, work routines, and subroutines is kind of at the heart of what you're doing. So talk a little bit about the hierarchy of work and the ladder of automation.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, so there are a couple of things in that. First, I guess it's maybe helpful to have a concrete example of what that looks like at Google. So one of the things that we went through at Google was reaching a point where the global load distribution system, which manages all data center traffic, was needing to be adapted to manage really rapid growth in demand for network bandwidth. And so before that, we were really just kind of moving search requests around across a set of global data centers. And that has its own constraints. You need to be able to move that traffic quickly.</p><p>You need to be able to respect capacity constraints. You don't necessarily blow up substations if you get it wrong, but you actually can overload and crash servers. And it has a lot of analogs to the grid system in the sense that once you overload servers, you can cause cascade failures that will take down service globally. So there are consequences to getting that wrong even when it's just search traffic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To put it in electricity terms that the audience will be very familiar with, you're just trying to avoid peaks in computing load. Basically, you're trying to make the demand for computing look like a nice smooth line, even though there's tons going on beneath that line. If you can coordinate it all just right, you get a nice smooth line. And spikes, because you have to build, as you point out in your papers, any network is built to the size of its tallest peak.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>That's exactly right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the more you can smooth out those peaks, the more you can grow the whole thing without demanding more infrastructure. And that just transfers very straightforwardly to electricity. You're trying to move load demand around and coordinate it, such as to create a nice smooth demand line.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's exactly right. And that's kind of the fundamental capacity planning constraint for any large-scale system like that is really what's your peak demand and can you absolutely meet it, or do you have a way to shed some of that demand if you're going to cause system problems? Right, so when we transitioned to needing to be able to scale the use of network bandwidth, it was when Google bought YouTube and we needed to be able to serve lots of cat videos. We started to think about not necessarily taking every user request all the way from Azerbaijan to a data center in California, but rather could you put capacity out in Azerbaijan to serve the most popular Azerbaijani cat videos?</p><p>And so we went through this really big transition of how we manage the network towards much more distributed capacity management and also software-based network automation. So really moving towards software-based management of where and how peaks occur, because you're exactly right. And then also trying to move as much work as possible to the edges of the network so that you could get more work done on the network as a whole. So the parallel in the energy system is moving as much work as possible, as close to the user as possible. So that's moving it to distribution, connected resources, and to DERs.</p><p>And what that gets you is a bunch of tools for optimizing your network capacity, which, if we want to get our grid to do more without building four times as much of it, is really what we need to do now. So thinking about like, okay, what's the set of technologies that makes that kind of transition possible? If you need 10,000 times more capacity from an existing network, or let's just say like ten times more, or even four times more, which is probably about what we're going to need, you need some tools to be able to handle that. So firstly, the more of that work you can do close to the source, the more network you have to work with.</p><p>Secondly, understanding what the network constraints are in a really nuanced way, and also what the need for capacity and the available supply to meet that is in a really nuanced way. The monitoring piece, like what's out there? What's available not just for the system as a whole, but on my street or your street or my substation, is a really important part of that. And then the analog to what we did at Google, which was to put caching, which is basically computers that store information close to the user. So we'd like preload the cat videos that are most popular near your house is basically storage in the grid.</p><p>Right. And what that gave us was the ability to do some work locally, which increases the reliability of the system as a whole, because you don't have to have the whole network between Azerbaijan and California working perfectly all the time. A lot of times you can just do the work locally. But it also gave us a lot more flexibility around being able to handle really extreme variations in load because you could have some of that load soaked up locally, you could potentially shed a little bit of it, you could potentially move it around to other assets that could soak it up somewhere else.</p><p>And so when I think about that from a grid perspective, the sorts of changes that would support that, they're not huge. We need a better sense of what's going on. We need more control over load showing up, when and how it shows up. And ideally, the ability to smooth out peaks and some reasonably large amount of storage distributed broadly across the grid to like, substation or lower would give us a lot of flexibility in how we manage that system. So if we're not exactly right about exactly how much the planned demand is going to show up, you can just kind of soak it up with local storage and not have to worry about it too much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Get you a little buffer there.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the equivalent here is if I need an electron to run my toaster and the grid can be coordinated, such as to provide that electron from my neighbor's solar panel, let's say. You're using the minimal amount of the network and leaving as much of the network possible open for other things, basically, like you're minimizing total network load work.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And to some degree, you do that already, right. Like, let's say that your neighbor, like me, has an oversized solar panel, I have 9 kW on my garage. During the day a lot of times I'm back feeding into the system, so I'm powering my neighbor's toaster. The reason that doesn't really get us very far in terms of saving money on grid upgrades or really contributing to the health of the system today is that all parts of the grid still need to be sized as if that didn't exist because we don't have any way to guarantee that the peaks don't show up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And this is the thing, is when you're building a network, if you've eliminated 99% of the peaks, you still got to build the network as big as the last remaining peak is.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Or you need a last-ditch alternative to be able to shed that one remaining peak. There's a couple of different ways to do it, but yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's so much in here, but this gets to the grid architecture question that I was writing about back in 2018 with my cool diagrams. That my —</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>They were so cool.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know. I've seen that you're using variations of them in your presentations and it makes me so happy.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>I'm glad it makes you happy because we thought that they were amazing and really explanatory and found them very inspiring.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's Javier at Vox. I'll put a link to that piece in the show notes. But basically, the idea here is that you go to the lowest level, the edge of the grid. Let's say the distribution node, a node on the distribution grid. The idea is you satisfy as much of the demands of that distribution node with resources within that distribution node. Net that out. So the only power that the distribution node is asking for from the transmission system is whatever is left over once it has subtracted its own supply from demand or demand from supply. And then you sort of move up levels.</p><p>Right. So in a sense, everything is kind of a microgrid. It's like microgrids within microgrids within microgrids. I don't even know if that's the right terminology, but islands within islands within islands.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah. You ultimately be looking at a system with multiple abstraction layers where some amount of management is done locally, and then those nodes are connected to the broader system, and then the broader system does its own coordination. But the thing that's really nice about that model is that you don't have to worry about your toaster from the California ISO.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly. There's someone in between the California ISO and me that's worrying about my toaster. Some entity or —</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>That's right, yeah. And technically, you could build a system that did kind of coordinate from the ISO to the toaster. But what you would lose in that kind of system that I think is really important is some amount of local abstraction layers and local management entities where you can optimize for different kinds of work. So optimizing for the temperature in my house is actually kind of different than optimizing for the load on my transformer and kind of different than optimizing for overall supply and demand for the state of California. It is reasonable to have those things handled by different layers, different entities, even.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And there might be neighborhood goals or values or city goals or values that are slightly different than the state goals or values and so on. And also, just as a matter of computational complexity, I mean, this gets to what I was trying to get out of my article. It's one thing for these ISOs or RTOs — these sort of entities that are coordinating transmission grids — it's one thing when you're coordinating — call it like five big power plants in a couple of dozen distribution nodes. Right. As we were saying before, that's a finite number. You can control that more or less centrally.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Model it deterministically.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you can model it deterministically. But once you're getting to thousands and millions of devices trying to coordinate all that at every level from a single point, from a single operator at the top. It just seems to me it's rapidly going to overwhelm their ability, their ability to — and why would you want to? It just doesn't make sense to have one giant regional organization coordinating your toaster, as you say. All of this brings us to the DSO model, which is I was delighted to find beloved by both of us.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is you need an entity — you know, we can discuss whether it has to be a singular entity, but let's just call it an entity for now. You need an entity at the distribution level, at the level of that distribution node that is responsible for coordinating the activities of all these DERs within that distribution node. Matching supply and demand, netting it out, determining how much power is needed by the distribution system. And then that node, that DSO, the distribution system operator, does that work. And then the only signal it needs to send up is a single signal, like we need x amount for our distribution node.</p><p>Right. So it's taking all that complexity at the local level and simplifying it before it sends it upward, basically. And you have that at every level you're simplifying and sending upward. So that once you're at the top level, the ISO, you're dealing with a tractable number of signals rather than trying to talk to every toaster.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, definitely. And even for very large scale load balancing systems like the ones that we used at Google, they were still built that way. Right? It was like local coordination across work within a single data center that was then providing a simple interface to global coordination systems, which basically were like, "hey, how much load you got? How much load can you take?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>And then would readjust allocations every second or two.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So from the transmission operator's perspective, a distribution node will basically just be a single machine that either has a set amount of demand or can offer a set amount of supply.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>It would ideally look a lot like battery does on the ISO system today, I think. Where you've got a certain amount of power, need a certain amount of flexibility available, perhaps a certain amount of power available. But I think something like that would be a small enough adjustment on top of how we think about managing at the transmission level today to be practical.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you? There's a large amount of reform —</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Don't get me wrong. There's definitely new software components, new data components, new business model components, all the above required to do this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it's the business part and the regulatory part that's baffling to me because that's the hardest, in my experience, the hardest part to get moving on. And right now, just to be clear with everyone, there is no such entity in the US. Basically, there's no entity responsible for handling the complexity at the local level, simplifying it and then sending the signal up. So we would have to create those out of parts. So I know Lorenzo Kristov, who I drew on to write that original piece, who's kind of the guru of all this stuff, I think has been beating his head against the wall in California, trying to get them to run DSO sort of test models or create test DSOs.</p><p>So who out there is doing that? And what does the DSO model look like? Is it up and running and working anywhere or is it all experiments?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah. So this is where I get to talk about Australia, as promised, because Australia has a really nice large scale demonstration of this type of model that they're actually pretty far into at this point. You know, like many regions, including the UK, a couple years ago, Australia sort of took a look at the oncoming challenges associated with DERs on the electrical system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Swarming rooftop solar per some previous podcasts here, tons of rooftop solar. Way ahead of anybody else.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And so they were a little bit more motivated, maybe, than other places to try to solve this problem. And so there was a bunch of really interesting work led up there, mostly out of AEMO, but also out of the CSIRO and some of the universities and stuff as well. And I know what this is because I'm from Australia, but what they did was come up with a couple of kind of trial models of coordination between AEMO, which is the Australian market operator this is kind of the ISO, and the distribution network operators and the aggregators and retailers that were working within some of their key markets.</p><p>And one really relevant example of this work was something called Project Edge, which you can Google, although you might need to, I don't know, add AEMO or something to it, just AEMO. And what that was doing was looking at a coordination model exactly like the one that you're describing. So it was asking the distribution network operator to take on more of a DSO role. It was asking the aggregators to provide data about the location of their devices, what they plan to do with them, those kinds of things. And AMO is playing a coordinator role to kind of sponsor that and bring some of the data together.</p><p>But ultimately, it's a sort of joint function between those three parties. That's just one example of how this model could work. The UK is taking a little bit of a different approach with the central regulator and kind of central operator National Grid taking a bit more of a central role in that. But still, it's kind of looking at the idea of cutting up the system into multiple localized components and then having some entity take on a distribution system operator role to collect that data about the state of the grid and the things that are participating in it.</p><p>Coordinate that with data from the aggregators and coordinate that with data about market participation. And in Australia, they liked the results of that so much that they are planning on rolling it out nationwide.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Which is an advantage of being a smaller country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You know, they've got so much rooftop solar now that they're having duck curve problems and even some stability problems, I think. So where they've tried this, they're solving that kind of duck curve-ish problem.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah. So some of the early applications in Australia particularly focus on being able to curtail rooftop solar in places where they have basically oversupply issues. So it's a duck curve problem. Right. And just given the way that sort of social license and kind of public sentiment works in Australia, if you're curtailing somebody's solar, the Australian consumer citizen will kind of expect you to pay for that just as much as they would expect you to pay for the energy that they provided when it wasn't curtailed. And so they needed a market construct to support that. The other thing that is happening within that broader model that I think is really interesting is also the ability to do basically flexible interconnections.</p><p>So being able to basically say you can connect this new load, EV bus charging is my favorite example, but only if you don't exceed a certain capacity allocation. So you can connect it and it's kind of up to you to manage that. And we will give you that capacity allocation either as a fixed allocation or even better as a dynamic allocation. And that idea of like a dynamic capacity allocation that a user has to stay within is called dynamic operating envelopes. And that's a sort of technical component of that Australian work that helps the system operator to manage basically the capacity allocation to every individual DER, consumer or producer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And this is where again, automation comes in because you're not going to get every bus charger operator to sit there with their hand on the lever, no pulling it up and down as these dynamic constraints change.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is a job for computers, this is not a job for humans.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there are DSO models out there happening. In the US, let's talk about the weird US situation. So in the US, recently, FERC issued this order is it 2222?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>2222, which says aggregators — which just in case people are not familiar with these, that's just like a third party entity that strikes contracts with dozens or hundreds or thousands of DER owners to basically give them control over those DERs so that they can treat them as an aggregate, treat them as a big, giant generator, or treat them as a big, giant battery — and then FERC's order 2222 says those aggregators can play in wholesale energy markets, basically.</p><p>So you can take an aggregation of DERs and pretend to be a power plant in the wholesale power market, basically, or act as though you are a power plant in the power plant market. And that's a response to the need for our system to make more of these DERs, to use these DERs rather than just be a victim of these DERs, to take some control of them and use them in such a way that they're useful. But to me, that just feels cludgy, feels like a half-ass solution. Because you have this weird thing where pretty soon, like I said, these wholesale markets, depending on how many aggregators you have, and I'm not sure totally how that market is going to shake out, but there could be a lot of them eventually. Again, you're just like, why have the one central coordination of all those machines?</p><p>It just feels like that should be resolved, that the stuff among individual DERs should be resolved at the local level and not something for the ISO to have to be dealing with. And also, so you have sort of aggregators kind of speaking directly with the ISO, kind of bypassing any DSO. It's just a weird kind of hybrid model of localness and centrality, I guess. To me this seems like a temporary fix on the way to something better. How do you feel about 2222?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>I think it's definitely a key part of a solution. I actually really like 2222 for a little bit of a roundabout reason. What it does is mandate that aggregators should have access to wholesale markets. And it is entirely silent on the interaction of the DERs that they control with the network that they're actually located on on the distribution side, which is kind of bad in the sense that you really want to know probably what's happening with any assets that are moving a lot of load around on the distribution side.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, if you're running a distribution grid and a bunch of the machines within it, their behavior is being coordinated on behalf of the ISO. That might not be exactly the kind of behavior you need for stability at the local level.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Absolutely. It might cause a lot of problems, and I think it's actually likely to cause some problems. However, there's nothing to stop a given distribution operator/utility from deciding that they want to understand what's happening, that they want to be able to play a coordinative role or at least get data from aggregators about what they're doing and to say like, "look, I want to take on a distribution system operator role within this broader system." And there are some implementations of 2222 that are kind of going that direction. The one I'm particularly thinking of is PJM has a filing for their implementation that does include coordinative function with the local utility.</p><p>And I think that's really interesting. Now it doesn't necessarily 100% meet the needs of aggregators because it basically says that the local utility should have visibility into and perhaps dispatch control over aggregate resources.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Kind of a veto, right? Because it's those local needs. That ultimately are the that's the actual toaster coming on.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>So, you don't really want to veto either. But one thing that I think is really important to remember about those aggregators and the resources that they're managing on the customer side is that they want to get paid for the services they can provide. And one way to get paid for that would be to bid them into the wholesale market. But the value of the service that those local DERs could provide is actually a lot higher to the distribution utility that they're located on. If we look at kind of all up and down the value stack, selling energy on the market is part of that value stack.</p><p>But selling peak shaving at the local transformer or substation level theoretically is very valuable in practice. No one's paying today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. If there were a market at the local level, this is the thing. It almost seems like the DSO should be running a local market.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the DSO should be sort of serving as the aggregator. Right. So you let the local market do its thing, and then you bid for whatever's left. You bid up into the wholesale market. Does that make sense?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah. And so I think what this does is provide an opening to start having that conversation. FERC 2222 doesn't really provide the structure for that kind of DSO/ISO aggregator coordination function as we see in other countries. But it does provide kind of a stick in the kind of carrot and stick sense, in the sense that you could either choose to take a leadership role in coordinating the behavior of assets on your network as a utility, or you could just let that happen and kind of deal with the stability and cost implications on the back end.</p><p>And don't get me wrong, there's probably a bunch of utilities that will end up doing the latter, but there is an opportunity to do the former, and some will go that way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So in your efforts to cajole utilities into doing things differently, I feel like the landscape is littered with the exhausted husks of people who have spent their lives trying to get utilities to do things differently. You're focusing specifically on co-ops and munis as kind of places to experiment with this more local model, this DSO model. Why is that?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>So, we do also work with investor-owned utilities, but primarily with ones who have a vision for taking that leadership role and really kind of want to move that direction. But one thing that's really nice about working with co-ops and munis, which are both nonprofit, typically local utility structures, is that they have a very local set of motivations around serving the community, keeping costs low within their specific community. And they're also nonprofits, which makes things a lot simpler from a business model perspective. They also are pretty sensitive to the cost of energy, which for most investor and utilities is financially speaking, it's a pass-through.</p><p>It's not really part of their profit model.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>So for a coopera-muni to save a bunch of money on the cost of the energy that they procure for their customers, it's like kind of a direct benefit because that goes back to the customer in the form of lowered bills or for co-op, they even sometimes send checks back to their members, which I think is really cool, but they care a lot about this and that's a business motivation for them. Likewise, if they are looking at substantial system upgrades because they're going to see a lot of load growth that might be from electrification. But actually for these utilities today it's more often because somebody is like planning on putting in a factory or a data center or something like that.</p><p>They're open to looking at non-wireless alternatives and kind of using smart management to avoid doing a very expensive substation upgrade again because they would have to pass that cost back along to a very limited number of members. And it's not like investor and utilities don't have a similar broad motivation or care about it. But if you're a co-op executive or staff member, people come up to your front desk asking about like "hey, why is my bill $15 higher?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We'll run into you in the supermarket.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>That's right. And it's just a very different relationship with the community for those utilities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you think they're more open to this. Have you gotten movement? Are there US co-ops and munis that are setting the standard here?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, so there are a bunch of utilities that have been really interested in kind of moving down this path, towards a distribution system operator model and taking on a more active kind of local system operator role. And that's true across kind of all of those segments from co-op to muni to some IOUs as well. The thing that's nice about the co-ops is that they can move faster because they're small, and sometimes also they will just decide that something's working and decide to roll it out broadly. Whereas if you're at an investor and utility and you had the greatest thing in the world, you'd probably still be stuck going through a kind of regulatory approval cycle for scaling it up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Process, process, process.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>There's good and bad to that. But the co-ops are often self-regulating or at least minimally regulated by the Public Utility Commission because they are deemed to be acting in the public interest so they can move quickly. And so there are a subset of co-ops which are rural electric utilities that have been experimenting with these models and are moving very quickly in this direction and it looks different depending on the utility as to what that looks like for them. Some of them have been pushing really hard on generating energy locally and avoiding the wheeling costs of shipping it across transmission and putting that money back into the community.</p><p>So there's one that we work with in northern New Mexico that does that, and they serve the area around Taos, and they decided that they wanted to get to 100% of their daytime electricity load served by local solar. They're actually at about 120% now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, wow.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>And they're starting to look at models where they can export power out of the community, which I think is a really interesting economic growth opportunity for communities like that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Again, if you can imagine these local markets, you can also imagine markets in between distribution nodes. Right. Like, imagine if my distribution node, I'm handling all the complexity within the DSO, handling all the complexity within the distribution node, comes up with a certain amount of leftover demand that it needs satisfied. It could procure that from the next distribution node over. Right. And it's in a peer-to-peer transaction and not have to involve the ISO at all, theoretically.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah. And there's probably a bunch of different ways that this might play out, but you certainly could see a world where that's the case. And it has a delightfully localized kind of quality to it in the sense that the community is mostly self-supplying in local electricity and including batteries and flexibility that get them through the night. But they also have this opportunity to potentially export a resource that they have a lot of, which is pretty cool because it's sun.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Part of the delightful locality of it is that some communities might value resilience more, so they'll want to, say, bank more of their excess solar and batteries. Some communities might want the money more so they'll be more likely to sell it across to a different distribution. You can see communities will actually have much more fine-grained control over their energy. And one of the points Lorenzo makes a lot of times is this would make it much easier for local electricity and energy policy to be coordinated with local building policy and local transportation policy, and basically, like, your local — becomes part of how you want to run your local area.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yep. And ideally, that would include members of the local community getting paid for the flexibility that they provide, too, because that's a big part of how we get this done. One other example I'd want to give for that is there's another utility I know pretty well. It's in Colorado. They're expecting to double their load in the next five years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just population growth?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>No, it's actually a mix of factories, clean energy production facilities, delightful also, and data center loads, which are really growing due to all those big cloud computing facilities that we mentioned earlier. So they're looking at doubling their current energy usage, and there's no way they're going to get enough transmission additions built out to support that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Especially since it takes 10 to 15 years to build one line.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yes. Transmission is one of the few industries where you can pass along a single project to your children, which is not a compliment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A legacy project.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah. And so they're looking very closely at models where they can trade generation and flexibility and storage amongst their large users, particularly within their territory. Because the usage profiles for a refrigeration facility are different from that of a shipping facility. Maybe a lot of EVs charging and different again from a factory facility. A lot of those would also be inclined to put local generation into the commercial and industrial site and getting all of that stuff signed up to become part of the future overall supply profile for that territory, it requires a DSO function. There's kind of no other way to do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Somebody's got to be in charge of all that.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah. And so that's a place where the utility taking that leadership role really makes a lot of sense because I don't know how else they would manage it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. What do you think are the prospects of basically just local distribution utilities right now which are just sort of running the wires right now and billing customers growing into the DSO role? Like when you bring it up to them, do they just blink at you? It's such a sort of cosmic upgrade of their role and importance and responsibilities, etc. Are any of them eager to do that?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, there are a lot of utilities that see this as being part of their future. I think the tricky part is it's a really big change for an industry that hasn't had load growth in 20 years. Being able to suddenly adapt to all of the technology and organizational and business model changes required to support that is going to be a lift.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. It's wild. Like 20 years without load growth and without really substantial change in the industry and all of a sudden now it's like new tech, new models, new regulatory models, new legal models like boom boom boom boom boom. It's a lot.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah. And so there are utilities that are definitely thinking about this. Like SCE has a public roadmap that's really nice that covers a transition to a DSO model. The only thing that's a bit of an issue with the normal utility process for this kind of change is that it tends to be very slow and in many cases we're going to need to see rapid adaptation in the next like three to five years. And for most utilities, they're used to kind of planning on a five to ten-year time horizon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Utilities and PUCs, I mean, I'm not sure that PUCs are exactly legendary for being agile either.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>They do compare notes. So if you get something that works well in one place, a lot of times they will try to spread that more broadly. And so, from my perspective, one of the best things that we can do to make this happen is just show it operating at scale in as many places as possible. Not all of those will be right the first time, but it's not the kind of problem that you can really sit down for five years, come up with a solution to and then implement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, which is the utility way, right. You make this point in one of your talks too. It's like the whole software world model, which is that you sort of build, iterate, test, learn, rebuild, reiterate, test, learn that's foreign to the utilities.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>And it's not that, in the software world, it's not like we don't plan ahead or design things. Of course we do. But you design with the idea that rapid iteration is going to get you closer to the goal more quickly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>And we've seen really good success with this in adjacent industries. Right. Like one of my old bosses at Google was really interested in skydiving and decided that he wanted to jump from space from a weather balloon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Such a Google guy.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>This is definitely a Google problem. And so in order to do this, he acquired — this is kind of post-Google for him, but he got really interested in spacesuit design, and then worked with the company in the US, that's a premier designer of spacesuits, who had not designed a new one since, like, 1973, to rapidly develop, prototype, test and deploy new spacesuits so that he could jump from space in a weather balloon. Which by the way is a total badass move. He's an engineer from the ground up. But so they worked in a really iterative kind of rapid development and testing cycle and they got that done within a couple of years and now the same company is developing the spacesuits that are like the next generation ones that are used for SpaceX and Blue Origin and all of those.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, if nothing else, this is like a chance to be a hero, right? This is a wide open field and there's just so many opportunities here for innovation, for people to try new things and show successes.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a really exciting time in the industry broadly and for the subset of folks at utilities that are really actually interested in thinking about what the future of the industry is going to look like and kind of working towards building that. Boy, it's an exciting time to be in that industry too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know. I've been writing about this stuff for 20 years now and it is still somewhat head spinning how all of a sudden it's just all happening.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>It's changing really fast on the ground.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's just waiting and waiting and then boom, all of a sudden it's all happening. So I would feel bad if we did this whole thing and I didn't give you a chance to sort of say what your company does. Your company is called Camus. Why Camus, by the way? I was thinking existentialists. This must be about the existential despair that you experience when you contemplate trying to reform utilities?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Not exactly, but related. So we are named for this philosopher, and the reason for that is actually really specific. So Camus wrote this essay called The Myth of Sisyphus.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>There's a short version in a longer book by the same name.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>"One must imagine Sisyphus happy." One of my all-time favorite philosophy quotes.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the short version is only about three pages long, and I totally recommend it. But Camus is basically asking, "how do you create a sense of meaning in the face of a large, uncontrolled, potentially godless universe?" Right? Like, where do you derive a sense of purpose? And his answer for this was basically, you pick something, you work on it, you find joy in the process. Not in the notion that you're going to win, but in the everyday act of pushing a rock up a hill and following it back down.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I love it. At the base level, I think there are sort of like levels of your service. At the base level, you're just helping utilities be more aware of DERs and then sort of laddering up from there, like coordinating them, et cetera, et cetera. So, how high up do you go on that ladder?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Well, since we've gone to the trouble of describing a DSO and what it does, our goal is really to create a software platform that will enable a utility to take on that role. So a much more real time and local operations model that can include local resources as part of the supply and demand landscape and ultimately include them into capacity management and network management for the grid and let them get paid for it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. So you're creating the tools for the DSOs for whenever they show up?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>We are creating the tools for the utilities that want to take on that role and working with them to figure out what that looks like in practice.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And we should emphasize for the utilities out there listening, this is not a binary thing, it's not like —</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>It's a process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>jumping off the high dive into the whatever. There are pieces of this you can adopt, one at a time.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Yes, that's right. It's a process. Right. The question is not like, what's it take to get to the grid of tomorrow. The question is more like what is the set of reasonable steps that you can take with the data and control capabilities of today to add more sophistication, get better visibility, add coordination, talk to aggregators, coordinate with FERC 2022 deployment and 2222 deployments, all of those kinds of things. So it's going to be a process, but it doesn't have to be impossible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But it's just great that this idea of making the electricity system more like the Internet goes way back. As I'm sure you're aware, Al Gore was talking about the Internet. Of course, he's trying to coin a term for it back in 2007. And I went through a period of hype for it, and being very excited about it, and DERs, and all that. And then I sort of ran up against utility and transigence and had my life force drained. But now it seems like at long last the hype cycle has come back around and it's actually happening now.</p><p>Like there's actual things happening, actual movement in that direction happening.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>It's all happening.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's very exciting. So final question then, and this is kind of a bit of a curveball, but I'm curious. So say we imagine our glorious future here in the US, where we have revolutionized the system. And we now have all local electricity being administered and run by DSOs, who, as we say, resolve the complexity of the local area before passing on a signal upward, maybe nested a couple of levels. Maybe like the level above them has three or four distribution nodes and the level above them, et cetera, et cetera. But by the time it gets to the transmission level, you've already maximized the use of local resources.</p><p>Basically, the goal here is to maximize the use of local resources before calling on large scale distant resources. So imagining that glorious future where we've made that happen, how much of net US energy do you think will come from local resources versus still coming from big utility scale power plants on the transmission system? Do you have either a predicted or desired balance of those two in your kind of perfect world?</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>So I've seen modeled estimates that put that somewhere between 30% to 50%. And you talk to other folks in the space who do modeling on this. There's some really good work from Vibrant Clean Energy that did a bunch of work on the potential role of local resources a couple of years ago. But I think somewhere in that kind of 40% ish space is likely and practical. In Australia right now, by the way, it's sometimes 50 and sometimes 70% local. So it's just like do you mean instantaneous or overall? Because if it's instantaneous, sometimes it could be 100% or even more if we're storing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. I mean overall, like on a net yearly basis —</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>But on an overall basis, because the sun does go down and the wind doesn't always blow, as you covered very well. I feel like 40% is pretty reasonable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. That'd be a good, like something to go to one of those betting sites, start a pool on, say, 2040. What's the net balance? Well, Astrid, this has been an absolute delight, as I knew it would be. I love this whole subject. I love what you're doing. As I say, it feels like you are someone that I willed into being by writing my 2018 piece, which is I'm sure you existed before that, but —</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>I certainly did. But the piece made a huge difference in how I was thinking about the space. So I'm pretty grateful for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Well, it's a delight to have you on, and I'd love to have you back on again sometime once this stuff evolves some, because this is an endlessly, inexhaustibly fascinating topic. So thank you again.</p><p><strong>Astrid Atkinson</strong></p><p>Thank you so much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/managing-a-distributed-grid</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:138882473</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 25 Nov 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/138882473/c4c88c0c94ceb251de636d6bac42379a.mp3" length="97460035" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4871</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/138882473/fac0ab68e597b5134d40d6c9f17e5bc9.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[FERC is about to make some very important decisions about transmission]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is poised to pass new policy that will expand regional transmission capacity, but how impactful will its new rule be? In this episode, grid policy expert Rob Gramlich gives the lay of the land.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/cgcpa7ugz9wf5emynmmj6/volts23.11.17-rob.gramlich.pdf?rlkey=flr3l9az274o6axp6gmwsyu34&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/ferc-is-about-to-make-some-very-important-decisions-about-transmission"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>By now, it’s fairly well understood that the US badly needs more electricity transmission lines to keep up with the changing generation mix and growth in demand that will come with clean electrification. But new lines, especially the much-needed longer-distance regional lines, are being built at a snail’s pace. If the US is to hit its mid-century climate goals, transmission capacity expansion must radically accelerate.</p><p>Congress helped a little with money in the infrastructure bill, and the Biden administration helped by establishing a Grid Deployment Office inside the Department of Energy, but arguably the biggest opportunity for progress comes in the form of an upcoming rule by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). </p><p>It will beef up the commission’s existing rules on regional transmission planning, but exactly how much it will strengthen them depends on the final rule, expected early next year. Transmission advocates are urging FERC to pass a rule with reel teeth — including Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, who sent the commission <a target="_blank" href="https://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/building-on-work-in-inflation-reduction-act-leader-schumer-calls-on-ferc-to-make-americas-energy-grid-cheaper-cleaner-and-more-reliable">a letter with encouragement and suggestions</a> in July. </p><p>Nobody knows more about grid policy than Rob Gramlich, founder and president of Grid Strategies, a policy analysis and strategy firm. He is executive director of the WATT Coalition, co-founded and used to run Americans for a Clean Energy Grid, serves as a board advisor to a half-dozen other groups, and has a long history in the industry, including a stint at FERC in the early 2000s. </p><p>I talked with Rob about the current state of affairs in transmission policy, the scope of FERC’s authority, and the details that matter in the coming rule. Don’t let the technical-sounding subject scare you off — this was a fun one, and incredibly clarifying.</p><p>Okay then, with no further ado, Rob Gramlich. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Thanks, David. Great to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I am excited to talk about this. I know that perhaps FERC is not at the top of people's mind when they think about excitement and thrills, but I think people will see by the end of this why this is a very good time to tune in to what FERC's doing. So let's start here. I think we can assume for the purposes of this pod that Volts listeners understand the need for more transmission, specifically the need for more long-distance transmission for a bunch of reasons. We know that the resource mix is changing. We care more about renewables now.</p><p>They're located in different places. They're located not necessarily next to load. They're remote. We're going to double or triple the amount of electricity we're using in the coming years, because we're electrifying everything. So we need more transmission for that reason. We know that connecting up a wider geographical area makes the whole system more reliable, makes the whole system cheaper. Transmission is the wonder tool of energy. It makes everything better, and yet we are not building it. So back in the late 90s, FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which has jurisdiction over interstate transmission, released a series of orders.</p><p>So in the beginning, there were, just across the nation, just dozens and dozens of individual vertically integrated utilities, all of which were building their own transmission, more or less for their own areas. And so back in the late 90s, FERC saw this and many other people saw the need for more interregional transmission and issued a series of orders trying to kind of nudge things in that direction, doing, among other things, they created regional transmission operators and independent system operators, RTOs and ISOs, which were supposed to be regional organizations that did regional transmission planning. And there were others too, I think, going all the way up to 2011, there were other orders, basically like, "please friggin utilities, get together and start doing some planning, do some interregional planning." And yet, despite this series of orders, and despite the existence now of RTOs, we're still not building interregional transmission.</p><p>I mean, we're building it at a snail's pace and not necessarily where we need it, and certainly nothing close to the pace we need to be building at. So maybe let's just start here. Why, given the existence of RTOs, which are explicitly supposed to do this, is there still not adequate regional transportation planning? Maybe you could run through the three P's here. That's going to help kind of set us up for what's to come.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Sure. Well, first of all, thanks for your help in communicating all that. So let's stipulate that the need for transmission is understood. And that's great that it is, because a few years ago it wasn't. But you've been helpful.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It does seem like that at least has sunk in, in the wider world.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>I think that's right. And of course, in recent years, it's been more sort of the climate-focused policymakers and community who have understood this, which is great, as they should, for the incredible clean energy need for transmission and climate benefit. But just suffice to say, it wasn't always such a democratically tilted issue. But that's a separate conversation we could get into. But, yeah, FERC has been, in the 90s, the early 2000s, had orders trying to beg, plead and borrow the industry to get going on regional transmission. And in fact, it goes even way back. I mean, the 1935 Federal Power Act itself has some language about the voluntary, encouraging the voluntary coordination of the systems.</p><p>And then there were actions in the pre-war and wartime to be able to produce the military assets and airplanes and everything by — we needed to increase the production basically out of the electric industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a bummer. We decided to build this interstate road network basically for security purposes around then, and did not decide at the same time to do the same thing for transmission. It would have been a good move on our part.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>That's right. But there were actions by the predecessor to FERC, the Federal Power Commission, during those same years, though, trying to strengthen the connections, but it only went so far. And then it was really when the electric industry tried to restructure to get generation competition in the 90s that it started pushing harder. There was a 1993 regional transmission group RTG policy statement, and then they said, well, that's not enough. And then they had Order 888 for open access transmission. That included a push for voluntary creation of independent system operators. That's where that term really came into practice.</p><p>It was encouraged and voluntary. And then the commission tried in 1999 to require participation in the regional transmission organizations (RTOs). That's where that term was sort of defined. But Chairman Hoecker, at that time, couldn't quite get the votes to make that mandatory — so it was voluntary. And then I was part of — my full-time job was standard market design. I'm not embarrassed to say that one never made it to being even a rule because of a political backlash. Again, another story for another day. But that was at least strong encouragement. And then Order 890, when Republican Chairman Joe Kelliher came in, he had been on House Energy and Commerce and in the Bush administration, and he tried to require, well, he did require through Order 890, some strengthened planning requirements.</p><p>And then Chairman Jon Wellinghoff issued Order 1000 and the commission, of course, in 2011. And that also sort of went another step further. In this process, some of those orders were challenged in the courts. Then FERC's hand was actually strengthened after all of that because the court challenges upheld FERC's authority and said, "absolutely, you can require transmission planning." So FERC's role here has only been strengthened over the years in terms of the clarity of its legal authority. And yet, as you say, it hasn't really worked yet. So here we are at the end of 2023 with an agency that actually is in charge of this and has quite clearly been claimed by the courts to be the one entity that can really do this in a significant way.</p><p>And it's actually kind of exciting now, because look at this, we have this great proposed rule that Chairman Glick and the commission issued a year and a half ago —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, before we get to that, though, I want an explanation for why those previous ones didn't work. Like why aren't RTOs building these things?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yeah, there are probably a few reasons.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. In like 100 words or less. Because we can't get too bogged down in this, because I know this is a tar pit.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>I'll try to just give you a few. Look, I mean, one issue is incumbent generators don't necessarily want to enable new generation to come onto the grid. So we have these RTO entities, incumbent generation owners, whether they're part of a utility or independent, they are usually not the strongest supporters of new transmission. So that's a factor. And then those entities are active in FERC proceedings as well. That's one factor. Another factor: We had all this transmission collaboration happening in 2010 through 2013, and a bunch of transmission got built. We actually got a ton of new renewable energy connected to the grid a decade ago.</p><p>From these, I'm sure many of your listeners know about the multivalue projects in the Midwest and Texas competitive renewable energy zones. So there was a little bit of a renaissance then, but then it was very short lived, and it ended like ten years ago, it stopped. Some people say Order 1000 had some unintended consequences that stopped that. I think that's part of it. Also, the cost of solar dropped and the cost of gas dropped, so a lot of that transmission was more wind driven. And when you could do a lot of gas and solar, you didn't need quite as much transmission.</p><p>So I think that does factor as well. And then I just sort of think, like, inertia took over. People got used to going to regional transmission planning meetings and making sure nothing actually happened, and they got good at eating muffins and checking the compliance box, but then not actually doing anything. So, I think it's just ripe for a whole reshuffling. And that's what FERC can do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so before we get to this FERC opportunity, let's at least give a little shout out to some movement lately, some policy wins. So in the Infrastructure Act, the Bipartisan Infrastructure Act, there's some money for transportation, which I think is nice but inadequate. And then there's this new Grid Development Office. Are those the two biggies, and how sort of like a big of a deal are those, relatively?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Relatively, yeah, potentially over time. The Grid Deployment Office could be huge, and it's off to a great start. I will say the current team there and the current administration and Secretary Granholm are leading, I think, a very productive and promising exercise there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Was that created by legislation, or was that just created by an executive action?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Technically just an executive action by Secretary Granholm. She can set up offices, if she so chooses —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As an office within DOE.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>That's right, which — put this on your list of future policies. Let's actually formalize that in legislation. It would be nice to do that, but there was actually an attempt. But that's a longer story. But that office has financing tools, it has permitting tools, it has capabilities. They've been hiring like crazy, really good people, and that could really be a very helpful enabler of transmission, private sector investment. There's no shortage of capital that wants to invest in this sector, but it's just a morass trying to get projects done. So DOE has important tools. Many of them are now kind of all being consolidated in this Grid Deployment Office to enable transmission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what's the money in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Act?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Right. Well, very little, unfortunately. I mean, there's like one really great provision called the Transmission Facilitation Program. Senator Cantwell introduced that, but it's a $2.5 billion program, and it's not technically a loan, but it's sort of like a loan. It does have to be paid back, and so it's not really that much money. It's intended to be a revolving fund, but $2.5 billion in the scheme of an industry that spends that every couple of months is not transformative.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And there was, at one point in the Build Back Better saga, a pretty hefty tax credit for transmission, which got stripped out at some point. That would have been serious money, right?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>That could have been serious money. It's scored at 13 billion. But who knows? The way tax credits work is if the industry really gets excited, it's uncapped. And more could have been done, so that could have been great. And it's so hard to figure out who pays for how much. Just starting to evolve into the three P's, planning, permitting and paying that paying part is, I think, the hardest, because it's a public good and everybody benefits some, so nobody wants to pay for it. And so that tax credit could have at least made that whole problem 30% easier by covering 30% of the investment cost.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So then you're having to allocate 70% rather than having to allocate 100%. And we'll get into that cost allocation in a bit. So we've had some movement, but inadequate, and there is some legislative stuff that would be relatively easy and high impact. And maybe when we get through this FERC stuff, we can touch on that before we're done. But now, in terms of the tools Biden has to use here, well, not even Biden, really, since it's supposed to be independent. But in terms of federal tools, basically we're dealing with FERC. So before we jump into the proposed rule, let's just talk for a second about FERC.</p><p>As I understand it, there are supposed to be five commissioners, ideally. There are, in fact, four, and we're heading to three. So, make some sense of all that for us. Where are we with FERC in terms of the balance of commissioners?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. There's supposed to be five, no more than three from one party. So over the years, it's typically been three-two, one direction or the other.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>And Chairman Glick, his term expired, and so he is off. And that seat is open. Commissioner Danly, his term ends, well, technically, June 30.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, wait, Glick is gone, which left a two-two Republican-Democrat split. That's the current state of affairs?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>That's the current state of affairs, as we said. Yes, for, I guess, the entire year of 2023, it'll be two-two.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And then Danly, who is a Republican, is stepping down when?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>That's right. So, yes, every year one seat opens because they're staggered five-year terms. So he will need to leave by the end of 2023 in a month or two.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. Which will leave a two to one Democratic majority on FERC and those other two — we don't have to get into this, but what the hell is going on? Why is it taking so long to get new commissioners? Is it Joe Manchin? I'm just going to throw it out there. I'm just guessing. Is it Joe Manchin?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, certainly he's the chair of the committee and he has strong preferences that he expressed both on existing commissioners and potential new commissioners. And the White House technically gets to — you know, the two of them have to agree, the president and Senator Manchin, but also the history and the tradition — the practice is sort of often one party will pair with the other party, so you'll do two together, and there's just been just a lack of activity. I'm not actually sure either party. I'm not sure the president or McConnell or Barrasso or Manchin. I'm not sure any of them are like, hustling or feel a need to hustle to get a lot done right away.</p><p>I think they all recognize, like in 2024, when you're down to three, then you really can start having problems. Like, you might not have a quorum just to get business done. Somebody might have a cousin who, one commissioner might have a cousin who works for a company, and they get recused from the case and you can't vote the order out, and it gets dicey like that. So just when situations like that arise, the Senate Energy Committee, knowing it's their responsibility to make sure business can get done at FERC, they'll get more active. So I do expect in early 2024 they will get active.</p><p>There seems to be a name that Manchin and the White House agree on. There could be a pairing. There could be somebody that McConnell and or Barrasso recommend from the Republican side. But I think everybody's kind of holding their cards close right now. There's not a lot of —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that could take a while. So what's relevant for us here, I think, is if this rule is, the rule that we're about to talk about is advanced expeditiously, it could be voted on by a three-commissioner FERC, with a two to one Democratic majority, meaning it could be made good and strong and get through with Democratic votes.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>That's right. I mean, the order seems close to ready. They wanted to do interconnection first. We could talk about that, but that was a major undertaking, one of the biggest orders ever. And so Chairman Phillips had to sequence things one way or another. Couldn't do them all at once. So that happened first. They seem to be getting close to ready on this big planning rule. And so I think early in 2024 they'd be ready to do that. It will be a two to one at that point. But everybody in FERC world likes to not talk about it in partisan terms.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of course, or pretending.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Well, the proposal did issue as a unanimous bipartisan proposal. So the hope is that it would be a three to zero and it could be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, let's just say there's no obvious reason that this should be partisan at all. It's literally good for everyone, except maybe some utilities. It's good for society. Name your entity. Bipartisan would be nice. But should that fail, it could still get through. So tell us a little bit about this planning rule. It dates back to 2021. It was a Glick joint originally.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>That's right, yeah, so Chairman Glick and his team really led the development of it. The other commissioners were there, Commissioner Clements is the other Democrat on the commission who I don't think we mentioned yet, and she's very supportive of the rule. And then they had this extensive process with the states. That's part of why it's taken a lot of time, which is, I think, great and very helpful. But there's this incredibly extensive record of discussion with states on how this works through this joint federal-state task force. So it has been out there for now 18 months. And again, we had commissioners transition and a chair transition and other big orders that the commission had to get out, but I feel like it's ripe now and good and close to ready.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One other preface question. So I saw that Chuck Schumer, Senate Majority leader, wrote a letter to FERC recently acknowledging the importance of this rule and giving some recommendations for strengthening it, recommendations that, as far as I can tell, were lifted more or less straight from this report you wrote last year with recommendations, and we're going to go through some of those recommendations. But is it the case that the current order, as it currently exists does none of these things and that's why you're recommending all these things? Or so it's unclear on how strong the extant order is and how much of these recommendations — you know what I mean? Where is it now?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yeah. So many things are great about the order. It has all the right analysis, I think, and record evidence and support from a really vast majority of the industry, including utilities and consumer advocates and the whole range of stakeholders who care about these things. And the proposed rule is generally, I think, excellent. And I think Chairman Glick is going to be commended or should be commended for that, as well as the other commissioners. But there were a few things that somehow ended up a little bit weak in the proposal, and I don't think, accomplished what the commission thought it was trying to accomplish.</p><p>Now, there's a lot of cooks in that kitchen, and the commissioners don't talk about internal deliberations. So one can only on the outside kind of guess what happens on the inside. Where I used to be there walking up and down the hall trying to negotiate orders like this. But sometimes you can guess because the commissioners make public statements about what they like or dislike or what they would want to see in the final rule. But I thought that letter you mentioned from Senator Schumer did an excellent job of saying, "hey, here's a few things you really need to fix to make this thing do what you say it does."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, let's walk through some of those. So there's sort of three buckets here of recommendations. One is about planning what to require in terms of interregional planning. There's some stuff about cost allocation, paying the planning and the paying — permitting, I think is separate and will have to be dealt with separately. And then there's stuff on basically making sure the process is cost-effective with a little bit more FERC oversight. So we're going to walk through all those. So in terms of interregional planning, there are four specific recommendations about what to require of the planning process. So let's walk through those.</p><p>The first is just maybe do your planning based on what you actually think is going to happen to the electricity system, forward looking rather than backward looking. Just tell us a little bit about that.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. And by the way, the rule really is more intra-regional than interregional. They're going to do, hopefully, they'll do interregional separate, but they bit off the intra-regional.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, so this is planning within regions.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Right. As a first step. But honestly, everything in here could equally be applied. You could just a year later come through with a redline — global search and replace intra with inter. And it's all the same, things would work. But let's focus on the regional. And these are wide regions of the country, you know, the whole Midwest, the whole mid-Atlantic. The west is in three areas, but could be one merged together. There's discussion about that. But at any rate, yeah, the planning requirements. And again, the courts have said, FERC, you've got very strong authority to require planning practices, whether you can actually direct the outcome, like plan for this or that outcome.</p><p>That's sort of untested. But in terms of planning methodologies, absolutely FERC, go for it. So they issued these planning methodologies and the first one, as you say, is essentially plan for the anticipated future resource mix. If you're going to plan —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I had to read this section a couple of times. I'm like, "they're not doing that?!" What else would you do?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>You would think that if there are these organizations around the country with regional planning in the name of the organization and in their charter of what they're supposed to do, as well as departments called regional planning and people with regional transmission planning in their title, you would think you would be forgiven if you thought, "oh, these people plan," which by any definition means like preparing for the anticipated future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, right.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Well, that is not actually what happens. So in most of the country, they really don't do any kind of long term, they don't do an estimate of what the future resource mix is going to be. And I'm talking about load and generation and retirements and additions and all these sort of macro categories of the things that change on a transmission system. And by the way, it's not like saying, "oh well, the president wants to decarbonize the system by such and such amount, by such and such a date, therefore everybody do that." No, it's not even saying that.</p><p>It's just saying "regional planner, you and your region anticipate these changes, these additions, these subtractions, these load changes, and then plan for that."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the critique is not even that your forecasts are inadequate or that your forecasts and modeling are flawed in some way, but just that they're literally just not —</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>ONot doing it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>doing at all. Right, that's a little crazy. Seems like an entirely reasonable request that when you're planning, you anticipate what's to come. And especially, I think this is implied, but let's just state it, because we're in a period of incredibly large scale rapid change in that very system, in what sources are coming online and retirements are accelerating all this growing load because of electrification, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p>So it's just crazy that your regional planning involves no regional planning.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Exactly right. And that's a striking thing about the official record evidence in this case of like so many, I mean, scores of utilities in states came in and say, "yeah, we basically think all these changes are happening and we need to plan for them." And those entities, states and utilities and others come from a variety of political perspectives about whether they want those changes to be happening faster or slower. But they all kind of acknowledge some baseline. And of course I'm sure in the details their estimates are different, but they're all pretty much in the ballpark and directionally all entirely consistent, that, for example, there's just going to be dramatic wind and solar and storage growth in every region, and that's when it's in the interconnection queue and every other evidence of what the changes are going to be.</p><p>So there was a remarkable alignment in the record about the changes happening that need to be planned for. And so, yes, first and foremost, if your listeners have to shut off the podcast now, please don't. But that's the number one, just very basic thing that this rule would require.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Number one requirement for planning process involve planning.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Right. Plan for the future, right. It seems radical, but yeah. Planning for the past — no, no, don't plan for the past — we're planning for the future. Radical idea.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then number two is consider all the benefits holistically. To say a little bit about sort of like what current practice is and what that would mean.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Transmission has multiple benefits. There's reliability, resilience. It reduces congestion on the grid, which is sort of the day to day cost that consumers have to pay when you have to ramp up expensive generators because of transmission constraints —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or curtail solar.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Or curtail wind and solar, absolutely. And it's very hard to often separate out all these benefits. I mean, you build transmission for one purpose and it has all these other benefits for other purposes. Well, this is where the proposed rule got kind of weak. It sort of, here's all these benefits. But then it kind of goes back through and says, "well, those are sort of optional.</p><p>You can look at this one or that one. It's sort of up to you." Well, the problem with that is that's not a regulatory requirement. That's just giving — based on the power structure of a region. If they choose not to do any of this stuff, it's giving them a get-out-of-jail-free card to not do this, to say, "well, we're just going to pick and choose our benefits." And what happens is it's like if you think of a really basic benefit cost analysis, if you're allowed to say, "well, I'm only going to consider one of the four or five or more types of benefits compared to all of the costs," you're almost guaranteed to not have the transmission lines pencil out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>It's sort of like if you bought your car only for the basis of its benefit to drive to the grocery store, but not all the other reasons you use a car, you're probably not going to buy a car because it's not worth it just for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also, let's just say there was nothing in place preventing them from considering these benefits. So telling them voluntarily, you may consider these benefits like, yeah, they could have been considering these benefits and they aren't. So clearly there's a reason they aren't, so clearly they need to be pushed to do it, not just allowed.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Exactly. Right. So what's the point of a federal rule if it's just an encouragement to do what you're able to do before?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So this would be a requirement that in those cost benefit analyses run on a particular transmission project, that all the benefits of the transmission project, including resilience, emission reductions, reliability, cost, et cetera, all be put on the benefit side of the ledger.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yes, that's right. Now, in the details, there are some issues. FERC didn't even go into a carbon benefit or any number of benefits you could get to that are sort of a little bit outside of normal FERC Federal Power Act jurisdiction. And without going too far into this, there's a little bit more that FERC can sort of allow and accept from regions as opposed to what it would require if it's doing a nationwide rule. So again, what I'm suggesting and what a lot of different clean energy and environmental groups suggested is very modest in terms of just doing the basics within traditional FERC regulatory domain about reliability, resilience, and congestion cost, traditional economic regulatory things that couldn't be misconstrued as making FERC be an environmental regulator for the country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, require the basics and then maybe allow extras like emission reduction. So that's number two, consider all the benefits. Number one, plan. Number two, consider all benefits. Number three is when you are looking for solutions to congestion, etc., consider all the possible solutions. So a new transmission line is not the only possible solution to the problems solved by transmission lines. So, explain that one just a little bit.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>So, there are different technology options that are available today, which is great. There are grid enhancing technologies, and I know you had a recent podcast on that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Volts listeners are familiar with these ways of getting more throughput from existing transmission.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>So, I recommend going there. And so those technologies were recommended. A little bit of back and forth about the exact list. Hopefully, that turns out in a good place to consider all those technologies. So that's kind of the category of like squeezing more out of the existing wires. And then another category is new wires. There's new types of conductors, high-performance conductors, I call them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's called reconductoring existing lines. That's what that's about?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's one way to do it where you can just put a different wire on an existing tower, or you can take the towers out and put a different type of maybe bigger, heavier cables. You can have superconductors, you could have composite core. There are different opportunities for that. So there's conductors as well, and then more broadly, there are just other technology options. And so FERC proposed these, and I think various parties are just trying to make sure that the commission requires full consideration of these technologies, in part because, look, nobody wants to have to go to new rights of way when you don't need to.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You say maybe like from a social perspective, we don't necessarily want to do new rights of way because they're difficult and they take a long time. But it's worth saying here that the utilities, the reason this needs to be made mandatory is that the utilities make money by spending money. Right. This is something I come back to over and over again. Like from a utilities perspective, they get a big rate of return if they build a brand new transmission line, whereas some of these other technologies, I think, fall under kind of maintenance costs that they don't get a rate of return on.</p><p>So this is one of those areas where utilities probably prefer building more hardware when there are alternative solutions that could avoid the need to build that. Is that accurate?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>That is an issue. There are a lot of utilities that are doing a lot of great stuff on their system, but it's also true that this is a regulated monopoly industry. There's a reason we have economic regulators, and their job is to ensure that we get reliable service at affordable, just, and reasonable rates. And the reason we have this whole regulatory system is because the incentives are not aligned with consumers' interests if left unregulated. And so that's just sort of what regulators are supposed to be doing. And they're supposed to make sure, and they do this at the state level and the federal level, they're supposed to make sure that the right technology is deployed and it makes sense to get that reliable service at a reasonable rate.</p><p>So consumer interests are very persuasive and important at FERC on this. They want to make sure, particularly because a lot of these are very low-cost technologies. They want to make sure that these technologies are deployed in the right way at the right time. I think a lot of the folks communicating with FERC feel the same way. And again, from those who are concerned about land use have the same type of concern. They don't want to disturb previously undisturbed land with new rights of way if they don't have to. So this is where these technologies can really come in and help maximize what we get out of existing rights of way and existing transmission assets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so then the fourth, and this, I think, is a little bit more to wrap your head around. The fourth is that these organizations should select, rather than doing these cost-benefit analyses one at a time on proposed projects, FERC should require them to work on a portfolio and to do the cost-benefit analysis basically on the portfolio. So instead of choosing an individual project to maximize benefits, you're choosing the portfolio that maximizes net benefits. Is that accurate?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. There are a lot of efficiencies there that can be uncovered when you look at all the transmission options and configurations together and find the right portfolio or the right suite of upgrades. There could be just a substation expansion or upgrade that solves a problem more efficiently than a new line would. Or when you put some technologies along with a substation here and reconductoring over there and a new line over there, the portfolio has a lot of efficiencies because it is a network. The whole thing is an integrated network. So treat it as a network, plan it as a network.</p><p>And so that's kind of another sort of best practice transmission planning feature that historically — I mean, if you ask the planning engineers from 50 years ago, when we actually planned big transmission before, they would say, "of course, we do that. How could you do it any other way?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is another thing that, like, "duh" —</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so to just summarize here in the planning portion of these recommendations of this upcoming rule number one, plan for the future actually forecast what's going to happen and plan for that. Number two, consider all the benefits, not just singular benefits, not just the benefits you pick and choose three, consider all possible solutions, not just new lines, but also new ways of getting more of existing lines. And then four, apply all this to portfolios rather than individual projects. So you want considering all benefits and all solutions to different portfolios so that you can maximize the aggregate benefits of this.</p><p>All of those, as you say, seem like things that are obvious and that anything going by the term regional planning would already be doing, but it is not happening. And so, FERC has an opportunity here to basically require RTOs to do this. So that's the big planning section. And that, I think, is the main event here. Those four alone, I think, would be transformative. But then we come to the second knot of the planning-paying-permitting Troika, which is cost allocation, which is a kind of unnecessarily technical term for just if you're going to build a regional transmission line that crosses boundaries from one utility to the next, from one state to the next, that crosses over all these lines, it is not obvious how to pay for it, or rather, who should pay for it.</p><p>Who should pay for these lines? Is it the people building them? The people who will benefit from them? And right now, the loose rule is roughly people should pay according to the amount of benefits they get from it. But this is not, like the rest of the process, working very well. So tell us a little bit about how FERC should be trying to tweak cost allocation to work better? And is part of this just by having a formula or some sort of cost allocation formula that can be applied to every project rather than kind of like a bespoke process for every line?</p><p>So just talk a little bit about cost allocation and how FERC's trying to solve it.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>The basic problem is, as you say, it's essentially a public good. Everybody benefits to some extent. And like with other public goods, classic public goods, like national defense or bridges and roads and public transportation, everybody would rather have the other guy pay for it and get to use it. And that's just natural. And that's why we have usually public financing right through our taxes, all of those things. Now, the electric industry is different, and it's generally a private industry, not public. And FERC isn't about to completely change that, nor is there really reason to. But we just have to figure out a way to allocate the costs in a fair way, just to make sure that sufficient infrastructure gets paid for so that it can be built.</p><p>So that's why we have this challenge called cost allocation and one of the three Ps, the paying part of the three P's. So FERC's main need here and proposal here is to make sure that a decision gets made. Okay. It sets up like a process at the regional basis where the states get a chance to weigh in and figure out a solution. And hopefully that leads to agreement on how to allocate the cost of a transmission plan. Maybe they'll decide to have one formula that stays in place for all time, or maybe they'll review it based on each plan every couple of years when it comes through.</p><p>But the risk now, if FERC doesn't clarify this in the final rule, is that if they don't agree, it just gets stuck. Well, that obviously doesn't solve the problem or get infrastructure built. So at the end of the day, there has to be a way to resolve a disagreement between states. And so that's pretty much all it is, just recognizing that, "look, this can be hard, it's never easy, but at the end of the day, a decision has to be made."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, can FERC say in this rule, you must make a decision?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yes, yeah. And that's essentially what hopefully they will say.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is, you know, continuing a theme from the previous section. But also I noticed the recommendations are that they should be assessing costs also based on portfolios, portfolios of projects maybe, rather than like who's paying for this individual project? This individual project considering a portfolio and then sort of the aggregate costs —</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Doing cost allocation based on that.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yeah. And that helps with the cost allocation challenge. If you do all the assets and upgrades together, then the chances are greater that everybody benefits a little bit, as opposed to when you just kind of come in and say, "hey, I got a line from here to here." Well, guess what? The people in all the other places on the region say, "well, I don't want to pay a dollar."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You end up with a mire there because it's like, where to draw the line around those benefits, as you say, mostly will be on either side of that line. But also in some second order way, a regional benefit, also in some second order way, a national benefit, I mean, benefit to humanity, to where you draw that line is somewhat arbitrary. So I think it's helpful to take at least a bigger unit of analysis.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>There's no magic bullet here where could say, "here's the best formula, now everybody do it." Because some regions, when I go, and I don't know, I was in the Pacific Northwest and they're like, "yeah, we could really put together something, but we need flexibility to — everybody needs to poke and prod at the benefits evaluation and come to the table and support it. In other words, get to a bespoke cost allocation agreement among parties," whereas other regions are like, "oh, man, if we had to go back and relitigate the benefits and cost allocation with every regional plan, we'd never get anything done."</p><p>So there is this tension that FERC is going to have to balance between the bespoke and the formulaic approach here. And there's not a good answer that works well in every region. You know, I think they can provide very helpful guidance. They can narrow down the funnel of the things that people can agree or disagree about and get to much greater alignment about how to measure the benefits. So those types of things, as well as the process with the states, I think could be helpful.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And as you say, just requiring a decision, "you can't leave the dinner table until your plate is clear," type of thing.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Way to give it a really bad taste in people's mouths. Now everybody's thinking about the bad brussels sprouts, but, yeah, no, you got to have a decision at the end of the day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, so that's planning and cost allocation, planning and paying. So then the third section of recommendations, I think are really interesting. And my instinct, and maybe tell me if I'm wrong, is that this might be the most uncomfortable for FERC, or maybe you might find the most resistance within FERC. Tell me if I'm wrong about this, but this is just a section about FERC oversight. Basically, the recommendation is like FERC needs to take a more active hand here in ensuring that this regional planning process is being done well. It's being done in a cost-effective way, which is just going to be a little bit more active governance, a little bit more active oversight.</p><p>And quoting from the report, "eliminate the multi-stage process that currently prevents inter-regional projects from being constructed." So tell us a little bit about what role you envision for FERC here, what these recommendations are about, greater oversight and sort of like what the political valence is of those recommendations.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Right. Well, again, FERC is the transmission regulator of the nation, and the courts have clarified that over recent years. And so I think the main thing here is to put these planning approaches out there, put it into regulations, require them nationwide. Sure, there's going to be regional flexibility and each region has a different set of institutions that will come into play and be used. I think FERC can sell this whole rule as providing plenty of regional variation and flexibility. But at the end of the day, you've got to do these planning practices and FERC has to oversee that they happen.</p><p>So with any nationwide rule from a regulator, there's always the risk of you put it out, you require compliance filings, and then you kind of loosen things up on compliance and then over time they get away with things. And the regulator isn't making sure that the rule was followed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. The rule only matters if there's some stick, some element of enforcement.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Right. And the industry does follow it. I mean, look, there were plenty of opponents of open access in the mid 90s. Now they all have open access tariffs and they follow them like they're contracts. And anybody can bring a case to FERC enforcement if the tariff is not being followed, the tariff being like the public contract. And so the same would be the case here. And so just one hopes that FERC would follow through in implementation and make sure that all these practices are followed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, what can FERC do, though, if I'm an RTO and I'm not following these practices and someone brings a case before FERC saying "this, such and such RTO isn't doing what you said." What sticks does FERC have in its backpack?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Well, in some cases they do have enforcement authority and financial penalties. That's more in the market manipulation realm, but with the regional transmission organizations, and I should also say the planning entities that are not in the RTOs. Right, because we've got the Southeast and the West where there is no RTO, but they would also be subject to this rule. FERC just simply has to tell them — it's not a great answer to your question, but they set the rules and they are the regulator of these entities and FERC enforcement can get involved if they don't comply.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So if it comes to it, then FERC can penalize them financially. That's basically what it's got in its.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>I don't know the extent of that on something like a transmission planning practice, but they do have some penalty authority that came up in the interconnection context. So there may be some of that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Another thing mentioned in this section is the possibility that FERC could impose performance-based rate making on some of these entities. Is that a significant possibility?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>I think there is some possibility there in certain contexts. It's not within the scope of this particular rule. There are forms of incentives. FERC got all this incentive authority in EPAC of 2005 and they haven't really — well, they've used some of it. It's been sort of back and forth. And there are definitely opportunities, like in the grid enhancing technology case to use incentives to reward utilities. And they are the economic regulator. So they have the ability to penalize utilities and say you get less rate of return if you don't do these things. So there's opportunity there. I don't think there's like a great proposal for how to kind of do that across their whole set of operations.</p><p>I think there's some very narrow, tailored approaches for that. But again, FERC would have to do that in another proceeding.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just say a little bit about how, say, FERC took this to heart, implemented this rule with these requirements for a better planning process, guidance on the cost allocation, and then this more active governance and oversight. Describe a little bit how that would look to you. What would you like to see in your dream world? What would a more active FERC look like? What would that involve? A more vigorous oversight from FERC.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>So let's take any region, I mean, the Midwest — MISO is the RTO there. They're doing a lot of this now, as is California, which is they look out at 20 years. They estimate generation, additions and retirements and load growth. They might do a scenario on electrification, like are we going to have a high EV deployment in this region or lower middle? And they'll put all that together and this can happen in any region.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>MISO is actually one of the better — like MISO is a leader, right?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>They're doing a lot of this now. Yeah, MISO and California ISO are doing a fair amount. Some other regions have done some things lately. New York has done some things lately, and they're all talking about doing it partly just because FERC is driving this. And you know how, and you've talked about this many times about the two terawatts of generation in the interconnection queue. So this proposal is not about necessarily saying, let's take every proposed generator that anybody ever imagined and plan for that — because we're not going to get two terawatts by 2030 or whatever.</p><p>So it's really more like start with kind of from a consumer standpoint or a load serving entity standpoint of what is needed to serve that load with the types of resources they say they want or their law says they need, and let's kind of work from that. So you make a reasonable, just objective estimate of the new generation, the retired generation, the expanded load, and those are the main factors. And then you take that set of inputs and give them to the transmission planners and say, "okay, transmission planning engineers, plan me the most efficient, reliable grid based on all that" — planning engineers, they know exactly what to do with that. That's not hard for them.</p><p>Granted, they haven't been doing it for very long, and the people who did that retired ten years ago. So there's a little bit of a human resource challenge there. But generally they know how to do that. And that's essentially the vision, which, consistent with everything we've talked about here, really isn't rocket science. It's just planning for the future. And then get the transmission experts to say the right transmission grid for that future. And then what is the FERC — you're asking about the FERC role here? So FERC can kind of say, "hey, wait a minute, you didn't actually factor in these factors."</p><p>Or parties can appeal to FERC and say, "wait a minute, my state has this policy," or "all of the consumers are saying they're buying this much energy. Or the load serving entities have sort of testified here or provided information about the resource mix they're going to be utilizing based on their, whatever it is, their utility targets. And you haven't factored that in." — regional planning entity. So then FERC can say, "hey, regional planning entity, do that, put all that in there." And that's how they — you know, they're not directing the outcome. They're not saying, "you need a DC line from over here to over there", but they're saying "you didn't follow the practice that we required."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And I should just say, by background, I mean, maybe listeners already understand this, but the sort of background here is that the Federal Power Act requires utilities to set just and reasonable rates. That's sort of the engine of all this. The idea here is that if you're not doing this planning process in a rational way, then the resultant rates you decide on will not be just and reasonable. So, if you're reasonable, you would do these things. That's kind of the driver in the background.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Exactly right. Exactly right. And that's a good point to kind of highlight the cost-benefit issue here, which is transmission is not cheap. Right? Nobody's claiming it's cheap. Sure, there's technology, ways to get a cheaper portfolio, but none of it's free. But the thing is, for just and reasonable rates, if you really look at it, we're actually doing things the most expensive way possible right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Which is not reasonable.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Right. Which is not reasonable or just for anybody. A lot of consumer groups are saying this now to FERC, which is that, "hey, look, maybe we'd even prefer zero be spent on anything. But the reality is we're spending money on each incremental request that comes in, both on the generation and the load side, and then we're serving that need in only that need, the minimum required to serve that need. Well, it turns out with an industry that has massive economies of scale, you're necessarily doing something that costs way more per delivered megawatt than if you plan just a little bit ahead.</p><p>And at the scale, like maybe the 230 kV line should be a 345 kV line or a 500 or 765. We got to call a stop to the current practice. Just can't keep doing things —"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's kind of the root of FERC's authority here is that the current practice is not just and reasonable.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One other thing, which I probably should have covered up front, but let's just say a quick word about now. I think listeners know that our electricity system in its wisdom is sort of split. There's these restructured regions that have wholesale power markets and that are governed — where the transmission is governed by these regional bodies, RTOs. But then there's this other half of the country, notably the South and the West, the Southeast and the West, which are not wholesale power markets and do not have regional transmission organizations. Does all this apply to those regions just as well?</p><p>And if so, who does it apply to? Who does regional planning in a region that's just balkanized utilities? Who do all these requirements apply to in those areas?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yeah, it does apply to all regions. And there are regional planning entities even in the regions without regional transmission organizations that were set up under Order 1000 in 2011. So, for example, there's Northern Grid and WestConnect out in the West. So it's not clear what the final rule will say. It could be those groups or they could allow different groups to do it. But it is important for this to cover the entire country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And let's just say, although, as you say, this is in a completely different pod, but let's just say it would be sure be convenient if the Southeast and the West would just get their s**t together and form regional power markets and RTOs of their own so that at least we could have consistent entities across the country when we're trying to regulate things. So just to sort of review here, there's this upcoming FERC rule. It's been proposed. It's going to be finalized soon, ideally and likely finalized in a FERC with three commissioners, two of which are Democrats.</p><p>It's going to require a better planning process, better cost allocation, and it's going to boost FERC's sort of authority and oversight. That is, this rule will do those things if these recommendations are accepted and taken to heart. So maybe actually two final questions, I should never say final question. Who's the really decision maker here? What's the sort of political valence of all this in terms of the commissioners? All of this sounds so obvious and sensible in such a way that it's difficult to kind of imagine who doesn't want this? Who doesn't want sane regional planning that takes a holistic view, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p>So what's the resistance here? Who needs to be persuaded on the commission?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Chairman Phillips is the leader of the commission and on the timing and the substance, and he's going to work with his colleagues to make all the final policy calls and all the things. So he's the primary person here, and he wants to do this. He's been consistent in his public statements and his comments in the Oversight Committee hearings in Energy and Commerce and Senate Energy about this, that this is a priority for him, and I believe it is. But there's just a lot of details in here. There are powerful entities that don't want FERC rules on things.</p><p>They might be utilities or they might be incumbent generators or others, and the commissioners all hear from them. And like, everybody's a little bit nervous about spending too much money because everybody wants low electricity rates. So in that uncertainty about exactly how much transmission is needed and where, I think there's a lot of room for parties to push the commission in different directions and for commissioners to say, well, yes to this and no to that. So this is so important to get right. I get nervous about those details. But all the things we've discussed on this podcast, these are the high-level things that really are important.</p><p>And that would, I would just think, I mean, any average person on the street would think, "of course they got to do those things."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not that complicated. It's just like any planning, that's what planning is, right?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>That's what planning is. And yeah, I don't know if you had radical ideas about how you would do networks without the need to plan and just wanted all like market-based system without regulations, who knows? But the industry, this is an interconnected, large, regional, multistate network.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just iconically network. And all the things, all the sort of design principles that apply to networks apply here, really iconic form. And I can sort of imagine individual entities with narrow pecuniary interest in stopping this. But I can't imagine a sort of like public interest argument against, like, I can sort of imagine a utility saying, "this will reduce our profits some," but I can't even conceive of what the kind of public interest argument against this stuff is.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Well, remember, this is happening in Washington. We're recording this right before a potential, another government shutdown. So getting basic things done —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, a really final question. There's a lot to be said about this too, but just quickly sort of, it seems unlikely that any legislation is going to pass DC ever again of any kind, really, but especially transmission. It seems a little bit like this is getting, it shouldn't be, but it is getting a little bit polarized. It seems like it's getting to be more of a Democrat versus Republican thing, even though that makes no sense. Such is our politics. But are there in your sort of realist, if we're taking a purely realist perspective here, are there legislative things that could be done that have some glimmer of chance of having bipartisan support and actually getting through a divided Congress?</p><p>And if those — what are those things?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yes, I do think there is some possibility for bipartisan action, and I think the Senate Energy Committee is thinking and taking seriously a lot of those things. I've had very encouraging conversations, many, many conversations with both Republicans and Democrats on the Senate Energy Committee. And the one area that I think resonates with everybody is the interregional case, which again, is not so much the subject of this rule. And partly the idea is, while FERC's doing the intraregional right now, but I think there's pretty broad recognition that in the interregional case, really across between these large areas of the country, the industry historically did not grow up with any way to get those types of lines built.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Can I just ask in that case, because everything we've discussed, I can see how it could be applied relatively straightforwardly to the interregional setting, with one exception, which is, what are the entities in question? What are the planning entities to whom all these rules apply in the interregional setting?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. Applying a rule to many dozens of entities is hard to hold anyone accountable for not doing —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Is there a prospect on the table of creating such entities, or would just this just be a matter of, like, RTOs cooperating with other RTOs, like interregionally? Who's doing that?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Well, yeah. So there's two main options there. First of all, it will be helpful to, I think if we get some kind of recognition that that is the need, this large interregional case, we'll see what happens.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's plenty of evidence at this point. I mean, the DOE itself had that gigantic report that showed the benefits of national network.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>That's right. So then there's two policy things to do about that. One is a process like require — you could have legislation directing FERC to set up a process with many of the same planning practices we've just discussed and apply them in the interregional case, recognizing that, who exactly is the regulated entity and who do you hold accountable for not doing it? That's not easy, but it's not totally unfamiliar to FERC either. So that's one thing is a process requirement. Another is a minimum transmission capacity requirement between the regions. Just say, well, we don't necessarily know the optimum level, but let's just make sure we have a minimum level and set that level at some percentage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Between regions?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Between regions. Right. And they do that actually in Europe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wasn't that on the table recently or developed recently? I feel like I heard about that in the background.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. A lot of people probably heard about that in the context of the debt ceiling deal back in late spring, or —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It didn't happen.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Yeah, it kind of had a glimmer of hope and it sort of had some bipartisan support. So it almost got in there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then it got summarily executed, I think, by utilities in their Republican catspaws.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>No comments. The fingerprints were removed, but yeah, it just turned into a report, unfortunately. But there was this big wires bill that Senator Hickenlooper and Representative Peters had introduced in their respective chambers, and that still is kicking around. It's got the bill, the idea, anyway, has a lot of support from a lot of stakeholders. So that's another possibility. Some version of that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, well, we're overtime, and this has been so fascinating. So, this is something that has come up on Volts over and over again. The need for more planning. I mean, not just in transmission, but just like, it feels like every topic I get into, you pull the string long enough, you end up in two places. One, utilities are screwing everything up, and two, we need better planning. I feel like those are the themes I end up no matter what topic I take on. So this is an opportunity here, right in front of us to do better planning.</p><p>So I know people don't necessarily pay a lot of attention to FERC on a day to day basis, but this is like "rubber hits the road" time right now. So it's really important, I think, that people tune into this and do what they can to encourage FERC to go big here and to do well by this rule. By the way, is there anything like an average listener, it all seems so distant, is there anything average people can do to poke or prod FERC to do well here?</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>For those who might have a way to engage at the state level or the regional level, that's important. No transmission really moves forward without strong support in the region. And so governors can be influential, encouraging governors to get supportive of this. I think that type of thing is useful. Even state legislators are weighing in. The National Caucus of state legislators, about 200 of them wrote a letter to FERC. So there are sort of indirect ways to encourage FERC or to encourage the regional planning entity in the region or encourage the governor or others involved in those processes to get on board with the agenda.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, we will leave it there. Rob, thanks for coming on and walking through this with us. It's funny when I get into these topics that seem sort of like forbiddingly technical from the outside, and then you dig in a little bit and it's like FERC wants regional planners to plan. It's like, that's not really — turns out it wasn't that technical.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Now you know, and it's not that hard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, thanks a lot, Rob.</p><p><strong>Rob Gramlich</strong></p><p>Great to be with you, David. Thanks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/ferc-is-about-to-make-some-very-important</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:138823612</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 25 Nov 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/138823612/6eebf812ab003bdb3206b6a43df5b7b2.mp3" length="84920776" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4244</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/138823612/02b5178c931843607de27d8009341fbd.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[An insider's view of the Biden years in clean energy policy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>As I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/im-coming-to-yale-in-november">previewed for Volts subscribers</a> a few weeks ago, I attended the third annual Yale Clean Energy Conference last week. It was a blast! It’s always energizing (pardon the pun) to be surrounded by so many young people doing so much cool stuff. It gives this crusty old blogger some hope.</p><p>While I was there, I recorded a podcast — live on stage! — with Sonia Aggarwal.</p><p>Sonia is well-known in Energy World. She co-founded (with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/focusing-on-the-climate-actions-that#details">previous Volts guest Hal Harvey</a>) the energy policy think tank <a target="_blank" href="https://energyinnovation.org/">Energy Innovation</a>, where she worked for years before heading into the Biden administration as the (deep breath) special assistant to the president for climate policy, innovation, and deployment.</p><p>She recently reemerged from the belly of that beast and is now back running Energy Innovation. I chatted with her about her experiences in the administration, what policymaking looks like close up, what she’s proud of getting into law, and what gaps remain in US energy policy. It was super-fun.</p><p>Thanks to Sonia, thanks to the kind folks at Yale, and thanks to all of y’all for listening. Enjoy.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/an-insiders-view-of-the-biden-years</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:138688793</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 18 Nov 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/138688793/387a820cf228e0708431b56a5097be9d.mp3" length="89744306" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4485</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/138688793/61dc3994f5bc71c0013648b0e54c947c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The cheapest way to permanently sequester carbon involves ... fizzy water]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Ólafur Teitur Guðnason of Icelandic company Carbfix discusses his company’s approach to carbon sequestration by essentially making fizzy water and burying it deep underground.</em> </p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/q4m5ctxu7qj1cybt43uct/volts23.11.13-olafur.teitur.guonason.pdf?rlkey=7vdhqvalo6ncrykke9sdta36o&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/the-cheapest-way-to-permanently-sequester-carbon-involves-fizzy-water"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The idea behind the Icelandic company <a target="_blank" href="https://www.carbfix.com/">Carbfix</a> is simple: pack water full of carbon dioxide (literally carbonate it, like a SodaStream) and inject it deep underground into Iceland’s porous basaltic rock. Minerals in the rock dissolve in the water, where they react with the CO2 to become calcium carbonates. </p><p>The carbon effectively becomes rock, which it will remain, for all intents and purposes, permanently. Or at least thousands and thousands of years. It is as long-term as carbon sequestration gets.</p><p>The idea dates back to 2006, but pilot injections didn’t begin until 2013 and it wasn’t until 2016 that a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aad8132">study published in </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.aad8132"><em>Science</em></a> confirmed that 95 percent of the CO2 in the water was mineralizing within two years — far faster than most had assumed possible. </p><p>Since it started, Carbfix has sequestered almost 100,000 metric tons of CO2 at its original site, but that is just a drop in the bucket compared to what it believes is possible. It has plans to make Iceland a major international carbon-burial hub and to replicate its technology in other geographies, maybe even in the shallow ocean. </p><p>When I visited the Carbfix operation in October and saw it in action, I was extremely intrigued and had a million more questions, so last week I got in touch with Ólafur Teitur Guðnason, Carbfix’s head of communications, to talk about where the company gets the CO2 it buries, where it plans to get it in the future, whether burial can work in other kinds of rocks and geographies, and exactly how much carbon Iceland can store.</p><p>All right, then, with no further ado, Ólafur Teitur Guðnason of Carbfix. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, Ólafur, I visited you guys when I was out in Iceland a few weeks ago and was very taken with this idea. And I don't know how I have been covering this stuff for so long without ever hearing about it, but it sounds like you guys are sort of on the verge of expanding. So I think probably a lot more people are going to be hearing about you soon. So to begin with, for listeners who are not familiar with your company, I'm going to run through the process and tell me if I get anything wrong. So you get a source of water, and we can discuss the source of water more later.</p><p>But you get water, you carbonate it more or less like a SodaStream carbonates water. You pump carbon dioxide into the water, and then you pump the water deep underground. And this carbonated water is heavier than normal water, so it tends to sink down to the bottom of the water table. And as it is sinking, the carbon dioxide in the water reacts with minerals in the rock to form calcium carbonates. Basically, the carbon dioxide in the water gets transformed into a form of rock, where it will then stay underground as rock for thousands of years. So you've permanently sequestered the carbon.</p><p>Is that more or less an accurate description?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>It's more than more or less accurate, I think. I'll give you a ten out of ten.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Excellent. Good. Well, I have so many questions about this, but the one thing I wanted to start with is the carbonation process of the water. Is that your intellectual property here? Is that your sort of main thing that you've pioneered here as a different way of carbonating water, or is there something special about the way you carbonate water?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's one part of it. There are several elements to what we feel is proprietary or what we have solved — technology that we have developed. One thing is the capture of the CO2 emissions from the geothermal power plant, where we were kind of born as a research project within the company that runs the geothermal power plant, as well as universities both in Iceland and the US and France. So that is one element, yes. The dissolving of the CO2 with the water is another element, and the third element would be the way to inject it. So, yeah, there are different elements to this and at different stages of patenting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, I didn't realize that you were involved in the capture part of this. I knew that part of the CO2 that you're burying is coming from the geothermal plant, but I had kind of thought that was separate. Is this something that you're going to export if you try to export this model to other places or other countries? Is capture part of what you're promising, or are you mostly, do you think, going to be working with CO2 that someone else captured?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yes, mostly. Capturing is not our core field. It just comes from the fact that we were born out of this proximity to the geothermal power plant, so we needed a source of CO2, and we may, and have and are collaborating with other companies that run geothermal power plants, so our know-how is of use in that situation. But we are definitely not primarily a capturing company. There are other companies that focus on the capture part, and that has different technologies for different streams of CO2. So we're not too involved in that. We are mainly and primarily focused on getting it into the ground and mineralizing it and storing it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then when you carbonate the water, the physics of it, is it basically the same thing that's going on in a soda stream? Is there anything fancy going on, or is this just the carbonization that we're all familiar with?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>It's not too different, in essence. We have a stream of CO2, and then we shower it with water and pressurize so that it is completely dissolved. The difference is that we don't have the bubbles that you have in the soda stream or the soda drinks, mineral water that you drink, because these bubbles, they mean that the gas is escaping the fluid, so we don't want it to escape. So we are putting more of it into the water and making sure it's completely dissolved so that it doesn't rise back to the surface. And pressure takes care of that as well, as it continues to ensure this trapping mechanism underground as well when the solution gets into the ground.</p><p>So solubility trapping, as it's called, is kind of the first stage of trapping and isolating the CO2 from the surroundings or from the atmosphere. It's a pretty secure way of trapping CO2. But then, fairly soon, mineralization comes into play, as well as the second stage, and even more secure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You know, when people think about what is basically a geological process of a gas being transformed into a stable mineral. I think of geological time frames. But your mineralization process, by which the CO2 is pulled out of the water and becomes rock, happens in two years, you say. Two years of the water being underground, all of the CO2 will be pulled out of it and mineralized. So how is that happening so fast?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Well, you need favorable conditions. You need favorable rock formations that are highly porous and reactive. It was quite a surprise when the scientific studies showed the extent and speed of the mineralization. So that was indeed surprising to the scientists at the time. A lot of it actually happens even sooner. So the process starts very soon, within a few weeks. And when we're talking about within two years, that is when almost all of it has mineralized. But it doesn't wait for two years, and then suddenly everything mineralizes, it starts sooner. So it's a very rapid process. Yeah, and that was a surprising finding, and that got a lot of attention back in 2016 when the results were published internationally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, right. We should mention that this is not a new thing. You guys have been doing this for ten years now, have you been — ?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, eleven years. Celebrated ten years of continuous mineralization last year and counting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there's been plenty of testing and monitoring?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Absolutely. The idea was born in 2007, and this research collaboration started designing the way to capture, to dissolve the CO2 in the water to get it into the ground, drill testing holes, make mistakes, and so on and so forth. But the first successful pilot injections took place in 2012, so that was only five years after the project really started as an idea on paper. So a fairly quick progress there. And since then, we have continuously applied this method to sequester emissions from the geothermal power plant. Now we have also added a second source of CO2, which is captured from the atmosphere by our partners at Swiss company Climeworks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When you say the rock needs to be reactive, what does that mean exactly? It just needs to contain the minerals with which the CO2 is going to react?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, it has to be rich in those minerals or metals, iron, magnesium, calcium, that tend to come out of the rock, if we can say — I'm looking for the right word in English — they get dissolved, they get into the water, and then react with the CO2 to form these new minerals. So we are really dependent on those types of sometimes called mafic or ultramafic rocks. We are working primarily with basalts in Iceland. So it's a young volcanic rock that contains high levels of these metals, about a quarter of the weight. So they have the ingredients needed to form the minerals.</p><p>By the way, important to mention that this happens in nature over geologic timescales. It's one of the reasons why over 99% of all the carbon on the planet is already underground in rocks. So even though we have a crisis on our hands, it's less than 1% of the planet or Earth's carbon that is in the atmosphere and oceans and biomaterials. So, yeah, we can say it's nature's way, that we have found a way to accelerate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so when this mineralization happens, it becomes rock that is, for all intents and purposes, permanent. There's nothing that could reverse that process.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Right. There is a debate on what counts as permanent in the climate debate. Is it 100 years? Is it 1,000 years? Is it 10,000 years? But we are definitely above all of those and into the tens of thousands of years. So even millions of years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Okay, so it says on your website that you have to date buried 97,000 metric tons of CO2. So I want to ask a few questions about the capacity of the land to absorb this. So you have said, I remember you said it was very striking, and I remembered it afterwards, when I came to visit that the amount of porous reactive rock in the Iceland sort of bedrock in and of itself could store all the CO2 that humans emit. Is that accurate?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's even when we expand on that thought and say all of the CO2 that would result from burning all remaining fossil fuels on the planet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No kidding.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>And that's Iceland alone. But that is a theoretical figure, not something that anyone is contemplating.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So theoretically, there's almost no upper limit to the amount of CO2 you could store in here, but I presume there are practical limits? So, like, say, in a particular injection well, you're pumping water down and the CO2 is reacting and becoming a rock and filling in those holes. The rock is porous, it's full of holes. The rock is filling in those holes bit by bit. So I wonder, in a particular injection well, do you reach saturation in a particular area? Like, is that a limit on your pace here?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Well, in the end, we assume we will. But for the decade that we have been operating the same well, we are not even close to it. One of the signs would be that the well would become less receptive to the water flowing in. But that is not happening. So we don't really know exactly how long one well can last. But we do know that for the ten years that we have been operating, admittedly on a fairly small scale, but nevertheless, for a decade and close to 100,000 tons, we estimated that we have used less than 0.01% of the capacity of this area where we are operating.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This particular well, so there's tons more headroom even in this individual well?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yes, absolutely. The empty space in the rock has such a huge volume and we are depending on the empty space. In the first instance, we are depending on it for the permeability of the rock, for the water to be able to flow through, and then for a part of this empty space, a small part of it to hold the newly formed mineral that consists of the former CO2. As a rule of thumb, if your listeners are interested, a cubic meter of basaltic rock could hold approximately 100 kg. I'm using the metric system, excuse me. So 100 kg in a cubic meter as a rule of thumb.</p><p>And it is hard to wrap your head around how many cubic meters of rock there are underground. When you go deep, when you have a sizable area, these very quickly amount to huge amounts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So space for the carbon is not a limiting factor?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>No.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm wondering, as you scale up, if more and more CO2 is coming to you. I'm trying to figure out what the practical limiting features are here. Is there at a certain point you max out your flow, like at a certain point you're going to max out the amount you can carbonate at a time. Right. There's presumably limits on the flow of water that you can pump.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>It depends on the number of wells you have. If you need more flow, you can add wells. You just need to have a reasonable space between them because each well is only using so much underground area. So you can have another one 300ft away or 500ft away or something like that. So scaling up means really adding more wells, provided you have the appropriate conditions there as well. I would say a major limiting factor is the access to CO2 that has been captured.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>So the problem is not really storing it, the problem is getting it in the first place and getting it not only capturing it from emitters, but then also transporting it to a suitable storage site.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Your only limiting factor is how much CO2 you can get your hands on. Practically speaking, there's no limit to the speed and quantity that you could handle if you can solve the problem of getting it to you, basically.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I would also mention that, of course, we need water for this process, so there has to be access to water as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I want to ask about that later too, but I want to start with energy though, because a bunch of people, I was talking about this on Twitter, this is the first question people have, which is sort of how much energy are we using to do this? And presumably, the energy you use to do it needs to be zero carbon, or else you're just sort of like in a loop of creating carbon to bury carbon. So this is all premised on zero carbon energy, right?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yes, preferably. Or at least you need to be — well, in Iceland, we don't really have that challenge. All of the energy is either geothermal or hydropower. So it is green energy, definitely. But still there is the question of displacing green energy for the purpose of carbon capture. And it's a whole debate on that, or at least some points to be made. But yeah, I mean, how net positive do you need to be to be justified? That's an open question. But in our case, the energy is completely sustainable and it is a very low energy process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can you put numbers on that? Like, what do we mean by low energy?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>It is negligible. I mean, it is running of pumps. Pumping water doesn't require a lot of energy. So it is really almost invisible in the big picture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Theoretically, then even if you are using whatever natural gas generated electricity to do this, do you think you still might come out positive just because you're —</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Oh, definitely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>just because you're not using much energy.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's so low compared to the amounts of CO2 that we are getting rid of, irrespective of the fuel or power source. It would be vastly net positive. But that's not the full value chain of course. You need the capturing, you may need the transport.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Right.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>And we will maybe come back to that. So we think for our biggest project that we are preparing — next big project in Iceland as well — transport will be most likely the major source of emissions to be then, of course, fully accounted for and deducted from the benefits that we are claiming to make.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so right now, you're getting your CO2 that you're burying from two sources. One is the geothermal power plant, which I think people think of geothermal as zero carbon. But it's not really zero carbon, there are —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No, it's not zero. I think it's 1% of a coal fired plant, approximately, but still —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Enough to capture it. And the other source of CO2, which Volts listeners will be familiar with, is from Climeworks, this direct air capture facility just down the road from you. With the big fans that are pulling air over this absorbent that's pulling the CO2 out. Presumably they are compressing the CO2 and putting it in a pipeline that comes to you. Is that how it gets to you?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, they currently get it to us in liquefied form, so compressed and liquefied. So they break it away from their filters — I'm not the best one to explain their technology — but basically it's filters that they then collect it from the filters and compress it and send it to us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And how pure of a CO2 stream do you need for your process to work? Does it need to be super purified, or — is that a limit?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Not necessarily from the mineralization perspective, but from other environmental considerations.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>I mean, the European Directive on Geological Storage of CO2 stipulates that you shouldn't dump other things in there along with the process. So you should have a pure stream of CO2. So I think that's mainly an environmental consideration that makes sense generally. But that wouldn't necessarily hurt our mineralization process too much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are there other emitted gases that we don't like that we could capture and bury and mineralize in this same way, or is this like a carbon only kind of thing?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Hydrogen sulfite is emitted by geothermal power plants, comes from the ground, just as the CO2 does. And in fact, Carbfix was born as a twin project of Carbfix and Sulfix to take care of hydrogen sulfide, which is, you could accurately say that that is an even bigger threat to the local environment. It's dangerous in high concentrations and really a harmful gas. So that was among the key considerations, was to get rid of that as well. And as it happens, the same process applies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It works same way.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah. So we get rid of the hydrogen sulfide as well, literally improving the air quality of the vicinity of the geothermal power plant and co-inject it with the CO2, and the same mineralization process happens, producing another type of mineral. But —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>this is specific to geothermal power plants. So we are very much focusing on CO2.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about then getting CO2, because if you're going to scale this process up to meaningful, sort of globally meaningful levels, the big limiter is your access to variable CO2. So it's easy enough to envision how this works in Iceland, where you have lots of geothermal power plants creating gases that at this point you're quite familiar with. You know the process. There's suitable rock nearby. Talk a little bit about the Coda terminal, because you guys have very big plans to import CO2 from other places and bury it. So how is that going to work and how is that going to pencil out in emissions terms?</p><p>Because obviously shipping uses energy and produces emissions, compressing the CO2, et cetera, et cetera. There's energy all along the chain there. So talk a little bit about how you're thinking about how you're going to set up a system to import.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>The big question was where should Carbfix scale up to the megaton scale, get to a million tons or more, which is, that's the big milestone that's ahead. Because I should add maybe for context, just to back up a little bit for half a minute. It's true that our focus needs to be on eliminating the use of fossil fuels. So the criticism is often, "well, you're distracting us from that mission." And it's true, it's a moral hazard to use carbon capture storage as an excuse to continue with business as usual. But the fact of the matter is, and the IPCC said that very clearly in their report last year, we will not reach the climate goals.</p><p>Even if we manage to do really well with the energy transition to green and renewable power, we will need to capture other emissions that will remain, that we know will remain. There are industries that have emissions that have nothing to do with energy. It's the part of the process of producing cement, steel, aluminium and so on and so forth, where even if they're powered by green energy, they still have the emissions, because the emissions are process emissions. So how do we take care of those as well?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You could also say that even if we could cut off all emissions to zero tomorrow, you could argue that there's too much CO2 in the atmosphere already to be safe. So you need to draw some of that down, even if you're not emitting anything.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Right. So you need carbon capture, both from these hard to abate industries, which is the reduction of the remaining hard to abate emissions, and then drawing out of the atmosphere what we know as carbon removal. So the IPCC says in its report — anyone can look it up — even in their scenario, they have several pathways of how we could reach the climate targets. They have a pathway that is highly dependent on big successes in renewable energy. So it's called the high renewable pathway. Even under that assumption, they have calculated that by 2050, the annual amount of carbon capture storage will have to be 3 billion tons.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, that even makes looking like the million-ton milestone look pretty small.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>The global total today is about 40 million per year. So we need to go from 40 to 3 billion until 2050. So that's why we can feel, we can very confidently say we are a necessary complementary action in addition to other efforts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, then it becomes the question of —</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Where do we scale up, how to move it around? And we decided that for scaling up and proving that we can do this on a megaton scale, it would be most feasible to do that in Iceland, where we are based, where we know the geology, where we know the legislative framework and so on and so forth.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It does seem like ideal conditions for what you want to do.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yes, it's ideal, both from a geological perspective, resource perspective, and makes sense, because this is where we are and where we know best. But then the challenge is, well, we don't have millions of tons of CO2 in Iceland to inject into the ground. The total emissions of Iceland, excluding land use, is about 5.5 million, approximately. That's from cars and planes and ships and so on. You won't be able to catch that. Industries in Iceland are emitting a little bit over 2 million tons, I guess. So even if we could capture all of that, which is not feasible in the near future, we would not be really utilizing the potential that we have.</p><p>So the idea with this project called Coda terminal is to be a transport and mineralization hub for mineralization of CO2. And this concept of a hub is really what is happening now, it seems, around the world, when it comes to geological storage, at least you have pockets or individual areas where you can geologically store CO2, but you need to have a network to get it there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. The big question here is how often do you want to build the infrastructure to bury carbon, versus building the infrastructure to carry carbon to the places where that infrastructure already exists. Which of those is better, carbon-wise?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, we won't be able to build a mineralization facility next to every factory or emitter, next to every cement plant, every steel plant. So that's just not feasible. The conditions are not there. So in any case, even though transporting to Iceland from Europe seems excessive, there will always need to be transport for whatever distances other big projects are looking at storing beneath the ocean floor in the North Sea that will have to be transported somehow — ships, pipelines, whatever. So I think there is a lot more focus on this now. How do we make sure that we have the infrastructure in terms of the Coda terminal there will be shipping from Europe.</p><p>Of course, it has to get to the ship as well before that. There are discussions of pipelines. Can you use existing infrastructure to some extent? Possibly, probably. But you also need some new ones.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think they're a little farther along in Europe in terms of CO2 pipelines, than in the US, is my understanding. Like there's an actual plan there.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>They are starting to at least look very seriously into it, and adopting new legislation to make sure that we have the framework about financing, access and so on and so forth. There is actually considerable existing infrastructure in the US connected to the oil industry that is piping CO2 over some distances as well. So it is a known concept. It's not inventing anything new, really, but on a larger scale. So the plan for the Coda terminal, is to be able to receive and mineralize 3 million tons every year as of 2031, when we plan to have reached full capacity.</p><p>And some of that will come from Iceland, no doubt. We are working, collaborating. The Icelandic government and heavy industries in Iceland are collaborating with us to find ways to capture and store the emissions. We have several aluminium plants in Iceland using the green energy that we have a ferrosilicon plant as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In Iceland, you can build one of these next to every factory.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Conceivably. Well, one of the plants is in east of Iceland, where there are actually the least amount of basalts, but at least for several of them, it is very feasible. And, in fact, the Coda terminal will be built next to one of these plants. So it will be fairly straightforward, once the technology is there, to capture their emissions, to get it to us, because we will be located right next door, and also there is a harbor there for receiving ships from elsewhere. But this is definitely needed. The ships. If we assume that the ships would run on traditional fuels, we estimate that the emissions of shipping would be maybe approximately 7% of the CO2 that's being transported for storage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So significant, but not enough to wipe out the value, right?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Definitely not. But then, of course, as soon as greener fuels become available for the shipping, those will be employed immediately as they become available.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So ideally, these would be zero carbon ships carrying this stuff from Europe to you.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah. Or at least much lower than traditional fuels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Right. And this Coda terminal, is this a gleam in your eye? Are there plans, is there money set aside?How real is this plan for this big terminal?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>It's very real. It last year got funding from the European Innovation Fund for €115 million, give or take a third of the total cost. So it was deemed by the European Innovation Fund to be realistic, and the technological readiness level, as they say, is very high. As we have been operating this technology already, we're not inventing new things, we're scaling up what we already know. So the plans are in full motion to secure environmental impact assessments, permits, land and so forth and all moving along quite nicely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is the idea that Carbfix would sort of have direct contracts with big emitters in Europe, sort of direct contracts to off-take their CO2?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yes. The business case is, in part, and we could say probably the biggest part of the business case is the fact that Europe has a cap on emissions from industries. So the European trading, emission trading system, ETS, is the driver for companies to take care of their emissions. So those who know how the system works will know that you get a certain amount of free allowances, and it's a total cap on the continent. The free allowances are reduced gradually, year on year, creating a kind of pressure on industries to improve. And since the emission allowances are quite expensive, there is a significant incentive to take care of it, otherwise capture it and store it.</p><p>And the regulatory framework says, if you capture it and store it in a regulated geological storage site that has the appropriate permits, then you don't need to purchase the emission allowances. So this is what creates the business case. And the flip side of that is the economy of our method, which is a very economical method indeed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Is this, as far as, you know, the cheapest form of permanent storage?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>I'm not sure I can say that with 100% certainty. But judging from the look on people's faces when we discuss the costs, I'm thinking that they must be. The mineralization cost itself is very low, less than $20 per ton or something.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to talk about water, but first, actually, I got a bunch of questions about land use. But I think we should just say that the land use needs of this are really quite small. I saw one of your little domes that you build to house the pumps, and it's just like a little yurt. Like it's relatively tiny. I guess you have to count the pipelines in some respect. But in terms of land use, that doesn't seem like a kind of limiting factor. You're not taking up a lot of space.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Definitely not for a single well. And even with the Coda of terminal, where we will need many more wells, of course, spreading out over a significant area, the actual footprint of the actual infrastructure is quite small and can quite easily coexist with other industries, facilities. It's not a delicate operation. It doesn't emit noise, vibration, emissions. So I think I would happily live next door to one of these injection wells.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, like I could tuck one of those in my backyard. They're even kind of cute.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>It can easily cohabit with other industries, no question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So right now, because you are in this symbiotic relationship with the geothermal plant, insofar as you build next to geothermal plants, you don't really have to worry about water, because geothermal plants bring water up and then they pump water back down. So all you're doing is kind of inserting yourself and adding one additional step in that process. But the water loop is basically the same as for a normal geothermal plant. But I'm wondering, I have several questions about sort of the potential to do this in other places, in other contexts. If you didn't have a geothermal plant, how do you think about where to get water?</p><p>And do you view that as kind of a limiting factor on where you can go and where you can establish one of these?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>We do need water to be there, but there are many places where you have access to groundwater. In fact, I read a report on groundwater in the US that said that it is an underutilized resource because it's only about 30% of the fresh water that is used in the United States is groundwater. The rest is surface water. So I think not everybody realizes the extent of water that is stored in the ground and for one reason or another, hasn't been extracted. It's certainly a precious resource. And that's why it's important to note that we are not competing with domestic uses of potable water. Definitely not going anywhere near those kinds of reservoirs. We do return the water into the ground, not having contaminated it in any way, added CO2 to it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What you do to the water, does that render the water dangerous in any way? Like, can it mess up groundwater or can it pollute anything, or is there any risk to this carbonated water?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Well, it is mineralized water, mineral water. When you add carbon dioxide into water, it raises the acidity, so you don't want to mix it with the groundwater. And that's why we go much deeper with the injections, isolate the pipes from the surroundings and because, as you mentioned at the start of our talk, that once you have added the CO2 to the water, it's heavier than the water around it, it tends to sink and continue sinking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you inject it below the groundwater that people are drinking —</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>and it sinks.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So theoretically, you could pump up the water yourself. I mean, presumably that would add a little bit of cost, but you could just pump up the water yourself out of the water table, carbonate it and pump it back down with no need for an external water source.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Right. Well, if the water is there at the site, yes, we, of course, need relevant permits and everything like that. But yes, the water use, because we are talking about fairly big amounts, it adds up and it's easy to calculate big numbers. I was actually looking into this a few days ago. What's the water footprint of products? And I found a website from, I guess it's an NGO that's concerned with water and water preservation and so forth. And it takes about three tons of water to make a hamburger if you calculate the life cycle of it. So, for us to take care of one ton of CO2 requires about the same amount of water that it takes to make nine or ten hamburgers or two smartphones.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But you're not really using up the water, right. You bring it up and you put it back down.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>We bring it up, put it back down. We do add the CO2. The CO2 then gets released from the water again as it mineralizes. So then the water is free of the CO2 that we added to it and it goes on its way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it seems like in terms of large scale hydrological systems, you basically have very little effect. You're just kind of inserting yourself in the middle of a process that's already happening. But you're not net subtracting water.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Well, it depends on where you take the water and where you put it. Do you return it to the same place as where you took it? So that will be different from site to site and will need to be assessed. I would not be comfortable saying, well, we don't have any effect at all. I think that wouldn't be fair. So it is something that needs to be looked at, investigated, analyzed properly, to make sure that we are not affecting. When you extract water from one place, you can affect the hydrology of surrounding area and so on and so forth.</p><p>But I would not say it's a zero concern, but I would definitely say that with the proper designs, we can make it entirely safe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, one almost inexhaustible source of water is the ocean, which is sitting right next to you there in Iceland. So I wonder, what about the prospect of carbonating ocean water and injecting it underground? Because if you could do that, then you have all the water you could ever want in the world. Is this something you have been thinking about or trying to do?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Most certainly. We, a few years ago, started to look into this very heavily. We have already demonstrated in controlled conditions in the laboratory of the University of Iceland that the physics work dissolving CO2 in seawater, exposing it to the appropriate rocks, produces this mineralization process in much the same way as using freshwater does.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there any reduction in performance or anything, or does it work just as well?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>It more or less works well, yes. I'm not sure exactly about the details of the differences, whether you can dissolve as much or more even, or what the effects are exactly. But what I do know is that once you leave the controlled conditions of the lab and go into the field, you tend to run into unexpected things. And that's precisely why we have actually started — just a few days ago, we finally injected the first CO2 that was dissolved in seawater below the ocean floor using seawater. So the installation is at the shore. It's not offshore; it's close to the shore.</p><p>So we are extracting seawater and then pumping it or injecting it under the seabed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is like the shallow coastal seabed, right?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yes, but we always go a few hundred meters down into the ground and below it. So, yeah, that was a milestone for us that we have been celebrating for the last couple of days at the company, because it has such potential to be a game changer in terms of opening up new geographies, new areas where it might otherwise not be feasible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And definitely removes any worries about the availability of water.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>At that point, you've got all the world's oceans full of water. Right now. You are, as we've been sort of discussing, in what might as well have been cooked up in a laboratory to be the perfect circumstances for this. You've got the geothermal there, you've got cheap carbon free power to run it on. You've got the perfect porous, young basalt rock. Almost unlimited space down there to use, so this — Iceland is ideal for this. Have you tried to do this with other kinds of rock and other kinds of geology in other countries?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>We have done two small test projects abroad, so we have injected small amounts in Germany and in Turkey. Those were kind of research pilot projects, not really intended to become huge projects, more of a scientific exercise. We are looking into several locations abroad at various stages of discussion, possibly development. Basalt is actually quite common. It covers about 5% of the land mass.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah. So it's not only in Iceland, but it tends to be young and favorable basalt in Iceland; also, the ocean floor, the majority is basalt. So that also is about what we're discussing earlier. So there are several locations, but I could mention also the US. We have been awarded three rather than four, I think it's three grants from the US Department of Energy to study the potential of our method in the US.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Where would that be?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What kind of rock would that be?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Well, it's basalt in the Pacific Northwest, so two projects there. And I should note that we are in collaboration with many other parties collaborating on these projects. So it's not just us, it's the Rocky Mountain Institute, the University of Wyoming and others, and others, Pacific Northwest National Labs and other partners that are collaborating on a couple of projects in the Pacific Northwest. And those have to do with basalt because there are huge basalt in that area. And then in Minnesota, we also have a feasibility study that we are going to do in collaboration with others as well, to check whether our method can be applied there in a slightly different form of rock formations.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there a general way to characterize what sort of geology you need? I mean, is it basalt specific, or is it just, you need porous rock, rock with a lot of these minerals in it? Are there other kinds of rock that have these features?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, like I said, they are similar to basalt. These mafic and ultramafic rocks, which have the large amounts of the metals that we discussed, need to be there. The porosity can vary — for our approach it needs to be there to some extent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>And we know that there are other companies looking into different types of rocks that are maybe less permeable but have also potential storage capacity. So those will bring different challenges, I guess, that we are not qualified to explain fully. But at least this natural tendency and capability of rocks to store CO2 is something that is catching a lot of attention. And to my knowledge, I think I can safely say that we are the only ones actually applying it today, at least on a commercial basis.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's still somewhat of an open book here. We still don't have a great idea of the full extent of types of rock that could be used here.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, you're right. And I forgot to mention that we also got, in collaboration with scientists in Scotland, a public fund there, to also look into potentials there. I believe those are also slightly different rock types. So there is a lot of research going on and what we have to balance is to move our projects along that are based on what we know and at the same time to expand, improve and do research and development as we need to do to scale these things up. But we are quite satisfied with the project pipeline that we have already and the R&D pipeline.</p><p>So we are around 43 people today. We were 15 when I started 18 months ago. We are changing fast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's the right thing at the right time. Seems like there's no shortage of CO2 out there looking for places to be buried.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In terms of sort of accounting, just to take your current setup. If Climeworks captures a ton of CO2, sends it to you and you bury it, who gets the carbon credit? Who gets to sell the carbon credit there? Who gets to sort of claim to be the entity that dealt with the carbon?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, that's a matter of negotiation. Under the current setup, Climeworks sells the credits to customers such as Microsoft and others. So we are providing the storage as a service. Potentially we could have a different setup where we would split those credits somehow. We were not really there at the moment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's not totally settled yet, how that's going to work?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>For the current setup it is definitely. But what may happen in the future potentially we also have collaborations with other direct air capture companies. So what the setup will be when those come online, we'll have to see. One fascinating question from my perspective is also the interplay of corporate accounting and national accounting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, we addressed that on an episode of this very pod a few weeks ago.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>I'll have to listen to that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a puzzle.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah. Because there is some criticism that, for example, a particular project in Denmark, where Denmark is going to count the storage project against its national targets and the credits are also sold to a private company in another country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think it's Microsoft, actually. I think we discussed that very case.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah. So some people call that double claiming, double counting others, and I'm a bit fond of that argument, which is that this is co-claiming where you shouldn't confuse national accounts with corporate accounts. It's two entirely different systems. So you do have countries, for example, publishing figures on employment, and then you have companies publishing exactly the same figures and one is an aggregate of the other. So you're not double counting the jobs, you're just counting them in two different. You have them in the annual report of this company and then you have them in the national economic figures of the country.</p><p>So I don't think really there is necessarily a problem there as long as there are not two companies claiming the same results.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, there's still puzzles though, because, say, in the private accounting scheme, whatever, Climeworks gets the credit and shares a little bit of it with you, that's the private thing. But for publicly, if emissions are captured in, I don't know, Germany liquefied, shipped to Iceland and buried in Iceland, is that a reduction in Germany's emissions? Does Iceland get to claim anything?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Well, what is, and what should be? My understanding is that under the current rules, it would be an emission reduction in Germany. Because you count at the smokestack, so to say.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>And that's the same logic. The current climate accounting is you count the emissions where they happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>You could do it otherwise. You could, for example, have consumption based accounting where Iceland would have to — well, we import cars, we don't produce any cars.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>The case could be made that to be fair, we should be acknowledging the carbon footprint of those cars —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The embedded emissions I think they are called.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yes. And at the same time, we are having in Iceland to acknowledge or bear the burden, so to speak, of having three aluminium plants. We are producing aluminium for 3% of the world's production, many hundreds of times more than what we need. We could produce our own needs in like 10 seconds or something.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Right.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Because we're such a small nation of 360,000 people and you could say it's unfair that we have to account for this. And as a result of this, we have some of the highest emissions per capita in the world. But that's because we are the aluminium factory of the world. That's not really fair, you could argue. So you could argue for a consumption based, but I guess it's just not practical. So you just count at the stack in the geography where the stack is located.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, if you did do a consumption based accounting, you could see Iceland being like negative emissions many, many times over. You know if they become a hub for bearing stuff.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, if you would count all the bearing in Iceland, then you could. Yeah, but at the same time, we do consume products and they have to be shipped here and so on. But the point I'm making is maybe that there is no single best way. You have to choose an approach. And it may not be perfect, but it has to be practical. We have this principle of just counting the geography. And by that logic, I guess if emissions are reduced in a certain location, that location needs to be credited. And even though it seems a bit unfair that the country storing it doesn't get the credit, because if you couldn't store it, then what would you do with it?</p><p>Personally, I feel that it is worth discussing at least whether we need for this to be recognized somehow, the contribution of countries that are storing, providing storage. Or is it simply the financial benefit of selling that service? Or should it be reflected in the climate national accounts? I mean, I don't really have a very strong opinion on it, but it's worth thinking about. And it's an interesting thought exercise.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's quite a puzzle. You move one piece and a bunch of other pieces move.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah. I'm also sympathetic to the view that we mustn't get too caught up in bookkeeping. We need to get things done. So I don't want to give the impression that, well, Iceland will not store CO2 unless we get the credit. I mean, that's not really a very sensible position, even though you may have interesting arguments about it. The pressing issue is to get things done and not to get stuck in these details. With all due respect to proper accounting and everything, of course it has to be in place. But let's not get distracted from the task, which is to get some progress and scale up our efforts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>For sure. One of the things that really captured my attention and my imagination —</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>No pun intended?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>exactly! Captured, but did not bury my attention and imagination, here is just how simple this whole thing is. There's no piece of this that is particularly obscure or technical, more than an ordinary person could understand. So I wonder, are there places in this process where you can foresee substantial performance improvements or innovations? Like where could you improve the performance of this process? Or is it so simple that it just is what it is, and you might get some economies of scale, but the process itself just is what it is. Or is there room here to sort of improve the performance of this?</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. We are continuously doing that. I'm not sure that there will be an order of magnitude improvements in efficiency, but we are definitely working to use our resources more efficiently, use less water, and increase the capture efficiency from geothermal power plants. That was a big breakthrough that we had. So we have designed new capturing equipment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>We've designed a mobile injection system that enables us to go into areas for test injections with much less effort than before. The seawater tests, of course, would be, if those are successful, a game changer. But you are right, I think it's more apart from the seawater, which is really a big shift, it's more honing and fine tuning, but definitely going after every bit of improvement that we can identify.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Well, this is so fascinating, Ólafur, thank you so much for coming on and talking us through it.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>It's been a pleasure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I hope to see you up here in the Pacific Northwest before too long.</p><p><strong>Ólafur Teitur Guðnason</strong></p><p>Absolutely. Thank you for having me. It was a real pleasure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-cheapest-way-to-permanently-sequester</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:138440744</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 18 Nov 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/138440744/7d04626776ef895589df612c067c1358.mp3" length="71352318" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3566</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/138440744/6f677f603cd57d887b29e24d88f97bab.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What rural people actually think about clean energy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Rural community pushback to new wind and solar farms has the potential to slow the US clean-energy transition, but very little research has been done on what rural Americans actually think about renewable energy. A recent survey of thousands of rural residents about their opinions on climate change and clean energy development sheds some light; in this episode, Robin Pressman of Embold Research and Mike Casey of clean-energy PR firm Tigercomm discuss the results.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/kvkkkewbxzugseju0vbnn/volts23.11.09-robin.pressman.mike.casey.pdf?rlkey=5z1yug345g6cwjhpn7i4xd38b&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/what-rural-people-actually-think-about-clean-energy"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of the handful of forces that have the potential to stymie the clean-energy transition in the US, perhaps the most immediate and dangerous is rural NIMBYism. Rural communities will, by necessity, host most of the wind and solar farms the US needs to decarbonize, but rural resistance is already responsible for dozens of canceled projects and growing delays.</p><p>What do rural Americans think about renewable energy? Where are they getting their information and what sorts of arguments are getting through? There’s been weirdly little research on this question, despite the growing severity of the problem.</p><p>Into that breach comes <a target="_blank" href="https://emboldresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Rural-Renewable-Poll-_-Results-Memo-_-October-2023.pdf">a new poll</a> done by Embold Research, which surveyed thousands of rural residents to uncover their opinions on climate change, wind and solar power, and the promises of energy developers. The poll was commissioned by the clean-energy PR firm Tigercomm, which also interviewed community engagement staff at energy developers to find out what they’ve been hearing in the field.</p><p>I contacted Mike Casey, the president of Tigercomm, and Robin Pressman, the head of Embold Research, to discuss what the poll found and what it means for clean energy developers engaging these communities.</p><p>All right then, with no further ado, Mike Casey of Tigercomm and Robin Pressman of Embold Research. Welcome to Volts. Thank you both so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Thanks for having us.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Thank you, Mr. Roberts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Mike, let's start with you. Let's just talk a little bit about the background here. There are kind of two bits of research here that we're going to discuss today. On the one hand, Robin's firm has done this polling of rural Americans. I hate that I'm going to have to say the word rural over and over again in this podcast. It's my least favorite word to say. But also, your firm has done a bunch of interviews with developers, renewable energy developers, specifically the people at the renewable energy developers who are responsible for going into these communities and developing these projects.</p><p>It's sort of the advanced people who are going out to talk with the rural people and live in that world. And I'm interested in both those perspectives. But maybe actually, Robin, let's start with you. So, tell us a little bit about what this poll did, who it polled, and what kinds of things you were asking about.</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>So, we wanted to take a look at your favorite word, "rural," Americans and understand perspectives on renewable energy. We've seen a lot of polls lately that look at the country as a whole, that look at specific communities where projects are being built. We're certainly polling for people in those local communities and areas. But what we really wanted to do was to get sort of a 30,000-foot view across the country of what perspectives rural Americans have, where they are at this point in time, and how they're feeling about the renewable energy transition that is happening. And so we surveyed 2,645 rural Americans across the country, and we were able to have conversations with them, both the quantitative survey and then also the qualitative, get information from them that they could fill in so we could learn a little bit more about their perspective.</p><p>So, sort of virtual conversations, not actual conversations. And we were able to really get a look and understand where they are and go beyond just sort of the loudest voices in the room, which has really been a big stumbling block in these communities, to getting these projects built.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In the small handful of items that I would list as threats to the success of the clean energy transition, threats to the success of IRA and all the rest of the bills, NIMBYism and permitting is probably the biggest and most threatening one. And so everybody's thinking about this right now. Everybody in the energy world is thinking about this right now. And one of the big questions I think that's on everybody's mind is this resistance that we're seeing, is it a small handful of people that are being paid by right-wing groups stirring up this trouble, or are they speaking in some sense on behalf of a broader sentiment?</p><p>In other words, are they articulating the true sentiments of people in those areas? So maybe the place to start is just what did you find out, that they think about renewable energy?</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>So, to start with, there is support for these projects, both solar and wind in rural communities. And support does outweigh the opposition as a whole. When we ask people, do you support or oppose solar energy and wind energy projects separately being built in the following areas, communities across your state, in your local community, or on a property near yours, we could see that support does outweigh opposition across the board. As you get a little closer to on properties near yours, you would expect to see some of the support drop off —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Your backyard.</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Right, and the opposition increase, but not nearly as significantly as we thought it would.</p><p>And so there is sort of a core group of people that are opposed, certainly, but it's not as strong as one might think. It tends to hover between 10% and 25%, depending on how proximate the project is to you. And we can see that, for example, when we ask in your local community, we can see strong support, 37% strongly support solar and 32% somewhat support it. And for wind, similarly, 30% strongly supporting, 26% somewhat supporting. So, there's real opportunities here for having the conversations. But when we dug in underneath the top line data, what we can see is some real differences.</p><p>And interestingly enough, while, as you might expect, Republicans tend to be more opposed to these projects than Democrats, we see a real difference between MAGA Republicans and non-MAGA Republicans.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are those self-designations? Like, these are people who self-identify as MAGA Republicans?</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Yes. We ask them their party identification. And for those people who self-identified as a Republican, we then ask them if they identify as a MAGA Republican. And about 28% of the entire sample identified as MAGA Republican. And so what we see with those non-MAGA Republicans, we see real opportunity for growth. And we already have pretty strong support with independents as well. So, there are some groups there that we can talk to that are either already supportive or maybe sort of soft supporters who, when given and educated a little bit more information about understanding the impact on the community, are going to become stronger supporters.</p><p>We also similarly saw interesting difference between people who self-identified living in a small town or a rural area.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wait, those are two distinct things.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Yes, and an important distinction actually.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Spell that out a little bit. When people choose between those, what are they saying?</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>So, this is a self-determination. So, when we created this survey, we looked at a number of things. We looked at the rural areas based on subcounty designations and then ZIP codes based on population density, to be sure that we really were talking to people in rural areas, and we are overwhelmingly so. But there are small towns, right? Within these communities, there are one-stoplight towns. There's a main street, there are shops, there's a coffee shop where people are coming. And the people who are living more closer into the small towns tend to be stronger supporters than the people who are further out, right where these projects are more likely to be built.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's funny. One of the things that we keep finding is that more density equals bluer, and that seems to hold at every level. Even out here in the rural areas, these smaller distinctions in density seem to matter.</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Yes, but they're not entirely blue. These are areas still, that even in the small towns, these are areas that voted, still voted for Trump overwhelmingly. Right. So, these are definitely red; they're just not as strong. But what we see is people who help build the fabric of our communities, who maybe run the small shops in town, or you know, work at the local buildings, are going to see some opportunities for growth and benefit overall. And we sort of started in the middle of this conversation and I should have premised this with this is, it's really important, the context for understanding where rural Americans are right now.</p><p>And that is that they're decidedly downbeat. I mean, half think that the country is off on the wrong track, and we can dig into this further in a little bit. But their perspectives on their communities, in terms of economic opportunities, job opportunities are really, really downbeat. And so people are seeing a need for something that's going to be beneficial for their communities, but they're not necessarily believing yet that renewable energy is going to be that solution for them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Well, the big question to me, I mean, politically speaking, the big question here is about intensity. Like anyone who follows politics, I think, knows that wide, broad, shallow majority support cannot stand up to narrower, smaller, but more intense opposition. Right? Because intensity is what brings people out to meetings. Intensity is what makes them speak up. And if you're just sort of like mildly in favor when you're asked, that's not going to get you out to the meetings. So, do you have any way of measuring or judging the intensity of this sort of majority support versus the kind of concentrated MAGA opposition?</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, we can see is, like I said, when we look at some of these questions and we look at strong supporters versus those that may somewhat oppose, we can see that there is opportunity for growth. And when we look at those who just identify that they're not sure on a series of measures there is real opportunity for education and growth there, we can see that maybe when we start talking about specific aspects of what these projects are going to bring to their communities, you get about 20-25%, about a quarter saying that they're not sure what the implications are going to be for their communities as it relates to, say, tax benefits, for example. So this really opens up opportunities for conversations.</p><p>And here's the important point: It's conversations with culturally credible messengers. Having companies come from outside is not necessarily welcomed or appreciated in a lot of these communities. Identifying folks that are from those communities, specifically farmers and ranchers, small business owners who can have these conversations with their friends, with their neighbors, really carry significantly more weight. There's some perspectives that we were able to uncover in the survey that really just look at how rural Americans perceive themselves as it relates to the country, and they perceive that they're looked down upon. They think that elites, liberal elites from the coasts are looking down upon them.</p><p>They think that the politicians aren't paying attention to them and their needs, and they're not feeling understood in that. And so those are really important points. And so when you have outsiders coming in and making promises of tax benefits, and here's all this opportunity we're going to bring, they're decidedly suspect of that, as you might imagine, rightfully so, given their experiences and where they're coming at it from. But importantly, as we begin to share more of that education, of the information, of the opportunities that it can bring, we are able to build a coalition of supporters in these communities.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>So, there's actually some good news here. The good news is that the poll that Robin's firm ran, that we were part of in terms of commissioning it and socializing it, mirrors what the Berkeley National Lab study in 2019 found as well. So, they looked at people who were neighbors of existing wind farms. Three miles, one mile, half mile radius. Half mile is less than most of your dog owning listeners walk their dogs at night. And among people who lived within a half mile of a wind turbine, 51% had a very positive or positive experience. 24% had a very negative or negative experience.</p><p>That's actually worth taking into account. Wind is typically viewed as triggering greater opposition than solar. That was found in our poll. But yet among those who live next to it, they don't mind.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, 51% is — I guess that's good news. Half and half. It's not great news.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Well, actually, no, check that out, though. So, 51% very positive or positive, 24% very negative or negative.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>So it's a two to one ratio. That's actually a significant gap. And the point here is that you are right: Of the nine barriers to the clean energy transition, critical minerals, grid stability, physical infrastructure, transmission, workforce development, supply chains, government, storage, permitting is the most likely transition killer. No question. Yet people who live next to it, once it gets built, it is readily accepted. All the data show that. And the even better news is that what renewable energy can offer rural communities is an almost exact match with what rural Americans say they want for themselves and their neighbors.</p><p>They want lower energy prices, they want jobs so their young people can stay in the community, and they want tax revenue to address aging infrastructure. That's exactly what renewable energy offers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's what they say on the poll that they want. That's where you're getting up.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think this is a pattern of NIMBY opposition, not just to wind and solar, but to urbanist projects. And I mean, name it. It's almost always the case that afterward, everyone's fine. Everyone's fine with the thing. It's the same with, like, a bike lane. Like, after the bike lane's built, everybody loves the bike lane. It's always that way. But that never seems to translate into making it any easier to build the next bike lane. Do you know what I mean and like so the fact that people are happy with wind farms once they're next to them, how do you translate that into making it easier to sell the next wind farm?</p><p>That's the magic here. Mike, I have a bunch of questions for you about engaging with this, but just a couple more for Robin. Did you, on your poll run by these rural people, specific arguments for and against renewable energy? And if so, I'm just curious what arguments against it are catching on and grabbing people's minds? And conversely, what are the arguments for it that actually sway them?</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Absolutely. So, starting with what people are really for, some of the messages that really resonated focus on the fact that we're going to move away from dependence on foreign sources for energy. The increase in renewable energy decreases our energy dependence on other countries, which resonates, as well as the diversification of the grid. Renewable energy helps diversify our sources of energy, ensuring that the lights stay on even if one energy source fails. So, those really rise to the top. Some of the economic arguments that we tested in this poll didn't work quite as well. And I think that partly there's a "not sure" component here.</p><p>As I mentioned earlier, about a quarter identified some of the tax benefits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You mean in terms of local economic benefits that these things bring?</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. And so there's some education and because it's generic. So, we've seen in other polls where we've gone into very local communities and asked the question related to specific projects that we could name that are nearby and received greater support. So, to some extent, by asking it in a generic sense, they're not sure. They're wanting to get more information.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>And so the opportunities will increase as we go into these communities and we can serve up these messages again, relying on people from within the community, people who have gone ahead and had projects built in their backyard or on their land and are benefiting from it, to be able to share some of that experience with their neighbors.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Speaking of trusted messengers, people from those communities.</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Yes, absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because it seems to me like a general rule that these sort of abstract principles that you kind of will say you're in favor of in a poll like energy independence and things like that, those things, in my experience, tend to crumble pretty quickly in the face of, "But this will hurt you specifically." And so I'm curious, what are the — you know, if I'm a right-wing group and I'm going into one of these communities to try to stir up opposition — what are arguments am I using that are working? What triggers people?</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, one of the greatest concerns people have is that renewable energy cannot currently meet our energy needs. And that really rises to the top of concerns. You also see some people have concerns about the use of farmland and that the benefits and energy are actually going to go elsewhere, that their community is not going to be the one to really benefit to the extent as other communities will. There is definitely skepticism at this point about renewable energy fully meeting those needs. But again, opportunities exist for education where we can see that people are identifying as either somewhat disagreeing or not sure, and we can go in and educate folks on those benefits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it seems to me that rural communities in the US have good, historically grounded reasons to think that energy companies might come in and treat them like a resource colony, mess up their land, and extract all the benefits, because that's basically what fossil fuels have done everywhere they've gone in rural US. You know, why wouldn't you think that seems quite sensible to me. So, Mike, you and your colleagues are out talking to people at renewable energy developers who are now having to deal with this. And this, I think, is not totally new, but there's certainly a rising level of opposition and just the significance and the importance of the whole thing, it's just rising.</p><p>And when I think about the renewable energy developers that I've spoken to and that I know, they just do not, I say this with all love and respect, do not strike me as the kind of people who are going to be particularly adept at navigating these highly charged, fraught, very culturally specific circumstances into which they're being thrown. Like, it just seems like they're going to get chewed up. Are the people you're talking to, do they feel prepared? Are any of them actually prepared? Do they have a good sense of what they need to be doing? Do they have the same view of themselves that the rural residents have of them?</p><p>Sort of like, what are you finding when you talk to these people?</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a good question. So, I should just give credit where credit's due. Our Director of Community Engagement, Ayelet Hines, also teaches influence mapping at Johns Hopkins. So, this is her jam and she ran most of these interviews. But from the meta perspective, community engagement professionals have a very good sense of the dynamics in the community. They also volunteer. They feel very undertrained for the increasing political campaign aspects of their job. That's really what we found, is that if you look at the punch list of tactics that community engagement teams are facing in these communities, it reads like a political campaign.</p><p>So, political campaigning is being done to them and these companies are not responding in kind. And fundamentally that's because the leadership teams of the companies who have never really had a reason to be in the room and get yelled at, so to speak, until you're there, and I have been there, you don't really get the sense of how visceral the concerns are in these communities. They really are proud of their communities. They value their way of life. And what we find in talking to developers is that MAGA voters, they're usually leading the opposition. And we suspect that's because of the following reasons: One, these voters see the culture in the country going in a direction they don't like. Now anybody can have opinions about their opinions. That's irrelevant. These are people who have the right to vote. They have the right to their opinions. They have very strong opinions. And their opinions —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, Mike, you say they see it. Let me just clarify: They are hooked up, trapped by, entirely captured by a gigantic propaganda machine that is pumping their heads full of the most paranoid stuff you could. I mean, they're not just seeing this happen, this story is being shaped and fed to them everywhere they look.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Yes, I'm taking a more clinical view of it, David, I think because —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sorry, it works me up.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>No, totally understood. But I think that's actually a useful thing you just said. Let me take it as a microcosm. This industry is going to have to build things in rural America, and rural Americans are not going to change their existing baseline worldviews and opinions to accommodate clean energy. The only route to building in their midst is to respect their views as their views. You don't have to agree with them, but you have to respect they hold the views they have and you have to address them on their terms.</p><p>It's the ultimate sign of respect. And what rural communities demand above all else is that you respect them. You come in the door respecting their way of life, their quality of life, and their values. And that really is the challenge I think the industry faces. I think in retrospect it's pretty clear that this industry committed an original sin, unknowingly. It assumed low friction permitting, and it's not what it's encountering right now. So, the people that we talk to are squeezed between an emerging reality on the ground and leadership teams who don't have a reason to fully appreciate it and the budgets are sized accordingly, and therein lies the problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it seems to me it ought to be showing up in the numbers by now. Like, there's a lot of projects getting shot down and killed. There's a lot of projects waiting in queues. There's just a lot. I mean, at this point, it's hard to avoid the permitting problem. It ought to be, seems like it.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Yes, you know I'm most of the way through a book called "The Polluters." It's a history of the chemical lobby. And if you read that book, if you read Robert Caro's book about LBJ, particularly "Master of the Senate", what you see is that industries mature in the way they organize and deploy their public affairs, their lobbying, around decade six or seven. Clean energy is most generously credited with being in its third decade. And here's the challenge most clean energy companies do not understand: They are not creating a new industry as Google did. They are creating a new sector within an industry dominated by powerful incumbents with decades of experience weaponizing government influence peddling and disinformation.</p><p>And because of that, there is this residual amount of magical thinking, and it affects the way this industry makes its case. And the challenge and the task here for those of us working in the industry is to accelerate, unnaturally accelerate the maturation of the way this industry scales up its public case making at whatever level of government decision. And this is just one of those.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then, I guess, as someone who has studied and thought about and talked about and written about for a long time, the power of, the increasing power of right-wing media, the increasingly concentrated power of it, the increasing domination of rural America by it. I get your point about you have to respect their identity and their worldview. But it seems like it would be pretty easy for right-wing media to come along and tell these people, "hey, guess what part of your worldview is that renewables are bad." And if right-wing media decides to do that and has their eyeballs and their ears locked up, what power does a company, does a single company wandering into town with a project in their back pocket, what power does a single company have against that?</p><p>In some sense, they just seem, even if they were well funded, it seems like they're outmatched here.</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>We did ask some questions about understanding what news consumption people —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah, yeah, I meant to ask about that.</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, about 40% identify online news sites, which can mean a wide variety of things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'll say.</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>But 37% local news, you see about 21% identifying Fox News specifically the more right-wing sites, 17% identifying things like Newsmax, Breitbart, and the Blaze. What's interesting to me though is we asked a question earlier on about what are some of your concerns about renewable energy? And one of the options that was offered was sort of taken straight from the disinformation playbook, and that was that wind and solar can harm your health. And we only saw about 5% of people identifying that as a concern.</p><p>And when we asked the open-ended question, just what are your concerns? It didn't come up at all. And it may be that other pieces of disinformation are sticking more than the one we asked about, but in that sense, it didn't rise to the top. And so I think people are able to sort out, of course, you'll always have a core percent of people that are going to be sort of stuck in their own perspectives and in their own loop of information. But generally speaking, their concerns seem to be grounded in some of the areas we talked about, which is reliability, use of farmland, that sort of thing.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>David, to answer your question, it is the disruptor's sentence to have a disruptor's needs: large, with disruptors budgets: small. And yet that doesn't get us off the hook. It is a fundamental reality that clean energy is doing the equivalent of walking into a party, going up to the biggest guy in the party who's sitting on the couch and going, "dude, you're in my seat, move." That's what we're doing. That's what we're doing. And we have to get over ourselves that incumbents with trillions of dollars in physical infrastructure, sunk costs, are not going to just say, "You know what? You guys are right. The planet's on fire. I'll listen to the IPCC. I'm going to just convert our vast infrastructure into a home energy management company, no problem."</p><p>It just is not going to happen, you know. One of my favorite sayings was Confucius: "Those who say something is impossible should not interrupt those who are doing it." And I really think that our task here is to stop whining about resource disparity and suck it up and start pooling our resources to at least do the basics better. Allow me to give you a contrast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, please tell me about the basics, because I have no, like, if you told me to go into a small town and work up support for a renewable energy installation, I would not have the slightest clue where to begin. So, what are the basics?</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Well, I'll give you an example. So, I gathered some of this information in the research I did for a piece I wrote last year called "We're the People We're Waiting For." And it was essentially a study about how do we prevent the next Joe Manchin holdout on a critical climate solution step we've got to take. And if you're Joe Manchin, you are well aware that the oil and gas industry, really, the fracking industry in West Virginia, has a statewide annual festival. You can go to Parkersburg and go to the Early Oil and Gas Museum. Your graduating high school senior can apply to West Virginia Wesleyan for a full ride to become a fracking tech.</p><p>Right. Now, what they've done, and I say this because I actually cited something you wrote a long time ago where you talked about a country western song that lionized a coal miner.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I remember that.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>This is 100% what we're talking about. There has been great effort, very culturally astute by incumbent polluting sectors, to put biceps and belt buckles onto the digging out of our energy supply. And the whole meme of —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And trucks, too.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Right? The whole meme of Solyndra was that if you don't dig or mine for your energy, it's beneath your dignity. Now, there are four wind farms in West Virginia. One of them, what was built, was the largest one east of the Mississippi River. And if you go on Tripadvisor right now and you search their names, you're going to see people expressing frustration. They couldn't find the things. Well, why do they want to go there? Because they want to look at it. And the crazy thing is that our industry is ghosting its host communities, places where the wind and solar farms are already built, make almost zero effort to grow, curate, and demonstrate support.</p><p>Now, why is that important? Because I'll point you to research by the Republican Accountability Project. These are never-Trumper national Republicans, George Conway, et cetera. They have tracked attitudes and worldviews of Trump voters from '16 to '20 to '22 and beyond. What they've noticed is that the more legal trouble Trump gets into, the tighter the screens on information sources and validation that these voters will have, and that 100% applies to the Americans we're talking about. So, if we are ghosting, like communities. For example, two counties in Michigan, one is called Isabella County, and the county to the south of it, Montcalm County.</p><p>Isabella has a huge amount of renewable energy development. Montcalm, there's a great deal of contention around renewable energy development. The best validators for Montcalm County undecided residents are Isabella County residents, because they know some of them and they look like them, and they are like them, and yet we're neglecting that. So, can we put on a festival, statewide festival with a beauty pageant? No. Can we have a museum yet? No. But for goodness sakes, we have basic block and tackle, making the most of our built infrastructure, communicating through social media. Really, Facebook, because that's the new newspaper in rural America.</p><p>Proactively engaging rather than just responding with fact sheets. These are some campaigning basics that don't cost much in the way of money. You just have to work them harder. And will we close the gap entirely? No, but we can close the gap a lot.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, a big piece of this, then, is this going somewhere where you already won a battle, where there are happy residents next to these things and simply trying to sort of formalize and amplify that positive feeling? Get some of those people to testify on your behalf or write op-eds for you or talk to their neighbors on Facebook. What's that look like?</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Video testimonials. I'll give you an example. Robin and I, we did a precursor survey in the very tip of the thumb of Michigan, a county called Huron County, 33,000 residents. Ruby red, voted for Trump, 69% over Biden, and it has the highest density of wind turbines in the state of Michigan. Michigan has a very strong township structure, so it's kind of like many counties within counties. And as the years have gone by and renewable energy has been developed, moratoria have been passed in various townships. So, Robin's firm did a poll. It's brilliant. And they asked, do you want more renewable energy development or not?</p><p>Negative 9%: No, we don't. By nine points: No, we do not. Now, we ask, in one question, naming three specific pieces of infrastructure, a school lab, a parking lot, and something else. And we explained to Huron County residents, this is what renewable energy has paid for. Now, how do you feel? David, opinion moved 14 points. I have read thousands of polls. I've participated in the construction of, I don't know, 100 or so. And you have to usually ask batteries of questions to get opinion to move 14 points. One question, 14 points. And what that tells us is people are open to this if you talk to them with local reference points, respecting their culture through people they're willing to listen to.</p><p>Does that beat propaganda from Robert Bryce on Breitbart? I don't know. I think it remains to be seen. But we don't get to declare that it can't unless we've tried, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I bet there's enough for a museum. It occurs to me now, like, why isn't there a museum of renewable energy? It's been around for at least a few decades, like get some old NASA solar panels. Someone should do that. Is there a success story here, Mike? A company that's done well, or a company that is not ghosting its communities, that is staying in its communities and working up support and trying to expand support and use that to leverage more? Is there anyone who's doing this well?</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Yes, there is a high degree of variability in the sophistication of the programs. One public example is AES has the largest wind farm under construction. They just completed a second phase in Winslow, Arizona, and the community support is very strong. This is a sprawling pair of counties. One of them is quite Trumpy. I think the other one's a little bit more even, but in terms of presidential preferences, but they have really strong support. Their phase completion event was extremely well attended by the local community. And the details on how they got there, I think I'll let them share.</p><p>But there are companies, an increasing number of companies that are seeing: We've got a $10 to $20 billion problem unfolding here and we're underinvested and we want to change that. I can 100% tell you that awareness is growing. I think the important thing is that the industry overall, most of the developers came out of a European utility background. EDP, Avangrid, EDF, EON/RWE. These are all companies that started as European utilities, and then they started building renewable energy overseas in their home countries, and they came over here and built renewable energy. And for brand considerations, they've had very tight controls on how they allow their staff to use Facebook.</p><p>But you can't have handcuffs on your staff when you're using Facebook, because it's the conduit where community decisions are framed and the decision making gets going. And if you tie your shoes together, you can't win a race.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, although releasing your employees to freestyle on Facebook also carries its own risks.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>I didn't say freestyle, and I would just assert there's a whole lot of room between "don't do anything unless we approve it at headquarters" and "do anything you want." There's a whole lot of room. So, I'm arguing for a firm midway point in that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A lot of these companies are relatively small and I would imagine don't necessarily have the funds to staff up like whatever ten person community engagement squadron. Is this the kind of thing where there can be shared resources? I mean, a) shared resources among and between developers, but also b), it seems like this is something that they ought to be getting help with from the broader community of people who are concerned about seeing renewable energy get built, you know what I mean? Like, it'd be nice if they had a gigantic propaganda machine on their side, but at least something. So, how could we move beyond these sort of one by one battles, one by one companies and pool resources?</p><p>Does that spark anything?</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Well, I know that those are active, ongoing conversations right now. I'm a part of some of them, and I know those are taking place. And I will say that it remains to be seen how much of the traditional development processes that originated with oil and gas and real estate that are now being used for renewable energy, how much of those can and should be changed to accommodate newly emerging political campaign demands, so to speak. And our conclusion, having talked to the companies, is that fundamentally, the companies are going to have to experiment on a per company basis, how to advance and update the way they're solving for these emerging realities.</p><p>I don't think there's a right way. There's a body of best practices, generic best practices for public case making, and then there's a set list of tried and true development steps. The former have to be experimentally incorporated into the latter, and the latter varies by company. So, there are some things that multi-company platforms can do. Further research from Robin's shop sharing results of pre-designed experimentation. These are things that can be done. And yet, fundamentally, the companies need to seize their own destiny and understand that even if it's a significant expenditure, it beats bankruptcy, it beats lost projects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>My gut says that part of their reservations have to do with resources having to do with needing to spend a bunch more money on this. But I'm just guessing, based on what I know about the type of people who are in this business, that if you come to them and say: "You are now mired in politics, you are in a political campaign. There's a political campaign being run against you. And if you want to build your project, you have to run a political campaign on your own behalf." That just horrifies people. These are generally technocrats, I think, who want good information and fact sheets to carry the day and loathe partisan politics and are horrified by the thought of getting hoovered into it.</p><p>How big of a factor is that?</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>It's massive, in short. Because your descriptions are fairly on point. And I think Robin and I have seen that reaction unfold for the last two months, I think since we spoke at the trade show, and we use that term political campaigning with intention. It does push up fears and concerns, because when non-politically experienced people hear that, they think about attack ads, hyper-partisanship, bribes, like first energy cuts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, politics is ugly these days. I mean, it's just ugly. That's what comes to mind is ugliness.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Right? And so we have to explain to them, this is the basic block and tackle. It's communicating within emotional frames. It's winning the race to define. It's using social media as an engagement tool, not a cheap form of news release distribution. And when you help people understand that their assumptions aren't matching what's needed, their concerns ease and they're just — cod liver oil is good for you to have, but it tastes like crap. And there's no getting around that it tastes like crap. So, if you want the benefits, you have to drink it. And so we just don't have enough time in the planetary hour to be hung up on ourselves and our squeamishness about the messiness of public case making.</p><p>As Gandalf said in Lord of the Rings "War is upon you". You know, Gondoer. I'm sorry you don't like that, but that's just the way it is. So the orcs can pillage your castle or you can actually defend it. And that's really what we have. We are telling that big guy at the party, get off the couch, that's my seat. That's what we're doing and we have to do that. So, if we accept that and then we get over ourselves, let go of our concerns and fears, invest at scale to the best we can, I think we're going to see a lot of this difficulty be reduced. Not eliminated, but reduced.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Robin, I'm curious. My priors, my instincts are to think that rural people's opinions about renewable energy as such are relatively shallow and easily shiftable and that the deep currents here are more of what you referenced earlier. Just about: "We don't want to be disrespected. We don't want outsiders coming in and plundering our resources." Did you poll about other kinds of development? Like, did you poll about how do you feel about how would you feel about a fracker coming in and fracking? Or how would you feel about new oil wells or new oil drills? Is there anything specific to renewable energy here?</p><p>Or is this mostly just sort of general feelings about culture and the culture of being rural and the culture of outsiders, that kind of thing? You know what I mean?</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Yeah, I do. It's a good question. And in short answer, no, we did not find it beneficial to do. But in every poll, you have to make decisions about what you're going to include. And what we decided to really focus in here on is attitudes and perspectives of rural Americans. We wanted to sort of dig in and really understand where they're coming from and what opportunities and concerns they see. And while 70% think that rural communities offer a better quality of life than other types of communities, around three in five identify rural America as, quote, "the true America" and think that rural Americans work harder than others.</p><p>But yet 60% strongly agree that the national media and elites don't understand what life is like in rural America. And similarly, a majority strongly agree that people living in cities don't understand the problems that rural Americans face. So, beyond sort of looking at renewable energy specifically, we wanted to understand what are the concerns of rural Americans? What are the challenges they're facing? They're facing tough economic times. They're facing a situation where they don't feel like there are enough jobs moving forward for them, availability of good jobs for themselves and opportunities for young people. Significant concerns. And interestingly, also availability of low-cost energy is a concern.</p><p>So, we see these economic concerns, but they're not yet hearing the solutions that they feel are going to bring them out of this difficult situation. And so that's where we chose to really explore here, is to understand what are some of the messages, what are some of the messengers? And as I mentioned earlier, through some of the open ends, just sort of try and hear directly from people talking about their struggling. They're struggling with bills, they're struggling with groceries. They really are facing these challenges. But there's an openness with some, certainly to going forward to new technologies for renewables and the jobs and the opportunities that they'll bring.</p><p>So, there is some of that there, and more conversation is really going to open up more opportunities, I believe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, one of the things that occurs to me is, and this is something that whenever I talk to sort of like marketers or people like that, they always cite as one of the strongest sort of psychological forces in messaging, which is just, I think what people want to hear or are looking for is something along the lines of "people like us do things like this." That's what moves people. And so this brings back to the messenger thing. This brings back to the success story thing. This brings back to sort of know, they just need to make that mental shift where this is not something people want to do to us, this is something people like us do to better ourselves.</p><p>It's like moving the locus of agency from outside to inside somehow. So, along those lines, Mike, final question for you, which, know, you said a couple of times that obviously every situation is different, every community is different. In some way, every project is different in some way, and there's not going to be an obvious kind of like mechanical algorithm to follow here. But on the other hand, as you say, there are some basic common-sense things. So, maybe just by way of concluding, you just say, if I'm a renewable energy developer and I've got my eye on a community there in rural, whatever, Pennsylvania, and I've watched your slideshow and I've read your poll, and I'm ready to do these things.</p><p>What is my sort of checklist of basics? What are my block and tackle basics, like the obvious things that I need to do? I'm guessing that one of them is that I think one of the worst sins of these things that people don't do is engage early. So, the residents of these communities end up being sort of confronted, like, "here's a thing on your doorstep, yes or no," and naturally, it gets their hackles up. I'm guessing engaging early is part of it. But if you just had to give a list of like four or five, "no duh", at least do this type of things for that developer, what would those be?</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Engage early. Start by talking to the business community. Use culturally credible messengers, gather validation from built project neighbors, and do not be afraid of a mess and cacophony that comes on Facebook. Embrace it, because that's the way community conversations are had. And David, I'll tell you an anecdote that I source as the genesis of this, the whole arc of what at least my firm is doing on this. 14 years ago, I took my then six-year-old daughter to a wedding in Idaho Falls. And so we flew to Denver and we puddle jumped to Idaho Falls.</p><p>And as the plane came into Idaho Falls, it banked over a mountain range, and there was a wind farm wind project that dotted some of the peaks. At least half the people in the plane were locals. And as the plane banked and the wind farm came into view, there was an audible gasp like, "whoa, that's cool," from the locals. And out came the phones and people were taking pictures. The thing is that rural communities have a lot of really great qualities. And one of them is people aren't afraid to work. They work with their hands. They like to understand how things work and renewable energy, mechanically, it's really interesting, it's cool.</p><p>And we are not making the most of that. We're instead just expecting people who don't see the problem that we solve as nearly as serious a crisis as people who listen to this show. We're expecting them to see the world our way and to accept what we're doing on our terms. If we change that, if we open our minds to how they see the world and communicate to them where they are, this is going to go significantly better and significantly more successfully.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I come back over and over again to the appropriate messengers thing because — nothing's worse, and I'm familiar with a lot of this kind of talk in the politics world, and what I've found is nothing's worse than someone trying to mimic a different culture. Do you know what I mean? A different culture, like reading off a list of things and trying to sort of sound, "hey, I'm an authentic rural guy." There's nothing cringier and there's nothing rural people spot faster than that. Right? So, it just brings me back again and again to find the people who speak the language natively and then train them like that just seems to me like it ought to be such a huge part of this.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>It is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a little wild to me that this is such a huge problem that we're running into. And I've been thinking about this a lot lately, Mike, I've been thinking about your nine possible blockers. And I've been thinking a lot lately about what a huge piece of the puzzle social license is to all this, just getting people to agree to let you do it and how comparatively little compared to the amount of energy system modeling and price comparisons. And just like all this technocratic quantifying and modeling and how comparatively little real tangible research and work is being done on the kind of sociological and psychological and cultural aspects of making this work.</p><p>And that's like where the rubber is meeting the road now. That's where everything is happening now. And it's so weirdly, everybody's hand waving, everybody's trading priors and trading intuitions. So, it's just nice to finally see some meat on the bone here, some people actually going and researching this problem directly.</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Thank you for that. One of the benefits of our approach with polling is it allows us to be able to get into these rural communities where it's difficult sometimes with other types of polling to do with significant samples. So, it allows us to be able to launch these surveys and be able to have the information from the respondents.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's great to hear directly from them. So, yeah, thanks for doing the research and thank you both for coming on and walking through it with us.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>David, I'll throw in a final point. You can throw it on the tape or if you want, but I sound like Elrond of Lord of the Rings, "I was there 3000 years ago." But the climate community, the NGO climate community, it seems very safe to say now that we made a terrible decision 30 years ago to let the inmates run the asylum. We let wonks and lawyers do our messaging. That's why we're stuck with these terribly uncommunicative terms that ExxonMobil loves us using. Emissions, greenhouse gases, climate change. No, it's pollution. It's climate disruption.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Net metering.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Right. And that came because there was this technocrat's proclivity to be exact, to have the world comport with the way we are certain it is. We need not, we cannot afford to make that mistake now. We cannot let engineers run our public communications campaigns.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Your lips to God's ears. I'll just say that's not just the renewable energy community that needs to hear that.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>I mean, obviously I say this with love and I make my living as a fan of this industry. And Robin and I funded this poll even though we got turned down. We pitched this poll to the industry to pay for. It declined and we paid for it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's crazy. That's crazy.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>That's how strongly we feel about it. But it needed to be done. And that's okay, because if it slingshots a better approach across this industry, we're going to stand a much better chance of realizing that 40% carbon pollution footprint reduction potential in the IRA. And if we don't, we don't.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well said. All right. We'll call that the final word. Thanks, Mike. Thanks Robin. Thanks for coming on.</p><p><strong>Mike Casey</strong></p><p>Thank you, my friend.</p><p><strong>Robin Pressman</strong></p><p>Thanks for having us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-rural-people-actually-think</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:138240739</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 11 Nov 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/138240739/b357145924be0db5b2c92c5c0b10e575.mp3" length="65713025" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3284</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/138240739/7829dfbd0b94351449eba7282f8c612c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The Volts/Catalyst pod crossover you didn't know you were waiting for]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Shayle Kann, cleantech investor and host of the podcast Catalyst, shares his educated opinion on the most overhyped and underhyped technologies and trends in clean energy.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/r3r6cn7mxbqlfybgb2m1e/volts23.11.03-shayle.kann.pdf?rlkey=kavj7uxg80v304yqbk8bcg4a5&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/the-volts-catalyst-pod-crossover-you-didn-t-know-you-were-waiting-for"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If you listen to Volts, you probably also listen to — or at the very least, should also be listening to — <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/podcasts/catalyst-with-shayle-kann">Catalyst</a>, the Canary Media podcast hosted by veteran cleantech investor Shayle Kann. </p><p>Like Volts, it features fairly nerdy deep-dive interviews, though they are mercifully shorter, and they’re more focused on cleantech, less likely to drift into politics and activism. (Shayle is a partner at Energy Impact Partners, where he assesses and funds cleantech companies for a living, so unlike me he brings some expertise to the table!)</p><p>Anyway, our pods have been mutual admirers for a while now and we thought it would be fun to do something together. So the following episode features Shayle and I discussing a few technologies and trends we think are overhyped, and a few we think are underhyped. </p><p>We get into electric stoves, interest rates, thermal batteries, and much more. It was just as fun and enlightening as I expected — especially where we disagreed — so I hope you enjoy it as much as I did. </p><p>All right, here we are. I'm here with Shayle Kann, the host of Catalyst. Shayle, welcome to the greatest crossover event in podcast history.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Man, I had already written down that joke. I had written down that literal joke for my monologue. I got to come up with something else.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's the Infinity War of podcasts for nerds. You know, Shayle, I have been listening to Catalyst for a long time, a big fan, and we've been talking for a long time now about how we ought to do something, do some sort of crossover, have some sort of chat, especially since we're both quasi under Canary now. So what we decided on was to chat a little bit about the clean energy landscape via the lens of a couple of what we feel are overhyped trends or technologies and a couple that we think are underhyped. And so we're just going to walk through things that way and have a little chat along the way about what we're seeing and doing. So, Shayle, are you ready to go?</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I am. But before we start, can I ask you a question?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, please.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>So when I was trying to come up with my overhyped and underhyped things, I was having, like, a surprisingly difficult time determining what I think is overhyped or underhyped relative to whom? You know, I kept coming up with things where I was like things that are overhyped to the people who care about energy on Twitter, which is not representative of anything important. So I was trying to figure out overhyped or underhyped by whom and to whom. And I don't know if you struggled with the same thing?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I did struggle with that. We do live in a weird, tiny, little insular world in which many things are overhyped that normal people have never heard of. And vice versa. So I think I did a mix. So you'll just have to explain the context of your answer while you're answering. You have to explain underhyped or overhyped to whom while you're answering. Some of mine are definitely overhyped or underhyped to our audience.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Right? Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which, as you say, does not mean much to the wider world, since we both have audiences of energy nerds, handsome, viril, unusually intelligent energy nerds —</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Of course.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>in our audiences.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah, I also struggled a little bit with, like, there's some things that I think might be overhyped because I overhyped them. Just a bit circular.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know one of my underhyped is something that I have been relentlessly trying to hype for years, but I just don't think I have the hype power to bring it up to the hype level, where it would be sufficiently hyped. So we'll discuss those along the way. So we starting then with your first underhyped trend. So tell us what it is and perhaps to whom it is underhyped.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Okay, so I think this is underhyped by almost everybody outside of a relatively small corner of the clean energy world that's like trying to pound the drum as loud as possible about this, which is the trend of onshoring of manufacturing in clean energy supply chains. Onshoring, and I guess I would add near shoring or friend shoring, but predominantly onshoring. So let me contextualize a little bit, which is I know you were around for the whole solar story as solar was just starting to mature, but the short version of that story in my mind, if you go way back in solar history, was Japan was really the first market that both installed any meaningful amount of solar and produced it.</p><p>Right. You had these companies like Sharp and others, way back in the '90s. And Japan had this feed-in tariff for residential solar, and that was small and steady for a long time, and not a whole lot happened. And then what really kickstarted the solar market was demand in Germany, first because of their feed-in tariff, and then in the US. Predominantly in California, thanks to the California Solar Initiative and the renewable portfolio standards here. And then it spread through other parts of Western Europe, as other countries like Spain and the Czech Republic and Italy and others started introducing their own policies.</p><p>But demand was clearly coming from Western Europe. Manufacturing followed briefly. Right. In Germany in particular, you had some of the big early solar manufacturers were German companies, and the US looked like it might be on the verge of a domestic manufacturing renaissance, largely of the next generation of technologies thin film solar. And then, of course, everybody knows how the story ended up playing out, which is that basically all of that manufacturing moved to China and then kind of spread into Southeast Asia as trade barriers started to get enacted and has stayed there. Right. And the thing that I think is underhyped that people don't appreciate starts with solar but doesn't end with solar, which is that thanks predominantly to the Inflation Reduction Act, but not exclusively, we are seeing a crazy renaissance in domestic manufacturing of clean energy components.</p><p>I woke up this morning to another announcement. This is Canadian Solar, which, despite the name, is really a Chinese solar manufacturer, setting up a five-gigawatt cell manufacturing facility in Indiana.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's crazy. They're one after the other these days. I've almost become numb to them already, and it's only like a year. A year? But it's just one after the other.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>That's the key point. Right. We're barely over a year since the IRA. And yeah, it's solar cells and modules, but obviously the battery and EV supply chain is the other places is playing out in a huge way and it's an enormous amount. And we've never seen anything like this in the history of clean energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is one of the things I struggle to convey to people outside our world. I think it's gotten out that the IRA is a climate bill, but I do not think it has appreciated the sort of brashness or the sheer ambition involved in attempting to stand up a domestic supply chain for these things out of almost nothing. Right. And it's just a huge, conjuring feat accomplished with a boatload of money. And it's happening right in front of us. It is quite remarkable. I do wonder. As big as the growth seems from our end, since we're starting from a relatively sort of desiccated manufacturing base, as people have been complaining about for years, do you think we're going to get to a meaningful chunk?</p><p>I mean, China is like 90, 95% on most of these materials, most of these manufacturing, most of these supply chains — other than it brings us jobs, and it employs a lot of people in a lot of areas that are hurting, and so it's good for that reason, manufacturing is good. But do you think we're going to be able to build up enough of the manufacturing on our shores that we can throw weight around in the actual market? Or do you think it's more of like an insurance policy we're doing? I struggle to conceive the scale here that we're shooting for.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I don't think it's going to be consistent across various parts of the supply chain. Right. We may end up assembling a lot of our EV battery packs in North America, but that doesn't mean that we're going to be producing all of our lithium chemicals here, for example. Right, there's places where China's stranglehold on supply chain is stronger than other places. Rare earth elements is another one. Right. Like China's super dominant. And it's going to take a lot for us to play a big role there. But in other places. Like I said, battery assembly and maybe solar, interestingly enough, we've got a ways to go there.</p><p>Now, to be clear, I don't think there's a future wherein the US produces as much of any of these things as China does. But we don't need to if our point is to get high on our own supply, basically.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's resilience, right? Mostly it's just sort of having a little buffer in case China tries to play games. I think that's sort of how it's being viewed in the administration.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Which is happening. Right. Like we just saw China just announced that it's going to curb or at least require licensing of exports of graphite to other countries. That's a big deal. Graphite is a predominant anode —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And they utterly dominate graphite. It's like 99%. I think on graphite it's something ludicrous.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Exactly. So I think the geopolitical element of this is definitely a dri... It's a combination of the geopolitics and the China-thing, along with the "economic development in regions that need it"-thing that make this so attractive.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And plus, not to rant, but here we have in this country, we've been complaining and complaining about parts of the country that have been hollowed out by globalization, right? Especially a cliche now. And those parts have gone red. It's the white working class, it's angry at Democrats because of globalization, blah, blah, blah. So here is a huge multi hundred billion dollar, very direct effort to reverse that, to send, to get manufacturing going back in exactly those parts of the country. Like, you've seen the maps. These are red areas where these jobs are going. Here we have a multi billion dollar effort precisely targeted at reviving manufacturing precisely in those areas.</p><p>And it's like you can't get the news to talk about it.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I think that's true. You said you think people woken up that the IRA is a climate bill. I'm not sure. I think people don't pay any attention to the IRA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Might be optimistic. Okay, well, we could talk about that forever. Because another aspect of that is the sort of sort of Europe being kind of having its butt up on its shoulders about our industrial policy and our supposed protectionism and the sort of trade tensions that this is sparking with Europe. But we can't get too sucked into it. We've got a lot of items to get through.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah, save that one. Okay, so that's my first underhyped. What about you? What's your first underhyped trend or technology?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this one people will laugh at me about this one, as you did when I emailed it. But my first underhyped is thermal storage. Anyone who's been listening to either of our podcasts —</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to say, you and I have both been hyping this one. This is the one where you're reflecting a failure on our collective part.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know, a failure of our scale. I think this deserves — I'll say this right now, thermal storage is having a little bit of a moment in our audiences, right? In our energy world, in our sort of kind of nerd circles. But I personally think that it is eventually going to be a sufficiently big piece of the puzzle that it's going to sort of escape our world and become — I think normal people can sort of grope around with batteries now. I think normal people get, "oh, you have wind and solar, you need some batteries." I think that's like escaped our world into the general understanding.</p><p>I think thermal batteries are going to play a big role in this for the simple reason, as you know, we've both interviewed the head of Rondo. I interviewed the head of Antora. I don't know if you talked to him too. I think the reason it's going to be a big enough deal that even normies will hear about it is that it is going to be this kind of skeleton key that unlocks the decarbonization of industrial heating, industrial heating and cooling. Which is one of the big, quote unquote, difficult to decarbonize sectors, this sector that everybody's worrying and fretting about and tearing their hair out about.</p><p>Like, we know how to do electricity, we know how to do transportation, we know how to do home heating and cooling industry is the big unsolved problem. And I'm not sure the news has gotten out that I just don't think it's unsolved anymore. I think thermal batteries alone get you some large chunk of it, 80% or whatever. There are lots of process emissions in some of these processes that still have to be hashed out. And by the way, Canary is in the midst of running a great series of articles about exactly this, about concrete and steel and the specifics of how to decarbonize them.</p><p>But basically, if you think of replacing, for a given industrial application, replacing a natural gas pipeline and a natural gas boiler with an electricity pipeline, an electricity line, and a thermal battery, they get you basically the same thing. And so voila. There like half the final energy we use is heat. Half of that is industrial heat. Voila. There's your industrial heat. To me, thermal, in addition to just being delightful technologically, I love the whole just the simplicity of heating up a box of rocks until you need the heat. I love the technology of it. I don't feel like the news has gotten out.</p><p>It also basically tackles the industrial heat problem and there's not a ton left over after this, I think.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>So, I have one comment and then two questions for you on this one. The comment is, I obviously generally agree with you. We and I have both been very bullish on thermal storage. Listeners of this podcast, for full disclosure, know that we're investors in Rondo. The way that we think about it actually is — for your industrial heat, the world ends up splitting into two categories: There's high-temperature industrial heat and then low-temperature industrial heat. I think for high-temperature industrial heat, thermal storage is awesome. And exactly as you said, it may end up being the solution. For low-temperature industrial heat you may just be able to electrify directly. We like heat pumps for low-temperature industrial heat. So, you kind of split the world that way. My first question for you, thermal storage is not a new concept. These companies are new and they have new —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the oldest in all of energy, really.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>But there was a wave of excitement around thermal batteries maybe ten years ago. And I'd say two things were different about those attempts than the new ones. One is the materials they were using. They're often stuff like molten salts that are highly corrosive and tough to handle. But two is that they were all talking about electrical to electrical storage, right? So they were serving the function that a lithium-ion battery would serve on the grid, albeit maybe with different duration and costs and so on. What you're talking about and what we find most exciting as well is a different thing.</p><p>Right. You turn electricity into heat, you store it as heat, you deliver it as heat rather than turning it back to electricity. Is that —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which gets you way higher efficiency? Like you can get 95% of your heat back out.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>That's the key point. Yeah, I think when people talk about thermal batteries or thermal storage, if they're not already clued into this, they're thinking of a battery that goes power to power. And we're talking about a battery that goes power to heat, but has storage in the middle.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you got to start thinking about heat. I mean, a lot of my answers today, and I think a lot of the pod lately, a lot of both our pods lately are about heat, about just like got to start thinking about heat more. It's kind of the forgotten energy, like saving it, using it, reusing it, using waste heat, all these kind of things. So yes, I agree, it's using heat for heat. That is going to be the sort of killer app because another thing I think this unlocks and we could do a whole pod on this too, but I'll just sort of kind of throw it out there and mention it is this enables — it's very difficult, right now. The most difficult part of building electricity generation is getting hooked up to the grid.</p><p>It's not cost or financing or anything anymore; it's just waiting for your slot on the grid. So the beauty of this concept is you can just build some renewables out in the middle of nowhere and instead of hooking them up to the grid at all, you just hook them up to your heat battery, right. Store all the energy they store as heat and then use the heat directly in some industrial application. Then all of a sudden you have renewables providing heat that do not have to go through the grid, do not have to wait for grid interconnections.</p><p>And if you can make that work, that's a huge, huge, huge new market for renewable energy developers that they can just start building now and they don't have to wait in interconnection queues. To me, that's one of the most exciting aspects of it.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean 100%. And just to add on to why that would be such a big deal as it stands right now, if you're trying to develop renewable energy, if you're trying to develop any electricity generation, you're extraordinarily location constrained, because you need to go not only where the resource is, obviously, but you need to go where there's land available. And you need to go where you can get interconnection, as you said. And that's hard now, but if you remove that constraint, you can go where the cheapest land is the easiest permitting, don't need to worry about interconnection, and you can direct connect to load.</p><p>You can actually cut some physical costs out of the system, too. So it's just like, theoretically, this massive unlock.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. All your TND costs vanish, right? There's no TND costs. It's just the cost of the power itself, which, as we know, is super, super, super cheap these days. I mean, that's kind of what all the heat battery guys say. The reason this one is a bigger deal than the last one, the reason so many things are changing is just the renewables have gotten so cheap that there's just lots more to do with them now.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah, though one of my underhyped things, which we'll come back to, is one of the reasons why the renewables have gotten so, so cheap thing is not really true today. But I'll come back to that one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, intriguing. All right, so we could talk about thermal storage forever, but let's go move on to your you've got onshoring and friendshoring underhyped. I've got thermal storage underhyped. What's your first overhyped?</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>All right, so, this admittedly, I can't tell this is the one that I was struggling with. Like, is this really hyped or was this just like a brief flare up in energy Twitter world? I don't really know. So I guess my first question to you is going to be, do you think this is hyped? But my answer is electric stovetops. And the reason for that is because maybe, I don't know, six months ago, something like that, there was this just like, raft of articles and they weren't just in energy Twitter-land. This showed on the New York Times and a bunch of other places talking about induction stoves and this debate between induction stoves and gas stoves, and then it wrapped in even a little bit —</p><p>I think I saw something about it on Top Chef and how the Top Chef chefs hate induction stoves. And it seems to be this big thing. And assuming it is this big thing, the reason that I think it is overhyped is that from a climate context, I don't think it really matters. At the end of the day, your stove is not a significant load in your home and so you can electrify it or not. And I guess maybe it matters if you care about shutting off the gas altogether. But the end of the day, the total impact on energy consumption, where that comes from, and ultimately on emissions is going to be negligible.</p><p>And I would like much rather spend — if we're going to talk about consumer choices that affect climate, what car you drive, how you commute, how you heat your home, those things matter. How you cook doesn't really matter.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I'll push back a little bit on when I first saw this on your list, I thought you were specifically talking about these electric cooktops with batteries embedded in them.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I think those are cool, actually. I like those more for a bunch of reasons.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Those are super cool. And that was going to wound me if that was your overhyped one, because I love hyping those.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I don't think those are hyped enough because nobody really knows about them yet. But no, I mean, induction stoves in general and electric cooktops.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, the one thing I push back on is I absolutely agree that relative to greenhouse gas emissions or energy use or any real physical metric, stoves are very low on the list of concerns. You're much better off switching out your car, et cetera, et cetera. But there's a reason it's on your overhyped list. And I think the reason is that it was drafting on the gas stove hype, basically, like on the gas stove controversy. I think that —</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Which was more about local air quality health stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And about jack-booted liberal thugs coming to take all the things that you love and hold precious.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Well, but just for a second on that, I guess what I'm saying is, like, yeah, you could characterize the people who are doing gas stove bans as jack-booted liberal thugs. But why the gas stove ban in the first place? Why is that the fight to pick?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I think you mentioned it in passing. It is about whether to hook homes up with gas at all, right? Like, if you've got the electric car, you've got your solar panels and your heat pump, the only reason you're still hooked up to the gas system at all is the stove. So in a sense, it's like the mopping up remainder of home energy use. But is it a binary thing? You either can cut off your gas connection to your house or you can't. This reflects sort of in some sense, an admirable kind of quantitative carbon brain.</p><p>Like we're going after the carbon. This is not where the carbon is. Why are we spending time on this? But I feel like the right they don't care that gas stoves are a relatively small part of gas use. They've recognized that this is a cultural battle that resonates beyond energy people. And I feel like the energy world, climate and energy world is full of, like, wonks and technocrats and quants who are not as literate as they should be in the language of these cultural battles and lacks what I think ought to be like the desire to fight them.</p><p>We just run away from them. The right starts a huge fuss about gas stoves and we run away and talk about something else. I feel like we need to start learning how to win these things, even though, as you say, in some sense, the amount of hype on stoves generally wildly outpaces their real significance.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, I don't know, we could probably move on from this one, but I guess all I'd say is maybe you've characterized me right as this overly quantitatively minded climate person. But my only reaction to that is like the climate doesn't really care who wins this battle. Right? I don't think it really matters in the context of climate change and that's the thing I'm focused on. So we could do a gas stove ban. It's not really going to matter. You could do a gas boiler ban that would be a much more difficult to pull off thing, but a much more impactful thing if you wanted to do something that mattered. I get confused.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and they are doing — there are broader gas bans, gas hookup bans out there. It is a little odd that they started with stoves, but I think hearts and minds matter. Even in the long term battle. I think hearts and minds matter and this is a hearts and minds — like if you convince people to think in those jack-booted liberal thug terms, then they're just going to apply that frame to the next thing we come up with. You know what I mean? At some point we got to fight that fight, but let's move on. Your first overhyped is electric stoves.</p><p>So my first overhyped, I hesitated a little bit with this because in a sense as much hype as there is about them, there's almost an equal amount of people out trying to unhype them. Anti-hype. There's almost as much anti-hype as there is hype. So I don't know if this sort of counts, but mine is SMRs or just small modular nuclear reactors. They are incredibly hyped, I think well beyond our circles. Right. Like something about the idea of SMRs has grabbed onto the imagination of —</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Of who? I think they're hyped in two circles.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Normies.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I don't know about normies. I think they're hyped in — my sense is they're hyped in some clean energy climate person circles and then they're hyped in a corner of tech world. Like there's a bunch of VCs who really hype the s**t out of them. But I don't think "normies", so to speak, with quotation marks so that normies don't get mad at me, but I don't think that the average person knows what a small modular reactor is, do you?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Clearly this is a theme in our show, is our utter mystification about what normal people do and don't think about or know. I don't know. I feel like advanced nuclear, like nuclear renaissance, nuclear is better now. It's smaller and cooler and safer. I feel like some of that has drifted beyond but you're right. I think the hype that is most bothering me is among, but it's among some powerful people. Powerful people in corporations looking for ways to decarbonize themselves are ordering these things. Like you have cities and utilities pretty seriously — you had this weird announcement from Microsoft the other day, I don't know if you checked that —</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>They didn't announce anything. They just put out a job spec and then a bunch of people started writing articles about it. They just said we're hiring for somebody to look into SMRs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So so the tech people are very serious about it and I think the DOE is extremely enthusiastic about it.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Okay, so tell me, why is this overhyped?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I just think, well, two reasons. One concept I'm trying to bang on to the point that I can push it out to wider circles, beyond our circles, is simply yes, we have variable renewable energy that is going to be the heart of our grid. Yes, that means we need balancing. And I just want people to see nuclear not as some sort of special unique kind of power but simply one of the options on the table for balancing longer term renewable energy. One among others. There are other options. There's geothermal, there's longer term storage, there's e-fuels, whatever.</p><p>And there are I think lots and lots, there's lots and lots of action and development and innovation in this space in the longer term firm power space. So one, I just want people to reframe nuclear as not THE option, but an option for balancing out renewable energy because I think a lot of people have it in their heads that renewable energy is just useless because you have to back it up 100%. And so why not just go straight to nuclear which is more familiar? I think I want to break people of that. And two more on the details.</p><p>It's just that we haven't really seen a lot of nuclear plants get built that are actually small or actually modular. Right? I think that the whole notion of shrinking the overall size of the project and then shrinking the subparts of the project so that they can be constructed in factories and shipped to the site. That's the vision. Right? That's how you're going to reduce costs is you start making things in factories over and over again the same way you get learning curves because nuclear has resisted learning curves. And it's a great idea but it's not really panning out the way I think people think it's panning out.</p><p>There aren't a lot of small or modular — if you talk to the people at the DOE, the loans office, they'll tell you what needs to be replicated and done the same way over and over again is not necessarily the hardware, the chunks of hardware. It's construction practices. It's the construction subparts of building a giant project. Our problem is that we keep doing, first of a kind, bespoke one-off construction projects where everybody's figuring everything out as they go, and they're all going over. So what DOE wants is to systematize that stuff, the sort of the operational and construction part of — they think that's a bigger deal than the actual pieces of the plant.</p><p>So even on nuclear, even within nuclear itself, I'm not sure SMRs are necessarily the answer to getting more nuclear. But that's controversial, maybe.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>So when you sent over your list so we sent lists ahead of time, obviously, so we would know we wouldn't cross over too much. I was ready to disagree with you 100% on this one. And now upon your explanation, I'm ready to disagree like 25%, I think.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, good. I got 75% of the way there.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah, you mostly got there. I mean, I think that I agree with your framing that the right way to think about nuclear and SMRs as a subcategory within nuclear is as a suite of options. And I agree with you that there are other options there as well. Now, there is no silver bullet there. Every one of those options, including nuclear, has a host of challenges to overcome. So it should be in that mix, but it should be considered as an option in that mix. And it has some unique characteristics that are particularly attractive in theory about it.</p><p>And this is nuclear, not just SMRs, but obviously it's extraordinarily energy dense. If you are talking about a real SMR or microreactor, if you want to go even smaller than that, you could put it closer to load. You can site it anywhere in theory.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In theory, they're super awesome. I mean, I definitely will not argue with that. In theory, they answer a lot of very specific difficulties with other sources.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Well, now I think you get to the crux of the thing, which is like there's this wide gulf between the theory of what an SMR could do and the reality of what we've seen them do. And then this is where I think the discourse always unravels, because the question is, why is there such a gulf there? No one disagrees that there's a gulf. And the answer, depending on who you talk to, is either because the US can't get its — and many countries, in fact — can't get their act together to license these things and get them built such that we will start to see that learning curve that you're describing and reach that promised land or it's that these things were never meant to be cheap and sitable anyway, and so it's a failed promise. And I don't know how to bridge that divide exactly, except to say that if I'm leaning in a direction right now, it is that I know we need this class of thing. I know that this is one of the relatively few options we have to solve this class of problem. And so I'd like to see what we can do to give it a real shot.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. My only worry, and this will just be my final comment, is I totally agree. Let's give it a shot. I'm all for R&D. I'm all for first of a kind demonstration projects and things like that. What I don't want is the sort of generalized hype around SMRs to translate into just yet another round of a large and historically corrupt and incompetent industry getting another giant round of subsidies dumped on its head for ultimately nothing, which is the nuclear industry, basically the history of the nuclear industry. And I don't want this to be a wedge issue where you just end up with more of the same kind of historical flailing we've had in that — the industry itself needs, badly, needs some discipline imposed on it.</p><p>And I don't want this to be an excuse to get more just to get more substance.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, let's move on.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Fine. I feel like every one of these we should do like an entire episode on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know. This is what I'm realizing. What have we bitten off here? What are we doing? Your second underhyped. Go for it.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>All right, so this one's underhyped, but not in a positive way. I think it's underappreciated how big an impact this is having, which is the impact of interest rates being higher for longer on clean energy, both the industry and deployment of the technologies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm glad you put this on your list because I have a vague spidey sense that it's a big deal. But I think to your point, perhaps I have not actually stopped and taken a close look at what it means and what it's doing.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, I've been meaning, and I probably will at some point do a whole episode on this. It's concerning. Right. So high level: Most clean energy technologies, the thing about them is that they are high capex, low opex. And so you finance the thing upfront, you pay more upfront for it, you finance it, and it ends up being hopefully cheaper over the long term. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>For our amateur listeners, that's capital costs and operating costs, they're high capital cost, but cheap to operate.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Right. So think of solar and wind. You pay a lot to get your solar panels or wind, but then the wind is free and the solar is free. And that's contrast to, say, natural gas: You build the thing, the thing may be cheaper to build, but then you got to keep paying for natural gas over time. And because they're high capex, low opex, that makes them particularly sensitive to the cost of financing. And of course, the cost of financing is tied to the cost of capital, which is tied to interest rates. And that's just for those technologies.</p><p>It's also true of other technologies that are coming down the cost curve, starting more expensive, like electric vehicles, for example. And this has been known, this is not a new thing, everybody for years, I remember talking about this a decade ago. We were saying, "oh, look at all this growth in wind and solar, but someday interest rates are going to rise and then it's going to be tough" and we're there and it's having a real impact. Just to give you a few data points —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And can I just insert here? I'd be remiss if I didn't. We had a whole decade of insanely low interest rates during which we really should have taken advantage of that. Like now that they're rising, now that we're hitting all these problems, I think we're going to be looking back like, "Boy, those were nice times, weren't they? We really should have gone gangbusters while we could, while we had low interest rates instead of faffing about with austerity and deficit hysteria and the rest of it."</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I mean, if you're talking about in a macroeconomic sense, I have no ability to comment. In the context of clean energy, I think we did make some hay while the sun was shining. At least this is what got these technologies to the point where they're at today. But let me just spend a minute pointing out what I think we're starting to see in the market. So there's lots of different ways that you could point to this, but an easy one obviously is in the public equities sector, right? So far this year, the S&P 500 is up 8% as of this recording.</p><p>The S&P Clean Energy Index is down 35%. And it's basically true across the board, right? So this is the residential solar companies. This is the manufacturers, like First Solar, and if you want to broaden it out, it's the independent power producers like NextEra and a bunch of others. This is not a great time. Now, it's coming off of what was historically a great time, right? And that's true of everything. It's particularly true here. But it's definitely a tougher road at the moment because again, for probably a few reasons, but I think the biggest one is interest rates.</p><p>That's one thing. A second thing in the electric vehicle world — I think this is tied, but not exclusively because of this — you're seeing EV manufacturers, some of the big OEMs, pulling back a little bit on their manufacturing expansion plans, citing kind of weak demand for EVs right now. And then I'll give you one more data point, which is just that, in the oil and gas world, the super majors, at least some of them, are announcing at least sort of moderate pullbacks in their plans to expand their clean energy businesses because they're getting a lot of shareholder pressure to focus on the more profitable part of their operation, which remains oil and gas right now.</p><p>So I just think it takes a while for this stuff all to bleed through and for you to really see it. But when you take a step back this was predictable and I think a lot of people predicted it, but I don't see a lot of people talking about right now how challenging an environment it is for clean energy thanks to high interest rates.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, yeah, well, briefly, what should people do with that knowledge? What can be done about it other than suffer? Is there a checklist of things that you should do in atmospheres of high interest rates?</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>That's a good question. I mean, I think it's worth noting this is to the point you made earlier. I think one thing that we have grown accustomed to saying is, "Oh, thank God renewables are so cheap now" and they're not actually today. The PPA prices for renewables have been going up for the past year in the US. Both because of interest rates and because some component prices had been rising as well. I think we should be careful in the long term, I think we probably agree that the trajectory of renewable costs continues to be down. But in the short to maybe midterm the actual delivered cost of energy or mobility, if you're an electric vehicle owner or whatever it is, it might go up if you're choosing the clean option.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. "How midterm?" is the $6 billion question, right there, I think, on everybody's mind. I think everybody, not everybody, most people, I think, agree that this is a bump on a longer downward trajectory. One believes and hopes. But of course, in the long run, we're all dead. Like Keen said, a long enough bump is going to disrupt a lot of companies. And I think opponents of the clean energy transition will make great hay out of it while they can.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Right, okay, so we should move on probably. Okay, so that was my second underhyped thing, interest rates. What's your second underhyped thing?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I went back and forth on this one too, because I have hyped these in the past and they are getting a little bit of hype in our world, but I think are totally unknown in the larger world, which are and to this point, I don't think they even have a standard terminology yet sometimes they're called geogrids. It's basically heating, district heating using rather than one central source of heat, they drill a series of boreholes, a series of small boreholes to take advantage of the high temperatures that exist, whatever, 50ft down. And then you have a network of pipes that carries that warmed water to each house. Each house has a heat exchanger to pull the heat out.</p><p>And basically, if you can build one of these things, you have what I think is easily the cheapest and cleanest and most efficient way of heating and cooling buildings that exists in the world, as far as I can tell. And so I did a pod on this a year, two years and a half ago. They're building a test one in Massachusetts now. I think maybe some campus — I should have looked this up before we started — but some campus I think is building one. And to know as I said earlier, I've been thinking a lot about heat lately and this gets to that.</p><p>But also district energy is difficult in the sense that it's much easier to build when you're building a new neighborhood or whatever. You just build it in underneath as you're building it and much more difficult to do in a retrofit way, retrofitting existing neighborhoods and communities. But this I think ideally can piggyback a little bit off of natural gas infrastructure either using the natural gas pipes themselves or using all the rights of way and the holes and the tunnels and the whatever else. This is exciting to me for a lot of reasons. One, just the efficiency and cleanliness of it and the and the kind of the neatness of it, the cleverness of it.</p><p>But also this is theoretically something that a natural gas utility could be charged with running and that's an alternative to natural gas utilities slowly withering and dying, which is what all the natural gas utilities across the country are facing right now. And of course is creating enormous political blowback, enormous controversy, et cetera. This at least gives natural gas utilities some vision of the future that they can look toward and argue about rather than just death. So I'm excited for both those reasons and I don't know how much a form of district energy is ever really going to be hyped in the larger society but I at least want people to be aware that there is a way for natural gas utilities to transition to something else clean that exists.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Well, setting aside the natural gas utility death spiral thing, which I think we should have a separate conversation about another time, I don't agree that that is what they are facing otherwise at least —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh really?</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah. But that aside, I do agree with you that whatever you want to call these geogrids or district heating —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>"Underground thermal heating networks" is the boring term.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I agree that they are underhyped because I think they are barely discussed at all in the US. I think they are more in Northern Europe. Right? Like this is where there's a real market for it. You mentioned in the US. You could literally count on one hand, I think.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, they're nascent at best in the US.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah, but I agree with you. I think they're actually quite interesting. I think that you're right that in theory if you could do it, it's maybe at least in some places going to be the most efficient way to heat buildings in a region. I also though agree with you that it's a really tall order if it's not a greenfield development. And so that's what I've always struggled with is like how do you — "awesome," and maybe some campuses and things like that could pull it off. But if you want this to really scale, is it realistic to imagine that's going to happen anywhere other than new developments and then these campuses that sort of control the entire district themselves?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is why I was a little iffy on including this, because I'm charmed by it and I love it and I have high hopes for it. But it's one of those things like you mentioned, one I think signal feature of technologies. But another thing I think that you find in common across a lot of these technologies is they're cheaper and they work better if you plan up front. They require a lot of planning and coordination, often across jurisdictional lines, across entities, across different kinds of entities owned by different people. They just require a lot of planning and coordination, and we're not great at that.</p><p>I think you could retrofit neighborhoods to put these in, and I think on some time horizon, probably relatively quickly as these things go, it would pay itself back. But you got to just get all those ducks in a row, all those entities lined up, all those different layers of government and all the households. So I agree, it's a steep climb. I guess it's going to come down to sort of how severe the need for clean heat gets and how cheap heat pumps get, et cetera, et cetera. What are the other options in this space? But I love them, so I like to hype them whenever I can.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Fair enough. I mean, it's underhyped relative to very little hype, so it's hard to disagree with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I know. It could hardly be zero hyped by definition, under. Okay, we've got three of our four here, so your second overhyped all right.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>My second overhyped thing is voluntary carbon markets. And what I mean by overhyped is like, okay, so what's happening right now is that there is a series of extraordinarily painful exposés about all the follies of the voluntary carbon market, particularly forestry related carbon credits in Africa, especially. There's been a bunch of articles —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, you say a series now, but I feel like that series of exposés has been going on for decades now. There's been nothing but exposés for decades now. It's not like there's any other kind of story about these things.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I think it comes in waves, right? There was like a big wave of that. And this is getting to my own history. I was involved in voluntary carbon markets in 2007, 2008. There was a wave then which that, along with the economic collapse, basically killed the market. And then there's a new wave now. And yeah, maybe there's been some in the meantime, too, but it's getting louder and louder at the moment, and it looks like it's getting worse and worse. And the reason that I say and I agree with basically all of those, I agree with the exposés.</p><p>I agree that that market is a mess and broken and there's a lot of vaporware there. I totally agree with all of that. The reason I think it's overhyped is it's a pretty small market. At the end of the day, it's about a $2 billion total global market for voluntary carbon credits. There's a much bigger compliance market you could talk separately about, but it's just not that big. And it's been growing a bit, but it's not growing that fast. And so there's a part of me that just thinks, look, absolutely we should be calling out these absolute BS carbon projects that are delivering no value to anybody.</p><p>But at the same time, I just want to be clear that it's not a big piece of where spending is going when it comes to decarbonization, and I don't think it was going to be a big piece. Now, maybe I want to separate out this kind of new world of carbon removal purchases which hopefully won't get too wrapped up in this stuff because I think there is promise there. But I just think it's overhyped because right now it's in the news and this is very much in the mainstream news and it's just pretty small at the end of the day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I thought that corporate procurement of renewables via these markets was actually a pretty big chunk of renewable buildout.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>So those are two different things, right? So the voluntary carbon markets are the purchases of carbon credits, which are mostly forestry and stuff like that, and then corporate renewables procurement generally does not get counted within that same category. And yes, that has been, and I would argue has been actually quite a net positive, like really has been beneficial to the renewable industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I had those confused, which is why this one confused me. But I see now what you're saying. And also, I think in that latter market, the move away from yearly RECs to hourly — to this attempt to build a 24/7 portfolio that a lot of corporations are involved in, I think that's also a big deal. But as you say, voluntary carbon markets are — it's funny, I think this is probably the best answer for overhyped because this is one that definitely has gotten out of our world and exists in the larger world because probably one of the most common — I bet it's the same for you —</p><p>it's one of the most common questions I get still to this day, which is like, "I'm buying an airplane flight. Is it worth offsetting?"</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>"Should I click the thing?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? "Should I click the thing? Is this offset worthwhile? Is this program through my utility worthwhile?" All these kind of things. And yeah, I think — although I do think the turn to carbon removal in that market is interesting. And to repeat a theme, we could do a whole episode on that. I have some hope and some skepticism about how far voluntary markets are going to get on carbon removal.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Yeah, I guess the only point I wanted to make here is I'm all for this continued — I think what's happening now is this big shakeout in that market, specifically voluntary carbon markets, and mostly the sort of nature based and particularly the forestry stuff. I think that's a good thing that that is happening. But I just want to remind everybody it's a very small market in a global context. Okay, last one, I think. Which is your final overhyped thing?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>My final overhyped, my second overhyped, is the whole discussion of minerals.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I wish we had more time. I'm ready to go to war on this one. All right, you go ahead.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You think it's appropriately hyped?</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'll just say two things, and by necessity, I have to be a little bit glib here. We don't have much time. But I'll just say two things. One is this has definitely escaped our world, I think, at this point. The idea that batteries and electric vehicles use materials that are mined in horrible ways and that are environmentally destructive, that notion has escaped our world and now comes back at me all the time from randos online and whatever. So I think that idea has grabbed on to the public imagination. And on that score, I just think it's incredibly important to remember that there is no story, no matter how negative, about the materials needed for the clean energy transition that adds up to anything close to the ongoing day-to-day destruction of the fossil fuel system.</p><p>I think that you probably agree on. I think that's starting to come out in more and more papers and more and more studies. Just if you tally up pure environmental damage, digging up fossil fuels every day to keep shoveling in our engines is just way worse than any conceivable alternative I see. Okay, but I'm going to go the other way now. The way you're going to disagree with is my second point. The second point is about shortages. Is this going to be a meaningful handbrake, you might say, on the clean energy transition?</p><p>Is the availability of materials and minerals going to be a meaningful constraint on the speed of the clean energy transition? And I just think here this is a big sprawling area. There's lots of general things you could say about it; it's hard to generalize. But my just basic — I go back to first principles here — my basic instinct is that of all the things capitalism does well, finding ways around material shortages is genuinely its number one thing that it does well. This is what markets know how to solve. And I just think between finding new sources and substituting, of course, historically, substitution is one of the huge answers here.</p><p>It has defanged a lot of sort of hyped materials problems in the past. I just think substitution plus new sources over the midterm, mid to long term is going to solve this. I agree that there will be years, a couple of years, choke points here and there, as we've already seen a couple of materials get tight. But I just think in the fullness of time, the multibillion-dollar global market, the entire global transition that's running now is just going to stampede over those problems. And in retrospect, we'll look back and I think that will not be as big of a deal as we are now expecting it to be.</p><p>You disagree?</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I will say, well, yeah, once again I was ready to disagree 100% back down to 25%. I do agree. I mean, the way I put it to people is like, look, there is no free lunch in decarbonization. Whatever we transition to from what we do today, there's going to be some cost to that. One of the big costs is going to be a lot more mining and dealing with a lot more minerals. That's true and I do not think that should be a reason to slow down. So I agree with you on that first point generally.</p><p>On the second point, I also agree with you in the fullness of time comment. I think what I would say is that the time periods during which we are able to do, particularly to unlock more of a particular mineral or to do the substitution are not generally one to two years. What scares me is that the average time it takes to build a new mine right now, pretty much everywhere in the world, is 15-20 years. Right. And these markets do move, but they move at that pace. And so what worries me is not like we'll never figure out a way to expand the clean energy economy because we're going to run out of name your mineral.</p><p>It's that we'll have periods of more like five years or ten years where we do have a shortage and the shortage doesn't translate to we can't sell any more electric vehicles. It translates to higher costs for electric vehicles and that translates to lower demand. And that's five to ten years of stalled growth that we can't afford. So for me, it's not that I agree with you we'll have enough stuff to make the things that we need to make. But because this transition is occurring so quickly and you can already start to see the geopolitical impacts and all these other things, I think that there are real possibilities of crunches that have a meaningful impact on the pace of adoption of key technologies.</p><p>And that's what I think we need to keep an eye out for in the world of minerals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that'll be interesting. I think that is the real question here. It's definitely an environmental advance to do this transition that I think is obvious to both of us and not obvious, I don't think, to the general public. Now because of this spate of hysterical, bizarre anti-EV articles that have come out really recently. I don't know if that's just a function of EVs growing now and starting to pose a real threat or whatever, but it seems like there's been a surge of those. So that, I think, is nonsense. It all comes down to how big are those periods of tension?</p><p>How big are those periods of choke point or slowdown or higher costs? And do they mount on one another in such a way as they exacerbate one another? Or is it the opposite effect? Do we find ways around within markets or shift to other markets? The one other thing I'd throw out here is just that the danger you're raising is a great reason to think more seriously and systematically about minimizing our need for materials generally, and that'll be different sector to sector. But I did a whole podcast on this question having to do with EVs. And one of the things we could do is walk and bike more and drive less and try to reduce VMTs generally, and then you reduce the need for lithium, et cetera.</p><p>If you improve building codes and make every building airtight, maybe even energy-positive, you reduce the need you can reduce the need for materials in a lot of different ways in a lot of different sectors. And I feel like that's kind of been moved to the back burner, and I think the whole materials issue might move it back to the front burner.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Sure. Or you lightweight a vehicle so you get more miles traveled per amount of material.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Totally. Yeah. Maybe to wrap up, I'd love to just hear your thoughts on you've been in this business for 20 some years now, going on 20. I don't know what the exact number is.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Approaching 20.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A lot of swings up and down. You've interviewed a lot of people. You've tracked this very closely. What's your sort of general feeling about where we are right now in this whole thing?</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I feel like most of me is still riding this cresting wave of like, "oh my God, the IRA is such a —" at least for the US, I won't say globally, "— the IRA is such a big deal". And even within our industry, I feel like we don't talk enough about how it's the biggest climate bill ever by orders, orders of magnitude. And it's just like transforming all these markets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also, let me just throw one thing in there. It's not just discussing it itself, but the thing is, the IRA put aside all this money, and what you're seeing now is that money trickling out. So almost every day I get an email from the DOE or the IRS or some agency like $407 billion going out to this, $500 billion going to this, $2 billion more for whatever power line monitoring. So IRA is translating into this constant stream of money going out the door to cool things. And I feel like one of the things that's incumbent on you and I and people in our world generally, is to not just say like, "we did this great thing, IRA, and now let's move on," but to talk about the stream, the sort of floodgates that have opened because of IRA, just keeping track of that money on a day to day basis because it's just pouring out now.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Right. So I guess all I was going to say is mostly that's the sort of upwelling of that opportunity is the predominant feeling. It is tempered to some degree by I am nervous about the interest rate thing and what impact that's ultimately going to have on this market. So things are pushing in opposite directions. I think the overall trendline is still up and to the right, but it's not going to be an easy journey. And I guess the very final thing that I will say is my current bee in my bonnet is people talking about, quote unquote, hard to decarbonize or difficult to decarbonize sectors.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That was almost one of my overhyped. That was my runner up.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Okay, maybe we agree on this. My reason I'm annoyed about that is because by implication, it implies that energy is an easy to abate sector and I do not see that being remotely true. So I don't want to make it come across like it's easy and especially just because we passed this big bill that didn't solve it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think the way to say that is technologically hard to decarbonize sectors are going to be easier to decarbonize than I think is expected, technologically speaking. And I think that's been a theme in the clean energy transition now for decades, is that the technological challenges turn out to be a lot more solvable than we think in advance.</p><p>That's almost always —</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I'm almost saying the opposite.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really?</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>I'm saying nothing about the hard to decarbonize stuff. I'm saying the easy, quote unquote, easy to decarbonize stuff is going to be hard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, Shayle, this was a delight. As expected, I'm a big fan of the show, even though I frequently tune into the latest episode and feel that feeling in the pit of my stomach where I'm like, "man, I wish I had done this episode. I wish I had gotten this guest." So I may continue duplicating your episodes in the future, but thanks for coming on and good luck to you with Catalyst.</p><p><strong>Shayle Kann</strong></p><p>Thanks, Dave. This was a lot of fun for me as well, and I think we should do it again sometime.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. For sure. Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-voltscatalyst-pod-crossover-you</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:138440250</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 11 Nov 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/138440250/924af739da4bd340027c4a8df68b723d.mp3" length="77144775" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3856</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/138440250/da52a11576a7359f16d096f1fa589520.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What? The sun isn't always shining?!]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Princeton professor and energy modeler Jesse Jenkins tackles the question of how we can build a decarbonized energy system that relies on inherently variable wind and solar power.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/y9m6iyu8sjyz4qdnhkoqz/volts23.11.01-jesse.jenkins.pdf?rlkey=jf3qcgv81yaz5zo27rizkiyb4&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/what-the-sun-isn-t-always-shining"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If you’ve spent much time discussing clean energy on the internet, you’ve probably come across a disturbing piece of information: the sun, it seems, is not always shining. What’s worse, the wind is not always blowing! </p><p>It’s crazy, I know. </p><p>Unlike coal or natural gas or nuclear — “dispatchable” power plants that we can turn on or off at will, when we need them — we do not control solar power and wind power. They come and go with the weather and the rotation of heavenly bodies. They are, to use the term of art, “variable.” </p><p>Many people, bringing to bear varying levels of good faith, conclude from this fact that we shouldn’t or can’t shift to an electricity system that is based around wind and solar, at least not without occasionally shivering in the cold. </p><p>Is that true? Do we know how to balance out the variability of wind and solar enough that we can fully decarbonize the grid with them? This is probably the number one question I hear about renewable energy, the number one reservation people have about it, so I decided it’s time to tackle it head on.</p><p>To help, I called on longtime Friend of Volts, Princeton professor and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscast-jesse-jenkins-on-energy#details">energy modeler extraordinaire</a> Jesse Jenkins. We walked through the basic shape of the problem, the different time scales on which variability operates, and the solutions that we either have or anticipate having to deal with it. </p><p>This one is long and occasionally gets a bit complex, but if you’ve ever wondered how we’re going to build an energy system around wind and solar, this is the pod you’ve been waiting for. </p><p>All right, I am here with Princeton professor and longtime friend of Volts, Jesse Jenkins. Jesse, welcome back to Volts. Thanks for coming back.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Hey, Dave. It's always good to chat with you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Jesse, the reason we're doing this is that in the course of my research, I have come across some extremely disturbing information which I felt like I needed to share with you and the world as soon as possible. Apparently, the sun is not always shining and the wind is not always blowing.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Wait, what?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know this changes everything, so we're going to have to talk through this.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Oh, man.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But seriously, I don't mean to make too much light of this. This is a subject about which people say lots of dumb things, but it is at its heart, I think, a perfectly valid question, a perfectly valid area of concern. In fact, it is the central area of concern about renewable energy. It is the central question to answer, which is the term that used to be used is intermittent. Renewable energy, wind and solar are intermittent, I think. Now the preferred term of art is variable, but I think probably the most accurate terminology for our purposes is non-dispatchable.</p><p>It just means we don't control it; we don't turn it on and off. It comes and goes with the weather.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, I prefer just weather dependent. Right. I think it makes more intuitive sense to people. Like you said, it's solar and wind power, so it depends on the weather. That is not shocking, but also defining of what the resource is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Also dependent on the turning of the planets and the solar system.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>That's true.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But anyway, people know what we mean. We don't control them. A lot of people, I think, especially people who are coming, who haven't given a lot of thought to the clean energy transition and are starting to grapple with it for the first time, I think intuitively run up against this question early on in their thinking, which is "how do we deal with this?" So, I want to take those questions as good faith questions and talk through answers to them to the extent we have answers, to the extent we do know how to deal with it, to the extent we do have the tools to deal with it, and the extent to which it remains to some extent unsolved.</p><p>I want to start with a couple of really big picture questions before we hone in on the details. I think the first big one to ask is just what greenies, what climate people seem to be recommending, and what we seem to be doing, at least in the early stages, is shifting from an electricity system based on dispatchable power plants that we can turn on and off at will to a system that is fundamentally based on non-dispatchable weather-dependent power plants that we can't turn on and off, which, as we're going to talk through, raises a whole host of issues and problems to solve.</p><p>So I think the first thing to address is just why do that at all? Why take on that trouble? Why not just shift from dirty dispatchable energy to clean dispatchable energy like nuclear, hydro and geothermal? Why take on the burden of dealing with variable energy at all?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a great question, and the reality is that now the reason is that wind and solar are really, really cheap. That wasn't the case a decade or two ago. And we sort of set off on this path supporting wind and solar and other clean energy technologies in different countries, not sort of knowing exactly where the cost declines would travel. And what we've seen is that basically, in the west at least, the cost of building new large scale nuclear power plants, which is our sort of most mature and previously scaled carbon free generation technology, they've only gone up over the last couple decades, and we can talk more about why or that's probably a better subject for another podcast.</p><p>Just observe that that is a factual statement. In other parts of the world, like China and South Korea and UAE, where they're used to building large scale civil works projects, they've been able to build nuclear plants at a reasonable expense. And it's a big part of the mix for those countries. But what we've seen is a tremendous decline in the cost of wind and solar power. And what we chalk that up to is what's known as experience curves. I know there's a great Volts cast in the archives on this topic. You can go back to listeners.</p><p>But the idea is that as we scale up and deploy basically any technology, but in particular wind and solar at scale, we drive a whole set of processes kind of centered around innovation and competition that lower the cost of the technology. And that's done through economies of scale, either in manufacturing or production of the technology itself. It's done through incremental innovations and sort of improvements that just get more efficient and better at producing and building these things over time. It's done by learning, by doing sort of tacit knowledge. The skilled workforce develops and the engineers of the processes develop over time.</p><p>And all of that drives the cost of technologies down as we build more of them. That's true for ships and flat panel TVs and aircraft and also for wind and solar. And particularly true for wind and solar because they are very small modular technologies that are repeatedly built both in manufacturing and in installation characteristics that make them well suited to not just learning, but rapid learning or rapid experience curves. The sum product of that is that wind and solar are the cheapest way to get electricity, period. Not just clean electricity, but electricity in most of the world today.</p><p>Solar is the cheapest in most of the world. And if it's not, it's probably wind, with a few exceptions. And so that's the main reason to rely on it. It's a cheap source of both clean and abundant electricity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So this would be something that the market would be pulling people to do anyway. These set of problems around variability would be problems that we would be trying to solve regardless because people want cheap energy and here's cheap energy. And so, people are going to figure out how to maximize their use of the cheapest energy available. In large part, this is being driven by forces that are not directly related to climate change. Obviously, we need to do it as fast as possible because of climate change, but this is not, as I think many people naively think when they first encounter it, something that we're taking on just because of climate change.</p><p>It is because this prize is out there, this super, super cheap electricity. And if you can run your widget on super cheap electricity, you're going to want to figure out how you can do that.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean that's true. Now, I think it's important to remember that we supported wind and solar when they were expensive alternative energy technologies. That's what we called them back in the mid-2000s, right? And we supported them for a variety of reasons. Right. Because of climate change. Yes, but actually originally because of energy security concerns that were sparked by the Arab oil embargoes in the 1970s. And that's what drove the early era of solar and wind development in the US, Denmark, Japan, and other countries that wanted to get off of imported fossil energy.</p><p>We still burned a lot of oil in power generation at that time. And so, finding alternative sources of electricity was important for energy security. That has come back to the fore of our attention, of course, with the invasion of Ukraine and Russia's unprovoked invasion there, which sparked Europe to really dramatically reorient on a rapid pace away from imports of fossil fuels, gas, coal, and oil from Russia, which they were very dependent on. And it shot the cost of natural gas and gasoline here in the US. Where we, yes, produce more fossil fuels than we consume. So we're sort of physically energy secure, but we're still connected to these global energy markets.</p><p>And so when a dictator on the other side of the world decides to invade his neighbor for no reason, that drives up the cost of gas at the pump and the cost of natural gas for our heating here in the US, like, overnight. So there's a bunch of important reasons to pursue these fuels. They also, of course, have no air pollution. Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Air pollution. Yes. Let's throw air pollution in there because the science on air pollution, as you and I know, just gets worse and worse and worse. The evident damage of it gets worse and worse.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah. And not just mortalities but also it makes us dumber. There's a lot of clear indication that particulate pollution, actually it affects our cognition, it affects our hearts, it affects our lungs, it impedes development of young children. I mean, it's just nasty stuff. And so if we can produce energy that's made from a domestic resource, like the abundant wind and solar that we have across the United States and other countries, that we can do so affordably and that we can do so without any air pollution, those are all really good reasons to rely on wind and solar and to want to tackle the associated challenge of dealing with their variability and weather dependence.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One other general level question. This is something else I think people kind of come to intuitively and there are not great straightforward answers out there, which is and this is a variant of the first question, but I think importantly different. A lot of people want to say there are times when the sun will not be shining and the wind will not be blowing, i.e., there will be times when renewable energy output is at zero and demand will still be there. So you'll have to have backup resources capable of satisfying all that demand. But if you have to have 100% backup, why not just make the backup the main thing?</p><p>Again, why go to the trouble, you know what I mean? This idea that because they are variable, they require basically 100% redundancy with non-variable resources strikes a lot of people as sort of crazy. Like, why don't we just build the non-variable resources and skip the first step? So what do you say to the 100% backup hang up?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, so the reality is you don't need 100% backup. You do need a sufficient amount of what I call firm capacity available. It's capacity that you can use whenever you need it for as long as you need it. Which makes it a really important complement to weather-dependent resources like wind and solar, as well as to we'll get to their role later, but to energy limited or time-limited resources like batteries or demand flexibility, which are key parts of the puzzle as well. And so you need a certain amount of firm capacity. It's a pretty significant amount.</p><p>But the reality is it's not 100% backup. You don't need one for one, because there actually are really no times when there is no wind or solar across a large area, unless you're talking about maybe an island grid that really has no geographic diversity. But yes, there's nighttime and there's winter, but generally there's some wind somewhere, right, at all times. And so you don't need 100% backup. So that's the first thing. And the second is that, again, for all the reasons I just went through, we want to rely as much as we can, again, not all the time, but as much as we can on wind and solar.</p><p>Because the fuel is free, the cost of installing them is incredibly cheap. And when you have wind and solar, you displace other dirtier fuel-consuming resources like natural gas or coal, and that saves money and it saves lives and it improves energy security. So all of that is the sort of main value add of wind and solar. I call them fuel-saving variable renewables, because when you've got them, you don't need to consume other fuels. And it turns out that if that's the kind of grid you're building, then there are pretty cheap sources of standby capacity that don't cost very much upfront and are perfectly fine to pair with also very cheap wind and solar to play that backup role. I mean, the one example is combustion turbines.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We should say that it's also unlikely that a trough in renewable supply is going to overlap with a peak in energy demand. Those peaks in energy demand tend to be during the daytime.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>That's true today, although I would worry more about that in the future as we electrify heating when the demand is likely to peak in the winter overnight. And so it may be more likely that we do line up one of those periods, what the Germans call Dunkelflaute — You have no solar output or very little solar output even during the daytime because it's winter, it's very cloudy, and then you have a prolonged period of a big, high blocking high that sits across a wide region, a weather front that limits the wind output that can occur both in the winter and the summer.</p><p>And so, it is a challenge and it's something we have to plan our renewables-based grids to be resilient to. But again, that's why we don't depend entirely on wind and solar. We need a portfolio or a team. The way I describe it is there's a couple of metaphors. One is you need a balanced diet in your day-to-day life. And the fact that starches or wheat is cheap, right, as a cheap way to get calories, means that the bulk of your food pyramid or whatever is going to be from those sort of cheap sources of calories, rice, starch, all the sort of staple crops.</p><p>But of course, you also can't subsist entirely on those staple crops. You need a balanced diet of different things, playing different roles and combining with each other in a way that gives you a balanced diet. So the same thing's going on in the grid. We have imperfect substitutes here for each other. They all produce electricity just like all foods produce calories, but they have other characteristics as well. And just like starches and staple crops are the staple of our diet but not the exclusive makeup of our diet, wind and solar can be the staple of our energy diet as well, but have to be complemented by other things.</p><p>And so we just need to be clear about that. No one's saying only use wind and solar power all the time for everything. We're saying these are cheap, clean, energy secure ways to produce electricity that are scalable across most of the world. And so they're going to play a really central role, a star role in our overall energy mix.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>People might be aware there is some controversy about — there are people out there who want 100% renewable systems versus people who want some nuclear or natural gas with CCS involved. But the argument there is not whether you need balancing resources to balance renewables, right? Even the people who want 100% renewables acknowledge you need storage and hydro and et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. They acknowledge you need resources to balance variable renewables. It's just an argument over which resources. Right? And we'll get to that later.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>That's right. And I should just say before we dive into solving the renewables challenges, it is worth noting that it's a big diverse world out there and we have countries that are situated in vastly different ways in terms of their geography, their population density, their available renewable resource potential. And so there are going to be parts of the world that can't rely on wind and solar as the dominant source of their energy mix. Places like North Korea or Japan or the UK.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I was just in Iceland, which gets 100% carbon-free electricity with zero wind and solar. It's hydro and geothermal.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah. So we should acknowledge that up front. And I'm not saying like this is the solution for the world, it just is for a big chunk of the world. And even in places like Japan or the UK, which are pretty dense and limited land area, they can rely on renewables for a good chunk of their energy needs. And they're trying to do so because of the energy security, affordability and climate clean air benefits that they offer. So it's a piece of the mix. Whether it's the dominant majority or not, it depends on the local circumstances. Some parts of the world are probably going to need nuclear power or geothermal or other more energy-dense resources to complement or even fully supplant wind and solar because of local resource constraints.</p><p>But that is going to probably be the exception, not the rule.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so I want to hone in a little bit on the timescales here. I'm going to run through and we'll sort of proceed in the discussion from the first of these to the last. So I'm going to run through real quickly the different timescales of variability because renewables are variable, but they're variable on several different timescales which pose distinct problems. So let me just run through this real quick. So at the shortest level, you have variable in terms of seconds or minutes. So you can think of something like clouds drifting in front of the sun that causes a slight dip.</p><p>There are those constant slight dips in the wind and the sun. And so you need something that is balancing in terms of near instantaneous short-term balancing. Then second, you have what you call minutes to hours. So you think of like ramping. So for instance, the sun goes down at the end of the day. You go from 100% solar resource to 0% solar resource relatively quickly over the course of an hour or two. That's a different kind of intermittency. And then you go up to hours and days. Here you get to what are called diurnal cycles. Overnight, for instance, the sun goes down at night and occasionally the sun and the wind will flag for a couple of days and then come back.</p><p>So there's the hours to days cycle. Then you get up to weeks. You can have weeks of unusually high demand or unusually low renewables. And then beyond that, you have what's called seasonal variability. So there can be entire seasons or years where solar insulation is unusually low or wind is unusually low. So at each of those timescales, you have a distinct problem to be solved in the electricity grid. And we have I think it's fair to — I mean, tell me whether you think this is fair or too crude.</p><p>I think that is roughly also the order of easiest to solve to most difficult basically. But we can get into that. But let's start at the normal second to second, cycle to cycle variability of wind and sun. What's our solution there?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Well, here's where it's important to remind folks that the electricity system is a pretty unique supply chain, in that supply and demand have to be balanced every millisecond instantaneously, basically, in this market. So if you're consuming electricity somewhere out there, someone has to be producing it at the exact moment that you're consuming it. That's true for every location across the entire grid all the time, which is different than, say, like Amazon's supply chain, where there's a package in a warehouse somewhere, it may or may not go out to get to you when you ask for it. It'll take anywhere from a day to five days right, to get to you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's the ultimate just in time delivery.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>It's like Amazon Prime on steroids. So, yeah, it has to be balanced everywhere. Supply has to equal the demand in real time. And there's actually really significant physical implications if that doesn't happen, because you have a whole bunch of generators and induction motors that are actually synchronized with the alternating current frequency of the grid. That means that in the US, every 60th of a second, the grid's frequency is reversing back and forth. And the motors that are spinning to generate that electricity and the motors that are induced to spin by that electricity to do useful things like run industrial processes and other things are all synchronized with that frequency.</p><p>So they're spinning at 60 Hz as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What a wild thing it is that it works.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah. I start my classes like this just to remind ourselves that this is like the craziest continent scale Rube Goldberg machine that we've built with incredible physical tolerances. And it just works. Yeah. So that's important to remind ourselves because it's not like there isn't variability in that system already, right? Demand goes up and down. You can flip on a light switch or plug in your EV, or flip on an electric kettle, whenever you want. Right. You don't have to ask the grid in advance. You just do it. And that's true across millions of consumers all over the continent.</p><p>And power plants, transmission lines, they fail sometimes. Substations go down, transmission lines fail, generators break. And so not only do you have small changes in demand from your light switch, but you can have big changes in that supply and demand balance that happen pretty much instantaneously.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is a good distinction to mark here, which is the distinction between predictable variability and unpredictable variability, which are very different.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Exactly. So there's a certain amount of this variability and uncertainty that already happens in the grid. There's sort of demand changes that are both predicted and also errors in those predictions. So we have demand forecast errors every day that are off by several percent right, from what we thought the demand was going to be. And we have what grid operators call contingencies sort of the unplanned forced failures of certain grid equipment that we have to be ready for at all times. Because if you lose a 1000-megawatt substation with a big factory on it, like an aluminum smelter, or you lose a generator, a big coal plant or a gas plant complex, or a nuclear power station, instantaneously, you have to rebalance that because if supply and demand get out of balance, the inertia of the grid physically responds.</p><p>So it's a little bit like if you remember playing on a merry-go-round at a playground where you could sort of have a couple of friends on it and you're spinning it around and then somebody jumps off and all of a sudden the rotational inertia is the same, but the weight is different. And the merry-go-round speeds up really fast, right, because there's less mass to move around or somebody jumps on and it slows down, right? And that's the same thing that's happening on the grid in aggregate is if you add load, is what the electricity system calls demand because it acts like a physical load on the force that the generators have to induce to create the electricity. It slows those generators down just a little bit and they have to work a little bit harder or you have to add more supply.</p><p>One of your friends has to come run up and help you push the merry-go-round as more people get on. And the same thing, the opposite happens. If supply exceeds demand, it gets easier to push, just like when somebody jumps off the merry-go-round. And so the generators all speed up and so do all the motors that are connected to the grid. And what's challenging here, again, is that the tolerances there are incredibly narrow. So just a 1% deviation in that speed of the grid is enough to trigger devices to disconnect to avoid damaging themselves because they spin up.</p><p>If you have a generator that's designed to go a certain speed and it starts to go faster than that, it can start to throw turbine blades out at very high velocities and self-destruct a whole building, right? A whole very expensive generator that you don't want to blow up. And same thing with industrial equipment, right? If they start moving too fast or even too slow, they can cause damage. So we have these protection devices that will trip offline devices as the frequency gets out of this very narrow range. And that can also cause a cascading failure because if you lose one generator because the frequency is too high or too low, then you'll start to lose the next generator and then the frequency will drop even more and then you'll lose the next generator and it'll go even lower.</p><p>And so you get these cascading failures. And the grid operator's job, really the number one job is to avoid that outcome at all costs, right? To make sure that this crazy Rube Goldberg machine is resilient to those kinds of scary unplanned contingencies. So we always have enough backup generation, enough flexibility what we call operating reserves or contingency reserves or spinning reserves — lots of different names for these products — of basically backup generators that are there able to increase their output if they're already producing or decrease it very rapidly or that are offline but can start up quickly to step into the gap when something occurs.</p><p>And that's how we keep this crazy system running right now. So there's sort of a physical response of inertia as you turn on or off devices and then we have all of these sort of cascading markets of different paces of response time that we have backup capacity waiting for from seconds to minutes to half hour, hour long kind of startup times. And that system of redundancies is how we keep the grid running today. And it will be the same set of solutions and some new ones that will come in to help augment what we do today.</p><p>That'll help us deal with the variability that we now are adding from wind and solar to a system that is already variable and has dealt with variability since its very beginning.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. It's fair to say, though, that we have a lot more.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yes, we will have more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The second to second variability, for instance, is going to be a lot more from a wind and solar based system.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, it adds a new source of forecast error. Right. Because your wind and solar is now also variable with the weather and we get better at forecasting that the closer to real time we get. But there are still errors in those forecasts. And certain power plants, coal plants, nuclear plants, others are slow to react to changes. And so we actually commit them to operate a day ahead of time. Usually we give a day ahead schedule for the next 24 hours and that predicts the sort of average demand over the course of each hour that we're trying to meet.</p><p>And so generators get turned on and are ready to meet that demand based on the forecast. And if the forecast is wrong a day ahead, then we need to deploy those flexibility resources at different timescales to cover the surpluses or deficits that we have in the system. And again, that's already how it works. We're just going to do more of that. And in some ways, we're going to be reducing the conventional sources of that flexibility. Because right now we get most of that flexibility from hydro and fossil power plants that are committed and operating on the grid but are held back from operating at their maximum or minimum levels to have some flexibility to ramp up or down quickly.</p><p>So the less of that we have because we're shutting down those plants to make room for wind and solar when they're producing, the more alternatives we need or we end up actually having to curtail wind and solar output in order to keep a minimum amount of those fossil generators online to maintain reliability. So that's the first option is you just curtail the renewables. But of course that's wasting free energy. And so we'd like to have other ways to take advantage of the wind and solar and still manage that short term variability. And that's where things like batteries and synchronous condensers and capacitor banks and other devices that we can add to the grid to augment their flexibility on those short timescales come in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it safe to say that with those options, especially batteries, do you worry as we get closer to net zero, closer to a 100% carbon-free system, do you worry about this second to second variability or do you think basically with batteries, we basically have that problem solved and can handle that?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>It's very low on my worry list. And that's not because it's not something that somebody has to worry about. It's just that I think there are very good control engineers and power engineers and grid operators out there solving these problems already. And we've known about these problems for decades. And so there are a lot of solutions already out there. And so pretty much everything is figured out in this space, I would say, with the exception perhaps of the physical inertia that really immediate microsecond, microsecond response that we get from the physical spinning mass of all of these interconnected generators.</p><p>Beyond that, the next line of defense is what we call frequency regulation or frequency reserves. Those are the ones that sort of move up and down on a second by second time scale to track a control signal. They say go up a little bit, go down a little bit to sort of keep things balanced out. And a few years back, maybe about a decade now, some of the grid operators in the US opened those markets up to batteries and particularly lithium-ion batteries —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Grid services.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yep. And it turns out that lithium-ion batteries are incredibly good at this job because you don't need very much battery capacity, right?</p><p>You don't need a bunch of energy in the tank to be able to do this because it's generally about neutral, right? You're sort of going up and down and up and down and up and down around a middle point. And so you can maybe only have 15 or 30 minutes of full power discharge capability. And that's still enough to provide frequency regulation because you're really only charging discharging on few second to minute long timescales and they're incredibly fast. So the power electronics responds really quickly to the control signal and it can flip from full on to full charge very quickly, much faster than a physical generator could do, even a hydro generator, which traditionally were the fastest response.</p><p>And so when PJM and other grid operators opened up these markets in around maybe 2009, I think, to storage, we saw the first commercial scale deployment of grid connected batteries and they basically ate the entire market because they're just the best way to do this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's not much left of that market in places where it opens up. It's pretty easy to cover those needs.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, you only need probably a few thousand megawatts of frequency regulation nationally. So that's like a few nuclear power plants worth of capacity nationally. And we have built that and a few hundred megawatts usually per grid region. And so the batteries just came in and you built a few grid batteries and they have taken on that role very capably. And the market is sort of full.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that what they call synthetic inertia?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>No. So that's the next challenge. So yeah, this is frequency regulation, which is on the sort of second by second timescale. That initial response of the physical inertia is like milliseconds that just happens instantaneously because again, all of the devices are interconnected and physically synchronized. And so when the demand goes up a little bit, all the generators kind of lean into it a little bit and produce a little bit more and vice versa when the demand drops. And so that is where we currently depend on the physical inertia of generators who are connected to the grid and producing power.</p><p>And we get that for free. It's not something we pay those generators for, it's something that they just physically have provided for free. And it's been ample and well in excess of the amount that we generally need with rare exceptions like islands or micro grids where it's much more challenging to keep enough inertia. And so we haven't been paying generators for that. It's just sort of a bonus that we get from having these synchronized generators online and grid connected inverter based resources, which includes wind, solar and batteries and fuel cells and any other kind of direct current device like that electric chemical device.</p><p>They're not synchronized spinning masses of copper and steel like generators are and so they don't provide that physical inertia. And so synthetic inertia is basically a computerized control strategy to make those inverter based resources act like a physical inertia device would and to sort of automatically compensate based on local measured characteristics. This is too fast to send a control signal out even from a centralized dispatch. It has to be locally metering what's going on, and directly responding to the local conditions without knowing what's going on in the rest of the grid. And so you are basically designing control strategies to use the power electronics in an inverter to change the reactive power production or consumption of the battery or the solar panel or the wind farm, which can, if you do it right, can tune it well, can simulate and replace the physical inertia that you get from the system.</p><p>This is something that, again, people have been working on for decades in the lab. We've done lots of experiments. It's one of those ones that grid operators are very reluctant to deploy at scale and rely on in a field experiment because if it goes wrong, the grid goes down potentially. And so it's one of those ones like, it probably would work if we were willing to just jump off the cliff and try it. But for obvious reasons, this is an incredibly conservative industry. And so there's been various small scale deployments to try to see how it works.</p><p>But nowhere in the world that I'm aware of is relying substantially on synthetic inertia today. Again, with the exception, maybe, of small micro grids. I should say that there's a dumber, simpler and slightly more costly solution that we can fall back on, even if that doesn't work, which are called synchronized condensers, which is basically a generator without the turbine, without the spinning prime mover that are just spinning hunks of copper wires in magnets that are on the grid and are synchronized. They consume a little bit of electricity to spin around and stay synchronized. So they do use up some variable, some of the energy production, and they do cost money because they're basically half of a generator, the magnet part without the turbine.</p><p>But these have been around for a long time, and they're used in certain locations to buffer short term variability from, say, starting up a steel mill, electrical steel mill or aluminum smelter. That is this big new demand that comes on very quickly. They've been used in that context and to support the voltage at certain little pockets in the grid where it's been hard to do so. And I recently read a thesis a dissertation from University of Melbourne PhD student who modeled this as an option without any synthetic inertia in the grid, but a minimum physical inertia requirement and found that it would add to a fully decarbonized system about 1% or 2% to the cost of that system, if we only relied on synchronized condensers to do the job.</p><p>So, again, these are mature technologies we know how to build. At worst, they add a couple of percent to the system. At best, they're free, because all of these inverter connected devices that we're adding can perform the same role as physical inertia via synthetic controls. And again, that's more perspective at this point, but I think it's an imminently solvable challenge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so this is the super short-term variability. Let's call it a solved problem, at least as these things go. So let's move up a little bit. Then you get big ramps, ramps in the morning when the sun comes up and goes down. Occasionally wind will die down quickly. What do you do about these sort of minutes to hours midday variability?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>So I'll say what we do now and then what we could do, which would be better. Right now, again, we rely on fast-acting thermal or fossil power plants to play that role.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Mostly natural gas, right?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Mostly natural gas. Sometimes diesel, internal combustion engine reciprocating engine generators. So what we do is we commit a bunch of generators that are ready to act when the sun is about to set, and they are operating at their minimum stable output level, which is not zero. So generally, they don't get to just sort of sit there and park at zero. They have to be on at somewhere between 40 and 60% of their output, usually, or 30 and 60% of their maximum output is as low as they can go. So during the middle of the day, when the solar is at its maximum, many of these are shut off, but then they start to get recommitted in the afternoon hours, right before this evening ramp and run at sort of crouch there at their minimum output level and then ramp up really quickly as the sun sets to compensate.</p><p>And so gas turbines are really good at this. They're really fast to respond. I mean, they're, what, run jet engines, right? I mean, jet engines are basically gas turbines. And we derived our gas turbine generators from jet engines. So the fastest ones are as fast as a jet fighter. They're literally the same engine. We have one here at Princeton in our central plan as an aero derivative gas turbine. It's the same. It's used in like an F-16 fighter. So they're really fast to respond because they can handle a dog fight. But then you also have bigger what are known as frame combustion turbines and combined cycle power plants that usually also use these frame turbines connected to a second steam generator, so they use the hot gas from the combustion turbine as the steam generation source for a steam turbine as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's combined cycle.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>That's why we call them combined cycle, because they combine a Brayton and a Rankin cycle, a gas and steam turbine.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we don't want to do this. We can't do that in a fully decarbonized grid. I mean, you can, I think, keep some fossil plants online and use them very, very rarely. But I don't think you could do that on a day-to-day in a decarbonized system.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, theoretically you could do this with a hydrogen turbine or something like that, but you would probably consume way more hydrogen than you want because hydrogen is a very expensive fuel to produce. And so, yeah, you don't want to keep doing this on a day to day basis. But I want to add that, again, we do this now. And this is how we keep the grid running even when California gets nearly 100% of its electricity during the middle of the day from solar and wind. The downside is that because you have to have those generators running at their minimum level before they can ramp up, because it takes between 30 minutes and several hours to turn on once you call on them.</p><p>And like a combined cycle power plant takes the longest of the gas generators. The air derivative turbines can maybe turn on in 30 minutes, but generally they have to be sort of on and parked and ready for that ramp. And you need some of them just sitting there, even for the unforecasted variability. Right. We know that the afternoon ramp is happening, but —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They're displacing wind and solar while they're sitting there —</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Exactly. And so that limits the ability of wind and solar to displace their fuel consumption because they're on, not because they're the cheapest generator to meet demand at that hour, but because we know we need their flexibility for the ramping periods or the contingencies that we're waiting for. So it would be great if we had a really fast way to flexibly produce or consume energy to match the variability of wind and solar. And fortunately, there are lots of good ways to do that too, batteries being the first and most significant new source of that kind of hourly flexibility. But also the demand side can be called upon much more as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We should note that batteries in this capacity are way faster than the turbines.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, once again, they can do that frequency regulation on a second by second basis. So they surely can deal with the sunset. And yeah, they don't need to be committed. They can sit there, they're on the grid all the time. They can go from fully discharging to fully charging or back. So they actually have twice the ramping capability. Right. Because if you have 100 megawatts of battery, it can switch from being 100-megawatt consumer to 100-megawatt producer, giving you 200 megawatts of ramping in that battery and they do it in a second, right. From one to the other. And so they're really good at this.</p><p>And we're already seeing them deployed at gigawatt scale in a lot of markets in the world, particularly those with high solar penetrations, because this daily cycle is so predictable. You get really cheap power during the middle of the day and really expensive power in the evening ramp and so they can make money arbitraging that spread, buy low and sell high.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And you also mentioned demand shifting, which is just trying to move large sources of load under that curve when solar is producing all this energy away from the times of sharp ramps.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Exactly. You mentioned at the beginning that we're shifting from a system of dispatchable generation to one of variable or nondispatchable generation. Well, we're also hopefully shifting from a system of nondispatchable demand, constant demand that doesn't know what the price of electricity is and just keeps consuming no matter what to dispatchable or flexible demand. Because power electronics are cheap, computing power is cheap, controls technologies are very sophisticated and it would not be very hard to wire up a whole bunch of HVAC controls and hot water heaters and EV chargers to be much more flexible on both minutes to hours to even daily timescales.</p><p>There's a lot of flexibility in an EV, right? I mean, I have a 300 miles range EV. That's enough for five to seven days of driving in my typical driving pattern. So not only can I shift which hours during the night or daytime, if it's plugged in at home during the day, that I consume energy, but I can even choose which days to consume, right? I can shift from Monday to Wednesday or Wednesday to Saturday, right? And that's probably the most flexible of these loads. But think about a hot water heater. That's just a big thermal battery.</p><p>It's a big insulated tank of water and when you charge it and heat it up or not, it is quite flexible. You can do it right as you're drawing down the hot water, or you can preheat it and get it above the desired temperature. And there are even more sophisticated ways to do that. Parts of the world that traditionally relied heavily on hydro or nuclear power, where you had the problem of too much generation overnight: What those parts of the world did way back in the 50s through to today is they have ceramic brick heaters that heat up a big ceramic brick when the power is cheap, and then let that brick reradiate heat into your house during the daytime right when —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thermal storage!</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>It's cheap —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We love thermal storage.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>And again, this is not Sci-fi. This is like they do it in Quebec and the UK and they've done it since the 60s. So we could be building big thermal batteries in everyone's home whenever we put in a new HVAC system, right? It could just be part of the HVAC design, is that you have a big hot water tank or a big hot brick tank.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We also get to what I think is one of the most fascinating questions and I think unexplored as yet questions in this whole area, which is when you are talking about big industrial loads, how much of that load is shiftable, how much of big industrial load could be shifted? I don't think there's been a ton of exploration of that to date. And I think we're going to be finding out soon what the answer to that question is.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, and actually, I have a paper that we just resubmitted this week. After revisions on this, we can provide a link to the working paper in the show notes on what we call demand sinks. So these are consumers that are extremely flexible in when they decide to consume and will basically match their consumption to the availability of low-cost power. And since wind and solar are the cheapest way to make low-cost power, that will mean they can sync up their output to wind and solar. And so we actually offer four different categories of demand in that paper to try to help kind of talk through the options here.</p><p>So if we're thinking about the demand side, there's firm demand. That's the normal stuff that we're used to having where it wants to have three or four nines of reliability, we usually say, which is like 99.99 or 99.999% reliability basically all the time. And that's most of our current demands. Residential, commercial, lighting and cooking and refrigeration, industrial, most industrial loads, hospitals and other critical loads, and most heating demand today. And that's the demand we expect to serve. And if you don't, it's a big problem, right, that's when you're having rolling blackouts. Then we have interruptible demand or curtailable demands.</p><p>This is the sort of category of demand response that we have. So these aren't necessarily shifting their production, they're just stopping consumption when the price of electricity is really high or when they're being paid a lot of money to do so. And that's where things like aluminum smelters or industrial demand response contracts that they have with a whole bunch of industrial refrigeration warehouses or consumers with backup generators who can turn on and get off the grid when the price of power is higher than the cost of running their generator. That's a lot of the demand response we have today.</p><p>That's also where hydrogen boilers, other things could potentially play a role. So there's some new ones coming in that category too. Those ones, you don't want to call on those very often, but they can help you avoid building a bunch of generation that just sits there for that like half a percent of the hours of the year when you really need some backup because they can consume less during those periods for a few hours at a time. Then you have what we call shiftable demands. These are the ones we were just talking about where you can move around when you consume within a kind of hourly or even daily scale.</p><p>Flexible EVs, heating demand, data centers potentially can do this — something Google has explored, moving around in both space and time where they do the compute loads.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, Google is doing a ton of work trying to figure out how much of their compute load is shiftable.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yep. Yeah, one of my former MIT classmates who I happened to see last weekend at a wedding was working on this with Google. Yeah, fun stuff to optimize, right? Great control problem to play with. Then things like agricultural pumping is another one that's often done already. Like California irrigation districts will shift when they pump their water into the canals and the reservoirs and things like that. So that's another tried and true demand. And so those demands, they meet their needs, right? It's just a question of when they do it. So it's different than curtailable or interruptible demands. And then this last category of demand sinks are the really price sensitive consumers who really can choose when to consume.</p><p>And this is where it's an interesting question which categories will emerge here? What we found in our paper is that in order to do this, you kind of need a weird combination of things. You need something that's highly automated because you can't have a lot of labor sitting around idle when you stop consuming. Right. Because that's usually too much of a cost. It needs to be very energy intensive, meaning a big chunk, if not the most of your cost of production is the cost of energy inputs. And it needs to produce something of value that isn't so valuable that you never want to turn off.</p><p>This is the current problem with crypto mining with bitcoin, is that the bitcoin prices are so high — or they have been, I don't know, they're all over the place now, so maybe they're lower now — that you want to consume even if the electricity is several hundred dollars per megawatt hour, $100 per megawatt hour, it means you basically consume 98, 99% of the time anyway. So that makes you more like an interruptible demand, not a flexible consumer. But if the price of the product is lower, where your willingness to pay is only ten or 20 or $30 a megawatt hour, then you want to concentrate to when the load is — or the power is cheap.</p><p>And then finally it has to be not very capital intensive because if you're going to idle your production and shift your consumption around to low price hours, you're going to have a low utilization rate for that capital, all that equipment. And so it can't be too expensive or you'll need to run it all the time. And that's where kind of direct air capture fails the test right now because it meets the other requirements, highly automated, totally energy intensive, but it's too capital intensive to run at anything less than maybe 95% of the time. So there are a few here that I think may work.</p><p>And one is, I think we share is one of our favorite technologies out there, which is resistance heating with thermal storage. Right. So Rondo or Antora, who you've interviewed on here I'm on the advisory board of Rondo Energy, I should disclose and big fan of what they're up to. But here you basically take in renewable electricity whenever it's available and you use a big thermal battery like the hot water tank or the ceramic bricks that we're talking about in the home to decouple —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Box of rocks.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, or a box of rocks or even just rocks in the ground covered up with dirt to decouple the constant heat demand of an industrial process from the variable input of the wind and solar. And that's a great option. Another option is to just install resistance heaters alongside gas boilers. So don't replace the gas boiler fully or at all, but run it in a hybrid mode, where when energy prices are cheap electricity prices are cheap, you switch off of gas to electricity, and when electricity prices are higher than the gas cost, you go back to gas.</p><p>And that makes it look like a very flexible demand sink. That was a technology we put in the model for the Net Zero America study and we saw like terawatts of that load in the final Net Zero system. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the system wants —</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Wants that cheap renewable electricity if it can use it. Right. So if you can find a way to meet your constant energy demand for industrial heat while tapping into this cheapest source of energy, period, whenever it's available, that's a really valuable thing to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that one's going to be huge in like a decade.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think so. I think the industrial heating is the biggest one that people largely are sleeping on. Although not you and I of course. And then the other one that's getting most of the attention right now I should say is hydrogen production from electrolysis.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? Yeah.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Where again today electrolyzers are pretty expensive so you probably want to run them at least 70% of the time. But that's still very flexible. I mean 30% of the hours is a lot of hours you can shut down. And as the cost of electrolyzers fall, which we expect they will just like solar and batteries did, probably by 50% over the next six years or so, then you can afford to run them at 30 or 50% utilization rate and then they're a really good flexible consumer. Now I want to add that both of these, any of these demand sinks, what we found in our paper, they don't really help the broader grid operate.</p><p>What they do is allow you to just tap into that weather-dependent but very low-cost clean electricity and make greater economic use of it and displace fossil energy consumption elsewhere in the energy system. But it's sort of additive to all the demands that we already are going to have in the grid and the flexibility that we need to handle those demands. So we added a whole bunch of demand sinks in our modeling and we found is that it didn't really reduce the amount of firm generating capacity or battery capacity that you wanted on the system, but it also didn't increase it much. It just sits there and soaks up that good cheap renewable energy when it's there —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But allows you to use more wind and solar.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Much more. Yeah, much more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so we've covered seconds and we've covered minutes and hours and it sounds like on the minutes to hours thing, combining batteries and then all these demand, as you say, these various sources of shiftable demand. Do you think that the sort of ramping problem is solvable to solved? Let's say it's also low on your list of worries.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>I think we have solved that problem in the sense that we know the technologies; they are not Sci-Fi, they can be deployed at scale now. They are not deployed at scale yet at the scale we would need. So in the next ten years or five years we are still going to have to rely on those gas turbines and things like that to do a good chunk of this. But over time, as we build more batteries, as we wire up more flexible loads and give them the incentive to participate in this demand shifting, as we get more interruptible consumers signed up, we'll be able to do more of this without relying on so much gas backup capacity.</p><p>And that's a good thing from a decarbonization perspective.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then we get up to hours to days variability in terms of diurnal cycles, the sun going down every night in the sort of daily storage needs. What are our options there?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah. So here we probably again, we rely right now on fossil generators, right. Ramping up and down. We can rely to some degree on lithium-ion batteries. They are most economic to operate for just the highest price periods for that sort of peak in the evening ramp, or maybe twice if there's a double peaking system in the morning too. And it's not a function of like physically you could slow the discharge rate and run a lithium-ion battery for 24 hours of discharge. You just have to discharge at a much slower overall rate than you could. And so, economically, batteries and given their cost today, are really best suited to somewhere between like two and six hours of duration.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, although that number has been edging upward, I feel like, for as long as I've been paying attention.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Right. Because the reason I'm emphasizing that technically they can do longer is that what limits that is not the technology per se, it's the economics of the battery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, you could theoretically just stack batteries to the heavens and solve all of this if you had infinite money.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>If you've got ten four hour batteries, you've got a 40 hours battery. Or if you have one four hour battery that you discharge at one 10th of its rated capacity, you have a 40 hours battery. Right. So that's not rocket science. The problem is you need to make enough money every time you charge and discharge to cover your overall fixed cost of a battery. Right. So batteries make money off of kind of capacity contracts and flexibility services. So they're sort of paying for their standby ability, but also from buying low and selling high. Right. This sort of buy sell spread.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>And the problem with any arbitrage play is that the more you buy low, the higher the low price gets. And the more you sell high, the lower the high price gets. And you're not the only one playing this game.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everybody else is arbitraging too.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Exactly. And so we've seen this happen is that basically the price spreads start to collapse as you build more of these flexible demands and more of these batteries all kind of playing on the same price signals. And so that creates a race between the declining cost of these technologies and their declining value as you do more and more with them. And as long as the costs keep falling, or we develop cheaper lower cost per kilowatt hour of storage capacity batteries or storage technologies, then batteries can stretch to play a longer and longer duration role. And so, just to put some numbers on that, right now lithium-ion battery systems are probably $250 to $350 per kilowatt hour of capacity installed. If they fell to 100 ish dollars —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Isn't that DOE's stretch goal?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the pack costs are already falling below $100. So the actual battery pack itself, but you have to install it and give it cooling and power control electronics and wire it up to the grid and everything. And so the labor and the balance of system costs, just like for solar modules, which are only like a third of the cost of a solar system now at scale, the pack cost is a piece of it. And so we would need to get the pack cost down a lot more. If you want to hit the $100 per kilowatt hour total system cost level, you'd still need to probably a stretch for lithium-ion to hit that target.</p><p>But maybe lithium-ion phosphate batteries are looking like a better option to do that. Sodium sulfur batteries or sodium-ion batteries, sorry, are being introduced now as a cheap, low-range option for EVs. Well, EV batteries need to charge and discharge very quickly and they need to have a high enough energy density to give you a lot of range in a small package for not very much weight. None of those apply to a grid battery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, right.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>A grid battery can charge and discharge over hours, not minutes. And the energy density doesn't matter. The gravimetric density, the weight part, doesn't matter at all. The volumetric density only really has a small impact on the amount of space you need to put them, which can impact the installation costs and cost of the land.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So here you get into this weird because we're going to discuss later long-duration energy storage, where we're talking about days and weeks. So here you're getting into this weird sort of liminal space between —</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, diurnal storage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>lithium-ion batteries, which gets you up to whatever, six, maybe eight hours.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, maybe 16. Right. This sort of diurnal scale is what it seems like is necessary to manage most of the day-to-day variability of demand and solar and wind, which they have pretty pronounced daily cycles because the sun goes up and down every day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's where you get into flow batteries and things like this, which are sort of like longer than short term, but shorter than long term.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, iron flow —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't know how much of that space is going to be left. My sort of instinct is that that space is going to get eaten from below by lithium-ion and eaten from above by long duration and there's not going to be much of it left. But, what do you think?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, it depends. It's sort of a race to market, I think, and which technologies kind of get to scale and get on that cost curve first because there's a lot of path dependency here, right. If you can get to market and scale up and start driving down your costs before another startup can, you may be able to edge them out of the market. And this is something that any of these startup battery companies need to keep in mind. Because lithium-ion and sodium-ion and all of the automotive battery technologies are coming like a freight train for your market, too, if you're in this diurnal space because there's going to be huge price pressures and competitive pressures from the auto sector to get a better, cheaper, lighter weight battery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is such a key point. I want to underline this. You have lithium-ion batteries competing in this daily space with other flow batteries and things like that. But flow batteries are getting all their money in development and drive from this space. But lithium-ion batteries have the much, much, much larger EV market behind them.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yes, it's probably two orders of magnitude bigger.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, so it's an unfair advantage.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>It is. And I think it's really important to realize that if you're an investor and entrepreneur in this space, you should expect lithium-ion to just keep getting better, or sodium-ion or other substitutes from the automotive sector and that will help stretch them from four hours to six to ten and being economic in that space. And so, yeah, I do think you're going to see a shrinking market unless you're like a factor of two or more better than lithium-ion is today and you're going to get to market soon because lithium-ion will be half the cost eventually, you are going to be in trouble. And so there are plenty of solutions here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There are lots of chemistries in the lab, you read the MIT press releases or whatever. There are lots of interesting chemistries competing for this space, but as you say, they're so far behind that they would have to be such an order of magnitude higher performance to get a foothold.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Some of them say they can and I think probably can. And so we'll probably get a half dozen of new diurnal ten to 24 hours kind of duration batteries, which are sometimes called long duration. Which is why I think it's useful to separate this diurnal timescale from the sort of multi-day or seasonal role, which is a whole different one, which requires an even cheaper battery or cheaper storage medium. But yeah, again, there are solutions coming here. Some of those flexible demands can even shift around on the order of days. Think about EV demand again. If we had ubiquitous charging at work or on the streets that you could drive and plug into a small low-level charger pretty much anywhere, then in solar-dominated markets, which is probably going to be most of the world soon.</p><p>It makes the most sense to charge your car during the daytime and not at night. Right now, because most people charge at home, the easiest thing to do is to just avoid that peak afternoon evening consumption and charge in the middle of the night, which is generally cheaper. But you could also charge during the daytime if you can plug in during the day. And if we shifted all of our EV consumption around, it could very well provide this sort of diurnal capability also because, again, you have multiple days worth of charge usually in your battery, and you can shift large fleets of EVs fractionally to produce a lot of storage capacity in aggregate.</p><p>And so I do think there's a lot coming in this space.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? You think diurnal is again solvable with technologies that are either here or on the near horizon.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. And maybe a little bit behind some of the shorter timescales that we're talking about, because we are talking about technologies today that are in Series B or C venture capital rounds and still need to get to market and produce at scale. But most of those are coming in the next two to three years, right. They're going to be producing at commercial scale soon, and we'll see what costs they hit and whether they can scale to gigawatt hours per year. But there's a lot of innovation, a lot of investment, and a lot of potential on both the battery or storage and demand side to fill that role.</p><p>And again, in the meantime, we've got gas turbines. And so it's important to remember in all of this, there's no reason to wait for these technologies to come forward. We're just going to keep building more wind and solar, maintaining our gas as we add these additional resources to augment them. And if all else fails, right, and we don't get there with these diurnal technologies, what it does is it just provides an economic limit on the amount of wind and solar that we can add, because we'll start curtailing wind and solar more than we would ideally. And that just reduces the amount of energy that those wind and solar farms can sell out of value.</p><p>And that also creates a race between declining wind and solar costs and curtailment or declining value of wind and solar. It's something I've talked about a lot in the past. Again, if wind and solar just keep getting cheaper, they can keep winning that race. But if they stall out of the way wind has appeared to over the last couple of years, and we'll see if it gets back on track, then the limitation in diurnal flexibility options will present an economic limit on the amount of wind and solar we can add. If solar just keeps getting cheaper, like, say, solar drops —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which will then provide an enormous financial incentive for people to come forward with these solutions —</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>To do this, exactly. Yeah. So, think about if solar just got half the cost it is today, which is still achievable, right? That solar PV could decline by another 40 or 50% over the next five to ten years. If that happens, then you can afford to waste half of your solar production that you would otherwise need to sell today. Right. Because you just knocked the cost in half. Probably more than that, because prices are not evenly distributed. And then yeah, now you've created this huge amount of free energy during the middle of the day that somebody can come and arbitrage with a daily storage or demand flexibility option.</p><p>So, I think we're on a pretty inexorable path to solving that problem as well. Even though it's not technically solved today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This seems like a good place to bring in transmission, which is another in the basket of solutions to variability, I think, on virtually all these timescales, really. I mean, transmission helps in all these ways, but I think in the diurnal timescale it is going to be the most sort of notable contribution, which is just the broader of a geography you connect up, the more smooth your overall profile is.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>That's right, yeah. We haven't talked about the geographic nature of this, but again, what this is all driven by is the weather. That's what drives demand wind solar variability. And over longer timescales you tend to have to go over broader geographies to decorrelate the output. Right. So if you're just talking about those seconds to minutes, the clouds and the variability of an individual wind farm, you can go not very far away and get a solar farm or a wind farm that is not in the same cloud or not dealing with the same wind gust as it goes across the plains.</p><p>And you can balance those short term variabilities out over relatively small geographic areas. When it comes to hours to days timescales, you kind of need continent scale, not the entire US continent, but at least big chunks of it scale interconnection. And we do have grids that span continents, so that's not an impossible thing. In particular, if you go east to west, you see the timing of that peak demand shift as the sun sets right across the country. And so you can spread the solar and demand out in the evening hours. You can't get rid of the nighttime entirely unless you have a grid that spans the whole world.</p><p>But across the expanse of the United States or Europe or China, other big east to west countries, you can do a lot there. And wind fronts tend to be driven by these big synoptic scale weather patterns that span big areas. You'll see them talked about on the news. And we've got a high pressure front off of the Atlantic that's affecting the Northeast today. And those affect big regions, but not the whole country. So if you can connect from Pennsylvania to Oklahoma, right, it maybe has very different weather patterns going on. And you can deal with some of these even multi day kind of fronts potentially as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so we've got second to second, more or less covered. We've got minutes to hours covered, coverable, easily forecasted to be coverable. Then we've got hours to days, which is, as you say, the site of enormous activity right now. A lot of people working on those things and solutions either in hand or anticipatable relatively soon in the next decade. Then we get up to weeks and seasons. And I guess the first thing I'd ask is, is there a meaningful difference here technologically in terms of what we need between weeks and seasons? Are those going to be distinct categories?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Well, yeah, I don't know that there's a huge difference between weeks and seasons. I think once you're cheap enough to do weeks — so what we tend to see is that it's not that you're doing seasonal discharge. Like you're not discharging for months at a time. But what you might do is charge very slowly for weeks at a time in the spring or the fall and the sort of shoulder seasons, and then step in for five or seven or 20 days in the peak demand, low wind and solar period in the winter or the summer and during those Dunkelflaute or whatever.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Once we're beyond days, we're just talking basically about long-term solutions. And here, as I understand it, this is the most difficult, least answered, least settled form of variability that we're dealing with here, which is just what is that resource that's not wind and solar, that when wind and solar are unusually low for weeks or seasons at a time, can step in for weeks and seasons at a time without generating carbon. So that's a head scratcher of a category.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>It is. And this is what I call the — we published a paper, Nestor Sepulveda and I, back in 2018 on firm, low carbon resources, looking at this need. We followed that up with a later paper in 2020 on long duration energy storage. How cheap does batteries or other technologies need to be to actually fill that role? With a storage technology the answer is really cheap, like two orders of magnitude cheaper than a lithium-ion battery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, lithium-ion batteries are not —</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>They're not going to do this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>— cheap enough to do this.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>No.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But what can?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the options on the generation side and we can come back to the storage front in a minute, are, again, the default in all of these conversations is we just keep using fossil fuels for less and less and less and less of this job. Right. So if, again, we can't develop any other technology, all we can do is have some combustion turbines and diesel generators sitting around for that week.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, right.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>That is not the end of the world from a CO2 perspective. Right. It would be challenging to maintain the gas and fuel delivery infrastructure for that. And it'll get more and more expensive to do than today. Right. So it won't be as cheap as today's gas turbines, but we run our models and they're pretty damn price insensitive to that cost, especially on the variable side, because you're not going to burn a lot of fuel in those power plants. Right. They're going to sit there, they're going to provide a lot of power when you need them. But because you only run them for a week or five days or 20 days, they don't burn very much fuel over the course of a year.</p><p>That means that even if the fuel is really expensive, like it's all synthetic methane or hydrogen that you produce from renewables in another period of the year, or you produce from biomass gasification or whatever, those could cost several times as much as current natural gas. And that still would be fine from a total economics perspective because you don't use very much of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we could learn to live at peace with some marginal natural gas plants sitting around waiting on these periods.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah. Again, the things that we don't like about fossil fuels, whether it's gas or coal or oil, are all related to how much of it we burn, not how much capacity we have sitting around to burn it. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a crucial point.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>So all the pollution, all the fracking, all the fuel production, all the transportation, all the methane emissions from the fuel cycle, all that scales with how much volume we use, not the peak power output. And so it isn't the end of the world. If we don't get to a 100% carbon-free grid, we get to a 98% carbon-free grid and we run some gas turbines.</p><p>The thing that we're actually researching right now and I think is important to consider in that context, they call that the fallback plan. Right. We don't get any new innovation and we have to do this plan, which is unlikely. Then the thing I'm exploring with my group now is how much fuel storage or firm pipeline capacity or whatever do you need to make sure that you actually have the fuel around when you really need it? Because if you don't, then all that standby capacity is worthless.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a lot of infrastructure to maintain for a few power plants.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>For backup use. As I said, it's very insensitive to variable cost of the fuel, but it may be much more sensitive to the capital cost of the fuel, of the equipment you need to secure the fuel supply. And because you're not using it very often, so you don't get to amortize that cost over a lot of hours. And so it may be that that becomes more expensive than we think if we start to account for all those additional things like the need to have onsite fuel storage or something.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, like maintaining the natural gas distribution system. Is this weird sort of like yes or no, on or off question. And if it's on then that's a shitload of money. And if it's off, you're saving a bunch. It's not really something you can half do.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, right now power plants, gas plants basically are non-firm consumers. So they just use the gas capacity on the pipelines when it's there and when it's not, they don't, generally, but if you're going to be the last resort firm resource, you better make sure your fuel supply is secured. Otherwise, you're useless and people will freeze to death. And that's not okay. So that's one option is we just figure out how to secure gas turbines running on either methane or synthetic methane or biogas or hydrogen or something, or —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Capturing and burying their CO2 or let's mention the Allam cycle real quick.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, so I would say that's not a great option for this very intermittent capacity role because that capital equipment to capture CO2, and to store it, is not going to be used at such a low utilization rate. So then we go into the next category beyond these sort of backup combustion turbines or fuel cells or something. And that's where you have gas with carbon capture or maybe coal, but probably not. And advanced nuclear and advanced geothermal. Even a gas plant with carbon capture is sort of in the middle. It's got fuel costs, so it's non-zero variable costs and has some capital costs.</p><p>So you want to run it maybe 40% to 70% of the hours of the year. And so it will do more than just fill in the standby capacity if you build that. It'll also supply some of our carbon-free generation and we'll need less wind and solar because of that. But that is an option. And then the final one. Geothermal and nuclear, both fission and potentially fusion are majorly capital intensive upfront cost, but very low if any fuel cost. And so if they are in the mix, we want to run them most of the time, not all the time.</p><p>They don't need to run base load. The term is there is no base load that we need to meet anymore. In a system with lots of variable renewables, what we need is something that can complement the variable renewables. So even geothermal or nuclear, it would make sense to couple with a storage option. So we've looked at coupling nuclear fission with thermal storage the way some of the new designs are going to do. We've looked at geothermal plants that both closed loop and enhanced geothermal can shift their production on daily or even weekly or seasonal timescales. So they just concentrate all their output in the best periods and store it up in the other periods.</p><p>So they will operate flexibly. I call them flexible base technologies, but they're going to be operating at 70% to 90% utilization rates, not standby. Again, those are with the exception of fusion, which still has some very serious engineering questions to work out. We know we can build nuclear power plants, we know we can build geothermal, we know we can frack wells. And we're starting to do the first hydrofracking for geothermal with enhanced geothermal technologies being built. Like right now. These are technologies that are right over the horizon and are well capitalized now by startups and by public sector support and are going to be built in first commercial scale projects over the next two to five years.</p><p>And so we'll see which of those start to look really viable. And by the end of the decade, I think we'll have this part of the toolkit worked out as well. And we'll really have an understanding of which ones of these are ready to scale and which ones aren't.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the idea here is if you hit the Dunkelflaute, if you hit the period of low wind and solar, you just ramp up your nuclear and your geothermal and your carbon captured natural gas plants to compensate.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yes. Or you have very, very low-cost energy storage, like what Form Energy is working on with very cheap iron air battery. Or you could do very large compressed air in big salt caverns that if they're big enough, get really cheap. Or you could store hydrogen underground.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>These are long duration energy storage.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>All of these are potentially sort of $1 to $10 per kilowatt hour type range of cost of storage capacity, marginal storage capacity. And if that's the case, then we found that they could displace much, if not all of that firm generation role and act as basically a firm storage option for those.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So if we successfully develop and commercialize a few of these long duration technologies, we are reducing our need for clean, firm, reducing our need for nuclear and geothermal.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>What we found is it's pretty difficult to fully eliminate it, but you could do a lot more with long duration storage and renewables and less — need, less firm.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Give us a sense of — I think a lot of people are curious about this is, like, where are we on those long duration energy storage technologies? I mean, technologically they don't seem that mysterious, but none of them, as far as I know, are commercially used yet, except for pumped hydro.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, and pumped hydro is way too expensive for this role. It's a diurnal technology, too, that is really sized for and has the cost for daily or multi-hour kind of applications.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we don't have long duration energy storage at a commercial scale —</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>No —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>yet really?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Partly because we haven't had to. We have chemical fuel, we don't need it. We have diesel and coal and natural gas and that's our storage. Right? So what we're trying to figure out is a way to get by without those fuels. One option is really cheap electrochemical storage or alternative chemical storage, like hydrogen or synthetic natural gas stored in salt caverns or the way we store gas seasonally today. Those are all doable. But yeah, I basically say they're in the same place as all of the clean firm generation options, which is that there are multiple startup companies that have clear line of sight and are capitalized and are scaling and are trying to work it out.</p><p>And we'll know in the next three to five years which of those are real and which of those can't get off the ground. And so again, when I published our paper, when Esther and I published our paper, initially, it was very speculative, right? Which of these could take off? Most of the nuclear designs existed on paper. The Allam cycle existed on paper. We were just talking notionally about hydrogen with no policy support whatsoever. Right? And now you have strong public policy support in well capitalized companies in all of these categories moving forward. And so I think we're again in a good position to solve this problem.</p><p>It's not an unsolvable challenge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's quickly just spell out what we mean by Allam cycle, natural gas, in case for the non-super nerds out there who are not following this. I wrote a piece in Vox about it three or four years ago, but I haven't heard a lot about it lately. But spell out what that is.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>So, this is a technology that is commercialized by a company called Net Power, recently went public via SPAC. And I should disclose that I served as a consultant to the SPAC company as they were exploring that acquisition. And so it's now a publicly traded company that is building their first commercial project in the Permian Basin, West Texas. They're building another one. I got a couple of others planned and they have operated a pilot scale facility outside of Laporte, Texas to try to prove out the design. But what it does is it basically burns natural gas in a pure oxygen environment.</p><p>So it uses an air separating unit to get oxygen out of the atmosphere. And then when you burn gas with only oxygen instead of the air, you don't get any air pollutants. So you don't get — it already burns with very little no particulates. But all of the nitrous oxides, the NOx emissions that we get from gas power plants, the nitrogen comes from the air. It comes from partial combustion and high temperature combustion that dissociate nitrogen out of the air and combine it with oxygen and produce NOx. And so if you burn it in a pure oxygen environment, there's no nitrogen available to become NOx.</p><p>And so it produces power with no air pollution. And it produces a pure CO2 stream from that combustion that can be easily captured at 99.9% capture rate and then sequestered or stored. And so it has the potential to be a very low air pollution, basically no air pollution and nearly 100% capture gas power plant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really cool, really cool machine.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, I should say it doesn't eliminate the upstream impacts of gas supply chains, but everything from the power plant it can clean up. And so that's a huge difference from our current gas plants. It's also different from a post-combustion capture system, which bolts on to a conventional gas plant. Those have a harder time capturing 100% of the emissions. It takes a lot more energy to do that and they all add a lot of cost and reduce the efficiency of the process. The Allam cycle itself, it has some other complicated systems to it. It uses supercritical CO2 to run the turbines instead of water and it keeps it at a constant phase.</p><p>Long and short of it is it's much more efficient and compact than a combined cycle plant too. And so if this can be made to work — and again you have to show that it can work, work on a sustained basis at commercial scale — then it's a potentially much more affordable option and can capture much higher emissions levels with zero air pollution relative to a gas plant with conventional gas combined cycle plant with carbon capture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As has come up several times already in our discussion, there are several contexts in which it would be very handy to have a couple of sort of low utilization natural gas plants hanging around. So, if you could build those in such a way that they are air pollutant-free and easily capturable CO2, it's a big help.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah. And if you can site them in ways that where you can source from gas fields that have very low methane leakage and don't have to transport across big pipelines and don't use the distribution hour — there's a lot of upstream impacts to consider. But yeah, you could do it in a not zero impact, but much, much more benign system than our current gas plants.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And do you think of e-fuels? So for listeners, you can strip hydrogen out of the air with electrolysis and then combine hydrogen with hydrocarbons that you've captured elsewhere to create basically carbon-neutral fuels. This is how we're going to solve aviation fuels, probably how we're going to solve shipping, some form of methanol. There's a variety of these e fuels available and possible. Do you think of those conceptually as long term energy storage?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, you can think of them either as long duration storage or as firm generation. I mean, I think they're kind of a mix of the two because you're probably going to get some of their initial energy inputs from electricity, but maybe not all of them. So you can think of it in the extreme manner: We don't use any electrolysis. We get all of these from biomass and from methane reforming with carbon capture, other non-electrolytic sources. And then it just looks to the electricity sector like a fuel because it doesn't consume electricity to produce. It just gives you electricity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>On the other extreme: It's a full round trip electrochemical process. You use electricity to produce the fuel, you store the fuel, you burn it back into electricity. What's interesting is that they sit in between and that they're part of a much larger fuel system that is predominantly used outside of the electricity sector and has input options besides electricity. And I think that's also a big advantage because just like lithium-ion batteries are going to kind of coast on the much larger EV market for batteries, it means there's more things you can do with these long duration storage options.</p><p>You can power ships and you can power industrial processes and you can use them as chemical feedstocks as opposed to an electrochemical battery that can only do electrical storage. And so I think those are pretty viable options to kind of eventually play the role of a long duration firm generation/storage option. And the long duration electrochemical battery makers need to keep an eye on that market too because it could be coming for the other side of your market. They do know this. I mean, I've talked to several of them that they're keeping an eye on hydrogen and e fuels and other things.</p><p>But that's the other route is that we just burn these fuels occasionally. But again, that comes back to that fuel supply assurance question that I raised before, which is the piece we're researching now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. How do you set up an entire infrastructure to create fuels that are only used marginally or used?</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Well, see, this is where I think those ones have an advantage in the sense that you would use them in other sectors, right? You would use these fuels to produce jet fuel or to produce shipping fuel or as a feedstock for petrochemicals or others. And so you could sort of tap into that larger, more established and more constantly used fuel system the way that power plants today tap into the natural gas system. It would be smaller probably than today's gas distribution system, but it could be similar in that it's sort of a multi-use fuel network and reaches economies of scope and scale because of that.</p><p>So it is an option, one that we see in our kind of multisector modeling that we do. And I think whether you see that as a generation option or as a storage option or some hybrid in between, it certainly fits the role of a firm resource and can be our potential backup kind of source.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Stepping back here, we've walked through the time cycles of intermittency from seconds all the way up to seasons. And basically what you're saying is that in all those cases there are options either available or in development. It's probably safer to say that the seconds side of things is more solved, there are more options. We're more ready for that. And when you get up to the seasons level of intermittency we're a little bit more out in the future. We're a little bit more theoretical. There's a lot of stuff in the lab. There's a lot of competition that needs to be had, but there are options there as well.</p><p>So one thing you could take from this is just, "oh, variability is nothing to worry about." And yet people see California having problems. People see high renewable energy penetration systems starting to run into these problems. So how do we square those two stories in our head, this idea that we know how to do it, yet even at relatively low penetration, we're starting to run into tensions and problems.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Okay, Dave, do you ever encounter challenges in your day-to-day life? Do you have writer's blocks?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm a podcaster. It's all easy.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>You need to figure out what to make for dinner for your kids. Do you just throw up your hands and cover your head and go back to bed? Of course not, right? You wouldn't get through your life if you did that. Also, some of those challenges, you don't solve them the first time you sit down to do it, right? But these are challenges, not barriers or impenetrable walls that we can't pass, right? These are not rules of nature or fundamental limits. They are challenges. They have costs to overcome them. Those costs change as we apply innovation and ingenuity to solve them in new creative ways and as technologies improve and they take time to solve because this is a big system and we're trying to rebuild it as we use it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And some experimentation and failure along the way.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>So I think we just have to keep in mind you can take these challenges very seriously, and we should, and the industry does. And you can see them as solvable, and we should because they are and not despair because we can overcome them. So I think you have to hold all those things in mind and that's not an unusual or unique thing. Like that's how we get through our lives. We encounter challenges, we find solutions, we implement them, we iterate, we try again. And we don't generally give up right away. At least you don't get very far if you do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or give up before we even really are trying, before we've even tried at all.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>"Ah, can't possibly do it." And so that's where we are, right? We have a bunch of solutions. We've talked about them here. They are not all at scale, ready to use predominantly today. We cannot stop using natural gas power plants tomorrow. In fact, I would counsel we don't shut really any down over the next decade or longer because we probably need them as we rapidly replace coal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You can idle them, not shut them down. Right? There's a distinction there.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>What we care about is how much fuel they burn, not how much power capacity they have. And so we need to keep that front and center. So I think it's interesting is that over the last few years, I think a really clear roadmap has emerged for decarbonization of the power sector. And that roadmap looks like this: It says deploy wind and solar and batteries and demand flexibility as quickly as we can. Right? We know these things can work, they're effective. They need to scale up and play a bigger and bigger role in our energy system as fuel saving and balancing resources.</p><p>The second thing we have to do is use those resources to just shut down our coal-fired power plants as quickly as is practical. Yes, they're the highest source of air pollution and carbon emissions and the cheapest thing to replace in the grid. So best bang for the buck is shut those plants down as quickly as we can. In any net zero pathway we run, they're offline by 2030, basically, all the coal plants in the US. Third, while we do that, we have to keep our existing natural gas and nuclear power plants running because they provide firm generation today.</p><p>And we don't have enough of that multi-day diurnal firm generation ready at scale right now. And so you want to keep existing nuclear as a foundation to make more rapid progress on and you need to keep the gas power capacity even as we use less and less gas burned in the generators and in some places in the country where we're really rapidly retiring coal, we may even need to add more gas capacity. But we should do so recognizing the role that those gas plants are going to play in the longer term as this sort of backup kind of resource.</p><p>And then the final thing, of course, is we have to build a lot bigger grid, right? The fourth thing, we can't tap renewables. We can't meet growing demand for electricity from EVs and heat pumps and hydrogen production without a bigger grid. And so we have to do that at the same time. And all those things together, those four things we've seen in study after study can get us an 80% to 90% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from the power sector even as we expand electricity supply and keep costs pretty much comparable to what they are today.</p><p>Even lower after you account for subsidies from the Inflation Reduction Act.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And of course, all this innovation going on in all these areas is going to produce all kinds of things we can't anticipate.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>And that lets us go the rest of the way. So the next decade is doing those four things and cutting emissions 80% to 90% and then simultaneously because yes, we can walk and chew gum. We're smart big people with lots of big boys and girls with the ability to do two things at once. We are going to be deploying and innovating and scaling the rest of the toolkit that we need. The synthetic inertia, the firm low carbon generation, the multi-use fuels, the demand sync technologies, the long duration low-cost energy storage, all of that will be commercially ready — not every technology out there, but something in each of those categories will be commercially viable in the early 2030s.</p><p>And then we put the pedal to the metal, deploying those things to go the rest of the way to close the distance to 100% or 99% carbon-free grid. That's how we get the job done.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Beautiful. A substantial social and political challenge, just —</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>For sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>to put it mildly. But technologically, the road ahead is more or less clear.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Yes, and it didn't say like, "we have all the technologies we need." I've been hearing that for 25 years. We have all the technologies we need to make rapid progress, and that should be all we need to start making rapid progress. And if we walk and chew gum at the same time, if we're clear-eyed about the challenges ahead of us, we don't see them as impenetrable barriers, but rather as innovation challenges to overcome. And we invest the resources and scale the technologies to do so proactively, which is what we are doing now as a private and public sector, then we're going to get there, we're going to solve these problems.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Beautiful, beautiful, Jesse. All right, variability: check done. Marking that off my list. Moving on to the next thing. I assume once this podcast circulates, I will no longer be running into people on the Internet who are informing me that the sun goes down at night.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>I look forward to that day on Twitter.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, thanks so much, Jesse.</p><p><strong>Jesse Jenkins</strong></p><p>Thanks. Take care.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-the-sun-isnt-always-shining</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:137504119</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 04 Nov 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/137504119/012866897bc8652a4bae70a743b40dfd.mp3" length="113589803" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5678</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/137504119/028c56b7ab2ac897b23623a0b42a3b12.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with district energy? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>District energy refers to a system in which a shared central plant distributes steam, hot water, and/or chilled water to multiple buildings via underground pipes. In this episode, Rob Thornton of the International District Energy Association shares about district energy’s newfound popularity and the role it could play in the clean energy transition.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/zbnko2aemxga7ic5p298s/volts23.10.25-rob.thornton.pdf?rlkey=at8didxnxqzp6fh26wvlz4bqv&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/what-s-the-deal-with-district-energy"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>District energy is one of the oldest concepts in all of energy, dating back at least to the ancient Romans. It simply refers to connecting multiple buildings to a common source of heating and cooling — a furnace, heat pump, geothermal well, or what have you — and distributing the heat via water or steam flowing through underground pipes. There are hundreds of district energy systems in operation, in every country in the world. (Virtually all of the buildings in Iceland, which I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-iceland#details">visited recently</a>, are heated by district energy systems running on geothermal.)</p><p>However, fossil fuel heat has been so cheap for so long that district energy has never quite become the default — it’s just been too easy to stick a natural gas furnace in every building. There hasn’t been much pressure to share heat.</p><p>But with the climate crisis and the clean energy transition, that’s changing. These days, lots of people are looking for cleaner sources of heat and more efficient ways to share it, so district energy is becoming sexy again. Among other things, it’s a great way for cities to meet their carbon goals without overburdening their electrical grids.</p><p>With all that in mind, I contacted Rob Thornton, the head of the International District Energy Association, to chat about the clever new sources district energy systems are drawing on (everything from sewage to deepwater lakes), the infrastructure they can integrate with, and the other services they can provide.</p><p>All right, then. With no further ado, Rob Thornton of the International District Energy Association. Welcome to Volts. Thanks so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me, David. Pleasure to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I am super into district heat, so I was delighted when you all reached out to me. I've been meaning to do something on it, but I think it's, at least in the US, not particularly familiar or well understood to most people. It's relatively rare in the US, which we will discuss later. So, let's start with a definition. What is district heating?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>So, we call it district energy because it's both heating and cooling in cities, campuses, communities. Essentially, it's a central plant that's providing steam, hot water, and/or chilled water to an underground thermal piping network to provide heating and cooling to buildings in a city central business district, campus, airport, hospital, healthcare, et cetera. So, it really is the aggregation of multiple users of heat or cool provided by a central plant. So, each individual building doesn't need to dedicate space or equipment, right, to boilers, chillers, et cetera. So, yeah, that's the simple definition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Could not be more simple. It's using one source, a single source of heating and cooling for multiple buildings, which you think seems like an obvious thing to do. What, in terms of existing district energy systems in the world, what is that central source? Typically, empirically, what's the most common current central source?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>I'd say at the moment, still natural gas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just a big boiler?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Well, often large boilers, sometimes gas turbines, recovering the heat, making additional electricity. So, combined heat and power. But that's shifting with the energy transition appetite for lower carbon solutions. There's a lot of integration, optimization happening. Industrial heat pumps, renewable heating and cooling, a variety of sources. That's the advantage of district energy. You change the central plant, and actually the benefits flow to multiple, sometimes hundreds, thousands of customers by updating the central plant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it safe to say these days that all things being equal, natural gas is probably the cheapest, that's why it's the most common?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Well, it's cheapest, it's cleaner than some other solutions. It's dispatchable, available, widely available. And it wasn't always that way. District energy started really by the Romans, but then Thomas Edison I would really characterize as the inventor back 140 plus years ago, and he discovered he couldn't really just sell electricity. He had to actually sell heat, too. Building owners saying, "Oh, I'll buy your power, but what am I going to do with the dynamo in my basement that provides the heating?" And so Edison realized, in order to make a profit at this enterprise, I have to sell both the heat and the power.</p><p>So, while it's not commonplace, in fact, district energy is prevalent. 900 systems in North America, thousands all over the world. Every major city has district energy from Paris to New York City, obviously, Boston, San Francisco, Denver to Moscow. And even recently, though, the shift in the United Arab Emirates, all across the Middle East, massive investment in district cooling. As you would expect, right. Air conditioning is the driver there, so the industry is growing quite substantially.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What does it look like, just as a side thing here? Because I think a lot of people run up on this. Their intuitions break a little bit when they think about this. If you have a central source of heat, how do you use that to cool buildings?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, heat in the form of steam can move equipment, right? So, steam, you use the pressure to drive a compressor. And in New York City, there's hundreds of buildings that use steam — turbine drive chillers, so they're still making cold water, but they're using steam instead of a motor.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Right. Instead of electricity to drive the compressor, they're using steam. You can also use heat with an absorption machine. And that basically you use heat to kind of change the chemicals, and you will absorb the heat from water. So, I don't want to get all nerdy and too scientific for you, but it isn't so much heat as much as sort of the optimization of process in a central plant to both make heat and cool and or power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. And for the record, we love scientific and nerdy here. Don't feel like you need to restrain yourself at all.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>All right, noted.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the cool things about these systems, and you alluded to this, is that as they evolve, we're discovering that there's all kinds of things that you can use as that source beyond natural gas, boilers and turbines. Really, you just need a big source of heat or cool to tap into. And it turns out this is something this podcast returns to over and over again is the sort of as the energy transition proceeds, we're starting to think more about heat. We're starting to think about it more than we used to because it just was very, very cheap.</p><p>Fossil fuel heat was just very, very cheap. And we didn't value it, think about it much, or optimize it much, or worry about it that much. But now we're trying to phase out fossil fuels. So, we're thinking a lot more about where is heat, how can we use it, reuse it, where can we find it? So, talk about some of the other clever ways that district energy systems are — where they're finding that heat? Like, for instance, sewage.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Yeah, so one of our members, CenTrio, they own systems in multiple communities across North America. They're recovering heat out of the wastewater treatment, as you mentioned, the sewer system. So, Vancouver has a very similar system. I forget the year of the Olympics, but basically, the district heating system that was built to support the Olympics in Vancouver, British Columbia, was constructed to provide low carbon, reliable heat from the sewer main to the Olympic community, like the housing campus, which has become Falls Creek. And it's really been a whole economic development success. So, yeah, you're right. We were talking earlier offline about the oil embargoes, right, the first and second oil crisis that really hit Scandinavia.</p><p>And they were highly dependent on imported oil. And basically, the valve closed and the price quadrupled overnight. And some of these countries, Norway, Finland, Denmark, they said, "Well, if you're going to make electricity here, you got to recover the heat." And so they required cities to do heat planning and to develop municipal heat plans. And so they recognized the value of heat, not so much for heat itself, but as a byproduct of making electricity — let's not throw it away, let's use it. And so now, today, Copenhagen, for instance, 98% of the buildings in Copenhagen are on district heat.</p><p>They don't have their own boiler. And it is both like an environmental as well as an economic strategy. So, I'll come back on that, but I'm not sure if I answered your question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What does Copenhagen use as their source? It's just all the different kinds of things you can use as a source that I'm interested in.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>So, primarily waste heat recovered from electricity generation and waste to energy plants. In Copenhagen, there's this new asset called Copenhill, I guess, and it's basically a waste incineration plant. They recover all the trash and they use it for heat instead of pushing it to landfill. And now, this asset actually also has a public ski hill on it, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, yes. I'm familiar with this.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>It's brilliant. And so I think they've really understood the scarcity and the value of using the full kind of hydrocarbon value of energy instead of throwing 60% of it away, like we have historically done with power plants in the US. They're remote, they're dumping heat into the river, the bay. In Europe, that heat is heating Paris and Copenhagen and Oslo and Stockholm. So, it's an infrastructure opportunity and challenge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This raises another question, which is electricity. You can transmit very long distances with relatively low losses. Heat, not so. Heat is much more difficult to transport over long distances. How close does the source need to be to the users to make this work? How far out could a power plant be that you're recovering heat from and still get the heat, say, to your village? Is there an outer limit?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Well, you can move hot water more than 10 miles. In Beijing, they're doing that now. They've moved a lot of the power plants outside of the inner ring, 8 miles — they're moving the heat. Now, that requires very large piping networks underground, but it is technically conceivable. We have typically had district energy in cities, central business districts, because that was where both power and heat were generated at the time. Then in the 40s, 50s power plants got larger, they went from 200 MW to 2000 MW, they moved outside the cities. Probably the range for steam, because steam requires — it's a gas and it has to maintain under pressure.</p><p>It's probably a couple of miles where after that, it begins to condense. Hot water you can push and pump tens of miles, but there is always, like an economic real estate question. Yeah, but there is an aggregation — we see district energy, there are 900 systems plus in North America and mostly clustered around vertically dense or urban requirements or college and university campuses where — they were formed at the time that the power plant was being built, like University of Colorado Boulder, the power plant was the initial building for the whole campus, and it grew from there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One other source I wanted to touch on before we leave, the question of sources is, I'm very fascinated by this one that uses deep lake water, which is super cold, presumably. How does that work, the physics? What are they doing there?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, think of cold like gravity. There's no such thing as cold. It's like the absence of heat.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>So, just like you put ice cubes in a glass, they absorb the heat around them. They don't bring cold, they take heat.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>So, what happens in Toronto or at Cornell University, these very deep lakes, the water — as you know, heat rises, right, so the surface waters are hot, but the bottom of the lake is generally always cold. In the case of Lake Ontario, 34 degrees F virtually year round. Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>So, what they do is they pull the water off the bottom of the lake and the pipeline goes out like a straw, and they pull it in. And that is actually the drinking water source. There's three straws that go out into Lake Ontario. That's the drinking water for the city, for the municipality. But before they use it at 34 degrees, they put that water through heat exchangers. So, the primary water is on one side of a heat exchanger. The other heat exchangers are connected to a network of underground pipes, supply and return cold water. And they basically — I need a graph to do this.</p><p>So, you bring cold into a building. The cold flow is in a coil, like a radiator in your car. And the hot air in the building is breathed over that coil, and the water warms up, and the other side of the coil is colder. Right? It's like the radiator in your car. So, what we're basically doing is taking the heat out of the buildings, putting into a return network, and then that's a closed loop on the district cooling side, on the city side, what they do is they pump around like 40 degree water F, and the buildings heat it up to 54, 55 degrees, sometimes warmer.</p><p>And that's a continuous circulation of cold water. And then on the lake side, that warm water, that's warming up the water before it goes into the drinking water supply of Toronto. This would be more effective if I were showing you the diagram.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's very visual.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>I'm probably confusing people more than clarifying.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No. It's so clever how heat is fungible in some sense, right? You can just sort of trade it from one bit of water to another and move it around that way.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>And water is the most brilliant because it has a specific heat of one. So, every BTU you put in, you can get out. Water really is a remarkable — but you have to keep the water clean. You have to keep zebra mussels, et cetera, et cetera. It's not just simple standing water, but that's a chemistry story for another day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, if I'm looking at a neighborhood and I'm contemplating whether it is suitable for district heat, are there characteristics? Is it just about density? Is that the beginning and the end of the story? Or what is it that makes an area or a neighborhood or a campus suitable for this?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>There is an economy of scale that — you want to minimize your capital investment and optimize the number of customers that are using it. Right? So, I think that's self-evident. There are some rules of thumb, but what we're finding now, particularly in cities that are working towards reducing carbon emissions, etc., and they're really striving. They're seeing that there are these heat sources or cool sources that are really nearby that have been under-recognized, undervalued, underappreciated. So, there is a chicken and egg, right? Cornell — getting back to lake water — Cornell 22 years ago: It took them ten years of engineering, policy, education to permit the Lake Cayuga, the deep lake water cooling.</p><p>But what they did was they traded an electricity bill going out to buy electricity to make chill water at their campus for a bond payment. So, they made an investment because they actually had, at the time, five or six million sqft of buildings that could be connected to a district cooling network. There was a district cooling system there, but that today, I think is like 20 million sqft, right? The campus has grown and just recently they connected this massive science building where they have the Synchrotron, where it's like the flux capacitor, right? It's really an energy dense — so your original question was what's the scale, what are the rules of thumb?</p><p>You can draw a radius. Part of the question is, well, what's the source of the heat or cool? How ubiquitous is it? How frequent is it? Is it 8760 hours a year? Is it intermittent? Does it vary? And you have to value that. And then you look at who the potential customers are in a radius and what type of customers are they? Is it residential? Is it commercial office? Is it an event space like a baseball park or something that has 80 games a year? So, you have to kind of understand what the market is.</p><p>So, there's a lot of, I think, iteration to it, but generally if you have about a million square feet within a reasonable proximity and either a low cost or low carbon sort of source, it could be a fungible opportunity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there a smallest scale, like four buildings? I mean, logically there's no reason four buildings couldn't share a common heat source, but I assume it just becomes uneconomic at some point if you're getting down that small.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Well, if you're Amazon, and you own four buildings in downtown Seattle, and you have a data center in one of them —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I wrote about this once. So clever. I love that.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>There it is, right? That data center is making so much heat year-round, 8760, that it's sufficient to supply the heating for the other three buildings collectively. So, if you have a common ownership, which is what we see on college and university campuses, whether public or private, there's economies of scale. The aggregation really does provide immediate economic value. But over the term what we're also seeing in cities, we just did an interview with our Chicago district cooling system, the old post office. This is a massive building right in the Loop downtown. Instead of having their rooftop dedicated to condensers and cooling towers, they have a green roof, an urban garden.</p><p>The building is 90% occupied because the tenants want to be there. I mean, it's also proximate to the rail. But what happens with district tenders is it creates many other value drivers in the real estate other than just the expense of heating or cooling.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? Well, you're just getting rid of all the heating and cooling infrastructure, and then you have all that space.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Simplifying, right? And then it's like subscribing to a fleet where 50 weeks of the year you'd rather have a Prius, but man, those two weeks, you want an SUV. A district energy plant has a segment of capacity that can be responsive to the energy requirements of the community over that full annual cycle and meet their needs and not be overinvested.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Logically, this is the exact same benefit you get interconnecting grids, right? It's just the same. It's the less individual infrastructure you have — you don't have to build your own peak, right. Because you have to build to your own peak load —</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>and so everybody's being inefficient by building more than they need. And if you share, you share, and then you don't have that excess capacity.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Exactly. And not only that, you don't really need an SUV. If you have a pickup truck, maybe you need to move furniture, etc., etc. It's great to have it in your fleet, but really you don't want to make it your day to day vehicle. So, you have to tease out those advantages and they vary. But that's one of the principal value drivers we're seeing, particularly as cities are dealing with carbon and densification.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It makes total sense to me the case if you are building something new, a new neighborhood or a new campus, the case for putting district energy beneath it seems self-evident, right? Impeccably self-evident to me. Obvious. Like, obviously you would want to have a shared heat source rather than everyone building their own peak load infrastructure in your tiny little area. But where my mind bumps up is so much is already built. So, how big of a challenge is it to go to a place that's already built up, say, using they've all got nat gas boilers and you want to shift it over to district heating.</p><p>How much bigger of a deal is retrofitting versus new build in this? And relatedly, for things that are already built, are there forms of infrastructure in place that could be shanghaied for use in the district energy system? For instance, like, say you're a city or you're a neighborhood and you've electrified everything, so you don't need natural gas distribution to your individual boilers anymore. You've got all that piping, all that natural gas piping underground. Can you use that for district energy? So, just in general, retrofitting, how big of a deal is it?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>In most cities, there's a new build opportunity. And as you mentioned, the pivot point is when people are facing like a replacement or a renewal or a reinvestment or a shift in the use of the space, right. The chillers are 25, 30 years old and need renewal or the boilers. What we're seeing a lot of times heat is driven by carbon accounting now. So, cities are imposing measurement, etc. So, there's that. I want to disabuse you of the notion that you can use the existing natural gas pipe for heating and cooling because they're very different pressures and temperatures.</p><p>And to move heat, because the temperature differential for heat is probably — there's a 50 or 70 degree shift, you need a larger volume. So, it's probably a larger diameter pipe or two than would be an existing natural gas line. Now, however, when we built a district cooling system in downtown Cleveland, we found a right of way that used to be occupied by the trolley. So, it isn't so much the pipe itself as the space now available to replace with another asset. Our friends in Chicago, they just did a really brilliant webinar with us yesterday. They showed how they put district cooling pipes to serve the old post office.</p><p>So, it's not for the faint of heart, really. I'm not recommending you go out and get a backhoe and start putting treads, but it can be done. In fact, our cities, I would say most of the growth has been existing buildings connecting and converting over.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So, to do that, to add a building to an existing district heat, you just have to lay pipe to that building, basically.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Assuming that the main trunks are nearby, a block or two, or even right on the doorstep on the sidewalk, then it's a service lateral, and the size of the pipe is sized to provide the cooling or heating capacity required for either that existing building or what could potentially be built there. Right. It's like the footprint. There's actually more to it than that. But back to your original premise. So, in a city like Dubai or Abu Dhabi, right, which has basically built Manhattan in a decade, it's virtually all new build. And all of that new build is on a district cooling network because they didn't want to burden the electric grid with having to make air conditioning with electric compressors in all these buildings.</p><p>70% of the electricity produced in that region is used for air conditioning and growing. Obviously, air conditioning is mission critical, life safety, very important. But district cooling reduces the peak demand by 50% or more and the annual electricity requirement by 30, 40, 50 or more percent. And so there's like a double win if you're responsible for building the electric grid to have a district cooling network there. It really reduces the infrastructure, the vault, the transformers, all of the wires. The infrastructure is very challenging underground for electricity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It occurs to me that as the clean energy transition proceeds, most of it is electrification. So, there's going to be a lot more burden on the grid, especially for these cities that are trying to decarbonize. So, this is the sort of rare piece of decarbonization that can ease pressure on the grid rather than adding more to it.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Right. Well, I don't know if you saw the IEA report that came out last week. They're saying that it's going to be like 50 million miles of transmission line, and that's like a $5 trillion requirement. So, I wish it were as simple as electrify everything. I wish it were that simple. Some cities are looking at doubling, tripling, quadrupling in order to electrify the buildings that exist in those cities. That's how much infrastructure would need to be put underground. The space is not that readily available. I don't know if you've ever seen underground Manhattan. It's a nightmare. Five stories down.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, this is like at least easing some of that pressure.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Exactly. So, one of our members in Boston, they operate the system in Boston and Cambridge. They're electrifying the steam supply so that the buildings that are currently serviced, 250 life science hospitals on district energy right now. They're putting an industrial heat pump and electric boilers not to continuously make the heat with power, but certainly when the power is greener and cleaner to optimize that. Our campuses right now, David, one of the signals that they've often used, whether like a CHP on a Princeton or a Harvard, right now they can make or buy power from the grid.</p><p>And they do that right now. But they're getting not only a price signal, but now they're getting a carbon signal. A 15-minute interval: What is the forecast carbon intensity. And here's another myth. It's like, well, what's the average mileage of my car? Well, 30 miles a gallon. You don't always get 30 miles a gallon. I drive my car, I'm in the city, I'm alone. So, it's miles per gallon per person drive. So, what campuses are now doing is they're looking to see the marginal, it's not the average carbon intensity, it's the marginal intensity of the grid. Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>So, in the summer months or even the winter months, the carbon intensity of the grid can be two or three times what it is on an average basis. And averages are not always acceptable when you're making economic and environmental decisions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We've discussed this extensively in regard to big industrials looking for 24/7 clean power. It's like, it's not the average. It's what is the intensity this hour?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also, you raise the possibility here that if you've got a bunch of buildings on a district energy system using warm water that is circulating out from a central source, that central source doesn't have to be running all the time. It can heat water and then go off. Heat water and then go off. So, you can heat the water when the electricity is green and might otherwise be curtailed. So, effectively, you have a giant energy storage system. So, say a little bit more about that. Are people starting to use these things like batteries?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Yes. In fact, our friends in Denmark have installed an electric boiler. I probably saw it physically 15 years ago. And as you know, there are times where all the wind power in that grid exceeds the demand, right. So, they either have to fluff it or lose it. And so what they decided is, well, let's get paid to take that electricity and we'll convert it into heat and use it the next day. As opposed to trying to store electricity in batteries, which we all love batteries, and we couldn't live without them, but at an urban scale and at that level of magnitude, by converting it into its use, you can then harvest it when needed or as the demand.</p><p>One of our members, Princeton University, is in the process of putting geo-exchange: They've drilled 850 boreholes already on campus, right. And Ted Bohr, whom you should get as a guest because he's brilliant, he's the energy manager, a lot of brilliant people. But he likens it to having seven Rockefeller centers underground underneath their campus. So, in the summertime, they're going to put the heat into these seven Rockefeller centers and then in the wintertime, they're going to take them out. So, that's not the same diurnal calendar as you're talking about, right? Like converting electricity to heat —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's the much discussed, rarely witnessed seasonal energy storage.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Right. And they're not done, and they've really just started commissioning it and they actually have more work to do. But they actually have some data from that plant that's showing really promising performance, etc.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is a huge issue up in the north, it is northeast or anybody with a high peak winter load, right, where cooling is sort of the peak load throughout the year, has this seasonal storage problem. But if you can store heat in this endless acres of water beneath every one of your dense urban centers, that's a lot of energy to store way out of scale with what you could probably get out of batteries, at least currently.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Right. I started my career in 1987 with the Hartford Steam Company, and that was the first downtown district cooling system commercially built in the — you know, 1962 began operating. We used the Connecticut River as our condenser, right. So, all the heat was rejected in the river and we invested in a plate and frame heat exchanger because once the river temperature reached 45 degrees, it usually happened around Thanksgiving. It's a little later now, but around Thanksgiving then we would basically just turn on a pump and use that to provide instead of 25,000 tons at peak in the summer, like 5000 ton peak, there's a winter load, but constant for the data centers, insurance.</p><p>And that had like a seven-month simple payback, that investment. This was 25 years ago, David. But I guess my point is that these sources now, the Seine River in Paris is the source of cooling for the Louvre and a lot of downtown Paris, right. So, when we start to think about energy, it's important that we think about not just electricity, but thermal energy. And when you start to really kind of understand heating and cooling is 50% or more of the energy appetite of a city, then you think, "wow, there's more protein here."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And the really cool thing, the really new thing to me, which is opening up all sorts of fascinating frontiers, which is keeping this podcast busy and keeping energy people busy, is the growing overlap, the interplay between the electricity system and thermal system. Right. They were largely separate up till now, but they're starting to interact in super fascinating ways. And like I said, a lot of this just people didn't have occasion to worry about it much up until now. But all of a sudden all our cheap fossil fuel option is going away and all of a sudden people are thinking about economizing between electricity and heat and there's just clever ways to do it all over the place.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Right. I don't know if you recall, Ernie Moniz from MIT was the Energy Secretary.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>I was chatting with him one time and he goes, "oh, district energy, back to the future." So, it is kind of like this "oh", when we kind of go back to where we were, which is an integration of heat and power or cool and power and heat. You know, these opportunities, they kind of reappear. And the other thing, in addition to carbon and environmental objectives, David, one of the things we're really seeing is resilience. As you well know the frequency and severity of extreme weather events, storms, hurricanes, et cetera, is rocking cities and campuses. It's a public safety as well as an economic and environmental.</p><p>And one of the things about district energy is we actually have an outstanding track record for reliability. Some of our systems have been operating for 50, 60 years and literally have recorded like a couple of hours of unscheduled outage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Isn't there one in Boise that's been around for — that was like the early 1900s, right?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Yeah. It might be Klamath Falls, Oregon. Or Boise, Idaho. Right? Yeah, I think it's a geothermal system. Our system in Minneapolis began operating in like 1972. The asset was owned by the gas company, then was sold to an investor and then it was IDs. And these things have changed hands and there's really been a lot of growth. But when the investment banks look at these assets, that's one of the tests. How reliable is it? Is there a renewal cost here? What's the capital? And that system over 35 years, literally had 35 years, like 2 hours of unscheduled outage.</p><p>It wasn't their problem. It was the gas supply was interrupted by a backhoe. But the beauty of district energy is we don't rely on a single source. Most plants have multiple feeds of electric and sometimes multiple sources on, not always, but multiple sources. Right. So, when the price of gas gets too high, they can ship to something else. So, there's a lot of permutations, a lot of different categories of distribution. It's like ice cream. It's like way many flavors, high fat content, low fat content —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But they're all underground, basically sheltered from the weather, which is the big thing.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Yeah, most of the asset is and I meant to talk about like storm Uri. Right. You recall that was a couple of winters ago, hit Texas —systems that stayed online. Texas Medical Center, six hospitals bigger than the city of Houston. UT Austin 20 million sqft stayed online. UT Austin and they have district Energy is CHP, right. Gas-fire generation and power and heat. And they maintained operations. In fact, the Texas Medical Center not only was supplying all the needs for the campus, that largest healthcare campus in the world, they were actually able to capture and truck water to some of the municipalities whose water systems were frozen and not operating.</p><p>So, they were an area of refuge beyond really the capability of their own — it's not their own lifeboat. Right. They were really a highly valued asset for the larger community.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Obviously, the main service provided by these things is heating and cooling. But as we discussed, there's also energy storage, which helps with the grid. That's another service. There is resilience against weather. That's kind of another service. When you're pitching a district energy system to someone who's contemplating building one, are there other sort of services and benefits aside from the heating and cooling that you cite?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Good question. Some of our systems create really a wonderful circular economy opportunity. In the case of St. Paul, district energy St. Paul. They began operating 1988 and then added cooling. But they built a biomass CHP plant. It's literally recovering waste wood from the Twin Cities region that would otherwise go to landfill. It gets processed into fuel and displaces 250,000 tons of coal. So, you get the double benefit. The carbon emissions are cut in half. Instead of going to landfill and essentially becoming an environmental problem, it's now an economic opportunity for people to make a living converting wastewood into a low carbon green fuel.</p><p>So, in University of Missouri Columbia, corn stover. Right? A byproduct of making corn is like, you know, it's the stalks that's actually a fuel — supply gets mixed in. University of Iowa, there was a cereal, the General Mills cereal plant. So, turns out when you crack an oat hole like a pistachio, there's the part you eat, and then there's the whole shell. Well, that shell can actually be used as a fuel input in a power plant. And so, interesting, that happened at University of Iowa probably 25 years ago, and it enabled that cereal factory, instead of paying to dispense of that waste product, they actually got paid to provide it.</p><p>Right. So, there's really a lot of, I think, interesting, innovative economic, environmental opportunities that come from having a district energy system in your community. So, there's a lot of success stories out there. Time prevents me from covering them all.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it relatively straightforward? I mean, I guess this will obviously depend on the system, but if you have source X and you want to switch it out for source Y, you already have all the infrastructure going to the houses and everything. Is it relatively straightforward to switch sources on these things once they're built? Or how customized is the network to the source, if that makes sense?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>So, all across Scandinavia, houses are connected. Entire communities have district energy. They're often municipally owned. Right. So, the people that are using the energy are the shareholders. Right. So, in Sweden, in Denmark, often it's a nonprofit like a municipal enterprise. So, it's a very different market, drivers, et cetera, than our investor model here. But no, at Princeton University, I hate to pump the tires on them, but they really are tremendous. And Google them if you would, but they did a test because they use natural gas in their jet engine. So, it's basically like the jet engine that would be on the wing of a fighter plane, F-35, right.</p><p>That's now stationary, and they use natural gas. They did a test burn 20 years ago with using biodiesel, and it turns out that the engine, the jet, liked biodiesel better. It burned cleaner, cooler, and it was happy. But of course, the price of biodiesel is eight times or more. Right. So, there are opportunities to kind of just switch. It's not as simple as switching the fuel like valving one and opening the other. Although that can and does happen. Right. I don't mean to overly simplify it, but one of the big advantages of district energy is with the scale of serving 500 to 200 buildings, you can then integrate what are lower carbon or renewable technologies.</p><p>And you don't have to go all in. Like it doesn't have to be 100%. Right. You can feather it in. And if you look at a city like Gothenburg in Sweden, 30 years ago, 80% of the fuel input was fossil. Today it's like 8%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And they've just been nudging it that way over time.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Exactly. Now the markets are entirely different. There's carbon price driver, there's taxes. There's a whole different set of circumstances that really need disclosure when you look at the difference between Denmark, Sweden, and the US. But on a technology basis, it's not a technology — it takes smart people, don't get me wrong. And we're gifted in district energy, our industry, we have some really talented, dedicated people running our systems in cities and on campuses. Really just remarkable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But people can and do switch out sources.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Exactly. It isn't necessarily I mean, you have to solve for the economics, the reliability, efficiency. It's really kind of a four-level chessboard now. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Relatedly, and you touched on this briefly, and this is something I wanted to get at. In the US, we're talking about the increasing interplay between heat systems and electricity systems, which from a physics point of view is awesome. And from a carbon point of view, I think is awesome. But from an institutional point of view, it is problematic since we have gas utilities and then we have electric utilities, and they're not necessarily eager to play nicely with one another. So, in a US city, who owns this? Is it the gas utility? Because that's sort of kind of related to their business.</p><p>Can an electric utility own this? Is it co-owned? How does it work with the US utility system, which screws everything up some way or another?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>The answer is yes and yes. So, the first eleven downtown district cooling systems built in cities in the US were built by natural gas utilities, LDCs, local distribution companies, because they had all this summertime gas capacity available. It was really before the grid was primarily natural gas driven. So, the gas utility, they really were the initial, I would say, principal investors in the district cooling industry in North America. Since 1990 we've built like 60 systems in cities across North America.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I said they're rare in North America, but apparently that's just my abject ignorance. Apparently they're all over the place.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Depending on where you went to college, you probably lived in a dorm that was on district heat. I would make that bet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is a classic invisible infrastructure here.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>No, it really is out of sight, out of mind. We're not wind turbines. We're not blue panels, not self-evident, quietly, silently, effectively doing our work. The electric utility industry, I think they're kind of coming back around to district energy. Now, currently a lot of the downtown systems are actually owned by pension funds or investor groups and operated by very talented third-party companies: Vicinity energy, Cordia energy, CenTrio. And then in Canada, Enwave, Corex. So, there are people that own and operate systems in multiple cities. Right. So, there's been a kind of a scaling up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The model there, is that an energy as a service kind of thing, where they own the infrastructure and they just sell the heat?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Well, it's more like we will contract with you to provide the heating and cooling that you require. It's almost like leasing space in an office building. You're purchasing a share of the capacity, and then you're going to pay for the metered consumption. So, there's really two components to the sort of the rate structure. Generally there's a capacity and then a consumption of metered, and that's generally billed monthly. Oftentimes it's on a multi-year contract, like a lease, 10 to 20 years. Many of the district cooling systems, when they were initially built, were like — the gas utilities built them, and then they were sometimes sold off.</p><p>Right. Because there was huge value in selling them off, and then when private enterprise kind of came in to own them, the contracts, the service agreements, were, in effect, the collateral to fund the capital. Right. Time probably prevents me from kind of getting into all the perturbations. But to your question, many of the systems today are privately owned and operated. They own the pipes, they own the plant. They own the pipes or they have the right of way. Most systems are integrated where the production plant and the networks are owned by the same people. Right. It's rare where the pipes are owned by a third party or the municipality, and then you're paying like right of way, et cetera.</p><p>So, in 60s, 70s, the gas utilities built like this first group of district cooling systems. And then in the 90s, right when Montreal Protocol and CFC phase out was happening, the electric utility is like, "wow, we should get in the district cooling business." So, they were investors either as a principal or as a partner in district cooling systems. Like the system in Chicago was a joint venture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Did any of them get rate-based or like our ratepayers on the — ?</p><p>Generally not; typically they had their own balance sheet, P&L. Oftentimes it was equity downstream. But when I grew the business in Hartford, I was a non-regulated subsidiary. The allowed rate of return for the gas utility was in the neighborhood of 10%. It was like eight to eleven. Right. If I needed the capital to expand the network, I had to provide the shareholders a 15% to 25% return on equity.</p><p>Good God.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>And at the time we doubled the size of the system in Hartford, we were producing almost 25% of the earnings per share with less than 10% of the revenue.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wild.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>So, there's a lot to uncover here, unpack here. Let me just say that district energy is a highly valuable, highly valued asset and becoming more so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you see as these things get more popular and just in general, as heat in general becomes more important, prized and important, do you see heat sources, like for instance, data centers making sighting decisions based on proximity to these things, based on their ability to sell heat to these things? Like, is this starting to be a force in where big industrial things locate?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>I think it's a factor and is sort of rising in the valuation. It's gone from maybe a rounding error to maybe top ten tier like row. We have seen a demonstrable growth in data centers, certainly in northern Europe. Right. And what's happened with the data center operators is they're realizing "I need to reject heat all the time." These servers are making heat all the time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Well, typically the way is to site out in the middle of nowhere where renewable, where electricity is super cheap. So, you can just run your coolers for super cheap. But this seems like this seems better. To use the heat. Right?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Yeah. It turns out there's actually some margin in it. Right. Instead of paying to dump it right. Or exhaust it right. Now you can actually have a value stream. Now, I wouldn't say that it's a prime driver. It may be the case where a data center would have been like 30 miles away is now closer to a load center.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, right.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>And then the heat can be harvested on an economic basis: Data center heat, industrial heat. You mentioned earlier, sewage heat. Turns out, man, there's a lot of heat pumping underground. And you think about you take a shower in the morning, then you run your dishwasher and then your washing machine, et cetera. You're putting a lot of BTUs into the waste stream. This is low value, but with a heat pump, you can up the value of that heat three, four, five, six to one. And you know what? Municipalities, especially water systems, they're always looking for a new revenue stream. It really is a symbiotic opportunity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is kind of what I got into. I've done a couple of pods on industrial heat, storage heat, batteries. I don't know quite what the distinction is. It's technological, but not technological in the way we're accustomed to in the 21st century. When we think technology, we just think chips and obscure stuff going on that is opaque to us, that we can't understand. It's like a black box magic. This is like an earlier form of technology where it's very tangible, it's very physical, it's very engineering based. There's nothing conceptually here that's hard to understand. Right.</p><p>It's just moving the pieces around to make them work better. It's delightful in a way I have not quite been able to capture. It's like an older form of engineering.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>I mean, we'd all like to think it's simple and straightforward, and generally, it is. But let's say I'm in an elevator and someone says, "So, what do you do?" And I take the 20 floors to tell them. Most people go, "Oh, man, that makes sense. Don't dump the heat in the ocean. Yeah, use it for cities. Right?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>"Why aren't we doing that?" Right. So, that's generally the reaction I get. It's like, "Wow, that's common sense. Don't waste it."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The more you start thinking about it, you're like, "Well, where is the heat?" And you start looking around, you're like, "Oh, it's everywhere. It's all over the place. How can I get it from there to there? How can I get it from there to there?" It's very clever. Okay, we're running out of time, but I want to get briefly to the policy question. So, first is, is there stuff in the IRA for district energy, or are there existing subsidies or supports in U.S. Policy for district energy?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>There are some. It's not a straight line. There isn't a call out for district energy or CHP. There are a number of initiatives where our members can participate and compete and win and win funding. Often it's driven at the Congressional District level right now. Here's a project, there's a public entity, it's an infrastructure investment. So, it requires sort of a packaging and explanation, but that is happening. I would also say that district energy has survived and thrived without relying on incentive. Right. Or tax policy or credits. Now, obviously IRA, the fungible, the transferable tax credit, that's going to create opportunity where like a public institution, non tax requiring entity previously would have had to partner with a third party investor with a tax appetite.</p><p>Right. And that wasn't always a kindred spirit, wasn't always so revising. That will create even more opportunity for funding, opportunities for infrastructure investments, which these tend to be. So, I'm not really giving a clear answer other than, yes, there are some, but it's not a clearly delineated —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Indirect, you might say,</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Kind of set aside, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well then, final question. Are there obvious policy reforms that would help district energy and at what level are those? Is this mostly going to be a municipal thing or is this where states can help or is there some national policy that could help? If you were pulling a policy lever, where would you look for the lever?</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think it's all three layers. At a federal level, if there were a carbon tax, not that I'm a proponent of tax, but if there were carbon tax that really did, I think, appropriately evaluate emissions that would really then unleash investment in efficiency, et cetera, I mean, that would unleash "oh my God, we can get there faster with district energy at scale doing this 20 MW a time or more." At a state level, we are seeing some states, Washington, New York and others that like New York has the climate law and at a local level right, municipal New York City local law 97, which is requiring large building owners to itemize their carbon emissions, right, et cetera, right.</p><p>Now, you may know recently they provided a two year reprieve on the compliance with local law 97 because the carrot and stick, the stick was coming out next year to impose fines on buildings that weren't in compliance. And some buildings, not for lack of trying, really were in a rat in a maze they couldn't solve to get to low carbon. Right. So, again, I'm not advocating a carbon tax, but if the right to emit had — so many of our members, right, when they're doing an evaluation on a utility plan or a master plan or a renewal, they have a shadow price for carbon.</p><p>But it's not necessarily a revenue stream that's going to amortize the debt. But it is something to consider because I don't know if it's likely. I've been at this for 45 years. We've had starts and stops. The Clean Power Plan, I thought, was a move in the right direction. Right. It kind of said "states do this, but we all got to get on this." That came and went. Right. So, the uncertainty of policy immediacy, I think, can be both a crutch and an advantage. And I think our industry, we've managed to make sense based on efficiency, resilience, and economies of scale, not to say that we wouldn't benefit from more informed policy like is in place with our colleagues in the EU.</p><p>Right. Certainly in Scandinavia. But I'm not here to advocate that a $140 carbon price is the answer today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'll advocate for that on your behalf. If someone here needs to advocate for that, I'll take that bullet. Some of it is about subsidies and policy help, but a lot of it and this is a theme I come back to again and again and again and again, which is just this is another area of clean energy that involves more planning and spending upfront for huge savings over time. You run into that situation over and over and over again. Especially in the US, planning is not our forte, not really something we're great at doing. So, a lot of it is just about like, let's sit down together and think through this thing in advance and come up with a plan.</p><p>I don't know if it's policy that helps that happen. It's just more of a culture of planning, it seems, almost we need.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Well, there's the challenge of weighted average cost of capital, return on private capital. Right. Those are real. Where we are seeing, I think, an acceleration of investment is on our college campuses because, as you might recognize, they have an investment horizon. Cornell has been in the same location 150 years, Princeton, 300 years. It'll be 300 years soon. So, they have an assurance of not only provision, but supply and use, et cetera. Right. So, you can have a six-year return on investment and anticipate 20 years of benefit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>And that's actually the case with the Cornell deep lake water cooling. Turns out when they stroked the $56 million putt in 1990, it's actually worked out better than they predicted economically, better environmentally. And today they're able to add load with a very low marginal cost. And so it isn't as simple as "if you build it, they will come." But we are seeing where the risk appetite — I think private enterprise in the US has the double burden of shareholder intensity next quarter, next month, next day, right. Versus what's beneficial for employment growth, labor, continuity,</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The time horizon of capital. I come back to this again and again and again. We got so much fast, impatient capital, and so much of what we want to do requires slow, patient capital.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Yes. And we're seeing that district energy renewals are really having significant economic value. Then it also comes back to, well, how many customers? What is the predictable use of that asset over this life? Right. And so you have to do some sensitivities around that. Well, what can we bank on? What can we predict? What can we expect? But I think our industry is actually enjoying a renewed recognition, really. I'd say an appreciation. I don't want to call it a renaissance because we've always been there and very good at it, but I do feel like we're becoming the cool kids table in the high school cafeteria.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>At last.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Leave it there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Back to the future. All right, Rob. Well, thank you so much. I've been fascinated by district energy for many years. It's great to really dig through it with you. Thanks for coming on.</p><p><strong>Rob Thornton</strong></p><p>Thanks so much for the opportunity and really keep up the good work. Really applaud all the work you're doing to help people understand and get their heads around all these opportunities and challenges. Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-district-energy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:138059033</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 27 Oct 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/138059033/c2224daba970be460bb32ec04f442e7c.mp3" length="72013836" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3599</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/138059033/b810f998462fbfb8ce54f152933b6b95.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with Iceland? ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Iceland aims to be the world’s first carbon-neutral nation; thanks in large part to hydropower and geothermal, it’s well on track to meet that goal by 2040. In this episode, Halla Hrund Logadóttir of the Iceland Energy Authority reflects on the country’s energy history and looks to its ambitious future.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/2jbpb073js72z5de19ot2/volts23.10.18-halla.hrund.logadottir.pdf?rlkey=2q65hyan9760v4lhqpsxlqbdm&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/what-s-the-deal-with-iceland"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Iceland is an island just south of the Arctic Circle, perched directly atop a rift where two tectonic plates are drifting apart, exposing the magma below. It is a small country (physically about the size of Kentucky, with a population a little larger than Cleveland, Ohio’s), but what it lacks in size it makes up for in drama. It is a land of glaciers and volcanos, ice and fire, wind and rain and snow — and deep heat that makes them bearable. </p><p>I was there for four days last week, meeting with sustainability-related businesses, hearing about everything from <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vaxa.life/">micro-algae</a> to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.lakipower.com/">grid monitoring</a> to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.carbonrecycling.is/">carbon recycling</a> to <a target="_blank" href="https://hakaimagazine.com/news/icelands-quest-to-use-100-percent-of-its-fish-waste/">using 100 percent of the fish</a>. There’s an incredible amount of innovation going on there, and to my unending delight, a great deal of that innovation is in some way or another in a symbiotic relationship with geothermal, the heat and power that Icelanders pull from underground. </p><p>Iceland’s electricity is entirely carbon-free — roughly 70 percent hydropower and 30 percent geothermal — and so is its heating, 90 percent of which is geothermal. Overall, 85 percent of its energy consumption is carbon-free, and it is aiming for 100 percent by 2040.</p><p>To hear more about all this, I visited the Reykjavik office of Halla Hrund Logadóttir, who runs Iceland’s National Energy Authority, overseeing the country’s electricity system. She used to teach at the Iceland School of Energy at Reykjavik University and now teaches at the Harvard Kennedy School, where she co-founded the Arctic Initiative and founded the Arctic Innovation Lab. </p><p>There’s no one with a better sense of the overall state of Iceland’s energy situation. We talked about the country’s history with geothermal, its current energy mix and policies, and its race to become the world’s first fully carbon-neutral nation. </p><p>I'm here with Halla, who — I'm going to call you by your first name. Will you say your name for us?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>So I'm Halla Hrund Logadóttir. One of these Icelandic simple names.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, extremely. That is extremely Icelandic. And you're head of the National Energy Authority? National Energy Authority here in Iceland. And I've been visiting Iceland here for the last three or four days, visiting lots of startups and sustainable businesses of various kinds, and have found it absolutely fascinating, much more than I expected. Such a unique — so many things about Iceland in general, but Iceland's energy situation that are just absolutely unique and fascinating. So maybe the place to start is you could just tell our American audience, which is, you know, Americans are not known for their deep knowledge of other countries —</p><p>So maybe we could just start by a little history of Iceland and geothermal, which is, I think, the sort of origin story of Iceland's current situation. Maybe just tell us what happened back in the 60s and 70s and why and sort of what the result is.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And I think just to kind of start where we are at today and then looking back: Today, nine out of ten houses in the country are heated with geothermal, and overall, 85% of our primary energy use comes from renewables. So the hydropower is the other main source of electricity production, basically. But the heating mainly comes from geothermal and it is a unique situation, but it is a story that goes way back. It started with bathing that is kind of from the Vikings coming here, staying warm in this cold country. But then in the early 1900s, there was a farmer that found a way to connect his farm to a neighboring hot spring here in Mosfellssveit, which is close to Reykjavík, where we're sitting now, and a few others did the same.</p><p>And so it was a story of entrepreneurship and innovation. Then municipalities noticed this technology and it became a part of a policy, to make a long story short. But then the first drilling for geothermal was done in the early 1900s and 1928 here in Reykjavík. And I think such an important part of this story is the fact that those were small projects, but they were used to heat key buildings like the hospital you can still see downtown and a primary school that we have downtown. And this was really important because it made the technology, the fact that it worked, very visible to people and made the buy-in for the technology — you always need buy-in from voters and so forth.</p><p>The benefits were very obvious from these two key examples and from these small successes the big transition, the big story, begins, which also I think is interesting now when we think about the overall energy transition, it usually starts with small pilots that then become added up to a major success. Then we had the First World War that was a driver for the government to look closer at local energy resources. But then, as you mentioned, the big change was in the 60s and the 70s during the oil crisis in the world and we're an island, it was extremely expensive to import oil and gas, which were the main types of energy used here in Iceland at that time.</p><p>So the government started building incentives for this transition and the major part of that incentive is the Iceland Energy Fund. Do you know of that fund? So just to share a bit about it, it's a fund that was established to help mitigate risk of drilling for geothermal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, I did hear about that, yeah, I've had a couple of people talk to me about it. So they can loan a village money and if the village finds geothermal, they pay it back. But if they don't, the loan is just canceled, right?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Almost as good as that. Yes, about 50% is canceled, but definitely the main features of it. And this is what allowed small municipalities in Iceland to really focus on exploring geothermal in their regions and about 20 district heating systems were built across the island during this time from 61 to 1983 or so. And the beauty is that these are the same systems, the same infrastructure that we're still using today. So it proves as well how stable the geothermal resource is and how important it is when we're looking at the energy transition is to make the right bets when it comes to building infrastructure because it has such a long lifetime.</p><p>So these are the main factors of our history. And I think it's important to highlight this is long before climate change became a major issue, the research was not where it is today, but it was about economics, it was about energy security and then clean air. I mean, you can see pictures from Reykjavík very close, from where we're sitting now, where you have this thick smoke looming over the city and just imagining that a few decades later it would be one of the cleanest cities in the world.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, stable and stable prices too, right? All of a sudden prices are not going to spike or fly around. So that's an undersold aspect of renewables, is they're the same price now; they're going to be the same price in a week, in a year, and two years. We should say, I'm not sure everyone knows exactly why there's so much geothermal power in Iceland, so maybe just say real quick about the continental plates, which I've been learning a lot about this week.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yes, we are situated on the boundaries of two tectonic plates that are drifting apart 2 centimeters per year. So you can say that you are either in Europe or North America when you're in Iceland, depending on location. But because of that, we have a lot of geothermal activity, we have a lot of volcanoes in Iceland, and because of the high temperature, we can both use our hot water that comes from the ground for district heating. So we're basically almost using the water directly, if you will, or we can use it for electricity production. And I think it's important to note that the planet has huge potential for geothermal and particularly when you look at using the water directly for district heating.</p><p>And very interesting things are happening in that space across the planet. When you look at areas that have high temperatures that you can produce electricity as well, those places are fewer, but there's definitely a lot of potential there as well. But as soon as you start to look at the source as simply a heat source, then it's just fascinating to look at the potential and to witness — I mean, we at the National Energy Authority, we partner with a lot of countries in Europe. We're working now, particularly with countries in Eastern Europe that are trying to get more energy independent after the war in Ukraine.</p><p>And there's resources there maybe with between 40, 60, even 70-degree temperature. These are not volcanically active areas, but they have potential to heat millions of homes and they just haven't been looking at that potential because it's been so much cheaper to import gas from Russia.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I have a question related to that. So the government decided, I mean, it's a pretty cool story, the government decided we're going to move our country's heating over to geothermal and then just did it in like a decade. You don't hear a lot of stories about large-scale, ambitious, successful government initiatives these days. But the population of Iceland was relatively small. Today, 380,000-ish, but I assume it was even smaller back then. So a lot of your current housing stock and buildings have been built with district heating under them. So it's easy to do district heating if you're building a new development.</p><p>But a lot of other countries, Eastern European countries, US, there's already so much building stock existing. So is it more difficult to retrofit existing buildings with this than — is that a major barrier?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>It's definitely an issue. It is much more expensive if you need to transition the whole system. But if you are using, you know, in many countries in Eastern Europe, for an example, you have like gas, you just have to change the heat source. The infrastructure are pipes. So in these cases, it can be particularly economical to just change the heat source from gas to geothermal. So those are kind of the low hanging fruits where you have existing infrastructure. Then if you look to countries for an example like China, that has been expanding quite dramatically, they have geothermal in 70 cities now.</p><p>There you're looking at China using a lot of it for new buildings as well. Right, and we're talking about then heat down to maybe 50 degrees Celsius. And there the design of the building is also using floor heat and so forth to make the biggest use of the lower temperatures. But I will add to this that of course geothermal is many things and in terms of lower temperatures and in terms of where you don't have like a centralized district heating system, you can still do a lot with if you combine different solutions with heat pumps and so forth, that also take advantage of geothermal heating in a different way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, this is one of my favorite projects in the US. I did a podcast about this last year, the sort of geogrid, they're doing a test up in Massachusetts where they're doing little boreholes every 50ft or so and then have heat exchangers with each house. Very excited about that. So that's heating, which is now almost all of Iceland's building heating. So when did geothermal electricity take off? It's now 30% of your electricity and the other 70% is hydro, which I assume is just rivers.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah, glacial rivers mainly. Right, and that's another story, really. So the electricity production comes much later with the bigger plants. I know little, you visited one of them. And with geothermal you have to make sure that you manage the resource well. And as you have witnessed, one of the elements is electricity production, that we use it where it's high temperature today. But we also use different streams of the hot water for greenhouses, for drying fish, for heating sidewalks during our snowy season, which is long, I can tell you. And for all kind of our cosmetics for food supplements.</p><p>So there's a big industry like an innovation happening around the geothermal resource in general. And I would say it's very integrated in people's culture. Also, through bathing, there's not a weekend that you don't go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We went to Sky Lagoon on our first night here.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's the fancy stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Pretty amazing. Yeah. But there are little pools all over the place.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>I challenge you to visit one of them. It's like a standard thing to do for a family in Reykjavík is to go to visit one of the pools. So it ties into also just the general healthy way of living, which I think has contributed to so many different aspects of the Icelandic society.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I meant to say, the thing that surprised me most in the last four days is I knew there's lots of geothermal here, I knew there's geothermal electricity here. But as you say, there's this entire ecosystem of businesses that are symbiotic with geothermal. They use the water for different things. The cold water, the hot water, the steam, they say eat the whole animal. It's like every bit of that heat and water and steam and every bit of that geothermal is used somehow, somewhere. It's amazing.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah. It's the circular economy kind of thinking. And I have to say, because you come from the States and you have this incredible Silicon Valley that is the hub of technology in the world. We have two resource parks, one here in Reykjanes area and one here not so far from Reykjavík. These are resource parks that exactly work with the ideology that you described. So many companies in renewable energy working together. Carbfix, it has this major potential in the world of simply turning CO2 into stone, where you have basalt rock in the world and then Climeworks —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I talked to them yesterday.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Right. So you have these kind of ecosystems, and I sometimes say that these are tiny, tiny little Silicon Valleys that have so much potential to grow.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So much cleverness and so much innovation. It's really surprising, all the thinking that goes on around that. So this raises a question that I get a lot from people whenever I talk about geothermal, which is, how renewable is it? Is it possible to exhaust a geothermal field? Or is it if you manage it well, is it effectively renewable forever? Is there any worry about running out?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, definitely, you have to manage the resource well. You have to make sure that you're not pumping more out from the resource than flows into it, if you will. So there's definitely a sustainability management. But as I mentioned, we've been using our resources for decades and we are looking at developing more sites in Iceland now because there's so many tourists, there's more people, so the demand has grown a lot. But it's definitely a resource that you can count on for a long time and is renewable in the sense that if you manage it well, it maintains itself over time.</p><p>But I will also say that because one of the hidden elements of geothermal in the renewable energy category is the fact that it is baseload. You have baseload heating from geothermal, while if you look at solar and wind, these are dependent on the weather. And then as well, it has a very low footprint in terms of visibility. And we see with the energy transition across the world that visibility is usually when it relates to wind power, for example, a big factor. So geothermal has these secret elements not to add to that, it's also the price factor.</p><p>We have not had any major shifts in energy prices for heating our homes during the European energy crisis. Yes, so there's a lot of benefits that come together and of course, the fact that it is green, it's our luck that we've transitioned. So now when we're looking at closing the energy transition gap, we have a renewable energy component for the heating and heating and cooling is about 50% or up to 50% of the world's primary energy use. So once we've tackled the heating and cooling crisis in the world, we have tackled such a big part as well of the climate crisis.</p><p>And that's why geothermal is an important solution to keep as one of the puzzles. It will never be the puzzle, but it can definitely play a much bigger role than it's playing now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I've said as much, many, many times. I mean, you're so lucky here that you have the two forms of renewable energy that are not variables. You have not had to deal with that kind of the same kind of worries about flexibility and balancing and everything else that you have with wind and solar. Although this does raise a question that I've had several times. One of the notable features of the climate here is extremely windy everywhere, all the time and so it's a little puzzling that there's no wind turbines anywhere. Was that a conscious decision? And is that going to stay that way?</p><p>Is there any talk about bringing wind or offshore wind? Because it's extremely windy out there.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yes. So right now, as I mentioned, we have like 85% of our primary energy use covered by renewables. So we're looking at the final 15% to close the gap. And if we think about what is included in these final 15% —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Cars. Cars. Cars. Cars.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>It's cars. So it's transportation on land, basically, and then it's our shipping fleet. We're a big fishing nation and then it's aviation and we are quite far along when it comes to transitioning with our transportation on land. Basically, if you look at what the public is doing it's around 65% of newly registered cars are electric in Iceland. If you count the car rentals, which are pretty big in Iceland, the proportion is lower. But we're number two in the world after Norway when it comes to being the fastest one and transitioning our car fleet.</p><p>When it comes to our shipping vessels a lot of things are happening, but it's happening slower because you need to retrofit the ships. You need to make sure that they can be the end user of e-fuels, for example. And this is where we look at, it's not about — you can't plug the ships in like you can with your electric cars. You need e-fuels. And this is where energy demand comes in. And one of the areas thus where wind power is being discussed is how to use that resource to help us with the energy transition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To make e-fuels.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>To make e-fuels. And I will say the energy mix in Iceland is really interesting because it's only 4% to 5% that are homes, the end consumers. Then you have 15% that are like normal businesses and then 80% —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I was going to discuss this, this was also a very great surprise to me. 80% of electricity consumption is industry. Big industry, which is not necessarily what you'd expect to find on a little island in the middle of nowhere. And not just big industry, but a relatively small handful of really big plants. Aluminum. Right. Aluminum —</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yes. So this became a strategy of the government earlier on. Iceland became independent in 1944 and we were looking at ways — this also ties into the geothermal story — we were looking at ways to basically become independent, diversify our economy and so forth. So attracting the aluminum industry and others to locate in Iceland was a part of the strategy to gain revenues and build up our economy. But it's definitely an unusual energy mix and keeping in mind as well that we are an island system. We do not have an interconnector to anywhere. So our way of exporting electricity, if you will, is through aluminum.</p><p>We export it through production.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Use the clean energy to make aluminum and then export the aluminum.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yes, but there's been discussions in the society about how much more should be developed. There's continuous dialogues about what for and so forth. But the government is now working on and we are contributing to a holistic policy because you have also elements of us wanting to protect nature as well as developing energy resources. Both resources, nature and energy, renewable energy are increasing in value, if you will. So it's important to find balance. Offshore is not as far in the policymaking world as onshore. We have unusually good conditions in both areas but offshore is more difficult than in some other locations in Iceland because you have deep waters, so you need floating in many cases.</p><p>And the technology is not completely cost competitive, but as I said, it is an ongoing dialogue.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Has the public sort of weighed in on wind turbines yet? They love geothermal. Do they have feelings about wind?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>I think it's a much more difficult subject. In general, there's always been debate about any big projects that have an impact on Iceland's nature because we have one of the most diverse sets of nature in the world, ranging from lava to black sanded beaches, to glaciers to greenfields. It's really —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's dramatic. Everywhere you go, everywhere you look, there's something dramatic.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah. So people are conscious about making sure that there is this value that definitely plays a role in our economy as well and is important for the future, is kept at the same time that we continue to grow our potential by utilizing our green resources. So this is where long term policy making comes into play. And we certainly do have policy measures that aim to tackle exactly that. And right now, if you want to build a wind farm, it goes through Parliament, through a process called the Master Plan. So it's quite a heavy process, but whether you look left or right in the political sphere, people are in full agreement about finishing the energy transition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, transitioning to net zero is not politically controversial? More or less everyone's on board?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yes, and I mean, it's a unique opportunity. We may be small, but it would be a proof, and this is the exciting part, it would be a proof that you can actually run a whole economy completely on renewables. And if we can't do that with 85% of our primary energy already coming from renewables, then the question might be, who can then?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, one thing before we move on from surface transportation — this is a big issue in the US that we come back to again and again — is electrification of vehicles the only policy or is there any talk about trying to bring in public transportation, biking and walking infrastructure, just reducing the amount of driving because it is pretty driving dependent here, similar to most American cities.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah, definitely. I mean, there's been much more focus on biking in the recent decade or so and I would say with electric bikes that can kind of support you during the wind you mentioned. There's been a big shift for people actually using that as a part of commute and there are kind of bigger projects that relate to public transportation that needs to be improved in Iceland for sure, must be a part of the solution. So all of these factors are playing a role. And speaking of the energy fund that I mentioned earlier, the role of the fund now has been to help Iceland with the final 15% and a part of that has been to support building infrastructure for electric cars across the island because Icelanders — you know they like to drive, they need to be able to take their car and go somewhere. I think it's a similar mindset as in the US. So making sure that there is infrastructure everywhere in the island so it doesn't become a barrier for people to actually take that step and invest in an electric vehicle.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In terms of the huge role industry plays, aluminum in specific so there's like three giant aluminum smelters and then like two other, I think big industrial facilities. So that 80% of electricity demand is basically five, I think big factories or big — Do you worry, like if one of those closed all of a sudden you'd have a relatively giant surplus of electricity? Are you worried all how big a role they play in the electricity system or in the energy system that there's some vulnerability there? How confident are you that these industries are happy and going to stay?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>So we have the ones you mentioned and then you have data centers and more kind of a bit more diversified set of buyers. The situation as it is today is that we have much more demand that we can produce. So if there would be such a risk that one of these players would close of course it would temporarily have an impact. But with the massive demand for renewables in the world, with the energy need that we have for our transition there would definitely be opportunities in that space.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so there's one, e-fuels, there's one current methanol plant making green methanol. Are there more of those on the way? Is that a big growth area?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah, one of the things that we've been doing through the energy fund is investing in the shipping industry to co-invest with companies in retrofitting ships because you need to have the user —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The demand, right?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah. And that has been kind of the challenge. You establish the production and if you don't have the demand there's a difficulty in matching these two factors. So right now there are some plants that have also gotten support from the energy fund that are on the horizon. But it is an interesting market in a big transition globally. There's so many questions around how will the market look like? What will be the key fuels that will be used for different sectors? Where will Iceland be most competitive in what type of production? There are many types of e-fuels so likely we would not be producing all of them.</p><p>What needs to be the size of these projects to be cost competitive? So a lot of these questions are also reflected in the development of this industry globally and it's important to Iceland to stay tuned to be in the forefront. But also it means that there are some more risks involved.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, all these chicken and egg questions, although it does seem like there's going to be I think I've least read of several shipping companies that have sort of stated goals. So it does seem like there's definitely going to be some demand.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>And we have very ambitious goals when it comes to completing our energy transition in the near future when it comes to transportation on land and when it comes to our shipping fleet. And these are also the sectors that are really important to focus on when it comes to EU legislations because one can say that these are emissions that we're also critically responsible for. Where it comes to aviation —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to ask what is that answer to aviation? Do you guys have one?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Well, I can tell you, if we start by looking at domestic flights. One of the most exciting co investments of the energy fund last year was the fact that we purchased, together with multiple parties, the first e-plane, which is basically an electric plane that you can plug it in as your phone. Or your hairdryer. And you can take off in weather like we have today. A sunny, still weather where there's almost no wind. But you can fly for half an hour. But if you look at how the technology is developing here, you can see that there's likely going to be around up to ten passenger planes, maybe a bit more, that can fly short distances.</p><p>And those would be perfect for domestic flight in Iceland because the distances are relatively short and because if it's electric planes, the infrastructure would be much less difficult. The transition, the cost of electricity would be lower. So it could actually mean a lot of interesting things for development for different towns in Iceland. So it's quite —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Make them more accessible.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Right, so it's a very exciting area to follow. But when it comes to aviation between countries, we're talking about the European Union has its goals, we're talking about different paths there and it's much more likely not one country will kind of lead the way. But these are international standards, so we will follow these standards and be at the forefront. But it's, you know, in aviation you need to follow the rules, obviously.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I suppose you could be a big producer of aviation fuels too, sustainable aviation fules.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Right, that's also a possibility. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. One question I got when I was discussing this on social media about Iceland is, as you say, you don't have a grid intertie with anyone else. So you're somewhat unique. Well, similar to Hawaii, actually, in being a full, self contained grid with no external connection. In Hawaii, that's an endless challenge because there's so much variable solar wind involved. Is it a challenge here because hydro and geothermal are both pretty stable and predictable. So does that make managing the grid pretty easy or do you have these balancing challenges as well?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>You're right that it's much more stable. And definitely if we look at integration of wind and solar here in the future, it's possible to have solar even in Iceland, at least for some part of the year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It seems pretty gray.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, but with technology, I mean, it can be again, a tiny little solution, but not the biggest factor. But it can play a role, especially in colder areas that do not have access to geothermal. But there is, of course, a variability still in the system. Sometimes you have more current in the glacier rivers because the melting is different depending on how the weather has been. Has it rained a lot? Has it not? So all of these natural factors matter and you can compare it to fisheries. Sometimes you can catch more cod, sometimes it needs to be a bit less.</p><p>It's like natural variability as well. But those are a small percentage of our overall system. And the way that energy companies manage these variabilities is by selling types of agreements that can be, you can cut how much you supply when you have a smaller amount of water in the hydro reservoirs and so forth. But for the biggest part of it, it's a really stable system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So probably there's not a ton of storage. Are batteries, grid batteries not really a thing that you need?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>I mean, our reservoirs are really our storage system, but we are following closely and participating in innovations when it comes to battery technology, because these types of technologies can definitely play a role for e-fuel production. They can play a role for isolated communities. We have a lot of them as well in Iceland that do not maybe have the same access to the grid. So there's definitely many use cases for such technology as well. And to be honest, if you look at the world, big innovation breakthroughs in battery technology would mean so many things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, it'd be very helpful for many, many economies.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there more hydro? How close is hydro to being tapped out?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>So right now there are a few things happening in the hydro space. There are new power plants in the making.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are they controversial at all? Politically controversial at all?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>So we have this policy framework called the Master Plan. So after certain steps, projects go through the parliament and are either approved or not. So you have some hydropower projects that have been approved and are in development, and one of them is actually quite close to the final stages of permitting and so forth. So there's potential in new projects. Some potential, but there is also potential in updating or upgrading other ones. And that is a very important factor as well, because in these cases, you've gone through all the legislative processes, and it's a much better use of the resource if you just add new equipment and get more power.</p><p>So there's potential there, and then there's been development as well in smaller hydropower projects. And that is how Iceland's story and hydro actually started. So you had similar to geothermal, it was a journey led by farmers, and often you had a few farmers clustered together having a small hydro project in one of the kind of neighboring rivers or small streams. So you had over 200 such systems in Iceland before the overall grid was built for the country. So we also have some potential in these smaller projects as well. We have potential when it comes to geothermal. We have potential, of course, when it comes to wind, but I would say that there is a clear focus on how we can use these projects to complete the energy transition.</p><p>And there is a big demand from the public to make sure that we're using the resource well, that we are developing it in sites that do not impact nature too much and so forth.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Speaking of getting more out of existing facilities, is there innovation in trying to get more out of existing geothermal fields? Like trying to go deeper?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is a very exciting topic, actually. So you both have potential in improving geothermal by injecting water, making sure that the water you pump out, you're repumping water into the system. So that's something that can extend the lifetime and the potential of the area as well. So that's one area. But the deep drilling — we've had projects here in the past that are still ongoing in terms of drilling much deeper and getting like super hot conditions. And honestly, these are types of projects that could really bring a revolution for the geothermal industry. And what I find fascinating is too if you look at what is happening in the geothermal industry, is that you're seeing more and more of oil companies looking at this industry.</p><p>Originally, the technology comes partially from that industry. A lot of the technology, and I should mention because we're talking about earlier, how the transition went from A to B and so forth. I mean, it was a major undertaking at the time because at the time geothermal was not a plug and play technology, it was like a big innovation project. And we're speaking about Icelanders being few, we're speaking about not having a very educated workforce. So it's actually an incredible journey that this actually happened. But in terms of going back to the field today, the oil and gas sector is looking at geothermal as a part of their transition.</p><p>And there's a lot of win-win through collaboration there because technology, funding, the research part of it all can play a role. And you see that if you look at who are the biggest investors in the geothermal expansion in China, for instance, it's Sinopec. If you think about other players, Chevron has been investing in geothermal in Europe, I think Shell had a similar venture.</p><p>Drilling is their thing, so —</p><p>And the geothermal industry has suffered from — because it's an upfront cost technology. So maybe there's a potential to make sure that geothermal takes off as a part of our green transition by utilizing some of these funds and expertise and at the same time help cities and towns around the world to become less dependent on other types of fossil fuels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and so politics, it's the one thing I haven't really looked into at all since I've been here. I've just been talking to businesses and so I don't have a good sense of Iceland politics, but it seems like there's a weird — something I haven't encountered anywhere else, which is a kind of consensus and unanimity and long-term thinking and planning. Everyone moving together, everyone having the same goal. Are there political controversies around energy? Or is politics just are the fights elsewhere? Are there controversial things in the energy transition?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>So I mentioned that completing the energy transition, different parties are unified around that goal. And people are extremely proud of the geothermal history. And actually, geothermal, I mean, it's been a part of our foreign policy. We've educated thousands of people across the planet on geothermal. I think we participated in almost all geothermal power plants that have been built elsewhere than in Iceland. So it's a big part of our identity and our expertise, our contribution to energy transition elsewhere as well. But the controversies, like in other countries, there's controversies when it comes to development of projects in terms of nature conservation versus development, even though it's renewable energy projects.</p><p>There's controversies around utilization, what type of end users should we be attracting, and so forth. So these are examples of areas that have been debated, and there's an ongoing debate in many of these fields. But I think the good news is that having such debates is an important and healthy part of the process. As long as we're all aiming to the same goal and the same destination.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What is the statutory goal? What are your targets, officially speaking?</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Basically, so our energy policy aims that we become completely oil-free, if you will, by 2050, and with a coalition agreement that was actually moved a decade earlier. So that's really soon, and we're going to see how we manage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the goal is to close that 15% gap by 2040.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah, but I mean —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's pretty close.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's very close. I think the helpfulness of these ambitious goals is that it definitely starts to move the society. And there's so many factors that need to come together for the final 15% to close. You need the businesses to be willing, you need the fishing companies to be willing to retrofit or invest in new shipping. You need the tour industry on board, you need all of these different players. And then you need to make sure that the infrastructure is developed, and you need to make sure that energy producers and sellers are aiming towards the same goal.</p><p>And the beauty of having the timelines quite tangible and close in time is then the goals become real.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's very real. That's very real.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I've encountered quite a lot of pride among the people I've talked to. One thing I keep hearing is Iceland leads the world in clean energy per capita, right? Because there's so few people. So there's relatively so much clean energy and relatively so much innovation relative to the population really fighting above your weight class or whatever the analogy is.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, thank you so much for taking all this time. It's been super interesting coming here and talking to people, and it's been really impressive. So thanks for wrapping it up for us.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Thank you so much. And we'll try to continue the path, hopefully collaborate with as many as possible. And I think it's punching above your weight. No?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Punching above your weight. Thank you. It's funny that you know the Americanism better than I do.</p><p><strong>Halla Hrund Logadóttir</strong></p><p>Fantastic to have you. Thank you so much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts Podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-iceland</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:137912049</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 27 Oct 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/137912049/9a1fee6d3c6c74d8c0995a197bca32f7.mp3" length="58531589" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2925</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/137912049/d35b9f1e6309da3b7932830d05b391ff.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Reflecting on 20 years in political journalism]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, veteran journalist Brian Beutler waxes nostalgic about the past 20 years of political journalism and muses about its future.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/h3r2mubd8m49l76i6vfow/volts23.10.11-brian.beutler.pdf?rlkey=w24yy0dz73km72g6z6uj0ki8k&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/reflecting-on-20-years-in-political-journalism"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>I’ve known political journalist Brian Beutler for a long time. We met back in the late 2000s in DC, in the heady days leading up to Obama’s victory, and have kept in touch fitfully ever since.</p><p>Brian, one of the smartest and most insightful political analysts writing today, has published in a wide variety of outlets, but this month he followed me into the wilderness — left his job at Crooked Media to launch his own newsletter, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.offmessage.net/">Off Message</a>. He’s already written some <a target="_blank" href="https://www.offmessage.net/p/the-democrats-lost-september">great stuff</a> and made some <a target="_blank" href="https://www.offmessage.net/p/video-how-profit-motive-distorts">cool videos</a> — check them out. </p><p>I figured I would take the occasion to catch up with him, wax nostalgic about politics past, discuss partisan journalism, and muse about how opponents of authoritarianism might show a little more vigor. Please enjoy this long and somewhat indulgent ramble down memory lane.</p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I'm sitting here with my good buddy Brian Beutler, who is a political journalist living in Washington, DC. He has been a political journalist for a long time. We've known each other for a long time, been involved in this mess of political journalism for a long time. He has worked, Brian, where all of you worked everywhere. The American Prospect, did you do that one?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I didn't do that one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The New Republic.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yes, I was there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Did you do an American Progress stint?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>No, you're misremembering. I was actually with you at Grist. I think I was on a freelance contract for like six months or a year way back in 2006.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Smokes, I forgot about that.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I worked at a bunch of places when I was like, a pup. So I think Raw Story still exists. First reporting gig. But I really got my training as a reporter at TPM. I was there for several years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. That's the one I was trying to call to so spell it out for people. It's Josh Marshall's site.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yeah, it used to be Talking Points Memo that's I think still the URL, but it's just TPM.</p><p>One of the longest standing, I mean, still going strong.</p><p>I rely on it all the time. I'm friends with my old editor there. He's still basically, like, running the day to day there, I think, the world of TPM. And then a very brief stint at Salon, which I enjoyed, but then The New Republic came and was like "join us instead." And so I said yes. And I did that through a really tumultuous period from like 2014, I think, to 2017. And then I was editor in chief at Crooked Media for six years, and now I am independent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, this is the occasion for the pod is my friend Brian has left Crooked Media and is now launching on his own, launching a newsletter because all the cool kids now have newsletters, a newsletter called Off Message where he is going to continue political journalism. You should all go sign up. I've learned an enormous amount from Brian over the years. And so I thought, on the occasion of Brian's birth as an indie, self-employed journalist, welcome to the fold, that we would sit down and catch up and I guess you could say, does the world really need two white, bearded, middle-aged guys of roughly similar socioeconomic backgrounds and ideological outlooks, affirming one another's priors for an hour?</p><p>Maybe not, but this is my pod, and if I want to have an indulgent episode periodically, that is my right as an independent. We got no bosses anymore, Brian to tell us not to do so.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>My two favorite flavors are waxing nostalgic and vigorous agreement. And we're just going to —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We're going to get right into that.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Give your listeners all that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right. I feel like one of the signal characteristics of political journalism, and I expect this has probably always been true in all times and places is just that a lot of stuff happens, one thing after another happens, and it's a constant scramble. And so you can do it for a long time. And you really do not get many opportunities to sort of step back and think about kind of the arc of politics as you've experienced it over the course of a career. I guess what people used to do is report their whole lives and then become opinion columnists and write books.</p><p>But anyway, so one of the things I want to do is just think a little bit about kind of the arc of American politics that we've experienced and where that leaves you and kind of what you think about it and how you're thinking about politics has changed over experiencing all this. So you — when did you come to political consciousness as an adult, would you say?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>It was definitely during the George W. Bush presidency, the first term of the George W. Bush presidency. And it was actually, like, less Bush vigor, although in hindsight, once I became politically awake, it kind of reverse incepted me how important it was. We've been on a wild ride since then. That was a moment when the Gingrich revolution could have been snuffed out, maybe, and normalish politics resumed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>My estimation of the importance of that episode has, as you say, risen steadily, more or less ever since, ever since it happened. And now I see it as sort of like the turning point in US. Politics, the pivot point.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>So it was 9/11 and the Iraq war, and I went through a relatively quick transition as, like, an undergraduate from, like, "Holy crap, what's happening? Wait, we got to do something about this. Oh, George W. Bush is going to do something about it," to like, "wait, these seem like crazy ideas. What did Iraq have to do with that?" And by 2004, I was like, "this is nuts." And I voted for John Kerry that year. And I voted for Democrats ever since. And it was after that that I decided I want to go into journalism. But I knew I would end up being, like, a liberal journalist and that I'd have a really hard time just ignoring everything that had happened, you know, going on TV or writing in newspapers as if I wasn't aware that things had gotten so bad or gone so far off the rails.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But before this, did you have your callow, Libertarian high school, college period? Did you go through that?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Not really. I think I did vote for the Libertarian candidate in the 2000 election, but —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I voted for Nader. Confession time.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>But I was in California. I came from a really reactionary part of California. I think the expectation for most people who graduated high school with me was that they'd vote for Republicans their whole lives, and that seemed like stuffy and distasteful to me, but also the Democrats, the Clintons, whatever. And so just like, protest vote Harry Brown, Libertarian candidate, 2000. But it was never like I'm sure I did some of the reading. The Libertarians love to do the reading and then talk about the reading, but I know it's never like, "Wow, Frederick Hayek was onto everything."</p><p>So it really was just like a quick transition from total political naivety to: the conservative movement in the United States has a really disturbing vision for the country, and blocking them from power has to be like priority one and kind of everything else falls beneath that and is shaped by that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I entered the same way and this is something to do with our sort of micro generation. I mean, one of the things I sort of meant to mention is that I faffed about in grad school for a while, getting a philosophy degree after college. So by the time I sort of wound my way into journalism, I kind of slipstreamed into journalism right alongside your cohort, sort of you and Matt and Ezra and then the birth of the Netroots and all that stuff. One of the sort of interesting features of it is that I've always been about five to seven years older than most of the people I think of as my peers.</p><p>So, I'm like ahead of you guys in life stage. Like, I had kids while you guys were all still living in group houses and all this kind of stuff. So, I feel like I'm seeing your future. But anyway, you look younger than us though. Oh, well, thank you. That's because I kept the same hobby my whole life. But yeah, to me also getting involved in politics, the occasion was to look under the veneer of quote unquote, normal boring. This is what I indulged in in the 2000 election, back when I was really callow and really disconnected and not really paying attention, I sort of went for the whole, like, duopoly.</p><p>The parties are the same: "It's the system, man. It's the system that's broken. And who cares which face of the system you vote for, man." Voted for Nader based on all that horseshit. But pretty quickly watching 2000 and then watching 9/11 and watching Iraq, pretty quickly my whole posture was: under cloak of normal politics there's something rising on the right and it is ugly. And it is like there's an authoritarian, illiberal reactionary movement stirring beneath this facade of normality. And I need to be the town crier. I need to go out and bang on pots and pans and say, "look at this."</p><p>Like, look beneath the surface at what's happening. And so it's interesting for you and me both, preventing this rising reactionary movement from taking power has always been one and the same with our journalism and our engagement with political journalism.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I have a story about this, which is like, I think that if the Iraq war hadn't happened, or Bush v. Gore hadn't happened, or just things had been a little bit less extraordinary in the post 9/11 period, like, I was at Berkeley, I might have done the flip from 17-year-old pseudo-libertarian to what you were talking about a narrative progressive or socialist or something like that. Just because that was very much the milieu there still. But then 9/11 did happen, and then Iraq did happen and the imperative to try to knock Bush out of the White House was very high and the mistake of the 2000 election loomed really large.</p><p>It was 2003 probably, or 2004. There was a live debate at Berkeley between Christopher Hitchens and Mark Danner, who was a journalist. I haven't read anything by him in a long time, but he was at the New York Review of Books at the time and they were having an argument about the war, and that's what the debate was. And like, obviously Hitchens had his really signature flair and charisma and pithy everything, and Danner was this more studied professorial type and he was correct about the war, but that's not how debates work, right? And so Hitchens won.</p><p>But I was taken with the fact that's what they got to do with their lives. And I wanted to be able to do stuff like that. And I kind of wanted to bring Hitchens-esque persuasive abilities to the big moral issues of the day without being glib and wrong about them. And, like, everything since then, has just been kind of like the Iraq War. But it's some other extraordinary, reactionary, dangerous thing. It's Sarah Palin and the birthers or the effort to repeal Obamacare. It's just — it's just emergency after emergency after like, there's never a shortage of things to be passionate and right about in the hope of like —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, if you want to rail against the machine, there's been no — plenty of machines to scream against. We have no shortage. Another thing about the 2000 election that I wanted to say is it's very paradigmatic in a bunch of different ways. But the main lesson I've taken from it and this is a lesson that I feel like I've learned again and again and again has sunk in deeper and deeper ever since then, which is when a time comes of political chaos, right? Everything's up in the air. Nobody knows exactly what's happening. There's a moment of high potential energy, right?</p><p>And no one knows which direction it's going to become kinetic, right? There's this sort of doubt and uncertainty. High potential energy in the air. You get these moments in politics periodically, and watching how the two sides dealt with that was so instructive because on the Democratic side, as you well recall immediately, it was, "How is history going to judge us as we do this? Right? What's the right thing for America. What's the fair thing to do? Let's meet in the middle. Let's be patient." Al Gore, whatever you think about him genuinely in that moment, had noble motives in mind, had history in mind and the larger welfare of the country in mind.</p><p>And they were basically the entire party was performing as though the entire episode were being overseen and judged by some sort of referee who was applying basic rules of accuracy and fairness. And basically like they were trying to please the teacher, trying to please the referee. And then on the other side, when chaos comes up and you've seen this happen a million times since then, no one on the right had a moment of doubt or hesitation or scratching their chin and pondering the judgment of history or pondering what's fair in the big picture. No one. No one on a blog, in a magazine, in politics, no one had that moment.</p><p>They all like a school of fish immediately recognized this is a moment of uncertainty and chaos. Chaos is a ladder. Let's fight, fight, fight, fight, with any tools necessary. Don't give a s**t about consistency. Don't give a s**t about fairness.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Act and then react, and then act again. And then react again.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Always push our interests, no matter what we said before, no matter what anybody else says, no matter what may be fair, blah, blah, blah. Just act on our interest. Push, push, fight, and then secure the victory. And then once you have the victory, then you have all the time in the world to come up with pleasing stories about why you did what you did and how it was all fair after all, and why we just need to move on and why we don't need to dwell on the past, et cetera, et cetera. Once the thing's over, then you can smooth it all out.</p><p>But when there's chaos, immediately go on the attack. And we've seen this like, this is the essence of the two parties ever since, really. And you could say the same thing about 9/11. You could say the same thing about Iraq. Just like when Iraq came up, as you say, there were all these people on the left sort of, like, ripping their hair out, like, "what about this? But what about that?" Doing the Hamlet, like, "maybe this, but maybe that. What's the bigger picture? What's history going to say?" And on the right, it was just like, "Here's a moment of chaos. Let's fight to advance our interests on every front at every moment." And that's just, like, the deepest lesson I have written on my psyche about U.S. Politics ever since then.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I mean, I'm going to pull a version of David Brooks and say, I think there's a happy medium in between. I like that. Democrats will survey the nation. What are the pressing needs facing the country? And not like they'll address them all perfectly right then and there, but at least they'll just be like, "oh, okay, the roads and bridges are bad. Let's rebuild them. New parents don't have enough money. Let's try to give them some money." And Republicans don't really engage in that kind of assessment, and they don't even think that the government should be doing that stuff.</p><p>And it's really hard to bring that analytical bench to things. If A, you're an ideologue and you think you're not supposed to do it in the first place, but B, if you're just saying like I have to say and do in the moment what is necessary to gain power, you're just going to be inconsistent all over the map all the time. And that's why Republican policy is always a bad fit for the moment, it seems like. But the flip side of it is — then you think, well, let's just compare records and which presidents have been better for job creation, which President Joe Biden or Donald Trump actually passed an infrastructure bill versus talked about Infrastructure Week all the time?</p><p>And Democrats own that game and nobody gives a s**t because like you said, there's no referee.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly. If there's a referee to be like, "I've tallied up your column, and your column Dems are out ahead on improving people's lives." There's just no one to do that.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yes. And so that's why here we are in the year 2023, and Republicans are, like, crushing Democrats on who's better on the economy, and it makes no sense. And I bet you if you took a poll of the public and asked who's better on infrastructure, Republicans might win that one too. Or at least it would be like 50-50, but it should be 100 to zero, right? It's simple and it's not.</p><p>If evidence were involved in any way. But get back to the history a little bit because and tell me if this was your experience too. Sort of like 2004 was like the early first nadir for me because you and I both got sort of like activated against Bush during his first presidency for very obvious reasons. Reasons that in retrospect seem like he hasn't come out better with the passage of time. Like it all looks even worse than it was.</p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then 2004 came, and that was the first time I remember an experience that would also be repeated several times over the years, which is me thinking, "well, this is obvious." I don't even really know how to mount an argument here. I just want to say, "look," I just want to hold my arm out and say, "look at all this." Case closed, right? And yet America goes and reelects him. And I was just flummoxed by that. Absolutely spun off my axis. But then after that, we started this arc of 2004 forward where Bush sort of fails on his Social Security drive and Dems win big in the House in 2006.</p><p>And then there's the rise of Obama and that race and all the hope around Obama and the election of Obama, that whole period from sort of 2004 to call it like 2009, let's say, let's give Obama one year of that. That was a period that, as I think back on it, if you're a younger person than us, as there are many out there, if you came into politics later, or if you came into politics around like 2010, say, you've never experienced a period like that where it actually felt like, "Oh, my God. The forces of decency are rallying. We're going to move forward again.</p><p>There's hope, things are sane. There's a guy in charge who is speaking in complete sentences and is clearly intelligent and is clearly a good person, a good father, a good husband." That whole period feels like a weird dream in retrospect, but it's a dream that people younger than us have never had any taste of. Like, if you came in in 2010, it's been all s**t since then, wall to wall. At least for us. There is this weird, hazy memory of the idea that things could get better.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, I mean, to pick up where I left off in college in that Hitchens - Danner debate so it was like, "Okay, there should be really eloquent spokespeople, but not for the Iraq war, but against it." Right.</p><p>But that was a time when Democrats, they were not making a dent in that direction. Right. This was John Kerry reporting for duty. Right. Like, the young people won't get that allusion, but it was like a signal moment in Democratic politics prior to Obama. And it was the era when Democrats were, like, agonizing themselves over whether do we have a religion problem? Like, maybe we're not winning because we're not appealing to churchgoers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thinking that nominating a war hero would get you something from the other side. Right?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yeah. The referees would say, "look, George W. Bush kind of a draft dodger. John Kerry. War hero. Case closed."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You're not allowed to call this guy a coward because he's a war hero. I'm blowing the whistle on that one. Where was that referee? It never showed up.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>The swift voting actually left a lifelong impression on me because initially I was like, well, people are just going to be super offended that Republicans are tearing this guy down in this way, but A, they weren't, and B, I was also demoralized and put off and came to lose respect for Kerry and the Democrats for not standing up for themselves. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And just like, waiting on the referee, right? Waiting on the referee is what they're doing.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>And there is no dignity in that. And honestly, for all the things that you and I spend our time arguing with other people on the Internet about how to optimize politics or tweak policy in this or that way, to make polls move in whatever direction, is like, throw all that out and just act like you have some pride in yourself and will stand up for yourself when people smack you in the face. And a lot of your political problems are probably just going to go away.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like you would if you were just a person.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yes, be a person. I honestly wish I thought politics were a more elevated craft than this, but it's like, "how do you become popular in high school?" is a better question to ask yourself.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not having good arguments.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Right. It's not having good arguments. It's not conducting polls and then going around to the people in high school and saying what the polls say they want to hear. And it's not like running for class president with an item list agenda. It's just like being chill. It's being a reasonable person, but also not a pushover.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And signaling strength in these sort of like, nonverbal —</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>And being comfortable in your own skin and just like, how do you — and life is like that too, but politics also. And John Kerry was flunking that test. He was like, you are acting like somebody Nelson Muntz would point and laugh at if you were in high school right now. And it left this lifelong impression on me and it's like at the core of my politics today. It's the basis of a lot of what I write about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, it's sort of the animating message of your writing in the past several years and I assume your new newsletter, which is the same. Like, you have the tripartite failure, right in that episode, right? As a one, you have the right being nastier than — no matter how cynical, you can never keep up. At the time, I was like, "God, that's just like, so gross. Grosser than that's so out of bounds. That's so obviously gross." So like, one, the right being grosser than you think they're going to be. Two, Democrats being passive in the face of it and trying to be dignified and not dignify it with an answer and not get in the mud and all this and wait for the referees to show up and save them.</p><p>And then three, the mainstream political press failing to convey that a Rubicon has been crossed, that something has gone out of bounds, that something is now not normal, that it's not normal for a political movement to mock a veteran's service. That's just not like — we are the kind of people who are outraged about that kind of thing, right? Like people just don't know. Average citizens don't know what's normal and what isn't. You know what I mean? They pick that stuff up through signals, through trusted people they know and through media. And if the media says like, "Oh, well, they're just mocking his war service and how's that going to affect his chances in November," then people are like, "Well, I guess that's a thing we do now. I guess that's how they roll now."</p><p>And that tripartite failure is basically the template over and over and over and over and over and over again ever since then. Reliably. You could go back to last week and find one if you did.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, pick a week.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Republicans are expelling Nancy Pelosi and Stenny Hoyer from their office in the Capitol to be — like, as retribution for not saving Kevin McCarthy's ass. And it's the same thing. It's like they're just smacking him in the face. Are they going to well, "It's so disappointing that they would do this" like, no. Stand up for yourself.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And remember when the a*****e, who was it, yelled "liar" at Obama during the State of the Union? Yeah, that episode also. I was, "Well, Jesus, that's so outrageous. It's so obviously outrageous." But again, it's only outrageous if people react as though it's outrageous, and if they just don't.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>It was Joe Wilson, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And apparently that's just like, a thing we do now is, like, right wingers shout at the president.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yeah, constantly. Now it's like the whole Republican conference instead of just —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know. Back then, people will have to trust us, that that was really shocking and outrageous. But pick an episode. It's all that same basic framework.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yes. This thing, stand up for yourself is like a big it underlies a lot of the work I've done over the last few years. It's one of the big reasons I launched Off Message. And another big reason is, like, the Netroots, I feel like arose in some way as a response to that kind of thing, if not that exact thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, right, exactly.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>And my recollection of the Netroots is that it was premised on two things, right. Like, one, first and foremost, you got to crush the Republicans. But two, Democrats have proven so far to be really shitty at that.</p><p>And everyone in liberal politics, I recall, or most people in liberal politics anyway, they were cool with these two ideas, living side by side. And after Trump won, I kind of expected a revival of that kind of righteous ethic. Just like Democrats should be a little bit more confrontational with Republicans, especially when Republicans have power and if they don't, liberals, like the whole progressive ecosystem, et cetera, should feel unencumbered to criticize them for it without worrying that they're helping the Republicans in some way or not presenting a unified front against the right and Donald Trump and authoritarianism or whatever. But it didn't happen.</p><p>Like, the politics of over caution dominated in the four years of the Trump presidency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, the immediate response to him winning was, "Oh, we weren't over cautious enough in the run up to this." Right. Like, that was the immediate —</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>When Democrats won the House back in the midterms in 2019, the first thing they did was, like, Chuck Schumer, Nancy Pelosi went to the White House. And, I mean, I realized this was a faint and it was meant to embarrass Trump, and so but they said, "Let's do a $2 trillion infrastructure bill together. You got them." It's like instead of everything we've seen the last two years is so unacceptable and accountability is here for you now. And look, the water is warm. If you decide you want to do anything good for the country, we're not going to say no.</p><p>But that's not our main mission here. Our main mission is to expose what you've been up to: the things you've been hiding from the public. That's all coming out now. You are in for the colonoscopy of a lifetime. And that was not the attitude. And it's not like I was shocked or anything. I was not like but I still don't understand the mindset that convinces a party and its leadership after suffering so much abuse from this guy that you're not going to do something about it when you win the power to do something about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What was it? Josh coined a term. Oh, right. He called it "b***h-slap politics". I think he has since revised this. I don't know if he has a new term for it. I think he's —</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Whatever, I mean, it's fine. B***h-slap politics. It conveys something real.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. It's like playground stuff. It's not a rational exchange of ideas. Just like if somebody comes up and smacks you and then people are standing around in a circle laughing and you start into a soliloquy about how unfair it is that they slapped you. Like, this is brainstem level stuff going on, you know? This is stuff that operates on a much deeper level than ideology.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>The Paul Pelosi hammering to head — Okay. I had an argument with a friend who disagrees with me around that time because I thought, "well, this is something that Donald Trump is essentially responsible for and Democrats should talk about a lot now while everyone is still shocked and appalled by it." And Democrats, of course, did not really want to do that. And this argument was about whether they were right to pivot back to inflation or crime or whatever the thing happened to be. And I was like, do you honestly believe that if the shoe were on the other foot and some left-wing person or progressive person took a hammer to Elaine Chao's head now two months before the election, or whatever. Like, you would agree with me that the election would be over and Democrats would lose, right?</p><p>That would be the end of it. Because it would be the only thing that anyone talks about —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It creates a moment. Do you or do you not exploit that moment to advance your political interests? And basically right-wing media just is a giant machine built for that — explicitly that purpose. When a moment happens, bring all the guns, turn all the guns in one direction, dominate conversation with this one thing, and Democrats just don't want to do that. And this gets to my central question. This is the main thing I wanted to — there's no answer to this question, but I want to ask it anyway, because this is what haunts me and keeps me awake at night.</p><p>So I'm talking about that tripartite failure of, like, Republicans being grosser and nastier than anyone thought. Democrats still not fighting, not getting angry and fighting in response. And then the mainstream media mushing over it all with this sort of blanket of both sides mush that obscures responsibility and obscures consequences and obscures the sort of nature of it all, that those criticisms were all, as you say, alive and well in the Netroots in the early 2000s. This is what the Netroots came up to say. Like "Fight, for Christ's sake. Like, look at what's happening. This is crazy, what's happening around Iraq, and no one's out saying it.</p><p>Like, someone come out and say it." That was the impetus of the Netroots. And so basically, fast forward literally 20 years, Brian, 20 years, and all those critiques are exactly the same today as they were then, and all the behavior is more or less the same. And I used to think back when I started, like, these dynamics are happening under a veneer of normality, a veneer of normal politics. And my sort of job is to sort of strip the veneer and show you the dynamic beneath. Because assuming that if more people saw and recognized the dynamic beneath, then they would just naturally recoil and change things, buyt then, you know, you could cite a bunch of different episodes to make this point, but obviously the big one is Trump winning, right?</p><p>Trump comes along and there is no veneer, zero veneer. Not only no veneer, but he will actively destroy any veneer that his allies try to throw up, right? He will actively say "No, no, that's not the reason. It's just because I hate people and I'm cruel." He won't let you veneer him. And it's sort of like, true for Democratic weakness and it's true for the mainstream media's failures. It's all the same as it ever was. But there's no veneer left. So, like, what's my job now? I can't strip away the veneer. There's no veneer. The dynamics are sitting out there in the open, visible and obvious to the naked eye, and yet people are not recoiling and nothing is changing.</p><p>So what do you do now? This is my existential, basically since, like, 2015 forward, this is my sort of existential crisis. Like, if America can see directly and obviously this dynamic and it doesn't seem to mind it, it's not recoiling, right? There's no backlash. Then what do I do then? Maybe this just isn't the country I thought it was. Literally, what's my goal now? Does that resonate?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, I think I do have an answer to this question, and I don't even think it's that complicated. The only addendum I'd make to what you just said is that it's 20 years later. I actually think that the positive effect that The Netroots had on Democratic politics from 2006 to 2008 or whatever it was that's kind of gone.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It got shut down. Right. It got shut down by the establishment.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>And it was and absorbed in some cases, by the establishment too. And the absence of it, I think, is very strongly felt because there isn't a loud chorus of liberal voices who are willing to be a little bit iconoclastic and not worry about presenting a progressive movement in disarray or a liberal movement in disarray and aren't worried about what the various congressional offices will think of them. And just say, we don't think that you, the Democrats, are running an optimal opposition strategy to this threat. I think that the truth is that the Iraq war era also had very little veneer.</p><p>I mean, George W. Bush was a more polished person, and he well, I.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Think about, like, Dick Cheney. Like, Dick Cheney is the essence of the guy who is an absolute monster in a suit, talking calmly, making you feel just like, oh, this is a calm guy who knows exactly what's going on.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>When I say the word torture, I bet you a single image comes to your head and it's the guy standing on the thing with the hood over his head in crucifix position. There was no veneer there. That was politics in 2005, and it was awful, and the Netroots was like, "Democrats point at that and call it awful, and if you don't, why are we here to help you? If you can't help yourself, what do you want from us?" Right? I think that that was very healthy, and it doesn't really exist anymore.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it seems like what happened is that when Trump won, it kind of threw everybody a little bit off their axis.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yeah, for sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it's just the danger of Democrats losing again has become so acute and existential that everyone's terrified into tiptoeing.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I don't think it's like corrupt forces or capture. There's some level of capture there, but it's risk aversion. It's fear, and it's totally well grounded. It is scary, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's f*****g scary.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I don't begrudge the people who get frustrated with me for focusing a lot on Democrats in my writing and criticizing or in many cases, praising the way they respond to things instead of attacking the Republicans, because, as you say, what's the point? We all agree. It's all out there in the open. There's nothing more I can do than just be like, "See? It's bad."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The guy's mocking injured veterans. He's saying, "I find injured veterans distasteful, and I don't want them around me." Like, that's, just like, I don't know how to argue that that's gross. How would you even argue that that's gross? It just is viscerally on its face repugnant. So what do you even say about it?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I mean, when Trump won, I think in a weird way, the political world was a little bit lucky that he also won the House and Senate. I mean, like that led to bad things too, but Democrats were completely locked out of power. And so really all there was was just, like, taking stock of what this horrendous formation was doing with their power. And also like, "oh, look at the information that's coming out about Trump" and his business ties and the Russia stuff. And so for that two-year period, that's what I was writing about. And also to the extent that I thought media wasn't conveying the gravity of the situation well enough, there was an element of media criticism in there, but the Republicans ran everything.</p><p>And so that was the focus. It was when Democrats won back the House in 2018, but then much more acutely when Joe Biden beat Donald Trump that it's like, okay, we're still in this twilight struggle against authoritarianism. It's still extremely important that Democrats do their opposition politics well, but now they're the ones with the power, or at least they have more power institutionally in Washington than Republicans. What are they going to do with it, and how are they going to exploit it to weaken the opposition so that they stand a better chance of defeating them in the next election?</p><p>So that means you're writing a lot about Democrats, you're doing a lot of in-house critique. And I think it's like the answer to the riddle you pose like, what do we do to try to effectuate positive change or better politics or whatever it is when Republicans are so naked, is to be willing to look in-house and see how things are going. And if you think that Democrats are inexplicably letting an opportunity to exploit pass them by, you can just pound the table about it. And, I mean, it's not as intellectually exciting as writing about policy, which is interesting, it's like puzzle solving, but it's real —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There was, like, a few years we got to do that, these brief little lacuna in our careers where we actually were just for a year, policy mattered just for a blink of an eye. I enjoyed those times immensely.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Me too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about this idea? The big fight these days is — on the left, there's this faction of people more or less singing your song, which is just "quit trying to act like this is normal, quit trying to be normal in the face of this. Convey that it's outrageous. Convey that it's out of bounds. Attack, fight. Like do politics. Brand yourselves as good and brand your opponents as bad."</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Crazy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know, right? Brand the Republican Party as bad. Rather than anytime you mention the Republican Party, it being in the context of how much you can't wait to work with them on bipartisan this and that, right? So just there's a faction of people out there who saying this and have been saying this for many, many years, and then there's a sort of faction, you know, that's like "actually what America wants from Biden is that he's normal." He's not Trump. He's not crazy. He's not fighting all the time. There's not all this fighting. He should in fact, be more normal, make more gestures, know sort of centrist positions.</p><p>You know how, like Obama used to sort of make concessions to border security and he used to make concessions he used to make concessions to his opponent's arguments and try to find this centrist road forward and this would pull in more swing voters. Basically the opposite of what you're saying. And there are nuances on all sides of this. But what do you think about that basic argument that what wins for Democrats is being kitchen table focused normies who understand your reactionary impulses and will acknowledge them and not going to criticize you for them, but we're going to try to gently nudge things forward a little bit.</p><p>What do you think about that basic argument?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>So I don't think that the insights or the beliefs at the core of those two visions are totally incompatible. I think that you could, in theory, have a very muscular confrontational politics that was run by a party that had a very moderate policy agenda.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I do want to put an exclamation point on that. This is something I feel like needs to be better understood in some respects those two axes, the sort of lefty versus centrist policy axis and then there's the sort of pugnacious versus accommodating axis, fighting versus not fighting axis. And to some extent those are orthogonal. Like you could come out in different places on those.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Absolutely. What do I really think is that if Democrats were trying to be 100% optimal, like right on the top of the curve of what maximizes their chances of winning elections, I think it would probably be some version of confrontational pugilistic, pugnacious you said, politics and like, you know, being chill about policy, not trying to be too radical or whatever, but it just seems very strange and wrongheaded to me to focus on perfecting the policy appeal when the party leaders aren't doing the pugnacious thing right. That's where the untapped potential really is. Any additional margin you can get by adjusting your child tax credit to be just so is like tiny compared to that.</p><p>And so my main beef with the people who say Joe Biden should be more centristy, more moderate in his policy and know, accommodating to Republicans is like, it just makes me want to pull my hair out. But how do you think your hypothetical medium voter comes to the conclusion that a particular politician is moderate or not?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it analyzing policy positions on their website?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>These are mostly policy issues that Republicans weigh in on, but yes, I guess abortion, the big moral policy questions of the day. Republicans could gain a big electoral advantage, I think, by saying "we're no longer forced birth people," right? And "we no longer want to abolish Medicare," that would help them. I don't deny that. But I don't think that —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I almost wonder if it would. I mean, this is the thing. This is the whole of our past 20 years is always thinking that there's some threshold right? There's something that could happen that would snap us out of this horrendous equilibrium. Presumably, there's something extreme or obvious enough on one side or the other that it would break us out of this 50-50 balance. But all I've seen over the past 20 years is things that I think will do it, not doing it, and Trump didn't do it. So would that even make that big of a I find myself just kind of speechless.</p><p>I don't know what would change public opinion at this point. If Republicans have not been grotesque, if the public is still saying on polls that the Democratic Party is more extreme than the Republican Party, like a year after the Republican Party tried to coup! Literally what could break us out of that equilibrium? Like, if they flip-flopped on abortion, would that do it? I don't know. If Trump literally shot someone on Fifth Avenue, would that do it? I don't know. It's at this point difficult for me to even imagine what could break us out of this frozen 50-50 horrendous equilibrium.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>The institutions and incentives aren't set up for it. But if Republicans could clean slate themselves from Trump and the last 40 years of their politics and become like kind of Christian social —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A European center-right party.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that they would win elections by huge margins in the United States.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you? I wonder about that because I've really come to think that in politics, having a truly furious, activated, well-funded, well-organized minority is better for you than having a sort of majority that's vaguely on your side. I almost feel like having this army of cultish zealots, you know, has advantages for the Republican Party that don't necessarily show up in voting totals. You know what? Like just in clean energy that I cover in wind energy, like they're out organizing opposition to wind energy on the ground in a way that absolutely just dwarfs anything that the left is doing.</p><p>And you don't necessarily see that show up in vote totals, but it affects the political balance in the country.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I don't know. I'm like you'd have to duplicate the United States and make a new one without a Fox News and without the Schlaflys and you know, like the billionaires who are giving over fortunes to make sure tax rates stay low and saying "any reactionary politics you have to engage in to win that fight, just do it." I agree with you that it's very potent and it makes breaking out of the 50-50 rut very hard. But it's Republicans trying to hang on to the 50%, and that making it difficult for Democrats to get to 55 or 60.</p><p>It's not like Republicans are experiencing a big growth benefit from that. You know what I mean? And so I do think that if you could just stop, reset, realign and then hit play again on the United States with a European center-right type Christian, a lot of the Romney-Clinton type voters would go back to the Republican Party, but very few Obama-Trump voters would join the Democrats.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But it's all these poor, you know, high school educated, white, working-class voters that came out of nowhere to vote for Trump. They were not previous voters. The question is whether they would just go back under their rocks or would they continue voting for the best they could get.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yeah, I don't, so I don't really see myself as having a zero-sum argument with people who think that policy is the main lever Democrats can pull to optimize their odds of winning. I think who are the Democrats who overperform in states or districts where Democrats shouldn't be doing well or whatever? And I think that they think that they all look like Jared Golden, and I just don't think that that's true. They look like a lot of different things. Some of them look like Jared Golden, some of them look like dynasts, like Joe Manchin. Some of them, though, look like John Tester and Sherrod Brown.</p><p>And they're just better at seeming like they have personal integrity and they don't take a punch without swinging back. And they have this kind of like, "throw the bums out" mentality about Republicans.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So much of it is affect.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>And like get that stuff right and then we can talk about what is the perfect policy. Do you think that a hypothetical, like a median voter or a very typical voter is going to think that you're moderate because you say, "let's all work together?" Or do you think that they're going to think that they respect you because when someone kicks you in the nuts, you kick back?</p><p>And my experience of life is that the best way to make friends and influence people is to act more like that than always turning the other cheek and entering a defensive crouch. And they have this very literalist view of what capturing the middle is. It's like you measure the middle and then you build a contraption that can fit around it perfectly and then it is captured and now those voters will like you. But that's not how humans are, right? They're not like tallying up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And especially the people who I would say are closer on the personality spectrum to the authoritarian, reactionary personality, right? Like that's a big, broad spectrum. You have sort of like Trump at the one far, far end of it, but there's many, many varieties. But that personality so much operates on the id, so much operates on this subconscious level where if someone kicks you in the nuts and you respond with a policy argument that just looks like weakness, like there's a signal sent there that's nonverbal. And so much of politics is this nonverbal sort of non-propositional, id-related work.</p><p>And I feel like the problem is that, and this is one area where all these people who think that the left has become captured by these sort of highly educated, white, upper-middle-class people, I do think has some purchase in that those kind of people project what they would want to hear, which is rational persuasion. Right? And they think, "if someone just came along and told me, we take vaccines in this country, you have to do it by law. F*****g line up." that that would be awful, you need to change people's minds. But I feel like they don't recognize that for a lot of people,</p><p>and this is like something I get a lot of criticism for saying publicly. But here we are at the end of a podcast, probably nobody's listening, so I can just say it. Which is like, a lot of people respond better to that. Just to force and strength, just to certainty, right?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>It's a foregone conclusion that you're going to get jabbed, so just get over your reservations. Yeah. So I think something kind of happened in parallel to the Netroots thing. But also, I think maybe has some roots in the Netroots thing, double roots, which is and I'm working on an article about this that will probably land as this podcast does, but the Netroots thing prefigured a quant takeover of liberalism and the Democratic Party. And it used to be that I think Democrats would use the word science as a cudgel, to basically signal to the public, like, Republicans are medieval in various ways.</p><p>And mostly this has to do with climate change, but it has to do with all kinds of other things. And we are the party that trusts science and believes in science. And I think that at the time and even to this day, it's a good signaling device. But I think at some point it actually became a totalizing part of the liberal identity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And it became, as efforts to quantify politics always do, largely aesthetic. Right. Because in actual fact, politics is full of people and people are very hard to quantify.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I want good quantitative methods brought to bear in politics and policy, but I want people who are numerate to be doing the analysis of what that means. And it's like —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You see all these articles flying around like, why did SBF fool so many people? Right? Sam Bankman-Fried into —</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Oh, man, this. Is in my article. This is in my article.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Why? Because he's got that affect. He's a white guy. He went to good schools. He talks in a certain tone and manner. He uses numbers as though he's a numbers guy and doesn't have any social graces, which makes him seem like this sort of maladapted genius. He hits all the affective aesthetic marks. And that's what most people who think they want quant in politics, that's what they're falling for is the aesthetics of precision and being a super genius who's not a dumb partisan like all the others. But there's no correlation between that aesthetic and accuracy and value, right?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>But it wouldn't matter so much. It would just be this small band of reasonableness people who throw around numbers a lot, like talking to each other on the internet. Except that people have sold Democratic politicians and their election committees on the idea that these races are highly scientific. Like running an optimal race is really a matter of plugging some stuff into a computer and doing what the computer says, and it's just not the case. And we go back to the politics is a lot like high school thing. Like if you try to make friends by plugging in what you think people want to hear into a computer, or plugging in numbers into a computer, and it spits out what the computer thinks people want to hear, and you go into high school and you read those things, you're going to get a wedgie.</p><p>You're going to get a great big wedgie. But politicians are not particularly numerate and they believe this stuff and it has, like, I believe, infected Democratic politics very deeply and very detrimentally and I want them to be using numbers well. It is worth knowing if a policy polls at 20% because if it does, that's probably really toxic. And even if in your heart of hearts you think it's right, you should make your peace with not talking about it. Okay? But that's like a guardrail that's at the very edge and you can move between those guardrails all you want.</p><p>You have a policy that polls at 45%, okay? Just figure out a way to talk about it that sounds positive. You're going to be fine. It's really not that big a deal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's a lot of looking for their keys under the streetlight type of things going on in that whole field of political science and social science around elections, which is just like there are certain things that can be measured, right? Numbers of votes or whatever or demographic characteristics. And so you go measure those and just come to your conclusions about those and assume that those are the important things. But there's all kinds of stuff that you can't measure going on around that that you're neglecting. If you just are measuring what can be measured, if you're just measuring people's responses to policy proposals, then you're going to read that poll and go, "oh, what people really care about are policy proposals."</p><p>But no, that's the assumption. That's the assumption you brought in.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>It also just sort of presupposes that ambient conditions are going to be the same from when you conduct the poll to the election. But you don't know what's going to happen. I mean, if you are so hidebound to what the polls say about policy or whatever and then something weird happens right before the election, you're not going to be well primed to capitalize on it if you can. Or defend yourself from it if you need to. Because you're going to have one playbook, and it's the one that the computer said was the right one. But I remember 2014 very well.</p><p>This is another election that left a big impression on me. It was the election where Democrats lost the Senate and thus eventually the Supreme Court. So it was a big deal and it was like for most of the election, basically a dead heat. The economy had recovered most of the way from the Great Recession, and Obamacare had been implemented. So the horrors of healthcare.gov were in the rear view and like Obama was entering his lame duck phase so he was more like freewheeling and I think he was doing fairly well in polls. And so the election looked like it was going to be a jump ball, which is really good for the incumbent party in the midterm.</p><p>And then there was an Ebola outbreak in West Africa and Donald Trump, actually then still just a TV game show or whatever guy, and the rest of the Republican Party, they didn't stop to consult the polls. They were just like Obama, Ebola, terrorists across the border with Ebola. That's what's happening in the world right now and you should be scared about and like you can go to Real Clear Politics or whichever poll aggregator you want and look at the generic ballot in that midterm. And right when the Ebola thing happens and Republicans demagogue the hell out of it, that's when the polls split and Democrats lose that election in a landslide.</p><p>It was just that. That's it. Obviously, I'm not saying you have to wait for an Ebola outbreak to have a successful election, but you have to be nimble.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Things like that happen all the time, and you need to be prepared to pivot and attack on those things that come up —</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>And you have to have some intuition about whether you're on the right side of it or the line you're going to take on it is going to appeal to people and make them want to vote for you. But like Donald Trump sent his supporters to sack the Capitol. And there were brave Democrats like Jamie Raskin and Ilhan Omar in hiding in the Capitol complex. And they got to work drafting impeachment articles right then and there with, I think, their idea being, "we're going to finish this election and then we're going to impeach the b*****d," which was the right instinct.</p><p>And Nancy Pelosi adjourned Congress and I to this day have every reason to suspect it's because she was worried that if she didn't adjourn, the push for impeachment was going to boil over before they'd had a chance to focus group it or poll test it. And she didn't want — I don't have reporting to back it up, but it is consistent with how the Democratic leadership through the whole Trump era did everything, and that's crazy to me. It's like, just understand that you are on the right side of something horrible that just happened. And as bad as it is, you have an opportunity to use it to your advantage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the main thing is, don't go out and ask people whether they think it's a big deal. People don't f*****g know. People don't have the background. They don't have the history. They don't know what's a big deal and what isn't. The way they find out it's a big deal is by you acting like it, right? So if you're going and asking them if it's a big deal right there, right there, you're sending the nonverbal signal. Well, we'll get mad about this if you guys are mad, but not if you don't want us to get mad.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Which is just like exactly. My finger here is possibly measuring the wind, but if you don't like my finger here, I'll put it away.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know I can put it somewhere else. Another episode I always bring up and talk about in this same capacity is the Benghazi thing, the Benghazi hearings. Republicans had — I don't even know what they got to by the end of it, was like multiple dozens of hearings on Benghazi, which was just nothing. Which was just b******t, right? And they did it and did it and did it. And if at any point during that, if you had asked a typical Dem consultant to advise Republicans, right, they would have said, the public doesn't really seem to be caring about this much.</p><p>Like, you're kind of embarrassing yourselves. There's a lot of other policy work you could be getting done. Just like on the traditional measurements of political sentiment, it was dumb to just attack, attack like that, like a mindless zombie. But they kept at it. They kept at it. They kept at it, and lo and behold, they found her emails, and boom, there goes the election. So polling would have told you, don't attack, attack, attack. But as you say, things come up, and if you're always geared for the attack, right, you're ready when they come up. You're ready.</p><p>Like, you're always ready to use anything that comes up for your benefit. And this sort of short-sighted, like, the immediate poll response to what you're doing is negative. Oh, well, we'll run away from it. That's just so short-sighted. Like, there are long-term plays here, long-term gains. There are narratives you build up over time that you have to come back to over and over and over again. And just this sort of, like, snapshot poll taking, it doesn't even do what it's supposed to do, which is give you a good sense of where the public is, right? It doesn't even do that.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I mean, it does for that day and that's it.</p><p>Right? But it's so shallow, right? Like I keep saying, the public just does not generally have deep-seated feelings about most of these issues.</p><p>We are living through a recrudescence of the Benghazi thing right now, and I don't know if it's going to go anywhere, but I remember when Hillary Clinton testified for 11 hours before the Benghazi Committee and everyone on the left was just overjoyed because she owned the Republicans so hard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, the memes.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>She owned them so hard. And it's true. Like, the media coverage and the immediate aftermath of her testimony was very positive because she took it to them and she answered all their questions and made clear that there was no there there and blah, blah, blah. And this was celebrated as a big turning point moment and like a proof of the theory of Hillary Clinton. It didn't stop Republicans at all. They just kept hammering away at it, kept right on. And like, there is a similar kind of self-congratulatory thing happening right now. And I mean, I'm glad it happened, I guess, because it's better that it happened than it didn't.</p><p>But the witnesses in the Republican impeachment inquiry, which they admit is they only launched so that people would think Joe Biden did something bad. They brought in witnesses who are like, yeah, there's no corruption here, or the impeachment. This doesn't merit impeachment. And everyone's like, well, there it is. The referees showed up and they spoke and they said, there's no corruption and this doesn't merit impeachment. And so you lose by the rules of the game, but they're not going to stop. And it's because they know maybe there's a 2% chance that they find a thing that is actually incriminating or that they can rip out of context to make —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or just looks that way, right? Or just looks that way mildly. It doesn't have to be anything.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>And if that happens, then the election's over and Donald Trump wins again, and we'll be happy. And so they just do it. And I don't admire that they do it based on b******t, but I admire that that's how they think about —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They are always advancing their political interests, always at every juncture, in every decision. And every principle is subordinate to that.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>That's really all I wanted from Democrats from, like, 2019 to now. Why isn't there like a pound-the-table public inquiry about Jared Kushner and Donald Trump and the Saudis? Yeah, just do it. Just do it. Why not?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They just sit back. They sit back and wait for the mainstream news to cover it. They're like, "this is a big deal. Please go cover this." But the way to keep that in the news is to talk about it. Talk about it, have hearings on it, even if nothing practical can come out of the hearings, right? Even if there's no obvious tangible policy or regulatory goal or legal goal. Even if the only point is just to talk about it. If the media is talking about that, then they're not talking about something else, right?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If they're talking about that, then they're talking about something that works for you.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>If you want the agenda to be something, set the agenda at that thing and things will fall into place. David, I promised at the top of this that this would be an hour of waxing nostalgic and vigorous agreement, and I think we've delivered.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We're killing it. Okay, final question, because we're over our time, but I did want to address this subject, which is probably we could do a whole another pod on, but journalism. What is wrong with it? Journalism. So I sort of have one foot in politics and then sort of one foot in this kind of technocratic analyst, entrepreneur clean energy technology. Let's use models and replace all the dirty energy with clean energy. This very kind of technocratic minded group of people over here, and then one foot in politics. And in my experience, the technocratic minded people recoil from the kind of discussion we've been having, recoil from the whole idea of, like, "oh, this team and that team, red team versus blue team.</p><p>It's all so silly and base somehow." And they have this image in their heads which so many people on the center left seem to have instinctively so many well-educated left people have in their head, which is that partisanship in and of itself is endumbening. Right. It makes you dumber. If you choose a side by definition, then you lose the ability to step back and see the bigger picture. So it's like partisanship is distasteful almost by definition for a lot of people, even though I think the vast majority of them in that world, if you pinned them down and said, "hey, do you want to create a decent social safety net?"</p><p>They would say yes. In policy terms, if you pin them down on their positions, yes, they are on the left. Yes, they are on a team because the other team hates all those things and wants to destroy all those things and wants to destroy those people. Right. Like the other team hates their f*****g guts and they're sitting back saying, "eh team sports, I don't want to bother." So the way this translates in our particular case is a lot of people want to think if you are a partisan, if you have decided that some things are bad and some things are good, one of the parties is trying to f**k everything up and take us to an authoritarian nightmare.</p><p>And the other party is like fitfully, weakly, half-assedly resisting a little bit, then you can't do good journalism, right? You've lost your quote unquote objectivity, and you can no longer do good journalism. So just tell me, especially after 20 years of doing it, how you think about the relationship between, on the one hand, partisanship and on the other hand, journalistic virtues.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, what I don't think is a journalistic virtue are indefensible professional habits or mental habits that are meant to create the impression of fairness, but they're actually not rooted in anything real. They're just kind of made up, and it creates a lot of bad quality political journalism. And it's almost all just in the realm of political journalism.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. The aesthetics of fairness.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yes. I wrote an article for Crooked Media several years ago now about how media should embrace its liberalism. But I had in mind, like, the small L liberalism. And the things about journalism that I think are important and that I bring to my work are the ones that are if you make a mistake, you correct it. You try to understand the whole range of facts before you write about it, if only to avoid making the kind of error that then because you're a liberal journalist, you feel impelled to correct. Right. That you write with precision and that you're not engaged in a sort of propaganda enterprise where you intentionally omit things that are inconvenient for your argument.</p><p>You're kind of like steel manning your argument. You're looking for what you think would be the best objection to what you have to say and sort of prebutting it, but you're doing it without putting a lot of spin on the ball about what that objection is or trying to make it look ridiculous. Those are the kinds of things that anyone can do, even if they're partisan.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And the awareness that you might be and probably on some timescale are wrong.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yes. It's so funny because yeah, it's like the political journalists who are mostly, like, on cable news but also write for the political desks of the Beltway Press or the New York Times or wherever else, they have this disdainful thing about anyone who chooses a side because they're just doing team sports. But then the writing is basically like, "whoa, isn't this team sports thing really exciting?" None of the things that those people think that they're doing with integrity are incompatible with having an ideology. They're not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You don't have to be like Peter Baker who swears that even his family doesn't know what his opinions are. And you mean this is a little mini rant, but I've met lots of — you know I used to hang out in DC a lot more. I used to meet a lot more of these types of journalists. I used to hang out a lot more with journalists. And one of the things you find is, and tell me if you think this is true too, is people like Peter Baker who go through their whole career explicitly and deliberately refraining from forming opinions, consequently become very bad at it. Like, if you get them in a bar at night, late night, get a few drinks in them and get them to actually talk about something substantive.</p><p>What you find is, like —</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Mush.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>a stunning degree of sort of naivete and mush because the way you get good at having opinions is by stating them and arguing about them and refining them in response to feedback. And so these people are supposed to be the sort of most sophisticated, right? Because they're in the game, they're insiders, but in fact they're so clueless about the larger picture and so clueless about policy that they're like naifs. They're like some of the most naive people I've ever met about politics.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>If you think that studious neutrality between the parties in your journalism requires you not to form opinions about anything, then you end up reporting about the parties in a way that is unable to be declarative about anything factual if the underlying fact is, in your mind, derogatory about one of the parties or the other.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. But you can get involved in arguments about who's hypocritical and who said one thing but a different thing. That's like, you can have opinions about these sort of like, shallow matters. But that's all you can have an opinion about and that ends up being actively misleading, I think.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>It does. And I don't think that there's anything that would break the rules of legacy media journalism to throw that model out and to report on US politics in a way that's intelligently, critical, or aware even of what's happening in US politics. There's this game that people used to play on Twitter where imagine this happened in a different country. If you look at how US news media reports on authoritarian takeovers of other countries, they're very clear. Like, this party believes in democracy. That party is trying to overthrow it. There is no reason why the New York Times political desk or the Beltway rags or cable news that their marquee reporters couldn't do that about Donald Trump.</p><p>And it doesn't mean that they have to be like, tribunes against fascism and on the side of the Democrats, right. It just means explain what's happening in politics accurately. But you have to be willing to accept that the accurate thing is that the Republican Party has descended into this authoritarian formation and it's hostile to democracy and it's using its power to try to warp the game board so that it at least stands a better chance of winning than pure numbers would have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it's gotten so much that way with so little veneer, like I said, that we're almost in the weird position where the mainstream journalists are more invested in cover stories that make the Republicans seem like they have some reasonable area of disagreement than f*****g Republicans are, right? Like, you talk to these nutbags in the House, they don't care about appearances. They're not trying to "on one hand, on the other hand," anybody, right? They're not pretending anymore. They're like, we hate our opponents and would like to string them all up and destroy the government. They're not pretending anymore.</p><p>And yet the journalists are sort of doing it for them, sort of like rubbing the sharp edges off for them even when they don't seem to care about doing it anymore. It's surreal. So, final, final question. There's a lot of talk about the right has this giant machine at this point. They've got Fox, the biggest cable station. They've bought up all these local TV stations. They've bought up all these local newspapers. They dominate or own the social media sites now. They completely dominate radio. I mean, they've really come to dominate the media environment, the information environment.</p><p>At the very least they are, I think, of equal size now with the supposed mainstream media. And there's all this lamentation, which I've engaged in many times myself, that the Left, the Democrats don't have anything like that. They do not have a giant propaganda apparatus waiting for these affordances that come up so that they can exploit them, right? Like, that's what the right-wing media does. It's what the left-wing media does not have. Like, something comes up that they could make a big deal out of and push into the news for days and gain some advantage on and they just don't because there's just no one, like, who would do it.</p><p>So this leads to a lot of argument about what do we want to see? Do we want to see an active, pugilistic, explicitly left media that is the mirror image of right media? And then the weak-kneed "one hand, the other hand" MSM in between them? Or do we want the mainstream media to get better? Is that what needs to happen? So what media ecosystem do you think would be healthy? What would you like to see?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>So, I mean, if I had a billionaire patron and he was like, "I want you to start a media company that will be big from the outset because I'm going to put a billion dollars into it," I would want a big broadcast hub like Fox. I would not want it to operate quite like Fox because I think Fox engages in a lot of lying to the extent that they end up owing like a billion dollars in damages for defaming. Like, that's a mess. And I don't think anything good —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a billion dollars well spent, though, for the billionaires. I mean, you have to admit for the billionaires, that's the best friggin' investment they've made in the decades.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I don't want like a liberal or progressive propaganda outfit that throws the things about liberalism that I care about out the window. Like, people should be honest and people should take account of facts and you shouldn't conceal things because they're inconvenient and all the stuff we just talked about, right. But I do think that you could have a big liberal network that embraced those healthy aspects of the journalism profession, like the ones that I bring to my work. You bring to your work and staff it with people who will operate in that way. Like, there are good broadcasters like Rachel Maddow and Chris Hayes who see the world clearly and can focus on what is genuinely important and beat a drum about things that they think matter, even if the mainstream media has moved on from them without engaging in dishonesty or agitprop or anything like that.</p><p>And I mean, look, those are very talented people and it's not easy to find them, but I promise you they're out there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Remember when Tucker Carlson decided he wanted to create something like that on the right and couldn't find anybody, basically couldn't staff a place because there's nothing like that on that side anymore.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I said the small l liberal journalistic values are not incompatible with having an ideology. I think they are incompatible with American Conservative ideology.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. I wrote a whole article about this, which is about the media taking sides. Like, the media on some level cannot be neutral and objective about everything. It's got to be on the side of reality, right? It's got to be on the side of telling the truth. It's got to be on the side of being fair. So if a political movement has explicitly aligned against those values, then yeah, journalism has to be against that, right? There's a certain point you can only back up so far before you've backed your way out of journalism entirely. If there is to be journalism, then you've got to stand up for that at least.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I mean, it's very fitful the way journalists, the subset of journalists that we're talking about here and I don't want to paint with too broad a brush. This is like people who have cable news gigs and people who work at the political desks of newspapers. It's 200 people or something like that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's not a huge yes, it's a very insular world.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>The ways and times at which they do what you're talking about, it's like stand up for the concept of truth because that's supposedly what journalism is about, which means sometimes saying that Republicans lie all the f*****g time. Some will occasionally acknowledge that, but there's no expectation or standard around it. And like, Republicans are at war with the vocation of journalism. Yet the journalistic class can be very defensive of the profession. Like when Barack Obama is rude to a White House reporter or whatever.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Jesus. But like, remember when he tried to kick Fox out of the briefing room and other journalists rallied to their defense? That was mind boggling.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Yes. And so here you have a whole political party and a political movement underlying it at war with the vocation of journalism. And the impulse to be like, well, we'll hear both sides politely tends to overwhelm the self protective "we're a guild and we won't have you destroy us" mentality that they'll apply at other times. So I think that you build a big institution where you kind of codify those things so that the programming is true, but it's also pugnacious and it also has internal integrity and won't be pushed around by people who want to destroy truth.</p><p>Like, that's a recipe for success. And if a billionaire is listening to this and wants me to start that up, I will do it. I'll bring David along. We'll do a good job.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Please don't make me manage anything.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>You know, I don't think that you could retrofit an existing outlet into something like that. You know, if outlets are going to evolve in that direction, it's going to be by attrition. It's going to take decades —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How would you advertise —</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Be people from our generation. How would I advertise it?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What would be the public facing? Because CNN has been in the doldrums and the only thing they can ever seem to think of to do is to double down yet again on being straight down the middle. It's the only reform they seem to think possible. You're trying to get away from that. So what would you tell the public that your news would you talk about it as though we are coming from the left but we're committed to fairness? Or would you talk about it as though we are simply journalists telling the truth? Like, would you frame it as a left thing?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I don't know that this would necessarily be the tagline, but I would just say, like bearing witness faithfully, that's the whole mission. And you don't necessarily need to say that you're of the left, although that will come screaming through the programming.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Fox will make sure everybody —</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Fox could — got away with "fair and balanced" for a couple of years. But I guess the risk in all this is that you don't know what the future holds. And I think a model like what I'm describing would be successful for this period of American history, but it might not meet the moment in five years or ten years. And then you might have a defunct cable company or something like that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are we even going to have cable in five years? I mean, who knows?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Whatever. But I do think that right now something like that would be extremely advantageous. And I think it's a bummer that it doesn't exist, but I think there's kind of a cultural problem in the liberal wealthy do-gooder class about what counts as spending money well or honorably. And this idea doesn't fit into that picture, but it doesn't mean it couldn't happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I would just like the billionaires to create left institutions that argue for the left. I mean, it sounds simple, but like, I can list a dozen think tanks that are explicitly anti government. Basically that's their whole reason for being. Whereas the think tank that is explicitly not just on this issue or that issue, but explicitly saying "public capacity is good, competent government is good. We can do good things with government." I feel like the left has just assumed that the public shares a lot of its bedrock values and thus has sort of stopped talking about them.</p><p>And we're finding out over and over again, like just standing up for basic decency, treating people equally, not excluding and being violent to people, just all that basic stuff that we would think goes without saying. I don't think it goes without saying. And I would like to see left billionaires create some institutions that go out and say it.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>So, I think that a lot of progressive spending goes into getting the message out about various liberal do-gooder ideas. I just don't think that they're centralized in like a media hub. But the one place I would borrow from Fox is that most of Fox programming is not about the merits of Republican policy ideas. They're not talking about —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No, hardly any of it. There are barely any left, right?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I mean, like, Republicans good, Democrats bad. Trump, innocent, Biden, guilty. It's just that over and over and over again and occasionally you slip in a little something</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Mostly Democrats are bad. This is what I try to impress upon people. This has been the core message of Fox and all of right-wing media from the time Rush Limbaugh came on talk radio. It wasn't anything about the size of government or foreign policy or any of that. It was just the Democrats are bad. And so now you've got this situation where you get like Brian Kemp, the governor of Georgia, who Trump dragged him into this fraud case, threatened to kill him. He's had death threats from his own friggin side, and he's still out saying he'd support Trump if Trump's the candidate.</p><p>Because the bedrock of any Republican politician is just "Democrats winning, it's unthinkable," nothing could be enough.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>All-in against the left. Period. No matter what. Yeah. And so, you know, if you're building a new giant media entity from scratch yes, like mixing in heroic tales of America, like rising from the ashes and building things with government is all good and well, and it would be a part of the programming. But I think that the main thing is create the drum beats that the right is able to produce about the left that are almost always based on nothing. Make those happen about the genuine odiousness of Trump and —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Plently of material, you will never fall short of material.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>And like, it is a good model. It is like the few broadcasters who do do that are, I think, pretty successful at it. And I think that if you front —you, you'd have to front load it with that stuff and kind of pepper the policy, and like "the left is good" on top of that and around that because, honestly, people get bored by policy stuff. The purpose of it, I think, should be to shine a light on the right and create unity against it, not shine a light on the left and give rise to factional disputes because, "Oh, you're talking about infrastructure, but the bill didn't go far enough. And also, what about abortion?"</p><p>If you base it on policy, I think you end up probably not succeeding as a market thing. And also you end up just, like, arguing amongst yourselves all the time about what should take precedence over what.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But this is what I think of as my I mean, maybe I shouldn't confess this, but this is sort of what I think of as my basic political valence is like, I could take or leave the Democrats most of the time. I've got lots of criticisms. I could quibble about policy. My allegiance to Democrats is light at best, but the main thing that I'm engaged in public life for is to stop the ascendance of a very obviously reactionary, authoritarian movement that threatens to destroy American democracy entirely. That's my main thing, and I feel like if you had a media apparatus, you've got plenty of material to make that the main thing for lots of people.</p><p>You know what I mean? There's such a story to tell there, and so many people feel this way. I feel like it would be like, I can't believe no one's done it. Like, I can't believe it's not out there. It baffles me.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Amen, brother. We should send this to, like —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You know, any billionaires?</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>I've actually met a couple. Clip it to me, and I'll send it to them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, Brian. Well, we've talked for way too long. This is more nostalgia and vigorous agreement than anyone signed up for, but I really appreciate you walking down memory lane with me. This is fun.</p><p><strong>Brian Beutler</strong></p><p>Are you kidding? This was so much fun. Yeah, I've enjoyed your work, and good luck on your new Substack. Everyone should go sign up and subscribe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Offmessage.net. Thanks, David.</p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/reflecting-on-20-years-in-political</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:137684687</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 27 Oct 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/137684687/b7adc7b6d5688adba4a47bf39052fcc8.mp3" length="103844144" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5191</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/137684687/677bfec09958d5225982651f3bc9a9cd.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A super-battery aimed at decarbonizing industry]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Antora Energy CEO Andrew Ponec talks up his company’s game-changing approach to thermal energy storage.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/8hkte57i8yfa4jt4zyobu/volts23.10.06-andrew.ponec.pdf?rlkey=f5njrspobdgi8hh8p7k5lfsti&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/a-super-battery-aimed-at-decarbonizing-industry"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Back in March, I did <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-electrifying-industrial-heat#details">a podcast on the possibility of using wind and solar electricity to decarbonize industrial heat</a>, which represents fully a quarter of all human final energy consumption. The trick is to transform the variable energy from wind and solar into a steady, predictable stream of heat by using some form of heat battery. </p><p>The idea is that heat batteries will charge when renewables are cheap or negatively priced, around midday when all the solar is online, and then use the stored heat to displace natural gas boilers and other fossil fuel heat sources in industrial facilities.</p><p>Among other things, this vision represents a huge opportunity for renewable energy developers — industrial heat is effectively a brand new trillion-dollar market for them to play in. And they can often enter that market without waiting in long interconnection queues to connect to the grid. </p><p>Anyway, that episode, which I highly encourage you to listen to at some point, was with the CEO of a thermal battery company call Rondo. In it, I mentioned another thermal storage company whose technology caught my eye: Antora Energy. </p><p>Like Rondo, Antora is part of the broad “box of rocks” category, but its tech can do some things that, for the time being, no other thermal battery can do.</p><p>I don’t want to say much more here — discovery is half the fun — but I will say I’m as geeked about this technology as I have been about anything in ages. I’ve been thinking about it ever since I first heard about it three or four years ago. Now the company has launched its first commercial-scale system! So I’ve brought Antora co-founder and CEO Andrew Ponec on the pod to talk through how it works, what it can do, and how it could transform industrial heat markets.</p><p>So with no further ado, Andrew Ponec. Welcome to Volts, thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Thank you for having me, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is so fun for me. I've honestly been thinking about this tech for years and really hoping that you guys would make it far enough to justify me doing a pod with you. So I've been rooting for you. So we're going to get to kind of the role heat batteries and heat storage can play in the energy system a little bit later. But I just want to start with the technology itself. So the basic idea here is you're heating up a rock, right. And what you do with the heat, we'll get to that in a second, but let's just start with the rock itself. Tell me about the material you're using for your rocks and their qualities and why you chose that material.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>We looked at a lot of different options for the material that we wanted to store energy in, and there are a lot of different types of rocks, types of solid materials that we might choose. And after a pretty thorough search, we decided to focus on carbon, solid carbon. And that was for a number of reasons. We were looking at different attributes that we thought were important, one of which was cost, one of which was earth abundance. We were also looking for things that had existing supply chains and that were extremely stable and safe for long-term operation.</p><p>And when we went through all of that process, carbon came out on top as the best option, although I should say that it didn't come out on top the first time around, actually because of a mistake I made in our spreadsheet. Carbon has a really unique property, which is that it gets better at storing energy as it gets hotter. So the specific heat capacity, its ability to store energy, increases by about a factor of three between room temperature and 800 or so degrees Celsius. So you can imagine what the process would be like to choose a material.</p><p>We built a big spreadsheet. We put all of the materials candidates in it. We put what their ability to store thermal energy was, did some calculations on what the cost would be, and then stack ranked them. And in the first pass, carbon was near the bottom, because the mistake I had made was going online and just googling the specific heat of carbon and of course, got the room temperature value. And it was only a few months later, after we were exploring all sorts of other materials, that we kind of went back and looked and said, "Man, carbon has everything we want, except that its storage capacity is really low."</p><p>And it was kind of our disappointment in carbon that made us take a second look and then realize this really remarkable property of carbon, that it gets better at storing heat as it gets hotter. And then it was by far the best choice. And that's where we've gone from there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I think when most people hear carbon, especially in our space, they think about carbon dioxide, they think about carbon in the atmosphere. So what is solid carbon? What does it look like? What's it used for? Like, what is solid carbon out there doing now?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Great questions. Solid carbon is one of the biggest industrial products that most people have never thought about. We use solid carbon in massive quantities, tens of millions of metric tons a year of this stuff, but it's almost always used as an intermediary in some other process. So the biggest uses of carbon are in the aluminum smelting industry and in the steel industry. So in aluminum smelting, it's actually part of the electrolysis process. And in steel making, electric arc furnaces use it because it's the only material that can survive the hellish environment within an electric arc furnace.</p><p>But because none of those go into the final products, we don't think about it very much, even though by mass it's only a little bit behind aluminum as one of the biggest industrial commodities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting. So part of what falls out of that is, as you say, there is a huge existing supply chain. And so when you say that there's a lot of solid carbon already in use, if it became the de facto material for thermal batteries, would that represent a substantial portion of total solid carbon use? Or is its use so big and so ubiquitous that this is just sort of a marginal thing?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>It ends up being a drop in the bucket. We could make terawatt hours of thermal batteries using just a fraction of the carbon that's already processed as part of the supply chains for aluminum and steel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. So this is a material that is already abundant, already manufactured, already there, ready for you to go. There's no material shortages and what know, people hear materials these days and they think, "oh, what about mining and the social cost of mining" and all that. So what's the sort of like the ESG status of solid carbon?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>There are a bunch of different types of carbon, and each of them have different attributes with regard to how much energy goes into them. Are there any other concerns about the supply chain where they're made, are they even mined or are they synthetic? So, just to mention a few. First, carbon comes in many different forms. Diamond is one very expensive form of carbon that we don't use in our system. There's other forms of carbon that are relatively disordered, like the carbon blocks that are used in aluminum. And there are other forms of carbon that are more ordered and more pure, like graphite that's used in electric arc furnace, steel making.</p><p>And actually, if you continue going up the chain, there's more and more pure, special forms of carbon. Usually, graphite, when you get to the very high end that's used in things like lithium-ion batteries and even nuclear reactors, uses a very, very special, very high purity form of graphite.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And for that form, there are some supply chain issues. Like, I know that graphite for lithium-ion batteries is one of the supply chain constraints that gets discussed.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>That's right. And it was really important for us that we be able to use not these extremely pure and more scarce resources, but that we be able to use the kind of lower-level carbons that are used in these massive quantities in the metal industries like aluminum and steel. The good news is, because all it has to do in our system is just get hot, it doesn't need to do something special chemically or physically. We're very flexible on the type and grade of carbon that we use.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I see. And if I was just looking at a block of solid carbon that's going to go in your battery, is there anything special about it or am I just looking at a big square rock?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>It looks like a big, square, dark block. Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, so you say that carbon can hold a lot of heat. And I'm assuming you also chose it because it can hold heat and release heat over and over again without degradation. Like how many times can it cycle? How long can it last?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Graphite is a remarkable or carbon in general is a remarkable material with regard to its thermal stability. So just a few different aspects that you can look at it that way. One is that it's thermally stable up to incredibly high temperatures when it's processed to make the graphite, for example for electric arc furnace steel making, they heat the graphite electrically to over 3000 degrees Celsius in what are called graphitization furnaces.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good lord.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>So it's used at extremely high temperatures, industrially. It's also used in industry, for example, in arc furnaces where you have huge temperature gradients where the tip of the electrode essentially has arcing lightning coming out of the tip and is well over 2000 degrees Celsius in air at the bottom of the steel pot, whereas the top of it is actually water cooled to room temperature. So huge thermal gradients, very high temperature capability. And another factor that makes it really good for this is its strength. Unlike almost every other material, graphite gets stronger as you heat it up, up to about 2400 degrees Celsius.</p><p>So we often joke that if something is strong enough in our system at room temperature, then that's all we have to do because every part is just going to get stronger as the system starts charging. And that's unlike metal ceramics, almost every other material just gets weaker and weaker, even well below its melting point.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So you're heating up carbon blocks. They're in an insulated container, and these are what, like the size of a shipping container? Is that roughly the scale we're looking at here?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>That's right. It was important for us that the module be road shippable so we could make it in a factory and then ship it to the customer site.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How is the heating done? Is it just an electrical coil? Is it like an electrical resistance heat? How does the heat get into the rock?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>The electricity goes through a resistive heating element very much like a toaster coil, a resistive coil, and heats it up to the glowing hot temperatures that the system operates at.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, when I talked to John from Rondo, he was saying that one of the things they were worried about is inconsistent heating. And they've come up with all these different ways of trying to evenly distribute the heat as it's heating up the rocks. Is that an issue with carbon as well? Like, are the coils like, sitting next to the rock? Are they going through the rock? Or this might be getting too much in the weeds, but I'm fascinated by this stuff.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>It's a great question and please do get into the weeds. I love it. So one of the things that we looked at also when choosing a storage material was thermal conductivity. So its ability to move heat within itself. And graphite has a thermal conductivity that's at these temperatures at least ten times higher than most other types of rocks. And that means you don't have to worry so much about that inconsistent heating. So all of the companies that are working with rocks or bricks or other materials that are non-carbon based have to be really careful about do you differentially heat different parts of the system or even different parts of a single brick or rock. But in graphite it kind of smooths it all out very quickly because of that high thermal conductivity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting, interesting. Okay, so you're taking this renewable energy, you're putting it through a resistance coil, heats up, heats the solid carbon, and then you heat this solid carbon up really, really hot. So explain the temperatures you get to. And then one of the most fascinating parts about this for me is how you get the energy back out of this rock. And this has to do with heat transfer at high temperatures. Some things that I, a humanities major, did not know about heat transfer, I learned from reading about this tech. So explain how hot the rock gets and then what it looks like to get energy out of a rock that's that hot.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>So we heat electrically to over 2000 degrees Celsius. So these big carbon blocks are glowing white hot at 2000 C when the system is fully charged. And those temperatures are very hot from a conventional perspective. They're also much cooler than many of the applications where graphite is used industrially. But at those very hot temperatures, there aren't many options for materials you could use to get the heat out. The conventional way of getting heat out of a thermal energy storage system is to use some sort of fluid. It could be a molten salt, a molten metal, it could be air, helium, something that you're then pumping or blowing through the system through lots of little channels to get good heat transfer and then pulling back out of the system again.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>And if you go up to these very high temperatures, you find that your options are limited. The gases end up having a very low heat capacity. Viscosity increases with air, for instance, with temperature. So it's very hard to pull the heat out at those high temperatures. Similarly, there just aren't that many options that aren't really exotic for liquids that you could use. And even the liquids that you have have some sort of problem typically with freezing at above room temperature. So you could immediately clog up your pipes or pumps or valves if the system ever were to cool off.</p><p>So these are some of the challenges that we were facing when we wanted to get all of these wonderful qualities of graphite in our system, including the ability to go to very, very high temperatures, but we weren't sure how we would get the heat out. And so the "aha" moment for us was to realize that we didn't need a fluid at all to get the heat out. That the movement of a fluid through the system to move heat, which is called convective heat transfer, is only one of the three mechanisms of heat transfer. There are two others.</p><p>One is conductive, so just moving directly through the solid, and the other is radiative. So that's just light, that's glow. Even though graphite is a very conductive material, it's still too hard to conduct the long distances you would need within the system. But light can travel long distances very easily. And so we realized that by changing the geometry of the system, opening gaps within the system that can allow light to move, would actually do everything we needed as far as getting the heat out of the system, even at temperatures where we had few other options.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, so the short version of that answer is light.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The heat comes out of the rock as light. It is so hot that it is glowing like the sun, and the heat is coming off it as light.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what you do with that light, you do two different things. And this is where I think your battery is different than anything else on the market right now. One is you can shine that light on a pipe full of some fluid. So you heat the fluid up and then you take that fluid off and use it for some industrial purpose. Or you make steam and pipe the steam off for some industrial purpose. That's sort of the conventional thermal battery way of doing things. You heat the rock and then the rock heats up a working fluid and you use the fluid for industry.</p><p>Then you have this other option which is shining the light onto special photovoltaic panels to make electricity. So you can get either heat or electricity out of your battery. So first, explain what this looks like inside the box. I'm a little mystified, so you've got this insulated box and inside the box, you've got this giant piece of solid carbon that is whatever, 2000 degrees Celsius. So hot that it is glowing like the sun. What is between that glowing rock and the sides of the box where all the tubes and the PV panels are? How do you modulate the amount of light, say, for instance, falling on the tube full of fluid?</p><p>Because presumably you don't well explain how things are working inside that thing.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>It's critical to be able to vary the amount of light because a hot object like that is always going to be glowing, it's always going to be shining that light. But you need to decide whether and how you let that light out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>And so in most of the areas between the very hot carbon and the wall of the unit, there's a layer of insulation. And that insulation is actually just a porous form of carbon that has very low thermal conductivity. So that's sort of the conventional part. The unique part is in specific areas where we want to vary the amount of energy coming out of the system: We have an insulated door that can open and close and that door, when it's closed, is blocking the light from coming out of the system. And when it opens, it's allowing the light to come out of the system.</p><p>And that is how we shut the system on and off. It's also how we change the amount of energy coming out. A really critical part of any thermal battery is how you get a consistent discharge as the battery cools off, as you're getting that energy out of the system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because you don't want a declining level of energy coming out.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>No, exactly. I mean, it would be imagine that similarly in a lithium-ion battery, if as the battery was discharging, its voltage got down, you could almost not get any energy out of it anymore. In lithium-ion batteries, you do get a little bit of a drop off, but generally, you can get most of the power still out until it's at 0% state of charge. And so a thermal battery, to be useful, has to be able to have a consistent discharge. And so the way we achieve that is by progressively opening those insulated doors wider and wider to allow more and more of that light to escape, to compensate for the fact that that light is slowly dimming as the system cools.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so it's like a shutter, like a window shutter almost, that you open depending on how much light you want to let out.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And when you open the shutter, the light comes out and it shines on a tube of heating fluid, a tube of working fluid or a photovoltaic panel. So I think the shining on the fluid and heating up the fluid is pretty straightforward. And I think at this point Volts listeners know that you get a hot working fluid or a hot steam and there's any number of things you can do in industry with that heat, with that hot fluid. But let's talk a little bit more about transitioning the light back to electricity. So you are in an environment that is unlike the environment that normal solar panels are in, to say the least.</p><p>You've got a solar panel that is sitting next to a 2000 degree block of rock that is shining super hot light out of it. So presumably you need a special kind of photovoltaic panel, something that can, for instance, resist super intense heat. And this is a big part of what your company has done. I think you just recently opened up your first manufacturing facility to create these things. They're called thermophotovoltaic panels TPV. So tell us a little bit about TPV. What is it? How do you build it? What qualities does it need? What's it look like?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Going one step back, we should talk about why you would ever want to create electricity out of a unit like this. Because we have a great system already that can take in variable renewable energy from solar and wind, use it to heat carbon to high temperatures, and then deliver 24/7 energy to an industrial process that requires heat. And that's a great product. There are many companies out there that have seen the same economics that we have to say: This is an important problem, this could decarbonize a lot of industry in a way that's cost-effective.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. This is, I guess, all other thermal batteries just output heat and there's a huge market for that. But you also want to be able to create electricity. I want to put off, just for a minute, the use case for the electricity. Why it's important that you can also do that. But I just want to stick with the tech for a minute. So how does a solar panel stand up to 2000 degree light?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>The first thing is that we don't let the solar panel get to the same temperature as the carbon blocks. We actively cool it. And an analogy that you could think of is the sun is very hot. But a solar panel here on Earth looking at the sun doesn't have to withstand the same conditions that the sun is at.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But your sun is very close to your panels.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Our sun is very close, yes, our sun is much closer than the other sun. It's also a fair amount cooler, but it is still much brighter. The combination of those two effects, it being much closer and it being somewhat cooler, still leads to something that is hundreds of times as bright as regular sunlight, which is really helpful in terms of keeping the system very compact and low cost, because you just don't have to make much of these photovoltaic special photovoltaic cells and modules. But they do have to be cooled. And this was surprisingly easy, actually, part of the problem. The power densities, how much energy per area, is not all that high compared to a lot of other cooling applications like power electronics or computer chips or things like that.</p><p>So, we have a very conventional water-cooled metal plate that we put all of the photovoltaic cells on. And that plate keeps the cells plenty cool so that they're operating at nearly room temperature even while they're facing this very intense light source.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And because the light is so much more concentrated than typical sunlight, presumably you also want photovoltaic cells that can maximize — I guess it's just not a normal circumstance for a cell to be in. So, what do you need the cells themselves to do?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yeah, the main difference because of the amount of light on those cells is that we're getting much more current off of the cells, there's just a lot more electricity being generated per area. And the way we get the current off of the cells is just the same way that solar does with metal — they're called fingers — just metal lines on the cell that collect the current off of the front of the cell and then carry it out to the external circuit. And so because we have so much more light and so much more current than conventional solar, it means we need a lot more of those current collecting lines and we need them to be thicker in many cases than they are in solar.</p><p>So this is certainly a difference, but one that adds only a small amount to the cost of the cell, but allows it to be very efficient at collecting a huge amount of power per area.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it sounds like then that these are specialized. You're manufacturing your own TPV, but it doesn't sound like it's super high tech. It's just sort of like a modified solar panel, basically.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>There's one other thing besides the power density that really matters, especially to efficiency, which is what to do about all the photons that you can't convert into electricity. So similar to a conventional solar cell, not every photon from the sun and not every photon from the glowing hot carbon has the right energy level to create an electron in the semiconductor that then can be pulled off to the external circuit. Most of the photons actually in both solar and in our application have too low energy and so aren't useful. In solar, all of those photons are a waste.</p><p>They essentially go right through the semiconductor because photons that don't have enough energy to create an electron typically go right through. It's transparent to them and then they're lost. In our application, we can do something that's a little bit more unusual, which is we allow those photons the same way as in solar, to hit our cells, go right through, but then we have a really effective infrared mirror on the back of the cells that turns those unusable photons right back around and sends them out the front of the cell right back to the hot carbon where they're reabsorbed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No s**t — oops, uh, kidding.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>I hope you keep that in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The photon goes back in the carbon?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So does that mean none are wasted? What's the efficiency here?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>That reflection process isn't 100% efficient, but it is far greater than 90% efficient. So most of those photons that we can't use, we do return to sender, we send back to the carbon that they came from. And that allows us to hit much higher efficiencies than conventional solar cells. As someone who comes from the solar industry in the past, this just feels like cheating. It's like mind-boggling that you could just say that photon wasn't one that I wanted and I'll just give it back and get credit for that. If you send photons back to the sun, nobody tells you that you did the sun a service, but if you send it back to the carbon, that energy is retained within the system and it really does have a chance to come back as a good photon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what's a comparison of the efficiency of a standard solar cell versus one of these?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>So, in conventional solar, you see cells that are in the 20% range, a little bit higher actually, these days, which is fantastic. And there's actually a theoretical maximum called the Shockley-Queisser limit. That means any single junction solar cell can't get above about 33% efficiency. And that's just because if you look at the math, all of those photons that you can't use limits your efficiency to that 33%. We have already demonstrated a 40% efficient photovoltaic cell in our application that's also just a single junction. And junction just refers to the fact that you can have different types of semiconductor materials that absorb different wavelengths of light.</p><p>And for us and for solar, you can boost your performance a little bit by adding junctions. But the key takeaway from that is because of the unique aspect of our application and that we can return these photons back, and we do with high efficiency, we already are able to make cells that are more efficient than the efficiency limits that prevent solar cells from getting to high efficiency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's because you're recycling the photons. That's because you're, whatever you would call it, returning the photons.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly. We're sending those photons back and preventing that energy from being lost.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Cool. Okay, so you get this battery, this glowing piece of carbon. You got the shutter that allows differential amounts of light out, and the light is either falling on a tube with fluid if you want heat, or on a TPV cell if you want electricity. Can a single Antora battery do both of these things? And do you have to switch back and forth or can it do both of these things simultaneously?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yes, our thermal battery can do both and is doing both. Our pilot unit is discharging simultaneously electricity and thermal, and they are independently controllable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>So the easy way to think about that is you can have a separate shutter in front of your photovoltaics and another one in front of something that's extracting heat. And you can vary independently at the amount, the opening of each of those to change the ratio of heat to electricity you're getting off the system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the renewable energy goes in and you can either get heat or electricity out, varying independently, simultaneously, depending on your needs. So that's the battery, and as far as I know, you guys are the only thermal battery that is capable of also producing electricity. Is that true? Are you aware of anybody else doing this?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>We're not aware of anyone, but we certainly hope there will be more in the future. Because looking at the decarbonization problem in industry, you have to decarbonize the heat and the electricity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, let's talk then about use cases. Listeners are familiar with why industry needs heat and they are familiar with the fact that today almost all that heat comes from fossil fuels burned on site. And they are familiar from my pod with Rondo, with the fact that the reason it's changing is that wind and solar have just gotten so cheap. Now they're the cheapest energy available. So, if you can use them for heat, you want to. I mean, this is true across all energy applications. Basically, if you can use wind and solar, you want to because they're the cheapest thing out there.</p><p>So, this is going to enable industrial heat to use wind and solar. That use case is familiar enough. What do you get by also outputting electricity? Because if I'm an industrial facility that wants to decarbonize my electricity, I just buy renewables through RECs, right? Or whatever. Like decarbonizing electricity is to some extent a solved problem. Like they know how to do that. So, what does it benefit you to have a single battery that can do both these things?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>There's two levels of answers to that question. The first is at the highest level, industrial users are using heat and electricity. And so they need both. They need to decarbonize both. You mentioned that there are options out there like RECs for decarbonizing electricity. What we've seen is that there is a push industrially for people to use electricity that is clean and that is being used at the same time that it is being generated.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Hourly matching. Yes, we've done a pod on that as well.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly. And so, I think some of the solutions that are out there right now that don't have hourly matching we think are likely to be insufficient both from a global climate perspective and for an industrial perspective to say that you've truly solved that electricity problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>The much deeper answer really involves the economics of a thermal battery that has the ability to output both. And this gets a little bit subtle and so I'm not sure I would do this on any podcast, but let me walk through why it is so important to have both. The way to think about this is to look at how we would decarbonize electricity first. And you're probably familiar, as are many of your listeners, with the large number of academic and industry studies that have shown that one of the best paths to decarbonizing electricity is to use wind and solar and long duration energy storage.</p><p>In order to make that work so that you're covering every hour of the year, you typically overbuild your wind and solar and you overbuild your storage in that you're building way more duration than you would ever use on a daily basis. And that combination can get you to 100% renewables. In some cases that is an attractive option. But let's dive in and look at what's going on with those capital assets. Both of them are now being underutilized. 95% of the time, you didn't need all of that wind and solar you're over generating. And 95% of the time you have a bunch of excess storage capacity that isn't useful.</p><p>So, let's say if you look at that long duration storage system, let's imagine that you chose a long duration storage system that was a thermal battery and a thermal battery that had the ability to output heat and power. Now, during that 95% of the time that you had excess renewable generation and excess storage capacity, you can be using all of that excess capacity to provide zero carbon heat. So for no additional money, for no additional capital equipment, you've taken a system that you designed to provide 100% electricity and you've also decarbonized, call it 95% of your heating needs as well. And that's the fundamental economics that drives why it's so important to have something that can do both.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, to draw an analogy, listeners are familiar with the fact that we have these peaker plants, natural gas peaker plants that are rarely used for much the same reason, right? They just serve peaks. And peaks are by definition rare. It's as though you found something else to do with those natural gas peaker plants while they weren't producing peak electricity. Right. Some way of occupying them and producing value out of them while they were not providing that peak.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly. And in this case, all of that energy is coming from renewables. So this is a ton of clean energy that we would love to have found a use for. But that in kind of the current paradigm of long duration energy storage for 100% renewables and decarbonization is going to waste.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So rather than waste it, we're overbuilding renewables, overbuilding batteries, and rather than waste all that excess capacity, we're using it to get heat.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And in those times when we are at peak load and your batteries are being used for that purpose, for electricity purposes, during those short periods of time, we need to meet those peaks that won't disrupt the production of heat in any way. Like, are these two uses ever, do they ever conflict?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>That's an important point because there's no free lunch. I said that excess generation and that excess storage capacity was only available 95% of the time. What happens in that remaining five?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>And in that case, we would stop generating heat. We no longer have the excess to decarbonize heat as well. And you essentially devote all of the energy resource, both the generation and the storage capacity, to generating electricity and then you backfill the heat need with some other means. This could be a fuel, whether fossil or hopefully zero carbon. Now, the question would be, did you actually win out of that? We said "Hey, you were overbuilding all this excess wind and solar and battery storage to cover the last 5% of electricity." And now we've just shifted that all over and we're saying, "Okay, now we've covered the electricity problem very cost effectively, but now we still have this last 5% of heat."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Now you got to overbuild your heat stuff to handle that last 5% of heat.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly. So the question is, is it better to have the problem in how do you solve the last 5% of heat or how do you solve the last 5% of electricity? And the answer is, hands down, it's better to have it for heat. And that's for two reasons. The first is the capital equipment to make heat from a fuel is a burner. It's very cheap, it's totally fine to have a burner that sits there 95% of the year and only gets turned on in these very rare occasions where you don't have solar and wind for a long period of time.</p><p>That is very different than having a power plant, like you mentioned earlier, a peaker that sits there 95% of the time and is super expensive.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>So, it's orders of magnitude cheaper on a per power basis, per energy flow basis, to have a burner sitting there versus a power plant sitting there. And the other thing is efficiency. We can convert some sort of fuel into heat with 80% efficiency with a burner. Whereas a peaker plant, because you're trying to keep the capital cost down because it's rarely used, you end up with very low efficiency, cheap like aero derivative turbines to provide that peaking capacity. So, you have a huge win on efficiency and a huge win on the capital expenditure for something that sits around all the time if you have that problem in the heat arena versus in the electricity arena.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, you'd much rather be mopping up that last few percent of heat than you would be mopping up that last few percent of electricity.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can your rock get hot enough to produce heat for any industrial application or are there still some levels of heat that you can't reach?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Almost all of industrial heat is below temperatures of about 1500 degrees Celsius, which is all achievable or all deliverable with Antora's thermal battery. The only processes that happen at significantly higher temperatures are things like the production of graphite. Because graphite is such a high-temperature capable material, to produce it, you have to go up to these very extreme temperatures. So almost all applications can be served here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Including concrete and steel.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Including concrete and steel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Those are the big ones, right? I mean, those are the ones you want to be covering.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly. And this is a really important point about temperatures for thermal energy storage that often gets missed when you have a process that needs to have heat input to it at a certain temperature. Like, let's just say you're talking about a calcination process that's happening at 1000 degrees Celsius. So you need to deliver energy at 1000 degrees Celsius you don't get any credit for the energy you stored between 600-700 degrees Celsius because there's no way to get that heat, that lower temperature heat up into the higher temperature industrial process. Which means that whatever the temperature you process that is the floor for your thermal battery's temperature range and thermal batteries only store energy by moving the temperature of the thermal battery through a range.</p><p>Which means if you're talking about that 1000 C process, if you had a 1200 C capable thermal battery, you would be storing almost no energy in order to deliver it into a 1000 C process. Similarly, if you have a 1500 C process, you better be able to store energy at significantly above 1500 degrees Celsius. Otherwise, you're not going to have an effective storage system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>And that's something that I think is not well understood. It's not just the capability of the storage material to reach the process temperatures, it's to reach temperatures so much higher than the process temperatures that you can take the energy from that storage material and deliver it into the process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it standard to just heat the carbon up to its maximum temperature and just leave it there? And that way you can sort of, with your shutter, release varying levels of heat, but the carbon itself is just as hot as it will get at all times.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>So the carbon has to go up and down in temperature because that's what's storing the energy. So if you have heated the carbon up to 2000 C when it was really windy and there wasn't a lot of demand for electricity, let's call that 100% state of charge for the moment. Then if you're stopping charging, if you're delivering heat out of that, you're necessarily dropping the temperature because that is actually getting the heat out of the material. Which means you're going to always be having the temperature fluctuate with charge and discharge cycles. And you're going to have to be varying the opening of this shutter to make sure that the temperature and power levels that you're operating your process at remain consistent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. But if you're supplying, say, 1200 C heat out, 1200 C has to be the floor of those fluctuations. Right?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly. That becomes the floor and actually, practically you end up with a floor that's call it 100 degrees C higher than your process temperature because you still need a driving force to push heat into the process. You can think of heat kind of like pressure in water. In order to get heat flow, you have to have a temperature drop. Just like in order to get water flow, there is some pressure drop across a pipe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And let me ask this really an academic question, since I assume these batteries are designed to be charging and discharging almost continuously, I think certainly on a diurnal basis. But say you were just storing a bunch of energy as heat and not letting anything out. Say you charged it packed in as much heat as you could, closed the shutter completely and let it sit there, how long would it hold that power? Is there natural leakage?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>There's really two totally different designs you could have for a thermal battery. One which is the one that we're developing and that I would say most thermal battery companies are developing, are thermal batteries that are discharging continuously. So ours is always discharging 24 hours a day into the industrial process, and then we're intermittently charging it up and cooling it down. So you're sometimes charging and discharging simultaneously. Sometimes you're not charging, but you're still discharging because you're discharging 24/7. There's a very different type of thermal battery that would be operated where you're charging up, you're then holding that energy, and then you're discharging later.</p><p>But it turns out almost no industrial processes want to use energy intermittently. If they could use energy intermittently, they probably wouldn't need storage in the first place because they would just run when it's windy or sunny.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So presumably if you wanted to design to discharge intermittently or even to maybe hold energy over long periods of time, you would just put more insulation. Is it that simple?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly. It's as simple as that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's talk price then. If I'm an industrial process, say, in Ohio or whatever, and I build a big solar field and a big wind farm and hook them directly up to Antora batteries and then I'm getting my heat from those batteries — and my electricity too maybe if I want clean electricity — I'm getting heat and electricity out of those batteries. The heat I'm paying for out of those batteries: How does it compare, cost-wise, to the heat I could get out of a conventional natural gas boiler?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>The absolute key for determining the economics for any facility is going to be the cost of the renewable electricity. That's the input.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of course.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's two parts of it. What's the cost of the renewable electricity and then what's the amortized capital expenditure of the plant, just how much does it cost to pay back the thermal battery? And in most cases, you find that the key factor is the renewable electricity cost. And the amount you pay for that electricity also, though, depends on the characteristics of the thermal battery. For example, a thermal battery that has a very long duration capability has the ability to pick and choose when it charges more than one that has a short duration.</p><p>Similarly, one that has a faster charge rate can charge at only the best times, and one with a slower charge rate is going to get an average charge price that's higher because they can't be so picky.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Let me pause here and just spell this out a little bit for listeners in case you're not getting it. So, the price of electricity in electricity markets fluctuates constantly, and it tends to be when you have a lot of renewables in the system, the price of electricity tends to crater for this period in midday when all the sun is out, basically. And so, you have ramps down and then ramps back up price-wise out of that. And so, to the extent you can charge during that very particular period when electricity is basically free or even negative, you're going to benefit.</p><p>But if you charge more slowly, your charging cycle is going to extend into those ramps where it's getting more expensive on one side or the other. So basically, you want to be able to charge as fast as possible so that you can make maximum use of that relatively brief time when electricity is super, super cheap. Is that right?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>That is a great explanation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you can charge quickly.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>That's right. We charge quickly. We charge about three times as fast as we discharge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's just the power of carbon there. Is that why you're able to charge so fast?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>The power of carbon? Yeah, we can charge fast in part because the carbon is so thermally conductive that as you're trying to push heat into it, the heat is immediately sort of diffusing deep into the block as opposed to just getting stopped up at the surface, which would prevent you from being able to keep charging quickly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, say my industrial facilities then are in Iowa where I have a crap ton of wind and an increasing amount of solar and I have periods of negative electricity prices each day. And I have my industrial facility, I have my Antora batteries and my Antora batteries are charging with renewable energy during those periods of super cheap electricity. Then what's the economics of the heat relative to a natural gas boiler?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>We can beat natural gas long term in all of those areas that have high renewables penetration. And that is, I can't emphasize enough what a big deal that is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, natural gas heat is very cheap. That's the whole dilemma of this space.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>That's right. And natural gas heat in the United States is some of the cheapest in the world. So when we're talking about being able to go into an industrial facility in Iowa or Texas, we could be sitting next to Henry Hub, the trading hub, and in the future still be able to undercut natural gas on price. Which is really remarkable and that's without any sort of subsidy or green premium or anyone having to care about the climate attributes of the battery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's just by virtue of the fact that renewable energy gets very cheap in these markets, gets super, super freakishly cheap. When you say you can beat natural gas, is there a cut off on the price of electricity that makes that possible? Like do you need negatively priced electricity to do that or is it cheap will be enough, super cheap? Like is there a level there, a cut off?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Well, the really simple math to go through with some approximations here is that $10 per megawatt hour, which is one cent per kilowatt hour, corresponds to about $3 per MMBTU. And I use that unit because that's how most natural gas is traded in these areas. As you might be familiar, Henry Hub has fluctuated somewhere between $3 and $5 per MMBTU for a long time. If you account for any sort of industrial energy price, which usually has some basis, some step up in price versus the actual trading hub, you end up with natural gas that's call it $6 per MMBTU.</p><p>If you then apply the efficiency of the boiler, the actual price of the heat coming out of the steam, for instance, coming out, is between $7 and $8 per MMBTU. So immediately you can see that you need an electricity price — even if your thermal battery was free and 100% efficient — you need electricity that is cheaper than call it $20 a megawatt hour to be competitive with that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And that's very cheap.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>And that's just the energy conversion. Like, none of that was technology specific. The good news is almost all thermal batteries are included, are very efficient in the 90s. So you don't take a big efficiency hit there. Then it's just a matter of, can you get the electricity cheap enough, and is your thermal battery cheap enough?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. In terms of cheap electricity, you're not worried at all that that super cheap electricity is a weird artifact of the way we structure markets today? You're not worried that's going to go away? I mean, presumably with more and more renewables on the system, there's just going to be more and more of these periods of excess production you think?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>That's right. There are going to be many periods, and there already are when the renewables do line up with demand and that energy is really valuable. And so you're going to end up wanting to install more solar and wind to cover those periods. But then you're just, along with that, going to get a bunch of energy that comes at periods where the grid is already saturated, and that's going to be very low value power. And that's the power that we want to soak up. And I really want to emphasize the difference there between the charging price is not necessarily the same as the levelized cost of energy of the solar and wind, because you're looking at some of the energy from the solar and wind going to the grid to some productive use that commands a relatively high price and then some of it coming at these wrong times when there's over generation and that is at a very low price. So the price some of the time is going to be lower than the levelized cost of energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what about the electricity? So I'm that same industrial production facility in Iowa, you can get me heat cheaper than natural gas boilers, which is a big deal. What if I choose to get my electricity out of those Antora batteries rather than off the grid. What's the kind of the typical price differential there?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>So when we look at supplying heat and electricity to an industrial site, we end up with an overall cost that is cheaper than buying natural gas for the heat and buying grid electricity for the electricity. Now, there's a little bit of a question of do you call that the electricity being cheaper and the heat being equivalent or do you say that the other way around? So you can kind of put it into one bucket or the other, but the outcome is a combined energy bill that is lower than a conventional energy bill would be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that is true anywhere where there are enough renewables on the system to produce these periods of kind of overproduction which, god willing, will be everywhere soon enough.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly. And that's the bet that we're making as a company, and that I certainly hope comes true for our sake, but also for climate's sake. Because right now there are a few places in the world, like some of the windy areas in the Midwest where this makes sense today. We see the signs already and a bunch of other geographies of as more and more renewables come online, the economics of a thermal battery like this making more and more sense. But we are absolutely counting on that, extending beyond the geographies where it makes sense today, to nearly every geography over the course of the coming decade.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And it seems like it just unlocks so much for renewable energy developers. Because if I'm building a solar field in Texas now during midday, my solar is competing with all the other solar and I basically am losing money on it. So I'm only kind of making money on my solar on these weird shoulder periods. But if I can take all that electricity during that peak period and sell it to a heat battery, that means I'm selling all my electricity rather than just ride the shoulder periods.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's just huge for renewable energy developers. This seems like such a huge thing. It's just like here's another sink —</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>into which you can dump all your renewable energy regardless of timing.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly. This is such an important point. We are working with and have partnered with some of the biggest renewable energy companies in the world. And what they are seeing right now is that the primary impediment to continuing to deploy renewables in the areas that have great renewable resources is the fact that a huge chunk of their power is now worthless.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. It's getting curtailed.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly. So if we can put a price floor on that power, even one that's very low, it enables far more renewable development than would otherwise be able to happen in those regions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And this is a point I made also in that previous pod, which is there's enough demand for industrial heat to soak up all the excess renewables that you want to generate. Like this is not a small sink we're talking about, right? Like if you can get all of industrial heat onto thermal batteries rather than natural gas boilers then you're never going to curtail renewable energy again. Right? Like you're never going to waste another electron of renewable energy. You're going to have all the demand you need out to the horizon.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It would basically end curtailment.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>That's right. And that requires you to have thermal batteries that can charge quickly, as we talked about, it requires having thermal batteries in the same geographies and have some overlap between the generation and those energy intensive industries. But I think that is where we are going to continue to see energy intensive industries move as they always have to where energy is the cheapest. And in the past that was where is the fossil fuel the cheapest, where are those molecules coming out of the ground. And in the future that's going to be where are you going to have a lot of excess wind and solar production that can drive these energy intensive processes.</p><p>So the great news for the United States by the way is we have some of those best resources in places like the midwestern United States. So, I think you're going to see a pretty dramatic reindustrialization of a lot of these regions because they're going to have the cheapest energy on the planet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, the new oil, the new energy geography. Who has the intense wind and sunlight and where? Yeah, I was talking with John in that previous pod about: Long term you can imagine the physical migration of industry to these areas where there's lots of sun and wind, which would be a total sort of just a mind-blowing reconceiving of industrial geography. That's just like a huge social and economic shift. I think that's on the way. We're running out of time but I wanted to ask this. You just have the battery, you say you're charging the battery from renewable energy but there's nothing that requires the energy going in to be renewable.</p><p>Like theoretically you could just charge your battery off-grid power. What percent of your batteries do you think are going to be saying we're charging on renewable energy based on either RECs or hourly RECs. We're just charging off-grid electricity but we're doing some sort of financing scheme where we're just paying for renewables which is what most businesses that are running on, quote unquote, 100% renewables are doing today versus developers actually building wind and solar off-grid and just attaching them directly to these batteries. At which point you could say clearly and incontrovertibly we're using renewable energy.</p><p>What do you think is going to be the balance of those two?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>I would say there's one in between that's important to talk about which is where you're building renewables, you have local renewables that are splitting their production where some of the production, the low value production is going to the thermal battery and the high value production is being sent to the grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So grid connected, but that would be a grid connected renewables.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>That's right, grid connected but still directly connected and hourly matched to the thermal load or to the industrial load.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. So the renewable energy developer, again, this is like financially such a big deal for renewable energy developers. It basically is like here's a second market that's going to sop up the power that I was not going to be able to sell previously. So you have two customers there. But do you think — I'm trying to figure out whether to be excited about this idea of off-grid renewables. Do you anticipate people building? Because one of the roadblocks now for renewables, one of the big impediments is the slow interconnection process is the difficulty of getting connected to the grid.</p><p>And this is as you're well aware, a subject of much angst these days. And one of the main things slowing down renewable energy buildout, what these heat batteries enable is you could just build all the renewable energy you want and hook it directly to these batteries and then you don't have to worry about the grid, you don't have to worry about interconnection, you don't have to wait for interconnection. Do you anticipate that being a big piece of this, a big market for this just off-grid renewables connected directly to thermal batteries?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yes, we think there's going to be a fair amount of that in the future. We have some projects in our pipeline that are exactly that; off-grid renewables being turned into industrial energy without those electrons ever touching the grid. But we do think that the highest value you can do is to allow those electrons at the times when they're really needed on the grid to flow to the grid rather than to thermal battery. Because that's the whole beauty of having thermal batteries. You don't always need those electrons going to that process. You could give them to the grid if the grid is really needing that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's right, the grid is handy. It's nice to have. I'm just saying — this would not be like a blank sheet of paper thing you would do. This would just be a response to grid congestion basically. It would just be a response to interconnection dysfunction.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yeah, and to be clear, in this case, the grid is really handy. It's more that we could help the grid at those times if we were connected rather than we're relying on the grid to fill in. It's really the addition there. But if you have a use for the electricity that's behind the meter and not related to interconnection, you can imagine how this provides a really useful hedge too against interconnection delays because you might be able to fund projects that have some sort of interconnection risk or timeline risk where there's still a use for that energy at an industrial site.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you could say I'm going to build this and use it to power heat batteries until I'm allowed to interconnect.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. That alone would just throw open the doors. I mean, what do they say, there's like a terawatt of renewable energy projects waiting in the interconnection queue. If you could just soak all that up with heat batteries while we're waiting for interconnection. That is a lot of renewable energy to unlock.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Give us a little sort of like reading on where Antora is now. You've built a commercial scale battery that is operating commercially. What stage are you at and what's next?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yeah, so we've built one of our modular thermal batteries. So it's a modular unit, but we only have one of them so far. We've deployed that, it is operating at a pilot facility and we are now ready to go to larger scale commercial customers. So we just recently leased a facility to start the manufacturing of those thermal batteries and we're going to be delivering those to much larger customers that need multiples of them rather than just a single one in the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Every time I talk to a new company with a new type of product, part of what you need to break into markets is good technology, but part of what you need is financing. And big money is notoriously conservatively, right. It wants to finance boring, proven things here. And this is a battery that can output heat and electricity is a new thing in the world. How long do you think it's going to take to get big financiers comfortable with this so that you can get your cost of capital down?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>It's a great question. It's one we're always thinking about how to accelerate the path to low cost of capital with big financial players. We're already working with a number of big firms that do finance these sorts of projects. It's key to mention that while we have talked a lot about the thermal battery that does both heat and electricity, which is great, and a very important part of industrial decarbonization comes with some big economic advantages in the future. Our first product is a thermal battery that outputs heat only, just like most other thermal batteries do. And in that case, the technology that we're looking at here is a very simple, boring technology.</p><p>What we're doing looks pretty much the same as an industrial graphitization furnace that is running at a far lower temperature, but just that also has these insulated doors that can open and close to release some of that energy on demand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, like storing heat in rocks. Goes back centuries, you could say.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Yes, and we love that. It's actually funny. We get this all the time. Potential investors in our company or project financiers that they almost seem embarrassed to call our technology simple. And they're like, "Well, I'm sure there's been a lot of work put into it, but is that really all there is to it? Is it that simple?" And we're always like, "Yes. It's a matter of pride for us to create a simple technology. We don't want to be engineers."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's my favorite thing about this whole space. Like, I could sit down a fifth grader and explain how this works. There's no advanced physics here. You heat the rock up and then you get the heat back out of the rock.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly. So we have a phase two that involves some new technology that solves a second part of the decarbonization puzzle for industry. But the first product is a pretty boring box with some hot carbon blocks in it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because it's so simple, it's not obvious where you'd get innovation. Right? I mean, I can imagine costs coming down with scale and with manufacturing scale, obviously, and capital getting cheaper, obviously. I can imagine ways that the costs could go down. But in terms of technological innovation, where do you see room to improve? Or do you or do you think this is, like, good to go?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>The first product doesn't have that much complexity in it. There are a lot of ways that we're going to continue improving the manufacturing process, bringing the cost down over time, but there's nothing big and fancy and shiny and new that's going to be introduced into that process. It's a lot of the just unglamorous engineering of working through supply chains to squeeze costs and improving manufacturing in the factory. I think it is important that it is made in a factory. I think that's been one of the lessons of climate technologies thus far, that we're not doing each of these as a bespoke construction project, that we're making them in a standardized way in a centralized place and then shipping them to customers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You got to hop on that learning curve.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Exactly. So that's the first product. In the second product, which includes the thermophotovoltaics to make electricity as well, that's where there's a lot of really interesting technologies that we're pursuing right now to bring that cost down. And the reason why that product is being released a little later is to give time for all of those kind of fancier engineering things to make sure that we can produce them at very low costs and high efficiency. And to have shown the reliability.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that mostly around the TPV itself? Is that mostly around the thermophotovoltaics themselves, that you're going to be doing those tweaks?</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>That's right. It's photovoltaics, which are well understood, but it is a photovoltaic that has some unique properties. The high power density that we mentioned, the ability to reflect the unusable light. So this is new. Anytime you're scaling up a new technology, it's going to take some time. But the first product doesn't really have any new technology in it, which allows us to move much faster.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, well, Andrew, thanks so much for coming on. This is a real delight for me. I love this whole space. I love the shutters with light coming out. And I love all of this. So thanks for coming on and talking it through with us. And good luck to you.</p><p><strong>Andrew Ponec</strong></p><p>Wonderful. Absolutely. A pleasure. Thank you so much and looking forward to chatting again sometime soon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volt.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-super-battery-aimed-at-decarbonizing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:137559683</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 22 Oct 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/137559683/4653f350f2dd2d131ed2f7615afe57be.mp3" length="79087899" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3953</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/137559683/106b5e85111dc23bbc045ae05124d1f7.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Minnesota forces transportation planners to take climate change seriously]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Minnesota State Representative Larry Kraft shares about the state’s ambitious, progressive transportation policy, which includes climate accountability measures that no other state has implemented.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACkGgM0qe3aoEM1N42jq3oZa/volts23.09.27%28larry.kraft%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/minnesota-forces-transportation-planners-to-take-climate-change-seriously"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In 2022, Democrats narrowly <a target="_blank" href="https://www.mprnews.org/story/2022/11/09/minnesota-democrats-win-capitol-trifecta">won a trifecta in Minnesota</a> — House, Senate, and governor — whereupon they launched into an absolute <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2023/06/minnesota-democrats-progressive-laws">frenzy of activity</a>, passing bills on everything from abortion to paid leave to gun control to free school lunch to clean energy. Vanity Fair <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2023/06/minnesota-democrats-progressive-laws">called it</a> a “tour de force for progressive legislation.”</p><p>I covered the state’s new clean-energy law on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/minnesota-sets-out-for-net-zero-emissions#details">a previous pod</a>, but I also wanted to take a closer look at the <a target="_blank" href="https://kstp.com/kstp-news/top-news/minnesota-legislature-passes-transportation-bill-with-delivery-fees-gas-tax-increase/">big transportation bill that was signed in May</a>. It passed somewhat under the radar, but it’s got some very cool stuff in it. </p><p>One key feature is that it requires both state and municipal transportation-planning agencies to take the state’s climate goals into account when assessing new projects — to hold themselves accountable to those goals. As obvious as that may seem, it’s not something any other state has done. </p><p>To discuss the significance of this and some other provisions of the bill, I contacted one of its primary authors, first-term state Representative Larry Kraft (D). We talked about what these changes mean for transportation planners, the kinds of transportation projects that can reduce emissions, the new money the state will raise for public transit, and the state’s new e-bike incentive (!).</p><p>By the way, if you enjoy this conversation, you should know that Kraft co-hosts a podcast of his own, on climate policy in small and mid-sized cities. It’s called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cityclimatecorner.com/">City Climate Corner</a>, with co-host Abby Finis. Check it out.</p><p>All right, then, with no further ado, Representative Larry Kraft of Minnesota. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Oh, my gosh. Thank you for having me. I'm super excited to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is cool. You are a freshman legislator. You entered the Minnesota legislature in 2022, last year. It's sort of hilarious to me: You slipstreamed into the most exciting and productive legislative session for Democrats in living memory that I'm aware of. Like, I hope, you know, on some level, this is not what politics is normally like, Larry.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yeah, I have good timing. And I tell you, I hear that. And what I tell people is, you know "I'm sure you're right. But at this point, it's all I know. So let's keep going."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you just go in and you start passing bills, changing things right and left, wow. The Minnesota success story, I think people have heard a lot about it by now. There's more bills than you can shake a stick at, more progress, just a wild amount of progress. But let's focus on transportation. So Minnesota is similar to many other states in that transportation has become the largest source of greenhouse gases in the state. I think it's 25% —</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yeah, 25, 27%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>— in Minnesota. So this is sort of my overall impression: Especially at the state level, is there's been this sort of, like, parallel tracks going for a while now of on the one side, happy climate talk, which ends up mostly focused on the easy stuff, which is electricity, right? And then transportation over here on this other track just expanding, getting more and more carbon intensive willy nilly, and the twain have not really met. So this is like what's happening in Minnesota, really. To my mind, maybe Colorado got there a little bit ahead of you. But really what's happening in Minnesota is the first time that people grappling with climate change really are taking on transportation in a serious way.</p><p>So let's start by just talking about what kind of targets are on the books in Minnesota now, prior to this transportation bill. Let's just talk about sort of like, what targets have been set in terms of greenhouse gases and in terms of VMT, vehicle miles traveled.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Right. So in 2007, Minnesota passed. Actually, it was a bipartisan bill on climate that set state goals as 80% emission reductions, greenhouse gas emissions reductions by 2050, and then set some interim targets. In this last session, we updated that to be net zero by 2050. And then on the transportation side, there's been folks that have been working on this for a few years and set a vehicle miles traveled reduction goal of 20% reduction per capita by 2050 and 14% by 2040.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are those targets, are these sort of aspirational things, or are those binding in some way? Are those statutorily binding?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>They were not statutorily binding. It was in a climate action framework that the governor initiated that the VMT target started. But I think what we did this session was to give some teeth behind them and some mechanism to actually achieve them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So before we get to that, let's talk a little bit about RMI. Rocky Mountain Institute did a big study basically looking at what would happen for Minnesota were it to hit those VMT goals, what would be the sort of economic effect, say a little bit about those conclusions and how it came to those conclusions, like why those things would happen.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>RMI came and did a presentation about what was going on in Colorado early in our session. And then we're doing the analysis on Minnesota. But what they said was, if we could hit the vehicle mile travel goal of 20% reduction per capita by 2050, it would save Minnesotans $91 billion. And that was from a mix of things like just number one, not needing to drive as much and the cost of cars being $10,000 - $11,000 per year. Saving money there, but also a lot on the health side by the fact that you'd see a reduction in air pollution and the savings that would come from that and then also just from not as many people dying on the roads would be a significant savings.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So $91 billion cumulatively for the state, which I think I saw, RMI broke it down. It's like $3 something billion a year, which is not a small thing in a state the size of Minnesota.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>No, it is not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this is a worthy goal. So you passed this big transportation bill. It has a bunch of stuff in it, a lot of things. But what I found most intriguing is the requirements it puts on transportation planning agencies. So explain to us what the Minnesota Department of Transportation has to do now that it didn't have to do before this bill passed. What is the new regime?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Right. So it starts by saying that MnDOT — MnDOT is how we refer to it — has to set greenhouse gas emission reduction goals statewide, commensurate with the overall state goals, and then has to split them out regionally in a way that makes sense. And specifically that means in certain areas of the state, more metropolitan, there's going to be a bigger opportunity to reduce emissions and VMT than there may be in some greater Minnesota areas. So it has to start by doing that. And then what it has to do is look at if there are new projects on its system that were to increase capacity or increase VMT and emissions, that it then will have to offset them in some other way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I want to get to that. But it also puts this same obligation on municipal planning organizations, does it not? So at the state level and then also at the municipal level.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>It requires for the metropolitan regional planning organizations, especially in the Twin Cities area, which is the seven-county area around Minneapolis and St. Paul, it's about 55% of our population. So yes, it does that there. And then the other piece of it is for the metropolitan area, that organization has to incorporate those targets into its regional plan such that cities that are part of the region have to incorporate the climate targets as well as the VMT and greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets and transportation into their comprehensive plans.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's kind of a fractal thing here. The Minnesota Department of Transportation has to plan around these emission goals and then, at the smaller level, the municipal organizations do. And specifically, the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council has to incorporate that in its city planning.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's kind of funny. Like these states pass these greenhouse gas targets, which you would just assume, well, of course, the transportation agencies have to take those into account too. Like, why wouldn't they? But as far as I know, this is the first — I mean, this goes beyond even what Colorado did, I think, doesn't it? I mean, are you aware of another state that has formalized this kind of thing for its transportation planners?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Not in the same way that we have. I think there are pieces of it and we certainly learned a lot from Colorado. We talked to them and we modeled the way we were starting from a lot of things that they were doing. But we definitely really thought about there was a piece of this that was transportation focused on MnDOT and the fact that you have to address land use to really get at long-term transportation emissions reductions. And so there was another part of the bill and initially started as two separate bills, but the other part was very focused on land use and how do we incorporate that? And then, they came together.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. And the land use stuff is mostly down at the regional and municipal level, right? I mean, that's where most of those decisions are made.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And now those decisions have to be made with greenhouse gas goals in mind.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It seems to me on some intuitive level that if you have a project that is going to expand highway capacity, it is almost by definition going to increase greenhouse gases and vehicle miles traveled, is it not? And so if the state goal is fairly rapid reduction in greenhouse gases in VMTs, it looks like the implication is you just need to stop building new highway additions. I assume that's not what's going to happen. So how does that work out? How do you do an addition to highway capacity that doesn't increase VMT or GHGs?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>So the interesting thing is in working through some of the objections on this with the city and county engineers, they analyze some previous projects and sometimes you have a project where you're maybe expanding capacity, but it eliminates a lot of congestion that has flowed over onto other roads. So the GHG emissions might in some cases not be negative or might not be all that negative. VMT is a little bit of a different story. So what the bill provides then is that if there are increases from induced demand or whatever, that they then have a prescribed set of things that they can do to offset that.</p><p>Ideally first within the project themselves, maybe it's by adding more transit, maybe it's by adding some micromobility or some bicycle pedestrian infrastructure, but there's a set of things that can be done to offset any induced demand increase.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let me pause on this induced demand question, because this is one of the sort of long-running issues in transportation. One of the long-running controversies is that the Greens are always yelling that these state departments of transportation make these completely unrealistic calculations. Like if we add another lane to this highway, it will ease congestion and everyone will flow faster. And then inevitably what happens is you add the lane, more traffic comes to fill up the lane, congestion remains as bad or worse than ever. This repeats over and over and over again. So who's going to be sort of in charge of the analysis, I guess is what I'm asking?</p><p>Who is making the calculation about whether and how much a project will reduce or increase those metrics?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>That is the responsibility of the Department of Transportation. That said, they do have to publish the results of the analysis on any project on their website, so there's a transparency that's required within it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so people can check. Are they cognizant of this induced demand thing? Would you say that they're relatively progressive in the way they do these calculations? Because state departments of transportation vary very widely across the country.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, I will say that I think they are and they were a willing partner as we created this legislation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They're not going crazy in opposition? That's another thing I was going to ask about. This seems like this would be exactly the kind of thing they hate. What was their sort of disposition around it?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>You know, because there had been work done over the past several years in Minnesota on this stuff. A few years ago, they brought in someone by the name of Tim Sexton who's the Assistant Commissioner of Sustainability Planning and Program Management. So I don't know how many DOTs have someone with that title, but he's explicitly focused on this kind of area. So they kind of knew that something like this might be coming and had thought through and were prepared to have good discussions on it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So the party that is proposing the expansion of the highway is the party that will be responsible for offsetting its emissions. So, who is that party? Is that generally a private developer? Is that the state? Or, who exactly is the person or entity in charge of these expansions?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>This is one of the things we had to work through in that it happens in different ways. Sometimes it is the DOT themselves that's doing it, but often it may be a regional planning organization or a city or a county where the funding is coming through. So they're responsible for thinking through what happens with their project. And the way this works is ideally you would find a way to offset it within the project itself. But if they can't for some reason it is possible then to offset any increases in a series of other ways of looking at things in areas that are more challenged from an environmental justice perspective or elsewhere within the region. Or even if not, they can look statewide.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hmm. So if I'm I don't know a city in Minnesota and I'm proposing to widen the highway coming into the city, so I submit that project to the state DOT, state DOT, analyzes it and says "this will in fact increase greenhouse gas emissions and VMT." So I, the city planner, then first look at the project itself and try to figure out how to do it more lightly. Or then I look around at other things I could do in my city. And then if worse comes to worse, I look around statewide and I'd find projects that what reduce VMT and greenhouse gases.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>There is an interlinking process that's specified, and so it looks at things that you can do locally, but if not, you can connect with other projects or other actions elsewhere within the state that would reduce emissions. So, maybe you can't reduce emissions where you are, but maybe there's something else you can interlink with that is where transit is being added or where additional pedestrian or bicycle infrastructure is being added in another project. And so you can interlink the projects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so, what are these offsets like? What are the sorts of things if I'm the city planner and I'm trying to offset the increases from my highway widening, what are the kinds of things that are on the table here?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Right, so there are nine of them listed right now. One is a transit expansion. Another is transit service improvements, active transportation infrastructure, micromobility infrastructure like shared vehicle services, transportation demand management like van pool or shared vehicle programs, parking management, changing production of parking requirements, parking cost adjustments, land use could be residential or other density increases, mixed-use development, transit-oriented development, Infrastructure improvements related to traffic operations like roundabouts or reduced conflict intersections. And then also one for natural systems in the area such as prairie restoration, reforestation, urban green space. So those are the things that are envisioned right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. And all of those are sort of within a city's power because I'm just sort of imagining these sort of cross jurisdictional. I mean, one of the big problems with transportation policies, I'm sure you're aware, is it crosses over so many overlapping jurisdictions and overlapping areas of control. I'm just wondering if it's always going to be in an individual city's power to make all these other changes, is it going to have to collaborate with other agencies or other levels of government?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yeah, so in many cases they will have to. And as we work through this, this is a process that happens quite a bit today of coordination across regions. But one of the requests from the city and county engineers and the Department of Transportation was to create a working group, which has started meeting, to figure out in more detail how impact mitigation can happen, how there can be a trading between different projects. So one of the things we did in the legislation was create this working group that's meeting now and will come back with recommendations on how to implement this in specific by the end of the year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it will be the state DOT that is also responsible for assessing those mitigations and putting a number on them, sort of quantifying them?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yep.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The reductions have to outweigh — this is another question I had: When you say the project has to be in line with the state goals, you could read that a couple of ways. One, you could just say, "well, it can't increase greenhouse gases and VMTs." It has to reduce them. But to be in line with the state's goals, the state's goals require relatively rapid reduction. So, is there a case where a project will have to mitigate more than all of its increases?</p><p>Do you know what I mean? How much does it have to decrease them, or does it just have to come in negative at all?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Well, I think the way we worded it was such that the projects had to be consistent with MnDOT meeting its goals. So that does envision some level of reduction, not just offsetting. So the portfolio of projects that are being done have to be meeting these reduction goals. So there is some level of emissions reductions that would be envisioned in that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And one thing I didn't hear among the list of mitigation actions was anything about EVs, just getting more EVs on the road. How do you see that? I mean, obviously that's not going to do anything for VMTs, right? It will do something for greenhouse gases. How do you see EVs fitting into all this? Are they going to be one of the tools in the toolbox of the sort of city that's contemplating something like this, or do you want to keep that separate?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Well, initially we had kept that separate. It's possible that this working group can come and say, hey, look, we'd like to include it for X reason, but I think EV is super important and we need to hit that hard as well. But part of the reason for this is that the transition to EVs won't happen fast enough in order to reduce emissions to where we need to. And so VMT is really important to do that as well. Additionally, by getting at VMT reduction, we make the transition to electrification easier and faster.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>So we're keeping that separate to focus this on the infrastructure I would say. But you know, we'll see if someone proposes a unique way to incorporate it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Minnesota, though, has separate EV policies, though, right?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yes, we know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>At this point, I'm repeating myself a little bit, but I just want to underline that it is a little wild that this is the first time a state has told its Department of Transportation: "No, we're really serious about those goals we passed. We really mean it. Act on them, take them seriously." You're the first state to do this. You said you worked with MnDOT productively. Have you gotten feedback from the city level, the municipal level? I'm sort of curious what city level policymakers think of this, because in some sense, it's going to be mostly cities where this plays out.</p><p>It's mostly cities where these mitigation actions are going to be taking place, adding bike lanes and whatnot. Have you gotten feedback from the municipal level?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yeah, I would say cities and counties. So, yes, as we worked through this legislation, there was a lot of interaction at the city and county level on the traffic planning side, met a lot with city and county engineers, and one of their biggest concerns was how would this impact projects that they were working on?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Currently working on?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Currently work on. Like, "Oh, my gosh, I'm doing route X Y and you're going to make me stop." So one of the things that we did is said, "No, look, it's not reasonable for us — with an engineer, if you've got something planned out, the last thing you want to do is throw them a wrench midway or close to the end of the project." So we dealt with that by saying, "Look, this is going to start in February of 2025 for anything that's not in an advanced stage of design. So you have time to think about it, you have time to plan it into your process."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Another issue that was raised quite a bit was around safety and was pushed a lot to say, "Hey, we should exempt projects if they were being done just for safety reasons." And after some thought, I really pushed back pretty strongly against that because that would be putting safety against greenhouse gas or vehicle miles traveled reductions. Like, you can do one or the other, but you can't do both together. And that's just not true. We have to do both. And in fact, in many ways, doing vehicle mile traveled reductions will increase safety. It's been shown to do that.</p><p>So the real thought was, look, just as safety is one of the foundational things that you must do in transportation planning, we're elevating these greenhouse gas VMT climate considerations to be at a similar level. So when you plan a project, it has to be done with safety as well as with climate considerations. They also came back about the Mitigation Working group. That was a thing that they worked on with MnDOT, proposed back to me that we could really use time and a group to think of exactly how this is going to work and exactly how the trading across projects would work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a lot of devils in those details, I would imagine.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Right. And also, not something necessarily that from a legislator that I could go in and say, "Boy, this is how it needs to work." It was obvious that when they came up with this idea, it was a really good idea. So we put that in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I could see this going a lot of different ways. The whole discussion about offsets generally is, I think, there's a lot of suspicion about offsets, and this is a different kind of offset, a different context. But some of the problems still seem to apply, which is, are all the entities proposing projects going to be flooding to the same cheapest, lowest hanging fruit offsets? Which I'm not sure what those would be. Maybe just like a car sharing program or a van sharing program, just the easiest. Do you think this is actually going to sink its teeth deep enough to get big projects in the works, like big new light rail or serious density or serious rezoning?</p><p>Do you think this is going to prompt the kind of big bold things that need to happen at the city level to really change the transportation landscape?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>That's a great question. I do think it will change the way people think about transportation projects. I remember one of the meetings I had with the city and county engineers and they said, "You know, we can't really do this well unless we deal with land use." I'm like, "Absolutely." Now, that said, you kind of made it sound these big, huge projects. I do think at the same time, this year we put a lot of money behind our mouth here in that we created a new sales tax within the metro area that's going to generate $440 million for transit and then ramp up from there per year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's in the Twin Cities area.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Tell me a little bit about that tax, because a new tax is obviously a big thing, controversial. How did that come about? Was this just looking for revenue sources for transit?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>The transportation committee — and this was in the house led by chair Frank Hornstein — was looking at the full transportation needs across the state. And we had been, I would say, underfunding transportation for a number of years. So there was a big gap and there was a number of mechanisms, fees and things we used to close the gap. And for transit, especially in the seven county metro area, was a three-quarter cent sales tax, of which most of that goes to transit. And so that was the key way of addressing the money we need on an ongoing basis for transit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, a sales tax, as I'm sure you're aware, is one of the most regressive forms of tax. Were there other kinds of taxes discussed? More progressive taxes? Like, I live in Washington, in Seattle, where we don't even have income taxes, and so we end up funding everything with sales taxes. And this is a source of great angst for our local progressives, because on the one hand, you want to do good things, but on the other hand, you don't want to crank up the financial pressure on the poorest people to do them. So did you hash through those issues?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>There were a lot of things that were looked at. This was the one that was doable. And I will say I totally agree that in general, sales taxes are regressive, but so is lack of transit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's true.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Really regressive. We heard a story of one math teacher, middle school math teacher, whose car broke down and used to take 20 minutes, half an hour to get to work and then in transit was taking an hour and a half to 2 hours. So that is incredibly regressive. And so it's certainly an issue, we think, with where this money is being directed, that it makes sense and maybe for where we're at overcomes the regressive nature of the tax.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And is this tax money devoted to transit by law or is there room, fuzziness in there?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>It's devoted by law.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this all goes to transit.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Just to clarify that the three-quarter cent sales tax, I think it was five-eights of it go to transit. And then the remaining one eight, I think, is for roads and bridges in the area.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So most of it for transit.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yep.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And for those of us who don't have the pleasure of living in Minnesota, what's the transit situation now? You got the Twin Cities area, is your big metro area. Is there light rail? Are there subways? Are we talking about mostly buses here? Like, what is this money going to be going to?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>It's a combination. There is light rail that's expanding, and there's buses and a lot of new bus rapid transit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And isn't there somewhere in the bill a big long distance passenger rail line, am I making that up?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>No. No, you're not. There is. Looking at a passenger rail line from Minnesota to Duluth. Duluth is about two and a half hours to the north of us, right on Lake Superior. So there's a line there. And then it's also investigating a line that would go from Minneapolis up to Fargo-Moorhead area.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Are those high-speed or are they just normal Amtrak rail?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>They're not high-speed in the sense I mean, the one to Duluth, I think the top speed would be around 90 miles an hour or so. 90 - 100 miles an hour.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not like French or Amsterdam.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>No. Or the Japanese bullet trains. Not that fast, but still pretty good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay. See, aside from this new requirement on transportation planning agencies, which is a novel thing in the world, as far as I'm aware, there's a bunch of other stuff in this transportation bill, as you say, there's a new sales tax which is devoted mostly to transit. What are some of the other, I mean, this thing is a bit of a transportation Christmas tree. There's all sorts of delights in there. What are some of the other pieces that are worth sharing?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>The other pieces to this is that we connect to the metropolitan area. So within the metropolitan area, the Metropolitan Council, which is our regional planning organization, needs to take the targets developed by MnDOT and build them into their regional climate action plan, and then those become guidelines for each city's comprehensive plan the next time they do comprehensive plans. And that will happen in the 2026 to 2028 timeframe for comprehensive plans for cities that go through 2050.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>So they will have to now build in climate considerations as well as land use transportation to match the things that MnDOT has put together.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's new?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>That is new.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I meant to ask this before, and we were talking about mitigation measures, but I would assume that zoning changes qualify here as mitigation measures. Or do we know that yet? Has that remained to be seen?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Well, there's certainly specifics to be worked out, but that would fall under the land use mitigation action. So yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, because I know there's been a lot of good work in the Minneapolis area on this stuff already.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yes, Minneapolis has done some land use changes in their 2040 comprehensive plan.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And there's some money for bike and pedestrian infrastructure. What's that look like? How does that play out?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yes, there's a bunch of money for active transportation, grants and the like. And then there's also a new program for e-bikes, a rebate program for e-bikes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everybody's favorite. How big, what's that look like?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>I think it's 2-3 million a year for the next couple of years, and then we'll see how that goes. And I imagine — It's interesting, it's one of the things I get asked about the most is, "Hey, when's the e-bike credit available?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>People are fascinated by this whole subject.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>So we'll see; that might run out quickly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's just like point of sale rebates type of thing. And I know Colorado piled some of its own EV rebates on top of the federal EV rebates. Have you guys done that at all?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>We did. That was not in a transportation bill. The EV rebates were in our energy bill. And we put rebates in for new vehicles, I think $2500, and used $600. And we kind of matched the federal guidelines to what kind of vehicles they would apply to. So for the new vehicles, it's anything under $55,000 in sales price and for the used, anything under $25,000.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. What about equity? Obviously when transportation, energy or transportation honestly, equity is hovering around that discussion, it's inevitably the most vulnerable and the poorest communities that suffer the most from transportation pollution tend to have the least access to transportation choices, et cetera, et cetera. What sorts of things are built into this bill to address the equity question?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>That was a really key part of this. And when we look at the mitigation aspects for mitigating an increase in emissions if it's not doable within the project itself, the first place that a project is expected to look is within an area that's been impacted by environmental justice issues in the past. And maybe that's living close to a highway and subject to higher degrees of air pollution or lack of access to transit or anything that folks have been impacted on an environmental justice perspective. So that's the first place that folks are supposed to look for mitigation. And after that then you go to other areas within the region and statewide. So we tried to build that in the plan right up front.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You know, I threw this out on Twitter. One question I got a lot of which I think is on the mind of anyone who has been involved in these sorts of programs, which is: What about accountability? So say I'm proposing a highway widening project. MnDOT runs the numbers, tells me it's going to increase VMT. And so I'm looking around for mitigation measures. I spend a bunch of money on, I don't know, a vanshare program in a low income community. And then, you know, "based on our projections that will reduce VMTs X amount, you're clear to go build your project."</p><p>Is someone following up to see if the program, the vanshare program, actually does reduce VMTs? In other words, is this all prospective, or is there some follow up here to ensure that these targets are actually being met?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Well, that's a great question. And as this is not yet implemented, we have some thinking to do on how that happens. But because this is an overall goal for MnDOT overall and many of the mitigation actions are around greenhouse gas emissions and VMT within their network, I think there's somewhat of a built in tracking mechanism built in that they have to keep looking at that. But as we get to some other mitigation actions that maybe go outside of that, I don't think yet we have in the legislation, about how do we make sure that that happens and follows through? It's something that is worth thinking about as we implement this in the coming years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I was wondering the same thing. You tell a city to account for these things, but what happens if the city doesn't? Is there a stick here if either MnDOT or the sort of municipal organizations don't do this or don't do it well, is there a penalty?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Not currently in the legislation here. But some of these processes that are being worked —like with I talked about that the cities would have to build in things into their comprehensive plans. That's an existing process. One of the things that we tried to do with this is build it into an existing process that folks were used to working, and where there's some back and forth that happens in accountability in multiple cycles of the processes. So that's the hope with it. We'll have to see, as this gets implemented if there's other sticks and things that are needed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I was also wondering if there are and maybe this is something to think about in the future, too, if there are carrots for municipal regions or counties that go beyond what's targeted, sort of above and beyond what's expected based on these goals, are there inducements to exceed these targets?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a great question, and I always prefer carrots to sticks. So though sometimes you need both of them. I think one of the things that the working group has said is: "Look, we're going down this path and we think we might want to ask you to provide more money to be able to do some of these mitigations." And I've told them: "Look, I'm open to kind of revisit this and propose some things as we figure out how this is going to be implemented." So I think it's likely that something like that will happen, but we'll see.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let me ask you then about the politics of all this. Kind of famously, Democrats won a trifecta in Minnesota in 2022 and are going hog wild doing stuff which is just so counter to the norm in US politics that everyone's sort of, like, staring with their jaw open. But specifically on transportation, as you were forming this bill, is this just a Democrat versus Republican thing? Is there any more nuance to it than that? Did you get any Republican help? Were there any unexpected allies or was there any opposition from within what you think of as your coalition? Like, how did the politics shape out?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, the other thing I want to point out is this legislation we're talking about got rolled into this broader transportation bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>So there's a lot of politics about the broader bill as well. But on the stuff that I was working on, I don't think I got much in the way of Republican support for it. That said, my approach was to meet with everyone that had an objection and listen carefully to it and incorporate what made sense. And that worked out very well in terms of, I think, making the bill and legislation better. And so at the end of the day, while I might not have gotten any Republican support, I think the opposition wasn't as strong as it might have been.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, because you would think, like, the stereotype would be that Republican is rural, rural areas hate all this and will fight it. I don't know if that's what you found?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>To a certain extent. But the way we address that is by saying, first of all, that in many ways they were right, that it's harder to reduce VMT in a greater Minnesota area than it is in a metro area. So then, the instruction for MnDOT was to set targets appropriately, recognizing that you may need to get more reductions from metro areas than rural areas. Another thing that was raised was, "Look, when we do a highway expansion or a grade separation, it may pull a bunch of traffic that previously was on more local roads." So what we said was: "Look, it's not VMT on a certain road, but it is on the network."</p><p>So we're able to say: "Look, that's a good point. You want to look at the network overall so that we properly take into account stuff." They raised objections and where it made sense and made the bill better, I incorporated them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But you wouldn't characterize the opposition to this, to your piece in particular, as something that the statewide GOP sort of rallied around, freaking out about. I imagine they had so much to freak out about this past year. Maybe you escaped some of the worst of it.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>There was certainly some opposition, but I think we dealt with it in an intelligent way. And, yeah, there was a lot of other things they were freaked out about. So maybe this got less freaking out than it might have in a non-trifecta year like this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It would be so fascinating to see what, if anything, comes up in the implementation of it. Right? It's so hard to predict. It's kind of a new thing. It would be really interesting to see what sorts of issues arise. Let me ask you about something that's sort of outside of this, and maybe you won't have anything to say about it, but I feel like it's germane to this discussion at least. So Minneapolis is increasingly beloved of the national urbanism community. It's doing all sorts of great things with zoning and transit, etc. And it had this really bold plan for 2040, this really bold vision for 2040, which involved transforming zoning across the city.</p><p>Lots of infill, lots of density, etc. Really like a green urbanist's vision thing. Everyone loved it in my world. Along come some local NIMBYs forming groups with "environmental" in their name, sued the thing, and now a judge has put a stop to it, sued it specifically, saying it will be bad for the environment. And the judge stopped it specifically on the grounds that it will be bad for the environment, thus causing everyone in my world to want to tear their hair out. I wonder if you just have any comment on that situation in general, how you think that's going to play out, what you thought of that judge's ruling, and how you think that's going to play out.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Well, in terms of how it's going to play out, I don't know that I can have my crystal ball that accurate on it. But I will say I think that the objections to it are incredibly short-sighted. And so I hope —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You don't think casting a shadow on a neighboring building is sufficient damage to the environment to warrant stopping the whole thing?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>And, you know, the things that Minneapolis is trying to do — and by the way, I would like to try to do some of those on a state level. I really appreciate that you did an episode with Jessica Bateman in Washington, you know, we want to look to do things like that in Minnesota. So that's one thing. I think we can do things at a state level. But to object to what Minneapolis is doing on an environmental basis when what they're doing is really beneficial to the environment long term and to climate action just strikes me as really short-sighted. And it does feel like NIMBYism.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this sort of gets at my broader question, which is once the rubber hits the road, once these municipal organizations are really told, like, "No, you can't expand that highway unless you do some other stuff, unless you do some rezoning or bike lanes or whatever," are you worried about local NIMBY opposition? Like, everybody in my world is worried about this. All the kinds of changes you're talking about to mitigate GHGs and VMTs all frequently face this sort of opposition. Do you lose sleep over that?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Well, I certainly worry about it, but I will say the kicking off of this implementation group that got going was really encouraging to me because there were folks in there that had some real objections to it. But they put those aside and said, "Alright, let's figure out how to make this work." And I think with engineers and with planning stuff, if you give enough runway and say, "Look, these are the boundary conditions with which you have to work with," they can do it. And I'm really convinced that they can. The problem comes in when you change those boundary conditions on them at the last minute.</p><p>But if you can say, "Look, this is what you need to plan for the next 20 years, this is how you need to think," then they will build that into their approach. So my hope is that through this implementation group, the issues will come up, but we'll figure out the right kind of planning structure and implementation structure to make these trade-offs and then it will just start working.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, it's one thing to have a plan. It's another thing to stick to your plan when you confront a room full of elderly people in matching T-shirts screaming at you, that's a different kind of thing.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>I tell you when I started this process and folks would come with objections, I'd say, "Look, I'm really open to listening to all and working them in, but we have to start from the perspective that the Earth doesn't negotiate with us. We have to get to this point. So let's talk about how let's talk about if you have changes to make this better or to deal with objections that I haven't thought about because you're the experts. But as long as we still are getting to that end goal, that's a good discussion to have."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, well, by way of wrapping up, this is, I feel like a huge piece of the overlap of greenhouse gas policy, of decarbonization policy and transportation policy. That sort of Venn diagram that overlap has been notably and lamentably empty or close to empty for a long time. So this strikes me as a huge step, just telling the transportation side of government, "No, we're serious about this. You really got to do this." So this seems like an awesome foundation. What is next for transportation policy, do you think, in terms of greening and decarbonization, for instance, just to toss an idea out there, is there a low carbon fuel standard along the lines of what we have now up and down the West Coast? Is that on the table or what else are you looking to next?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yeah, so a low carbon fuel standard is on the table. There's quite a healthy discussion going on in Minnesota about that, and it sometimes does divide the progressive community with just concerns about overly incentivizing ethanol.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Yes.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>So that's when we're going to be going through, I think, a lot more transportation on EVs and electrification and this tie-in with land use. So, I do think housing policy is part of this too. Right. The stuff that Jessica Bateman did in Washington.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes!</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>So we have a significant housing deficit in Minnesota. We have to build a lot more homes, especially middle housing, but we need to build them in the right places and we need to build them in the right way. So to really get at transportation, not only do you have to electrify, but you have to think about these land use issues. So, I think the intersections there will happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How this is wildly out of your area, but just as a final note for those of us who are not intimately familiar with Minnesota politics, how secure would you say this trifecta is versus y'all having a feeling like, "Man, we got to get everything done real quick, real quick like." What's the sort of midterm future of Minnesota politics?</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a great question. Let me also say on the politics side of this, one of the reasons this got done I'm a freshman, right? But it was the support of leadership. So the Chair of the House and the Chair of the Senate Transportation Committees, Representative Frank Hornstein and Senator Scott Dibble recognized the importance of this and were really strongly behind it. Now on our trifecta, Minnesota is a fairly evenly split state. We're purple, probably with a little bit more of a blue hue, but in the House we have a 70 to 64 majority, which is three seats.</p><p>And in the Senate there's a one seat majority.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>So it's close next year, only the House is up for reelection. So whether we have a trifecta for the next two years after that will be dependent on the House results. I think we're going to be able to keep it. I think the way we governed are improving Minnesotans lives, so I think we'll be able to keep it. But we have work to do. I will also say that as I look at this means two things for me who's very focused on climate work is I do want to get everything I can possibly get done next session because I know we have a trifecta then.</p><p>But another reason is climate sort of demands a level of urgency. So I'm pushing for stuff to get done as quickly as possible. But I think we can keep our trifecta at least for another two years and then beyond that, 2026, we'll see.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it sure would be nice if getting in office and doing a bunch of things that tangibly improve the lives of your constituents translated into political advantage. I don't know if we still live in a world where that simple equation holds anymore, but it sure would be nice. Well, thanks so much for coming on and walking us through. This is really I think this is sort of a little bit of a dark horse story, an untold story. What a big deal is to have this. It sounds procedural, but it's crucial. So thanks for coming on and walking us through it.</p><p><strong>Larry Kraft</strong></p><p>Oh, thank you so much for having me. Really enjoyed it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts Podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/minnesota-forces-transportation-planners</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:137058667</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 01 Oct 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/137058667/43d0f62a25fa4e4dcab694e669dd7683.mp3" length="62224323" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3110</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/137058667/a8ffd03857f3b287785308f5a57a2693.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The campaign for public power in Maine]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Maine State Senator Nicole Grohoski discusses an upcoming ballot measure that gives Maine voters the opportunity to replace the state’s unpopular for-profit utilities with a nonprofit public utility.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAGykUTw0VD4XuJ1r7XAKI3a/volts23.09.22%28nicole.grohoski%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/the-campaign-for-public-power-in-maine"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Maine’s two big investor-owned power utilities — Central Maine Power and Versant Power — are not very popular. In fact, they boast among the <a target="_blank" href="https://mainebeacon.com/cmp-versant-once-again-ranked-last-in-residential-customer-satisfaction-survey/">lowest customer satisfaction scores</a> of any utilities in the country, perhaps because their customers face some of the nation’s highest rates, suffer more and longer outages than average Americans, and pay more to connect rooftop solar than ratepayers in almost any other state. </p><p>This November, Mainers will vote on a radical alternative: a ballot measure to replace the two for-profit utilities with a single nonprofit utility that would be called Pine Tree Power. Maine and many other states already have lots of small nonprofit municipal utilities, but this would mark the first time a whole state with existing private utilities decided to make them public en masse.</p><p>Naturally the utilities are opposed and have dumped <a target="_blank" href="https://www.levernews.com/the-campaign-to-keep-electricity-bills-high/">$27 million and counting</a> into a campaign to crush the measure; supporters have mustered just under $1 million. </p><p>To discuss this David vs. Goliath fight, I contacted one of its champions, Democratic state Senator Nicole Grohoski. We discussed why she thinks a public utility would perform better, what it would do for clean energy, how it would be governed, and what other states can learn from the effort. </p><p>With no further ado, Maine State Senator Nicole Grohoski. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me. I'm thrilled to be with you today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I am super excited to talk about this issue. There's a lot of ins and outs I want to cover, but maybe let's just start with a brief history of this thing. So the idea here is, as I said in the intro, to replace Maine's two big investor-owned utilities, Central Maine Power and Versant Power, with a single publicly owned main utility called Pine Tree Power. Tell me who first had that idea? Where did it first pop up? I know it was legislation and then it got vetoed. Just tell us a little bit about how we got to where we are now.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>The history is really interesting, and I'll try to not spend too much time on it, but I think it's really important to start with the reality here in Maine as a backdrop. So a couple of things that are important to know for listeners is that we, as Mainers, find that our electricity isn't really affordable or reliable and our utilities aren't trustworthy. So we have, for many years running now, the worst customer satisfaction in the country, some of the highest rates in the country for electricity, and those just keep going up. We have experienced a 20% increase this summer, with another increase coming in January.</p><p>And we also have the most frequent outages in the country. And there are a couple of other reliability metrics that we're not doing so well on, including the length of outages and how long it takes to restore power. So basically what we see here in Maine is that the status quo of these for-profit multinational corporations is just not working for us. About a tenth of our residents in Maine received disconnection notices earlier this year because they just couldn't afford to pay their bills. And it's not working for companies or big corporations that really rely on low cost and reliable electricity to compete.</p><p>So that's kind of the background. So a number of us were wondering, does it have to be this way? Is there an alternative to worst of the worst? We are Maine, we are very proud and independent, and we like to be leading, but this is not the way that we wanted to be leading. So there was a lot of grassroots pressure. In 2017 we had a big storm, and the power was out for days. But at the same time, there was a billing fiasco, which resulted in billing errors for over 100,000 customers, which is in a state of 1.3 million people, that's a very big percent.</p><p>So there was a lot of pressure, a lot of phone calls to legislators, to the Public Utilities Commission, to the public advocate about these utilities. And so I think that really planted a seed for a number of folks. Specifically, Maine's first public advocate pointed out to some members of the legislature, including Representative Seth Barry at the time, myself, and a few others, that there were other options and that the financial and local control aspects of those options might be really helpful for Maine. So we started meeting in 2019 with the previous public advocate, economists, labor, legislators, people that were part of a group called CMP Ratepayers Unite.</p><p>And that's when we formed this idea of creating a consumer-owned utility for Maine that would be non-profit and similar to the ten other consumer-owned utilities we have in Maine. I don't know that we had a name for it at that time, but we do now call it the Pine Tree Power Company. So those were the early days. And then to sort of fast forward, the Legislature commissioned a study which was done by London Economics International in 2019 to learn more about the economics and also legal pathway here. Then, of course, 2020, everybody knows what happened then, things kind of went on pause. And then in 2021, we wrote a bill. And that bill passed in both chambers in Maine with bipartisan support. As you mentioned, the governor did veto that bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that bill was to create the utility or to put the question to voters.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>That bill put the question to voters, and it's very similar to the language that we'll be voting on this November. So we did revise the language based on some feedback from the governor, and that is the language that is now in front of us to vote on this November, November 7. And in order to get the question on the ballot we had hundreds of volunteers working together to collect around 80,000 signatures in total, which is a little bit above the requirement needed to get a question on the ballot in Maine.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm a little curious why — this is a Democratic Governor Mills. What was her rationale? I mean, I guess I can imagine her rationale for opposing the public utility, but what was her rationale for opposing asking voters what they thought? Did she have a good rationale?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Not in my opinion. I'm sure in her opinion it was great. But we read the veto letter for the most part. There was very little in there that was substantive. Some of those minor changes that we made are all things that we would have happily made in advance had we had outreach from her office about them. You know, the unfortunate thing with governors in Maine is that we have yet to elect one that has campaigned using our clean elections, publicly funding campaign option, which is something that most legislators use. So you can draw your own conclusions there about the — money in politics may have been at play.</p><p>I can't say for certain.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we should just make a note here because a couple of podcasts we've done here on Volts are about state laws prohibiting utilities from using ratepayer money to lobby and pay off politicians. Maine does not have one of those laws.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Well, we actually did just pass a law. We were one of four states earlier this year to be sure that ratepayer dollars are not going for lobbying. You know, industry membership, group memberships.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>You know, Edison Electric, for instance, Chambers of Commerce, et cetera. So that is a new law. It will be in effect in about a month. So we'll see if that improves things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just in time or actually just a smidge too late. So the bill of particulars here then, against these two utilities, as you say, they have really low ratepayer satisfaction scores, lots of power outages, more than usual, higher rates, some of the highest rates in the country. Like every state, Maine has a Public Utility Commission that is meant to regulate its utilities. That has members appointed by the governor or elected? I'm not sure how it goes in Maine.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>In Maine, the commissioners are appointed and then subject to Senate approval.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So why not just use the PUC to sort of get these utilities in line? That seems like it would be the sort of first order of business.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>It's a great question. I mean, I think everyone kind of wants to default to using the systems we have in place, but I have a couple of thoughts about that. Our Public Utilities Commission I do think is full of folks who are hardworking and really trying to get under the hood with utilities. But there's a lot of information there that the utilities really understand best. And so when you have questions, you're going to ask the utilities and there is sort of a long term back and forth relationship there. Some people might call how that turns into regulatory capture sometimes.</p><p>Additionally, we do have the ability to fine the utilities if they're not performing up to snuff and that has happened. It doesn't happen that often, and the most recent fine, I think was around $10 million. At the same time they had a significant rate increase and are pulling out over $100 million in profit every year. So it's not really proportional and we could theoretically increase those fines a bit. But there is hesitance. I think the legislature has interest in doing some of that but the utilities are of course not interested and I think we would see another veto pen action is my guess.</p><p>But all that being said, this effort to create a consumer utility has led to a lot of us just digging down into what is the history of utilities in this country and regulation. And what we found is that utilities are natural monopolies so it makes sense for there to be regulation because there isn't competition. But the folks who sort of started the effort to create public utilities commissions were those who were going to be regulated. And so there has been this hand in glove relationship since the start around the regulators and the regulated.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's not ideal.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>That's probably a subject of a whole other podcast but —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It doesn't work quite like you would want it to.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Exactly. And additionally, I would say I have recently been talking to folks in other states and other people have served as public advocates. And what I find remarkable is the backflips and cartwheels that we go through with regulation to try to outfox the utilities when, by no fault of their own, the investor owned utilities are created with their number one mission to be maximizing repair profit. So it's like we could keep trying to think of creative and clever ways to balance this out. But at the end of all of it, I keep coming back to the fact that we don't have our roads, which are critical to our economy and our safety and our way of life in the private sector; and nor are our schools, nor is our military.</p><p>Why does it make sense for something as important as our electricity grid to be subject to for-profit motivations?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Listeners will be rolling their eyes right about now because this is something I say I find a way to say it almost every episode no matter what we're talking about. But utilities, they are structured such that they make money insofar as they spend money. So all they really want to do is deploy more big infrastructure. And so as you say, like PUCs find these elaborate Rube Goldberg mechanisms to sort of beg and plead with them to do things like efficiency or distributed energy, know on and on, inter, regional transmission, name it, all of which are sort of just counter to the basic incentive.</p><p>So as you say, you can spend the rest of your life coming up with more and more elaborate ways to try to trick them into doing something against their interests. But at a certain point you just got to grapple with the central issue which is that they're set up wrong, they're set up badly, they're set up to not want things that are in the public interest and at a certain point you got to just deal with the root cause. Anyway, sorry to go off on my standard canned rant there. So then a skeptic will say these two utilities, just so people are clear about this, these are not vertically integrated utilities.</p><p>These are just distribution utilities. They just have wires, they just distribute power. They do not own generation. They're dealing with a certain set of supply issues, a certain set of power plants, a certain geography. Maine is very heavily forested which is a nightmare for transmission lines for all the obvious reasons. So it just has a sort of set of things that it's dealing with. And so I guess the skeptic is going to ask what reason do we have to believe that given the sort of same resources that Pine Tree, a public utility, would perform any better?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Well I think we have a lot of evidence that it would because we already have ten consumer owned utilities in Maine. Just for an example, there is one that's called Eastern Maine Electric Co-op. That's a traditional co-op. It is more rural than most of Maine. You might find it interesting that it is serving about 1.2% of the state's load in kilowatt hours but it is in an area that's twice the size of Rhode Island. Now EMAC, which is in rural downeast Maine is directly adjacent to the territory of Versant that I live in and the cost for delivery in EMAC is nine cents and the cost for delivery in Versant is 13.1 cents per kilowatt hour.</p><p>So I don't think that's just some kind of magical happenstance that when you take profit out of the equation you're just paying less. We know that together CMP and Versant are sending out about — was last year was $187 million a year in profit. So I think if Mainers are in charge of our utility we can decide do we want to use that money to lower rates? Do we want to use it to reinvest in the grid to increase reliability? And I think it would probably be a mix of both of those things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that amount of money you think is material enough that it would show up as improved performance, show up as measurably improved performance?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>I do think so. I mean I think for your listeners, while Maine is large and rural we do have 1.3 million people. So, when you sort of divide those numbers out it does make a difference. And we've had some independent economic analysis that shows us that Mainers would be saving on average $367 a month, excuse me, a year, because of the fact that we're basically going from expensive rent for the grid to a lower cost mortgage. So I think it's easy to explain it to folks in terms of, like, "What's better when you're looking for housing, dropping your money down a rent hole, black hole for the rest of your life, or swapping out to a mortgage where you've got a lower interest rate than what we see now with the guaranteed return on equity that happens for our for-profit utilities."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this was another piece I wanted to ask about. So part of why you think this will be cheaper for ratepayers is just you take that huge slice of profits that are going, as you say, out of state to the owners of these utilities and keep that in state and that alone will buy you some better service. There's also the issue of investor-owned utilities expect and want and are guaranteed relatively high rates of return on their investments and often resist making investments if the rate of return is lower than that. But as you say, a public power utility can be more patient with its capital, right?</p><p>Can make investments with lower returns as long as they pay off eventually, right?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Yeah. So we see here in Maine that the utilities are getting a ROE of 8% to 12%. And we know that firstly that's kind of astounding because it's not all that risky. Most people are paying their bills.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Crazy. It's guaranteed. It's huge and it's guaranteed. It's wild what it is. This is like the safest business on the planet as being a regulated utility.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Couldn't agree more. And on the flip side, the Pine Tree Power Company can access low-cost capital through revenue bonding at 3-5%. So when we think about paying off that debt over many years with compounding interest, when we think about the fact that our grid really isn't ready to electrify our economy and experts expect it's going to need to be, increased two to three times. Now is the right moment in time, I think, to move away from high cost, low-risk investment to low cost, low-risk investment before we literally triple our grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Tell us a little bit about how the utility would be governed or structured and what implications you think that might have.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>I love this question. I am a public servant and so I believe in local governance and people getting to vote and go to public meetings and have a say and all that is built into the ballot question. So the Pine Tree Power Company would have elected board members and there are seven of them, one for each grouping of five Senate seats, state Senate seats. And those members then turn around and appoint six members who have specific expertise in things like utility law and management, concerns of workers, concerns of economic, environmental and social justice, things like that, that we really want to make sure those folks are at the table.</p><p>And this group of 13 people, they serve six-year terms each of them. And of course, there's like a little bit of a lead-in time because they'd all be elected at once, where some of them served shorter terms at the start. But point is, they are people in our communities. They have to be living in Maine. They have open meetings that are subject to freedom of access laws. And in order to best serve the public, I think they would be doing a lot of public outreach. And that's something that in talking to managers and board members from other consumer utilities in the country, I've been really impressed with how much local engagement they have. I think Sacramento Municipal Utility District, they said they're hosting 1300 community meetings a year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good grief.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>A couple a day on average. But they have, I think they said 95% customer satisfaction. So people feel like they're valued, their experience matters and they also have a plan to get to 100% clean energy by 2030. So our Pine Tree power governance is very much in the spirit of "It's a public good. It should be publicly governed."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's a little bit of a controversy in Maine a few years ago. I don't remember all the details, but it was about a big transmission line that would have brought hydro from Canada down through the woods of Maine. It was fought and I believe killed by popular resistance. And there was a lot of, at least nationally there was a lot of talk of like here again we have environmentally minded locals blocking things for environmental reasons, but in a short-sighted way that's going to be worse for the environment overall. In the long term, they're NIMBY's. We've got to figure out a way of dealing with this problem, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p>So this leads to my question, which is: if you have a governing board that is elected by local people, and it is the local people who are often the source of the NIMBYism, do you not have some fears? That this would lead to a more NIMBY rather than less NIMBY operation of the utility, which is going to be difficult when, as you say, this is the time when every state everybody needs to be increasing and bolstering their transmission systems. Do you worry that local control is going to translate into more rather than less NIMBY opposition to new lines?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>I'll put it in a way that I think makes sense to me as a person in Maine who's intimately familiar with what you laid out, which is at the root of that decision, was a fundamental lack of trust in Central Maine Power. A trust that it would be doing anything in our best interest, that it would be giving us appropriate benefits, that it was really after anything more than profits. And so I think it wouldn't be true that as soon as Pine Tree Power was created that everyone would immediately trust the company. But I do think it would be a fresh start.</p><p>And on top of that, with elected and appointed leaders spending time in communities and just energy literacy, I think in general would increase because it's something we would be talking about more if we had to elect the board. I'll say I think that people's interest in energy policy has gone through the roof this year compared to where it was in the past. And people are asking just really great questions, a new curiosity around electricity that I hadn't seen before growing up here. So I think that the outcome would actually be that folks would feel like they had a say in how the transmission was cited, who was benefiting if we remove the profit motive.</p><p>Imagine if that money that would have gone to profit was actually going to community benefits. That might really change how people feel. And I think that here in Maine we are sort of skeptical of what's being pushed on us by people from away, quote unquote, is a saying we have. I don't always love it, but it is accurate in this case. You've got Central Main Power, owned by Avangrid, then owned by Iberdrola, based in Spain, telling us, "Oh, we've got this great deal for you." And people are skeptical of that. So I think we have a greater chance actually of doing transmission right and in a way that people can accept if there was this broader community process and a lack of for-profit skepticism that comes naturally to us here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the criticisms of the two existing utilities is that they're kind of slow-walking clean energy in particular. So I wonder if you could just say a word about what that means and why and how we think Pine Tree would be better on that score. Because it's not obvious. These are just wires utilities, right? So they're not dealing directly with clean energy generation. So what are the issues around clean energy and how will Pine Tree be an improvement?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>So, historically, we have seen that the utilities do spend a lot of time and money in the State House, not just behind the scenes, but also right out publicly testifying against clean energy bills. Now, that has slowed in recent years, but certainly in the previous gubernatorial administration, that was a very common practice.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If I could just pause there, I guess I just don't fully understand why, like, if you're a company that's just running wires, what's it to you?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Right back to the return on equity question. So, these utilities make more money when they build transmission lines than when they upgrade the distribution system. They get a higher rate of return, right? So it is in their best interest to continue with the model of large far-off generation facilities compared to local rooftop solar type solutions or microgrids or battery storage. So that's the first part of the problem, I think. And secondly, I think some of these utilities just really are not very nimble. They're sort of in the business that they've been in for a long time and thinking about how to create a dynamic grid that has time of use rates that actually work, for instance, or bidirectional power.</p><p>We have had smart meters in this state for over a decade and I can't see how they're being used in any kind of smart way. I mean, people are still calling the utilities to let them know the power is out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's just baffling to me. Like, if I'm in the utility business, this is like my time to be a hero, you know what I mean? After 100 years of sleepy operation in the background, all of a sudden the world is calling upon me to be cutting edge and be the hero and save the world and instead, I'm just going to "I just want to keep doing things the way I've been doing." I don't know, people are disappointing.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>No comment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I read in one of the stories about this. One of the opponents of this measure said, quote, "The people behind this proposal have no actual plan to lower rates, improve reliability and enable a swifter energy transition." The implication being that the fans of this measure just think that making the utility public is going to be sort of automagically, make everything easier and cleaner and cheaper, but there's no actual plan to do so. Is there a specific plan for how Pine Tree would operate and how it would do these things? Has anyone modeled out sort of you know what I mean?</p><p>Is there more than just hope that the structure will do the work for you?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Well, I think that the person who said that spent some time cherry-picking certain things in the ballot language but missed the bigger picture here, which is we have to start by saying yes on November 7 and then at that time then we have an election for the board of directors and it goes on from there. But until that time the Maine Public Utilities Commission cannot compel the utilities to give over their very private data to do that kind of in-depth modeling that is going to be the very next task for the Pine Tree Power Board once it exists and that is spelled out in the ballot question. You know, these utilities, I'm just going to be level about it: They don't have a plan either.</p><p>And I can tell you that because the legislature last year had to pass a law requiring them to do integrated grid planning and think about how is it going to work to increase renewables on the grid, to increase demand as people install more heat pumps and use electric vehicles. They're not doing that or if they are doing it they're not doing it in any kind of way that is transparent or subject to review. So I think it's like a great bait and switch tactic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Aren't they supposed to create integrated resource plans? I thought that was something that all utilities had to do.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>I think they have some planning, but it is clear from the way that the interconnection queues are looking, the very high cost they're pushing onto developers for even just what turns out to be basic grid maintenance, there isn't really — maybe they have something that says "plan" at the top, but I'm not sure that all the nuts and bolts are actually there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I meant to hit on interconnection before because that's one of the critiques also is that they are slow-walking interconnection of distributed resources, etc. Presumably they're doing that, or at least they say they're doing that to protect the grid. Do we have reason to believe they're slow-walking that on purpose such that Pine Tree could substantially speed up the interconnection queue?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>We do have reason to believe that specifically because of all the complaints that we've received as legislators. We did ask the Public Utilities Commission to look into this and they hired the Interstate Renewable Energy Council, or IREC, to do a study. And the IREC findings were basically especially around Versant, which is in eastern and northern Maine. These guys are some of the worst actors we've ever seen in the United States. They are requiring things that they can't justify why they're requiring them, and we can find no reason from an engineering perspective to require them. And your listeners might find it fascinating to know that for Versant customers, the average cost of interconnecting your rooftop solar to the grid is $10,000.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Jesus.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>That is not normal is what I'm told. Another great story that I've heard from a couple of constituents is that they need a transformer upgrade to interconnect their rooftop solar. Okay, that might be true, and that upgrade is going to cost you $1,000 - $1,500. But we can't get the parts for two years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh my goodness.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Now the same solar installers that are working in my area are also working in CMP's area Central Maine Power. Because I live my district includes both, and the installers are saying "CMP says they can get it in two months." So then I asked my constituents "Can you file a formal complaint at the PUC using this process we had to create because this is such a rampant issue?" And when they do that and go through the whole process, then that transformer has arrived and been installed within two to three months time. So I don't know what to say about it.</p><p>I can only say what I see from the outside and the experience that I have heard about from people that pick up the phone and call me. But it seems shady to go from two years to two months.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's grapple here with what is probably the biggest and most difficult issue around all this, which is say Maine voters say yes to this, and it goes forward. Basically, it would involve the state of Maine buying these two utilities assets from the utilities, and depending on who you believe those assets are worth anywhere from $5 to I think CMP is now saying it could get up to $13 billion. So that's a big public expense. So how's that going to get financed? Who's going to pay it? How long is it going to take to pay it? Have we thought through in any detail how that process works?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Yes, definitely. And that was a big part of what the London Economics analysis included was that legal analysis of what that purchase price process would look like. We also have been able to look at this transition as has happened in other communities in the country, and we created an expedited and refereed process to determine the purchase price. And all told, from this fall to switch over to Pine Tree Power, we expect it to take three to four years. What we know from the LEI study is that this is a completely legal and constitutional effort. It's helpful to remind folks that because these are actual monopolies, they only have the right to be doing business because we give it to them.</p><p>And in the Maine statutes, it literally says the PUC can take it away.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, of course, again, this drives me crazy. I'm reading articles about this and of course, just once I'd like there to be a good argument had in public instead of idiots. But all the Republicans are now saying "This is a communist takeover of private business by the state. It's Communists. Why don't we call it Chinese electricity?" I've read, some of the dumbest quotes.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Are you in the comments section?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No, these are legislators. This is not even I mean, there's barely a distinction anymore. But like, the Republican legislators are saying this now. So it's worth just emphasizing the point that you just made, sort of drawing a line under it, which is these businesses have been granted a monopoly by the state and granted guaranteed returns by the state. So of course the state can take that back. Of course this is legal. Like if the state grants, the state can take away if the state is granting it on the grounds that it will be of service to the state's residents and it's not anymore, then of course the state can take that monopoly back.</p><p>It's just crazy viewing. It's not like Maine is going to go take over the potato chip industry.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>We have no interest in that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is not a normal business. Utilities are not normal private businesses. They are state basically state created entities. And so of course, the state can uncreate them if it wants to. Sorry, I know that will not have any effect at all on the dumb things Republicans say about this.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Well, I do want to clarify. We do have some really strong Republican support, from certain legislators as well as just regular folks. I mean, that was the greatest thing about collecting signatures for this initiative, which I did and my family did and many other people I know was that when you remove it from a debate in a state house, regular people just get it. They get that this is really important to our economy to have an electricity grid that works for us and for our health and safety. And they also understand that maybe this is not a place for profits.</p><p>And I've had folks wearing Birkenstocks and folks wearing MAGA hats sign the petition because I think Maine people are really resilient. We are proud of our ability to solve problems and I think the majority of us believe this is something that we can do and that we probably could do it better than some far-off foreign monopoly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Anyway, I interrupted you. You were talking about how these giant bills are going to get paid. Basically you say it's going to take about four years to do all the work, to transfer everything over. Would the $5 billion or however much it turns out to be, be paid off over those four years or how will it be financed?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>No. So we did meet with some municipal bond banks. This sort of acquisition, like in the case of Long Island, has been paid off over a long period of time. And that's how we're able to see the rate reduction. You know again, similar to renting versus owning. I was able to buy a home. My mortgage is less than my rent would be, but I am still paying it off. And even with the interest, it's still less. So we have the ability through revenue bonding to borrow that money backed by the ratepayers, not actually by the state government and the general fund, but by the ratepayers.</p><p>We have the ability to borrow that money, and then pay it off over time, and borrow more as we need to build out the grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Would it being a public utility enable it to draw on state money? Because one of the points a few pods ago we were talking about a new offshore wind bill that would draw money from state coffers rather than from ratepayers. And one of the sort of arguments and defense of that is taking tax money from state taxpayers is much more progressive than taking it from ratepayers. Basically you're getting a much more progressive source of funding. Is there any talk of Pine Tree being able to draw on state money or would it still just operate as a utility and get all its money and revenue and stuff from ratepayers the same way a private utility would?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>The enabling statute has it separate. I think that that is really important, especially to our union workers because they had concerns about becoming public sector workers and what that would mean for their right to strike, for instance. So we have ensured that they are private sector workers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Whether or not a future legislature might say we're able to maintain that and have the utility doing efficiency programs that are paid through the taxpayer dollars versus ratepayer dollars, I can't predict. To your point about regressivity, one of the things that is required in the bill language for the Pine Tree Power Company is to establish lower rates for low income residential customers in the first five year plan. So we are trying to address that challenge that you're absolutely correct. It's the regressive funding structure, unlike taxation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Also, one of the criticisms of these utilities is that they're sending all these cutoff notices, they're cutting off people from power, which is bad for all obvious reasons. But is Pine Tree going to pledge not to do that? And if it doesn't do that, where does that money to cover those people's rates come from? Because that would seem like an additional expense because whatever you might say about cutting people off, it does save the utilities money.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Right. Well, we do have what's called the Arrearage Management Program here in Maine and that does help folks get out of arrears and that is ratepayer funded program. So that is a somewhat fiscally progressive approach to that. You know the details of that program are probably more than you'd want to know. But the long and short is if you get back on track then some of your debt will be just forgiven. But it's not forgiven by the utilities, it's forgiven by your neighbors.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, would Pine Tree pledge not to cut people off? Like, is that part of the campaign here or how would it treat cutoffs ?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>You know, it's a good question that surprisingly I don't know if anyone has posed to me it is not in the legislation one way or the other. I'm of the belief that if rates go down and we could have rates that were income stratified to some extent, that the amount of disconnection notices that we saw earlier this year would go way down just economically. But I think it would be really a decision of the board. And then I'm also not sure if the Public Utilities Commission if there are any rules on the books because this utility, unlike a lot of consumer utilities in the country, is regulated by the Public Utilities Commission as if it were an investor owned utility.</p><p>So, there may be specific rules about that already.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I would just think though, if you're trying to sell this, making this public rather than private, one of the things you could sell is like we think this is a public right to have electricity on some level.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>The one other thing about it that just comes to mind is that a couple of years ago during COVID, people were especially concerned about the disconnection notices, not knowing if they were going to be receiving a next paycheck but we were told that the disconnection notices were necessary in order to provide certain assistance. So the utilities said, "Oh don't worry, we're not actually going to disconnect anyone but we have to do this to get them into this next program." So, I don't know if that would come into play here but I'm not convinced that the utilities wouldn't have ultimately shut the people off but that was a way that they spun it at least.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One more kind of semi-technical question that's a little bit of a side thing but is of interest, I think, to Volts listeners. One of the provisions in the IRA, the Inflation Reduction Act, is that it makes some of the tax credits direct pay, which means you don't have to pay taxes to get it back. You can get it back directly as a check and one of the categories of entities that would qualify for this is tax-exempt entities. So I wonder, has anyone done any thinking, and maybe this is too in the weeds but done any thinking about what advantage it might pose for Maine to have its utility be tax-exempt, whether it will benefit from the IRA through that.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>It is something we're thinking about because we were excited to see that direct pay provision sort of leveling the playing field for publicly owned generation which is another topic I'm very interested in, but I think it remains to be seen. In the case of Pine Tree Power, it is not allowed to own generation and it may be permitted to own some storage as is necessary to maintain the grid functioning. So I'm not entirely sure that that direct IRA provision would help in this case but what I think it does is sort of change the paradigm a bit there that may then also shift to other things. If the federal government says let's have an ITC or PTC for transmission lines, the next step might be —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Praise be.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Well, let's make sure we set it up the same way we've just done with generation. Yes, I think it's a really important conversation even if it doesn't have a direct immediate effect on the Pine Tree Power Company.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. As I think anyone could predict just from what we've said so far, even knowing nothing else about it but what we've said so far, I'm sure people could predict that the private utilities in question are not excited about this happening and have mobilized to prevent it from happening. So tell us a little bit about the campaign against this. Is it as hysterical as one would predict?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean hysterical is one word for it. Deeply troubling is another phrase that comes to mind. But these are utilities, like I mentioned, about the amount of profit that they make and that's just off of their Central Maine Power and Versant holdings. But Central Maine Power is just a small, small fraction of the entire Iberdrola conglomerate. So, yeah, we have seen them spending a lot of money against the campaign. They've put $27 million toward the campaign, both utilities, as of the end of June. So we expect to see more of course.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not a small amount in a small state.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>No. And honestly, talking to my neighbors, people are very upset by it. They're kind of irate that they're the people whose power goes out and doesn't come back on for a couple of days. They're the folks who had to spend $10,000 for a generator which isn't part of a clean energy solution last I checked. And there go the utilities putting $27 million toward just running ads.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, are they experiencing it as a flood of ads? I mean, $27 million must allow you to kind of dominate the airwaves.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Yes, the airwaves are definitely bought up, as far as we can tell. And they have just their two donors, which are the utility parent companies, which are Avangrid and Enmax.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are they funding 100% of this?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>100%, yes. And these utilities, lest they tell you how amazing and green and climate-friendly they are, they are gas utilities, Avangrid and Enmax anyhow. And then on the flip side, we are a smaller organization. We don't have Mainers' pockets to pickpocket on a regular basis.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm guessing you guys haven't hit $27 million yet. How much money have you have?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>You're closer to around a million, I think. And that's over 1000 donors, most of whom are just regular donors giving what they can because they understand these differences. And also I think the big difference is the utilities are putting out a lot of fear, doubt, scare tactic type ads. And on the flip side, what we're offering people is something different and something positive, something that we can all lean into and make sure that it succeeds because it would actually be ours. So I think that's resonating with folks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What are the scare tactics specifically? Are they saying this will be expensive or what?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Yeah, expensive. I mean, you quoted some of their numbers and it's laughable. They're like, "Oh, we're going to get $13.5 billion." Well, they're worth $5.4 billion. That's what they pay taxes on. That's what they filed their official paperwork saying. So I think especially as we learn more and more about how decrepit certain portions of this grid are, they'd be lucky to get a little bit over that. So that's one of them. "Is there a plan? We don't have a plan, but do they have a plan?" is another one. You know what, a lot of it is just to my sensibility is a little insulting to Maine people.</p><p>You don't know what you're doing, that kind of thing. Meanwhile, we're going to keep the line workers who are doing the work and we're giving them a retention bonus because we value their expertise, because they're the ones that actually know how the grids work, not the CEOs and the CFOs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it is historically pretty easy though just to I mean, when you're fighting against change, you barely even need arguments. You know what I mean? You can just say "Booga booga booga change" and you're halfway there, it seems like.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Well, I think that's why we're in such a unique position in Maine because while that can be kind of an initial gut reaction, I think people here are curious. We've certainly seen plenty of campaigns where one side was outspent a lot by the other and it didn't make a difference. We have led in other policy areas. Ranked choice voting could be one recent example. Clean elections one of the only states that splits our electoral college votes. So I think Maine people, I think we're interested in things that are different if they make sense to us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Where is the public on this? Do we know do we have enough polling or survey data or what have you to know kind of what the level of support is or where the public is on this? Do we have a barometer? Do we have a measure here?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think the most recent public polling was probably a couple of months ago. But what it showed was there were people that were solidly in each camp but a lot of undecided voters and it really put us in a dead heat in terms of the people that were decided. And what I think is interesting is folks are not being swayed by Central Maine Power and Versant ads mainly because we don't trust them. They have not been good faith actors.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are they creating fake groups like "Mainers for puppy dogs and grandma"?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Yes, Maine Affordable Energy is one of them. Yeah, so they sound pretty good, but all you have to do is google that and you find out pretty quickly, because of our disclosure rules, that's 100% utility funded.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To the extent that the public supports this, are they viewing it as primarily a green thing, a thing about clean energy? Or is it primarily " Screw these out of state —," you know what I mean? Like a Maine pride kind of thing. Is it a reliability? Do you know what it is about this that the public has taken from it? What it is the public is supporting when the public supports it?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>That's a great question and it does vary depending on the person and their interest and maybe even where they live in the state because the utility rates are the worst where I live compared to all the other districts in the state. So it depends. I think if you're a person who tried to interconnect and you got told you have to wait two years and $10,000, then it might be about greening the grid. But I think for a lot of folks underlying whatever their specific reason might be, it is that question of trust. I think about this all the time we have aggressive clean electricity goals, but 50% of our carbon emissions in this state are coming from vehicles and we are the most heating oil dependent state in the country.</p><p>So we've got to get people onto the electricity grid in order to have any hope of cleaning it up. But it's really hard for me to knock on someone's door and say, "I really hope you'll consider changing your whole house over to heat pumps, even though we have below zero temperatures sometimes. Or I know that the power went out for a week last year, but would you consider an EV?" So I think that in order to make this transition work, we have to have utilities that people trust and that are providing just basic service. People should not have to think as hard as they're thinking about if their electricity is going to be there for them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, that's such an important point. And so generalizable too, like if electrification is the thing, then people have got to trust the institutions in charge of electrification and they do not have much public trust these days. So that's an interesting argument in favor, I think, of making utilities more accountable, more public. What about the other big argument against one of the big scare things is you have to buy all these assets, which is like a big bill, a big one-time bill. The other scare story is that utilities are going to immediately sue, that this is going to get mired in the courts, and that it's going to take 4, 5, 6, 7 years to even get it all settled, and until then it will be chaos and no one will know what's going on and blah, blah, blah.</p><p>So realistically, what's your view of, say, voters approve this in November? What is your view of sort of how that plays out and when and how the inevitable legal wrangling gets resolved?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Basically, the Pine Tree Power Board will offer a certain amount for the utility infrastructure. I don't expect that the utilities will accept that on first pass you're buying a used car, you don't just take the first price. Right. So we would expect some negotiation, but if that doesn't work, then it will go to the courts. And there is a refereed process that's spelled out in the legislation in the Superior Court that then can be appealed to the Supreme Court in the state of Maine. But there are timelines set up. So it cannot go on for years and years and years, because at some point, if you lose or win a case, that's it.</p><p>You have one appeal. I think it's funny that this argument is coming from the utilities because if there are any lawsuits and if it got dragged out, as they say, even though we've protected against that to the best of our ability, that's coming from them. That is a choice that they are making.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>"Don't make us do this."</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Yeah, so it's kind of ironic but additionally, one of the things that comes up is how do we know the utilities will continue to invest in the meantime? And it's like the best parallel I could say to that is if I'm going to sell my house, I don't just stop fixing things before I sell it. I keep it up in really good shape. And in fact, utilities would have an incentive to invest more because usually they don't just sell it for exactly what it's worth. There's usually a multiplier. We expect it to be like 1.5 times.</p><p>So we actually have increased the oversight capacity of the Public Utilities Commission to ensure that there isn't any of that sort of last-minute gold plating going on, because that is actually what we'd expect, not the further disrepair scenario.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, so you think if this goes through, they'll plow a bunch of money into high dollar upgrades just to boost their price that you have to pay for them?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>That's what I would do if I were them. Fortunately, we're going to keep an eye on that on behalf of Maine people. But if you are able to invest a million dollars here and in two to three years time make $1.5 million because that's the multiplier that the courts assign, that's pretty good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So what's your timeline in your head then? What do you envision? At what point is there just the one public utility operating and all this is behind us? Were you willing to predict?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're looking at fall 2027, so four years from now, and that includes having the elections for the board members next year. So that's the first major hurdle, which I think is exciting, especially because living in one of the more rural parts of Maine, we don't always feel here that our interests are represented at the Public Utilities Commission, which is folks from southern Maine. And I think this geographic component is really compelling to, you know, so that's our first step. And then basically we have to get a lot of information. I mean, the board would have to get a lot of information from the utilities in order to know what purchase price they should put forward, what's the business plan, what does the revenue bonding look like, and make sure they can secure that financing through a large municipal bond market.</p><p>So that takes time and we want to make sure we do it right. On the other hand, doing nothing is also a risk that I think sets people in my generation and folks younger than me behind economically and environmentally for decades. So a couple of years to do it right is definitely worth it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, final question then. I can see lots of Maine-specific reasons why one might argue that this is a good deal; these utilities are particularly bad, Maine has a particular set of problems, it has a particular sort of public culture, a culture of participation and a culture of civic engagement, et cetera, et cetera. Lots of Maine-specific reasons why you could make the case for this. I wonder, to what extent do y'all have your eyes on other states and trying to make this the beginning of something bigger? Like, do you believe that taking private utilities public is a good idea across the board?</p><p>Is that something you'd like to see become a national trend or are you just purely focused on Maine? How do you think about the influence this may or may not have on other states?</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>I think that all the issues we've had in Maine are what led us to looking around for solutions, but it is a structural imbalance that we have with the regulated monopolies when they're for profit. So, I do think it is something that is exportable to other states. We people in our coalition have been working with and talking to people elsewhere in the country who are looking to make a similar transition also elsewhere in the world. It's kind of interesting. The Scottish power is also owned by Avengrid, which owns Central Maine Power, and they are looking to become a public, truly public utility over there.</p><p>So, in doing this work, we've found a lot of interest for that business model change. And I think as we become another case study, we are standing on the shoulders of other case studies that have happened in this country. And as we become another one for folks, I think that we'll see some opportunities arise. And I would like to see that because I want every American to be able to afford their electricity and to be able to have clean energy and not a lot of hurdles to getting there, because we are literally all in this together as a country and as a world with our climate crisis.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That seems like a wonderful note to wrap up on. Nicole Grohoski, thanks so much for coming on and walking through this with us. It's super fascinating and I think it will be an example to the rest of the country one way or the other. However it plays out.</p><p><strong>Nicole Grohoski</strong></p><p>We're hoping that we're a positive "yes" example. We're working every day toward that. And I want to thank you, David, for having me on and talking about this topic, which is, I think, endlessly important and fascinating.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Agreed, agreed. OK. Thanks, Nicole. Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts. WTF. Yes, that's volts.WTF so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-campaign-for-public-power-in</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:136963841</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 26 Sep 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/136963841/7cd03e10e9504f46aa222120ab338828.mp3" length="71813906" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3589</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/136963841/70d79e07f9b47811538b29eebdc04868.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How climate activists can help get things built]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, organizer Jeff Ordower of 350.org talks about how the environmental movement can shift its focus from blocking what it doesn’t like to building what it does.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACslfJPHyh-_pHgcS-TvfBFa/volts23.09.20%28jeff.ordower%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/how-climate-activists-can-help-get-things-built"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It is a much-discussed fact that the environmental movement cut its teeth blocking things — mines, pipelines, power plants, and what have you. It is structured around blocking things. Habituated to it.</p><p>However, what we need to do today is build, build, build — new renewable energy, batteries, transmission lines, and all the rest of the infrastructure of the net-zero economy. Green groups are as often an impediment to that as they are a help. </p><p>So how can the green movement help things get built? How can it organize around saying yes?</p><p>Recently, the activist organization <a target="_blank" href="https://350.org/">350.org</a> hired Jeff Ordower, a 30-year veteran organizer with the labor and queer movements, in part to help figure these questions out. As director of North America for 350, Ordower will help lead a campaign focused on utilities standing in the way of clean energy. </p><p>I talked with him about organizing around building instead of blocking, the right way to go after utilities, the role green groups can play in connecting vulnerable communities with IRA money, and what it means to focus on power. </p><p>All right then, with no further ado, Jeff Ordower of 350, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Thank you so much, David, for having me. I'm excited to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, well, I want to get to 350 and climate activism in a second, but first I'd like to just hear a little bit about your history in activism, which is mainly on the labor side. And what I'd really like to hear, and this is probably like a whole pot of its own, but insofar as you can summarize, I'd love to hear from your perspective when you were working as an organizer in labor. Looking over the fence at climate activism, what was your sort of take or critique like from the labor perspective? What did you think climate activism was doing right or wrong?</p><p>Or what did you think you could bring to climate activism from the labor side?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Yeah, I both did labor organizing and I come out of base-building community organizing. I actually come out of the notorious ACORN was where I spent the first half of my organizing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The late, lamented —</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Yeah. So it's very similar. But I started in labor, moved to ACORN very quickly, and then as ACORN was destroyed, both helped to start new community organizing efforts. And then lately, over the last few years have been involved with labor organizing. And it's interesting because I really started tracking what was happening in climate around Copenhagen, which was 2008, 2009, at the same time where ACORN was going through its difficulties. And we were trying to figure out what to build and how to build it and how to build something that was more intersectional. So I was — the personal piece of my story is I was working in St. Louis, which is where I'm from, and part of what we do as community organizers is think about how do we challenge the local power structure?</p><p>It's about power and it's about how we build power for folks who don't have the power that they need and help collectively do that. And St. Louis is, like many midwestern towns, is kind of a branch office for many Fortune 500 companies these days. So the most powerful players in the region were coal companies. Peabody Coal was the largest private sector coal company in the world. Arch coal was the second largest in North America.</p><p>Both were headquartered in the St. Louis region because it's at the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi rivers. So, as the only Fortune 500 company in the city limits of St. Louis that was getting tax breaks, there were lots of reasons to fight Peabody and so started on a campaign about that, but there was also this tremendous excitement that was happening. So we were both at the beginning of the Obama administration. There was a time of great hope. For those of us who —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I recall vaguely, vaguely distantly.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Well that's interesting. So, for climate folks, they're like, "Oh, this is not a time of great hope." But the fact that after six or seven attempts, depending on how you count it, at winning health care for everyone in the country, I look back at that early days of Obama and say, wow, we got financial reform to some degree, but we got health care was the most important thing that changed so many people's lives. So I actually think climate folks view that era a little bit differently than we might in having really a generational win. And I'm sure we'll get into this a little bit later, but it is how I think about IRA is also the next generation or the next generational win that we've gotten.</p><p>But, looking at that, I think the sheer number of resources that the climate movement was mustering — you know there were many organizations in St. Louis at the time that had been newly created that were doing work. There was a global movement, there were these incredibly ambitious, and I just want to say badass, for lack of a better word, youth, climate activists and organizers. So I think there was a lot to be admired about what was happening. And the fall of 2009 with 350 managing a global day of action, it's when I first started tracking 350.org. So, that was where I really lauded at what was happening.</p><p>The climate movement was so exciting to think about the global nature, to think about what they were doing. I think where also looking over the fence where things seemed harder was I think about organizing. And I think many of us, community labor organizing, think about organizing and not mobilizing and how folks build longer term power. And it was less clear to me how the climate movement was doing that and how really the most affected people were — you have a lot of people whose job was to whether it was to get signatures or to do lobbying. But there didn't seem to be formations not just where people could speak from their experiences but also really exercise the longer term campaigning and power building that was necessary.</p><p>And so that felt like, and still feels to me a little bit like some of the weaknesses in the climate movement. And obviously more than a decade later, we also have strengths too. I mean that the Sunrise movement is the complete counter to that actually moving folks in hubs in a very significant way for youth organizing. I think, 350.org with our 100 chapters, that the game has changed somewhat. But at the time it really felt like much more emphasis on mobilizing, much less emphasis on organizing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So people would show up in the streets and march but you didn't see the sort of long-term accretion of power coming out of that?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Yeah, and it's not just the accretion of power, it's also the relationship of having real organization where you have folks who are directly affected by issues, make decisions collectively. That's how things get stronger. It's how you figure out tactics that work. It's the relationship between staff and members. It's members figuring things out. Building of power comes through some trial and error and that comes through a process of collective work where you have democratic organizations. And that's similar — it's the most clear in labor fights because if the workers aren't really willing to fight the boss then you can't have a union no matter what.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>And you can think of a thing as an organizer that should work. But really, it's what people who are going and working on the shop floor or these days working in an Amazon warehouse or working in a Starbucks, what they think is going to give them the courage to stand up to the boss. It's not what you think as an organizer. And so I think that's what's so important and that comes over time and building that. And I think where the climate movement sometimes struggles is it has just some of the sharpest, most brilliant policy minds in the world but it doesn't always have that relationship with folks who are the most affected to be able to figure things out and have this trial and error that organizing really is about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's then talk from a really high level, 30,000 foot level or whatever the phrase is about where the climate movement finds itself. Sort of what kind of moment is the climate movement in right now? I think you have said and written that this is a sort of historic turning point. How would you describe that in a broad way?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think it's kind of two parts. So one, we've had this historic generational win with IRA in the US. And so the one piece of it is the task before us is whether we can rise to the occasion and use it. And I know in previous podcasts and I sometimes use the pod to talk about previous pods, but both the IRA is filled with carrots and not sticks. But I think we can do a lot with those carrots. And I think we can really transform our energy system and also do that in a way that promotes equity and justice and it's an opportunity before us.</p><p>And then the second thing is we also have to do that while recognizing that all of the above is insufficient, that we actually do need to convert the way we live and we work so we can't just continue to build pipelines and mine coal and also add in some renewables. There has to be a real transformation. We have to make some hard choices and we have to and this is where it comes back to power. We have to build the collective power to do that. So I think we're at a crossroads. We have more tools than we've had before in the toolbox, at least in the US, to really have a just transition. So it's a question of whether we can step up and build the power that's necessary to consummate that transition, if you will.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let's talk a little bit about that because the premise of this conversation is sort of the attempt by 350 and I think probably broader than 350, but we'll focus on 350 —</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Definitely broader than us, yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To sort of pivot from purely oppositional trying to stop fossil fuels from getting built, to a more prospective, forward looking support for building things, right? This is a big topic in green circles right now. There's this whole school of thought that liberalism is not used to building things and the whole approach of sort of abundance and building is different than what we're used to. We have to reorient ourselves, et cetera, et cetera. At a general question about that, which I think is probably the one that strikes most people first and most forcefully, is just this: The conventional wisdom in organizing or the conventional wisdom about organizing is just that it's easier to get people fired up about things they hate and oppose and want to stop.</p><p>For one thing, it's just clearer, right? When you stop something, you've stopped it, right? It's a clear win. It's not ambiguous. You got big, evil, corporate bad guys that you can demonize and sort of rally people around that. And just generally, like, anger fires people up. And the sort of conventional wisdom is that it's very difficult to organize around building for a lot of reasons, I think we'll talk about, but just for a million reasons. There's a lot more arguments among advocates about what to build, where to build, when to build right? And what are the right trade offs and all these kind of things.</p><p>So do you agree with that general conventional wisdom? Do you think it's true that it's just easier to get people fired up around anger and it's more difficult to do this sort of forward looking thing that you're thinking about here?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a very good general philosophical question because for decades with comrades, you have the conversation do you organize out of anger or do you organize out of love? I think that this is a related question and the answer is I think polarizing and organizing out of anger is important and matters and lots of people do that and works for them. But I also think organizing out of a vision of what's possible and the world in which we can live and what's possible if we can open the door and really change material conditions for folks, I think that is just as compelling and I think folks will join and build together as well. Now I'm thinking about this question.</p><p>There's many directions we can go in this, but I do want to say organizing for solutions doesn't mean that we're just organizing to build renewable energy or utility scale solar, wind. It also means there's a lot of people, people and their companies and their corporations that are in the way. And so we still have to clear out a lot of these barriers. And it's not just fossil fuel companies, but it's also the pernicious role of utility companies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh yeah, we're definitely going to get to that.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Okay, I didn't mean to jump ahead.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, my friend, we're definitely getting to that. I know you're the North American director now and so maybe you won't have anything to say about this and we can just cut it if you don't. But one of the interesting things when I had lunch with May, the head of 350, a few months ago, she was talking about this shift. And one thing she told me that I had not understood, I don't think, is that a lot of the impetus for this turn away from sort of pure opposition more to building things came from 350 branches in the developing world.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I think maybe naively you would think those are the people getting hurt worst by oil and gas pipelines and have the least environmental protections down there and that's the protection they need. But they say otherwise. So maybe talk a little bit about why that is.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Well, I think people are clear that they're getting hurt by pipelines. I also know, again, it's hard for me in the Global North to be like, "Here's what people in the Global South think," but here's what's been reflected to me that — first of all, when you talk with many activists, in the Global South. They say whatever is happening for us around emissions just generally is a drop in the bucket compared to the damage over the last hundred years that countries in the Global North have caused. But related to that, there's the reality of like, what do people need to actually get the energy that they need?</p><p>And that's around renewable energy that's around solutions. Energy is just so unaffordable. It's increasingly challenging given what's happening, given the war, and given that, again, the Global North is going to capture all the oil and gas that they can. And given the issue with governments that having a real ability to have diffuse solar is absolutely critical to how people can live and get what they need to do. And so I think for many of our groups, if you talk to folks in the Philippines at 350, they'll say our ability to actually deliver solar to more remote fishing villages is absolutely critical.</p><p>And that also as a bulwark against the increasing level of climate chaos that we're facing. Unfortunately, the grids are weak and get knocked out all the time. And so if you're facing typhoons, if you're facing hurricanes, you need to have some kind of resilient energy. And so I think folks are talking about the solutions for those two things, and they're not saying it in the context of like, let's build pipelines and renewables. They're also saying some of this gives us the ability to think globally about how we're campaigning. So how are we actually moving resources, the trillions of dollars over the last few decades that have gone in all the different ways from the Global South, the colonial practices that still exist and the imperialist practices that still exist.</p><p>How does money and money moving from south to north, some of it is about how we move money back from north to south, and how we as a global organization, push for that and campaign for that so that that can go into solutions. And there's pretty interesting dynamic governments, new governments in Latin America and Colombia and Brazil, places like the Marshall Islands. Folks are talking about Kenya, where there really is a commitment to change energy policy and practices. And so it's a huge opportunity if we, as a global organization with allies, can do the work that we need to do to redistribute the wealth instead of having it go upward.</p><p>So I think that's the context through which we're thinking about solutions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They need energy, is what seems obvious.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Yep.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I hadn't really thought about like, they need more energy. And so just stopping bad energy is not enough.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>No, that's right. And for many years of campaigning against Peabody Coal and St. Louis, and fascinatingly, going to their shareholder meetings so that we could both ask questions and occasionally disrupt them, they would do these presentations on energy poverty. The coal company's role is they're eliminating energy poverty in Africa. And actually no, we need to be thinking about what's the real way to deliver energy so that it's also not controlled by — If we think utilities are bad here, right, South Africa, where you've got rolling blackouts for hours a day because of the huge amount of corruption of utility companies and the coal companies, how do we actually create real grassroots, real community controlled power is absolutely critical.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's talk about utilities then. So it sounds like the main way that this sort of turn toward building is going to manifest is a focus on utilities. So maybe just say a general word about how they fit into that frame, why you think they are a good target and the right target for organizing.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Yeah, they're the main thing. There's other things too and I'm sure we'll get into them. But utilities are particularly pernicious for a number of reasons. The first is they're not interested in sharing their power, right? They want to control transmission, they want to control how energy moves. So they don't want a grid where you have lots of rooftop solar and lots of other sources of transmission. So they're actively blocking that in all the ways that they can. Almost every utility company is and they're worried about their profits. And so it's anything from how they spread misinformation to how they're messing with permitting and transmission.</p><p>So that's the first thing is they're actually blocking the transition and then they're interested in really where they make a good chunk of money. Some people have characterized utility companies as like they're not actually interested in the generation transmission of electricity. They're really interested in building things. But it is often what we see is that's what's sexy is to build things?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Well that's what gets them their rate of return, right? Listeners are bored of hearing me talk about this but that's literally how they make their money is by building big things and spending a lot of money and that just the consequences of that cascade down to everything, right.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>And spending our money. So they're like, oh well, you're right, we're not going to do coal, we'll build frac gas plants and that'll be the transition. That's the bridge fuel that we need. Right, so you've explained it much better than I'm going to but that's certainly how they're structured and what they want to do. And then I think because the fact that the way we get energy is dependent on the profit system, I mean, that's obviously also problematic but it really plays out in a way that's very dangerous for working people, low and moderate income people because you're faced with outrageously skyrocketing bills.</p><p>And so there is a link between what happens in terms of how energy is produced and the same companies threatening to cut people off, not providing the power they need to provide. Or as we see with every heat wave, unfortunately, every summer is folks making decisions about not turning on air conditioning, not doing the things that they need to do to stay cool or to stay protected from the weather. Similar in winter and how many deaths there are of lower income folks because of heat waves, because people are scared that they're not going to be able to pay their bills. So it's both cut off, it's the threat and it's really the impact on — we have two energy systems people who can afford it and people who can't afford it.</p><p>And it's the same utility companies that are part of that. So these issues are interconnected and utility companies are and again, I think you've talked about this on previous podcasts in a much deeper way as not a policy person than I will, but there's the whole web of the ways in which utility companies influence things through ISOs the impact of utility companies and expertise that we don't have as consumers on public utility commissions and public service commissions. And a way in which sort of there's a self perpetuating kind of ecosystem of how decisions are being made.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They are enormously influential for all the reasons we're talking about, but they're also because of that kind of self perpetuating, largely closed ecosystem of decision making. They're also relatively obscure to most people, just to the average Joe or Jane on the street. You bring up like Big Oil, all the associations come along with that. Like people get that rapacious oil executives, that's a very intuitive frame. But like utilities, I'm just not sure people know what they are, what they do or have any real sense of them. Is that a challenge in organizing around them? Just sort of like that basic educational piece of like this is the entity that is between you and this is the reason these things are happening. Are people responding to that?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Yes, I think they really are. I think actually, while people know about oil companies, people also know you're writing a check to your utility company every month and you see the rates increase and you don't understand why you didn't use any gas in the summer and you're still getting a bill for basic services. Or you don't understand the outrageousness of heating bills and cooling bills, particularly as weather becomes more extreme. So, I think we are finding that folks are pretty fired up about their utility companies. I think what's harder is, and this is our next step and this is our organizing challenge, is how do we get folks to really think about challenging that in a way in which they think the game — to your point, this closed circuit we've got closed circuits on transmission and closed ecosystems, on how decisions are made and how do we get people to believe that their voice matters, that there's things that they can do that are going to change a rigged system so that it works for consumers and ratepayers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I guess that's what I was getting at. That's what's opaque is, you know, there's a utility, you know, you get bills from them, but how they come to their decisions and how you as a random person could get involved or insert yourself in that, I don't think most people know intuitively. So what is the answer to that question then? Because even if you do know about utilities, it's still not obvious what the answer to that question is, so what does it mean? Is this mostly about sort of public PR campaigns drawing attention to them, bashing them so that they feel pressured to change?</p><p>Or are you talking about organizing around more specific stuff like getting people into PUC meetings or getting people into shareholder meetings? So what does it look like to organize against a utility?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think it's all of the above. And when I say we actually want to talk about the bigger we because to the point this is not 350.org driving this, there's a lot of groups doing really interesting work on utilities. So folks are getting into shareholder meetings and rallying outside and having some people inside and some people outside to get utility companies to change the way they operate. Folks are engaging in a more robust way than I've seen in years. Actually, ACORN used to fight utility companies and 20 years ago was really the height of our fights against utility companies, both winning more money for subsidies and doing everything, including folks blocking the trucks.</p><p>Usually, there's a cut-off date in the colder weather states like April 1 or April 15 where you can't cut anyone off for non-payment, and then on April 15, trucks would roll out and ACORN members would block those trucks. So 20 years ago, you saw much more robust fights against utilities. We're seeing this really popping up in lots of places. There are organizations going to PCs and PSEs and that's really exciting. We're seeing folks really thinking about shareholder meetings in a different way. And then some of the most innovative things are also both legislatively and using the power of the ballot.</p><p>So legislatively, three states have now passed legislation and we're hoping this is setting the stage for many more. I believe it's Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maryland. I want to say that forbid utility companies from using ratepayer money for lobbying, which would make sense, right? We're paying our bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Seems so obvious, right? Just seems so obvious.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>I know. Capitalism, David, that's how it works. You get to sell a product, then you can use our money to lobby against us. So we're hoping that that sets the stage for many, many more states passing this and that even these are the kinds of legislation that could have bipartisan support. And again, this wasn't us thinking about this. This is many groups doing it. And then there's a different set of things that are also possible, which is in Maine, we're seeing a critical fight, Pine Tree Power, where they're trying to use the power of the ballot to basically eliminate the private utility companies and create publicly owned utilities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Stay tuned for a Volts pod on that very subject.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Oh, fantastic. Yes. So elections in November, and I think last I checked, the two major utility companies that spent $18 million to try to beat it. I'm sure that I'm looking like do I have a little what is that countdown to show how many more millions they've spent in the last week.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, maybe the right sequence is first you pass the law preventing them from using shareholder money for lobbying. Then you go after try to make them public. So that's utilities there's a lot of sort of vulnerable points, I think, where you can get in there and bash utilities, where they're subject, I think, to public mobilization. But you said the turn toward building is broader than that. So what are some of the other pieces that you see? How can activism organize around building?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Well, what's really exciting, and one of the groups in the 350 Network Council, Minnesota 350, really did some significant work as part of a larger coalition, for example, with their Climate Action Plan in Minneapolis, to think about how IRA funds really can help them change and electrify the whole city, particularly starting in lowest income neighborhoods, neighborhoods of color first. So I think there's a lot of tools in the toolbox to do this. Many other organizations are thinking about this as well, where there are progressive mayors and progressive city councils to think about. The IRA money itself is not sufficient to transition whole cities, but it gets you pretty far.</p><p>And so if you can find some bridge funding, if you can do a windfall tax on profiteers or a corporate tax or something, that you can find additional resources to really move in an aggressive way to electrify a whole city. So I think one thing is thinking about larger scale industrial policy and lots of brilliant — both policy groups and organizing groups and groups that are doing party building and political work. The major organizing networks are thinking about this kind of work where how do we really transition cities? So I think that is in the building category and it is within our reach given the additional influx of money.</p><p>And then I think there's a second thing, which is the direct pay provisions of IRA, where school districts where public buildings can install the solar that they need to install rooftop solar. And then they're getting a check from the federal government to be able to do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As opposed to a tax credit where you buy the, whatever, the item, and then later when you file your taxes, deduct the item on your taxes, get the credit for it. This is just you buy the item and you get basically the refund at the point of sale. You don't have to do it through your taxes. It's only available to schools and nonprofits. I feel like there's a couple of other categories too, but it's a couple of categories of entities are eligible for direct pay.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Right. And these are entities predominantly that don't pay taxes, right. So they're getting money that they wouldn't have normally gotten. Because you're right, the other things are in tax credits for entities that pay taxes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and all of those seem like good points around which to organize, like schools, churches and nonprofits and things like that.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>It's absolutely so clear in schools, I don't know about you, but I went to school in St. Louis and there was one wing of the school that was air conditioned. So everyone wanted to take social studies classes because that was the only wing that was air conditioned. Everything else, you're in school in late August in Missouri, and it's 97 degrees. But yeah, so many schools, the facilities issues, and we were seeing just waves of school cancellations because of the extreme heat. So it's really helping kids learn, too. There's such an opportunity. It's not just about that it's cool to have solar on top of schools, but it actually makes a difference in kids being able to sit and learn.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I've always thought that was like a low hanging fruit. And I've always been puzzled why there isn't more organizing around that, but just healthy interior air for schools and electric buses so they're not breathing diesel fumes and efficiency upgrades so that they can stay cool in the heat. These bring together your environment people and your school people, and like, parents who are the most rabid, ready to organize demographic in the world. I've always wondered why there isn't more action around that.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Same here. And I think this is the challenge before us is whether we can spur this kind of action in organizing. And this is something that ought to happen in red states and cities and blue states and cities. And so I think this is the excitement, and I think folks are just starting to wrap their heads around this opportunity and this possibility, and so let's see if we can do it. But this is I think the challenge before us as organizers is whether we can muster the enthusiasm that's necessary, because you're absolutely right, this is the link.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I read your piece about IRA. So say a little bit more then about how you see the opportunity IRA presents. We've talked about this on the pod a couple of times, but just how you envision using IRA to organize around building things. What do you think are the opportunities it provides?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I think this is where we started the podcast, which is about the role of how we think about organizing, which is what I think right now may end up being very different as we're talking to groups, as parents are getting in the struggle in their school districts, as they're meeting with folks. What it ends up looking like on the back end is different. But I think some of it is we need to do some basic education with folks. So folks understand what is possible and what they can do. Because it does seem there are parts of it where I'm like "Oh, this seems too good to be true. What's the catch?"</p><p>So really, to talk about the possibilities, I think the second is if we're talking about school districts. And you said this before, what do we do? Why aren't there more fights about this? I think people are pretty particularly in big cities, there's a lot of despair about the state of school's infrastructure. Right. The major project schools were built in many places decades and decades ago. And so they're dealing with just basic infrastructure problems of lead pipes and bad water and asbestos pops up here and there. Like I know in Philadelphia, where I live now, they've had to shut down schools because of safety concerns.</p><p>And schools are so underfunded. It's really leading with the vision there. And there has to be a little bit of a fight and a little bit of a push. And then I think having folks realize that there are going to be in city after city, in school district after school district, there are going to be bureaucrats and I actually use this term fondly, there are going to be folks within the system who are going to be trying to figure this out. And so we need to figure that out together. And I think some of the missing piece is, we in organizing, this is going to be a slight shift from how we think about organizing.</p><p>I laid this out before where we said, okay, we're going to fight the utility companies. That's right. But also there's a way in which we can have some relational power because there's folks within the bureaucracy of these systems trying to figure out how to make things work. And we're going to need to co-conspire and collaborate with those folks as well and believe that we have the access and can be heard. And I think many times people don't feel like they're heard at cities, states, federal level, we've talked about this in the context of public utility commissions.</p><p>So we're going to need to try out and see if folks can be collaborators and will be heard by the bureaucracies that are going to need to take care of this opportunity or step into this opportunity, I should say. And that's where the excitement is. But it is going to be something different for us and it is going to be a little bit of a shift that we've got to figure out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I have a question about precisely that shift, which is especially on the left, I think there's just this very sort of deep, almost instinctive suspicion and hostility toward "the man", whatever guise "the man" takes in a particular situation. But the idea of you as a nonprofit organizer collaborating with, say, a utility, or maybe collaborating with private companies sometimes who are trying to build things in innovative ways or collaborating with institutions that leftists have more traditionally just fought will inevitably bring some measure of like "You guys are selling out. You're getting absorbed into the man. Like you're collaborators with the man."</p><p>Now that sort of sentiment. Do you worry about navigating that at all?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Not if we're doing real organizing and people are making — I think this is where the democratic process comes in handy is if a group in X city is making a decision based on a set of meetings and actions, some of which will be actions, some of which will be meetings, some of which will be research that they're doing this and that it's based on a collaborative process, then I think that's a defensible decision. I think where we get into it is if we're talking about big picture decisions and someone's like telling people what to do. But I do think that's the magic of organizing is folks can handle pretty nuanced conversations and decisions and they have to live that through.</p><p>And so, for example, those of us who come out of community organizing, there's something called research actions. And what that means is before you make a decision to start a campaign, you often pick up the phone and call the people who might be decision makers and see if they'll meet with you and tell you what it is that you need. Like who's the targets? What do you think? And usually it's interesting because you do three or four of these meetings and everyone's like "Oh no, we're not responsible for that, someone else is." But then you build an analysis and then you can make the decision about what your campaign is, who are your targets and what you're doing.</p><p>And so, I think this is similar in that if we can get to the table with some of the folks who are making the bigger policy decisions for school districts, for public buildings, those folks are then going to give us the information that we need to collaborate and that offer will be there. And that folks can decide that. And so, I think that's where organizing matters. And I do think with public institutions I'll say two more things about this. I think public institutions, it's not selling out and that we're not just I think that is a view sometimes that we have.</p><p>And I kind of think I don't know, I'm just going to say it. So, I think there is an elitism among many, both folks within government, the political class, some set of kind of elite policymakers that believe that if you didn't go to an Ivy League school and if you didn't, that there are folks who are qualified to tell you what policy should be. And then there's a great set of unwashed people who just want to fight things and can't deal with complicated subjects. And my three decades of organizing, David, that is absolutely not true, right?</p><p>We have lobbied for very complicated sets of banking regulations of things — folks can get this. And I think it's when we cut the steps there. And I do think the more elitist folks who are doing this aren't doing this because they hate people in Middle America or something. That's not what's happening. But what's happening is, I do think, for example, this is where utility companies are the problem, are trying to set up the way money moves, the way advertising moves. They're trying to set up these false choices, these false juxtapositions, and saying that people can't handle that complexity.</p><p>And I think we've really set up this level of elitism and we need to push back against it. And my experience is when the process means that folks will really figure out what makes sense based on where we're trying to go, if we can make that set of decisions. But again, I don't want to well, actually, that's not true. I'm happy to spend the whole podcast critiquing utility companies, but I think they are creating these false choices, right? We saw this in California around the rooftop solar regulation, where the utility "No, no, no. Low income people. We're not going to be able to have subsidies for low income folks.</p><p>If all the middle class people have rooftop solar, then we won't have any money for lower income folks." And so they're creating these false juxtapositions and we're buying into that. And that we can't buy into that, we actually have to believe the folks will understand and will want to fight together. And that's why I think the utility work, it's so important that we bring together constituencies of folks who can't get net metering together with lower income folks, working, folks who can't pay their bills. I think that's where the synergy happens and that's where we can make the good decisions around organizing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Speaking of that, one of the things I always have appreciated about the labor organizers I've spoken to, I mean, obviously there might be a trace of naivete about this because I'm from the outside looking in, but my impression is that the labor movement is extremely focused on and realistic about power. They recognize that power is the thing, that it's not who has the best arguments or the best slogans. It's just what are the concrete results here and how can we organize in such a way as to create further results? And so from that perspective, you've written that IRA sort of all these pots of money give activists a chance to go in and organize groups of people who have not necessarily traditionally been part of green organizing, like low income communities, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p>My question is, how do you do that in a way that isn't just — because I feel like the climate movement has been sort of not very good at this — how do you do this in a way that makes winning the next battle more likely? How do you do it in a way that builds power over time and isn't just about one win or one bill or one sort of victory? How do you organize in a way that makes the next bit of organizing easier, that builds your institutional power? Are there general principles to guide us here?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Absolutely. So power is critical. Power is about size, it's about scale, it's about mobilization. It's about the ability to really move, to act and move the things we want to move. And so that is investing in longer term institutions. And part of the reason why I came to 350 was because we had 100 local groups and they weren't just in Brooklyn, but they're in Montana or they're in Sioux Falls. They're in places where we need to be doing that work and we need to be then investing in the size and scale and ability of not just our groups because that doesn't matter.</p><p>It's about a larger ecosystem of how lots of organizations are working together, building their size and scale and scope, including with labor unions, to the degree that in the place where we can collaborate so that we are building stronger organizations so each win strengthens us and strengthens our ability to then move the next thing. And that we're thinking some number of steps ahead around that too. So I think that's absolutely critical. And I think having campaigns where and again, people join and stay in organizations where they have a voice, where they have a say. And so going through the process, going through the steps of running the campaigns and winning the campaigns and needing the participation of everyday people in order to do that develops leaders and keeps those people in so that we can continue to grow for the next step that we're doing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to press you on a couple of things.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm sure you've heard, I'm sure you're aware of the larger conversations going on about speed and about building. And one of the sort of standard critiques of the green movement is that it is too accustomed to blocking things and is still sort of instinctively blocking things. And now all these sort of environmental laws that were passed for good reasons are now being sort of turned and used to block building things. You hear not just about NEPA on the national level, but like in California, the California Environmental Quality Act is being deployed to stop infill, to stop zoning reform, to stop bike lanes, to stop basic public places, to stop low income housing.</p><p>And then there are environmentalists fighting solar fields in the desert because of the species, or that they're fighting transmission lines through the forest that could bring hydro and lower emissions intensity, et cetera, et cetera. There's a lot of this going on around. Is this turn toward building going to involve at any point direct confrontation with friends over these sorts of issues, over these sorts of clashes of values and trade offs? Is at any point 350 going to come out and say, "Yes, this is a short term damage to the environment depending on how you measure it. But it's a long term step we need to take. And so we're going to come out in favor of building this thing that other environmentalists are coming out against." In other words, are you going to put some real skin, real organizational skin in this game?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>I certainly hope we will. I do want to draw some distinction. I know you didn't say this, but I think there are some red lines for us too. We're not going to compromise on the ability of indigenous communities to determine what happens with their lands. For example, we think absolutely that things that are built or things that are mined on indigenous lands, indigenous folks should get a say in that and should get to control what's happening on their lands. So there are some red lines. And the second thing is, I think we're lumping conservationists and environmentalists and everyone not worrying about all the labels, but everyone's sort of in the same pot.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>NIMBYs.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Yeah, the NIMBYs versus, and I do think that there is a level of hard — organizing is about having challenging conversations with people too, and it is about asking tough questions. And the group process is about people trying to think about what there is for the greater good. And sorry, I'm going to go on a slight ramble, but I do think this is important. So the folks who are blocking the wind in wherever I forget, is that Martha's Vineyard? Those are the uber-rich and it's about impeding their view. And we need to fight with those folks, whether or not they claim they're environmentalists or conservationists or whatever.</p><p>And the NIMBY folks, we really do have to challenge them. We have to challenge NIMBY folks in a whole variety of ways, right, because all of the issues are tied together, as you pointed out, affordable housing, having single-family zoning that's required in some places, that's unconscionable, right. There needs to be multifamily housing. There needs to be we need to have less class-segregated housing, not just in California, but everywhere. And so we need to fight those things and we need to push back against people who are using NIMBY, who are using levers. And that's very clear.</p><p>And we're going to take some difficult positions around that and we're going to be pushing our folks and we're going to be challenging our groups to do that. We also, though, this is an opportunity, there are going to be a set of like, each decision is going to open up a can of worms, but a set of other decisions. So if what we're saying is Exxon or Chevron is then going to build big wind or utility-scale solar and wind and that's getting built, that's not what we want to do. And that's not the reason, the opportunity for the transformation.</p><p>What we're trying to do predominantly is fight for community-controlled solar and wind, right? We're trying to change, not just change the way that we need to convert. And so the most profitable rapacious corporations, as you called them, David, although I agree 100% that they can just fund the next wave of things. So I think we want to use the opportunity as best we can to really change the power dynamics, to change the way the grid works, to change who produces it, who controls things and how they're controlled, and to bring many more things into the public domain and to really diminish the power of the richest 0.1 of 1% who are controlling things.</p><p>So there's going to be fights and challenges, but also we need to think about how this opportunity really creates a more equitable system, really gives the opportunity for some of the most disadvantaged folks and neighborhoods and communities over time to actually be first in line for the benefits that are possible with this just transition. And we need to think about that and we need to put so much more energy into fighting that as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I guess I'd push a little more though. It's fine and good and great to organize around solutions that both produce more renewable energy and cut low-income people in on the benefits and involve community control, et cetera, et cetera. Those are all great, but those are like the puppy dogs and grandma of this space. In the real world, there are lots of times when you just can't get all of that, where you have to decide about trade-offs. You have to decide getting more renewable energy is worth less than optimal ownership structure or whatever. Or like getting more renewable energy is worth some sacrifice of some piece of some ecosystem.</p><p>There are trade-offs and I think what I hear constantly from outside the green movement is that green groups are refusing to grapple with these trade-offs. And I guess what would really convince me that there's a turn here is a group taking some of those trade-offs head-on and being explicit about their willingness to compromise in some areas, to get advances in other areas. That seems to me it's what building is about. And what building involves is inevitably you're not going to be able to just do community solar. That's not going to solve the problem.</p><p>They're going to be bigger, more difficult things, more difficult trade-offs. And I just wonder, is 350 going to be the group to go out and be more explicit and be more honest about those trade-offs?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>First of all, it would be great to be in a position where we were sitting at the table, where our members and leaders were sitting at the table, and there was a set of "Here's what we're going to do as a society, and here's how we're going to get the huge amount of energy that we need. And here are the decisions. What do you all think? How do we make these hard decisions?" So I think the answer is yes, we are willing to do that. But also it's a question of like, what does that mean? Which decisions are hard, which particular decisions are the ones that we're trying to make and it's time, place and conditions around that.</p><p>And so I think generally we understand on a very basic level, we're not trying to run campaigns that are against large-scale renewables, right? But I want to give a very specific example about utility-scale solar and wind because I think this is really important and it talks about some of the first barriers that have to be cleared out. So one of the things that we're seeing is the unions, particularly utility unions and the building trade unions tend to be — you know, you saw this in California with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers being on the side of PG&E around solar hikes.</p><p>And some of that, we've got a first barrier, which is — it's part of what's happening with the auto worker negotiations right now — is we're really talking about why are folks siding with the status quo, what are the parts of the status quo that are set up in a particular way? So if you're building out utility-scale solar and wind and you're a worker on that, you're working for a temp agency; you don't have any union protections in 80 or 90% of the cases. You're driving across the country for a three-month gig and then sleeping in your car till your per diem comes in. So all of that is like there's a lot of things that we have to push for before we get the — there's not an equal power dynamic where we're all sitting at the table and being like, "Here are the sacrifices that some people are going to have to make or some ecosystems are going to have to make to get to the energy grid that we want."</p><p>Right now, there's a lot of fighting to do just to clear the path so that we've got good jobs in renewable energy, that we've got good jobs making electric vehicles, that we've got the ability for utilities to stop building new gas plants and start investing in the renewable energy production that they need to, including having a more diffuse grid. So I'm not saying that the choices won't be coming down and that some of them won't be hard. But right now there's a lot of underbrush that we need to clear out, a lot of fights to pick that sort of change the power dynamics so that we have a way to do what we need to do first.</p><p>And let's see how far and how fast we get just by changing the way workers are treated, by changing the way communities are treated, by changing the way that people have the ability that they're going to directly benefit from this utility scale community benefit agreements, from having utility scale solar and wind in their backyard. So that's not because Amazon told X Energy Company to build this, but that actually people are going to benefit in their bills by having utility scale solar and wind and then I think folks are going to be a lot more ready to make some of the challenging choices. But let's get to the table first. Let's talk about power. Let's really talk about power and not have the conversation in the abstract.</p><p>Right. Another critique you often hear is that green groups, and I think this is probably a critique you hear about NGOs generally, really, is that when they reach a certain size, their internal sort of organizational motivations take over. Like the preservation of the organization takes over and the health of the organization itself becomes a top priority of the organization and they sort of take their eyes a little bit off the game and that they end up — And so my question is, if 350 and other green orgs try to make this shift, try to shift more toward building, and it doesn't fire people up as much as say, the pipeline battles did, just how committed are they to this? Are they committed enough that they're willing to sort of maybe take a hit in terms of email responses or the number of people showing up at events or the amount of small donor funding that comes in?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In other words, are they willing to push through maybe some sort of diffuse organizational resistance or diffuse resistance to this because they are committed enough to it? Or is this the kind of thing where you're sort of testing and if the membership doesn't like it, then you are going to sort of withdraw? I don't know that you can answer that question on an abstract level, but you see what I'm getting at.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Oh, I see exactly what — now, you're throwing the cans of soup at the nonprofit industrial complex, as it were. And I appreciate that. I certainly can't speak for the sector. I think part of what makes us different and unique is a couple of things. One, as we talked about earlier, because we're a global organization and we're trying to really function to some degree as a global organization, we're going to stay the course on the solutions work because that's being driven by the most impacted communities in the global south. And so we're obligated to follow their lead and we're going to stay that course.</p><p>The second thing is the funders are not a monolith and people do things because of funding and not because of funding, et cetera. But the reality is, it is about what our chapters, what local groups of 350 want to be doing. It is about both making suggestions to them and it is about having a program where people can do the work. And some of it is because some of the state groups that are both independent of 350, but have the 350 name and are part of a network council of 350 groups, have already been moving and doing solutions work.</p><p>And so they're ahead of where 350.org is. And the same thing with many volunteer run groups that we're actually hearing it the other way. I'm not worried because groups are ahead of us on solutions and we're in some ways, like running a little bit to catch up over some of the great work that's happening.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about the other side of that: the donor community? Because another critique you often hear is that whatever the young people might want to do, the young people have their heads on straight, they're ready to go, but they depend on money, basically from foundations that are run by what's the polite term? Aging white boomers who might not be, let's say, totally clued into the latest in politics and the latest in organizing. And in some sense they have to chase the money. So what's your sense of the donor foundation community's posture on all this? Do they have a clue?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Well, certainly around IRA Implementation. They ask —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Speak freely, Jeff.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>What did I say about — don't talk about the donors. I will say again: Members are not a monolith. Groups are not a monolith. Donors are not a monolith. There are some really interesting foundations that are thinking in very large terms about the opportunities that the Inflation Reduction Act has to really remake industrial policy and why that's critical and not just why that's important, but also how this changes the politics as well. That the way we're really delivering things for people. And that also to your point in talking to folks in the Biden administration, the way that translates into votes as well.</p><p>So I actually think the donor class does understand what we need to be doing on solutions, does understand what we need to be doing to deliver for people so that they understand that actually investing in robust government, robust, functional government is something that is in our collective interest.</p><p>State capacity, yay! That's on the Volts T shirt whenever I make one.</p><p>How do I get one of those? What's cool and is happening in donor communities these days is I think there are so many different levels. To your point on the youth. Yeah, there are some aging boomers that are sitting at big foundations and fancy buildings, usually on the East Coast. But there's a lot of folks now on the West Coast who came into money recently. There's a lot of young people who have inherited money who have much more fundamental challenges to capitalism and how they got their found wealth in the first place. So this is unique again, in my three decades that we're seeing a level of philanthropy that is actually becoming increasingly democratic, becoming increasingly kind of challenging status quo and systems.</p><p>And it's not 100% there yet, but I'm confident. I feel like there's like something for everyone within philanthropy right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. All right, well, we're out of time. So let me conclude on a positive question. If I'm just an individual, I support decarbonization and I've already bought my heat pump or whatever, and I want to get involved in activism that advances decarbonization, that helps things get built. Where do I look? Where do I go? Who do I join? Where do I aim my fire?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Well, obviously I would like to say you should join 350.org. And I know we'll have a lot —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's get that obvious answer out off the way.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>But I do want to say I think you should join something that is local, I think because we're trying to build things. So there may not be a 350 chapter where you are. If there isn't, we'll help you build one. But there may be something else. There may be a different formation that is also thinking about building. There may be something if you're young, there may be something in the Sunrise movement and there might be something in Indivisible. There might be something in a base-building group that's through the Center for Popular Democracy or People's Action or Community Change where you can get involved.</p><p>There's organizing happening almost everywhere in the country and you can get involved. And I do think that great minds are thinking alike and that we're at a unique point right now where folks are really scrambling. We are scrambling in a good way to try to figure out how to implement this transformation, how to do it in a way that is equitable, that is just and that is clearing out, that is sort of contesting for power against those who are holding it and building the world in which we want to live. And so there is something for you to get involved locally wherever you are.</p><p>And I hope that you do that. And I really hope that you're both fighting the pernicious utility companies but also meeting with the person in charge of all buildings in the school district to figure out how you're going to get rooftop solar in your school district. And I think those two things go hand in hand and are going to help you transform your community.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You might say think globally, act locally. Then what might be the suggestion?</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>That's not the Volts T-shirt?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's going to be a lot of text on my Volts T-shirt. Jeff, thank you so much for coming along. This is really interesting. It's really fascinating to watch this movement try to reconfigure itself on the fly under intense time pressure, under intense moral pressure, etcetera, etcetera. It's fascinating to watch. So thanks for coming on and talking us through it.</p><p><strong>Jeff Ordower</strong></p><p>Appreciate that. And we're not going to get it right. I think part of what's great about organizing is you iterate and you try to figure it out. And that's having the community of practice of being able to do things, make mistakes, get some things right and continue to push. And that it's going to be a collective effort that we're going to need millions of folks to be involved in. And we're excited about that opportunity. So thanks for having me on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-climate-activists-can-help-get</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:136921453</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 26 Sep 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/136921453/9bbb582cf1dd8d6cd2a8f36bdae9021c.mp3" length="73588208" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3678</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/136921453/46c4391e5f57c2c0939dacdc7f17aaa1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to accelerate rooftop solar & household batteries in the US]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>How can the US make it easier, faster, and cheaper for homeowners to install rooftop solar? In this episode, Sunrun CEO Mary Powell shares her vision for boosting not only residential solar, but other forms of residential electrification too.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADxFVraPUpHbLqiUM2Qlmbra/volts23.09.15%28mary.powell%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/how-to-accelerate-rooftop-solar-household-batteries-in-the-us"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In Australia, one out of three households has solar panels on the roof. In the US, it’s one out of 25. That probably has something to do with the fact that in the US, rooftop solar is twice as expensive, twice the hassle, and takes twice as long to get installed.</p><p>Why is the process so broken? And what could be done to make it smoother and faster?</p><p>To discuss these and related matters, I went to the source: Mary Powell, the CEO of Sunrun, the nation’s largest residential rooftop solar company — or more accurately, the nation’s largest residential electrification company.</p><p>Before taking the top spot at Sunrun, Powell spent more than 20 years in leadership at Green Mountain Power, Vermont’s largest power utility and a nationally recognized pioneer in clean energy. Sunrun brought her on to help the company move into products — batteries, EV chargers, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/guides-and-how-tos/the-power-grid-explained-plus-demand-response-virtual-power-plants-and-more#virtual-power-plant">virtual power plants</a> — that were once thought the province of utilities.</p><p>I talked with her about how to speed up the rooftop solar interconnection process, the role of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/guides-and-how-tos/what-is-net-metering-and-other-solar-terms-explained#netmetering">net metering</a>, Sunrun’s move into vehicle charging and VPPs, and the future of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/guides-and-how-tos/the-power-grid-explained-plus-demand-response-virtual-power-plants-and-more#distributed-energy-resource">distributed energy</a>. </p><p>All right, then, with no further ado, Mary Powell of Sunrun. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Oh, my pleasure. I was looking forward to chatting with you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Mary, I'm looking at my notes here and I have — let me just count real quick — one million questions to ask you. So, we're going to have to move quick here because I've got so much. But just by way of framing, I was in Australia recently and was listening to them talk about their rooftop solar success story there, the sort of rooftop solar miracle. So the US is at, I think, something like 4% rooftop solar penetration. And Australia is up around 30%, 35%, something like that. One out of every three households, mainly because it is two to three times less expensive and way, way, way faster to get on your roof there.</p><p>Most of what I want to talk about are in different forms. How can the US process be made cheaper and faster? That's kind of, I think, the theme of our discussion here today. But before we get to the reality of why things take so long, let's talk a little bit about perception. So I guess Sunrun is now the biggest residential solar company in the world — I know, in the US.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah, certainly in the US. Yeah, we're the largest, not just residential solar company, but we are the largest in the combination of solar-plus-storage. So we really see ourselves as a clean energy lifestyle company, and we're really well positioned to meet customers wherever they are on their clean energy journey and help them transform their lives to something that's more affordable, certainly something that's cleaner. So we have solar, we have storage, we have sophisticated electric panels, we have EV chargers, and of course, we have that amazing partnership with Ford on the F-150 that you can use to back up your home.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Going to get into all that later.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But I assume as part of what you do, you do a lot of consumer research, a lot of talking to homeowners. So the first thing I'm interested in really is what do US homeowners say they want when they come to you? Why are they now installing rooftop solar and batteries? Why are they doing it? Or perhaps even more to the point, what do they say about why they're not doing it? What are the sort of pain points you hear about from customers?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>So the reason customers are going solar, and increasingly, as I said, solar-plus-storage in California now we're up to probably about an 80% attachment rate. So customers that are going solar really want the benefits of storing their energy as well and having the resilience and the comfort and the peace of mind that comes with that. Back to what I'm hearing from customers: It's so interesting. I would say for so many years, largely it was an industry where customers were enticed to go solar to save money, so they knew they could save money off of what they were paying their utility.</p><p>And Dave, that's still true. I mean, in every market that we sell in, the cost per kilowatt hour that you generate on your roof is lower than the cost you're paying your utility. So many customers still find the value of savings to be very appealing, but it really has evolved over time where so many customers, I talk to customers every single week as well as I've worked in our stores and I've been in customers homes. And increasingly what you're hearing is that they just want stability. I mean, I've heard so many customers have said to me, "Mary, like, it's fine if I save money, but honestly, I just want greater independence and I want stability.</p><p>I want to know that the price isn't going to go up of the energy that I'm getting." And of course, you also have so many customers that want solar energy because of the clean energy attributes. But so many customers now are really enticed around the energy independence we can provide. And then, as customers increasingly adopt electric vehicles, that makes them painfully aware of what they're paying on the kilowatt hour basis with their utility. So that also then entices them to really want to go solar.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what do they say is stopping them then, the ones who are not pulling the trigger?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>I would say back to your opening. We don't make things easy, not Sunrun, but in the country, we don't make it an easy process for customers. And then I think for many customers, I've heard many customers who come back to us later because they say, well, it just feels like such a big decision and a big project, and then when they realize, "Oh, actually, I don't have to put any money down, it gets installed in a day." In many cases, we now can install up to two homes in a day. So they're starting to see it's not a big infrastructure project.</p><p>But I think for many customers, they initially maybe feel that it does. But also to your point that you started our conversation with, there's a lot, particularly in some parts of the country, it's a very onerous process and a long process, and some customers just drop out along the way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think because there's only 4% penetration in the US, it's still somewhat of a novelty to most people, I think. Most people probably don't have a really good sense of what's involved. So maybe just walk through what is the process of getting solar on your roof and what are those pain points? What are the points that are difficult and take a long time?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>It's not uniform, so it's different all over the country. It really depends on the state that you live in and the utility that you're served by, as well as then sometimes also local regulations and restrictions. But let me talk it through in sort of the easier and then the maybe more challenging state. So in the sort of more straightforward geographies, you could have a conversation with your salesperson, you could have a quote. Within days, you make a decision.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, nobody needs to come to your roof now to figure out your suitability anymore. Is all that done by satellite and whatever now?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yes, there's a lot of advanced technology that we can use to understand whether a customer is suitable. In the process we do have somebody, actually, we do have photos that we have to get and we obviously want to verify everything. And so you start with that initial consultation, you get an initial design and then, yes, we go through the steps of finalizing that design, making sure it's the absolute right design. Once we understand the nuances of your home, once we understand the electrical infrastructure, the roof, the design of the roof, the age of the roof, the layout, and then that moves into full design.</p><p>And then you have to obviously work through interconnection with the utility and any permitting that needs to happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When does that happen, though? Does that happen as I'm planning my system? Or do I build my system and then contact the utility and say "Hey, I've got the system, I want to connect" ?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Well, first of all, at Sunrun, what we do is we want to make that easy for all of you. And I first went solar 14 years ago, bought the system outright in Vermont with a local company, and then since then have gone with solar storage and EV charging with Sunrun twice and once before I became CEO. And they make it very easy. So they made it a very easy process. So they basically just keep you updated. But Sunrun is the one that shepherds through all of those process steps that we then make the customer aware. I mean, obviously for the customer, it may entail that somebody has to stop by the home if there's local inspection that needs to happen, but we basically shepherd that for the customer.</p><p>But you have to work on interconnection. So again, in some jurisdictions interconnection is actually very straightforward. Vermont's a great example of a very solar friendly state where the utilities make the interconnection process very easy. There's some states where it's very time consuming with months of delay for studies or paperwork. There's many states where the utility interconnection for home solar and battery systems, the costs can range from one hundred dollars to ten thousand dollars depending on study costs or required upgrades. Yes. And then there's some where there's just solar is prohibited.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's more and more areas now where they're just saying "No more." Right. Like you're cut off. Which seems kind of crazy.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah, it does to me, too, particularly as a former utility CEO, because even if I were facing what they like to call a solar-saturated circuit, it's an amazing opportunity just to put some storage, some power packs or utilizing some other storage technology at the substation and basically just soak up all that energy and use it exactly when it's best suited for the grid. So there's many, many solutions that we could absolutely see.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It occurs to me that if the customer is just interfacing with Sunrun and Sunrun is hashing through these difficult and extended interconnection processes, it seems like a business risk for Sunrun, basically is the customer aware that it's not Sunrun's fault basically that it's taking so long? Are those tricky discussions?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>I'm a firm believer in really setting expectations appropriately up front. So we've done a lot of work on that, on our customer obsession and customer experience to really make sure that right up front it's all laid out so that they understand the steps of the process, but they don't have to necessarily be exposed to having to deal with all the steps. So again, in many cases when you lay it all out and you tell a customer "So in your jurisdiction it's going to take six months, and these are all the reasons why," most customers are okay with that. But to your point, when things increasingly become more complicated through that process, there's obviously a risk of losing some of those customers and they don't end up going all the way through the whole process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, let's talk then about interconnection process. As you say, it's not ideal that it differs so radically from one utility to the next. And it's not ideal that it can take three to six months. It's not ideal that it's impossible now in some areas. So what are some reforms? Like what are some steps to take to make that whole process smoother and more predictable and more uniform. And who needs to take those steps?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Right. And back to your example of Australia. Again, the differences are exactly what you're talking about. The differences are that it's very standardized there. So those are the kinds of solutions that we're seeing that could help reduce costs and speed up deployment of home solar and batteries. So it's really having standardized costs for residential interconnection so that there are no surprises or unequal costs that will make a project too expensive for a family. For example, in Illinois, through the Climate Equitable Jobs Act enacted, they enacted a $200 interconnection fee so there are no surprises with upgrade costs, and it remains affordable for all households.</p><p>So there's great examples all over the country. I think it's really about how do we make those more standardized, faster and more affordable interconnection with online and standardized interconnection technical requirements, such as allowing meter collars. I don't know how much you've spent time looking at meter collars, but meter collar adapters, they avoid main panel upgrades, so they save time and costs. So dozens of utilities allow for customer owned meter collars, but the majority still continue to block their use. So again, a really simple change. Utilities could easily allow third party certified electricians to approve main panel upgrades, also avoiding increasing and unnecessary utility delays.</p><p>Those are a couple of examples. There's also ensuring interconnection access with smart inverter functionality. A few states have enacted fast and open interconnection rules that leverage smart inverters. For example, Hawaii now uses a combination of a voltvar function and a volt watt function to avoid the need for distribution, circuit hosting capacity, and customer service upgrades.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Explain it at my grandma level. What is the significance of a smart inverter? What does that get you? What does that do for you?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>I think the easiest way to explain it to grandma or anybody is really, when you think about it, the design of the utility system is literally like the same fundamental design as 100 years ago. So when I use these names and these technologies, it's really simply saying, moving towards putting technology on the grid that makes it smarter and more effective so that it's more flexible to allow additional solar energy on the circuit. So it kind of gets back to what I was saying about the example of where we have utilities that are saying no more solar in XYZ territory. They could solve that through some of these kinds of technologies.</p><p>They could also solve that through just, again, putting storage in substations along those circuits so it allows them to then utilize that energy. So even on clogged circuits, customers can interconnect solar and batteries to the grid and they can avoid high upgrade costs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what is SolarAPP? Tell us a little bit about that initiative.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah, SolarAPP was launched by NREL in 2021 to basically address the permitting times and to cut down on permitting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is different than interconnection.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Permitting comes before or after interconnection or it's all at the same time?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>To me, that's all at the same time. I am sure there's a linear process to it that I'm not aware of. But at the same time as you're having to get things ready for interconnection, you're having to work through the permitting process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Who is permitting? Who is the permit coming from? Is it the city?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yes, the local AHJ. So it's the local jurisdiction that you're dealing with. So that is one of the reasons that the development of the SolarAPP was so powerful. Because you're dealing with so many different jurisdictions that in many cases were using an intensely manual process and they also had just nuances that weren't necessarily meaningful, but they were historic. Do you know what I mean? They were just in place. So what was really cool about the work that Sunrun did with NREL and others was launching SolarAPP. And again, it has helped. It was launched in 2021 to cut down on permitting times.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's just to standardize that process, that's what the app is meant to do?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's to automate it, but it obviously takes time to get the local offices using the technology. But to date, we have more than 24,000 permits that have been issued via SolarAPP across the country. So that's very powerful because it took what was a weeks to months long process and made it instant. So it ends up saving consumers, installers, and local governments time and money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I would think the local governments would want that, right? I mean, I think it would be desirable for them. I can't imagine them resisting why they would resist such a thing.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, human behavior, right? Don't we all —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I often can't imagine why people would resist things. And yet there they are resisting them all over the place.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Exactly. No, I had the same reaction way back in 2007 when I launched an incentive as a utility for our customers to go solar, I had the same reaction. I was like, why would anybody resist this? This is just the future, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, turns out people can come up with all kinds of reasons to resist.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's interconnection, which is a utility thing that needs to be standardized, and then there's permitting, which is a local jurisdiction thing, which also needs to be and is being standardized. Are there other soft costs? Because this is the thing, right? Like, we're buying the same cheap panels here that they're buying in Australia, so it's not hardware, it's all these soft costs that are making ours take longer. Are there other soft costs?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>That's why we should be able to deal with it because the biggies are exactly that: The interconnection and the permitting. And again, one of the things I was really thrilled with was just about a year ago, California did adopt a mandate requiring cities with populations over 50,000 and counties with populations over 150,000 to adopt an online automated permitting platform like SolarAPP. So we are seeing Colorado also recently adopted legislation which established a million-dollar grant program to implement SolarAPP because there is cost to implementing it. So back to your question of like, why wouldn't they use it? You know, it's still converting a manual process to an automated one.</p><p>And we've also seen work in Maryland as well where the Maryland Energy Administration requested money from DOE to support SolarAPP efforts. So I do see on the permitting side, I definitely see some progress happening. And on the soft cost on the interconnection, again, there are some bright lights, but a lot more work could be done to bring down the cost significantly for consumers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I feel like every pod I record at some point we come to the problem of "utilities being utilities" being the main issue. Okay, let's jump to a few other subjects then, which may or may not be slowing things down and I'd like to get your read on. I hear a lot in the clean energy world generally about labor, labor shortages, sort of shortages in the trades, a shortage of trained electricians and everything else. Is that something you're struggling with right now? Like are you having trouble finding people to do the work or is that —</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>No, we really aren't. I mean, it's really interesting to me leading Sunrun, it's so powerful the kind of work we do. We are a highly attractive employer and in fact, I'm out and about on a regular basis talking to installers and electricians and the story I hear over and over again is that they are really thrilled to have the opportunity to work at a company like Sunrun. I mean, we treat people well, they get good benefits, they get compensated well, and the attraction of working in clean energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I've heard, though, that I think, one of the sort of traditional dings on the whole notion of a just transition, which you often hear is that the old jobs in fossil fuels are unionized and really well paid and et cetera, et cetera. And the shifting to jobs like solar installers, which are less well paid, more often gig work, et cetera, et cetera. So you don't think that's true?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>No, I mean, in fact, really, again, where we're pulling people from the most on the installing side are people that have been working in the construction business. And in fact, just with electricians that I was meeting with when I was down visiting some of the branches in Massachusetts, were telling me how, again, it's not just the pay and the benefits, it's also the stability, and frankly, the way they're treated at Sunrun. So no, what I'm hearing is it's providing a lot of really good opportunity — I mean, honestly I was a bit surprised just because we have all talked about there's going to be a real challenge with electricians in particular.</p><p>And so I continue to be pleasantly surprised that we have a really good amount of applicants. Yeah, we haven't had any challenges in saying "Oh my gosh, we can't meet the demand in XYZ Market because we can't find the people that we need."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk a little bit then about supply chains. There was a lot of hubbub in the last couple of years. Lithium got expensive, there were shortages of materials, there was panel shortages, silicon shortages for a while, panel shortages. I haven't kept it all straight in my head, but there's a lot of difficulties with the supply chain. So I have a couple of different questions about that. One is just where does that stand? Are you currently able to get what you need at a reasonable price? Are the supply chain problems being smoothed out?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah, they are. There were a lot of things going on at the same time in the last couple of years with COVID. So, yes, there were some real challenges. We've been at this now for 16 years, so we've always been a leader in ensuring that our suppliers meet the highest standards in the context of all the existing rules and regulations, but also really then shooting for the highest standards possible. So we've always had that in place. So, when there were different federal challenges that needed to be met, we knew it was a matter of time until we met those with our suppliers.</p><p>The real challenge was the COVID-related challenges, and that impacted, as you know, panels, it impacted storage. Now the pendulum has swung, and what we're finding is that as we look out to the end of this year and into next year, we actually see declining costs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I saw lithium has started nudging back down again already.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly. So, as we look out, we're actually seeing declining costs in our inventory. Right now, we're absorbing just a lot of the inventory that we built up candidly because of some of the challenges, and we wanted to make sure that it didn't slow us down. But no, so, I would say right now we're feeling pretty good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is a broader question and I don't really know how freely you'll be able to speak about this. But one of the sort of philosophical things, animating IRA, the Inflation Reduction Act and all the Biden legislation is this notion that it is a threat, a national security threat and an economic threat for China to dominate supply chains in all these technologies. That means processing of raw materials straight up through anodes and cathodes batteries, panels, the whole nine yards. And there's a big effort in IRA to onshore and or friendshore, as they say, supply chains. What's your general take on this at kind of a philosophical level?</p><p>Do you agree that it is smart for the US to try to move supply chains on shore, even perhaps at the expense of slightly more expensive panels? And there's the whole tariffs issue too, tariffs on Chinese panels, et cetera. Do you agree with that general push or do you think it's better just to buy all the cheap panels you can get and accelerate deployment?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Candidly, one of the things we're pleased about is that the Inflation Reduction Act is encouraging US manufacturing, you know, and the domestic content adders are real. Do I think that will have a positive impact on the US economy? Yeah, absolutely. Do I think that's going to have a positive impact for Sunrun? Absolutely, actually. I mean, from a broader perspective —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What do you get out of it to have US-manufactured panels?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Just more choices of more vendors and companies to work with, more competition. I don't think there's anybody that is launching an effort in the US that is saying, "Well, I'm going to launch it, but I'm just going to be a lot more expensive, and everyone's going to buy it." So I think that the desire is to have competitive manufacturing. It'll take time to see how that plays out. But yes, we've already used US sources wherever we can and so the idea of having more available to us is of course attractive.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One question, I got to know, I threw it out on Twitter that I was going to talk to you and one thing a lot of people are interested in is whether higher interest rates are affecting your business right now. This is a big subject in the clean energy world that recent interest rate hikes are doing damage, say to the offshore wind industry, for instance. Are you seeing that how's that playing out in your business?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah, for sure. I mean, higher interest rates have affected, I mean, they're going to affect utilities and utility rates in a significant way and they have absolutely affected, I think, every fabric of business and society in some way. And for sure for Sunrun because really a lot of what we do is we finance for customers. So we give customers the opportunity to buy through a third party ownership model, which again so many customers love, and allows us to have a really wonderful long relationship where then we can sell them additional products in the future. But yes, so a lot of what we do is financing, and we have absolutely had to absorb the higher costs in the market.</p><p>We had flexibility to do that because honestly, in so many jurisdictions in the country, we were selling at like 30% below the utility. Again, utility prices went up dramatically over the last few years. So that gave us headroom to deal with those price increases that were coming through not just in that, but also because of the supply chain challenges that you and I just talked about. We had to absorb some of the costs associated with that over the last couple of years. But really what we found is we had significant headroom in the markets that we were in because of how high the utility rates were.</p><p>So we were still able to provide in all the markets. We do business in a value proposition which is below what customers are generally paying the prevailing utility rate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you think that you could weather that for an extended period of time, do you worry about this in the long term?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Like everyone. The interest rates continuing to elevate, just continue to make some aspects of business tighter. But yes, I feel very confident in what we do in the value proposition we provide customers and the flexibility that we have to create other value streams that help offset that increase in rates. Like for instance, one in particular this year, it's really, really powerful now that I would say all across the country, but particularly like in a really important market like California, we're no longer just selling one product. So for years we were basically monetizing — every customer was worth the value of one product, we were selling them.</p><p>And now across the country, but particularly in some of our most important markets, we're selling every single customer two significant products. So that really helps offset some of the other cost pressures from rising rates.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And here's a question that might seem kind of dumb and obvious, but I still would be curious what you think is IRA helping? I mean, obviously IRA is helping. What impact have you seen in the year since IRA was passed on your business?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>I mean, the most significant impact on us was just the extension of the federal tax credit. So that was effective right away and having not just having it extended, but having the stability of saying it was over a very long period of time was very, very powerful. The other incentives are going through the process to make their way to the market. So energy communities is one where, again, if you're helping customers in fossil fuel based energy communities go solar, there's additional incentives in those communities. Sunrun was already selling in a lot of those communities, but they didn't really get identified until about this summer.</p><p>The other incentive that we're really excited about is the low and modern income incentive because despite what people think, the majority of households installing solar are low and modern income households in the United States. So the fact that we're going to be able to help more of those customers go solar and have storage and have energy independence and feel more safe and secure in their own homes, it's very, very powerful. So that is one that we're really looking forward to. And then back to your earlier question, the domestic content adder. I think it is encouraging some domestic manufacturing, but it also is something that is going to have an impact on making our packages for customers more affordable because some of our partners will be able to take advantage of that domestic content adder along with us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>On to another very hot topic, which is net metering. For those listeners of Volts who are not familiar with net metering, I can't imagine who they are at this point. But this just means if you put solar on your roof and you generate more than you use, you can sell it back to the utility. Net metering sort of determines how much the utility pays you for that power. Let's start here. California has been wrestling with this and wrestling with this, and wrestling with this because the critique of net metering is, from its critics: They say if you wipe out the bills of residential solar homeowners, then all the fixed costs of maintaining the grid get lumped onto who remains.</p><p>Basically, prices rise for those people who can't afford solar, and then the solar people — This is a long, endless debate, but anyway, California has been wrestling with it, finally came out with its new version of net metering, and then got roundly beat up in public, went back to the drawing board, and I think have come out with the new, new net metering. So I guess my first question is just have those revisions downward in what California is paying affected your business?</p><p>And just more generally, what's your take on net metering? How much of your business relies on net metering?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>So what my takes is, going back to initially how you described it, and again as a utility leader, I saw solar and distributed energy and then storage — we were the first to partner with Tesla on their Powerwall way back in 2015 — I saw all of those things as obvious, necessary evolutions of a 100-year-old way of thinking about providing energy to homes and businesses and to refashioning the grid. So I've always felt that when you take a lens of "How do I make this a valuable asset in the future?" you get two very different answers than when you take the lens of "How am I going to deal with this disruption and this new technology that I'm feeling threatened by?"</p><p>So, from a big picture perspective, I think the most significant thing that has been missed in this is the question of how should the utilities leverage this transformation versus resist it? So to put a point on that, and again, the argument about, "Well, they're not using as much yet, they still need the grid" — we've pushed energy efficiency as a society for decades, right? And so a customer that's made a ton of energy-efficient investments and has gotten their bill down to a very low amount, should they be penalized for that? Back on the philosophical thing, I think that's a very interesting question.</p><p>But what is more important, from my perspective on this topic, is that what you actually will find, if you look at the data of what's happened over the last seven years, is that solar customers tend to be the first customers that then want an electric vehicle, that then decide they want a heat pump, that then decide they're going to go with the induction stove — like a lot of customers. What we found, and now I'm talking from a utility perspective, but we see this as well at Sunrun, what we found is actually in many cases, we ended up supporting more load at that home than we did before because they were the leaders of electrification. The really cool thing, if you think about it from a "How do I leverage this transformation" versus resistant perspective, is it gets really cool when you start thinking about, well then how if that home has solar-plus-storage plus a smarter panel like we put in homes now, we've started partnering on that. Right.</p><p>What you in essence do is you create for the utility an amazing capacity to have smart controllable load all over the grid. So I can't answer the question, it's like, why are we staring at the blade of grass instead of the lawn? Because that was for me, the sort of challenging part of dropping into California right as this was all happening. I kept saying, "Geez, I think the biggest problem is this whole thing is based on a look-back study." We need to be looking forward. We need to be thinking about how do we radically collaborate and actually create a world where we're helping by having all of this smart controllable load which will then make the grid more affordable for everybody.</p><p>So that was always the orientation I took, Dave. I mean, I never took the orientation of, "Oh geez, you're generating your own and now you want me to buy it and you're using less." I took the orientation of "Where are we going with this, this could be really powerful and it could be a really powerful way to save money as a grid operator." That was the way I looked at it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think some of the smarter net metering critics approach it from basically that perspective, saying like, this is a relatively old school, kind of primitive way of compensating for this. It's not sensitive to time of use, it's not sensitive to geography and grid conditions. That's because households are getting more sophisticated and because the ways grid managers are interacting with households is getting more sophisticated. We need to basically evolve beyond net metering to something more smarter and more nuanced. Do you buy that or do you think that net metering is good enough?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>I've always been bullish on the notion of solar and storage in every place. I mean, we're actually going to be offering storage only to customers by the end of the year, going into next year. So, again, I think storage alone is a great standalone product in the energy transition. But for customers who've gone solar like to have storage, we feel like that's really powerful and that's been where we've been headed for years. The only reason we don't have more of it on the system is really back to your earlier question on the supply chain challenges, right?</p><p>So storage just wasn't readily available for a couple of years and I think that slowed things down. So policies and approaches that encourage more storage on the system, I think that's a very forward way of approaching the energy transition. But back to my earlier point though, and the way I looked at it from a grid perspective, and in fact we did, we attracted, we actually held like a forum in a part of the state where we knew we could really leverage having a lot more solar energy capacity online. So we made it super easy. We brought solar installers into town, we showed them the areas where it would be great if they could install more.</p><p>So I think there's ways to do it that way and there's also ways to do it in the context of so then just put some storage on some of those circuits. When I look at the speed at which we need to all be moving in the context of the energy transition, my view is we should all be working with the lens of coming at it from a place of abundance, of how do we get more. I mean, again, we're scaling at a gigawatt pace.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's wild.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>As a utility executive, I know how hard it is to bring on a gigawatt, right? So why wouldn't we want to leverage homeowners? They're the ones paying for these generation assets to go on their roofs, right? So why wouldn't we want to continue to encourage it and then just get smarter and better at how we capture that in a way that is useful from a grid perspective? And there are many ways to do it. Again, you know, having all of that smart controllable load that you could have through companies like Sunrun is really incredibly powerful.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you see any — you know because California is not the only state that is contemplating reducing their net metering rates or imposing fixed fines or costs on solar homeowners? Basically, the generosity I think is declining in a lot of places. Do you see any appetite for going off-grid? Do you see that in the future, more people wanting to go off-grid? And is that any part of your business yet? Are you helping anybody go off-grid yet?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>There are customers that are interested in it. Even as a utility, I offered customers the opportunity to go off-grid years ago. So I think for some customers that is what they want to do. But I think for your mass market, I think for your average American, being interconnected makes a world of sense. And leveraging these technologies can dramatically reduce outages, can dramatically reduce challenges that we're having with the grid. In 2022, more than 140,000,000 people in 40 states dealt with blackouts or calls to conserve power due to extreme weather. So that's a great example. In California, we real-time dispatched back to the grid that stored solar power that then helped every other person on the grid.</p><p>For me, it is so much like what we really need to do is reframe and be thinking about how do we radically collaborate? Because again, the grid let's go back to the grid. The grid is like 40% economically efficient. It's not built for economic efficiency. It's built for the worst minute of the worst day that happens every ten years and then 20% some, right? So one of my big drivers in really embracing distributed technology was that. Because I was so tired of the old thinking of beat the peak: "Oh, we got to chase the peak," and then you had all these peakers, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Overbuilding.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Right. Why don't we focus on flattening and crushing the peak? Why don't we focus on eliminating? The way to do that is to get to a grid that is as — I used to like to think of it, where you become like the symphony conductor of an orchestra of a ton of instruments. You have EV technology that you can use now to support the grid. So it's really how we could make the entire grid more affordable by embracing distributed smart controllable load and being able to store it and dispatch it. So this year alone, we're installing a nuclear power plant's worth of solar just this year.</p><p>And when you think of that attached to storage, it is it's mind-blowing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Another excellent segue to my next question, which is about, speaking of being a conductor of an orchestra, is about virtual power plants. These are also a hot new thing in the energy world. And for those who don't know, a virtual power plant is just a bunch of distributed energy resources. Panels, batteries, cars, smart panels, water heaters, what have you, coordinated by a single entity in such a way that they act like a big — well, it's kind of misleading to call them virtual power plants, actually. This is one of those things. It's dumb terminology because they're not just producing power.</p><p>Right. You can also coordinate them to store power. So it's like virtual power plant plus storage, virtual generation plus storage.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Well, it's a power plant. Like, how I think of it is there's nothing virtual about it. It's a power plant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But also a big battery.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, that's my point. It's actually a distributed, flexible, amazing power plant. Like, again, as somebody who ran a utility —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's the coolest power plant.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>It's the coolest power plant you could have. Just seriously, from a utility perspective, we had a bunch of peakers, right? And you have to run tests, you have to make sure they're running for like that one hour of that one day a year that you're going to need them. And then guess what? Sometimes that big hunk of metal, it doesn't turn on and then you're out of luck. Right. When you have a distributed power plant and you have all these devices you're pulling from, guess what? If a few of them you don't pull from, you still have 99% or 95%, right.</p><p>That's not true. With a fossil-based peaker planner, it's either working or it's not. And I can tell you when it's not. It's painful, as we all know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. This is one of the dumb things I always hear because you always hear critics being like, variable power has to have 100% backup. And I'm just like, that's ridiculous.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A natural gas power plant, you need 100% backup because if it doesn't come on, then the whole thing doesn't come on. But as you say, there's not one single failure — point of failure in a virtual power plant. It "degrades gracefully" is, I think, the system architecture term for it.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I didn't actually know until very recently that Sunrun had gotten into the virtual power plant business, the aggregation business. Just tell me a little bit about what that looks like, where you're doing that, and kind of like how's it going so far?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah, actually, one of the reasons Sunrun got on my radar and I think I got on Sunrun's radar so many years ago, was because I think we were the first on the utility side to do a virtual power plant, and Sunrun was the first on the solar storage side to do a virtual power plant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When you say "we" just for listeners benefit, you were in Vermont at —</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Green Mountain Power. Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>— at Green Mountain Power.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah. So that was one of the reasons that Lynn and I got — Lynn, who was the co-founder and former CEO of Sunrun — Lynn and I got on each other's radar was because of our work and our work both seeing that, "Oh, my gosh, like, through collaboration, we can modernize the grid and make it more affordable for everybody." So Sunrun's had many different programs. I would say one of the ones that I think is most exciting, to tell you the truth, is the most recent one because we've learned as we've gone along and we did a project with Patty at PG&E where our customers in California were able to participate in a three-month program.</p><p>PG&E compensated our customers. So these are existing Sunrun solar-plus-storage customers that we've had in many cases for years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How many were involved in this? I just mean, like, scale, roughly scale wise, hundreds of thousands? I have no idea how big these things —</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>We're in the tens of thousands with PG&E. So what's really cool about that program is, again, it's to help with summer reliability. And again, back to what we were talking about. You can have big peakers you can rely on, or you can have these distributed resources. And so, again, what PG&E wanted to do was leverage these distributed resources. So the customers received a notice that they could get paid $750, which is real money to households. Right, $750 —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that per year or just a flat fee?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>It was just a flat fee for these three months. So it was for three months they were getting paid and with no impact on their use of the storage. So it was also done in a way to make sure that if there's an outage, they would still have the storage and still be able to use it for resilience, which so many customers want. So I think it's a great example of the kind of program that really can scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're not doing the thing where you call these people and say, "Hey, can we take some of your storage?" This is all automated. Sunrun is controlling all these things centrally. And you're not interfacing with homeowners about it.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Our whole vision is to make life easier for customers. One of the things that I was never a fan of was energy policy that was about making lives harder for customers. I think most Americans have enough things to worry about when they come home. So we want to make their lives easier.</p><p>Yeah, tell it to Texan ratepayers.</p><p>Exactly right. So if they have time of use rates or — we want to make all of that easy for them so that it all just happens behind the curtain, if you will, and they get the best optimized value for their home and they don't have to worry about anything. They can just live their lives and use energy when they need to.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So do you see the virtual power plant thing evolving where — because just a flat upfront fee seems like for a test project is fine, but do you think these things will evolve where compensation for the homeowners involved will be more sort of scaled to the amount of use you're getting or scaled to — you know what I mean? Sort of like variable, the compensation for homeowners, is that going to evolve or do you think just writing them a check upfront is the best way to do it?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>I think undoubtedly it will evolve just because this is still a relatively new space. So when you look at any evolving system, you're going to see different mechanisms. You're also going to see because we don't have every state is different, every utility is different. So I don't see a homogenized like "This is the program." I think it's going to definitely be very jurisdictional. So based on the regulatory and utility climate of the state in which customers live in, I can tell you the reception from our customers to this program was glee.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If someone offers you $750 for you doing nothing at all.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Right, exactly. So, they just feel like they were so smart to make the decision to go with solar and storage. And when I look to the future three to five years out and I see what's happening from a climatic perspective to the utility system and to the utilities, I just see this as this value really just growing immensely, both from a Sunrun perspective as well as for the customers that we serve.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In terms of VPPs, is there policy help you'd like to see, or is this just a matter of utilities sort of deciding to do it and try it? Or are there sort of systemic changes you think need to be made? Or is this just utilities getting with it?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>For sure in California, I mean, the policymakers and the regulators, they set up the framework to encourage PG&E, for sure, to do this type of a program. I see it coming from different directions, but largely coming more from the policy perspective and the regulatory perspective than the utility perspective, except for the few more enlightened ones.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The partnership with Ford is really interesting. So, basically, the idea here is that people who are buying a Ford F-150 electric can opt into this package deal, where they also get, with the Ford F-150, they get a charger that is bi-directional. Such that the Ford can charge their house, which is cool, and also optionally solar panels so they can buy if they want, the full meal deal. And a home battery, too. I don't know what all is part of the package that's available to them, but I'm curious how that's going? Like, are Ford customers taking that up?</p><p>And of course, numerous people, hilariously, numerous people ask me, are they going to throw heat pumps in with that package at any point? These partnerships of trying to get electrification technologies in a bundle, how's that going so far? And do you see that expanding in the future?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>It's going great. I mean, I think I started with, like, we see ourselves as a clean energy lifestyle company. I mean, what we are about is meeting customers wherever they are on the customer journey and helping them to transform their lives in ways that make it more affordable, more resilient, have them feel more safe and secure in their own homes and have some sense of energy independence. So yes, we were so excited about the Ford partnership. I will tell you that Ford was very pleasantly surprised with the uptake of the number of customers that wanted the full bi-directional.</p><p>So, again, if you went online and you just wanted to buy the Ford Lightning, you could buy a basic program that doesn't include, like, the bi-directional charger is, of course, more expensive. It's the higher end Ford F-150 Lightning. And they were really surprised at how many customers wanted the bi-directional charging. So we've been very pleased with the partnership. Many of the customers did want to talk to us about solar. Some already had solar because, as I said, there's such a strong statistical correlation between EV adoption and solar adoption. And then to your point on heat pumps, yes, absolutely.</p><p>We do see the future as being one where we can provide customers with very holistic, easy to transition to bundles of products and services.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to ask, is that the end state we're moving toward here, which is like a homeowner can just call up Sunrun and say, I want the package, and then you'll come in and electrify the stove and the water heater, the furnace, whatever, panels, batteries. Is that sort of what you're heading toward?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Definitely. Directionally, that is absolutely what we're headed towards. My passion has always been, how do we make the energy transition easy for consumers? And one of the ways that when consumers move quickly, it's usually because you have found a way to make it easy for them. So yes, we're continuing to explore all facets of expanding the relationship and doing it in a way that works for customers and works for Sunrun.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let me ask about this, your basic financing model, the lease model, which is people pay nothing upfront. Basically, you are installing and owning the solar panels and you're selling the power to the homeowner. So the homeowner doesn't pay anything up front, they just buy the power from you, basically.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Right, and they save on what they would otherwise be paying the utility.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. From their perspective, the only change is lower electricity bills. Sort of financially. But that means you own the panels and that means when the 20 to 25 years is up, you're responsible for those panels. So, I'm wondering what your general thoughts on end-of-life stuff, recycling, and just the financial burden, which I assume is going to be substantial, of you being responsible for dismantling and doing something with all these panels. How does all that figure in?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>First of all, we do meet customers wherever they are. So, we do provide the customers with the opportunity: They can buy the system outright if they want to, and they can also get a loan if they want to. So, just to be clear, but I love the third-party ownership model because as I mentioned, I went solar 14 years ago myself in Vermont, at my home in Vermont with a local installer. And I had no way of knowing, two years later, is it working? Is it not? Like, who do I call? So one of the things we find, customers just love the ease and the convenience of not having to worry.</p><p>And now we're getting these great reports, these impact reports, out to them so they understand how much their system is generating and the impact it's having on their life as well as the planet. So we love these longer-term relationships. We also find that, again, so many customers that we sold solar to so many years ago are now on — we have quite a long list of customers that now want us to come back and attach a battery. We also provide an EV charger as well. It's not just the Ford F-150 partnership. We also have a Sunrun branded EV charger.</p><p>So we see real opportunity over that time to expand and deepen the customer relationship. As it relates to the technology: The technology is good to go for 30 to 35 years. With many customers, over the course of that time period, they'll contact us. In many cases, actually, it's multiple customers because again, the panels are on the home and the average American owns their home for about seven years. So we also find it's a great way to add more customers because the customer who then moves tends to want to become a Sunrun customer. And then we adopt a new Sunrun customer, and we're also getting more sophisticated in our outreach to those new customers that are taking over homes and providing them the opportunity.</p><p>We can upsell them to, in many cases, more solar, we can upsell them to storage. So we see a lot of value in having that longer relationship relative to when the technology, when a panel needs to be turned out or a change needs to be made. We partnered with Solarcycle, which is a leader in solar panel recycling, and so we really love our partnership with them. But again, we see real opportunity to continue to renew the relationships with customers over the long term, to expand the solar that they have on their roof. And when they need it, we'll be there for them to basically take the system down and put a brand new system on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're not worried about recycling, you're not worried about because there's a lot of hype around now about solar panels piling up in landfills, et cetera, et cetera. Do you feel good about the general state of recycling for these technologies?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Let me just put it this way. I feel as somebody who's been in energy a long time and having built a wind farm, I mean, you still have to think of end of life, of just about anything. So when I look at it, compared to other energy technology, I'd say 30 to 35 years is a really good length of time and just then be responsible and how you can recycle. So I'm really excited that so many of the components can be recycled, as I would be just about any part of society. It's nice when we can recycle things and put them to use.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you sell to residences and I guess you sell to small businesses and commercial as well?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>No, we're just residential.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, pure residential.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're pure residential. The only thing that you could call quasi-commercial is we do multifamily housing. And that I'm really excited about. We're the largest supplier of multifamily housing projects. So, again, those are, generally speaking, low and moderate-income rental housing where we help the renters also save money through the project that we do with the owner of the multifamily housing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there's no thought then, because I got a bunch of questions about community solar. I got a bunch of questions about solar on parking lots people are obsessed with solar on parking lots. Are you going to get into any of that or is this a pure residential play?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>I mean, we have so much opportunity ahead of us on the residential side. I too am a huge fan, particularly of carport solar. I did a project myself back in 2018 to do that. So I'm a big fan of it. I think it makes so much sense, particularly as we're seeing so much more EV adoption. To have solar and have charging right there wherever possible makes a lot of sense. But for Sunrun, we see just tremendous opportunity in accelerating this customer-led revolution, which truly, Dave, that is foundationally what I've always seen. Which is why even way back in 2007, I really embraced this technological advancement because I always saw that ultimately this is a better system from a customer lens.</p><p>It's a more reliable system, it's a more energy independent system. And so we see tremendous opportunity to continue to accelerate the customer-led revolution and bring them so many more ways to improve their lives in the clean energy transition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the advertised benefits of DERs (Distributed Energy Resources), generally speaking, is that they defer the need to build new power lines, basically new distribution lines, in some cases new transmission lines. This is one of the things that in the net metering arguments constantly comes up sort of on the solar side of things is, "Well, we defer TND costs." But as far as I know, there's no way to compensate them for that. As far as I know, they're not actually being compensated for that deferral. Is there any way they could be or how is there any mechanism through which they could actually see that value?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yes, it's true. That can happen. And that was exactly when I used the example of — it was actually Rutland, Vermont, where we held a Solar Summit and we encouraged development of rooftop residential solar by private companies in that city. It was because we also saw that we could use it as a non-transmission alternative and basically save customers — in that case, I think that project was like a little over $100 million by putting online more solar energy capacity in that area. So it kind of, for me, gets back to the broader point. When we were talking about net metering, which is if you brought leaders to the table looking at how can we create a more affordable grid for all, you might find, you'd end up paying them more than you're paying them through some of these net metering schemes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If you avoided a 100 million dollar outlay, some of that value, it seems, ought to go to the solar. Right. And it's not now, I don't know exactly how that would work or what the mechanism would be.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah, and again, some of it, it's not inherently the utility's fault. Like, they're also part of a broader regulatory construct that is really largely incenting them to build stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>So again, it was really our focus on customer obsession, on innovation, and on keeping rates low that led us to a lot of this innovation that I think is just a nice postcard from the future for so many other parts of the country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Final question. Solar panels at this point are very straightforwardly commoditized. They're very standardized and have been for a while. Batteries are sort of getting that way, pretty commodified. Are there big technological advances that you have your eye on or that you think are intriguing in this? Specifically in the residential sort of electrification space, it doesn't seem like thin film. I mean, maybe thin film will make a comeback. Or maybe solar in the windows, the window pane solar, there's all these different battery chemistries. But today at least, the business is standard PV panels, standard lithium LFP batteries.</p><p>I think in the home, lithium-ion in the cars. Are there big technological advances that you think might shake things up?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>One of the things that's very exciting about where we are on the energy transition is frankly the amount of investment that's just going into clean energy and going into clean energy technology. So I'm humbled by and excited by different things that I hear that are happening. What I can tell you, sort of as I take a longer view, I just get excited at like, "Oh my gosh, I'm sure there's going to be all of these amazing evolutions that you and I could never concoct today." But back to the here and now, in the here and now, the things that I'm really excited about are yes, first of all, solar technology has continued to improve.</p><p>But the other thing that's happening is you're really seeing improvement in not just sort of the capacity of storage. So again, back to the Ford F-150 Lightning. I mean, that sucker can back up your home for up to two weeks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know, it's insane. People don't appreciate it's so much bigger than a home battery.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly. But the other thing that's happening that's so exciting, for instance, with our partnership with Lunar, which was founded by Kunal from Tesla, is they're also working on ways to make it so much easier and faster to install and embedding a lot of the technology in the storage device. So we're also seeing improvements, like back to where you and I started this conversation of friction and things that make things more costly. So even a year ago, storage was just longer and harder to install than it is today. And I see continued advancements and improvements in that so that we could get to like maybe a 20 minutes install.</p><p>So, again, back in the day, it was multiple days sometimes just for — I think my solar project I told you about was days here. And now we have crews that are in some cases doing two solar installations in a day. And with storage now getting easier, that all will be a real unlock from a consumer perspective.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what about the sort of home coordination? You're getting into that a little bit with the bi-directional charger, but are you going to get further into sort of the kind of smart panels and the things that are like coordinating loads and all this kind of stuff?</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>We can already do that. So, I mean, that is something that we already can do. And again, we had a partnership that we launched a while ago with Span using their panel, which is just really cool, particularly if you live in a part of the country like California where you're going to have outages a lot. One of the things I love about that partnership is it gives the homeowner the ability right during an outage to decide, oof, I actually think you can just open the app and you can say, I'm just going to shut off this and I'm going to use this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. I did a podcast with the Span CEO a couple of years ago. People should look it up.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Yeah, for sure. So again, yes, that's what I mean about the excitement of like, oh my gosh, if we all look forward the power for utilities of our capability to be able to package load back to the grid when the grid needs it the most from an economic perspective. We could really get away from this tired, old fashioned, "beat the peak" thinking and really move towards a future where it is a fully orchestrated maximized energy system that is a lot more affordable for all.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, that seems like a great place to wrap up. This is so interesting and fascinating. I'm so into the distributed energy thing in general and the household thing in particular. I think we didn't really get into this, but in addition to being technologically fascinating like we've been discussing, I really feel like politically leading with, "Hey, we're going to reduce your bills and make your stuff work better" is just politically way better than leading with, "Hey, we're going to tax everything you use," or "Hey, we're going to give a billion dollars to this big corporation and trust me, they're going to do cool stuff."</p><p>Politically, it's so much more potent to start with households.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>It is to that point. That's another thing that really struck me. I mean, I think it was way back in 2012 when I saw data on how homeowners felt about this. Right across the political spectrum, there was dramatic support for solar for different reasons. Some people saw it as energy independence. Some people are attracted to the clean energy benefits. Some are attracted because they want to save money. But it's why I've always felt like this is just going to be an accelerating customer led revolution because it's something that just provides Main Street America with what they've been wanting for years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Mary Powell of Sunrun, thanks so much for coming and sharing today.</p><p><strong>Mary Powell</strong></p><p>Awesome, so nice to chat.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-accelerate-rooftop-solar-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:136807950</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 19 Sep 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/136807950/f988381a6007c58452e04e4cada44f64.mp3" length="83728975" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4185</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/136807950/8982ab1abf0b3029dbac9d117d851f43.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Getting more out of the grid we've already built]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Clean-energy transmission lines in the US are horribly congested, and buildout of new ones is agonizingly slow. Yet while other parts of the world use grid-enhancing technologies (GETs) to significantly improve performance of existing transmission lines, the US system has been resistant to deploying them. In this episode, Julia Selker, head of a GETs trade group called the WATT Coalition, discusses the potential of GETs.</em> </p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACB7hs2OJaqdEYlR1ZC1Ryga/volts23.09.13%28julia.selker%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/getting-more-out-of-the-grid-we-ve-already-built"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong> </p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the primary threats to the clean energy buildout spurred by the Inflation Reduction Act is a lack of transmission. Models show that hitting our Paris climate targets would involve building two to three times our current transmission capacity, yet new lines are desperately slow to come online. Meanwhile, existing lines are congested and hundreds of gigawatts of new clean energy sits waiting in interconnection queues.</p><p>Wouldn’t it be cool if there were some relatively cheap and speedy ways to get more capacity out of the transmission infrastructure we’ve already built? To ease some of that congestion and get more clean energy online while we wait for new lines to be completed?</p><p>As it happens, there are. They are called grid-enhancing technologies, or GETs, and they can improve the performance of existing transmission lines by as much as 40 percent. </p><p>It’s just that, in the US at least, utilities aren’t deploying them. They’ve been tested and deployed all over the world, but the US system has resisted using them at scale. </p><p>I contacted Julia Selker, head of the Working for Advanced Transmission Technologies (WATT) Coalition, a GETs trade group, to discuss exactly what these technologies are, their enormous potential to ease grid congestion, why utilities still resist them, and what kinds of policies can help move them along. </p><p>So with no further ado, Julia Selker. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is, to me, a very exciting topic that is like many exciting topics in the world of energy, somewhat obscured behind a wall of jargon and technical sounding terms. So we're going to do our best up front to decode some of this and lay it out in a simple way so people can grasp it. But before we get to GETs, before we get to the GETs, let's talk just a little bit about the need here, the need for more capacity on the transmission system. Run down a little bit, because I know you've done or have been involved in some research on grid congestion and things like that, give us a little rundown of why this topic is so important right now.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. The United States is basically desperate for transmission capacity and there are a few ways that we see that in data, and one is transmission congestion. So this is a quantification of the cost of a transmission constraint. So if you don't have enough transmission to deliver the cheapest electricity, you'll then have to turn on a thermal generator or something more expensive than a wind or solar generator, for instance, and that will increase costs for consumers. So back in the day, let's say 2016, the market monitors found $3.7 billion of congestion in the regional transmission organizations and the independent system operators that actually transparently report congestion data.</p><p>And if you scale that to the whole US, we're looking at about $6.5 billion in congestion in 2016. But in 2022, the national number was over $20 billion in congestion.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>20 billion.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>20 billion. It's rising astronomically. And it makes sense: There's more low cost generation available, gas prices are going up. So the redispatch cost is another term for this is going to get higher as you have to curtail more renewables and dispatch more expensive generation because there's just not enough transmission to deliver all the clean energy. So we also see this in clean energy interconnection costs and delays. Back when there was a lot of headroom on the grid from large scale infrastructure expansion back in the day that projects could interconnect at lower costs and with faster timelines.</p><p>But now projects are seeing bigger and bigger upgrades, all that headroom is used up and projects are seeing tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in transmission upgrades that need to happen in order for them to interconnect to the grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Volts listeners will recall just a few weeks ago had a pod on interconnection queues and they'll recall that sort of you get in a single file line and if you happen to be the project that triggers a need for a transmission upgrade, that whole cost gets added to your project, which renders many projects unviable. And that's just happening more and more often now because the grid is more and more congested and there's more and more upgrades needed. So it's making that process take longer too.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, and beyond the cost. I've heard from clean energy developers that they are looking at seven years to actually make the transmission upgrade, or in one case, four years to szslchedule an outage to begin construction. So that's not sustainable at all. And there are policy actions that are taking place to try to make these processes more efficient. But the fundamental issue is there's not enough transmission capacity and we need to be finding it fast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's no way to fiddle with processes enough to get around that, which is there's just not enough transmission capacity.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Given all that, we need more transmission capacity. New transmission capacity takes forever to build in the US. Which is a problem a lot of people are working on. But even reforms look like they're years out and then more years out to build the new lines. So here we have then this set of technologies that can help us get more transmission capacity out of the existing grid. The GETs, the grid enhancing technologies. So let's talk about first what counts as a GET and let's run through the big ones.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Sure. So there are some practical reasons that certain technologies would fall under the GETs category, and there are some policy reasons too, so I'll cover both of those. But the items that we think about are does this technology make use of the dynamic capabilities of the grid to increase transmission capacity? That's sort of the practical category. So, we're used to thinking about transmission lines, transformers, substations. We install them, and they have these set capabilities that are based on really conservative assumptions. And when you have digital technologies and high tech communications, you can actually monitor these assets and make more efficient use of them depending on grid conditions.</p><p>And another value we look for from a technical perspective is the redeployability. So if you build a new transmission line, great, you have a new line right where you put it. But with these technologies, you can use them as stopgap measures. If you have a big line under construction and you want to reduce costs in the interim, or you're expecting grid topology or the grid assets to change or increase, but you're not sure how. It's still kind of a zero regrets option because you deploy it, it pays for itself quickly and you can move it later.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So redeployability just means you can put it on a line and if you don't need it on that line anymore, you can take it off that line and put it on another line. It's not a permanent addition to a line.</p><p>But it could be. Certainly there's no expiration date, but the flexibility is —</p><p>Right, you can leave it on, but you can move it if you need to.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so, given those parameters, let's walk through the three big ones. The first one helps elucidate something you said. I think the first one is called dynamic line ratings. So, I think the important background for people to understand here is today you build a transmission line, you have the transformer and the line, the familiar pieces of infrastructure, and basically a grid operator has to know how much energy can I push through that line? And to come to that number, they make some estimates about how much will the line sag if power is going through it, what are the sort of ambient weather conditions typically in this area?</p><p>So, they do these estimates to come up with a capacity estimation for that line and the grid operator uses that estimate. But of course, because these are estimates that you're doing sort of in advance, you have to be very conservative. You have to be careful that your estimates are not on the high end so that you don't overload the line and blow stuff up. So all of which adds up to the fact that existing transmission lines typically only use like 30% to 40% of their capacity. Is that right? Just out of sort of an abundance of caution because you just don't know specifically in real time what's going on in that line.</p><p>Is that roughly correct?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah. So historically a lot of transmission lines use a static line rating, so they'll assume it's going to be a hot day and that there's not very much wind. The wind has the highest impact on the cooling of a transmission line. So they're like, "Okay, this is how much the line will be cooling, and this is how much the current would heat that line. And that's our limit." But they might use that limit year round, even in the winter. So transmission owners have been updating to seasonal ratings. That's an improvement. FERC is requiring lines to use ambient adjusted ratings, which will take into account temperature by 2025.</p><p>But like I said, dynamic line ratings also include wind. They're at a more granular level, so they might be updated every 15 minutes, for instance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so dynamic line ratings, if I could just back up dynamic line ratings just means you attach something on the line that will give you real-time information about those conditions that you were previously estimating on a seasonal or yearly basis.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, it could be on the line itself. It could be on the transmission tower looking at the line with LiDAR. It could be a weather station, too. It could even be in the fiber optic cables that are strung on the same towers as transmission lines. Those are really good temperature measurement tools as well. So there are lots of different approaches to dynamic line ratings. And they're not just real-time, they're also forecast, which is really important, because when you're making your dispatch decisions, the day ahead forecast is critical and maybe even further ahead. So that's one of the major values of DLR.</p><p>Once you've had the sensor on your line for a few weeks or months, you know how the line heats and cools, and you can use those forecasts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, long story short, by getting more real-time data about the conditions around a line and reliable forecasts around the condition of the line, basically, grid operators can get closer to the actual capacity of these lines rather than stopping so far short out of caution. So how big is that delta between, say, I was using a yearly, static yearly, rating for a line, and then I shifted to DLR, so I was getting real-time information about that line and good forecasts. How much more, theoretically, can I push through that line once I have DLR attached?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah. So in one 2021 deployment across three states, DLR exceeded static reference ratings by 9% to 33% in winter and 26% to 36% in summer. And so that's a big range, of course, but you're still looking at big capacity increases. And also the fact that the extra capacity found in summer was higher kind of shows that they were probably using seasonal ratings. And the summer rating was very conservative in terms of heating. But then in this same case study, the DLR actually found 15% of hours either matched the static rating or was below the static rating.</p><p>So DLR also shows you in cases of extreme weather, for instance, whether you should be running less power along the line. And if we're dealing with weather patterns like heat domes and these unprecedented situations, that's when that kind of monitoring could be really life saving.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Because even with the caution of static ratings, with extreme weather, you might exceed even those bounds.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So basically, DLRs can tell you what's really going on. So that's somewhere from 9% to 33%, more transmission of power through the same line, through the addition of DLRs.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>More or less. And then the second one, even nerdier sounding, "advanced flow power control," what do we mean by this?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, so there are existing technologies that utilities use to control power flow, but the advanced ones are just that much better. Basically, these are devices that go at the substation between the generators and the load. And often in that pathway, you'll have multiple circuits that could deliver power. But power likes to follow the path of least resistance we say. Technically it's impedance, which is a combination of resistance and other items. But advanced power flow control can adjust that impedance to push and pull power over different circuits. So say you have one circuit that's just maxed out 100%.</p><p>You have two circuits that are more like 20, 30%, you can push that power off of the maxed out circuit onto the others, and then you can actually add generation behind them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of my theories about this is that the sort of average person on the street, their familiarity with technology is mostly around the Internet and phones and stuff like that, and digital stuff. And I just think the average person on the street, probably, if they have thought about it at all, thinks in their head that the people controlling the grid just have much more fine grained digital level control than they actually do. But the standard practice now is for the power to just go the way it goes based on physics. And if it runs into a congested line, you're just screwed.</p><p>So this is like the advance here is just you can push power where on your system it needs to go based on availability, which seems so — such a rudimentary level of control. It's a little wild that it's new, it's a little wild that we didn't already have that, I think.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, there are sort of analog approaches to all of these GETS in terms of: There are ways that you can reroute power manually by flipping switches, or you could use emergency line ratings instead of dynamic line ratings where you say, "Okay, I could run more power for 2 hours or 15 minutes," but we have the technology to do that more strategically. And that means you can do it every day instead of in these sort of emergency situations.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And you can do it, I presume, much faster digitally than you can by running around physically throwing switches.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so, the third of the big three here is "topology optimization," the nerdiest sounding one of all. So, I think people are familiar with topology, like a topological map, which shows you heights, basically shows you elevations. So, in grid terms, the topology of a grid is just sort of the equivalent of elevation in that sort of like power will go, quote unquote, "downhill" towards the easiest place to go. That's the topology of the grid. So, what does it mean to optimize that topology?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Basically, it gives you sort of a map of everything that's going on on the grid. All of your power lines, all of your generators, all of your load and topology optimization software lives with a system operator or other entities could use it, but they can say, "Oh, we see congestion here, what are our options for reducing it?" And one example is you might see congestion on line A, and if you switch off line B, that actually balances everything out so that line A is no longer overwhelmed. So, it's counterintuitive sometimes. And that's why we need software to do it, because today transmission owners would undertake reconfigurations, as they're called, manually by flipping switches.</p><p>But it's just based on operator experience, whereas this software lets you actually look at all of the options, all of the interventions and quickly assess the system impacts. Because the other thing is, like I said, it's counterintuitive. It takes some math to figure out exactly what's going to happen when you switch something off.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Especially as these things get more and more complex, the amount of interactions involved. I mean, again, not to beat this point to death, but it's just wild that today grids are run by Bob, who just knows this grid because he's rode this horse for 20 years and he knows its quirks and he's going around physically throwing switches, trying to get things to work smoothly. It's just so much more analog. I think that people have it in their heads that these things work. So, this just replaces Bob's intuitions with software basically that analyzes the shape of the grid and can come up with solutions for which switches to throw that will maximize the smooth performance of the grid, basically, yes?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it's worth acknowledging that when we had a bunch of thermal generators that operated really consistently that we knew their costs, there wasn't this variability. You didn't have to be so dynamic in your operation of the grid. But the fact is we're moving into a new era and that means that the dynamic capabilities of the grid will absolutely be very valuable. So, for instance, topology optimization could reduce congestion costs in PJM by 50% in one study, just by reconfiguring the grid, depending on —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>50%?!</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Right. And that was $2.5 billion in 2022. That was the congestion in PJM.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good grief, that's a large number. The grid is getting more complicated, not just because variable renewables are coming online, but also like distributed renewables. So, like distribution grids are going to start becoming producers also. And once you get that level of complexity, then you quickly get way beyond what any one person can intuit, no matter how long they've worked with that grid, right. At that point, you need software.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Definitely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, these are the big three that I always hear discussed when people talk about grid enhancing technologies. Dynamic line ratings, which sort of watch the line and tell operators what's going on around that line in real time and what's going to be going on around that line in the next day or two so that grid operators can increase the throughput of those lines. And there's advanced flow power control which allows you to move power around as it moves through the grid to the least congested areas. And then there's topology optimization, which is sort of optimizing power flow through the grid at a system level, which as we say, is getting increasingly complex and requires software.</p><p>These are the big three. Are there other sort of like the category of things that could help the grid work better? Seems pretty capacious. Are there other technologies that sort of qualify or that are around the periphery here? Or is it just those three?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm not as much of an expert in the other options, but energy storage can be deployed as a type of power flow control. Basically, if you site your batteries at the substation, they can inject power or consume power strategically in a way that also changes power flow. So that could count. And then other technologies that increase transmission capacity much faster than building new infrastructure: There's reconductoring with high performance conductors and superconductors potentially, tower raising. There are these other technologies, but they don't have that dynamic aspect to them that GETs have, and then GETs are also very low cost.</p><p>Very low cost. We'll get into that, I'm sure. But reconductoring a line is a level of capital expenditure and a type of technology that utilities understand and they're ready to use.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Can we just pause to define reconductoring? Is that just literally replacing the line itself, the actual wire itself?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>With just better wire, better higher capacity wire?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, there are a few different types of technology, but a basic way that you would increase capacity would be to use a stronger core in your transmission line. So right now most lines have steel cores and steel, when it heats, gets a lot weaker.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>If you're using a composite core, then you won't have that sag that the steel would have and it can withstand a lot higher temperatures.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So that gets you somewhat higher capacity with the same sort of towers. But as you say, it's not the kind of dynamic real-time control that sort of characterizes the other GETs. And I think for our purposes we can just sort of slot energy storage under advanced flow power control, since that's basically what you can use storage for in this instance is helping power move around more rationally through the grid.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Just an aside, we usually say advanced power flow control.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Advanced power flow control. So is APFC the — ?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right. Advanced power flow control. Yeah, that makes more sense. I don't know why my notes have it backwards. Advanced power flow control, none of these trip off the tongue. So I think the next question, the obvious question is the numbers you cite in terms of increased capacity that you can get out of these things are pretty mind boggling. Like, DLR can get you up to 33% more capacity. Topology optimization reduces congestion costs by 50%. This is the point I want to emphasize most in this pod, is that these are not marginal gains here, necessarily.</p><p>Like, you can get big chunks, big amounts of new capacity with these things. So how much do they cost relative to, say, reconductoring, putting new better wire through or building a new line? What's the sort of cost scale here?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yes, well, the fun and frustrating thing about GETs is it's hard to generalize. Every deployment will have a different value, different payback period. Some places are windier, sometimes there's a hill in the way, what have you. That's why these ranges will be big. But I have some good examples in terms of costs. For instance, PPL Electric Utilities just won the Edison Electric Institute's Edison Award, the 95th award for their deployment of DLR. They're the first utility to deploy DLR in markets, in operations.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The first US utility to do that.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wild.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yes, in 2023. Whereas Belgium was all over it in 2008. So we're a few —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>2008?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So these are not new. Like, DLR, for instance, is not new. Not brand new technology.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>No, it's getting better every year so that there's a benefit there, but we're way past due to bring it into common practice. But PPL's sort of flagship deployment, they had a line that was seeing $23 million of congestion a year, and they could fix it by rebuilding a price tag of $50 million. So that's a little over two years payback. That's not bad for transmission, certainly, but instead used DLR, which cost a quarter million dollars. And so that's a big cost savings. And when you talk about the payback period, it's infinitesimal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, no kidding. That's a quarter of $1 million rather than $50 million to build new lines. That's quite a delta.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Exactly. And so we often talk about net savings. So a deployment of advanced power flow control devices saved $70 million in congestion costs over a three and a half year transmission outage. So that's a net savings. I don't know how much the deployment cost, but $70 million is not chump change for one deployment. And another, widespread deployment of advanced power flow control in the United Kingdom saved half a billion dollars in production cost savings by enabling new renewable energy and then also in avoided investments in new infrastructure. So half a billion dollars for like 50-odd power flow controllers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's wild. So huge potential savings here. Relatively cheap to install. One thing I'm a little curious about is what do these physically look like? What is the physical process of installing, say, DLR? How long would it take and how disruptive would it be for a utility to go put DLR on a particular line?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, like I said, there are multiple approaches to DLR, so there are some that would require no outage at all. So if you're installing a sensor on your tower that's looking up at your line, or if you're using the fiber optic cable, then you don't have to take an outage and you immediately start getting data about the line temperature and ambient conditions. And then, as I understand, it takes a few weeks for that data to give you the right information for forecasting. But you're in business within months. And the sensors that go on the line, it's not that big of a difference.</p><p>I think you do need a short outage to put a sensor on the line, but very short. It takes a couple of hours in a helicopter to install the sensors. So again, you'll be in business in months, and you'll see that 30%, 40% increase. And it also corresponds, of course, to when wind generation is highest. If the wind is cooling your line, then it's also spinning your blades.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And what about advanced power flow controls? I imagine there's a couple of different technologies there, too. But is that how fast or disruptive is a deployment there?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, again, we're looking at just months to procure the devices and install them and have them operational. So really fast, I guess, is a short answer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And same with topology optimization. That's just installing software, or are there physical changes you have to do to do that?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, no physical changes. Installing software and then training your staff to use it. Again, really fast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is no small thing. It's a diverse set of technologies. And as you say, every installation will be different since every sort of line is somewhat different, every sort of grid system is different, et cetera. But has anyone modeled sort of the cumulative possibility here, the cumulative effect they could have, say, if, like, every US utility got religion on this and went out and installed GETs on all their systems and all their lines, do we have any idea sort of the cumulative effect that could have?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, as you can imagine, they're somewhat complicated to model because we're looking at dynamic conditions. But the Brattle Group back in 2021 did a great study called "Unlocking the Queue." And so they used the Kansas and Oklahoma grids as a little case study, medium sized case study. And they looked at the interconnection queue as it stood. They looked at planned upgrades, they looked at weather snapshots, and then they looked at GETs deployments. So where can we optimally use GETs to increase transmission capacity? And they found that if they didn't install any GETs, the Kansas and Oklahoma grids could sustain 2.6 gigawatts of new wind and solar generation using traditional planning approaches.</p><p>And then with GETs, you double that. We would have room for 5.2 gigawatts of new renewable generation without any other grid upgrades.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's which two states again?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Kansas and Oklahoma.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Ah, very windy states. So you could install double the clean energy with GETs basically than without is what they found?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Right. And this was a pretty conservative study. We did not allow any import/export changes. So that really limits the value. And so I feel great about this result. And the total installation of GETs would have cost $90 million. And the production cost savings just from having that cheaper generation available would be $175 million a year. And then there are other benefits, there are jobs, there are lease benefits for the community.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So $90 total to install it, and then $175 million of savings per year from then on.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And presumably that will filter down to consumers, that will lower costs for consumers at the end of the line. What does it do to reliability? Has that been sort of studied or modeled?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a little harder to quantify, but we have some ideas for sure. Basically, if you can see how your system is performing and you have options for how to respond to changes, that is a net improvement on reliability. Right? You have awareness, you have flexibility, and you can improve your resilience and reliability. And then also I mentioned case studies of advanced power flow control, saving money during an outage. Topology optimization has also been demonstrated to, for instance, save $40 million over a nine month outage. So when you're dealing with contingencies and outages, these tools can help you do that at lower cost and with more optionality.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, so this brings us then to this $61 million question, or whatever the term is, the big question, which is if we have in the US right now huge problems with grid congestion that is blocking the buildout of clean energy that we all say we want and that in fact, we're plowing tens of billions of dollars into. And there's a solution on the table that gets us considerably more transmission capacity quickly at relatively low cost compared to building more transmission: What the hell? Why aren't utilities, why aren't RTOs and ISOs, why aren't states and state legislatures, why isn't everyone beating down the door to put these on?</p><p>It just seems like an interim solution that takes the pressure off of all our current problems relatively cheaply. So what am I missing here? Why is there resistance? Why are there not laws mandating these things? Why are utilities resisting at all? Let's start with utilities. Why aren't utilities doing more of this?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Well, very big question, and I'll start by saying you're doing your part because one of the big barriers is just awareness that planners and utility executives and regulators and stakeholders don't know that these technologies are available. They don't understand the benefits. And so I'm out here trying to tell the story and share examples and that's an issue and just general inertia.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean it's kind of their business to know these things, isn't it? I have limited sympathy for that. But okay, so they're not aware. I guess here's what I'm obliquely getting at which regular Volts listeners will roll their eyes as I harp on this all the time but I'm not telling you anything. The basic utility model is they make money by spending money. They make money by deploying large physical assets and getting a guaranteed rate of return on them. So if you're telling them "We can with something that is super cheap and doesn't involve deploying much money, get you more capacity out of what you already have and avoid the need for you to deploy a bunch of big physical infrastructure," basically you're telling them you're going to reduce their profits.</p><p>It's pretty straightforward. It's the same story behind energy efficiency and distributed energy and everything else. Anything that reduces the need for utilities to spend money and deploy physical infrastructure is going to be resisted by utilities. I'm just assuming that's one of the dynamics at work here.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah. I want to be a little nicer to the utilities and say these aren't going to make them money. They're going to have to do like you said, this is a really small capital expenditure and it's a change in their operations and processes so, right: It's not a money-making opportunity. I think, and I've been working on GETs since 2019 that there's been a shift that utilities realize they're going to have the opportunity to build as much transmission as ratepayers will pay for. Right. This is a transmission building era.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Not like there's going to be a shortage of demand. Even if you deploy GETs, it's still going to be building as much transmission as you can.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Right. A lot of our grid was built 70 years ago. It's time to replace things. We need large interregional transmission. There's going to be a lot of transmission built. So I believe and hope that utilities are seeing that they need to be showing that they're maximizing their infrastructure. That said, they can't be blamed for doing things the same way as they have for decades. So they're going to be risk averse. They have this lower returns on lower capital expenditures and historically they're only responsible for reliability planning. They're only responsible for building transmission to deal with reliability issues.</p><p>And that goes back to the history of thermal generation, when that was all we needed to get a good system. But, in the future, we need to plan for reliability and clean energy integration and customer cost savings. Because at the end of the day, the utilities need to demonstrate to FERC that their rates are just and reasonable and economic transmission planning is going to be a part of that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You know you say, "You can't blame utilities." Maybe you can't, I can blame them a little bit. But how could they be induced to do it? Because in one obvious way is they're under legal obligation to have just and reasonable rates. And I think if you're a ratepayer advocate or a state regulator, you could reasonably say: "It is not just and reasonable to ignore giant cost saving, reliability boosting opportunities, that it's both unjust and unreasonable. So therefore, you have to do it." Are people trying to do that through rate cases?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>FERC is working on that. FERC is looking at a few different models for grid enhancing technologies. So, one big-picture way to think about it is requirements versus incentives. And they're both a little bit tricky when it comes to grid enhancing technologies. So for requirements, one model that FERC is thinking about is a threshold where if you have a certain amount of congestion every year on your line, then you have to look at dynamic line ratings. And that's good. It's simple and clear, but there are still loopholes when it comes to a requirement. There's no transparency, really around transmission constraints.</p><p>So if a utility comes back and says, "Well, actually, there's some other limiting element. So dynamic line ratings don't help." We're not sure that a requirement will be the most effective model, but it would lead to more deployments in certain cases. So that's one good approach. And the other is an incentive which would drive the utility — say it was based on congestion cost savings. It would drive the utility to look for those most congestive lines and try to solve a problem with really low cost solutions if they were getting compensated based on the net savings, for instance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. I mean, those make sense to me, although I'll just register one last time, and then I'll let it go. It's a little crazy that you have to bully or force or beg or incent utilities to do cheap things that could save a crapload of money. This is like, we come around to this in the clean energy world again and again and again. Why are we begging utilities to do these things? It's insane that their incentive is not to have the best service at the cheapest possible rate. Like, it's insane that they have to be brow beaten to do these things.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Well, I mentioned that Belgium is really far ahead on dynamic line ratings. And in 2021, someone from the Belgian transmission system operator testified to FERC, and he said that ten years ago, when they were installing dynamic line ratings, the utility engineers were resistant. I think he said they looked at him like he was crazy, but that now whenever they run into congestion, they immediately go to dynamic line ratings. So as much as we want a fast and transformative transition, these things take time. But I feel like we're going to follow in Belgium's bold footsteps.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, what about PUCs? What about state regulators? Like, presumably they could be made aware of these things and they could push are they doing so?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yes, the Joint Federal State Task Force on Electric Transmission, which is a group of ten PUC commissioners from around the country, and then also FERC commissioners, met in July and discussed grid enhancing technologies. That was their agenda for two and a half hours. It was a really great discussion, lots of great ideas from state commissioners in terms of how GETs should be deployed, the barriers, etc. So that was super promising. And then they can take various actions. So for one thing, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act came with $14 billion of formula and competitive grants from the DOE that grid enhancing technologies would be eligible for.</p><p>So for the formula grants, every state is allocated a certain amount of money and they can propose projects and a use for that money. And then the DOE sends them that money. And then, for the competitive grants, states and utilities and nonprofit utilities, for profit utilities, there's different grants for different entities. But they can again propose a grid enhancing technology deployment and have it — many of the programs have a 50% cost match, for instance, and that could include that workforce training that I talked about. So these are really low cost devices. Obviously, maybe the 50% cost share isn't huge there, but if you're doing that first deployment and you have to update your systems and you have to train your staff, then maybe that cost share is more meaningful.</p><p>And certainly for nonprofit utilities that are on shoestring or relatively shoestring budgets, that sort of savings should be really significant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's $14 billion in the Infrastructure Act, not specifically for grid enhancing technologies, but for which grid enhancing technologies are eligible.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Right. And if you generalize that Brattle study that I talked about, with the $90 million of GETs deployment roughly over the country, we would expect $2.7 billion to deploy GETs optimally over the whole network. So we don't need $14 billion, but we're not going to get it also.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I know this is the crazy thing. It's so cheap that dumping money on it is almost beside the point. Like it's so cheap already that whatever the problem is, it's not money. Right? It's not money being available. Are there other federal programs in place that are attempting to juice GETs along? Like, I know the DOE has a gajillion different grant programs and I know the Loan Programs Office is getting involved in nascent technologies and there's all these different programs. Are there other pieces of federal policy that are aimed at this?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>I want to say no, but I could be forgetting something. I will say that there are national lab groups working on grid enhancing technologies in different ways. There's a sort of separate funding for demonstration projects, for instance, for utilities. So again, sort of targeted at deploying your first project because that's the expensive one, that's the hard one, and then the ball is rolling.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So grants in the Infrastructure Act. And then there's this meeting of PUC commissioners that are getting behind it. What about FERC? You mentioned FERC is doing some things — FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, for those who don't know that by now — what's FERC doing on this? It seems like it ought to have a key role here.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah. So two recent FERC orders included GETs so order 881, which was about managing transmission line ratings, required utilities to use the ambient adjusted ratings and then for RTOs to prepare their systems to accept dynamic line ratings. And some RTOs already can. For instance, PJM is set up based on that PPL deployment I talked about. But all the RTOs have to be able to accept DLR by 2025. So that's a good start.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In what way are they not currently ready? What does that mean to get ready? Like if you're just going to go clip a LiDAR onto your transmission tower, what does it mean to get ready for that?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Well, you have to be able to accept forecasted line ratings, and those will change. So when the RTO is deciding which generators are going to be dispatched and they are going to use the dynamic forecasted line rating to do that, that's a change.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, it could change their planning, their sort of integrated planning, do you think?</p><p>That's an operational change, I would say, in terms of how they're dispatching generation. And you could talk to people who will make it sound really hard. I hope it's not as hard as some people make it sound, but I think it's doable, especially by July 2025.</p><p>And that's FERC 881. You said there was another one.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, Order 2023, which was about interconnection, requires the evaluation of alternative transmission technologies in interconnection processes. It leaves a lot of discretion currently to the transmission owners in terms of how they're used. And we've seen other processes in the US that leave a lot of discretion to the transmission owners. And that means you get uneven results.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to say, I was reading your reports and it sounds like in a lot of cases, like the case was presented to the transmission owner with all the information you've told me. Seems like an obvious no regrets, easy win. And then they just don't do it and don't explain why. That's sort of one of the things that was mysterious to me. Is that just inertia? Is that just habit? I mean, they don't explain. So you obviously can't answer that question. But it is mysterious.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, one example that I have from a renewable energy developer is that there was a 1% line overload identified in the interconnection study between RTO seams. And as we talked about, DLR is going to fix a 1% line overload almost all the time. Just because the static rating is so conservative. It doesn't have to be a very windy place. So the upgrade that was identified in this case was $400 million to fix that 1% overload and the TO refused to consider DLR.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's just wild. As opposed to like a buck fifty. Yeah, I really don't get that. I guess the positive story you could tell is just habit and culture and that that will change over time as these things starting to get deployed and are more familiar. Is there something obvious that you would like FERC to do that it's not doing?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah, I've got a list.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everybody's got their FERC list?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah, wish list. So they've got their notice of proposed rulemaking on transmission planning. We hope they go a little further than they went in the Interconnection rule in terms of requiring the use of GETs in transmission planning. They have the threshold requirement that I was talking about for requiring the study and implementation of dynamic line ratings, for instance, if there's a certain amount of congestion on a line. And then incentives: FERC was tasked by Congress, I think, about 20 years ago to create electric transmission incentives policy for transmission technologies, and FERC did a workshop about performance based rate making approaches that's that, for instance, cost savings, utilities getting compensated based on the savings they enable.</p><p>Yes, but that hasn't moved much since 2021. And then also transparency because grid users and stakeholders don't have the information that we would need to understand what the potential is. SPP gave a lot of information to the Brattle Group to undertake that study I talked about. But generally, if you ask PJM how many lines see $2 million of congestion a year, they might tell you that, but they might not have on hand what's causing that congestion. So this transparency question is big. And FERC started getting into that with transmission planning and cost management work with the Joint Task Force.</p><p>They had a technical conference where they brought up the idea of a transmission monitor. So that's also interesting to us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there a role here for sort of just the public, just advocates? All of this seems kind of technical and it's all being sort of hashed out by these technical bodies and these working groups and federal agencies. Is there any role here for sort of just public advocacy for the public to get involved?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, why not? There are some legislators who've proposed, like federal legislators, who proposed legislation around grid enhancing technologies. So Senator Martin Heinrich has legislation to include GETs in a transmission tax credit. Representative Kathy Castor has a bill on including GETs in interconnection. There's been some movement since that was introduced, but there's federal legislation that can be pushed for. And also, the Federal Congress oversees FERC to some degree and has conversations with them. So your Congressperson can always push FERC to act on these issues. Leader Schumer wrote a letter to Chair Phillips at FERC in late July asking him to move on the GETs proceedings.</p><p>So pressure on legislators is good. And let the public utility commissions know that you're looking for more efficient use of the existing transmission infrastructure as well. And state policymakers, too. State legislators, they can all call on the utilities to embrace these tools. And part of the barrier, not the most significant barrier, but part of the barrier is that utilities don't want questions about why they're using this new technology. So if they're getting their state regulators and legislators telling them to use these technologies, that's one less thing for them to worry about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this does seem like one of the areas of policy where states are a little more movable and good things might get going in states and then work their way up to the federal level. That's sort of been the path of most good policy, energy policy in the last decade or so. Final question. You say these things have been around for a while, they're getting better, but they've been around for a while. Who in the U.S., if anyone, is actually using them? And then part two of the question is who in the world is using them?</p><p>Where are these things actually in use?</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, so GETs have been piloted by dozens of utilities in the United States.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Love their pilots.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's the good news. I mean, since the late 90s, dynamic line ratings story goes way back. So they're out there, like I said, the first operational use of DLR just recently. But even power flow control, for instance, has been used. There's this great story a transmission engineer told me about. They were going to have to interconnect a generator. They were going to have to rebuild a line in case of an outage. You have to plan for N minus one, like something going out contingency. So they were going to have to rebuild a line for that.</p><p>Instead, they were able to install a power flow controller and the power flow controller was never used. That contingency never happened. But just by putting in this device, you didn't have to do this whole big rebuild. That would not have given that benefit. So that's an example.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I saw on your map that Europe is covered in these things.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Yeah, lots of dynamic line ratings in Eastern Europe, for sure. Southern, Eastern Europe, Belgium, the UK. So in the UK, National Grid has an incentive regulation that a) gives them funding for innovation: So if they're using a new technology, there's that initial support. And then they also have incentives for saving money through innovation. So when they install those advanced power flow controllers that create half a billion dollars in savings, they're getting compensated for that in a way that when the National Grid US does it, they don't get compensated directly like that. But it's great that National Grid US and UK have some knowledge sharing and National Grid US is one of the more ambitious utilities in terms of GETs, I think partially because of that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is all super interesting. Julia, I just think it's so important for people in this world, in the energy world, to know that transmission is a bear. It's a difficult problem. It's the difficult problem. But we're not just stuck waiting for new lines to get built, right? We're not just stuck waiting for these interminably slow processes to go forward. There's tons of stuff we can do now with these existing technologies to move things forward, reduce costs, get more clean energy on the grid, et cetera, et cetera. It's available now. And so people, when they're pounding the table about transmission, they should add this to their arsenal.</p><p>You can act now. There is something to do now about all this. So thank you for coming and sharing the good news with us.</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Thanks so much. And yeah, we're just sitting on all this dormant capacity that's untapped, right? So once we start using these technologies, suddenly we open up these lines and these circuits to carry so much more for us. And then when we're planning the future grid, we can consider these technologies too, and make sure that we're building the line that's the most useful to the system, because we have all this other flexibility and extra capacity. So we shouldn't be making planning decisions based on the assumption that the grid is a static asset.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes!</p><p><strong>Julia Selker</strong></p><p>Certainly, so, yeah, really exciting technologies. Thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at Volts.wtf. Yes, that's Volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/getting-more-out-of-the-grid-weve</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:136659065</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 19 Sep 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/136659065/09d1f9a4b525805981d7d60d04daf431.mp3" length="65698771" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3284</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/136659065/1043a5fb95f0ca2ea506ff5afeb363f9.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Grid-scale batteries do not currently reduce emissions. Here's how they could.]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Energy storage as deployed on the US grid today has a dirty secret — it actually increases carbon emissions. In this episode, Tierra Climate founders Jacob Mansfield and Emma Konet discuss their vision to incentivize emission reductions by making batteries and other energy storage eligible for carbon offset.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACL0xb3JwAxw6KV_9aGUPoga/volts23.09.06%28jacob.mansfield.emma.konet%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/grid-scale-batteries-do-not-currently-reduce-emissions-heres-how-they-could"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It is widely understood that decarbonizing the grid will require a large amount of energy storage. What is much less widely understood is that batteries on the grid today are generally <em>not</em> reducing carbon emissions — indeed, their day-to-day operation often has the effect of increasing them.</p><p>Yes, you heard me right: most batteries on today's grid are responsible for net positive carbon emissions.</p><p>I was quite disturbed when I first found out about this, mostly through the research of Eric Hittinger at the Rochester Institute of Technology, and I wrote <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/4/27/17283830/batteries-energy-storage-carbon-emissions">a piece on it on Vox</a> way back in 2018.</p><p>Contemporary research suggests that nothing has changed in the ensuing five years — most batteries still behave in a way that increases emissions. But a new startup called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.tierraclimate.com/">Tierra Climate</a> is trying to change that. It wants to incentivize emission-reducing behavior in batteries by making it an eligible carbon offset. </p><p>Just as a renewable energy producers can make extra money through the sale of renewable energy credits (RECs), battery operators could make extra money through the sale of carbon offsets on the voluntary market — but only if they change the way they operate.</p><p>It’s an intriguing idea and the only real solution I’ve seen proposed to a problem that no one else is even talking about. So I wanted to chat with founders Jacob Mansfield and Emma Konet about why batteries increase emissions today, what incentive they would need to change their behavior, and what’s required to set up an offset product. And yes, I recall that Volts recently featured <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/voluntary-carbon-offsets-are-headed#details">an episode extremely critical of carbon offsets</a> — we’ll get into that too.</p><p>So, then, with no further ado, Jacob Mansfield and Emma Konet. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>Thanks for having us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Emma, let's start with you. You worked at a battery company before jumping to this startup. Let's walk through a few basics here. Let's just start with this question. If I'm an investor and I want to build a big battery and attach it to the grid, how would I make money? What are the sort of routes through which I could make income with a battery?</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>So batteries typically have three ways in which they make money. The first one is, I think, what everyone traditionally thinks of a battery doing, and it's called energy arbitrage. And basically that just means that a battery buys power when the price is low and it sells power when the price is high.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>And the difference between those prices is what the battery is paid. Of course, some energy is lost through the process of storing it, and so batteries are not 100% efficient. So that's kind of the traditional idea of how batteries operate. But that's actually not really what a lot of batteries are doing on the grid today. Instead they provide what are called ancillary services and those are basically products that help to keep the grid frequency at 60 Hz. It's really important for reliability, just in everyday power grid operations, that that happens and the grid operates more efficiently when it's in a tighter band, around 60 Hz.</p><p>Batteries are really good at providing those products because they can very quickly ramp up and down and they can provide those products around the clock.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is a really cool thing about batteries, just to sort of insert kind of an aside here is those grid services used to only be able to be provided by giant spinning mass, giant fossil fuel power plants. So it's very cool that we have this basically digital source now of these grid services — is much more precise.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>Exactly. And just much more efficient. So that's the second revenue stream available to batteries and then the third is what's called capacity revenue. And this is not available in every market, but it's basically available in every deregulated market outside of Texas. And it's like long-term grid planning. So the grid operator looks at the expected demand forecast on the time horizons of years rather than days or weeks and determines how much power plant generation capacity it's going to need to satisfy that demand in the future. Then it creates a market to establish the price of what basically it costs to bring new generation online to meet that demand and also to satisfy power plants that are retiring and going offline and that we need to backfill. So that is another service that batteries can offer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Paying them to be available basically.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>Exactly. Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you mentioned this, but maybe it's worth clarifying a little bit. Capacity payments are obviously only available in areas with capacity markets, so that is restructured areas other than Texas. Because as Volts listeners may or may not know, Texas has this energy only market with no capacity market. So what about in areas where there are still vertically integrated old school utilities? Can batteries make money in those areas, and is it the same way?</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>So that's actually a really good question. And there's a lot less transparency in vertically integrated markets, so it's not obvious to say exactly what batteries are doing. And basically the utility decides the operating mode of the battery. And I think the biggest distinction between vertically integrated and deregulated markets are that in vertically integrated markets, utilities can rate base the cost of bringing new generation online, whereby in deregulated markets that has to be supported by the fundamental economics of the power market. And that's why deregulated markets are so good at getting lowest cost dispatch. And that was why basically they deregulated in the 90s. It's basically that batteries functionally do the same thing, they're providing frequency services and probably doing some energy arbitrage and are online for capacity in vertically integrated markets. There's just much less transparency on how they're being paid and how much of that is essentially being subsidized by rate payers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And let's just say a little word about grid services, because, as we mentioned, it's very cool that batteries can provide these services, sort of voltage regulation and stuff like this, but I think people should understand that this is not a large burgeoning market. Like the actual demand for grid services is relatively limited and close to being saturated now. Or sort of like how much headroom is there in that particular slice of the market?</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>I think a lot of developers also would like to know the answer to that question, because when ancillary markets saturate with storage, that's going to be a major revenue stream that has price pressure on it, so that revenue stream will decline. Basically, ancillary markets are — I'm just going to use Texas as an example, because it's the market I'm most familiar with — we just are hitting around 85 gigawatts of load in the energy market. And in contrast, ancillary markets are between three and five gigawatts, so much, much smaller in scale. And we are not far from having three to five gigawatts of batteries in the ERCOT market operational.</p><p>It's a little bit of a moving target because the grid operator, ERCOT, can move around the quantity of those services that it procures, and that's actually changed a bit. They've released a new ancillary product in ERCOT this summer, so it's not exactly a certainty. But I think certainly in the next two to three years, we'll see some significant price pressure on those services. One thing I just want to note here is that when we talk about batteries getting compensated, it's not a clear cut "batteries can win in these markets with respect to paying back their costs."</p><p>A lot of batteries actually struggle to make enough revenue to meet their break-even hurdle. This is just one more pressure on the product that's been keeping them afloat in the past couple of years. So I think this is really concerning to developers and they're sort of looking for new ways to compensate storage for the services that it provides.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, yeah, I was sort of getting around to that. The grid services market is relatively close to saturated, let's say, but if that's true, then it's definitely going to be saturated well before we get anywhere close to the amount of storage we think we're going to need to decarbonize. So this is not going to be a big driver of additional battery deployment. And as you say, like, just in general, and you made this point to me when we talked earlier, Emma, it's just very difficult, even today for batteries to make money, period. For all the sort of talk about batteries and how much batteries we need and the sort of gigantic quantities of storage we're talking about needing, it's very difficult for them to make money in today's market.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>You're right. You're absolutely right. I think they're the sexy new thing that everyone's really excited about and gets a lot of buzz. But when you actually operate them and see the revenue they bring in versus the revenue you expect them to bring in, I think it's a little bit of a reality check for folks that are investing in storage, which is really problematic because we need to continue to invest in storage, continue to build storage in concert with renewable energy in order to get this power grid to net zero. So we can't lose momentum here and if we start to see the economics stall out, that might be what happens.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Putting grid services aside, let's talk about arbitrage. So your basic: buying power when it's cheap, selling it when it's more expensive. One of the things that you've found, that Hittinger's research found, and that your research has found, is that today, at least, your typical sort of arbitrage will have the effect of raising emissions. So just explain why that is. How does that work exactly?</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think it's actually, just to put a little bit of a finer point on it, it's not necessarily a blanket statement that doing energy arbitrage will increase emissions, but it really highly depends on where the battery is located on the grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>In fact, some batteries are located in places where they can significantly reduce carbon emissions. But energy markets and power markets do not incentivize batteries to site in those places. They incentivize batteries to site in places where they aren't reducing emissions on the grid through energy arbitrage. And the reason why that happens is because — well, there's a few reasons — but the big reason is because of the round trip energy efficiency of batteries. So some energy is lost due to the resistance when storing the electrons.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What is the average efficiency of deployed lithium-ion batteries on the grid today, roundabout?</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>It's around about 85%. So it's actually quite efficient for battery technology. It's basically the most efficient batteries we have. And every other technology that can do longer duration for cheaper is usually sacrificing efficiency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. But it's still the case that for your arbitrage to make money, you need not just to sell power when it's more expensive, but it has to be like more than 15% more expensive because you got to sort of compensate for the lost power.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>That's exactly right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So as we're saying, arbitrage does not intrinsically increase emissions. It entirely depends on where the battery is and what time it is and a lot of other factors. But today we think they are increasing emissions. So how do we know that? Tell us a little bit about the study you did.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>So we are partnering with a company called REsurety. It's been around for about a decade and they produce a data set called a Locational Marginal Emissions Rate, which basically measures the carbon intensity of power. So you can kind of think of it in terms of CO2 tons per megawatt hour at every point in time and space on the grid. And what it really is truly getting at is the incremental carbon impact of injecting a clean megawatt hour onto the grid. And so we can leverage that data to take a look at a battery's historical behavior and actually measure what the carbon impact was of its charge and discharge cycles, including all of the things it may be doing to satisfy other markets like ancillary services.</p><p>So I think what's really critical is that in some cases it's better for a battery to cycle more and do more energy arbitrage, but it might be selling an ancillary service instead, because that's more profitable. And as a result, we're not getting the carbon impact that we want to see. And some reasons for that might be a battery might charge uneconomically in the real-time market to satisfy a state of charge requirement for carrying ancillary obligation. Or a battery might charge and discharge very rapidly to respond to the frequency regulation signal that is completely divorced from the carbon signal.</p><p>And so you start to see these behaviors that are incentivized for the battery to make money, but that don't actually correlate to emissions reductions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is the theme of this whole pod, is there is no freestanding financial incentive for batteries to operate in a way that reduces emissions. They're just simply not incentivized to do that.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I just want to say about locational marginal emissions, because this is an important concept for people to get, and it sounds technical. Locational Marginal Emissions (LMEs), but basically so at a given point on the grid, at a given time, if you add a unit of demand for power, what power plant is going to come online to satisfy that next unit of demand? Righ, so people will know, in restructured markets, you generally buy power from the cheapest generators first and sort of stack it up. As demand increases, you bring the more and more expensive generators on.</p><p>And so the locational marginal emissions in a given spot is just like that next unit of demand. What is the next power plant that comes online? And if the next power plant that comes online is a fossil fuel power plant, then you have higher locational marginal emissions in that one spot, basically. And this will change, as the name suggests, from place to place on the grid and from time to time. Like it depends on time and place. And this sort of ability to — people who listen to my pods on hourly matching and all that kind of stuff, trying to sort of hourly match your power consumption to clean generation, will sort of remember this concept.</p><p>It's just very granular. It's different from averaging the emissions in a particular place over a year or over a month or something like that. It's really sort of real-time data. And so this is what you're looking at when you're studying how batteries behave, is what is their effect on locational marginal emissions when they charge and discharge? And what you found is that generally they're increasing Locational Marginal Emissions when they come on.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>That's right. So we did a study in ERCOT where we looked at 24 operating batteries in the calendar year 2022, and we found that over the course of the year, 19 of them actually increased carbon emissions. Only five of them reduced emissions, and only one of those batteries really did so meaningfully. And that battery was a paired solar plus storage facility. Kind of telling, definitely sort of tells us where we think the market needs to go to have a big carbon impact from storage. But what I think is the most interesting thing we modeled out in this paper is what could have happened or what would have happened if we were actually compensating a battery for the carbon that it abates.</p><p>And how does that change behavior? And we really found three things, and that's some batteries that are not in locations that allow for carbon reduction and that are just not emissive, we can actually reduce their carbon footprint and make them less emissive. And then batteries that are in locations where they can reduce emissions, but they're not doing so because there are financial incentives for them to sell other services. We could actually flip those batteries from being emissive to being abating. And then a battery that is already abating because it's in a really good spot on the grid and it's paired with solar, for example, we can actually double the impact and pull even more carbon off the grid.</p><p>So it kind of runs the gamut of all the different places and operating modes that a battery might be located and operating in, and it can have a substantial impact on its behavior.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So before you leave the study behind, though, this is just you just studied batteries in ERCOT, which is the Texas energy-only market, as you say. Other restructured markets are somewhat different in that they tend to have capacity markets as well. And then there are vertically integrated markets. How confident are you that you would find roughly the same thing if you studied other power markets? In other words, is this a generalizable phenomenon that arbitrage tends to increase emissions?</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>It really depends on the stage of renewable penetration of the grid. So I think when we think of grids that are furthest along in the renewable energy transition, we think of California. We're actually, our company is not targeting markets like California because they have a lot of state regulatory support in the form of mandated procurements for storage. So batteries are kind of just getting built off the back of that. And then Texas has a pretty significant renewable energy penetration, but it's also a market where there's not state support for storage or really green energy in general from a regulatory perspective.</p><p>The other markets that we think of are probably the biggest opportunity, are probably MISO and SPP. Because there's a wealth of renewable energy in that part of the country and that renewable energy is getting built. It's in the interconnection queue right now. So we're going to see that penetration increase and I think we can start to basically see the trends of these markets move as more and more renewable energy comes online. So to answer your question about "do we think this is replicable?" I think the answer is yes, especially as more renewable energy comes online. But the critical difference being capacity markets, which is kind of the one little wrinkle — like Texas doesn't have those.</p><p>So we have to think about how does this all play nice together with capacity markets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And you say the grid services market tends to lure operations away from what might otherwise reduce emissions. Does the capacity market have the same effect?</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>Well, I think the capacity market impacts a battery's decision making actually with respect to siting more than anything else. Different capacity markets have different rules with respect to operations, maybe some must-offer rules or just availability requirements. So in terms of like operating mode, I don't expect it to have a big impact but it's more in terms of where you put the battery. So when you have a capacity market that power has to be deliverable to load in order to get a capacity payment. And to be deliverable to load, it has to be studied under a system impact study which is an AC power systems model that looks at power flow and it can be not deliverable if there's not transmission capacity.</p><p>And really unfortunately where all the renewables are located is where the transmission capacity is bottlenecked. So it doesn't incentivize a battery to go site itself near renewable energy where it can have the highest carbon impact because it's going to have to sacrifice potentially a capacity payment or pay hundreds of millions of dollars in transmission upgrades which would kill a project.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>So that kind of points to why this product is even more necessary in markets with capacity markets because we need to incentivize storage to site in places that have high impact but we need to pay them so that they are not having this opportunity cost in the capacity market.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, because right now if they deliberately sited in places where they could have the most positive effect on emissions they would be sacrificing capacity revenue basically.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>Yeah, they could be and I think "would be" is probably the right word. Obviously every location is different and transmission infrastructure is getting built and things are changing. But generally speaking yeah, where the power is bottlenecked is typically where the renewables are producing and so it's kind of a misalignment of incentives and I think there are a lot of people working on transmission and interconnection reform and I think that needs to happen as well. Given my experience trying to work with stakeholders and ISOs and all the different people that make those processes go, this is a much faster path.</p><p>It's to just build the batteries where they need to be and pay them to be there. And then in that case, the battery acts as an aid to the transmission system as well. So it can be highly beneficial.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so it's fair to say that in the fullness of time, this problem will go away. Right. Like eventually, once we have enough renewables on the grid and there's enough transmission built, then batteries will start just naturally behaving in a way that reduces emissions.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But that's potentially quite far away.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think it's quite far away. And anyone who's worked in development and interconnection and trading, it's a sticky, sticky process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm a bit of a wonk, so always my first instinct when I hear a problem like this, we have batteries out there that could potentially be having positive impacts on the social good, but are not because of screwy financial incentives I want to reach for public policy. So I just have to ask: If you were emperors for a day and the US political system was not grossly dysfunctional at almost every level, what type of public policy would solve this?</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>Yes, I also like public policy, so I looked into this and did some modeling. Basically, we can use a production cost model which simulates a power grid on a fundamental level. It looks at bids and offers and structure and generators and all that stuff. Essentially, what we found is that if you add a battery to a grid without a carbon price, based on how all the mechanisms of power markets work, you would see emissions increase today. If you add a carbon tax and we just threw one in for $50, basically. So essentially what it's doing is it's causing generators to just bake that cost into their power offers.</p><p>You see emissions go down, same grid, same model, all you're doing is changing — you're internalizing that externality and it basically solves the problem. So, a carbon tax, I think, is probably the most effective way to go about that. And I think Jacob has some thoughts on this too. So I know I've been talking a lot; I'd love to bring him in. But that's kind of my take on it. And like you said, it's really hard to imagine a world in which that happens at a federal level in this country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm painfully aware. So the carbon benefits are not being valued today. A straight-up carbon tax would value them and would probably solve the problem at some reasonable level of carbon tax or some of the many sort of kludgy ways we have of kind of simulating a carbon tax, like maybe something sector-specific or something that goes through utilities. But anything that basically sort of values carbon is going to get at this problem.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Jacob, any policy thoughts before we sadly abandon public policy and move on?</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think in an ideal world, I think having something close to, like a Pigouvian tax, which is kind of a fancy economics term from my undergrad, would be a good way in which you could build something that's somewhat revenue neutral, where you're taxing the emitters, you're subsidizing the abators. And that would create this clear transfer of value that's really meant to eventually decarbonize and transition the entire grid. I think the challenge is just there's not the political wherewithal or the willpower to do so. And especially in an inflationary environment like we are right now, it probably seems somewhat unsavory to use a tax-based approach. Which is why I think we lean more into leveraging voluntary carbon markets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But taxes are good. I'm just going to plant that flag before we move on. Yay, taxes. Okay, so given that politics, US politics is pretty dysfunctional, we're probably not going to see a carbon tax anytime soon. Tell me about this idea. So the idea basically is that a battery that reduces emissions, that changes its operations in such a way as to reduce rather than increase emissions, could sell those reduced emissions as carbon offsets. So just tell me a little bit about the idea and how it would work.</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>To back up a little bit, I think the reason why we're talking about this is because of the fact that, one, we've seen voluntary corporate activity be a huge driving force for adopting new technologies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>So my background was all in power origination, doing transactions between large scale wind farms and solar farms and corporate clients that were looking to procure renewable energy for their sustainability goals. And just to level set right now where things stand, over half of all the renewables developed in the United States have offtake agreements in place with large commercial and industrial customers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's really wild. I don't think people get that because I think maybe people in my world have a little bit of a skepticism towards corporations. I don't think people get just what a huge force corporate procurement has been in driving renewable energy in this country. As you say, like half the renewable energy in development is for a corporate entity that wants to claim it's reducing its emissions. I mean, that's not small potatoes.</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Yeah, no it's incredible and I think that it's a really good thing, in terms of free markets and companies themselves adopting these initiatives voluntarily. And I think if you take it one step further so if you put that in context with batteries now batteries have not had that to date, right? They don't have any sort of environmental attribute that they can sell. They don't have renewable energy credits as an alternative revenue stream. So the question is what do they really sell or what do they package to receive more investment? And given the state of affairs where batteries may not be a great financial investment for some developers, the reality is that there's not a lot of investment going into batteries.</p><p>And so Bloomberg put out a report earlier this year about how the green energy transition eclipsed a trillion dollars of investment. But when you actually look at the numbers, about half of that went to renewables. And when you compare battery investment to renewable investment, $0.03 for every dollar that goes towards renewables is being invested in batteries. So there's gross underinvestment in batteries. I think it's in part because there isn't the financial revenue stream to really compensate batteries as net abating assets versus being generating assets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And as Emma said, there are some markets like California, where the penetration of renewables is sufficient to cause problems unless you have energy storage. And in those markets, they are kind of getting off their butts and trying to explicitly support batteries and battery investment. But that's only in the places that have kind of been forced to it by the physics of the power system. Not these sort of larger markets where penetration is lower.</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Right. And I would even say beyond California there's other markets like Massachusetts has the clean peak standard. New Jersey has been bouncing around the idea of adopting something similar to compensate batteries for reducing emissions. I think that there is some momentum towards supporting batteries in some mechanism. I think that the tension there is: What is the actual instrument used to encapsulate those environmental attributes?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Is there no consensus? Is there no sort of like standard model?</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>No, not really. And I think that's where it's really being derived in private markets where you have companies that are also adopting an emissions-first principles kind of framework for thinking about this and where they allocate resources. And then at the same time, you have kind of the burgeoning data space around LMEs with REsurety, Singularity, Watt Time, Energy Maps. You have a whole host of folks that are dedicating themselves to building out these data sets that I think we're getting to the point where you can really use an emissions-based approach to estimating and quantifying what the abatement impact is of a battery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If I can just pick up on one bit of that and spell it out a little bit. So this emissions focus by corporates is somewhat new. So to date they've mostly just been sort of like stampeding to buy renewable energy wherever, wherever and whenever and counting that against. But now that we have this, more sophistication about the granular effect on emissions of a given investment — so, like a wind farm in one place might reduce net emissions much more than a wind farm in a different place. Especially true for solar, I think. So now corporates are taking, like, as you said, a sort of emissions-focused look at this, which is where can we invest in things that have the maximum emissions impact?</p><p>And that's what locational marginal emissions, that's what all that data gathering is allowing them to do.</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Yeah. And if I could add just one more thing. I think there are some changes in the actual standards within corporate sustainability that are going to move in that direction. Chiefly, the greenhouse gas protocol, which I think like 97% of Fortune 500 companies have adopted, provides guidance on how to estimate your emissions in the scope 1, 2, and 3.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so they're being pushed to do this not just voluntarily.</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Exactly. And so, scope 2 guidance, which is how you essentially estimate your emissions from electricity, is going through its biggest overhaul in the last decade. And so in 2014, they updated it to have a market-based approach, where you could take advantage of if you purchase RECs or you enter into PPAs to megawatt match and say "I'm offsetting my total annual load of electricity." But now, given that we have the data to more granularly estimate our emissions, we're starting to think about well, maybe if I'm on a dirty grid where I'm consuming electricity mostly from gas and coal, and I'm buying power, from a wind farm in Texas, where in the panhandle, where it's already mostly green, maybe I'm not actually having the impact of being carbon neutral while I'm still claiming that I'm 100% renewable energy supplied.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, you can offset your electricity without offsetting your electricity emissions.</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so they're going to need to do this. And so enter batteries then. So how do you slipstream batteries into that kind of system?</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>It's worth noting that under that construct where people are already supporting wind and solar, I think the next evolution is batteries. And from the corporates that we spoke to, some of them have told us that they think that buying more wind and solar is sort of table stakes and they see a lot of importance in supporting batteries as the next stage in decarbonization. And it's worth noting too, as we add more renewables to the grid and as penetration goes up, you're going to have more resiliency issues potentially, and you're going to have to rely more on fossil fuels to solve for the intermittency problems. And the benefit is that potentially batteries, if sited and operated appropriately, can really supplant thermal units like coal and gas, wean off the grid's reliance on fossil fuels and allow us to run the grid the way that we hope it to be, which is 100% renewable energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So to do that, we have to incentivize that behavior. So the idea here is corporates going out on the voluntary carbon offset market, corporates looking to offset their emissions. Basically, you want to make batteries that reduce emissions eligible as an offset. So tell me a little bit about how that would work because I have no idea. Is there a governing body running voluntary carbon offset markets? Do you just go out and say, "hey, we've got some offsets" and people start buying them? Do you have to get certified by someone or how does all that work?</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Yeah. So it's interesting because it is a voluntary space, so there are a lot of different players and lots of folks trying to figure it out and chart new paths every single day. But I think generally speaking, the accepted pathway would be for us to work with a carbon registry. And so we've joined a consortium of players. It's called the Energy Storage Solutions Consortium, which is comprised of corporates and battery developers. And so we're charting a pathway to try to get a methodology in place with Verra. And so Verra is one of the key carbon registry bodies that exists, it's a nonprofit.</p><p>Verra actually accounts for 70% of all the voluntary carbon offsets that are issued. It's gotten some bad press recently due to nature-based offsets, but the reality is that they've actually become much more stringent as a result of it, which hopefully is a boon for us in terms of getting something passed and getting something through that passes muster. And the goal for that is to have a check in place such that if we're working with developers to certify projects, issue offsets, get them minted through Verra and have a validator that's a third party audit the entire process.</p><p>You have all these checks and balances in place to ensure that whatever's being purchased by a corporate really is going to pass the test of time. And it's really going to be something they can use for their sustainability goals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, well, this seems like a good time to sort of wrestle with the offset question then. Because a few weeks ago I had Joe Romm on, very critical of the offset market generally. And I know at this point that offsets have kind of even, I think, maybe among the general public gotten a little bit of a bad reputation as sort of scammy. So talk a little bit about how you see these kinds of offsets fitting into the market and sort of how confident people should be in them relative to other kinds of offsets. Like how would you pitch this to someone who's skeptical of offsets, let's say?</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Right. And those are the folks that we talk to on a weekly basis, so it's nothing new from that end. I think the reality is that this is just a fundamentally different type of product than what exists on the market. To zoom out a little bit, there's sort of a bifurcation between avoidance and removal offsets and then also between nature-based and things that are not nature-based. So avoidance typically means there is some sort of activity which might increase emissions. If we forego that activity, then we will avoid emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. This is the classic counterfactual that is so problematic.</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Right. So it's been pretty challenging in terms of deforestation, like someone threatening to chop down a forest or a parcel of land and then claiming that's an avoidance because they didn't do it, because they got compensated. And that's pretty problematic. And the reality is that that requires you to make a guarantee of some sort of activity for hundreds of years, meanwhile still recognizing revenue up front for something that hasn't yet fully come to fruition. I think the reason why this is pretty different is that we're getting to the point now where power markets are pretty instantaneous and things — the grid, what supplies electricity is fairly instantaneous.</p><p>And so the reality is that at the end of any given day, we can look back and calculate what was the empirical impact of a battery on the grid, and we're not making claims of 100 years into the future, what's going to happen. We can actually look back and say, "this battery that was charged with renewables at this time, discharging at this point in time reduced our reliance on this thermal unit." And that's the type of avoidance that I think is markedly different than a nature-based solution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So this would be then maybe if we think of it in terms of — because I think as a rough and ready heuristic in the offset market, generally, you get what you pay for. So these nature-based offsets are sort of legendarily, notoriously cheap, which is why people buy so many of them. But they're cheap because they're mostly junk, I think. And then you have, as you said, the removal offsets, which are literally tons of carbon buried, right, tons of carbon sequestered, which is about as certain as you can get, that you're offsetting a ton if you literally bury it.</p><p>And those are incredibly expensive right now, I think, because the technology for capturing and burying carbon remains incredibly expensive. So where do you think battery offsets would come in between those two poles?</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think right now, nature-based offsets, the high end is probably like $20. And then you have CDR DAC that are in the hundreds of dollars, even north of $1,000. And then you have some things in between. But for the most part, I would use those as the key price points. Now, going back to our study, what we saw was we did a sensitivity analysis on carbon price because we wanted to know how much can you shift behavior? We found that there were diminishing returns. Like batteries can't infinitely abate carbon unfortunately. No matter what price of carbon you attach to them, there is a finite limit.</p><p>And so what we found was it comes down to the proverbial question of: Is the juice worth the squeeze for a battery operator? Like, if we attach a price of $5 per ton of CO2, it might move the needle slightly. But if you're only increasing the total revenue to the operator by a couple of percentage points, that's not meaningful enough to go through all these hoops and hurdles. So then it comes down to, "okay, what's the point at which this is meaningful money for batteries to move from being in the red to being in the black and changing their behavior?"</p><p>And so based on our study, we found that it's between fifty dollars to one hundred dollars. And to put kind of more mental benchmarks around that, if you think about RECs, and specifically high impact RECs which are increasing in popularity right now, people are paying as much as $20 per REC or more with maybe a carbon abatement of maybe 0.3 to 0.4 tons per megawatt hour. And when you convert that to per tons, that's already between thirty dollars to fifty dollars per ton of CO2. So we don't think we're totally off from that, but also with the co-benefits of improving grid resiliency and building more batteries which will help us in enabling more renewables to be built as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So in the middle then, somewhere cheaper than carbon removal, but probably more expensive than nature-based and RECs.</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In the $50 to $100 per ton range. And would that amount of money be different in different markets or is the idea to sort of standardize here across markets so that the market sort of allocates efficiently across different regions?</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think the beauty of this is that you can actually have price differentiation across batteries where the batteries that are the lowest hanging fruit that are more easily enabled to change their behavior, to reduce emissions, they may fetch a lower price than someone who's a little bit stickier or harder to abate. So I think that there is opportunity for price discovery where based on the price point, maybe we need to hover closer to $50, in which case we need batteries that are going to more easily shift their behavior to do so, to justify creating these offsets. But as the price goes up through time or there's higher demand for these types of offsets, maybe that's where you get to the higher hanging fruit of other batteries that are more difficult to change their behavior starting to be economically incentivized to change their behavior. So I think in general it would be a market force where the product generally could be fungible.</p><p>There's a claim that maybe it could be an inset or someone could want to source these from the ISO or the grid that they operate in. But the benefit of it being denominated in carbon is that it could be fungible across batteries, which is also beneficial in the event that you have an outage or you have an issue with any single asset, you now all of a sudden have a number of other assets that can offer a similarly qualified product.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, and you can imagine corporates wanting, preferring to pay batteries that are on the grids where they are operating right in the name of this sort of hourly matching. People are talking about some sort of hybrid of hourly matching and emissionality that's probably too geeky to get into in this pod. But you can imagine a corporate paying a little bit more to change the behavior of batteries that are producing the power that they're using.</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I think this also affects the siting as well. And I actually would probably hand it off to Emma to kind of chat more about how that affects the siting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Emma, let's talk a little bit about if, say, $50 a ton carbon offset money were available to batteries, grid-scale batteries, how would that change their behavior and who builds what and where?</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>Well, batteries are always operating in the market to maximize their revenues. So, you know, one of the products that Tierra Climate is offering is optimization services to help batteries maximize their revenues across carbon markets and energy markets. It's kind of difficult to answer that question as a blanket statement because every market has different prices for different things, and those prices are constantly changing as the grid is evolving. But generally speaking, as soon as you attach a price to carbon, even a smaller price of carbon, like once you basically jump the hurdle of like, "okay, we are in the contract and I'm actually going to operate my battery in a different way," even a smaller price of carbon can start to change behavior. And so basically, batteries will stop selling perhaps responsive reserve service or spinning reserves in favor of cycling the battery more to capture arbitrage opportunity that maybe it otherwise wouldn't have gone for.</p><p>And a really critical example I think we see is that on a typical grid, pretty much anywhere in the US, you're going to see maybe a $20 - $30 difference between the lowest price and the highest price of the day. But batteries degrade when you cycle them, right? And basically the kind of value that I think that the industry has landed on is about $25 to cycle the whole thing. And so if you are only making like a couple of bucks or it's uncertain if you're going to be able to capture that, it's like, "why do I cycle my battery, I'll just sit there and sell something else and not take the degradation and just collect my money doing ancillary."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>But as soon as you attach $50 to that and obviously carbon and megawatt hours are not one to one, but let's just assume roughly you're displacing a unit that's one ton per megawatt hour, then all of a sudden your arbitrage opportunity goes from 20 - 30 to 70 - 80. And that now can incentivize much more cycling. And I think as battery developers are looking to the future, they're going to start saying, "hey, this part is available to us. So let's go to the place in the grid where we get the max arbitrage opportunity and kind of let's maybe not so much worry about these small ancillary markets that aren't going to be relevant to us in the next five years."</p><p>And so we might actually see battery operators and developers flocking to renewable-energy-rich areas that allow them to cycle the battery frequently and capture that arbitrage. And then we have that whole discussion about capacity markets which kind of throws a wrinkle into it. But I think generally speaking, the price of carbon should be discovered in a way — we'll have price discoveries such that it incentivizes the behavior based on the demand for the tons.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Presumably, if there's a spot on the grid where there are considerable arbitrage opportunities that could reduce emissions, those will saturate too, right? Those are not infinite. So the idea of putting a price on these is to just start filling those in, basically.</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I think a lot of the big energy arbitrage opportunities that we see are driven by transmission constraints where basically you have one part of the grid that's bottlenecked. The emissions factor gets really low, basically zero or perhaps negative. And so it's a charging opportunity. So that's going to change as we both build more batteries and build more transmission. But I will make a comment just on what we've seen happen in markets where it's kind of like "if you build it, they will come." You build a transmission and you alleviate a constraint and now all the power can get out and then a bunch more renewables build right behind that transmission because that's where the renewable-energy-rich areas are.</p><p>Those aren't moving right. Like we know where wind is in Texas, it's in the panhandle. So we go build projects there and then we fill up the transmission again. And we've just seen this, it's like history repeats itself. So I don't really have the concern that on the long time horizon for batteries that they're somehow going to cannibalize the opportunity, I mean, maybe for a few years and we see a cycle where the opportunity is less. But we got to build a lot of transmission to solve this problem and transmission is very hard to get done in this country and we also need more renewables and we need more batteries.</p><p>And so these trends are going to continue. You're going to continue to see an arbitrage gap in both price and emissions in certain parts of the grid, basically in perpetuity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And this might be kind of a dumb question, but it occurs to me that if you establish a situation where batteries are making money because there is grid congestion, right, I mean, that's sort of like what is making some of these arbitrage opportunities so big is that there's a lack of transmission. Then if somebody comes in and builds transmission in that area, they are going to be taking revenue opportunities from those batteries. And do you worry at all that this is going to sort of set battery owners and operators against transmission, put their incentives against more transmission?</p><p><strong>Emma Konet</strong></p><p>This is something I've thought about a lot and I think, just not to get too technical here, but there's kind of two different flavors of transmission constraints. One of them is like a thermal constraint which is basically like an isolated singular, one line or a couple of lines that's causing extreme price action. And typically we see that price action on the upside, where we see really expensive units have to ramp up to satisfy demand. Then the other type of flavor is a voltage constraint where basically you're trying to push a large amount of power across a wide region of very — we call it like an interface.</p><p>And those constraints are more persistent, harder to solve with a single transmission line. You can't just come in and say, "oh, I built a transmission line, problem solved." It's kind of this integrated whole process that you have to go through to solve that. And in the meantime, the interconnection queue is filled with generators that want to interconnect. So I don't really think that's going to happen. I think it could happen if you're trying to site a battery to just capitalize on a small constraint — like we saw this in West Texas with the Permian demand with oil and gas load.</p><p>Basically, as oil and gas started to electrify their process of extracting, we saw a bunch of electricity demand in West Texas and it caused prices to skyrocket. Some batteries sited there took advantage of that for a couple years. They built like two transmission lines and the opportunity went away. But that's not really what we're talking about. We're talking about just these endemic structural issues within the grid where we're trying to get renewables from the middle of the country to the coasts to the load centers. That structure is not changing.</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>And if I could just add something else, I would say that MISO did a study where they examined what would be the most cost-effective way of decarbonizing and they evaluated if you used purely batteries, used purely transmission or a combination of both, which would be the most cost-effective way. And the answer really is you need both. So it's sort of an "all of the above" approach where this isn't going to supplant the need for transmission, but it certainly is going to help alleviate it. And especially where we are so far behind, and we'll be constantly behind as we electrify everything.</p><p>I think it'll be really imperative that we are building more batteries in tandem with building more transmission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think we can see in a couple of ways that in some sense this opportunity that you're trying to monetize is temporary and going to go away at some point. But that point is far away, it's plenty far away that there's plenty of money to be made in the interim. So maybe by way of wrapping up, I would just ask this seems like a good idea, right? We have this problem with batteries. Now they're operating in a way that increases emissions. We have a relatively simple intervention which is just monetizing carbon reductions in battery operation by way of offsets getting some of that corporate money flowing to batteries to incentivize them to operate in a smarter way or a way that is more emissions conscious.</p><p>Where are you in this effort? And have you had when you talk to corporates, are they open to this idea? When you talk to sort of offset the people analyzing and sort of assessing offset quality, all these entities involved, who would be involved, is there interest? How far away are we from seeing this happen somewhere?</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>I think it's a spectrum, depending on the corporate, their stance on sustainability, the tools that they're looking to use. What I have found generally in our conversations, the short of your answer is "yes, there is interest from corporates." And in fact, there was a deal executed last September that was made public where Meta did a pilot transaction with a battery developer in Texas called Broad Reach. And I think that's really put it on the radar that this is potentially feasible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wait, what did Meta pay for?</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>We don't know the exact contract terms, but in general, the idea was they were compensating these batteries in Texas to reduce emissions through this type of LME construct alongside REsurety. And I think that's like a really core data point to say there are pioneers in the space that are looking to do these types of transactions. And I think that the corporates that are most closely aligned with doing this are ones that, again, have done a litany of renewable transactions. They're looking to now move towards grid resiliency as the next phase of their sustainability agenda, maybe have an emissions based approach, and their other alternatives aren't that great.</p><p>Whether it's doing a toll with a battery, financing batteries, a lot of things that would involve incurring significant risk to a project versus a very elegant instrument where you pay for performance for these projects to have an incremental revenue stream and also reduce emissions in an empirically validated way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What's between you and this happening?</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>I think it's just that it's so early days, so that transaction was done a little less than a year ago. Now, I guess we're entering September. But yeah, it's putting the wheels in motion in terms of corporates wanting it to be validated through a nonprofit like Verra and getting that stood up. I think there's a lot in terms of getting batteries to the table and formalizing those partnerships, and that's where we hope to really play a role as an intermediary. Again, going back to my experience as an originator, looking at the PPA market, it's taken decades to get to the point where things are becoming standardized by intermediaries.</p><p>And I think that there's a lot of value to doing that at the outset where this can be a standardized fungible product that corporates can easily execute in and standing it up early relative to it being something far down the line later on when the market's already taken off.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If you had to put a time prediction, like, what year will the first corporate buy the first official battery offset?</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>So in some ways, you could say it already happened with Meta, but I would say —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, did Meta get an offset out of that? And if so, how? If that product hasn't been set up yet, or did Meta just get a good feeling out of that?</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>I can't speak for them, but I would say in general, I think it was the idea is that eventually, with a certified process in place through a carbon registry firm like Verra or Gold Standard, they can use those assets towards their sustainability goals. I mean, but there's a lot of other companies that have done transactions that have been off registry. You could say a lot of CDR support has been for projects that don't have methodologies in place, but they're doing it to support novel technologies. But to go back to your original question of when, I mean, putting that aside, I would say next year is probably a really good bet in terms of maybe having something in place to get approved offset. Everything in terms of the stars aligning and corporates being interested in supporting batteries. I think more and more we talk to corporates, I'm pleasantly surprised into how much they're already talking to developers, how much they're already thinking about this issue. And so I think we're just bringing it to the foreground and also providing a solution as opposed to pointing at all the problems. And I think that's really important for moving this area forward versus just setting it back and saying, "headline, there's all these issues and there's no solutions to it."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Well, hopefully, yeah, when I revisit this in five more years, there will be a different story to tell. All right, well, Jacob and Emma, thanks so much for coming on and walking through this. This is like a weird, obscure little side problem in the renewable energy world that I feel like hardly anyone's aware of, and it's great to see someone actually attempting to solve it. So thanks again.</p><p><strong>Jacob Mansfield</strong></p><p>Thanks again for having us on. Appreciate it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wt. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/grid-scale-batteries-do-not-currently</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:136701012</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 11 Sep 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/136701012/e8f5f380c77665206ce2431055d30045.mp3" length="66368048" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3317</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/136701012/985d9f065d0f90e9c8f47c36d3843f2a.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The progressive take on the permitting debate]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Johanna Bozuwa of the Climate and Community Project shares a progressive vision for permitting reform and the factors that could speed up the US clean-energy buildout.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAA606jgVZYWqPcnLRC5b1Awa/volts23.08.30%28johanna.bozuwa%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/the-progressive-take-on-the-permitting-debate"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To achieve its Paris climate targets, the US is going to have to build out an <em>enormous</em> amount of clean energy and clean-energy infrastructure in coming years. But that buildout is going slowly — painfully, excruciatingly slowly — relative to the pace that is necessary.</p><p>This has given rise to considerable debate on the left over what, exactly, is slowing things down. Much of that debate has come to focus on permitting, and more specifically, on permitting under the National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA.</p><p>A deal that would have put some restrictions on NEPA in exchange for reforms to transmission planning was effectively killed by progressives toward the end of the last congressional session, leading many people inside and outside the climate movement to accuse progressives of being The Problem. They are so attached to slowing down fossil fuel development with NEPA, the accusation goes, that they are willing to live with it slowing clean energy. And that’s a bad trade.</p><p>Progressives, not surprisingly, disagree! Their take on the whole permitting debate is summarized in a new paper from the Roosevelt Institute and the Climate and Community Project: “<a target="_blank" href="https://rooseveltinstitute.org/2023/08/24/a-progressive-vision-for-permitting-reform/">A Progressive Vision for Permitting Reform.</a>”</p><p>The title is slightly misleading, since one of the central points of the paper is that permitting under NEPA is only a small piece of the puzzle — there are many other factors that play a role in slowing clean energy, and many other reforms that could do more to speed it up. I called up one of the paper’s co-authors, Johanna Bozuwa of the Climate and Community Project, to ask her about those other reforms, the larger political debate, and the progressive community’s take on speed. </p><p>All right, then. With no further ado, Johanna Bozuwa from the Climate and Community Project. Welcome to Volts, and thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is a hot topic, as you're well aware, permitting and the larger issues around it. And so, before we jump into specifics, I wanted to start with a few sort of broad, call them philosophical, questions.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Perfect.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As you know, progressives have been under quite a bit of fire lately, not only from their typical opponents on the right and in the fossil fuel industry, but from a lot of sort of centrists and even a lot of sort of allies in the climate movement. For — I think the general idea is they are too attached to stopping fossil fuels and not yet supportive enough of building out renewable energy. And the mechanisms that they rely on to slow and stop fossil fuels are also slowing and stopping renewable energy. And so I think the general critique is that they ought to swing around and be more pro-building and loosen these requirements, et cetera, et cetera. I'm sure you've heard all this.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I guess I'd just start with this question. Is, do you think the progressive — and by the way, I meant to say this by way of a caveat, I'm going to be sort of using you as a spokesperson for progressivism, which I think we both realize is ridiculous.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Right, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Progressives are heterogeneous just like anybody else. There's no official progressive position. But as a crude, let's just say as a crude instrument here, we're going to ask you to speak for that perspective as you see it.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Perfect.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So in your opinion, do you think progressives have taken it into their heart that things are moving too slowly and they desperately need to move faster?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>My answer to that question is that I think speed is progressive. You know, David, I don't need to tell this to you or any of the people that listen to this podcast or even progressives. We're dealing with the existential threat of the climate crisis and lives are on the line. And so I think that as progressives, we do need to take the speed question seriously. And I think what I would push back on is the fact that people have this myopic focus on permitting as the thing that's slowing everything down. And especially when I'm talking about permitting, NEPA permitting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. We're going to definitely get to that.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I just think that when it comes to this question of "Do progressives believe in speed?" I think that they actually very much do. And one of the things that I get frustrated with sometimes, when I hear these arguments like "Oh, progressives don't want to build anything," I think what progressives are interested in is building the right thing. And if we think about the United States and how our energy system rolls out today, we have a real issue that fossil fuels can expand at the same time as renewable energy is expanding. Like when it comes to fossil fuels, we can actually export that.</p><p>We are now the biggest net exporter of LNG and crude oil. And I think that progressives are particularly aware that if we do the wrong thing on permitting then we're actually not only expanding renewable energy — and maybe poorly done renewable energy — but also the fossil fuel industry knows how to use these tools so much better than our renewable energy developers. And we are going to see just a massive expansion that we absolutely don't need right now. If we think the climate crisis matters.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about the argument which goes like this: Fossil fuels are reaching sort of a structural peak and decline. Renewable energy is getting cheaper and cheaper and cheaper. It's on the rise. So if you just, all things being equal, make it easier to build everything across the board, renewable energy will win that race and so it's worth doing.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>I just don't think that argument is true, look at how much power the fossil fuel industry still has in making these decisions. Like if we look at who is behind the recent push for permitting reform: It was largely the oil and gas industry. There's definitely some more nuance that's there, but they have significant power to move things and move them faster than the clean energy world. It's a question of when you're rolling back some of these bedrock environmental laws that the pie — it's not that the part of renewable energy in the pie is getting bigger. It's that even if we are getting more renewable energy, the pie itself has expanded so that we're having fossil fuels and renewables expanding at the same time.</p><p>And it's not fully pushing out the power of the fossil fuel industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, then, how about this? And this is the final philosophical question before we get down to some nuts and bolts. Do you agree that there are going to be trade-offs as we pursue speed? This is, of course, the big discussion right now is that if you really double down on speed, if you really pursue speed with everything you've got, there are inevitably going to be some trade-offs, some other progressive values that have to take a backseat. And that might be other environmental impacts. It might be impacts on communities. It might be, you know, name it. It might be that we have to loosen up a little bit on those other things.</p><p>Do you think that there are those trade-offs?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>I think that there are some trade-offs. You, I think, had my colleague, Thea Riofrancos, on the pod some time ago talking about lithium extraction, right? And the fact that if we are going to decarbonize our transportation sector, it is going to take extraction in order to accomplish that. Right. And there are substantial and significant impacts that has in terms of water contamination in some of the most drought-impacted parts of the United States, that is something that we need to be thinking about. And I think what my hesitation is when it comes to so much of this conversation is that we're talking about deregulation as the way to do speed instead of actually talking about planning and coordination.</p><p>And from my perspective, it's the planning and coordination that allows us to think through the decisions we're making with a far better sense of what's happening instead of a "get government out of the way, we'll figure it out" project that — it didn't really do great things for the planet. Are we going to do that again and trying to fix it? That seems like a silly mistake to make.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a really important distinction. I'm glad we get that out up front. Because I hate when we go from, "Yes, there are trade-offs" to therefore "Let it rip, let everything go." As Thea said on the podcast, we can acknowledge those trade-offs and thoughtfully try to minimize them through planning.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's start with this. As you say, there's this sort of what we're calling the permitting debate, quote unquote. Permitting debate is actually a bunch of debates and they're all kind of getting squished together under this notion of permitting. But in fact, there's a lot of things going on here other than permitting. So maybe talk just a little bit about all the disparate things that are now sort of getting lumped together under that rubric.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Exactly. So I think just to put a point on it, often when people are talking about permitting, they're talking about this unfocused conversation about cutting red tape. But really what it comes down to is where the fight is right now in particular on the national stage is around NEPA. So the National Environmental Policy Act, but wrapped up into all of their arguments are all these other pieces that actually are maybe more of the problem than particularly NEPA. So, you know, four of them, just to start us off, obviously we do have NEPA. That's part of the permitting process.</p><p>We have local and state zoning permits, approvals, things like that. You know, going to Georgia County to make sure that you can put something through. Then you have third, these contracts or arrangements that are actually between private organizations. David, I know you had folks talking about internet connection queues — that often is part of the permitting debate, but it's actually about who gets to go onto the transmission that's being built.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let me pause there because I want to make a point that I'm not sure everybody understands and I'm not even sure we made it in that pod. But the ISOs, the ...</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Independent service operators. I know I always mess it up. RTOs. ISOs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I know. ISOs and RTOs. I could never call that to mind. But anyway, the ones who are sort of running the transmission systems and running these queues are not public organizations. Those are not state organizations. They are private consortia of transmission organizations and utilities and things like that. So it's not something that the state can come in and just directly change. I just think that's worth sort of putting on the record.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>I think that's a really important point and I think we'll probably dig into this further. But the idea that and I think you talked about this on the pod last time, but there are so many different kind of private actors that are operating within the RTOs and ISOs with not actually a huge amount of oversight, as it currently stands.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, or transparency.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Or transparency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or accountability, really.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. And it turns out if we're looking at what's really miring the buildout of renewable energy, a solid amount of it is right there. Is in the interconnection queues. I think it was Southwest PowerPool — takes like eight years sometimes to get the developer to get their project through. And those are for projects that already have their offtaker and have all their permitting in place. So it just feels quite misguided for us to spend all of this time talking about permitting when we could be actually diagnosing the problem —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you said there was a fourth.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>— and there's a fourth. The fourth one, I would say, is just operation and construction permits, like some of the pollution discharge stuff that is at some of these more local levels. And those four don't even include some of the other things that stop things, which is like access to capital, utility squabbles, supply chain slowdowns, these whole host of other issues that are just being swept under the rug because it's very alluring to say, guess what? I have the one quick fix to make sure that renewable energy gets built in the United States.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And local NIMBYism. I'd throw that in.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yeah, yeah, local NIMBYism, absolutely. Add it to the pile, exactly. So and NEPA's not going to do things about local NIMBYism in the same way that's the local and state zoning stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think people really want, for obvious reasons, they're frustrated by everything going so slowly and everybody wants there to be sort of like something to cut the Gordian knot, sort of one, as you said, one weird trick. And that's, I think, why people are grasping onto NEPA because it seems like that's one big thing we can argue about and change. But as you say, the reasons here are very disparate. But let's just take a second to talk about NEPA. I go back and forth on this, but is it, do you think the progressive position that NEPA is okay "as is" and doesn't need any changes?</p><p>Like, do you think there are problems with NEPA and how it's administered?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Okay. My feeling on this is that the case about NEPA is overstated, especially as we describe so many other things, even outside of the permitting process that matters. But if we're going to talk about NEPA, I think overall the projects are going through pretty quickly. There was a new study, actually, this month by, I think, David Adelman that did a really comprehensive look at wind and solar NEPA reviews over the past ten years, and he found that less than 5% of Wind and solar projects required. The EIS, like the Environmental Impact Statement, which is the one that takes the most time usually, can be two and a half years or whatever, but they're going through with categorical exclusions or some of these faster ways to move wind and solar projects through, or just projects in general.</p><p>And he found that there was very little litigation involved, which is often like the dog whistle, I feel like, of some of these folks who are calling for permitting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was surprised when I looked at that study. It's a relatively low percentage of those projects that get litigated after they're done.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Right, exactly. And I think if I were to make any improvements to NEPA, the thing I would do is bulk up the administrative state. Jamie Gibbs Pleune wrote a kind of corresponding piece of research to our permitting report where she investigated and talked about NEPA in particular with Roosevelt. But she was looking at another paper and found of 40,000 NEPA decisions that the US Forest Service looked at, the biggest causes of delays were actually from a lack of experienced staff, budget instability, and honestly, delays from the applicants themselves not getting their stuff in on time. So I just feel as if we're going to do anything to make NEPA better, give the BLM, give US Forest Service, give EPA far more funds, training, staff empowerment that's going to actually move these projects even faster through the pipeline when they're actually moving relatively quickly.</p><p>And these places have experienced chronic understaffing and lack of empowerment. So there is work to be done there. I don't want to understate that, but I think that it's a reasonable thing for us to accomplish without rolling back and applying a very neoliberal frame to how we get this job done.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I would say it does seem like NEPA has sprawled a bit since it was passed. Originally, it was supposed to be major projects that came under NEPA review, and the court basically decided that all projects were under NEPA review. And so there's just thousands and thousands now that just have these little sort of not very long delays because they get these categorical exemptions. But there's just a lot of — it's very sprawling, it seems like, and unfocused. This is one of those areas where I feel like there are procedures of the administrative state that could work better and more effectively.</p><p>But at this point, liberals, they've just been under assault for so long. And liberals just know if you open this can of worms, if you open it up to review, there's just a pool of piranhas that want to go in and strip it bare. And so they just don't open it for review. Like, there's so many things like this. Like, if we could have a good faith process of actually trying to do what NEPA is supposed to do better than NEPA does it, I feel like, yeah, there's stuff we could improve, but Joe Manchin doesn't want to improve it.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>We don't want Joe Manchin in charge of what NEPA looks like and what's the more muscular version that takes into consideration the real-life climate impacts. Because I don't know when you're talking there, David, a thing that comes up for me is the reality that we will have more things happening on the ground. Like, let's say you put transmission in, we have a wildfire crisis. Now all of a sudden, the stakes are higher when it comes to these things like environmental review that are very material that I think also aren't talked about as much as they should be. And so, yeah, I can imagine things being shifted and changed within NEPA so that it works better for the current context.</p><p>But I think that, as you describe it, could be a real political problem for us to do that type of work right now. And we have other mechanisms that can move us much more quickly in the interim. Like, is this really the thing we want to be spending our time on as progressives? The answer is no.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I also think if you look at the reforms that were sort of ended up getting jammed through, like of all the thoughtful things you could do to NEPA to make it work better, just a sort of — page limit, like a page limit on reviews: Seems like it's such a blunt instrument. It's such a crude way of approaching this.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Oh, and I think it's going to get them into serious trouble. If you want a thing that is going to increase litigation, try adding an arbitrary deadline and page limit to something with no administrative capacity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay. We could do a whole pod on NEPA, but I don't want to get too — our whole point is it's not the sole or even main impediment here. So at a slightly more granular level, let's talk about what you think is actually slowing down clean energy infrastructure build out. And there's a few categories your report covers starting with transmission, which is, I think, the big one.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yeah, totally. And I would agree with you. I mean, transmission planning is kind of in shambles in this country. It's not up to the job.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I don't think literally anybody on any side of anything would disagree with you about that.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Exactly. And I think there are a couple of reasons for that. One is that multistate transmission buildouts are incredibly hard to do in a federalized system. We just have so many different actors that are vying to hold on to their particular part of the market, especially with our vertically integrated utilities that don't have much interest in allowing other utilities into their service territory. And in deregulated states, utilities are kind of out of the picture for deciding where new generation is being built. So there's not a lot of efficiencies that are built into that. So we just get this really haphazard development, if development at all, of our transmission system, which I think is just quite a failure.</p><p>There are so many clear opportunities to do much more clear planning around this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And then what about big large-scale renewable energy projects like big solar, wind, geothermal, what is in practice, slowing down their build out?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I think that when it comes to some of these larger scale projects around solar or wind, you're running again into projects that aren't thinking strategically about where they're being placed. So if we're looking at the amount of land that we're going to need with the energy transition right. Wind and solar take more space up than one natural gas plant. And I think that there's just like a clear lack of land use planning when it comes to these larger scale projects when we could be doing it far better. Right. And thinking about what are the areas that make sense and are going to limit the amount of impact on our landscape and on communities and actually deploy it in those areas.</p><p>And I actually think there are answers to that question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, we're not to answers yet. We're dwelling on problems.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Okay, all right —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So how does that slow down? I mean, what does that manifest as? How does that slow down the build out?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, the way that that manifests is that you're putting big renewable energy projects in tension with things like agriculture. You're putting big renewable projects in tension with our biodiversity goals. And so those are the things that are going to potentially mire the development and deployment of these larger scale projects — in addition to getting them attached to the transmission and making sure that it's colocated with the transmission we need.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, the aforementioned interconnection queue issue, which alone is like, "That's a lot of years," which as you say, that's a lot of years tacked on the end of all the other stuff they have to go through. Like once they have to go through all that other stuff, then they get in the interconnection queue and wait and wither, etc. And then another thing you take on here is a big piece of the clean energy buildout, which I think a lot of people don't really think about as much, maybe don't enjoy thinking about as much, which is the sort of minerals and metals aspect of it. A big part of IRA, the Inflation Reduction Act, is an attempt to onshore supply chains so that China does not dominate them.</p><p>But that means onshoring some mines and some minerals processing which are not necessarily environmentally friendly, not necessarily things people like having in their backyard. So what's slowing those things down?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>I guess I would say there are two pieces that are happening. One is just that this is a pretty new area and there are so many price fluctuations that are happening. There's all of these big mining companies that are shifting ownership, trying to figure out financing. Right? So there's a lot that's happening there. And mining companies are not the best known for having perfect environmental impact statements or anything like that, that's going to get them mired right. And then you add in the fact that as we talked about earlier, a lot of where these lithium reserves are is also in extremely — like the likelihood for drought is a lot higher if you're looking, for instance, at the Salton Sea in California or, you know, over in Nevada, these are places that we actually have to be extremely careful about. And also it just takes a really long time to build a mine like this isn't something that happens the next day. Right. It's like 10 to 15 years in the future type thing. So it is a longer time frame that's going to be even longer if we aren't thinking, again, about who is impacted, how they are going to be impacted by the mining itself. What is that going to do to air quality, water quality, all of these different things?</p><p>It's a really big part of the permitting discussion, or of the transition discussion in particular that is being discounted in the United States.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And one more bit on problems, before we transition to recommendations. I noticed that one thing you don't get into a lot in the report is the expression of those state and local level permitting issues. And a lot of those I think, are tied to environmental review. And a lot — like, for instance, the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) is just sort of like legendarily at this point, a tool for local NIMBYs to stop things happening. Like we just read a story that was bouncing around Twitter a few days ago about these wealthy people — I forget what county they were in — but they were suing because someone had moved a playground closer to their house.</p><p>They didn't like the sound of the kids playing and so they sued. And part of it was that the city had not done a proper environmental review under CEQA of moving the playground. And you hear stories like that all the time. Do you think you said that NEPA is not as big a problem as people say? Do you think state level environmental review is a serious problem, a serious barrier, at least in some places?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>I think it just really depends on the place. And I think that's part of why as we were writing a national paper, being able to dig into the detail and differentiations between all of these different places seemed like a big haul for a small paper. So yeah, I think that there are these pieces at the local level, the zoning things, right? People are historic preservation boards that are saying like, "No rooftop solar because we don't like the look of it." Yeah, that's some BS in my mind and I think we do need to figure out how to manage that.</p><p>And I think what this comes into conversation with is a little bit of like, what is the community review process? What does that look like and how do we manage that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Contemplating the variety and number of those instruments at the state and local level is really overwhelming and really does make the problem feel so intractable because it's just like, as you say in a federalist system, it's like every bit of reform is not just one bit, it's 50 bits. Every bit is 50 fights.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Totally agree. And I think that's why we get stuck in these gridlocks sometimes. And also when we get to solutions, I think there are some examples that we can draw on and utilize our little multi tool of ideas of how to move this forward.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Final thing before that, because I forgot about this bit, but actually it's worth making a note that it's actually easier for fossil fuel infrastructure to get NEPA permits than it is for clean energy projects. It's something you note in the paper. If anything, NEPA is easier on these pipelines and stuff. Even though Joe Manchin is complaining ceaselessly about it.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yes, and I mean, I think that's why in particular, people who have been fighting the fossil fuel industry for so long, look to this group of folks, more center left folks, that are saying "Repeal NEPA, let's do it, we want to build." They're saying, "Oh my gosh. What you're doing by saying that is saying that the West Virginian that I have been fighting alongside is going to be decimated by this pipeline that's being passed now." So there are really high stakes and in a lot of the permitting process that we saw at the federal level, it also implicated the Mountain Valley pipeline.</p><p>Right. And that type of infrastructure getting a pass when it couldn't even get some of its permits at the state level to just go forth is a really, I think, scary potential because that locks us into decades of extraction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I feel like that was not covered well when this whole thing happened. You know, the Mountain Valley Pipeline: It's not that it was like stuck unfairly in a bureaucratic tangle. It just sort of straightforwardly was polluting and so it couldn't get the permits, the permits were rejected. It wasn't like stuck in some queue or something. It was just straightforwardly a polluting project that could not qualify under US law to go on. And it was just like jammed through. So I feel like the outrage of that didn't really penetrate partially because everybody's on this like "everything needs to go faster tip" and so they just kind of slotted it under there.</p><p>But we don't want things that straightforwardly fail environmental review going forward do we?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Exactly, like, I would like, that the Cuyahoga River does not catch on fire again. And that's the reason we have environmental review and NEPA. And also I would like it to be able to stop more fossil fuel infrastructure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I know. And this is the other thing too, as though we're supposed to have some sort of content neutral opinions about permitting as such. I'm just like, "Well, I want more good stuff and less bad stuff. Can I have that opinion?"</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Exactly. That's so crucial too, where there are ways for us to stop permitting new fossil fuel infrastructure and permit the hell out of good renewable energy projects. That's a political possibility that Biden actually had signed up for and now is stepping back on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, it's politically tough, but let's be positive here. You have a lot of recommendations in here, all of which are juicy, all of which could probably have a podcast of their own on them. There's no way we can cover them all. But you sort of have your principles and recommendations grouped under three headings. And the first one, which I think is the one that is most directly germane to the speed question, is enabling more coordination and planning. And I think this is a huge thing. This is one of my soapboxes I get on all the time.</p><p>I really want the climate movement to take this up is that we've had decades and decades of for lack of a better term, neoliberalism and this sort of instinctive free market stuff. And it's not like any major developed economy actually stops planning. What happens when you claim you're not planning and you claim you're being a free market is you just move planning behind closed doors or bury it in the tax code where no one can see it or understand what's happening. And then that results in whoever has the most power and money winning the planning fights.</p><p>So I'm done with my soapbox. Let's talk about restoring our ability to do public, transparent, cooperative planning. Let's talk about a few of the items under here. And first is just land use planning. What do you mean by that and what would it look like?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>So, land use planning, as we talked about earlier, it turns out that one fossil fuel plant is a lot smaller than the types of assets that we need to build. That's just a reality of what we're working with. And so that necessitates far more land use planning to think about how do we get the most out of the least amount of space that is going to do the best for keeping the lights on. And so there are examples of how we can do this type of land planning. And one example I want to bring up actually is in California.</p><p>So there was the Desert Renewable Energy Plan that was basically where states and federal agencies came together and they were looking at the Mojave and Colorado desert area. It's like 22 million acres.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Very sunny.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yeah, very sunny, exactly. Very sunny, very good for some solar. And what they did is that they coordinated a plan for this entire region so that it was prescreened for issues. So they said, okay, we're going to look at the biodiversity impacts of things being put here. We're going to look at the cultural or tribal impacts, the environmental potential impacts. And so after they did that kind of, what's called often like a programmatic study, that meant that the developers that came in to build the stuff there don't have to go through some more involved environmental impact assessment or study because it's already done.</p><p>And so that meant that because they had done all of that work ahead of time, projects are getting approved so much faster. They're getting approved in less than ten months. And have, I think it's been now this zone has been around for about ten years and I don't think there is one litigation case. So that is just such a good example of land use planning where it's like thinking ahead of what we need and how we're going to do it. And that still does allow for private developers to come in, even though I might even argue that we could do even more planning and fill in the gaps with some public transmission or public renewable energy.</p><p>But we can get into that later.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And we did an example from California, so I think now we're constitutionally obliged to do one from Texas too.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Absolutely. Well, exactly. Thank you for setting me up so neatly, David, for the Competitive Renewable Energy Zones of Texas, which was such a success. So this is a very similar situation where the legislature directed the PUC, the Public Utilities Commission to plan where new generation and transmission was going to be located, routed, all of this. And so by doing so, they allowed for this proliferation of wind in Texas, a place where you might not expect a massive amount of wind to be. And I was reading a study the other day that said that in the past ten years, the CREZ line, so the Competitive Renewable Energy Zone, represents 23% of all new high voltage lines in the US.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good grief.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. They're actually building I mean, I don't know if people know this, they're actually building transmission in Texas. I'll just talk about how transmission never gets built. They're building it there because —</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>They had a plan.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They planned in advance. Yes, they had zones where it got approved and so you didn't have to then go there and do the entire like a transmission developer didn't have to go somewhere and then do the entire thing. Right. Do the entire review, do the entire land use review and the environmental review. They didn't have to start over every time that stuff was done in advance.</p><p>Okay, point made. There more land use coordination and planning. That's the states doing it. But you could imagine the feds getting into that somewhat. You have these jurisdictional issues and federalism issues that are a bit of a tangle, but it does seem like the feds at the very least could do some informational, advisory planning and assessment on a bigger level, don't you think?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Oh, absolutely. Actually, we do have a lot of private land in this country. Absolutely. But there is a lot of land that is owned by the federal government. So they're actually implicating a lot of this already. And it makes far more sense for an actor that has that kind of meso level understanding of what we need to build to be involved in those processes and be doing kind of a national assessment of where should those zones be. Like CREZ that's going to have all of these benefits and is going to allow for the most kind of efficient way for us to be deploying renewable energy while also taking into consideration these biodiversity, tribal nation relations and all of these things.</p><p>That's a good role for the federal government to actually play.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, we're going to pass quickly by two of these since I've done pods on them. But as you say, one is the interconnection process, which is probably the biggest thing right now, slowing down renewable energy getting built. I did a whole pod on that with RMI's Chaz Teplin a few weeks ago.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>A fantastic one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really encourage everybody to go listen to that. There's a lot of recommendations in there for how to improve the interconnection process, how to improve things in batches. To return to a theme here, a lot of that has to do with just more and better planning on the ISO's parts.</p><p>Once again, like, think in advance a little bit and you can skip some of this case by case stuff, but I encourage people to go listen to that pod. Another one, which we've touched on slightly, which I also did a pod on, is just and I think this is so important is just the capacity of the agencies that are doing these reviews. These are at the state level and at the federal level. These agencies have been cut to the bone. They're all, all understaffed, desperately behind, and that, of course, makes things go slower. So all these people who are whinging about reviews, if they're not talking about bulking up agency capacity, I just have trouble taking them seriously because that is the lowest hanging fruit you could do.</p><p>But I did a whole pod on that several weeks ago about government capacity and about some of the provisions in the IRA that are meant to bulk up capacity at these agencies. It's just a matter of money and hiring. So we're going to check that one off the list. Let's talk a little bit about this next recommendation, which is about more publicly owned energy and transmission. What do you mean by that? What would that look like?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yeah, so this is kind of trying to answer the question of building where private companies will not, right? Like, we do have this problem of not having the long-range solution in the mind's eye, right? And we have this system in which there isn't a lot of this coordination that's in the mind's eye of a developer, right? Like, they're focused on their development, whereas the state government, federal government, has a little bit more of like, "Okay, what are we trying to accomplish? We are trying to handle the climate crisis. And that means we need to move as quickly as possible to deploy as much renewable energy as possible.</p><p>And it turns out we actually do have some capacity and to actually build this ourselves." And we've done this in the past, admittedly, in a much less dense energy system. But the New Deal is a really good example of this, where the U.S. either directly financed or built itself a massive amount of transmission and energy infrastructure, like the Rural Electrification Administration that FDR put in place. It electrified 80% of the United States land mass in ten years. And when we're talking about the climate crisis, I would like to go at that clip. So I think if there are ways for us where we have a standstill where things aren't getting built fast enough, where can the federal government, the state government come in with a little political muscle and do that building?</p><p>And I think that there are additional kind of benefits to doing this too, which include the fact that if you're building public renewables, for instance, you're also probably going to value having higher and better-paid jobs. You are probably going to, in comparison to a private developer, probably thinking a little bit more about some of those community benefits. And I think that there's a real win there that actually kind of creates a baseline for the rest of the private industry in a good way too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Instead of just nudging and incentivizing private developers to do these things, we could just do them.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>We could just do them and we can also show them the way a little bit too. Right. Like right now, right. We just have the Inflation Reduction Act. Fabulous. We love the climate investments. It's so great. And also it just largely relies on tax incentives, right. And in those it's like you get a little bit more if you use local steel and if you have high wage jobs, all these things. And we could also just do that, build some public renewables and make it happen ourselves. And also when you have, particularly from a job perspective, right, like a public renewables entity that's building these developments with high wage work, that means that the private developers are afraid that they're going to lose all of their workers.</p><p>So then they have to raise their wages too, which is a good thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Race to the top, I think they call that.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>I would love a race to the top instead of a race to the bottom in our renewable energy world.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Okay, we got to keep moving here. There's a long list. The next one is something we covered, I think, on the Thea Riofrancos post, which is just we know we have to build a lot of stuff, but that's not a fixed quantity of stuff we have to build. Right. We can be more efficient with how we use materials. We can try to build in a less material intensive way. So, you know, what Theo was talking about is encourage more walking and biking and multimodal transportation rather than cars, cars, cars. Like that's a choice. And there are other choices we could make to build a clean, but the less material intensive version of clean.</p><p>There's a lot of different ways we can guide things in that direction.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Oh yeah, absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everyone should go listen to that podcast, too. This pod is like an advertisement for all my other pods.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>I love it, I love it. Yeah. And just to kind of emphasize, the more that we can invest in efficiency, the fewer transmission lines we might have to build, right? Like if we have a bunch of houses that aggressively go in on multi units. Like, we're having more people housed in multi units. We're creating urban density. We're making the houses that we already have more efficient. All of those things accumulate and make it so that we actually don't have to do the same level of massive deployment, which is a huge win. So we have to — I think it's like questioning some of the assumptions, too, of how much do we need to build.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Maybe not all our private vehicles need to be the size of military tanks and weigh three tons. This segues perfectly into the next one, which I feel like is underappreciated, which is supporting distributed energy resources. Talk about why that's part of going faster here. How does that fit into this picture?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>So let's say we're able to add rooftop solar to a lot of the rooftops that are around and implement microgrids and put in storage. These are all, again, things that are going to be a lot easier probably to deploy because they're smaller. There's less of this zoning permitting etc. that has to happen when it comes to some of the bigger stuff, where you're going to maybe need environmental review. And so by making those investments in distributed energy resources, you're actually lightening the load again on transmission development.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. It's kind of a piece of the previous one, really.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's about being less material intensive.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Exactly. And I also think the added benefit of doing that, of course, is the fact that we live in unreliable times and it adds additional reliability potential by having things like microgrids deployed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, many future pods on that particular subject are in the works, are cooking in the Volts oven. Let's go to the second big category here, and this is where I have a little bit of skepticism. So this category is "Enhance community participation and consent." So this is what I want to talk about: You say, let's bring communities in more and earlier. And of course, I think most people, at least most people in my world, when they hear "more community involvement," their palms start sweating. They envision these local zoning meetings with old people shouting at city officials.</p><p>They envision nothing ever getting done, everything getting blocked, NIMBY's everywhere. You have this sentence where it says, "Strengthening community participation early in the process will likely move projects forward faster without as much community opposition." Do we know that to be true? I want that to be true. I like the idea of it. Do we know that?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Great question. It's worth interrogating. I'm going to borrow a little bit from my colleague that we've already referenced today, Thea Riofrancos, that she often says which is "Sometimes going fast isn't actually fast." So, you know, if we streamline, right, or NEPA gets streamlined or many of these other permitting processes, you cut the red tape and therefore you are steamrolling communities affected by the infrastructure. You're potentially hardening them against the project. And when they feel mad or disenfranchised, chances are they're going to throw the book at you. They're going to throw the book to stop the project. We talked about these arbitrary dates set by some of the permitting system.</p><p>You're actually putting yourself up for far more potential litigation and drawn out legal battles because you actually haven't done the work that's necessary to bring that group on side, nor do you have all of your ducks in a row. So I think that there is a justification for defraying conflict and making our odds better at doing that. I'm not saying that we're not going to run into problems and there isn't going to be this annoying mob of Karens that's going to show up every once in a while. But I do think that our odds do look better when we do involve community.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's a cynical point of view here which says communities are always going to have their Karens. There's always going to be somebody who objects, no matter how early, no matter how much you consult, there's always going to be somebody who doesn't want something near them. The only way in the end to overcome this problem is to take those instruments of delay out of their hands, including the litigation tool, including the environmental review tool, including the community review tool, and just get a little bit more Chinese about the whole thing. Just go do stuff, even if — bulldoze, basically.</p><p>I know we want to resist that conclusion, but I wish we knew better. I wish we had better models of moving quickly.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>So I think actually, since you mentioned the Chinese, I'm going to mention the Danish. And I think that part of this is actually like — we have this problem, right, that we know that deploying renewable energy, deploying clean energy is just incredibly important for the climate crisis. But the benefits are diffuse where the potential negative is pretty concentrated when it comes to these things. And so I think one question we can ask or the permit reviewers or whatever it is, or how we're thinking about developing these projects, is getting in their shoes and asking, what is in it for me?</p><p>We can pay people to have some of this stuff, right? So the Danish government in the 1990s was building out a bunch of wind. And so one of the ways that they incentivized this wind development was by incentivizing that part of it is owned by the local government to give them a revenue stream. And that actually helped to limit the controversy. And you'll see that in Denmark, people have kind of higher concepts or like the polling is better for wind. And I was talking with this professor, Nick Pevzner from University of Pennsylvania, who was discussing this really interesting particular instance in which in one of these towns where they were going to be around the offshore wind, they actually brought in landscape architects to design the offshore wind. So that it would be aesthetically pleasing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The Danes give a shi-, give a dang, about how things look like. What a thought.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Huge difference.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I know. You look at what's the one waste incineration plant in the middle of the town that's like gorgeous. It's got a laser display, I think it's got a ski hill on it. All these kind of things. It seems like we don't care here in the US. How ugly things are. Witness any sort of midsize town or strip mall or the periphery of any city. Everything's just like plain and ugly. Like what if we made things look nice that might improve community —</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>We deserve nice things. Communities deserve nice things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We can have nice things. And you talk about we should do what's called a "Cumulative impact analysis."</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Again, to me on first blush that sounds like oh, bigger and more analysis: Surely that's going to slow things down. So how do you see that working?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Well, again, this kind of takes us to our planning. Right. Like cumulative impact analysis which New Jersey and New York have put in place is this way to discern not just the impact of the project but the accumulated impact of that project and what's already come to date. And I think what you would find in cumulative impact in these places, is that actually it's doing some of what we were talking about before, which is trying to fight off the bad and build more of the good. So that's a way to stop new fossil fuel infrastructure but maybe see benefit around solar or something like that.</p><p>These are actually tools that, yes, as you say, at first glance you might think, "Oh my gosh, more? Really?" But what it's doing is assuring some of that larger meso level discerning and also in a lot of ways these are environmental justice tools too. Right. The reason that they're doing that is because it has so consistently been the same community that has had to shoulder the coal plant, then the gas plant, then the pipeline, then another cement factory. Right. And so they're trying to say, "Okay wait, this is out of control. Let's think about where we're putting this and how that's going to burden people."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the last category here is "Empower a just transition." And I don't think we need to go piece by piece through here since these are very familiar asks from progressive climate people, which is just stop permitting new fossil fuel facilities. Protect the communities that are getting hurt by fossil fuel pollution and set emission reduction targets that will phase out fossil fuels. I think those are all pretty straightforward. I do think the point here, though the larger point you're making with this section is worth underlining because it seems obvious to me, but also frequently left out of this debate, which is if you want to get renewable energy built faster: One way you could do that is through statute and regulation forcing fossil fuel out. Like, nothing's going to speed up renewable energy more than forcing fossil fuels out. Right. It seems so obvious, but it's weirdly left out here.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Very weirdly left out. It's a bizarre kind of development that we've seen in the climate realm, right? The IRA, for instance, that is a bill that is great. It creates a lot of carrots, but basically no sticks. And the reality is we need sticks if we're actually going to do this, right, as we were talking about at the kind of outset of the show, we can't let just the entire pie keep on getting bigger and bigger. We actually need to get rid of the fossil fuels. That's the point of what we're doing here. They're the reason that we have the climate crisis.</p><p>And so, the best way to get rid of them is to just regulate them out of existence, like eliminate them. And I also think there's a certain amount of private industry hates regulation, but they do love certainty. So what is more certain than a decarbonization mandate that says, like, well, you need to be done by this date? And that actually gets us to more of the displacement than when we just say "Build, build, build just hopefully build the right thing for us, please please."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I think that's true on several micro levels and it's true on a macro level too. One thing that would help us go faster is if we could just clearly articulate our goals. But we're sort of just hampered by having to beg Joe Manchin for his vote. And to get Joe Manchin's vote, you have to pretend that the whole pie is going to get bigger, that everything's going to grow. That's explicitly the grounds upon which he voted yes on Iraq. He sets it outright. He's like, I voted yes because I thought it was going to grow renewable energy and fossil fuels.</p><p>In some sense, politically, we can't just come out and say the goal is to get rid of fossil fuels. That's where we're headed. It would just help everybody, private developers, state and local governments, if we were just on the same friggin page. Instead of sort of like backing into this, we're just backing into everything we do. Trying to sort of like wink wink at one another. Like we know what we're doing, they don't know what we're doing. It's just a bunch of confusion.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Right? And I think that it's also a little bit laughable because they obviously know what we're trying to do, right? Like, we're not really hiding the bag. And I think that this speaks to the need for us to be like, this is a 20-year fight, we're not done with the fight the progressive left needs to keep — we can't just have IRA and think that we're done and can wipe our hands. I mean, even this conversation that has come up on permitting shows that people are hungry and need more. And the question is okay, how do we build the actual political power so that Manchin isn't the one that's in the driver's seat?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>I think one kind of last thing on this kind of community consent piece or community engagement that makes me really nervous to tie us back to the permitting realm, right. Is that the people who are potentially going to be railroaded by infrastructure that they don't want is rural America. And if you are pissing off rural parts of the United States right now, that's a very short-sighted game to be playing, right. Because you are potentially taking these rural folk who have just been beaten back again and again, and you're turning them to the right, to a growing fascist right, and giving away a massive voting bloc that is going to be crucial for us to continue to win and win again and keep winning until we actually solve the climate crisis.</p><p>So I think when it comes to this kind of larger political project that we're doing on from a progressive perspective, we have to be wary of this idea that this is — not a get it fixed quick scheme.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. We do not want to tick off these particular communities any more than they're ticked off. I think if you talk to Biden administration officials sort of behind the scenes, they will tell you that part of the design of IRA, part of the thinking behind it is we need to flood these areas of the country that were hollowed out by neoliberalism, hollowed out by globalism. We need to flood them with new economic activity and new development or else our democracy is screwed. But it is also the case that you can't just go stomping things down here and there, willy-nilly, without community consent.</p><p>They need to have a feeling that they're involved in where and how this is done.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're trying to bring them into the fight for a populist amazing future, and shoving this down their throats I just don't think is the most effective tactic. And if you look back to the New Deal, right, so much of it was workers. It was people that were in more of rural America. There were so many of these folks who were standing up and fighting. And if we're not setting ourselves up for that same kind of sea change, then I'm afraid we're not going to be able to win this thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay. We are just about out of time. So just to kind of review, this is just, I think the point of your report, point of all this is to say the question of speed is not the same as the question of permitting. Technically speaking, permitting is a relatively small piece of the puzzle here. There's lots of other things we could be doing to speed things up that have nothing technically to do with NEPA or even technically to do with permitting. And we've reviewed a lot of them here, and I would commend people to your report to get a fuller picture of them and to think about them.</p><p>But let me finish, I guess with, this is all a vision. I love this vision, but politics are politics and we live in a fallen world, et cetera, et cetera. So toward the end of last session, there was this chance to have a permitting deal, and basically it was these sort of arbitrary caps on NEPA reviews, the length of NEPA reviews and the Mountain Valley pipeline in exchange for some pretty substantial transmission stuff, some pretty substantial stuff on transmission, federal transmission planning. The progressive movement rallied to kill that. They called it Manchin's dirty deal. They rallied, they killed it.</p><p>And what ended up happening was the NEPA stuff squeezed through somewhere else. The Mountain Valley pipeline squeezed through somewhere else, and the transmission stuff died. Looking back on that, do you think that was the right political move for the progressive movement to fight that bill? And more broadly, do you think the progressive movement is prepared to sort of make the political trade-offs which are going to be necessary since a lot of this stuff that you list in your report is just going to be very difficult with today's current political distribution of power?</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Yeah, great question, and I think my answer is that the progressive movement still did the right thing. We needed to fight — or the progressive movement folks who were in those fights needed to fight off and make very clear the MVP is not something that we can have — this permitting that's going to expand. It was a big toad to swallow. And I think if we look at some of the transmission stuff, like, sure, it was fine. Was it the things that we were fully looking for? I think it was Hickenlooper's bill, big wires that was in some of those kind of final fights, right.</p><p>With the Fiscal Responsibility Act, his bill included something like a 30% interregional transfer. The DOE says we need a 120% increase in interregional transfer. That's just not even at the scale that we need, and we'd be giving up so much for it. So, yeah, we didn't fully win that fight, but I think that from what I'm hearing, kind of at the congressional level, there is the potential for another bite at the apple on transmission. There is still some, as we said earlier, right, everyone agrees that transmission is a boondoggle right now and a hot mess. So I think that should be one of the things that we're thinking about as the progressive movement.</p><p>How do we do that? Right? But I don't think I would go back in time and say "Eh, we should just accept Manchin's deal." I think that it was an important political flag to stamp in the ground that, no, we actually don't believe that we should be expanding fossil fuels and renewable energy at the same time because that's not what we need to do. Saying all that, I do think there are things that we can be doing right now to advance transmission. For instance, FERC is looking at some of these interconnection issues right now. Biden should not rest on his laurels until he gets someone approved and appointed to the FERC board.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hey, there's Joe Manchin again being a jerk.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>I know, it's so true. But there are things and again, we've already talked on this pod about stuff that can be done at the state level, too. We still have some cards to play in our hand to accelerate and prove our case increasingly and build the case for more federal implementation, too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Johanna, thanks so much for coming on. I feel like lately the progressive environmental left has appeared in mainstream media and social media more as a weird caricature viewed from a distance than been able to speak for itself. So I'm glad to be able to have you on so we can talk through a little bit about how progressives see this and the larger issues at play and their specific recommendations, all of which I think are great. So people should check out your report. And thanks for sharing your time with us.</p><p><strong>Johanna Bozuwa</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me today, David. It's lovely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-progressive-take-on-the-permitting</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:136326420</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 01 Sep 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/136326420/1d7342ac73a5b3e38bac341d0176cc9d.mp3" length="79571424" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3977</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/136326420/54c6b377f3af77bc2f7031fed11f13e1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Me, on an Australian pod]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Australian comedian Dan Ilic hosts me on The Greatest Moral Podcast Of Our Generation.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACVLFzPxgWAHV9eIe9sHYoBa/volts23.08.22%28dan.ilic%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/me-on-an-australian-pod"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>While I was down under in Australia, I appeared on a show called <a target="_blank" href="https://arationalfear.substack.com/">A Rational Fear</a>, a pod about climate change which is, I’m told, the winner of Australia’s Best Comedy Podcast. </p><p>More specifically, I appeared on a spinoff show they’re doing called [ahem] The Greatest Moral Podcast Of Our Generation, a series of interviews with climate types hosted by comedian and journalist Dan Ilic.</p><p>It was short, and fun, so I figured, why not share it with the Volts audience? Enjoy, and do check out A Rational Fear some time — it’s quite delightful.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>I'm recording this on the land of the Gadigal people of the Eora Nation, and I encourage you all to think about whose land you're on and the wealth of the life that you enjoy on that land and why you enjoy it. As we head into this referendum month, I think it's all upon us all to kind of think about listening more. And if you don't know what the Voice Referendum is all about, go and find out. Let's try listening.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Despite global warming, A Rational Fear is adding a little more hot air with long form discussions with climate leaders, good and bad.</p><p><strong>Intro</strong></p><p>This is coal, don't be afraid. The — heat waves and drought — Greatest — mass extinction — Moral — we're facing a manmade disaster — Podcast — they're the climate criminals — of Our Generation. All of this with the global warming and that a lot of it's a hoax. The Greatest Moral Podcast of Our Generation. GMPOOG for short.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Every now and then, the A Rational Fear podcast turns green. We talk to someone who is super interested and who lives and breathes climate on a podcast I like to call The Greatest Moral Podcast of Our Generation, or GMPOOG for short. And I'm excited for you all to meet our next GMPOOG guest. Since about 2015, I have been following his writing on Vox.com and the Grist, but in more recent years, I've been listening to his podcast and reading along with his newsletter. It is Volts, or rather the presenter and the writer of Volts podcast, David Roberts. Welcome to A Rational Fear.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So glad to be here.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Or welcome to The Greatest Moral Podcast of Our Generation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm not sure I can keep that acronym in my head.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Well, the first guest on The Greatest Moral Podcast of Our Generation was former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who coined the phrase that climate change was the greatest moral problem of our generation. So that's why we called GMPOOG, GMPOOG. You are one of the foremost experts when it comes to climate and energy. I love Volts. I devour it, I listen as often as I can. And for such a complex and often combative topic, quite frankly, your voice is so calming and reassuring.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>I mean, you could sell anything, which is why you're here today. To sell us on small modular nuclear reactors.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly. And carbon capture and sequestration. That's my thing.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Well, it's such a sprawling conversation I'd love to have with you. Let's start there. We do hear a lot from a very small subsection of our politics all about small modular nuclear reactors. In fact, Barnaby Joyce, who at one time was a leader of a party in this country, said, "People aren't talking about the cost of living down at the supermarket. They're talking about small modular nuclear reactors."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are they?</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>So I want to ask you, David Roberts, is anybody talking about small modular nuclear reactors?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, yes, people are talking and talking and talking about them. The more relevant question is anyone building small modular nuclear reactors? And the answer to that is a big no. So I think they play more of a rhetorical role than an actual physical role in the energy system.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Why is there this energy, for better, no pun intended there, around small modular nuclear reactors? Why is this conversation happening now? Why is there a big drumbeat happening not only in Australia but other countries for it when there are no working models anywhere in the world?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's two answers to that a cynical answer and a less cynical answer. The cynical answer is if you need something to say about climate policy and the other party has already claimed renewable energy, you need something to talk about, right? You need a climate policy and there's nothing left to grab but nuclear. And you want to claim to have a policy, but in practical terms, delay any actual real solutions. That's the cynical answer. The less cynical answer is renewable energy is variable. It comes and goes with the weather. So you need what's called firming. You need sources that can firm up renewable energy i.e. that you can turn on and off at will. And right now gas is serving that role. And so in a decarbonized system, you need something else to serve that role. So exactly what will serve that firming role, we don't completely know yet. Could be batteries, could be geothermal, could be hydro or small hydro, or it could be SMRs, if they ever come along. There is a role for that kind of thing in the energy system.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>I'm excited to have you here because you're in the country. It's great to see you face to face because first and foremost, I'm a super fan. But two, we're at a really weird spot right now in Australian politics and global politics when it comes to climate. We're about a year on from the Inflation Reduction Act. We had Rich Duke on this podcast about a year ago when it got announced. How has the IRA been and where is it still lacking?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The headline news is that there have been, I think, around $70 billion of announced new manufacturing facilities and industrial facilities announced in the wake of IRA. So it has unquestionably sparked a huge flood of new investment.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Is this because the IRA is like — one of the core tenants is all kind of transport need to be built in America in order to get this government money?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, there's a lot of the buy domestic sort of provisions in it, so everybody's coming to the US. So they can claim that. So that's part of it. And also, I think estimates of US economic growth have been revised upward a couple of times in the wake of IRA. So it has absolutely sparked growth, sparked a huge wave of investment. But in the larger picture, there are still big chunks of IRA that are where the implementation is being hashed out. So we really don't know yet. It really has not come into — all the subsidies for household stuff, demand side stuff, household stuff, your heat pumps, et cetera.</p><p>They were just announced. The structure of those tax credits was just — sort of came out last week, so it's too early to tell with those. And things like the green hydrogen subsidies, which are billions and billions and billions of dollars. The US Treasury Department is still beavering away trying to put those together, figure out how they work, figure out the requirements for those. So a lot of the bill hasn't even come into effect yet, so it'll be a couple of years before we really know what happens in the week. But it's clear it's sparking growth and investment.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Hey, this is a very tough question for you. If Trump gets in —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, God. Everybody keeps asking me this. Everybody keeps asking.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>what will happen to the IRA?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everybody asks me this, and I get the strong sense that they want me to say something other than the obvious answer. But I'm afraid I have only the obvious answer, which is that it would be totally apocalyptic. Not only, I mean, for everything, but like the Heritage Foundation, the sort of right-wing think tank for some definition of think.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Yeah, I love these words. Like the Heritage Foundation. And generally, the Conservatives, they don't want to conserve anything and they're not interested in the heritage of anything.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know, but they've already put together a plan, a very concrete plan, to roll it all back. So their intentions are clear. So it would get nuked, basically, is the short answer.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Okay, you're in Australia, I understand it, to do some side events around the ALP conference later this week. How have you been soaking up Australia and Australian culture and Australian politics to get kind of a grasp on where we are with climate policy?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, I spent a couple of days in Canberra talking to politicians, and I've been talking to philanthropists and activists and business people have been talking, talking. That's why my voice is so scratchy. My strong sense is that I am here pushing on an open door. The question of whether something big needs to happen is settled, and what remains to be seen are the details. So it really seems like an inflection point.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>I mean, this is not strictly energy — well, it is, but it isn't — but when it comes to our own scope 3 emissions in Australia and our own emissions targets in Australia, our government keeps signing off on new gas projects and new coal mines, as does America. Where do you see similarities in this kind of talk versus action disconnect between our two countries?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I think what's happening is and you see this in virtually every fossil fuel producing country, which is they are trying to say: Yes, let's reduce our domestic emissions. Let's decarbonize ourselves, but then let's go on exporting fossil fuels to everybody else. And of course, everyone can't do that, right? The trickier argument is trying to give Australian policymakers some sense of what could replace and improve on their export economy that they now depend on. I mean, Australia completely depends on fossil fuel and iron ore exports at the moment. So the question is, what role could Australia play in a clean economy and still maintain its sort of healthy exports?</p><p>And that has a lot to do with, I'm sure you've heard these discussions, critical minerals processing. Critical minerals processing iron ore to make it green so that people can make green steel. I mean, the world needs these clean materials and Australia is awash in them.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Well, whose mouth has been chewing your ear off about that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everyone.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Who's lobbying you to tell these lies? Not these lies, not these lies. these liens.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everyone. Because that's the big question for Australia, is what, if anything, can replace, or at least diversify? I mean, Harvard issues this list every year of countries by economic complexity. And I think Australia is like 70 something right down near Nigeria. It is really 100% —</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>It's because we have two major exports: Rocks and Hemsworths. There are two major exports.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you're out of Hemsworth.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>I think we found a renewable source. It's okay. It just takes a while to regenerate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I assume they'll be producing new Hemsworths shortly. Yeah, that's on everyone's mind. One of the big features of IRA is the US, and a large pool of global capital is going to be looking around for sources of these materials that aren't China, basically. That are friendly sources of these materials. And Australia is on the front of the line for that. So it's a huge opportunity for Australia.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>When it comes to our unique political landscape. Have you gotten across that? What do you find most interesting about that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, my goodness, so many things. Let's say I'm extremely jealous of compulsory voting. I'm extremely jealous of ranked choice voting.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm extremely jealous of having an independent nonpartisan commission that does districting rather than partisan gerrymandering.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Okay, David, you're talking to an Australian audience who takes all this for granted. What we think is so weird is like, what? Like, you wait for CNN to call the election? You let some Republicans and Democrats decide who won in that particular city.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Don't remind me. And you know what else I find super, super fascinating, which absolutely could not exist in America's dysfunctional system is the sort of rise of the Teals, the sort of independents, the sort of what, I guess back home we would call moderate Republicans, which is pretty much an extinct species back home because we have such a binary system. But here you have room for a little variety, a little complexity. It's much more interesting than America's extremely boring: Left v right, red v blue. Everything is polarized. One or the other. It's mind deadening. So it's just interesting to have some complexity.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>I've spent a lot of time in America, I've worked a lot in America. When I explained to people that Australians aren't really polarized by political party because of compulsory voting, because everyone has to vote, no one has to pick a team. And what we essentially do as a population is stand back with our arms folded and go, "All right, impress me."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Political parties don't go out picking and choosing their voters. Right? They don't win by choosing voters. Everybody votes.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Oh, my God. Gerrymandering is a whole other thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, the US political system is dysfunctional in so many ways. I could go on and on.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>What about the room itself? What about you were in Canberra who struck you as an interesting character, talking to them? I assume you would have been protected from the crazy ones.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was not forced to deal with any of the crazies. I did a little roundtable thing with Chris Bowen, the energy minister, and he was nodding along and seemed very on board and said something that I thought was striking, which is that the US IRA is probably the most significant climate event, even more so than the Paris Climate Agreement, which I thought was quite dramatic and I think defensible.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Do you think that was a fair comment?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, the US still, despite its dysfunctions, has enormous soft power, it has enormous influence over people and just the sheer amount of money it's spending now, like the other developed countries, simply cannot afford to sit on their hands at this point. I think the message of the IRA, which I've been saying over and over again to everyone who will listen while I'm here, is that the era of free trade, free market neoliberalism is over. It is over. And the Biden administration is explicit that it's over. There's a new economy, global economy, taking shape around clean energy, around semiconductors, around all these things.</p><p>And the US is taking active measures to shape its place in that economy, and other countries need to do the same.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>So, what do you see in 15 years? How will the economy be different in 15 years' time? I mean, I'm asking you because 15 years ago, you were writing about climate —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know, don't remind me.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>and energy. Someone who's had their eye on this game for so long. In 15 years, what do you see? Every country, it seems — here's my understanding, watching other countries talk about climate from their perspective, they're all saying that they are going to transition to become a renewable energy superpower. It's not a slogan that we just have in Australia from progressive climate people. You hear that, I see and read that in other countries everywhere around the world. It's like a disease that's kind of caught this meme that everyone thinks they're going to be, but everyone can't be an energy exporter.</p><p>What does it look like for you in 15 years? Where do you see the board?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, the problem answering that question is that in the US, now, with every election, the entire fate of the free world is on the line. Literally —</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>No pressure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>literally, if Trump and the Republicans win in 2024, it could be the end of democracy in the US. It could be that we double down on fossil fuel. It could be that we choose a sort of Russia style, sort of like as long as there are fossil fuels being used anywhere in the world, we're going to be the producer of them. Or we could have a green utopia down the other route.</p><p>It's so hard to predict, but I mean, I think you can see a few things like EVs are going to dominate. I think heat pumps are going to dominate, electrification is going to take over. Renewable energy is going to be even cheaper than anybody now predicts, which is what has happened at every stage of renewable energy growth. It's always cheaper than anyone says it was going to be. Because the beauty of renewable energy, which is not true of fossil fuel energy, is that the more you do it, the more you build of it, the cheaper it gets, on and on to eternity.</p><p>So it's going to be much cheaper and that's going to change. And the question is, once countries can domestically generate their own energy, once fossil fuel importers are able to generate most of their own energy and no longer depend on fossil fuel exporters, how is that going to change geopolitics? I mean, who knows? But it's definitely going to shake up the world order, right, in ways that I think are incredibly difficult to predict.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah, of course. Like Japan currently is one of the biggest importers of fossil fuels, so they can run their economy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, it's a relatively small handful of countries that are fossil fuel exporters, so most countries are going to benefit from this. Most countries are going to be better off when they're generating their own energy. It's only the exporters that really have anything to lose here.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>I hear what you're saying, we're going to have to find a new source of Hemsworth.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Renewable Hemsworths.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>It's interesting. I think it was your podcast, you had somebody on talking about batteries within appliances. I remember that's —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A geeky one.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>yeah, forgive me, David, I'm very excited to talk to you, but most of the time I listen to you it's in the shower —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>More than I wanted to know.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>because it's a great place to listen to podcasts. And I think there's something really interesting with stovetops and water heaters and all these large appliances that need power at nighttime to have batteries within them, to run them. That was all this kind of interesting innovation. Who's going to be making those next lots of appliances, do you think?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a good question. Right, because what you generally big established — I mean, this is true, I think it's sort of a truism of business scholarship, which is that big established incumbents are not generally particularly innovative. So it's probably going to be a bunch of little startups to begin with. And the question is, once — one of the most fascinating things I see happening at the household level is that eventually all these appliances and all these households are going to be connected digitally. All the appliances are going to be talking to one another, they're going to be talking to the house, they're going to be talking to the neighborhood, they're going to be talking to the grid.</p><p>So what happens in terms of emergent effects? Once you have literally hundreds of thousands of basically small scale, energy producing, energy consuming, energy storing devices distributed around the grid, talking to one another and coordinating, I think that's going to open up whole new markets, whole new vistas, whole new things that we can't even really guess at yet, what that's going to look like.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>We're going to see startups. I guess a great parallel would be the Teslas and the Rivians of the kitchen world. And then the GEs will come along.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. You're going to see a lot of startups, most of whom will end up carcasses on the side of the road. As with any new market, as with any sort of emerging market, there's going to be one or two Googles at the end of the line, but most of them are going to die along the way. But in the process, we'll be innovating.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Yeah. I want to know a bit more about you. You don't give a lot away about you as a person on your podcast. It's strictly for the nerds, but how did you —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm very boring.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Well, I want to know a little bit about you. How did you come to this subject? How did you come to energy and climate? What was the catalyst for you?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>100% random chance. I went to grad school for philosophy for a good while, got along far enough in that to get a good look at academia, recoiled in horror, dropped out and moved to Seattle, was unemployed, bouncing around crappy tech jobs for a while. And literally the first time I ever went to Craigslist, I don't know if you guys have used this, was I think early in Craigslist, the first time I ever went there, there's just a little ad for an editorial assistant at a small web publication called Grist, which was devoted to the environment. And to that point, I had no journalistic experience.</p><p>I had no particular experience in the environment or interest in the environment. So I wrote this long overwrought cover letter begging for the job because I didn't want to get stuck in tech jobs, wormed my way into Grist and just over the years, wormed my way over into writing. So 100% self-taught in terms of journalism and in terms of climate stuff.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>I mean, you say this sometimes in your podcast, how you're just a guy trying to learn about stuff. And you're not an expert. At what point has that tipped over and you've become an expert? At what point does that shtick no longer count?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I will never feel comfortable. I talk to too many genuine experts to claim to be one. I've seen genuine expertise up close, and I know that's not what I have. I think I'm a better than average educated generalist, let's say.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Who has an obsession with climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Who's obsessed. And I loved what I found when I started at Grist and I was like, well, I got to find something in this area that really interests me. And then I gravitated to climate and clean energy because much like what attracted me to philosophy, it's just these big systems and systems within systems and how do they all hang together and how do you think about them and conceptualize their relationships? And it's just really intellectually, endlessly fruitful and interesting.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>It's such a hard time right now with what's happening in the global north with climate. Seeing your home country in flames is terrible, like we were on fire three years ago, which radicalized me. That moment was a moment where I was like, well, when am I doing this comedy podcast for? Let's really lock in and do more on climate. How are you coping with kind of this time we live in after covering it for so long?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>My great anxiety is — there's sort of two stories you can tell one story which I think climate people have kind of been telling themselves for a long time, which is, enough of this stuff happens, enough disasters pop up, it's going to change people's mind and radicalize people, and they'll come around and then we'll all start acting. The other story is the more disasters there are, the more stress there is. The more anxiety there is, the more dislocation there is. And people generally do not respond to anxiety and dislocation with rational, forward-looking reason. They generally, stress and anxiety make people more small c conservatives.</p><p>So my great fear is that all these disasters are going to have people drawing in and putting walls up rather than throwing themselves more into international cooperation. I worry a lot.</p><p>You're here to do side, as I mentioned, to do side projects around the ALP conference. Do you have any kind of — I know it's weird to ask someone who's kind of outside of the political sphere do you have any notion of how you might be received from ALP people or how you might be received within the decision makers in labor themselves?</p><p>I mean, I think there is widespread fascination about the IRA, about the Inflation Reduction Act, widespread interest in it, how it came about, what effects it's having, what political effects it's having. Because the big dynamic right now is my feeling is liberal knows it needs to do something, but it has a little PTSD about the grubby history of climate policy here in the country. It's had a lot of backlashes.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>You're talking about the Liberal Party, not liberals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, Labor has, I think, suffered backlashes in the past due to climate policy, or at least it perceives. So it has a little bit of that hesitancy. So the question is just can it screw up its courage to go big? And sort of that's why I think it's fascinated by IRA, because the US has also had a lot of history with climate policy and the US somehow managed to go big. So that's I think at the very least, their ears are open.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>So you're thinking IRA might see some kind of big ATM cash injection in Australia? Like you think that the government in Australia might do something as bold as IRA?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Maybe, if it can overcome its reticence about big spending. Right. Because the hangover of neoliberalism, the hangover of treating the national budget like a household budget, all that nonsense, things needing to be revenue neutral, terror of deficits, all this kind of like neoliberal hangover, there's still some of that around. So it's a little question of which way they fall —</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Spoken like an American.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, but I think at the very least they're open in a way, at least from what I've heard, that they have not been in a long time.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>It seems so counterintuitive that they are not more aggressive on climate and energy, clean energy. Because the Teals, as you mentioned before, when they got elected, they got so many seats, they're only one seat away from disrupting Labour's majority. And I don't know if Labor can see that, but that movement was not just about anti the coalition, it was about pro climate, pro green energy. And I don't know if they can see that. I think they just see these Teal seats as a threat to liberal seats. But what they're actually threatening is the notion that if you don't act on climate, those Teals are going to take your seats.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, well, is the risk going too big or is the risk not going big enough? And I think that's really up in the air right now. I think there's a real — they're very torn about that right now.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's part of why I'm here is to nudge them in the one direction.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>So who's paying the bills? Who's bringing you out here? Is it a big Teal?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's the big electrical union. Because another feature of IRA that's new for America is the unions are on board. Now the unions are pulling in the right direction. It's the same here, because unlike previous iterations of climate policy, IRA is all about jobs, good jobs. A lot of these tax credits are conditioned on prevailing wages and using apprentices. And so it's a very pro union, pro good, well-paying job environment. And it's good to have the environmental justice community and the unions and the centrists, all the factions of the left are aligned for once, which is not the normal state of affairs.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Let's quickly ask you this. So I saw two nights ago, you're at the MCG watching AFL. What did you think?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I saw the Roos fall to the Bombers and I tweeted out, I said, I'm here at the AFL game and I'm rooting for the Bombers. And was quickly informed by a number of Australians that I might want to use different nomenclature.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Yes, rooting means f*****g.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It turns out I'm barracking for the Bombers. Excuse me.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>That's great. Well, thank you so much for hanging out with me on The Greatest Moral Podcast of Our Generation. It's a real thrill to meet you, and I'm a big fanboy. So hopefully many of our listeners can jump over to the show notes and click the link and go listen to your podcast as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thanks so much. I really appreciate it.</p><p><strong>Dan Ilic</strong></p><p>Hey, no worries.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/me-on-an-australian-pod</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:136184532</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 30 Aug 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/136184532/023a010b2929a970b78585a8ba608474.mp3" length="37282346" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1863</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/136184532/67adbb15d9c99608eb0b10e95353d5c9.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A conversation with Saul Griffith]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Saul Griffith — co-founder of Rewiring America and, more recently, Rewiring Australia — chats about all the things that energy nerds love to chat about.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAA-4Pe3OVbs_UtLpM44TfJea/volts23.08.18%28saul.griffith%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/a-conversation-with-saul-griffith"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If you are a Volts subscriber, you are almost certainly familiar with Saul Griffith. I've been following him and his work for years, and I think I can say without hyperbole that he is the smartest person I have ever met. </p><p>An Australian by birth and an MIT PhD by training, he got his start as a tinkerer, inventor, and entrepreneur, responsible for, among other things, the kite-based wind power company <a target="_blank" href="https://x.company/projects/makani/">Makani</a> and the innovation incubator <a target="_blank" href="https://www.otherlab.com/">Otherlab</a>.</p><p>A few years ago, alarmed by the lack of progress on climate change, he turned his attention to public advocacy, authoring the book <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3OE3zKM"><em>Electrify</em></a> and co-founding <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rewiringamerica.org/">Rewiring America</a>. That organization has, in relatively little time, become incredibly influential among US thought leaders and policy makers. It played a key role in the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act.</p><p>In 2021, Griffith and his family moved back to Australia, where he helped found <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rewiringaustralia.org/">Rewiring Australia</a>, and sure enough, it has already become as or more influential than its American counterpart. As Volties know, I am currently down in Australia. I was scheduled to do a public event with Griffith, so I thought it would be fun to meet up a little beforehand to record a pod.</p><p>Neither of us had particularly prepared for said pod, but it will not surprise you to hear that Griffith was nonetheless as fascinating and articulate as always, on subjects ranging from IRA to Australian rooftop solar to green steel. Enjoy.</p><p>I won't belabor any further introductions. Saul, thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Thanks for joining me in a strange little kissing booth in Sydney's central business district.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, we are. This is the second ever Volts recorded in person. And just so the audience knows, this came together at the last minute and neither of us have prepared at all. So we're all just freestyling here and we're just going to have a conversation. So, Saul, let's start with you were intimately involved in the sausage making of IRA. Why don't you just start with telling us a little bit about how on earth someone like you ended up in the halls of DC with the ear of lawmakers. What's the origin story of this?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>The romantic origin story is just before I married my wife and I think it was 2007, I said, if the world hasn't made sufficient progress on climate change by 2020, can I become an ecoterrorist? To which, it was so far in the future, she said yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Surely, well, by then, surely.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>And then 2019 came around and I said, remember that you made that promise to me. And she said, yes, but we didn't have two children, so you're not allowed to do that. And she sort of actually first planted the idea in my head. You're always complaining that the hardest thing to do in energy technology is the regulatory stack. So why don't you focus on regulatory and policy for a while? I give you leave. We can afford it. See what you can do. Right about then, I was having another conversation with a guy called Alex Laskey. He was a founder of Opower.</p><p>He wanted to talk to me about heat pumps. We were working on some new heat pump technologies and the conversation spiraled out of control and we said, well, working on heat pumps is good, but these Democrats keep saying climate change. So this is in the primaries. Every time any of them say climate change, they wince a little bit and try to shy away from what you would do. So we started Rewiring America. We booked a few tickets to DC, we took a few trips to DC and we thought that we were going to be an advocacy organization, trying to help Democrats talk positively about what the energy transition could be, how we could save money, how our health outcomes could improve, how we could change local community economics.</p><p>So we were trundling along with that effort, working with all of the presidential candidates at the time, and I can retroactively say I loved them all exactly equally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Didn't you love Jay Inslee just a slight bit more, though?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Understanding where you're from, I know why you say that. And I did love Jay Inslee just a little bit more and just a little bit more than Jay Inslee I also loved Elizabeth Warren.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, RIP, I know she's still alive.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I'm sure she's, well, maybe not politically.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But RIP to her.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I have a habit of judging people by their staff and it was so obvious to me that her staff loved her and believed in the mission and it was extraordinary to behold. So we were doing that and then the election was won and it became — we'd hired, Alex and I are probably both ADHD to an extreme, so we hired a competent adult to run the organization Rewiring America, a guy called Ari Matusiak. He'd actually worked in the White House under Biden, worked on similarly complex legislation, the American Healthcare Act. So we knew a bunch of people on the climate team going in and we were worried, so we went to talk because really what we wanted to prosecute was the case for — electrification of everything is really the only pathway to eliminate the majority emissions and secondly, that any spending should equally or even maybe bias more a focus on the demand side.</p><p>And what I mean by the demand side, the places where we use energy. So households, small businesses. Part of that was because there was still the idea that you just decarbonize the grid and they were thinking about clean electrification standards. But if you just do that, you don't also electrify the cars and electrify the homes and eliminate all their stuff. So I was worried that we were going to have insufficient climate policy because of that. So we did a lot of work working on the demand side. The early days, we didn't know whether the Democrats were going to take on the filibuster and whether they were going to go big, so they're — sigh yes.</p><p>So there was three or four or five months where we thought there was going to be regulation and legislation and I think people were thinking about regulating and legislating the grid and electrification grid. When that fell through, let's say that ears were a lot more receptive to what we were trying to propose, which was this demand side electrification. We got extremely lucky a few times he's told this story himself, so hopefully I'm not speaking out of school, but Senator Martin Heinrich of New Mexico, his dad was a lineman, so familiar with electricity, the only senator with an engineering training. He had heard not to belittle your podcast, but he had heard another fabulous podcast with me and Ezra Klein when he was driving across the country with COVID and he cold emailed us at Rewiring America, and we actually let the email sit in our inbox for a few weeks.</p><p>But eventually he became a champion and, in fact, helped us. I got up at 02:00 a.m — so in the middle of all this, we were going to move to Washington. We had booked an AirBnB. My parents were going to come and live in Washington. My kids were going to do homeschooling on the Mall, and I was going to do six months of door to door knocking, Republicans and Democrats selling the abundance agenda of climate solutions. And three days before we left, San Francisco went into COVID lockdown. So we persisted in San Francisco for another six or nine months.</p><p>Then when San Francisco shut down the schools for another year, we said, well, we know the schools are open Australia. So we ripped off the Band Aid and got the hell out of Dodge. Anyway, that meant that Rewiring America Now is doing a lot of this work internationally. We were still a tiny team. And I got up at 02:00 a.m. one night to talk to the Democratic Senate Caucus, basically a tutorial of how the U.S. Energy system works, why you have to electrify, which there is precedent for. During the oil crisis in the 70s, there was a book produced by Georgetown University which in the opening paragraph in the book is like, this book will show the competent person in 1 hour or less how the U.S. energy economy works. So I was trying to do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In an hour or less.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>In an hour or less with the Sankey diagrams. Here it is. And we made the case for demand-side electrification. We were lucky in a million ways. We got involved with a large coalition of people who were working on pieces of the bill. People, you know, like Leah Stokes, Jesse Jenkins. And we rolled up our sleeves, sort of sensing that unless people outside of government put as many ideas down as possible, it would be underwhelming.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A lot of my audience, I think, is quite familiar with IRA at this point. But maybe tell us a little bit about the sausage making. What is your impression of how a bill becomes a law, as they say? Was it more or less irrational than you expected? Were there more or fewer sort of sane people involved who had their head on straight?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I think there was a huge number of people very well-meaning and diligent and working hard. I think there were a lot of people who would fit those descriptions, but you might say had 30 and 40 or 50-year-old ideas that they wouldn't let go of. I was surprised at how much we were facing opposition from the gas industry in many different forms on all aspects of the bill, really. I was politically naive. I was a Silicon Valley entrepreneur for 20 years. I never really cared for politics, so I thought that legislation was written by politicians.</p><p>But I had an unbelievable awakening that it's actually written by lobbyists. So we became basically a lobbying organization and worked with a few others. So it was all a giant learning journey for me, for all of us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>My impression is that the sort of — because originally, Build Back Better was this massively sprawling, it had health care, it had childcare voting reform, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and everything got winnowed away, basically, down to just the climate stuff —</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Oh, you know, I saw a little bit further back even than that. AOC's staff contacted me when it was the Green New Deal. Can you help us come up with some climate policy? I think they gave me four weeks, and then they announced something two weeks before I'd been able to do much. But yeah, it went from — I think the transition from Green New Deal to Build Back Better was just as —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Winnowed and winnowed and winnowed and went, shrunk shrunk shrunk shrunk. But my impression was that in the details, a lot of that sort of original wonky thinking and a lot of that original legislative writing more or less survived. Like for all the drama, Manchin took out the beloved clean energy, whatever the I can never remember the name of the damn program, but the one sort of stick, right, the one stick left in IRA. But otherwise it seems like in the details, nobody really mucked around too much with what the wonks originally put on paper. Is that your impression, too?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Pretty much. The wonks came out strong. It felt to me like a special process. Like this was the first time that engineers and physicists were in the drafting room.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And modelers, and it seemed like I was shocked and surprised, like I was anticipating that Manchin, because of all the fits he was throwing, would have policy opinions, and if he came and could be persuaded, he would have policy asks. But instead he just woke up one morning is like, sure, whatever, this thing that's sitting here is fine. So he ended up actually not messing with it. Maybe to his subsequent chagrin.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>The rumor I heard from people who were in those negotiations were like, normally this is fairly easy. You have an obstructionist senator. You ask them how many schools and highways they want.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>You give them schools and highways and anyway, rumor has it that there was no negotiating.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. It was unclear what he wanted, and then it was unclear why he changed his mind.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Yeah, I don't know exactly why, but I do remember we made a presentation called electrification is anti-inflationary, and it's an extraordinary graph. You can look at the household cost of energy in the US for all of the energy you use. So your petrol, your gasoline sorry, I'm living in Australia now, so I have to translate all the cost of your gasoline, your diesel, your propane, your network gas, your electricity, and you can see it, that chart from 1980 through to 2020 is upwards to the right at roughly the price of inflation. That shouldn't surprise you because the energy is a core part of the consumer price index.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, a big part of the inflation we experienced. And that Manchin claimed to want to do something right.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>So we then showed a chart that here it is, up into the right. If you electrified everything in an American household, this is the amazing thing. When you buy solar cells and put them on your roof, you're paying for 20 years of energy up front, and so then you're paying a fixed interest payment. So you've got no — you've inflation-proofed your energy inputs. You've bought — you're depreciating your electric vehicle, you're depreciating the electric stove, you're depreciating the electric water heater. And so in fact, your cost of energy stays dead flat at your price of finance. And that's a pretty profound insight that this energy transition is the substitution of finance for fuel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I've been trying to carry that message here to Australia. This is true at the micro level, it's true at the household level, and it's true at the —</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>True at the macro level, too. I don't think economists have grappled with this yet. It's really amazing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the implications are, you know, you follow that string for a while, it is transformative. So then let's just briefly wrapping up on IRA. Obviously, it had to go through budget reconciliation. So obviously the whole regulatory and standards side got chopped off. So just say a little bit about what you think it's missing, where you think it falls short, what you would have liked to see more of in it had there been a more sane policy process and vehicle.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Industry would have more certainty if there was regulatory teeth.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Some sticks. And industry would make investments with more certainty. Were there — Norway, ICE vehicles in 2025. Victoria just announced they're going to stop gas in new built homes. So there's these precedents that sort of certainty would certainly help, and I would have loved to have seen that. I remember actually in talking to that Senate caucus pointing out that really only three fifths of the US energy economy was being addressed by the bill. There was actually a huge amount for vehicles and transport, a huge amount for households, but very little for the commercial sector and very, very little for industry apart from a few advanced manufacturing things.</p><p>And so I think Jesse Jenkins is a bit optimistic when he predicts maybe it'll get 40% emissions reductions. I think it probably gets 25. I'll have that conversation with him soon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's quite a delta.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I hope he's right. That would be great. But, I think they missed large pieces of the economy, didn't have regulatory teeth, but quite honestly, in retrospect, it was the only thing it could be, and probably was more by accident than anyone's grand plan kind of genius. Because I think it gets some Republican proofness through being all incentive-based. I still remember the moment where we're a year into the process and everyone's like, "Oh, pens down, tear up everything you've done. Now it's a tax code hack." It's a tax code hack.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Much like virtually all of US policy, federal policy for the last whatever decade or two.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Yeah, but I think there's something really — I now am prone to saying to the Australian government, "You're not serious unless you're rewriting the tax code." And that's the evidence of whether you are going to fix climate policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, Biden is now out saying, and he has his people out, "This is Bidenomics," by which they are saying the era of sort of free trade, free market neoliberalism is over. To what extent do you think that is sort of a retroactive wrapper to put around IRA? And to what extent do you think that's really sunk in in DC? How dead is neoliberalism in DC?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>This is where the podcast goes off the rails. I don't remember most of the people doing the modeling, wrestling with international trade in the work. So, I think it is a little bit retrospective by my interpretation, but I think it's a very honest assessment that we are not operating in anything remotely like a free market. China is producing 90 plus percent of the world's solar cells with 90% of them containing technology that was invented in Australia, about a mile from where we're sitting, or 1.8 km. China is producing the overwhelming majority of the batteries. The Australian steel industry, which I stay in touch with because my first degree was in metallurgy, my first job was in a rod mill, is extremely aware that you could not make the tower pieces for a wind turbine. That's maybe the simplest thing in renewable energy is to make a giant steel tube. But the best estimates are that China is underwriting those 25% to 40%. So unless you figure out some way to rebalance that, then your economy is not going to make the transition very elegantly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It takes two to neoliberalism.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>So that piece of neoliberalism is maybe dead, but there's another piece of neoliberalism that is alive and well, which you might call the porous borders for international capital. Headline in New Zealand last week is that BlackRock is huge amounts of money going into New Zealand's regulated electricity industry to buy all the offshore wind turbines. So in regulated monopolies around the world, you get a guaranteed profit margin. Australia gives a guaranteed profit margin of 9% to transmission and network companies, which is why most of our transmission network companies are owned by Singapore and China. So, I worry that if countries aren't aware of that, all of the profit, all the margins are going to leak away from these countries. If really you can generate your own energy domestically. So, Australia's economy is about a 10th the size of the US. But we import 40-50 billion dollars a year in oil. We import basically all of our oil. We have abundant sunshine driving an electric car in Australia on rooftop solar costs you about two cents a mile. It's about twenty-eight cents a mile to drive it on gasoline or diesel. So we could totally have this $40 billion a year windfall driving Australian electric cars, but we may not choose to do that well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You'd prefer to keep that in Australia, obviously.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I think you would like to keep as much of that in Australia as possible. I think the fact that we've sold off our gas networks and electricity networks to overseas interests in a bunch of places is a bit of a disaster that will hamper this transition, that won't allow us to build a lowest cost energy system. Because the rules that we wrote 20 years ago that were a good idea in the fit of neoliberalism at the turn of the century are not a good idea now. So, I think neoliberalism, it's got some wins and losses, hopefully a few more losses.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Half dead.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Half dead, it'll zombie along. You remarked to me yesterday on the phone that you smell a bit more neoliberalism in Australia than you thought you might. That's been my experience in returning home.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Well, let's talk about speaking of which. What's your impression of the international effect of IRA? The effect of IRA on the international conversation in other countries.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>It's extraordinary. And this is a win that America should take and the Biden administration should loudly pronounce as their victory. Without IRA, the world wouldn't have done anything particularly significant. Because of IRA, Australia is now engaged in a conversation with itself and amidst government of what is our response to the IRA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Every government, I think, is.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Yep, we now have Rewiring Australia, Rewiring New Zealand. In both places, we're trying to look at policy that you would write in those contexts. That goes further than the IRA. I think Jesse and my argument of 25-40% aside, we really need 60 or 75%. And that's made obvious by all the fires we're seeing around the world and the heat waves. And so we need the IRA to become better versions of itself as it's written in every new legislative. You know, it might sound strange to you, but I'm doing a lot of work in New Zealand. They're four weeks out from a transformative election.</p><p>They could set very interesting precedents for ways to use their carbon credit system to help electrify and decarbonize. They could set precedents in household financing. The IRA was regressive because it was a tax code hack. You had to earn enough money to be able to get the rebate for the electric car. The Australian government has a tradition of more progressive policy. I think we could do IRAs that reach all demographics and do a much better job for low middle income households. I think the world has to take every one of those opportunities to get ambition to beget more ambition. It's our only real climate hope.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I, relevant, the other day was in a small roundtable, including, among other people, Australian Energy Minister Chris Bowen. And he said that in his estimation, the IRA was the single most important thing that's ever been done for climate, including the Paris Agreement. He thinks it's bigger than the Paris Agreement in terms of the international reverberations, which may or may not be a bit of exaggeration, but I think it's testament to the transformative effect it's having on other countries' thinking.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I think he's right. I wouldn't have thought that he would think that. I'm glad he's thinking that and I think it's true. The IRA has put everyone on notice a little bit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, let's talk about Australia, then. We're here in Australia, you're working with Rewiring Australia, and from my sort of discussions around with various people here in Australia, my sense is that there's not a lot of "should we or shouldn't we" anymore. It's all "how should we?" Right? It's all "what should we do?" It seems like, obviously, I'm not talking to the Conservatives here, but at least among the ruling coalition, it seems like they want to do something big. But it also seems like, as you say, there's this lingering "we can't just spend a bunch of money, we can't keep up with the US on sheer spending, we need something else."</p><p>There's this lingering sort of like, "we've got to be revenue neutral, we've got to balance our budget." All this the lingering hold of the aforementioned neoliberalism. So what's your sense of how wide the range of practical possibilities is here? Do you think there's an appetite for going as big as you want to go?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I know there is, and I'm encouraged by conversations I've had with the coalition government. I'm even more encouraged by some of the conversations I have with the independents that made an incredible showing at the last election.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The Teals. See my previous podcast.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Yeah, they don't have a lot of political power, but they're having some influence, which is good, but I see there's a lot of appetite. The challenge is we have a very strange economy. Two thirds of our emissions don't even count on us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Scope three.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Yeah. So we make coal for the rest of the world and have some liquid natural gas and none of that counts on us. In fact, 10% of the Australian emissions that do count us is using fossil fuels to get those fossil fuels to international markets. Because of that, there's the fear that if we lose the prevailing fear that we lose fossil fuels and what do we replace that with? Is driving a lot of misinformation. Two or three months ago, I went with a Smart Energy Council and a bunch of people variously involved in renewables and electrification to Parliament House, and there were 40 of us and everyone was self-congratulatory, like, "Isn't this great?"</p><p>And I was giving the motivational speech and I was like, "you know that there's 80 gas industry people here every day. This is the first time we've ever showed up with 40 people," and that's what we're facing. A manifestation of that is in the last budget, we got a billion dollars in the bill for electrification. They got $2 billion for hydrogen. Hydrogen production in Australia can only increase the retail price of electricity for Australians because they have to take the lowest price electricity to produce hydrogen, otherwise it won't make it economic. And we don't need hydrogen to decarbonize any major portion of the Australian economy, so that's really just to do exports.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's a lot of talk about Australia becoming a hydrogen superpower. So we can talk about that in a second.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the genius of the Inflation Reduction Act is the majority of the incentives went to consumers. That's good politics. I'm going to help you have the shiny things that will help you go green, get to zero emissions and lower your cost of energy. The majority of the conversation here is, how do we do handouts to largely foreign-owned industry so that we can maintain their jobs, but the jobs we get aren't that great and the profits are foreign-owned. I think 85% of our coal and a huge amount of our iron ore industries are foreign-owned at this point.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good grief.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>So I think we need to win the argument in Australia that do make it good politics. Help single mothers in the outskirts of Sydney or Melbourne buy an electric car so they can save $3,000 a year on their horrific commute. That would be good politics and the fastest way for us to address domestic economy emissions reductions, the government's first two pieces of climate policy my apologies, Chris, I think are going to be a bit troubling for the government. So one was the safeguard mechanism, which is an incredibly complicated, arcane way for industry to basically buy industry credits, unclear that that will deliver any emissions reductions this decade.</p><p>The second piece was a program called Rewiring The Nation, which was to connect the renewable energy zones, which were picked politically, not necessarily for energy cost reasons, to connect them with big transmission lines. So it'll take five plus years to get those transmission lines in the ground. You're going to piss off every farmer and everyone in a small town who has to look at the wires, and it'll take another couple of years for the solar and the wind to connect up to them, so it will not deliver any emissions reductions by our critical 2030 date. So I think it's more reasonable to say, look, the thing you can do now, rooftop solar, we could power 60 plus percent of all of our household energy uses, including our cars on our rooftops here.</p><p>It's the cheapest electricity in the world as Australian rooftop solar, three to four cents after financing. And you could do all of those emissions reductions very, very quickly, because pretty much all the industries are, if not at scale, getting close to scale. Electric vehicles, electric heat pumps, induction cooktops, household batteries.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about rooftop solar for a second. I've said this before, but the sort of freakish success of Australian rooftop solar seems oddly little discussed here in the sort of policy and energy discussions I'm having. And I don't know why it's not trumpeted more. So maybe just tell us a little bit about why is it so cheap? And something I hear, I mean, I've heard a lot of confident, very opposing opinions. Some people will say it's creating this huge Duck curve. There's this huge swamp of solar during the day. We're having to curtail it now. We've already like, building more is basically pointless at this point until we have more firming and more transmission.</p><p>And then other people say, oh no, there's plenty of runway, there's plenty more rooftops, there's plenty more we could do with rooftop solar. So maybe just say a little bit about why it's so damn cheap and how much headroom you think there is.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I tried to do a column for the New York Times. They actually published it on why Australian rooftop is so cheap. They flubbed it. They didn't want me to say that American rooftop solar is more expensive than the grid, which it is, because they didn't want to deter people from purchasing rooftop solar. So much for integrity in journalism. So I actually interviewed a whole bunch of people who were very early in the 1990s, early 2000s Australian solar industry, and I got roughly ten different answers for why. Some was political luck. We got John Howard traded sort of a yes to doing some rooftop solar stuff because he was going to throw Australia under the bus at Kyoto. And some academics and some smart early industry people took advantage of that.</p><p>Part of it is we created a certification and training program that took a lot of the liability away from what you'd call contractors; we call them tradies. That took a big chunk of the cost out. And then Australians abhor — Americans like to think they're small government, but we really want to be small government and low bureaucracy here. On average, it takes three months to get a permit to put solar on a rooftop in the US. 50% of sales are canceled in that three months. Because you get cold feet, you have to go through what's called an ASJ, an Authority Having Jurisdiction.</p><p>They have different rules in every single state. I think there are 11,000 ASJs in the US. In Australia, you get the permit over the phone in 24 hours and the tradie is on your roof 24 hours later.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wow.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I keep trying to convince my colleagues at Rewiring America we should run a "Get the Government off My Roof" campaign in Texas because there's no reason. In fact, an Australian solar installer is paid about 10% in real dollars, more than an average American solar installer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are those good jobs here? Because in the US they have a pretty bad reputation.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>They're not fabulous jobs, they're not terrible jobs, they are definitely hardworking trade jobs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so what's the headroom one out of three?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Australia 35%. I think California just touched 2% penetration.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And already California is panicking and trying to change the rules and saying we have too much blah, blah, blah.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Well, I now work with what they call here DNSPs again. In a fit of neoliberalism, in the 1990s, we introduced market reform. We split our utility monopolies into four functions: transmission, distribution, retail, and generation. The price of electricity went up because now you had four times the overhead. But the good news is that the DNSPs sort of see the opportunity. So they control the local poles and wires. When you talk to the CEOs of the DNSPs, they understand that you need to deliver 300% of the electricity over those local poles and wires to accommodate the electric cars and the electric cooktops and the electric water heaters.</p><p>So their business is going to grow. They understand that even if you saturate Australian rooftops, which might saturate at 75 or 80% penetration with big systems, 8 kW, their business still grows. And so the natural partnership for a lowest cost energy Australia, is a partnership between the city, the householder, and the DNSP. And when you talk to those DNSPs, they understand that the batteries are coming, they understand that the electric cars are coming, they understand that all the demand response systems are coming and that that will solve this problem. But if you talk to a generator, they don't think about batteries, then electric cars is the storage and mopping all this up.</p><p>If you talk to the retailer, they're a bit scared that they might get cut out of this because the householder can do it without them. And if you talk to the transmission companies, they're a regulated monopoly that gets a guaranteed return on investment for building wires, whether or not you like it. So none of them are particularly interested in the truth, shall we say. So I think that's why the answers vary greatly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so you think you can go from 35% to 70 or 80% of rooftop solar.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>With 75% penetration in Australia of 8 kW systems. We would produce 60% of all electricity required for 11 million households with all electric vehicles, all electric appliances.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you think you can balance that out and firm that just with household EVs, household batteries, household demand response?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Not entirely. And so people often hear me and they think, oh, he's the off-grid guy, but I'm not. You need other renewables in the mix. It is handy that Australia has some hydro. We're doing a big pumped hydro project. It's over budget and behind schedule, but that's true of all big infrastructure. Nevertheless, we need that. We need wind, which counter correlates with solar and will fill the gaps in in winter and really, Australia's best strategy is oversupply. So you don't install — California has rules that make you install sort of the summertime amount of solar to just do your electric appliances in your house.</p><p>Solar in Australia is so cheap that you should install enough solar so that you've got enough to run your house and your cars in the winter, which is a 12 or 15 kilowatt system. And it's much cheaper to have 200% of three or four cent generation cost solar than a huge amount of batteries, all these other things. So Australia can actually quite easily do this, curiously, with an oversupply strategy and good energy management. And, yes, you have to have a mix of renewables, but everyone agrees and expects that. And we're doing offshore wind and onshore wind and all the things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about the other huge topic that is extremely front of mind for Australian politicians, which is Australia's extraordinary amount of critical minerals that are going to be needed for the energy transition, and batteries and solar panels, et cetera. How much does it have? What does it currently do with them and what ought it to do with them?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>We have the first, second, third or fourth largest known ore bodies in the world for all of the above materials. Cobalt, nickel, iron, aluminium, silicon, lithium, copper, tin, which are all the things you need. We sold 55% of the world's lithium last year. So we can easily be a much, much more dynamic, much, much more profitable economy, selling those minerals and metals to the world. You don't even need the super exotic stuff like neodymium. If we just processed our iron ore domestically into steel here, which will be a good idea because we will have the cheapest renewables in the world, it will be hard for someone else.</p><p>If you make hydrogen in Australia from our sunshine, it's going to be, by the time it's in China, five times more expensive than our sunshine. Half of the cost of steel making is the energy that goes into it. So we have this fundamental advantage in the new economy that we'll be able to make all of these metals. We only process 1% of our iron ore into steel domestically at the moment. If we processed 100%, it would be more than a $1 trillion industry that is ten times larger than all of our fossil fuel industries. So even if we don't do the exotic stuff like lithium and copper and nickel and tin and all the other things just on iron and aluminium, we can make hay. And it's a better export economy than the fossil fuel economy that we have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You think it makes more sense, rather than using the wind and sunshine to make hydrogen, exporting the hydrogen to other steel making countries where they will make green steel, you think it makes more sense to just make the green steel here? And do you have the infrastructure and skills? And how much would it take to revive that industry?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Well, this is a bit of a question about neoliberalism. My father was the first person in the history of his family to get a degree. He was paid by the Australian wool industry to become an expert in wool making when that was our major export. I had a full paid ticket through university, paid for by the Australian steel industry when that was what we were going to do. So we used to, as a country, invest and they were fully funded, free educations for both of us. We used to understand that you invested in the people to do those things and then they would build the industries.</p><p>We stopped really doing that in the 2000s. If we can find the courage to do it again, we can do this. And we still do have enough muscle memory in Australia. We are losing it rapidly, but we could still do it. I think it's just a matter of political appetite.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So how do you make an argument? I mean, what do you say to a politician who says, sure, OK, yes, let's do more processing of our critical minerals, let's move farther up the value chain of critical minerals. Sure, let's process our iron ore, let's even make steel and then let's also continue exporting met coal because there's a huge appetite for met coal and it's good for our economy. What is the freestanding argument for seizing fossil fuel production, is there an argument?</p><p>Either the high-met process in Scandinavia or the Boston Metals process or one of these things will eliminate met coal within the next decade?</p><p>You think so?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>So it's existential and a little bit to your last point, but also to this question: The energy cost of coal into steel making is about a half a cent a kilowatt hour equivalent in heat. The energy cost of natural gas in steel making is about one cent per kilowatt hour in heat. The Australian stretch goal for hydrogen is $2 a kilogram, which is copied from America's $1 a kilogram, that's six or seven cents a kilowatt hour at the electrolyzer that's before you've transported or shipped it, it'll be 12 cents in any reasonable optimistic estimation. So you're not going to make steel with a lot of hydrogen because you're going to make steel cost five or six times as much.</p><p>So I think we've just got to get with the program and invest in those things. They are the critical industries for our next century. We got to invest in them. We have all the American problems. We gave away all of industry between 1980 and now. With my metallurgical degree, I went off to MIT because there were no jobs in metallurgy in the 1990s, because we were just starting the neoliberal ideal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So talk about then this ties into very closely the export economy. Talk a little bit about Australia's relationship with the sort of Asia Pacific region like Japan, for example. Japan is an island not blessed with a lot of domestic energy supply resources. It wants to, I think, has some illusions that it's going to become that it's going to sort of import a bunch of hydrogen fuels from Australia to run its economy on. What is the sort of political valence of these other countries? What do they want and what do you think would make more sense to give them?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>We've had long standing relationships with Japan. My son is in high school in Australia. He's much more likely to learn Japanese in Australia than you are Spanish. Germany and Japan both lost World War II because they didn't have a domestic supply of liquid fuels. Germany was developing hydrogen for the V-2 bombers, and the V-2 bombers were powered with hydrogen. They were using coal gasification.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, right.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>We had seven years of both of those countries believing that their path to energy independence was through hydrogen. And that explains probably more than anything else, why the last two sets of automakers in the world to really commit to electrification are the Germans and the Japanese. As giant trading partners of ours they're driving our hydrogen fever. But refer to the previous conversation. It's just a very expensive way to do everything. We will do some hydrogen, and you need it for ammonia and you might need it for steel making, but only the redox component, not for the energy component.</p><p>Redox meaning the reduction reaction, getting rid of the oxides. But we are still addicted to this idea that we're going to sell them gobsmacking amounts of hydrogen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, they're addicted to the idea too, are they not?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>They are also addicted to the idea, and I think there's a reckoning there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So what is Japan's answer? Because it seems like one of these really difficult equations in the transition. What does Japan do?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Japan will almost certainly turn its nuclear power back on, or it will figure out a better relationship with its geothermal resources. It also has extremely good offshore wind, and they're a manufacturing and precision engineering powerhouse. That's not going away anytime soon. The question is, can they survive the 20 year head start they gave to China on electric vehicles? So that's my concern for Japan.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Toyota and the Japanese companies drive so much of the economy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So turning back to Australia, you — obviously play a big role in your sort of head, your scheme is played by EVs, playing a role as storage. Let's just talk briefly about vehicle-to-grid (V2G). Because this is another thing: When you sort of toss it out in public, you get a lot of extremely confident, extremely mixed opinions about its potential. It's realistic, how realistic it is, whether consumers will put up with it, whether cars are available when you need them, et cetera, et cetera. How bullish are you on that, on V2G?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I think there will be some V2G. I think it will take longer than we think and I think we'll give up a smaller portion of the battery to the grid than people expect. And I don't think that's really the relevant question. The only thing that matters is are the cars going to be plugged in when the sun is shining and the wind is blowing? So really, it's about a profusion of vehicle charging infrastructure. So that is absolutely critical and we have to do that. And you can make the numbers work without intoning huge amounts of V2G. I think V2G will happen.</p><p>The battery packs are just getting bigger. Unfortunately, Australia, I would have hoped — speaking of Japan, Japan has Kei cars. Do you know, K-E-I? They're fabulous.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They've gone viral on Twitter several times recently.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Yeah. I was hoping Australia would — we could manufacture cars in Australia again if we'd made Kei cars, because we'd only compete with the Japanese. If we wanted to make trucks or utes, we can't compete. And Australia looks like we're going to go down the giant ute path. I own a Rivian in the US, a giant 172 kilowatt hour battery on four wheels. I will use in an all electric household, driving two cars, the average amount Australians, 37 kilowatt hours a day. So the battery in that Rivian is five days. The battery in the second Rivian is another five days.</p><p>So, I've got ten days of energy from my household in my two utes. I kind of hope for the planet that that's not how we solve climate change. But you can tell that story now where I think it's still a political sore point in Australia. What are we going to do with our utes? I mean, it's a religion here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What, the utes?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Yeah. And a lot of 23-year-olds own 70 - their best asset is a $70'000 or $90,000 ute and they're probably in debt in every other way. So it became strangely central to the Australian ethos in the last 30 years while I was away. I was surprised when I returned.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. What is going on with the obsession with big trucks? Do you think Australia will ever — speaking of moving up the value chain, you go all the way up from critical minerals, you get to battery cells, you get to batteries, you get to EVs, and then you get to battery recycling. How far up that chain can and should Australia go all the way?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I think we are fine if we are the foundry of the world, if all we do is make the metals turn bauxite into aluminium, turn iron ore into steel, turn lithium brines into lithium. Would I like us to go further up the value chain? Yes. My father was employed in going up the value chain in the textile industry. He made the spinnaker that defeated America in the America's Cup in the 1980s. We know we can do those things. Very hard to imagine how we do it in Australia. Our prevailing wage is ten times higher than all of our neighbors.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I mean, our neighbors are Indonesia, Asia, Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka. We can only do it with extraordinary amounts of automation and probably things like border carbon adjustment mechanisms. Something that was announced today in Australia with the idea that — your mate Chris Bowen. But it's pretty hard to imagine that we'll do these things otherwise. We do have a solar manufacturer here. They make incredibly high-quality cells. They're 25% more expensive than the Chinese ones. They are better, probably. They come with a better warranty. But we are a Walmart bug and hunting country like yours, which is not called Walmart, it's called Bunnings here.</p><p>So I worry we could easily make electric cars. Again, there's no reason not to do any of these things. I suspect in the wind turbine space, we'll make towers and maybe the floating platforms. We won't make the nacelles. Denmark and Korea have and America have a 20-30 year head start on that. We could make the blades, but we probably won't. But it doesn't matter if we were in the best use of our extraordinary abundance of very cheap renewables, if we are the world's foundry, we're in great shape. And to put that in perspective, Australia could supply all of the energy for our domestic economy and process all of our metals with about a quarter of 1% of its land area dedicated to renewables.</p><p>America would need 2% to do the same and China would need up north of 10%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>So really, only if Australia steps up to be the foundry of the world does the whole world get there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And what a better moral position to be in than the one you're in currently, which is the entire health and success of your economy is contingent on the failure of humanity to solve its biggest problem is that moral dilemma sinking in to the public.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>The public that I hang out with? That's not the public, it's the public you hang out with in America. I think in Australia and America, 2% to 5% of people worry about the moral dilemma. What I don't understand, and I was reflecting upon this, for whatever reason you sparked this thought, we still have never had any important global politician in command of a reasonably sized economy, stand up and say, solving climate change is going to be good for us. Like, if you think about all of Biden's —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Biden says, jobs, jobs, jobs. When I think climate, I think jobs. That's his shtick, right?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Yeah. But no one ever stood up there , and Winston Churchill'd we'll fight them on the beaches, we'll succeed. I'll improve the air quality of your children. I'll do all of the things right. Biden's message is very simple: Jobs, jobs, jobs. It would be within reason and not exaggerating for Prime Minister Albanese to stand up and say, I have a vision for the country. Here's the 50-year vision. We will be the world's foundry. We will increase our exports by five x. We will own more of them because it's on crown land, the majority of the ore.</p><p>We will lower energy costs because of our abundant renewables. And I think that would go along in a similarly important historical moment to the IRA. I think if Australia did that, that would also get a whole bunch of countries to be like, oh, because of our rooftop solar, we're ten years ahead of everyone else on the cost curves.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it's so much more inspiring than being a hydrogen superpower, because for the average citizen who gives a f —</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>No, Australians don't think we're a superpower in anything. I mean, we're a superpower at women's soccer this week.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Go Matildas.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Go Matildas. But — I don't think truly identify with that superpower narrative. I understand the political origins of that narrative. That's what environmental organizations had to sell ten years ago to a very conservative government as the reason to do anything in climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Running out of time here. There was one other subject I wanted to talk to you about, which is a very beloved subject of yours and of Rewirings, which is anytime you bring up let's electrify households to average folk, what you hear is, it's too expensive. I can't afford solar on my roof, I can't afford a heat pump. It's so much more than a gas boiler. EVs are so much more expensive. These are all toys for rich people. There's a real populist, faux populist, call it pushback to all this stuff. And your response to this in various and sundry ways has to do with financing. So in the Australian context —</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Which brings us to neoliberalism.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Once again, we're back to our old friend neoliberalism. Let's talk about what would it look like to finance Australians shift.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>So the perception of those things in America is a little bit true.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>People are not making it up.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Yeah, your fossil fuels are cheaper, your bureaucracy is heavier and incurs more soft costs. And because it was a tax code hack, the IRA, it's regressive. So you have to be a rich household to make enough money to earn the tax credits. There's a few in the margin.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Some are refundable, right?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I mean, some are refundable and Rewiring America, and others are trying to figure out creative ways to actually package these up so you can deliver it to low-income households in smarter ways. But my true hope for Australia is because we have a stronger tradition on the labor side, on the left side of politics and of broad social policy, including Medicare and Medicaid and the Australian public health system, which is a little teetering right now but has been extremely strong for a long time. I think we are capable of big — and we had a higher education contribution scheme here. It's a little out of fashion right at the present moment because the rules of it changed a little bit under the neoliberals.</p><p>This is how you finance your education. But we have in the past written global, precedent-setting social policies that were really around debt and about how and who people pay for things. And so I think there's an extraordinary opportunity for this government to get emissions reductions this decade which are critical. And the only way where the majority of those are this decade is in our vehicles and our homes. Because we don't have green steel yet. We don't have green hydrogen yet. They would address the cost of living crisis and the government could do concessional financing, so they could either buy down the interest rate the biggest problem in America and Australia is probably 60% or more of homes don't qualify with a credit rating that allows banks to lend them the money.</p><p>So while a single mother in Western Sydney would absolutely save $2,000-$3,000 a year on gasoline even if she's a nurse her credit rating probably isn't good enough to finance an electric car to access those savings. There are ways that the Australian government could step in either by backstopping the banks or guaranteeing the banks doing something like income contingent loans which is how we finance their education system. And if you look at the macroeconomics, it's a slam dunk for the country. If all of Australian households were all electric, we'd save $40 billion a year. The problem with revenue neutral, because you brought up the thing that I hate the most is we have an obstructionist treasury that thinks the country is broke, that wants it to be revenue neutral.</p><p>And the problem is like a —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like a household budget, Saul.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Right. But that's because they think that they will pay the costs and the households will receive the benefit and that that's not revenue neutral —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well the households pay f*****g taxes!</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>They don't understand that the households will take all that savings, they'll spend it elsewhere in the economy and the government will see back in taxes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They're not lighting the money on fire.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>David Roberts can we end with your Jedi mind trick that convinces Australia's neoliberal treasury that this is a f*****g great idea and they should do it to save the world?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, this, I feel like, is in the wake of IRA, even in the US. But also here, definitely: This is sort of one of the last barriers to truly good policy, is just breaking this notion that the government has, like, this box of money, and when it spends it, it's gone. And then the government's broke. Like, no household behaves that way, no business behaves that way, no growth enterprise is revenue neutral. And why would it be? And so you give money to households, they flourish they spend money —</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Government flourishes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They pay taxes.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>Here's an extraordinary thing that I —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Spend money to save money, spend money to make money.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>I'm not sure if this is a useful idea but I keep getting stuck on this: Australia's housing stock is worth about $100 trillion. It would cost you far less than $1 trillion to electrify all of the households, including all of their vehicles, over the next 20 years. You'd be zero emissions by 2040 and for less than 1% of the value of the asset base. We're there. Like absolutely, you don't need to be a banker to know that we can afford to do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. All right, well, let's finish on that note. One last gut punch to neoliberalism. Seems like a good place to wrap up. Thanks so much for coming, Saul. It's been a delight doing this. I've meant to have you on the pod forever. We'll probably do it again sometime, but good luck cracking heads in Australia, getting people — and I hear rumor has it that big things are in the works relatively soon. October-ish, November. Albanese is going to DC, I think, in October, November and may or may not announce something.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>We will either see something — the announcements in America will likely be, you know, we'll give you cheap lithium if yo give us big monster trucks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh Jesus.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith</strong></p><p>My KPIs are, or OKRs, I can never remember the difference between the two damn things. Neoliberals invented both of them. But my KPI is federal budget of next year. Are we fixing the tax code structurally in a way that enables this to happen? And then what is the platform climate-wise for this government for the next election? And they will be the political moments where we know we've either done a better job of the IRA or whether we've been lackeys to the gas and coal industry and we're merely trying to squeeze a few extra dollars for some multinationals out of there —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Ha, right. All right, with that, we'll conclude. Thanks so much, Saul. Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-conversation-with-saul-griffith</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:136183245</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 23 Aug 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/136183245/ef4e303dcc6fec9a69e1e9f7a8737de2.mp3" length="66825791" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3340</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/136183245/ca3e655912db88a29698c1a8d4c47211.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with Australian climate politics?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, activist Miriam Lyons gives an overview of Australian climate policy past, present, and future.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADGdmKcOLxhpMsMDB1Rr9kDa/volts23.08.16%28miriam.lyons%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/what-s-the-deal-with-australian-climate-politics"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>G’day mates! As you all know, I’m in Australia at the moment, on a whirlwind speaking/listening tour regarding this country’s response to the Inflation Reduction Act.</p><p>I’ve been learning a ton about Australia’s history with climate policy, its clean-energy resources, and its current politics. It’s all much more complex and interesting than I appreciated before coming, so I thought it would be cool to record a podcast “in the field,” while I’m here, with someone who could provide an overview of all that stuff. </p><p>To my great delight, I was joined — live! in studio! — by Miriam Lyons. Lyons’ resume is … daunting. She founded a progressive think tank called the <a target="_blank" href="https://cpd.org.au/">Centre for Policy Development</a> and led it for seven years; she led the climate justice campaign at <a target="_blank" href="https://www.getup.org.au/">GetUp</a>, the Australian equivalent of <a target="_blank" href="http://moveon.org/">Moveon.org</a>; she has written or co-written two books on economics and the clean-energy transition; and currently, she is director of the Australian Economic Transformation program at the <a target="_blank" href="https://sunriseproject.org/about/">Sunrise Project</a>, which works to scale social movements and accelerate the transition.</p><p>Needless to say, she is quite familiar with the ins and outs of Australian climate politics! We had a fascinating and wide-ranging discussion. Enjoy.</p><p>So, Miriam Lyons. Welcome to Volts. Thanks so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Thank you so much. Very excited to be on the pod.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is excellent. Oh, also, Volts listeners might be excited to know that this is the first Volts that I've ever recorded in person in the same room with my guests. That's exciting too. I know usually I'm a hermit at home, so this is cool. I would like to do more of it. Okay, so let's start then with a little bit of capsule history. I think the Volts audience is aware of the agita of climate politics in the US. From sort of Waxman-Markey era of 2009, 2010, all the way through the turbulence, et cetera, through IRA.</p><p>So let's talk a bit, a little bit about what's been happening in Australia during that same time period. Give us a sort of summary of the history.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>I've been thinking about how to sum up all of Australian climate politics really briefly. Okay, so in a galaxy far, far away. A colonized country was sitting on one of the world's biggest carbon bombs, and what happened next is an epic tale of triumph and betrayal. I think the TL;DR version is that we are one of the world's biggest exporters of climate pollution. We are also the sunniest continent on Earth and one of the windiest. So we have this enormous potential to be a massive exporter of climate solutions. And we're currently hitting our crossroads, which is that moment where we decide whether we want to be a Kodak country that is so attached to its old technology that it's failing to notice —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, that Kodak. For the minute. I had the bear in my head. I was like, wait, what's the bear analogy? Oh, and the photograph analogy.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, that one. It's just like, oh, there's all this sun and wind. What could we possibly do instead of killing the world with our coal and gas exports? So that informs a whole lot of the history of our climate politics, of course. And our fossil fuel lobby have been experts in using their enormous profits to win friends and influence policy and more importantly, to bully politicians when they don't get their way. And that playbook has worked really well for them for quite a long time, but it is now running out of oomph. And I think, you know, a big question now is whether our major parties will notice that the gun that the industry is holding to their heads doesn't have quite so many bullets in it anymore, but to kind of go back in time:</p><p>John Howard was our second longest-serving Prime Minister and a climate denier. He was unseated by Kevin Rudd in 2007 for two main reasons. So one was a massive backlash against his attacks on workers' rights, but the other reason was his failure to act on climate change. I saw the polls at the time. Those were the consistent two main reasons that voters switched from him to Kevin Rudd. So Kevin Rudd came in, he signed the Kyoto Protocol and he introduced a very modest emissions trading bill. So it was going to cut emissions by about 5% and any stronger emissions cuts were going to be conditional on what other countries did.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's discuss the political parties here. I forgot, we have different political parties at play. So the Conservative Party here is called the Liberal Party.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yes. So this is down under everything's topsy turvy. The Liberals are the conservatives.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly, southern hemisphere thing. And the liberal party or the center-left party is the Labor Party.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>The Labor Party.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So Rudd was of the Labor Party.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Rudd was of the Labor Party and the Labor Party was born from the workers' rights movement. And the Greens Party is also very relevant, which was born from the environmental movement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So Rudd comes in, does some mild emissions cutting.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, he plans for a very modest emissions trading scheme. And that bill did not pass the senate for reasons that you should not ask Australian climate campaigners about, unless you want us to break our own personal version of Godwin's law. Then the Copenhagen COP flopped, which took a bit of paint off Rudd because he had really been pinning his kind of domestic story to the idea that we would be acting in a pack. Then Malcolm Turnbull, the moderate leader of the conservative Liberal Party, who Kevin Rudd had been negotiating with, was overturned by his own party in favor of Tony Abbott because he was considering actually negotiating on a climate bill.</p><p>And so Tony Abbott was a Trump style climate denier. So suddenly Rudd had lost his prospect of having somebody reasonable on the opposition to negotiate the bill with. He then decided to shelve that bill, which turned out to be a very unpopular decision because immediately afterwards, his polling started to plummet, which resulted in his own party losing faith in him and overturning him in favor of Prime Minister Julia Gillard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All these names are ringing very, very faint bells.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>And there's more. So she then narrowly won an election and was only able to form government with the help of a couple of progressive rural independents who were very clear on what climate change was going to do in terms of damage to the farmers in their electorates. And so they demanded strong climate action as part of their deal to allow the Labor Party to form government. Which meant that between them, they put together another climate package, which included an emissions trading scheme again, but also the Australian Renewable Energy Agency, which then had a big budget to invest in a whole bunch of really important grants to bring the cost of renewables down in Australia.</p><p>And the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, which was essentially like an investment, publicly owned investment bank that could invest in the clean energy sector, but with a slightly lower rate of return, so enabling that kind of investment to get up. Green bank. Exactly. But there's also more. So while all of this was going on, the Rudd and Gillard governments were also trying to make the mining industry pay a little bit more tax for the massive, massive profits that they were making on the back of a massive mining boom, very little of which was staying around in the country.</p><p>Our mining sector is by far the majority multinational owned, so most of those profits go offshore. And of course, the mining industry was not a fan of paying more tax and neither was Tony Abbott. So both of them ran a massive culture war campaign against Julia Gillard, which spooked her party, who then turned around and dumped her in favour of Kevin Rudd. Again, same guy back in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wait a minute —</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>So it's pretty safe to say that backstabbing is not voters' favourite quality in a candidate. So they then handed the election to Tony Abbott a couple of months later, who then dismantled the carbon price, but interestingly, was unable to dismantle the Renewable Energy Agency and the Clean Energy Finance Corporation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Some political lessons. And so Rudd comes back in and loses to Abbott.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Well, no, Rudd got dumped in favor of Gillard, who then won, who then got dumped in favor of Rudd, who then lost to Abbott in 2013.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then so Abbott begins a long reign of doing nothing.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, Abbott repeals the mining tax, repeals the carbon pricing part of that big clean energy package, tries to get rid of the renewable energy target, which we should also talk about, but fails to completely eliminate it. It gets a small, I think, roughly 20% cut to the renewable energy target, which is a really big success story, actually, of Australian climate and energy policy. Tries to overturn the Clean Energy Finance Corporation, tries to overturn ARENA, isn't able to because they've got too many fans in the Senate, basically too many fans in the public and the Senate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>But then yes does absolutely nothing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then Abbott's in charge until just recently, yes?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Abbott, then embarked on an incredibly ideological public service cutting push, which was not popular. So then his polling started going down. So he was then dumped by his party in favor of Malcolm Turnbull. So he was then back again. Then Malcolm Turnbull starts glancing sideways at the idea of something that kind of, if you squint at it, might look like carbon pricing within the energy sector. And in order to do that, he had to negotiate with the states. The states were putting some quite reasonable requests on how to make sure that it actually worked.</p><p>As soon as the right wing of his own party started to get the idea that the scheme might do something, they dumped Malcolm Turnbull. But in this case, what happened was that Peter Dutton had put in the bid for the leadership spell, so he'd instigated the backstabbing. Yet he didn't actually win that spell. Scott Morrison did.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Scott Morrison? Another name that rings a faint bell.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good grief. *Sirens wailing in background*</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Somebody's telling the truth about climate politics, send in the cops. So Scott Morrison then ends up the leader of the party going into the next election. And people don't blame him for having stabbed Turnbull in the back because it kind of looked like he was the person who got him by default. So then he was able to be elected, then he did a whole lot of damage. And Scott Morrison was quite famous for having held a lump of coal in parliament, doing that as a bit of a stunt or waving it around. What then happened was actually a bunch of climate disasters, so particularly some horrific bushfires, just unprecedented in how much damage they know.</p><p>Property lost, enormous swathes of bush that had never burned before, burning for the first time, and lives lost. And everybody was very annoyed about this. And Morrison was out to lunch and specifically out of the country. And then when confronted on why he was neither taking the climate change that had caused the intensity of these bushfires seriously, nor really being very present to try and look after the people who were surviving this disaster, he famously said, "Well, I don't hold a hose, mate."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's some real political skill right there.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah. So people didn't like that so much. And that was like, really emblematic of people's sense that he was just failing on a whole bunch of national issues that were hurting people's lives, where he just wasn't providing leadership, so he then lost. And now the prime minister is Anthony Albanese.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this is an incredible amount of drama and back and forth, two emission trading schemes, both of which more or less got defanged. So let's take stock then, after all of that. You know, right now, Labor is contemplating what to do on climate change. May or may not do something big. We'll discuss that in a minute. But taking stock, sort of, what is there now of climate and energy policy in Australia? What do you have going for you currently?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>So now we have a Climate Change Act, which basically means that the government's emissions reduction target, a 43% cut in emissions by 2030, has been legislated. But the legislation basically says this is our target and every year we have to turn up to parliament and tell you what we're doing to meet our target. The legislation does not make them meet the target, it just makes them have an annual moment of accountability where they have to say whether or not the dog ate their homework.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. This is something anyone who has followed me for a while knows I yell about a lot, the illusion that targets are policy, but they're not actually policy.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>They have an enormous amount of soft power, right, which you shouldn't discount completely. Like it's good to have accountability on whether or not the dog's eating your homework, but doesn't actually make you do the homework. Not the same as homework.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And there's a 2050 target as well, right?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah. Net zero by 2050 is now bipartisan. So that was one thing that did happen under Morrison, was that they formally adopted a net zero by 2050 target, but again, with absolutely no homework. They had a pamphlet that they said was their roadmap on how they were going to meet the target. Then other pieces of policy that we have there was something called the Safeguard Mechanism, which was introduced under the Abbott government, if I'm not mistaken. So it was a very Abbott style way of saying that you were doing something on climate without really doing anything on climate.</p><p>The way that mechanism worked was to say that the covered facilities, so it was 200 largest facilities in the country, had to reduce their emissions below a baseline, but they set the baseline so much higher than their actual emissions that it never made them reduce their emissions. And so what Labor took to the last election was a promise to turn it into a scheme that did something — terribly designed scheme. It's not like even a third best policy design, right? This is like the 6th to 7th best policy design, but it was a piece of policy that already existed.</p><p>So, they were hoping that by saying, "Oh, we're just going to have the same policy but make it work," they would diffuse attacks on them having a climate policy going into the election. Naturally, that did not diffuse any attacks anyway. Yeah. So the Liberals were very happy to attack their own policy in the context of the election campaign. Also, something we should learn lessons from, probably.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>No negotiating with terrorists. Appeasement does not work. Yeah. So we have a safeguard mechanism now which has been strengthened with a whole lot of campaigning from the climate movement, a whole lot of negotiation from the Greens and also from an independent senator and independents in the lower house, all working to try and improve the scheme. So it actually does something, looks like it's going to actually do some things, still a few holes, some devil in some detail. A whole lot of work is going to have to go into actually making sure that it does the things that it has the potential to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And yeah, maybe it's worth pausing to say this is something I think all Australians know, but it's worth pointing out that these defeats of Labor throughout the 2000s and the 2010s on the back of their attempts to do emissions trading schemes, their attempts to do climate policy have left them somewhat gun shy and paranoid about backlash. I think that's kind of the sense I get. The context that this is all taking place: On the one hand, this sense that we have to do something. On the other hand, this sense that we've been burned before and here we are, finally we have the government, let's not screw it up, let's not go too far, let's not risk another backlash.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>All of those things now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A lot of push and pull both different ways.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>But what's changed, obviously, since that time is renewables are so much cheaper than they were when the last round of the climate wars was happening. The popular understanding of that has shifted. I've sat in focus groups all over the country, including in some of our most carbon-intensive locations and it's actually some of the places where there are the most workers in fossil fuel industries where people are paying the most attention to the fact that the writing is on the wall. And I can show poll after poll that shows that people are quite happy to embrace the transition to clean energy as long as they know that government has a plan to look after workers and community along the way. Because we actually expect governments to do their jobs in this country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Weird. Yeah. This is actually something I meant to ask about earlier, but this might be a good time to flesh it out, which is the extent to which Australia is dependent on fossil fuel exports. I think people know that Australia exports a lot of coal and now gas. But the extent to which the economy rests on that, maybe, I think, was a little mind-blowing for me. So you talk about that for a second.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah. On the one hand, we are a massive problem. We have a big problem domestically. We have a big problem externally that we are exporting to the world. So we have the highest emissions per person than any other rich country other than Canada. Our domestic and export economies combined add up to about 11% of the emissions of the entire Asia Pacific region. We are the second biggest exporter of thermal coal in the world, biggest exporter of met coal. We have more proposed export coal mining than anywhere else on Earth. We are equal largest exporter of gas, along with the US and Qatar.</p><p>We have unexploited gas basins whose size is similar to the giant Marcellus Shale gas basin your readers, your listeners are probably familiar with. So what is quite interesting is that despite all of that damage, the entire fossil fuel industry still only employs 1% of Australians. But it is a significant provider of well-paid jobs in some very politically influential regions, often regions that have high unemployment otherwise. So that makes it very easy for the fossil fuel industry to use those workers as human shields to hold back progress.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A familiar dynamic.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it's less a significant source of government revenue than you would assume because of aforementioned mining industry success in fighting off attempts to actually make it pay its way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>But where it does really show up is in our export profile. So we have a small domestic market, big export-oriented kind of economy and our top exports in order are iron ore, coal and gas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, my goodness.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Right. So I think the only major export that we have that's very more knowledge sector, knowledge-intensive sector is education. But also we treated international students quite badly under COVID and so that's a highly competitive sector. So we're not doing a great job of actually preserving that bit of diversity in our export economy. And so we have essentially Dutch disease. So our dollar is intensely tied to the price of our commodity exports. And what that means is that every time there's a boom, the dollar goes up and that makes all of our other exports less competitive.</p><p>So some of them shut down. So it hollows out the rest of our export economy, which then makes our dollar even more closely tied to commodity prices and so on. And that can also show up in the influence of other sectors politically. So these sectors, all of the mining sectors really are enormously profitable and they are able to use those profits to influence how politics goes, including with very expensive ad campaigns.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Yeah. Talk about this. Is it Harvard that does it, this measure of economic complexity? This was really interesting to me to find out.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah. We are the world's 13th largest economy, but we rank 74th in economic complexity. So yeah, we really have the resource curse in all of the ways, whether it's what it does to the rest of the economy, but also when it comes to the influence it has on our politics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What it does to politics, what it does to the dollar. I think Australia is unique in that way in being a sort of modern, developed, wealthy economy, resting almost entirely on this pillar of dirty exports.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, certainly when it comes to our export economy. But it is important to kind of temper that with the recognition that when it comes to domestic employment, it doesn't loom as large as people would assume, given its big footprint in our exports.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, the same in the like. People are always saying the coal industry doesn't — employs fewer people than, you know, Hardee's or Arby's or whatever, forget what the cliche is, but it's not actually that big of an employer. But it looms so large in politics.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>We kind of had Dutch disease of the mind.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. So you mentioned some policies that are in place. One thing that I have found somewhat peculiar when I started reading about Australian climate politics and talking to people and hearing these sort of rundowns and such is kind of over on the side, weirdly, rarely mentioned, is this wild success Australia has had in rooftop solar power, which is like kind of this anomalous thing that doesn't really fit in with the rest of the story. And it seems like Australia would be out there waving this flag and bragging about it, but I hear weirdly little about it.</p><p>So tell us, how is it that Australia ended up with basically the cheapest rooftop solar power in the world? Basically, as far as I know, the cheapest the people who have rooftop solar in Australia now, the soft costs are so low that they basically have the cheapest residential power of anyone in the world.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>In world history.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In world history. And yet, you hear weirdly little about it. So, what is the kind of valence of this? How did this happen and why aren't people bragging on it more?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, good question. Back to a little bit of potted policy history. One of the very, very few things that John Howard, winding back in time, did that was good on climate was introducing the mandatory renewable energy target. Very, very modest at the time, just 2%, but it created a piece of infrastructure that could then be turned up, that was then increased under the Rudd government. So that was actually a real success of that first Rudd government, increasing that target to 20%. Very little fanfare, very little debate at the time. Then Tony Abbott wanted to turn it down because it was doing such a good job of getting more renewables into the system and cutting energy emissions.</p><p>But it was beloved, so he was able to cut it by about a fifth in 2015, but it stuck around, and it stuck around until 2020, when it was completely met. But that target was split into two parts. So one was the large-scale renewable energy target, which has now been met, but the other part was the small-scale renewable energy scheme, which creates an incentive for rooftop solar, basically, and that is still in place and is actually still creating an incentive for people to adopt rooftop solar. I think it equates to about a $2,500 rebate off the top of installing rooftop solar in Australia still.</p><p>And because that scheme was so long-lived, it really helped the industry scale up and learn and bring down those soft costs over time. So the industry got kickstarted by state-based feed-in tariffs that were very generous, usually the case. Right. You need those really generous feed-in tariffs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Very generous at first, from what I heard.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. But that is the thing that gets you the deployment, that allows the learning rates to kick in. It brings down the costs. So they do end up paying for themselves several times over, but then having something stable like that national Small-Scale Renewable Energy scheme pick up and then just stay the course year after year allowed for the industry to scale up, build their supply chains. Also, I think one of the things that did was it was so popular that almost before the distribution companies and the big utilities, the big private utilities, almost before they had noticed, it had been taken up wildly, was wildly popular.</p><p>And there was a whole cohort of people who were willing to defend their solar to the death. And so any attempt to slow down that uptake got fought with a kind of particular credit to the Smart Energy Council who set up to represent the small-scale sector. And so anytime a distribution company would say, oh, we want to limit solar exports, or anytime somebody tried to cut the small-scale renewable energy scheme, solar citizens who represented people who had solar on their roofs would fight that off and successfully. So, yeah, it created this constituency of people who were directly benefiting from solar on their roofs, who were then able to defend a great piece of policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's, again, a very familiar story in the US and in Germany, I think, both in that it kind of got born because nobody much noticed, because nobody much thought it would do anything. And then by the time the sort of powers that be realized what was happening, it's too late. You have all these constituents, which is another interesting political lesson here about distributed energy, I think. It's not just its energy generating power, but its constituency generating power.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it's the combination of the kind of climate history that we talked about and examples like this that make me increasingly attracted to ambition loop theories of policy change on climate. How do we actually create climate policy that stays? We make it popular by ensuring that it's delivering real benefits to real people in real places, whether that is good clean jobs in some of those carbon-intensive regions, or whether it's savings to households. And the job's not done, right. Even when it comes to rooftop solar. Yes, we are wildly successful, fastest uptake in the world.</p><p>Rooftop solar makes up half of our renewable capacity by gigawatts now — three gigawatts a year every year. Quite reliably and less volatile than the large-scale wind and solar construction industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's say one out of every three households. That is so wild.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>One in three. Yeah. And at half the cost of the US. So, yeah, wildly successful. And a lot of that is just because of that success in bringing down the soft costs. Right. But despite all of that success, we're currently at maybe 20 gigawatts, give or take, of rooftop solar capacity. If you look at our rooftop real estate, we have the potential for up to ten times that and we should be using it all because that is just about the lowest land use clean energy that you can get. It makes so much sense. Obviously, you get to avoid a bunch of transmission and distribution costs and it's really fast and the workforce is already there and it enables everybody to get a slice of the benefits of the clean energy sector on their roofs.</p><p>So of course we should be using all of that. It's not enough to get the whole job done, but if you look at very ballpark calculations of what it would take to completely repower Australia's domestic economy, that adds up to about half of the capacity that we would need. It's a big part of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What is the statistic Saul Griffith is always fond of citing: He says even if you could build this magic low-cost nuclear whatever, just the cost of transmitting power from a power plant to a house is greater than the cost of rooftop solar. So even if you can make free power, it would be more expensive to get it there than people are getting from rooftop solar.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>And of course we need the large-scale renewables as well. Right. We need wind so it generates at night. We do the transmission we need the negative correlation between the different parts of the country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about the Duck curve, because I'm imagining if everybody's got solar everybody's generating at the same time and you have, you know, already in California, for instance, where there's a lot of rooftop solar. You get, you know, flood during the day more than people need and then it drops off at night and you have this ramp up of other sources. Is that starting to pose a problem to the Australian grid?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean it's been a thing that we've been dealing with for a long time and every time people say that we couldn't possibly handle any more, then it gets proven wrong and a whole lot more gets installed and it's actually fine. One of the bleeding edge places where that's happening is in South Australia where they're actually quite often seeing getting close to zero demand at points in the day because of rooftop solar. And yeah, they're starting to come up with really creative ways of dealing with that. One of the ones that I am very excited about is that they have a virtual power plant scheme which has solar and batteries in a whole bunch of social housing properties.</p><p>So, this is publicly owned social housing for low-income people, and by being part of that virtual power plant, the residents of those houses get a big discount on their bills. But the grid operator gets a source of dispatchable power that they can deal with en masse instead of piece by piece. So that's pretty amazing. There's been a really interesting history about the relationship with the distribution companies and rooftop solar where they fought it tooth and nail, and it's starting to look like maybe there'll be some kind of enemies-to-lovers rom-com plot twist at the end where they'll actually decide that it's great and embrace it.</p><p>In South Australia, they've done a new thing where they're embracing flexible exports where basically they get a little bit more control over the export to be able to turn the solar down basically when they need it for local grid stability. But in return, the houses get to up the amount that they can export to the grid. So that earns the houses more from their rooftop solar exports. But yeah, the distribution company gets what they want too. But overall, even though it's like a pretty dreamy story here compared to other places, we still have further to go.</p><p>So the distribution companies really need to be made to shoulder the burden of proof of how much solar can you have. Because at the moment the default is that they just get to say no, we can't have any more and they don't have to show their data about why that might be the case. And we keep on finding out that they're being too conservative. So if we could shift that so that they had to prove that they couldn't handle anymore and release their workings, that would really shift things. Particularly, I think, for the somewhat larger installations.</p><p>So at the moment there are some limits on the bigger commercial rooftop solar installations. So you could unlock a whole bunch more of those by shifting that burden of proof.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This brings up two questions actually. One is, which I forgot to ask earlier. What is the sort of balance of the Australian grid currently? How much fossil is it versus renewable? Where are you at?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>We're at 35% renewable now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>35%. And it's mostly coal that's the fossil domestically. Right? But coal is declining, that's my —</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Certainly is. And there was a massive acceleration in the coal closure dates being brought forward. So we saw a couple of really big announcements. One was our biggest domestic polluter, AGL had a massive corporate campaign against them run very effectively by Greenpeace and a few other groups along with some really great strategic impact investment. So activist shareholders also being in the same mix so in response to all of that, AGL massively accelerated their coal closure timelines with a commitment to look after workers along the way and investing in clean energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Political pressure, not —</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Campaign pressure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>— not some sort of physical —</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Response to campaigning, but also response to the way that once you've got a certain amount of renewables in the system, the economics of coal shifts. Of course, because that solar dip in the day, that Duck curve really eats the lunch of coal company's profits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You need flexible sources. And the other thing is, anytime I have to do this, I'm required by law to do this because otherwise someone will send me an angry email. I have to ask about nuclear. Since we're talking about dispatchable capacity, what is the sort of Australian disposition towards nuclear? There's none here, there's none on the grid.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's no nuclear power here. And by the time that it would be plausible for a new nuclear power industry to get off the ground, 1.5 would have been and gone. So it's completely irrelevant on the timeline of 1.5 degrees in Australia.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So it's not a big political — it doesn't come up a lot.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>So the Liberal opposition is mad keen on nuclear —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, of course.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>And really, in the context of Australia, when you look at the economics, when you look at how cheap our renewables are, when you look at the way that the cost of batteries are coming down dramatically over time, like it is very, very clear that on any reasonable timeframe, there is no way that nuclear will stack up economically. And there is also no way that it can contribute to reducing our emissions on a timeline and that is relevant for a 1.5 degree world or the attempt to overshoot and get back to it.</p><p>So this is really a delay tactic. Right. Embracing unfeasible technologies is like one of the last resort plays in the playbook of the climate denier.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, familiar. Speaking of this, also, I keep hearing about this sort of semi-crisis of rising power prices, rising residential power prices, and it has something to do with the fact that you stopped using all your gas domestically and started exporting it. Is that right? When was that?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>It was over quite a few years that it happened, and governments at various levels were warned that when we had a massive LNG export industry and effectively hooked the domestic price of gas to the international price of gas, the price of gas would go up. In Western Australia, they had a domestic gas reservation policy, which meant that didn't happen. But on the East Coast yeah, there was nothing to basically stop gas companies from just getting as much as they could, which often meant actually signing long-term contracts to the international market and undersupplying the domestic market. And of course, when Putin invaded Ukraine, those global prices went through the roof.</p><p>And look at the kind of windfall profits that Australian gas companies were making in that context and it was in the tens of billions to — yeah, I think I saw 80 something billion of windfall profits, essentially war profiteering by coal and gas companies. And in response to that so that was one of the things that massively pushed up energy prices last year. Another factor was that our coal fleet is extremely old and unreliable and so it breaks down from time to time, unpredictably. And so, yeah, we had seen a couple of units go out at one coal plant and that pushed the price up.</p><p>So this is the situation we're in in Australia as well, is that we actually have to replace the coal plant. It's not like we can just keep it online forever. It needs to be replaced by something because it is old and some of the boilers are sort of held together with sticky tape.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is this a political threat to Labor currently, like these rising prices? Do they view it as like do people blame Labor for well —</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>What they did last year was introduce a price cap, which was a very popular move. The thing that I think was a bit of a missed opportunity there was that there was also massive popular support for introducing a windfall tax on those war profits at the time. And if they'd done that and put that money straight into household clean energy access so rooftop solar for the people who are currently locked out of it, like renters. Energy efficiency for the people who are currently living in Australian buildings that are built like leaky tents on average.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I hear, unusually notoriously leaky.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>So bad. So, yeah, that could be fixed with that kind of money. And that would give people a permanent reduction in their energy bills as opposed to what did happen, which was effective capping of wholesale prices and some direct assistance to households to help with a short-term impact on prices, but in a far more complicated way than you could have done with a windfall tax. Because what it actually meant was that the government was then on the hook for hundreds of millions of dollars in payments to essentially buy out the contracts that had been signed above the cap so that they didn't get sued by companies who wanted to make even more money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? And in the US now, we're stampeding toward building these LNG export terminals, just attempting to follow that very same narrative. We love our cheap gas and then we love our exports and then like, wait a minute. Let's take a sharp turn here back toward politics. One of the things that I have been most fascinated to hear about since I come from a land of incredibly stupid, binary, simplistic politics, I always find when I talk to people from other countries, they want me to tell them about the subtleties of American politics. And all I can ever tell them is, no, it's just as dumb as it looks. Just as dumb as it looks from the outside.</p><p>It's black and white, this side and that side. So tell me about the Teals, this phenomenon of basically what we would call, I think at home, moderate Republicans, maybe even Liberal Republicans, which in the context of US politics is an extinct species, here exists and has some power. So tell us a little bit about how that came about.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, I think the real origin story is a bunch of community movements starting up in some specific places, interestingly, not even in inner city Australia, which is where the Teals had a real landslide in the last election. But there's one example of a rural area in our state of Victoria where people were very unhappy with an incumbent MP who was very right wing, more so than the community. And a bunch of community activists got together and said hang on, the fact that this person is out of step with our community means that there is an opportunity to change things here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But they would never vote for Labor.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>But they wouldn't vote for Labor because it was not the kind of identity in group. Right. Voting for Labor was just not the thing that people thought of people like them as doing, if that makes sense. And so yeah, they got together and ran an amazing campaign where they picked their own candidate to represent the broader community and then ran that candidate as an independent —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>With no party affiliation.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>No party affiliation. And so that sparked movement all over the country of people realizing, ha, hey, if I'm not happy with my representation I too can run "Voices of Warringah" or "Voices of Indi" or "Voices of" all of these different places. There's the whole "Voices of" basically movement that are based in these different electorates where the community gets together and says, hey, if we're unhappy with our representation we can find someone else.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is mostly conservative communities where the representatives are nutbags and they want something that's not Labor but not a nutbag.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which seems like a lot of our communities would want to in the US. If they had any way out, any option. And so yeah, I should just say that teal is blue and green. Blue ,to scramble US brains, blue is the conservatives. And so these Teals, several fascinating things about them, they're still, I think, what you would call fiscally conservative but are good on climate.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>In other words, they're representing their communities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, conservatives who are good on climate and good on social issues too, right?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>I think yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And they are mostly professional women, is that right?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Which again was a constituency that was wildly underrepresented when the hard right had control of the Liberals nationally. And I should also note that we just talked about a couple of examples where it was hard right MPs who were very at odds with their community. In some cases these voices of movement started because even though their MP was from the moderate faction of the party, they weren't voting like a moderate, they were still voting for policies that were at odds with the values of the community.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so now there are these what are called Teals and what sort of power do they wield? How important are they to politics?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Well, they're a big part of why the coalition lost the last election in a bunch of its heartland, including seats that it had held for many decades. So they're a big part of why it is going to be very, very hard for the National Liberals to get back into government unless they get better on climate. So that does change the dynamics a bit. There's also an independent senator from one of the states who is on a very similar kind of model and that's senator David Pocock. And he sometimes has a casting vote on policy, or a very influential vote on policy, needing to pass the Senate.</p><p>So that's the upper house. So that's a bunch of hard power right there to shape policy as it's made.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so the Teals are viewed then as allies to Labor on climate.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>I think it's a little more complicated than that. I think you've got a bunch of representation of different sorts, different places, different sections of the community. Everybody plays politics against each other sometimes and with each other at other times. And through that giant shemozzle, sometimes you're able to get decent policy through.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Imagine complexity and coalition building. I don't suppose the National Liberal Party has responded to this defection of moderates by moderating.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Not yet at a national level that you can see as reflected in their current leadership. But there are increasing numbers of moderate champions who are being a little bit more outspoken within the party nationally. I think sometimes those lessons do take a while to learn. So one can always hope that they're going to recognize that they're on the wrong side of history, the wrong side of demographics, the wrong side of economics, and might need to get with the program. And I guess the one reason to hold out hope that that might be possible at some point, even though it's very hard to see right now, is that here in New South Wales where we're recording this podcast, the moderate treasurer so the previous treasurer, Matt Kean, was a massive champion of clean energy, massive champion of renewables.</p><p>Instituted a quite ambitious energy transition package to get the state to when we calculated, I think it was roughly 75% renewable by 2030. And managed to do that with the support of his whole party. Bringing his whole party along, including a bunch of rural conservatives who basically said, well, I can't vote against this many jobs and this much investment in my electorates.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>So the recipe is there like the playbook is there if they want to embrace the future rather than the past.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And this is also something that's very important to point out is one thing they can't do is what US Republicans are doing, which is picking and choosing their voters, or trying to suppress some voters and bring others out because —</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>We have an independent Australian Electoral Commission that actually makes decisions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No gerrymandering and compulsory voting.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everyone votes. So that alone, I think, is a firewall of sorts against lunacy, American-style lunacy. Everybody votes. There's an independent commission that does the district making, and there's also ranked choice or what we call ranked choice voting, all of which I think probably has moderating effects on. You can't get this sort of weird cultish —</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>It's a lot less about playing to the fringes or even playing to the base. A lot of it is actually about who can reach disengaged swing voters, which is its own kind of difficult task.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, but you know they're going to vote like they have to vote. So that's super fascinating. Of all the reforms that we talk about in the US, for some reason that one never comes up: compulsory voting. But from what I've heard about it here, it really has a lot of effects that we could use in the United States. What about the climate movement in Australia? We've seen in the US, the climate movement sort of beating down the door for years and finally has really sort of made its way into the upper echelons of the Democratic Party, has pushed climate to the top of the Democratic agenda in the US.</p><p>How big of a force is the climate movement here? Maybe you're slightly biased.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, definitely not an unbiased observer, but best attempt to be objective. If you look at where we are now compared to where we were a decade ago or a decade before that, and you think about why that has happened. Right, so the climate movement has got us to the point where the Liberals are unable to win places in their heartland unless they have a decent climate policy. Like that is quite transformative. The climate movement has got us to the place where large parts of the business sector are very reluctant to associate themselves with fossil fuels, where banks are rolling out investing in fossil fuels.</p><p>So that is a fairly transformative situation and obviously when you put that kind of pressure on the corporate sector and the corporate sector starts to change what it does, that in turn flows through into politics. So there were some fantastic campaigns to get 20 something of Australia's biggest companies to set 100% renewable targets by 2025. Actually, it's the corporate PPA sector, the power purchase agreement sector, that is currently underpinning a whole lot of renewables coming into the system and when that comes in, it changes the economics of the energy sector and that changes the politics. So a combination of that corporate campaigning and the community campaigning, that's just put climate higher and higher on the agenda of the voting public over time.</p><p>That has got us to where we are, but obviously where we are is still not good enough. So there's a lot further to go and there have been gaps. So I think that there are a bunch of places where geographically the climate has built up a whole lot of power to the point that it is now very hard to take a stance at odds with decent climate action. But there are a whole bunch of places where that work really needs to be scaled up. So that includes the fact that over a quarter of Australia's population is multicultural and the climate movement in Australia has historically been very white.</p><p>There are fantastic organizations who are working to change that, like Voices for Power organises multicultural communities. Here in New South Wales, Democracy in Colour are working to organize multicultural communities to get climate action that actually serves their communities. And historically, generally, I think the climate movement has not done enough to organize in low income communities and actually have organizing that is resourced both by and for low income communities getting the kind of clean energy solutions that serve them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about, briefly, critical minerals. This is something I didn't know until I started poking around coming down here, which is that Australia is like, I think, a top five country in almost all of these critical minerals that people are, which have become a very common subject of discussion in the climate world in the US. As we shift to renewable energy, certain minerals are going to become very hotly demanded and currently a lot of the supply chain for the minerals, especially minerals processing, goes through China. But what I did not realize is that Australia is a top five location for almost all of those critical minerals.</p><p>It's a huge, huge source of those minerals. So tell us a little bit about kind of what role that's playing in people's climate vision, because right now, as I understand it, they just mine them and send them abroad and then China processes them and then Australia buys them back as products. So do people have schemes? Because part of what IRA does is set the US on a trajectory to find friendly sources of these things and here's Australia a friendly source. So what role is that playing?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, if we go back to what it would take for Australia not to be a Kodak country, the real recipe there is taking the fact that we are the sunniest continent on earth and one of the windiest that our solar penetration per capita, like just the radiation per capita that we have at our fingertips is literally off the charts. Like you draw a chart and then it's off the top. And that gives us this enormous potential to take a whole bunch of the energy intensive materials that the world is going to need to decarbonize and decarbonize them here. So yes, we're exporting — we're currently the world's number one exporter of lithium, but we could also be doing more of the processing of that here using renewable power. We are currently the world's biggest exporter of iron ore. We could be doing a massive favor, really, to the world that needs to decarbonize its primary steel industry by processing that here using renewable hydrogen, because that will lower the cost of turning it into green iron. But it will also lower the environmental footprint of turning it into green iron because it lowers the land use footprint, because you basically need half as much renewable hydrogen to make green iron.</p><p>If you're using the hydrogen where it's made, rather than sticking it on a ship and sending it overseas. So there's an opportunity to do that also feels like a massive responsibility that we have to eliminate the enormous scope three emissions in our ore exports.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the idea is you use your massive wind and solar resources to generate green hydrogen and use the green hydrogen —</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>To take our iron ore and turn it into green iron. And then that gets stuck on a ship much more efficient. And then that gets turned into green steel in a bunch of our trading partners where we're currently sending the iron ore that have much more limited availability to do that kind of large scale renewable hydrogen production, but that would like to keep their steel industries so they get to still make the steel. Right? And there's a bunch of people who are really interested in this as a pathway and there's already a bunch, know, MoUs getting signed with companies in South Korea, in Japan and Australia looking at this pathway, which makes so much sense.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it sounds politically popular here too. Like when I was talking know, lawmakers in Canberra, this seems to be —</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Everybody loves manufacturing —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everybody's on board with this.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>People love making something that hurts when you drop it on your foot. But one thing that is incredibly important to remember when we're talking about all of this is that we are a colonized country without a national treaty. And all of this land is First Nations land, which obviously creates a clear moral obligation for anybody doing any of these developments to seek the free, prior and informed consent of the First Nations owners of the land where these projects are happening. There are also inadequate but real hard legal obligations for any company in most of the places where you'd be looking at these kinds of developments.</p><p>So if people are looking at Australia externally and going, "This is a massive opportunity," do make sure that you're doing your homework and figuring out when you're asking about any specific project, whether the company and the developer involved has actually negotiated in good faith with First Nations people. And there are some good examples starting to pop up of First Nations communities instigating large scale renewable projects themselves.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Potentially a huge opportunity for those communities.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Exactly. It really depends on the community, whether that is part of the vision for their own self-determination. Right. But in some cases, you've got these projects getting instigated where First Nations people are actually getting equity in some of these big projects. And that is, of course, what you would be wanting to see.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And tell me about the phrase "hydrogen superpower," because I hear it over and over and over again. Tell me what role that's playing. What is that vision, and do you buy it?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>I think that because of the Dutch disease of the mind that we talked about earlier, where it's really hard for Australia to imagine anything that doesn't look like what we've already done. The hydrogen hype was very effective in breaking the back of the idea that Australia could never export anything that wasn't fossil fuels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. It's just a different gas.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah. But what is actually exciting is that while we only want to use hydrogen for the things that we definitely need it for because it's a lot less energy efficient than electrification or efficiency for that matter, we do need it for some things, and we do need it for things like green iron. And so where we do need it, there is this enormous potential and a clear competitive advantage for Australia economically in using the renewable hydrogen where we make it so that we're essentially exporting embodied decarbonization.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, well, this is a lot to take in and this is a huge question to wrap up on, but I would like to hear two things from you. One is, as we said, Labor is at once suffering from a little PTSD from its previous backlashes and failures on climate and is a little leery about spending too big or going too big. But on the other hand, there's this enormous momentum from the climate movement, there's this enormous momentum from the public. There's this huge resource available. There's this pathway now via critical minerals and iron ore and hydrogen for Australia to pivot and become a productive force for good in the climate world rather than just a source of emissions.</p><p>So if you were predicting or guessing, where do you think all this going to shake out? What do you think Labor might do? What do you think it might actually take on and try to do? And then following up on that, what would you like to see it do that's within the realm of plausibility?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, if we were starting from what I'd like to see them do, let's start with what has to happen and work backwards from there. So I'd love to see us actually embrace the fact that we're going to have to fully decarbonize our domestic and export economies and work backwards from there with a strategic plan to transform the economy and a plan to look after workers and communities along the way. That's what I'd love to see, and that is what the science tells us that we need to see. What I would love is actually to see them stop thinking incrementally and start thinking transformatively.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It seems like IRA, the Inflation Reduction Act, has at least sort of like introduced that glimmer of possibility. The fact that the US sort of went big at least has put going big on the table for Australia, it seems like.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. Yeah. I mean, basically right now they're doing a bunch of modest and incremental sensible things when it comes to decarbonizing the domestic energy sector and then kind of putting their hand over their eyes when thinking about the damage that our coal and gas exports are doing to the world. And modest and incremental is better than Tony Abbott grade wrecking, but it really doesn't cut it in a world where the IPCC is saying we have to be net zero by 2040 and the International Energy Agency is saying we need no new coal and gas starting now.</p><p>So modest doesn't match the scale of the problem, but it also doesn't match the scale of the opportunity. And Bowen, our Energy Minister, loves to say that the world's climate emergency is Australia's job's opportunity and it is true. I will believe that we are embracing that opportunity at the scale that it warrants when I start seeing announcements that are closer to the scale of investing in a bunch of silly submarines, in a bunch of terrible defense policy at the cost of hundreds of billions of dollars.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We don't have time to go down that rabbit hole. But for some reason Australia is buying nuclear submarines. That's broken my brain when I found out about it.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah. So basically it's a question of scale and speed. So they need to be both embracing the scale of the jobs opportunity when it comes to actually ensuring that we get the firmed renewables to the industrial hubs that will be doing this decarbonization of our exports for the benefit of us, for the benefit of the world. Like when we're actually seeing the renewables being delivered at scale and the investment in that at scale that will start getting to the point where we're really matching the scale of the opportunity. Also when we're actually recognizing that the job's not finished when it comes to clean energy justice at a household level.</p><p>And that the way that you deal with the volatile prices that we have been seeing because essentially our coal and gas industries are quite greedy, is to actually enable every household to access the benefits of energy efficiency, of rooftop solar, particularly the renters who have really been locked out until now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What would that look like, though? Will this be one big policy package, do you think? Do you want to see a renewable energy trading scheme or big subsidies and investments like IRA?</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>I want standards and investment and justice, David!</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awhee!</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think we need a great big package that delivers the clean jobs to the regions and the clean energy savings to households. Some of that would involve some standards at a national level. Some of it would involve some payments to the States in order to enable them to expand household clean energy access, because the Feds have most of the money and the States do most of the service delivery in this country. Very familiar picture, I'm sure. So, yeah, if we were to see something like that at scale, then we'd be getting there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right. Fingers crossed. Well, Miriam Lyons, thanks so much for coming in and chatting and explaining Australia to us.</p><p><strong>Miriam Lyons</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts Subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-australian-climate</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:135951876</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 23 Aug 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/135951876/369f46be237cde21064fc7eb2b44bca1.mp3" length="75009496" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3749</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/135951876/e5afeb89415a9a95e674d12804bf695d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with interconnection queues?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, clean grid expert Chaz Teplin demystifies interconnection queues.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADpr0aJpeLG3qrAIgJQXBfPa/volts23.08.09%28chaz.teplin%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/whats-the-deal-with-interconnection-queues"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>By now, you’ve probably heard that tons of new renewable energy projects are “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/energy-transition-interconnection-reform-ferc-qcells/628822/">stuck in the interconnection queues</a>,” unable to connect to the grid and produce electricity until grid operators get around to approving them, which can take up to five years in some areas. </p><p>And you might have heard that FERC recently <a target="_blank" href="https://ferc.gov/news-events/news/ferc-transmission-reform-paves-way-adding-new-energy-resources-grid">implemented some reforms of the interconnection queue process</a> in hopes of speeding it up.</p><p>It all seems like a pretty big deal. But as I think about it, it occurs to me that I don’t really know what an interconnection queue is or why they work the way they do. So I’m going to talk to an expert — Chaz Teplin, who works on carbon-free grids with <a target="_blank" href="https://rmi.org/">RMI</a> — to get the lowdown.</p><p>We’re going to talk through the basics of interconnection queues, why they’re so slow, what RTOs and FERC are doing to reform them, and what remains to be done (namely some friggin’ regional transmission planning).</p><p>With no further ado, Chaz Teplin. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You know, as I said in my intro, it seems like the clean energy community at this point has heard the term interconnection queue enough times that they all know it enough to say it, right. We know on some level that interconnection queues are slowing things down and they're backed up and that's why we're not building renewable energy as fast as we should be. But I suspect that quite a few of my listeners are roughly where I am, which is that's basically where my knowledge runs dry. I can say the words, so I'm excited to talk to you about what the heck they are, why they exist, etc., how to solve them, etc.</p><p>So maybe let's just start with why is it that all of a sudden everybody's talking about interconnection queues? Why has this come to the top of the pile recently?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, everybody's talking about interconnection queues and there's been a recent order from FERC amid the hullabaloo. Right. So I think it's a good news, bad news story. The good news is that there's currently two terawatts of generators asking to connect to the US grid. And almost all of that two terawatts is clean energy, wind, solar and storage. So for those of us that have been in the business for a while, this is unbelievably great news. That means there's so many projects out there of clean energy mostly there's some gas, but clean energy mostly that believe it's economic to connect to the grid and they're willing to pay a fee in order to ask to connect.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And how much is that relative to what's currently on the grid?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's not exactly an apples to apples comparison, but two terawatts asking to connect 1.25 terawatts approximately on the US grid today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So there's more waiting to get on than exists currently on the grid. Now, we know, I'm sure you're going to say, we're going to say probably 50 times during this pod, just because something's in the queue doesn't mean it will necessarily get built. So it's not like all of that two terawatts is real or inevitable, but still, the fact that more is waiting to get on the grid than currently exists on the grid is quite striking.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>That's right. And every year more is asking to connect, right? So, yeah, absolutely, it's not going to all get built. But I think it's a fairly clear demand signal that generators and developers are giving. They want to connect to the grid. They believe they can make money doing so, so it's great news.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And yet they are stuck there.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>So that's the good news. The bad news is twofold. First, say I'm a wind or solar generator developer wanting to connect to the grid. It's going to take me years after I ask, before I even find out if I'm allowed to connect. Three, sometimes even five or more years. It depends on the grid and some of the details, but it takes years. And that adds cost and obviously time to your project that you don't want. And that's unfortunate. And second, it's bad because a lot of times what the grid operator comes back with is a really large bill that could easily make it so that your project is uncompetitive, no longer makes sense.</p><p>And so you see high dropout rates. So yeah, the queue is huge. That's good. It shows that there's demand, but it's bad because projects take too long to get through the queue and even find out what the cost is going to be to connect. And often those costs are high.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This might even be too obvious to say, but I think it's worth emphasizing at the outset that it's just a little crazy. Anyone who's an investor or who's tried to manage a project or build a project, just imagine if you had to say to your investors, not only like, this is a worthy project now, but this will be worthy in three years, or it will be worthy in five years. How do you know? It's just an insane addition of uncertainty and risk to every single solitary project.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Right. And you don't know how much it's going to cost. It's like this cost of my project is a dollar a watt, plus or minus $0.50. That's not really reasonable because you don't know what the connection cost is going to be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know it's just an insane business environment. Like we're not sure of what your costs are, not sure how long it's going to take, and then you're trying to talk investors into sort of sticking with you through this.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>One thing I want to add on that is it causes problems for developers, for investors, but it also causes problems for the grid. And the problems sort of are in this reinforcing loop. Because developers don't know where to ask to connect or how long it's going to be. They tend to put in a lot of speculative projects. Because they are hoping that one of them is a good deal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Playing the table, right?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>That's right, they're playing the table and unfortunately that doing that might be good for them but it puts a huge load on the grid operator to try and process all this and makes it bad for everybody because then it makes the process take even longer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>It's an example of the rule of incenting bad behavior and then the bad behavior cycling.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So let's back up then and talk about what an interconnection queue is exactly, and why they exist. Like why do utilities need every project to stand in a single file line and be approved one by one? Why?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>So, there are some very good reasons and then some arguable reasons for having an interconnection queue. The clear and very good reason, and we're all glad that they exist, is because the grid operator does need to ensure that a new generator on the system won't cause some cascading set of failures that could bring down a significant fraction of the grid. That's not likely, but it's possible. The way that that would work is you would study the grid under some set of scenarios and then the key thing is then you also ask so what if something else on the grid fails that would cause transmission or cause power to flow along the transmission lines in different ways.</p><p>And if you, for example, overloaded a line or a substation, that would be bad. And so you might need to upgrade that substation to make sure that when this new generator comes online you don't cause a problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're just ensuring for each individual project that that individual project will not be sort of the straw that broke some camel's back.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>That's right. And it's important to understand though that's like one piece and every grid operator studies that to make sure that there's not going to be a problem. But there's a second piece which is making sure that the power from that generator is usually going to be deliverable to load, meaning you don't have to turn it off to keep things in safe conditions. And that's a little bit different. And that's related to how grid operators plan for resource adequacy, making sure that there's always enough generation to meet load. And different grid operators do that in different ways.</p><p>But a lot of the different opinions about how we should do this come down to how much we should ensure that different projects are deliverable to the system. And it's related to how grid operators again think about making sure that there's always enough generation online at a given time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so that seems like a reasonable reason to have a queue. Is that the main one?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>The one that's universal right is the making sure there isn't cascading failures issue. The one that is more controversial is the connection to resource adequacy because different grids do that in different ways. And then the other related issue is that in a lot of grids today, this is the primary way we invest in the transmission system is we ask the next generator to pay for upgrades to the transmission system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, this is the part I always stumble over the craziest thing to me so I want to just spend a second on it. The analogy I always hear is like a line of cars waiting to get on the freeway. The freeway can only fit so many cars. So when the freeway reaches capacity we ask the next car in line to build a new lane of the freeway, basically. So the next generator in line when capacity is reached is on the hook for paying for new transmission which is as crazy as it sounds, yes?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's pretty much like that. So it's a competition to be the car after the person had to pay because then you sort of get to nominally free ride.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly. Or the car before or just like not be that car. You don't want to be like that one car who it's like a lottery almost.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it's important to recognize though that it's crazy in the current system to look at it that way. But when these roles were put in place it wasn't quite as crazy as it seemed. In a world where that we're in today, where we're seeing lots of new generation that is sort of geographically constrained. You want to put low cost wind farms where it's windy, you want to put solar farms where it's sunny and the cost to build is low. Those are sort of geographically constrained. In previous eras where load was flat and we were mostly building gas plants, you can kind of build a gas plant wherever it's convenient for the grid.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>And so to continue with the analogy, you can get to your destination through lots of different highways so you're encouraged to use an empty one. But that's no longer the world we're in now. And because, and this is the key thing, because we haven't been doing significant investments in transmission, we're in this place where all of the key highways are clogged or close to being clogged and lots of cars are waiting in line to get on that highway.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So is it the case that if you are the project that just draws the short straw and happens to be in line or at the head of the line when new transmission is needed, two questions: One, how much additional cost is that to you, does it double your cost? How much is it for a developer to pay for new transmission? Is that sort of dispositive amount of additional money? And number two, if you are the unlucky person in that spot or the unlucky project in that spot. And you hear back from the RTO that, yes, you can connect if you build a new transmission line, can you then just say, well, never mind, right, and then drop out, and then the next project behind you is the unlucky project and then why wouldn't that project also just drop out?</p><p>So who accepts these additional costs? It seems like you don't have to like everybody would be trying to avoid it.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>That's right, everybody's trying to avoid it. Absolutely. You aren't required to build your project when you enter the queue. You might lose your deposit. So the cost can be very large. The queues that make it all the way through, often they are ones with manageable costs and so they do get built or they run into the next set of challenges, things like supply chains currently or permitting. But those projects that do make it through the queue often are the ones that chose a good place on the grid, if you will. Like I mentioned earlier, it's sort of a cascading problem if a project drops out, that also impacts all of the projects around you. So now somebody else becomes the second car, the second car becomes the first car. And so then the RTO needs to go and restudy and say, oh, we thought that generator A was going to be online, but they dropped out, so now we have to restudy the whole thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And those studies are what take years.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>The studies themselves are pretty complicated because first you have to look at every possible failure on the grid that could happen and then you have to look at, well, okay, if that fails and something else fails, what happens? That's part of the interconnection queue study and they are processor and human intensive. And so, yes, they actually take a long time to do the studies. They're expensive in terms of having the staff and even the computational capabilities to run. And so they take a long time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we can get a situation here that's trying to paint a picture where all these projects are in line. A project comes to the head of the line, the RTO takes years to study, comes back and tells the project, our study concluded that we don't currently have capacity to accommodate you, so you're going to have to build a new transmission line if you want to connect to the grid. And that project says, oh, that's going to double my costs. No thank you, I'm dropping out. And then the years long study process starts over again. That's like two years a pop, three years pop with nothing happening and nothing getting interconnected. That just seems like an insanely slow way to do things.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yes. And so there's been lots of ideas about how to fix some of these process-oriented challenges and some RTOs are already doing that. And FERC has made some progress this week. We'll get to there I'm sure. But yes, that is a fairly close approximation of the existing process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is any transmission getting built this way? It just seems like the most inefficient possible way to build transmission, too. Are there projects that get stuck with this obligation to build new transmission who do it? And are we seeing transmission getting built through this?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, most projects will have some interconnection cost, right? And so they do make some improvements to the transmission system. So some developers are able to make it work and they'll swallow the cost and that benefits everybody else on the system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>They pay for it. So, yes, we are building a small amount of transmission in that way. Not very much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right. And also, it seems worth pointing out that in terms of transmission planning, building each increment of transmission based on what the next project in line requires also seems like the most myopic possible way to be building transmission. Like, you're not planning for the future, you're just literally reacting —</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>on a project by project basis.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah. And like I said, it's not crazy in a world where you don't imagine the grid needs to change very much, but it'll never get us to where we need to go with the energy transition underway. And this has big implications. In terms of economics, as ACORE has pointed out, in terms of states meeting their clean energy goals, as NRDC study recently showed, and then even in terms of reliability, which PJM in the Mid Atlantic has shown, they're worried about retiring fossil plants and these problems and the lack of ability to get projects online, being out of sync and then having reliability issues. Not having enough resource adequacy to meet demand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So this process is not going to be fast enough for any of the things we want to do to hit our carbon goals, state carbon goals, utility, carbon goals, utility, reliability. All these things require some speed and agility, which this is standing in the way of. So why is it like this? How did it get this way?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yes, I mean, the current system was set up in the 2000s where natural gas was the primary generation being added and could be flexibly cited. And so in order to try and set up the system in the way that made sense, FERC suggested that we have this participant funding paradigm where new generators pay for the transmission needs that they require. That's how we got here, and there's a lot of status quo bias towards keeping that system, and there's not a lot of appetite among many for changing it dramatically.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This I don't understand, though, because I'm not a grid expert, but even just explaining it to me in this way, it's very obvious to me that it's not working. It's obvious from the results that it's not working. It's obvious from any description of the process that it's clearly not working. It's not working for anybody, for anybody's goals. Why isn't there more appetite for large scale change? Is it just the conservatism of the industry?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, you're putting me in a tough spot here, David, but I think there is a lot of hesitancy to change. Cost allocation is often a problem with — if we're not going to ask new generators to pay for the transmission, who are we going to ask to pay for it?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>And then there's disagreements between again, to go back to PJM the grid I perhaps know the best, between states that have clean energy goals that are excited to do this kind of transmission planning and states without that feel like they're being burdened with other states goals. I don't think that's a good argument necessarily for not building transmission because just the economics and reliability benefits from the transmission alone are more than adequate to make a great case.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To make a great case for ratepayer benefit, for citizen benefit. But the utilities in those states with no targets, their narrow financial interests may not always line up with — they make a lot of money through the grid being congested is one of the dark secrets there.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yes, of course. There are financial actors that have a spot on the grid where power prices are higher than they would be otherwise. And if you happen to own the generator there, you're making more money. And if you did the transmission and you had to compete with that's just unavoidably true. We would hope that the stakeholder processes and the RTOs and whatnot would take the broader picture about what's best for the full system, for the economics and everything. But it's hard to make those changes and it's always hard to make a change from the status quo, especially if it was — there were long battles in the 2000s about getting to this era, so folks are always hesitant to make that effort, to really look at what could be done differently.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So let me ask what might be a naive question, but what would happen if an RTO, a regional transmission organization that's responsible for the sort of wholesale electric market in a region, just threw open the door and let projects connect? First come, first serve as they show up? Without this extended single file line process, would things come crashing down? Is that even a possibility?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, that is basically or has been at least the ERCOT model, which is in Texas. Right. So to be clear though, they still do interconnection queue studies. They just don't worry about deliverability to the same extent. They still make sure that new projects won't cause dynamic instabilities in the grid that could cause cascading failures. Everybody does that. What happens though is you put on the developer the risk that they just will have to be curtailed much more often.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, because of grid congestion.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. It's also tightly related to the different ways that in this case, ERCOT handles resource adequacy. In ERCOT, there is no effort to make sure that there's always enough power to meet demand. They trust that high energy prices will incent developers to build projects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. For the nerds, this is an energy-only wholesale market. They do not have a capacity market alongside it.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>That's right. And so, because in PJM, in order to qualify for the capacity market, PJM, quite reasonably wants to make sure that you can actually deliver power to load, otherwise you're not really helping much with resource adequacy. Though there's some details there. In ERCOT, there's no such concern. They just trust that developers will look for places on the grid where they think there might be high energy prices, because there's barely enough generation to meet load, and that that will incent development and so they don't have to be as careful with that kind of analysis. And so it speeds up the system.</p><p>They put more of the risk on developers that their projects will get curtailed and so they're able to make their interconnection queue process go more quickly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it works?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Well —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>ERCOT's had some troubles lately.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Their queues are much shorter and they are able to process applications much more quickly. Every grid has been having its challenges in ERCOT especially. I'm not sure I would blame the recent outages there on this problem. The other thing that in the past, ERCOT has done well and is the solution everywhere, as we've hinted all along, is the CREZ transmission planning effort made it much easier to connect a whole bunch of wind energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What's the CREZ?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, this was an effort that the state and ERCOT took to recognize renewable energy zones and plan significant transmission investments that made it possible to connect all of the amazing wind in the Texas panhandle.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Proactively planning and building the transmission for when they show up, rather than waiting for them to show up.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then building the transmission in reaction. So that sort of takes that bit of risk off the developer's back.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Right, that's right. Or you do in places where there's been proactive transmission planning, there's a surge in projects in those regions with the new transmission and the interconnection costs are much lower.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And what does CREZ stand for? I can't let this go.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Now you're going to get me. It's something for renewable energy zones.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>And we would love and many folks are calling for the same thing, that we need to do a lot more of this kind of proactive transmission planning for reliability, for economics, for reducing costs to customers and to help relieve the stress on the interconnection process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I think this is a theme here, not only in this podcast, but on all of Volts and indeed all of the clean energy world. It is mind-bogglingly crazy that we're not doing large scale regional transmission planning when that is clearly necessary to shorten these queues, to improve reliability, to reduce costs, to meet our energy emissions targets. Just name it. If you look in these models, Princeton has done these models of IRA's effect, the Inflation Reduction Act's effect and how big the effect is depends almost entirely on how much transmission gets built. Like the modeling that shows big reductions from this depend on a ton of transmission getting built. And right now we just aren't doing it. It's crazy. I know I'm just repeating myself at this point, but it's so crazy, I feel like I need to just say it over and over again.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>And we can make the argument for that based on economics, benefits to ratepayers and reliability. As you've said, in other cases, the emissions reductions are just a bonus. I think it's also important to notice where progress is being made. For example, in PJM again, my favorite grid there is now the start of some regional planning. So there's going to be a huge opportunity there to look at what that looks like.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Maybe let's take a minute to focus in on PJM because PJM is sort of like the poster child for this difficulty, right? They have the biggest queue, the slowest queue. Like, this is the problem that's most acute there. So maybe tell us a little bit about PJM, like where it is and what it is and why it has this problem so badly.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah. So PJM is in the Mid Atlantic 13 or 14 states, District of Columbia, it's the nation's largest grid operator with 150 gigawatt peak. They have 3000 queued projects, even though they stopped taking actually projects into the queue for some time because they just couldn't process it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you can't even go to PJM now and set up a new renewable energy project, basically, like you can't even get in the queue at all.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, they've just restarted their process. I want to acknowledge the staff at PJM and the stakeholders at PJM have a really hard job to manage this large collection of politically diverse states. And they see their job as keeping the lights on and doing so economically, and they're balancing lots of competing things. So their job is hard for sure, but the queue process, they have not done any real regional transmission planning for some time. So they've looked at where transmission projects are needed to relieve, like, immediate congestion on their system and they do a good job of building those kinds of projects, but they haven't done any of these regional transmission projects for some time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is their queue notably slower than other queues? Like, do their studies take longer or are they just in a particularly large and busy place?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>No, objectively, their queues have been taking longer to process, typically five years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Esh...</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah. Compared to nationally, about three years. Again, the good news is that there's lots of projects in their queues.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I sort of wonder why, though. I start to wonder why, if you're the 2970th project in the queue, why bother? Like if it's taking five years per project, you're not going to come up for approval until like the year 4000 or whatever.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>It's a good question. I think these project developers though, right, they have to take a long view. They know that in five years, if they still want to have work, they got to put projects in now. And so there's a lot of speculation about where good projects will be and where they'll be able to get generations cited. And so it's worth taking the risk and we'll get to the FERC piece, but there's relatively little cost to adding your project to the queue and it potentially could be a really valuable position to do so. Really profitable to build a project there.</p><p>So people do still have a lot of appetite to put projects on the queue, even with a long time horizon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And do they have unique reliability problems in PJM that are either exacerbating or being exacerbated by this interconnection process?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>One thing that makes it easier in PJM, I'd argue, is there's very little variable generation on their grid right now. They have very little wind and solar, less than 5% of generation in PJM is from wind and solar, whereas it's much higher in many other parts of the country. It is true. PJM has done recent studies of their own where they are very concerned about in the out years, about resource adequacy, they're looking at upcoming electrification, they're looking at coal retirements and they're concerned that they can't get new generation online fast enough. The official take on it and others take on it places the blame at different places on the system and the solution at different places.</p><p>What we'd like to see is transmission planning and reforms to the queue that makes it easier to get new generation online. We think that's the opportunity with the best economics and the most reliability and of course also the bonus emissions reductions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so isn't it the case that outside of ERCOT, no RTO seems to be really like killing it on this? But didn't MISO recently do some things to have some reforms that sort of sped things up somewhat? Aren't they? I thought they made news recently with some reforms.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>There is progress around the country, not to the extent that we'd like to see. MISO's process is probably seen as one of the better ones. They've had a long stakeholder process and they've identified the first of four tranches of new transmission that they have approved at the RTO level. Right. So MISO is approved. There's also good things going on in California. California has identified that they need a lot more transmission to bring more generation in from out of state. And I mentioned PJM starting up a new process and of course, FERC is looking at requiring with a new rule that regional transmission planning be more holistic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it one of the things MISO is doing? And this I feel like is one of the reforms, sort of the near term easy reforms I see tossed around a lot, which is at least approving projects in batches instead of one at a time.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah. And this is perhaps the biggest deal in the FERC order as well. So most of the RTOs now are moving towards more of a batch process. So it's not like the example, the metaphor you used earlier with the cars in line, where the last car that gets tasked with the whole lane, instead they look at looks like there's twelve cars coming online in this freeway entry. We're going to look at what it's going to cost to add all of them at once.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And if it requires a new transmission, then the cost of the new transmission gets spread out over those twelve projects.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>That's right. They also ask more of the developers in each of these so-called clusters. They want to do more to increase the financial and the siting, make sure that they actually have the land available to them, that they're serious projects. And so this first ready, first served approach where you look at clusters of projects and require the developers to show that they're likely to actually build the project, is hoping to fix a lot of the issues that we talked about. Not all of them, there's still going to be a lot more to do. But this is something that now FERC is requiring that MISO and PJM and their new process is requiring, I believe SBP does it as well in California.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This batching?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It seems like if nothing else, that would impose a little sort of discipline on the queue. Like you wouldn't get in the queue so casually, like you wouldn't get in the queue unless you're really ready to go.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>And these clusters sort of progress together and it handles dropouts much more efficiently so that there's less re-re-re-re-studies, still some, but — the process should move a lot faster and more efficiently. With these best practice cluster studies.</p><p>Do we have empirical evidence that these reforms are going to speed things up? Or is it just hope at this point? Has it been implemented anywhere long enough for us to judge its success?</p><p>I wish I had great data on that. I don't. I know that MISO for sure has been doing this now for a little while, and I'd welcome a listener to comment somewhere on whether there's data there. But I think everyone agrees that this is best practice and we're seeing better results with the process moving along more efficiently.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so let's talk about FERC then. So FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, obviously this problem has been bouncing around for a while and people have been angsty about this and we desperately need reforms of this. The chance to do it legislatively came and went. So sort of all on FERC's back now. So what exactly did FERC take upon itself to do and what did it do?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah. So FERC Order 2023, named obviously after the year was issued last week. It's a 1500 page light read.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yikes!</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I admit I have not read all of it but can summarize what a lot of folks have been talking about. So perhaps most importantly, it moves to this first ready, first served approach and this cluster study approach which includes some more requirements from developers to show their projects are serious.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this has force of law now like RTOs have to do that?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>That's correct. The way it works is that all the RTOs will have to say, okay, we see your order, we're required to do it in certain ways. This is how we're going to change our process and then FERC approves that. And a lot of the RTOs already have a FERC approved process. Likely a lot of them will have to over the course of the next few months, revise their already approved processes to comply with the new order or ask for an exception. There's going to be a lot of action there to try and make sure that the RTOs are as aggressive as possible in how they comply with this new order.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm sort of wondering if we can just kind of a timeout here, but I'm just curious what the sort of disposition of the RTOs is toward this. Are they looking at this as like, oh, here come the Feds imposing onerous restrictions on us or are they on board, do they want to do this? Are there any RTOs that are sort of like pushing back or recalcitrant on this type of reform?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>I mean, compliance is always a burden, right? But I think FERC's stakeholder process and comment process is extremely extensive and the RTOs get a large voice in that process. So the order itself is quite long. But the comments they got on the draft order, the notice of proposed rulemaking was even longer and so shout out to all the FERC staff that had to read all those orders and try and make sense of it and final rule. So the RTOs of course are going to like some things and dislike others and have to work hard to comply.</p><p>And I think that FERC did a good job of balancing the needs. Of course we probably would have asked them to go further in some ways, but a lot of what they've done is really good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what else is it? There's the clustering, first ready, first served.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, they now need and there are studies of like how can we solve the issues that we did identify. They now have to include what FERC called alternative transmission technologies. Right. So things like new ways of moving power on the grid and other tricks that we can play to get more out of the current system. Unfortunately — also they're called GETs, grid enhancing technologies — so a lot of these technologies are really cost effective, most studies show, but they're not always adopted. And so now we probably would have liked this ruling to be a little bit stronger. We think that the opportunities for these technologies is really great and the payback times are often measured in months, not years.</p><p>And so we'd like to be adopted more aggressively. They're now required to at least consider and evaluate the option there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's it though, they have to consider and think about grid enhancing technologies?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah. We haven't, I haven't especially, gone through the detailed language in the order to know exactly how that's going to look, but I think a lot will come down to how the RTOs actually comply.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Longtime listeners will remember I did a piece on grid enhancing technologies a couple of years ago and a pod on it, and it's just sort of like advanced digital stuff, as you say, to get more performance, more throughput out of existing lines. And it always struck me that if we have these technologies available and we know they're available and we know they work, then RTOs are like utilities refusal to use them violates the sort of core utility mandate for just and reasonable rates. Like, you could lower rates by using these. So it seems like it ought to be more enforceable.</p><p>It seems like something that you could sue utilities over, not just like a helpful suggestion.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah. A lot of people have made the just and reasonable argument that these are cost-effective technologies and it's just crazy not to use them to the greatest extent that we can. There's always the balance that comes back on. Are they really proven? And we have to be very conservative because we don't want to risk the grid. I think the evidence is there that that's not a great argument. And so we have projects to really try and push getting more of these GETs technologies onto the grid to reduce interconnection costs and just use our existing grid more efficiently while we build out the transmission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and when we say more efficiently, like getting 30, 40, 50% more out of it. These are not small numbers that these technologies enable.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, often. And they're fairly low cost and can be deployed a lot more quickly than building a new transmission line.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes!</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>They make a lot of intuitive sense and most of the studies support that. There's always some devils in the details and so we're even doing some quantitative work there to try and show how much it could reduce costs and increase deliverability.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I need to revisit that. I need to revisit that subject on the pod. Okay, so FERC saying batch processing, you have to at least think about and consider grid enhancing technologies.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Well, there is now some deadlines and penalties if the processing takes too long. So there is some stated rules about we expect you to process interconnection applications in a certain amount of time. I don't think this is like start to finish when you get in to when you get the final results of the study. It's more like how these cluster studies should progress as they go through. So we think that's good. The penalties, I don't believe, are extremely large by utility numbers, but it's still meaningful that they're there and I think it should be a way to encourage transmission owners and RTOs to move quickly.</p><p>As an aside, I think this isn't in the FERC order, but just from a pure staffing perspective, it's really a challenge for the RTOs as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Capacity. Capacity. Capacity our favorite subject here.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>That's right. Yeah. So you did a workforce pod and I don't think it was too much focused on this kind of issue, but yeah, the need for transmission engineers is far exceeding the supply. So all you engineering students out there, please go into transmission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right. So that seems like those three things together seem like reasonable, incremental reforms —</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>from FERC. So nothing bad. Is there more that FERC could have done? Like, I'm sort of curious about the kind of limits of its authority here. What would you like to see it do that it didn't do?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, I think the regional transmission planning and ideally even interregional transmission planning, I'd be remiss if I didn't say, like, please, we need to do everything we can to make that kind of transmission planning the default and the requirement. So that's number one, it's not a fast fix because it takes a while to build transmission —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm just curious whether FERC can do that because this was the whole debate over they tried to get it in the legislation and then that deal fell apart and it fell out of the legislation. And then people are like, well, we'll just go to FERC. And so I'm curious, I think a lot of people are curious whether FERC can do that to the extent legislation could have.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, they're not going to be able to do obviously legislation is more flexible. Right. But FERC does have a notice of proposed rulemaking on regional transmission that has been a huge focus and hopefully will come out over the course of the next year and hopefully require this transmission planning. It's definitely within their jurisdiction to my understanding, though. Though I'm not a lawyer to make that caveat.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, it would just make so much more sense to go plan your transmission grid and then for the RTO to go out and say, hey, we're going to build transmission here. It can accommodate X amount of new energy bid for this spot on the grid. Right. So instead of backing into the future, you're sort of proactively filling out your grid according to your vision.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>That's right. And that requires broad alignment, though, about everybody in the market trying to say, yeah, what is the future that we envision? It's not going to just be a — so it's a long and complicated stakeholder process that we're all excited to partake in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It'd be super nice, wasn't it, if we had federal, if we didn't have this patchwork of states with radically different visions about what they want to do and radically different targets. It'd be nice if we were sort of like everybody's on the same page and striving for the same goal. It is politically a super sticky wicket to do interregional transmission planning with states that are so heterogeneous.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>The clean part of it is challenging politically but the reliability and the cost perspective isn't so bad. So the Hickenlooper bill that would have required more interregional transmission built does have bipartisan support, and we're hopeful that that will come back and there'll be a chance for a requirement there on the legislative side. But in the near term, and as for what we can do to fix these problems the FERC oder, perhaps order 2024 is really top of mind for everybody in this space.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So FERC can do more and do you think wants to?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>I'm not going to guess what the current set of four commissioners are going to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? We're still lacking one, aren't we?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>We're still lacking one. Yeah. So we currently, I believe, have four. Commissioner Danly's term I believe, is up or coming up but is able to stay on for, I believe, till the end of the year. So yeah, we may be down to three shortly. It would be great to have, as they say, a fully staffed and operational FERC.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I'm sure Joe Manchin will find some way to screw that up and delay that appointment. I want to ask one final question, but first, I want to ask a second to final question because I forgot to ask about this earlier. This is something I've always been sort of curious about. Generation projects in the queue are one thing, but lots of projects these days will be combined generation and storage, and some projects now will be standalone storage. Are those also in the same queue and if so, are they studied the same way? Because it just seems like the performance of a storage project on the grid is going to be fundamentally different and its effect on the grid.</p><p>It's going to be fundamentally different than the performance and effect of a generator. Do they all go mushed in the queues together? Are they all evaluated in the same way?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>They are all in the same queue. They aren't always necessarily evaluated in the same way. And there were some reforms also in the recent FERC order about the assumptions we make about inverter-based resources which include storage, about how they're going to operate and the ability for developers to say what technologies they're using to make sure that they go well. And I believe there's some ability to change how you can add storage, like make your solar project a hybrid project. If that's not in the FERC order a lot of the RTOs are looking at or do allow you to make some of those changes.</p><p>You don't have to go to the back of the line if you just add storage, which in theory should just make your resource more valuable and easy to control.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. I mean, this is what I'm saying. Intuitively it seems to me like a storage project is going to be good for the grid, almost categorically like, good for grid reliability, good for grid performance. There's no overloading the grid from storage. So it seems to me like storage ought to be either allowed to skip the queue or at the very least go to the head of the queue or if you attach storage to your project it seems like you ought to get some advantage in the queue.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I think another thing that RTOs can do that's really valuable is look at using retiring generation, citing things there and storage like natural gas, as I mentioned earlier, can be placed pretty much anywhere. So that's an obvious place. Hopefully, you can also connect wind or solar nearby to a retiring coal plant connection. Right. And as we repower that valuable grid connection and so storage can go there and there are fast track processes and fast track queues, if you will, for considering things like that. And a lot of the RTOs are looking at those processes and we really see that as a really valuable way to leverage the existing grid.</p><p>There's a lot of fairness and cost implications and if you're a developer in the queue, you don't like to see anyone jumping the queue. So there's a lot of ways, questions about what the best way to handle that is, but yeah, that relates to storage for sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just tell them like if you want to jump in the queue, add storage. It just seems to me like yes to storage as much as possible, as fast as possible.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Yeah. Certainly for short term duration resource adequacy challenges, there's no question that storage is an obvious solution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>For sure. Okay, so by way of wrapping up then, let's just briefly talk about what's next. So FERC has issued this order as you say, these are good things, they're going to be improvements, they're going to speed things up a little bit. Do we think that this FERC order alone is enough to speed things up enough to catch us up where we need to be? And if not, what are the other tools in the toolbox here? What else can be done? What should sort of advocates be thinking about next?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Well, there's no substitution for transmission. Okay, I know, keep being a broken record there but it's true. So leveraging gets as much as possible, leveraging the existing retiring connections as much as possible. And then the last one's a little fuzzier, but I think the RTOs have some flexibility on how they treat deliverability of resources and think about their resource adequacy. And sometimes I worry that we're overly strict about making sure a project is really deliverable. And so Commissioner Clements noted that there's something called energy only resources that typically have different, less strict rules for deliverability. So there's probably ways of getting projects on the grid more quickly by looking at some of the specific rules about how careful we have to be on deliverability.</p><p>Those are going to be some complex conversations and possibly build on some long-used processes that RTOs have been using, but I think there's some flexibility there and we're excited, certainly to work with everyone to see if we can figure out ways to get more generation onto the existing grid quicker while we plan transmission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>These all — except for maybe fully grasping and throwing ourselves into regional and interregional transmission, which is still not really on the table in any meaningful way — this all seems kind of incremental. Like, just intuitively to me it doesn't sound equal to the scale of the problem. So I'm wondering if you feel the same way. And I sort of wonder, given the need for grid reliability, as you say, the legitimate need to sort of study these things and make sure they're not going to screw up the grid, is it even possible to approve things to get on the grid fast enough to hit the targets we want to hit?</p><p>Like, is there a process that moves fast enough even on the horizon here?</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Well, I'm an optimist, and if you look at how many gigawatts of power are likely that the RTOs themselves say are going to clear, then it's a large number, so we can actually move fairly quickly, but it's not as large as we want. And how many of those projects are going to get bogged down in really large network connection, costs are going to be hard, but perhaps there's ways to fund those. So yes, I'm an optimist that we can use our existing grid a lot better than we are today and get a lot more storage, wind, solar on the system. But yeah, it's going to be a challenge.</p><p>There's no easy answer on expanding the grid to replace a lot of retiring fossil generation and grow it to substitute for the existing oil and gas industry. Right. That's a large ask to do very quickly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's not something it's never been done.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>No, never been done, but that's why we're here to do it for the first time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, well, thanks so much for decoding all this for us and picking apart these strands. And it sounds like as bad as this problem is currently, there are things happening, there is hope.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>There is hope. The FERC order is a big deal and there's lots of dedicated stakeholders and advocates working really hard to try and fix these issues. So that's what always gives me hope.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. All right, Chaz Teplin of RMI, thanks so much for coming on.</p><p><strong>Chaz Teplin</strong></p><p>Thanks so much. Always great to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-interconnection</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:135650154</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 23 Aug 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/135650154/084489ecb6f9db94430cc058dc36beed.mp3" length="61801745" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3089</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/135650154/d0bf4032c5058bad077f04c18263b2ca.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Voluntary carbon offsets are headed for a crash]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, influential climate blogger Joe Romm discusses whether carbon offsets are, per the title of his recent white paper, “unscalable, unjust, and unfixable.”</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAujO9Gz-aJXeZG1ETRFGsha/volts23.08.04%28joe.romm%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/voluntary-carbon-offsets-are-headed-for-a-crash"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Carbon offsets — whereby one party pays another party to reduce carbon emissions — are an extremely convenient thing to have for people, businesses, and institutions that have money to spend, want to do something green, and either won't or can't reduce their own emissions.</p><p>So offset markets have flourished for decades, even in the face of investigation after investigation, exposé after exposé, showing that the emissions reductions they represent are dubious or outright fraudulent.</p><p>Things may be coming to a head, though, especially as it slowly sinks in that the Paris Agreement in many ways renders the entire enterprise of offsets moot. If everyone is trying to get as close as possible to zero emissions by 2050, what is gained by trading those reductions back and forth?</p><p>A white paper digging deep into these subjects was recently published by none other than Joe Romm. Romm has a PhD in physics from MIT and worked at the Department of Energy in the 1990s, but most people in my world know him as one of the earliest and most influential climate bloggers. He’s also authored numerous books on climate solutions.</p><p>As of <a target="_blank" href="https://web.sas.upenn.edu/pcssm/news/pcssm-welcomes-senior-research-fellow-dr-joseph-romm/">earlier this year</a>, he is now a senior research fellow at the University of Pennsylvania Center for Science, Sustainability, and the Media, being run by climate scientist Michael Mann. His <a target="_blank" href="https://web.sas.upenn.edu/pcssm/files/2023/06/OffsetPaper7.0-6-27-23-FINAL2.pdf">first report is on offsets</a>, and it’s a doozy. I called to talk with him about the role offsets have played in the past, the reforms the UN is attempting to make to them, and their future in a post-Paris world.</p><p>Okay, with no further ado, Joe Romm, welcome to Volts. Thanks so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Oh, well, thank you so much for having me, Dave.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You know, it's funny. I'm sure you will resonate with this. Probably the number one question I get asked my entire friggin career is people writing in to say, "Hey, such and such, my utility or some firm or some company is offering me these voluntary offsets. Are they worth it? Is it worth it doing this?" And I've been meaning forever and ever and ever to do something squarely on offsets, because what I always want to tell people is, like, "No, they're kind of junkie," but I don't want to exaggerate or stereotype. And I thought maybe I was missing some nuances.</p><p>So then I read your paper and realized I was missing a bunch of nuances, but they're all nuances. Showing that offsets are way worse than I imagined. Far worse than I had even dreamed. So let's get into it. Let's just start, though, in case any listeners out there don't know exactly what we're talking about. Just what is a carbon offset? And there's two basic kinds the sort of mandatory kind and the voluntary kind just run real quick through what an offset is.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Sure. Well, I use a definition from the General Accounting Office: Reductions of greenhouse gas emissions from an activity in one place to compensate for emissions elsewhere. So a typical transaction is the developed country or a company, instead of reducing its own CO2 emissions, pays a developing country to reduce its emissions by an equivalent amount instead. And then if the buyer purchases enough offsets, they've been going around calling themselves carbon neutral or net zero. And I would say the interaction that most people have had with offsets, the most common one is when you're buying an airline ticket and you sort of have that option to spend a few dollars to offset your emissions, usually by planting trees.</p><p>And the short answer is don't waste your money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. But the idea behind it originally, and they go way, way back, the idea behind it originally is that it's kind of expensive to reduce emissions in developed countries and wealthy democracies, and there's lots of super cheap reductions waiting to be had in developing countries. So the idea was, let's flow some money from developed countries to developing countries. You'll help do some virtuous projects there and we'll reduce emissions. And it doesn't matter where you reduce emissions, right, because it's all one atmosphere and you'll get cheap reductions. That was the driving idea. And conceptually speaking, it's not crazy.</p><p>It just kind of turns out that every particular turns out to be difficult to do in a rational way. So we're going to get to some specifically sort of modern or contemporary issues around offsets relating to the Paris Agreement and how that kind of changes the whole playing field. But before we even get there, let's just talk about the history of offsets and the issues that face them, the difficulties. This basic idea of like, I reduce emissions here and I sell it to you and then you count it against your total, the basic issues that they have faced.</p><p>And I feel like every couple of years I see another big comprehensive sort of report come out saying, "Yeah, offsets are still mostly junk." So as far as I know, they've been junk from the beginning. But just talk about some of the basic difficulties facing offsets.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Sure. And the phrase that there's this lots of super cheap emissions out there in developing countries. This is a very key phrase that we will come back to because it's that misconception that is really screwing up the way a lot of people are looking at how we're going to solve global warming.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Because they don't exist. So the first offset was 1988.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, wow.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is Mark Trexler worked on this. And this was a utility, was just trying to see could they do a project in another country. Because utilities, they figured they were going to be — they thought in 1988 they would be regulated sometime soon. So they wanted to check this out. So there was a voluntary market created and voluntary means it's unregulated. It is the wild, wild west. There is nobody out there who is saying this is a real offset and this isn't a real offset.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there's no government body that vets these in any way. It's all just private companies making claims.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Exactly. And working with brokers or verifiers or creditors out there. And so that's sort of problem number one. Whenever you have a market that is completely unregulated, there is generally a race to the bottom. Which is to say, if I told you, "Hey, I can sell you a good carbon offset in Brazil for $20 a ton," but someone else says, "Oh, I'll sell you an offset for $5 a ton," who are you going to buy?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And it's important, I think, to say here, too, like the seller has every incentive to sell as cheap as possible, the buyer has every incentive to buy as cheap as possible. Neither party in that buyer seller relationship has any incentive at all to maintain quality. There's no regulatory backstop, there's no penalty for low quality. So both have every incentive in the world to cheap out on this.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And I was where you were at, at offsets until I decided to start really digging into them. So it took me like six or seven months of really looking closely to realize, "Oh, this is worse than I thought." But also it was tricky to explain, so I had to spend a lot of time trying to figure out how to explain it. And indeed there is an article, the scientific literature is like a nonstop assault on offsets. And there was an article back in 2001 that basically said, yes, one of the problems with offsets is that both sides have an incentive to exaggerate.</p><p>Because the seller is getting paid a low dollar amount per ton, right? This is going to be a low dollar per ton market, right? So they have an incentive to inflate the number of tons and not even care if they're real tons or not. Now, in most markets, the buyer cares about quality and quantity, right? Caveat emptor. If someone says they're going to sell me ten real oranges but they sell me five rotten oranges, I'm going to object. But in the offset market, I'm not going to object because in fact, I'm paying a price, a fixed price.</p><p>So for that price, I want to get as many — remember, this is sort of an imaginary negative quantity of things, right. So I want to be able to claim credit for as many offsets as possible for my money. And do I want to look under the hood and see if those are real offsets? I'll just say maybe some companies do, but in the vast majority of cases, nobody is really looking very closely under the hood.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And you said something crucial there, too, which is what you're allegedly buying when you buy an offset is a unit of something not happening.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there were going to be greenhouse gas emissions. And because of this money you're spending, there won't be. So you're buying basically a hypothetical, like an alternate reality, something that didn't happen, which I think we should say, even if there were a regulator, and even if buyers and sellers both were extremely interested in quality, it's just intrinsically difficult to measure a hypothetical with precision. Right. It's difficult to say what would have happened.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Right. And this is the famous additionality problem. This problem has always been identified as one of the two or three biggest problems. How do you know that the money you're spending to fund this project, that the emissions reduction wouldn't have happened anyway? And this particularly comes into effect when we're talking about renewable energy, because a lot of offsets were renewable energy projects. Now, you've done many podcasts on these remarkable drop in renewable prices over the years, to the point where they, in the last decade, increasingly became the cheapest thing to do anywhere. So it became increasingly clear that offsets that were funding renewables, that the money from the offsets weren't making the difference.</p><p>So in fact, the offset would have happened anyway, and so the buyer shouldn't get credit for something that would have happened anyway. Right. They didn't make any difference with their money. And there's another tricky feature here, which is there are two types of offsets. There's one where I pay you something that will actually reduce emissions. Like maybe I could pay you to shut down a coal plant, or maybe I could pay you to plant trees and pull carbon out of the air. But a lot of offsets, many of the most popular ones, are called avoided emissions.</p><p>That's where I pay you not to cut down trees.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And this raises so many issues. Like, for instance, if I own a bunch of trees, I could sell you not chopping down X parcel, and then I could just turn around and chop down Y parcel to compensate, right? So I end up chopping down just as many trees, but after you've paid me not to chop down these, I just turn around and chop down those instead. So the emissions, the trees are all the same.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>These all have names. That's the leakage problem. And you might even be good faith, maybe you're not going to. But the lumber company still needs the wood, right? The reason they're cutting down the trees, presumably not always, but in general, they're going to sell the wood. So the lumber company will just go to the next province. And the question is, how much leakage is there? And the answer is, as it turns out, there's a lot of leakage. Because, again, people aren't cutting down the trees for no reason. I mean, some people might be, but there's always a reason why they might be cutting down the trees to grow crops.</p><p>But if they want to grow crops, they're going to grow crops somewhere and so, yeah, this is very, very difficult. Now, we all want by the way, we do want to stop deforestation, right? We do, in fact, want to figure out how to support ending deforestation as everyone committed. Not everyone, but a whole bunch of nations, as you know, in Glasgow made that commitment, and I think we all support it. The problem is just that you shouldn't turn that into an offset. An offset is — another way of thinking, an offset, it's a license for the buyer to pollute.</p><p>I'm paying you not to pollute, so I can keep polluting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>So you don't want to turn protecting forests into someone else's license to pollute. So there are lots and lots of problems. And indeed, there are countries, I won't name them, but there are countries out there that noticed who have a very good track record. They weren't deforesting and they realized no one was doing offset projects with them. The only way they could get offset projects, if they said, you know, we are thinking about doing some deforestation in our country, and so maybe we'd like — you know, what kind of deal that is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>And people can Google that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Nice forest there. Be a shame if something happened to it.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Exactly. And that's, again, paying people not to do something is — like not to grow crops, I mean, it's going to get you in trouble. And so, over time, these problems never went away. And the voluntary offset program ambled along. It was not very big through 2005. In fact, the total amount of offsets from 1988 to 2005 was about $300 million. So not a lot of money from a global perspective. Then came the Kyoto Protocol, the 1997 agreement, in which the rich nations committed to make some modest reductions by 2010, but the developing countries did not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>But in order to make it easier for the richer countries to sign on to this protocol, it included something called the Clean Development Mechanism, the CDM. And the Clean Development Mechanism was simply an offset program. But this is a regulated offset program. This would know sometimes this is called a compliance market. It's used to comply with an agreement. And the problem was that the rich countries were buying these offsets from countries that didn't have any inventory that was tracked. They didn't have a baseline, so there was nothing to stop them from, yes, building a renewable plant and selling you that as an offset.</p><p>But they could still keep building coal plants. And one of the points that I make in the paper is that between 2006 and 2022 and the CDM is still running, the Clean Development Mechanism is still running, the biggest seller of offsets was China. China sold half of all the offsets that were sold. During that time China added so many coal plants that it added almost the equivalent of total current US emissions. Right? So China simultaneously didn't develop cleanly, dramatically increased their CO2 pollution. And in the worst of all possible worlds, all the renewable plants that they were going to build anyway, they sold those to the rich countries, which then used them to actually not meet their target, right?</p><p>So that resulted in net pollution. There are analyses out there in the literature which basically say the Clean Development Mechanism as a whole led to 6 billion tons more CO2 emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this, remember, is the regulated one. So it's not like bringing in a regulator can solve what are basically intrinsic problems. The mismatch of incentives is not something I mean, you would need the world's best regulator scrutinizing every penny and it would still be difficult. So even from the beginning of offset markets, the beginning of the voluntary market, and then accelerating with the CDM, like, I swear I've seen at least four or five massive literature reviews, reports, etc., saying all these markets are junk, the CDM market is junk, it's still junk, it's still junk, it's still junk.</p><p>And that's been going on, as you say, now for over like 15 years. So are offsets finally starting to lose their luster? Are they starting to lose their reputation? And then, if that's true, what happens to companies or countries that are sort of staking their claims of emission reductions on offsets? And that's a lot of private companies at this point that are going around saying we're net zero because we bought all these offsets. What happens if the reputation of offsets finally collapses? Is it going to collapse?</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>In the last 18 months since Glasgow, really, since November 2021, the price of nature-based offsets, those became the most popular. That was either planting trees or paying people not to cut down trees. And there are some emerging ones, but those are the big ones. They have collapsed 90% in price. And you are correct that there are a lot of these exposés. In fact, I have like 160 footnotes in this paper. And I mean, there are literature reviews, right, and there are major reports by independent bodies and then there's the media. And the media has been increasingly scrutinizing them.</p><p>And anyone who fought Bloomberg, for instance, has been doing regular exposés and really basically calling them fake. One of the big decisive moments was in January, the UK Guardian, along with the German Die Zeit and an independent group called, I think, Source Materials. They had done a major nine-month research effort with scientists and they were looking specifically at what had been considered high-quality offsets were protecting the Brazilian rainforest. These are offsets that were bought by Shell and Disney and Gucci, and they found that 94% of them were worthless. And that 94, 95% number is not at all different, any different — there was a 2016 study of the Clean Development Mechanism by the European Commission, which looked at hundreds of the projects and they concluded that only 2% were high quality.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So if I'm Disney, why should I care? I get to greenwash, I get to look green, I get Super Chief offsets. Maybe I just say, nobody reads these exposés, nobody cares. Everybody's doing well here. Why should Disney care about this happening?</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Yeah. And the answer is that finally, I would say the environmental community and the people who do care about this started using different tactics, which is to call out companies and to actually bring lawsuits. And there have been a lot of lawsuits in the last twelve to 18 months. The lawsuits are of two kinds. The most common kind is where you go to the regulator in the country, the advertising regulator, and say, this is false advertising. The Swiss regulator, for instance, ruled finally that the World Cup, the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, had been calling itself carbon neutral.</p><p>That's FIFA, if I'm pronouncing it right, or FIFA, the soccer federation had been making this claim, and this was finally taken to the Swiss regulator, and the Swiss regulator said, this is all misleading. You haven't proven that you're doing anything, so please stop calling the World Cup carbon neutral. And if I can just make tell a 30-second story of just how bad that this is very symbolic of the voluntary market. As I said, renewables become so cheap, right, that it became very dubious that an offset could support a renewable project because it was going to happen anyway.</p><p>So in 2019, the two biggest creditors in the world, which are Verra and the Gold Standard, they decided, we're not going to allow any offset project, we're not going to verify any offset project that involves funding renewables unless it's in a very, very poor country. But the overwhelming majority of them were not counting, so they stopped. But because this is the wild, wild west, guess what? Qatar decided it was going to launch its own offsetting verifying company, crediting company, which they did, and they said, we're going to take all comers, we will take any renewable project and we will credit it as an offset.</p><p>And guess what? Guess who's going to be a big customer of ours? So yes, that is a large way that the World Cup became carbon neutral. And by the way, you can Google it, Saudi Arabia set up its own in the last couple months, they set up their own crediting firm and they are issuing offsets to their many polluting companies. So we're seeing a lot more of these lawsuits. There have been lawsuits in the Dutch court because Shell keeps trying to claim that its oil is carbon neutral or somehow good for the environment, and they've lost four times in a row.</p><p>The British has something called the Advertising Standards Authority, and they've now issued guidance: Please do not use carbon neutral or net zero. Last fall Evian, if you buy a bottle of Evian water, it says carbon neutral on it. So they've now been sued for that. That is a trial that's undergoing and it has now gotten to the point where law firms, this year, law firms have been issuing memos to their clients saying, guess what, this is a very ripe area for lawsuits because this whole offset business is kind of dubious but environmentalists are like they're caring a lot more about climate change and these are starting to launch.</p><p>And there was an advertising magazine, the Drum, which basically advised clients that suddenly you have to understand offsets are becoming a reputational and a legal risk. Some people may know at the end of June, a lawsuit was filed in federal court in California against Delta because Delta has been calling itself the world's first carbon neutral airline. And basically the suer said, you know, I bought this ticket because I thought you would solve the climate problem and now I learn you hadn't.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>This has started to have an impact because you may have caught the news that the very end of June, Nestle's publicly said we are withdrawing all the claims that we are planning to make about carbon neutral for Kit Kat and, guess what, Perrier water.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So even if you're a company that doesn't care particularly about this as such, right, in terms of carbon emissions, you're going around buying these standard sort of voluntary offsets and making these claims, which is something that has been a herd activity, right. It's fine to do it because everybody else is doing it, but now the slower, weaker members of the herd are being picked off here. You're actually in some danger now of legal exposure basing the claims on these goofy offsets.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's two stories going on. On one hand it seems like there's a house of cards here that's about to collapse. But on the other hand, as you say, there are more and more kind of scammy people herding into this market to sell them. So it's tough to see how that shakes out.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>No one can stop that, really, because it's an unregulated market. We will get to, in a little bit, the one player who could make a real difference. But fundamentally, it is only going to be turning something that has been done for good PR, right — They were all doing this to try to say, "Oh, we're good environmental citizens. Why? Not because we're reducing our own emissions, but we're paying other people to reduce them for us." And that is now starting to lose its luster. Right. So as people start to realize and maybe get sued, maybe they'll get a group of environmentalists will write a letter saying this is a bogus claim. As that starts to become more popular.</p><p>And I think that that is increasingly something that you're going to be seeing happening. It's going to become bad PR. And so it's going to be a reputational risk and a possible legal risk. And those two together, I think it's going to start dawning on people and I think one can say that no serious company should be purchasing offsets to make claims about carbon neutral and net zero. And I will say in the reverse, which is that any company that is, is not a serious company. And it's no longer just people like me saying this. The fact of the matter is that the Secretary General set up a UN expert group to look at this specific issue, which is offsets by non-government entities.</p><p>And in Egypt, at Cop 27, they reported out and basically said, "No, please stop saying that you're using offsets to become net zero. You can't become net zero that way." And by the way, the biggest independent group out there working with companies to look at targets to see if they're real — you may have heard of them, the Science Based Targets Initiative — they have also said the same thing: You may no longer use offset. We're going to develop a plan for you to make a science-based target where you reduce emissions 50% by 2030 and get down very close to zero by 2050.</p><p>But if you cut your emissions 50% by 2030, you can't go out into the voluntary market, buy the rest of those tons and say you're net zero. That doesn't count. So, yeah, I would say more and more of the serious players are walking away from this notion that offsets are real and can be used by companies to pretend that they're doing something.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's move on to what I think is an interesting, not new, but newer issue around offsets. So, as you say, the sort of explosion of the offsets began with Kyoto because developed nations were supposed to make reductions and developing nations were not obligated to do so. So under that regime, it makes sense for developing nations to sort of sell their reductions to developed nations, right? If you don't have to make them yourself, why not sell them to people who have to make them? Then comes Paris. So under the Paris agreement, the Paris framework, everybody is supposed to be making reductions, including developing nations.</p><p>So then we get to an interesting problem of double counting. So if I'm a country, I reduce emissions by X and I sell those reductions to a company, the company claims the reductions via offsets, but then I also claim them under my Paris obligations. So it kind of seems like two entities are claiming them. Walk through how this works using the example used in the paper is one of Ørsted in Norway and Microsoft buying offsets from them, and then Norway also counting them. So just walk through how that worked.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. And I'm going to talk about it, not how it appeared in the paper. It took me a while to figure this out. There was a Bloomberg article in mid-May which reported on this, and it's only literally because I had been working on this for six months and had just gotten to realize that this particular deal was the problematic deal. Or, I will say, one of the two problematic deals, but the other one was solvable. And we'll get to that. So this deal in May, the Danish government announced that it was paying the bioenergy company Ørsted to put carbon capture systems on two biomass plants in Denmark, capture up to 450,000 tons of carbon dioxide a year and bury it under the Norwegian sea.</p><p>And Denmark subsidized this with a fund it had set up for the very purpose of doing, you know, carbon removal and carbon capture. And so Denmark is claiming all those tons. It's putting them in its national greenhouse gas inventory.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And we should say quickly that unlike the tree stuff, unlike the forest stuff, these really are verifiable and verified emission reductions. That's not the issue here.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Right. Certainly this is a more quantifiable and also potentially more permanent. The other problem with trees and stuff is trees aren't permanent as we're living through more and more these days. And indeed, these were emissions that were coming from Danish power plants. Right. So these were official Danish emissions that they had agreed to eventually eliminate entirely for their meeting their pledge under the Paris agreement. And so that seems very reasonable. And if that had been it, it would have been a perfectly fine deal to announce. But Ørsted also announced that it was selling over half of the same exact tons that had just sold to Denmark, to Microsoft, which also threw in some money and is also claiming them to offset some of its corporate emissions.</p><p>So the same tons are being sold twice and they're being claimed twice.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So what you've got is Denmark claiming these tons under their Paris pledges, and then Microsoft claiming these tons under its private pledge to reduce its emissions. Both entities are claiming the tons. And if you ask Ørsted, I mean, it's not like this is a secret that this is happening. It's right there in the press release. If you ask Ørsted, they say, "There's no problem here. This is just two separate accounting systems."</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Yes. When I saw this, I wrote a letter email to the person who was in the press release for the Danish government at the Danish Energy Agency. I sent an email to Ørsted and I sent one to Microsoft. Twelve days later, the Danish government writes back and says, "We don't consider this to be a double claiming because there are two different inventories we're talking about." Now interestingly, the Danish press release never mentioned Microsoft. And basically the tone of the email was, "We don't really care what Microsoft does. We're claiming them officially in our national inventory to meet our climate targets, and we don't care what anyone else does."</p><p>So Ørsted said, "Yeah, it's two different inventories." And ultimately Microsoft said the same thing. But some journalists asked me, "How could there be two different accounting systems?" And I said it's easy: One's real and one's pretend. And that's what is really going on here. The voluntary market is the pretend market. I think that that has become clear over the decades that what companies are doing is pretending to do something and then really taking credit for being a good environmental actor. But clearly what this deal shows, if you knew nothing else about the voluntary market, it's clear that Denmark has every right to claim those tons, right?</p><p>It did subsidize them. The tons came from their country. They're putting them in their inventory and they are actually helping to solve the climate problem. Right? They made a pledge so that's clearly the real market, the one that is recognized by the entire world. So whatever Microsoft is doing here, they're not offsetting tons.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, you could say, though, I mean, just so people grasp the implications of this, given that every country in the world now has pledged emission reductions under Paris, every deal is going to be like this. Every deal in the voluntary carbon market is going to take this same shape. It's going to be double counting. So the question of whether that double counting is legitimate or not, the entire fate of the voluntary carbon market rests on that question. Because if it's double counting and illegitimate, then there just won't be any reason for voluntary carbon offsets anymore. Every country that hosts emission reductions is going to want to claim them for itself under its Paris obligations.</p><p>And why would it want to sell them? So, is there any way to, I mean, as you said, you can't stop the voluntary market from coming in and just saying these things because there's no regulator and it can say whatever it wants. But as you say, the UN has sort of stepped in here and tried to draw a distinction. Now tell us a little bit about that, how the UN is trying to sort of square this circle.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>It is important to realize, and this took me a long time to understand enough to know where to look in the literature. This deal isn't just exposing the voluntary market. This deal actually undermines the Paris Accord and that emerged in the literature. Within a year of Paris, somebody wrote a paper for a German think tank and ultimately there have been multiple articles, there was a report to the German Environment Ministry. Paris was designed to get every country to make commitments to reduce their emissions and then to go about the business of reducing emissions. It's not a mandatory thing, right?</p><p>There's no enforcement mechanism.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right right.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>That's very important to remember about Paris. It is a good faith effort by countries, or some people may decide whether or not how good a faith it is. But fundamentally, the nations of the world came together at Paris and made these commitments. And there is now pressure on countries to meet these targets. And obviously, as the climate keeps getting worse and worse, it will be harder and harder, I think, for countries to walk away from them. The problem with this deal is if I'm a developing country and I've made emissions reduction target, I'm disincentivized from reducing my own emissions.</p><p>Because I can just sit around waiting until some rich company comes in and says "Hey, I'll buy some of those tons from you, even though you're not selling them to me and do this deal." And basically, that's what the literature said. The literature said this deal, first of all, it's not an offset. The country had already agreed it was going to make these reductions, right. Therefore it was going to happen anyway.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. This is the hypothetical thing. Like in Paris, all the countries committed to reductions, therefore there's no hypothetical world anymore without the reductions. The whole premise has been wiped away.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Yeah, these aren't offsets — and by the way, the Gold Standard and I emailed back and forth with the Gold Standard. The Gold Standard said this. It has written articles basically saying that this deal, anyone who does this deal cannot call what they own an offset and they're not going to sign off on any such deal being called an offset. So, yes, as you say, fundamentally, Paris was the beginning and the end of voluntary offsets. And people should have realized that. When the Paris Accord was signed, everybody knew — and the Paris Accord has something called Article Six — and I'm only saying this because I know your audience is sophisticated and I think they should understand this. So Article Six is the part of the Paris Accord that deals with carbon credit trading and carbon offsets. 6.2 is carbon credit trading, 6.4 is offsets. So that was part of the Paris Accord. However, it became clear that the deal that we're describing between a company and a country is one thing, but you clearly can't allow the double counting if it's two countries. So by unanimously agreeing to the Paris Accord, the world was saying, we are going to work out the details of this Article Six and offsets at a later date.</p><p>But the literature was clear that there's only two solutions to the double counting problem. So what is the double counting problem? Let's use very simple math. Imagine that Brazil has 2 billion tons of CO2 emissions and the United States has 2 billion tons of CO2 emissions. And the United States says to Brazil, we want to buy half of your tons that are the easiest to reduce. And we're going to pay you this amount of money and you're going to sell them to us and they do this deal. Now, Brazil has actually physically reduced its emissions by a billion tons, right?</p><p>So it actually has a billion tons of emissions, but the United States wants to claim that it also reduces emissions a billion tons. But clearly they can't both claim that because then they would each have 1 billion tons, but the world would actually have 3 billion. They combined would have 2 billion tons, whereas the world still has 3 billion tons. Because the United States actually has 2 billion tons. So there's only two solutions to the double counting problem. Either the buyer doesn't count the tons or the seller doesn't count the tons. Right? I think that's pretty straightforward.</p><p>Now, if the buyer doesn't count the tons, then it's not an offset, right? They're just helping Brazil reduce its emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>And that in Cop 27, in November 2022, the world agreed that would be called a mitigation contribution emission reduction. That the rich country was helping contribute to a greenhouse gas mitigation, helping Brazil achieve its Paris agreement, helping the world reduce greenhouse gas emissions. But it couldn't take any credit for them itself could not be used as an offset.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you can have a reputational boost, you can get a little green glow, you can get some good PR, but you cannot claim to be reducing your own emissions when you're the buyer in this situation.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>And you should know that the environmental community had been urging the voluntary market to move to that exact scheme for many years. Just don't call it an offset. You can keep doing what you're doing. Rich companies can help poor countries reduce emissions. Just don't call it an offset. Just don't pretend you're buying the same thing that they're not selling to you. I mean, it always seemed obvious to me that if the country that reduced the emissions is keeping the tons, then they're not selling them to you. So how could you be buying them? And by the way, the Gold Standard agreed to do this for the voluntary market in the last year or two.</p><p>The Gold Standard is basically saying, you can't do not call any of our projects offsets anymore unless you meet very strict criteria, including that it doesn't involve the Paris agreement. So the other solution is the one that is complicated. It's not that complicated, but it's sufficiently complicated that no one understands what was actually the implications of what was agreed to. So the solution where it's a real offset and the selling country, Brazil, doesn't keep the emissions reduction, Brazil has to publicly announce to the world that it is giving up those tons and it is not going to count those emissions reductions in its own inventory because it's selling them to the United States.</p><p>Now, there's only one way this can happen, is if Brazil adds back the billion tons to its official inventory. And that addition, that billion tons, that's called the corresponding adjustment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Corresponding adjustment. So the idea then is you're selling the tons. You're literally selling the tons, which means you no longer have them. So in that case, the United States could claim to be reducing its emissions, but then Brazil could not claim to be reducing its emissions. It would still have the 2 billion tons on the books.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>So put simply, the rich country gets to pretend that it made emissions reductions, even though it didn't. And the poorer country has to pretend that it didn't make any emissions reductions, even though it did.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And this is now a legitimate framework in the UN. You can do this.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>When the final rules are written. All the rules have not been agreed to. But at COP 26, the nations of the world, when the nations of the world signed off on the Glasgow accord or agreement or whatever you want to call the final document, they were unanimously agreeing that they were going to set up something called an authorized offset. And in order for an offset to be authorized, it had to come with the corresponding adjustment. The developed country had to give up those emissions reductions. And as you might imagine, this deal doesn't make a lot of sense.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it does make sense in one way. We should say the one way that it does make sense, which is unlike the old regime, where neither the buyer or the seller had any incentive at all to ensure quality, now, at least if I'm Brazil and I'm selling some of my emission reductions, and I won't be able to use them on my inventory anymore, I'm, by God, going to be sure that those are high quality. Right? Like, I don't want to be selling, I don't want to be giving up my ability to reduce emissions on the cheap, right?</p><p>So at least now one party in the transaction has some reason to care about quality, right?</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>And this gets to the core issue, which is these offsets won't be cheap. And this is the thing that is the complete game changer that everybody needs to understand. It's one of the reasons why I wrote this paper once I figured it out. Developing countries must not sell these off cheaply. And the reason is pretty clear. If the developing countries let the rich countries skim off their cheap emissions reductions at a low price, those developing countries, because they're all going net zero, right? This is the point. Everybody's going to zero. Those countries are going to have to go back in the market later and buy those tons back, right?</p><p>Because they have to pretend they didn't make those reductions. In other words, Brazil had 2 billion tons. It cut its emissions by a billion, but it gave that up to the United States. So it has to pretend it has 2 billion even though it only has one. So in order to come net zero, Brazil not only has to reduce the remaining billion, it has to offset the corresponding adjustment bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The billion it sold.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>So the only way it's going to do that is with the expensive stuff, direct air capture, whatever is the price, towards the end of the emissions reduction period. And by the way, I had to use Chat GPT to help me find a lot of these sources when the developing countries were told that by signing the Paris agreement, they were going to have to give up the tons. They weren't happy. And when Brazil, people may know, if people who follow Paris know that Brazil and some other developing countries were the obstacle, they had refused to make this agreement until Glasgow.</p><p>And when Brazil finally agreed to make this deal, they added a little hook. They said, yes, we'll agree to your dumb-ass thing, but we retain the rights to make the decision ourselves as to whether we keep the tons or give them up. Which is to say, we can decide. And no one has been able to tell me, by the way, when they get to make that decision, whether they can do it at the beginning or the end. But the point that I want to make here is that since the developing countries are going to have to go back into the market to buy those tons, they better not sell those tons for anywhere near the current market price for voluntary offsets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>And this gets back to the point that you made at the very beginning. The one really bad thing about the voluntary market is that it left everyone with the impression that there was this vast sea, unlimited sea, of cheap emissions reductions in developing countries that they would be able to buy up instead of doing the hard work of reducing their own emissions. Right. Because fundamentally, offsets are a way of not doing our own renewables efficiency, electrification, et cetera, et cetera, right? We're going to pay someone else to do the hard work. So, because everyone thought that this was the case, I think it has fooled a lot of companies into making the same net zero pledge. Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. They think it's cheap.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Yeah, we'll solve it cheap. But the whole point is, once the country has to give up those tons, then it has to say, what is the correct price of those tons? The correct price isn't how much it cost me to do this project, it's the replacement cost.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>And so the World Bank came out in February with a paper which explained all this, because I was sort of figuring this out and I said, this can't be true, this is all ridiculous. So the World Bank came out in February with an analysis which basically said the following: These tons aren't cheap. First of all, the offset projects themselves won't be cheap because the offset projects were only cheap before because they weren't real. Right? So they didn't say that. I'm putting in some color commentary, but basically, these projects are going to be more genuine because, as you said, Brazil isn't going to give up tons.</p><p>Right. In other words, if Brazil was going to reduce these emissions anyway, right. The additionality problem, Brazil's never going to sell tons it was going to do anyway to some other country, right. Because that's rendering the action meaningless for them. So what the bank said is first of all, the tons are going to be more expensive because they're going to be realer and there's going to be fewer in each deal because the seller isn't going to want to inflate them. So the point is, the deals are going to be more expensive, a), and b), there has to be a price for giving up the corresponding adjustment.</p><p>And what the bank said is the actual price is going to be somewhere between the cost to the seller to purchase the last ton it needs to meet its 2030 target, right? Because it's adding those tons on at the end, right. If you see what I'm saying. So all of those tons are it sold off the cheap emissions reductions, tree planting, whatever you want to say, shut down some coal plants, whatever is easy, right? The hard stuff like steel or concrete, all that stuff, that stuff the United States isn't buying. So the bank said the actual price for these tons should be at a minimum, what it would cost the developing country to meet its last ton.</p><p>But then it added the following, which is what I basically thought, which is in fact, the actual price isn't the marginal cost for the developing country to meet the last ton, it's the marginal cost for the rich country. And this is a very important point. Imagine a world where these authorized offsets are $50 a ton. But if you look at the models, and the World Bank published the results of a GCAM model that had been done, of what it would cost countries to meet the 2030 target, the marginal cost for the US is $155 a ton for the EU and Japan, it's more like $120 a ton.</p><p>The EU Market, right, the closest to a real ton on the market is what's traded on the European trading system. It's a European Union allowance. And those are currently sitting around $90 a ton of carbon. They've been oscillating between $80 and $100 a ton for the last year or so. So that's closer to a real emissions reduction by a developing country. So the point is, if these authorized offsets were being sold by Brazil and developing countries for $50 a ton, and it cost the United States at the end, $155 a ton to meet its hardest target, it's just going to keep buying the authorized offsets, right?</p><p>They're going to bid the price up until it's much closer to what it costs the rich countries, because otherwise it'd be insane for the rich countries to do it themselves for $150 a ton if they could pay another country $50 a ton. So the point is, once everyone realizes this, once everybody reads my report or really starts to think about it, they're going to realize that these tons should not be sold except at at least $100 a ton.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If we could, just — to bring this full circle. So if you're selling reductions to another country, you're not double counting, you're verifying that they're long-term permanent reductions. If you're dotting all your I's crossing all your T's and properly pricing these things, that basically the buyer is going to end up paying as much as they would need to pay to reduce their own tons.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Yeah, the final ton.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which gets you to the final conclusion here, which is what is the point of all this anymore? If the offset markets were rational, were not double counting, were high quality, were verified, they wouldn't really pose any price savings over just reducing your own emissions in the first place.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what is the point of having them at all?</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Right, and that is the important point. This is the thing that should have been obvious once the Paris Accord started to be put into place. If everyone in the world has to go down to zero, then it doesn't make any sense for you to sell off any of your cheap tons, right? You've got to keep them for yourselves.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>So someone might say, oh, but there's going to be all these negative emissions tons out there, right? There's going to be bioenergy carbon capture storage. There can be direct air carbon capture and storage and then we can plant an unlimited amount of trees. And I'm working on papers on all of those and people just need to understand that none of those are scalable. Trees are not scalable. Direct air carbon capture storage is not scalable, certainly not by 2050. And bioenergy carbon capture and storage is not even a climate solution. And I love doing coming out of an analysis in September with some original modeling by one of the best modeling groups in the world that are basically going to show that bioenergy carbon capture and storage not only isn't a solution by 2050, it would probably warm things up.</p><p>But in any case, there is no net zero. There is only zero. There's no free lunch. Everyone is going to have to reduce their own emissions and some may take longer and some may take sooner, but it doesn't matter. Anyone who sells off their cheapest emissions reductions now to anyone else is one of two things. Either they're making a mistake or they're not going to honor the agreement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? So offsets made sense in a world where some people were reducing and others weren't, or some people had to reduce and others didn't.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But in a world, in a Paris world where everybody's going to zero, it's just a shell game. Like you're just moving these things around. In the end they all have to be reduced. Like in the end the money is the money. The reductions are the reductions. Everybody's got to reduce to zero. So the whole justification for the shell game of buying and selling these reductions has kind of like vanished out from under the market.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>It has. And I just want to use a little bit of history. The reason I think people got the wrong impression for two or three reasons. One is when carbon trading was first set up, right, the famous acid rain program, sulfur dioxide program that was set up under George H. W. Bush, that was a 50% reduction. Right. Now, in a world where every company has to cut its emissions 50%, it makes some sense if one company can easily reduce down 60% to sell those 10% to another company, that can't easily get past its own 40% reduction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, this is just trading. This is credit trading. It's the whole economic justification for credit trading in any context.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Right. That's the market efficiency. Right? This is the efficiency in the marketplace. That was why economists and corporations liked that. But again, if we imagine that the acid rain program said everyone had to take their sulfur dioxide down to zero and there was no way to pull sulfur dioxide out of the air, then it would have been, again, crazy, right, for some company to sell off some extra, easy — there is no extra emissions. Right. The point is, there's no extra.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's no such thing as extra. There's no away.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Yeah. And in this sense, by the way, even the European trading system, people will come to realize, doesn't make a lot of sense. It's good for price discovery. Those markets are very good for price discovery. How much does it really cost? And there is a 2030 target, right? Everyone doesn't have to go to zero by 2030. But when you think about it, why should Brazil sell some tons to France to meet its 2030 target when by 2050 everyone's going to zero?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>I mean, you might say, oh, well, by 2050 we'll have a lot of new technologies and maybe we will. And I'm not here going to tell you what is going to exist in 2045 or not, but I think the main message is that ultimately what Paris means is you got to reduce your own emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right? So we've established here that in a world where everybody is going to zero, it doesn't make a ton of sense to shuffle around. It certainly doesn't make sense to sell your cheapest reductions when you have to get to zero, because then you're going to just end up having to make much, much more expensive reductions at the end, or do carbon DAC or something like that at the end, which may or may not even be possible. So the whole point of shuffling around emissions between entities has kind of lost some of or all of its rationale in a world where everybody's going to zero.</p><p>So then, a question. Let's take it back to the beginning, because a lot of the reason the voluntary offset market exists in the first place is that there are lots of companies and entities who, with varying degrees of good faith, want to do good things on climate and are pushed to by their customers, by their employees, want to do something good. So if you're telling them going out on the voluntary carbon market, buying these offsets and then claiming you've reached net zero is BS, complete BS. It's physical BS, it's accounting BS, it no longer makes any sense anymore.</p><p>What should entities who want to help and do good things, what should they do in light of this?</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Well, it is a challenge and I've been asked that question. Certainly, one thing you can do if you really want to do, quote, unquote, an offset is anyone can go to a broker and buy tons on the European trading system and retire them. Just as people did buy into the sulfur, as you know, I'm sure you remember people did buy sulfur allowances and retired them. So yes, that can be done. I mean, I suppose if it were done a lot, then the European Union might limit it. But I would say yes, you can go to the market and do that.</p><p>And do you know, companies like Microsoft are funding like direct carbon removal, except that's like $500 a ton. And the point is that at that price right now, for a few dollars a ton, right, a few dollars, you can supposedly offset your airline travel, right. If the price were $100 a ton, it would cost like a third of your ticket. So a lot fewer people are going to do that, needless to say.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So you can buy verified actual carbon reductions in that they're burying them and sealing them in the ground permanently if you're willing to spend whatever, $500 a ton. So your plane ticket would then be, whatever, $10,000, right.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Except of course, as we said, you can't do that if those tons belong to another country that has its own need to reduce its emissions. That was the mistake that Microsoft made, and I admire Microsoft because they made a leading-edge commitment. They committed not only to offset all of their emissions and go down to zero without offsets, I believe, but they said they were going to offset all of their emissions since the company was incorporated.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, Microsoft, I think, is acting in good faith. That's like a good example here.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Except the problem is, and I've talked to people about them, those tons don't exist. And I don't think Microsoft realized when they made the commitment. And I think somebody out there, hopefully someone knows, someone high up in Microsoft, they are stuck with this commitment at a corporate level. But those tons don't exist unless you do the double claiming stuff. Unless you do the stuff that's obviously ridiculous. And because Microsoft has said we only want to do high-quality tons, right, they did a whole RFP for tons and they rejected 98% of the projects that were proposed to them and said we are only to do high-quality offset and removals.</p><p>And I will tell you, I spent weeks trying to convince Microsoft that this was not a high-quality removal project, but I'm hopeful someone else out there can persuade them to stop doing this particular deal. I think that is going to be a challenge. Yes. There are a lot of companies out there that have made a net zero commitment without realizing, thinking again, that there was this vast sea of cheap tons in the poor country. The notion that the rich countries could skim off the easy tons from the poor know that's like climate colonialism or climate imperialism.</p><p>And the other thing I would say to your audience is, right now, Singapore, Switzerland and South Korea are going around to developing countries and buying up tons. And I would love to see those contracts because my guess is they're selling those tons cheaply and they may be agreeing to have them be authorized tons and therefore they may not realize that they are basically being ripped off. And I believe that, as I say, one of the reasons I wrote the paper is so everyone in the market needs to have full information so we can't arbitrage anyone's ignorance. But the other thing is, it makes no sense to rip off anybody in this market because, again, it's voluntary.</p><p>And if a developed country in three years said, wait, you guys ripped me off, they could just say, I'm voiding the deal. Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>We reduced our own emissions, you can't force us to do anything. So, yes, this is a collaborative effort by the entire world to get as close to zero as possible, as quickly as possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, maybe this even goes without saying, but I feel like the answer to what a company or an entity of goodwill should do is just reduce your own emissions.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Any entity, any country. That is job one, two and three. Right? Like, do the hard work of reducing your own emissions. That's what everybody's going to have to do eventually. And all of this sort of financial shell game to put off that reckoning, I just feel like should be over at this point. Everybody should be reducing their own emissions. And the one thing and maybe we can wrap up with this is just these BS claims of net neutrality have been circulating so long and are so casually used and are used by so many companies now that the companies that do pivot to the hard work of reducing their own emissions are on an accounting level or a PR level, going to appear to be reducing less emissions.</p><p>Right. So I wonder if there's any way to sort of give them the reputational boost they deserve when they reduce emissions the right way. Do you know what I mean? How do we incentivize companies to do this the right way?</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>That is definitely the challenge. I think that we can certainly do the reverse, which is to publicly criticize the companies that are doing this the wrong way. I think I said that there is one body that could at least solve a lot of this problem, which is to say the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Egypt, the Cop 27. The nations of the world considered, or at least the group that looks at this, considered, the possibility of banning voluntary offsets of this nature that help someone achieve their NDC, achieve their Paris target and they punted. But the fact is that if the nations of the world got together and said, if you don't have the corresponding adjustment, you don't have a real offset, they could do that.</p><p>I mean, again, people could ignore them. But at know my feeling is that the mere fact, and I think people have some people have caught onto this, the mere fact that the nations of the world unanimously decided to call something an authorized offset is a pretty good indication that anything else isn't real. I mean, you could call it an unauthorized offset, but the point is one of them is in the globally recognized inventory of countries working to actually solve the problem, right? That's the real thing. Anything else is pretend. And I recognize these are very tricky issues for the nations of the world to come to agreement on, but ultimately also it's up to developing countries.</p><p>You may have seen in the news that Zimbabwe, I think, was a month or two ago, publicly announced that all future offsets, that no company or entity can do an offset deal with a company in Zimbabwe. They have to go through the government. The government's going to take half the money, a quarter of the money is going to stay in the country on the project, and only a quarter is leaving the country. And I think you're going to see as more and more countries realize what's going on here, they're going to have to stop any deal that doesn't go through the country, because it's only the country that really can officially sell one of its own towns.</p><p>And this is what it comes down to: Ørsted had no right to sell those tons to Microsoft because they weren't Ørsted's tons, they were the Danish government's tons.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the take-home here is: Reduce your own friggin' emissions.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just quit looking around for accounting gimmicks and just reduce your own emissions. And if you want to help fund emission reductions in developing countries, which is a perfectly wonderful and virtuous thing to do, do so. Just do not claim that you are thereby reducing your own emissions.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Right. Just say you're making a contribution claim, mitigation contribution. You're doing a good thing. And as we both know, the rich countries really actually have a responsibility to help the poor countries.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Let's not forget that part of things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thanks so much for this, Joe. As I said, I knew offsets were dodgy, but the depth of the dodginess was a revelation. So thanks for coming on and clearing all this stuff up for us.</p><p><strong>Joe Romm</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at Volts.wtf. Yes, that's Volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/voluntary-carbon-offsets-are-headed</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:135538536</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 10 Aug 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/135538536/521b089a02db80be6f0d3088cf54f308.mp3" length="81856745" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4092</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/135538536/96efd140155ce0c9fce8e166bd600464.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Enhanced geothermal power is finally a reality]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Geothermal developer Fervo Energy has successfully brought online the first ever full-scale commercial power plant sourcing from enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) — a groundbreaking development both literally and figuratively. In this episode, Fervo CEO Tim Latimer discusses the company’s accomplishment and where flexible geothermal is headed.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAWdPjKIPJ-C92qF-If6AjJa/volts23.07.21%28tim.latimer%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/enhanced-geothermal-power-is-finally-a-reality"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Traditional geothermal power, which has been around for over a century, exploits naturally occurring fissures underground, pushing water through them to gather heat and run a turbine. Unfortunately, those fissures only occur naturally in particular geographies, limiting geothermal’s reach. </p><p>For decades, engineers and entrepreneurs have dreamed of creating their <em>own</em> fissures in the underground rock, which would allow them to drill geothermal wells almost anywhere.</p><p>These kind of enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) have been attempted again and again since the 1970s, with no luck getting costs down low enough to be competitive. Despite dozens of attempts, there has never been a working commercial enhanced geothermal power plant.</p><p>Until now.</p><p>Last week, the geothermal developer <a target="_blank" href="https://fervoenergy.com/">Fervo Energy</a> announced that its first full-scale power plant passed its production test phase with flying colors. With that, Fervo has, at long last, made it through all the various tests and certifications needed to prove out its technology. It now has a working, fully licensed power plant, selling electricity on the wholesale market, and enough power purchase agreements (PPAs) with eager customers to build many more. </p><p>EGS is now a real thing — the first new entrant into the power production game in many decades.</p><p>Here at Volts we are unabashed geothermal nerds, so naturally I was excited to discuss this news with Fervo co-founder and CEO Tim Latimer, an ex-oil-and-gas engineer who moved into geothermal a decade ago with a vision of how to make it work: he would borrow the latest technologies from the oil and gas sector. Ten years later, he’s pulled it off. </p><p>I talked with Latimer about how EGS works, the current geographical and size limitations, how he plans to get his technology on a rapid learning curve to bring down costs, the value of clean firm power, the future of flexible geothermal, and much more. This is a juicy one.</p><p>All right then, with no further ado, Tim Latimer. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Thank you for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Tim, this has been a long time coming. I've been tracking your adventures from afar for a few years now, and now you've reached a real milestone here, a real milestone for you, a real milestone for your company, a real milestone for geothermal power, which Volts listeners are like me, big fans of. So to help us appreciate the significance of the milestone in question, I want to back up a little bit and do some background first for listeners who have not, for whatever bizarre reason, heard my previous geothermal pods. So a couple of times we've talked and you've told me kind of this short, potted history of geothermal, the last couple of decades of geothermal, the sort of struggle to align the money and the attention and the technology and everything.</p><p>So maybe by way of starting just share that with our listeners, sort of like geothermal's struggles to take off in, say, like a post-2000 context.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Absolutely. Well, to do that, I probably have to explain a little bit about how geothermal works, which is straightforward in the idea, difficult in the implementation, but geothermal has been around for forever. The first geothermal power plant was built in Italy over 100 years ago. Major places like New Zealand, Iceland, and northern California built massive utility-scale power plants going back to the 70s and 80s. But essentially what happened is — as the choicest areas for drilling geothermal, the places that steam was literally coming out of the ground got tapped — we ran out of really good resources and technology couldn't keep up with the challenges needed to go deeper, go into less permeable areas, and still produce economic electricity.</p><p>So geothermal has been kind of a boom and bust industry. The big technology push for a long time was the idea of something called enhanced geothermal systems, which was a DOE-led effort going all the way back to the 1970s to try to incorporate things like hydraulic fracturing, advanced drilling techniques, better subsurface characterization, to try to solve that problem and let geothermal be a more widespread resource. But many of the early technical attempts came far short of expectations, and so the industry had fits and spurts a lot of unrealized promise that never came about. And kind of the two big waves recently, in the late 2000s, there was a big push to do more geothermal energy development. And you always think about what does it take for a new tech to actually get to market? Well, you got to have the technology there, you've got to have supportive policy, and you have to have market conditions that are ready to go. And so in the late 2000s, the market conditions were there. People started caring about carbon-free electricity for the first time in a really meaningful way. We saw state RPS targets come out. We also were in a world where people thought natural gas prices were going to be exceptionally high for a long time.</p><p>So people were concerned about how we were going to source electricity. And so there was huge demand for geothermal. And then between different initiatives like the loan program office and the R initiatives, putting funding into alternative energy resources in the late 2000s, geothermal really had a great moment. But what happened there is it was missing that third pillar, it was missing the technology area. So there were a lot of contracts signed, a lot of investment came into the space. There was supportive policy, but a lot of the visions of geothermal in the late 2000s sort of petered out as drilling results were underwhelming.</p><p>And as a result, it put us in this decade plus of time where there was not supportive policy in the US for geothermal, where there was not investment dollars coming in. And the irony of this whole thing is all of these drilling and subsurface methods that people had tried to make work for geothermal for 50 years, all of a sudden became viable and cheap and cost-effective because of the shale oil and gas revolution. So all of a sudden it wasn't expensive to drill horizontal wells and we could image the subsurface with high degrees of clarity, but for most of 2010s the new tech showed up and in an inverse of the tech was there, but there was no policy and there was no financing.</p><p>And so it's taken quite some time for this mix of better technology, supportive policy and market demand to coalesce. And it's really just been in the last couple of years where geothermal has finally had all the forces pulling together here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's what we sort of tried to convey with my last pod with Jamie Beard on geothermal, just how everything's finally coming together. Right now, all the pieces of the puzzle are coming to place. It's a super exciting time. So I think most people get traditional geothermal power, right? You find an area where there's some sort of volcanic activity, which just means sort of tectonic plates rubbing on each other. So you have fractures underneath the ground and then you have water. When you push water through those fractures, it heats up. So you have one well where you push the water down, the water heats up in the fractured field and then comes back up the other well and you use it to generate electricity.</p><p>That is standard geothermal power. And as you say, that kind of geothermal power, which has been around for a long time, is confined to geographical areas where you find these fractures, where you find this sort of geological activity. So let's talk briefly about how to distinguish that traditional geothermal from the various other kinds we're hearing about now. There's a lot of terms flying around. So there's enhanced geothermal, there's super deep geothermal, there's closed loop geothermal. Maybe walk us a little bit through what is the technological landscape of beyond normal geothermal.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah, so the nomenclature here, what the industry has kind of settled on, and the DOE uses this nomenclature, is that first type that you described, which is very descriptive, you know, Iceland, Kenya, northern California geothermal prospects. We call that hydrothermal. And hydrothermal is those areas that have natural high temperatures, natural high flow capacity, because there's these natural fractures and permeability in the reservoir and there's water to circulate. And those areas can be tapped with relatively traditional old school technology. That's why they were drilled out in the 1970s, even though we didn't have all these technology advancements, because the geology is just better suited for it.</p><p>Now, broadly, the umbrella of next generation geothermal is sort of any advanced technology method to go beyond those really shallow, high temperature, naturally high flowing resources and make them economic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it the case that those natural areas, globally speaking, are tapped out, or is there runway there? How sort of like how at capacity are we for that kind of geothermal?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Well, the traditional geothermal industry, it's not small, but it is small relative to the total extent of the global power system. So less than 1% of global electricity, but really meaningful in certain markets. It's around 20 gigawatts installed. It grows by 5% to 10% a year. So it's not over by any means. And there's a lot of great investment in projects going on. But whenever you plot it against a resource like solar or wind and the growth that have occurred in those industries over the last decade plus, you can't even see that the line is moving because the axes are so different.</p><p>So always an important resource. It's certainly not tapped out globally. But when you look at the places that are on accessible land close to power demand that have the right natural resources, it's an industry that can produce a 5% to 10% per year growth rate, not an exponential rapid, world changing growth rate like we've seen in other renewables.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then all the advanced is beyond that. And so what are the relevant categories there?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Right, so you mentioned super deep, for example. So geothermal economics are all dictated by at the end of the day it's how much flow rate can you get out of a well and how high temperature is that flow rate?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And flow rate is just how much water you can push through it for a given time period.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Exactly. And so if you want to make geothermal projects more economic, you have to figure out how to lower the cost of drilling or you have to figure out how to make the temperature you're working with hotter, or you have to get the flow rate higher. So those are sort of the three levers you can pull. One of the things you mentioned there was super deep geothermal, which is interesting, which is trying to change one of those levers, which is temperature. Can you go so deep that rather than, let's say, 200 C, which is a reasonable temperature for modern geothermal, can you do 500 C or 800 C and improve the economics through drilling ultra deep and having very high temperature output?</p><p>So that's sort of one way. And there's super deep there and then there's enhanced geothermal systems, which is what the DOE through the Utah Forge project and their research projects and then us at Fervo have been working on for a long time, which is, can you use methods that incorporate directional drilling, advanced drilling tools and well stimulation, principally through application of hydraulic fracturing, to improve the flow rates? So the way you improve the economics of projects is you drill wells still targeting that same temperature resource, but you do it in a way where you get so much more flow per well that it improves the economics and unlocks a much broader resource.</p><p>So all of these things are next generation geothermal and the extent that it's tech that unlocks a new class of geothermal resource that goes beyond that traditional older style technology that's been around for decades.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How do you slot closed loop geothermal? So the traditional geothermal and enhanced geothermal, both sort of they inject the water, in the ground, and then out of a pipe, and then collect the water at the other side into a new pipe. But then there's also this new closed loop, which is just the water stays in the pipe the whole time. Is that meaningful enough to be its own category?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah, it is, because it's quite distinct from traditional geothermal or enhanced geothermal. It is definitely its own category where you're just flowing and recirculating through pipes in the ground and not through these large and extensive geothermal reservoirs. That's definitely a different category.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so is it fair to say that enhanced geothermal, which is fracturing more of the ground and improving flow rate, that's the one you're doing and that's the one that's right on the verge of commercial production. The other two are where in the cycle of things?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Both the other two — the nice thing about enhanced geothermal systems and the applications there is these are technologies that are very advanced and far along in their technological know-how. These are the technologies, like I say, that the Utah Forge site, which is supported by the Department of Energy, are proving out in real time. If you follow that project, every month there's a new advancement of that tech and they are commercially viable today, which is, I think, some of what we're going to talk about later, the results of our pilot project. The other technologies are both ones that still rely on radical technology breakthroughs in drilling technology.</p><p>So if you're talking about an enhanced geothermal system where you're drilling to 3000 meters depth and targeting 200 degrees C, which is really the area that the Department of Energy and Fervo is going after, we can do that today with existing technology. Getting the right cost structure or drilling down to 10,000 meters depth or 800 degrees C like some of these other projects: Very promising, lot of potential, there a lot of upside. But those are things that would require radical technology step changes in performance that put it more akin to the way that we look at fusion technology breakthroughs, where it's a big prize, it's worth pursuing, but we're certainly talking about deployment timelines that are ten plus or potentially several decades in the future to get those kinds of results.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. So the advantage enhanced geothermal has is it is going to depths that are familiar to the oil and gas industry. And thus the drilling technology has been worked on and perfected absolutely by the oil and gas industry. Whereas you drill deeper, you start getting hotter, you start basically having to design new kinds of drilling equipment.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Exactly. And I can tell you Fervo in a lot of ways came from ideas that myself and my co-founder and other folks in the Stanford Geothermal Research Group started batting around over a decade ago. And one of the constraints we gave ourselves when we launched the company in 2017 is what is the most optimized, effective design that would produce attractive economics today with off-the-shelf oil and gas technology. Because anytime that you want to build a new tool to go down hole, you extend your development timeline by years or decades. And so what we were looking at is the performance curve of oil and gas drilling, because it did get ten times better in the last decade because of how many technological advancements there were in the oil and gas unconventional world.</p><p>We were looking at what you can do off-the-shelf, and has that off-the-shelf performance from existing oil and gas tech gotten so good that you can drill wells in an effective and economic manner for geothermal? And that was what we set out with our thesis to prove.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which probably explains why you're the kind of first to the finish line. The starting line? I'm not sure.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>The finish of the start line, I guess you could say.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. The end of the beginning.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>The end of the beginning.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk then about what Fervo does. So, as we said, traditional geothermal finds these areas where there are fractures in the rock where you can squirt water through it and the water heats up. The whole idea behind enhanced geothermal is you make your own cracks in the rock. Basically, you fracture the rock, which is the same thing fracking does. Natural gas fracking cracks the rocks apart and natural gas seeps out. In your case, you just want to fracture the rock so you can squirt water through. So maybe walk us through kind of what the Fervo power plant looks like.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the idea behind enhanced geothermal, it works roughly the same as traditional geothermal, where you have those wells, where you pump cold water down injection wells and to calibrate here we are talking about wells that are 2000, 3000 meters depth. They're seven to 10,000ft deep, or in some cases, deeper. So these are really deep wells.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you say shallow relative to the deep — but that's not all that shallow.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah, shallow relative to deep. And this is one thing I've had to learn is these depths are quite different. And if you're not in the drilling world, we can often make the mistake of just assuming everybody knows what we're talking about. So I can be quite explicit. We're talking about wells that are 10,000ft deep here, which is mind-boggling in certain senses when you think about it, but very achievable when you think about the fact that the oil and gas industry has been doing this for 150 years, and that's what they've gotten exceptionally good at.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So you have one well, the injection well that basically squirts water 10,000ft deep, cold water 10,000ft deep, then what happens to the water?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>So, in a traditional geothermal system, it then finds that natural flow paths between the wells heats up to near the reservoir, temperature gets produced up the production wells, and then gets captured at the surface. And that heat is then used to power a turbine and generate electricity. And because you're using the natural heat of the earth to capture that energy, and you're not combusting something like coal or natural gas, there's no emissions associated with geothermal power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's pause there for a second because I want to press on that a little bit. When we say no emissions, do we mean literally no emissions? Like, just how clean is all this? Is it literally just water and steam and there's no environmental externalities at all?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Generally, yes, there's obviously risk to projects that developers like us have to be very attentive to. But when we're talking about carbon emissions from modern geothermal power projects, and I'll explain that distinction in a second, we're talking about a system that is truly a zero-emission resource. And the reason I distinguish this modern geothermal is the other surface technological breakthrough that has become mature now and unlocking the resource that we're going after is the advancement of binary cycle power generation technology. So the vast majority of new geothermal that's built in the United States now is this binary cycle.</p><p>So if you go back to that first power plant in Italy 100 years ago, they had steam coming out of the ground and they slapped a turbine onto that steam and they generated electricity from that. And many of the power plants built through 2000 looked kind of similar to that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. The steam itself was turning the turbine.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yes. And in those more old, I'd call them old school, geothermal power plants that were very high temperature, the consequence of that steam powering the turbine is then as the steam would be flashed on the other side. If there were things in that geothermal brine that was deep in the earth that were produced, those would cause emissions. So in nearly all cases, we're talking about stuff that's dramatically lower carbon emissions or other emissions from coal or natural gas power plants. But in this older style design for geothermal, there would be some operational emissions just dependent on whatever's in your geologic fluid there.</p><p>Now, more modern binary cycle power plants are a very different design. And so rather than using the steam from the geothermal wells to power a turbine, what you use is heat exchangers at the surface that are closed loops. So the geothermal fluid is never exposed to the atmosphere at all, and it heats up a different working fluid. That working fluid then goes through a continuous cycle to power the turbine and the power cycle for geothermal. And then the geothermal brine is reinjected back down those injection wells with no losses and no emissions so if you look at the history of geothermal, one of the enablers of recent growth and one of the enablers of the technology approach Fervo is taking is these binary cycle power plants which have multiple benefits.</p><p>They allow you to do lower temperature geothermal than those traditional resources and still be cost-effective. And they also eliminate the issues related to emissions of any kind, including carbon emissions from geothermal plants. So when we're talking about modern binary cycle geothermal plants, we're talking about a very clean resource that has no operational emissions of any kind.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Truly zero. And the water, how sort of like closed loop are you on the water? Do you have water requirements? Like, do you require a constant supply of water or is it just you're just recirculating forever?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>It's a very minimal amount because you are really recirculating forever. You know, people that are maybe familiar with the geysers in Northern California know that it declined and has water issues and has to source water from the local counties to make up for that depletion. But that's because it's using that system that has evaporative losses at the surface. Whenever you talk about a binary cycle system, it's much different because you're injecting all the fluid that you take up, so you're not losing fluid through that system. And so in general, you're talking about reservoirs that are fairly well connected in the subsurface, no water losses at the surface.</p><p>Once you go to sufficient depth anywhere in the world, the reservoirs are always what we call saturated. They're always filled with fluid. And so these geothermal systems, by and large, all we're doing is taking the fluid that's already in the geothermal reservoir and we're recirculating it over and over again. The only change that's happening is it goes down cold, picks up heat in the reservoir, releases that heat at the surface to create electricity, and then goes back again. But we're really just recirculating that same fluid flow for decades.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you deplete the heat at any rate? Or is the heat sort of eternally renewing? Is there such a thing as a decline in production in a geothermal well over time?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>It's a good question, and the short answer is yes. But it's something that is sort of manageable and can be designed for. So you think about the actual — I'm an engineer so maybe I'll go engineer for a moment — you think about your actual energy balance of what's going on. There's a fixed quantity of heat in that block of rock that you're accessing with these wells. There's also a constant flow of new heat replenishing that. So your energy balance here is basically what are you extracting? What was there to begin with and how quick is it replenishing?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>It turns out most geothermal systems, you could design them to only be produced at the replenishment rate with no decline period over time. But then you'd be sacrificing a lot on the power output to be doing sort of flow that's that level, and in general, the quantity of heat and we'll talk about this, I'm sure, later. But the geothermal reservoir that we're talking about, we're talking about cubic kilometers worth of reservoir, very hot rock. So that heat resource can last for many, many decades. So, in general, you do design these systems to have some temperature decline because that's a more economically optimum way to operate it, because you can get higher production results, but it's not a very significant decline.</p><p>Right. In a well-managed reservoir, this will be on the order of 1% to 2% a year. And you can always recover that either by drilling more and drilling deeper, and drilling and doing makeup drilling, or just slowing down fluid flow at some point in the future and allowing that replenishment to catch up. So geothermal is considered a renewable resource because the combination of how much heat content there is plus the replenishment means that these are extraordinarily long-life assets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. And so explain how you create fractures in the rock.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah. So again, we're not the first to do this, and it's probably worth maybe reflecting a little bit on the original 1970s Fenton Hill experiments done by the Department of Energy, where there was always this concept that if you injected at sufficient rates into injection wells, even in areas that did not have all that natural permeability, that you could create fractures that could then carry the fluid from one well to the next. And so this is something that's been trialed for a very long time. But the distinction is that in those first tests that the DOE did in the 1970s and then in the subsequent let's call it 50 or so tests that have been done around the world, many here in the US some in Japan, New Zealand, you name it. Any country that's a big geothermal producer has usually run some sort of test on enhanced geothermal systems. The vast majority, actually, all of those were done in relatively simple vertical well configurations because that's all that the technology would allow for. And so, by and large, the metrics that we look at to be commercially viable are things like how much surface area are you accessing there for the equivalent of what your radiator is down there in the subsurface, and how much volume for flow can you get? And what volume of that heat through the rock are you actually able to access?</p><p>And doing it through a simple vertical well and a single zone approach just turned out to not come anywhere close to the metrics we needed to see to say, yeah, this is worth drilling. The output per well you got could not cover the expensive costs of drilling.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I suspect this is a dumb question, but my brain rebels a little bit at the thought of water pressure fracturing solid rock. It just seems like rock is real solid and water is just water. So what types of pressure are we talking about here?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Well, I'll say a couple of things on this. First off, are you a hiker? Do you ever go hiking?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I've been hiking before.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah. So if you ever go hiking and you can sometimes look, and if you haven't looked closely at it, I encourage you to. Whenever there's, like, an exposed rock outcrop there, a lot of times you're going to see major fractures and faults just exposed in that rock outcrop. And the thing that's fascinating about geology, that's not just something that happens when that rock outcrop is exposed at the surface. You go 10,000ft down, and rock kind of looks the same way. There are these fractures and faults, and it's complex, and there are major forces down there in a way that can really just create these different shapes and fractures and faults in the subsurface either naturally or through some sort of design.</p><p>So it's something that happens all the time. And I don't know, since you asked the question, I guess I'll keep going down the engineering bent, which is when you look at actually how that rock breaks, what we're actually talking about is what we call tensile failure. So you're not actually crushing the rock right. You're actually creating enough pressure that it pulls the rock apart. And it's somewhat fascinating. Rock turns out to be extraordinarily strong in compression. You can stand on it. You can build pyramids out of it —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>It's really strong that way. But then for a lot of rocks, you can just pull them apart with your hands because they actually have much less tensile strength, we call it.</p><p>And so what ends up happening in these systems is we can pump water down, and water is an incompressible fluid, so it carries pressure really well. So what we're doing in our designs and this is what has been done in a lot of designs for a long time now in the subsurface is we are picking very specific ports where we're opening up our well to that outside geology and that geologic reservoir and that rock and applying a lot of pressure right at that specific point. And it's enough pressure that actually can initiate these fractures, because, again, rocks are relatively weak in tension, and that's what kind of allows this to work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're taking natural fractures that are already there and just widening them, or is it the case that you can literally cause a fracture in a solid piece of rock?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>You can cause a fracture in a solid piece of rock. And again, this is a controlled system happening thousands of feet below. And we know to great precision what the dimensions of this look like. But, yeah, it's actually creating these new fractures that go out of the injection wells and into the production wells that create a new flow pathway that didn't exist before that allows for the controlled movement of fluid between that injection well and production well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is just wild to me that you can do that at all, much less at like 10,000ft down. What is the technology that allows you to see the structure of the rock 10,000ft down?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Well, we're doing all sorts of characterization work here. I think, again, I sort of opened the conversation here by telling you it's simple ideas that are difficult to execute. And actually, the first tool in our toolkit to actually characterize this rock is we can drill down with what's called core bits and actually hollow out a sample of rock that's 10,000ft down and pull it up and then go run a bunch of lab tests on it. So we're doing that work regularly. And that's sort of how you kind of create a baseline for this. Beyond that, we have all kinds of different tools in our toolkit.</p><p>And a lot of this is stuff that, again, didn't exist ten plus years ago or wasn't cost effective. That allows us to map out what's actually happening in the subsurface. So to your point, one of the challenges why it was so hard to drive innovation in geothermal, even though, like I said, the first tests for this were 50 years ago, was because you do the project, it wouldn't work. And then you'd be sitting around with a bunch of messy data and say, well, we know it didn't work, but we don't know why because it's 10,000ft below you and it's difficult to see.</p><p>So we have tools that our predecessors didn't have access to. And one of the things that we've invested heavily in and have a lot of innovations around now is fiber optic sensing. So actually, one of the things that we use in all of our projects that, again, when we did this, in a lot of cases, it was the first time this had been applied to geothermal. When we drill our wells, we actually lay fiber optic cables along the entire length of the wells. And we have a special data acquisition system where we send laser pulses down that fiber optics.</p><p>And because there's impurities in all fiber optics, those laser pulses get reflected back to the surface, and we can look at the reflections there and basically map out what those reflections look like in the fiber optics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wild.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Using that data, as we change things, we can get a very clear picture of what's happening in the subsurface. So, like, if you think back to your fifth grade science class, when stuff gets hot, it expands, right? When stuff gets cool, it contracts. So if we're trying to figure out, for example, how much fluid flow is going down each of these ports that we've opened up into the reservoir, we can actually look at the real time temperature change, because along that fiber optics, if it cools off a little bit, all those impurities get a little bit closer together.</p><p>And we can read that with our fiber optics and measure in real time the temperature along the entire well. And from that temperature we can figure out everything from how much flow is going where, how much of that is getting over to the other wells that we've drilled as our production and collection wells. We can also map the fluid pathways that are going in between these wells, even if it's hundreds of feet out into the rock. And this is stuff that has given us a data set that allows us to actually understand what's happening in geothermal reservoirs that goes far beyond any sort of data we've ever had access to before.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so that's what we're using to measure and verify.</p><p>It's super gratifying to learn that lasers are involved.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Of course.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's always good news.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>You can't do any great technology without lasers. So we've got our lasers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the big breakthrough here is old enhanced geothermal. All these previous attempts, basically you got one vertical well. You're jamming water down it to create fractures. But you just create fractures basically in a sort of circumference around the bottom of the well, right? And the big breakthrough here is your well goes down and then across laterally and so you have water coming out of those lateral pipes at intervals, right? Like a yard sprinkler is the diagram on your website. So you're creating these fractures over a large swath of rock, basically. So you just get more fractures out of your well is the long and short of it?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Exactly. And so you think about what I said before. It's all about drilling is expensive. How much flow, how much surface area, how much volume can you get for each well that you drill. And so in our industry nomenclature, the term we use is zones. So every time there's fluid that's leaving that well and going from one well to the next, we call that a flow zone. And just to give a bit of history, I went to my first geothermal conference in 2015 and I'd started my career as a drilling engineer in the oil and gas industry.</p><p>I became passionate about climate change. I saw that there was a way to apply my skills as a drilling engineer to a carbon free energy resource that really seemed like it needed some help. And I talked to one of the leading researchers in the space and I was captivated with this idea of multiple zones. And what drilling horizontally allows you to do is put multiple zones in a well. So in our pilot project, what we've done is drilled 8000ft straight down and then we've turned perfectly horizontal, 90 degrees, and we drilled another 4000ft over. And so rather than just having one zone at the bottom of the well where we can choose to inject fluid, that gives us just so much more length to spread that fluid out.</p><p>And so when I was at this conference, I was talking to this researcher, a very respected person, a career person, and he told me that enhanced geothermal systems would never work. And I said, well, of course not. You can't get the right design metrics you need if you only have one flow zone, but I think there's an opportunity to do multiple zones. And he said, oh, we've looked at that too, and it doesn't work. And I was like, well, what did you model? And he said, well, we've done some extreme cases, we've even modeled up to three zones in one well.</p><p>And I looked at him confused, because if any of your listeners are familiar with how modern oil and gas drilling works, that's quite a bit different number. And I said, well, I was thinking a lot more than three. And so whenever you think about those specific targeted design flow ports that we open up and flow fluid through in these reservoirs, these zones, in our very first project that we just completed, we have 102 different flow zones.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So does that mean the water goes down and travels through all of those on the way to the other well?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Exactly right. Exactly right. And what's nice about this is because we have that fiber optic technology that I was talking about, we can actually verify where that fluid flow is going and show that we're getting good distribution across the entire reservoir. So the reason we've had different results and a step change in performance, and why we've made this commercially viable when past efforts have not been successful, is rather than thinking about can we go from one zone to three, we jumped straight to the answer, which is 100 plus zones. And that gives you a radically different result.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, this brings up one of my questions, which is, is there a physical or practical limit to the length of your lateral drilling? Like, you've got 4000ft now, and that gives you 102 zones. Could you do 8000ft and 200 zones? 16,000ft and whatever? Is there a limit to the size of one of these things?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>There is, at some point, a limit. It doesn't become cost-effective to drill further, but we haven't come close to hitting what that looks like yet. So just to give you an example, we've just finished our first pilot project, and the intent of that was really to prove that this all worked. So we wanted to design something, even if it wasn't full scale. But every single bit, every single unknown question, every unknown technology assumption was proven out by this. But it doesn't mean we can't make it bigger, right? So to make that concrete, this system, we drilled right around 4000ft in the horizontal distance.</p><p>And we also spaced these wells about 400ft apart. And so you think about the amount of power you can get out of the system then is kind of bounded by that geometry. 4000ft long, 400ft across. That's what you're flowing the fluid through. Just to give an example of this and the flow test results that we've gotten from this and this is what we're excited to announce that this worked is we've gotten nearly the equivalent of 4 megawatts of electricity out of this two well system, which is a really great number. It starts talking about the success that this can be at the utility scale because you can do many of these wells in a single field.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You have one well going down, one well going up, and all these fracture zones in between that the water passes through. I'm assuming when you are building commercial power plants, is it just going to be a one well down, one well up type of situation or is there a limit to how many of those could you have? Multiple down wells, multiple zones, multiple up wells, all in the same area?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And that's what makes this so scalable and that's what brings out the potential here. This was an N equals one attempt. This was a first ever. We spent an enormous amount on data acquisition. We made a lot of design choices to make sure we were maximizing the learning from this and maximizing our chances of success. The really exciting thing we've learned about this, to get back to your original question about what are the limits, our very next project that we're going to, we're going to do larger diameter wells, we're going to space them farther apart because we collected the data that shows that we can do that.</p><p>And then rather than 4000ft, we're going to drill 6000ft in the horizontal direction. And so our next project, rather than getting roughly 4 megawatts of electricity from each well system, it's going to be about double that. And so that's sort of the next move.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So just larger wells just get you more flow, right?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Exactly. And then the other thing that's great about this, and I know your listeners also have been informed greatly about the importance of modularity and repeatability.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's our next thing.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>So here's the key for this that's very important. If I want to design now an 80 megawatt power system using this design, it doesn't mean I have to throw the book out, start over from scratch and design a completely different system. What I need to do then is take this two well system that I already know works and just do it ten times in a row. And so that's what's very exciting about this breakthrough that we're announcing today. This isn't something that like, oh, now we're going to go 100 times bigger. So we got to go back to the drawing board and redesign everything.</p><p>For us, going 100 times bigger means doing exactly what we've already done, but just 100 more units of it. And so this is the whole key of the repeatability of making this work. And the next site that we're moving to is going to be a 400 megawatt project, which means drilling wells just like we just did, but just a lot more of them. And in a very tight space, we can stack these vertically on top of each other, we can put the wells close together. And so another thing that people often care about when they look at energy resources is the surface footprint.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What do I see if I go to Nevada? How big or small is your surface footprint?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Well, what's left at the surface when you're done drilling these wells is a well head that's a few feet tall and a couple of feet wide. And that's it and it's actually quite an underwhelming thing. I've taken many visitors out to our site and they expect to see something dramatic. And —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just the hole.</p><p>what you end up seeing is a piece of metal that could fit in your living room. And so that's what's left. Now, of course, we have to connect it to power plants, and the power plants look more like they're warehouse-sized buildings.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>But what's beautiful about the directional drilling that we're using in these projects, another thing that you couldn't do with traditional geothermals, you have to imagine the wells have to be spaced a certain distance apart. And if you're drilling vertical wells, that means if you want your wells to be 500ft apart at the bottom of the hole, they have to be 500ft apart at the surface. If you go visit a traditional geothermal site, oftentimes every new well is a different well pad and it can be spread out over a wide area. Now we're using directional drilling, we have tight control over where we drill these wells.</p><p>So we can put many, many wells on the same well pad and just drill them out in different directions using directional drilling. And so geothermal already among all the energy resources, typically scores top or near the top in terms of energy output per unit of land used. And this is actually going to be significantly better than traditional geothermal because we can put many of these wells that once we're done, have a very small surface footprint altogether on the same pad.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But do you need like, you're starting from that central well pad, that's your injection wells, and you're going out 4000, 6000ft in different directions. Do you have to own all that land that you're going under? Because you'd have to at least own a lot of land, even if you're not sort of like marking it?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah, you do not have to own the land. The Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 was passed and signed into law that created a new mineral class for geothermal lease rights. And so what our company owns is not the land itself, but we own the exclusive right to access and develop the geothermal resources for this land. So what we have is a really small surface footprint. And then the wells, as they go, know, we negotiate with landowners. Which because a lot of these resources are in the Western US, a lot of times the landowner ends up being the US federal government.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, right.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>We negotiate and sign contracts to specifically develop the geothermal resources that are found thousands of feet below the surface.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But if I'm on the land that that lateral well is going beneath, I'm presumably unaffected. Like you can have buildings and farms and whatever, 4000ft down presumably is not going to bother anybody.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Absolutely. Some of the more interesting geothermal power plants you can visit are in urban areas. You could do like a little geothermal tour of Munich, for example, where they have all of these geothermal power plants that also power district heating systems that are plopped down right in the middle of the city of Munich. And there's examples of that all around the world. The stuff that's happening thousands of feet below our feet has no discernible impact on the surface at all.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The big promise has been geothermal anywhere or geothermal everywhere. You're going down 10,000ft to what, 300, 400 degrees, you said?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's about 10,000ft. And the temperature we target is roughly 400 degrees Fahrenheit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, is it the case that if I throw a rock at a map of the United States anywhere I hit, if I go down 10,000ft, am I going to find 400 degree rock? In other words, could I build one of these theoretically anywhere?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>No, not anywhere. But for me, the key question is always not can we do it anywhere, but can we do it in enough places that it makes a difference? Right. And to use an oil and gas analogy, you can't drill anywhere in the world and find oil. But that doesn't mean that oil is not an important global commodity to the energy system and geothermal is not any different. The key is can you drill in places where it's economic to drill and you can access the electric grid so you can sell your power to customers. And there is an enormous amount of that in the United States.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's the limit. The limit is connection to the electrical system. Like physically you could do it anywhere, you just can't port the power out.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, there's wide variations in what we call geothermal gradient. So, like where we're drilling our projects, you get to 400 degrees F at 8000ft or so. There's places that are a lot cooler where you'd have to drill to 20,000ft to get to that temperature. And so the question of how much you can develop is really a cost question more than anything else. How deep can you drill and for the right bang for your buck and get the temperature you need? And so I'd say the exciting thing about the Department of Energy launching their enhanced Geothermal Earthshots Initiative recently and one of the first things that they did was review the gradient maps of temperature at depth throughout the United States and come up with a finer resolution output of how much shallow potential there is.</p><p>And they used in this report and I think a really important number was 4000 meters. And the reason 4000 meters is important is that's a depth that the oil and gas industry drills today, geothermal industry drills today, and we know we can do with existing equipment. And the important thing out of this is, as they looked over this resource, traditionally there'd been a few tens of gigawatts of resource found that way, but with higher resolution mapping. The new report out from NREL on the energy Earthshots that just came out this year, which incorporated a lot of these more advanced technologies into the assumptions, identified an additional 230 gigawatts of potential just in the United States that can be accessed with technology today.</p><p>And so we're talking about several hundred gigawatts of potential that's in the right temperature range, that's at that 4000 meters or shallower depth, that's ready to go, cost effective today. That can be done. So can you do it anywhere? Not yet. Let us come down the cost curve a little bit more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If it follows the path of oil and gas. As you scale up, things get cheaper —</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>the technology gets better, the available resource grows.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the bet we're taking, you look at this NREL estimate, if we only ever produce a few hundred gigawatts of power in the United States, only get to the point where we're 20% to 30% of US electricity, and that's it, it's probably still worth doing. But I still think that as we get to economies of scale and come down the cost learning curve, we're going to be able to go to even deeper resources and make that work. So there's really no limit to the technical potential of what can be done here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So another thing Volts listeners are familiar with is this notion of a learning curve and this sort of famous graph. I interviewed the authors of the paper on the pod. They have this sort of famous graph about which technologies do and don't get on learning curves, and sort of like, what are the features of a technology that make it, that lend it to a learning curve. And the sort of long and short of it was modularity, repeatability, that kind of thing. You're doing the same thing over and over again. And then sort of out on the edge you have these technologies where every new project is bespoke, where you have to sort of do custom engineering for each project.</p><p>In that paper, geothermal, by which I think they're referring to traditional geothermal, they have out there on the no learning curve side of this for that reason, because every new geothermal project required specialized engineering and its own specialized well drilling and etc., geothermal has not demonstrated much of a learning curve. And so your whole thesis here, starting Fervo, was to fix that, to figure out how to get geothermal on a learning curve. So talk about that a little bit what that looks like and what you need to do to make that happen.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's exactly right. And this is one of my favorite papers, too. We share this paper internally for onboarding when people join Fervo because we want people to know, what is it you're doing? And the premise of this paper, and I thought it was so well articulated, is that if you want to create an energy technology revolution that actually scales to global scale, it has to be simple and it has to be repeatable. And they used multiple great examples in the paper. You look at their type one, standardized simple resources are solar PV modules and LEDs.</p><p>And those are sort of self explanatory.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everyone's the same. Every sort of mount is the same. Every field almost is the same. You're just doing the same thing over and over again.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Exactly. And if you want to have global impact, you have to figure out how to make that happen. And so what's interesting about this is that I think a lot of things are somewhat short sighted, like how could we make this next unit cheaper? Which of course is important. But if you're doing a bunch of complexity and customization to do that, you're never going to scale the resources. So let me use the oil and gas analogy again. A conventional oil and gas basin, you drill into it, it has huge flow rates, lots of hydrocarbons there, and just pumps out gushers.</p><p>And it's a simple well. It's vertical. And that's what they were drilling 100 years ago. But the challenge with that is that every geologic trap looks different. Sometimes you find a good resource and sometimes you don't. Oil and gas used to have dry holes. And so you drill one area, you get a gusher, you drill the next. It doesn't work. So you got to stop. You got to retool. You got to remap, try again. You shut down, your crews go away, you lose all the learnings. The next well looks radically different than the one you did before, and it doesn't reduce cost.</p><p>And you think about a lot of the people who dismissed the shale revolution when it first started out. They had this thought, like, "Well, if this project isn't economic, drilling vertical wells, how is drilling to the same depth and then drilling horizontally for a really long way going to be economic?" Right. You're just adding to it. But what people missed was that it changed oil and gas exploration and drilling from a customized complex problem to one that was standardized. And so in oil and gas, because they can create their own permeability, they can target basically what's called the source rock.</p><p>And so every well looks the same, one to the next. And the whole reason the shale technology revolution took off wasn't because those wells are cheaper. It doesn't take a drilling engineer to understand that if you drill down and sideways, that's more expensive than just drilling down, but it's because every well could look the same and you could find these huge resources. And so you start looking back ten years ago, all of a sudden these companies would report out like, "We've got 4000 wells in our inventory and every single one of them looks just like the last one that they drilled."</p><p>And so it shifted oil and gas down to the bottom left. And you look at what we're doing in geothermal and it's actually the exact same pattern. Of course, if you find the next geysers or the classic Iceland resource or something that's going to be cheaper on a one-off unit basis than drilling these deeper wells with more bells and whistles. But you're always chasing something. You have dry hole risk. You drill something, you don't find it, you got to shut down, you got to retool, you can't make it modular and repeatable. So if you're able to create a well design that's robust enough that it works in any geologic setting, which is what we've done through the combination of technologies that allow us to have highly productive wells everywhere we go, we can shift geothermal down to one of those resources that is standardized.</p><p>And that's the whole key. Because once one well looks just like the last one, you can start bringing it down that learning curve, which has been the most powerful force in driving global energy technology revolutions across all of the ones we've experienced in the last few years. And the key of what we're doing here is we now have a geothermal well design that does for geothermal what unconventional oil and gas did for oil and gas, which is make it standardized and repeatable. And that puts this industry on a learning curve that is not possible if you're just looking at the conventional hydrothermal resources.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you think you've got that now, so you've got something that you're ready to just start cranking out copies of.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Basically exactly. When we started this company in 2017, we faced an enormous amount of skepticism from the traditional geothermal community and everybody else. We were told that you can't actually drill horizontal wells in geothermal reservoirs because the rock is different. You can't use fiber optics in these wells because the temperatures are too high. There was a whole list of things that we needed to prove out because in order to get on a learning curve, you have to be able to do the first unit right. And that first unit becomes the basis at which you drive cost down and you drive performance and you improve from.</p><p>And so what we set out with our commercial pilot project that we've now finished, is to prove all those things that you can drill horizontally, that you can get enough surface area, that you can evenly distribute the flow across thousands of feet, even if it's 8000ft down. And what's fantastic about this is we now have all of the data to prove that works and have done it in a commercial project. And so we've now started a new learning curve for enhanced geothermal with the first project.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Like the starting gun.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>The starting gun. And we're going to do that over and over and over again to bring more clean power onto the grid, more reliable power onto the grid. And with each iteration we're going to bring the unit cost down.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The beginning of a new learning curve stirs the heart.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>I think this is the right audience for it. It definitely gets me excited, but I don't find other people maybe than other volts listeners that will share the same thrill that we do at Fervo about the beginning of a new learning curve.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is awesome. And this is know. Here we are, an hour in. This is the significance now of what you've done. So you've put all these pieces together into a well, into a commercial sized well and they work now.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So now you are ready to start basically cranking out power plants, commercial power plants, the very first enhanced geothermal working, money making power plants.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's talk then briefly about costs. This is everybody's first question, sort of like how much does the power cost coming out of this? And this is not a straightforward question, so first let's just talk about just briefly — I think this is also something most Volts listeners will be familiar with, but it couldn't hurt to do a very brief primer on — just what is clean, firm power? Why is it valuable? How are you doing it? Why do you think it's going to be so — you're not just like power is not a commodity where it's always worth the same in all places at all times.</p><p>Right. So there are timing issues, there are geographical issues, and there's this thought of the future power system which is based around it's going to be primarily based around wind and solar, which are both variable. You need something to complement that. So just say a little bit about what that means and why you think you're going to sort of fit in and profit in that niche.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah. The path to a decarbonized grid has been a multistep journey. And if you reflect back 15 years ago when the first ever RPS targets were announced and corporate 100% renewable energy procurement targets were announced, there was a lot of skepticism that any renewable energy could get built. Wind was still relatively expensive, solar was very expensive. If you go back to 2000s and so the sort of this first step on the decarbonization journey was just the massive successes of getting wind and solar cheap enough that they were economically viable to deploy. And we saw in the 2010s what the impact of those coming down the learning curve were.</p><p>As now, solar is this unbelievably fast growing resource all around the world. Now, depending on what model you believe of. Course, at some point the fact that those are variable energy resources and obviously solar only works when the sun is shining limits how much more can be produced. And so sort of the next pillar of decarbonizing the grid and the next energy technology revolution that we're all now quite familiar with was the massive reduction in cost of lithium-ion battery storage. And I think there was a lot of exuberance in the mid-2010s to late-2010s, that "Great. Energy solved, solar is cheap, batteries are coming, we did it."</p><p>And I think in hindsight that was clearly a little bit premature. There were a couple vocal but not necessarily listened to voices out there in the 2010s waving their hands and saying, "Y'all, this is great, we're going to get a good way there. But we need at least one more thing to make this work." Because as it turns out, and you can look at some of our favorites, are the NREL LA100 study, which is wonderful. Your listeners are probably very familiar with Jesse Jenkins and the Princeton Net-Zero America work.</p><p>And what we see again and again is that even with ultra-cheap solar, even with ultra-cheap lithium-ion battery storage, even with ultra-cheap wind, if that's just what you're dealing with, you do see this inflection point where costs to decarbonize go up exponentially as you get beyond the, pick your model, 60% or 80% electricity coming from carbon-free resources. So what we know is we need at least one more thing. And this is where the whole concept of clean, firm power has come about, which is solar and wind are probably going to be the majority of the electricity supply on future decarbonized grids. Batteries are going to help extend how much of the market share solar and wind can take.</p><p>But we're going to need something if we really want to get that last 20% done. And I think the big change in the last few years is a few years ago, people viewed this as the purview of academics to debate about because it seemed like a problem that was 20 years in the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When you get to 80%, right?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I think what we've seen here is it's not that clean the world doesn't work the way that models do. It's not like there's some magic day where you wake up and renewable energy is now 80.1% and you're like "Oh no, we need something else." It turns out some of the growing pains of getting to that system emerge far before the 80% level. So I opened up this discussion talking about how the market and the tech and the policy have to be all there together. Well, there were some major changes around 2020 in the policy- and market-world of this.</p><p>The first is that because of the success in wind and solar, all of a sudden people said, "Wow, we can maybe actually do this decarbonization thing." And the most ambitious RPS target in the country renewable portfolio standard was California's 33% target in the 2010s, and Hawaii was the first to beat them to it. And Hawaii, going back five years ago, passed the first ever 100% clean energy standard. And then California, not to be outdone, passed SB100. And now we've seen dozens of states follow suit where we've upped our ambition. And so now this isn't a question of like, "Oh, we'll cross that bridge when we come to it."</p><p>It's like, "Okay, we're ready for the next step. How do we get there?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Firm just means it's there when you need it.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>It's there when you need it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You can turn it on and off at will, which you cannot do to wind and sun, obviously. And you can do that, obviously, with natural gas. Natural gas is basically what's playing that role now. It's just missing out on the clean part.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>And there's an important distinction here between the term firm and the term baseload. Sometimes they're used interchangeably, but they're really not interchangeable. Firm is an attribute of the energy resource. It's there when you need it, but it doesn't necessarily have to always be there. Baseload is a way of operating the resources. Baseload is it's on all the time. Those are two different concepts. Most baseload resources are firm resources, but it's all about how you operate them. So when you look at the solution set of what keeps the lights on in those troubling hours where we don't necessarily have enough variable renewable energy solution, you're looking at a few things.</p><p>Coal and natural gas are the traditional resources that have played that role, but both of them come with carbon emissions. So if your idea is to decarbonize ,your solution set then becomes nuclear in all of its various forms, whether it's conventional or small module reactor, fusion. Or you're talking about hydro, which has its own geographic limitations and challenges. Or you're talking about a breakthrough in cost for long duration energy storage that goes far beyond the four-hour lithium-ion battery storage that we're talking about today. Or we're talking about coupling CCS onto natural gas or coal plants.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. If you look at decarbonization models these days and dig in a little bit, there's tons of that. There's tons of natural gas with CCS attached playing that clean, firm role, which is like, I've always even before there were technological options, I've always thought, that's not going to be it. There's no way that's going to be it. And now I'm so gratified that other alternatives are coming along.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I think the role we see ourselves playing on the grid is when you look at that last 20%, which I do think that most people who think deeply about grid decarbonization say that it's there. Now the arguments aren't, "Do we solve that problem or not? Or is it a now problem?" It's "Okay is it actually 20% or is it 10 if we get cheaper on storage? Or is it actually 40?" Because all of these models made really rosy assumptions about transmission build out and we need even more firm power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or too many nimbies.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Or too many nimbies, you name it.</p><p>But there's a recognition that there needs to be a role on the grid for clean, firm power. And historically, geothermal has not been included in that conversation. And broadly because people didn't believe that it was a resource that could be widely deployable and they also didn't believe that it was a resource that could get on a learning curve and get cheaper. And I think that's what we have now begun to push back on, and we've now got the data to prove it out, that this is a resource that is more widely deployable than people thought, and the costs are coming down. And it's a resource that has the characteristics to get on a learning curve.</p><p>So if we invest in it today, it's going to be much cheaper in the medium to long term future. And so we're excited about our results. Some of our results have already worked their way into the most recent NREL annual technology baseline, which is what a lot of people use to sort of discern what might the grid look like in the near future under different scenarios.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So maybe the next round of models might look a little different.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>I can tell you the current aggressive cost cases for the NREL annual technology baseline for enhanced geothermal systems are much better and much more cost-effective than anything that's come before. And that's been really a combination of us publishing our results and making sure that those get out into the public domain, but also want to recognize the Department of Energy's leadership efforts on that. Utah Forge, which is a test bed in central Utah where they're testing a lot of these techniques, broke all kinds of drilling records on the various updates for their projects. So we're coming out of this great stagnation period of geothermal where there was really no new data for like ten years.</p><p>So the NREL ATB used to model geothermal costs as if drilling technology had been stagnant for 20 years, which, when you look at the oil and gas industry that's a silly assumption, but if there's no geothermal data to update it, that has to be what you assume. The beautiful thing now is between Utah forge projects, our projects, and other efforts around the industry, we've got the data now to say it's time to get way more ambitious on these cost reduction curves for geothermal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is so, I mean, just from a personal point of view, this was like the last piece of the decarbonized electricity system, and all the sort of extant possible solutions were sort of like slightly hold your nose. I don't want to get into how people feel about small nukes or whatever, but all of them were vaguely problematic in some way or another. This is like the first clean firm solution that is free of footnotes or caveats or skeletons in the closet. This is like a bona fide renewable clean firm. So the last thing I want to touch on which gets into this so traditionally geothermal has been thought of as a baseload resource.</p><p>I.e., thought of as a clean firm resource that would be run all the time and run at a steady state all the time, which is useful. Baseload power is extremely useful, especially when it's clean and there's plenty of runway there. But even more useful would be flexible clean firm power. I.e., clean firm power that can ramp up and ramp down or store energy for a while and then release it. So flexibility is huge and Volts listeners will recall my podcast with Wilson Ricks last year about evidence that these new enhanced geothermal wells could be used flexibly.</p><p>So maybe just talk a little bit about what it would mean to run a well like yours flexibly, what you could do, and how close is that to being a reality?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Absolutely. So a couple of comments on this: One is geothermal historically has been run in a baseload fashion because baseload power historically has had value. There's been very few hours on a traditional grid of negative priced electricity. So if you've got a resource with no marginal cost, you're going to run it. And that's still the case as we're talking right now in July 2023 that that has value and you can see evidence of that. For example, one of the big things that really boosted the market demand for geothermal was in response to the rolling blackouts that occurred in California in August of 2020, the California public utility commission issued what they'd called their "midterm reliability ruling" that required a lot of capacity that is leading to a massive build out in battery storage on the grid.</p><p>But there was already this recognition in the state of California that we have to be thinking about that next step. So they carved out what they'd call "long lead time resources" and created a 1000 megawatt procurement mandate for clean firm power to help keep the lights on in California while still achieving their decarbonization goals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that the first specifically clean firm requirement that you're aware of in the country?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>It's the first one that we're aware of and it made a huge difference in catalyzing the modern iteration of the geothermal market. And so a lot of the power purchase agreements we've signed have been in response to this forward looking mandate that California issued on this topic. And so there's a recognition that in 2023 and throughout the rest of this decade getting any kind of power, baseload or not, as long as it's firm, is going to add value to the grid and help achieve the decarbonization reliability goals of our customers. But we also wanted to sort of skate where the puck was going.</p><p>The grid is always changing. There's a few negative hours a year if you're in like Oklahoma or west Texas with wind, or in California on a spring day with sun. But every single model shows that there's going to be a lot more of those in the future. And the attribute that everybody's going to value going forward is going to be flexibility and dispatchability. So while we're signing these power purchase agreements and selling round the clock 24/7 carbon free power to our customers, we've hatched an idea of working on a more flexible resource for the future as well.</p><p>And so if you think about geothermal, it actually can operate flexibly with no issues. And in fact, it makes sense if you think about countries like Kenya or Iceland or the Big Island in Hawaii that get such a high percentage of their geothermal power that by definition, it has to ramp up and down because it's a huge part of the grid. And so geothermal is ramped up and down for forever. There's no technological limitation in making it happen. But the thing that we became really interested in is because we're operating in different reservoirs than traditional geothermal, and because we're able to kind of create these closed, isolated systems, we thought, "Well, what about rather than just ramping down production. What happens if we shut in production while we continue to run our injection wells and build pressure in the reservoir?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So like, when you talk about, like, Iceland traditional geothermal well running flexibly, you just mean it can ramp down by injecting water at a lower rate?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Right. Or by continuing to produce the well field, but then just bypassing the power plant so that you're not producing extra electricity with that fluid flow.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So there's a ceiling, a max flow rate that you can do on a sort of baseload way, or you can go down from there.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so your innovation is don't pump less water down, just literally put a cap on the other well where things come out. So water's still going down, but it's not coming out, which means pressure is building.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yes. And so this is something where we found in the Princeton Research Group and Jesse Jenkins and Wilson Rick, who you had on the podcast, some like minded folks who shared our views on what was going to be very valuable for decarbonizing the grid of the future. And we applied and got first an NSF grant and then later an RPE grant to actually test this in the field. And if you remember, because we've collaborated with Princeton and Wilson for a while on this, we thought about joining Wilson on the podcast when you discussed this last year.</p><p>But what I knew at the time was that rather than talking about our modeling results, if we just waited a few more months, I could come out and tell you about real results and so we wanted to hold off on it. And the great thing about this, and I would encourage folks who are interested in this topic, Wilson did a wonderful job articulating the value to the grid and how this would work on the Volts podcast last year. But what's nice now is we've actually collected the data to prove that this works. So thanks in part to the RPE funding we got during our test phase of this project, we tested for traditional industry standard time to prove that under conventional operating conditions, this was an effective and viable way of producing geothermal power.</p><p>We were very excited about the positive results there, but then we took and extended an extra time to do cycles of what we call Fervo flex, which is this idea of doing in reservoir energy storage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, because if you're capping the well coming out and you're still pumping water in and pressure is building, you are effectively storing energy underground.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Exactly. And so the idea here is we have a geothermal power plant that by itself is very valuable because it could produce 24/7 carbon free electricity. But then as we get to grids that have ever increasing levels of, in our case in the western US, mostly solar built out, we could operate it in a mode where we actually continue to inject into the reservoir throughout the daytime without producing any new electricity, taking power and using that to run our pumps to build pressure in the reservoir. And then when the sun starts to set and we're dealing with these challenging evening ramp conditions where you've got to add tens of gigawatts of power —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The neck of the duck.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>The neck of the duck. We can open the wells up. And that pressure that we've stored throughout the day means that we're still getting geothermal fluid flow out, but it's coming out at a faster flow rate and temperature than just our steady state conditions. And so we can be responsive to the neck of the duck in a really powerful way. And so, to be clear, this was a shorter test than sort of the industry standard test that we ran on the geothermal round-the-clock production methods that we're very confident in now. But it's great to run a model and then get out there in the field and deal with the tens of thousands of feet and all the real-world conditions and have the field production results match the model perfectly, which they did.</p><p>And we have an enormous amount of optimism about how not just 24/7 carbon-free power from geothermal, but also incorporating a flexible energy storage mechanism into the output profile here is just going to further unlock potential for geothermal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and then you have clean, firm and energy storage in the same package. A true Swiss Army knife for the modern grid.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so we know that's possible. That's not something you're ready to do in a commercial setting yet. Do you have any timeline on that or any idea like when that might be a reality?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yeah, the power purchase agreements that we're signing up with folks right now, again, the grid still needs baseload power right now, and it's an urgent crisis. In fact, I was just reviewing the Electricity Reliability Council's report for their five-year outlook on grid reliability. And I don't want to scare everybody, but it's hard to look at it and not get scared. They break it up by grid ISO and they have an okay color and then a yellow color and a red color. The yellow color is under extreme weather conditions. This grid is going to struggle to meet demand in 2027.</p><p>The red color is under normal average daily operating conditions. This grid is going to struggle to meet demand in 2027. And it's a little bit scary how much yellow and red there is on that chart. So the world still needs reliable power and it needs it fast, especially if we're going to continue this decarbonization journey, which we must. And so the products we're building for the next two to three years, at least, the utility scale products we're building are going to operate that way because that's what the grid needs. But we have continued R&D scope that as we're building out these geothermal power plants, we're going to do longer and longer test cycles of the Fervo flux methodology.</p><p>So that the power plants that we build by the end of the decade are all going to have that proven out and built in as a feature of the way we operate geothermal plants of the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the plants you're building, even if they don't run that way, will be ready to run that way when it's proven out.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's an interesting proposition for a buyer, I would think, sort of like, here's the price and the value you now want and need. And here's a little hidden bonus. It might someday become even more valuable.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>That's right. And I don't mean to draw too big of a distinction between what we've proven already versus what we're trying to prove now. The catch on this is, as you know, and probably have had many guests on the show, people who buy utility scale power don't like risk and they don't like the words "new stuff". And so we're very clear to market this is the proven thing and we can bring it to you in the next two to three years, and it has enormous value for your decarbonization goals and your reliability goals. Also. We've got a nice topper to that that's less proven, but it could be out there.</p><p>And so it is interesting, as much as power buyers want that, though, it's incredible whenever you're actually building a business, how important it is to bifurcate. Here's the proven thing versus the stuff we're really excited about, but it's going to be a new feature that we're able to add as we scale and get to market.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Especially in a very conservative market, conservative industry. I have kept you too long, but this is all super cool. So enhanced geothermal, no longer a gleam in our collective eye, is now a real thing, ready to commercially produce power. So what's next for Fervo? Is it just, I mean, do you feel let's check in on your feelings here, Tim. Do you feel like you've kind of crested a summit here and you're ready to just like "Hell, yes. Let's just start building power plants and making some money." Do you feel like you sort of completed a phase here and the next phase is going to be a little easier? Or is it just all challenges forever in this industry?</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>There's a reason why people talk about R&D as distinct from deployment. We've crossed the chasm now where what we're doing is, it's not you know, low technology readiness level. It's not unproven. And the work and I can tell you, I've worked on this for over a decade now. We founded Fervo six years ago. I worked on it in a research capacity for years before that. So to see steam coming out of the ground because of the thing we drew up on a napkin nearly a decade ago has been just a phenomenal experience for me personally and the whole team at Fervo.</p><p>We took a moment to celebrate. But then you realize that deployment isn't easier than R&D. Deployment is just a different set of challenges. So we've had a moment now where it is "How do we do this all again and again?" And that comes down to how can we standardize, how can we bring it down, the cost structure, how can we get the right interconnection position and transmission policy that supports this?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, now you're getting to really old school industrial problems, right? Like, how do we make our process efficient and all that kind of stuff.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>So what we've done is we've built a new system that is creating electricity in a way that has been hypothesized for 50 years but never done before. But we've just done it once and doing it a second time and a third time and then 500 more times because that's what it takes to move the needle on global carbon emissions. It's not any easier, it's just different.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But you've got contracts now. You are officially a GENCO. A power producing company no longer a mascot for geothermal research. You're a producing company now and you've got enough contracts to keep you busy.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>That's right. We've got power purchase agreements lined up from now through 2028. That's going to keep us drilling and drilling for some time to come. And we've got the production test results behind us now where we can say with confidence this works. So we are a developer. We're developing a new kind of energy that has been hypothesized, but not part of the grid mix to date. And we're now trying to do it as fast as we responsibly can, because that's the only way to make a difference on the grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So exciting. These are exciting times. Well, thank you so much for coming on. Congratulations for working on something for ten years and then having it work out. That's not everybody's story. So it's really amazing what you've done. And congratulations.</p><p><strong>Tim Latimer</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at Volts.wtf. Yes, that's Volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/enhanced-geothermal-power-is-finally</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:132922080</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 28 Jul 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/132922080/1dcc3785c1f49a3bd1f4b1f074b5d20d.mp3" length="97216810" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4860</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/132922080/1742bdd3d67902ff1e69c1069e24f8e3.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's next for clean energy and climate mitigation]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, I have a conversation (IRL!) with longtime energy analyst Ramez Naam about a wide range of nerdy but fascinating topics.</em></p><p><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACK2MQGDVnr-RoGstxsaMJ5a/volts23.07.14%28ramez.naam%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>(PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/what-s-next-for-clean-energy-and-climate-mitigation"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>Text transcript:</strong></p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transcripts-and-a-live-event#details">previewed a few weeks back</a>, on Wednesday, June 28, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com">Canary Media</a> held a live event in the downtown Seattle home space of beloved local independent radio station KEXP. It’s a gorgeous space, with a coffee shop and a small vinyl store, well worth a visit if you make it up this way.</p><p>In addition to a lively panel about the IRA and plenty of mixing and mingling with a fascinating, diverse crowd of energy nerds, the event featured a conversation between me and energy analyst/guru Ramez Naam.</p><p>We had a wide-ranging discussion covering everything from hydrogen to space-based solar power to geoengineering. Then we opened it up to Q&A and got a bunch of geeky questions about grid-enhancing technologies and performance-based ratemaking. It was so fun!</p><p>As promised, it was recorded for all you wonderful Volts subscribers. Enjoy. </p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I just wanted to say before we started, I should have thought in advance how to say this delicately. A lot of us have been to a lot of energy events, a lot of us old hands, and especially in the early years, we got very accustomed to seeing seas of gray hair at said events. And so it's just such a thrill that things have come as far as they have and this room is full of exciting young people doing cool stuff. Makes me feel old, but it's a small price to pay.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Are you saying that we're old now?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I'm afraid, yeah, if you do the math. Also, this is being recorded for my podcast. This will be an episode of Volts. So maybe everybody in the room say hi to Volts listeners at home. You could have been here, but you were too lazy. I'm joined today by Ramez Naam, who is a longtime energy guru I guess would be the word, forecaster, VC guy, now author of books on climate change and Sci-Fi books and other books, speaker, et cetera, et cetera. Somebody I have been looking to for wisdom since I started this back in the dark ages.</p><p>So I'm excited to talk just about sort of where things are now that we've been in this game for 20 years and how things have changed and sort of what's next? So the way Mez came to my attention, and I think a lot of people's attention in this world, was a 2011 blog post in which Mez said, here's the rate at which solar is getting cheaper. I'm going to make the bold prediction that it is going to continue doing that, which you'd think wouldn't be that revolutionary of a thing to do. But anybody who knows energy forecasts knows that as long as there has been solar, there have been people forecasting that it's going to stop getting cheaper, that it's going to level out, it's going to plateau.</p><p>If you look at the forecast, it's just plateau, plateau, plateau. And the reality is just down, down. And Mez just said, yeah, it's going to go down. And if you just project ahead on existing learning curves, you get what looked like ludicrously optimistic projections, which you then updated in 2015 and then updated again in 2020, and both times found that despite having been decried for ludicrous optimism, prices had in fact fallen farther than your forecast. And you did a similar post on batteries, more or less, with the same structure. So I guess the way since, I think we agree that solar, wind and batteries are going to be the core of the electrify everything century, I guess my first question is just do you think solar is going to keep doing that?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Yeah. Well, so first, David, it's awesome to be here. We've been together for twelve years now and we met basically on Twitter, arguing with this stuff back then. So, yeah, in 2011 I wrote a piece for Scientific American, a blog post, and at the time, the IEA International Energy Agency had a forecast for solar costs, said the cost of solar would drop by about half from 2010 to 2050. And my forecast was very naive. I'm not that smart. I was very lucky. I came from tech, where we have Moore's Law, and so I just applied the very same sort of very dumb learning model to solar.</p><p>And because I didn't know enough about energy to know how I was going to be wrong, it worked, more or less. So my forecast was the cost of solar would drop about a factor of ten to 2050, and it actually dropped twice as fast as I thought it would. And again, there were various things wrong in that model and I've updated them since and found where the errors are, I think. Will it keep getting cheap? The future is uncertain, but the odds are yes. So my personal forecast is the cost of solar will drop by another factor of four by the time solar is about a third of all electricity generation on Earth, something like that.</p><p>Now, could it be twice as fast? Maybe that's pushing it. Could it be half that rate? Yeah, but it's already the point, so I think it is clean electricity, especially solar, and now batteries have gone through, they're entering their third phase. The first phase was all of history from the 1970s to 2010, 2015, they were in their first phase. That was totally uncompetitive, totally policy dependent. Then with a second phase where new electricity from solar to wind became cheaper in some parts of the world than building new power from gas and coal, at least during the hours of the sun shone, or that the wind did, and that's their second phase cost competitive, and now they're into their third phase.</p><p>We've seen this like next era, started saying this in 2018, 2019, they hit this phase where the cost just on a pure kilowatt hour basis of, let's assume new solar, new wind would be cheaper than the operational cost of an already built coal or gas power plant. And that's happening. That happened in Indiana, it happened in Texas. Again, it doesn't deal with intermittency and what you do when the sun goes down and so on. But it's on a bulk electricity basis and there's every reason to believe this will continue. Now, solar is the fastest of these technologies.</p><p>Batteries are nearly the same pace. Wind is like half the pace. And wind has various problems, doesn't scale as fast. Hydrogen electrolyzers are going to look like batteries. I think. Batteries and EVs, EVs are still in their first phase. They're still more expensive than gasoline cars, but they are plunging in price and growing in scale at twice the pace of solar. So I do think there's lots of reasons, not in every single clean tech, but in those and the ones we make in factories, mass produce in high volumes, simple single part items, if you can, that those will have a very, very rapid learning rate for decades to come.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good stuff. So, one of the big questions about the electrify everything model is wind and solar variable. Even with batteries, the batteries we have today, you can get two, four, maybe six, eight hours out of lithium-ion batteries, but you still have variability to deal with. And so, there's this idea that sort of you're going to get to, depending on who you ask, 60, 70, 80, 90%, and you're going to have to fill in the remainder with something else. And it seems to me whether that's 60% or 90% depends a lot on just how cheap solar and wind get.</p><p>So, how far do you think electrify everything is going to go? Do you think these learning curves are going to be so far and so fast that we're going to end up needing less of that supplemental stuff than is currently forecast?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Yeah, it varies on a variety of things. It varies on geography. So, for instance, Europe is harder to power with renewables than the US. The US has more sunshine and solar gets cheap the fastest. Europe or Japan or Taiwan or South Korea are these places that have winter peaking systems and don't have a lot of sun. So, they're more dependent on wind. It doesn't get cheap as fast. It also matters how big the grid is. Like if we built a Chinese scale grid in the US, you could have solar going from New Mexico to New York. You could have wind from the great plains going out to the coast.</p><p>But if we don't get transmission built, and right now we're sucking at building transmission in the US, then powering New York in winter is actually really hard. So, those are like big variables. And in general, I have my opinions on what I think is going to get cheap the fastest. But I'm in general a believer in let's have more tools in the toolkit than we think we need because some of them are not going to pan out in certain areas. So, let's invest in all of it. Let's invest in small modular reactor, nuclear, nuclear fusion, transmission grids, ultra long duration energy storage, power to hydrogen.</p><p>Let's do all of it and be in a certain way of more tools than we need rather than fewer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, you're doing all the above cop-outs. I'm going to push you on this. You have solar wind and battery, you have your variable core, and then you have your supplements to even out the power, smooth out the power. Right now, what's going to occupy that role, that supplemental role is up in the air, could be a lot more storage. It could be, as you say, a lot more transmission. It could be some sort of clean, firm power like geothermal or small nukes. It could be small natural gas plants with CCS, which is what you see in the models.</p><p>In the big models, they have truckloads of natural gas with CCS all playing the same basic role, which is evening out the variability of renewable energy. So, I want to know, yes, we want to invest in everything. Yes, we want to pursue everything, yes, we want to keep our options open. But in your opinion, what is the mix that's going to play that role?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>The most underrated of those technologies is ultra long distance, like coast to coast, continent scale transmission. It's probably the one that has the best upside and the most certainty that we can do it. But it's blocked not by economics, not by technology, but by permitting, fundamentally. And we're not doing a lot on there, I think clean firm, whether you call it nuclear vision, SMR vision, fusion, geothermal everywhere, ultra deep geothermal can get power. Any place on the Earth has a big role to play. Ultra long duration storage is a wild card. Like twelve-hour storage, I'm convinced, is like that's going to be solved.</p><p>But in Europe or on the US east coast, you need weeks or months of storage. And we don't think there's a few technologies that might do that, but they're wild cards right now. I think offshore wind has a huge role to play. And floating offshore wind is one of the most underrated technologies because in deep water you basically can't do bottom out offshore wind. So around Japan or the US west coast, I think floating offshore wind is probably also a massively underrated technology. And then my very favorite total wild card in these that nobody believes in really, but me, is space-based solar.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I knew it.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>And that one, my friend Greg Rainey has been talking to me about space-based solar for a decade and I'd be like "No no no, Greg, 20% of the Earth's land area is desert, space launch costs so much why would we ever do this?" But in space, there's no clouds. You can just have it. You can get 24/7 power. You can beam it to Earth as microwaves that penetrate clouds and rain. And some models show it getting in at like two or three cents a kilowatt hour. Based on things like how cheap Starship is going to make launch cost, we think.</p><p>Right. And isn't space — it's getting cheaper, right? Getting up to space rapidly getting cheaper?</p><p>Space launch is getting cheaper faster than solar. Only two things in history have gotten cheaper faster than solar to date, which are computing and gene sequencing, or gene printing. But right now, we're in a phase where the cost of space launch is actually dropping faster than the cost of solar. And so, that, and then you have this other advantage: if you beam power back to Earth with microwaves — there's a variety of challenges with it, let me tell you. There are a lot of challenges — but if you beam it down to the same intensity as sunlight, rectennas are like three or four times as efficient, so you get four times the power for the same land area, and it works in winter.</p><p>So that's my personal wild card. There's like six startups in the whole world doing it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Has there been solar power transmitted to Earth from space, like, as it actually happens?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>No. And there's various problems with it. So we've had the first experiments of transmitting — we have lots of solar in space for satellites — and we have the first experiments happening for transmitting solar from one satellite to another. But the big problem so some startups are using lasers. Lasers are BS, because lasers don't penetrate clouds and rain. So why would you do it? Doesn't matter, but one of them just raised a bunch of money. Whatever. The way to actually do it is microwaves. But the problem with microwaves is, if you want to hit a target on Earth, you need these kilometer square arrays in space, and no one's ever built anything of that size in space.</p><p>So if you want Sci-Fi that's totally Sci-Fi.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And do you fry the birds? Do you fry the birds?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>You can transmit it, I mean, you could if you're really good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If you wanted to.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>No one can get that good. No one can get that good at beaming microwaves yet, but you could transmit it at like, one sunlight intensity, but get three or four times the energy on the ground in the same area. So getting to where you can fry birds is actually a really really hard problem. It's not the problem that we have right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. And this brings up my lonely wild card. Since you're talking about lonely wild cards, the one that only I seem to care about, which is wireless charging of electrical devices, which I always thought conceptually solves all kinds of problems. I can just imagine power transmitters seeded throughout your city and every electrical device having a receiver able to receive power through the air. I mean, those technologies exist. Like, you can power something at a distance now, even at a reasonably large distance. There are, like, sonar versions, laser versions, there's X-ray, weird X-ray versions. I just thought, like, cut the cord, all these charging difficulties go away.</p><p>Basically, everything electrical is charging all the time. When I do my little "the future" meme, the future world we're going to have meme, like, it's all wireless charging. Do you have an eye on that? Is anything happening there? Do you think that's going to go anywhere?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>I have a little bit of an eye on that, but it still doesn't solve all the problems because it's really hard to do super long distance again unless you build these — if you want to penetrate clouds anyway — unless you build these kilometer square transmitters. So I think for a short range, like within our room, there are potential or maybe for, like, mountaintop to mountaintop. But getting it across a continent without bouncing it in space is really hard, I think.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you are in tech, really, and not really in politics. But I'm curious what your take is. I wouldn't say that IRA has taken care of the funding problem. I mean, I think we still need a lot more funding for everything, all the time, everywhere. But there's a huge accelerant now, at least in terms of money. So what do you see then, when you think about the US decarbonizing? What are the big remaining barriers that worry you?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>It's a really good question. I'd say, like, the IRA is just part of the puzzle. It's interesting. The IRA is understated. It's not $450,000,000,000 of federal spending a year. It's like trillions. Because the IRA is not a pool of money, it's a per unit subsidy. And forecasters always do what on unit forecast. They always underestimate it.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>So the actual size of the IRA is actually much larger.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think Goldman Sachs said 1.3 trillion, I think was its number, as opposed to the official number, which was 3.9 billion or 300 and something billion, but a lot more than the official forecast.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I think the IRA also we talk about the US, but let's think about this globally, like, three big things happening in global climate policy over the last few years. China has further put its foot on the accelerator. India has done some I won't even count that. Vladimir Putin invading Ukraine. Putin is, like, now a climate hero. He's an a*****e, but he's done all this work because we thought natural gas was going to be the last fossil fuel we got off of. And Putin thought the natural gas exports to Europe, he had Europe over a barrel. But instead he's accelerated the pace, which Europe is getting off of gas, deploying more renewables, ultra long duration storage, hydrogen funding, fusion, all this stuff.</p><p>So those are equally big. And the IRA is really big. What does the IRA and by the way, in the US. We talk about the IRA. We don't talk enough about state level policies. 29 states in the US have a binding RPS or CES. Right. And that started before the IRA, and it's actually potentially even more impactful. What does the IRA not solve? It doesn't solve permitting. And that's actually like the Achilles heel that we have. And we talk about permitting. There's a strain of environmentalism that is like "don't build it environmentalism", and that's going to kill us.</p><p>That's the biggest political barrier we have in the US. Is that it's so dang hard to build things. And people talk about NEPA reform, whatever. NEPA is just the feds. Like, if you want to build something, it's this internested issue of multiple federal agencies and then multiple states and then county level and city level and every property owner. We just had the first interstate transmission line in the US. The biggest one, approved, like, two months ago, I think Arizona to California. I think it's an $8 billion project. Okay, we spent trillions, right? That $8 billion project took 18 years to get approval from multiple states, multiple counties, landowners, and so on.</p><p>If that's the pace, we're just in a world of hurt. So what do I think the most important thing we can do in policy in the US is get out of the way and allow stuff to be built. NIMBY is like the death of the world if we don't stop it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. This is going to be an interesting tension. I think there was a great article in Heatmap about it just this week. Everybody should be reading Heatmap.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Eric has an opinion on that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>After you're done with Canary. You should read Heatmap. And I not just toot my own horn, but I wrote about this back in 2012 or whatever, but this distinction between climate hawks and environmentalists is, how I put it, people who are primarily focused on decarbonization, people who are primarily coming out of the environmental movement with all its sort of associated commitments and whatnot. And I think this is going to be a huge tension, but it's also — do you worry at all, maybe you don't worry, I worry about a lot of the people who are yelling about permitting, want to cut down environmental review because they don't care about the environment and want more oil and gas and don't this is all bad faith from one large portion of this debate.</p><p>Do you worry about being on the same side with a bunch of bad faith jerk offs?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>I think the bad faith the bad faith actors, the actors that want, like, permanent reforms they can build more fossil fuels are on the losing side of history. They're betting on a technology that fundamentally is going to lose on cost. So I say let it come, like, in an open playing field. If it's easier to build pipelines and transmission lines. Clean electricity is going to win. So I'm totally happy taking that deal. Bernie Sanders disagrees. Right? Like he voted against the Schumer-Manchin permitting reform bill that you had one Republican vote for because he's so obsessed, obsessed with don't build fossil fuels.</p><p>Well, guess what? Building more renewables is actually more important than not building fossil fuel. On a competitive basis, at least my bet, the clean energy just wins on cost. So like open the floodgates, let it in and clean energy is going to win is my personal viewpoint on that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What do you make of this? Just came out another version of information that's come out over and over again over the years, which just shows that fossil fuels are not declining globally. They're not declining. We are adding on to the total energy load of the world that's what renewables are doing is increasing the total. But the actual amount of fossil fuels is not declining, which leads a lot of people to say building new renewables is not enough. We have to cut off supply at some point. What do you make of that argument?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>So, I think you have to look at leading indicators and trailing indicators, and the leading indicator is cost. What's going to win economically? The next derivative is like the pace of deployment increase, and then actual deployment and actual deployed stocks is a super trailing indicator. So, you look at this and ask, are we growing renewables fast enough now? Are they undoing fossil fuels? Well, actually, we might have passed peak fossil fuels in the power sector in 2022. All the growth we have not yet shrunk the internal combustion engine car fleet. But what was the — anybody want to guess? — like, what's the year in which sales of gasoline-powered cars peaks? Can we have a guess. 2017, 2018. It happened already. Now we want it to go down faster. We want retirements of ICE cars to be faster than deployments. But all the growth in vehicles and passenger vehicles is electric. So, have we peaked yet? No. And I think we'll have peak total fossil fuels and peak emissions sometime later in this decade towards 2030. It's not fast enough but the writing is on the wall. Like fossil fuels are primarily dead men walking. It's just a matter of how fast can we pull it off.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, let's talk —</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>I'm very opinionated here, but that's just what the math says.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, let's talk then about the hard to abate sectors then because they're the ones I wouldn't say we have electricity in hand, but we have a sightline to where we're going on electricity. We have a sightline where we're going on transportation. We have a sightline in buildings, although this crowd is full of people who will tell us all about the many complications of doing what we know how to do in buildings, but we know how to do what we need to do in buildings. But there are these legendary, difficult to decarbonize sectors. So, two questions.</p><p>One is, do you think they still warrant that term? Do you think they're still difficult to decarbonize? And which of those worry you?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Yeah, they are. And so I should say that what I've been saying is mostly related to power and ground transport. That's where we have really, really fast linear rates. But if you add up ground transport and power, you've got maybe 45% of global carbon emissions. Right. The really big ones are industrial emissions. Rahul talked about cement, my math is more like six, seven percent of emissions. Steel is another seven or eight. But like, industrial emissions are really hard and it's not clear that learning rates will be as fast as our renewables. So that is a big problem.</p><p>That said, I wrote a piece for Tech Crunch in 2018 or something where I was really worried about this. And we've made more progress, faster on industrial emissions than I expected those four or five years ago. So, are we going to go fast enough? I don't know. But we're moving that needle and then the other one that's hard and big, we talk about aviation. Steel is four times as big as aviation, right? Like aviation we will solve eventually. But steel and cement are really big ones. But the other one that's really hard is agriculture, forestry and land use, cows and deforestation.</p><p>And that one's not growing, really, but about a quarter of all emissions, it's bigger than industrial emissions. It rivals, electricity. And that's going to take a mix of just pure policy work to protect land and finding a way to feed the world's appetite for meat, which is just going to go up. Like, forget about reducing meat consumption, it ain't going to happen. Meat consumption is going to keep going like this and this. So we got to find ways to produce that meat or people think is meat at a way that's cost — And I'm actually not that bullish on alternate proteins either.</p><p>I think it's got to be like mostly it's going to be fields like where we grow corn and soy and so on today and wheat and animal agriculture is my guess. We've got to find a way with a cost perspective to reduce that cost, reduce the emissions, reduce emissions of things like fertilizer 96% of emissions and protect land from being converted from forest or wetlands into crops or grazing land. And that one, cows and steel and cement keep me up more than electricity and cars.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, what is happening in steel? You say we're making more progress than you thought. What is the solution that you —</p><p>Yeah, I think with steel, the most likely solution is power to hydrogen. Like a lot of the steel emissions — so for recycled steel ... use electric arc furnaces, you can power them with renewables. But for primary steel, we use coal as a reducing agent. Iron ore has oxygen on it. You got to strip the oxygen off. So we're using the coal. You can bust the coal. You get carbon monoxide. It binds with oxygen and strips it off. It's a reducing agent. So you can use hydrogen for that. And hydrogen does look like it's going to have a sharp production.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>It's not the only bet. There's other bets, I think, breakthrough invested in a company that does a form of electrolysis to extract pure iron that you can use to make steel from iron ore. So there are multiple technology pathways in each of these. But right now, hydrogen looks like the best bet, I'd say, for steel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let's talk about hydrogen for a second then, because this is like, as Amy said earlier, everybody, hydrogen is on everybody's tip of everybody's tongue. It's the next belle of the ball. Everyone loves it. Everyone thinks it's going to do everything, and you can technically do everything with it if you wanted to. This gets back a little to one of my original questions, which is how far electrification is going to go and how much you're going to need other stuff.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How big of a role do you see hydrogen playing in the final analysis?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Hydrogen could be enormous. It could be that we build as much power gen, as much renewables to produce green hydrogen as we do for direct power into buildings and electric vehicles and so on. We'll see. I think there's things that hydrogen is not the solution, as we mentioned earlier, like hydrogen-powered cars and trucks. Forget about it. That's been clear for a decade. That's not going to be cost-competitive electrification.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You saw the Toyota guy now —</p><p>So out to lunch. They were so good on hybrids and they just totally missed the boat on electrification.</p><p>He's out now doing sort of the falling on his sword thing, apologizing to everyone. And yeah, I mean, it's clear for anybody who doesn't know what we're talking about. Toyota's, it was one executive, I think it was like the legendary longtime head of Toyota was like, electricity ishmactricity, it's going to be hydrogen fuel cells. And just clung to that.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>And that was a unique Japanese thing. Like Japan as a country has made some interesting on paper bets on hydrogen that just don't make any sense. Importing hydrogen across oceans. Hydrogen is so hard to move.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Mixing hydrogen into your natural gas in your natural gas pipelines.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Yeah, that might work for just distribution of the hydrogen pipeline. It is the only cheap way we know to move hydrogen today. Or using the hydrogen to make steel, for instance that you then ship round the world. But hydrogen for building heat doesn't make any sense. Hydrogen for cars doesn't make any sense. But hydrogen makes a ton of sense for steel making, maybe for high-temperature industrial heat. Hydrogen makes a ton of sense as an ingredient to make electrofuels. You can put it in existing ships and planes, whether that's ammonia or a drop-in kerosene, we'll probably never make hydrogen-powered planes.</p><p>They don't make any sense. But making a drop-in fuel from hydrogen that you can burn in existing Boeings and Airbuses does potentially make sense. And hydrogen for green fertilizer, fertilizer is already like, I don't know, a $70, $80 billion market for hydrogen goes into methane-based hydrogen for fertilizer on the world today. So that's already like an enormous market that once hydrogen gets cheap enough, it has various access to.</p><p>Yeah, everybody should listen to the pod I just released this morning I think. I'm not sure when this will come out, so this won't mean anything to listeners, but my last pod, a guy whose business model is off-grid renewables, feeding directly into electrolyzers, making green hydrogen, which then go directly into methanol. They're starting with methanol for ships. None of it's connected to the grid, no pipelines coming in or out. The only thing that comes out of the whole thing is trucks full of methanol. It's really interesting —</p><p>It makes a ton of sense. It's way easier to move hydrogen as a product that's not hydrogen than it's hydrogen itself.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. That was his calculation. His calculation was it's really difficult to move hydrogen and it's really difficult these days to move electricity. So let's move the methanol. Let's make methanol and move it.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>I will say that the policy details about hydrogen were mentioned in the earlier panel and there's a big policy fight right now of what gets counted as clean electricity for hydrogen. And there's every chance we're going to screw it up. And that the IRA is going to be interpreted by the treasury that actually controls who gets the tax credit to just let you buy grid electricity and unbundle directs, which are kind of BS, as a way to call your hydrogen green. And if that's the case, it's going to set us back for a while and we'll see how the treasury rules. But it's not looking that pretty.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Although, it's worth saying that it says not to get into this whole thing, but it says in the statute that the hydrogen subsidies must reduce emissions. So if they do it that way, it won't reduce emissions. So I don't see how they get around that very plain statutory language, although I'm sure if they tried hard enough —</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>I'd love to be wrong. I hope that you're right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And another big battle going on around hydrogen that's maybe just worth calling out is natural gas. Companies that are dying, looking at obsolescence, flailing about for some reason to stay alive, are now talking about mixing hydrogen in with natural gas to lower the greenhouse gas intensity of the natural gas, which is just somebody compared it to pouring champagne in your municipal water supply or something like that. Just the most ludicrous use of hydrogen possible. But there's a lot of money, a lot of money behind that one. Now so a lot of opportunities for shenanigans around hydrogen.</p><p>I want to ask a bigger theoretical question, because this is one of my favorite things to talk about and I'm never sure how seriously I take it, I'm never sure how serious I am about it. But when you look forward at the solar cost curve, it was ludicrously optimistic back in 2011. If you just do the same thing today, once again, like ten years out, it's just ludicrously cheap. It's just cheap beyond anything anybody knows how to process today. Wind, too, and batteries too, but mainly solar. You had a great chart about batteries, which just made the point that as they get cheaper, you find more uses for them and as you find more uses for them, they build more and they scale up and they get cheaper, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p>Same for solar. Like as it gets cheaper and cheaper and cheaper and cheaper, it's just going to be possible to put it everywhere, on everything, all the time. And so you can see in the distant future, but our lifetimes, I think a society in which power is ubiquitous and to coin a phrase, too cheap to meter, is that going to happen?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>I think we'll always have a reason to pay for it. And as the cost goes down, appetite might go up. You look at other things, like the cost of lighting has dropped by a factor of 500 over the last century, and that's a combination of power getting cheaper, the way they produce lighting any cheaper, and efficiency, LEDs. So will the cost of power drop eventually? It will. I think that what you're going to see is right now the grid investment is sapping up most of the reduction in cost of renewables, and the cost differential of power across time and space is going to change.</p><p>What I mean by that is today power costs do fluctuate by season and by location, but fossil fuel costs vary less. Whereas in the future you're going to find is like, how do you power stuff in winter, especially a place far away from the equator. So the power cost average of the year might be cheaper, but in January, like in the UK, in London, you get one 7th as much power from solar panels in January as you do in June or July. So that means that the cost of power from solar at least is going to be loosely high in winter.</p><p>And guess what? UK energy use, or Germany's peaks in winter. So I think you might find much cheaper power in certain times and places, but not as much in northern latitudes in winter. And that's going to cause funky things in sort of our power pricing. That having been said, I think there's every reason to believe that in the long run, energy is going to be cheaper for people than it is today, certainly as a portion of income.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I guess I just wonder if you ever can imagine it becoming cheap enough and ubiquitous enough that we get to something like elevated global standards of living and fully autonomous luxury communism or whatever you call it.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Maybe. I mean, we're getting more elevated standards of living around the world today. People don't know this, but global inequality peaked in the 1970s and has been dropping since then. If you compare countries around the world, and not just within one country, poverty has dropped massively. So the number of people on Earth that don't have electricity access has dropped materially in the last 10 or 20 years. The number of people without access to clean water and food has dropped a lot in China and India, less so sub-Saharan Africa. So we are gradually increasing global abundance. Are we going fast enough?</p><p>No, but it's happening, and I think there's every reason to believe that it will continue to happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's talk about fast enough then, because obviously the counterweight to fully automated luxury communism is climate dystopia. Who knows how those might balance out? What fun? What fun? We'll all find out.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>It's good for science fiction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, I think it's clear though, that even with all the good news these days and all the momentum behind clean energy, and I think growing momentum, you could say it looks pretty clear that we're not going to hit our 1.5-degree target that we all agreed on in the UN. Not at least through the replacement of fossil fuels with clean energy alone. So, I think that people say that a lot and then there's a sad trombone and everybody's sad for a while and then we move on. But it seems like that's important and we should be thinking about what that means, what to do with that information, what we should do.</p><p>Are there emergency pull handles, if emergency type things we should be doing when we think about avoiding 1.5 or trying to keep to 1.5 or compensating for not hitting for 1.5? So, how do you think about sort of if you think of the energy world as kind of going the right direction but not fast enough, what do you do about the rise in temperature in the meantime?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>It's a great question. Just like to put some numbers around that. When you and I both sort of got into this field, 2011, let's say we thought the world was headed for four, five or six degrees Celsius of warming. And that's the difference between now and the middle of the last Ice Age. That is truly the stuff of nightmares. That is like agriculture would fail in various large parts of the world. Probably not an extinction level event, but maybe the end of human society in certain ways.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. I never forget Kevin Anderson's quote, "Four degrees is incompatible with organized global society."</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>It ain't good. Right. So the good news is we have very likely canceled that apocalypse. Like if you look at what's happened now, just in the last 24 months, we had a raft of papers saying the most recent one says the most likely outcome, there's climate dice, there's probability distributions. There's lots of unknowns in this. Most likely outcomes now are, I think the most recent papers had 2.1 and 2.4 degrees Celsius of warming. And so the good news is we should all celebrate that for a while, because that is a level of temperature that is actually compatible with the world overall growing richer.</p><p>We've canceled — like, it's no longer going to be what's the movie where you have a new ice age come in, whatever — any of these day —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Day after tomorrow.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Day after tomorrow. We're probably not headed for that right now. So let's take a moment to actually be happy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that movie had an ice age literally coming, like, block by block. There are people running away from it.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>That'd be really bad. But the bad news is we have missed 1.5 degrees C. And I don't know how to say this anymore, clearly, because there are people that will tell you that we might hit it. The odds of that are minuscule.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You can still torture a model to get the model to show us hitting it.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>The carbon budget, the remaining budget. The most recent papers, like, from last month, say that the carbon budget to have a 50-50 shot of staying below 1.5 C is about 250 gigatons. We're emitting about 50 gigatons of carbon per year. So that's five years of emissions. Or if we smoothly went from 2020's numbers to zero in ten years, by 2032, we'd have about a 50-50 chance of staying below 1.5. That ain't going to happen. Okay? Like, it is just not a thing. Now, the good news is to stay below two degrees C is about a trillion tons.</p><p>That's about 40 years of emissions. So it's about a little over 20 years of emissions. If we had 40 years to reach zero, you have a 50-50 chance of two degrees C. That's a stretch. 2062. But it's not impossible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a stretch.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>And 2.5 degrees C is more than 2 trillion tons. So that if you, like, smoothed out from today to net zero in 2100, you do a 50-50 chance, the models tell us of staying below 2.5 degrees C, and that is totally achievable. That's the good news. Okay, what's the bad news? So first, like, at 1.5 degrees C, the world does not end. It doesn't end at 1.6 degrees C, but every tenth of a degree matters. And right now, for instance, most recent papers say that every coral reef on Earth above 1.5 degrees C will experience bleaching events more rapidly than they can recover from.</p><p>They won't all die on day one, but they'll just enter a period of permanent decline. Now, the planet's going to be fine after the last mass extinction event. It took about 4 million years to recover biodiversity in the oceans. That's nothing to the planet, but it's forever for human civilization. So our children and their children will not live in a place of such abundance. Okay, so what can you do? I've started to say that there's three things we can do on climate. Number one is build. That's what we just talked about, getting out of the way of permitting, having more policies to build stuff, so on.</p><p>Number two is help nature adapt. And I'm going to say the things that are like my most provocative things. Maybe you're not going to like me after this, but I'll just call it how I see it. There is no such thing as wilderness on planet Earth anymore. We have modified the climate such that if you're if it's a forest, if it's a coral reef, if it's a wetlands, it doesn't exist in the same climactic band that that natural ecosystem evolved in. And so if you want to preserve those, we have to actively manage every so-called wild ecosystem on Earth, whether that's a rainforest or a forest in the Northwest or in Canada or in the tundra or things like coral reefs.</p><p>And there's ways we can do that. But we have to get off of this naturalistic fallacy of like, we should just leave nature alone. You leave nature alone, it's going to die. Right? The only way to do this is we know there are some coral species that do better in high temperatures than acidity. Nobody wants to genetically engineer them, but you could be selectively breeding coral species for maximum survival rates in high temperature and helping these coral reefs adapt so that they can survive. So that's one, and then the next one is the even more controversial one is we've already geoengineered the planet.</p><p>We just have. We've done it accidentally through carbon emissions, and we've also done it by things like when people talk about solar radiation management, this is scary kind of geoengineering. We're talking about reflecting more sunlight into space, cloud brightening, or injecting aerosols into the stratosphere to reflect a tiny bit of sunshine back into space. Nobody wants to do that. Okay, but let's be clear. We're already doing that, and we're undoing it unintentionally. Today, if you look at IPCC's numbers, all greenhouse gases account for about three watts per square meter of warming. That's human activity. The sulfur aerosols we're already emitting from ship fuels, from diesel engines, from coal plants, low altitude, they cause acid rain and other nasty stuff.</p><p>That's about one watt per square meter of cooling. That's already a solar shield with huge air bars, bigger air bars than greenhouse gases. And guess what? We're undoing that. In 2000, the International Maritime Organization's new IMO regulations went in that reduced the sulfur content of ships. And that means that we're in for this bonus warming where we're undoing our solar shade and we're going to have more warming happening. You see it. You're going to see some satellites, shipping lanes having less reflection and more sunlight being captured.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. This is an irony that is not well understood in the public, I think, is that by cleaning up air pollution, we are pretty radically accelerating warming.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>So James Hansen and James is a little bit of a radical scientist, but he's got a paper out. He's really, really worried about unforeseen bonus warming as we cut these sulfur aerosols. So should we just start injecting some into the stratosphere? No. What? We ought to do some science. So, last year, before the IRA, the world spent about $1.1 trillion on climate tech. $1.4 if you ask the IEA, that's one times ten to the ninth. The total budget for all science into solar radiation management has been about $10 million. Right. Like one times ten to the seventh.</p><p>Right. I think I've had a factor of three off there. Sorry, ten to the twelfth versus the seventh. That's 1/100,000th. As much we spend on just doing, like, computer modeling and small experiments. And so I'm a modest man. I don't think we should spend a lot of money on this, but let's spend a billion dollars a year. That's nothing. Americans spend $4 billion a year on shampoo, so a billion dollars is not much. It's like chump change. A billion dollars in climate gets you nothing. But let's spend like a small amount, a billion dollars a year on actually doing the science.</p><p>Better computer models, more compute time, more funding for scientists, platforms that have sensors. When the next volcanic eruption happens, it sends stratospheric aerosols up. We can send LiDAR and spectrography and so on through them and see what happens. And some small controlled experiments, tiny ones, to actually see how this works. Just to know, do we have this tool in our toolbox so that we could deploy it? If the Arctic starts to warm exceptionally fast, we have uncontrolled methane release. And if we're not doing that, I think that's criminal. And that is the single biggest problem that we have in climate tech, the single biggest omission that we have in our climate plans today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So when I think about those things —</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Like, no one's throwing a tomato at me yet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everybody's still chewing on it, when I think about these things, one of the things I've learned over the course of my career is that lots of ideas sound good if you can sort of stipulate a rational humanity to do them. But it turns out that's a large stipulation and in fact, we don't have one of those, and in fact, we screw everything up. So I'm just trying to imagine humanity as we currently know it with our current leaders and our current institutions trying to manage every global ecosystem, and my mind turns to various horrors.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>And it could be horrific. But let's bear in mind, we're just doing it now on accident. So we have this status quo bias of like, oh, as long as it's accidental, it's fine for us to play God. But you know, like, God forbid that we start like, doing it with a plan. And some of these things like solar radiation management are so cheap that Bill Gates could afford to just do it on his own. He's not going to. But if we don't do the science, then somebody's going to do it without having data on what the effects are. So I think that's more irresponsible than actually understanding it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think it's in the book The Deluge, which maybe some of you guys have read. I did a podcast on it a while back. I don't know if you've read it. You really should. You would love it. It's an effort to sort of play out climate politics for the next 40 years. And one of the chapters of that book is about India rogue solar managing and leading to causing a war, basically like an invasion.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>And Kim Stanley Robinson had a plot like that in Ministries of the Future as well. It's something that any small country basically could afford to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Crazy. Okay, I quasi deliberately left about ten minutes for a spontaneous Q and A. So if anyone has questions for me, please say so.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>I have a question. So you talked about the deep stuff with we're not likely to meet the limit to 1.5 and all that. I've been thinking a lot about options to phase out fossil fuel infrastructure potentially early to get rid of locked-in emissions, which is causing a significant chunk of that problem. So this could be a range of different options from phasing out coal plants early to creative options to get people off this sort of dependence I don't really want to bring up here. But what are your thoughts on that area in particular in terms of how much it can at least make a difference towards limiting damage overall?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Yeah, I would say overall I'm less of a cut-off supply person because so often if you cut off supply in one place, somebody else produces it and routes around it. Right. If you like, Shell sold all of their oil fields in the Permian. Guess what? They sold them to Exxon or somebody who just produces the oil anyway. So like divestment is also it's a hard sell to me that having been said that we should try many things. And so some of those successful policies have been policies that worked with local communities. The Sierra Club's Beyond Coal campaign funded by Mike Bloomberg worked with local communities to shut down coal plants early and to find jobs for the people that worked in coal mines working these coal plants, replace them off with natural gas, with renewables and so on. Sometimes —</p><p>Wildly successful before it was cool, by the way. Shout out to Sierra Club.</p><p>Yeah. And so I think you can have creative stuff. But as Jessyn was saying in the previous panel, you got to have buy-in from the community, from other stakeholders, to get that sort of model built, I think.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What would you say if I can inject here, what would you say to someone who said, if you are willing to contemplate something as extreme as humans managing all global ecosystems and managing the atmosphere with SRM, it seems like the chances of those screwing up are high, and it would be worth a lot to avoid them. What do you think about MOM's argument for ecoterrorism?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>I don't advocate violence. As a science fiction writer ecoterrorism is very exciting because you can, like, you can write a plot, a thriller plot around — it's hard to write a thriller plot around climate in general. But in reality, would it work or would it have negative effects or blowback? I really don't know. But one of the reasons to do the research on things like SRM is to reduce the need for someone to engage in ecoterrorism. And so I think that's worth thinking about.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>Hi. Big fan of the podcast. I absolutely adore it. My name is Ben Riley. We've gone beyond just simply the energy transition. My question is related to that, which is the role of negative emissions and how do you feel about various forms and what role it has to play?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Yeah, so again, I'm somebody who's a believer in let's build more tools than we think we might need. And I'm a big tent person. Like, I'm dubious on nuclear fission, but I'm like more power to it. Let's invest in it. Let's change the NRC, make it easier to build stuff and so on. That's more or less how I feel about CDR, too.</p><p>So, personally, my bet is permanent carbon removal is just too expensive. To cut temperatures by about a tenth of a degree C, you've got to cut carbon emissions by 100 billion to 200 billion tons. And so if you're talking about $100 a ton carbon removal, you're talking about 10 or $20 trillion. And that's real money, and that's how you get to $100 a ton. So personally, I'm really excited that Stripe, Microsoft, and Google are committing billions of dollars to carbon removal advanced purchases. They've learned a lot from learning rates and so on. It's modeling up that off what we learned in solar, and I think more power to them.</p><p>But I'm not making any bets in that sector because I just don't see, like, if you tell me that carbon removal could get down to, like, $10 a ton or $5 a ton, I think it might be a big part of the solution. But at $100 a ton or $50 a ton, I just don't think the world I think there will be multibillion-dollar markets. You'll have some people make a lot of money. Some venture capitalists will do well, some ... will do well, and it won't move the needle is my personal bet, but again, I'd love to be wrong.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>So David and Mez, you've both expressed sentiment that we have sightlines to decarbonizing most essentially of the economy and that clean energy is cheap and it's getting cheaper and that it's going to outcompete fossil fuels in a lot of applications. But I'm curious about the possibility and what you see as the potential that we get most of the way there and then we get to the really hard parts and things kind of stall out in terms of the political will to accept the high cost of getting to a completely decarbonized future, which we need to get to to actually halt global warming. Because although clean energy is cheaper, probably for a lot of applications, it's questionable that an economy that uses exclusively clean energy is going to be cheaper than one that uses clean energy and also has the option to use fossil fuels where they're most cost-effective. So curious for your thoughts on that.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>You want to take that one?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, it's an interesting conceptual question about how you think about the transition. Whether it is like a boulder rolling down a hill, gaining momentum and momentum, momentum such that it will just crush and go right through the last bits, or whether you're eating the fruit off the tree that's lowest and you have to climb higher and higher and it gets harder and harder and harder and harder. And I think there's a little bit of both. But I'm so curious what you have to think.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>I think of it as we're on an S curve, right? And it's like renewables, let's say, just in power solar and wind are 13% of global power generation, they are entering the decade where they might have the fastest growth and we're going to see the growth accelerate. But at some point, they do hit these headwinds of as Jessyn has done, and you've done these like they cannibalize themselves. They suppress prices at the hours that they're operating with the problem of winter. And so you —</p><p>Get to more difficult land.</p><p>You get to more difficult land for sure. And so you do hit this challenge, whether it's at 60%, 70%, 80%, where it gets harder and harder. And so I do think most like models of decarbonization assume a curve that looks like this. We have the fastest reductions early and then it kind of goes like this. And I think that we're going to see something that's much more of like an S curve where it's going to take a while to hit the peak and then renewable like, emissions are going to drop from some sectors really fast. And then the last bit is going to be really hard and really slow.</p><p>But while everyone's obsessed with hitting net zero, if we get to 10 billion tons a year by 2100, that's actually still compatible with canceling the apocalypse. So I worry more — this is to steal a memorable movie quote, I worry more about the next 20, 30, 40 50% than I do at the last 20% right now — although I do think we should invest in more technologies to try to have a head start on those sectors now than we need.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And just one other consideration to throw in there is that as the carbon lobby shrinks, policies to reduce carbon become easier to pass. So when you're targeting a smaller part of the economy, it's a little politically easier, I think, than it was when you're saying, everybody reduce everything.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>Hi. So, under the umbrella of hot trends and climate tech, I'm curious about grid enhancing technologies, specifically both on the transmission and the distribution system. I'm curious if there are any things that either of you are particularly excited about and what do you think some of the limitations or challenges are to adopting those technologies and how do we overcome them. So, small question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you want to go first?</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Go ahead, sure. Yeah, I think it's fascinating. I think like the grid, I talked about permitting and long-range transmission, but interconnection queues and distribution are a more pressing problem. They're a problem for like, hooking up your renewables to the grid at all. They're a problem for things like Jessyn was talking about. How do you build an EV truck charging depot? If you want a system of high-speed chargers for electric semis, that's like a tens of megawatts power drop, that's like a small town. So building that is really hard. And the grid is not used to working fast.</p><p>I'm a big fan of software control of power generation and consumption. There's lots of startups that are doing interesting things to make more efficient use of the grid. Storage at the grid edge, I think, can do a lot to make better use of the current system. And then you have some other crazy ideas. For instance, a friend of mine did her dissertation on taking high voltage AC transmission corridors — assume that you can't build more transmissions of permitting, but upgrading the power electronics on current corridors from AC to DC and you could get — this is Liza Growing — you could get triple or quadruple the power on this existing rights of way. So I think there's solutions like that that are probably still under invested in or there's Veir, it's like a superconducting tape you apply to — I don't know if that'll ever work, but that one would be cool. You can apply it to current transmission lines and again, massively increase the power on them. So I think there's room for a lot of creative solutions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I don't think people get that on a lot of these big long-distance transmission lines. A lot of our big transmission lines, they run at like 30% capacity, like 30, 40% capacity. Just because we need a big buffer, because we don't know in real-time what's happening on that line. This gets to a larger theme, which I just was mentioning on a podcast earlier, which is I don't think people appreciate, especially people who grew up around the Internet and people who view information as sort of like modular and transmissible everywhere and everything. People think of the grid that same way, but I think people would be shocked to hear how much of the grid operates by people turning knobs and making phone calls to other people like, "Hey, you should probably use less power over there."</p><p>It's weirdly primitive how we run our grid now. And that's not a technology problem. There's all kinds of grid-enhancing technology. There's all kinds of ways to get a lot more out of the existing grid and just generally moving towards digitizing the grid. To me, the barriers there are almost 100% sociopolitical, it's almost 100% utilities, which is you pull any string in this mess long enough and you end up back in utilities. It's utilities not being on top of things. So I think that's on the one hand, that's very frustrating, but on the other hand, I think that could change quickly if we ever get utilities in hand.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Fix their incentive model.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I know it changed. We don't have to get into the whole utility mess. But yeah, that's 100% about just procedures and regulations and things like that more than technology.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>I think that was the execution of the death sentence.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think we're done.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Thank you all.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh yes, okay, so we're done everybody. Thank you for coming.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thanks.</p><p><strong>Ramez Naam</strong></p><p>Give money to Canary.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversation like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-next-for-clean-energy-and-climate</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:131345735</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 28 Jul 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/131345735/1f055332216424b6222b9d031649663e.mp3" length="70972663" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3547</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/131345735/6fdfd2a9aa49c34a9cdd1dabb8259655.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The depthless stupidity of Republicans' anti-ESG campaign]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Kelly Mitchell of journalistic watchdog group Documented discusses Republicans’ furious pushback against ESG funds due to their ostensible greenness, and the ridiculousness of said vehemence since ESG ratings are actually a poor reflection of companies’ true environmental impact.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAB_FhTMWrRfvQQ7nNkiQwE0a/volts23.07.12%28kelly.mitchell%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/the-depthless-stupidity-of-republicans-anti-esg-campaign"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>For the last few years, the fastest growing segment of the global financial services industry has been ESG (environmental, social, and governance) funds.</p><p>Here’s how it works: one of several ratings firms uses its own proprietary formula to rate how well a company is responding to environmental, social, and governance risks. An environmental risk might be: will the county where you’re locating your data centers have sufficient water supply in coming years? A governance risk might be: have you filed all the proper disclosures?</p><p>Fund managers like BlackRock then gather highly rated companies into ESG funds, which are sold to investors as socially responsible. Hundreds of billions of dollars flow into ESG funds every year.</p><p>Note that there’s a bit of a shell game at the heart of the enterprise. What customers and investors generally <em>think</em> is that a company gets high ESG ratings because it goes above and beyond in those areas, that it is trying to “do well by doing good.” But in reality, high ESG ratings simply mean that a company is responding to material risks — maximizing its profits, as public companies are bound by law to do. </p><p>So Tesla gets no ESG credit for accelerating the electric vehicle market, but it can pull a low ESG rating (and fall out of ESG funds) over vulnerability to lawsuits over working conditions. (This is why Elon calls ESG “the devil incarnate.”) McDonald’s loses no ESG points for the enormous carbon impact of its supply chain, but it gains points for reducing plastic in its packaging, because regulations against plastic packaging are imminent in Europe. </p><p>So investors get to feel like do-gooders and big companies are rewarded for carrying out their legal obligation to assess risks to their business. There’s not much social benefit to the whole thing, but everyone feels good and green and happy.</p><p>Except now there’s a problem: Republicans bought it. The whole sales pitch — they believe it. They believe that companies in ESG funds are going out of their way to do social and environmental good … and they’re furious about it. </p><p>Over the past year or two, an enormous, billionaire-funded backlash against ESG has consumed the GOP, leading to multiple congressional hearings, hundreds of proposed state bills, and red-state treasurers vowing never to do business with woke lefty activist funds like [checks notes] BlackRock. </p><p>It is stupid almost beyond reckoning. And I’m just brushing the surface. To dig into the deep layers of dumb and where it all might go, I called Kelly Mitchell. She’s a senior analyst at the journalistic watchdog group <a target="_blank" href="https://documented.net/">Documented</a>, which uncovered emails and other communications between the architects of the anti-ESG campaign that led to a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/05/climate/republican-treasurers-climate-change.html">New York Times exposé</a>.</p><p>All right then, let's do this. With us, we have Kelly Mitchell from Documented. Kelly, welcome. Thank you so much for coming to Volts.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Thank you, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Kelly, when I first decided to do this episode, I started looking into it, thinking, you know what, this all seems kind of stupid. But what happened is as I dug in and explored it into the nooks and crannies, some of the background, some of the work you've done, some of the work Documented has done, what I discovered is that it is actually so much stupider than I ever could have imagined. The depth of stupidity here is remarkable. So I just want to thank you. I feel like you should get hazard pay for what you do. And I just want to thank you for immersing yourself in this. It must be wearying.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>It is. It's like the Thunderdome of stupidity. But I'm glad we can talk about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, let's talk about the levels. Okay, so let's bracket for the moment what ESG actually is in reality. We'll get to that later. Bracket for the moment the merits of the criticisms that conservatives have of ESG and let's just talk about what's happening. So I think probably normal news consumers are aware that sort of ESG, or the sort of boogeyman of ESG, has come up sort of out of nowhere and is everywhere now. So maybe just tell us a little bit about what has happened here, who's doing what and what are the bills? And tell us the phenomenon we're discussing.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Well, the current iteration of this phenomenon really kicked into high gear probably in about 2021. And there's been a long history of folks who have opposed corporate social responsibility, who have opposed any restriction on investment in things like coal or natural gas. But a lot of gasoline was thrown on the fire in 2021, probably for two major reasons. So first is that Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, published two back-to-back letters to his clients, to corporate CEOs, basically saying that BlackRock, the largest investment firm in the world, was now going to consider climate risk as a fundamental investment risk and wanted CEOs to do the same.</p><p>And the second is that in May of 2021, an activist investor company called Engine 21 or Engine No. 1 rather, bought a small slice of ExxonMobil and used that slice to wage a battle to get new board seats on Exxon's board that would take into account climate risk and against a 100 million dollar campaign by Exxon. They succeeded. And they succeeded with the help of large institutional investors like BlackRock. And I think those two moments sort of broke a lot of people's brains. Wall Street is not supposed to be against the fossil fuel industry, it's not supposed to be against the right-wing apparatus.</p><p>And it provided this galvanizing moment for a lot of dark money groups to look for ways to mobilize state agencies and state legislatures against ESG.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Brains then broken, what do they start doing?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>There's two fronts that open up. So first you see a big infusion of resources by groups like the Heritage Foundation by Leonard Leo's, Consumers' Research into weaponizing state treasurers to attack, quote, unquote, woke investing or ESG. And it's a smart play because state treasurers are people that nobody pays any attention to.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What are they? Maybe just take a minute and tell us. Like, I know that such a thing exists, but I couldn't tell you in a million years what they do.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Yeah. So basically they're in charge of managing large pools of money that the state uses to pay its bills for the long time, to receive tax money, to give tax money to folks who need it. And in that role they get to decide who manages that money, how that money is invested —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Pension funds and the like.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Exactly. And so there was this big opportunity to kind of utilize these folks to start pulling money away from asset managers that they believed were in some way boycotting fossil fuels or in other ways, looking down on disfavored industries.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Being woke.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Being too woke, not wanting to put their money into investments that were going to lose them lots of money. The worst woke sin of all.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we'll get to that later. So then the right-wing activists get to the red state treasurers and what then? What happens?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>So they start to do a number of things. They begin to organize these treasurers onto big sign-on letters to do things like block appointments to the Fed, to chastise members of the Biden administration for speaking out against oil and gas. But then they start to take more direct action. You see states like West Virginia and Louisiana start to send letters to financial institutions basically saying they're no longer going to do business with them. West Virginia stops doing business with JPMorgan Chase, they stop doing business with BlackRock because they believe that these companies have been unfairly targeting and blacklisting fossil fuel investments.</p><p>They also transform a lot of these treasurers into big mouthpieces for the movement. You see treasurers going on Fox News, writing letters in the Wall Street Journal, and they have this kind of air of authority because they manage money. They're going out and really criticizing woke investing from that role as a state elected official.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and as I read about this, I think traditionally, based on our rapidly crumbling norms in this nation, state treasurers were quite nonpartisan. They were quite distanced from the whole politics fight. They were supposed to be sort of technocrats. But the young generation of conservatives, they're all creatures of Fox, they're all activists. And so now they're getting in those positions as well.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And that's basically the deal that these treasurers were offered. If you look at the State Financial Officers Foundation, it's sort of a trade association of Republican elected state treasurers and auditors. They basically said, "Look, we're contracting with communications firms. We have access to this whole web of right-wing organizations, you're a nobody state treasurer who anyone's ever heard of. But if you join this anti-ESG effort, we're going to get you on the news. We're going to boost your op-ed, we're going to provide you communications training," and suddenly people who no one would have ever heard of are becoming household names because they've dove into this culture war issue around ESG.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, this is, I think, for young conservatives why you get into politics in the first place, right? It's to get on Fox News. That is the, you know, the sort of middle stage where you actually do policy and affect people's lives has just kind of fallen out of it. Now they're all just like, "What can I say? This outrageous that will get me on Fox News." What about legislation?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Yeah, so we saw the first round of anti-ESG legislation launch in 2021. A think tank called the Texas Public Policy Foundation basically drafted a bill. It was basically governed contracts in the state. So it said that state governments, municipal governments, can't contract with organizations that boycott the fossil fuel industry. That went into effect in September 2021, and it kind of became this great natural experiment for what the impact of these bills are. And I know we might talk about it later, but —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're going to get to that in a second.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>We see this first bill come out in 2021. In 2022, we see another 16 states kind of dabble with these anti-ESG bills. But where it really took off was this year where there were about 157 bills introduced in 36 states. So a huge amount of legislation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that every red state?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Just about, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think that's almost all of them.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>And plus yeah. So they absolutely flooded the legislative market with bills this year, sometimes introducing multiple bills within a single state to discover what approach might have the best chance of success.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>People familiar with the operation of the right wing these days will not be surprised to hear that. ALEC, The American Legislative — what is it?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Exchange Council.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you. The American Legislative Exchange Council is known, I think, at this point, for having these sort of template bills where you just fill in the name of your state. They have those bills for this, right? I mean, that's how they proliferate so quickly.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>That's right. And this year, there are about five different buckets of template bills, model bills that were introduced throughout the country. Some, yeah, came through ALEC, the American Legislative Exchange Council. Others came from the Heritage Foundation. Others came from the Foundation for Government Accountability. It's been a really instrumental bill on rolling back abortion access and voting rights in this country. So bills were everything from the style that the Texas bill introduced, which was restricting contracting within the state. We saw a number of bills that specifically went after pension funds, either putting restrictions on what asset managers pension funds could work with or even more insidious, introducing language — this is what we saw in Florida, for example, this year — that said that pension managers can only consider what they call pecuniary issues, sort of fiduciary, financial-return-focused issues when making decisions. And the best case scenario, the bill is effectively worthless because pension managers are already required by law to only look out for the best financial interest of the state's pensioners.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Indeed.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>But what it actually did was sort of redefine what it means to hold that pecuniary interest in heart and said that if you're looking at systemic risks that violates pecuniary interests, if you look at risks with some margin, of uncertainty that violates pecuniary interests. And if you look at just a broad suite of kind of environmental or social criteria that potentially could violate your pecuniary interest. So it's basically rewriting the rules of what risks an asset manager can evaluate or not. And that's the stuff that really, I think, scared a lot of folks in the state because hamstringing investors like that could have some really big consequences down the line.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This, I think, gets to a key feature of all this, which is that the sort of rhetoric is like you need to just be focusing on money but in reality it's saying you cannot consider certain risks.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like there are certain threats to the money that you're not allowed to listen to, which is very different, the sort of contradiction there. So this is very much something that was sort of born and germinated in big money, right-wing circles. Right. It sort of starts with these big money groups which then sort of they just push out into the states.</p><p>They have this machine basically if all the big money people get worried about X, they just push it out and suddenly it's like in every state government it's on Fox all the time. But this is clearly a sort of big money originated thing, right? There's no popular outcry here.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Absolutely. This is not a grassroots movement. I mean, I think if you polled any person on the street they would have no idea what ESG even was, let alone have an opinion about it. Yeah, this has absolutely come from you have Texas Public Policy Foundation which has been a longtime recipient of Koch money, of oil and gas industry money. Leading this you have the Heritage Foundation super deep pockets and then within all of this you have groups like Consumers' Research which have been propped up by Leonard Leo, most famous for buying a Supreme Court justice or two.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Buying a couple? Yeah, he's completing a set.</p><p>And what do you give a man who already owns half the Supreme Court? You get him onto some new culture war issue and you know, we know his organizations have been pouring millions of dollars specifically into this anti-ESG woke capitalism fight. So very, very deep pockets. A lot of dark money on the right launching this effort.</p><p>Yeah. Even more top-down than usual, I think.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it's interesting, they are pretty explicitly trying to replicate what they did with CRT. The whole critical race theory thing. They realize, like, CRT means nothing to anyone, but that means it's just an empty vessel that we can fill with all sorts of bizarre, paranoid crap. They're trying to do the same thing to ESG, make it sort of another one of these kind of right-wing buzzwords that means just anything bad you can think of.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. And they've been in the situation where in recent years it's sort of fallen out of favor to be an outright climate denier. But now with ESG, they found this vehicle to sort of drag climate denial kicking and screaming into the culture war.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Same thing. You can't be anti-racist in public anymore, but you can be against CRT. You can't be sort of just outright anti-climate anymore, but you can be anti-ESG.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>But you can certainly believe that ESG is part of a globalist cabal that's forcing climate action on all of us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, but one thing I wanted to get clarity on before we move on is just this is something I don't think I really got a sense of reading around is are the amounts of money that red states manage material to a giant firm like BlackRock? Like I get there are sort of PR issues here and sort of like public — how things look. But just in terms of the quantity of money, is this something that's going to materially affect the financial industry?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>The short answer is probably no. So in general, blue states, even though there are fewer of them, typically have much larger pools of money in their pension system than red states. And when you talk about a company like BlackRock, I mean, BlackRock has $9 trillion. That's an amount of money I don't understand. So one of the biggest pieces of action we've seen this year is that the state of Florida pulled $2 billion out of BlackRock and that was sort of the single largest withdrawal of funds that we saw from states in the last couple of years.</p><p>And $2 billion is a rounding error to BlackRock. But I think to your point where the real issue has been is that it has kind of created this chilling effect where now you see Larry Fink and BlackRock not wanting to use the words ESG. And now you have this completely bizarre phenomenon that the New York Times has dubbed "green hushing," where you see insurance companies, financial actors continuing the practices they had before of evaluating climate risk, of looking into environmental considerations, but just not talking about it anymore because they're afraid of the political attention that's going to get directed their way. So, yes, on a dollar for dollar basis, BlackRock has more money under management today than it did when this campaign began, and it'll probably have even more next year.</p><p>But I think folks just don't want the ire and they don't want the spotlight.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is just a classic example of a very small group of people with extremely unrepresentative views and interests just having the raw money to make a lot of noise and just look bigger than they are. Right, you see this over and over again. They make so much noise that somebody in BlackRock is like, well, I just don't want to deal with it. You just would, like, at some point, they just run this same scam over and over again. At some point, you'd like some leader of a big institution like Larry Fink to just say, you know what?</p><p>There aren't that many of these people. They don't represent anyone. Screw them. I don't care. But no one ever does. They're so easy to intimidate.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>These big leaders are —</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>If I was in charge of $9 trillion, I think I would feel a little more confident.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like, I own you people. I could crush you. Yeah, I don't get it. So I want to go through a couple of amusing aspects of this whole thing. There are several. One is it seems like it's mostly been a flop so far, both with the public and even with red state business communities. So maybe tell us a little bit about what we know about polling and what we know about how the actual financial institutions in these red states are taking this.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>It's been a deeply unpopular effort, I think, for its attempts to copy CRT. It hasn't hit in the same way. So first off, if you poll folks about should the government be intervening to limit investment decisions based on ESG? It's a pretty unpopular thing. I mean, even among Republicans, I think about 70% of polled Republicans oppose it when they're asked about it, and polling can be what it is. But I think in this case, the proof is in the pudding in terms of how this stuff played out in the state. So 165 bills, 83 of them dead as a doornail.</p><p>Some that are sort of lingering on to maybe continue into the next legislative session, a few that are pending and haven't quite had committee hearings. But overall, this hasn't been a slam dunk. And as much as I wish it was because maybe environmental advocates were showing up in these state houses, a lot of the opposition has come from the banking community, from chambers of commerce, and from pension managers in these deep red states. And they have been coming out hearing after hearing after hearing with strong language to oppose what's happening in these bills. The bankers are worried about compliance risks and costs.</p><p>The Chamber of Commerce see this as a huge assault on the free market. Pension managers are worried about how this is going to reduce returns for teachers and firefighters over the next ten years. Even in the state of Wyoming, we saw the Wyoming Petroleum Association come out to oppose the bill because they even thought it went too far because some of their members have some methane emissions plans and work, and it's helped them to attract some financing and they don't want to put that at risk.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>We're talking about states where Trump won by huge margins and they're coming out in force to oppose these bills.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You're threatening the money. It's like one thing when you're like, waving bloody flags and causing parents to go yell at school boards, but you're starting to step on the money here. And that's —</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>I mean, a lot of money. So in some of the states that had bills specifically around pension funds, like I was talking about earlier, those often came with the highest price tags. So in the state of Indiana, their pension board system said it would reduce pension incomes by over $6 billion. In the state of Kansas, they said $3.6 billion in reduced pension returns.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You mean if these laws are passed.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>If these laws are passed, yeah, because it's going to restrict who they can do business with, and it can restrict the amount of risk that they can continue to evaluate when making investment decisions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There was a study maybe that's what you're referring to, was it in Texas, where they sort of because Texas passed this bill and then they measured the increase in borrowing costs. It's not theoretical. It's been detected.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>The effects yeah, that was the benefit of Texas going first is we got to see what the real life impact of these bills are that restrict contracting. And University of Pennsylvania Wharton School did a study on the municipal bond market in Texas before and after this bill, and they found that within the first eight months of implementation, it cost those municipal governments almost half a billion dollars.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good grief.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>And if you're talking about small towns in Texas, like an extra million or $2 million you're paying to service a bond, I don't understand how these legislators go to these folks and say, "Oh, you're not going to build your library this year, but guess what? We really stuck it to the globalist cabal." So it's all good guys.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. It's amazing. It's such a punching yourself in the face phenomenon, right? That's just one of the levels of stupidity here, is like, even if the bills passed, none of the hated targets will be inconvenienced in the slightest. Like no one is going to be hurt by this that they're trying to hurt. They're literally just hurting themselves.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Right. They're literally just like reducing the amount of money a firefighter can retire on, having a little less money for roads in a small town somewhere. And all just to make a political point in the culture war.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the business community hates it, the banking community hates it, the public hates it. The attempt to replicate CRT is not working. Another amusing aspect of this, I thought, is that if you could go back five years, ten years, and make your index fund hyper woke by taking all the oil companies and gas companies out of it, you would have performed like gangbusters these past five to ten years. Like energy stocks have been for s**t these last five to ten years.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I mean, oil and gas was the worst performing sector of the entire market in the 2010s. Like, you would have been better off, yeah. Just taking your money and putting in a pile and lighting half of it on a fire than investing in a lot of energy companies during that period. We saw hundreds of bankruptcies during that time. So, yes, it would have been a much sounder investment philosophy in 2010 to pull oil out of the equation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. If you had gone woke, you wouldn't be so broke.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is hilarious to me. Another amusing aspect: Our favorite presidential candidate, Vivek Ramaswamy.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Oh, yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>People might sort of know him peripherally. He's one of these Republicans running for president, and he's sort of made his name by being kind of the lead anti-ESG guy, the lead critic of "woke capital," upon which he allegedly has some credibility because he's a finance guy, he's a money guy. So it turns out, I couldn't believe this, it turns out he runs a fund that he wants states to do business with. Like, he's literally a competitor in this space trying to work up this hysteria to hurt his competitors. It could not be more like it's not even hidden.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Yeah. To his credit, he's the most transparent grifter in this entire fight. His whole story is amazing. Right. So he founds this pharma company, and then after BLM takes off, he has to quit because it's so hard to, I don't know, say true things. After BLM —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>He's one of these guys who cancels themselves because he just knew he was going to get canceled.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Right. He pre-canceled himself to go become an anti-woke crusader, and then he really immerses himself in the dark money. Right. So he's a frequent guest at Heritage Foundation. He's part of Teneo, which is another Leo Leonard sort of vehicle for young, up and coming culture warriors on the right. He embeds himself with the State Financial Officers Foundation and starts making all these connections with state treasurers, and then he decides to, I'm sure by coincidence, launch his own investment firm, Strive Asset Management. And then we see in case after case, how he uses the relationships he formed through the State Financial Officers Foundation with treasurers through Heritage to gain kind of special access to pension fund managers.</p><p>So you can look at all these emails with pension fund managers where he's getting a special introduction from the treasurer and they're talking about how fun it was that they all had that steak dinner together. And then he goes before these pension fund managers to pitch either his proxy advising services. So he'll help you kind of vote your shareholder resolutions or he'll hold on to your money and directly invest it. So he's playing both ends, sort of churning up the anti-woke sentiment and then trying to find a way to profit off of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And the state of Indiana went for it.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Their pension fund is now signed up with what is it? Strive.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Strive Asset Management. Yeah, they signed up for the proxy advising firm and a reporter out there was able to get a leaked copy of the contract and it included a $4,000 per hour fee for Vivek Ramaswamy's personal consulting services. Good work if you can get it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know. So he's out on Fox stirring up anti-ESG sentiment, then going with his own fund to hoover up that business and subsequently making $4,000 an hour advising Indiana. Even by our degraded standards these days, such a transparent grift. And nobody says "boo". Like, he's on the team. So boggling.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so you've got this massive anti-ESG movement that's sort of stirred up by the right-wing money people through the right-wing money groups, through these treasurers in red states, opposed by the public, opposed by the red state business and banking community, a failure. Where it succeeds, where it is passed, it just causes states to lose money without hurting the woke targets at all. And it's just sort of the site of an amazing amount of grift. So just like all that together just makes it such a perfect crystalline example of conservative politics circa 2023. So let's talk about then, just briefly, because this is, I think, the real mind blower and something that a lot of listeners probably don't know. A lot of —</p><p>I think a lot of people even involved in this argument don't know, which is what is ESG really doing? What is it really? Because I think people have the impression that you take your company to these ESG ratings firms, right? There are these firms out there that will assess your company and give you an ESG rating. And if they give you a high rating, then you can be part of an ESG fund. And there's tons and tons and tons of money flooding into these funds. So there's reason to want to be highly rated on ESG. These ratings firms, the sort of intuitive understanding that people on the street have is the rating firm goes and looks and tries to find out, are you a do-gooder? Do you have sort of like charitable initiatives? Like, are you doing good things on race? Are you doing good things on climate because of the goodness of your heart? And if you are, then we'll give you some points, right, so that the people who rate high on ESG do so because they are do-gooders, that are doing good in the world. That, I think, is people's intuitive understanding of what ESG is, but that is, in fact, not at all what ESG is.</p><p>In fact, ESG is how you react to risks to your business posed by environmental, social, and governance issues. So, for instance, I'm sorry I'm ranting here, but this blew my mind as it sank in. Like, McDonald's, for instance, is highly rated in ESG funds. Why? Because they're doing something on plastic packaging. Why does that get them a good rating? Not because they're doing it out of the goodness of their heart, but because a bunch of European countries are contemplating regulations on plastic packaging. So McDonald's is reacting to a business risk by paying attention to its packaging, whereas McDonald's is an enormous source of climate pollution throughout its supply chain.</p><p>But according to the ESG ratings firms, there's no imminent threat of regulations on that stuff that might affect McDonald's. So the fact that McDonald's isn't doing anything on climate is neither here nor there. It just doesn't affect their rating at all. The climate is immaterial to their rating because it's not currently posing the business a risk. So it's literally the opposite of what people think. These are not out of the goodness of your heart, do something good for the world. It's literally assessing businesses based on whether they are responding to risks. But do people who are following this fight get this, even like the pro ESG people?</p><p>How well understood do you think this is?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>I mean, I think this is the layer where the entire ESG story jumps into absolute brain melting territory.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's just why I'm ranting. I can't even —</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>I will give a shout out to Kate Aronoff at the New Republic, who I think has probably done the best piece so far on this. Just this whole idea of the right coming after this "woke investor class" when obviously no such thing exists. To the extent BlackRock or any of these guys are talking about climate risk, it is recognizing with eyes open that the world is decarbonizing. So depending on what industry you are in, how is that going to affect your bottom line? It's recognizing that the climate is changing in different ways. And if you have operations perhaps near a coastline or in a floodplain or in an area where wildfires are sparking up every five minutes, that's going to have a real impact on your business.</p><p>It recognizes that there's an incredible amount of public political pressure for new regulations. The plastic stuff you mentioned that is eventually going to change and that the companies that are aware of these risks and can adapt to these risks and are taking the proactive steps now are the companies that are going to be successful in the long run. This is all in service of people continuing to make more money. And ESG overall, I think has been a pretty great thing for the oil industry because there are these rating agencies and each of them kind of have their own sort of standards and metrics that they use.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we should just pause to say people take these ESG ratings for granted. But these are mysterious black boxes. They're just, private firms, who do not even tell you, who do not even necessarily have to tell you what criteria they're using.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>And they all use different criteria. So I think in this muddiness, right, in the muddiness of having different rating agencies, in the muddiness of no one understanding what ESG even means, oil companies are kind of in the sweet spot right now where they get to put out their methane reduction plan. They get to put out their 2050 net zero plan. They get to kind of speak the language of risk and responsiveness, but they don't really have to do anything because at the end of the day, as of today, this moment, there is no government agency that's going to come and round you up and put you in cuffs if you're lying about your ESG plan.</p><p>And so oil companies have kind of had the best of both worlds in some ways, where they can speak the language of sustainability via ESG without really having to do anything. And banks get to do the smart bank thing, which is evaluate risk, but they still get to pour billions and billions of dollars into oil and gas companies because they can make the claim that there's no existing regulation that makes that too risky of an investment for them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And then when there are regulations, which are a bunch happening on methane, right, methane is subject to furious regulation all over the place. Of course, oil companies have to do something about it. They have to. They literally have to. And yet they all get brownie points on these ESG funds for doing the thing that they have to do. So it's not like the ESG funds are saying you are going above and beyond on methane. You oil companies, so you get extra points. It's just like you're responding to this obvious looming risk, here are some brownie points.</p><p>And they're all doing it. So they're all getting the points for it, right. So it's not you're even distinguishing among and between oil and gas companies on this?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>No. And it's like when I ask my kids to clean their room or take the trash and they're like, well, what are we going to get out of it? I'm like, that's just the rule of living here. You don't get points for it. The stuff we reward these guys, we're just basic compliance with the law. We're like, wow, you're really stepping up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You get points for not breaking the laws.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Right? But I think it speaks to sort of another fear that has animated the ESG stuff. So I spoke to the Larry Fink letter and the Engine No. 1 letter. But the other kind of looming threat that is driving a lot of this anti-ESG work is the threat that the Securities and Exchange Commission is actually going to throw a wrench in this plan and put in place some requirements that will force companies to disclose their emissions in a much more rigorous way and to actually have some teeth and enforcement behind ESG claims as we started to see in Europe. I mean in Europe, if you lie about your ESG goals, they do come and lock you in bank jail or whatever you do.</p><p>But I think the fear of our government through the SEC actually starting to take some action and move ESG out of this black box amorphous "We're just just making sure companies evaluate risk" and actually force companies to put plans on the table that they're going to comply with and to really disclose the emissions impact of their products when used as directed. That stuff is scary and it's probably the place where for all the hilarity of the anti-ESG movement, what a disaster this has been in the states, what a disaster it's been in congress when they've tried to hold hearings. The one place where potentially it has had some impact is that it has given the illusion that there is enough resistance to climate action in the financial sector that maybe the SEC should be a little more cautious in implementing rules or maybe congress, because this is a hip new culture war thing, maybe congress should pitch back.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There are sides and if the SEC does something it's taking a side exactly.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>It moves it out of that risk management, let's keep our financial system in working order space. And now suddenly the SEC having a disclosure requirement becomes a culture war issue. And that's where potentially things get a little less hilarious than the bulk of the anti-ESG movement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, one background question that I think occurs to a lot of people right around at this point in the discussion, which is if in reality ESG is just businesses responding to material risks to their bottom line, why is it a special thing? Why isn't it just part of the natural operation of business?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Yeah, it should be part of the natural operation of business. I think the biggest issue is that it's really easy for businesses to do that when there are these immediate, time-bound, practical, tangible risks. Like if you know that a road is going to be built near your factory, you can have a plan for that. I don't know why that's the best example I can think of a tangible material risk. But when it comes to some issues like climate change, or if you have some issues like addressing some really big disparities around race or gender in the workplace, they're so big.</p><p>And the time horizon is so long, that I just don't think companies are very well built to figure out how to integrate that into their business decision. So in the best case of ESG, if you're steelmanning ESG, it actually provides a framework for companies to try to evaluate some of those really kind of long-term risks in a way they're not typically suited to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I think you could fairly say that just the way public opinion is moving and the way sort of advanced democracies are moving. There's just more attention to these issues.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>More regulations, more laws, more action. And so it's just, I think, areas that corporations traditionally were just not that cognizant of, didn't have to be that cognizant of. So I think that's why it sort of has this sort of air of novelty to it, because it is a little bit new for them to be caring about this.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Definitely. And they have to, for better or for worse. Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And they have to, which is the most cosmically, stupid — oh, and this is also a good time to — I opened this up on Twitter and the one question a ton of people have because this is sort of one of the times when ESG broke the surface of the news cycle and kind of poked itself into everyone's attention. Which is why Tesla lost its ESG rating. And then Elon Musk subsequently comes out — what I forget his exact words.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Like ESG is the devil, I think is literally a tweet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, the devil incarnate. That was it. There you go. So people were confused by that, because people have it in their heads that ESG ratings are just a rating of how good a company is for the environment and society. Right. Which is not, again, not what these ratings are. So, like, if there are no imminent regulations forcing people to switch to EVs, then there's no brownie points for making EVs. Right. Whereas what they got dinged for was the race stuff. Right. Which is a material threat that they are not responding to.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that too. And then there's the G, which I think is the piece of ESG that no one really likes to remember is there, which is governance. And that covers really basic issues like, do you have an independent board of directors or is it all your dad's golf buddies? And Tesla has suffered from some very serious governance issues.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Are you making massive decisions on the fly on Twitter, half-joking might be like a governance issue. For instance, as you say, these dumb critiques of ESG tend to occlude the reasonable critiques of ESG, of which there are many. One of which is just, why is this a basket? Why are these three things in a basket together? It just muddies everything for them to be mushed together like this.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's really wild, actually. So the whole reason we got started looking at this anti-ESG work back in 2020, 2021 —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Say briefly what Documented is doing and how you ... I forgot to ask that early on, but sort of how did you dig up stuff on this?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>So, Documented is an investigative watchdog group. We cover oil and gas issues, but also sort of democracy issues, things like voting rights and just the large influence of the dark money right. Increasingly creeping over our politics. And with this issue in particular, the way we came about the anti-ESG movement is for a while, we were attending industry conferences for the oil and gas industry, and we were noticing this trend that at every conference there would be some presentation from an ESG consultant that was actually there to talk to the oil industry basically about how to boost its ESG scores.</p><p>And they would say things like, ESG doesn't have to mean green. It's just about saying this in your document and saying this in your document. And say —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It hardly has to mean anything, really.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Exactly. It was all about how the oil industry effectively could kind of game the murkiness of ESG to attract more investments. And so we were following that for a while and about to potentially do a little write up exposé on some of those consultants that were making big money from this. And then, yeah, it was kind of around that time, that 2021, 2022 space, where suddenly the script flipped. And it wasn't really necessarily about how to game ESG anymore. It was about how ESG is sort of a threat to democracy and low energy prices and the stability of America.</p><p>And it got politicized just really quickly. And so that's kind of where we started, just filing thousands of public records requests and tracking how this was playing out in different states.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't know if this is like a function of me paying more attention these days than I used to, but it seems like the scheming of the evil empire has just gotten less and less hidden. These emails you have uncovered are just like, I don't know, they're all in a bubble together, so I guess they just don't no longer feel any need at all to kind of, like, use euphemisms or to disguise what they're doing. It's all very straightforward. So let's talk about these hearings, because nothing really came of them. But I feel like we just need to at least spend a minute on how dumb these hearings are, even, again, relative to our degraded baseline standards for how dumb a congressional hearing can be, these were some spectacularly dumb hearings.</p><p>Some of the accusations in these hearings. Are just —</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Yeah, so the house oversight committee held two hearings in the last month or so on ESG, and, oh, man, they were a mess. So to start off, the star witness in the first hearing was the attorney general of Alabama, Steve Marshall. If for some reason the attorney general of Alabama is familiar to you, it's because he's been sort of a longtime leader in the Republican Attorneys General Association, including heading up the org that sent robocalls directing people to the January 6 insurrection. So he has a couple of questions about the election, but he's here to tell us the facts on ESG.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>He's just asking questions. Yeah, he's an attorney general. Not, we should just point out, say, pension manager or no, someone in the financial industry. Someone who knows anything about the financial industry.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>No, but he has some feelings about cabals. Basically, the testimony from the attorneys general, who were their star witnesses and the members of the Republican caucus was like a bingo card of culture war catchphrases. Like, we had to talk about Bud Light and Dylan Muvaney. We had to talk about a cabal of global elites.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, the SVB. The bank.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>We had to talk about that bank.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That only went under, as we all know, only went under because of wokeness.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>We had Representative Grothman worried that ESG meant that certain men of, quote, European descent would no longer be able to get jobs in this country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is what we all know ESG is moving toward, not allowing corporations to hire white people anymore.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Exactly. My favorite, though, was Lauren Boebert. She described with a complete straight face, BlackRock, not as the world's largest asset manager, not as the world's second largest investor in fossil fuels. She described them as a left-wing activist fund.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>$9 trillion. Imagine if lefty activists had a $9 trillion fund on their side. Just imagine the possibilities.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Oh, man. So, yeah, they basically brought out all the hits. I think they probably had to pinch themselves under the table to not say, like, the Jews and just talk about global elites and their secretive cabals instead. I mean, the anti-Semitism was certainly dialed up to ten on this one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there's the cabal, and they're saying insofar as they're making any tangible accusations, they're trying to say to their base that these companies like BlackRock are boycotting fossil fuel companies, gun companies, agriculture companies, all the companies that are crucial to the heartland, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. And just, you know, they're not.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>They're definitely not at all. Yeah. I mean, look at any major oil company in this country, and look at who the top investors are, and it's all the companies that are supposedly boycotting them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is a hearing that Katie Porter, who has been to her share of hearings, called the stupidest hearing I've ever been a part of, which is, if you can get that out of Katie Porter, who's sat through a lot of dumb hearings, that's very impressive. So I just hardly know what to say about it. So is anyone in charge over there? And if so, what do they want out of this? As we've seen, insofar as they succeed in any of the things they're trying to do, it does literally nothing but hurt their own states. It just makes borrowing more expensive.</p><p>It just makes running the pension fund more expensive. It increases the bills for municipal budgets. Is there a discernible goal here?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Any goal would be a little bit of speculation on my part, but that's why you come on a podcast. So you can just wildly speculate —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wildly speculate here that's what we do.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>I think for a lot of the individuals involved, to them it's like a ticket to higher office, quite frankly. We talked about how the treasurers have gotten communication support through doing anti-ESG work. So Riley Moore of West Virginia is riding his recent anti-ESG fame to make a congressional bid. There's a number of places where you're seeing state reps and treasurers who have been on the forefront of this anti-ESG movement seek higher office, governor's offices, AG's offices. So I think for them it's really a personal branding issue. It gives them a stake in the culture war for their base.</p><p>And then I think for the folks with really deep money, like the Leonard Leos of the world, the folks who are running some of the bigger dark money groups like Heritage, it potentially accomplishes a couple of things. Like Leonard Leo has talked about how he basically wants to build a Federalist Society for everything. It's not enough that he built an organization —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What a nightmare phrase that is.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>It's terrifying, right? And he sees himself saying "Okay, I was able to do this for the courts. I was able to cultivate young lawyers, young judges through the Federalist Society and then eventually" —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Widly successfully.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Wildly successful. And now he's saying, okay, well how do we do that in entertainment, how do we do that in finance? How do we do that in other areas of government? And so I think this is potentially a bit of a little salvo for him to see how he can sort of cultivate and deploy his own network.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Get some drones into the financial industry.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Or boost the profile of actors like Vivek Ramaswamy or these are sort of state treasurers that he wants to have a long term stake in. And then I think from the perspective of the oil and gas industry, they've had a really interesting role in this. They're not the folks who are on the ground lobbying for these bills. They are not the folks testifying in Congress. They've actually been quite quiet on the anti-ESG stuff, I think, because they want to have their cake and eat it too. Like they like the ESG apparatus for what it's able to get them in the near term and muddy —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They're pulling in all kinds of investment through it.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Exactly. So they're not going to cut off that gravy train just yet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just literally the opposite of what Boebert et al. are saying. They're saying ESG channels investment away from oil and gas and ESG literally does the opposite by doing these notional mild steps, many of which are required by regulation anyway. Oil and gas companies get more investment, extra investment.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>But what I think they do like is people in state houses, people in Congress falling on a sword to talk about how the worst thing we could ever do as a society is cut off financing to the fossil fuel sector, whether or not that's what ESG is doing at all. You have these champions of investing in industry now in all of these states and you have a lot of resistance within Congress to SEC regulations around climate disclosure. And so what I think that the fossil fuel industry has gained in this process is just creating potentially some new champions and potentially creating a little bit of doubt among the Biden administration and other regulators about how —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Spooking people.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>how aggressively, exactly, they can move on this front. And so I think that will be something that's paid dividend. We haven't talked about it quite as much, but it's like we know that American Petroleum Institute has been in the mix with the treasurers a bit. We know they're coming out now publicly in favor of a bill that's going to be marked up this July in Congress around these issues. So they are starting to creep into the mix a little bit here through the trades. But I think the world is better for them when there are more people who want to block action on climate change.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I wonder that's the calculation for them, the sort of tangible benefits of ESG as currently operating for them versus the sort of more difficult to quantify, but possibly quite larger benefits of just kind of shifting society away, spooking society away from taking climate seriously.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A real devil's bargain there. So I just want to pause to say, like, yes, there are some of those potential benefits attenuated benefits, but really even more than the usual right-wing kind of moral panic, two-minute hate or whatever they call it, even more than usual, this is like almost entirely self-contained and without consequence. You know what I mean? It's just a show for the show's sake. There's not even things in the world that are hinging on it anymore. It's just they are just performing for one another now.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I mean, it's your best audience but no, I'll give you just one example. So, I was at a petrochemical conference earlier this year and not the greatest champions of the environment historically, but the whole conference was a love note to ESG. And you had guys come to the stage and they say, "Look, you might hear a little bit about the political pushback, but in reality no serious investor is going to stop looking at ESG criteria." And that's how folks are opening their speeches. And I was able to talk with a pretty high up exec in a global petrochem conference and I asked her that, I said, "Look, with all this political pushback, are you going to be changing your practices?</p><p>Are you going to be abandoning your DEI initiative? Are you going to abandon your ESG initiative if you're given political cover to not have to do it?" And what she told me was "No, because we'll never be able to hire anyone again." And so I think this stuff is so baked into the system where investors can't look away from these risks anymore, companies can't look away from these risks anymore. There's a real question of how much anyone here is really going above and beyond. But yeah, the fighting from the movement on the edges is super performative.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, just like dealing with risk. That's the thing, the big companies will do a lot of things in service of right-wing culture wars, but they won't risk money. They won't risk their bottom line. That's where they draw the line. It's like, "Wait a minute, we're actually making money off this hold up. We'll take down pride displays, but we're not going to risk money." I guess, insofar as it's almost entirely performative. How do you anticipate it playing out? Is anything going to come out of this? Is there a next step? Is it going to go anywhere or is this just going to sort of fade and they'll be hysterical about something else next month?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>I think there are two places where we see it heading and they're both around legal issues. So they've kind of played the legislative card for the time being. I think what we'll see next is we've had a number of attorneys general, similarly organized through the Republican Attorneys General Association, who have threatened to bring antitrust cases against companies that are part of any partnerships.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What is the European group? Zero —</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's a G fans and an N fans and a Glasgow.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I forget what all the acronyms are for, but there's lots of these associations of companies who are about taking these risks seriously and trying to alter their portfolios in response. Is that I mean, with legal issues these days, it's almost immaterial to ask if there's any merit to it since if it gets to the Supreme Court, who gives a crap with it?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Leonard Leo stacked the deck for us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly, because Leonard Leo finished his job there. But is there any merit to the antitrust angle here?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>My understanding is if there is, it's slim and it's probably if there's any place where there may be some merit to it, it's with insurance companies. Now, I won't explain why because I'll say a bunch of things that aren't probably true, but that's sort of the legal read I've been given. And I think that's why we've seen a number of insurance companies who have dropped their membership in some of these alliances. And interestingly enough, none of them have rolled back any of their climate-related policies. Like, they're all still taking into account climate risk. They're just not going to do it through these global alliances because their lawyers have informed them that potentially there is some amount of risk involved.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Why take on the hassle? That's the thing to intimidate these people. It's like a little bit of hassle, why bother?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>So I think we'll see the antitrust stuff continue to rev up and again, it's like, yeah, when you have people like Ken Paxton, when you have some of these AGs that are just really aggressive and really political, like you said, they'll bring a suit whether the merits are there or not. And so I think that could create a bit of a chilling effect.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If there's anything goofier than Republicans suddenly pretending to care about high school girls sports, it's Republicans suddenly worrying about trust.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Real champions of antitrust —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Antitrust champions. There's one thing they worry about. It's corporate concentration of power.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>So we may see that, and I think it will follow the same path of being mostly very stupid and nonsensical, but then having these little moments of real-world impact along the way because people get spooked. And then the other area where we could see some evolution is we've now seen two class action-esque lawsuits filed. So one in New York State against the New York State pension system, and one in Texas, but actually against the American Airlines pension board, whoever manages the board, and basically their lawsuits against those two pension bodies for either divesting from fossil fuels or for offering ESG options in their pension fund.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Jesus.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>My sense again is neither of them have an incredible amount of standing. I mean, the American Airlines one is wild to me because it's not even that they took this guy's pension money, the guy who's suing and invested it in some vehicle he didn't like. It's just that they offered ESG funds in the menu of funds that pensioners can self-select. So it was a complete opt-in environment, but just the existence of that opt-in checkbox is sort of prompting his lawsuit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good lord.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>So what I could see happening potentially is that similar to the legislative strategy where they just threw nearly 200 bills across a number of states to these hearings where they're testing out every conspiracy theory. Maybe we enter this phase with antitrust action from AGs and or these private citizen suits where they're again, just sort of trying to test the water and see if there's any ground here to stand on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, pushing it into the legal realm is that's where Leonard Leo has already done his work. So the merits are going to matter a lot less in that territory than when you're talking to actual money people who actually care about actual money. Super dumb. But I think it's fair to say, just by way of kind of summarizing and tell me if you agree, the broad global trend of big money taking climate risk into account is unstoppable. You're not going to turn the clock back on that?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>No, it's left the station and you can't not take it into account. There's too much actual change happening in the world for any sound money manager to ignore it at this pace. So in the long run, I think this is where the investment community is headed. I think a lot of executives will take this stuff and integrate it into their company's decision making.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And young people, one of the reasons all this started is that whether you like it or not, old guy on the board, young people care about this stuff and you need to be able to hire young people.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Absolutely, yeah. I think for the oil industry in particular, it is a huge problem for them. They offer very good salaries, like, they pay their workers very well. Now, sometimes they're not always doing the most desirable work, but they pay well. They've been a great ticket to opportunity in a lot of communities and they are struggling to hire given their current reputation. And so, yeah, this type of action is what makes it palpable for a young engineer to come work for ExxonMobile.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I forgot to actually mention, even though it's in the headline of this pod, but the reason we're doing this now is that July is, according to Republicans, ESG month. This means at least for the next month, it's going to be an absolute festival of dumbassery and further ridiculous hearings.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>I think they're doing two a day on some days this month. They're doing double-header ESG hearings in the middle of July, which is a real way to know an issue.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How many conspiracies are there? Like, how do they fill up the time? I'm not going to hurt myself by watching, but I honestly wonder sometimes, once you've run through the top-ten, Fox News — What do you talk about after that?</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>I think you just rinse and repeat.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, thank you so much, Kelly. Thank you for digging into this and documenting what's going on and thank you for walking us through it. And again, I commend you for maintaining your psychological health throughout this process.</p><p><strong>Kelly Mitchell</strong></p><p>Thanks, David. No, it's been fun and, yeah, thanks for having me on. I really appreciate it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-depthless-stupidity-of-republicans</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:132685761</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 28 Jul 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/132685761/b610230e51472ecd1eb288f810e2f920.mp3" length="79015803" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3950</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/132685761/47d4b3bae16cdfaf9a3de467dfe1a1f3.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How can AI help with climate change?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Priya Donti, executive director of nonprofit Climate Change AI, speaks to how artificial intelligence and machine learning are affecting the fight against climate change.</em> </p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AABh2Y7CRvXRPrm_if7COP14a/volts23.07.05%28priya.donti%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/how-can-ai-help-with-climate-change"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As you might have noticed, the world is in the midst of a massive wave of hype about artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) — hype tinged with no small amount of terror. </p><p>Here at Volts, though, we’re less worried about theoretical machines that gain sentience and decide to wipe out humanity than we are with the actually existing apocalypse of climate change. </p><p>Are AI and ML helping in the climate fight, or hurting? Are they generating substantial greenhouse gas emissions on their own? Are they helping to discover and exploit more fossil fuels? Are they unlocking fantastic capabilities that might one day revolutionize climate models or the electricity grid?</p><p>Yes! They are doing all those things. To try to wrap my head around the extent of their current carbon emissions, the ways they are hurting and helping the climate fight, and how policy might channel them in a positive direction, I contact Priya Donti, an assistant professor at MIT and executive director of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.climatechange.ai/">Climate Change AI</a>, a nonprofit that investigates these very questions.</p><p>All right, then, with no further ado, Priya Donti, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We are going to discuss the effects of artificial intelligence and machine learning on the climate fight. And I think we're going to, for reasons that will become clear as we talk, kind of like taking on an impossible task here. As we'll see, it's going to be very difficult to sort of wrap our heads around the whole thing. But I think we can make a lot of progress and maybe get clear about sort of some of the directions and some of the applications and get a better sense of how things are going, because this is something I've been sort of meaning to think about and talk about for a while.</p><p>I'm excited. But to start, can we just get some definitions out of the way? Because I think people hear a lot of these terms flying around. There's artificial intelligence, AI. There's machine learning, ML, in the business, and then there's just sort of the digitization of everything, and then there's just sort of more powerful computers. Like, if I'm running a climate model and I want to put more variables in there, but I'm constrained by the amount of computing power it would take, computers that have more power and more processing cores or whatever, then I can do that.</p><p>So help us understand the distinction between these things, between just sort of more and better and faster computing and something called machine learning and something called artificial intelligence. What do all these things mean?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I'm going to start with AI: Artificial intelligence. So AI refers to any computational algorithm that can perform a task that we think of as complex so this is things like speech or reasoning or forecasting or something like that. And AI has two kind of main branches. One of them is based on rule-based approaches where you basically write down a set of rules and ask an algorithm to reason over them. So when, for example, Deep Blue beat Gary Kasparov in the game of chess, this was a kind of rule-based scenario where you were able to write down the rules of chess and get an algorithm to understand and reason over what to do given that set of rules. Of course, there are lots of scenarios in the world where it's really difficult to write down a set of rules to capture a task, even though we kind of know how the task goes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Most you could say are difficult.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Exactly. And so, one of these things is, like, if I have an image, what does it mean for that image to contain a picture of a cat? I can probably tell you, okay, there's got to be a thing with ears, a head, a tail, but it doesn't capture that always because you can't always see the tail. Like, how does this work? And so, machine learning is a type of AI that basically tries to automatically learn an underlying set of rules based on examples. So, for example, it takes large amounts of data, like, that it can analyze and use to help kind of figure out what the patterns are in that underlying data, and then apply those patterns to other similar scenarios, like classifying other images that the algorithm hasn't yet seen but are similar to what it saw when actually being created.</p><p>And yeah, I would say that in terms of what's the distinction between these things and computing, I would say computing is a workhorse behind many of these algorithms. So in order for these algorithms to work, you need fast computers that are able to kind of execute the computations behind the creation of these algorithms. Behind the learning. You also need good data. And with those things together, you can basically create a lot of these more powerful AI and machine learning algorithms that you've seen today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I see. So in AI, you're kind of telling the computer the rules and then hoping that the computer can use the rules to respond effectively to new data. With machine learning, you're just feeding it an enormous amount of data and it is deriving the rules or patterns from the data.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Right. And those rules might be derived in a way that either is or is not interpretable. So I may or may not be able to go into the model and actually pull out what the set of rules are. But implicitly, at least in there, there's some set of rules that's being learned based on the data.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there are so many side paths that I'm going to try not to go down all of them as we go. But I'm sort of curious because one of the fears people are always bringing up is you feed it this enormous amount of data, it derives some rules from it and applies that to new data, but you don't really know what it's doing. And this is something we hear about AI a lot, is sort of relatively quickly the sort of complexity of what's going on and the kind of foreignness of what's going on to our way of thinking, to sort of human reasoning just puts these things out of touch. And pretty quickly we're in a kind of like, well, it seems to be working, so let's keep using it even though we don't know what it's doing.</p><p>So I guess my question is, is that a limitation of our knowledge? In other words, is it theoretically possible if we had sort of the time and willpower to dig in and figure out what it's doing? Or is there some reason that in principle it's sort of impossible to know what it's doing? Does that make sense?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>It does, yeah. And I'd say that one thing to kind of step back and note also is that there's a diversity of machine learning methods, some of which are inherently a bit more interpretable than others. So, linear regression, even though people don't think of it as a form of machine learning, it actually is, right? Because you're taking in some data and you're learning parameters that allow you to make some kind of prediction. And linear regression is, abundantly, interpretable. And similarly, you have things like decision trees. There are more complicated methods, like physics-informed machine learning or other methods, that try to just constrain the model in a way such that the goal is you can pull out certain kinds of rules.</p><p>So, there is that axis of methods, but then there are these other methods, like some of the more complicated deep learning methods you see today, where, agreed, we basically view it. It is a bit of a black box. You don't know exactly why a prediction is being made, and there is some work going on to try to get at this issue and see if there are ways we can understand what the model is doing post hoc. But it's an area of research, I think, one that undergoes a lot of debate. Also, in terms of can you post hoc explain what a deep learning model did?</p><p>For example, if I, as a person, make a decision and take some kind of action and you, David, ask me, "Hey, why did you do that?" I could probably come up with any number of explanations for you, all of which seem plausible, but those may or may not actually describe how I actually made the decision. So there's a bit of a debate about kind of even if you can try to somehow understand what the deep learning model did, what are the limits of that analysis and interpreting what it actually did and why?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's a lot of things about this whole subject matter that sort of unnerve people. But this is kind of what I think is at the root of it is just that as these things get more complex, you pretty quickly get into an area of kind of trust or faith, almost like our machine masters. They seem to be doing well by us, even though we don't know exactly why. There's just something a little weird about that.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah. And maybe just one thing I'll add. There are levers here, though, right? In any kind of machine learning pipeline, you have the data, the model, and then the outputs are how you evaluate the outputs. And you do have the ability to kind of quality control or constrain any of those things. So you should know exactly what's going into the data that's going into a model. In order to understand if your model is actually seeing quality things that it's trying to learn from. You can, as I mentioned, constrain your model to be an interpretable model.</p><p>And then, what some of my work looks at is, you can actually often constrain the output in certain settings. So, if I create a controller for a power grid based on machine learning and it outputs some kind of action, but I know something about the control theoretic constraints that that action should satisfy, there are ways I can actually constrain the output so that it still satisfies various performance criteria that we recognize. So, it isn't sort of a foregone conclusion that AI and machine learning must be this sort of black box, scary thing. But I would say that there is work to be done and kind of intention that goes into making sure that we really understand and are constraining and quality controlling how the whole pipeline goes forward.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And one other general question. So when people talk about AI these days, I think mostly in the popular imagination, I think mostly what they're talking about is what's called general intelligence. This idea that you could create a program that could find its own data and apply rules and figure things out, basically that has some autonomy, that would be the AI, right, the rules based. Like you give it the rules and then it goes and applies this to the world. Or is there a dispute about how you get to general intelligence? Which of these routes leads you to general intelligence?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I would say that the distinction between sort of general intelligent AI versus task-specific AI, it's not quite the same as this AI machine learning distinction of rules versus data. It's something different. And it kind of comes down to, when you create an algorithm, there is some objective that you're creating it with in mind. And so, for example, if I am creating a forecasting model of solar power, that's a very specific task. I'm kind of giving very specific data. I'm making a very specific ask when I look at the output of the model. But others are saying, can we somehow imbue a lot of data or a lot of rules and learn some kind of foundational representation that really is capturing a ton of general knowledge that can be kind of tuned or specified in various ways.</p><p>These are kind of the kinds of works that really are trying to lead towards something more general. And so, yeah, I would say that there's kind of these different threads of work within the machine learning community at the moment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And just to be clear, we have not reached general intelligence and no one knows how to do that. And there's a lot of theoretical work going on, a lot of work going on in that. But practically speaking, almost all of the AI or machine learning that is happening today is task based. Right? I mean that's to a first approximation, when we talk about AI and machine learning, that's what we're talking about today.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yes, that's right. So, I think that there is some kind of research going on in specific labs that is trying to work on artificial general intelligence. But when we think about the implementation of AI and machine learning across society and what it's really used for in practice, I think it is safe to say that a lot of it is task-based. And even some of the stuff that looks very clever and artificial general intelligence-like, there is genuine debate as to whether that is actually the case. For example, large language models and models like GPT have been called stochastic parrots, which is to say, they're not actually thinking; they are mirroring, parroting in a kind of stochastic way, what they're seeing in their data.</p><p>And we potentially as people who then read text outputs that seem realistic, we maybe ascribe intelligence to that. But that doesn't necessarily mean there's any thinking actually going on under the hood.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And then, of course, there's this whole, like, back in the "dark ages", I was in grad school in philosophy and I used to study cognitive science and consciousness and all these sort of theoretical debates around this stuff. There is a sort of debate. There is this sort of idea that all we're doing is what the language models are doing, just on a vast scale. So, there is no sharp line. They're just like, eventually you do that well enough that you are, de facto, deploying intelligence, and the models will eventually, eventually there will be no point in drawing a distinction between what they're doing and true intelligence.</p><p>But that is well far afield of our subject here today anyway. So we're going to try to wrap our heads around how this all applies to the climate change fight, the clean energy fight. But just as a caveat up front, in one of your papers you write "those impacts that are easiest to measure are likely not those with the largest effects." So just by way of framing the discussion. What do you mean by that?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah. So when we think about the impacts of AI and machine learning on climate, we need to think about a combination of AI and machine learning's direct carbon footprint through its hardware and computational impacts. The ways in which AI is being used for applications that have quote, unquote immediate impacts on climate change, be those sort of good or bad. But then we also have to think about the broader systemic shifts that AI and machine learning create across society that then may have implications for our ability to move forward on climate goals. And I'm sure we'll get into the specifics of all of those things.</p><p>But I guess, briefly speaking, these sort of broader systemic shifts that AI and machine learning is going to potentially bring about are extremely hard to quantify, but they'll be large. And so it's important to make sure that as we think holistically about the impact of AI on climate, we do the quantifications in order to guide ourselves. But we also make sure to look at this holistic picture, even for things that we're not able to put so concretely into numbers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think about going back to, whatever, the beginning of the 19th century and just saying, like, well, what are the systemic impacts of automation going to be? Who knows? But they were in fact enormous, right? And they did, in fact, sort of swamp the kind of tangible, measurable immediate impacts. So this just to keep in mind that we are to a large extent, I think, stumbling around in the dark here, kind of guessing, like, we know something big is going to happen. Big things are coming, but good big things? Bad big things. What kind of big things?</p><p>To some extent, we're guessing from behind a veil of very little information. So let's start then with the immediate impacts. And this is something, when I threw this out on Twitter, this is something I got a lot of questions about. I think it's in some ways the easiest question to ask, which is, just as you say, all these algorithms require a bunch of computing, a bunch of calculations, which requires a bunch of chips and a bunch of data centers and a bunch of hardware, basically. And so the first thing to ask is just, do we know this shift into AI and machine learning, do we have a good sense of just how much it is increasing the world's computing load and just sort of exactly how big the greenhouse gas impacts of that computing load are? This is a conversation I think people are very familiar with, vis-a-vis, Bitcoin, right? Like lots of people are asking about Bitcoin. Is whatever we're getting out of Bitcoin worth the immense resources we're putting into it, computing wise? Sort of same question with machine learning and AI. So do we know how to wrap our head around that do we know how to measure the total amount of computing devoted to this?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah, and there are some macro level estimates here but they are kind of evolving quite a bit over time. So in the kind of latest numbers at least that I am on top of at a macro level is that in 2020 the total information and communication technology sector was something like 2% of global greenhouse gas emissions and machine learning is an unknown fraction of that. And one thing that was happening is that we were starting to see kind of an increase and I think exponential increase in the amount of computational cycles that were being demanded from just various types of compute that we're doing across society. But hardware was also getting efficient at a similar rate which kind of kept these greenhouse gas emissions and energy impacts relatively constant over a decade or so.</p><p>But we're seeing a couple of these trends change. For example, we're starting to see larger and more energy intensive AI and machine learning models being developed and we're also potentially reaching the end of, quote, unquote Moore's Law improvements that were leading to these hardware efficiencies. And so it's really important that we get honestly better and more transparent data on machine learning workloads and sort of the dynamics and trends of that in order to really understand what we're dealing with. And this is one of those things where it's, from a technical perspective, not the hardest in the world to measure the computational impacts of AI and machine learning. You sort of know where they're happening or you know what entities are doing them. And it's a matter of instrumenting some computational hardware. But for political and organizational reasons we don't tend to have transparency on that data. It's also worth noting that hardware is an important part of this conversation because, of course, data storage and machine learning algorithms, they all kind of rely on having computational and storage hardware. And the kind of creation and disposal and transportation of that hardware has not only kind of energy impacts but materials impacts and water impacts and all other sorts of impacts that we really need to be thinking about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So is it true that Moore's Law is slowing down? I don't know that I had tuned into this issue, but is it measurably slowing down or is it a fear it's going to can we see it? I imagine it's not super clear.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I'm not a computer systems researcher myself, but I will say that there has at least been discussion within the community about are we reaching the end of Moore's Law as we've potentially run against just physical limits on how small you can make something.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, interesting. Yeah, we're getting down to nano, whatevers. Now, is it fair to say that the majority of these direct impacts are about the electricity that is running these things or are the embedded emissions in the hardware itself that you were just referring to are they comparably sized? Do we know how those two compare to one another?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I will say again, it's a bit of a shifting landscape. But as of now, I would say that the computational emissions are higher than the embodied emissions. But this is also shaped by organizational choices in certain ways. For example, what we see is that when you have data centers, they are often replacing their computational infrastructure very quickly in order to make it so that your computations are more efficient. So you kind of reduce your computational emissions footprint.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>But by doing that, by replacing your hardware so quickly, especially when your hardware is not actually spent, you're increasing your embodied emissions. And so I think we're seeing kind of adds a picture of what the computational emissions are versus how quickly are we replacing hardware. The kind of proportion of embodied emissions sort of is increasing if we kind of believe this fact that the hardware is getting more efficient.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And just in terms of how much to worry about this, about these impacts in particular, I mean, I guess I'm inclined to just say most of that comes down to the power sources. A) the power sources that are running the data centers, or b), the power sources that are running the factories that are producing the things. Those power sources are getting cleaner over time. Right. They're being replaced by renewables over time. And so you can imagine a not too distant future where this particular family of impacts, the direct impacts, are fairly low to negligible. So I guess I'm just inclined to just not worry about that piece of it much. Is that off? Do you worry more than that about this piece of it?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>I do worry about it. And this is because if we think about decarbonization strategies across any energy related sector, the first order of business is to reduce waste and improve efficiency. And if every sector feels entitled to its unbounded growth in energy use, we start to run into various constraints on the actual "can the grid handle this?" on the decarbonization-of-the-grid side. So I would say that here this translates to kind of reduce waste is; if it's not worth running a particular machine learning algorithm, if the benefit on the other side isn't worth it, then we shouldn't be doing it.</p><p>And then improve efficiency is; for use cases where we've decided it is worth it, let's make sure to do that in a way that is reducing energy use as much as possible. And I think this sector, like every other energy based sector, needs to be thinking about those primarily in addition to, of course, decarbonizing the grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And there's a lot of runway left to make these things more efficient, like the computations themselves. Is that mostly a software thing, a programming thing to make them more efficient? Or do you mean physical improvements in chips and data centers and whatnot?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>So there's both stuff that can be done in software and in hardware. There are kind of physical improvements that are doable and are being worked on to make hardware more efficient. But also in terms of the software, there's work that's looking at if you have a big model, can you somehow actually do something called pruning or architecture search? Things that allow you to figure out are there smaller versions of the model that would make sense. You can also, when actually training your model so getting it to a state where it's making good predictions. There are various procedures like hyperparameter tuning that go on, where you're trying to figure out kind of meta design choices around how the model is designed.</p><p>And there's more and less wasteful ways to do hyperparameter tuning. We can again pick to not always use the most complex model if it's not worth the value. So if a kind of much less energy intensive model gives you 99.9% accuracy and it takes you 1000 times more energy to get to 99.99, that may not be worth it in every use case. And so really, I think there's a lot that can be done in there as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it seems like we could also although I don't think we will, it seems like we could also say as a society that some things are not worth putting all this effort into. Like maybe if you're creating a bunch of greenhouse gases and burning a bunch of data center cycles to sort of improve the performance of a button position on a particular Amazon page or whatever, maybe we should just say deal with the current button position. There are frivolous things that we're throwing enormous resources at already.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>It's totally true. And I think all of these are driven by the fact of money speaks. And I think it's unquestionable sort of where money flows in society.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, well, so those are the computing related sort of direct physical impacts. The next tier up is what you call immediate application impacts, which is just what are the things that are running on machine learning doing now for climate? And I guess you might say against climate, it's like, oil companies have access to this stuff too and I imagine are throwing tons of resources at it. One of the papers you sent me was sort of this catalog of things that are using machine learning and it's just already it's so vast that you can't really wrap your head around it.</p><p>It's spread so fast that it's hard to say anything general about how they're being used. But is there some way of sort of wrapping our heads around or categorizing what machine learning is being used for now in this world? In this sort of clean energy climate world?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I can give a couple of themes that I think cut across a lot of the applications that I've seen and these aren't exhaustive, but hopefully are at least illustrative. So one of them is machine learning is maybe unsurprisingly being used to improve predictions and by analyzing past data in order to provide some kind of foresight. So an example there is the nonprofit Open Climate Fix in the UK is working with National Grid ESO to basically create demand and solar power forecasts by ingesting a combination of historical data, the outputs of numerical weather prediction models and in the case of solar, things like videos or images of cloud cover overhead.</p><p>And by basically cleverly combining different data sources and then using machine learning models to learn correlations between these, they were able to cut the error of the electricity demand forecasts in, I believe half —</p><p>Oh wow!</p><p>by doing that. And there are also applications in the climate change, adaptation space. So for example, there's a Kenya based company called Selina Wamucii which is using AI to predict locust outbreaks which are exacerbated by climate, by basically combining agricultural data, weather data, satellite data. So the idea is basically if you have a bunch of different data sources that are telling you something a bit different about the problem, machine learning is really good at combining and learning correlations among these heterogeneous data sources and then kind of using that to make some kind of forecast in the future. So that's one theme.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And does that theme also apply to the climate models themselves? Like, I'm assuming climate modeling in general is going to benefit from all this stuff.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yes. And so there is a lot of work that's looking at not machine learning as a direct predictor of climate because ultimately climate involves a shift in what's going to happen. And what machine learning is good at is you have a data set, you identify existing patterns and then to the algorithm, those patterns are the world. So it's going to continue trying to apply the same patterns. But where machine learning has been used in climate forecasting is to do things like take these existing physical models that are really complicated to run and try to approximate portions of them so that the overall model runs more quickly.</p><p>Or take the outputs which are often coarse grained and try to downscale them or fine grain them based on on the ground data. Kind of post hoc.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So just prediction.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yes so prediction is one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Seems like an obvious enough one.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yes. The second one I'll talk about is taking large and unstructured data sources and distilling them into actionable insights. So this often comes up when thinking about the large amount of satellite and aerial imagery that's becoming available as well as the large amount of text documents we have available on public policies or patents or things like that. So for example, there's a project called the MAAP Project which is using satellite imagery to try to give like a real time picture of deforestation in the Amazon in order to then enable interventions to actually stop it. And in the public sector, the UN Satellite Center UNOSAT they use AI and machine learning to analyze satellite imagery to get high frequency flood reports because basically you can have a human looking at satellite imagery and analyzing the extent of flooding, but it's a task that's hard to do at scale for a human.</p><p>And so they use machine learning to actually try to analyze how is flooding changing and get real time reports that have helped them improve disaster response actions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, in a sense it's just pattern recognition even for data collections that are so vast and heterogeneous that maybe the human mind sort of is stymied. The human minds are just pattern recognition machines too, but we have our wetware limitations so it just can find patterns in much larger and more heterogeneous data sets.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, in some cases it's that the patterns are just really hard for people to grasp. Now, I have to emphasize the pattern needs to exist. You're not going to find patterns where they don't exist. But that's one case. But another case is one where we as humans can grasp them and readily apply them. It's just that scale is really hard. Kind of labeling a couple of satellite images to understand flood extent is fine. Labeling thousands and thousands that you're just going to run out of human time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, that's two.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Number three. So the third is machine learning can be used to optimize complex real world systems in order to improve their efficiency. So while the kind of last two themes I talked about with forecasting and distilling data into actionable insights, it's fundamentally about providing information that ultimately will go on to inform a decision. But there are places where machine learning is itself in some sense, making a decision is automatically optimizing some kind of system. This comes up, for example, in building automation. So there are companies that are using AI and machine learning to automatically control heating and cooling systems. For example, in commercial buildings, based on sensor data about weather, temperature, and occupancy, we are trying to leverage that to basically find efficiencies in how the heating and cooling infrastructure is managed —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You can throw power prices in there.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>You can throw power prices in there. Yes. And I think this is actually a really kind of underrated and underexplored area of work where there's work using machine learning for demand response and market trading and there's work using machine learning for building energy efficiency. But I think actually there's a lot to be done in kind of bridging those two views. And so I'm really glad you brought that up, actually.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I can also think of another large complex system that desperately needs some optimization, which I think you also know something about one of our shared, shared obsessions, namely the electricity grid. I'm very curious what is currently being done with machine learning on the grid?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a great question and I will say , so, machine learning is pretty widely deployed across power grids for forecasting and situational awareness kinds of tasks. When it comes to optimization and control, I would say largely a lot of those applications sit more on the research realm than in the deployment realm right now. And part of the reason for that is that I think there's just a big lack of appropriately realistic data and simulation environments and metrics that actually allow us to test out and validate research methods in an environment that is realistic and actually advance their readiness that way.</p><p>Because by testing out a research method in an environment that looks realistic, you then understand how do I need to adjust my method to make it responsive to the realities of the grid. And you sort of have that feedback loop and kind of progression of readiness which I think we're lacking a lot of infrastructure for. But concretely, where machine learning can play a role there is when we think about centralized optimization problems. So things like optimal power flow problems and the stochastic and robust variance of that, these problems are computationally intensive to solve. And so sort of similarly to the theme of improving the runtime of climate models, we can similarly think about are there parts of the problem we can approximate, or can we learn quote unquote warm start points?</p><p>Or can we even make direct and full approximations to these centralized optimization models, but in ways that preserve the physics and hard constraints that we care about? And that's actually what some of my work looks at. And then also on the kind of distributed and decentralized control side, we want to construct controllers that can make decisions based on local data, maybe plus a limited amount of communication to get some more centralized data. And this is a place where control theory is playing a role and AI and machine learning can potentially also play a role by basically learning complex patterns in the underlying data and using that to make nuanced control decisions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When I first thought about AI, machine learning and climate, this was the very first place my brain went, I guess. No surprise to any listeners. But the rise of DERs, the rise of distributed energy resources is just, among other things, an enormous increase in complexity. You're going from, whatever, a dozen power plants in your region to potentially thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands. And I think I mentioned this when we talked earlier, but I'm not sure ordinary non-grid nerds really understand how much of grid operation today is still like people turning knobs and making phone calls to one another.</p><p>It's bizarrely low tech, a lot of it. And so that just seems to me like an absolutely ripe area for this kind of thing.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah, I definitely agree. I mean, there's the scale problem you talked about, there's the speed problem as we deal with increased variability, and there's actually the physical fidelity problem. So right now, because on power grids, we find that true physical representations are really hard to kind of solve computationally. So you often will use something like DC optimal power flow as an approximation to the grid physics, rather than something more realistic like AC optimal power flow. Then what we rely on is we make a kind of decision a bit ahead of time based on these approximate physics.</p><p>We let that play out, and then we allow real time adjustments on the grid. Things like automatic generation control take place to compensate for mispredictions or mischaracterizations of the physics. And as we have fewer spinning devices on the grid, and we're starting to see things like faster frequency swings because we don't have that buffer provided by spinning devices attached to the grid in the same way, we also lose some of our kind of buffer in terms of being allowed to be slightly physically off in terms of our characterization.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we need to be more precise.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>We need to be more precise.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is the thing about solar power in particular, is just so digital. It just seems like it lends itself to digital control and not to this sort of old fashioned kind of inertia and spinning and all these sort of very physical, very physical things.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>And I think one way to think of it is I know there's a lot of folks who are very scared. I mean, we're fundamentally talking about a safety critical system where if it goes down, it's a real big issue. And so I think there's a combination of for those physical constraints that we can kind of write down and really be certain of, there are ways to start to construct AI and machine learning methods to fundamentally respect those. And then also, I mean, it's not unreasonable to think that at certain timescales that we would possibly have some amount of human in the loop control.</p><p>Sort of in the same way, when you're driving a car, you as a human are steering it, but you're not dictating every lower level process that takes place to make the car go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, the car analogy getting slightly off course again. But the car analogy raises something that I've been thinking about, which is some of the dangers of automation coming from machine learning and AI. And I think the car example works really well. So it's generally pretty safe for a human being to be 100% in charge of the car. And I can imagine a level of AI and sensing and et cetera, and infrastructure sympathetic infrastructure makes it such that 100% automated control is safe. But what doesn't seem safe to me is the sort of quasi semi-automation where the car can drive itself most of the time, but then you need a human out of nowhere, possibly quite suddenly. And it's just we humans are not really made for that, to sit there not doing anything for hours on end and then be ready at any second to jump in. And I wonder if there's an analogy to other systems in that is there that gap between no automation and full automation where there's weird automation-human interactions that are kind of sketchy. Is that analogy broadly applicable or is it just a car thing?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>No, I mean, I think it is broadly applicable and it's a combination of what is the correct level of sort of human automation-interaction both at the level of an individual component but also you're often thinking of multiple components interacting with each other that may have different trade offs. So in cars, that is, if you have a mixture of autonomous, semi-autonomous and fully human controlled cars on the road in grids, you can imagine, of course right, multiple grids. I mean, it's a physical system, but there are different sort of governance and jurisdiction related things such that we're doing different things on different parts of the system. And so how do those interact with each other becomes a super important question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and it's one thing in a car, it's another thing if you're driving a grid. As you say, the cost of mistakes is much higher. But I interrupted your list, I think. Was there a fourth?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah, I had a last theme that I wanted to talk about. Yeah, so the last one is machine learning for accelerating the discovery of next-generation clean technologies. We've talked so far about machine learning for operational systems, but of course, as we're trying to transition systems, how do we come up with that better battery for frequency regulation on the grid or for your electric vehicles or how do you come up with a better carbon dioxide sSorbent for sequestration related applications, things like that, or electrofuels. So what machine learning has been used to do is analyze the outcomes of past experiments in order to suggest which experiments to try next, with the goal of cutting down the number of design and experimental cycles that are needed to get to that next better material or clean technology.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Yeah, I hear a lot about this, and this always seems enormously positive to me. And I thought, isn't it also in addition to just suggesting experiments, isn't it also a thing that they can sort of run the experiments virtually? Sort of do the materials science experiments virtually, so you don't have to do the physical experiment at all?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah. So you can do some amount of physical virtual simulation rather in order to understand what the performance characteristics of a particular material are. But virtual simulations are not perfect. And so ultimately you do sort of need to synthesize at some point. Right? You need to synthesize or create the thing and test it out in the physical world.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>At least you could narrow down the number of physical experiments you need.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. That's exactly right. And so the goal is really to in this case, it's again, not that you're sort of letting a machine learning algorithm itself sort of dictate exactly what experiments you do at all times, right. There is sort of human scientific knowledge that's really coming into play. On the other side, to look at the output and say, that seems reasonable, that seems like something I'm going to try versus this might not be worth the millions of dollars it takes me to synthesize this thing. So it's sort of an interaction between the computational insight and sort of the human judgment on the other side.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is a big thing in pharmaceuticals too, right? Like drug development. Is there a clear sort of a success story in that particular application? Like, is there a materials advance where the company that did it was like, look what we did with AI. Can we point to something yet?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah. So a group of us wrote this report for the Global Partnership on AI, which provides recommendations to policymakers on how they can align the use of AI with climate action. And as a part of that, we actually highlighted a couple of real-world use cases where we are seeing kind of on the ground successes. And so actually, some of the examples I've talked through today are from there. But in this category, one of the successful ones that we highlighted in that report, it's a startup called Aionics, which is a Stanford spin out. And what they do is they work with battery manufacturers across different sectors, so across energy and transport in order to help them kind of speed up their process of battery design, where of course, the properties of your ideal battery vary based on your use case.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>And they use a combination of machine learning and some physical knowledge to do this analysis. And per their reporting, they've been able to cut down design times by a factor of ten for some of their customers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Super interesting.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>I think there's a lot of potentially very impressive gains in that area.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, to return to my theme, how do you even begin to predict where that's going to go? I mean, the mind boggles on some, on some level. So in terms of these immediate application impacts, you listed four sort of broad themes, all positive examples. I'm assuming carbon intensive industries are also —</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Very much seeing the power of AI.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Are there prominent sort of examples where AI is being used to find or burn more fossil fuels?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Definitely. So AI is being used in large amounts by the oil and gas industry to facilitate their operations. So things like advanced subsurface modeling to kind of facilitate exploration, the optimization of drilling and pipelines in ways that try to improve extraction and transportation and also, I mean, marketing, right. To increase sales. And so there's a lot of applications here. And there was a report called Oil in the Cloud by Greenpeace that came out a few years ago.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I recall.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah. And that one estimated that AI was going to generate hundreds of billions of dollars in value for the oil and gas sector by kind of the middle of this decade. And that is substantial.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I believe their point was like Google is out there claiming to be a champion of clean energy and decarbonization and et cetera, et cetera, and it is providing these technologies that are turbocharging the fossil fuel industry. Seems odd.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah. And there's genuine debate, which I do happen to fall on a particular side of, but there's genuine debate about sort of whose responsibility the resultant emissions are. But I guess what I will say is every entity is very — the tech sector, the oil and gas sector, they're very eager to claim that every set of emissions is scope three emissions that are not within their direct control. And given the urgency of hitting climate change related goals, if anything, we shouldn't be so worried about, well, we need to make sure that — this sector is responsible and this isn't — by all means, double count it. Make multiple entities responsible for any packet of emissions and just make sure something happens.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. What's the danger of double counting? We might reduce emissions, accidentally reduce emissions too much.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So here's an unanswerable question for you then. When you look out over the landscape of these immediate application impacts, sort of the way AI and machine learning is being used today, is there any way to sort of net things out and say, oh, it's good for climate or bad for climate, or is this just sort of like this is just making everybody who does everything slightly more powerful? You know what I mean?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah. AI is an accelerator of the systems in which it's used. And this is not an original quote, it's a quote from many other people much smarter than I am. But what that means is that we need to look at what are the societal incentives around kind of who gets to leverage technologies like this and what kinds of processes does it mean it's likely accelerating as a result. For example, is there more money in oil and gas than in renewables? Right. That picture is shifting. But I mean, as long as that's the macro level case, you're going to see AI deployed where there is more money to spend for the use of AI.</p><p>And so, yeah, I would say that in some sense, the kind of obvious answer would be net, like, the impact is not good for climate. I mean, and this is aligned with the fact that we as a society are needing to work pretty hard to hit our climate change related goals —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just because society isn't good for climate right now.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Exactly. But I think importantly, as we think about both the broader climate fight and the role of AI within it, these are shapable. Right. So I think that in some sense, the macro level question of is AI good or bad for climate? Often leads to maybe the wrong implied downstream action of should we do or not do AI? Which I think unfortunately, or fortunately at this point is a bit of a foregone conclusion. And instead we need to really be thinking about how do we shape these developments on a macro level to be aligned with climate action.</p><p>And that's not to say that certain applications shouldn't go forward. Like, I think that's a very valid thing to say. A particular application is one where we should not be applying AI, but on a macro level, it's really about kind of steering both thinking about where we should and shouldn't use it and then how we should use it where we should.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is the same set of questions that face us on everything else too. Right. On any technology or doing anything, really. In a sense, the effects of these immediate effects are downstream of just sort of larger forces and will change as those larger forces change.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah, and the reason to think about them in an AI specific context is the same reason we think about sector specific policies when we look at climate action. There are in principle macro level policies that should just address everything, right? Like if you deal with the emissions and the pricing, sure, technically all of the underlying incentives should follow. But in practice, we find that sector specific policies that are really cognizant of the bottlenecks and trends in a given sector are helpful. And so this is the same thing with AI understanding who the players are, what the levers are, and how we can come up with more targeted policy and organizational strategies. To actually address those is ideally additive to thinking about it on just a macro level.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, well, I want to talk about policy, but just real quick before we get there, this third level of impacts is system level impacts, which are just going to — I barely even know how to talk about them. There's going to be sort of emergent large systemic shifts that arise out of the changes that these things bring. Are there examples of systemic impacts that could help us wrap our mind around what we mean by them and is there anything general to say about them other than they're probably going to happen?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, I would say that there are some that are a little more in that, "Uh, they're probably going to happen" and others that are more shapeable. So things like machine learning is a key driver behind advertising and increased consumption, not just because of advertising, but because of on demand delivery and all of these things that AI and machine learning creates which often increase emissions, but not always in ways that make us happier. Right. Which again, like emissions increases. I think there's this thing about well, but if there's a benefit on the other side. But there isn't always, and largely, it's obviously a big question across society, is increased consumption making us happier?</p><p>And AI is certainly driving that. In addition, AI is changing not just how we consume goods, but also information. So different people, when googling something will get a different answer. And on social media, also the targeting of posts, the generation of misinformation, but also the detection of misinformation. So I think there are some complex ways in which AI actually interacts with this, both in terms of having the capability to serve better information, but likewise be able to serve worse information as a result. And then there are things like the use of AI for autonomous vehicles where it's unclear what the impacts will look like, but they are potentially very shapeable.</p><p>Where if AI and autonomous vehicles are developed in a way that facilitates private and fossil fueled transportation, that has very different implications for the transport sector than if you're facilitating kind of multimodal and public transportation, right. Making it easier for people to connect between different modes of transit. And that's not a foregone conclusion, the direction we go in. And so I think there's actually a lot we can do to kind of shape the directions these technologies take in these settings.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Before we move on. There's just one other thought that occurred to me, is the use of these algorithms in trading in people day trading stocks, they're down to like one millisecond whatever trades. Now, I've read a lot of people a lot smarter than me write about this, and their conclusion is just like, no one needs this. No one is benefiting. The market is not benefiting from this. This does nothing but allow people skimming off the middle to skim more off the middle. So there's an application of algorithms and machine learning where we could just say, no, just don't. Just stop doing that.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think my tagline for people working on financial markets is; energy markets are way more interesting because you have both your financial system and your underlying physical system. I know there's a lot to be done there to facilitate renewables integration. Come join us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's a reality on the other side of all our numbers instead of just this weird sandbox that you're all just playing pretend in. Okay, by way of wrapping up, then let's talk about policies. So in your paper where you are making policy recommendations, some of the policies are just sort of obvious. You price carbon emissions, right? And then that produces a more or less universal force, pushing down carbon emissions and things like that. You offer tax incentives for greenhouse gas reductions. Just general good climate policy, you recommend a lot of that and all that stuff would be great, of course.</p><p>But are there more sort of AI specific policy directions we should be thinking about?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Definitely. So when it comes to facilitating the use of AI for climate action, what we want to think about is creating the right enabling data digital infrastructure, kind of targeting research funding in particular ways, enabling deployment pipelines. So I talked about this kind of research to deployment infrastructure that's needed in power grids and also capacity building. I mean, I think that both in terms of people who have the skills to actually implement all or parts of AI and machine learning workflows, but also people who have the ability to run organizations or govern systems where AI and machine learning will play a role.</p><p>I think having just that base level of literacy in terms of what you're dealing with becomes super important in sort of allowing there to be a lot of ground up innovation where people now are equipped with knowledge of their particular context and these tools and can make things happen as a result. So I think there's a lot that can be done and those all sound like very general levers, but of course there are specifics in there like how should research funding look? I mean, it should not be that climate funding is diverted to becoming AI plus climate funding only. It shouldn't be a narrowing of scope.</p><p>It should be things like making sure you have AI expert evaluators in climate calls so that they can understand when something's being submitted that makes sense. And it's about shaping AI calls to have climate focuses. So there's some subtleties there, but basically a lot of things that are needed to enable the use of AI for climate action.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it also occurs to me that there's tons of things you could think of where AI and machine learning would improve outcomes that won't necessarily make anybody money or might even by increasing public provision or reducing demand for some services, cost people money, like might reduce the net amount of money to be made. And that seems like a place where government policy could help nudge research funding and activity into those areas.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Absolutely trying to identify those quote unquote public interest technologies and channeling funding towards them. Exactly. And of course we talked about the kind of negative impacts of AI on climate and these should absolutely be accounted for as well. So when it comes to the computational and hardware footprint, we talked earlier about how it's just really hard to understand what's going on because you don't have transparency on what the computational energy impacts look like, even though you know in principle how to measure them because there aren't reporting incentives or requirements or things like that. And when it comes to hardware impacts, we can get a sense of embodied emissions.</p><p>But I mean, measurements on water and materials are really hard, just kind of putting in place at minimum reporting frameworks and standards so that those who want to report voluntarily know what that means. But I think more importantly, putting in kind of more mandatory reporting frameworks for some of these things so we can figure out what the dynamics and trends are and what it makes sense to do next.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, final issue. But this is something that several people flagged to me that they wanted to hear about is we've recently, I think, seen some articles about the enormous amount of human labor that is behind these AI things. And of course, the world being the way it is, it's often poor people, it's often exploited people, a lot of people that aren't treated well, aren't paid well. So once again we find ourselves with this sort of shiny new thing in the west and you scratch down a few levels and you find blood and tears from poor people behind it.</p><p>Is there any sort of like climate or energy specific way of thinking about that or is that just a general concern and do you have any thoughts about sort of like what to do about that?</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean it is a general concern and I would say that some of this also comes from machine learning being right now predominantly developed in contexts that have certain assumptions associated with them, like large scale internet data that is able to be scraped and maintained by entities in the west. Whereas in many settings in the climate realm, for example, you don't have data that's that large nor do you have the capability to maintain it. But then when you make the assumption that large data and larger models are sort of the way to progress AI and machine learning, which is an implicit it is an assumption that is created by virtue of who it is who's doing it. Now then you also create all these human costs, all these hidden costs that are really important to take into account.</p><p>And so I think really what has to happen is that and this is sort of along this point of also what can we do at a policy level to sort of align the use of AI with broader climate goals: I think we really need to think about what it means to develop AI in a way that is actually serving the needs of people around the world, which doesn't always mean biggest data AI. There are other ways to do AI and where the applications are ones where we're also picking in ways that drive the development of AI in these directions. So if you think about the development of AI for power grids, you're going to think about robustness and safety critical aspects differently than if you're looking at other areas.</p><p>And that's going to shape how AI itself moves forward and what other domains it immediately has benefits for. And so this just integration of climate and equity considerations more deeply into AI strategies in a way that should then inform funding programs and incentive schemes and the creation of infrastructure and all of that is going to be really important.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for this. This is really helpful for me to wrap my head around all this. And it just highlights again the fact that I emphasize over and over on this pod, which is it really seems like we are on the cusp of a wild wild time to be alive, to put it as bluntly as possible. Like, we're going to see some crazy stuff in our lifetime. Thank you for helping get our heads around, at least, how that's shaping up so far, so Priya Donti, thank you so much for coming and sharing.</p><p><strong>Priya Donti</strong></p><p>Thanks so much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's Volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-can-ai-help-with-climate-change</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:128435173</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 08 Jul 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/128435173/06c636318b109d8d471315aceae2e97a.mp3" length="71534889" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3576</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/128435173/62abf6c637e45053cb70b4b79ce0c467.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Making shipping fuel with off-grid renewables]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Anthony Wang, co-founder of ETFuels, describes his company’s business model of using renewable energy to make green hydrogen, then using the hydrogen to make carbon-neutral methanol.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAZbAAJmlJnhQrz3BWfDeqLa/volts23.06.28%28anhony.wang%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/making-shipping-fuel-with-off-grid-renewables"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Anthony Wang, a mechanical engineer by training, spent years as a researcher on hydrogen technologies. He worked with governments to develop policy and infrastructure plans — he was project manager on the EU's big <a target="_blank" href="https://ehb.eu/">hydrogen backbone project</a> — and with private companies like Total and Shell to develop hydrogen technology roadmaps. He has authored or co-authored several industry-defining reports on hydrogen and been cited in countless publications.</p><p>A few years ago, he decided to throw his hat in the ring and try to actually build hydrogen projects in the real world. All his research and contacts in the energy world led him to a very specific — and, to me, extremely intriguing — business model.</p><p><a target="_blank" href="https://www.et-fuels.com/">ETFuels</a>, the company he co-founded, develops projects that couple giant off-grid renewable energy installations with hydrogen electrolyzers; it then uses the resulting green hydrogen to synthesize carbon-neutral liquid fuels. (First up is methanol for shipping, but the company plans to branch out into other e-fuels.)</p><p>This model somehow manages to implicate half the stuff I’m interested in these days — green hydrogen, markets for hydrogen fuels, off-grid renewables, coupling renewables directly with industrial loads — so I was eager to talk with Wang about it. We dug into the limits of “electrify everything,” the difficulty of transporting hydrogen, and the economics of e-fuels, among other things.</p><p>This one gets fairly deep in the weeds, but if you find the real-world challenges of developing clean-energy projects interesting, you don’t want to miss it. </p><p>All right, then, with no further ado, Anthony Wang. Welcome to Volts. Thanks so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you were sort of recommended to me as somebody who knows a lot about hydrogen, about sort of green hydrogen, the markets. I know you've worked with public on policy roadmaps. I know you've worked with private companies on technology roadmaps. So I know you've given a lot of thought and sort of analysis to the green hydrogen phenomenon, the green hydrogen market. And you settled when you decided to start a company of your own, you co-founded this company, ETFuels. You settled on a very particular business model, which I just find sort of fascinating as it sort of implicates half the things I'm interested in these days in the energy world.</p><p>So I wanted to just run through it with you and talk about why you made the choices you did and get into some of the bigger issues that way. So just for listeners' benefit, the idea here is you find a big piece of land somewhere out in the middle of nowhere. You build a bunch of renewable energy, mostly solar, maybe some wind. Instead of hooking the renewable energy up to a grid, you pipe it directly into electrolyzers and make green hydrogen out of it. And then instead of exporting the green hydrogen or selling the green hydrogen, you use the green hydrogen, combine it with CO2 to make methanol, basically, carbon-neutral methanol, which you are then going to sell to shipping companies. So that's a big puzzle. That's a big puzzle with lots of pieces put together. So I want to kind of start at the front end of it. My intuitive reaction to this is you're taking valuable renewable energy and then you're converting it to hydrogen, you lose a lot in that conversion, and then you convert it again to methanol and you lose a lot in that conversion as well. It sounds sort of inefficient.</p><p>So the question comes up like, why not just sell the renewable energy? So why off-grid in the first place?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>For us, obviously, it depends where you're talking in the world, right? So renewable energy, if you can get it connected to the grid, you're completely right, it's extremely valuable. I mean, you've seen what prices of power have done in the last couple of years in Europe and in the US. And if you can use it to electrify your vehicles or heat up a heat pump, that's a very good use of that renewable energy. That said, there are many places in the world where solar and wind, on a levelized cost of production basis, are the lowest cost sources of energy we have.</p><p>And on top of that, most of these locations are not connected to grids. And so one question that always puzzled me a bit was everyone's talking about renewable energy getting cheaper and cheaper and being the lowest cost source there is. So why, why aren't we seeing that being reflected at all in, in the prices that we see a) on the wholesale market, and b) ultimately on our bills at the end of the month? And thought a lot about this, and I'm not an economist, but it does seem to me that while we've got very good at producing renewable energy in a very cheap way, I'd argue it's the cheapest that we've got.</p><p>We seem to have made a lot less progress in transporting, storing and balancing that renewable energy in a way that meets the consumer when they need it, where they need it. We know also that the energy transition is going to put this massive strain on power grids. Today we transport about 20% of our final energy through the grid. And in a fully decarbonized system, I mean, depending who you talk to, that number should be going up to 60, 70, 80%. We should electrify as much as we can. But that also means that we need about three, four, five times the number of cables, transformers and substations.</p><p>And right now the grid does not seem to be set up to deliver that. And so we wanted to marry that problem in a way with an opportunity that we saw in producing hydrogen. And obviously, when you lose 30% through energy, conversion losses. That's a huge deal if your power is super valuable. It's a lot less of a big deal when your power is virtually free, depending on where you are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So sort of to summarize that renewable energy itself at the point of production is super cheap, but all these balance of system costs, mainly transmission and distribution, end up boosting the cost anyway. So your idea is just to use the cheap renewable energy and avoid all those other costs. Basically just use the cheap energy directly and not have to pay those additional costs?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. And cost is quite a simple way of capturing it. But there's lots of other things right in projects it's also time. The biggest risk in developing renewable projects is often getting the grid connection permit. I think, not to bash too much on the grids, I've got lots of good friends there, but the numbers speak for this. So if you look at the US, I think the Berkeley National Lab found there's a two gigawatt backlog or 2000 gigawatts, sorry, of PV, wind and storage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Terawatts.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Terawatts, exactly. Which is like almost double of the installed capacity base today. And you see similar numbers in Europe. And the cost of interconnection, the deposits that developers are asked to put down are twice what they used to be. They can be almost as big as your CapEx of your solar project. So it's lots of things that have come together that are just making it very difficult to connect the phenomenal amounts of renewables that are available to the demand where it is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, I'm curious how you see this playing out. Because the enthusiasm is for electrifying everything and as you say, that's going to mean like four or five times our grid capacity and nowhere that I know of is a shining example of how to build grid capacity that much, that fast. I don't know that anyone's doing it. So, do you think that is going to be a serious constraint at the macro level on electrifying everything? Do you think that's going to push a lot of activities to this sort of off-grid model?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>We hope so. At ETFuels we're definitely pushing it. Look, I've got nothing against the electrify narrative. I think it makes total sense and where we can, we should. But the reality is that it's incredibly difficult. I mean, we're finding this ourselves. We're trying to develop projects which are in the middle of nowhere. And even there, permitting and consent can be a challenge. So, imagine building a transport cable that crosses the entire country. These transmission highways in Europe, we're talking about the European super grid. Governments are trying to kind of coordinate about who gets what space in the North Sea.</p><p>We're talking about kind of hydrogen backbones that should cover the entire continent. And you can just see the political and practical implementation challenge of doing projects like that I think. I was working closely on a hydrogen pipeline project between Spain and France, these countries putting a pipe through the Pyrenees. I think now they've landed on kind of putting it through the Mediterranean Sea and said, you see presidents shaking hands about which pipelines should happen and then it still takes eight, ten, twelve years before they're actually implemented. So, I think it's a question of let's do everything as much as we can and whichever one gets to market first, you should have some merit to that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Regular listeners will know that. I'm sort of fascinated by this question. We had John O'Donnell from Rondo, the heat battery company on and that's sort of his thesis of his company is kind of the same logic. The grid constraints are going to push a lot of renewables off-grid. Basically, they're going to be coupled directly with industrial applications and just skip all the grid stuff, which I find a fascinating trend. That's one of the reasons your kind of business model caught my eye. So then you're generating all this variable renewable energy which notoriously comes and goes, waxes and wanes, sort of out of your control and you're using it to make green hydrogen.</p><p>So part of the conventional wisdom that I always hear is that's a bad match because electrolyzers need to be run a lot of the time to pay off. Basically to be worth the investment, they need what's called a high capacity factor. And if they're sort of tied to variable renewables, how do you think about that problem? Have you thought about putting anything in between them? This is the heat battery question again. Have you thought about putting anything in between them to smooth the supply of the energy to the electrolyzers? Or is a lower capacity factor just a cost you think is worth bearing?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, a really good question. Obviously when we started the business that was probably the first question that we looked into because obviously we're only doing this because we think that we have a commercially viable proposition and we can provide hydrogen at lower cost than what is currently available on the market. And fundamentally when you look at this equation, you're kind of balancing three variables, right? You've got on the one hand, your cost of power. Secondly, you've got the number of hours that you're able to run your kit on that power, which obviously is lower with renewables.</p><p>And then the third is just the cost of the kit itself. So let's say the CapEx of the electrolyzer and the cost of balancing the power. And when we look at modeling this out across the year, there are places in Europe, in the world where your renewable energy wouldn't be producing often enough for this to be worth it, right? So if you only have a solar production model in the north of Europe, then it's probably not going to work. You can't run your electrolyzer for 1000 hours a year and hope it to make money but there are also places where it definitely can work.</p><p>And you're seeing lots of projects these days which actually combine solar and wind together in these types of hybrid configurations. And that's useful, one because they're not entirely I mean, so wind is a bit more expensive, but it runs a bit more often. But then on top of that, depending on where you are and there are special deserts where this is particularly the case where the wind and solar production hours actually very anticorrelate very well, where you essentially have solar during the day and then wind which mainly blows at night, not exclusively, but mainly at night. And when you combine those two, you can get very, very steady profiles up to 5500 hours a year of essentially base load production.</p><p>And when you spread that across an electrolyzer, and especially obviously today electrolyzers are still quite expensive, but going forward their cost will come down. You'll see that the numbers actually pan out very well. And when we've done the math, we come to conclusions where depending on the power that you're using but if you're comparing a hybrid solar wind project in, let's say, the deserts of Chile or in the Middle East or in Western Australia, you can easily get to production costs of hydrogen that are 40% lower than if you were using grid connected power, paying essentially wholesale prices in Northern Europe. So that's on the economic side.</p><p>Then there's of course the question around can the electrolyzer even run flexibly?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>And this is a bit more of a technical question. Obviously, you've got different technologies. You've got PEM, so the Proton Exchange Membrane electrolysis, and you've got alkaline ones. PEM is more flexible. But even the latest kind of pressurized alkaline models are able to run flexibly depending on their ramp rate. The specific model, you may need to add a small battery in between. But in principle you don't need to run, especially if you got 6000 full load hours from your renewables. You're mainly looking at balancing on the kind of second to minute level and the technologies that are on the market today can handle that.</p><p>So you don't need any additional storage. It's more of just a pure economic thing. If your power price is low enough and your hours are good enough, then you can make it work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So two things: You go to places where a hybrid renewable system can actually reach relatively steady production and then you go to places where the power is super, super cheap. So what about electrolyzers then? Let's talk about electrolyzers because you're saying you're going to produce green hydrogen that's cheaper than what's on the market. Is that purely because the power you're making it with is going to be cheaper? Or is there something about your electrolyzers that is special?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, and just to clarify, so when we say our green hydrogen is cheaper, I'm comparing to other green hydrogen projects, not the fossil hydrogen projects that are of course hydrogen that's on the market.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Brown or —</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>gray or whatever the hell.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>So, that stuff's definitely cheaper at the moment. So for us, the innovation is not in the electrolyzer technology itself. We're not an equipment supplier or manufacturer with our own technology. Our development IP, I suppose, is in the integration of the different technologies. So we haven't really spoken about the methanol component, we'll get there. But what we essentially do is we find the optimal end-to-end project configuration that makes the economics work for the final offtaker. Because we start with what is the price that we need to hit for our final product, which is methanol, we'll talk about, it can be a bankable commercially viable product.</p><p>And then we work backwards. So then we reverse engineer. Okay, what does that mean in terms of the electrolyzer size? What does that mean in terms of the hydrogen storage size? What does that mean in terms of the solar to wind ratio? What does that mean in terms of the battery if you need to add one? And so what we've done is we've optimized that end to end. And what you'll see is that you might have to do some slightly unintuitive sizing decisions from an engineering perspective. So that's kind of where our added value sits. And also just in terms of the development of those individual pieces of the project and pushing them forward at the same time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm wondering how much now because even if you have a hybrid renewable system, I'm wondering how much sort of overbuilding you do to try to boost that capacity factor. Like are you overbuilding and throwing away a lot of power just because it's so cheap?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, we do a little bit of that. So maybe a couple of things. So a typical project for us, what that looks like we're actually developing in Europe and in the US. So in the US, a site will be very big, 8000 acres, which is 8000 football pitches. European ones, I think the American ones are half the size it's like 8000 ... Anyway, you get the point. It's huge. And most of that's earmarked for onshore wind. So about 6000 acres is onshore. Turbines are spaced far apart, so you need a lot of land. And the remaining 2000 acres is a mix of solar PV and the process plant itself.</p><p>And that will give you about, I mean, these are rough numbers, but about 200 to 300 megawatt of onshore wind, one to 200 megawatt of solar PV. So you're looking at a combination of, let's say 400 renewables. And then we would probably put an electrolyzer that's around half the capacity next to that. So a 200 megawatt input electrolyzer. And that sounds like a very big delta. But actually, if you look at lots of the studies that have been done, they come to similar conclusions because you don't end up curtailing anywhere near half of the power you end up curtailing only a fraction of what you produce because there's only very few hours where both the solar and the wind are producing at peak.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Maybe just to complete the picture of the project. So that produces about 20,000 tons of hydrogen a year, depending on your load factor, which is a lot of hydrogen. That's I think the equivalent of about 30'000 to 40,000 Tesla Model 3 batteries in a day that's getting produced.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the electrolyzer part to you is mostly just a commodity at this point. When you're looking at big cost centers like the big CapEx and OpEx costs, where are the big costs here? Like, are the electrolyzers themselves a big cost center or is it all down to kind of the cost of the power? Is that the biggest variable?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>It's about 50/50. I mean, for us, we have kind of a renewables plant or part and then a process part, and it's about 50/50 between the two, the electrolyzer representing the main component of the process part. We've been doing a lot of, say, electrolyzer shopping in the last couple of months and you're probably wondering how that's going.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I am quite curious about what you're seeing out there in electrolyzer land.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, the reality is no one has actually built and constructed a 200 megawatt electrolyzer to date. It's not because electrolyzers are a risky technology, we've had them for hundreds of years. But at the scale that we're talking, we haven't really got that much experience. Even the biggest technology OEMs don't. And so as much as there is a big boom in the hydrogen space, I think for me personally, it's been quite a sobering experience being in the market, actually trying to procure these pieces of equipment because —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is the hype getting a little out ahead of where the market is?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Obviously there's the hype and then there's the reality of getting things done on the ground. It's not that I'm disillusioned by what I've seen. It's more that you just realize that there are so many practical implementation considerations that you haven't thought of, right. Well, one is on pricing, obviously, because there's very little, very few of these projects have happened. There's not that much price liquidity and so no one really knows how much this stuff costs. Not even the EPCs who are meant to build this really know. So everyone's trying to figure it out. People are also aware that there are subsidies, so everyone's trying to make sure that they don't leave a penny on the table in terms of how they price their kit.</p><p>And obviously you can imagine if everyone does that, then your economics go out the window. So that's on pricing and all the electrolyzer OEMs know the game and they're kind of looking to find a way to play into that. And then in terms of the actual technical and implementation challenges, ultimately this is going to be a process plant, right. This project is going to look a bit like a refinery. That means that every single valve needs to be lined up, every single power cable needs to be at the right voltage. And especially in our case, because we're off grid, for example, when you try to run your entire renewables to electrolyzer without — in the engineering terms, I think they call it like clock — you don't have a base frequency that you can follow, you end up having to create your own kind of grid stability. And that brings it with a bunch of challenges around frequency, voltages, harmonics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? You're not getting any of those grid services. You kind of have to do all that yourselves.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, so turbines, usually they're connected to the grid, so they just follow the frequency of the grid. Whereas when you don't have that, you need to create it yourself and then your electrolyzer is there, kind of disturbing it a bit because it's not entirely efficient. And so there's lots of day-to-day engineering challenges that we need to overcome that, I at least, had not expected when we started this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it does kind of seem like the mother of all optimization challenges you've taken on here. There's like so many variables moving at once. So you feed this cheap power into electrolyzers and just one last question about electrolyzers. Just from looking around in the market and your general sense of things, are you anticipating or do you feel like the sort of market is anticipating, substantial reduction in those costs or is that just kind of a fixed piece in the middle of this puzzle?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, good question. Obviously, when I speak with our suppliers, I always ask them because I hope that the prices that they give me today are not reflective of where they hope things will end up in the future. So today, they're obviously not pricing in that cost reduction. That said, all of them are very optimistic about the price reduction and usually, especially on the PEM side. I mean, when you talk to the PEM electrolyzer suppliers, they tell you that the reason they chose that technology is because it just has a lot more cost reduction potential.</p><p>And you've got lots of levers there, right? You've got the raw materials themselves switching from the very precious ones to the slightly more common ones and that'll obviously reduce the cost. Then the second one is purely in terms of the design. So lots of the OEMs are trying to figure out ways to modularize not just the stacks and the core kind of arrays of the electrolyzer so the area where the hydrogen gets produced, but also the balance of system and the balance around that stack. So the purifiers, the transformers, rectifiers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. All that stuff is still pretty bespoke at this point, right, for big electrolyzers?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, it is. And this is where the traditional OEM kind of equipment manufacturing model slightly overlaps with what traditionally an engineering company would have done. So the big EPCs would design stuff and engineer stuff to order rather than having prefabricated productized modules. But what you're seeing is that the intent is for electrolyzers to really follow what wind and solar have done, where in the future, if you need an electrolyzer project, you're not having to engineer for a year to find the right size of purifying tank. But you can just call up an OEM and they'll deliver you something that essentially comes out of a box.</p><p>I mean, I'm simplifying, but that's the idea.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, something containerized.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And if those cost drops manifest, will that be a substantial piece of making this kind of model viable in more places? In other words, is that a big lever or how big is that electrolyzer cost relative to say, the renewables on one side and the methanol on the other?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, we have our projections for this obviously. So we have our power part and our electrolyzer part. Obviously, we're more optimistic about the electrolyzer part coming down further. We don't expect renewable. I mean, there may be perovskite solar panels, you may have some thought on that, David, but on the renewable side, things will happen as they do. On the electrolyzer side, obviously, this is a huge part because when you think about that equation of cost of power, cost of the electrolyzer and then the number of hours as you reduce the fixed cost of your electrolyzer, the incremental impact of your cheap power just becomes even greater.</p><p>So all the benefits that you get from going to the cheapest places in the world so your windy deserts just get magnified and you will get to a point where whereas today you use your power, let's say it's 50 kilowatt hours per kilogram of power that you need to make hydrogen. That efficiency conversion factor, when you reduce the cost of the electrolyzer, it'll make a huge difference to the economics for sure. We're very bullish on that and we're hoping that those costs come down but we're not relying on it. And our first project probably won't be benefiting from a lot of those cost reductions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And of course, there's also just scale and learning.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, of course.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just the natural cost declines that come with more people buying more electrolyzers which I assume is going to be happening soon. So then you synthesize this green hydrogen and then the question is why not just sell the hydrogen? Why not sell the green hydrogen? It's pretty precious these days, a lot of people want it. Why not pipe or truck or however one carries hydrogen to customers? Why the third step?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>When we started this business we probably thought of two main challenges. One was excessive production costs and then the second was kind of the midstream transport challenges. And on the production costs, we've kind of covered that but to the midstream challenges. So maybe just as a bit of context. I spent my entire career in hydrogen and green molecules, working with power utilities, oil and gas companies. And at one point I actually led a project called the European Hydrogen Backbone, which was an initiative by the gas TSOs, the pipeline network operators in Europe to try to repurpose their pipelines from natural gas to hydrogen.</p><p>I'm a mechanical engineer by training. I spent a lot of time doing hydraulic modeling of pipelines and compressors at the time, and I learned quite quickly that hydrogen is a relatively leaky gas. It's not the easiest to move around, and it's also the reason that we don't really transport or store it at large scale today. It's not that you can't do it. You can. But the economics and the practical details of implementing it become quite challenging.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, just to pause there since you were just talking about having studied it, because I'm really interested in this question. When gas infrastructure companies talk about this, I've seen two things. One, I've seen mixing some hydrogen in, right, just sort of lower the carbon intensity. And then there's discussion of just turning the infrastructure over to hydrogen entirely. And my question is, just from an engineering standpoint, are those pipes ready for hydrogen? It seems like hydrogen is a lot harder to hold onto than natural gas. And there's thousands of miles of these pipes. Are they just going to work or is this going to be a thing where you have to go through the whole system and sort of fortify it?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a good question. And I mean, just on blending and repurposing. So in Europe, the discussion is mainly on repurposing. So fully converting, not blending hydrogen into gas pipelines. I think it's a bit depending on the political environment where you are in Europe, blending is not really seen as a viable solution. The energy impact is tiny because hydrogen is less dense than natural gas. So when you blend like 10%, I mean, there's only a fraction of that on an energy basis.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I mean, I think it's just a political fig leaf here. I'm sure it'll go away once the practical challenges become more clear here too, I think. But at least right now, natural gas companies are kind of waving it around as one of their "Please don't kill us" ideas.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's on blending. Just to clarify on the technical viability of repurposing, I mean, in Europe, they've actually done a lot of work on this and a lot of good work. I mean, the German TSOs have just had DNV GL, a very reputable engineering company, look at this and they essentially conclude that just on this, you do need to actually go through each single pipe and look at whether it's ready or not. So it does take a lot of work to do. But in Europe, the pipelines are in a very good state and you can repurpose them, but it will come at a cost. Mainly, at least currently, with the way that the codes are set up, is that you need to derate them. Which means that whatever pressure you are operating the natural gas pipeline at, if you want to operate it for purely hydrogen under the current safety standards, you have to lower the pressure. And when you look at the hydraulics of hydrogen, you really don't want to be piping it at low pressure because it just becomes very expensive. And so on the per kilometer or mile transported per megawatt hour, it becomes quite expensive.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's just more manageable at high pressure.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Well, you want to store it at high p... So because hydrogen is a lot less energy dense than natural gas, to get the same energy content throughput, you need to compress it more and transport it at much higher velocities. So when you don't do that, you end up, kind of like, transporting hydrogen, but very slowly. It's a bit like a congested motorway. And so in terms of value for money, obviously you get a lot less throughput and capacity of transport. That's the main reason.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you think, I mean, in Europe, I suppose, is probably the most promising place of anywhere, that this is actually going to happen on a timeline that is meaningful? Or alternatively, are a lot of green hydrogen projects going to end up doing what you're doing, which is basically being off the hydrogen grid, converting hydrogen before you ship it out? I'm sure there'll be some of both. But how bullish are you on hydrogen infrastructure generally? Pipeline infrastructure?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Well, we've not bet our company on it. That said, look, I mean, I wish them the best, right? Obviously it's a hugely ambitious project and I think that they're making progress. But ultimately I wouldn't want to for our projects and the ones that we're trying to raise financing for. The argument that you've got a business case because 5-10 years down the line there may be a hydrogen pipeline that comes in and it's the same for CO2 infrastructure, really. I mean, it's just not going to fly when it comes to raising debt financing for a project of this size.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And there's no practical way for you to build a pipeline even if you wanted to. So are there even alternative ways of transporting green hydrogen that are practical at all? Or is it pipelines or nothing?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>At the scale that we're talking now — hydrogen is already transported in trucks and you can put it in tanks and stuff and that's usually compressed, you could liquefy it as well, but that's even more energy lossy. You end up having to compress it. So you pay for the compressors, which are expensive, or the liquefaction, and then it's again not very dense, so you end up having to pay a lot for the transport itself — and at the scale that we're talking, 20,000 tons a year, that's not something that you would want to be trucking around. Also from a safety perspective, I'm sure that's not ideal and lots of local authorities would not be very happy with that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a lot of trucks.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's just not practical, basically, at this point to build green hydrogen out in the middle of nowhere where the renewables are good.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Right, yeah, exactly. And that's also why I think today most of the hydrogen projects that are actually getting somewhere and having traction are the ones that are near industrial clusters and by ports and next to an existing refinery, which makes total sense. Right. Decarbonize the existing hydrogen that you have. But that's not going to cut it when you're trying to integrate renewables from the best regions into where the demand sinks are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Yeah. Are there even exclusively hydrogen pipelines now? Is there much of that infrastructure now?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>So it does exist. So there is what's already available and there are industrial clusters and there are pure hydrogen pipelines. They're mainly operated by the industrial gas company. So the Air Liquides, the Air Products of the world, but these tend to be quite small. So these are 10-20 inch pipelines that aren't meant to transport across long distances. These are mainly pipes to bring it from one side of the industrial site to the other or as a backup. I mean, they work, they're totally safe and people have experience building them. But at the scale that the natural gas pipeline companies are thinking, which is like 48-inch huge cross country type pipelines, we don't have anything at scale or that's commercially kind of running.</p><p>But the TSOs, especially in Europe, are running pilots and trials. And I think there's one connecting Germany and France. There's a bunch of projects in the Netherlands. I know that the Dutch TSO is very active on this, so there's definitely stuff coming. But as to when and where exactly it'll be up and running, I don't know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And I'm thinking of the US. We have this huge hydrogen hub program. I'm sure you're familiar with it. It's a similar idea, building these huge industrial clusters. And I guess we're just going to have to build pipelines for all those in the US. Because there's not sort of curious about site selection for those too.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah. As a principle, it's very difficult as an individual project developer to make a pipeline like this work. I mean, it really requires everyone to come together and the stars to align. And then you often need — this is why these companies are typically regulated, usually is, because that's the only way to finance it. And so I know we've looked at, for example, using pipeline transport, and as an individual company, there's no business case for building a pipe just for your own uses. It would have to be because you pool into it with other producers and off takers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A little coordinated industrial policy to build that infrastructure. So you make the green hydrogen and then you combine the green hydrogen with CO2, basically to make methanol. So my first question about that is, where do you get the CO2? Because you've dodged the importing and exporting electricity problem, you've dodged the importing and exporting green hydrogen problem, but now you've got an importing CO2 problem. I guess my question is, how big of a problem is that? How available is CO2? How easy is it to get it where you need it?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, when we looked at this, it was like we kind of put the main energy carriers and commodities, we stack rank them electricity, hydrogen, CO2, methanol. Which one would you rather transport and which one would you rather store?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>And kind of where you end up is you really don't want to transport electricity if you've not got an existing cable network, you don't really want to transport hydrogen. CO2 is a bit easier. I mean, it's still not ideal. It's an industrial gas. You need to liquefy it. But it's better than hydrogen. Much better. But the best thing to transport in store is methanol because it's liquid at room temperature. So what we try to do is you try to bring everything into our sites and then make methanol there, and then ultimately transport the methanol out to a port and on the CO2.</p><p>So we have two options, really. One is to work with industrial point sources and we try to work with companies who have either unavoidable process emissions so cement companies, or biogenic sources of industrial CO2. So pulp and paper.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this is carbon capture you're talking about CCS.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah. So this is carbon captured.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there enough of that to supply you?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>So, obviously, we've got quite a big carbon CO2 supply problem. So from an availability in the flu gases, for sure, obviously, I think you're asking about the carbon capture itself.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Is enough being captured to supply a substantial market?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Interestingly for us, when we started this, we looked at the market and said, okay, very few are actually capturing the carbon. But when we spoke to a lot of these potential CO2 capture companies and suppliers, to our surprise, lots of them already had been doing lots of engineering study and were very keen to implement this technology. The problem for them is they had nothing to do with the CO2. Interestingly, for a cement company, especially the ones that we spoke to in Europe, they're under such immense pressure with the EUTS, the European Carbon Cap and Trade system, where they're essentially, once that's in full swing, their product price doubles because it's one ton of CO2 per ton of cement.</p><p>Cement sells for 50 euro per ton. So you can do the math. Right. So for them, they had to do something. So they've been studying this and looking to pull the trigger on some investment decisions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I thought there were industrial uses of CO2. I thought there was a market there.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, CO2 is already used today for greenhouses, but at a very small scale. And usually, the CO2 is not coming from big industrial point sources, although there are some. So there's some ammonia plants that already capture CO2. So that's one is on the industrial point source. The other source that we think is a very good option and where we have lots of discussions, is with biomass, often anaerobic digestion. So if you look at RNG, what you have actually is a very pure source of CO2, because in the process of making RNG, what you do is you essentially purify RNG from biogas.</p><p>And biogas is about 50% RNG and 50% CO2. So in the process of purifying RNG, you actually inadvertently purify CO2. But because there is no offtake for it, the CO2 is currently vented. People don't make a big deal out of it because it's biogenic CO2, right, because it comes from dairy manure or agricultural residue. But it's still right. It's CO2 that's vented into the atmosphere, which we could at that point, you're not really talking about carbon capture, right? It's just connecting it to a pipe because it's already pure. You don't need to scrub it or clean it.</p><p>And that CO2 is a very good source for us because, a), it's very, very pure, so it's cheap, and b), it's obviously biogenic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, if they were going to throw it away, if you hadn't come along, I would imagine they're willing to sell it to you quite cheaply.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So in terms of just sort of absolute numbers, you're not worried about supply of CO2, you think you have enough CO2 to go on for a while or what's your outlook on that?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, so, I mean, just to give you an example, right, we have an agreement with Cemex, a major cement company, and their cement plant produces 450,000 tons of CO2. And one of our projects takes 150,000. So three of our projects are needed to decarbonize one cement plant, just to give you a sense of the scale. And then these guys have tens of these around the world, and that's just one company. So in terms of scale, we're not too worried about the CO2.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So in terms of its availability in general, clearly there's a lot of it. But in terms of the mechanics of getting it to you, that's not a bottleneck at all. How does it come to you, by the way? Does it come to you in a truck?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>So we use a combination of rail and trucks. So both CO2 and methanol, we rail and truck. Typically, what we find is that actually the CO2 producers or industrial facilities are again close to ports where traditional industries are. And so what we end up doing is we use the same infrastructure, so the same rails and same train rail, cars and trucks to import the CO2 and then export the methanol. And it's a similar principle where we use tankers. So you liquefy the CO2, put it on a train and then the methanol is already liquid and you export it out.</p><p>And so that infrastructure all exists and it's just a matter of connecting to the right infrastructure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And to be clear, you intend to only use captured CO2, not like natural CO2 from underground, because your sort of process is only carbon neutral if you're using the carbon that's been captured somewhere else.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. And I mean, there's lots of debate and discussion about what exactly is good CO2. Maybe that's a rabbit hole that we don't have time to dive into.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Have they made up a bunch of colors for that yet?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Wouldn't be surprised if they're getting to that stage. So in Europe they call it biogenic CO2, which ultimately means that it has to be CO2 with a short cycle. So it can't be CO2 that's from the ground basically. Right, but obviously, even with things like processed CO2, you can argue how green is that compared to if it was from agricultural residue? But then you can argue that some of the biomass that's being used today for power and heat production from wood in the Amazon forest isn't great either, so it's a pretty big topic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or direct air capture. Is direct air capture even enough of a thing for you to have thought about it? Or is that still just a gleam in somebody's eye, more or less market wise?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's not competitive at the moment, so obviously for us it'll be an option in the future. Today there is not nearly enough scale and it's not competitive enough for us to consider it. But I mean, I'm definitely keeping a close eye on it, but for now, we stick to the industrial point sources. Obviously, it would take out a lot of the transport considerations because we could power the direct air capture with our own renewables. So we could just put everything in the same location.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you could make your own CO2.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That would add another piece to the optimization puzzle. You're going to have to bring AI in to deal with all this. So I think my knowledge of e-fuels is pretty sketchy, as I think most people's are. My understanding is that if you have hydrogen and CO2, there's a number of different fuels you can make. So of all the sort of possible fuel choices, why methanol? Is it easier, process-wise, to make it, or is it something about the market for it is better, or what are the sort of considerations?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, for sure. Obviously we had to pick one. We looked at the hydrogen market and if you look at where most experts think hydrogen will be used today and likely in the future, it's mainly as a feedstock. So it's for ammonia, methanol, steel and sustainable aviation fuel (SAF). And so those are the main kind of derivatives that we considered. Obviously we looked at the technical side, so we've talked a bit about the transport options and methanol kind of comes out on top. There ammonia, better than hydrogen, but still quite a toxic gas as well. We had to pick one to start with for our first project.</p><p>But I would like to add we're called ETFuels, not ET Green Methanol for a reason, not only because the latter is not very catchy, but also because we see our off-grid production model as a way to scale into a multi-fuel future. But for our first one, we chose methanol. Again, partially for technical reasons, but also part of it was just timing, because this was around the time that the big Danish shipping company called Mersk made a huge announcement that they essentially committed to methanol as their decarbonization fuel of choice. And they had put in an order for eight methanol-fueled vessels at the time.</p><p>This was a couple of years ago. Obviously, that number of methanol ship orders has grown exponentially since then. Last I checked, in the first half of 2023, methanol vessel orders represented 62% of the order book, outstripping all other fuel types. And so for us, the message from the shipping sector was clear. If we're going to decarbonize and do anything in the next ten years, it has to be methanol, because the ammonia engines just aren't ready yet. So that was quite an obvious one for us. And then on top of that, methanol is already an existing market of 100 million tons a year, used as a chemical feedstock for various plastics and chemical products.</p><p>So that's kind of the main reason that we went with that fuel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you chose methanol because it's easy to transport at room temperature and there's a relatively guaranteed market for it, but you think the model, there's nothing about the model that's going to prevent you from moving into other kinds of e-fuels.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. I think one of the reasons the model is attractive, the off-grid model, is because so much of the cost and learnings are applicable to other fuels as well. So obviously the renewables is the same, the hydrogen production is the same, and this is the notion of hydrogen as this platform chemical. And then the final part is, depending on which fuel you go with, is 15-20% of the total CapEx. But you could have a train for ammonia, you could have one for methanol, you could even have one for e-methane, which some people are doing, which is kind of e-RNG.</p><p>And so for us, it's — obviously we bet on methanol as our first. We think the market is ready there, but ultimately, ammonia might have a big future in shipping as well. And ammonia doesn't have the CO2 problem. So for us, it's a really good way to kind of keep our options open.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is making methanol out of hydrogen substantially more or less expensive than making ammonia out of it, or methane? Or are there substantial cost differences in that last piece of the puzzle?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>So the main difference is — they're all a bit different. So obviously, ammonia, the big benefit is you don't need CO2. So whatever you were paying for the CO2, you're now no longer paying for.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Betraying some rank ignorance here, but how on earth do you make hydrogen into ammonia?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>You combine it with nitrogen, so you take nitrogen out of the air, so you purify nitrogen and then you run it through a reactor. It's a similar type of synthesis reactor where you basically run your gases at a certain temperature over a catalyst. So for ammonia, it's called the Haber Bosch reaction. For e-methane, it's called the Sabatier reaction. I think the methanol reaction doesn't have a name, but they all have similar principles, which is you put it into a chemical reactor, hydrogen plus some other compound.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so it's not no, it's very similar.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>I mean, there are obviously some technical, detailed process differences. So ammonia in terms of reaction, temperature in terms of how well it operates under fluctuating load. So all of these processes, whereas the electrolyzer is very flexible, most of these chemical reaction kind of chemical plants are a lot less flexible because you need to maintain the temperature and the pressure. And it's much more like a refinery than an electrical kind of process. And then for methane, when you're obviously methanol, the last step is distillation, where you have to separate the methanol from the water, whereas with methane, you're separating a gas from water.</p><p>So there are some kind of nuanced differences. But in terms of the big picture, I mean, your renewables is the same, your hydrogen is the same, and the last 20% you can kind of flex that if you need to.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So in terms of carbon-neutral methanol, for which there is this sort of nascent market just emerging, these shipping companies just sort of getting into this. Are there lots of competitors? Do we know? I mean, is there a good sense yet, like, what it ought to cost? I guess it's far from commoditized at this point. But how mature is that final market? Or is this sort of like everybody's figuring this out as they go?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Probably more the latter. I mean, there are definitely competitors. I'd say most e-fuel announcements you see are probably around ammonia because it's just slightly easier because you don't have to source CO2, which is a challenge. So for us, it's a competitive advantage, I think, that we know how to source CO2 and we know our way around that market. On your question around pricing, so of course people are figuring it out. There are a couple of pilot plants. There's a few that have just started, kind of just taken an FID. Orsted has just bought one in Sweden where they've started construction, but they aren't producing yet, so no one really knows how much it's going to cost until it's operational.</p><p>Obviously, we know, today we would be producing at a price premium to fossil methanol. But that'll be the benchmark is — how many times more expensive are you compared to either fossil methanol or the fuel that you're replacing. So in our case it'll be fuel oil for shipping.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I'm guessing you're a lot more expensive than fuel oil at this point.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah. So at this point we're significantly more expensive. Obviously what gives us comfort is that we're well one is the cost reduction trajectory of the technologies and the learning that we think we will gain and two is our relative cost differential against our direct competitors which we see as green methanol. Right. So we don't think we will be directly competing with fuel oil because one obviously from a regulatory perspective those get treated very differently and all the incentives that a shipping company, especially in Europe, in the US you've got the IRA in Europe there's lots of incentives for fuel switching demand side kind of quotas and ways to benefit.</p><p>So you only get those if you're to decarbonize fuel. And for us, what gives us comfort is not so much the comparison to fuel oil but the comparison to other green methanol projects. And for us the off-grid nature gives us this competitive pricing advantage because of our cheaper power and that's what allows me to sleep at night.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, one question I have is, what counts exactly as carbon-neutral methanol? Because, as Volts listeners know, because they listen to the hydrogen tax credit episode, the question of what is the carbon intensity of your hydrogen is far from straightforward. And there's a lot of debate now about whether to require it to be off-grid or exactly how to measure the cleanliness of the electricity going into it, et cetera, et cetera. It's a very complicated debate here in the US. I'm sure you're very familiar with it over in Europe too, you are very clearly making carbon-free hydrogen because nothing's more additional than renewables that you are building yourself to attach to your electrolyzers, right.</p><p>So you clearly pass the bar. But is that same debate live in Europe? Because if people can use cheaper grid renewables I don't know, maybe that actually wouldn't give them a cost advantage. I don't know. But is there debate right now over what counts as e-methanol?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, for sure and really good point on the additionality I hadn't mentioned. Thanks, David. It's a big part of why we've chosen this model as well. It's the cost, it's a scale and it's the additionality on the debate around what is green methanol. So for sure, I think in the US it's a bit of a different discussion. There's not really so much a definition of what is green methanol because you make it compete with fossil methanol through the IRA, through the tax credit. In Europe, we've just had a big legislation passed called the Delegated Act for Renewable Fuels of Non-Biological Origin.</p><p>Anyway, lots of rules kind of were described in that one is for green hydrogen, which is the one that you talked about, which I think is the similar discussion in the States around additionality temporal correlation, geographical correlation, which we comply with. And the second one is around CO2 essentially how you carbon account for the CO2 in a fuel like green methanol. And the European policymakers agreed on that. So the commissioned parliament and so what we have is up until 2040 any CO2 is okay. So that's kind of what they agreed on. And then beyond that, you would need to be either unavoidable process or you need to be biogenic.</p><p>But for now, their argument is because there is so much CO2 that's kind of going into the atmosphere that we're not decarbonizing — all of those sectors, for those sectors, you can capture the CO2 and use it and it'll qualify as a "renewable fuel of non-biological origin." That's what they call it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So as I'm thinking about a project like yours in the US in a post-Inflation Reduction Act world, I'm sort of slightly boggled at the number of tax credits or subsidies that you could rack up with this. You could get tax credits for building the renewables, tax credits for green hydrogen which are substantial. I think there's tax credits for using the CO2. I think there's tax credits for the e-fuels. Like every piece of this is going to get money showered on it from the IRA. I'm wondering whether that makes these projects more attractive.</p><p>I mean it must. And whether you've been thinking about that. And two, just on a more general basis, how you think about subsidies and whether you need them and to what extent this business model relies on them.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, we founded the company before the IRA, before all these policy and incentive mechanisms came out. And we founded it because we believe there to be a commercially viable proposition without it. So we didn't create a business that relies on or is reliant on subsidies. I don't think that would make for a very good business.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, there are plenty of them.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, I guess so. But I mean, obviously now for us what this means is kind of accelerated our trajectory so we can do things much faster and basically just get going. And obviously we can't not go for them because it'll make us less competitive because our competitors are. In terms of which ones exactly, I mean, we take quite an opportunistic approach. Obviously in the US we'll try to play into the tax credits the extent to which you can, I don't know, what I would call "double dip" in the sense that get benefits from the US credits and then export your fuel to Europe and then get more benefits there from avoiding the EU ETS.</p><p>I don't think that's entirely clear. I mean, I'd be quite personally, as a taxpayer—if I were a US taxpayer—I'd be a bit skeptical of that. And even as a European one, I'm not sure how comfortable I feel with importing US-made fuel subsidized with US tax credits and then getting another whammy on top of that in Europe. Yeah, but I think that's all to be identified in Europe. Obviously, you've got the innovation funding there's all the onsite measures, which I think are much better. Like for example, the renewable fuel quota. That's a very clean quota for ships where they just have to switch a certain share of their fuel to be green.</p><p>And then you've got various other kind of incentive schemes, carbon contract for differences, which are meant to be a support mechanism for hydrogen production. And so we'll see for us, basically what it means is that our projects are even more viable than they were a year and a half ago.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Have you done the math yet on a project with all the IRA subsidies? Because the green hydrogen tax credit is ginormous.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, obviously we've done the math just to give you maybe cut some numbers. So the $3 per kilogram hydrogen tax credit translates to about $600 per ton of methanol. And just to give you a sense of fossil methanol, so methanol made from natural gas today, I mean, I haven't checked the latest numbers, but historically it's kind of traded at around $500 per ton. So that's only for your hydrogen. And then on top of that, there is potentially a CO2 credit, which again, the extent to which we can play into that, I don't know. But the CCU tax credit is $60 per ton of CO2.</p><p>And in terms of when you translate that to methanol, you would get to around $100. You multiply by 1.5. So again, it's a lot of you add it up, you get to like a $700 per ton of methanol tax credit compared to the fossil price of $500.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that enough to erase the delta with the fossil kind?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, we'd be in the money for sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, it would be wild to be on the market selling carbon-free methanol that is cheaper than the carbon kind.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>So that raises the question is what you're paying fo, right? That's where it's different in the US than in Europe. In the US, essentially that's the mentality, right? You're not trying to sell some different product, you're just trying to sell the same product cheaper. And that's why you need these support schemes to make that work. Whereas in Europe you're essentially saying, well, it's green, so it's okay that it's more expensive, but you have to do it because it's green. So it's kind of a different mentality.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there are more sticks in Europe and we're all carrots over here in the US.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, but I mean, from a developer and financiers perspective, it's not clear which one is better because obviously with the renewables, the drawback in the States was that one year you had them one year you didn't. Whereas in Europe the demand side signal meant that you had a very kind of fixed base load of demand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Yeah, that's interesting. So, the final question is just, it does seem like to some extent this business model is a reaction not to technological factors, but to socioeconomic factors. So, for instance, the limits of the grid and the slowness of getting on the grid, the slowness of interconnection, the lack of hydrogen pipelines, these are kind of bottlenecks or pressures that one can imagine easing over time. Right? One can imagine the grid getting built out more. One can imagine green hydrogen, I don't know, I actually have trouble imagining green hydrogen infrastructure being built. But who knows, it could happen.</p><p>So, I wonder if those became easier and they were less of pressure points, would some of the rationale for this business model go away?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm not sure if I fully agree with that statement. Just from the perspective of — yeah, okay, there are challenges with the incumbents and the pace that they're getting things done. But for us, it's also fundamentally what is a more efficient way to run the energy system. It's not just because it's not being done, we need to find some loophole that can make it work. Fundamentally, you can ask the question if you had a renewable energy system or an energy system that was driven mainly by renewables, is it more efficient to overbuild your grid, to run all that stuff intermittently —</p><p>I mean, I've been part of grid planning sessions in Europe and when you've got capacity factors of solar of 15% to 20% and wind of 25% to 35%, you have to build an enormous grid to balance that. By the time that you've actually built out the grid to kind of run your power system base load, your balancing cost, sometimes they call it balance of system, basically the cost of all the extra stuff to keep it running becomes quite excessive. So, I think a study by Imperial estimated that that cost would be 50 to 60 pounds per megawatt hour of just pure balancing costs. That's in addition to the renewable costs, which by the way are a lot less cheap in Europe than they are in Chile.</p><p>And so, you very quickly get to power prices which are much higher than what we are paying today. And then you can wonder, wouldn't it be more efficient if you could import some of that cheap power, put panels where it's sunny or put turbines where it's windy and import the power. And then also the other thing is, does it even make sense to try to aim for this type of base load, supply driven system or should we be running more flexible assets? And in many ways, what we've got is just a flexible asset, right? It's an electrolyzer that follows the renewables.</p><p>And so, the system benefit of an asset like that is quite big. So, I don't think I fully agree with your framing of the business model. I think there's more to it than just it's a way to bypass all of the slow incumbent infrastructure. But it's definitely a good question and I don't think anyone really knows the answer until we've tried both paths.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, you think that the limits of electrify everything are more than just incidental or contingent? You think we're going to run into these balancing cost issues and it's going to make more sense to run more stuff on liquid e-fuels?</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Not for everything, obviously. I wouldn't ever buy a diesel car and then hope to ever be able to afford e-diesel rather than an electric car. So, obviously there are time and place for everything. For certain sectors, though, I definitely think, I mean, I'd rather fuel my ship or my airplane with an e-fuel made where renewables are cheap than to try to do that next to Heathrow Airport in London or something like that. So, I think, as always, it depends and we're very targeted in where we go. We're not looking to sell e-fuel to heat homes or do anything like that.</p><p>It's very targeted to the sectors which are hard to abate and don't have other options.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This has been super fascinating. I hope listeners agree. I hope we haven't gone too far down the technical rabbit hole and lost people. But I find this, this is where all the sort of interesting issues in the energy world are hitting the ground, right? Like you're trying to actually do these things. And as, as you said, when you start trying to actually do things, whole different challenges arise and whole different sort of questions arise about optimization and stuff like that. So, super fascinating to walk through this with you. Thanks so much for coming on, Anthony.</p><p><strong>Anthony Wang</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me, David. It was a pleasure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/making-shipping-fuel-with-off-grid</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:129641951</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 02 Jul 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/129641951/1c5b05ace63d03b1a4ac1ed9d1b9f5ef.mp3" length="73714056" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3685</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/129641951/be9e827c60546e69e14998bbfb40f3a3.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Steps toward a unified electricity market in the western US]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Unlike other parts of the country, the 11 western US states have not joined together in a regional transmission organization (RTO) to more efficiently and cost-effectively administer their respective electrical transmission systems. In this episode, Michael Wara, director of the Climate and Energy Policy Program at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment, discusses the current status of a potential western RTO and the political factors affecting the conversation.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AABHXLo-1GAT-hSqQ1IMo4Hla/volts23.06.23%28michael.wara%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/steps-toward-a-unified-electricity-market-in-the-western-us"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In about half the country, power utilities have turned over administration of their electrical transmission systems to regional transmission organizations (RTOs), or what amounts to the same thing, independent system operators (ISOs). RTOs and ISOs oversee wholesale electricity markets and do regional transmission planning, which increases system efficiency and reduces costs for ratepayers.</p><p>The power utilities in the 11 western US states are <em>not</em> joined together in an RTO. California has its own ISO, but it only covers that one state. In the rest of the region, utilities are islands — they each maintain their own reserves and do their own transmission planning within their own territories. It leads to enormous duplicated efforts and inefficiencies.</p><p>For years, there has been discussion of creating a western RTO, to bring the western states together to share resources and coordinate transmission planning. Analysts <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy.gov/eere/articles/new-doe-report-shows-how-continued-western-state-collaboration-can-support-affordable">have found</a> that an RTO could save the region’s ratepayers billions of dollars a year.</p><p>Recently the discussion has begun to heat up again. A regionalization bill in California was tabled this year but promises to return next session. Governor Gavin Newsom expressed his support for the idea. Nonetheless, numerous sticky technical and political issues remain to be hashed out.</p><p>To explore the promise and risks of a western RTO, I contacted Michael Wara, director of the Climate and Energy Policy Program at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment. We discussed the political forces pushing for and against an RTO, the way the west's electrical system has changed since the last time this discussion came up, and incremental steps that can be taken in the direction of greater regional cooperation.</p><p>All right then, with no further ado, Michael Wara, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we're here to discuss something that is somewhat complex and rests on a set of concepts that might not be — that everybody might not come in understanding. But because I want to talk about the specifics and I don't just want this to be a 101 kind of thing, I'm going to assume Volts listeners have some basic background. So I think the main thing to know is the US electricity system is sort of divided in two. On the one hand, you have the traditional old school, vertically integrated utilities which own the generation and the transmission and the customer interaction, the whole deal.</p><p>And then the other half is what's called "deregulated" or "liberalized" or whatever the term is. Basically have created markets, wholesale energy markets, where generators compete and sell into the markets. And then distribution utilities which interact with customers buy power from those markets and sell it to customers. And those areas with energy markets are overseen by organizations called Regional Transmission Operators or sometimes Independent System Operators. RTOs and ISOs, as everyone in our world is so familiar with saying over and over again I'll just use RTO, I think from now on as a shortcut for those. So in these liberalized areas RTOs sort of manage regional transmission planning.</p><p>And the idea is if a bunch of different utilities can sort of share backup and share reserves and share generally they're going to lower costs for ratepayers. And so there are RTOs in the Midwest, there's one in the Northeast, et cetera. Listeners might be familiar with PJM and MISO. These are all regional transmission operators in various parts of the country. So as it happens, the western states, the eleven western states of the United States are almost all old school vertically integrated utilities which means they operate as islands. There's not a lot of sharing. So California has its own RTO or ISO, in this case California ISO or CAISO, but it only does planning for California.</p><p>So what we are here to discuss is the long standing discussion about whether the western states should form an RTO of their own, join together into a regional organization so that they can do more of this sharing. That is the question before us. And there are all sorts of ins and outs and details about this but that is the basic background. So maybe the place to start is just at a very general level, sort of abstract level. You could explain what are the advantages of joining an RTO versus just operating as an island? What is the pot of gold at the end of this rainbow?</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>I'd want to start by saying that there are advantages and disadvantages, right? And it's important to be straight about that. I think the key thing for listeners to remember and understand is that the primary mission of an RTO or an ISO is to operate. It's to operate the electricity system in a particular geographic footprint. And in general it is the case that it is more cost effective to operate across a larger footprint. And so a discussion around increasing the size of the California ISO or CAISO is about increasing the operational efficiency of the overall system. What I'd say also is that it's important to think both about the average conditions or kind of the expected conditions and then periods of extreme stress on the system.</p><p>I guess my view is that the discussions around regionalization or growing the California ISO further outside of its California footprint have really become more important because of the challenges of the reliability that we've had in California and elsewhere. But especially in California over the last several years due to drought, the unavailability of hydro as a result, and the growth of intermittent renewables.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The duck curve.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>The duck curve.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The dreaded duck curve. Yeah. So the idea here is just if you have more states or a wider area involved, you just have a larger pool to draw. And so if you're having a sort of like choke point or grid congestion here or a shortage of power here, there's maybe power over there that you can import just the larger geographic area you're covering, the larger sort of base of power and the larger variety of power sources you're drawing from. And that generally leads to resilience.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think an intuitive way for people to think about this is kind of national borders and trade, right? If you ship goods across an international border, they have to go through customs, and there are barriers to that. And we have rules about how those barriers are supposed to be under the WTO and other agreements we have with other countries. But it's just harder to ship things internationally than it is to ship something from California to Nevada, because we're all within a free trade zone. And what these ISOs or RTOs really create when they're done well is a free trade zone where electricity can be traded at very low cost.</p><p>And what that means is that the optimal power plants turn on within a system footprint to meet the electricity demand that exists within that footprint. So that lowers costs because it means that you're not buying something expensive within your little market because it would cost money to get something cheaper that's just across the border.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So it's just easier to share. And it's also worth saying, all these islanded utilities, the vertically integrated utilities, they're required by law to have a certain amount of backup available, basically resource backup in case of problems. And if you operate in an island, you have to have enough backup for your own island, which is and then the next island over also has to have enough backup for its island, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So you end up duplicating efforts over and over and over again. You have sort of like duplicated backups. And what this wider area allows you to do is sort of have a pool of backup, right?</p><p>So not everybody has to have —</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>enough to cover, and that also reduces costs. So these are the, I think, the sort of abstract benefits. Like a larger footprint means more sharing, better planning, lower costs. So back in 2016, 2017, there was a bill that came up in California, because at least one pathway to this, the first step would be right now, California's ISO is more or less controlled by California. The governor appoints the members and the California Senate approves them. So it's a very California-centric operation. So if you were going to expand that to incorporate other states, obviously you would have to restructure CAISO, so that it's not California-centric, because, like, other states are not going to join if California completely controls who's on it and how it works.</p><p>So there was a bill back in 2016, 2017 to restructure CAISO this way, and that sort of prompted a whole round of this discussion back then. So what I thought I would do is sort of throw out at you some of the sort of worries and objections that were voiced back then and then maybe you could tell us, are those worries? Were they valid then and are they valid now? Have things changed, sort of catch us up on sort of stakeholder worries and issues. So I think probably the strongest opposition to the whole notion of regionalization, especially back then, came from unions because California's climate laws have a lot of domestic content requirements, so they require that the power be generated in California, which means a lot of jobs in California, a lot of union jobs in California.</p><p>And I think the unions worried if we expand the footprint to include multiple states, California will be able to find cheaper power elsewhere and we'll just import it and that will mean fewer jobs here in California. So maybe you could say, was that a valid worry in 2017 and has anything changed now to address that worry?</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>So that, I think, is a primary worry about this proposal, and it does reflect the desire of the unions in California that have really benefited from the renewable portfolio standard here to make sure that those benefits don't evaporate. And I think it also in less maybe self-interested sense, the cooperation and support of labor unions in California has been critical to the political economy of getting hard bills through the legislature and signed by the governor that have been really important in terms of driving the climate policy situation forward in California. So we don't want to damage that. And the situation in 2017 was that you could build solar in California.</p><p>If you do that, you have to pay prevailing wage and have an apprenticeship program, which basically means you're hiring unions to do the work. And that is not the case in many neighboring states. And so that was the situation circa 2017, I think there was a legitimate concern about that issue. There was some attempt to kind of massage the legal questions using clever language, which at the time made many of us, I think many of us were skeptical that that language would survive review if challenged. It's notable that the language in the California RPS, which you correctly point out, David, is I don't know if I'd call it protectionist, but it's certainly designed with particular outcomes in mind about where generation gets built, has never been challenged.</p><p>So fast forward to today and the situation is different in a few respects that I think are worth talking about. The first respect, and this was actually true in 2017, but people didn't focus on it so much, is that we need to be real about who's going to want to join a sort of common electricity market with California. And probably it's not going to be states like Wyoming which are committed to subsidizing their coal-fired power plants as long as possible and in whatever way is legally tolerated by various courts and they also happen to have a really nice wind resource which if it were interconnected to California's grid would be extremely valuable. Rather than try to link up with Wyoming in a market sense what the CAISO is doing is actually building its own transmission line that it will control out to Wyoming to connect with Wyoming Wind.</p><p>Right? So it's sort of decided that there's not a future where that happens. And I think many of the benefits that were envisioned for kind of out-of-state generation resources circa 16, 17 really depended on this vision where the entire west is in a single RTO. I personally think that's highly unrealistic. It's unrealistic today for two reasons. The first one is what I just mentioned that very conservative states do not want to share power with a very blue state like California. So I think it's unlikely those states are going to want to join whatever the economic benefits.</p><p>It's a tribal issue. The second issue though is that there's a competing RTO under development in the west now that will be kind of the eastern side of the western interconnect and will involve a lot of these other states. SPP, which is an existing RTO based in Little Rock, is in the pretty advanced stages of getting ready to file with FERC to create an RTO across western states. So that's one set of issues. The big talk back in 16, 17 was "We'll get Wyoming Wind in the CAISO and that's going to really be great for various reasons" which it's still true it would be great to have more of that resource in the electricity mix in California.</p><p>The other thing though that's changed is federal law: The Inflation Reduction Act passed. The Inflation Reduction Act says that if you want to get the full PTC, the production Tax credit then you need to pay prevailing wage and have an apprenticeship program. Period. Full stop. Starting on January 1 of next year. So any projects that would be a part of the California ISO and hope to receive federal tax credits which are material to the economics of these projects is going to have to pay wages and have unionized labor apprenticeship programs that are very similar to California's. Now the prevailing wage in Nevada or Arizona may be somewhat lower than in Kern County where a lot of the solar gets built in California or in the western part of the Central Valley and in the Westlands Water District.</p><p>But at least a significant chunk of the kind of economic advantage to building out of state is eliminated by the changes to the Inflation Reduction Act the pro-union measures that the Biden administration has put in place. So I'd say we're actually doing some economic analysis right now to try to understand this with current data but none of the assessments that have been done of the ISO RTO concept and sort of regionalization really take account of this change and it's incredibly important. The unions are still opposed. And that may be the reason why we don't do this.</p><p>They are very nervous. From the perspective of a California union, it might not matter whether nonunionized labor or a Nevada union construct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I was going to say it's not necessarily quiet their worries to say "Oh, these jobs that will be taken from you will be given to a union somewhere else."</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>This is just anecdotal. But what I've heard is that there aren't actually unionized construction workers in a lot of these neighboring states to California because they're right-to-work states. And so some of what's happening is that in order to qualify for the Inflation Reduction Act tax credit structure, workers from California are being moved to Nevada or other states to construct these facilities. Kind of like man camp style. Because they need to make sure, right, they want to make sure that they check all the boxes to get the full tax credit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>And that's a part of it. And so it's a somewhat fluid situation. I personally can't believe that that sort of approach will be sustained in the long run. But the general picture is that — I guess the other thing I'd say is that and maybe this is a third point I should have said there are three because it was better three. Is that California is running up against the challenges of really achieving the SB 100 objectives. We are sketching out construction rates, starting to procure, attempt to procure renewables at a rate that is really unprecedented in California. And we're going to need to build everything.</p><p>And this is kind of a key message that I bring to this conversation. We need to make sure that we're building all the rooftop we possibly can. We need to make sure that we're building all of the in-state generation that we possibly can. And we are going to need to procure a lot of out-of-state generation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And even then, those goals are going to be very difficult to hit. This was, I thought, the strongest point you made. I was reading what you've written about this. It's just that California, its goals are so ambitious that this is not a scarcity situation. This is not an either-or situation. It has to go flat out to get all the power it can from everywhere it can. And even then, it might not be able to get enough.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>I really think that's the right way to view the situation in California right now. And we are working in our group on policies that will reduce barriers to in-state construction, reduce the barriers around interconnection, which are really the big delay right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah, I want to pause and emphasize this point too, before you move past it, because I thought it was another great point you made in your writing, which is that the real — if you're worried that there's not enough in-state construction happening. The prospect of imports from other states is the least of your worries. Like that's not what's holding up construction of new power in California. It's all these things that Volts listeners are very familiar with permitting, NIMBYism, et cetera.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>That's right. And I think the challenges there in California are quite acute. They also interact with just how much else the other jobs that our utilities have that are kind of even more pressing than achieving the SB 100 goals like not having wildfires ignited by their equipment. And many of the engineers and line workers that are needed to do the kind of renewables build-out in California are busy with that work as well. And so we have resource constraints in California that are real. We need to work on those, we need to train more line workers, we need to train.</p><p>All of this needs to scale. But there are things we should be doing in California and we've been working on them. Many others are working on these issues as well. The PUC at the ISO, at the Energy Commission as well, of course, is to remove the barriers that exist to building things in California at the same time as we facilitate greater use of imported power that's actually clean and not just the old way. California has long imported large amounts of electric power. We built our coal-fired power plants in other western states and on the res and we have shut those down, mostly.</p><p>A lot of it has been replaced by natural gas-fired power that we import and some renewables that we're importing as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let me pause and emphasize that point too because another of the objections back in 2017 or whatever were from environmentalists who say "Here in California we've got laws mandating clean power. But once you open it up, you're going to get a bunch of these coal plants in other states, generate cheap power and sell it into the RTO. And we're going to end up in California getting coal power in our mix when we don't want it."</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Is that is just much less of a concern than it was in 2016 for a whole bunch of reasons. But the fundamental and most important one is that coal is a five cent product in a three cent market and it is just the economic loser pretty much no matter how you slice it. And the states that are trying to prop it up frankly can't afford to do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And the last thing they want is market competition. Right. I mean the more you expose it to market competition, the less well coal will do.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>That's absolutely right. And so exposing coal, especially to markets that have a lot of renewables in them, so there's a big daily cycle in prices is really challenging for that type of resource. So I guess I look forward and I'll say I think about this also this proposal in terms of what the situation will be like, not right now, but in about five years, because it's going to take several years to get — eve if this law or a law like it were to pass this session, or frankly, it's not going to pass this session, it passed next session, then there would have to be preparation of a proposal that the ISO would share with the state government and then would submit to FERC, and FERC would review that proposal and approve it.</p><p>And only after that approval would the ISO be able to implement it. And I think we're looking at the late two thousand and twentys at best. So really you need to ask how much coal is left in the western United States circa 2028? And I think the answer is not very much. And even if it's there, it's not running. So then the question is, what about the other resources? And certainly there's a lot of natural gas in the west, and we might import some of it if — we would import some of that power if we were more strongly tied to other western states.</p><p>But California has its own issues with burning lots of natural gas to generate electric power. We generate enormous amounts of electric power using natural gas. And many of the gas plants we utilize are older, they have significant environmental impacts, they're located in EJ communities. And we are on the record of saying "We want to shut them down." So all of us in the west that have renewables goals and clean energy goals are going to be working on this question. But it's not like we're better, we're cleaner than other western states. And I guess the other point that you alluded to, David, that I want to come back to is the situation has changed fundamentally with respect to other states renewables goals as well.</p><p>In 2016, 17, we were out way ahead with SB 100, proud of that fact, and looking at most states in the west that had either very timid RPSs from California's perspective or no policy at all. Today, six of the states in the west have 100% clean energy goals, just like California. And there are several additional utilities that have taken on those goals and haven't just taken them on, but are proposing integrated resources plans that are consistent with them. So near term action to achieve those goals. And they're doing it because of the favorable economics of doing it right, that a mix of wind and solar combined with some batteries and natural gas is the cost-effective portfolio to have these days.</p><p>Now, it may get harder, we'll see, right? It could be that all of us get to 80% clean and things get really hard, and then some of these folks that are saying they want to do that now change their minds, but that's in 10 to 15 years. We've have a lot to do in the meantime, and a lot of potential partners in achieving those goals that we didn't have five, six years ago.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And not only are a bunch of states now targeting 100% clean energy, but it's worth noting that Colorado and Nevada specifically passed laws saying we support the RTO idea, we like the idea of a wider area here. So there's some momentum out in those other states.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I think there are a set of partners, some of which have become public and some of which are less public, that are sort of looking to see what happens. Right. There's this proposal from SPP. There's a lot of discussion in California. My sense is that the partners want to see, like, if there were to be a California option, the economics of it are highly favorable to others because California is just such a big chunk of the population in the west, 40 million out of 100 million people. So there's a lot of potential buyers of electricity in California, and having access to that market for other players in the west could create a lot of benefits for them and also benefits for California because California would be able to purchase lower-cost power.</p><p>I think where the other parties start to get worried is when we, and I say we, I'm a Californian, start to want to impose our values on others.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Great segue because the third and sort of final objection I was going to raise to that law when it came up then was just the general worry that with a California-only ISO, California is very tightly in control of it and can ensure that the values of the ISO reflect Californians' values, the sustainability goals, et cetera, et cetera. The worry is if you dilute that, California will to some degree lose control over the running of the common ISO, or at least it will just be one voice among many. And I think some people in California, some lawmakers, some environmentalists, are worried that you're going to end up with an RTO that doesn't reflect what California wants. And at that point, California will be just up the creek.</p><p>There's nothing you can really do once you, once you have committed to the RTO.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I guess I think this is a valid concern. If the governance structure of the ISO is not designed with some care.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Bracket that because we're going to return to precisely that question.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Okay, so let me just speak at a high level then. Certainly there are a bunch of states, one of whom I mentioned, Wyoming, that have really different priorities for their energy systems than California. California also is so kind of tribal in its blueness and its pro-climate policies, that can be a real turn off to more intermountain conservative states. Even with utilities that are a little bit out of step with their state. And I would note that Idaho Power has a 100% clean energy goal, but the state of Idaho does not, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To say the least.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>And so Idaho Power needs to be careful and I think they're interested in participating in the regional sort of markets that the California ISO — We haven't talked about this —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But that's our next topic. So you're setting it up perfectly.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>So California has spent, since the last effort at full-blown regionalization creating a regional RTO, California has spent a lot of time developing kind of what I term like halfway houses to an RTO.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>This thing called the energy imbalance market and then the enhanced day-ahead market proposal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about those. Right now, CAISO is operating what's called the Western Energy Imbalance Market, which involves multiple western states. And then it is developing what's called a day-ahead market, which will have a bunch of those same participants. Maybe you could just tell us, what does the energy imbalance market do? What would the day-ahead market do that the energy imbalance market doesn't do? And what would a full-fledged RTO do that the day-ahead market doesn't do? What are these halfway houses like? How big of a step is the energy imbalance market and what's the next step?</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Sure. So the energy imbalance market has been something that's generated a fair amount of benefit for all the states that participate. And basically what it says is you optimize in your footprint. And that optimization typically happens mostly a day ahead. Right. So power plants are on, they're not on, whatever based on a forecast a day ahead. But those forecasts are never perfect. And so there's always some kind of leftovers that — maybe there's too much in one place or not enough in another. And what the EIM does is allow trading in that real-time or almost real-time space where the day-ahead forecast was wrong and somebody has a little extra, somebody has not enough, and they can exchange and create benefit from that exchange.</p><p>And the real benefit is not having to turn on a power plant or call on a resource that would be expensive but can turn on quickly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's an incremental bit of sharing there.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's like the tip of the iceberg of benefits from lowering barriers to trade. And then there's this giant iceberg underneath, which is the day ahead.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the day ahead is not yet running.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>No.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It is in development.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yes. And the day-ahead is where you, say if you're a grid operator, look at the weather forecast and make an estimate of what electric demand is going to be, and then you decide which power plants you're going to utilize to cost-effectively meet that demand. So coordination across and I should say, even if there isn't a market right, like in these vertically integrated states, the utility is making that decision every day. So what the day-ahead market, The EDAM, as people call it around here, the Enhanced Day-Ahead Market Proposal will allow, is states if they want to, and if their utility commissions will allow them to, which is an important caveat, allow some utilities to kind of opt into participating in a single optimization across the footprint. Now, the challenge here, though, is it gets complicated to know what will really happen. And the reason is that many parties that say they're interested in the EDAM in this day-ahead market proposal say they are interested in it as a halfway step to an RTO and they are much less interested in participating in it if there is not an RTO proposal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If it's a terminal EDAM.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>If it's the end, yeah. And the reason for that is, understandably, utilities don't want to — what an ISO RTO kind of construct is turning over your system to somebody else to operate. And if that somebody is in Folsom, California and you have no say over how the rules are written, no seat at the table in terms of designing future transmission expansion proposals, that strikes many people as unfair, let me just put it that way in simple terms. And certainly the players that do have a seat at that table are going to seek to maximize their benefits from whatever gets decided.</p><p>And that's going to mean that the utilities in California, PG&E, Edison, and San Diego Gas and Electric principally get the most benefit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So EDAM is run out of CAISO, basically. And so the worry from other utilities is California utilities are going to get they're going to be at the head of the line here. They're going to get sort of favorable treatment.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>And California has bent over backward to create a governance mechanism for the EIM, the tip of the iceberg market that is really multistate and fair and is functioning well. And I think in many ways, many of the concerns that were raised in 16, 17 about what the governance would look like once California shared some power can be actually pretty well answered by just looking at how EIM governance functions today and has been functioning for several years. And it's a very successful model. It's widely perceived as fair.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the participants are happy, the utilities —</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Everybody's happy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Everybody loves it. That's why the EDAM project has moved forward, because the people that participate in the EIM, both California and non-California entities, have said, "Let's go further." But as this project has neared completion and it is getting close to that, two things are happening. One is this competition from SPP, which I think will thin out participation in the EIM, which is spread out quite far across the western grid and it will also limit participation in this new program, the enhanced day-ahead market. So the real story here is that to some degree, if California wants to have sort of day-ahead integration, it needs to maintain momentum toward power sharing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so what would the RTO do beyond the day-ahead market?</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Well, the other thing that it would do is actually plan transmission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Praise be.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yeah, right? Yes. And so today, in the footprint that a western RTO centered on California might contain, there's internal transmission planning each utility or within the California ISO, the ISO plans transmission build-out and then there are seams. And the seams are where different markets meet each other. They're kind of the border. And there are real limitations on planning across the border, planning transmission lines that cross these state lines and cross market barriers and just planning what people are today starting to call transfer capacity, which is the ability to move power for California, especially out of the Pacific Northwest and into California.</p><p>And I just add to that another challenge that we've all confronted in the west in the last few years also is the effects that large wildfires can have on these transmission lines. Because there may be like four lines that connect California to the Pacific Northwest, but they're all in one right of way. And so if there's a big wildfire that's putting a lot of smoke into that right of way, it can shut down the whole thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>And so there's kind of an additional need for greater redundancy which will create resilience to wildfire.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Speaking of that, I'm going to throw one more twist here at listeners who are now juggling whatever a half dozen acronyms we've thrown at them so far. But there's also something called the Western Resource Adequacy program.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yeah, WRAP.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>WRAP. Tell us what that is and how it fits in with that silent w.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Well, so one thing to say, another big objection, way back when, was the fear of imposing a capacity market. As you mentioned earlier, David, resource adequacy is an important goal that all utilities or system operators plan for. They need to have enough power available on those hot, in California, it's the hot summer afternoon into evening to make sure that we don't have to do rolling blackouts like what happened in Texas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. You need enough resources to meet the maximum conceivable demand.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which, as we say, if you're doing it over and over again in each one of these utility islands, just leads to huge amounts of capacity that is idle almost all the time.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>That's right. It's incredibly wasteful. So there's a developing program for utilities in the west to try to plan some of that resource adequacy together and sort of share resources more than they have in the past. How and whether this interacts with the burgeoning proposals both from CAISO and from the SPP group to have RTOs I think really depends on the rules in the markets. California has made it very clear that there's never going to be a capacity market in California and that the states that join any RTO created under — by governance change at the California ISO will maintain control over their RA.</p><p>It doesn't mean that the amount of resources might change. Right. So it might be that you need a little bit less because you're in this larger footprint utility, and the ISO say "Well, we can get by with this much instead of this much plus a gigawatt or something" because we're operating the whole system as one. But what those resources actually are will be determined by the participants and ultimately then by the state commissions that regulate the participants in an ISO or an RTO. That's like kind of a non-negotiable item for California.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there a particular reason that it's so uptight about this particular point?</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Well, I think it relates back to our earlier point about kind of California wanting to have some real say over the power plants that it's using to meet load. Also, I think it has to do with the observations from the outside of experiences with capacity markets within PJM, especially where there's been litigation over the desire of states to build new capacity in their own state as opposed to having it be controlled by an auction mechanism. I think anybody who's participated in some of these auction mechanisms as a market participant will tell you that they're problematic, very hard to design well. Often in retrospect, designed poorly, and then the market operator is left trying to fix things after the auction, after money's changed hands, kind of change the rules retroactively, and so no one's super happy with them.</p><p>It may be the least worst thing, but from California's perspective, they don't want anything to do with it. It's a non-starter, and that'll be written into the legislation. Any viable legislation that would allow for power sharing would say, power sharing fine, but there will be no capacity market. And if there ever were, California would withdraw.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. We've got the energy imbalance market as a little step forward. Then they've got the day-ahead market, which is going to be a really substantial step forward. Beyond that, I mean, I think it's worth pausing just to say that sort of analyses of these things show benefits of the day-ahead market that just dwarf the benefits of the energy imbalance market.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yeah, but let me just back up to these studies. Yes, they do. However, the studies that have been done to date typically assume full participation. So they ignore — they're like engineers sitting down to say "What would be the coolest electricity market we can imagine in the west?" Rather than people who are connected to the political process, which is very important in all of this, saying "Who are the most likely partners?" Or I would frame it somewhat differently who are the most valuable partners that California could have in an RTO, and what do we need to do to get those people?</p><p>And who cares if all the western states join? It really doesn't matter. What matters is and I'll just call out one particular partner, like, what are the things that we can do to induce the participation of Bonneville Power Authority? If you want to think about really successful heavily reliant on renewables systems. Think about like northern Europe and Norway. That is a system that we should aspire to be like where Norwegian hydro balances German and other European wind. Right? And today a lot of that happens. Right. We trade power every day in large quantities with Bonneville. But if we could induce participation of Bonneville and a number of the northwestern utilities in a California ISO that would do an enormous amount to simplify having more renewables on the system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So there's the day-ahead market that's being hashed out there's, the resource adequacy program going alongside here and these are all sort of envisioned, I think by a lot of people at least, as steps towards an RTO. So let's pause for a minute and just think about if you're sitting down with a blank sheet of paper today and designing a western RTO what are the sort of main design issues that you want to make sure — because there's not like a set blueprint, right? There's not like a blueprint. You take off the shelf and say here's our RTO.</p><p>These are all sort of designed in somewhat bespoke ways and would need to be designed in somewhat bespoke ways to fit the values of the participants. So what in your mind are sort of the top issues that anyone designing an RTO for the western states ought to keep in mind? I know that stakeholder input is a huge one, so maybe we could start there.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, as I look at it, I think we need to design a system that takes account of the real circumstances in the west and that isn't just a cookie-cutter approach. The EIM did an important first step toward that, but the reality is it doesn't go quite far enough. So I would say we should look at what's happened there, look at the successes and failures in the EIM, mostly successes. Honestly, I can't really think of real negatives and start there. But we'd also need to say there's not going to be a capacity market. We're going to give states sovereignty over their resource adequacy as long as they show that it meets the requirements for the system.</p><p>And then we need to work out some kind of a body of state regulators that has voting rights that reflect the complexity of the west, where we have a few states with very large urban populations that are going to be, particularly in the early years of a California ISO, the vast majority of load and so be paying most of the transmission access charge. But we also need to make sure that states that have relatively small populations have a real voice, not some sort of nominal participation where they don't really have any power, so that they feel less concerned that California might just go on some spending spree and run up their transmission charges because Californians can afford it, and other states are much more price sensitive to the cost of electricity. So to me, this sounds a lot like the problem that the Founders solved with the Senate and the House. It's also a problem that's regularly tackled in international agreements.</p><p>And the basic model is you say you need two majorities to move forward, you need a majority of states and you need a majority of load to make a recommendation and that's going to ensure that all the recommendations that come forward are really consensus-based and it gives everybody power to shape what happens. Another key kind of governance characteristic, that I think will be ultimately important is to make sure that the states that do participate in this market and in the body of state regulators that will be created have what's called Section 205 filing authority, at least for the really important issues that come up within an ISO and an RTO. And that basically just means that if the board of the RTO were to take some action that the body of state regulators really objected to, just basically the board kind of goes AWOL and starts taking their own independent actions without really consulting and considering what the states want. That the states can go to FERC with a relatively low burden of proof to get before FERC and have their issues considered on the merits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting. Just pause here and say back in 2016, 2017. Another one of the worries about an RTO is that at the time the Trump administration was in power, it was sort of bullying RTOs to allow more coal and just to be dirtier in general. And some of the RTOs were sort of seen as kind of bullying the states involved, disrespecting states, sort of clean energy goals, basically not giving states their independent due. So that was another of the worries about this is just when you give power to an RTO, you are giving up some power and I guess you just want some guarantees that you're not going to get that the RTO is not going to go bad and start steamrolling you over stuff.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yeah. So this is an important reason why not having a capacity market is a good idea, right? That's an insurance policy. So what the Trump FERC was doing was really interfering in a material way in the issues around what kind of power plants exist in particular states within these RTOs. And if you just take that off the table by saying that that's not going to be a question that the RTO is really concerned with, then you can go a long way toward avoiding that problem. But we don't have any guarantees that a future administration will not wreak havoc with western electricity policy.</p><p>That is possible. And that's why it's important that everybody vote who cares about the clean energy transition. Try to make sure that never happens. But there are lots of ways beyond FERC. I mean, you want to interfere, you could simply eliminate the tax credit provisions in the IRA if you had a cooperative Congress.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>So it's a problem that is just present in a country that is evenly divided politically on this issue, as the United States is. And given that FERC has jurisdiction over all the high voltage transmission, right, so it's not just these federally regulated electricity markets where there's a greater FERC role, for sure. But also FERC oversees all of the high voltage transmission in the United States because it's in interstate commerce. Even those vertically integrated utilities that kind of do things on their own. They still have to go to FERC and get approval for things. And if FERC wanted to, they could do things to make life difficult.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Notoriously in transmission planning, one of the difficulties is cost allocation. Who pays for what? Who gets the benefits of a transmission line and who pays for it? Do RTOs help with that? Would an RTO help smooth that issue?</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>It can remove some challenges, but it doesn't remove them all. And this is also getting to why having a good participation model for the body of state regulators, which would be kind of a subsidiary body to the board of directors but would provide a lot of input to the board, is important. Some RTOs have been very successful at building transmission to enable build out of renewables. Probably MISO is one that stands out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I did a pod on that.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yes, you did. And it was a good pod.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Listeners want to go Google that.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Other RTOs have been less successful. See PJM's long-standing cost allocation disputes. So I think it just really depends on the context and on creating a mechanism where there's mutual interest in seeing these new transmission lines get built. As I said at the beginning, I think we need to build them. And the ISO in California is building new transmission lines out to even distant other western states. We also need to build a lot of intrastate transmission. Right. And I think if that's the way to get things done, I'm sort of a person who's like "What can we get done?"</p><p>What's going to push us further down the track toward where we need to be and also create a political and economic situation where there's strong support for continued transition? And I do think that those problems are solvable as long as you don't try to pit people against each other.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, you sort of raised another issue which I wanted to ask about, which is there's a couple of really big utilities in the region whose disposition on this question will be very important. So I think like PacifiCorp and Xcel, for instance, and there's this idea, I think, like, if you listen to Southern Company, say a utility in the southeast, they are busy fighting off these efforts, fighting off efforts in the south to create a more unified market, to take steps towards an RTO, et cetera, et cetera. Even though all the same considerations apply. An RTO would be great for the southeast, for all the obvious reasons, but I think utilities like Southern Company view an RTO as kind of a direct threat to the vertically integrated utility model.</p><p>What do you think? PacifiCorp and Xcel, where are they on this? And do you think that the vertically integrated utility model is under threat? Once you start this process, once you start going down this road toward more sharing and pooling of resources.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>What I'd say is, it is potentially under threat in some ways, but the question again is, what are the costs and benefits? And does your vertically integrated utility also have an independent subsidiary that builds merchant renewable generation? Right. And PacifiCorp is one vertically integrated utility within a basket of utilities and other companies that are owned by Berkshire Hathaway Energy. And I think BHE is able to take a higher level perspective on what's valuable for all of its assets and what the potential market opportunities might be. But I also think the situation is somewhat different because the west is so different than the southeast, where in the west market access to California is super valuable for some of these utilities.</p><p>And so I think PacifiCorp looks at the situation and says "Yeah, well, there might be some more merchant generation that gets built in our footprint, but you know what? We could build it, A). And B) then we can sell all the energy to California and meet this, be a part of this really big market that we have trouble getting access to."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you think most of the big utilities in the west, generally speaking, are on board with the general movement in this direction?</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>I think so. I think that the other thing is that it's challenging for a state as big as California with all the generation portfolio that we have to manage the transition to a solar heavy grid. But if you're smaller, that problem gets even more challenging. And so a lot of these utilities are also Portland General Electric or Seattle. Power and Light, I think is —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>City Light</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>or City Light. Thank you. Yeah. Are looking at what they understand to be their future, right? And saying, "Wow, there's even additional benefit today to being integrated into a larger system."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. If you're just building fossil fuel plants to satisfy your own load in your own footprint, it's all very simple. But once you start moving to variable renewables, the value, the need for these larger footprints and more sharing just rises and rises and rises.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>I think that's right. And also the ability to do things that are — to have pretty sophisticated demand response programs, to have the ability to integrate distributed resources and then bid them into the market becomes more valuable. Those are still kind of nascent technologies. But utilities are looking at this problem five years — like I said, they're not thinking about now, they're thinking about five years from now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, those things are going to get overwhelming for a single utility to manage, I feel like pretty quick. I've always felt that about distributed resources particularly. It's like —</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>one thing when you have a dozen participants in your wholesale energy market, but what about when you have 1000 or 10,000 or 100,000 with DERs? Things get complicated quick.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>And particularly managing electric vehicle charging in a way that is grid supportive rather than grid destructive. I think it's going to be really important. There's a whole bunch of things that are coming at utilities relatively quickly and there's value in having scale. And a lot of the really innovative policies, like the innovative policies for integrating storage into wholesale electricity markets, those have come out of California.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>And ultimately become national FERC orders. But the early experiments happened here and I think there's a greater consensus, at least within the electric power industry, that that is the direction we are heading.</p><p>And so then that makes participation in an RTO more valuable and particularly in one like California's.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's return to something I've previewed a couple of times here, which is a little chaos agent in this mix, which is this other RTO, the Southwest Power Pool. SPP is at the, how did you put it, the eastern end of the western states. It has started to do a couple of things. One is it launched something called the Western Energy Imbalance Service, which sounds similar to and is similar to CAISO's Western Energy Imbalance Market. It's sort of a competitor to the EIM and it's sort of out there trying to lure states and utilities into that service rather than the EIM.</p><p>And then it's also got designs on expanding its own footprint. So basically what you have now that I think is new in the equation is this other RTO out there talking to western states saying "Hey, never mind California, come join our thing, come join our Energy Imbalance Market and then eventually come join our RTO." So a couple of questions about this. Like why? Why does SPP all of a sudden have these sort of imperial ambitions? Why does it want to expand? Why is it doing it now? And then do you think that has a chance of succeeding?</p><p>You can really see, you could imagine the western states, the western region kind of being split between two RTOs. So what's your take on all that?</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>So the first thing to say about the two RTO thing is like "okay, fine," there's lots of RTOs in the US.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>And the west is a big place. And while certain system planners have long kind of imagined that sort of the apple in their eye, like this one market —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes!</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>spanning across the entire interconnect, I don't think the sky falls if there are two. And it may actually be better for some of the parties to be I think there are real tensions that would come up in the body of state regulators, potentially, with having states that really just — it's not even that they don't care about climate. They view climate as a tribal issue, and they're on the other side, and California is on one side, and it's going to be hard to divorce some of those questions.</p><p>So I'm sort of like, actually, this could be a positive. It might mean that some resources aren't available to California that otherwise would be very economic to have, and that's too bad.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But at least everybody involved in the California ISO would be on the same page, right. Moving in the same direction.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Or at least sort of roughly. I don't think we can go too far there, but I think that there's flavors of that. So why is SPP doing this? I do think part of it is kind of a desire to expand, just sort of like empire building. But there's also the fact that they're meeting a need. Right? There is a need for greater interstate coordination. The EIM was a market test of that need. It proved that this is really something people want. And the EDAM is another step in that direction to meet that need. And SPP is recognizing that there is a void created by the sort of idiosyncratic governance structure of the California ISO, which is a legacy of the California electricity crisis, remember?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>None of the other ISOs work have governance that's like this. The reason California has it and the reason FERC tolerates it is what happened in California. And that also when you go to the legislature in California, not so much the legislators because of term limits, but the staff remember.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>PTSD.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I don't know if it's active anymore, but surprisingly recently, last few years, there's been active litigation still over who pays the costs of that debacle. And so the California governance structure is unique because of that. It creates challenges to regionalization that would otherwise not be there if there were an independent board, which is what all the other RTOs have.</p><p>And as a result, SPP sees an opportunity and they're stepping into it. And so the question really is, does California see wisdom in also stepping into that space?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Kind of puts a clock on things, right? It was either nothing or a western RTO before, but now it's like, you need to move, or your competitor is going to suck up all your —</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yeah, we'll lose some opportunities. Although I think you see that some utilities do switch RTOs. That does happen. Little Rock, Arkansas, where SPP is headquartered, is not a part of SPP.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hilarious.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Because the utilities switched out because it didn't like the deal it was getting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's not permanent. Like these things are fluid even after the —</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>They can be there are significant costs, and I think especially, and this is important to emphasize, there would be very high cost for California to withdraw. Might be easier for another state that's a smaller part of it to switch out of California as RTO. But once you get rid of your control room, you're kind of committed, or you have to move to another person's, another entity that has a control room.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I also hear worries about basically like, if SPP hoovers up all the states that California will be isolated in, this growing reliability problem that you alluded to earlier, this sort of serial crises, this growing duck curve, et cetera, et cetera. It's going to be that much harder to solve those problems if California remains isolated. Just if CAISO as an island amidst a larger SPP, do you give any credence to those worries?</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, I think California as an island is not a situation that we want to be in. I'm a little bit skeptical that that's going to happen in the near term. And if it were to start to happen, I think that California, that would increase pressure on California to respond by creating a pathway toward shared governance. I guess that the other thing I would just sort of say about all of this is that people in California tend to be really afraid of this shared governance idea of sharing power. But I think we need to be confident about what we've accomplished, how that has changed where other utilities think the future lies, and in our ability to persuade other states and other utilities to come with us on this journey.</p><p>And I think we can.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>On the politics of it, I forgot to ask this earlier, but I just throw it in now. There was a bill this session to restructure CAISO along these lines to take the first big step toward an RTO, and it ended up not advancing. And then, like the week after it died, Governor Newsom came out and endorsed it, which I think was puzzling to me as an outsider. What's going on there? Like, is Newsom on the side of the angels here? Are there internal political dynamics that are worth kind of calling out?</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Well, I think what happened with that bill was that it was essentially a reintroduction of the thing that did not pass in 2017 rather than an attempt to update it to the new circumstances. And so that was not perceived favorably. However, the issue is one that Newsom's team views as important. Remember, these are the people that have had to deal with the serial emergencies that have occurred on the California grid. The buck stops with Newsom. He understands that if there are rolling blackouts, à la Texas, he's politically accountable for that. And there's a sad history of what happens to governors in California that no one wants to go anywhere near.</p><p>And so I think Newsom's team has long been supportive of this, but maybe not ready to step out and publicly say that. And the point at which this bill was going to fail was the point at which Newsom decided that this is something that he had to get involved in. And so without supporting the bill, what he is supportive of, and this is I think, where many of us are, is the process is developing a workable proposal that can pass, that addresses some of the legitimate concerns and that keeps us moving. And so it's my understanding that at the staff level within the administration and also at the agencies, at the CEC and the PUC, there's high level attention being paid to this issue that's going to hopefully produce something that can pass.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So you think the politics are good, there's momentum going —</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>the big stakeholders are on board, more or less.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Let me be clear. I think the politics are still challenging. Anything that unions are opposed to in California —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>has challenging politics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And is there any prospect of bringing them on board, of persuading them? Like I'm sure the arguments have been made to them a million times. Are they immovable on this?</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>IBEW is the shop union, is the union for the California ISO. All the California ISO employees are in IBEW 1245. But I think the bigger issue is the building trades and how the people that do all of the work that is not electrical when you build a big utility scale solar farm. And there the question is going to, I think, ultimately going to turn — and this is also actually where having the governor involved is really useful and important. The question is going to ultimately turn on what else do the building trades need?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>And is there a trade where the governor's team feels like giving something along some other dimension is worth it —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I see.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>to get this value?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Because it's never just one dimensional, it's never just one thing that any organization as complex and powerful as the building trades needs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I say. I've always found this comes up again and again, the sort of opposition of the building trades to clean energy bills in a bunch of different states. Somewhat mysterious to me because it just seems to me like of all the worries you might have about a clean energy transition, a shortage of building work should be at the bottom of your list. You're just going to build a crapload of stuff everywhere, everybody, all the time. It seems like an odd worry. Like, if anything, the building trades are going to be overwhelmed with the amount of work.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Well, trades are generally supportive, like trades supported SB 100 trades are generally supportive of a lot of the clean energy legislation in California. They're worried about moving stuff out of state. And I guess the thing that I point to, and I think the issue that I feel California legislators and other stakeholders should be most focused on is the reliability question for the following reason: I'm old enough to remember the aftermath of the electricity crisis in California, where the basic political response was to roll back all the things that had led to that series of rolling blackouts. And what I worry about is a sustained heat wave in the context of a drought in California where we have significant rolling blackouts.</p><p>And the political response to that is rollback of SB 100 goals. And I think that is not something we should rule out of hand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wow, that's dystopian.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>I don't think it's dystopian. I mean, electric reliability is incredibly important, particularly in a heat wave. People will die. Like, there are real near term concerns with that kind of a reliability crisis like what happened in Texas in February of last year or two years ago. It's totally unacceptable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, yeah, and you look at the response of the Texas legislature and it does not augur well for —</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Without weighing in on their inadequate response, I would hope that California would have a more substantive and adequate response to a crisis like that were it to occur. I actually have confidence that we would, but I do think that it would raise real questions about particularly that last 20% of the SB 100 goal. And I don't want to see those. I want to see us succeed. And I want to see us do the things where we execute on that goal, ideally ahead of schedule. And so reducing risks is an important part of that. That's the reason why I think building trades should support this, because it's going to allow us to build more stuff.</p><p>Like it avoids a situation where we have an emergency stop or at least an emergency pause.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, that's a good point. Final question here is and it gets to the schedule as you just brought up, whatever happens in this process of taking steps towards an RTO, it's going to take a while, as you said, late 2020, as earliest, probably more like 2030. There's a dire, immediate need for more transmission and better transmission planning in the western region. And I think everyone can agree that it would be really bad if all of that waited until 2030 to get started and if California didn't start regional transmission planning until 2030 when an RTO was in place.</p><p>So are there ways to get more regional transmission planning going parallel to this RTO effort?</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>There are, and you see some of it in the current transmission planning process at the California ISO. So one alternative option is to begin to build transmission lines that are owned and operated by the California ISO, but which exist in other footprints. And that's something that has started to happen. It's happening with respect to connecting Wyoming Wind or a big slug of Wyoming Wind to California. I think we may want to think about that for sources of clean, firm power as they develop in the western interconnect. There are a lot of interesting geothermal proposals in Nevada and in Utah.</p><p>And without weighing into the nuclear conversation, there's some news. A lot of the small modular reactors are going to get built in Utah first. And so how we leverage our existing transmission to these states, as the coal units that were the original rationale for it shut down, and whether we construct new transmission on the California dime where California recognizes paying for these lines, no one else's to interconnect new sources of especially valuable supply to California demand. I think it's something we need to look at in the near term. The good news is that the California ISO over the last couple of years has really pivoted from being pretty reluctant to build new lines to being maybe making some parties uncomfortable with the ambition of what they are proposing.</p><p>And I think that's healthy. I think we need to be very ambitious in the near term because these lines take so many years to build and we need to be looking at where the puck is going to be, not where it is and thinking about systematic build out of the system to incorporate much larger renewable shares. And the ISO is moving aggressively in that direction. I think there's still room for them to move, but they are off the base and running, so that's good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for coming on and walking through this all. It's super fascinating. There's just so much going on in the electricity system. Everywhere you look. This is a really interesting little subdrama chapter here, so thanks for walking through it. Michael Wara of Stanford. Thanks for coming on, Volts.</p><p><strong>Michael Wara</strong></p><p>Pleasure. Thanks for having me, David. Great to talk to you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/steps-toward-a-unified-electricity</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:128869700</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 25 Jun 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/128869700/fe17d5b55b286df96005a685632813a5.mp3" length="88324897" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4415</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/128869700/507f1d1cd4470586a330373b8ce3afe1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Will the US have the workforce it needs for a clean-energy transition?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Will the US clean-energy transition be hampered by a shortage of electricians, plumbers, and skilled construction workers? In this episode, Betony Jones, director of the DOE’s Office of Energy Jobs, talks about the challenge of bringing a clean energy workforce to full capacity and the need for job opportunities in communities impacted by diminished reliance on fossil fuels.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAjzaFGOz39Wn8OFJTwqK1xa/volts23.06.16%28betony.jones%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/will-the-us-have-the-workforce-it-needs-for-a-clean-energy-transition"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Now that the Inflation Reduction Act has lit a fire under the clean-energy transition, a new worry has begun to emerge: can the US create the workforce it needs to build all of this stuff? And can it care for the fossil fuel workers who are displaced in the process?</p><p>Across the trades that will be necessary to build out clean energy — electricians, plumbers, construction — industries are reporting worker shortages. Meanwhile, entire communities are being disrupted and displaced by the closure of refineries and other fossil fuel facilities.</p><p>What can the government do to help growing industries create the job pipelines they need? And what can it do to help cushion the blow to fossil fuel communities?</p><p>To get to the bottom of these questions, I contacted Betony Jones, the director of the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy.gov/policy/energy-jobs">Office of Energy Jobs</a> at the Department of Energy. She has spent years thinking about clean-energy workforce issues and working with industries to create shared job training and apprenticeship programs. We talked about the jobs that are coming, the jobs that are going away, and the need for an active hand in smoothing the transition.</p><p>With no further ado, Betony Jones. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>It's great to be here. Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You know, ever since the Inflation Reduction Act passed and the rest of the legislation sort of like kicking off a new era of clean energy acceleration, I've been thinking about what are the remaining kind of now the policy log jam has broken, what are the remaining impediments? What are the remaining dangers? And I've sort of narrowed it down to the four Horsemen. The four or four horsemen of the clean energy apocalypse political blowback, which is basically Republicans taking back over and undoing everything NIMBYism, which is the difficulty of building all the things we need to build interconnection queue and transmission i.e. making the grid big and robust enough. And then, fourth, workforce issues. I'm going to try to do a pod on all these eventually, but we're here to talk about workforce issues. So just by way of background, maybe start by telling us what your office is and what it's for and what it's intended to do.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>First, I just want to say when the Inflation Reduction Act passed, that was really game changing for someone like me who's been working at the nexus of climate change and labor issues for so long. And so to answer the question of what my office does, the Office of Energy Jobs at the U.S. Department of Energy is responsible for a few things, but one of them is making sure that the jobs that are being created from these historic investments are good, quality, family sustaining jobs that people want. And so writing the rules around the funding and how it goes out the door and how it's made accessible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Was the office created by Biden, or has this been around a while?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>This iteration was created by Biden, but it has also been around for a while. I think Obama had an Office of Energy Jobs, and so did President Trump. But our office is really focused on, first and foremost, making sure that the investments are getting out into communities, that the investments are creating broadly shared prosperity and good jobs for American workers, and that we're investing in new industries in the domestic supply chain to provide the materials and equipment for this clean energy transition. So that's really exciting. It's actually just an absolutely incredible opportunity to show that we can address the climate crisis while creating real material benefits for American workers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you're really at the nexus there. That's a white hot area. So when I think about workforce issues and the clean energy transition, there's sort of two sides of it. There are the people in communities who are going to lose fossil fuel based jobs, and then there are the people in communities that are going to gain clean energy jobs. I want to start with the latter, although we will return to the former later. So there's all this work to be done electrifying and everything else. But I wonder, do we have a clear quantitative understanding or projection or good models or a sense of exactly what the job shift is going to be? I.e. Like how many jobs are going to be created in what industries, how many will be lost in what industries, or is there so much uncertainty that we're sort of adapting as we go?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>There's always uncertainty because nobody can tell the future. I mean, my office puts out the U.S. Energy Employment Report every year, which is a backward look at energy jobs. And we can see some trends in that backward look. But in terms of forecasting, that's really challenging to do. For the bipartisan infrastructure law, it's difficult to determine where exactly some of these investments are going to take place because for the Department of Energy and most of the energy investments, they're competitive. And so different private sector companies compete for funding, and then they decide where it is that they want to build their hydrogen hub or their battery factory or what have you.</p><p>And so it's hard to determine exactly where those jobs are going to be. But we do know that a lot of them, and I would say probably 75% of them are in the construction sector. And so this is traditional jobs. This is laborers and operating engineers, the folks who move heavy machinery, earth moving equipment to prepare the ground for these things or drill the geothermal wells. They're electricians, plumbers, pipe fitters, iron workers. These traditional construction occupations. And it's not that different building a battery factory from building a data center or building a hospital, for that matter.</p><p>Construction is construction. The jobs that are created are mostly in traditional occupations sort of regardless of the technology that's being deployed. For the Inflation Reduction Act, this is the really game changing legislation because of the way that it's structured with tax incentives, so we expect to see those investments pretty much everywhere. Now, obviously for things like wind and solar geothermal, you're constrained by the location, by the availability of that resource geographically. But if you're building a factory to make solar panels or battery cells or EV charging stations, you're much less constrained geographically. So that's one thing.</p><p>I mean, communities all across the U.S. are competing for those types of investments and then at the same time and this maybe gets to the first part of your question there's fossil assets that can be repurposed for some of the things that we're trying to develop now. And so there's a lot of attention on how do we repurpose those fossil assets, these facilities that have grid connections, that have water and other resources, that have a workforce and a community that supports that. So that's another area of focus.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. The reason I ask is just because a theme I'm going to return to again and again is just the difficulty of guiding this stuff with policy on any sort of macro scale. That's kind of something I want to interrogate a little bit. But as you say, this legislation that Dems passed we expect ought to create a surge of new jobs in the trades, in pretty conventional trades. And yet all I hear or read in the news is the trades telling us that they face a huge shortage of workers, that they can't find new workers, that the pipeline is drying up, that there's like a million jobs for every applicant, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p>So I guess I want to know why is that? Clean energy aside, why doesn't — you would think a market like this is what markets are supposed to do, right? Like when demand for something increases, the market produces new supply. So what is going wrong here that we have these shortages?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Well, a little bit of it is who you're hearing from. So there are employers out there who can't find workers for sure, and then there are others where there's a line out the door for the opening. You have these established firms with some, you know, where a worker feels like there's some reliability. Siemens, for example, or GE, they can generally fill their positions. The other thing is registered apprenticeship and in particular the union apprenticeship programs. I am being told that even now with this historic low unemployment, they have ten times the applicants as they have openings for.</p><p>So what that really shows is that people want jobs but they want good jobs. And so if employers are counting on paying yesterday's wages or counting on the labor market from pre-pandemic, then yeah, they're going to struggle to find workers. But the employers that have a good track record, unionized firms, union pathways into construction as opposed to just general construction, but the pathways that provide reliable access to the middle class, the ability to buy a home, to go camping on the weekends, have a garage full of toys, whatever, people want those jobs. And so the more that we can make sure that we're creating those kinds of jobs, jobs that people are excited about, that they want, it shouldn't be a problem to attract workers.</p><p>Is there a bit of transitional pain? Sure. But I think that that's okay because we're in a ramp-up. We're at the bottom of a ramp-up phase. And so what's really exciting, I think, is that we have this big boom. This inflation reduction act is really significant, not just in terms of the greenhouse gas emission reductions, which is huge, 40% by 2030. I've been working in climate change for over 25 years, and I never thought that I would see that actually. So it's really significant in terms of the greenhouse gas emission reductions, but it also is significant in terms of its ability to transform our economy and rebuild a lot of these jobs that historically have provided pathways to the middle class for workers without a college degree.</p><p>And so the fact that this is all happening so quickly, yeah, it's an abundance of riches and we have to do some work to realign the labor market. But it's also a great opportunity because there's a lot of buzz and it's a really exciting time to get into energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's what kind of breaks my brain, is that on the one hand, we have all this hype, all this talk, all this new legislation, et cetera, et cetera. And then on the other hand, over here you have electricians saying "Hey, we have a graying aging workforce. We don't have enough young electricians. We're falling short here." Trying to fit those two things together in my head is what kind of doesn't compute.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Well, I think that's exactly where this is an opportunity because, yeah, there is sort of this silver tsunami in the trades, and it hasn't been an area of work that parents have pushed their kids into for a while. And that's also true with manufacturing. But now with these investments tied to actual labor standards that will make sure that these are good career track, family-sustaining jobs, that's going to shift. The promise of a college degree has changed. It's no longer the reliable path to the middle class that it has been. And so we're seeing even people with college degrees going into apprenticeship programs where not only do you not have to take time off work to go get trained because you're earning as you're learning, but there's also no tuition associated.</p><p>So you're not going into any debt. You can tomorrow go sign up, get into a registered apprenticeship program. You start earning money immediately. You get to work with your hands. You get to see the fruits of your labor. There's a lot of people actually who want to do that. And so this wealth of investments that we're making really, I think, shows workers, young people or people looking to transition in their careers, that this is a pretty stable area of work to get into, that there's going to be investments for a while. This is a reliable career path, and I think that's really attractive to people.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. One of the articles I read, it says the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that there will be 80,000 job openings for electricians every year until 2031 as we electrify everything. My own 17-year-old son is seriously considering going into the trades instead of college.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>And how do you feel about that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because of all the stuff you mentioned, working with your hands, making decent money, not going into debt. And of course, he's like, I don't want Zoom meetings. I don't want cubicles. It's not just that blue-collar life maybe is looking a little better these days, but also that white-collar life is like "ugh". Young people aren't all that excited about it. Yeah, so we're thrilled. Of course, he's a teenager, so we're trying not to act thrilled. But the Bureau of Labor Statistics also says that the manufacturing sector is short 764,000 workers. So just catching up from that deficit plus all the new growth prompted by IRA to me just says that these labor markets, these particular labor markets in the trades, are going to be tight for a long time.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>They're going to be competitive for a long time. They're going to be competitive. And I think they'll compete with other sectors for workers like warehousing or the service sector. These sectors that have traditionally relied on low-wage labor are probably going to feel a bit more of a pinch than they have for decades, because now there's manufacturing and construction work that have the ability to pay more, be more stable, be more rewarding.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But I see you would think if you're a company in one of these areas and you're short on workers and you're competing for workers, one of the things you could do to compete for workers would be to make the jobs higher paying union jobs. And you would think that would attract people. And yet it just doesn't seem like that's spontaneously occurring to many companies. Instead, they're complaining to the press about entitled workers and asking the Fed to raise interest rates to weaken the labor market. What would it take? And now you're here basically saying it's got to be policy forcing, basically, or using incentives and tax credits to force these companies to make these decent jobs.</p><p>Why is it just habit of having crappy jobs in these sectors in the US? Like, what is it with US employers and the resistance to the sort of obvious solution of just making the jobs better?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think there is some habit there. And to be honest, we don't have a lot of really strong policy levers. We have carrots and carrots and carrots and we're trying to use those. And I think this administration is really committed to helping companies to provide better jobs. I mean, certainly at the Department of Energy, we bake job quality into our funding guidelines because we know that these companies are really only going to be successful if they are able to attract and retain the skilled workers that they need. And so we want them thinking about that up front.</p><p>And we're not the only agency doing that. But I think there is habit. There's decades of anti-union sentiment. Some startups say to me, I don't know why, but I've been made to believe that I should never talk to unions or that I should fear that at all costs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's just ambient now among that class, I think.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>I think for a long time in the clean energy realm, we've thought about the lowest cost as the solution to the climate crisis. And that lowest cost sometimes usually comes on the backs of workers and lower wages. And there's been even a concern among climate advocates that better jobs are going to slow down adoption or slow down deployment. And so I think that it's pretty entrenched and not just among employers. And I think this administration and certainly the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act puts that theory to the test because the Inflation Reduction Act passed in part because of the labor standards, the prevailing wage requirements, and apprentice utilization standards that are tied to so many of the infrastructure investments.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I would be remiss if I didn't also insert here that states pioneered those kinds of policies, including my own home state of Washington were really early in doing that, in tying the sort of level of tax credits to the level of worker agreements and things like that.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Right. I mean, it makes sense, right, because when people see a future for themselves in a low carbon economy, it's much harder to remain resistant to that transition. But for decades we didn't design our policies that way except at the state level where some states were innovative.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Even that it's pretty recent at the state level. Yeah. So the traditional ding you hear when you talk about workforce issues, one of the things you often hear is we're asking the country, the workforce, to move away from jobs that are really well paying and unionized to jobs that pay less, basically to worse jobs. The idea is that solar and wind and retrofit jobs and solar installation jobs are just worse than the jobs that are being moved away from. And this is one of the things that creates immense resistance among unions because, you know, not unreasonably, they want to keep the good jobs and are not induced by the promise of less good jobs waiting over the horizon. So do you feel like that's changing or will change?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>It does have to change. Again, employers that are paying well with some career stability for workers do not have the same challenges with recruitment. And we have data that shows there's a lot that shows that that's the case. And it's also true that solar jobs don't pay as well as fossil jobs, but they also don't pay as well as just general construction jobs. So this effort to drive down costs of renewable energy has been really important for increasing adoption, but it has not been helpful for fulfilling the workforce needs of that industry or building a nimble workforce that can transition from one technology to the next, which is really what we're going to need.</p><p>We don't need a massive workforce of solar installers or wind technicians or EV charging infrastructure maintenance workers, we need people who are able to perform tasks associated with those technologies, but not only that, who can also pivot when the incentives for solar decline and something else picks up that they can pivot to another job. So I think the narrow focus on clean energy workers as if they can only do one thing has been detrimental to building the broader workforce that can do more of these things and also making clean energy jobs compelling. Because right now, if they're lower paying and less stable and you have to travel all over for work, that's just not very attractive for very long for workers. And so it has to change and it will change.</p><p>But the other thing that is changing is that clean energy, while we might think of solar panels and wind turbines as these iconic symbols of clean energy, now clean energy means so much more than that. It means battery factories for electric vehicles and EV charging infrastructure all across the US. And geothermal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Geothermal!</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Yeah. I love Geothermal. I love Geothermal because it's such a direct —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everybody loves geothermal.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Do they? That's news.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, everybody in my tiny world.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Well, we should be friends. The workers who maintain the fossil infrastructure, those skills are directly transferable to geothermal and so it's a really great opportunity for transitioning workers, whereas the workers from a natural gas power plant, that is a pretty different workforce from building a solar farm.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hydrogen hub.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>So there's some technologies a lot we're investing in now. Yeah, hydrogen hubs are another example where you have much closer alignment between skills from the fossil industry and the clean energy. And not just the skills, but some of the employers are the same. Some of the fossil fuel companies are the ones who have the resources to invest in some of this new clean energy. So that could also help.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So over time, as these labor markets are tight and employers are competing for workers, there's going to inevitably be a movement to make the jobs better, if only just to attract the workers. In some sense, that's just like the normal operation of market capitalism at work. So my question to you is to what extent can public policy speed that up? To what extent do you have levers that can induce employers to improve their jobs, that can create maybe like, programs to onboard people into these areas? How big of a lever is public policy relative to what are huge macroeconomic trends?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Yeah, so we have our funding, but I wouldn't say that's the strongest lever that we have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The carrot?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Yeah, we have the carrot. We have the 62 for DEO, the $62 billion for energy infrastructure through the bipartisan infrastructure law, then another $30 some billion through the Inflation Reduction Act. And there's the tax credits that are tied to, again, prevailing wage and apprenticeship standards. So we have our funding levers. And those are significant, I think especially the Inflation Reduction Act lever is significant. It will kind of move the needle for construction job quality, I think. But we have these other levers, too.</p><p>Or maybe lever isn't the right word, but the federal government has real great convening power. And so one of the things we're doing to address manufacturing, and battery manufacturing in particular, is to bring together employers and unions and other experts in the field to identify what are the skills required to manufacture battery cells? And then we'll look up and down that supply chain and can we get to some industry consensus? And the argument that we make to employers is this there's no coherent system of workforce development for advanced manufacturing in this country. And so what that means is that every employer is responsible for training their own workers and there's nothing really to keep their trained workers working for them as opposed to going to work for a competitor.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. You invest in the worker and then the worker goes somewhere else. And that's inducement not to do it in the first place.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Right? So there's this free rider problem. We can move away from that because workforce doesn't need you're competing on so many different areas. Workforce development, workforce doesn't need to be a point of competition. We're trying to rapidly grow this industry and facilitate the ability of American companies to compete with Asian companies in this space. So let's take workforce development out of the competitive arena for manufacturing and figure out what are the skills that everybody needs. So there's always going to be 15% or something that's proprietary, but what's the 85% that's not? And then how do we standardize that, communicate it to community colleges or support the development of new apprenticeship programs that will really support the rapid growth of that industry. And so that kind of thing where you're building industry consensus and trying to do that in a really rapid way to get these training guidelines to support the development of a whole new industry that's I think a really powerful tool that we have and that we're using.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It seems like other countries, specifically European democracies, I guess specifically, I'm thinking of Germany. But I'm presumably not only Germany are sort of better at this than us. There's more sort of like bringing industries together and doing this sort of common work and setting up institutions for training people that go into these. Are there models from other countries that you think are really promising in terms of trying to not just shift a workforce so that it's ready for a booming industry, but to do so purposefully and quickly? Are there other models in other countries?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>There are models, but I would say I more look at the success of other countries. So Germany has a really robust apprenticeship system. They have seven times the number of apprentices per capita as the US has. And it's a really valid training pathway in the eyes of parents and students and workers. And I think we need to build up our apprenticeship system to get there. But the challenge of looking at other countries is that the context is so different. Other countries, I was talking to a roundtable of embassy people recently and I was talking about our approach with the Inflation Reduction Act and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and they were just floored that all we have is incentives.</p><p>They were like, can't you just require this? Like what?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You just got to explain budget reconciliation to them. It all makes total sense.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Right. I mean, the context is just so incredibly different that our solutions really do have to be American made. But there are examples in the US that work really well. So I will refer again to the construction industry and the system of registered apprenticeship. Let me just tell you for a second why this is such an incredible system of workforce development. One, it's privately funded.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is here in the US you're talking about?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Here in the US union apprenticeship training for construction occupations. It is privately funded by both the employer and workers. Workers take money out of their paycheck to fund the next generation of training. And so the people enrolled in apprenticeship, they work out in the field, learning on the job while also taking classroom training. And they're paid from the get go, they're paid from day one and their pay increases as they acquire skills and training. And so they have this articulated trajectory of pay until they graduate three to five years later with their journey card.</p><p>That is a transferable industry recognized credential that they can take anywhere in the country and get work. And so again, it's privately funded. Employers are putting in money and workers are putting in money. And that ensures that the system is accountable to the employers in terms of the skills that it's providing people and accountable to the workers in terms of realizing that they're going to get more money as they advance in their career development. And so that system works really well and it's collaborative. A bunch of employers contribute to that same system of training and then they can draw workers out of that system of training when they need them on the job.</p><p>How do we translate that to new industries? How do we expand that model for manufacturing?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Was that born of some kind of public policy nudge, or is that just something the industry developed itself over time?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Oh, my gosh, that's a stumper. I don't actually know. But it has been around for a very, very long time and it serves everybody well. It's sort of one of these things. If it was developed today, it would be like the greatest social innovation. It would be all over the headlines. It's this incredible system. The unions put $2 billion a year into apprenticeship training.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, wow.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>That's the contribution of workers and then there's an equal contribution from employers. It's not dependent on public policy. It's not dependent on the whims of philanthropy. It's not dependent on anybody. It's built into the system to make sure that the construction industry will be able to retain and grow a skilled workforce continuously.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But on the other hand, the Bureau of Labor Statistics also says that the construction industry is short 413,000 workers.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>I like your stats, and BLS is a reliable source. But the thing is, the construction industry is not very heavily unionized. So on the one hand, we see ten people seeking apprenticeship openings as there are positions for. Ten people for one position. Why can't apprenticeship programs just accept more people? If they have ten people who want in, why don't they just bring ten people in?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>It's constrained by their ability to put people to work. So if they don't have a project labor agreement to build the thing, then they can't guarantee a job for that person they're bringing into apprenticeship. As they get more agreements and as more construction activity gets built union, then that system of training can expand rapidly. And we've seen that in the past. It's very, very nimble. It can scale, but it is driven by demand. And not just demand for construction workers, but demand for union construction workers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It sounds like the slow pace or the anemic state of unionization in the US is a big part of what is creating this backlog or this appearance of backlog or this sort of choke point. Would you like to see and maybe you aren't allowed to say, but would you like to see other kinds of policy? I mean, are there other things that Congress could do to accelerate unionization or to support unions that you think would have the sort of side effect of accelerating the clean energy workforce?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Sure, Congress can do whatever they agree to.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or can't, as the case may be.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>But there was an early proposal, I think, to tie the electric vehicle tax credits to union made, or at least have some higher level tax credits and bonus credit if the vehicle was made in the US and made union that got stripped out, that would have helped. Right now we have Davis Bacon is the law that applies to federally funded construction work. So for construction, if you're using federal dollars, there are certain labor standards and wage standards and reporting standards that you have to meet.</p><p>And then in the Inflation Reduction Act there's wage standards and apprentice utilization standards. But beyond construction there's nothing statutory to nudge more work or to make it easier to unionize. Ultimately, unionization is the choice of the workers. But there are a number of barriers, ever increasing barriers, to support unionization. So it has actually been the National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935 and that act says quite clearly: It is the policy of the federal government to support worker organizing and collective bargaining because the quality of bargaining power is important to the free and fair conduct of commerce.</p><p>Or some 1935 language that I'm not paraphrasing very well, but it says explicitly it is the policy of the US government to support worker organizing and collective bargaining and yet lawsuit after lawsuit and decision after decision have kind of cut away at that right of workers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I wonder to sort of loop this back in. So there's this story in The Washington Post about how during the pandemic and post-pandemic, basically inflation kind of brought down the purchasing power of upper income people and labor market tightness raised the wages of lower income people. And as a consequence, the inequality gap in the US shrank by a crazy amount in a crazy short period of time, which you might think, woo! But in Rides, Powell and the Fed who say explicitly the rise in worker wages is a problem, we have to solve this problem by raising interest rates.</p><p>So it seems like we have a macroeconomic institutional setup that is intrinsically hostile to raising the wages of blue collar workers. Even as with the other hand of the federal government, we're desperately trying to improve those jobs. What do you make of that? Is that resolvable?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>I mean, I can see how one would draw that conclusion. I don't know. I think there's a lot of barriers to trying to improve job quality, particularly for workers without a four-year degree. And all I'll say is that I don't think we can achieve our ambitious clean energy goals without doing that and that employers will, whether they do it because we're now asking them to or they do it because they eventually realize that they have to. The labor market is competitive. The balance of power has shifted more to workers after the pandemic or during the pandemic, and I think workers are asking for more from their employers.</p><p>If you're an employer and you want to find and be able to retain a skilled workforce, you're going to have to make some investments in that workforce. And think about workers really as something that you're investing in and not this disposable commodity, because that's not a recipe for success, to be just churning through workers that employers aren't willing to invest in the skill, development, and advancement. I mean, you think about things like batteries or advanced manufacturing. This requires a really high level of skill. And right now, the way that that work is structured is to bring in low-wage workers to do very rote work and bring in foreign workers to do the skilled work.</p><p>And there's no transfer, there's no knowledge transfer happening. That's not going to work. Once we have 100 battery cell factories across the country, we're going to need to invest in our own workforce if we're going to be successful here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also, I think, worth noting here is we can remember back to sort of globalization draining away these high-paying jobs and the federal government responding. I remember Bill Clinton sort of responding with this sort of hand-waving about worker retraining. This was kind of a mantra like, oh, retraining, retraining. We're going to help our workers adapt. And to my understanding, those federal worker training and retraining programs just have an abysmal record. And so, consequently, jobs were degraded, people got kicked out of jobs, and there was an immense and still ongoing political backlash. So you would hate to see like a decade of transition to clean energy followed by a backlash against the sort of low-wage labor it's involved.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>And sometimes, I mean, not just accounting for the track record of those programs in terms of job placement, but sometimes massive training programs can actually have the opposite effect, where even during the ARRA period, we invested tons of money in solar training and other clean energy workforce training. And what happened then is that we sort of flooded the labor market with basically qualified people who couldn't find work. And so that drove wages down, right? That people were competing with each other and trying to get a job. That drove wages down. That served the industry, or it served the employer part of the industry, but it maybe hurt the industry long term because now people think of clean energy jobs as unreliable or as volatile, and that might not have helped us long term.</p><p>And so this time around, Congress passed these policies with very little money in the way of workforce education and training. There's very little. There's a few programs for a few things, but most of it is money that we're investing in the infrastructure itself, in the implementation, the deployment, the demonstrations. And so employers need to think about how they're building workforce development into their implementation plans because there's not just this massive pool of public funding to go train a bunch of people and hope that they find their way to jobs. This time it's much more demand-driven in order to ensure that there's good calibration.</p><p>And even if Congress were to pass or put some money into workforce development, the timing of that is more likely to align with when real jobs are going to be created. Because right now, there's a lot of construction planning happening, engineering happening, but a lot of the construction is yet to materialize. And then the manufacturing jobs are even a little bit further away. First, you have to build the factory before you can staff the factory. So we do have a little bit of time to kind of reorient the labor market to meet the demand for these positions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But the overall message here is this is not going to be a thing where the federal government steps in and sort of spends a bunch of money taking charge of the workforce itself. You're basically convening private industry and trying to help them and train them and show them how to develop these programs themselves so that they become kind of self-sustaining?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think it's an all-hands-on-deck. I mean who knows what Congress will appropriate in the future? But right now we're not dealing with a lot of public money for workforce development and so we are looking at how do we engage strategically? There's a massive community college system out there, 8.5 million students. There's a massive apprenticeship program out there, there are states and there are workforce boards that are funded through the Department of Labor. How do we align all of this existing workforce infrastructure to meet some of the needs of the clean energy sector? That's where I'm thinking more.</p><p>I don't think we have as much power when we have a million dollars to spend and we go train 26 people but if we have a million dollars to convene and corral the massive community college system out there then we're getting somewhere. So it's just what resources do we have available? And that's just an example by the way, we're not spending a million dollars —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It seems like —</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>— to community colleges.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>community colleges for their own purposes have all the incentive in the world to try to get smart on this and to try to orient themselves toward the big burgeoning jobs of the future. I'm sure they're hungry for guidance or are they? It seems like they should want this.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Absolutely and it's hard. Guidance is hard to develop. Getting industry consensus for an emerging industry, that's challengin. And so yes, people want that because they want their curriculum to meet employer needs. They want the students that they train to be able to find work in their community. So yeah, people are hungry for the guidance and I think that's a really valuable thing that we can do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, my attempts to goad you into badmouthing the Fed having failed, let's move on into one other thing, which I didn't leave all that much time for. And it's really, really huge subject, but maybe we can just sort of say some broad things about it, which is the other side of the coin, which is fossil fuel jobs going away. If you count not only sort of direct fossil fuel jobs but all the kind of second-order peripheral jobs around fossil fuel jobs serving fossil fuel workers, et cetera, et cetera. There are a lot of those and there are communities that depend on those fossil fuel jobs almost completely.</p><p>And there's been a lot of hand-wringing about this, about what to do with all these workers that are going to basically be pushed out of jobs if we do the clean energy transition successfully. I hear a lot of talk about this and I hear a lot of happy talk about how we're going to retrain them to work in geothermal or whatever. But the scale involved, I have not yet seen anything that seems of the scale of the problem. So are these sort of like fossil fuel worker retraining programs, are they just like nice brochures? Is there any prospect of having a humane response to that problem at scale?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Well, there has to be the prospect of it, and I think that's the thinking around and talk around a just transition. We can't leave people behind. It's not the right thing to do, and it will slow us down in terms of building political will to do more of the kinds of things we need to address the climate crisis. So it's not just a moral imperative, it's just a pragmatic issue. It's not just jobs. It's the fossil fuel industry's hold on the economy, actually the tax revenue for communities that are dependent on those industries. There's a lot of issues beyond just the jobs that threaten or pose risks too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean it's their schools, it's public services. It's all sustained by fossil fuel money in some of these places.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>So our approach is really, like, looking at economic redevelopment and diversification. There is no one-for-one replacement for a fossil fuel facility in a community. Like, I live in a county that has five refineries.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh my God.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>They are at risk at some point due to transportation electrification. There's no single industry that can come in and replace that economic base or those jobs. So then the challenge is economic diversification. And how do you retain an industrial base for blue-collar workers? It's not all just transitioning to the creative class or something else. How do you retain an industrial base in these communities?</p><p>And I think that advanced nuclear carbon capture and storage, direct air capture, hydrogen, some of these technologies that we're investing in provide those opportunities because they aren't necessarily dependent on a resource. They can be anywhere. So why not locate in a place that can use existing assets, including the infrastructure but also the workforce? There's a whole interagency working group that is really looking at how to serve energy communities, how to connect them with resources, how to make sure we get this transition right and create new opportunities for workers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let me ask about that because you wouldn't expect jobs in those new industries that you're talking about to sort of spontaneously align with lost jobs, right? You wouldn't expect them to sort of spontaneously line up with the places that need to replace fossil fuel jobs. So aligning them has got to be active, right? It's got to be done by someone and a) sort of like whose job is that and how does it work? And b) sort of like do we have a track record of success? Everybody's talking about this return to industrial policy, which is fantastic.</p><p>But industrial policy involves a lot of really difficult questions that we have not necessarily done great on in the past. And one of them is like trying to match new jobs to the places that most need them. What are the kind of instruments you can use to push that alignment?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Well, one, I will say the track record of success is really with military base closures.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>And there's a whole process that they follow so that they're not just leaving a community high and dry. And so again, there's domestic examples that we can think of. Aside from fossil fuels there's this massive transition underway in the automotive industry where the places where we're seeing new investments in battery factories are not necessarily the places that were supplying the parts and innards for internal combustion engine vehicles. And so in some of our grants and Congress gave us language to do this, we can create extra incentives for projects that are locating in communities that have or had an automotive facility. Or repurposing, I think there's funding for repurposing automotive factory supply chain factories, for battery factories.</p><p>So there's some levers in order to kind of put the thumb on the scale of locational decisions and then some of it is getting the word out around what are the assets of these energy communities and getting that in front of investors and people who are looking at where they can set up shop. And that's what the Interagency Working Group is really doing, like trying to draw investments to these communities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. What I come back to again and again is the scale of these macroeconomic trends relative to these policy interventions you're talking about is the thumb on the scale. I have no doubt that in a few years there will be a few success stories you can talk about like oh look, this factory closed and this one opened. But does that seem adequate to the scale of the problem? Does anything seem adequate to the scale of the problem? Is there more you would like to see or more you think the government could do?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that's a good question. I mean, I guess I approach this with a bit of curiosity. I mean, for years again working on climate change, I sort of knew that we weren't doing enough to combat the crisis and yet I kept working on it. And then we got like a pretty significant bill adopted to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a lot if we're able to get through some of these hurdles that you're going to cover in your podcast series. And so I think right now, me and I think others are trying new and creative things, partnerships, bully pulpit, levers with the funding that we have and with the authorities that Congress has given us.</p><p>And we're studying what works, and we're trying again and we're looking at what it's iterative. I feel incredibly optimistic. It might be because I don't have time to read the news or the headlines, which are always all so negative, but I see the kinds of things that we're putting into place for the long haul, and I sort of like I kind of can't imagine how it won't work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let me raise one possible way that it won't work, as my special talent is imagining problems. And this is probably not something you're going to want to answer since it's political, but one of the —</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>There is a big reason why it won't work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. It's called the Republican Party. But let me flesh that out. One of the big trends we're seeing and there's been a bunch of headlines about this since the passage of IRA. IRA has spawned already billions and billions and billions of dollars of investments in factories, et cetera, et cetera. And most of them, the bulk of those investments are in red states. Most of the new investment is going to red states. And red states sort of notoriously have this kind of low unionization, low wage, you're on your own.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Yeah, they're all right to work states.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right to work states, et cetera, et cetera. So in a sense, the Biden administration's quest to make these high paying unionized jobs is, it seems to me, going to run into red state's long-time habit and ideological commitment to worker precarity, lack of unions, low wages, high churn. There's this article in the Washington Post the other day about, "Oh, why are red states hiring more?" And then they looked more closely at it, and then "Oh, they're just hiring and firing more" because there's more churn, because these are crappy jobs —</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>People are quitting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>move through them more quickly.</p><p>So do you worry about that? Do you have any way to circumvent that? Do you see any prospect that Republican policymakers might change their tune on those issues to attract those kind of jobs? What are your thoughts on that?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, you're right that it probably is too political to weigh on some of the specifics, but I do think that the Inflation Reduction Act is designed in such a way that I think Americans who haven't seen why they should care about climate change, their livelihoods, are now going to be tied to somebody caring about climate change. And how does that not sort of shift the way that people think? Not that people always vote in their self-interest, but —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, Florida is sinking under the water and they're still — self-interest.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>But again, your livelihood is tied to a battery factory and the electric vehicle transition, it has to change a bit how people think and how lawmakers think, I don't know. I mean, the other thing is red states. Companies are locating in, quote, red states for a lot of reasons. But I don't think it's primarily because they're right-to-work states or because they're cheap labor states. It's usually because the permitting is quick, they can break ground quick, and they can get going quickly. And maybe there's some tax credits thrown in as a cherry on top.</p><p>And so there's a lot of factors that go into locational decisions. But I think, like, if you take Tennessee, for example, tons and tons of investment, well, that's going to make the labor market tighter, more competitive, and that will ultimately give workers more power. And so how do we change this dynamic? Some of it is going to be — the drive to organize your workplace going to grow right now that's seen a resurgence. Is that going to continue? Are workers going to feel empowered to ask for more? And how is that going to be a differentiator between companies in a state or between states?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What a fascinating dynamic. That will be fascinating and terrifying to watch. Well, I've kept you for too long. Let me finish with a sort of general question about your broad feelings about this area. So my analogy is sort of there's a lot of worry these days about the material specifically like minerals and metals requirements of clean energy. And there are a lot of sort of specific issues and specific problems and the solutions are not necessarily obvious or ready to hand. But generally my feeling is like, that's going to work itself out. Like of all the things that capitalism is good at, substituting materials and finding materials, is really good at that.</p><p>So I can't necessarily give you chapter and verse why, but sort of my strong feeling is like in 10-20 years we'll look back and be like "Oh, that just sorted itself out." Is that how you feel about the workforce issues or does your worry run deeper? Do you worry that this could be an actual bottleneck, an actual slow work to slow the transition? What's your sort of general level of optimism about this stuff?</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>For the clean energy transition, I'm not at all concerned because I think there's the capacity of these jobs and industries to compete really effectively for workers in the broader economy and labor market. Where I'm concerned is like, am I going to still be able to get cheap takeout? Or like workers will come from somewhere and are they going to come from the service sector where we've gotten really comfortable with very low-cost services.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>So that's more likely, I would guess, to be where things are going to change. But I would also say this, this is an incredible opportunity to get more workers who face systemic barriers to employment off the sidelines and into the labor market. There's workers with a history of incarceration that have a very hard time finding work. Can these jobs be more accessible to them? Or to veterans? Or to youth who've been funneled into these four-year degrees, taking on enormous debt, not being able to find jobs? Is this more opportunities for workers like that? Or for women who have sat out since the pandemic because they can't find good childcare?</p><p>This is actually an opportunity to tap more of the full talent of the American workforce that hasn't been able to access it because of one barrier or another. And if we think more broadly around the workers that are available, if we do a little bit of work to help reduce some of those systemic barriers that are keeping people out, I think then I really don't worry. But I don't worry anyway.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we have the people.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>I think so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is super interesting. I'm going to maybe slightly downgrade my worry about this particular horseman and compensate by worrying more about one of the other ones.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Worry about permitting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I worry about that plenty. Okay, Betony Jones. Thank you so much for coming on and talking with us. It was great.</p><p><strong>Betony Jones</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/will-the-us-have-the-workforce-it</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:124978863</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Jun 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/124978863/5ce0c2d207dbfd5f0cf9a5d52c59b3eb.mp3" length="68685550" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3433</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/124978863/492fef9e6a90c1ea1b652634f6041c9b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Everyone agrees Democrats suck at messaging. How can they do it better?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Jenifer Fernandez Ancona of Way to Win discusses the ins and outs of Democrats’ notoriously ineffective political messaging, and what needs to be done about it.</em> </p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AABOiykvusYUDJIEKSrmHLwXa/volts23.06.14%28jenifer.fernandez.ancona%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/everyone-agrees-democrats-suck-at-messaging-how-can-they-do-it-better"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If there is one thing upon which almost everyone in US politics agrees, it is that Democrats suck at messaging. They constantly find themselves on the back foot, struggling to respond on culture war issues that make them uncomfortable. Biden's approval rating remains abysmally low and the enormous accomplishments he and congressional Democrats have secured despite the barest of majorities remain almost entirely unknown to most of the public.</p><p>But why? What exactly is the problem with Democratic messaging? That is where the agreement breaks down.</p><p>Is it too liberal or not liberal enough? Has a young vanguard distorted the party's perspective and alienated it from swing voters or is an old guard holding back a diverse new coalition? Is Democratic messaging using the wrong words and phrases, or is the problem that it simply doesn't control enough media to ensure its messages are heard?</p><p>To dig into some of these questions, I wanted to talk to Jenifer Fernandez Ancona, the co-founder, vice president, and chief strategy officer for <a target="_blank" href="https://www.waytowin.us/">Way to Win</a>, a Democratic research, analysis, organizing, and fundraising group that came together in the wake of the 2016 election to make sure its mistakes were not repeated.</p><p>Way to Win just released its final report on the 2022 midterm elections, digging into who exactly bought advertisements, where they ran, and what they said, as well as how they performed with various demographics. I’m excited to talk to Ancona about what Democrats are saying, what they’re not saying, who’s hearing it, and how they can do better.</p><p>So with no further ado, Jenifer Fernandez Ancona, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm excited to do this because like anyone who's followed U.S. politics for many years, I have beefs about Democratic messaging and theories about it and all sorts of stuff to say about it. And I found over the years that everybody has a lot to say about Democratic messaging and everyone feels that they're an expert on it. But what I've come to see over time is most people, probably including me, are full of it and are just going off instincts and hunches and projecting their priors overinterpreting their own particular epistemological bubbles on and on and on.</p><p>So I'm extremely glad to have, I think, probably the closest thing the world has to an expert on this subject, on the pod to discuss it by way of bolstering that claim. Before we get into the details, let's just talk about Way to Win. Like, why did it come together and what has it been doing since the 2016 election?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Well, we came together essentially in the wake of that election when we felt like the same strategies that led to that complete failure. And honestly, a lot of the losses that we had seen over the course of the last four years across the country at the state level and local level, that we needed new strategies to change, that we weren't going to get out of this crisis using the same strategies that got us into the crisis. And that is what we were hearing as we were in Democratic big, major donor funding circles at that time, a real inability to recognize that major shifts were needed and an unwillingness to even confront what had led to Trump's rise and ultimate power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And one wonders what could shake people out of that kind of complacency if not that.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Exactly. Yeah. So a bunch of us came together, and it was those of us who had been working in the field of trying to bring more resources to movement building, progressive movement building, multiracial coalition building. Especially. We had Tory Gavito, who was one of our co-founders, who's now the CEO of Way to Win. She came from Texas. She's in Texas and was part of trying to, over time, flip Texas blue and had learned some really important lessons in the past few years. And we just felt like we needed to nationalize this idea of taking the fight to different places.</p><p>So we got so stuck in a battleground state world, which was really focused in the Midwest, and yet so much of the population growth is actually happening in the South and Southwest. And we saw the importance of states like Georgia and Arizona coming into power, but not enough resources actually going there. So that was one of the things, is, like, we need to re-imagine the map and actually expand the places where we could go to build power and to take power from Republicans. So we were some of the first coming on the scene to say we need to put major resources into Georgia, just as Stacey Abrams initial campaign was going, but it wasn't on the map of most national political organizations.</p><p>They still weren't talking about Georgia or even Arizona. So we were part of that. And we were saying we have to push into places like Texas as well as North Carolina, Florida, places across the South and Southwest that are growing and changing. So that was one thing. The second thing was funding politics in a way that actually leaves something behind. So when you only fund candidate campaigns, as you know, there's nothing left at the end of the day, the candidate wins or loses. There's no infrastructure to keep going, so you have to start over. So we wanted to create a way for donors to fund electoral victories in the short term, but that would also build toward the long term.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think they call that losing well.</p><p>Yeah, exactly. And knowing that if we're going to build in a place like Texas, we're going to lose statewide a few times, but we're winning in local areas, we're flipping counties, we're flipping congressional districts, we're showing how you can build over time. But then funding organizers, leaders, and groups that are going to be there the day after the election to continue to keep fighting. So that was two. And then the third thing was having essentially a three-part strategy, but a comprehensive strategy that would ensure not only we have, like I was saying, base expansion, community builder, power builders working in cities in states and actually growing and building a base over time also that the purpose of winning power is to pass policy.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>It's not just about electing a democrat. We want to make sure that we're arming the communities in that place with the tools and the ability to actually push for policy, whether it's democracy, climate education, et cetera. And then the third part, which I know you're interested in, given your intro, is that we have narratives that shape the multiracial diverse coalition that we have. We need to be going toward inclusion. So we want to make sure that we're winning, but not in a way that is more divisive or causing different groups to fall out of our coalition.</p><p>We need to continue to grow and forge this multiracial coalition that we have, our winning coalition. And we do that with a narrative strategy that is all about building across those differences.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So it is this latter part I want to focus on this sort of research you've done, on what messages Dems are using and how they're hitting. But before I get into that, I want to address my main hobby horse in this area, which I come back to again and again, which is I come up in the climate area. So I'm most familiar with the sort of agonizing, over climate messaging that has been going on and on and on and on as long as I've been following this area, and mostly has manifested in endless research and resources put into these kind of focus groups where you get a group of college students in a room and you read them various paragraphs and then you see which ones they react well to, and then you wildly over interpret that as some sort of messaging strategy. In other words, this sort of obsessive focus on what words are we using, what are the words and phrases, is it national security, is it home and hearth? Like what's the right themes? And I have come to think over the years that this a little bit misses the forest for the trees in that the reason the right wing seems to dominate this kind of messaging sphere and that they're always on the attack and the left is always on the defense is not their cleverness, they're not particularly smart.</p><p>A lot of their messages are quite stupid. They just are repeated over and over and over and over and over and over and over again in your face, everywhere you look. So in other words, it's not the cleverness of the message, it's ownership of the means of distributing messages. And that's Fox News, that's OAN, that's all the local newspapers they're buying up. All the local news stations they're buying up. Basically, right wingers are running Facebook now. Basically right wingers running Twitter now. I mean, they're just on a march through media, dominating media. And if you spend the money and exercise the power to dominate media, you can get your messages in the heads of the public, even if the messages are super dumb.</p><p>So I guess what I want to ask you is, is this a fair dichotomy, this dichotomy between the sort of messaging focus versus capacity to get the messages out? Do you think that's a fair dichotomy? And how do you sort of view the balance between those, or, like, how should resources be divided up between those?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a great question. The way I see it is not that it's not a dichotomy, because it really, I think, has to be both. And how I would think about dividing it is a good question, but I would say how we think about it is we absolutely need to be building different modes of ownership of media. Like, it should be a huge part of our strategy. We haven't focused on it enough. The right is certainly beating us, so I'd say we're behind there. I think we have to put significant resources there, but it really can't be the only thing, partially because that takes time to grow and build and we have low hanging fruit on the table.</p><p>Now, that I think that's what I've really been focused on is how do we actually build a process that can understand where voters are through research, then make content that tries to reach them in an emotional way, and we can test that content. There's lots of tools that can help us see what does this actually move people the way we want to move them. So there's a lot we can do. Now, I think that's not about necessarily being clever or finding the right words. It's like, can you deeply listen to the community you're trying to move?</p><p>Can you hear from them? Where are they actually? And not just trying to test in a poll with some words and see if they like what they hear. It's more like understanding how they think. It's like deeply listening is what we call it. And we use a lot of research tools that actually are much deeper than you would get from a focus group or for sure a poll. We use a lot of online panels where people actually you can kind of get underneath how they think. So that's what we're sort of about, like, how do we actually figure out what's underneath what people really, truly want, and then how we can speak to it in a message and then test that to see does it work or not?</p><p>So for me, it's not about necessarily finding the right words, but it is about finding the right kind of frames and the right overarching argument that we're trying to make. And then it absolutely is about repetition, repetition, repetition. So I think we can do it at the same time we can get better and smarter about how we actually do our message work. A lot of Way to Win and a lot of our partners that we work with do. But it's not the norm of the Democratic establishment or major campaigns right now that's what we're trying to do is influence and push in that arena, because I think there's just low hanging fruit that we could actually reach do better.</p><p>And I think that the midterms is a good example of where we actually did that. And so that just gives me hope. And we can talk about that if you like, but that experience just gives me hope that there is a way for us to get more aligned overall across the ecosystem, whether it's candidates, the president, groups on the ground, activists, et cetera. If we're all kind of rowing in the same direction on our message, it doesn't have to be all exactly the same words, but we're kind of saying the same thing in a big picture argument way that can actually break through.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Herding cats. Famously difficult to do on the left.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>It is. But like I said, we did it in the midterms. I mean, we should talk about it as an example of what we did, because it was really interesting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's get into that. I want to come back to the capacity question later, but let's get into that because I think the thrust of your report was that the midterms were a success story in terms of Democratic messaging, which you don't hear. Success story and Democratic messaging don't go together a lot.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Success and warning signs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to ask a semi specific question. So going into the Midterms, I think there was a piece of conventional wisdom among Democratic elites which went something like this the sort of positions of power in the Democratic coalition, the staffers, the people who are actually out there doing the work. That class has been kind of taken over by a young, very diverse, highly educated, highly liberal set of young Democrats who just talk to one another and convince one another that everybody's as liberal as they are. And they've sort of taken over the messaging, they've taken over the party's posture.</p><p>And what they don't realize is that whatever Joe average voter, Joe average mid-state voter, those concerns and things that they value don't resonate with him. So there's one story that goes the Democratic establishment has been taken over by lefties and they're alienating everyone else. And I sort of want to know a couple of things. Like a was there a lot of lefty messaging in the Democratic advertising going into the midterms? Like, were people actually out there saying defund the police and make immigration legal and all these kind of things. A was that the face the Democrats were showing the public?</p><p>And B is that the way the public actually does view the Democrats as sort of captured by their left flank, too far left? In other words, sort of like is the kind of rising left flank a vulnerability for Dems in terms of kind of messaging and posture?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>I really don't think so. I mean, my position is a couple of things. I think that those of us on the left and myself included, I consider myself progressive. Way to Win certainly has been funding a lot of progressive groups over time. So we're situated in that. We're progressives. We consider ourselves part of the left and the folks that we talk to in our coalitions really don't see things that way. I think we're very clear who our coalition is. Right? And it's ideologically diverse and it's racially diverse and it's diverse in terms of age too. And a lot of those things overlap, of course, but it's fundamentally a different task than the Republicans have.</p><p>When you're looking at we have 42%, 43% of our overall people who voted for Biden are not white. And then on the Republican side, it's 92% white. Right. So they're essentially trying to consolidate one group while fracturing off as much as they can from the other. We actually have to hold a really big coalition together, white voters and all kinds of different voters of color. So it's just a fundamentally different thing. And there's a lot of ideological diversity in that. So I think we understand that that right now it's an anti-MAGA coalition, really. It's like against this kind of MAGA Republican.</p><p>And that was partially the success of the midterms was making that clear. So I will say, number one, I think we're very clear what our job is. And we don't see the idea of a median voter. We see it in this diverse coalition way and needing to hold it together. Meaning you don't want to have messaging targeted to one part of the coalition that completely turns off and demobilizes the other. Right. You have to actually figure out how to get both to be persuaded and mobilized to vote for Democrats.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, you have both factions basically accusing the other faction of using messages like that. Like your messaging excludes me. No, your messaging excludes me. Is there some magic message that doesn't exclude either of them?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Yes. I think we found it in the midterms when we talked about we need to protect our freedoms. We have these MAGA, extreme Republicans who are trying to take our freedoms away and it's our job to actually come together. We did it before, we rejected Trump, we can do it again. That actual overall message really worked for both sides. But back to your original question absolutely ridiculous. Because when we looked at the midterm, like you said, it's called TV Congress's report that we did, which looked at the paid broadcast advertising, which unfortunately is still a huge amount of money, it was like about around $600 million that we studied on both the Senate and just the Senate and the House on both sides.</p><p>And so when you look at that spending, even on the Democratic side, just looking at Senate, it's $296 million. And looking at those ads, who's controlling that? It is not young, quote unquote, woke lefty liberals, okay? It is old school. A lot of consultants who've been around for a really long time, media firms, they are the ones who are driving this message. It is also not liberal. I mean, what's so fascinating to me about this debate within our party is it's like it misses the actual bad guy, which shocker, is the Republicans, okay? It's the Republicans who are lifting up defund the police, who are lifting up bad immigration narratives, who are talking a lot about crime and all of these racially coded things and attacks.</p><p>It's the Republicans who are painting us that way. So if there's a perception among our voters, which frankly there is, unfortunately, we still see it even today, there's a perception that Democrats are too liberal or Democrats don't care about you. It's not because of what Democrats are actually doing. It's because of how lockstep Republicans are in their messaging. I mean, it's absolutely mind boggling when you just see the amount of money that they spent trashing Biden, Biden, and Pelosi in their midterm advertising. It was over $200 million just attacking Biden.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Even though Biden was notably not up for election.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Yeah, because they care about brand. They are trying to trash our brand, and they did it pretty effectively. And I think that plays into Biden's approval ratings being so low.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But what would you say, though, they do use defund the police. I think it's fair to say that people on the right probably said the phrase "Defund the police" ten times more often than any liberal ever said it anywhere. Yes, but a few liberals did say it. You know what I mean? So they did get that ammunition from liberals. And so the argument ends up coming down to sort of like, on the one side, people saying liberals should stop saying stuff that's so obviously out of step with the mainstream, and then other side saying, well, you can't prevent all liberals everywhere.</p><p>You just don't have that. Kind of like if a single liberal somewhere saying something goofy results in like a ten week Fox News campaign about it, there's only so much you could do. You can't control every liberal everywhere. So how do you think about that?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Well, it's a different job. It's the job of movements to push the boundaries on what's possible. It's the job of movements to fight for their own lives, to fight for the things that they need and want. That's a fundamentally different job than winning elections. So those of us who are focused on winning elections. We actually have to just work with it. And that is what I think is our philosophy is like I was saying, we have a diverse coalition. We have to move them. So how can we actually figure out what they need and want? How can we talk to them in a way that they can hear?</p><p>Because we can actually make the case on things like community safety, for example, which is where that defund piece comes from. Ultimately, when you actually talk to voters, they don't like that kids are being shot by cops unarmed. They don't like it. It's not popular. Like voters actually don't like that. In our own coalition that we're trying to move, they care about it. They care about violence. They want something to be done. And what the problem is I think that we've really been saying in which we said in our report, is like, we actually need to embrace it a little bit more.</p><p>We need to figure out how to make comprehensive arguments on all of these things, whether it's crime or immigration or gender and LGBT issues, because what we've too often done is just ignore it. Like, think it's going to go away, dismiss it, try to focus on something else. Oh, it's just got to be about kitchen table issues. We can't actually address those things. We're not actually going to talk about crime, even though that's what the other guys are talking about. That's probably one of the biggest mistakes that I haven't seen us solve yet, and that is the focus of 24.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the other big themes in messaging debates these days is you have, I think, I guess they're called popularists. I don't know if any of them still want that label or if that label means anything, but there's a group of people that say basically like Dems have a core set of issues on which they are extremely popular and they tend to be "kitchen table" issues. We're going to protect Social Security, we're going to give you better health care. We're going to put you to work. Economics and health, basically kitchen table issues. And by this way of looking at things, anytime Dems sort of focus campaigns on other stuff, typically culture warish issues, they suffer.</p><p>And so what Dems should do is stick to their strengths, stick to talking about issues where they know they are popular. And insofar as they get drawn into these other debates, they're going to lose. I have so many questions about this narrative, including like, what the hell counts as a kitchen table issue? If I'm a young woman, abortion is an extremely economic issue for me. It's something about which I worry at the kitchen table, as a matter of fact.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Exactly, yeah. What kids are reading in school and how their teachers are treating them and what books they're banning are also kitchen table issues these days.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, but the conventional wisdom is sort of like these core economic and health issues or where Democrats should stick.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Right, it's wrong.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A) you think that's wrong but first I'd like to hear sort of like did Dems do that in the midterms? Did they stick to those issues or what did they do instead and why is it wrong?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Right? This is what I would say. It's another false dichotomy, honestly, to say it's got to be kitchen table versus culture, because it's all swimming together right now and we're not going to be able to have a conversation about one thing when the other side, which you noted has a very large set of megaphones and channels, is going to talk about the other thing. You can't ignore it. Politics isn't solitaire like our friend Anat Shenker-Osorio likes to say. So you have to know what the other side is saying and you can't expect to have a totally different conversation.</p><p>What we looked at in the lead up to the midterms, because we knew this was going to happen, was figuring out how to actually tell a story that does merge these two ideas together in terms of an economic, focused narrative and that also addresses the contrast of what the other side is trying to do. So it was a structure that involved sort of three parts. One is really just saying what you're for leaning into what we believe in this case, the things Biden has done created all these millions of jobs. Democrats came together and passed this amazing Inflation Reduction Act.</p><p>Like there were a lot of things we could point to of like this is what we tried to do, we actually did. We created millions of jobs with better pay and better benefits. These were think concrete things we did. Number two, you pointing out that the Republicans have completely gone off the deep end and this is what they're focused on. They're trying to ban your books, they attacked the Capitol with violence, all these things. You can actually point to the contrast and then at the end of the day just again remind people the third part that we are a diverse coalition and we came together before to say no to this kind of extremism and we can do it again.</p><p>And that three part strategy for the message actually really worked in our research to show that it moved folks over toward Democrats whether they were liberal or moderate or even somewhat conservative. And it also worked across black, white, Latino, Asian American voters as well because it's a unifying message that doesn't try to separate these two big topics, whether it's economic, kitchen table and kind of culture war and our freedoms that the Republicans are trying to take away. There really is a way to talk about them together.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean one thing that should be noted is that Republicans talk about them together, like, Republicans, when you hear them address economic and kitchen table issues, it's always through a culture like everything's culture war. Now it's all woke, right? Like, they don't neatly distinguish between those two areas.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>No, because they wrap their anti woke culture fear. We call it status threat. That's a term from academia. But status threat, it's like anything around race, gender, to try to make people feel threatened, to try to make people who are economically insecure in particular feel like there's someone else that they can blame for that. It's a way of deflecting blame for people rather than putting it where it should go, which is the actual Republican policy that has led to this kind of economy, which is for the elites, which is for rich people getting all the tax cuts, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p>But they literally wrap their anti woke status threat messages around a core message about money and taxes and how you're going to get more if you vote Republican. So you're right that they completely merge the two. So that's why I never understand why Democrats think we can't or we can somehow separate them and only talk about one and not the other.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I just think there's a fundamental and I think this runs deeper than argument. I just think there's a real and this is like, maybe it even dates back to, like, the 90s, when a lot of the Democratic establishment was sort of coming to political age. It's just the very deep sense that the general public doesn't share, like, that Democrats are that their positions on these culture war issues are sort of intrinsically unpopular and they're sort of quasi embarrassed by them. And so there's all this, like, let's just don't talk about that stuff. And that seems to me, as you say, a strategy that is not sustainable over the long term.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>It's super outdated. It's an outdated way of thinking. I don't think in the age of Trump, when we can see what our coalition is I mean, Trump ignited a huge group of people that were not that engaged in politics before. And we've seen in the data they're still engaged, actually. I mean, the young people who came out in 2022 were the very same young people who came out in 2018 and even grew from there. So there actually is a different playbook that needs to be applied because our task is different, our coalition is different. We're not in the 90s anymore.</p><p>It's a completely different world. And so you're absolutely right that that way of thinking is super outdated because abortion rights are popular, book bans are unpopular when you talk about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I can't believe they're banning books, and we can't make hay out of this.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Makes me bang my head against the wall.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>We should we shouldn't be able to. And like, gun violence prevention reform is popular. All of these things are actually popular with the people we're trying to move. So some of it just comes down to are we actually clear about who the audience is that we need to move. And it includes the swing voters who you may have always thought about, who are a little bit older, but it also includes what we call the surge voters, who are much younger, much more diverse, and there's a lot of them, there's a lot more of them, actually, than the more traditional swing voters.</p><p>So we got to figure out how to talk to them, but again, not at an expense of the other. So we did find that in the midterms, when we made an argument, look, the midterms were supposed to be a disaster. Everybody said we were going to get clobbered. There was a lot of hand-wringing about whether we should talk —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really classic Democratic stuff, just classic Democratic hand-wringing, self-loathing doom saying, it was in full bloom.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>It really was. But we could see in the data that there was some salient, like abortion was super salient. We saw that even before Dobbs happened that people were really mobilized when you talked about even what the Supreme Court did around the Texas law. So we knew that. And then the democracy issues, partially because of the January 6 hearings, and getting more salience in the minds of voters, the President really making it a priority in what he talked about. We could see in the data that we were looking at a real power in linking those two in a story and using the frame of freedom and freedoms.</p><p>Because freedom is an American value. I mean, most Americans will say it's their top value, but the left has never actually tried to own it in the same way that the right has that's contested territory. I mean, we can't let them have freedom. And in fact, when you look back at our own history of progress, whether it's a civil rights movement or the LGBT marriage equality movement, freedom has been a powerful frame. So kind of reclaiming the idea of freedom because it's a frame that can actually tie a lot of different issues together. And we paired that with this idea in persuasion that's called loss aversion, which is like when people have something and they think it's going to get taken away, it's very motivating for them to take action.</p><p>And so we combined those two tactics in the message that said, this election is about these MAGA Republicans who are trying to take away our freedoms, block everything we need, and we as voters can protect our futures and our freedoms by joining together and saying no to them. And that made a huge difference.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>For all Barack Obama gets sort of beat up in retrospect these days, I thought one thing he was absolutely great at is this loss aversion question. I did a whole pod on what's called "system justification," which is a slightly fancier term, I think, for roughly the same thing. Like, people tend to approve of the larger systems in which they are embedded even if they're sort of on the ass end of it and prospering from it. People are just sort of inclined to be averse to big — like we're going to change the system, we're going to burn it down, et cetera.</p><p>So what Obama did is frame like the ongoing struggle for greater and greater freedoms and greater and greater equality and greater and greater prosperity spread more widely is the system. That is America. That's what America means. And so when we're doing that we are affirming the system. We're not trying to burn it down. I thought he played that twist really well and I always thought should run with that.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In terms of this dichotomy, I'm a little curious where does climate change fit into all that? I mean I think the conventional wisdom on climate change and messaging is just that it's a very very low priority for voters.</p><p>They don't really care. They don't really want to hear about it. Did you find anything to the contrary? How do you sort of view that issue amidst these others?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Yeah well I mean it's becoming more and more important just because of the rise of especially the Gen Z voting generation because they do really care about it very as you know, passionately and it's not something that they're willing to let go of and not care about. So what we found really is like a) it is important b) in the messaging study that we released there was very little TV advertising talking about the climate provision that Biden had passed, again, despite how popular they were with voters. So that was like a challenge and a miss that I think that we saw in our own research. It was like we didn't sort of quote unquote, try to figure out how to talk about climate but actually more when we listened to voters about what they cared about.</p><p>Climate did always rise to the top. And again we talked to "gettable" voters across the board in several swing states, we call them gettable because they believed that Biden won the election. So we took out anybody who didn't believe that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Low bar there.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>But they weren't all Democrats. They were a mix. They were a lot of independents and people were there, white working class, Latino, working class, black, AAPI, across different class demographics. So it was a very diverse group of voters. It was about 300 people in qual studies that we ultimately talked to. And it's true that they saw the climate as a part of the future that they wanted.</p><p>They would see a healthy climate as a part of it. There's also a definite pain that voters are feeling around the climate disasters that are happening and all the changes that are happening. So people are feeling it. I think it's how do you wrap it into the overall narrative, which is the chance that we have right now with all of the legislation that's been passed is actually framing it in terms of the kind of way that Democrats are working for you. Democrats are part of this world we're in right now is, like, we're trying to help people with lower costs.</p><p>We're creating these clean energy jobs, lowering energy costs. Kind of like how do you grow the middle class? How do you have people feel like things are getting better for them? There's an economic narrative in that that I think climate really fits well into that narrative in terms of it's part of this different future we're creating. I think that's what we saw the most.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I would also say maybe this is like, getting a little ahead of things and maybe this message will work a few more years out. But in terms of the broader freedom narrative, I've always thought that we put up with a lot of horrible crap from fossil fuels because there's no alternative. They're the only way to get the prosperity we needed and have been for years. But now we have an alternative so we can be free of fossil fuels finally. And that, to me, is a great freedom message. Like, imagine being free of the fumes and all the geopolitical nonsense you have to put up with and just the worst people in the world being empowered, just like all the freedom from all of that.</p><p>I think that's so fertile, a fertile message.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>I totally agree. And that was always part of our thinking with the freedoms message, that it does apply not just to abortion and democracy. It can apply to all these things, the freedom to earn a fair wage and to have a good life, to retire with dignity, to breathe clean air, to thrive. What does it look like for us to actually get to a freedom to thrive? Having freedom from fossil fuel companies, as you say, is a key part of that. So that's how I see it. The most success we've seen is fitting it into a larger story because your point is correct, that it's hard to focus on one issue like that with our voters.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You say in the report, sort of the old, again, going back to sort of old conventional wisdom, and I think this is probably still the conventional wisdom among the aforementioned consultant class. But the idea is, like, you pick your issues, your message, your spin, and you just stick to it and repeat it over and over again and ignore everything else that's going on. And you say that no longer works. You say, we need offense across multiple issues and channels. So what does that mean? What is that mental shift and sort of operational shift that you're referring to there?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, one of the things that we talked about in our report was the compare and contrast of two different Senate races. One was Tim Ryan in Ohio and the other was John Fetterman in Pennsylvania. And it's kind of a perfect case of what you're talking about because when you look at what Tim Ryan wanted to talk about, it was China.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A lot of China.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>A lot of China, like, outsourcing. He hadn't made up his mind about what it was that he wanted to say, and it didn't really mesh with what Vance was saying. So you have Vance talking about, I mean, really, some of the most extreme, horrific, racist —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good Lord.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>— sexist messaging. And you have Ryan being like "But I am bipartisan, and I want to work with the other side."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, lots of, like, "I'm not like the other Dems" talk, which people in purple states just believe in their bones for some reason is going to work and never seems to.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>He even spent a million dollars trashing Obama. Okay? So that is one thing. And when you look at some of the charts in our report, you can see it's like, here's what Ryan talked about, issue, issue, and here's what Vance talked about, issue, issue. They don't match. Like, there's nothing related to each other. Whereas when you look at Fetterman versus Oz, a different state for sure, but not completely different in terms of Pennsylvania versus Ohio. But you saw actually, the issues that are salient for voters, whether it was economy and jobs, crime, well, really, those two were the kind of the top inflation, crime, economy.</p><p>Those are the issues that people in the state cared about. Oz talked about them, and Fetterman talked about them. So it was a way that he went on offense. So that was kind of what we were talking about before, where you could imagine, okay, Oz is going to attack Fetterman on crime, which was one of the biggest attacks that happened, and Fetterman could have just tried to deflect it or ignore it or try to focus it on something else. Well, I just want to talk about working-class blue-collar jobs. You could imagine that scenario, and that's essentially what happened in somewhat in Ohio.</p><p>But instead, the Fetterman campaign, they took it on. They took it on head-on. They had a real argument about their vision for community safety and their take on what it would actually take to make people more safe and to reduce crime. And it involved gun violence reform. It involved things that were really popular for voters. So that's what I mean, is that we actually can go on offense. We have to be aware of what the other side is doing and what they're saying, and we shouldn't be afraid to address those things. Whether it's Vance's xenophobia racist sexist attacks, or any Republican who's coming at us around inflation or crime narratives.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or even just Oz making a fool of out of himself.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>I mean, that helped.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In addition to the sort of big picture you're talking about between Fetterman and Oz, just on a day-to-day level, the Fetterman campaign just seemed sort of like alive and awake and engaged, like they never let anything go by, even if it was just an opportunity to sort of mock Oz for being from out of state, like they were engaged. And I've always thought and I don't know how you would make, like, a quantitative case for this, but I've always thought one of the big things that Republicans have over Democrats is just that they seem to really believe what they're saying. And they say it no matter what, and they repeat it no matter what, and they just have the strength of their convictions. And that's what you got from Fetterman, is this sense that, oh, you want to talk about crime?</p><p>Let's talk about crime. Let's do this. I believe in my own crime position, so I'm not going to go running away from you when you bring it up. And just that confidence. I think in addition to Fetterman's sort of general aura of big burly manliness, he just was confident in himself and his own beliefs and that's like, you can't really put a number on that. But so many Democrats just come off as like "What do you want me to say? What do you want me to say? I don't want to offend you." And it's just, like, you can't help but have a little sliver of contempt for people like that.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's absolutely right. And that's the brand shift that I think we're trying to say we need, right? We need to shift to actually making the case for what we already believe and what we already think in our own ideas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What a thought.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Coke doesn't run ads talking about how great Pepsi is, right? So we can stop running ads that make us sound like Republicans or that don't actually lean into the conviction of our own ideas. I really think that's a fundamental flaw. It does come from the triangulation, as you noted, and it's dead. Triangulation is dead. It doesn't work anymore. Our political messaging apparatus just hasn't caught up to that reality. There's many of us doing that kind of work, and we're doing great things and we're trying to push an influence, but I think that's fundamentally what it is.</p><p>At the end of the day, we haven't caught up to the new reality that we're not in the 90s anymore.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You cannot repeat often enough how unfortunate it is that an aging cadre elite is running all the levers of power in the Democratic Party is just like more and more glaring kind of how far behind they are from reality. But you are segueing perfectly into my next and one of my main questions and the one I've most interested in and sort of continually frustrated about, which is go back 50, 60 years, really, but certainly to the beginning of your Limbaughs and your sort of dedicated right-wing media. The main, absolute core of their message from the beginning was Democrats are bad. That is their number one thing.</p><p>Everything else hangs off that that is the theme they return to over and over again. Every news story is used to illustrate that. Like, everything every Democrat says is used to illustrate that. Everything is around that point. Way more than you ever hear "Republicans are good on those things." Like, they often are grumpy about Republicans because they want them to be more farther right. But the one thing that entire side is unified on is Democrats are evil grooming, pedophile, Satan, whatever. You can't go overboard in saying horrible things about Democrats. In other words, they've defined their opponents as bad, which you might think, yeah, seems basic, but if you look at Democratic messaging and you look at Democratic advertising, they hardly ever say that.</p><p>They kind of put their toe in the water this last cycle, and of course, all these high horses came out like "Oh, we don't want to be like them, and we don't want to be divisive. And voters don't want partisanship. They don't want this us or them stuff. They like us working with the opponents. They like bipartisanship and all this." Basically the way I've reduced this to a single word is branding. Like, Republicans brand Democrats. And Democrats, by and large, do not attempt to brand Republicans despite Republicans giving them so much material. I mean, as we said, they're literally banning friggin books. Now to make a 32 second ad, they literally are banning books for you. You couldn't ask for a better way to sort of say, like, this is who these people are. But we don't. So. Why, Jenifer? Why?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Well, it's interesting. I really believe and I'll give credit to Dan Ancona, who you also know, my husband, who says that the party brand is an open source process. The party brand is open source. We should all have a say, right? So if you think about it in that way, you can see where some of the challenges are. It's like you've got these different factions of our side, right, and people tend to divide up around issues. As you know. People tend to divide up. We saw the spending in 2021. It was just completely divided by issue.</p><p>So when all you talk about is one issue, you're not hitting into a larger brand about what this is about, right. You're not actually connecting it into a larger story. So the division by issue is a problem. There's a problem in the way that the Democratic Party establishment is focused or organized in that you've got people mostly working for candidates. So they're trying to provide a candidate brand. They're trying to elect one candidate. They haven't historically, I think that it's a big missed opportunity who is actually trying to brand the Democratic Party writ large because you've got the movement on the outside.</p><p>They don't necessarily see that as their job. They don't see it as their job to brand the Democratic Party.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Kind of the opposite. I mean, kind of their job is to hassle the Democrats and call the Democrats, sellouts and push the Democrats left, right.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>But the party itself, it hasn't historically been organized outside of a presidential campaign. You'll see the DNC now starting to come in behind Biden, and there is kind of more larger branding messaging because they're getting ready for the presidential. But in between those cycles, it's the DCCC focused on House, it's the DSCC focused on Senate. It's like, never the twain shall meet. They don't actually talk about, well, what is the larger Democratic brand that we should be advancing here? And so that has been actually the role that we have tried to play a little bit in this outside movement where I sit. But with Way to Win it's much more about, like, we see it as part of our job to help push a larger, across the party inclusive and effective message and brand, especially when there's no presidential cycle because there's really nothing to knit it together right now in the current structure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, if you just go ask normal voters, like, why are Democrats good? Why would you vote for a Democrat? It's amazing how little standard narrative and mythology and just sort of phraseology and just that messaging is not out there. I don't think people could tell you what you end up with is like, Republicans want to be crazy, and voters will go along with them up to a certain level of crazy, and then they'll overdo it, and they'll be like, all right, well, what's the other one? Let's let the other one in for a while.</p><p>But there's no positive reason for the other one because the other one isn't telling you and also not doing a very good job branding the other side. And this, to me, is crazy. Like —</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Crazy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I went through, sorry, a rant here. I told you I had a few rants about this, but I went through the George W. Bush years. I remember thinking, like, after this, the Republican Party brand is going to be destroyed for a generation. Like, they will not soon recover from this. This whole series of fiascos, disasters, lies, scandals. Like, it's just comically over determined at this point that the Republicans are doomed. Ha ha. On me, it took all of two years until the 2010 midterms for them to just be back unashamed. Like, hey, we're back criticizing spending.</p><p>I'm like, wait, but it was just a few years ago that you ran the deficit through the roof to pay for a war. What about — but what I realized over time is events do not tell their own story, right? The news does not tell its own story. If you want people in general to come to believe that about the Republican Party, that they're bad because of all the things they've done, you have to go out and say it, and no one's going out and saying it.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Well, it's true. I mean, we saw it in the early lead up to the midterms in 2021 when we were seeing in our data and research like, wow, the Republican brand is really pretty toxic right now in the minds of our gettable voters. When we ask them, what images come to your mind when you think about the Republican Party brand? They literally put up so many images of the actual devil and like, things on fire. So it's true that that brand has tarnished and become more toxic in the minds of people just because of Trump. I think the rise of Trump and January 6 played a huge role in that.</p><p>But at the same time, we found even in 2021, a resistance to actually calling them out for the January 6 attack. For example, for calling them as extreme as they were. We were saying, look, we're seeing this in the data, people are open to this argument, like we should really be branding them this way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You mean resistance from the message makers, the advertisers?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Yeah, from kind of people in some of the establishment, which is just like, well, we can't really do that. It doesn't really work. We've tried it before. That kind of, sort of we don't want it's going to backlash. There is definitely a timidness and kind of an overall fear, like you had said before, of just leaning into not only what we care about, but having a lot of conviction to call them out for who they are as well. But I will say so we saw in the 2020 Report that we did, the TV Congress Report, it was really wild to us because we saw very clearly the right was calling us crazy.</p><p>They were calling us extreme, they were calling us radical. That was the most money —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>After four years of Trump, is amazing.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Guess what? We didn't say anything about that. There was one campaign, Lucy Macbeth in Georgia, who talked about their extreme position on abortion. And by the way, she was one of the few that won in the toss up in that district, but in other places they didn't do it. But we did see in our data in 2022 a complete turnaround. So we saw not only they use those words a little bit less, but we use those words much more. I mean, we definitely won that one in 2022.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you have an explanation for that? What was the shift in opinion that caused that? I mean, I know Biden coming out and saying it was somewhat significant, but I don't want to over ascribe too much to him.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>No, it's like what I'm saying, this is how we can win is when you have people on the inside and people on the outside and people in lots of different campaigns saying the same thing, ultimately we got to it, right? So I was saying there was some initial resistance, but there are a lot of people who pushed we were pushing Anat Shenker-Osorio and her teams were pushing the research collaborative. You had people at the Center for American Progress really pushing the idea of a MAGA Republican and the extreme Republican. There were enough people in different parts from inside the beltway to outside in the movement saying it at the same time.</p><p>And I think that that made a difference. Ultimately, it's that what I like to call Dems in array.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But did here's another thing about Dems. They accidentally did a good thing and accidentally won. Will they learn that lesson and carry it forward? Are they aware that's why they won?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>I think so. I've definitely heard in a lot of the post mortems that I've been to since 22 a recognition that actually being in alignment around what we were saying about the Republicans was important. I mean, we're not totally there yet because like I said with Tim Ryan, we still saw people talking about bipartisanship too much, not actually branding them, but overall, especially in the House, which is honestly what we were supposed to lose, 30, 40 seats. We lost only five. I think people could see we made these surprise gains, and you could look at that kind of message where it was really clear.</p><p>The branding against them was really clear. I think people are seeing that and saying, okay, so that did work, and that's something that we can do more of. But the warning sign piece is that we have to keep doing that around branding them. And it's not enough just to only attack them. We also have to have a brand for what it is that we're doing, how we want to run the economy, how we're going to make people's lives better. That's the meta narrative about the past few years that we just don't have yet. And that's why we see in the data, 80% of voters can't name one thing Biden has done to make their lives better.</p><p>Or our Latino focus groups that we just came out of in Arizona, Nevada, saying, like "Nada", nothing they saw, nothing that Biden has done to help them. So that's our challenge going forward. Keep leaning into this branding of them that is really effective around how extreme they are, around MAGA, taking away freedoms, being out of touch, all of that. It's really good. It works. It's a narrative that we have to keep pushing together for 24.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Branding them and branding ourselves. I think we should all celebrate and lift up the woman from Nebraska. This would be a better story if I could remember her name, but she's in the Nebraska legislature filibustering their trans bill. You listen to an interview with her, and she's just like, "I don't want anything to do with these people. These are horrible, hateful people. They're trying to hurt my kids." None of this like, "Oh, we just disagree about the right vision, and we're all there's no red or blue America." None of that b******t.</p><p>She's like, they're trying to hurt my kids. And she's just reacting to them the way you would react to someone trying to hurt your kids. Right? Which is like, screw these people, they're horrible. And it's just so refreshingly human. It just sounds human and not —</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>It does.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>— focus grouped to a fare-thee-well.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>We saw that with Mallory McMorrow, too, right, in Michigan when she went on that rant. So yes, I completely agree.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, speak like humans. Okay, well, we're almost out of time. I just have a final question, which I wanted to return to after bringing it up at the very beginning, which is back to capacity. So you've talked a lot about the kind of meta narrative we need about Democrats and about Republicans and the way to sort of weave together Democratic issues and the way to talk about them. But let's return briefly to capacity. The right has spent many decades very systematically trying to take over as much media as possible and now basically have their propaganda in everyone's face all the time, everywhere.</p><p>It's going to clearly take a while to reverse or even make a dent in that situation. But what can people on the left do? Because I raise this all the time, and then people ask me, well, like, what do you mean? Should we buy a TV station? Should we start a blog? And I'm like "Oh, I don't really know. My job is just to complain about this. You have to figure out the solutions." But what can the left do to build media capacity that works in the 2020s? Not just sort of like an obsession with cable news.</p><p>I know this cable news is still big, but like a more broader 360 degree view of the media landscape. Where does the left need to be trying to build capacity and how?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, it's got to be comprehensive, and I think it's a combination of things. I think it probably is a ten year strategy that we need to start now, right? Like, it is going to take time, but we have to do a lot now. We can't wait. We need to buy media properties that includes TV stations, includes radio. There's a really interesting project that's being done in Wisconsin right now where they've bought up kind of all the rural radio stations.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah, I heard about that.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's really interesting. That's a model we could look out for other places. It's not about creating a lefty channel. It's about creating a more neutral channel, actually. It's progressive, but it's not about left versus right. It's actually about building a more of a coalition, like I was saying, across ideology. So that's interesting. There's the Latino Media Network, right? Like, building up in different particular audiences our own channels, which includes a lot of online YouTube, recruiting talent. Like, who are the Shapiros on our side? God invest in now, right? Because there are a lot of talented people out there, and there are people building audiences right now. So how do we support them in doing that? There's the world of micro influencers and people who are building on TikTok and Instagram. I think we need to do a lot more "always on" sort of — it's a funding stream. We have to create, actually, like people are artists and we need to pay them for their work. So we want them to talk about our message. Let's actually bring them in, make them fellows.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Are our billionaires — their billionaires clearly get that. They provided a lot of money, steady operational money for years. Do our billionaires get that?</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>More and more, I think you'll see more and more. It's just becoming really clear, and there's a lot of people out there talking about it on our side. I'm seeing a shift in terms of people actually paying real attention and putting real money and resources in. So I think we'll get there. There's a lot of great people doing work in this area. There's Accelerate Change, a group that has been buying up different online properties that either focus on audience or focus on things like news. There's a whole group that's looking at more sort of state-based news, which is a little bit different.</p><p>Yeah, like state newsrooms, like creating a place where you could actually get real information around state news. That's happening. I think it's called State Newsrooms. That's really interesting. There's a lot of stuff happening, but it is these three things which are: We got to buy up things that exist, we have to build our own things, and we have to try to influence the properties that do exist now, too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Working the refs.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Yeah. So it's a long-term plan, but I mean, that's supporting things like Crooked Media, which is one of our great owned media properties. They have a whole new thing people can do and become a friend of the Pod and support them. That's good. There are things that individuals can do as well as accountability on things like Fox, which we're in a moment now around. MoveOn has a really great campaign on that right now. So there are things individuals can do. Even if you're not a billionaire who can buy up a radio station.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You could subscribe to a Substack. Throwing ideas out there.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Exactly. I love that idea. You should give them some links they can subscribe to.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, Jenifer, thank you so much. Thank you for listening to my rants about this, which I've been carrying around with me for years and for actually knowing something and doing real research and pushing on this. So I really appreciate your work. Thanks for coming on.</p><p><strong>Jenifer Fernandez Ancona</strong></p><p>Thank you so much. It's been great.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/everyone-agrees-democrats-suck-at</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:123648974</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Jun 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/123648974/60b99ff695bbebfe208187f82cbf298d.mp3" length="72549615" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3626</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/123648974/a4b0d6afcbc49e28952054cbf2b7f571.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Transcripts and a live event]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Hey Voltrons! I’ve got no guest today, just a couple of little announcements.</p><p>First: At long last, we have gotten serious about transcripts around here. I hired a company called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.withfanfare.com/">Fanfare</a> and they are methodically going back through the Volts catalogue and transcribing everything. I believe they’re back to May 2022. Before too long, every pod will have transcripts. </p><p>Also, they are transcribing new episodes quickly — usually within a day or two of posting.</p><p>Each transcript comes in three forms. The first is full text on the episode page; the second is a downloadable PDF, in case you want to print it out or send it to someone; and the third is an “active transcript,” where you can play the sound file and it will follow along in the text for you. The active transcripts are really cool, especially for hearing-challenged subscribers; I encourage you to check them out.</p><p>(As an example, here's the geothermal pod: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-going-on-with-geothermal#details">text transcript</a>; <a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADlO8fDFsj65IZx2_Ox9pQEa/volts23.03.31%28jamie.beard%29.pdf?dl=0">PDF</a>; <a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/what-s-going-on-with-geothermal">active transcript</a>. Once transcripts are done, I add links to the different versions at the top of each episode page.)</p><p>I considered making the active transcripts available to paid subscribers only, but ultimately, I came back around to the same reasoning I've used thus far: I want this content to be as available to as many people as possible. So they are free to everyonel</p><p>Which I guess is a good time to remind everyone that the only way I can keep doing this, keep adding features like this, is through the generosity of my paid subscribers. My gratitude to each and every one of you remains unbounded. (If you’d like to make a one-time donation, you can do so <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/donate-to-volts">here</a>.)</p><p>The other thing I wanted to note is for listeners in the Seattle area. On June 28th, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/">Canary Media</a> will be holding <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eventbrite.com/e/canary-live-seattle-tickets-616481582007">a live event in Seattle</a>, at the headquarters of the radio station KEXP. In addition to some other speakers and some mixing and mingling, the main event will be my onstage discussion with <a target="_blank" href="https://rameznaam.com/">Ramez Naam</a>, a well-known clean energy analyst, about the state of the clean energy industry.</p><p>For those who can't make it, the conversation will be recorded and released as a podcast. But if you are in the area, I encourage you to drop by and say hi. Tickets are $49, which will help raise money for Canary, the best thing to happen to clean energy journalism in ages.</p><p>I’m cooking up some other cool stuff here in the Volts kitchen, but that’s probably enough for now. As always, to all you listeners, paid and unpaid, thank you so much for your time and attention. I know there's lots of content out there, new outlets clamoring for your subscription dollars, so rest assured that I never take that time for granted.</p><p>Onward and upward.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/transcripts-and-a-live-event</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:127023588</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 09 Jun 2023 16:01:13 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/127023588/f0cf70041fdc50db3550bce3ab1253ae.mp3" length="4024194" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>200</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/127023588/6a67f84620016e0c959edfb2c86133ba.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Maryland finds a more just & politically durable way to fund offshore wind]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Maryland state Delegate Lorig Charkoudian, author and primary sponsor of the state’s newly passed Promoting Offshore Wind Energy Resources (POWER) Act, shares about the exciting policy innovations embedded in the ambitious bill and what they have the chance to accomplish.</p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAPJhgCnL1GUwX0A939xXiOa/volts23.06%20.06%28lorig.charkoudian%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/maryland-finds-a-more-just-politically-durable-way-to-fund-offshore-wind"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Maryland was one of the first states in the US to see the potential of offshore wind energy. It passed its first offshore wind bill in 2013, and another supportive bill in 2019, but a few weeks ago, the Maryland General Assembly passed, and newly elected Democratic Governor Wes Moore signed, a bill that dwarfs both of those predecessors.</p><p>Whereas the state’s previous target was 2.5 gigawatts of offshore wind energy, the Promoting Offshore Wind Energy Resources (POWER) Act targets 8.5 gigawatts.</p><p>But that is just the headline. Underneath that target are clever new policy innovations that promise to make the funding and development of offshore wind energy more politically resilient and economically just for the long term, and to bring thousands of offshore-wind supply-chain jobs to the state. And the whole process is going to be turbocharged by the tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act.</p><p>I love me some clever policy innovations, so I was eager to talk to the bill’s author and primary sponsor, Delegate Lorig Charkoudian, about who will pay for the new offshore wind, the transmission backbone that can help accelerate development, and the high-paying union jobs that will be created by the industry.</p><p>All right, then, without further ado, delegate Lorig Charkoudian. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Thanks for inviting me. It's a thrill to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I love a good policy talk. I love a good policy.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Me too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this Maryland bill is a delight, so I'm excited to get into it. The first thing to say is promoting offshore wind energy resources where you get "power" as an acronym. Just well done, good acronym work. I don't know who on your staff is responsible for that, but I love a good acronym.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>And I have to say the advocates always give me a hard time because I write brilliant policy and then I have terrible names. So on this one, Jamie from Chesapeake Climate Action Network came up with a name, and they were key on getting the bill passed too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>That worked out well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The Power Act. So before we jump into this, this is a bill about offshore wind in Maryland. Just to set everybody's expectations. Before we jump in, though, I want to back up a little bit and talk about offshore wind in Maryland. My understanding is that Maryland passed its first offshore wind bill in 2013, and then there was another bill in 2019. And yet, as far as I'm aware, there is no operating offshore wind off the coast of Maryland. Why is that? What's gone on in the history of this industry in this state that there's kind of so much hype and so little actual wind turbines?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, it's a real challenge and it's kind of the story of renewable energy the challenges of renewable energy and offshore wind in a lot of places. So we were first out of the gate in 2013, one of the first on the East Coast, and then we had a couple of things happen. And so first we had the — Ocean City fought really hard against having the wind actually built. The Hogan administration really pandered to the Ocean City opposition. And so there were a bunch of sort of slow walking things that happened at the Public Service Commission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You got nimbied.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yes. So you've heard that before. So we had that going on. And then that ran into the Trump administration and all the things that were going on at the federal level and BOEM and slowing things down from that perspective. And then all of that ran into the buzzsaw of PJM and the interconnection queues and slowing everything down from that end. And then we hit the pandemic and supply chains.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, you really hit the perfect storm of all the things wrong with renewable.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Energy, everything that could go wrong. But I'm happy to say that those projects are really back on track now, so we expect to see them in the next couple of years. And a lot of things that we have in this bill set us up so that the various delays, transmission in particular, PJM, interconnections, that those don't become the barriers going forward. Got it as disheartening as that has been, all that's going forward now, and we learned from the last ten years and set ourselves up for success on this bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so there's construction underway offshore, or what stage are the current projects at?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Well, yes, some construction. And the really exciting thing just when we keep in mind that offshore wind is not only a really important renewable energy resource, but it's also a really important economic driver and a manufacturing on the manufacturing side, Tradepoint Atlantic, which is where Bethlehem Steel was for years and years and years. And the closure of that just really decimated the community and the economy. So in that same place now, Sparrows Point Steel, US Wind has a factory they're building, Ørsted just broke ground on a factory they're building. And so we can see it sort of starting, things starting to happen actually in the ocean.</p><p>But we're also seeing the beginnings of manufacturing coming back. And really importantly, those are union manufacturing jobs. And when we get to talking about the policies, getting the labor policies right within the legislation is key, but we're starting to see those jobs coming back. And so there are things happening on the ground and in the ocean now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, we're going to get back to that union stuff for sure. But first I want to sort of set the stage for the innovation in your bill by talking about the previous offshore wind bill. So the Clean Energy Jobs Act of 2019 was generally, I think, great, overall a positive, but it created some conflict between clean energy proponents and ratepayer advocates. And the reason for this is that the bill basically paid for the new offshore wind with what are called ORECs. I'm sure that sounds completely obscure to 99% of the listeners. So maybe explain what is an OREC and why did that mechanism lead to that conflict?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>I actually want to put it in a little bit of context because I do think it's important whenever we're talking about subsidies, which we're going to talk about now for a little bit, an offshore wind. Whenever we're talking about subsidies for renewables, I think it's important to remind everyone that we have been subsidizing and continue to subsidize fossil fuels for over 100 years. And that's really important. And the other really important thing to highlight about it is that those subsidies for fossil fuels are in all different kinds of things, right? So there's direct subsidies, there's subsidies in terms of tax credits, there's subsidies in terms of indemnification, there's subsidies in terms of lower than market rates, access to federal lands for drilling and it's like hidden in all these little places and —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Permitting much easier to build a pipeline than a transmission line.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. And that doesn't even start to talk about the externalities right, like all the costs of climate change and pollution and health and all those kinds of things. So that's just a really important context. And I know probably most of your listeners know that and kind of come in understanding that. But I do think every time we open up a conversation about the subsidies that are needed for emerging technologies to reach the point that they're competitive, I think it's really important to put that in context and to take an opportunity to say we need to end those fossil fuel subsidies last week.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can't say it often enough.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Now that I've said that I'm happy to talk to you about ORECs. So then the question becomes when we do need to find places to subsidize to close this gap, to basically internalize the value of the social cost of carbon that we're not emitting, right? Like however you want to think about that, when we need to find a place to put that, that is kind of the next conversation. And I think what we've seen in state policy, and I kind of think this is unfortunate and what I'm hoping my bill does is not just solve this problem in Maryland, but really start a different kind of conversation in other states.</p><p>What we've seen in a lot of state policies is that RECs the renewable energy credits is a primary driver of how we do renewable energy subsidies. And the renewable energy credits are generally required from our utilities and they are purchased. And those purchases of those RECs, whether they're solar RECs or general tier one RECs in our case, which is the land based wind and whatever else is in the mix.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that what O-RECs means what is the O in ORECS?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>O-RECs is different. ORECs is the offshore wind RECs. So we've got the RECs for everything else and then we've got SRECs or solar RECs, and then we've got ORECs. Now, this is where it gets tricky. ORECs are not actually RECs like SRECs and other tier one RECs are, right? So ORECs are actually more like a guaranteed price and a guaranteed amount that's being purchased. It's more like a PPA, although it's not a PPA. It's more like a PPA than RECs are because there's not a separate OREC market where they could get traded and the price would go up and down depending on how much you have in the mix.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>So we call them orcs because they're sort of managed by the Public Service Commission and they're reflected on a ratepayers bill, but they're not actually like other types of RECs. So they really just kind of create the guaranteed price and purchase amount, which is what a wind developer needs to get capital at the lowest possible rate is having the guaranteed $56 megawatt hour and 5 million MW. Right? Like that's what you take to the bank and that's how you finance the project. So that's what ORECs do. But what that means is that ratepayers are paying for that subsidy.</p><p>And so this is the challenge that you talked about earlier, which is that it makes sense in some ways, right, because you are tying the clean energy costs. The more energy you use, the more you're paying for the clean energy. But what it means is that rates are especially residential rates, are the most regressive place to put a subsidy like that. So while taxpayers and ratepayers theoretically are the same people, but ratepayers rates are the most regressive because people who struggle the most to pay their bill don't pay less because they earn less, right? People suffering from an energy burden are going to suffer from that energy burden regardless of what they make.</p><p>And they're suffering. The less they make, the more they're suffering, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And tax systems can and often do exempt low income people from taxes. But nobody is exempted from rates. No matter how poor you are, you're paying rates.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>You're paying rates. And generally if you have a house that is drafty or is not weatherized because you can't afford that, right, you're probably paying more in your electric rates and people have cut offs and everything else. So as much as I feel like we need to make our taxes more progressive, they're at least more progressive than our rates are. So that's a show for another time. Maybe it's a different podcast. But anyway, sticking to the rates for a second. So as we have looked at ways to continue to expand subsidies for offshore wind clean energy in general, one of the things that I've really looked for is ways to create those subsidies, create the same guarantee that the offshore wind developers need in order to take it to the bank and get the financing right.</p><p>But do it in a way that is out of a state budget which is going to come out of taxes as opposed to putting it on ratepayers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Pause here because this is so conceptually important and underlies everything else. It really is, and as you say, can be a lesson to other areas, which is just like so much clean energy policy, especially because it's all about electrification, it's all about electricity. So much of it gets piled on electricity ratepayers, which as you say, is the most regressive possible way to pay for something and just shifting to the tax base, much more progressive, much more the burden falls on high income people. It's much fairer, generally fairer way to pay for things. So it's just about finding the mechanism, right?</p><p>Like how do you tie the subsidy to taxes? So how does that work?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>So I think one of the interesting things that happens, and I often think about this as the difference between doing compromise, like split the difference as opposed to creative problem solving, which I think we need to be doing more of. I think what happened with the Clean Energy Jobs Act is that we had a compromise which is we said, okay, ORECs, go on the bills, we're worried about ratepayers, so we'll put a cap on how much this could cost ratepayers. And so what that does in the end is it protects ratepayers. Like they're not going to pay more than XYZ, whatever the cap was that we put on there.</p><p>But it also means that we're only going to produce as much as that cap will allow for, right? And so rather than doing that, what I try to do is to say, what are our values? Our values are to protect ratepayers, our values are to build as much offshore wind as we possibly can. And so given that we can in fact come up with new ways of doing things. But it was an interesting process because I looked at basically every other state and talked to a lot of people about what are the other ways that we could do this?</p><p>And there is often within policy making circles there's this way that we get stuck in, like, this is just how it's done. This is the way that we create that guarantee to the developers. This is the way it's done. But you start to see the danger of that. And like, I think in New Jersey, there was a filing by the Office of the People's Council, their ratepayer advocate there, suggesting that they ought to slow down some of the offshore wind because of the ratepayer impact. And so eventually there'll be the pushback. And so it's worth taking the time.</p><p>And it did, it took me like a year and a half to figure out a way to do it. And once I tell you what that is, which you already know, but once I tell your listeners what that is, it seems so obvious. But just because people haven't done it, I think a lot of people are just hesitant to try something new, especially in an area where it feels like it's risky.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like many good policy ideas, it's like once you hear it, you're like, oh, duh.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Duh. Right, exactly. So the idea is what the developers actually need is a guaranteed amount of offtaking, and they need a guaranteed price. That's what they need to go to the bank, right? So what we did is we said, okay, so the state is going to do a power purchase agreement, and the state is going to put out an RFP, and the state is going to take a look at the social cost of carbon, the state's goals. The state's RFP has the ability to consider things other than just the lowest possible price. Right? They'll look at price. Right.</p><p>We didn't want to make the state a full-on price taker, but we did want to make the state have the ability to look at a range of considerations beyond just the price.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And just to insert here just for listeners' benefit. I believe this is all in the context of Maryland having a law on the books that targets 100% carbon-free electricity by 2035. Is that correct?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yes. So this bill created the goal of 8.5 gigawatts. So that's a goal that gets considered. The 60% decrease in greenhouse gas emissions by 2031 gets considered. The 2035 gets all of those things get considered in addition to price in consideration of the RFP. But the other piece of it is the state uses, or will in a few years when they're doing these contracts, the state uses roughly 2 million megawatt-hours a year in electricity. And we believe that the two current offshore wind lease areas that we're trying to fill out with this procurement have the ability to produce about 5 million.</p><p>So the first thing that's really obvious is, well, the state's 2 million should all be offshore wind. Right? So make that happen. That makes sense. But then the next part of it is that we authorize the state to then offer the remaining if they end up getting to 5 million or whatever it is they end up getting to based on the RFP, the remaining 3 million, 2 million. Whatever it is, they have the ability to offer it either in bilateral contracts to, for example, other counties that want to purchase it, school systems that want to purchase it, or to offer it in the wholesale electricity market through PJM.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wait, so you say when the state uses you mean the actual government itself? The actual state government uses that amount?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not the state as a whole?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yes, the state government. Yes, correct, right. So the state government does procurement for the state's own buildings.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So it's going to satisfy all its own demand and then have a bunch left over.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Well, that'll depend on how the RFP goes. Right? Again, I didn't write the bill, I wrote the bill so that we weren't going to be inherently price takers. We want to create a competitive RFP process, but the state has the ability to purchase up to 5 million based on the way the bill is written. And so if they do that, if they'd get to 5 million, right, they use the 2 million of their own electricity, and then the additional 3 million can be offered through bilateral contracts or offered on the wholesale markets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then you'd have the sort of state government in the position of being a participant in the wholesale market, basically selling power on the wholesale market.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Presumably through a broker, but yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Because the state is going to have a PPA with a guaranteed price. Right. Any subsidy that's needed, the state will pay that subsidy, right. And the state basically takes on the risk. So I suspect that the way it's going to work is it'll be a subsidy in the first ten years of the 20-year contract. And at some point, because of the direction energy is going, I suspect that the state will actually have a contract for lower than the wholesale price for the second ten years of the 20-year contract. Right. So it's not that we're sure it's a subsidy, we're offering a subsidy.</p><p>We expect it to be a subsidy in the early years. But whenever you're doing something like this, what we're really saying is the state's taken on the risk instead of ratepayers taking on the risk.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the state's going to sell the power and if the state loses money on the deal, that will be absorbed by taxpayers, that's the subsidy in question. But if the state makes money, which you think it eventually will —</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Then it's revenue.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Then it's state revenue, it benefits taxpayers.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Correct. So it's really that the state's taking the risk rather than the state's committing to the subsidy. It could be a subsidy. It could be a subsidy for the 20 years, but it's the risk that the state's taken.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so it is going to depend on what is the cost of this offshore wind production relative to general wholesale prices.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Over a 20-year period.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Over 20 years.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>And so just, I remind people, I mean, no one predicts 20 years, right? Just take a look at the last 20 years. And we weren't expecting fracking and then we weren't expecting a war in Ukraine, right. So you have the prices going all over the place and so we'll see what happens.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, but the point is, eventually this could evolve just through the evolution of power markets into an ongoing source of revenue for the state.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>That's correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Fingers crossed, I guess.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Fingers crossed, yeah, absolutely. Because that will mean a lot of things that are important for our clean energy future if that happens. But one of the other things that I'll say about it is the other thing that was important about doing the bill in this way is that we wrote it so that this new way of doing procurement is a short-term strategy for the two lease areas which currently exist to fill them out. Right. Like to buy the rest to basically to build in the rest of those two lease areas. We expect BOEM soon to have its new lease area where we hope we'll have six gigawatts worth of space.</p><p>And so we haven't yet, while that's part of the goal and the other part of the bill that I hope we get to talk about, because I always want to talk about transmission, is preparing for that six gigawatts. The procurement is just for this smaller amount. And what it does is it gives us a chance to test it out in the short term. And if it works, then it's a system that we can use for this larger procurement of six gigawatts that we're going to have to develop in the next two or three years</p><p>And BOEM, just for listeners' benefit, can you spell out BOEM? Not everybody is up on the latest fed, federal agencies.</p><p>Yeah. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. They manage all the energy in the oceans.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what does it mean for them to give you a lease area? It just says this area is now open for development. That's the significance.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Correct. And they're not giving Maryland the lease area. They're working on lease areas across up and down the East Coast. Well, actually the West Coast, too, but they're drawing them and then DoD and NOAA and all the other federal agencies weigh in based on their knowledge about the area, and then they will auction them off. And so developers will then have a chance to bid on them. And then once the developers sort of have the lease on the lease area, I think it's a 99-year lease, then they'll have a chance to bid into whatever, Maryland offshore wind.</p><p>New Jersey offshore wind, whoever's got the system in place to purchase offshore wind.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So you're testing this state government-based procurement on these two smaller lease areas that exist, and if it works well, then you think it will be extended to this larger lease that's on the way.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yeah. And if it doesn't, then we go back to the drawing board, find another creative solution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How progressive is Maryland's tax system relative to other states? Do you have a good sense? Because the reason I asked this is I am talking to you from what I believe is, last time I checked, 50th on the list of 50 states in terms of the progressivity of their tax base. Washington State has the most regressive tax system of any of the 50 states. It's almost all sales tax. There's no income tax. I assume it's probably still a little bit more progressive than ratepayers, but I don't know how much. So this will differ state to state, I assume.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, it would. And I actually don't know what our ranking is. I know it is considerably more progressive than that, but we do have income tax and so on. But I don't know the ranking. But it's a great question and it sends me to — It's my task as soon as we finish recording today, I will find that out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so that's procurement, a very different and interesting model. You're not doing utilities through ORECs, you're getting the state involved and you're paying for it out of the state's tax base. And this has the potential, which I just think is so interesting, like the state's going to sell its leftover energy and depending on energy markets, could well be making money. And I feel like if a state is procuring gigawatts of clean energy and making money on it, that's going to catch the attention of other states, this model. So the second big policy piece of this, which I found interesting, has to do with transmission.</p><p>So sort of the current model insofar as there's any model at all since there isn't actually that much offshore wind. But you're sending developers out. They build turbines out in the ocean and then they run a transmission line back to land to carry the power. And then the next developer comes, builds more turbines, runs its own transmission line to land. You end up with all these separate transmission lines to land which are doing basically the same thing, only it's incredibly duplicative and incredibly wasteful. So what does your bill do on transmission to try to circumvent that problem?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>I think you described it pretty well, but I'll just say the way that I sort of think about it is right now you have let's say that there's six developers who each get a piece of this offshore wind lease area that's coming. Each of those developers now has to run an extension cord into plug into the state of Maryland and get onto the grid, right? And it actually is a bunch more than one extension cords just because of the complexities of transmission. And so the idea behind the bill is instead of that, how about the state coordinates an effort to run one line, one extension cord out to the ocean and put down a power strip and everyone plugs into it there.</p><p>And so if you think about it that way, it is both way more efficient, right? Like so it costs significantly less and it is way less ecologically disruptive to ocean floors and everything else that gets sort of touched by transmission interconnection. We started talking a little bit about. I know you have listeners all over the country, all over the country. People know that transmission is a challenge for renewable energy. But on offshore wind, as I was saying at the beginning, that is one of the issues, the interconnection issues here on the East Coast. It's one of the issues that still has us not yet having built the 2013 authorized wind.</p><p>Right. So solving this is really key and it's key for both actually having a solution and being more likely to build the wind. It's key for reducing costs and it's also key for signaling to the offshore wind industry that we are really serious about getting this done in the state of Maryland. And that's important as an economic driver, it's important to have people seriously looking at bidding on these lease areas and investing in the state of Maryland.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How does this solve the interconnection problem? Is the idea that the main power strip will be the one interconnection that all the others piggyback on? Or are they all still going to have to how does this interact with the sort of interconnection queue which, as all listeners know, is extremely backed up everywhere?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>I'm going to go ahead and claim worse in PJM than anywhere else, but someone can challenge me on that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think that's right.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>New Jersey is the one state that sort of has done this already. And they did it, although they didn't do it with legislation, their Board of Public Utilities did it kind of through regulation and through their process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This common transmission thing.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yeah, this organized, right? This state organized and it's not state-owned. Right. That's really important. It's not the state's building the transmission, the state's kind of coordinating the effort, the study, the figuring out the transmission interconnection points and then working with PJM to take bids for transmission developers to actually build and own the transmission lines. So that's the system that New Jersey kind of modeled that they could do over the last three years. And we took notes and paid attention and put it in legislatively. And so there still is a need to work with PJM in Maryland.</p><p>The way the bill is written, the Public Service Commission works with PJM, works with the developers, works with everyone who has information in this, the current transmission owners, the potential bidder transmission owners, does all the studies and then works through the interconnection process. And there's a couple of different questions and the Power Act leaves open a few different options about how it gets paid for because we have an evolving process right now with FERC and FERC rulemakings and PJM and so on. There's a couple of different ways that it could get paid for. The state agreement approach is one possibility.</p><p>That's what they used in New Jersey, I think that has advantages and disadvantages. I didn't want to lock us into it so we could end up with that. We could end up with depending on FERC decisions over the next few years, we could end up with some other sort of way that it gets paid for.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is paying for that out of state revenue also on the table with all the same sort of advantages, all the same reasons.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>It could be, but it's far enough away that it's not clear yet, right? So here's how it could be. If you ended up tying the cost of the transmission to the developers and so you basically lumped it in with the cost of the offshore wind. And if we went with the procurement method that I've been describing, then you would have that done through the state budget. If you went with another model and if FERC ends up with decisions about renewable transmission and spreading the cost over everyone, who benefits, you might have ratepayers across the region paying.</p><p>Because of course, these transmission lines are not only going to benefit Maryland, they benefit the congestion that we relieve in Virginia and Pennsylvania and so on and so forth. So there's a couple of different possible directions that it could go in, but one possibility could be that you end up with it back on the system that we described earlier.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I'm assuming you've heard from offshore wind developers that this is a big impediment, right, this transmission sort of quandary?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yes, we have. And yeah, I mean, I worked very closely with the industry on developing kind of this solution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When I was reading about this, it sparked an extremely old memory. Like one of the first freelance pieces I ever wrote, and this was probably more than a decade ago, was about this scheme, I can't remember what it's called now. I didn't bother to google the piece, but it was a scheme to build basically what you're talking about, like this extension cord, this sort of power strip, but to build it all the way up the East Coast. Like it was one of these grand super schemes, you know, and of course, like many of the grand super schemes I wrote about back in the day, who knows what happened to it?</p><p>But is there any —</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Don't give up on it yet, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there any thought or discussion of doing a multistate version of this?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yes, there is. So it is still in the conversation, this sort of backbone right up the I think that's probably what you wrote about, which wasn't that long ago, I don't think but —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everything pre-pandemic is a haze.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Pre-pandemic is ancient history. So the backbone up the east coast and then sort of interconnected at a couple of key points and it actually still is a really good idea and it has a lot of potential for thinking about resilience and if certain parts of the grid go down or certain regions have a significant weather event or something like that. So it actually still is a really good idea. And when I first started looking into this, people were like, oh yeah, and Maryland should coordinate with the states around it and the federal government should coordinate.</p><p>And what I wanted to do was to build this so it has the ability we talked about the system being mesh ready. It has the ability to interconnect in that way, but we're not waiting on that to happen. So it's possible that all of a sudden, in two years, all the states will get together, sing kumbaya, federal government will be on board, and we'll build that thing, and then we'll just all connect into it. But in the meantime, we have to keep moving forward. And so —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If there's one thing that makes transmission easier, it's involving multiple states.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Right. It absolutely streamlines everything. So in the meantime, the idea was we're going to have a process that could tie into that should that come about in the near future, but we won't be waiting for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So kind of modular, a modular power strip that could be added to in the future.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Sure, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I remember writing about that because the potential benefits of connecting the entire east coast would do so much for congestion. I mean, it's really mind-boggling to read about the potential benefits, but of course, coordinating every single state is —</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Well I mean, it's mind-boggling to consider that you could have a solution that's out there that is that beneficial and we can't get our act together to build it like that's. Also mind-boggling.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm much more familiar with that story.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Which is why we just kind of do everything we can leave it all in the field and hope it all connects with each other at some point in the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we went through the sort of novel procurement mechanism, which I think is really cool, and then this common transmission plan, which I all think is really cool. Let's talk about labor.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And unions. Maybe before getting into what this bill says, you could just tell us sort of like, what has been the general disposition of labor toward offshore wind in the past, and what does this bill do vis a vis labour?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Offshore wind has been committed in Maryland anyways. I think there's been this commitment to build offshore wind with good labor standards, I think from the beginning, and I think that a lot of developers have built relationships locally in Maryland and elsewhere. So we knew that folks already really had a sense that offshore wind is a development that really can be done with good union jobs. I think we had that idea back in 2013. Now I want to back up and just mention that for myself. I've been in office for five years and I've had a lot of clean energy legislation, and I've been committed to every single bill that I write, whether it's big development of offshore wind or residential solar micro grids that I'm doing, every single bill that I write has labor standards in it.</p><p>I think this moment in time is so crucial in terms of really thinking about we're going to build a new economy. What we're doing with a clean energy future is going to be a new economy. And so we have this chance to get it right or we have this chance to drive ourselves into an income inequality sort of hole that we're never going to be able to get out of.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This attitude, this sort of approach. And I say this happily seems to be basically conventional wisdom at this point. Like if you look at blue states passing these big energy bills, it's in almost all of them now.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Well, we're getting there. We're getting there. It is coming more into it. And I think the IRA helps. And I've certainly seen progress since five years ago when I started putting it into my bills. And I do think the IRA helped and I think that there's been really good organizing around it. But I think what we looked at with offshore wind, so this gets to 2013, 2019, and then this year what we looked at with offshore wind was what standards did we have in there? How much would they guarantee that really these were going to be good union jobs all the way from manufacturing, bringing manufacturing to Maryland, bring steel development, cable development, cable factories, all of that into Maryland with union jobs as well as all of the construction on the development being with project labor agreements as well as we have labor peace agreements for the maintenance on the projects as well.</p><p>All of that is in the bill. And I think when we looked back at the 2013 and 2019 bills, they had some standards in them. So we could see like there was clearly an intent to build the industry in this way, but we also had places where we could see things could fall through the cracks and we wanted to really make sure that there was no question about the standards and the jobs that we were going to create. And so this bill has a lot more and it's a lot tighter and it's all the way around and includes the domestic content and so on.</p><p>And the good news is that that is then reinforced by the IRA. So not only is it the right thing to do for the future of Maryland and the Maryland economy, but it also is going to be the lowest cost way to do it because the IRA is going to we're going to be able to maximize the rebates and the tax incentives in the IRA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Just for listeners perspective, the IRA ties in tax credits to labor standards. So the sort of higher labor standards you have, the more of the tax credit you can get. So if you are going into this industry with the highest possible labor standards, that means you're going to get the most possible IRA money.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. Labor standards and domestic content.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Both.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so labor was presumably in support on your side lobbying for this bill. Yes or no?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yes, absolutely. Labor was 100% with us on the bill, and that's because we built a coalition early on that everybody was in the conversation together. And as I mentioned, I think I worked on the bill for a year and a half before I actually brought it in. And so we had a coalition that included labor, that included environmental organizations, that included industry, include ratepayer advocates. It included civil rights organizations, environmental justice groups. And we just kind of stayed in that conversation for a year until everyone felt like this was something that they really believed in. And so then you had that coalition coming in and really fighting for the bill, and that made a big difference in terms of getting it through.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So when you say domestic content, are there provisions in this bill that require domestic content, like Maryland content, like Maryland manufacturing? What does the bill say about that?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Well, you actually can't do that because of the interstate commerce clause. It's got to be Maryland manufacturing. So you have domestic content requirements in the Community Benefit agreement. So we do have that in there. But I will say what Maryland has with our advantage is that we have a deep port in Baltimore, deep harbor in Baltimore. Right. So you have the port where what was talking about Bethlehem Steel earlier that built basically the ships that won our world wars and everything else. You have that. And so it is a really strategic place from which to build an offshore wind industry, to build domestic content that we're going to have in this country, not just for Maryland, but for the entire East Coast, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. A lot of this doesn't exist. It's not like you could buy it elsewhere. Currently, a lot of this just doesn't exist yet. The supply chain.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Right. It's not like there's some place in the Midwest that's building offshore wind manufacturing like components, and we're just going to ship them in. So the combination of what we have in Maryland, what Tradepoint Atlantic, what the port offers in terms of a strategic location for building the commitment that Maryland has made, the solution to the transmission problem and the domestic content together. We have reason to believe that a lot of that content will be based in and will be built in Maryland at Trademark Atlantic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Do we have any sort of like estimates or models or guesses about job creation here? I mean, presumably if you're going to build an industry almost from scratch, that's a lot of jobs.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yeah, it is like 5000 is the number that I've heard. I've seen a couple of different numbers, and I have to say I haven't looked at an analysis before. I quote a particular one. But it is and it's a lot of jobs because it's iterative we're going to get these first two lease areas built, and then we're going to get the six gigawatts, and then there'll be additional unit manufacturing for additional locations along the East Coast. And then we haven't started talking about, but coming soon is floating offshore wind. Right. So that's even beyond the 8.5 that we have envisioned in this bill, which we're trying to have in place by 2031.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>8.5, just to clarify, is a non binding aspirational. That's just sort of like what you want.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>That's right. 8.5 is. I mean, anytime you set a goal, you actually can't make it binding, if we're being honest.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. You could pretend.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yeah, so whenever you set a goal maybe I shouldn't say that because now people know they can get out of the goals. What makes the bill? I mean, it's interesting because I appreciate the chance to talk to you for like a full hour about it. You can tell I'm kind of in love with this bill, but most of what gets the headlines is 8.5 gigawatts. And that's important. It's big, it does matter. But really, what's going to make us meet that goal is the transmission, planning, and development that's in the bill and the new way of doing procurement that's in the bill.</p><p>That's actually how we're going to meet the 8.5 gigawatts. And those are the pieces that are real game changers for the state of Maryland for building that and then making sure, as we've talked about, the labor standards that are critical to how we do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do we have any sense of the total power potential off the Maryland coast once we do the fixed turbines and then the floating turbines and all the rest of it? Do we have any sense of the total?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Again, it's one of those things. I've heard numbers from like 13 total to 20 total, right. When you add in floating on top of the 8.5, that would be fixed. I haven't studied the studies enough that I'm going to say this is where I'm coming down.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's a lot of guessing in studies, too, not to sort of expose all the illusions in this one pod. A lot of studies are just this side of guessing.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this tackles the procurement problem, which is awesome. The transmission problem, the labor problem, all these pieces are signed up. The one other thing that we were sort of mentioned earlier that has impeded offshore wind development in the past is NIMBYism. And just reading articles about this bill, they all sort of are obliged to quote a few opponents. I don't like to cast aspersions, but like, "Oh, it's the view. Oh, it's the whales." It just has this feel of people who don't want any change groping around for some plausible argument to use. But nonetheless, we're not here to discuss how irrational NIMBYism is.</p><p>But is there anything in the bill directly about that, or do you just think the sort of advantages that you've brought together here are just going to kind of overwhelm that?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>So it's a great question, and it is a really important thing that we need to address. And I think that let me start with whales, because I care about whales, too, and marine wildlife. And I have read those studies, and I have engaged with NOAA, and I've engaged with the National Aquarium, and I've engaged with people who are actually experts on that, which many of the people standing on beaches and talking about whales are not. And so I got a really clear understanding of, because if there were proof, if there were evidence that somehow offshore wind development were affecting whales, then I would want to build mitigation strategies into the bill, right?</p><p>So there isn't any proof right now, and that's really important for that to be clear. There's no proof right now. There is proof that whales are dying from a bunch of other things, climate change being one of them, but there isn't any proof that that's happening because of offshore wind development. But having said that, there is still a full NEPA process that goes into the development of offshore wind. And so all these experts who know way more about whales than I do and other marine wildlife will be able to engage every step of the way in the NEPA process to make sure that any harm that could come or any danger that could come is mitigated.</p><p>And that just coming back to the transmission for a second. The fewer transmission lines that we have to run, the less kind of cable that we have to run, the more options there are to run that cable in a way that is least harmful, right, to any sort of marine wildlife. So to the extent that that is addressed in the bill, there's just a section of the bill that says that the developers have to share whatever those plans are that are part of the NEPA process that are being shared with the federal government, that that has to also be shared with the state government. Now, that means we'll be able to see it.</p><p>I think the federal government really has the experts who are looking at that and can determine what is and isn't appropriate to do, but it's addressed because the state will be able to take a look at what that is as well. So there's that piece of it, I think the second piece of it in terms of views, and I think that realistically, if you look at renderings, if folks are actually worried about views, they should look at renderings because you sort of can squint and maybe you'll see something if it's a really clear day. I've taken a look at those things. But I think it's really important to remember that a lot of, especially in the context of offshore wind, a lot of the NIMBYism that we hear, because we're talking about like 11, 12, 15, 70 miles away from the coast, right.</p><p>So a lot of the NIMBYism that we're hearing is really driven by, and is funded by and is supported by folks with ties to the fossil fuel industry —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Always worth saying.</p><p>Vested interest in not building this. And if you can get people worked up about a view and people are hesitant to change anyways, and people are bought into a culture war that is about not moving forward with clean energy, then it doesn't take a lot to rile folks up. And that's, unfortunately, where some of this has gotten caught up.</p><p>Yes, Volts listeners will recall a few months ago we did a pod about just that, about the sort of conservative groups that are out there very actively generating this sort of opposition.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>But in terms of your question, I think you asked another question about, like is, are we going to get caught up again? And I will say there's a couple of things that make me hopeful. One is that unfortunately, in the previous administration, under Governor Hogan, his Maryland Energy Administration and the PSC members that he appointed, the Maryland Energy Administration asked the PSC, sort of sided with Ocean City, asked the PSC to reconsider. It was related to a change in the turbine size that was tied to technological advancement. And so that reopened everything. There were hearings. There were all this kind of thing.</p><p>And so we're moving to we have a new administration. Governor Moore is 110% behind developing offshore wind, and his Energy Administration is 150% behind developing offshore wind, and the new members of the PSC are being appointed now and behind offshore wind. And so I just think even if there were to be filings from folks who oppose it, we're not necessarily going to have the same slowdown that we saw over the last couple of years that came from that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The glory of a trifecta. I've been doing several pods over the last year, basically talking to state legislators in these states with new Democratic trifectas about individual bills and stuff, which I'm very interested in, but also trying to sort of make the meta point that like, wow, look what happens when you elect a Democratic trifecta in a state. They go do stuff. So one of the things I ask all such people is how helpful or not were Republicans in getting this bill passed, developed and passed? And more broadly, how helpful or not are Republicans on the broader issues of clean energy in Maryland?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>So we did have a bipartisan vote. We had some Republicans in both the House and in the Senate voting in favor of the bill. I think that the folks who voted in favor of the bill, definitely because of the conversations I had with them, they could see that there was a real economic advantage to Maryland continuing to grow this. They could see jobs, they could see jobs in their districts. They could see jobs in their communities, and they could see that they were going to be really good jobs. And so I think that that was helpful.</p><p>I think that the opposition, unfortunately, in my mind, is tied to some of these culture wars I don't think that there's anything about — I don't understand. I work really hard to have relationships with all of my colleagues, including the Republican colleagues. And even when I work on understanding what the perspectives are, where we disagree, I don't understand where there is disagreement on the extraordinary economic opportunity of being out front on an emerging industry. Seems we would all share that value, clean air, those kinds of things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But what about liberal tears, though? This is going to create a shortage of liberal tears.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Is that what it's going to do? I'm not familiar with that theory.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, liberal tears are the top policy priority of the Republican Party.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>I got you. Okay, I'm with you now. Sorry. Yes, well, that's true. I wouldn't have as much to cry about. I remain hopeful that as the industry grows and as it shows itself for what it can be as an economic driver in the state, I think that what we'll see is kind of iteratively more and more consensus.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there an obvious next step in offshore wind policy? Specifically, like, is there an obvious next thing to do or is this you're going to wait for a few years and see how this plays out? What's the agenda?</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>So the next thing is really to make sure these things that we just passed happen. Right. So we need to make sure the Public Service Commission starts on this process, the transmission process, working with PJM as quickly as possible. I will say, I also do work with other legislators in other states really trying to push PJM to fix the interconnection queue. I met recently with a FERC commissioner on this. That broader issue of fixing that interconnection queue and the problems with it I think are related to this. It also affects other clean energy, but related to this.</p><p>So that's not necessarily a specific legislative policy, but it is something that I will be working on and others in this area.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not really clear what it is, what that solution is, honestly.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Well, if you'll indulge me for a second, David, I will tell you about one of the bills that I had this year that did not move forward. But part of the problem with PJM is in addition to the fossil fuel interest having so much power, it's not very transparent. Right. And so one of the bills that I had this year was to require that all of the Maryland so we can't change that directly. Right. Like, I don't have authority over PJM, but we do have authority over Maryland utilities. And so I had a bill that would require that all of Maryland utilities who vote in the lower level of the PJM decision making would have to disclose their votes.</p><p>These are the undisclosed votes. We have to disclose their votes and explain how they're in the public interest and they would have to do that annually. Right. It's a great bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I love that.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Thank you. We got out of the House and we couldn't get out of the Senate this year, but I'll be bringing it back and a lot —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, my God, I bet they hate that. I bet they hate that bill.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Exelon invested a lot in making sure that that bill didn't move. But my colleagues in other states who are also concerned about PJM and transparency are also bringing that bill. And so I say all that to say, it's sort of the big splashy 8.5 gigawatts. That's the stuff that gets the headlines. But it's these other bills that actually, when you ask what else has to be done to move offshore wind forward, to move clean energy forward, like, these other bills are actually part of the package of how we get that done. So that's one thing. And then I think the other thing that I'll just mention is I've been talking to the Department of General Services who's going to do this procurement, and they're excited, and we've been working with them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A totally new thing for our state government to do, right? I mean, this is really from scratch.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Well, sort of. It's worth noting that the state government does procure energy for state buildings. Like, they've been doing that for 50 years, right? So 100 years. So it's not like they've never done RFPs for energy before. Like, they have they do know how to purchase energy, but doing it in this way where you have all these other values that you're asking them to consider in addition to just the price, right, that is new. So in a few years, we'll be ready to actually develop the legislation that creates the procurement for the next six gigawatts right, to get to the 8.5.</p><p>And what we'll have by then is we'll have this experience the DGS has with the state has with this procurement, and we'll hopefully have made some progress on the transmission, and so we'll have that to work into it. And so, really, we're making sure those things move forward, and we'll be able to take all of that into account when we figure out how we want to design that six gigawatt procurement, which hopefully will be in a few years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I love it all. Lorig Charkoudian, thank you so much for coming on the pod and sharing with us.</p><p><strong>Lorig Charkoudian</strong></p><p>Thank you for inviting me. It's a pleasure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/maryland-finds-a-more-just-and-politically</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:123211958</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 13 Jun 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/123211958/5c7e37aa8bba78f55a741f84fa3bae19.mp3" length="61780961" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3088</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/123211958/30e13dac1bd363264a5d0ebddf8762d8.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[California's coming transit apocalypse]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Many transit systems are reeling financially in the aftermath of the pandemic, and the situation in California is particularly dire. In this episode, Nick Josefowitz of SPUR and Beth Osborne of Transportation for America discuss the urgent need for the state budget to boost transit funding, and the catastrophic implications if it doesn’t.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADP0mHYH4ODz-mjDAx5ymjIa/volts23.06.05%28beth.osborne.nick.josefowitz%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/california-s-coming-transit-apocalypse"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The pandemic was devastating to America's transit systems — not only the lockdowns, but the enduring shift to working from home that followed. It has left transit systems everywhere desperate for riders and funding.</p><p>Nowhere is that more true than California. The state’s transit systems find themselves at the edge of a fiscal cliff. If they do not receive some new funding from the state in this year's budget — which will be decided and finalized by June 15 — they are going to be forced to implement dramatic cutbacks in service. Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) could eliminate weekend service! It’s grim.</p><p>As anyone familiar with municipal transit systems can tell you, once routes and service are cut, it is extremely difficult to bring them back. And without transit, it will be that much more difficult to build infill housing, get people out of cars, or revive flagging downtown districts.</p><p>It’s a looming catastrophe — for climate, for social justice, for the state’s reputation. So where is the governor? Where is the urgency in the legislature to prevent this? The deadline is rapidly approaching and the escalating urgency of transit activists has largely been met with silence or indifference.</p><p>To discuss the crisis, I contacted Nick Josefowitz. He’s the chief policy officer at SPUR, a California nonprofit focused on sustainable cities that has been one of the most prominent voices raising alarm about the situation. And to avoid total doom and gloom, I also contacted Beth Osborne, the director of DC-based Transportation for America, so she could share some stories about states that <em>aren’t</em> screwing up their transit systems.</p><p>With no further ado, Nick Josefowitz and Beth Osborne, thank you so much for coming on Volts.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Thanks for having us.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Glad to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I have wanted to do stuff on transit for a while. It's always been a little difficult to know how to wrap my head around it, how to carve off a distinct issue or what angle to approach it from. But helpfully, reality has served up a horrible crisis. So just a wonderful excuse to jump into this subject. So before we back out to a more general picture, let's start there. Nick, with you. Just tell us, what is the transit funding cliff crisis and how the heck did it come to this?</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Well, the transit fiscal cliff, as we're calling it, is sort of most acute in California, although it's something that's happening elsewhere as well. And as a result of more people working from home, fewer people are commuting every day. Transit agencies rely in part on fare revenue to sustain themselves, and in California, they rely more on fare revenue than in other places. And as a result, we are about to see massive service cuts for California transit agencies with the big transit agencies in the San Francisco Bay Area most impacted. San Francisco Muni is saying that they're going to have to cut one line a month for the next 20 months.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yikes.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>BART is saying they would have to stop weekend service, potentially stop serving certain stations. It's a real mess. And it's the type of mess that once you're in it, it's very difficult to get out of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this was just the natural upshot or consequence of the pandemic and work from home. There's nothing beyond that that came and took money out of the transit kitty.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Not really, no. It's really just sort of people commuting less. And so much of our transportation infrastructure and our transit systems were built around the commute, and that's what's sort of driven the crisis. But the fact that we've allowed ourselves to be on the precipice is a decision that we've all collectively made, or that I should say in this case, the state government has made. The federal government stepped up during COVID and provided operating support to transit agencies around the country to help them continue to run buses and trains.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Through the infrastructure bill.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Right, exactly. Through all the COVID relief bills, there was really meaningful support for transit. But that's run out and there's not any more coming. And now it's really up to the state of California to support transit like other states have done.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is really coming down to the wire. So what is the wire exactly? What is the deadline here?</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>So the deadline is June 15. That's when California is constitutionally required to adopt a budget. And so it's a good 15 days away. And so we basically have, I think, two weeks here to convince the state, the governor, the legislature that this year would be the year that we need to save transit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so what exactly are advocates asking the government to do? Is this taking money from some other bucket? Is this just raising taxes? Is reallocating something, or is there a pool of money that they have their eye on? In particular, what precisely would you like California legislators to do?</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Well, there's really two things. The first one is that in the Federal Infrastructure Act, the IIJA, there was money that was allocated to transportation and it flowed through highway accounts but is eligible to support transit operations. And President Biden, even in his budget memo, said "Hey, states, we gave you this pot of money and you can use it on transit operations if you want." And so we're asking the state to use some of that money that is not allocated yet, over one and a half billion dollars, to support transit operations. And then the second thing is that California has a cap and trade system —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes!</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>which I'm sure all your listeners are sort of familiar with. And transit is an essential climate strategy. We're almost certainly not going to be able to meet any of our climate goals without massive increases in transit ridership. And so we're also asking the state to take some of the money that's generated by cap and trade and put it into transit operations.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I bet I'm not the only person that hears it this way. It just sounds weird to be in a blue state, a liberal state, an allegedly climate forward, climate leading state, you're begging them not to let transit die. Why do you have to beg them? Why isn't Gavin Newsom, the climate governor, et cetera, et cetera, why isn't he first in line pounding the table about this? Our legislators like, why on earth has it come to this? Why does this require advocacy at all?</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>There's a lot of reasons, but I think, like with a lot of things, it comes down to political power. And the grandma on Social Security who takes the bus to go grocery shopping doesn't have a lobbyist in Sacramento and is not getting state legislators elected. And the interest groups, like the folks who the contractors who build highways, they do have many lobbyists in Sacramento and they're very powerful and very sophisticated. And I think it really comes down to that power dynamic. And not just the power dynamic in this moment, but as sort of a power dynamic that has built up over many, many years where the people that transit serves most are the least powerful people in society.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>And so there is especially at the state level, they've really struggled to kind of get the state to pony up the resources that are really necessary.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You just have to wonder how loud the clanging and banging about climate has to get before that changes. And also the other aspect of this is a lot of this is, as you say, people are working from home. They've abandoned downtowns. And so downtowns are hurting in California. Google San Francisco downtown and spend several days reading apocalyptic accounts. But the thing is, those people that used to come into downtown, at least half of them ish came in on transit. So if the state wants to revive these downtowns, as it alleges to, and there are some pretty powerful interests involved in those downtowns, commercial real estate and stuff like that, and lots of retail, what do they think is going to happen to downtowns if the transit gets cut? Why aren't they at the front of the line?</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>You're absolutely right. For BART, for instance, 80% of BART trips start or end in downtown San Francisco, downtown Oakland or downtown Berkeley. And the geometry of downtowns in California don't allow them to actually be served by simply cars. So we estimated that if we were to replace just a fraction of the BART riders that come into downtown and they were to drive every day, we would need a new square mile of parking in downtown San Francisco. And downtown San Francisco is not much larger than a square mile. So it's a pretty existential issue for these downtowns. And in downtown San Francisco, you have office buildings that are 30 stories built with six parking spaces.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the stadiums, too. I forgot about this. Aren't there downtown sports stadiums with very little parking?</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Yes, it's amazing. I think that the Giants stadium in downtown San Francisco has the least parking of any baseball stadium in the country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that blew my mind.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Something like that. Yeah, at least vying for that title. And so I think what's happened is that this is a crisis that has kind of snuck up on people because, like with so much of the discussion in California around climate, every politician says the right thing. They all say they care about it. They care about climate. It's their top priority. They vote for goals that sort of set the state on a path to zero carbon future. They all support transit deeply, deeply, deeply. And then to a certain extent, everybody was taking their word for it on this one, that they actually did care about transit.</p><p>It was only about a week and a half ago when the proposals actually came out, that the legislature passed their budgets, that we realized that there was no money.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Nick, I think you might be really hitting on something very important that goes back to something Dave said earlier, which is how loud does the clanging have to get on things like climate and equity before people realize they need to fund transit? And it comes down to the fact that, a, no one thinks about the transportation system and climate. They think they're going to electrify all the vehicles and everything will be fine. Two, they don't think about transportation policy really much at all. It's very much a build stuff and go to the grand opening sort of approach, even in the most thoughtful of states.</p><p>And there is this perception, this mythology that Democrats are good on transportation. I don't know where this came from. There is no evidence of this. Some of the greatest updates to the transportation program, which are quite old at this point, having transit added to the federal program, happened in the early 80s, pushed by House members that represented cities. And at the time there were a fair bit of Republicans there. It was not a Democratic thing. It was not a progressive thing. It was an economic thing. And I often find that the best folks to convince to do transportation differently are those that are looking to make their money go further, not the climate and equity folks.</p><p>It is the folks that are saying this doesn't seem to be working and it seems to be wasteful. And you can get further with conservatives on that a lot of the time. So laying back and assuming that so called progressives are going to stand up for transit has always been a losing strategy that somehow no one has noticed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let me ask you about that then, Beth, because you have sort of a national perspective on this. The fact that transit had an anemic, let's say support, grassroots support, and then relatively anemic support, even among Democrats, has been true for a long time. All you have to do is look at where states spend their transportation dollars, like in blue states and red states. It's all going to highway, highway, highways. But it seems like to me, at least in parallel with the rise of the clanging and banging about climate change, there's been the rise of the YIMBY movement and the movement about more housing and the moving about cities and urbanism and transit and bikes, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p>It seems like there is something like a grassroots upswell happening. Do you see that being of sufficient size and scale to change that basic calculus? The calculus being nobody loves transit, nobody will fight for it.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Well, I think it's growing and it is moving in that direction. It's really positive to see people pushing back on things that used to be considered too nerdy, too in the weeds to get involved in, like fights about parking minimums and fights about single family housing and things like that. So there is something happening that is positive. We have a lot of ground to make up and we have a very short period of time to do it. But I don't know that it's a lack of love for transit. I think it's a lack of thought about transportation and transportation policy. That people don't feel like they need to go deep on this because transportation is just the bipartisan good news story that doesn't have deep policy connected to it for most elected officials.</p><p>That is not always true. There are some excellent examples otherwise, particularly the leaders in Minnesota who really just showed the rest of the country up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We're going to get to that later so that we're not depressed the whole time we're talking.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>But I will remind us all that the fight here in DC, to come up with that federal operating support, happened with a Republican Congress under the Trump administration. And a great deal of that money, that original $25 billion that we got in 2020, was to a large extent thanks to Senator Wicker from Mississippi, who really stepped up on behalf of his own transit systems in Mississippi and he knew that they were important.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't associate Mississippi with transit.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Let me just say that Senator Wicker also, from an economics perspective, is the reason we have a robust rail program in this country. So the champions come from many different places. But I have to say it's rarely amongst the big elected, so called climate champions, it really tends to be people who see some real potential locally. Senator Wicker has been very involved in starting Gulf Coast inner city passenger rail service, and he's very close with his transit agencies and his local governments. So that fight was successful in DC. Because people understood fundamentally that if we didn't have transit for nurses and lab techs and people like that to get to the hospital during the COVID crisis, it didn't matter if you had a car.</p><p>And that was so obvious to everybody then that we were actually at my organization, Transportation for America, making the case for more money than even the American Public Transit Association was asking for, and we got it. So it was not a hard fight. People instinctually understood that we needed transit to survive and that the feds, who have never supported operating assistance at that level before and certainly not in cities, stepped up and made it happen. So there is an understanding and a way to make this case, but I think that a lot of us are going to have to learn to be a lot more tough on the progressive, particularly governors who have not been asked to really put their action behind their words.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Nick you're in Sacramento. You're talking about like, there's $1.5 billion of cap and trade money or whatever and you're begging for I mean, this is not like you're asking "Hey, I'd like 50/50 here" you know what I mean, for transit and highways and cars or even close to that, you're really begging for scraps margins. And you would think if you just take a step back from it that in a state like California with its housing problem, with its climate problem, et cetera, that transit would be not the afterthought, not the marginal extra, not the sort of thing that you toss scraps to at the end. Do you see anything like that kind of fundamental shift coming?</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>I don't, though I would really like it to come. And I think there is potentially a moment where transit in California suffers so much that people stop taking it for granted and start to really plot a path forward for it to not just survive but thrive in the future. And there's a real risk for doing that because in many parts of the United States, in many parts of California, transit has gone away and transit systems that people never thought that they could live without just went away. They weren't supported by the state, they weren't supported by the local communities, and they just went away.</p><p>And then it becomes incredibly difficult to bring them back, incredibly expensive. So there's advocates that are this weekend putting on a series of transit funerals all over the Bay Area to try and try and help make it real for decision makers. And there's going to be a priest that buries the bus and there's going to be a band that plays Taps and the whole thing, right? But I think people struggle to really internalize that these transit systems, this transit service is really at risk in the way that it is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One more question for you, Nick, before I get back to you, Beth, with some more national stuff. But in terms of California, I mean, obviously this is a crisis and what is most needed in the short term is just money to save these things. But are there other particular reforms that you would like to see in how transit gets funded that might make it, let's say, less crisis prone, more stable in the future or even, god forbid, have enough money to expand and not just limp along, barely surviving?</p><p>Totally, and I think that that's been a really important part of the discussion because we don't want to just kind of get over this particular crisis, get the money to avoid this particular crisis and then be in the same crisis again in a year or two. Yeah, there's, I think, a lot of really simple stuff that's not that expensive that we could do that would really transform people's experiences of riding public transit and get many more riders on the buses and the trains. And in a place like San Francisco, you'd think that this was already the case, but it's not. Making sure that riders know exactly where their buses are and exactly where their trains are so that they know when they're coming.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Real-time transit information, making sure that that's universal would make a huge difference. For instance, one of the things that San Francisco has done quite well, but which it could do a lot more of, is put in place bus lanes, prioritize buses on the street. And there's on one of the big sort of thoroughfares in San Francisco, Van Ness Avenue, during the pandemic, there was a major new bus lane that was rolled out and ridership increased by 30% because it was just faster and it was more reliable. And what's not to like about that? That's kind of what everybody wants out of their bus.</p><p>And so I think there's some really sort of concrete changes that one can make that would really make a difference and would set transit up to thrive. But I think it's also important to appreciate that transit thriving is not something that transit agencies can do on their own. We have almost a century of car-oriented planning of cities being built around cars. And it's going to take a long time to kind of shift that to stop sort of subsidizing people driving alone in their car and to start sort of creating the urban fabric that is conducive to people walking to a bus stop, taking a bus to where they need to go, and then being able to walk to their destination.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Would you like to see California transit move away from its degree of dependence on fares, or do you think fares are a perfectly good way to fund things?</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>I think in the long run, that's really important. And we were saying that transit agencies in California get much less operating support from the state than in other places. BART, for instance, gets 5% of its operating budget from the state of California. SEPTA in Philadelphia gets 50% of its operating budget from the state. And many of California's largest transit operators compared to their peers are dramatically underfunded by the state. And that wasn't really sustainable before COVID and it's hella not sustainable now. And that's something that I think the state really needs to step in on and it has the resources to do it. It just needs to make the right decision.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You also have a bunch of transit agencies. Like isn't it a county by county thing in terms of transit administration?</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>You know, there's 29 transit agencies in the Bay Area. There are many more in LA metro area.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That can't be the right way to run things, can it? I mean, when I hear local control like that, I think somebody at some point did that because they wanted to block transit. That's why you bring control to a local area, right, is because you don't want transit, because you don't want the poor people coming. Did I guess right about how it ended up that way?</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Well, that's certainly the case for a lot of it. And then sometimes it's someone really wanted to build some rail extension and it didn't make sense to anybody else and so they decided to create their own transit agency just to build their own rail extension or whatever it is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is consolidation in the cards or do you think it would help?</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>I think the challenge is that consolidating transit agencies is really hard. And you even see this in the corporate sector where mergers often go bad. And I think in government it's really difficult to ring out efficiencies from merging agencies. And what we do know is that in the short term there will be significant costs as there are with all mergers and the benefits will be felt over time. And so I think it's difficult at this moment when we're really trying to help transit survive to impose another cost on them and say, "Okay, now you also have to merge."</p><p>So I think it makes sense to kind of think about it and to sort of put in place a structure where that can happen in the future. But I don't think it's the right thing to do now because I don't think it will actually deliver all that much benefit, even though it'll certainly be nice. It'll feel better.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>More conceptually neat and tidy.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Symmetry to it.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>I don't know if I think it's that useless. There are ways to make them at least coordinate investment packages, operations planning, and things like that that then make the preservation of their fiefdoms less useful or attractive. So there are ways to go in that direction. There are certainly ways to award those that do that. There's an example of some transit in Maine that's often very tourist-focused. But while they do have different transit agencies behind the scenes, the public-facing profile looks totally unified. So there are things that can be done that make it work better.</p><p>There are also things we need to do with transit to make it serve all trips instead of just the commute trip. Remember that transit has always been the secondary concern, or maybe even tertiary, where the reason in our country will fund transit is to benefit the driver by moving people during rush hour to work, which is rush hour. That work commute is 95% of our focus in the transportation program because congestion relief is almost 100% of our focus.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, Seattle just got done after 1000 years of trying, putting light rail in place. We raised billions of dollars to build light rail and we ended up just putting it alongside the interstate where its only use is a commuter substitute. Right. It's just a different commute. And all the other benefits of public transit, which as you both know are manifold, were wasted. It was maddening.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>But I think it is important to point out that there is an opportunity now to revisit some of those assumptions. And while the highway building complex is going to justify massive highway expansions, even if the commute never returns to where it was and will probably get the money they want, in spite of the fact that the car trips will not necessarily show up, transit has to justify itself. And so we can use this as an opportunity to think about serving those short trips, those neighborhood-focused trips, going to the grocery, going to school, going to the doctor, all those sorts of things. There's a lot that we can do and Nick hit on some of it just with things like painting bus lanes and giving buses the ability to get through lights faster and things like that.</p><p>I myself can tell you that my commute has benefited immensely from the fact that some bus-only lanes were painted on 16th street in Washington DC. Even with less frequency than before COVID it is a better trip because they don't have to be in the main travel lanes. So there's a lot that can be done.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So Beth, let's pull back a little. I assume that the catastrophe that struck California transit during the Pandemic struck all transit everywhere across the country. Is there a national transit crisis to echo this one in California? In other words, are there lots of transit services that are on the verge of serious service cuts or have other states figured out how to get through this?</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Oh yeah, this did not sneak up on everybody. This has been something people have been worried about. I do worry that other activists are taking their elected officials' words and not really holding them to account. And so this could happen in other places. But yeah, this is an issue here in the Washington DC area. It's definitely something that SEPTA in Philly is seeing. The MTA in New York. I mean this is everywhere. As we are adjusting back to post-COVID times and especially in big cities, a lot of employers are offering people more flexibility, and you can't choose a mode of transportation to go to work if you don't travel to work.</p><p>The bus does not serve my trip to my basement office. So it's something that is hitting a bunch of folks. Look, several states are stepping up and making sure that transit gets through this. Most are just trying to help it eke its way through rather than thinking big about how to make transit really robust.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you think it's inevitable that basically transit, nationally speaking, is going to come out of this worse than it came in? Is it inevitable that there's going to be sort of a national reduction in service and frequency. You don't think so?</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>No, I think it will come out worse in some places and better in other places. There are places that are really rethinking the way they provide transit to their constituents as a result of this crisis. And that is a wonderful updating, and it's thinking creatively and grabbing the opportunity, taking the challenge and turning it into opportunity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Don't let a crisis go to waste. Like whoever said that.</p><p>That's exactly right. And I think some transit leaders are stepping up and offering some visionary approaches, and some elected leaders are also stepping up. And so, yeah, I think we will see some areas come out of this stronger than ever, and others not.</p><p>Tell us what the 80/20 rule is and what it governs and what its effects are and whether that is. Because that seems to me the core of it. Basically, it comes down to money. What is it, and is there any hope of getting around that or changing that very fundamental misallocation, in my opinion.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>So that's at the federal level. And it goes back to something I mentioned earlier, that back in the early 80s, when the Reagan administration was pushing a gas tax increase, a bunch of House members from urban areas stepped up and said, I'm not going to support pouring a bunch of new money into a highway program that's going to be spent outside of my jurisdiction. I want to see some of this money dedicated to transit. And so they raised the gas tax by five cents, and one penny was reserved for transit, and the other four were for highways.</p><p>80/20 split 1982, 41 years ago. I have to say that's the last time urban members really stood up and demanded and got something big in transportation, they've really rested on their laurel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Since it's wild, there are more of them now. I mean, you'd think urbanity in general would play a bigger part in our politics these days because the world is urbanizing, US is urbanizing. That's where our economic growth comes from. And yet we still have this weirdly rural-focused —</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Well, that's partly because of the Senate. And every member of the Senate thinks they represent a rural state. They'll all tell you that. I remember Barbara Boxer saying that all the time when she was representing California. But the other thing is, in the interim, the transportation program was trust funded, which means the gas taxes that came in were protected from the annual spending debate. And I think that cut off knowledge, creativity, innovation, and debate. I think that this is a very Beth Osborne thing. Very few people will agree with me on this, but I really think that protecting the gas tax has been terrible for transportation policy and accountability.</p><p>So at the federal level, we did start pushing in this last reauthorization to go from an 80/20 split to a 50/50 split. And there was some beginning interest in the House. The Senate was not open and President Biden, who is a statewide elected Democrat, who, as I pointed out before, is not normally at the vanguard of transportation thinking, but also a creature of the Senate, also was not a participant in that conversation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But come on, Joe, he's a train guy.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>He's a train guy, not a transit guy. Trains and transit are different. And I doubt he does spend a lot of time riding the transit in Wilmington.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I doubt a lot of senators spend a lot of time on transit.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Now, I do want to point out that at the state level, this is very different. States handle things totally differently and they're not wrapped up in the 80/20 split. But more than half of the states have constitutional prohibitions against spending their gas taxes and highway user fees on transit.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah, California has that too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Specifically, you can't spend it on transit or just specifically, you can't spend it not on anything but highways.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>You have to spend it on highways. Now, I would argue that a lot of those constitutional prohibitions could be gotten around because they aren't phrased very well. They weren't drafted very well. So a highway expenditure could certainly include a bus-only lane. That bus-only lane is on the highway. The sidewalk can be part of the highway. And Colorado back about 20 years ago, just legislatively defined the word highway to mean highways, transit, walking, and biking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, hilarious. Well, that's one way to do it, I guess.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>So California has this same constitutional prohibition, and I think actually one of the big opportunities to get rid of this kind of 80/20 rule and the equivalent of it in states is when we transition away from gas taxes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Which has to happen anyway, right. I mean, that's got to — the gas tax supporting everything is not sustainable as gas.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Cars decline.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>As cars get more efficient. As more and more cars are electrified, we're just going to be using less gas, hopefully. And so I think with a new revenue source, there's a moment to decide "Okay, how do we want to actually allocate that new revenue source?" And we don't have to do the thing that we decided we want to do in the 1970s or the 1980s, which we haven't really been able to revisit since then.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But what about culturally, Beth, there's the money formula and the history of the money sources and then there's just kind of the culture at State Departments of Transportation. I know Washington best, and I have been listening to transit advocates rail against the State Department of Transportation, which has basically occasionally fought the Seattle Department of Transportation, forcing highways, forcing this sort of focus on the commuters that want to come into Seattle from the outside. Is that problem as bad as I have it in my head? Like, are State Departments of Transportation sort of uniquely reactionary corners of the state government, or is that overstating it?</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Well, I think again, a lot of them have funding that's trust funded. And as trust fund brats, they don't have to answer to a lot of people and they're often not held to account for their products. And that's a fault, again of citizens and the advocates and elected representatives. But the trust fund makes it easy to just kind of move along and do the same things you've always done. But I think it's really important to think about what is expected of the state DOTs. They didn't make this up because they have deeply held hatred for transit.</p><p>They were created to build a highway system. That was why they were brought into being. And as they built a highway system, a lot of them had more piled on top of that original purpose. But it wasn't necessarily piled on top with new priorities and robust funding. It was more like while you're doing your main thing, which is that highway building, you should worry about things like transit and pedestrian safety. And like anybody who is charged with a big task and then told to just do extra stuff on the side, you're not going to do that as well as you could.</p><p>And again, state legislatures are a big part of this. A lot of times it is the legislature that is demanding this kind of funding and approach. And if the DOTs do anything but focus on vehicle movement, vehicle speed and congestion reduction, they get torn apart by their state legislatures and frankly, by a lot of the press, because across the country, most of the press that covers transportation really only covers the traffic report, not really transportation policy. We are starting to see a change in that. There's been some extraordinary leadership from the L.A. Times that looked at highways and the harm they do to black and brown communities from taking property next to highways.</p><p>And here in the Washington Post and the New York Times have written really outstanding articles on what highway building and expansion really does for congestion reduction. But this is super new.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>I think one can overstate the power of the bureaucracy as an immovable object and every time we talk about it, it feels a little deep statey when we go there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Talking about state DOTs makes me feel very deep statey Nick.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Nick yeah, well, we all need to somehow indulge that. But what we've seen is that the leadership is appointed by the governor and sometimes there's commissions that are appointed by the governor in the state legislature and who is in those leadership positions makes a huge difference. And with a sort of — if you put people in leadership positions and you keep them there and you put people with similar values in those positions for a number of years, you can really change cultures of agencies. I don't think one can just kind of wave one's hands and say, we're never going to shift these bureaucracies.</p><p>I think there are really powerful tools that the governors and the state legislature can wield. And you've seen that in California. California has been setting climate targets since before I was born, I think. But it was only a few years ago with a really great DOT head that we managed to actually put in place climate targets for our transportation system that weren't just focused on electrification, they were actually focused on reducing how much people drive in a meaningful way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's only the recent round of sort of state level energy and climate policy where transportation is being treated as part of it, as part of the whole complex, and state DOTs are getting drawn in. So Beth, before we run out of time, though, California seems to be butching this, but let's talk about Minnesota. I had a pod a few weeks ago about Minnesota's amazing climate and energy bills. It's passed. If anybody is out there who has not been paying attention, go look at what the Minnesota legislature has done in the last two years. It will blow your hair back.</p><p>It's amazing. It's climate stuff, it's like justice stuff, the abortion stuff just down the line. Amazing. And transportation. So Beth, tell us, what did Minnesota do that you would like to see other states learn from?</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Yeah, and there actually is some real good news across the country as well. And we can copy off of states that have done great things. So in Minnesota, they've got some truly extraordinary transportation leaders, including Senator Scott Dibble and Representative Frank Hornstein, who are both just deep transportation nerds and wonderful for it. And so they both have some transportation policy and funding that will be real game changers. They raised the gas tax and they came up with other funds that will put a great deal of new money in passenger rail and transit. They've filled the funding gap, the operating funding gap for the Twin Cities transit system.</p><p>And they have put a large amount of money into big efforts to expand service, the Bus Rapid Transit system, and passenger rail between the Twin Cities and Duluth. There's also funding for tax credits for people to get electric assist bicycles and funding for better transportation connections for people experiencing homelessness or mental health and just really outstanding thought there. And then there's also a requirement in their new law that Minnesota DOT has to project how much carbon emissions will come out of their projects. And if a project is going to increase greenhouse gas emissions, they either can't move it forward or they have to move it forward with a bundle of transportation projects that will offset that increase.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. That would be so fundamentally transformative for so many state DOTs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It would.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>And Colorado has done something interesting and similar as well. They set up a regulation that requires the same thing, a projection of greenhouse gas emissions from their projects and the requirement that if there's an increase, it's offset by other investments. And that was led by their transportation secretary. Going back to what Nick said about leadership really matters, Shoshana Lou, who I got to work with at USDOT, and really just very thoughtful engagement to get to that role and real buy-in across the state.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Shoshana is amazing. She is a real leader.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I feel like Minnesota and Colorado are sort of like the two liberal kind of superstars of the last few years that don't really get as much hype and praise as the coastal states. But in terms of accomplishments, they both have been just crazy productive. Are there other leading lights that we might not know about?</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Yeah, something else that snuck by a lot of people was the leadership of Virginia DOT over the last eight years or so. They put in place back in 2014, legislation that was approved unanimously by a Republican legislature and signed into law by a Democratic governor, a scoring procedure to prioritize new capacity transportation projects across all modes. That includes measurements that are not typical to transportation. So instead of just looking at congestion relief, they looked at the amount of access to jobs by all modes of travel. And after they passed that into law, they had to figure out how to do it.</p><p>And not only did they figure it out, their partners, actually at the University of Wisconsin, the State Smart Transportation Initiative produced a manual so anyone can do what they have done.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>And they particularly look at access to jobs for people who are in the 20th percentile economically. And then there's another prong where they have to look at coordination between transportation and land use, which they have translated is access to everything other than jobs. So banks and schools and groceries and retail and parks and all those sorts of things. And it turns out that measure is very tightly connected to how many cars one has to own, how much you spend on transportation, how much you emit.</p><p>There's so much connected to that one measure that wraps up a lot of the climate and equity concerns people have, and again, points out why I don't understand what Governor Newsom is doing because he is already dealing with an affordability crisis and transit and walkability is the key to affordability for household expenses. But Virginia really hit it out of the park on that and created a great system. I'll also point to Washington state that now requires a redesign of roadways to safely move everybody, whether they're in or out of a vehicle, on any project that costs more than $500,000. So that's basically every project.</p><p>And a state like Florida, which has really spent the last five to ten years updating all of their rules, procedures, and design guides to think about how to design roadways for all people and have some extraordinary guidance out there for folks to look at, they could apply it a little more consistently.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Isn't Florida rock bottom on pedestrian fatalities? Or am I making that up?</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Well, according to our report, Dangerous by Design, they were recently leapfrogged by the state of New Mexico.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh. Congrats, New Mexico.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Not because Florida got safer, but because New Mexico got so much less safe, they jumped over Florida.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, great.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>As an American, this is inspiring all the amazing things that are happening. And as a Californian, it's rather depressing that we can't be emulating them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's striking that California is not in the lead in so many other areas, so many other climate-related and progressive-related areas.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Well, let me give California one shout out along with some other states that I'm excited about. The new leader of the DOT in Connecticut is outstanding. And we've been working with Connecticut, California, Tennessee, and Alaska to do quick build pilot demonstration projects to improve safety for people walking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>And basically, it's almost like tactical urbanism on state highways. And the states are figuring out what procedures they need to put in place to make these things happen. And a lot of these projects are going live as we speak. And California Caltrans is right in there trying to figure out how to adjust their procedures to allow this to happen, to be more innovative and test things out and try new things on their roads to better accommodate people walking and keep them safe. So there is some really exciting things happening, even at the lower bureaucratic level, to make their products better.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I've always thought I feel like narratively ordinary people hear talk about transit and walkability and all this kind of stuff, and they hear it as sort of like a liberal do-goodery, just sort of liberals' aesthetic preferences. They want people to live close together and all this stuff. The whole 15-minute city backlash is hilariously depressing. But I feel like it would be great for transit advocates if we could help spread the narrative, which Strong Towns has done such a good job on, which is that car culture and car-focused culture and car-focused building is bad for state budgets.</p><p>Like dense cities produce GDP. And the less dense they are, the more cars they have to accommodate, the more that goes down. So you get upkeep of highways and upkeep of roads, all the upkeep of sprawly development and all the health drawbacks of particulates and all that, and it's just a net like, car culture is a net negative for state budgets, regardless of your feelings.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>You're absolutely right. And it's not just the state budgets. As part of the kind of the effort to try and help the state of California realize they should save transit, TransForm, an advocacy group that we work with closely published a report that showed that for every dollar of state underinvestment in transit, that costs low-income people $2 in additional costs of having to buy and maintain cars and buy gas and all that stuff. It's also this fundamental drain on people's wallets as well as on state government.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>And I will say the governor that has done the best job, in my opinion, of making this argument is Governor Burgum of North Dakota.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You're bringing out some obscure states here.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>I got to tell you again, I don't know where this mythology came from that progressives get transportation. Do not get it. Some of the most exciting changes are coming out of much more conservative thinkers who recognize we're just wasting money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what's happening in North Dakota?</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Well, Governor Bergam, I believe, he was involved in developing before he became governor. I remember his Main Street page when he first became governor, talking about how a city the size of Fargo or a lot of those upper Midwest cities because they're so big, they have to spend so much more on operating their roadway system per capita. So just snow removal and things like that become extraordinarily expensive versus something that's more compact and has more traditional mixed-use development. He just fundamentally gets that. One of the top mayors that I enjoyed working with is the former mayor of Indianapolis, who was a Republican and former Marine who just recognized it was good for attracting talent in business to build bike lanes and to put showers and bike parking downtown, because that's what people who had options wanted.</p><p>They weren't going to move to a city —</p><p>That's what the youngs want.</p><p>— where they had to drive everywhere. And so he came into some of those one-way, five-lane roadways and took space away from cars and expanded the highways and created a massive bike ped network. And when people complained to him about him slowing down traffic, he said "Absolutely, I did, and you're welcome. I have made things so much safer."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>His lips to God's ears. That's amazing. Well, we're out of time. This is super interesting, super educational. But Nick, I wanted to end with you since we began with the crisis. Let's end with this crisis. Namely, if you are a Californian who's concerned about this upcoming fiscal cliff, that transit is about to go off and these huge cuts in service that are looming, what should you do? Is there a clear mechanism of feedback? Or is there a bill to push or what's the mechanism to make your voice heard on this?</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>Savecaliforniatransit.org is where you can go, and it will give you the tools and the information you need to contact the governor, contact legislative leaders, and say that you don't want California without transit. You don't want a Bay Area without BART. You want to be able to still get on the bus, come next year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And I think nationally, we should be able to agree. We're to the end of the period where you're allowed to call yourself a climate champion if you're not on the case, on land use and transit and density, et cetera.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>100%.</p><p><strong>Nick Josefowitz</strong></p><p>That ended on this podcast right here, right now. You are no longer allowed to do it. It's over. It's cold.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, Nick, Beth, thank you all so much for coming on.</p><p><strong>Beth Osborne</strong></p><p>Thanks for having us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/californias-coming-transit-apocalypse</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:125338656</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 11 Jun 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/125338656/9838eeeb8b0b752993cf63ff4ba8442c.mp3" length="63484165" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3173</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/125338656/4653b790ff2b4ee4d8bdd6e7fcec9cd9.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to make small hydro more like solar]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Emily Morris of startup Emrgy discusses the promise of small-scale hydropower and the opportunities it could provide for both power infrastructure and water management.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADYdvAEjoDpXwPrOFejkVNva/volts23.05.31%28emily.morris%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/how-to-make-small-hydro-more-like-solar"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hello Volts listeners! I thought I would start this episode with what I suppose is a disclaimer of sorts. I suspect most of you already understand what I’m about to say, but I think it’s worthwhile being clear.</p><p>Every so often on this show, like today, I interview a representative from a particular company, often a startup operating in a dynamic, emerging market. It should go without saying that my choice of an interviewee does not amount to an endorsement of their company, a prediction of its future success, or, God forbid, investment advice. If you are coming to me for investment advice, you have serious problems. I make no predictions, provide no warranties.</p><p>The fact is, in dynamic emerging markets, failure is the norm, not the exception. My entire career is littered with the corpses of startups that I thought had clever, promising products — many of whom I interviewed and enthused about! Business is hard. In most of these markets, a few big winners will emerge, but it will take time, and in the process most promising startups will die. Such is the creative destruction of capitalism. I'm not dumb enough to try to predict any of it.</p><p>More broadly, I am not a business reporter. I do not have much interest in funding rounds, the new VP, or the latest earnings report. (Please, PR people, quit pitching me business stories.) I do not know or particularly care exactly which companies will end up on top. I am interested in clever ideas and innovations and the smart, driven individuals trying to drag them into the real world. I am interested in people trying to solve problems, not business as such.</p><p>Anyway, enough about that.</p><p>Today I bring you one of those clever ideas, in the form of a company called <a target="_blank" href="https://emrgy.com/">Emrgy</a>, which plops small hydropower generators down into canals.</p><p>Now I can hear you saying, Dave, plopping generators into canals does not seem all that clever or exciting, but there’s a lot more to the idea than appears at first blush. For one thing, there are lots more canals than you probably think there are, and they are a lot closer to electrical loads than you think.</p><p>So I’m geeked to talk to Emily Morris, founder and CEO of Emrgy, about the promise of small-scale hydropower, the economics of distributed energy, the ways that small-scale hydro can replicate the modularity and scalability of solar PV, and ways that smart power infrastructure can help enable smarter water management.</p><p>Alright, then, with no further ado, Emily Morris of Emrgy. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Thank you for having me. It's exciting to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You know, I did a pod a couple of weeks ago about hydro and sort of the state of hydro in the world these days. And one of the things we sort of touched on briefly in that pod is kind of small-scale, distributed hydro, but we didn't have time to really get into it. And I'm really fascinated by that subject in general. So it was fortuitous a mere week or two later to sort of run across you and your company and what you're doing. Your sort of model answers a lot of the questions I had about small-scale hydro.</p><p>Some of the problems I saw in small-scale hydro, just because it just seems to me so at once small, but also kind of bespoke and fiddly. And your model sort of squarely gets at that. So anyway, all of which is just to say I'm excited to talk to you about a model of small-scale hydro that makes sense to me and some of the ins and outs of it.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. And I'm thrilled to be here. I'm thrilled to tell you more about our model. And I love that you called small-scale hydro bespoke because I was talking with one of the larger IOUs a few weeks back and they referred to hydro as artisanal energy. And I got such a kick out of that because it is in so many ways, hydro can often be a homeowner's pet project that has a ranch or something like that. And bringing hydro into a world in which solar panels are taking over distributed generation and utility scale, and doing it in such a standardized, modular, repeatable format, bringing that architecture into water, is something that hasn't yet really been done successfully. And what we're trying to do here at Emrgy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>it is kind of like a lot of this echoes solar. It's sort of an attempt to sort of replicate a lot of what's going on with solar. But we're getting ahead of ourselves. Let's start the business model is, to put it as simply as possible, is you make generators and you plop them down into canals. So let's start then with canals, because I suspect I am not alone in saying that I've gone almost all my life without thinking twice about canals. I know almost nothing about them. Like, what are they? Where are they? How many are there?</p><p>This water infrastructure kind of surrounds us is almost invisible. So just talk about canals a little bit. What are they used for and where are they and how many are there? What's the sort of potential out there?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Yes, canals are almost invisible, but my goal is that after this podcast, you'll never look at a canal the same way you'll look at it, as a source of energy. That, man, we should be tapping that energy and using it. Canals are our main target market. They're really our only target market right now. We get asked all the time, well, couldn't you do this in a river? And couldn't you do this in tides? And the answer is yes. If you're focused on the engineering but as a commercial founder at Emrgy, I'm focused on the market and where can we install projects today that can be immediately delivering economic benefit and environmental benefit.</p><p>And so canals are that market. A canal is an open channel of water conveyance that's moving water from one place to another for a specific purpose. That purpose might be because it's raw water that's being delivered into the city to be treated for drinking water. It could be that it's an agricultural channel taking water from a river out to farmland. It could be an industrial flow of water that's coming from a large brewery or a large factory and delivering that into either a river or another piece of water conveyance. But canals are seemingly invisible. I'll be honest, when I started Emrgy, I thought that the technology would first thrive in a water treatment environment.</p><p>There's 30,000 water treatment plants in the US. And many tens of thousands all around the world. And that water is running 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365. And man, the ability to take something modular that looks and feels like solar in terms of its ability to seamlessly integrate into the surrounding infrastructure, but deliver power in a baseload format was something that immediately, I thought, water treatment. Yet when I was really early in my entrepreneurial journey, we did our first pilot at the city of atlanta's largest water treatment plant. And I went out to Los Angeles and gave a white paper on it at LADWP.</p><p>And when I was there, the city of Denver had two representatives there. And they came up to me after my presentation, and they said, we think you're thinking about this all wrong. You got to come to denver and see what we've got in terms of water infrastructure. And when I went out to Denver that next couple of weeks, I spent three days touring probably 500 or 600 miles all around the Denver metro area of canals that are transporting water. You may not know that the water you drink in denver actually comes from the other side of the continental divide, and they bring it into the city of denver through a series of canals and storage reservoirs that allow for the appropriate amount of treated and stored water for the city.</p><p>And so when I was there, I thought about, okay, as a business model, being able to deliver one to ten of these modules at 30,000 water treatment plants sounds like I need a big sales force. And then looking at the Denver infrastructure and seeing hundreds of miles of uniform canal that's transporting water where thousands or tens of thousands of these generators could be deployed with one partner just made a ton of sense. And so then I started peeling back the curtain on that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You say one partner. So are most of these two of the sort of features of canals? That came as somewhat of a surprise to me, and I'm sure you're familiar with this response is, first, when I thought of canals, the first thing I thought of was agriculture. I assumed they were mostly out in farmland. But what you have discovered is that they are laced throughout urban infrastructure, they are in cities.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Oh, absolutely. It's both. It's certainly both. Our project we have a project with the city of Denver that overlooks the Denver skyline right there near the city. And if you overlay a map of Phoenix roadways with map of Phoenix waterways, you can see two highly sophisticated transport systems all throughout the metropolitan area. Not just Phoenix, think of Houston 22 canals and bayou's flow all throughout the urban metro area that are both a source of water or even an attraction for the city, but also have an inherent energy, sometimes too much energy during hurricane season and whatnot to be able to harvest and hopefully deliver value from as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and so the other feature is they're not privately owned for the most part. Most of these canals are operated by a city municipal water district.</p><p>Is that sort of the standard?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's correct. Typically there is an organization that manages the water infrastructure, the canal infrastructure. It is often public. It can be a political subdivision, like a municipality or a local not for profit organization or co-op. It also can be a private canal company, although those typically remain nonprofits. They're typically a public service for the good of the recipients of the water.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But the point is, you are not having to track down a bunch of individual owners of individual canals. You can get at a bunch of canals through one partner.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>That's absolutely the case. And it's all public record the managers of water infrastructure and their contact information. You're not going and knocking on someone's home asking if you can put something in the backyard or something like that. This is an operated and often, from their contractual perspective, they're typically buying water from an entity and selling water to a series of entities, buying water from the US Government and selling it to farmers, something like that. And so the reporting aspects about that water that flows through, they tend to be detailed. They tend to be long running. And so as you think about developing a resource assessment of how much energy is inherent in that water that you can produce electricity from, it's not necessarily like needing to go build a MET station and understand exactly what resources there.</p><p>They're typically well organized, well operated, and well documented.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A well characterized resource.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so you go to these canals. You make a deal with the owners of these canals, and then you go plop down energy generators into the canals. Let's talk about the generators, try to give the listeners kind of a sense of how big one of these things is and kind of what it looks like. What are you plopping down into the canal?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>In terms of physical size. Our generators are an eight foot cube, and they have their own precast concrete structure that holds them together. So you can think of sort of half of a precast concrete culvert, if you are familiar with the construction world, that is an eight foot cube. We do that strategically, they are easy to lift and handle.</p><p>They're easy to transport by trucking or other means. You can even containerize them if you need to. And we place those into the channels without doing any construction, any modification, any impounding of the channels, which is a really important part of the canals, because, as I mentioned before, that water is going to a destination for a purpose. And so going in and saying, yeah, we're just going to build a dam right here in the middle of your canal doesn't seem to resonate so well. And so being able to bring something in that's fully self supported can be placed into the channel and held there by its own weight.</p><p>And it only weighs about seven tons, so it's not a super heavy lift, but it's hydrostatically, designed to not shift or slide or overturn once the water hits it. And inside of that culvert or the concrete structure, there is a vertical axis turbine that looks probably very similar to vertical axis wind turbines that many of the listeners will be familiar with. And so they take advantage of the kinetic energy in the flow using the swept area of the turbine and the speed of the water, and generate torque and speed around the shaft up to the power takeoff and the generator. And so physically, they're eight foot cubes.</p><p>But from a power perspective, our smallest turbine that we sell is a 5 kilowatt turbine. And it's the same physical footprint that the 8 by 8 cube, but it can generate mechanically and electrically up to 25 kilowatts per turbine based on the depth and the speed of the water.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I was going to ask whether the sizes vary. So the generator, the eight foot cube is standard. All the generators come in these eight foot cubes, but the generators themselves vary in size based on the water flow.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's exactly right. We do have a deeper water platform that goes up to about 18ft of water, and then we're working on an even deeper platform in conjunction with the DOE. But right now, our main platform is the eight foot cube. And the beauty of water is that the power is exponential by the speed of the water. And so we can place a turbine in and it can generate 5 kilowatts at say a shallower, slower speed. Or that very same equipment can put out five times the power output if placed in a different location. And so as we think about coming down the cost curve, growing to scale, we can immediately find higher density resources that make sense today, even as a young company that hasn't quite gotten fully to the quantities that other adjacent industries like solar and wind have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So I have a bunch of questions about that. But just this question about size brings up the question about canal size. If you have a standard sized module, I'm assuming that canals themselves are relatively standardized in size. With this eight foot cube, can you confidently say, we can go to more or less any canal and it'll work? Or do canals also vary?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Canals vary, but not substantially. There are standard sizes, and our eight foot cube does cover a wide envelope of canals in the US. And abroad. We do see, though, that this is the array planning and array specification, which is how we deploy these. We never deploy them as single turbines, but really as arrays, just like solar and wind, that with the arrays. It's a very similar planning method to solar is you look at your total square footage across the canal, you look at the gradient of fall along the canal, and you plan out the optimized number of turbine modules that make sense for that canal.</p><p>So sometimes if you have a canal that's 18 feet wide, rather than build two 9 foot cubes, all of a sudden, you do two 8 foot cubes, right. And you standardize and you optimize for cost even if you're not squeezing every single ounce of power out of that flow. And I think that's one big thing that differentiates energy and distributed hydro from traditional sort of small-scale hydro is we're optimizing for cost and scale rather than for utmost efficiency, which is typically where hydro really focuses.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And Volts listeners are very well educated on the fact that the modularity, the small-scale and modularity of solar panels are a huge piece of why they have proven so adaptable and grown so fast. Like the advantages you get from standardization and modularity vastly outweigh whatever sort of marginal gains you could get on either side in a particular canal.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Absolutely. We're big believers in that, our smallest module is an order of magnitude larger than a solar module. But you should think of it absolutely in that same way. We do have people, especially the folks that are really focused in hydro, they say to us, "Oh, your modules are so small, 5 kilowatts or 25 kilowatts, that's so small." And I say to them, "No one ever goes to the solar field and say, 'Hey, your panels are so small.'" It's a totally different mindset that you have to be thinking of the module as the panel, as the individual generator that ultimately goes into the array. And yes, our arrays will likely continue to be on the distribution scale rather than on the utility scale or the large transmission scale. But no question the aggregation of modules is how power grows, this generation of renewables.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let's try to get a sense of just how big they are power wise. So, 5 kilowatts to 25 kilowatts, what's a typical array, and then what's the output of a typical array, and then maybe just to help the listeners kind of get their head around it, how does that sort of compare to an array of solar panels? Like, if I'm the owner of a canal or a network of canals, and I'm trying to decide, do I want to put a bunch of these in there or do I want to say cover the canals with solar panels? What's the scale comparison there?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Well, if you're asking me which one you should do, I would absolutely say both. The answer is both. One does not preclude the other, because this is a great real estate segment to be able to convert to renewables of all types. But when you think about our systems at 25 module, let's say that's 40 turbines to be a megawatt. And some canals are on the smaller side that we look at maybe enough for two or three modules across, some of them maybe ten modules across, just depending on the width of the canal. And so you could place 40 modules as close as, say, half a mile away across those four rows of ten, or it could be spread a much longer distance, it could be a mile or 2 miles for that.</p><p>And really we're optimizing for spacing. Obviously, you don't want to run cable to the point of interconnect any further than you have to. We're optimizing for hydraulics. You want the energy to recover after being taken out by our turbines as it flows downhill. And then ultimately, we want to co-locate these with the offtake and whether that's directly into the grid or behind the meter with a particular industrial or municipal client. Those are typically how we think about this. But when you think about covering a canal in solar panels, I don't have the specific statistics on how many linear feet equates to a megawatt or things like that, necessarily, but you're going to see, most importantly, that you need three times the power output or potentially more to overcome the differences in capacity factors. So with our system, they're typically operating 24 hours a day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So in these canals that water flows through, water is constantly going through there 24 hours a day. I would think some of it at least would be sort of like scheduled or go in one direction and then another direction. Are they all steady 24 hours flows?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Not everything is consistent, of course, but I would say that in the water space, the capacity factor is determined by seasonality and or maintenance schedules, but less by intermittency. It's actually pretty bad for a canal to be turned on, turned off, turned on, turned off, because you end up having other maintenance challenges, things that break issues in the canal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So they want to run them?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>They want to run them continuously. Yes. And so depending on what the water is being used for, whether it's a certain area of cropland and therefore there's a seasonality to the flow that's fairly common, or if it's municipal, it may be a year round flow. Or depending on your region in the arid Southwest, you'll see perennial flows a lot more frequently than you will, let's say in Montana or Idaho, where there's obviously quite harsh winters.</p><p>And so in our case, we target canals that can be the most predictable in their flow and the most continuous. Yet if you have a site that is only running six months out of the year, getting to that 40% to 50% capacity factor because let's say it runs constantly through that six months of the year can still lead to an incredibly exciting impactful project overall with good returns, even though it's not on every day. Right? It's a different mindset.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>I have definitely had water districts say. "Well, what do I do in November, December, January if we're not flowing water?" And I said, "You may not think about it, but every night when you go to sleep, your solar panels also aren't working." It's just a different mindset of something not working every day for 90 days rather than not producing every night. And so doing that educational piece to where projects in terms of their output and their economic value can be highly competitive even at the shorter seasons with canals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the basic point here is that while these generators may not crank out as much power as a solar panel while they're generating, they are generating much more often. They're generating around the clock. And so you have to have kind of three times the power output from a solar panel to end up matching the total power output.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They have the advantage of being base-loady, basically.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Exactly. That's typically what we see is that for canals that are running the majority of the time, you'll ultimately need if you want the equivalent amount of annual energy, you'll need a power capacity on your solar that would be about three times larger than what you would need on the hydro side.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Okay, so you go to a water district, you say, "Hey, we want to generate some power from your canals." You do an analysis of the sort of optimal kind of spacing and placing and then what, a truck comes in or a crane comes in and just sort of like drops these things one by one in the canal. It sounds like installation would be pretty straightforward and pretty low footprint, is that true?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>That's absolutely true. It sounds too simple to say in some ways, but yet simply lifting the turbines and placing them into the channel, making sure that they're level, making sure they're not sitting on top of debris, or boulders or something like that, that may have fallen in the canal is important. But placing them in the canal correctly is the most important aspect of the installation. That's unique to Emrgy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So they're not connected in any way it's just the weight of the thing holding it in place. It's not literally not connected to anything. There's no screwing or attaching or bracketing.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>That's correct. There is nothing that is physically attaching it to the canal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So easy to take out.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Owners love this. Yes. Because they can take it out if they needed to ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or move it</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>... often. Because these are operated channels they often will, once every five years or on some periodic schedule, drive up and down the canal or drive a bulldozer down and make sure that all the debris is out or something like that. So they love the flexibility. We tend to see that canal owners like the flexibility of being able to take them out. Now onshore each turbine, or each cross section, I should say, has a power conversion system that has both the control system as well as the power conditioning. And that is something we deliver as well. And it sits on a concrete pad on the side of the channel. But then as you connect those together electrically and then connect them to the grid, there's no innovation from Emrgy there. It's just optimization based on the appropriate electrical balance of system design.</p><p>And so as we think about partnerships with other types of developers, other renewable developers, there isn't a special skill set that installers would need to have to be able to install our system. The balance of system is essentially exactly the same as distributed solar. And all you would need to do is be able to place the turbines in the canals correctly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Yeah, I like simple and dumb. That's resilient and that's what can spread fast.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>And maybe I'll just mention that when I first started this business, I thought it was too simple. I assumed that somebody had already done this before, that it seemed pretty obvious. And as I looked deeper into it, I learned really the two things that I believe have held this space back that now are no longer barriers. One of them is regulatory. And that gets a little bit back to why we focus on canals in general, is that up until 2015, I believe it was all water in the US was permitted for power in the same way. So to place our system in a canal would have been permitted and regulated the same way it would in a river. And in 2015, FERC enacted the qualifying conduit exemption which stated that electric projects within water conduits or conveyance systems were exempt from FERC licensing up to 40 megawatts per project.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>And so now our projects are fully exempt from FERC licensing. And it's a 30-day notice of intent to FERC requesting that exemption, which is lightning fast compared to other projects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. So you're not dealing with permitting issues, NIMBY issues, all the sort of like land issues, all the stuff that's bedevilling wind and solar right now you're sort of doing an end run around that stuff.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>We'd like to think so. I mean, projects are always controversial to some extent, and every neighbor may have an idea of what they'd like to see in the canals. But in terms of general regulatory approvals and project buy in, we tend to see this being much lower barriers than many of the other types of land based systems. The other thing that was a major barrier that has since been lifted is the growing ability to use solar designed or solar inspired smart inverters for technologies and generators other than solar.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about that first. Maybe, I don't want to assume first, maybe just tell listeners what does an inverter do and what does it mean for it to be smart? And maybe tell us about how those were developed in solar.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Sure. So the generation of the power from the water or from the sun typically has been done over many decades and even centuries in terms of hydro, very successfully. The physics of getting energy out of a resource is something that is fairly straightforward. Now, the modern scalability of being able to replicate that in thousands of locations all around the world, conveniently into our modern electricity grid, is something that I would say has been hugely influenced through the development, industrialization and scalability of the smart inverter. And what I mean by that is actually readying the power, conditioning the power, making it grid compliant and ready for delivery into the grid, has received billions of dollars of industrial development in the solar industry to take it down in size and form factor as well as in efficiency.</p><p>And if that was not available to us, and Emrgy had to build out an industry much like solar to drive industrial development of power conversion and power delivery, to be able to install it globally, we would be on a 20- to 30-year timeline. We would need billions of dollars and or it would just be really slow. If we had to do all custom power equipment, then every utility would have to come in and do a full engineering review of what we were building, whether it would cause problems to the grid. And what we have been able to take amazing advantage of is the ability to utilize a smart inverter that was originally designed for solar and largely used in solar, and be able to use that to control our hydro-generator without invalidating its utility certifications.</p><p>You have to know quite a bit about power systems, perhaps, to know that controlling the power curve in a hydro-turbine and controlling the power curve in a solar panel is very different, a lot trickier than one might think. And being able to manage the torque and speed, to be able to manage and optimize a power point along the curve is tricky when you're trying to use a device that was made for a different industry. And so one of the biggest areas of Emrgy's technology, development and innovation is not necessarily in the. Physics in the water of how we're getting energy out of the water.</p><p>It's really how are we delivering that electricity now to the grid in the most cost effective, high efficiency and streamlined way. And being able to use the same inverters that the solar industry is using helps put us on a much closer playing field to be able to deploy these projects in an apples to apples way. And even, as you mentioned, do you do solar or hydro and canals? It's great to do both and potentially even put them right into the same inverter. And that's the beauty of where distributed generation, I believe, is going, is to a flexible environment where you can have that base load, have your peaking load, have your energy storage and share as much of the cost along the system as you can.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you can just use smart inverters that are designed for solar off the shelf. There's no engineering or tweaking or fiddling you have to do.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>So we're prohibited from doing a ton of tweaking inside the inverter because obviously they go through quite a level of utility compliance and we can't necessarily change that. However, what we have is a power controls unit. It's a NEMA panel that looks like a standard electrical panel that sits right next to the inverter and that contains all of our fairly sophisticated controls and mechanisms to allow us to control our system and have it communicate with the solar inverter in a language that the solar inverter understands most of our innovation. And IP in that area sits in that power controls unit rather than in the inverter itself.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. And so what do we mean when we say smart inverter? I've always kind of wondered, do people just say that because it's like sophisticated? Or is there a clear distinction between a dumb inverter and a smart inverter?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>I'm probably not best equipped to handle that question, but I can say that from our perspective, using the inverters that we do use enables us to have both the smart capabilities as it relates to grid following, ensuring the grid islanding or other types of issues are matched. But also for us, having the data aspect of what's collected in that inverter and the amount of information that we can pull off of it is very helpful for us. I mean, we collect data in a number of ways and using the solar inverter or the smart inverter helps us to triangulate and calibrate that data to ensure its accuracy. So, for example, the inverter will give us power output, real time data in that regard, while we also have sensors off board the system in the water that reads flow information, speed information.</p><p>And so we know if there's a change in power, is that related to a change in flow and we can calibrate that via the sensors, or is it related to an issue in the system? And using both the data off the inverter as well as off of our other data collection systems, helps us to diagnose and monitor device health as well as to especially as we continue to innovate, predict and alert water infrastructure owners of decisions they may need to make.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The obvious service you're providing to a water district is we're going to give you some power, some economical power. But I'm wondering about, if you're collecting so much information about water flow, is that information helpful to the canal owners? In other words, are you able to improve the actual operation of the water infrastructure itself?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>We are, and I believe that this will continue to evolve as the industry continues to evolve as well. But right now the water management, especially out in the field, is managed by an aging population. I think the last figure I saw that the average what they call a ditch tender or ditch rider, someone that is monitoring the health of the water conveyance system, the average age of that title is 56 years old.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A familiar story in so many of these areas.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah. So recruiting young talent, recruiting the right type of personnel is tough and so being able to provide data that can integrate back into a SCADA system or otherwise be able to inform those that are not in the field things that may be happening in the canal is definitely valuable. Now over time as well. The canals have been operated for mainly one purpose for many decades now, which is to deliver water and earn revenues off of delivering that water. They're selling the water now as they will be running water and earning revenues from generating power along the way.</p><p>Working with water districts to optimize their irrigation schedules or their deliveries, to be able to take advantage ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So they could change the way they do things to optimize power delivery too?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Yes, I mean, this is one of the very few generation types, particularly on the distribution grid, that is a controllable feedstock. And so to the extent that a water district can generate double the revenue by flowing water during specific times, there are incentives to do so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>And we can provide those. And so aligning incentives between the water district Emrgy and the farmers that they serve to be able to really bring a powerful force of renewable energy onto the grid at the right times of day or the right times of year is something that we believe distributed hydro has a unique ability to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I'm guessing that this is in early days, this idea of a water district sort of co-optimizing water usage and power output. I would guess that there's a lot of running room there to find efficiencies and find better ways of doing things.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>That's right there is it's early days. I mean, we are working one of our municipal clients, the canal that we're installed within, its only job is to manage water levels between two reservoirs. So there is a ton of operational flexibility within that section and being able to work with them on optimization of the water flows to drive power is something very straightforward. Now, there are other districts that have been doing things the same way for 50 years. And perhaps they're going to be more of the districts where you have to put the incentive out there first, let them start to see how it changes their income with a change in flow and guide them on that, and we'll see it over time.</p><p>But this is one thing that we talk about a lot at Emrgy, is how to adequately predict future behaviors with water as a function of how this partnership can work together and provide them both the data, the revenues and other services that are helpful.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You could even imagine water districts with an array of these turbines installed maybe playing a role in demand response type things. In other words, they might have the ability to sort of turn it up and down on demand as a source of value.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Absolutely, and they can do it both on the water side as well as somewhat on the power side as well. If you're familiar with the energy water nexus, the concept that it takes quite a bit of electricity to move water, move and treat water, a lot of these water districts are huge electricity consumers. And so one thing we often talk about with districts is what are their highest consumers of electricity? Is it a particular groundwater well? Is it a particular pumping plant? Is it a particular water treatment facility? How can we both utilize the water to drive demand response and to drive smart operation of water and therefore power?</p><p>As well as should we cluster these systems around some of those highest consumers even in some ways behind the meter or along with energy storage to where they're able to keep that demand down into a whole different echelon from what they've been operating at?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, this raises the question of in your installations so far, who's buying this power? Who's the modal kind of consumer? Is it the water districts themselves? I mean, they're big electricity consumers. You can see this as kind of a self contained loop kind of thing where they're sort of generating the power that they're using or are you selling it into the grid? Are you selling it to particular off takers or is there a standard model yet?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>There's not a standard model yet. I would say the most common models are power purchase agreements directly with the water district so buying power from us rather than from the grid. And in many cases, if we're in states that have advantageous net metering, which I know are becoming fewer and fewer each year, but able to use that type of arrangement where essentially they're receiving a bill credit and then remitting those savings onto Emrgy</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And net metering works the same here as it does for solar panels?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly the same. Exactly the same. Down to the same form you fill out from the utility, all the same. And then there are certain states that have advantageous hydro avoided cost contracts where we can just pull directly on a standard offer from the IOU in the area that can allow for a bit of a streamlined contract negotiation. Then when you're meeting with the district, you're only talking about how much we're going to be paying the district to host the system and share those revenues with the IOU rather than contracting with them on power purchase directly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. A little easier for them. And that sort of raised my next question, which is, is the business model that you go to a water district and sell it these turbines and then it operates these turbines, or is this a power as a service type of arrangement where you own the turbines and operate them and just sell the power to the districts?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah, Emrgy has always been organized with a goal toward power as a service. We're currently doing that, although in our first reference projects, we needed to sell the turbines just to get equipment out there, get people familiar with it, which we were successful in doing. Now we're focused primarily on a power as a service model. Although water does tend to be an industry with a high value on ownership. And so many of the districts we work with, they're either interested in being a part owner, they're interested in a future buyout option or transfer of ownership option, just because it's quite common that the manager of the water district grew up at the water district, had maybe a father or grandfather that worked there.</p><p>And so they focus on generational outcomes. They want to see long lasting systems. They don't want to see us come in, plop something in and then blaze off. They want to know that we're going to be there for the long haul, which with water power that is one of the other benefits is that this is an electromechanical system that if properly maintained, will last for many decades. It doesn't have that inherent chemical degradation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, solar panels are I think the official is 20 years, or in practice they last a little longer than but I think they're like generally certified for 20 years of operation. What's one of your turbines? Is there a specific fixed time period that you guarantee or how long will these last?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, we market 30 years. We seek out 30-year contracting arrangements on both site hosting and power production and sales. But truly there's nothing that drives that 30 years aside from that's what our clients are used to seeing from solar or wind or other types. For us, if these systems continue to be maintained, well, we do do an overhaul every 15 years and make sure that all the equipment is well maintained. But ultimately I was just in Idaho, a few weeks ago and there was a hydro-plant there that had similar materials, similar bearings, similar turbine blades, generators.</p><p>It was 113 years old. And I won't live long enough to know if one of our turbines can last that long, but there isn't anything inherent of the system that just breaks down and ultimately causes it not to function.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So another question is which these days I find myself asking every guest, which is what is IRA doing for you? Is the Inflation Reduction Act helping you in some specific way either in manufacturing these things and by the way, they're manufactured here in the US?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>They are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's domestic content, what's your relationship with the IRA?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>While we are still early in how the IRA is being implemented and transacted against within our projects, the understanding of how the IRA will provide advantage to the projects is massive for us. You're spot on. Our systems qualify for both the production tax credit and the investment tax credit. And by both, I mean either we can use either one. We meet the requirements for the domestic content requirement, and many of our projects that we're seeking are in energy communities as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, right.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>And so the opportunity for quite a substantial tax benefit as a function of these projects. And I'll say, in addition, some of the other major IRA programs or BIL programs that funded both the Department of Energy's Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, OCED, or the USDA's Rural Energy for America program, the REAP program, are also incredibly advantageous to our projects. A substantial amount of our project pipeline right now is in USDA REAP eligible census tracts, which means that they qualify for either loan guarantees, which provides for commercial lenders to be able to offer lower interest lending to the project, or grant programs for renewable energy systems up to a million dollars each. And so these can provide, especially given that these are not exclusive, so we can bring in both REAP loan guarantees as well as the IRA tax benefits into the same project, making them incredibly attractive even in an earlier stage of a company where we haven't yet optimized cost and whatnot.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting, so you're already in a position where you can go to a water district and offer them a pretty sweet deal, very low upfront costs, a new revenue stream, fairly minimal maintenance. A couple of final questions. First off, you talk about sort of scale and reducing costs. These are pretty simple, as I said before, as one of the benefits. Sort of simple. You have a concrete bracket, there's a vertical turbine, there's some wires and some power control stuff. Where is the room here for technological advancement or is there room for a lot of tech advancement or are you going to get more cost reductions out of scale?</p><p>Or are you, do you think, pretty close already to this being as cheap as it can get?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, in terms of tech advancement. I often describe our systems as sort of like when you drive past a wind farm and you can just tell that it was built in wind 1.0 all the turbines are sort of facing the same direction and they're sort of spaced in a finite manner. And then you drive by a newer wind facility and you can tell they're taking advantage of all of the wake of all the different turbines and they're all oriented differently and they're spaced differently. I call our system still a bit of like that 1.0 feel right?</p><p>We're designing systems and optimizing them for the canals, but there's things that we just can't simulate in any fluid dynamic software until we've got hundreds or thousands of these turbines out there operating.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So learning some learning by doing here.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Oh, absolutely. I mean, there are times we've seen in practice where the turbines are all generating and then let's say the water district starts to they lower their flow and the turbines are no longer fully submerged in the water. And we found that if you ease off of one of the turbines in terms of its electrical loading and it starts to spin faster in freewheel, then it can ultimately push water levels up and the turbines upstream push into their optimal generating capacity. And that gets a little technical. Maybe folks listening want to call me a nerd out about that sometime, I'd love to ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>About hydraulics.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>But nonetheless, we are definitely at the tip of the iceberg in terms of understanding all the different wake effects and how to create an array that is more than the sum of its parts. So I'd say that's a big area for tech advancement. We are currently funded by ARPA-E in advancing that what we call the term we use is called dynamic tuning, tuning the systems as things dynamically change around them. Another area for advancement is certainly around hybrids and micro grids. So you made the comment earlier about solar or this and we really believe that to really become carbon free at the distribution level, it's going to be many different technologies, not one silver bullet.</p><p>And so there's no reason why you shouldn't combine either floating solar or ground mounted or spanning solar together with our system, share as much of the balance of system as possible, drive LCOE down and have a hybrid. Adding in energy storage or even adding in renewable fuels production is absolutely something that you could use our system with. And we're actually, we're funded with DOE on another one of these projects looking at micro-grids for resiliency, because a lot of times that resiliency piece in a micro-grid is diesel, right? When all else fails, you have your diesel.</p><p>And so how can we create something where hydro can be that resiliency piece as something that we're currently working on as well for tech advancement?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>And I think you'll see a lot of we see Emrgy as sort of the base platform, the distributed hydro as the base platform. But ultimately we're interested in pursuing how water infrastructure, which spans, as we already talked about, both rural and urban environments, can ultimately become a key facilitator of the energy transition, not just something that's invisible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Would you Emrgy get into designing and installing hybrid systems or would this be like a partnership with a solar company? Or is it too early to know?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>We already are into designing and specifying hybrid systems and really more so on creating, for lack of a better term, sort of the universal plug right, where you could plug our system and solar and other things into our overall power architecture. And so we're not necessarily out there innovating on the solar side or on the energy storage side, but creating a way that whether it's with a codevelopment partnership or whether it's something that we can source from a manufacturer, the same way that other developers do, with a very flexible and universal application for combining generation and storage types.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, because if there are efficiencies available in optimizing one of your systems, I can just imagine once you get into optimizing systems that are small hydro turbines and solar panels and batteries, the more pieces you have, the more sort of room for optimization and efficiency you have, and the more sort of runway there is to bring down costs for the total system.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>And the more controllability you can add, then the more ultimately this becomes meaningful. At the distribution scale, I think we need more controllability and dispatchability at the distributed scale and providing that baseload resource is one of the key pieces to getting there. And so we don't claim to be experts in microgrid controls or anything like that and definitely seek partnerships in that regard. But I definitely see this as an important piece to the puzzle in how we get to be a more resilient set of carbon-free communities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Maybe just say a word or two about why you think, because there's a long running argument in the clean energy world where you see this, especially in solar, where people say, well, the industrial size, utility scale solar, you get cheaper per kilowatt hour output, which I don't think is controversial. Like if you're just measuring on a per kilowatt hour basis, you're going to get cheaper power out of giant fields of solar than by scattered multiple installations. So what do you see as kind of the advantage of doing all this work in a distributed way rather than just say, like adding some big new dam or some big turbine to some big river somewhere? What do you see as sort of the advantages of power generation being distributed through urban and rural areas in water infrastructure like this?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>I wouldn't call myself an expert on the math, but while I think you're right that at the field the cost per kilowatt hour of a large solar farm is less. Although I don't know that that math holds. If it's the cost of that kilowatt hour to your home, and if you calculated the per kilowatt hour cost to your home for utility or transmission level solar versus local distributed energy, whether that's solar or Emrgy or anything else, I think the number is probably a lot closer and maybe surprising. I'm sure people have done the math. I personally don't know it, but I believe that as we start looking and staring down the barrel, truly, of what it's going to cost our grid, our transmission grid, to maintain modernization and resiliency, if all we do is keep building large utility scale solar farms, the price of delivery to the house is no question going to become higher and higher.</p><p>And if we can successfully generate local energy, then it should be lower cost because you're not going to have those massive grid upgrades. It should be more resilient so that if there's a wildfire halfway across the state, it doesn't affect you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The micro-gridding and ability to island is huge, especially if you imagine it sort of multiplied out to every place with a series of canals, which is more or less every city of any size.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>No question. And so we're big believers in the distributed scale, but again, large hydro and large solar provides such a huge benefit. I think we often take strong stances without realizing all the benefits we enjoy from all the various types of assets that are on the grid. And so I think there's a need for all of it. But I absolutely think that there is a better way to becoming net zero than just covering all of our remote fields in solar and all the batteries that are needed to get there. So being able to bring that more locally in a more continuous format is one solution of, I think, all the many that we'll need to truly become net zero.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, final question is a question that, as you say, you get asked a lot. Do you have an eye on other kinds of distributed water infrastructure or is this like a canal play more or less exclusively? Or are there other like, I didn't even really know about canals, so are there other hidden water infrastructure that I don't know about hiding around? Or can you imagine something this simple and modular and low footprint working in natural water features, streams or rivers or something? What's the sort of next step beyond this?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, we get asked for all sorts of applications that would probably not be on your radar. Whether we can hang these off of oil rigs out in the Gulf, or can we take advantage of the intercoastal waterways on the barrier islands in Florida, or could we use these in tidal environments in Australia or in LNG plants in Singapore? I mean, you name it, we definitely get asked about anytime someone either is driving in their car, looks out the window and sees a flow of water, and they think, "Oh, we should be able to tap into that energy."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, there's energy in all of it.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>They're absolutely right from a physics perspective, but Emrgy is super focused on what we can do and bring value today. Because for me, a clean kilowatt hour generated today is far more valuable than a clean kilowatt hour that I have to plan for and engineer for and design for that can be generated in 2028. And so we're focused on what are near real term opportunities. I would say that we're coming full circle back around to some of the water treatment applications.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to ask, what if there's stuff in the water? I meant to ask this much earlier. Are most of these canals carrying clean water? And if it's not clean, if there's stuff in it, does that muck with your turbines?</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Certainly. If there's undesirables in the water, it's going right through our turbines. We design the turbines to avoid as much as that as possible with some fluid mechanic designs, but we have an operating mode that essentially will flush the turbines if needed. If they're stuck, if there's debris or algae or something on there, that's a very similar mechanism to what you find in a pump to flush it and get rid of any alien items. But nonetheless, I would say that in terms of water treatment, we'd be focused on effluent channels of already treated water that's returning out to a different water source.</p><p>As I mentioned before, we are doing some R&D work related to riverine and tidal resources. When I started Emrgy, I said, "Hey, we're going to pick a market that we can really master. And if we can master the product and master the base platform that can scale, amending it for a specific environment is much easier than trying to create a product in lots of different environments at the same time." So over time, perhaps you'll see us in rivers or you'll see us in tides. I don't think it'll be anytime soon. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that there's 2 million linear miles of surface water infrastructure in the world over the globe.</p><p>And so we'll be pretty busy in the canal market for a long time. And I think building a really impactful technology for this space along the way. But certainly we'd be open to collaborations or exploring other markets as those become, I believe, more accessible and developable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's exciting to me because this is sort of, as we said, modular and repeatable in the way that solar was, but at the very, very beginning of that journey that we've seen solar go through, which is scale expands, it gets cheaper. You find your ways into new niches. You find your way into applications you didn't even know you were going to get near. Just sort of like it's a self reinforcing cycle of sort of scale and cheapness and then spreading to new applications. That's been fascinating to watch in solar, and it's sort of just at the outset here in small-hydro.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>Absolutely. We hope we can leapfrog some of that, having learned from all the things that they've done and being able to actually adopt many of their innovations like the inverters and whatnot. But no question, this is an emerging asset class. There's still tons to learn. And as we scale, I'll like to look back on this podcast a few years from now and see how many of my predictions help.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we'll have to have you back on. Alright, Emily Morris of Emrgy, thanks so much for coming on this really intriguing and exciting new area here, so I appreciate you sharing with us.</p><p><strong>Emily Morris</strong></p><p>This was great, thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-make-small-hydro-more-like</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:123426635</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 06 Jun 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/123426635/34f4523e5e42b6f2bbf2bc33d7117ee9.mp3" length="76295181" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3814</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/123426635/1795eaa3e019c12d5e3cb68ca38add66.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The trouble with net zero]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, environmental social scientist Holly Jean Buck discusses the critique of emissions-focused climate policy that she laid out in her book </em>Ending Fossil Fuels: Why Net Zero Is Not Enough<em>.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAB5WbxWl2XPsrMLjNEGNNm-a/volts23.05.19%28holly.jean.buck%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/the-trouble-with-net-zero"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Over the course of the 2010s, the term “net-zero carbon emissions” migrated from climate science to climate modeling to climate politics. Today, it is ubiquitous in the climate world — hundreds upon hundreds of nations, cities, institutions, businesses, and individuals have pledged to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. No one ever formally decided to make net zero the common target of global climate efforts — it just happened.</p><p>The term has become so common that we barely hear it anymore, which is a shame, because there are lots of buried assumptions and value judgments in the net-zero narrative that we are, perhaps unwittingly, accepting when we adopt it.</p><p>Holly Jean Buck has a lot to say about that. An environmental social scientist who teaches at the University at Buffalo, Buck has spent years exploring the nuances and limitations of the net-zero framework, leading to a 2021 book — <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3MuKV8e"><em>Ending Fossil Fuels: Why Net Zero Is Not Enough</em></a> — and more recently some <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-022-01592-2">new research in </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-022-01592-2"><em>Nature Climate Change</em></a> on residual emissions.</p><p>Buck is a perceptive commentator on the social dynamics of climate change and a sharp critic of emissions-focused climate policy, so I'm eager to talk to her about the limitations of net zero, what we know and don't know about how to get there, and what a more satisfying climate narrative might include.</p><p>So with no further ado, Holly Jean Buck. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Thanks so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's funny. Reading your book really brought it home to me how much net zero had kind of gone from nowhere to worming its way completely into my sort of thinking and dialogue without the middle step of me ever really thinking about it that hard or ever really sort of like exploring it. So let's start with a definition. First of all, a technical definition of what net zero means. And then maybe a little history. Like, where did this come from? It came from nowhere and became ubiquitous, it seemed like, almost overnight. So maybe a little capsule history would be helpful.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Well, most simply, net zero is a balance between emissions produced and emissions taken out of the atmosphere. So we're all living in a giant accounting problem, which is what we always dreamed of, right? So how did we get there? I think that there's been a few more recent moments. The Paris agreement obviously one of them, because the Paris agreement talks about a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks. So that's kind of part of the moment that it had. The other thing was the Special Report on 1.5 degrees by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which further showed that this target is only feasible with some negative emissions.</p><p>And so I think that was another driver. But the idea of balancing sources and sinks goes back away towards the Kyoto Protocol, towards the inclusion of carbon sinks, and thinking about that sink capacity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you say, and we're going to get into the kind of the details of your critique in a minute. But the broad thing you say about net zero is that it's not working. We're not on track for it. And I guess intuitively, people might think, well, you set an ambitious target and if you don't meet that target, it's not the target's fault, right. It's not the target's reason you're failing. So what do you mean exactly when you say net zero is not working?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Well, I think that people might understandably say, "Hey, we've just started on this journey. It's a mid-century target, let's give it some time, right?" But I do think there's some reasons why it's not going to work. Several reasons. I mean, we have this idea of balancing sources and sinks, but we're not really doing much to specify what those sources are. Are they truly hard to abate or not? We're not pushing the scale up of carbon removal to enhance those sinks, and we don't have a way of matching these emissions and removals yet. Credibly all we have really is the voluntary carbon market.</p><p>But I think the main problem here is the frame doesn't specify whether or not we're going to phase out fossil fuels. I think that that's the biggest drawback to this frame.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let's go through those. Let's go through those one at a time, because I think all of those have some interesting nuances and ins and outs. So when we talk about balancing sources and sinks, the way this translates, or I think is supposed to translate the idea, is a country tallies up all of the emissions that it is able to remove and then adds them all up. And then what remains? This kind of stuff, it either can't reduce or is prohibitively expensive to reduce the so called difficult to abate or hard to abate emissions. Those are called its residual emissions, the emissions that it doesn't think it can eliminate.</p><p>And the theory here is then you come in with negative emissions, carbon reduction, and you compensate for those residual emissions. So to begin with, the first problem you identify is that it's not super clear what those residual emissions are or where they're coming from, and they're not very well measured. So maybe just explain sort of like, what would you like to see people or countries doing on residual emissions and what are they doing, what's a state of knowledge and measurement of these things?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>So the state right now is extremely fuzzy. And so I'll just back up and say that my colleagues and I looked at these long term strategies that are submitted to the UNFCCC under the Paris Agreement. Basically, each country is invited to submit what its long term strategy is for reaching its climate goals. And so we've read 50 of those.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Goodness.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Yeah, lots of fun. And they don't have a standard definition of what these residual emissions are, although they refer to them implicitly in many cases. You can see the residual emissions on these graphs that are in these reports.</p><p>But we don't have a really clear understanding in most cases where these residual emissions are coming from, how the country is thinking about defining them, what their understanding of what's truly hard to abate is. And I emphasize with this being a challenge, because what's hard to abate changes over time because new technologies come online. So it's hard to say what's going to be hard to abate in 10 or 20 years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>But we could get a lot better at specifying this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this would just tell us basically without a good sense of residual emissions across the range of countries, we don't have a good sense of how much carbon removal we need. So is there something easy to say about how we could make this better? Is there a standardized framework that you would recommend? I mean, are any countries doing it well and precisely sort of identifying where those emissions are and explaining why and how they came to that conclusion?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>So there's 14 countries that do break down residual emissions by sector, which is like the first, most obvious place to start.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>So, number one, everybody should be doing that and understanding what assumptions there are about what sectors. And generally a lot of this is non-CO2 emissions and emissions from agriculture. There's some emissions left over from industry, too, but having clarity in that is the most obvious thing. And then I think that we do need a consistent definition as well as processes that are going to standardize our expectations around this. That's something that's going to evolve kind of, I think, from the climate advocacy community, hopefully, and a norm will evolve about what's actually hard to abate versus what's just expensive to abate</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Kind of a small sample size. But of the 14 countries that actually do this, are there trends that emerge? Like, what do these 14 countries currently believe will be the most difficult emissions to eliminate? Is there agreement among those 14 countries?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Well, it's pretty consistent that agriculture is number one, followed by industry, and that in many cases, transport, at least short transport, light duty transport is considered to be fully electrified. In many cases, the power sector is imagined to be zero carbon. But I will also say that the United Kingdom is the only one that even included international aviation and shipping in its projection. So a long way to go there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is not really our subject here. But just out of curiosity, what is the simple explanation for why agriculture is such a mystery? What are these emissions in agriculture that no one can think of a way to abate?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>I mean, I think it varies by country, but a lot of it is nitrous oxide. A lot of it has to do with fertilizer and fertilizer production, fertilizer over application and I think obviously some of it is methane too from the land sector, from cows. So I think maybe that is considered a more challenging policy problem than industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is always something that's puzzled me about this entire framework and this entire debate is you look at a problem like that and you think, well, if we put our minds to it, could we solve that in the next 30 years? I mean, probably. You know what I mean? It doesn't seem versus standing up this giant carbon dioxide removal industry which is just a gargantuan undertaking. This has never been clear to me why people are so confident that carbon dioxide removal is going to be easier than just solving these allegedly difficult to solve problems over the next several decades.</p><p>I've never really understood that calculation.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>I think it just hasn't been thought through all the way yet. But I expect in the next five years most people will realize that we need a much smaller carbon removal infrastructure than is indicated in many of the integrated assessment models.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, thank you for saying that. This is my intuition, but I just don't feel sort of like technically briefed or technically adept enough to make a good argument for it. But I look at this and I'm like which of these problems are going to be easier to solve? Finding some non-polluting fertilizer or building a carbon dioxide removal industry three times the size of the oil industry? It's crazy to view the latter as like, oh, we got to do that because we can't do the first thing. It just seems crazy. Okay, so for the first problem here with net zero is we don't have a clear sense of what these residual emissions are, where they come from, exactly how we define them, et cetera.</p><p>So without that, we don't have a clear sense of the needed size of the carbon dioxide removal industry. That said, problem number two here is that even based on what we are currently expecting CDR to do, there doesn't appear to be a coordinated push to make it happen. Like we're just sort of like waving our hands at massive amounts of CDR but you're not seeing around you the kinds of mobilization that would be necessary to get there. Is that roughly accurate?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I think it follows from the residual emissions analysis because unless a country has really looked at that, they probably don't realize the scale of CDR that they're implicitly relying on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so they're implicitly relying on CDR for a couple of things you list in your presentation I saw and residual emissions is only one of those things we're expecting CDR to do.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>There's the idea that CDR will also be compensating for legacy emissions or helping to draw down greenhouse gas concentrations after an overshoot. I don't think anybody is saying that exactly because we're not at that point yet, but it's kind of floating around on the horizon as another use case for carbon removal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So it does seem like even the amount of CDR that we are currently expecting, even if most countries haven't thought it through, just the amount that's already on paper that we're expecting it to do, we're not seeing the kind of investment that you would want to get there. What does that tell you? What should we learn from that weird disjunct?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>For me, it tells me that all the climate professionals are not really doing their jobs. Maybe that sounds mean, but we have so many people that are devoted to climate action professionally and so it's very weird to not see more thinking about this. But maybe the more nice way to think about it is saying oh well, people are really focused on mitigation. They're really focused on scaling up clean energy which is where they should be focused. Maybe that's reasonable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, maybe this is cynical, but some part of me thinks, like if people and countries really believed that we need the amount of CDR they're saying we're going to need, that the models show we're going to need, by mid century they would be losing their minds and flipping out and pouring billions of dollars into this. And the fact that they're not to me sort of like I guess it feels like no one's really taking this seriously. Like everyone still somewhat sees it as an artifact of the models.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>I don't know, I think the tech sector is acting on it, which is interesting. I mean, you've seen people like Frontier mobilize all these different tech companies together to do these advanced market commitments. I think they're trying to incubate a CDR ecosystem. And so why does interest come there versus other places? Not exactly sure. I have some theories but I do wonder about the governments because in our analysis we looked at the most ambitious projections offered in these long term strategies and the average amount of residual emissions was around 18% of current emissions. So all these countries have put forward these strategies where they're seeing these levels of residual emissions.</p><p>Why are they not acting on it more in policy? I think maybe it's just the short termism problem of governments not being accountable for things that happen in 30 years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is a truly strange phenomenon to me and I don't even know that I do have any theories about it, but it's like of all the areas of climate policy there are tons and tons of areas where business could get involved and eventually build self-sustaining profitable industries out of them. But CDR is not that there will never be a self-sustaining profitable CDR industry. It's insofar as it exists, it's going to exist based on government subsidies. So it's just bizarre for business to be moving first in that space and for government to be trailing.</p><p>It just seems upside down world. I can't totally figure out government's motivations for not doing more and I can't totally figure out businesses motivations for doing so much.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Well, I think businesses acting in this R&D space to try to kind of claim some of the tech breakthroughs in the assumption that if we're serious about climate action we're going to have a price on carbon. We're going to have much more stringent climate policy in a decade or two. And when that happens, the price of carbon will be essentially set by the price of removing carbon. And so if they have the innovation that magically removes the most carbon, they're going to be really well set up for an extremely lucrative industry. This is all of course hinging on the idea that we're going to be willing to pay to clean up emissions just like we're willing to pay for trash service or wastewater disposal or these other kind of pollution removal services.</p><p>Which is still an open question, but I sure hope we will be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's totally open. And this is another area where this weird disjunct between this sort of expansive talk and no walk. It's almost politically impossible to send money to this greenhouse gas international fund that's supposed to help developing countries decarbonize, right? Like even that it's very difficult for us to drag enough tax money out of taxpayers hands to fund that and we're going to be sending like a gazillion times more than that on something that has no visible short term benefit for taxpayers. We're all just assuming we're going to do that someday. It seems like a crazy assumption.</p><p>And if you're a business and you're looking to make money, it just seems like even if you're just looking to make money on clean energy, it seems like there's a million faster, easier ways than this sort of like multidecade bank shot effort. I feel like I don't have my head wrapped around all those dynamics. So the first problem is residual emissions. They're opaque to us, we don't totally get them. Second problem is there's no evident push remotely to scale of the kind of CDR we claim we're going to need. And then the third you mentioned is there's no regime for matching emissions and removals.</p><p>Explain that a little bit. What sort of architecture would be required for that kind of regime?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Well, you can think of this as a market or as a platform, basically as a system for connecting emissions and removals. And obviously this has been like a dream of technocratic climate policy for a long time, but I think it's frustrated by our knowledge capabilities and maybe that'll change in the future if we really do get better models, better remote sensing capacities. Obviously, both of those have been improving dramatically and machine learning accelerates it. But it assumes that you really have good knowledge of the emissions, good knowledge of the removals, that it's credible. And I think for some of the carbon removal technologies we're looking at this what's called MRV: monitoring, reporting, and verification.</p><p>Is really challenging, especially with open systems like enhanced rock weathering or some of the ocean carbon removal ideas. So we need some improvement there. And then once you've made this into a measurable commodity, you need to be able to exchange it. That's been really frustrated because of all the problems that you've probably talked about on this podcast with carbon markets, and scams, bad actors. It's all of these problems and the expense of having people in the middle that are taking a cut off of the transactions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So you have to match your residual emissions with removals in a way that is verifiable, in a way that, you know, the removals are additional. Right. You get back to all these carbon market problems and as I talked with Danny Cullenword and David Victor about on the pod long ago, in carbon offset markets, basically everyone has incentive to keep prices low and to make things look easy and tidy. And virtually no one, except maybe the lonely regulators has the incentive to make sure that it's all legit right there's just like there's overwhelming incentive to goof around and cheat and almost no one with the incentive to make sure it's valid.</p><p>And all those problems that face the carbon offset market just seem to me like ten times as difficult. When you're talking about global difficult to measure residual emissions coupled with global difficult to measure carbon dioxide removals in a way where there's no double counting and there's no shenanigans. Like, is that even a gleam in our eye yet? Do we even have proposals for something like that on the table?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>I mean, there's been a lot of best principles and practices and obviously a lot of the conversation around Article Six and the Paris agreement and those negotiations are towards working out better markets. I think a lot of people are focused on this, but there's definitely reason to be skeptical of our ability to execute it in the timescales that we need.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, if you're offsetting residual emissions that you can't reduce, you need that pretty quick. Like, this is supposed to be massively scaling up in the next 30 years and I don't see the institutional efforts that would be required to build something like this, especially making something like this bulletproof. So we don't have a good sense of residual emissions. We're not pushing very hard to scale CDR up even to what we think we need. And we don't have the sort of institutional architecture that would be required to formally match removals with residual emissions. These are all kind of, I guess, what you'd call technical problems.</p><p>Like, even if you accepted the goal of doing this or this framework, these are just technical problems that we're not solving yet. The fourth problem, as you say, is the bigger one, perhaps the biggest one, which is net zero says nothing about fossil fuels. Basically. It says nothing about the socioeconomics of fossil fuels or the social dynamics of fossil fuels. It says nothing about the presence of fossil fuels in a net-zero world, how big that might be, et cetera. So what do you mean when you say it's silent on fossil fuels?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Yeah, so this was a desirable design feature of net zero because it has this constructive ambiguity around whether there's just like a little bit of residual emissions and you've almost phased out fossil fuels, or if there's still a pretty significant role for the fossil fuel industry in a net-zero world. And that's what a lot of fossil fuel producers and companies are debating.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I've been thinking about this recently in the context of the struggle to get Joe Manchin to sign decent legislation. Like, if you hear Joe Manchin when he goes on rambling on about climate change, it's very clear that he views carbon dioxide removal as basically technological license for fossil fuels to just keep on keeping on. Like, in his mind, that's what CDR means. Whereas if you hear like, someone from NRDC talking about it, it's much more like we eliminated almost everything. And here's like, the paper towel that we're going to use to wipe up these last little stains.</p><p>And that's a wide gulf.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>I don't want to seem like the biggest net-zero hater in the world. I understand why it came up as a goal. I think it was a lot more simple and intuitive than talking about 80% of emissions reduction over 2005 levels or like the kind of things that it replaced. But ultimately, this is a killer aspect to the whole idea, is not being clear about the phase out of fossil fuels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you say you can envision very different worlds fitting under net zero. What do you mean by that?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, one axis is the temporality of it. So is net zero, like, just one moment on the road to something else? Is it a temporary state or is it a permanent state where we're continuing to produce some fossil fuels and we're just living in that net zero without any dedicated phase out? I think that right now there's ambiguity where you could see either one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is a good question. In your research on this, have you found an answer to that question of how people view it? Like, I'd love to see a poll or something. I mean, this is a tiny subset of people who even know what we're talking about here. But among the people who talk about net zero, do you have any sense of whether they view it as like a mile marker on the way to zero-zero or as sort of like the desired endstate?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>You know, it's funny because I haven't done a real poll, but I've done when I'm giving a talk at a conference of scientists and climate experts twice I've asked this question, do you think it's temporary or do you think it's like a permanent desired state? And it's split half and half each time, which I find really interesting. Like, within these climate expert communities, we don't have a clear idea ourselves.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's such a huge difference. And if you're going to have CDR do this accounting for past emissions, for your past emissions debt, if you're going to do that, you have to go negative, right. You can't stay at net zero, you have to go net negative. So it would be odd to view net zero as the end state. And yet that seems like, what's giving fossil fuel companies permission to be involved in all this.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Yeah. No, we do need to go net negative. And I think one challenge with the residual emissions is that carbon removal capacity is going to be finite. It's going to be limited by geography, carbon sequestration capacity, ecosystems and renewable energy, all of these things. And so if you understand it as finite, then carbon removal to compensate for residual emissions is going to be in competition with carbon removal to draw down greenhouse gas concentrations. And so we never get to this really net negative state if we have these large residual emissions, because all that capacity is using to compensate rather than to get net negative, if that makes sense.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Given how sort of fundamental those questions are and how fundamental those differences are, it's a little this is what I mean when I sort of the revelation of reading your book. Like, those are very, very different visions. If you work backwards from those different visions, you get a very, very different dynamic around fossil fuels and fossil fuel companies and the social and political valence of fossil fuels, just very fundamentally different. It's weird that it's gone on this long with that ambiguity, which, I guess, as you say, it was fruitful to begin with, but you kind of think it's time to de-ambiguize this.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Yeah. Because there's huge implications for the infrastructure planning that we do right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>It's going to be a massive transformation to phase out fossil fuels. There's a million different planning tasks that need to have started yesterday and should start today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I guess also, and this is a complaint, maybe we'll touch on more later, but there's long been, I think, from some quarters of the environmental movement, a criticism of climate people in their sort of emissions or carbon greenhouse gas emissions obsession. And when you contemplate fossil fuels, it's not just greenhouse gases. There's like all these proximate harms air pollution and water pollution, et cetera, et cetera, geopolitical stuff. And I think the idea behind net zero was, let's just isolate greenhouse gas emissions and not get into those fights. But I wonder, as you say, we have to make decisions now, which in some sense hinge on which we were going to go on that question.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, it was a huge trick to get us to focus on what happens after the point of combustion rather than the extraction itself.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it says nothing about extraction, too. So your final critique of net zero fifth and final critique is that it is not particularly compelling to ordinary people, which I think is kind of obvious. Like, I really doubt that the average Joe or Jane off the street would even know what you mean by net zero or would particularly know what you mean by negative carbon emissions and if you could explain it to them, would be particularly moved by that story. So what do you mean by the meta narrative? Like, why do you think this falls short?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>I mean, accounting is fundamentally kind of boring. I think a lot of us avoid it, right? And so if I try to talk to my students about this, it's really work to keep them engaged and to see that actually all this stuff around net zero impacts life and death for a lot of people. But we don't feel that when we just look at the math or we look at the curve and we talk about bending the curve and this and that, we have this governance by curve mode. It's just not working in terms of inspiring people to change anything about their lives.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, bending the curve didn't seem to work great during the pandemic either. This gets back to something you said before about what used to be a desirable design feature when you are thinking about other things that you might want to bring into a meta narrative about climate change. Most of what people talk about and what people think about is sort of social and political stuff. Like, we need to talk about who's going to win and who's going to lose, and the substantial social changes and changes in our culture and practices that we need. We need to bring all these things in.</p><p>But then the other counterargument is those are what produce resistance and those are what produce backlash. And so as far as you can get on an accounting framework, like if the accounting framework can sort of trick various and sundry participants and institutions into thinking they're in a value neutral technical discussion, if you can make progress that way, why not do it? Because any richer meta narrative is destined to be more controversial and more produce more political backlash. What do you think about that?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>No, I think that the problem is we haven't invested at all in figuring out how to create desire and demand for lower carbon things. I mean, maybe the car industry has tried a little bit with some of the electric trucks or that kind of thing, but we have all this philanthropy, government focus, all the stuff on both the tech and on the carbon accounting pieces of it. We don't have very much funding going out and talking to people. About why are you nervous about transitioning to gas in your home? What would make you feel more comfortable about that?</p><p>Those sorts of relational things, the conversations, the engagement has been gendered, frankly. Lots of times it falls to women to do this kind of relational work and hasn't been invested in. So I think there's a whole piece we could be doing about understanding what would create demand for these new infrastructures, new practices, not just consumer goods but really adoption of lifestyle changes because you need that demand to translate to votes to the real supportive policies that will really make a difference in this problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I very much doubt if you go to talk to people about those things they're going to say, well, I want to get the appliance that's most closely going to zero out my positive conditions. You're not going to run into a lot of accounting if you ask people about their concerns about these things. So these are the problems. We're not measuring it well. We're not doing what we need to do to remove the amount of CDR we say we need. We don't have the architecture or the institutional structures to create some sort of system where we're matching residual emissions and removals.</p><p>And as a narrative it's fatally ambiguous about the role of fossil fuels in the future and plus ordinary people don't seem to give much of a s**t about it. So in this presentation you sort of raise the prospect that the whole thing could collapse, that the net-zero thing could collapse. What do you mean by that and how could that happen?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>So I think this looks more like quiet quitting than anything else because I do think it is too big to fail in terms of official policy. There's been a lot of political capital spent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, a lot of institutions now have that on paper, like are saying on paper that they want to hit net zero. So it seems to me like it would take a big backlash to get rid of it.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I don't think some companies may back away from targets. There'll be more reports of targets not being on track. And I think what happens is that it becomes something like the Sustainable Development Goals or dealing with the US national debt where everybody kind of knows you're not really going to get there, but you can still talk about it aspirationally but without confidence. Because it did feel like at least a few years ago that people were really trying to get to net zero. And I think that sensation will shift and it'll become empty like a lot of other things, unfortunately.</p><p>But I think that creates an opportunity for something new to come in and be the mainframe for climate policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Net zero just seems like a species of a larger thing that happens. I don't know if it happens in other domains, but in climate and clean energy it happens a lot, which is just sort of like a technical term from the expert dialogue, worms its way over into popular usage and is just awful and doesn't mean anything to anyone. I think about net metering and all these kind of terminological disputes. So it doesn't really I'm not sure who's in charge of metanarratives, but it doesn't seem like they're very thoughtfully constructed. So let's talk a little bit about what characteristics you think a better metanarrative about climate change would include.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>First, I think it is important that we are measuring progress towards a goal for accountability reasons. But I think there needs to be more than just the metric. I think we have an obsession with metrics in our society that sometimes becomes unhealthy or distracts us from the real focus. But I do think there should be some amount of measuring specific progress towards a goal. I think that the broader story also has to have some affect or emotional language. There has to be some kind of emotional connection. I also think we have to get beyond carbon to talk about what's going on with ecosystems more broadly and how to maintain them and have an intact habitable planet and then just pragmatically.</p><p>This has to be a narrative that enables broad political coalitions. It can't be just for one camp and it has to work on different scales. I mean, part of the genius of net zero is that it is this multi-scalar planetary, but also national, also municipal, corporate, even individual does all of that. So those are some of the most important qualities that a new frame or a new narrative would have to have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That sounds easier said than done. I can imagine measuring other things you mentioned in your book several sort of submeasurements other than just this one overarching metric. You could measure how fast fossil fuels are going away. You could measure how fast clean energy is scaling up. There are adaptation you can measure to some extent. So I definitely can see the benefit in having a wider array of goals, if only just because some of those just get buried under net zero and are never really visible at all. That makes sense to me. But the minute you start talking about a metanarrative with affect, with emotion, the way to get that is to appeal to people's values and things that they cherish and feel strongly about.</p><p>But then we're back to the problem we talked about earlier, which is it seems like especially in the US these days, we're just living in a country with two separate tribes that have very, very different values. And so the minute you step beyond the sort of technocratic metric, which in a sense is like clean and clinical and value free and start evoking values, trying to create emotion, you get greater investment and passion in some faction and alienate some other faction. Do you just think that that's like unavoidable and you have to deal with that or how do you think about that dilemma?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>I actually think people do have the same values, but they're manipulated by a media ecosystem that profits from dividing them, which makes it impossible for them to see that they do have aligned values. And I base that just on my experience, like as a rural sociologist and geographer talking to people in rural America. People are upset about the same exact things that the leftists in the cities I visit are upset about too. They really do value justice. They think it's unfair that big companies are taking advantage of them. There are some registers of agreement about fairness, about caring for nature, about having equal opportunities to a good and healthy life that I think we could build on if we weren't so divided by this predatory media ecology.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't suppose you have a solution for that, in your back pocket?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>I have a chapter on this in a forthcoming book which you might be interested. It's edited by David Orr. It's about democracy in hotter times, looking at the democratic crisis and the climate crisis at the same time. And so I've thought a little bit about media reform, but it's definitely not my expertise. We should have somebody on your podcast to talk about that too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let me tell you, as someone who's been obsessed with that subject for years and has looked and looked and looked around, I don't know that there is such thing as an expert. I've yet to encounter anyone who has a solution to that problem that sounds remotely feasible to me, including the alleged experts. And it kind of does seem like every problem runs aground on that, right? Like it would be nice if people had a different story to tell about climate change that had these features you identify that brought people in with values and drew on a broader sense of balance with the earth and ecosystems.</p><p>But even if they did, you have to have the mechanics of media to get that message out to tell that story. You know what I mean? And so you got one whole side of the media working against you and one at best begrudgingly working with you. It just doesn't seem possible. So I don't know why I'm talking to you about this problem. No one knows a solution to this problem. But it just seems like this is the -er problem that every other problem depends on.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, we should talk about it because it's the central obstacle in climate action, from my point of view, is this broken media ecosystem and if we could unlock that or revise it, we could make a lot of progress on other stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, on poverty, you name it. Almost anything that seems like the main problem you talk about. The narrative must be able to enable broad political coalitions, but you are working against ... I guess I'd like to hear a little bit about what role you think fossil fuels are playing in this? It seems to me pretty obvious that fossil fuels do not want any such broad political coalition about anything more specific than net zero in 2050, right. Which, as you point out, leaves room for vastly different worlds, specifically regarding fossil fuels. It seems like they don't want that and they're working against that and they have power.</p><p>So who are the agents of this new narrative? Like, who should be telling it and who has the power to tell it?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>So I think sometimes in the climate movement we grant too much power to the fossil fuel industry. It's obviously powerful in this country and in many others, but we have a lot of other industries that are also relevant and powerful too. So you can picture agriculture and the tech industry and insurance and some of these other forms of capital standing up to the fossil fuel industry because they have a lot to lose as renewables continue to become cheaper. We should have energy companies that will also have capital and power. So I do think that we need to think about those other coalitions.</p><p>Obviously, I don't think it needs to be all grounded in forms of capital. I think there's a lot of work to be done in just democratic political power from civil society too. What I'd love to see is philanthropy, spending more money on building up that social infrastructure alongside funding some of this tech stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I've talked to a lot of funders about that and what I often hear is like, "Yeah, I'd love that too, but what exactly be specific, David, what do you want me to spend money on?" And I'm always like, "Well, you know, stuff, social infrastructure, media, something." I get very hand wavy very quick because I'm not clear on exactly what it would be. So final subject, which I found really interesting at the tail end, I think it's fair to say your sympathies are with phasing out fossil fuels as fast as possible. And there's this critique you hear from the left-left about climate change that just goes, this is just capitalism, this is what capitalism does.</p><p>This is the inevitable result of capitalism. And if you want a real solution to climate change on a mass scale, you have to be talking about getting past capitalism or destroying capitalism or alternatives to capitalism, something like that. Maybe I'm reading between the lines, but I feel like you have some sympathy with that. But also then we're back to narratives that can build a broad political coalition, right? Narratives that can include everyone. So how do you think about the tension between kind of the radical rethinking of economics and social arrangements versus the proximate need to keep everybody on board?</p><p>How is a metanarrative supposed to dance that line?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Yeah, unfortunately, I think in this media ecosystem we can't lead with smashing capitalism or with socialism. It's just not going to work, unfortunately. So then what do you do? I think you have to work on things that would make an opening for that. Having more political power, more power grounded in local communities. It's not going to be easy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Even if you let the anti-capitalist cat out of the bag at all, you have a bunch of enemies that would love to seize on that, to use it to divide. So I don't know, what does that mean? Openings, just reforms of capitalism at the local level? I mean, I'm asking you to solve these giant global problems. I don't know why, but how do you solve capitalism? What's your solution to capitalism? What does that mean, to leave an opening for post-capitalism without directly taking on capitalism? I guess I'd just like to hear a little bit more about that.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>So I think that there's a lot of things that seem unconnected to climate at first, like making sure we have the integrity of our elections, dealing with redistricting and gerrymandering and those sorts of things that are one part of it. Reforming the media system is another part of it. Just having that basic civil society infrastructure, I think, will enable different ideas to form and grow.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you have any predictions about the future of net zero? Sort of as a concept, as a guiding light, as a goal? Because you identify these kind of ambiguities and tensions within it that seem like it doesn't seem like it can go on forever without resolving some of those. But as you also say, it's become so ubiquitous and now plays such a central role in the dialogue and in the Paris plans and et cetera, et cetera. It's also difficult to see it going away. So it's like can't go on forever, but it can't go away. So do you have any predictions how it evolves over the coming decade?</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Well, it could just become one of these zombie concepts and so that really is an opportunity for people to get together and think about what other thing they would like to see. Is it going to be measuring phase out of fossil fuels and having a dashboard where we can track the interconnection queue and hold people accountable for improving that? Are we going to be measuring adaptation and focusing on that? Are we going to be thinking more about the resources that are going to countries to plan and direct a transition and trying to stand up agencies that are really focused on energy transition or land use transition?</p><p>I mean, we could start making those demands now and we could also be evolving these broader languages to talk about and understand the motion. So we have some concepts that have been floated and already sort of lost some amount of credibility, like sustainability, arguably just transition. We have Green New Deal. Will that be the frame? Is that already lost? What new stuff could we come up with? Is it regeneration or universal basic energy. I think there's a lot of languages to explore and so I would be thrilled to see the Climate Movement work with other movements in society, with antiracist movements, with labor movements and more to explore the languages and the specific things we could measure and then take advantage of the slipperiness of net zero to get in there and talk about something else we might want to see.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, that sounds like a great note to wrap up on. Thank you for coming. Thank you for the super fascinating book and for all your work, Holly Jean Buck. Thanks so much.</p><p><strong>Holly Jean Buck</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-trouble-with-net-zero</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:119631811</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 22 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/119631811/cecd6e652ee36b11c743e704d0384611.mp3" length="59005810" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2949</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/119631811/4f4a9ed4497c2aed9e69664b11e7a771.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[It's up to states to implement IRA. Are they ready?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>States don’t (yet) have the administrative capacity to smoothly implement the ambitious policies in the IRA; in this episode, policy strategist Sam Ricketts of Evergreen Action discusses how federal programs can help them get there.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AABOYQoboorVrJ608VfDwNJEa/volts23.05.17%28sam.ricketts%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/it-s-up-to-states-to-implement-ira-are-they-ready"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>States are central to climate and energy policy. After the failure of the Waxman-Markey climate bill in 2010, states carried the torch of climate policy during the long decade that Democrats were locked out of majority power in Washington, DC. Now that Dems have actually passed some federal policy — and they are unlikely to pass any more anytime soon — states are once again in the spotlight, tasked with implementing that legislation to maximize its effect.</p><p>This raises the obvious question of whether states have the administrative capacity — the people, institutions, time, and money — necessary to implement ambitious federal legislation competently.</p><p>They do not, says Sam Ricketts, but they could, and there are federal programs that can help them get there.</p><p>Nobody is better positioned than Ricketts to address the issue of state readiness. He played a key role in Jay Inslee's pathbreaking presidential campaign, which was built off of successful policies in Washington and other states. Then, as senior strategist for <a target="_blank" href="https://evergreenaction.com/">Evergreen Action</a>, a nonprofit he founded with other Inslee veterans, he helped shape the ambitious trio of bills the Democrats have passed in the last year and a half: the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the CHIPS act, and the Inflation Reduction Act (or as advocates fondly refer to them, Uncles Bill, Chip, and Ira). Now he’s working with Evergreen and the Center for American Progress to educate and prepare state and local lawmakers for the post-IRA world.</p><p>I've known Ricketts for years, and there's nobody who better balances detailed knowledge of policy with a practical head for advocacy and activism. I'm excited to talk to him about the crucial role states will play in coming years, the kind of administrative capacity they will need, and the types of federal programs that can fund their capacity building.</p><p>So, enough of that. With no further ado, Sam Ricketts, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me, David. Pleasure to be with you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm so excited to talk about administrative capacity, the sexiest of all podcast topics loyal listeners know this is an ongoing obsession of mine.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>They've come for the good stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly. So get ready to jump in. So I want to talk about state and local governments and whether they're up for this. But first, let's just briefly talk a little bit about just how central states and local governments have already been in climate policy in the US. So after you and I, well remember all too well the humiliating defeat of the Waxman-Markey Bill back in 2009, 2010. And after that, the sort of national scene was dead for ten years and everyone was off in the wilderness. And the only thing that was going on was states passing good legislation.</p><p>So maybe let's start by just talking about those states being kind of the laboratories for democracy as it were and how the states sort of pioneered stuff and learned stuff that then went into informing the federal legislation that was just passed.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Indeed. So the first thing to your point, you mentioned that states and local governments have long been sort of the nation's leaders in developing and implementing climate and clean energy policy. And we're going to talk about what they need to do next in terms of implementation. But an important point, as you allude to here, is the progress that's just been given to us from Washington DC. The passage of Uncle Bill, Uncle Ira, Uncle Chip, the three climate uncles, so to speak. And the other initiatives that the Biden administration is advancing are really drawn from, inspired by, informed by the progress that states and local governments have made throughout the country.</p><p>And this progress, as you mentioned, really jump started over the course of the last decade and sort of in the interregnum period between the last attempt at climate legislation and this ultimately very successful one. But it goes back further, right. States began passing clean energy laws decades ago. Years ago. I mean, the first renewable portfolio standard to require utilities to start utilizing clean renewable electricity was actually passed in Iowa 40 years ago. That activity last went through states red, blue and purple alike through the 1990s. In the early 2000s, you really saw an uptick in states beginning to target greenhouse gas climate pollution directly with laws that like Massachusetts' Global Warming Solutions Act, notably, of course, the AB 32 law passed in California in 2006, sort of set economy-wide programs and sectoral programs advancing climate action.</p><p>And then in the 2000s, after the last failed attempt at federal climate legislation, you really saw this uptick. And states really carried the ball in a number of different ways and in ways that directly inspired the breakthroughs here. I mean, just a few of the items. In 2015, Hawaii became the first state in the country to pass a 100% clean electricity standard requiring utilities to get to all carbon-free electricity on their grid. And now over 20 states have that commitment in some form. About 15 have passed that requirement into law. And I would argue that that underlies President Biden's most important climate commitment that he's made and is trying to advance through both legislative and executive means towards 100% clean electricity by 2035.</p><p>A couple of the other things that were passed by states and indirectly informed things in IRA in particular were tax credits tied to labor standards. So to ensure that we're building not just clean energy and not just jobs, but clean energy supporting good family wage, high quality jobs. And notably that was inspired by things like the Clean Energy Transformation Act passed in Washington state and signed by my former boss, Governor Jay Inslee in 2019. You also see in IRA and throughout the Biden administration's initiatives a prioritized investment in disadvantaged communities to advance environmental and economic justice and things like President Biden's Justice40 initiative, which was itself directly inspired by the New York State Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act that had that Justice40 commitment for New York that was also passed in 2019.</p><p>So there's this rush of legislative and policy making in the second half of the last decade in particular, but really throughout the course of it just one more item because it's a favorite that really directly informs what we're seeing implemented now. And IRA is connecticut in 2011 was the first state in the country to establish a green bank. It's now been created in 23 state and local governments, I believe. And that directly, of course, inspired the creation of a greenhouse gas reduction fund, a $27 billion program in IRA that again is going to be now a critical tool for states and local governments to leverage to build the clean energy economy flowing out of IRA implementation.</p><p>So the first thing here is this progress that we now have so much of. It builds on the foundation established by states and local governments throughout the country. And now it's of course going to be a critical thing for them to turn to, really being drivers in implementation of these bills.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to say I wrote a piece for Vox a few years ago, I talked to you for it about the sort of general turn in policy thinking among climate people away from this sort of monomaniacal obsession with carbon pricing to what I called Standards Investments and Justice. SIJ never did quite get that term to catch on. But it wasn't just an intellectual turn. It wasn't just a sort of theoretical turn. It was very much states demonstrating that this is the politics that works, right. You can bang your head on that top-down carbon pricing wall over and over again.</p><p>It is the sector-by-sector standards and investments that work to get political buy in. So this wasn't just an idle exercise. This was very much showing the federal government what's possible and what works.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Totally. Can I just say, you wrote eloquently about standards, investments, and justice. And really to your point, it's directly informed by what's really borne out in practical terms, particularly on state policy leadership, right? Both the politics and the policy conspired here to show a better and a different path that you're seeing inform the entirety of the Biden administration's climate agenda. They have advanced robust investments that are going to leverage even greater private sector investments to catalyze this clean energy transition. They are now utilizing federal administrative authorities to go after sector by sector rules to ensure they're holding automakers utilities, others accountable for following this clean energy trajectory that's now available to them, especially with robust public and private sector investment.</p><p>And then they've got this central commitment for the first time at the federal level to justice this confluence of factors that again is directly borne out and directly inspired by the leadership of state and local governments throughout the country. Which leads us to where I guess we've got to go next.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's go there then. So the federal government passed all this stuff and I feel like everybody kind of gets on a general level that it's states and localities that are going to have to implement all this stuff but I think most people understand that in a very vague way. So maybe let's flesh that picture out a little bit. What are the kinds of things that federal legislation does that the states and localities are going to be directly responsible for administering?</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>The first thing is the Biden administration. We hear a lot of talk these days about Bidenomics and there were sort of a return at long last of industrial policy at the federal level. Targeted investments, economic strategies to really seize on the country's strengths, develop and maintain the industries we're going to need for a thriving and just and healthy economy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Volts listeners or everyone else should go back and listen to my podcast with Brian Deese a month or two ago all about that subject.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Totally. That was a great one and it really informs what's happening now in Washington DC. But also at the same time seeing industrial policy through in the country arguably has long been a larger part of the role of states and local governments, right, who implement federal dollars. I mean so many of the federal programs we know and love, the federal funding programs we know and love, be they Medicaid or education, energy and climate are dollars that the federal government or federal agencies pass down to states and to local governments and sometimes communities or individual consumers. But so much of it flows through state and local governments and then even the programs that don't directly flow through those governments they need to be the ones to take advantage of to help their companies and their consumers and their communities take advantage of clear hurdles, plan for, and execute on.</p><p>So there's three different types of investments I point to here in these bills that are all going to be part of what states and cities need to be administering or being attentive to as they do so. And all of them are direct opportunities and some of them are massive like untold opportunities. So there are direct grant programs, there are financing programs and then there are tax incentives and all of which state governments, local governments need to be attentive to all three of these. So just give a few examples. Direct grant programs. There's a few different programs or actually a number of different programs of course in these bills that are provided to state governments or to local governments that they can then turn and leverage for climate, for equity, for public health, for good jobs.</p><p>One is the Department of Energy has much discussed building energy rebate programs. Two different programs, one supporting energy, Home Energy Retrofits, another supporting electric appliances. Those programs are actually being run by the Department of Energy, but they're actually going to be dollars. The Department of Energy first provides to all state energy offices for those state energy offices to turn around and operationalize, working with contractors, working with local governments and providing consumers directly with rebates. Another program is the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, which I mentioned is a program that combines a couple of different elements, but there's an element of it that provides money directly to states and local governments for them to deploy or to set up programs to deploy solar and storage technologies in disadvantaged communities.</p><p>A third example of this direct grant program that I think we're going to talk about a little bit more is the Climate Pollution Reduction Grants, which is an investment program directly for state and local governments basically only, and tribal and territorial governments to be able to plan and then execute on programs and policies and measures to decrease climate pollution and build their own clean energy and industrial strategies that suit their needs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're going to come back to that one.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Then the second category is financing programs, programs the federal government has or is newly established where they provide financing tools, loan, loan guarantees, other financial mechanisms that individual companies and projects can use to leverage more private capital, to deploy zero emission technologies or build new manufacturing facilities. And there's a few different ones of these. One is again the new GGRF for Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund which is a new program being stood up at the EPA. Another is the USDA Rural Utilities Service has about $10 billion for rural electric cooperatives to be able to leverage to securitize and retire their coal plants and instead build clean and renewable energy for sort of a next generation rural electrification agenda for the country.</p><p>And then a third, the DOE Loan Guarantee program has got hundreds of billions of dollars of financing authority that states can help work with their local companies and projects to leverage to deploy much greater private sector capital. And this DOE one I'm particularly excited about because of its intersection with states, there's actually reforms made to the program in the infrastructure law. In Bill, Uncle Bill, the state gets a chance to work with the Department of Energy loan guarantee program to waive the technology requirement requiring this project to utilize a quote, unquote, innovative technology, one that hasn't been used before and if the state is a co-investor in the project, can leverage much greater private sector financing into deploying that project. So really a reform, a tweak to the DOE Loan Guarantee program that allows it to be more accessible and more usable, particularly state clean energy financing institutions.</p><p>And then finally — let me come to the big one — because the majority of the investments flowing through IRA are actually tax credits. Sort of automatic spending in reverse for the federal government, which are resources that an individual project owner, company, or under IRA. Actual public sector entities like public utilities, nonprofit institutions can take and leverage greater private sector or co investment in speeding much more investment into clean energy, into renewable energy, into individual consumers purchasing of electric vehicles or heat pumps, clean manufacturing facilities. The tax credits make up the majority of the funding in the bill and notably so state and local governments need to be aware of them so that they can help their companies and their consumers and their communities take advantage of those incentives.</p><p>And notably those tax incentives I mentioned have this new reform called direct pay where they are now eligible for use by those who don't have tax liability, including public institutions, including local governments who are operating with the, let's say municipal utility or even nonprofit institutions. And this amount of money notably is uncapped. So it can be as much money as we can all spend.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A theme Volts returns to frequently there's no upper limit to the amount that these tax credits could get sent out. There's no upper limit to the amount that could be spent on them. So as I pound the table and say over and over again the size of this bill, the size of IRA is not a fixed thing. It will be as big as there are people applying for the tax credits. So anyone out there who can organize and educate people and have more people apply for those tax credits, that's going to be a bigger bill. So states and localities here really have their hands on the lever of not only how to implement the bill, but literally how big the bill is.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Absolutely. There's much talk about how this is a $370 billion or $380 billion investment. I mean the reality is there's a fixed number of grant programs or financing programs that Congress and President Biden have invested in. And then there are these tax incentives that are uncapped and that can range much greater. They are literally only tied to the amount of money that can be spent on projects that they can then benefit from those incentives.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, Goldman Sachs I think, estimates $1.2 trillion rather than $3.7 billion, which is an enormous spread. All of which has to do with how many projects are going to qualify for these tax credits. And that is something that people can have control over.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>That's right. And the Treasury Department writes the rules of these things and they'll be the ones to dole out an individual cash payment as a direct pay grant or to send the tax refund to the company that takes advantage of the tax credit. But they're not out there searching out projects, working to ensure permitting works. They're not out there making sure communities are aware of these things. They're not there working hand-in-glove with companies on economic development projects. That is what states do. That is what counties do. That is what cities do. That's what individual community groups do.</p><p>But there is this massive opportunity for companies, for communities, for individual consumers to take advantage of these incentives and the rest of these investments and whether or not they do that well is going to be a thing that state and local leadership is going to play a key role in seeing through.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly. You can have as much economic development as you can muster. Right? There's no upper limit. Like you can have all the economic development you want if you're willing to put in the work, organizing and pursuing it.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>That's right. And as we know we need to move urgently and build as much of this as we can because we are under some very tight climate math, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we've established then that states have been an inspiration to the federal government and now we've established that the new federal legislation that has been passed in these past couple of years very importantly requires states and local governments to implement it. And indeed how big and how efficacious the bills are is more or less up to states and local governments, how well they organize and get it done. So then this brings us to the inevitable next question which is are they ready for this? Do they have economic development offices that are aware of the tax credits and understand the procedures and understand where to direct them and understand how to attract companies around them?</p><p>Do local governments have the offices to do outreach to local communities to clue them in on these tax credits? Do they have the sort of like manpower to do the research and just create the programs that can spend all this grant money? Are states and cities ready for the tsunami of money that is heading their way? Do they have the administrative capacity they need?</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Well, look, there's a gap. I like to think of it as an urgent opportunity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's an opportunity.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>It's an opportunity. An urgent one. Look, there's a definitive gap that exists across states and local governments and also tribal governments here too. I should probably mention that state and local and tribal governments are all sort of implicated as part of this sub-national government space of entities that are going to be helping to deploy dollars and are going to be dispositive about the success of these bills. They're all different. People regularly bunch them together. And here we're spending most time talking about state governments, a little bit about local governments and I'm going to continue to zero in on states because it's where I've worked before and it's what I'm particularly focused on in this moment.</p><p>But they're all going to be really important in this work and they all lack capacity, certainly to varying degrees. But I'll say state governments even just sticking with states often lack capacity. The state agencies, even the ones who have been sort of leading the most on climate and sometimes in many respects do lack capacity. And this is simply people in seats doing the work. They can lack capacity because of budgets regularly. That's the biggest reason. And then there is kind of like how the tax credits in the bill can be spent up to the level of funding that we put into them.</p><p>They'll get out what we put in. The same thing here with governmental capacity at the subnational level, there is an opportunity to do more because state agencies are regularly, red, blue and purple states alike, lacking in manpower to be able to take maximum advantage of these dollars.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you think it's fair to say that because industrial policy has been out of vogue and we've been living under this sort of well, I'll just use the word neoliberalism for the last 30 or 40 years with this sort of notion that markets are going to accomplish everything. Do you think that is part of the explanation for why some of this state capacity is lacking or has atrophied a little bit?</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I mean, the last 40 years of public sector disinvestment absolutely plays a role here. In particular, the public sector got hit hard after the Great Recession in particular.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>And budgets have only recently kind of gotten back even to those levels. They got hit again, obviously, recently during the COVID hit. And there has been investment from the federal level. Think of their COVID recovery dollars, some of the stuff that's implicated in debates right now in Congress about what can be clawed back, these are vital. Just like public sector capacity building investments, state and local budgets have regained relative health kind of quickly after COVID recovery.</p><p>But there still gaps. And there are gaps in particular in these areas where with state environmental, clean energy, industrial development that we've not invested as a society into sufficiently. And that's what leaves us with a gap.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And if you go look at part of the COVID money was grants to states arguably too much. But if you go look at what those states spent those grants on, it's not necessarily building their long-term administrative capacity. Sadly, obviously if you lack manpower, you lack manpower, and that's a problem. But maybe try to give us a little better sense of what are the concrete dangers here, what are the opportunities that states and cities are going to miss or botch lacking capacity? Like, one thing I worry about, and maybe this is silly, we can talk about the politics of this separately, but Obama and his stimulus money went overboard, bent over backward to make sure that none of it was misappropriated, that there was no fraud or graft.</p><p>He put so much energy into that for all the good it did him. But one of the things I worry about is states and cities that lack administrative capacity also seems to open more room for shenanigans and graft and just petty local politics kind of stuff. So flesh out a little bit the danger of lacking administrative capacity.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>A few different things, first of all, it's opportunity cost. These are all we talk often in climate policy in terms of carrots and sticks. And these are all carrots. And to the point here about being able to spend as much as we can spend. Well, carrots only deliver the nutritional value if people are eating the carrots. Right? Don't get me wrong, most people like carrots. Carrots are delicious. I like carrots. But in order to eat that carrot, people need to know that it's there. They need to know how to access it, how to ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, somebody's got to go dig it up.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Yes, right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't know how far we can push this metaphor.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>We could take this metaphor, but that's an opportunity cost. And if there's people who companies don't know or can't access them, if the infrastructure is not built, if the community isn't aware, consumers aren't aware, that's going to result in less money being spent here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Carrots going uneaten.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Yes, carrots going uneaten. Thank you for grabbing that metaphor. Another thing here, and this is less of an administrative capacity challenge as it is more of wrong priorities or leadership challenges. Money being spent on the wrong thing, which is also, I mean, having administrative capacity and having it focused on the right things is critically important here. There has been some discussion about the infrastructure law, which is the bipartisan infrastructure bill and it's transportation infrastructure spending and how there is an opportunity and this is really an opportunity that exists under law with state governments and local governments, not the federal government, to use those dollars flexibly for low carbon transportation projects, not simply widening freeways and investing in more roads.</p><p>That is a challenge. It's a challenge we're not always seeing fare out in the right direction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I was just reading this morning a story in E&E about some of that infrastructure money being used for a giant kajillion dollar highway widening project outside of Houston that would wipe out huge swaths of low income community just like classic old school d*****s highway mistakes, but now paid for with our new infrastructure money. So yeah, can you stop that? Is there anything that can be done about that? Like states are going to do what they're going to do? Well, I guess advocates can pay attention.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Yeah. No, the first thing to do is to be attentive to the issue and then to develop the strategies to address it. Sometimes the states who are investing in those projects are the same ones who have made ambitious climate commitments. And it sure would be helpful for people to point out that maybe how the incongruence of those things. But the final area where things I don't want to say could go wrong. But the final area that really calls forth the need for state leadership is that states need to lead here again and the next generation of clean energy leadership, right?</p><p>Not only do they need to maximize the uptake of dollars for the job creation, for the equitable economic opportunity, for the emissions reductions that can be catalyzed by those dollars, but they also need to hold utility companies and automakers and building developers and the heavy industry accountable for using those dollars and push forward the next generation of policies that are going to cut emissions and drive the clean energy transformation. And people talk about states versus federal climate leadership and people talk about like states taking the baton now that the federal government's passed it. And I totally reject the premise.</p><p>As someone who's worked before at the state level in a governor's office, think of it much more as like a band where the state and local governments are the rhythm section, the drums and the bass, if you will. Keeping time and just always keeping a level of climate and clean energy progress going even while the federal government fits and starts. Like a lead guitarist will riff on stage and then disappear. We'll see that happen here. Even the last couple of years while President Biden and Congress have been hard at work passing these bills and taking executive action, states have been leading too.</p><p>Right, you've seen the next breakthroughs in state climate and clean energy policy continue to occur, whether that's New Jersey's groundbreaking cumulative impacts, environmental justice law, that's Washington State's Climate Commitment Act, that's Illinois's Clean Energy Jobs Act, et cetera, et cetera. And so the states need to take the next step and especially now that Congress is going to be divided and in that way states will have to take the baton because the lead guitarist is off the stage again.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. He's backstage smoking a joint.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>It's not entirely fair because President Biden is of course advancing things through administrative action. But especially for the time being, while we don't see major congressional action again on the horizon, states are going to have that central role in driving forward the nation's energy progress again.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I feel like this is a little bit underemphasized aspect of all this is that one thing states can do with all this tsunami of money that's coming down on is just use it to boost their own legislation. Like this is going to change the financial and social and political landscape in a way that is going to make more ambitious policy easier. And especially if states are smart about how they do that, right? Like a smart state can use all this money to soften the ground, to go further, to get more ambitious on climate.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>And just on that point, a few places to point to. For one, it's not all legislative. I mean public utility commissions who oversee utilities need to know that the electricity market, the system is entirely changed for the country now and the integrated resource plans that the utilities had provided them before IRA passed are not really worth the paper they were printed. On anymore because the economics of energy generation throughout the country has fundamentally changed. You add in federal rules coming down governing criteria or carbon pollution from power plants, another knock that utility commissions need to be aware of as they're engaging with utilities that they are regulating.</p><p>And the utilities are saying we need this rate increase or this deadline extension or this thing or that thing. That work. That is capacity and that is the decision at that state level by utility commissioners, appointed by the governors or sometimes elected by voters.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wait. Just before you move on from that, I just want to pound the table on it a little bit, because when I think about I spend a lot of time thinking about sort of like, what are the potential impediments to this legislation doing as good as it could do. I think about workforce and NIMBY-ism, et cetera, et cetera. But one of the things I come back to is sort of utility intransigence or ignorance or intransigence or some mix thereof. I can imagine if utilities took the amount of money that's being dumped on clean energy seriously, as you say, it would completely transform all their plans, right?</p><p>Every utility in the country, now that this bill is passed, should be back at the drawing board, completely rethinking what they're doing. But of course many of them for various incentive reasons, don't want to do that and don't see a way to make as much money doing that or just are stuck in their ways or have relationships, old boy network relationships that they don't want to upset, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. The way to handle that impediment is with beefed up well informed utility commissions, which, as you say, is 100% a state capacity issue. It just means spending the money, getting the staff in place, getting the research done, really preparing them to force utilities to toe the line.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Anyway, I just wanted to emphasize that because I think it's a hugely under discussed and important piece.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Well, not just a few other areas where states have been stepping forward and taking advantage already of that point to Minnesota, which just earlier this year, at the very beginning of the year, passed 100% clean electricity standard, taking advantage of these new investments. I mean, the leadership of State Representative Jamie Long and Governor Tim Walls and others in the state to really bring that over the finish line had been a long time coming and they've been fighting against legislative inertia, but Minnesota did that. But they've also passed a bill to explicitly tasking the administration to maximize the flow of federal funds.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>And Minnesota is one of a few states, also looking at Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, a few others who are in the process of establishing nonprofit financial institutions, particularly to take advantage of the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Funds green finance program. Some states are passing incentives to sort of layer on what the federal government is providing and in some places to go beyond what the federal government has passed. Colorado just passed a robust suite of incentives and policies to go further.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, including for EVs, because a lot of EVs are not going to be available for credits for quite a while. There's this huge national controversy over this. Colorado just stepped in and be like, well, we're going to loosen the criteria and subsidize all those EVs that are falling out of the federal subsidies, which is like, well done, Colorado.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Well done. Exactly. Many states have established infrastructure coordinators housed by their governor or one of their agencies to coordinate across their state and with their city and county governments and stakeholders to maximize investment flows. Some of those have worked well and some of them haven't, state by state. But a key thing is there are states who are deploying different strategies to build capacity and coordinate a strategy around how to do this. Another interesting thing about it is it's happening in blue and red and purple states alike. Some of the major investments you're seeing, some of the big job creators, the battery manufacturing facilities, the big new projects are actually being announced or sighted and invested in red states or purple states.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Most, as I understand it, a rather large preponderance, is going to red states. Yeah, if I'm a state legislator or say I work in a state agency, I'm listening to this and I'm nodding and I'm saying, "Yes, I would love to have more effing capacity." Like, tell me something I don't know. I'm starving for capacity. I'd love to be able to do all this stuff." But state budgets are state budgets. Unlike the federal government, the state can't just print more money. So it's dependent on sort of business cycle year to year, dependent on booms and busts, and often have a lot of trouble finding stable funding for capacity.</p><p>So let's talk about where states can go to get some money and help building capacity. As it happens, Uncle Ira also contains some of that. So tell me about the Climate Pollution Reduction Grants program, CPRG. What is it and what's it for?</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>So the CPRG, the Climate Pollution Reduction Grants Program in IRA, is, I think, one of the most exciting provisions in the law. It is a new $5 billion grant program housed at the EPA, the Environmental Protection Agency, that can provide the opportunity to invest in state and local and tribal government capacity and to give states and tribal governments who want to lead additional resources, to empower them to do so, to lead in the clean energy and the industrial strategies that suit their unique needs and strengths and that will challenge them to compete amongst each other for the best plans most deserving of federal investment. To help them go further.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So there's two basic buckets here, both of which are interesting, but talk first about the money for planning.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>So this is based on a program President Biden first proposed in his American Jobs Plan, State Clean Energy Challenge Grants, which was at the very beginning of a very long and arduous legislative process. We don't need to recap in detail now, but is worth its own story. The program contains three different parts: $250 million for planning grants that are in the process of being executed right now to all states, to all territories, about 70 to 80 of the nation's largest municipal statistical areas, MSAs, and then to a number of tribal nations. There is going to be later on this year, Part B, the $4.6 billion Implementation Grant round, which is like where the big money comes in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Help to implement the aforementioned plans.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Exactly. With federal money to implement some of perhaps the best of the aforementioned plans. And then there is also, as an aside, because it's important, because it's about capacity building, $140 million in federal administrative costs that the Federal Government can use for its own cost of administering this program and can use to better support state and local governments and tribal governments with technical assistance. So, worth keeping an eye on that third bucket as well. But, obviously, the $250 million out to states and local governments and tribes right now, providing capacity as we speak and then providing opportunity for more money down the line.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that first bucket is for anybody who submits a plan.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Yes. And this is a great innovation. This is capacity building. Really excited to see how EPA is carrying out the Planning Grant round of this. It's some of the first money that's going to go out grant wise under IRA, every state, provided they submit a notice of intent to participate that was due at the end of March. And then, provided they submit a work plan and application that was due at the end of April, has an opportunity to receive a $3 million grant that they put in the agency of their choosing, whether that's the Governor's Office or the Energy Office or the Department of Environmental Protection or otherwise.</p><p>Every MSA gets a million dollars as well. Tribes also get investment, as I mentioned, as do territories. But these investments directly build capacity. They can use them to hire staff, hire consultants, build high quality tools they need, like greenhouse gas inventories, or cover other administrative costs of not just applying for the Implementation Grant in the future, but to take advantage of the rest of the money passed in IRA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. When you invest and build the capacity, the capacity is there. Once you use it for this plan, it's still there, and you can use it for other things, like these investments in administrative capacity, pay back richly over time.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so then the Implementation Grants, this is not going to be a give money to everybody who applies thing. This is going to be more of a competition type of thing.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Yes. So the Planning Grant round is intended by congress to be spread widely. And I'm pleased to see how EPA has done that and done that quickly to make sure dollars are flowing in everywhere. Again, to address both like, hey, you can use this money to apply for an implementation grant in the future, but hey, you can also use this money to build yourself some capacity inside of your agencies because of all the other things that are flowing. But yes, then later this year, we're expecting an implementation grant announcement. EPA says it would come late summer, maybe it's the fall.</p><p>We're hoping, the royal we all of us hoping together, they move these dollars quickly in order to get the dollars out the door quickly, certainly as early as they can in 2024. But these would really be grants that would bolster capacity and could reward those states and local governments who come forward with the plans that show they're going to lead to the greatest catalytic change. And what I'm hoping to see what I and others are hoping to see from them with this is really investing in the state driven, local driven strategies that fit their unique needs and that reduce the maximum amount of climate pollution and achieve those breakthroughs in places that are additional to that which may occur otherwise without these grants or that which may be possible otherwise, given these states unique policy environments.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is not a new format here the idea that states are competing for federal money, the whole Race to the Top idea, this is not the first time this has been tried with federal grants.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Indeed, it's not. Actually, a very similar amount of money was invested in a program called the Race to the Top Challenge Grants that the Obama administration executed about a decade ago, about $4 million that was spread around. I think twelve states were awarded grants that ranged in size from $75 million to $700 million or something, and those grants went to those states to pass or implement innovative leading edge education policies. But the fascinating thing about the program that I think should inform how the EPA thinks about this program is it wasn't only the states that got grants that executed their policies.</p><p>Everyone got to work writing a plan. And the majority of states, even those who didn't get a grant, would later go on to implement at least some of those policies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, this is what I always used to say about the Clean Power Plan, too, right? I mean, one of the that Obama tried and failed to pass, one of the great benefits of it is that it would have made every utility at least think about this stuff. And it's just a fact that once you start thinking about it, once you start planning, once you start doing the numbers, you realize, like, oh, these are good things to do regardless whether you get the federal money or not, right? So just catalyzing the planning itself does so much to generate future action.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>The Clean Power Plan is a great example of this, right? Because notably, utilities met targets much faster than they would have even if the plan had ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Actually catalyzed it without even passing it all. Look at the ...</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>And it catalyzed planning ... Actually that's a good example for this particular topic as well because having been in a state government at that time and been part of some of those conversations, it catalyzed planning not only by the utilities in the industry, but it actually catalyzed planning at the state government level. For the first time in many places you actually had environmental regulators who were going to be charged with implementing the Clean Power Plan, working with the PUC that regulates the utilities, working with the State Energy Office that writes the State's energy strategy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, which is a brand new thing. So let me ask you to editorialize a little bit. You got this $4.6 billion bucket of money that you can use to help states and localities and tribal governments implement the plans that they sent to you previously. Obviously there's a ton of latitude within that. There's a ton of approaches you could take that you could do bunches and bunches and bunches of little grants. You could make it your mission to sort of give at least a little bit of money to everybody who has a plan. Or you could try to sort of concentrate money on a couple of big plans that you think could be transformative or could serve as an example to other states or some mix.</p><p>So how would you like to see EPA approach handing this money out?</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>It's a great question. EPA has wide latitude as to how they design and execute this Implementation Grant Program round. And I mentioned it's $4.6 billion. I mean, recall that we were talking just a bit ago about they have an opportunity here to do a couple of different things. One is build capacity in states and local governments basically across the board, right? Because everyone needs some version of help here in order to take advantage of all of the resources that are here. But then they also have an opportunity to reward those states and local governments who are going to take advantage of that next generation of clean energy industrial policy leadership who want to use the resources to go further.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. You can fund the laggards to get them up to the starting line or you could fund the leaders</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>And you can do a little bit of both. Like you can cover that for one, using some of the money, a small chunk of the money to build additional capacity. Recall that capacity building investments already been made by EPA with the Planning Grant round. What happens if they did that with basically a second planning Grant round or maybe a second, twice of the size, Planning Grant round? And that would give some money across the board to continue building capacity which, as we've just talked about, is a ubiquitous problem regardless of the state's level of leadership on clean energy.</p><p>And then you could save the majority of the funding to slice up for a select number of grants that can range from eight to nine digits of major investments. That can help provide a locus of organization and momentum for that state and local government to execute on a truly ambitious clean energy industrial strategy, again unique to its own needs, and ensuring that especially EPA should be looking out for opportunities to invest in clean energy leadership where it wouldn't be otherwise occurring. So additionality is key here, I think the EPA should obviously also be looking at plans that are going to support disadvantaged communities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I meant to ask about that specifically, actually, isn't the 40% rule that 40% of all these monies have to go to disadvantaged communities? Does that apply to this bucket as well?</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Indeed it does. Actually, there's two different ways that sort of equity applies to the requirements that the administration should set out for. One, to your point, this is one of the programs that falls under the Biden Administration's Justice40 Initiative, meaning that applicants should be showing how no less than 40% of the investment benefits from their plan are going to benefit disadvantaged communities. And there's actually a second one in the statute which Congress said EPA has got to require these plans to show how they're going to reduce climate pollution both overall and in disadvantaged and low income communities.</p><p>So a couple of different ways. EPA already also in the planning grant guidance has required states to work with their city governments in developing their plans or municipal governments, and they've encouraged them also to work with disadvantaged communities. And that's an opportunity here for EPA and the Implementation Grant round as well to task applicants to show how they're going to work with and benefit disadvantaged communities with their investments, how they're going to support good jobs with their strategies. EPA has latitude here as to how to design this program. I think also there's an opportunity here to encourage states and local governments to work together, whether that's in a region and are in multiple parts of the country.</p><p>This is a time for creative strategies and for calling forth sort of that unique next generation of state clean energy leadership that we're going to need to see now and throughout the coming decade.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, one more note about this program before we move on and wrap up, because I just personally found it so delightful and clever. Listeners will recall when Obama said, "Hey, states, how would you like to have billions and billions of dollars of free money to help have better health care for your poor people?" And red states just flat turned it down. They turned down free money, which is insane, but certainly something you can imagine happening here too. But there's actually a somewhat clever and innovative feature of this program meant to address that eventuality. So tell us about that.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Indeed, this is a really innovative piece of what EPA has done with this program. I mentioned earlier that $3 million of planning grant money is available to all states. What they had to do was submit a notice of intent to participate and follow that on with an application and a work plan. Notably, if a state chose to decline that $3 million grant, the money wouldn't dry up or disappear. It would actually be available to the largest metropolitan statistical areas in that state, MSAs in that state and across the country. And so the dollars would go to somebody and it kind of provides a double incentive for the states to say yes.</p><p>And notably, they did. 46 out of 50 states submitted a notice of intent to participate and receive their $3 million.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's one thing to say no to money. It's another thing to say no to money when you know your nemeses in your blue cities are going to get the money you're turning down. That's such a clever twist.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>And we want some national governments tool one to say yes to this, right. Because if they take the money, they're going to go build a plan that's going to reduce emissions. It might be their unique flavor of that. It should be their unique flavor of that. But it gives them an opportunity to put people in seats and to start designing strategies that are going to reduce climate pollution and that are going to allow them to build the industrial strategy that's going to work for them in the 21st century clean energy economy. And we're going to need everyone doing that eventually at some point.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>At every level, okay, by way of wrapping up then, could we touch on I mean, this is a big $5 billion and especially $5 billion is how big is money these days? Who can judge? But like $5 billion when you're talking about state budgets is quite a bit of money. You can move some needles with that. Are there other federal programs that states can draw on or states and cities specifically to help them build administrative capacity?</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Really good question. The first thing I want to say is these investments will allow states and cities and tribal governments and territories to take advantage of the rest of the funding flows in IRA and Bill and CHIPS in new and more ways like we're talking about because they're going to build the capacity that empowers them to do so. The second part is though, there's not a lot of capacity building types of investments in these bills. There are a couple. I think the other main one spend a lot of time thinking about is the state energy program of the Department of Energy, which is the program that Department of Energy uses to support state energy programs throughout the country.</p><p>Sometimes they provide, frankly, the only funding that underpins a state energy program in some states. So a vital program, not a lot of money. It's actually money that came through that program was reauthorized and funded through the Bipartisan infrastructure law, not through IRA. But there aren't a lot of dollars in capacity building. There are other capacity building programs and technical assistance programs. Federal government and EPA actually has just announced investments in a number of TICTACs. I'm forgetting what precisely that stands for other than a delicious breath mint, which are regional entities that are going to work to provide technical assistance for disadvantaged communities in particular to help them take advantage of and community based organizations.</p><p>So there's the thriving communities program. There's a suite of federal TA programs, but not a lot that go directly into juicing the capacity of states and local governments throughout the country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. It does seem though, like if you're a state and you're given money to do X, it makes perfect sense to spend some portion of that money to build the capacity to do X, right? It seems like you could states could spend a lot of different buckets, at least a little bit on capacity because otherwise otherwise you can't really take advantage of the money.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>No, absolutely. And there's other piece of it. The Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund has some dollars that can be used for particular assistance. There are others, don't get me wrong. However, the flexibility provided to individual states to look across programs, some of them will get very tied into a grant associated with this particular strategy. And that's a little bit different than empowering the state or the city or the county to design its own strategy that works for it or to shift from one day to the next from one program or one project to the next, which is also a challenge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Okay, final question. We've been talking about governmental capacity, basically administrative capacity, which is great in rules. Is there anything that just ordinary people advocates or activists or maybe philanthropies, private philanthropies can do on this subject other than just like pay attention and cheerlead?</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, the first thing to know, as with most things, is that this is a challenge worthy of attention. That's sort of first things first. Lots of effort went in over many years to getting these bills passed for many people. Right. And there's a whole apparatus of advocacy that zeroed in on that for a very long time, as you and I know. And this is kind of a different line of work. Implementation is kind of a different line of work and it's the talk of the town now, but it's very much like attention to state and local governments is going to be dispositive in our success or failure with these bills and what we're trying to do with decarbonization and with building a just and thriving clean energy economy.</p><p>And that the attention that advocates need to provide, just like they've provided it at the halls of Congress, just like they provide it at President Biden and at his EPA and at his Interior Department, et cetera. They need to not be providing it with their City Council, with their state legislature, with their Governor's Office, with their Public Utility Commission. In some ways, it's not advocacy. In some ways, it's partnership with spreading the word to disadvantaged communities, to individual consumers that, hey, there's incentives available to you, there are investments available to you. Let's go take advantage of them and build some new, clean, better futures for our communities here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. This has been excellent, Sam. And I bet if state and city people are listening to this, they are gratified to hear it wrapped up and get a little focus and direction. So thank you so much for all your work over the years. And also thanks for coming on.</p><p><strong>Sam Ricketts</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me, David. Real pleasure as ever.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volt subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/its-up-to-states-to-implement-ira</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:120660384</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 05 Jun 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/120660384/d3d142a3b3725c5efd62555ba00b2b52.mp3" length="66899524" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3344</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/120660384/7869aa9653b3106e60c17bbf57532933.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A clean energy transition that avoids environmentally sensitive land]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Jessica Wilkinson and Nels Johnson of The Nature Conservancy discuss the pathway they see for a rapid, low-cost clean energy transition that minimizes impact on environmentally sensitive land.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADMjoheXhsXSEhLrkdPHHYaa/volts23.05.12%28jessica.wilkinson.nels.johnson%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/a-clean-energy-transition-that-avoids-environmentally-sensitive-land"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A great deal of confused and misleading information is circulating about the land-use requirements of the energy transition. Everyone agrees that building the amount of clean energy necessary to reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050 will require an enormous amount of land.</p><p>But is there <em>enough</em> land? Will the transition require industrializing green fields and virgin forests and other environmentally or culturally sensitive lands? Can the energy transition be done big enough and fast enough while still remaining respectful of natural resources and other species? What mix of technologies will go most lightly on the environment?</p><p>To provide a definitive answer to these questions, The Nature Conservancy launched its Power of Place project — first in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.scienceforconservation.org/products/power-of-place">California</a>, then for <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.org/en-us/what-we-do/our-priorities/tackle-climate-change/climate-change-stories/power-of-place/">the greater American West</a>, and now, this week, for the entire nation.</p><p>Using various metrics related to wildlife, ecosystems, cultural resources, and protected natural areas, the Power of Place project attempts to comprehensively map out sensitive land areas. It then tallies up the amount of clean energy required to reach net zero by 2050 and tries to match those needs to the available lands, to see if there is a pathway to net zero that protects them.</p><p>The good news is that, with some wise planning, the amount of environmentally sensitive land impacted by a business-as-usual clean-energy transition can be substantially reduced at relatively low cost. </p><p>To discuss this and other findings of the report, I contacted Jessica Wilkinson (Power of Place project manager) and Nels Johnson (the project’s science and technology lead) of The Nature Conservancy. We discussed the technology shifts that will enable a lighter footprint, the policies that could help encourage them, and the best ways to avoid community resistance.</p><p>Alright, then. Jessica Wilkinson and Nells Johnson. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Thank you for having us.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Yeah, thanks for having us, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Jessica, let's start with you. The subject of land-use and renewable energy, there's a lot of weird information and misinformation floating around about this, a lot of weird myths, a lot of sort of people with strong opinions who don't know what they're talking about. So what inspired this series of reports, the Power of Place reports? What inspired you to start undertaking this project?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is precisely one of the reasons that we were inspired to do this project under sighting, as usual. Like the way that we're proceeding now with a renewable energy build-out, we are seeing an increase in local opposition, and we are seeing concerns about land-use issues. And land-use and environmental issues are indeed kind of one of the obstacles that's popping up in the way of us being able to meet our clean energy goals and meet our clean energy goals rapidly. So we really started this work in California, which was the first time we kind of developed this Power of Place methodology and that refurbished report came out in 2019.</p><p>We refined it and then released Power of Place West in 2022. And this is kind of the next iteration where we further refined it. And each time we've kind of added new kind of levels of detail and asked some slightly different questions. But the land-use issue is exactly one of the reasons we've done this. So really what we're trying to do is question the premise of whether or not we really need to make these huge trade offs between conservation and climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think the conventional wisdom is that if we switch from fossil fuels to renewables there are a lot of advantages. But one of the disadvantages is you need a bunch of land and you're going to end up consuming a bunch of crop land or environmentally sensitive land or land that the locals don't want you on. All this kind of stuff. And so your take is that that stuff is exaggerated. So what is the power of place? What is it meant to convey?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's not to say that it's exaggerated, it's real, it's happening. The question is how much of it is avoidable?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>So what we are seeking to do is ask that question do we need to make all these huge trade offs for nature and for people on the path to decarbonization? So we've asked in Power of Place, it's a modeling exercise and you can ask the model, okay, go achieve net zero emissions by 2050, economy-wide. And model please kind of exclude these environmental data layers and let's see if that changes, whether we can get there, the pace at which we get to that goal and what the cost differential is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right before we jump into what you found, how would you describe the status quo of land-use planning and energy?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>This is a relatively new land-use, right? I mean, this is not something a lot of communities have seen before. They're leasing it for the first time and they may be seeing it come at them really quickly. And so there is a response. Just like local governments adopt local land-use planning and zoning for industrial uses, for commercial uses, for residential uses, they are adopting ordinances to ensure that the renewable energy is going to places where that community would prefer to have it. So we are seeing a lot of local ordinances go up around the country.</p><p>There have been projections from NREL. That report they released recently said that there were 3,000 local governments that adopted ordinances. And I think it's important to keep in mind that just because this is happening, just because these ordinance are being adopted doesn't necessarily mean that they're being adopted to block wind and solar. In every case, some of them are again, just a natural reaction to land-use planning and a desire to direct it to places that the community feels is most appropriate. Certainly, and the NREL study from 2022 showed that some of them are overly restrictive and likely intended to be.</p><p>But I think it's important not to assume that just because there is an ordinance, it was intended to block renewables.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To what extent is this response and there is a very widespread backlash happening. To what extent is that a fair critique of the way renewable energy has been planned and cited thus far? And to what extent is it just sort of an inevitable reaction to social change?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Right. We have looked at this and we do think that more or less about half of the renewable energy that is being deployed now is in areas that at least the Nature Conservancy might consider to be highly sensitive to wildlife inhabitant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a lot.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>I'll just add one sort of thought here about where are we today in terms of planning for this major infrastructure build-out that's coming our way? So first of all, just the scale of it is really huge. It's something like on the order of the interstate highway system that we built between the, in terms of the land area, in terms of the investment, in terms of the pervasive effects, mostly for good. But if it's not done in the right places, it can cause adverse impacts to natural areas, to local communities. So one way of thinking of this is we plan a lot for transportation, for housing, for commercial and residential development.</p><p>And up until now, we really haven't done spatially explicit energy planning. And that's one of the things we're hoping to accomplish with this series of power place studies is encouraging at all levels. Utilities, state energy offices, the federal government, regional transmission organizations, all to get more explicit about where are the best places to put all this infrastructure, and engaging the public at the community level, variety of levels to provide input into that planning.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it does seem like if you sort of measure the amount of backlash that has been produced by the amount of renewable energy so far, and then you multiply that by the amount of renewable energy we're going to try to build over the next decade or two, if you apply that same multiplier to the backlash, that's a very big backlash. Right. I guess part of the point here is that it's less, maybe less about poor planning than just no planning. There's just not a lot of coordinated planning around the renewable energy build-out yet.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that's fair to say that right now there's very little planning that the public has an opportunity to engage in and that needs to change to promote wider acceptance of this build-out. People have to have a voice in what that energy future looks like for them and they need to be reassured that they're going to get benefits out of the development that's taking place and that the energy isn't just being produced in their backyard and sent hundreds of miles away to a different user.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to come back to this question of public participation because I have a few troubled thoughts about it. But first, so this report, this is a national report and you created several different scenarios for different kinds of pathways to zero carbon by 2050, which have varying impacts on sensitive lands. And sort of like you did these increments like here's, we can avoid 10% of these damages, 20% of these damages, all the way up to 90%. So one question I had about the scenarios up front was because I feel like this is another sort of mythology that's floating around is in any of these scenarios, did you run into an absolute shortage of good land?</p><p>In other words, did you at any point encounter like there's just not enough suitable places to build enough renewable energy to do what we're talking about doing? Did that come up at all?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, you'll see that kind of our big take home message that we really lead with is that we can get to net zero emissions by 2050 while avoiding impacts to most natural and working lands. Not all, but most. And we recognize that there still are going to be trade offs. However, what this study did show is that we can reduce those trade offs significantly with some better planning. So there won't be none, there won't be zero trade offs. We think we can reduce those trade offs significantly and but by doing that, by reducing environmental and social trade offs, we really can accelerate the renewable energy build-out and avoid some of that conflict, which some of which is unnecessary.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>We've found that there is enough land for all of those scenarios to get built. What's important to recognize is that wind is probably the most land intensive of these technologies. And so as you reduce impacts, you do start to constrain wind a little bit more. But even so, there's more than enough land for wind to be accommodated. So for example, in the Power Place West report, we found that there was three times the amount of land available for low impact wind sighting in the western United States. Even under the most protective approach to natural areas and agricultural lands, we would still have more than enough to accommodate wind.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So whatever land issues we run into, not having enough land is not going to be one of them. Because I think people have in their head some very inflated ideas about because this stuff about land-use has been floating around so long. I think people have very inflated ideas about the amount of land required and just thought we should clear that up front. There's enough land.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Yeah. And with solar in particular, we have lots and lots of flexibility for where we put solar.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What the report shows is here's the energy mix for a 10% reduction in land impacts, 20%, 30%, 40%. And as you are moving up that scale and avoiding more and more of these impacts. What you see is that wind declines and solar grows. So insofar as you are taking land-use impacts into account, you are shifting somewhat from wind to solar, at least relative to sort of baseline projections. I just want to know why that is, because it's a little bit counterintuitive to me, because my impression is, and I think a lot of people's impression is that solar takes the most land, is the most sort of like sprawling per kilowatt.</p><p>So why is it that when you restrict land-use to more appropriate swathes of land, why do you shift from wind to solar? Just maybe explain that a little bit more.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Well, so the main reason, David, is that solar project actually are much more efficient in the use of land compared to wind. So, for example, a wind project that's 100 megawatts needs about 9,200 acres to accommodate those turbines. Those turbines have to be separated by a certain distance so they don't interfere with each other. And so you need a project area, about 9,200 acres. A solar project the same size 100 megawatts nameplate capacity needs about 430 acres. So it's significantly smaller. Now, within that wind project area, of course, not all the area is being impacted. In fact, only about 3% of it is.</p><p>You have the turbines and you have the road, and you have a power line that's connecting it all to the main grid, and those areas in between are available for agriculture. Right? So wind is really compatible with agriculture, but when it comes to species, when it comes to habitats, that's not always true. So when, for example, you clear a turbine pad, if it's in a forest, for example, you create what's called an edge effect, and that extends about 400 feet into the forest. And so that area is no longer good habitat for a variety of species, and it changes the kinds of plants that will grow there and other things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But even so, if you're only impacting 3% of that 9,200 acres, I mean, even if you have little islands of impact around the turbines, it still seems like a relatively small area that you're impacting them.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Yeah, of course, it depends on the species. So when you take prairie chickens, lesser prairie chickens and greater prairie chickens, they're both very sensitive to tall structures in grassland environments because tall structures are associated with places that hawks and eagles can see. And so they have an aversion to being in areas near large tall objects, including wind turbines. So that area is larger than the separation distance from those turbines. I see. That's kind of the indirect or displacement effect we see for certain species. So bottom line is, wind is very compatible with agriculture. It's less compatible with some species, particularly birds and bats.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Speaking of compatibility with agriculture, let's talk a little bit about ... Jessica, one of the things the report does is focus on a couple of strategies, I guess, to build out renewable energy in such a way as to impact lesser use. One of those is colocation. One of those is agrovoltaics. Can you maybe just tell us real quick what those two are and why the report sort of singled those out?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah. So this Power Place National really, again, was an evolution from some previous work where we were trying to ask some novel questions. And this issue in particular land saving approaches, really is a novel approach to decarbonization scenario planning. And what we wanted to do is in addition to considering how the mix of technologies changes the footprint, we wanted to consider how land saving approaches and there's a lot of different land saving approaches out there. One could argue nuclear is a land saving approach, but we wanted to consider how some land saving approaches could again affect the overall footprint and therefore kind of maybe by reducing that footprint, reduce some conflict.</p><p>And the three kinds of land saving approaches that we're able to really kind of dig into because the data were there were agrovoltaics colocation of wind and solar and then fix tilt solar. So those are the three that we really kind of dove into deeply.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And was that because you thought that those were the three most potent or just three common ones? Or why those three?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>There was robust data that was robust enough for us to consider this. This is the first time folks have taken a stab at this. So it's pretty novel approach. And for the colocation of wind and solar there, we're looking at wind and solar on the same project area. And when we looked at this approach, it was really promising for agrovoltaics. It's again an apportment and promising strategy for producing food and generating solar energy on the same land. Not all crops are compatible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just so listeners know what we're talking about, agrivoltaics is just putting solar panels on agricultural land, on the same land where food is being grown.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Exactly. And it's very popular conceptually. It's not like, at the moment, super scalable. But we wanted to ask how much more agrivoltaics could we do as a way to again get some of these co-benefits? And what we did find was that by using agrivoltaics we could grow the amount of agrovoltaics we currently are projected to have from 216 square miles to about 600 square miles. So that's a significant increase.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a significant increase. But is it a significant impact in the context of the overall land-use picture? Like, is this a big player in the final mix, do you think?</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>It's not currently a big player. And we don't project it to be under the assumptions we used. We do think it has the potential to grow with technological innovations and more incentives and more experience. So, for example, agrivoltaics that we looked at primarily are focused on fruit and vegetable crops there is some evidence that potatoes, wheat, cattle can benefit from agrivoltaics too, but there's just not enough data for us to be able to model the effects of agrivoltaics in those settings. But hopefully over the next few years we'll start to see more experience and that may expand the role that agrivoltaics can play in the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Why agrovoltaics and not aggri-wind, wind-agra, whatever the wind equivalent is? It seems like I mean, intuitively there's so much space between wind turbines, it seems almost more sensible to try to do agriculture amidst the wind. Is that not a thing?</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>It is a thing. And in fact, a fair amount of the wind that's being deployed now is in agricultural landscapes. And that's what we show as well. The area that we show being directly impacted in agriculture, that's cropland, that's a subset of the most productive, at least from a human food point of view, areas croplands, about 2% of them we project could be directly impacted by 2050. But that indirect impact or the area of agriculture that's in wind projects is going to be significantly larger than that. But that land benefits potentially from those wind turbines because the farmer or the rancher is getting an income stream not just from the agriculture they're doing between the wind turbines, but also the revenue they get for leasing land for that energy production.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>People understand the land saving benefits of agrivoltaics are very sort of intuitively obvious. Similarly with colocation, like if you put the wind and solar in the same place, then you don't need two places. It seems straightforward enough. But what's the deal with this fixed tilt solar? Explain that a little bit. The land saving benefits, what's involved there?</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>The main land saving benefit from fixed versus tracking is that the fixed panels are able to be packed together in tighter rows than the tracking. The tracking needs more space between the rows of PV panels in order to do that tracking. So that makes those tracking panels have a higher capacity to convert sunlight into energy. You can actually squeeze more energy capacity into the same amount of land using fixed PV. So at least in areas where there's not that much difference in the capacity advantage for tracking over fixed, fixed can be one of your land saving approaches because it uses somewhat less land than the ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting, that is not at all what I would have predicted. I would have predicted that tracking because it has higher capacity, because it produces more power, you just need less of it and thus would cover less land. But that turns out to be wrong.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Well, except as you go further south, then the advantage for the tracking really starts to pay off, including and exceeds what you can gain by packing more fixed into the same amount of area. Because that tracking differential, once you're further south in the southwest, places like Nevada or places like Georgia and Florida, there you're always going to have tracking is going to be the technology of choice. Fix probably doesn't make sense in those kinds of settings.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Okay, so the report takes sort of a close look at these three land saving, let's say, technologies fixed versus tracking, agrivoltaics and colocation. But those are mostly just novel inquiries to figure them out. The bulk of the land saving that's done in these scenarios is by shifting the technology balance. Is that fair? Like that's the primary instrument in what is or is not saving some land.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>So there are three steps that we kind of recommend. So one is use environmental and social data no matter what technologies you're using. Then look at those technologies you have available and figure out which combination makes sense for your region, for your landscape to achieve your climate goals, as well as your conservation and local community goals. And that may involve substituting solar for wind and maybe adding storage to the solar so you can better make up for the gap that the wind might leave behind.</p><p>And then the last is within those technologies that you have, say, solar. What are your options for saving land, for example, agrivoltaics. One thing I want to say about land saving approaches are two things that we didn't model as variables, but we assumed fairly high levels of implementation and that is efficiency and distributed or rooftop solar. So we made some pretty aggressive assumptions about how much rooftop solar will be built by 2050. We assume that about 35% of available rooftops would have solar 30 years from now, which is at the high end of projections that are out there. And so it's a decent chunk of the solar contribution, but it doesn't get us all the way to where we need to go.</p><p>It gets us something like about 10% of how far we need to go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But a big piece of land saving via solar is by moving the solar onto rooftops.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>It is an important piece and we should certainly support efforts that make economic sense to get solar on rooftops because it means there's somewhat less that has to go out in the landscape somewhere else.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>But I would say if you look at the main kind of figure that shows how total land-use impacts shift based on the different impact reduction scenarios we looked at and how the mix of technologies changes, I guess one way to look at it is we didn't challenge the model super hard on pushing the envelope on rooftop. We asked the model to kind of push the envelope as much as possible in considering how shifting technologies makes a difference, how agrovoltaics and colocation and switching from tracking to fixed makes a difference. There's a lot of opportunity, I think really to push the envelope more and challenge some of those assumptions about rooftop solar and policy policies that we can get in place really to kind of nudge us up as much as we possibly can because ultimately that and energy efficiency are some of the best land saving approaches.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And energy efficiency, I guess, is obvious enough that don't have to spell it out too much, but just the less energy you use, the less you have to build, so the less land you use. Yeah, I meant to ask about efficiency in rooftop solar because I noticed that they were not highlighted, but those are the main things I generally hear from people when they talk about how to save lands. Another question, Jessica. You mentioned earlier that you could view nuclear power as a land saving technology. This is something you hear very frequently from nuclear fans, that it uses tons less land than wind and solar for the same amount of power.</p><p>So I was a little surprised. I mean, I guess I would have expected that as you move toward reducing these impacts, you're going to get lots and lots more nuclear out of the model. But that didn't happen. It was a big shift from wind to solar, but there wasn't really a huge shift in anything else. I guess sort of bioenergy kind of declines sharply once you get up to avoiding a bunch of impacts. But the main technology shift was from wind to solar. So what explains that? Why not more nuclear if you're trying to save land?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>I think it really comes down to cost.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Nuclear's old Achilles heel.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah. And as part of this study, the modeling, we work very closely with Evolved Energy and Montara Mountain Energy and Grace Wu at UC Santa Barbara. And Evolved has the kind of energy capacity modeling expertise. And so what we're telling the model to do here is try and avoid natural and working lands as much as you can model and consider cost. And so as we're seeing cost play out in how the mix of technologies changes and it would select nuclear if it were competitive from a cost point of view to more wind and more solar.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then a follow up question about that. Then you say rooftop solar can save X amount, but advances in technology or policy, we could and should push that higher in the name of saving land. Do you take that same basic approach with nuclear? Like, would you support reforms? Do you support reforms that make nuclear either technologically, these smaller, allegedly cheaper nuclear plants that are allegedly coming sometime soon, or just regulatory reform? Do you support pushing the envelope on nuclear as well in the name of land preservation?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>So the Nature Conservancy, kind of, has focused a lot on the process also being incredibly important, having the local communities have a very important role to play here. And this is one of those technologies that for sure that we need to be particularly sensitive about. But we do acknowledge that current nuclear production is really necessary component of reducing emissions in the short term and even possibly in the long term, provided there are improvements for people and wildlife in the cost, safety and environmental performance of nuclear technology and as well as waste storage and mining practices.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Nels, one thing that jumps out at me as a longtime fan of electrification is that the scenario that performs best in terms of land preservation, sensitive land preservation, is the high electrification scenario. Why is that?</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Because it gives you more flexibility in how you get to net zero. So you have a range of technologies, some of which are more spatially efficient than others, and so that gives you the option. So nuclear, for example, is one of those very efficient options. And so as we reduce impacts, push really hard to reduce impacts, the model starts to choose some additional nuclear because it is so efficient.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it does boost a little bit. Nuclear does get a little bit.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>It about doubles the amount of nuclear that's online by 2050 when we really work hard to reduce impact. So it's not a lot, but it does increase somewhat. Keep in mind that the experience with the small modular nuclear plants isn't in the commercial space yet, so our data is very limited. And so the model just isn't able to really get enough good data to make it a cost effective option. Based on what we know now, that may change in the future. And I'll just say that's true of all technologies. So could be technology breakthroughs in lots of different places.</p><p>For example, I was listening to the show with Jamie Beard on geothermal not too long ago, and that's one of those technologies where there really could be a breakthrough that really makes it a much more attractive way of getting to net zero. But currently our data on geothermal is not exactly very promising in terms of cost effectiveness. But there's some really interesting innovations going on right now, really change that picture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it is notably light on land geothermal.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>It is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is worth noting.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>That isn't to say there aren't other issues, but generally it's more spatially efficient. You do have to look at aquifer effects and things like that and there can be things that are important to really avoid or mitigate with geothermal. But yeah, overall breakthroughs in geothermal could lead us to much more land efficient approaches to getting to net zero in 30 years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Jessica, what are energy communities and what role do they play in this? One of the results is that if you move to this more land sensitive approach, these more land sensitive scenarios, you end up with more jobs in energy communities, which seems like a good thing, but A. what's an energy community? And B. why do you end up with more jobs in them?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, so we didn't necessarily say anything about jobs, but when we were working on the modeling and building the assumptions, we had the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, so big deal. And so we wanted to consider. How that tax credit that is included in the Inflation Reduction Act would affect ... So IRA gives a 10% tax credit for clean energy deployment in energy communities and it has super wonky definition, as you would expect, it includes areas with historic fossil fuel production and processing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So these are communities that were embedded in the fossil fuel economy and we're worried about them because we're moving away from fossil fuels.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Right. And energy communities, the definition also included brownfields. But treasury is still working out kind of the technical definitions for a lot of this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Which made it hard when we were building this model several months ago. But kind of the mapping that has been done around the fossil fuel production aspects of energy communities is a little bit clearer. So we looked only at those and we were able to model areas again, those areas associated with historic fossil fuel industries, as I mentioned, evolved models, the evolved energy energies, their models takes into account kind of price. And we weren't able to kind of build that 10% tax credit into the energy model just because the rules haven't been set quite yet. Instead, and we might get to this, we use this dynamic scoring approach in this study and we basically put a finger on the scale in favor of these communities.</p><p>We gave them a negative social impact score to just see whether or not if we're incentivizing them, we see more of the renewable energy build-out in these communities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So kind of an attempt to simulate an incentive.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Exactly. And what we did find was that when we do that, we do see an additional 10% of the clean energy deployment being directed to these communities. So about 32% of the total 2050 energy portfolio in our scenario is built in these energy communities. And under one of the scenarios we looked at most closely, the 70% impact reduction scenario, 23 million people in those communities — live in those communities that host clean energy projects compared to 21 million people in the setting as usual scenario. So we do see a larger percentage of the portfolio happening in these communities and more people live in those communities.</p><p>When we again put our thumb on the scale for those energy communities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And are there land implications to that or is that just more about social impacts?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Sure, there's land implications as well. Yeah, so there's going to be benefits to those communities and there'll be impacts as well.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>One thing I'll just point out about the energy communities, one of the reasons why the modeling finds them very attractive for energy development is because it's likely they have the infrastructure and the energy capacity models out there looking for places that have certain characteristics. And these energy communities have the kinds of characteristics energy models looking for. So that makes them relatively attractive for new energy development. It's obviously a different kind of energy development, but it can take advantage of some of the same infrastructure. There are likely already existing transmission lines. There's road access, there's a worker force nearby.</p><p>So that's partly why we see such a large proportion of the build-out going to these communities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the land is sort of already affected.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Yeah, from a conservation point of view there's some benefit because these communities often have lands that have been previously developed for earlier forms of energy production.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. One other technical question is you're modeling finds as all modeling finds that building out renewable energy to hit the 2050 target is going to require an extraordinarily large amount of transmission infrastructure, new transmission infrastructure. But you find that an approach that is sensitive to these land and social impacts ends up using a lot more transmission, but a lot less more than in the baseline scenario. So why is that? What is it about being sensitive toward land that gets you less need for transmission?</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>The main story there, David, is that as we're reducing impacts to natural areas and to croplands, it's moving away from wind projects, for example, in the Great Plains that are quite distant from population centers where the energy demand is, to solar projects that are typically located closer to population centers and demand centers. So that is a big part of the explanation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the shift from wind to solar sort of carries a reduction in transmission.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>And then that reduces the transmission need both in terms of interregional transmission movement because you don't have to move as much between, for example, the Great Plains in the Southeast, as one example, but also the gen-tie lines. These are the lines that connect the wind project or the solar project onto the grid. And so both of those transmission requirements goes down. It's still a massive increase in what we have today. So we need at least two and a half times, or three and a half times at the upper end to move energy between regions of the country to get to net zero.</p><p>So that is a massive expansion from where we are today. The last two decades we saw very little expansion in transmission and that's really going to have to change as we convert most of the transportation fleet to electric vehicles. That is just going to really require us to expand transmission to keep up with all that new demand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And given how difficult it is, that does seem to serve as a recommendation for this sort of land sensitive approach since anything that can avoid the need for transmission is probably also going to avoid delays.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Yeah, and one thing we looked at more closely in the Power Place West report, we didn't have the time and the computing power to do it at the national level as much, but we looked at, well, what are the forms of transmission expansion that are available? And it's not just necessarily building a new line through a new right of way, but it can be things like colocating new wires on existing transmission towers. It can be reconductoring, that is, replacing the steel cable with carbon cables. It can be using what are called grid enhancing technologies that are software, for example, or new conductors and things like that, which enable the system that you already have to move more energy more efficiently.</p><p>And then, for example, two way energy flows in places where you only had one way energy flow. So all those things together we found in the west could account for half of the transmission capacity that we need to grow in the next 30 years. So that's a really good news story that we can invest in these approaches right here and now and make a big difference in that capacity while trying to figure out where are those big new lines going to go because we inevitably are going to need new transmission lines.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, but we can get a lot of just to sum that up, we can get a lot of new capacity without new lines or new land.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the idea here is to focus on those options as much as we can now, to make as much progress as we can while the longer term planning and investment for those new lines that inevitably are needed can take place.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Jessica, let's get to the $6 billion question on everyone's mind, which is when you ramp up these strategies for being more sensitive toward land, avoiding environmentally sensitive land, avoiding adverse social impacts, how much is the additional cost over and above sort of the baseline status quo projections?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Right. Well, at least the $1.87 trillion question. So existing studies have shown that as resighting today using sighting as usual scenario, the cost of meeting net zero emissions by 2050 is $1.87 trillion. So a significant price tag and that scenario where we use sighting as usual will also impact 250,000 sq mi of land. So that's an area larger than the state of Texas. So we looked at how under these kind of impact reduction scenarios from setting as usual, ramping it up to a 90% impact reduction scenario, how the cost change. And what we found was that half of the impacts to land can be reduced.</p><p>So under that 70% impact reduction scenario, half of those impacts can be reduced.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's half of wait, that's half of the amount of land is going to be impacted.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Yes. Under that 70% impact reduction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Half of the 250 what you ...</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>250,000. So the 70% reduction case gets you down to 125 ...</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>About right, yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>... thousand acres?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>You save an area the size of Arizona. Not too bad.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And how much does it cost to save an Arizona-sized amount of land from development?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Right. So that comes at a 6.3% cost increase over the current trajectory.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>And that's not nothing, particularly for lower income communities and families. However, we really think that is kind of likely to be pretty high because those costs may be offset by lower cancellation rates, shorter permitting times, and lower monitoring and mitigation costs. So into the sighting as usual scenario, we expect a lot more conflict, and we see higher cancellation rates, we see longer permitting times. If there's a lot of both environmental and social kind of value in an area as that Q and A defines it, and we think that although it comes at a 6.3% cost increase, it really can be kind of offset by some of those lower cancellation rates.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To what extent does the model of the status quo incorporate those conflicts? I mean, you sort of can't can't you're just sort of guessing how big those impacts are going to be? But they're going to be there, right? I mean, does the model take them into account at all?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>It really can't. There's there have been a few studies that we've relied upon that show kind of how much these, you know, sighting in sensitive areas from an environmental perspective does drive up the costs. And the studies that do exist demonstrate that when projects are cited in the more environmental sensitive areas, they have a higher cancellation rate, they have longer permitting times, and as one would expect, more monitoring is required. And there may be other kinds of ways to minimize impacts that would be asked of the developer than if they were in an area that, for example, was a mine land or a landfill or other kind of degraded lands.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you think 6.3% is what the model shows as additional cost, but we think maybe the status quo modeling is underestimating costs because it's not being able to predict all these conflicts over land-use. So maybe the costs are closer to comparable than at first blush. You think?</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Yeah. David, those soft costs are just not really available for monitoring. As Jessica said, we have some specific places where we have pretty good evidence of what those costs are, but we just don't have nationwide data. The other thing that's important to notice is that we're also avoiding costs that are occurring when we convert natural habitats or croplands. And there's a cost of that, too, which isn't in the modeling.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, you mean the cost of, like, lost nature?</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Lost nature. If we could put a dollar price tag on that, if we could.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So those aren't in the model at all. They're priced at zero.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>They're not. We're just modeling technology and land costs when it comes to these costs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So if you wanted to say that untouched land or unmolested land has some value that you would destroy if you developed it, that would change the final sort of cost balance outlook?</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>It could. We just wanted to take as narrow a view of costs as we had really good data for just so that we could have an apples to apples kind of comparison here. And that's why we limited ourselves to data that's really well vetted and reliable and that's the technology cost data and land cost.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, but I think it's fair to say that how you are going to view that 6.3% additional cost varies quite a bit based on how much you value land right. And how much you value untouched natural land.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And by the way, in terms of those soft costs that we talked about, project cancellation rates, permitting delays, there's really an important business case to be made here and we and others are working on that, but we just don't yet have the nationwide data.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. The business case just being it's more sensible to go to more appropriate land if for no other reason than to avoid the hassle and blowback and lawsuits and et cetera.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Yeah, the way I've heard some energy developers call it, it's kind of the land analytics. What is it about the place? You're thinking about the analytics, about a bunch of data related to that piece of land that relates to project success. There are lots of analytics that wind or solar developers look at.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do we know that? Is that sophisticated yet? Like, do we have a good sense of the full characterization of land that ends up being economic to develop?</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>We don't have good enough data. Companies probably have better data than we're aware of because it's a business and that data can be proprietary. But we think there are a growing number of companies that actually are starting to pay attention to, as I say, this notion of land analytics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. And Jessica, one of the ongoing discussions, let's say, areas of discourse in the clean energy world is about NIMBY-ism and about community feedback. And the sort of gathering conventional wisdom, I think, is that there's too much too many ways for communities to slow and halt things, too many ways for them to sue, too many laws and regulations that they can exploit. And thus that, like NIMBY-ism has all the power. And part of the solution is to move power out of local hands up higher on the chain, up to the.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>State or federal government.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But you in this report at the end recommend more public process, more engagement with the public. So how do you square that? How does that not end up slowing things down?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Right, I mean, we think there needs to be a balance. We need to make sure that the communities where this infrastructure is being developed have a voice, not only that, but that they're meaningfully engaged. And we also see a backlash when states try to go too far in taking away that local community role. And it can exacerbate, frankly, the backlash against renewable energy. This transition is not going to happen in the next five years. It's going to happen, we hope, as soon as possible, but it's going to take a few decades. And we really need to have these renewable energy developers have a long term social license to operate.</p><p>So we need to be finding ways not only to get that balance right between state control and local control, but we also need to make sure that we get the balance right in terms of how we share the benefits of this transition. And I think there's growing recognition about that as well. I think there's some encouraging signs there. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act directed about $760,000,000 in grants to state and local governments for economic development activities and communities affected by transmission, actually. And I think New York State is a place where they were trying to find the balance of that in their 2019 legislation, where they created this one stop permit review process.</p><p>That is great. And then they also acknowledge that in order to be eligible for that, you needed to demonstrate that you've consulted, hopefully more than just consulted with the host community and that you have a community benefit agreement in place. We need to make sure that the local communities that may be seeing a lot of this development in their communities are sharing in the benefits as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I feel like that's an underrepresented perspective in this debate, which is that maybe if you engage communities earlier and share more of the benefits with them, you could speed things up and then maybe part of the slowness is your standard capitalist rapaciousness trying to capture all the profit and not share any with the communities involved. Like maybe you could speed things up if you shared some of the money, basically.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>We really want to emphasize that when developers do the right thing, they show how they've avoided impacts, they show how they are working with communities to deliver benefits that the community wants they should be rewarded. And we think one of the most effective ways to reward them is to get them at the head of the queue in terms of permit review, in terms of interconnection queues. Because if companies go beyond what some of their competitors are doing to do the right thing, they need to be rewarded for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Well, that segues perfectly to my final question, which is sort of what policy recommendations fall out of this? One that seems very obvious is instead of not planning, let's plan. What are the others? Jessica, what are the main sort of policy recommendations that fall out of this for you?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Yeah, so we really were thinking about our audience as being those that do energy planning, state governor's offices and energy offices. So we kind of thought about the recommendations in terms of those audiences. And for energy planners at all levels, local, state, regional, national, kind of our solution is that they use the methodology outlined in Power Place to make sure that as they're planning for a clean energy future, they're doing so in a way that maximizes benefits to climate, to nature and to people.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are they just not doing that at all now? Is it land? Is this sort of like environmental sensitivity of land, is that playing any role at all in the planning right now?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Only a little bit. I mean, to the extent that they do and there have been some states that have they maybe are taking off the table, like in the way that you are telling the model avoid this place if you can, if you can't, but take it into consideration. They will, for example, include those lands that are currently off the table, like national parks and wildlife refuges and that really are off the table, but they tend to not include those other lands that maybe aren't regulated in that same sense. They're not designated as high priority conservation areas but we know they're really important either because they're wetlands or they are endangered species habitat or are lands that are going to be important under the changing climate to ensure that we have resilient and connected land in the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the first recommendation is just take this into account when planning.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Take this into account, use the high resolution conservation, land-use and demographic data that we do have. And then for policymakers, what we show in some of the particularly in the regional snapshots we have in this report is that different geographies are going to need different incentives and we need to tailor those incentives to the particular geographies and the specific kind of conditions. Is it highly agricultural? Is it amenable to agrovoltaics? We're going to need to adopt incentives to encourage the right mix of technologies and land saving approaches that make the most sense in those geographies. And then as Nels alluded to for those projects that are well designed and have lower environmental, social and economic risk, we do think that it's appropriate for them to be able to jump the line, not cut the line, but get to the front line for interconnection consideration and for environmental and environmental review and permitting.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>And it's really important to recognize that there are states where this is starting to happen. New York, California in particular have explicit approaches to avoiding and minimizing environmental and social impacts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What are they using? Is it just like a financial incentive or is it a jump the queue kind of thing or what? Do we know what works?</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>I think we're still learning. We're very much in the learning stage. There are states that incentivize provide incentives to solar developers, for example, that build on landfills and mine lands and brownfields. There's a lot of great examples of that. Does it solve the problem? No, probably not. But it certainly helps. And then New York was that example where they do have this one stop shopping for renewable energy permitting if you are consulting with the community and demonstrate that if you have a community benefit agreement. So we are seeing a lot of really interesting innovation and I think we're in an exciting time right now to try and get this right.</p><p>And now is the time we really need to get it right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Before we headlong into this stampede of growth, which just makes as someone who has become, over time sensitive to these possibilities for blowback, just the whole prospect of this giant wave coming, just the number of possible problems, it just makes me clench up.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>I think our findings are really encouraging. We we can avoid a lot of these impacts, we believe, but we need to get the planning and the policy incentives right, and we need to do it now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Okay, well, that's a perfect note to wrap up on. Jessica Wilkinson and Nels Johnson, thanks so much for coming, this fascinating report.</p><p><strong>Nels Johnson</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p><strong>Jessica Wilkinson</strong></p><p>Thanks so much for having us, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-clean-energy-transition-that-avoids</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:119631968</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 17 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/119631968/8e28c6e6532a39f4b28300c81545b30a.mp3" length="67742266" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3386</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/119631968/1fddc81a9b781e84c6d8a399cff555a5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Washington state Democrats are tackling the housing crisis]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Washington State House Rep. Jessica Bateman talks about championing an ambitious and successful bill that aims to increase housing density in Washington, and the politics of housing in general.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAA9mBSNTgu0Vk4AJJBX_nEba/volts23.05.10%28jessica.bateman%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/washington-state-democrats-are-tackling-the-housing-crisis"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>After decades of effort by urbanists, which often felt like the work of Sisyphus, housing has arrived as a political issue. Big environmental groups have come around to the idea that dense housing is a crucial climate strategy, support is growing from unions worried that their members can’t afford to live where they work, and polls show that the public is increasingly convinced that there is a housing crisis. </p><p>Over the last five years, a wave of good housing legislation has been building on the West Coast, spreading from California to Oregon and now to Washington state. In this last legislative session, some 50 housing bills were put forward in the Washington legislature and more than a half dozen passed, any one of which would have been historic.</p><p>One of the most significant bills that passed this session — and one of the biggest surprises — was House Bill 1110, which legalized so-called “missing middle” housing statewide. Every lot in the state will now be permitted to build at least two units of housing, four units when located near transit, and up to six units if some portion are set aside for low-income homeowners.</p><p>And that's just one bill. Other bills would legalize accessory dwelling units (ADUs) on all lots in the state, require municipalities to integrate climate change into their growth plans, sharply restrict local design review, and ease permitting of multi-unit residential housing. It's a feast.</p><p>The lead sponsor of HB 1110 is Rep. Jessica Bateman, who represents the capital city of Olympia. She was elected in 2021 and quickly established herself as a champion of equitable housing and a tireless organizer. Through sheer force of will, she brought together a broad coalition that was able to push the bill over the finish line, defying predictions.</p><p>Like Washington state Rep. Joe Fitzgibbon, who <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-washington-rep-joe#details">I interviewed for Volts back in 2021</a>, Bateman is widely seen as a rising star in the legislature. I was excited to talk to her about her bill, the wave of other housing bills this session, and the broader politics of housing at the state level.</p><p>Alright, then. Representative Jessica Bateman. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm so excited to talk to you. I've got so much I've got so much I want to ask you about. But let's just briefly start before we get into the nuts and bolts of the bills, et cetera, maybe just tell us a little bit about you're new to the Washington legislature as of 2021. So maybe just tell us a little bit about your history and how you came to the legislature and how you picked up an interest in housing along the way.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Well, I am new to the legislature, but I'm not new to legislative politics. I was a legislative assistant for three and a half years to former State Representative Chris Reykdal. He's now the Superintendent of Public Instruction. And before that, I came to Olympia to go to Evergreen. That's how I got involved in politics in my first campaign for I-1163. That's how I got started working as a legislative assistant, and then I became a planning commissioner for the City of Olympia working on comprehensive planning, and then I ran for City Council, was there for five years.</p><p>On city council. We dealt significantly with a growing unhoused population in Olympia and how we were going to manage and deal with that, which led me to working on permanent supportive housing and also more broadly, housing policy and how we create and build housing in Washington and the systemic barriers to doing that. We also worked on passing middle housing legislation while I was there. And when I came to the legislature, my goal was to legalize middle housing statewide. I didn't know I was going to do that in my second year as a legislator.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Don't get used to this heady success. I don't think it's typical.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>It was just by happenstance representative Nicole Macri had sponsored a middle housing bill for a couple of years, and she had other work that she was doing. So last year in 2022, I sponsored House Bill 1782, and then this year it was House Bill 1110.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, we're going to get into that in just a minute. So you've had your hands on housing policy directly at a municipal level, and this is kind of where the rubber hits the road with all this stuff. A slightly more general question, it seems like I and a bunch of other people I mean, not really me. I'm peripherally interested. But I know a bunch of people who have been banging their head on this wall for years. Decades of just urbanism housing in general, the dominance of cars, the lack of housing, et cetera. All this. And it seems like in the last, I don't know, call it five years, the dam has broken a little bit and things are happening.</p><p>Like, there's tons of bills passed in California recently, Oregon, and now Washington. I was looking at the list on Siteline for the listener. Sightline is a local non-profit research house. Awesome on housing. They list 50 bills related to housing that were proposed in the ledge this session. I mean, obviously not all of those passed, but it seems like housing has finally kind of roared onto the agenda. And I just wonder if you have any insight into how or why that happened and if you feel like do you have any sense that you're part of a movement, like a group of people here who are pushing this?</p><p>Or is this just like one of these things where the time was right and history turned and things changed?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I think it's a lot of all of those things. Honestly, the reason why we were able to take action on housing this year is multifaceted. One of the core issues is that our housing crisis continues to get worse. And as it gets worse and is experienced by people across the state, different generations, people are seeing their kids living at home. People like my dad, who just retired from Boeing, and watching his youngest, my little sister, who's a nurse, not being able to get a starter home of her own like he did, build her own family. It's a lot more relatable how the housing crisis is impacting people.</p><p>And it's a kitchen table issue that people, if they're not struggling with not being able to find a first home, which in Washington, first time homeowners, can only afford a home in three counties, and they're all in eastern Washington. That was a number from session, it might have gotten worse now. They're struggling with rent prices and seeing hundreds of dollar rent increases that put them more at risk of becoming homeless. And as a result of that, they're asking questions like, why can't we have more housing? Or what can we do to stop this? And thinking about having neighbors that live in middle housing becomes less ...</p><p>There's less stigma associated with it when people see it as something that their families could benefit from. Having said that, we've had a housing crisis that has been growing for years. And we have seen those that are in housing policy have really experienced a lot of frustration watching a lot of good housing bills die over the years. And last year, 1782, my middle housing bill died. Fantastically. In a year when the housing crisis was bad then, we'd seen 15%, 20% year-over-year increases in home prices. And so last interim, I and a group of other House Democrats got together, and we're talking about what are the barriers to passing housing legislation.</p><p>And there's a number of them, but one of them was the structure and the way that we organized our committees. We had a local government committee, which is where all the zoning and land use policies went. That's how you create more housing. And then all the symptoms of not having enough housing, like tenant protections, helping folks stay where they are, keeping them housed, that was in another committee. And then you had the investment in truly affordable housing through the Husing Trust Fund in a different committee. So we worked to create one committee that was all housing, everything housing holistic view.</p><p>And I think that was integral because as you saw, I mean, if you look last year versus this year, how many housing bills made it through the process, there was a significant uptick. And I also think us talking about the connection between housing and climate. I've been working on this issue for eight years, and my very first City Council race, the environmental organizations in my community, called me a developer-shill, because I was pro- unabashedly pro-housing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's just automatic now, though. That's just like part of the landscape ...</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Totally, which is why come up with something new because that's what's been thrown at me for eight years. However, it is frustrating as someone who partners with organizations and environmental groups to have them not see that connection, which is very real. Like if we're not going to address land use, then we're not going to realistically address our climate goals in Washington state. So to see premier environmental organizations stepping up and saying land use and climate are inextricably linked, we have to address both. And also, on the other side, equity. The way that communities have excluded people by race and by economic means through single family neighborhoods is very explicit.</p><p>And so we had a coalition this year that really focused on working families, communities of color, the environment all coalescing around the one issue that really does impact all those different facets. Because even though we're going to get into a wonky conversation, I'm sure at the end of the day this is really about people. And people having an opportunity to have a home, people having stability, people having the ability to put down roots in their community, to build equity, start families, have livable, walkable neighborhoods, have a future. That's what this is about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I love both sides of that answer, but I particularly love the first side since a recurring theme on this podcast is that in the spirit of Elizabeth Warren procedure matters, the structure of the bureaucracy matters, administrative capacity matters, it's boring, no one pays attention to it, but it really does matter. It really does affect results. Okay, one more general question. I think sort of ordinary people at this point have probably grokked that there's housing problem going on. But some of the questions I get are like to what extent is it a West Coast thing versus a countrywide thing?</p><p>To what extent is it an urban thing versus a statewide thing? How universal is it? Like is Washington particularly bad or is it just bad like all the other states are bad because housing policy is bad everywhere.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I mean, the country has millions of homes behind to keep up with population growth for building and constructing housing. So it's obviously not Washington state, or West Coast specific. However, you do see the real struggle to build housing commensurate with population growth in especially those high opportunity areas where people are really going to for jobs and economic opportunity. They also can be areas that are really good at weaponizing public policy to prohibit housing from being built. And that's a real challenge, which is one of the reasons why we have to address it at the state level.</p><p>Which is why you've seen California and Oregon. Oregon was first. But Oregon, California and Washington state. I do think if there's data that shows that Washington is particularly bad in terms of our per capita construction of housing, I think we are the lowest for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No kidding. Yikes.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>So we do lead the pack, unfortunately. But on the West Coast in particular, it is nationwide, but it is also really, I think, dramatic on the West Coast, where you see so many people wanting to come here for jobs and for opportunity. And in Washington state, it's not just impacting the large cities like Spokane, Seattle, or Tacoma, that statistic earlier about first time home for first time home buyers. It's only affordable in three counties, and they're all on the east side of the state in really kind of rural, expansive counties where there's not a lot of job opportunity.</p><p>So a part of this is about where do people want to live and what systemic policies do we have that make it difficult to build housing? And that is not specific to any one city. The vast majority of cities outlaw middle housing or anything other than single family homes in the vast majority of their areas where they can build housing. That's not specific to only Washington state. Other states are also in that vein as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's get to middle housing then, in your bill. I want to cover this bill, and then maybe we can mention talk about a couple of the other bills briefly at the end. But just by way of introducing this subject, I have like a little 32nd rant. I feel obliged to deliver because every time I talk with a policymaker in Seattle, I talk about this. What you see in Seattle, and I think this is typical of a lot of growing cities, is you got a lot of people coming here, you've got these single family neighborhoods that are fixed in place that won't allow anything to be built.</p><p>And so all new population, basically any working class people who move here, are put in big apartment buildings along giant arterials. So what you have increasingly in Seattle is a completely two-tiered bifurcated system. You're either living in a nice house in a quiet single family neighborhood, or you're in a big apartment building on a five lane, six lane street. And it's terrible on so many levels, but it's just so grossly unjust. And it just puts this sort of economic inequality in physical form all around you. And what's missing there? What's missing between these big apartment buildings on the arterials and the quiet single family homes, is what's called middle housing.</p><p>So maybe just start by telling listeners, maybe who aren't up on these debates, what do we mean by middle housing? And then let's talk about your bill.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Well, your observation is correct both in the description of what middle housing is and constitutes. So middle housing is everything between a single family home and an apartment or multifamily housing. So that could be a duplex. Two units that are connected, threeplex, fourplex, sixplex. My bill goes up to a sixplex. I think technically middle housing can go. I'm not sure how large they can go, but the largest that we have in my bill is up to a sixplex. The description that you gave is very apt in Seattle and the vast majority of cities, but using Seattle as an example, they only allow the construction of single family homes in over 75% of the city.</p><p>And so you have this economic and racial segregation where people that have historical wealth or connections or intergenerational wealth, they've been able and they have these homes. The median home price in Seattle is almost a million dollars. And then you have the new people that have no way of accessing homes like that to buy or to rent. And it's also about a person's health. Whether or not you get cardiovascular activity is do you live near a park? Do you feel safe to go to that park? Do you have sidewalks?</p><p>In terms of upward mobility and our investment in that from the state and education, well, so much of your lifetime income earning potential and your opportunity is based on your zip code and the people that live around you and the opportunities that are provided.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also if I could just insert also I've seen it. I'm pretty sure this has been said explicitly in Seattle planning documents is that these people who live on the arterials are referred to by city planners as buffers, basically for that air pollution that the cars create and the noise pollution that the cars create. Buffers to protect the single family homeowners from that nasty pollution, which is just, like, manifestly grotesque, I think.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Right, and our opportunity is really dependent upon that opportunity being available to others. And so I have a little sister, she's 27. I own a home. I won the lottery, I got lucky and I bought a home at just the right time. I have a fixed mortgage. I know year over year, give or take, how much that's going to increase. There's a significant amount of stability there that I want other people to have. And also, I couldn't afford my home today if I had to buy it now. As a legislator who has two jobs, so also as a city council member, having gone through that experience, we tried to pass middle housing legislation and it took us over two years, 44 public meetings, 1,200 pages of written comment, three public hearings.</p><p>And I can tell you that the way that we have these processes at the local government level, we hear from predominantly homeowners and older whiter, male homeowners that would like to maintain their property values. They have a definite stake in the status quo staying as it is. And it's by design, and it's been that way forever. And it's not embedded with equity because folks that don't live in the community yet, they're not voicing how new housing would provide them with an opportunity. You just add so many layers.</p><p>So that's why having a statewide floor for zoning is so important. It also creates stability and predictability for people that build housing so they can know statewide it's predictable, which is great. So the bill as it stands now, it went through a lot of changes in the process. It would apply to cities 20,000 or greater. Cities that are 20,000 to 75,000 would have to allow, will have to allow two units on all parcels, that allow residential construction. They would also have to allow four units near transit and four units anywhere if one unit is affordable. And that's up to 60% AMI for renters and up to 80% for a person who's going to buy the home.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the things I was wondering about, reading about this is this category of cities from 20,000 to 75,000 is that most of them what is the sort of distribution of cities here? Because I know the cap for that was lower in the previous bill and it got raised some. So you're including more cities now. And I don't have any sense of what percentage of cities or which.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I'd have to look at the numbers. What I can say is the bill started at any city of 6,000 or greater, so it impacted more cities when it started. And that was by design. We wanted to be really ambitious at the start. The vast majority of cities in Washington are small. There are over 260 and most of them are small. So when we increase that population threshold, the implementation at 20,000, we knocked off a whole bunch of cities. But the ADU bill that passed, which we can talk about, applies to all cities. And so the thought was for these smaller communities that really pushed back on how this change in housing would impact their community and what their community felt like and what their community needed, we could argue that, okay, well, the ADUs felt they felt less opposed to that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>That drives me crazy because it's not embedded in best practices or data or science.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, what in a housing policy is not ultimately like comes down to feels. There's not a lot of rational discussion around this where you look. So from 20,000 to 75,000 every lot, you can build at least two things. And if you're close to transit, four things. And if you set aside one apartment for low income housing, four things.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then 75,000 up is all one big category?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yes. That's four units anywhere, six units near transit, and six units anywhere, if two are affordable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Has Inslee signed it yet? It is passed the House and the Senate, and it's waiting for a signature, or has been signed?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>it's going to be signed on Monday the 8th.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>By the time this pod is out. So when this is law, if I'm a single family homeowner anywhere in the state, in a big-ish city, I can sell my home and my lot to a developer. The developer can knock down the house and build a fourplex. That can happen anywhere in a city over 75,000?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's four anywhere, six close to transit, and then six with some affordability?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Right. And then we have that third category, which is the contiguous cities, which are cities that are right up along it's kind of technical, but the largest city in a county of 275,000 or greater, so using Thurston County, Maya County, for example, the largest city is Lacey. Any smaller city that abuts up to it is a contiguous city has to allow duplexes everywhere. And so that was it started out being in the 75 category, so it would have allowed more homes and hounds near transit and anywhere if one or two were affordable. That got narrowed down in the Senate so it's just two anywhere.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But just for listeners, the reason this category exists is because there's all these like Seattle is surrounded by all these little communities, sort of satellite communities that are kind of part of the Seattle sort of municipal area. They're not really small towns per se.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah, the thought being we want to make more housing available and abundant where people are and where people want to go. And naturally that's where economic opportunity and social opportunity exists. So Seattle being the largest city in the state, you have all of these smaller cities that are adjacent. It makes sense that they would also we want housing to be there too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is huge. This seems like a genuinely huge and fundamental change. We can get into the politics of it later. But I want to touch on a couple of other aspects. What does it say about parking? Because parking is also sort of roaring onto the agenda as a thing people are starting to care about and look at and think about the negative effects of what does it say in particular about — because a lot of cities, I think listeners are familiar, a lot of cities have parking minimums. So theoretically one way a city could avoid this missing middle housing is by putting parking minimums.</p><p>So if you build four units on your lot, if you're required to put four parking spaces in, that kind of is going to eat a lot of the space and inhibit a lot of the growth. So what does it say about parking?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Love the parking. All the feels about parking. Parking adds ... not only does it add cost to constructing homes, it also takes up in our urban areas valuable space that could otherwise be used to house a person. So we prioritize vehicles over people when we create minimum parking requirements. It also doesn't make sense because you would want the person who's building the housing to make a market-based decision about: is it marketable to build this now? Will I be able to sell it or rent it if there is no parking? They're going to be much more aligned with that objective.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's something weirdly Soviet about how we think about parking. Why should bureaucrats be picking a number out of the air and deciding that's the minimum, it's just so goofy. We don't do that with any other service, product or service.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>So much of housing policy is really about the people that are currently housed wanting things to stay the same. And when other people move here, they inevitably it's more people, it's more traffic, it's more noise, it's more interactions. And so a lot of these policies underneath them, it's really about the people that are currently here kind of wanting to buffer themselves from any kind of impact.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I am subscribed to my local next door, and I can tell you anytime a new apartment building is announced, anytime new housing is announced anywhere, that is the first comment. Where are people going to park?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah, people get really upset about it. So the bill started out more ambitious, and it ended up you cannot have minimum parking requirements for the homes that are available near transit. So for the two units and the four units near transit, no parking minimums in the neighborhoods. We initially started with only being able to require one space per lot, and that got expanded to one space per unit. So if it's a duplex, you can require two parking spaces if it's a fourplex, four and sixplex. Six. And yeah, your guttural response is correct. That was a concession that I had to make.</p><p>They can also, if they want more parking, they can go through a process to appeal essentially to the department of commerce to say, we feel like more parking is necessary, but they have to demonstrate that it is because of some impact to public safety. We were pretty explicit in how they actually have to provide evidence for that, because, well, cars are kind of inherently dangerous anyway, so it'll be hard for them to make that case. So there is some restriction on how much they can require. It's not as much as I would have liked, but again, this is a watershed moment in terms of land use policy in Washington state, and I'm optimistic about us in the future being able to come back and make tweaks if necessary.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Kind of a side note, but I'm curious. A lot of these bills pivot around what is and isn't close to transit. So are there complications in identifying exactly what does and doesn't count as a transit stop, or what does and doesn't count as close to transit? Because a lot of money and a lot of rules are now hinging on that distinction?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I know one question came up recently about, I think, trolleys in Seattle, which was not something that we accounted for in the bill, but actually, apparently by the definition in the bill for frequent transit would qualify. So the department of commerce is going to be going through a process to answer some more of these specific questions as it relates to what constitutes the different forms of transit. It does get really technical really quickly. And we were also concerned with one thing we heard a lot was bus stops can change and that is technically true.</p><p>But we want housing near transit because the utilization of transit is predicated on density. So that's really necessary. But there's going to be some more fine tuning of specific definitions around things like whether trolleys qualify or not. We did take out ferry terminals. That was something that was taken out. I have to go back and look at the exact specific definition that we ended up with for transit, though.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm curious about how exactly this is going to interact with local municipal government. It's worth stating, does not dictate any citing or design issues. It doesn't tell local governments that they have to cite anything anywhere in particular or design anything any particular way. It's just sort of minimum requirements. But I'm sure there was and will be resistance from some local governments sort of notoriously around Seattle, like out on the islands, Mercer Island and whatever. They are enthusiasts about pulling up the drawbridge and not letting anybody else come out there, not letting anybody else live there, not letting transit come there.</p><p>So I'm wondering, are you worried about shenanigans by local governments trying to circumvent these things? For instance, I think there's an exception for environmentally sensitive land and maybe there's something about historical land. I can imagine local communities abusing those rules. Sort of like what do you foresee in terms of the push and pull between this law and local governments who for whatever reason don't want to do it?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Right, I think it's human nature to want to keep things the way that they are. And I don't inherently have ill will towards people that think that way because it's just kind of like how people tend to operate. But I do think it's our responsibility as lawmakers to be thinking about planning for the present, but also the future. And so that's why the statewide legislation is so important, because at the local level, so much of the response is inflammatory. It's an inflammatory and I'm talking like inflammation because people get really upset and they go to their city council folks and you are the closest to the people there and you just naturally want to make them feel better.</p><p>And you also I think there's a part of this that some cities feel like the state's coming in and telling them what to do. So I do anticipate that cities will try to find creative and innovative ways to circumvent this legislation. And I'm already thinking about ways that we can ensure that cities are held accountable for their responsible, fair share of providing housing. California has created an Office of Housing Accountability and they actually review housing elements in good detail. And the Attorney General there has a way of holding folks responsible if they don't do what they're required to by state law.</p><p>So that's one thing that I'm looking at. And then also really analyzing how historic districts are deemed valid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh my goodness, so much shenanigans there in Seattle. Please do something about that. All of Wallingford neighborhood is trying to become historical, which is just goofy.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>So we need parameters, I think on I am a fan of historic architecture. I'm a housing nerd. I'm going to Palm Springs next week and I'm going to take a tour of the mid-century modern houses ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I did that very fun.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Right? And we also know as people have weaponized SEPA, a really good environmental policy to obstruct creating more housing. They also weaponize things like historic districts to obstruct the creation of more housing and to keep their neighborhoods kind of covered in amber and staying that way for all time. So those are kind of two areas that I'm looking at.</p><p>Also, I would say that these laws will become effective in the next round of comprehensive plan updates. So it's going to be a rolling implementation based on the city's comp plan update. The largest cities going in 2024 and then they've got six months for implementation to pass their building codes. So 2024-ish for the next round, the first round of cities. So we have some time, but I'll be thinking this interim about ways that we can prevent those very things from happening.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And is there provisions in there about homeowners associations and their covenants and things like that? I feel like I saw something mentioned that it's ...</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>So the bill applies to all future homeowners associations. So if you create and build a homeowners association, this law applies to you. It does not apply to homeowners associations retroactively because we can't change the land use of a contract that already exists that people entered into when they purchased a home.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>So there are people that argue that we can and there're really smart legal experts that tell us, no, you in fact cannot do that. Other states that have passed similar legislation have not made it apply retroactively. I would also add the bill itself, it was kind of a wing and a prayer that this bill survived this year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I know. I've been reading about it.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>It came back from the dead a number of times. So I think there's an interest definitely because there was a lot of conversation about there's no secret that not having this apply to current homeowners associations. There are a number of them in Washington state.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to ask, do we have a sense of how common that is, how big of a swath of housing those covenants cover?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I don't have that figure off the top of my head, but it's larger than one would assume and the equity component is really bad. I mean, if you look at some of the areas, this bill will not be applying to some of the wealthiest whitest economically.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Those are the places with the covenants, right? I mean, those are the places with homeowners associations.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah. So there's an interest because of this bill. I think a lot of people in the legislature are talking about, hey, what can we actually do? And how can we push the envelope and look at this issue of homeowners association? So I anticipate we'll see some legislation on that next year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And is there anything in the bill along economic justice lines sort of anti-displacement? I know the one provision is you can build bigger buildings if you set aside a unit for affordable housing. Is there more all along those lines?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>So one bill that we passed a couple of years ago was House Bill 1220, which requires all cities to assess displacement risk. And Seattle has done that. You can see a map that Seattle has. And so what this bill does is it allows cities that have deemed an area to be at risk, a high risk for displacement. They can basically pause implementation for up to ten years. That law, House Bill 1220, requiring cities to do an assessment of at risk for displacement. It also requires that they have a better mapping out of the housing needed for different income bands.</p><p>We can go really into the weeds on comprehensive planning processes in Washington state, but cities have never been required before to go into detail on the different income bands of housing needs. So those two things were brand new. They just went into effect. They're in effect now, brand new. And so the question came up with the bill was, how do we protect for displacement in areas with classic examples, south Seattle, and I don't think we've answered that question thoroughly yet. I don't think cities know how. And that's what they said to us when they realized what they were going to have to do for implementation of 1220.</p><p>We don't know what to do for displacement. And they kind of looked at us like, give us money to give people money. And the state, you want to talk about the numbers? I mean, we need a million homes over the next 20 years. Half of them need to be affordable at up to 50% AMI. That is not a number that the state can budget for the Housing Trust Fund. I mean, as a comparison, just the data, the Housing Trust Fund, which is our largest bucket of funding for affordable housing in Washington, that's capital dollars for the construction of truly and meaningfully affordable housing, was created 1986.</p><p>We've built 55,000 affordable homes since then.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, not quite on pace for half a million.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Right, so what that tells me, and the whole premise of House Bill 1110 and some other supply side bills, is we need to figure out sustainable and progressive funding and revenue for massively increasing our investment in truly affordable housing. And at the same time, we have to make it systematically easier to build homes of all shapes and sizes a. to respond to the market and the demand there because let's be clear, half of those homes also need to be 50% and above AMI. And we have nurses like my little sister that also can't find an affordable home for her which is not spending more than 30% of her income on housing. So we need housing all over the place and of all shapes and sizes.</p><p>And the supply side bills this year are really focused on looking at there's some obvious low hanging fruit ways that we are making it difficult, in some cases impossible to build nimble, smaller, more modest homes that are also better for our environment and also increase equity in our communities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And for some reason this is controversial, but I feel like it's also worth noting that just building a bunch more homes is in and of itself an affordability strategy that's when you increase supply, prices come down. This is not controversial in any other market or any other area of public policy, but for some reason it's very controversial here. But ...</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>It is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Housing supply is an affordability policy.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Right. I mean, one of the other things I think about with our investment because advocates for affordable housing will rightfully say, well, you need to increase the investment in the housing trust fund. And I agree that we do. As long as we have these restrictive policies that make it really difficult and expensive to build housing, the price per unit cost that the state is investing. We'll house more people if we make it easier and cheaper and more efficient. And that's not just like me saying that as a talking point, that's really true. There's a ton of research that shows us how we make it more difficult and expensive to build housing.</p><p>But minimum parking requirements are a clear example and we get pushback the same people who demand that any new housing has to be affordable also push back on maintaining minimum parking requirements. So going back to the displacement question, we're going to have to continue to do more work because I think simply saying that we can pause implementation of building more housing is not a sufficient answer to anti-displacement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, let me ask on that exact note, maybe this is obvious and I'm just not getting it, but why do we assume that enabling more middle housing in these areas would produce displacement? Like what's the connection there?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>The argument that we heard from a couple of cities was you're going to see land values increase and demand in these areas already exists and with the opportunity there, you're going to see people being priced out either in their rent or selling their homes and having a developer come in and build the sixplex. That is then not affordable. And I can't argue that the value will go up and we will see some tear downs happen, although tear downs of existing structures happen only when it's economically a good decision for a developer to do that. Like in Olympia, my home and my property.</p><p>The structure is the most valuable asset on the property. It would make no sense for a developer to come in and bulldoze it down unless they were going to make a significant amount to recoup those costs and then make a profit. But in some areas, like Seattle, that might happen because of the land value, cost is so high and the demand is so high. But I would also argue on the flip side that say a black family that owns a single family home, should they not be able to sell it and make that profit and make decisions about what they want to do with that investment?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It seems like a species of argument, which I hear a lot of, which always slightly baffles me, which is like we can't let these places get nice because then people will want them and come buy them. So the only way to protect poor people in their housing is to keep the places they live grimy and unattractive and low value. That does not seem like a viable or attractive long term solution to me. Like that can't be the way we're protecting people.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Right. And that's what the cities, they're saying it's inherently more affordable housing, naturally occurring more affordable housing. And that by legalizing middle housing in those areas, we are going to displace the people that currently live there. And so that was the argument that we heard and the compromise was allowing for the folks, those areas to pause implementation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Let's talk about a couple of other bills. This one, the middle housing bill, is sort of your baby. A couple of others which you did not sponsor but voted for, which I think are at least worth noticing. The other big one I think on housing is ADU reform accessory dwelling units for people who are not nerdy on this topic, which just means you can build a nice little unit on your property, a second unit on your property and rent it out or sell it to someone. What does the ADU bill do?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>So that's House Bill 1337, sponsored by Representative Mia Gregerson, who has been fighting for this bill for years and it finally passed, which is amazing. You can build an ADU on any lot. Actually, I think two ADUs on any lot, it lifts local barriers on ADUs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Any lot period in the state.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah, it impacts cities smaller than the middle housing bill. Yeah. So for the cities that are included in the middle housing bill, they'll have the choice, the ADUs count towards the unit count. So unfortunately you won't be able to like in cities where fourplexes are legal, you can't do a fourplex and two ADUs, but you could do a duplex and two ADUs. The whole point, both of them, is to offer more flexibility and that is successful. So it caps impact fees and parking mandates, legalizes two per lot and sets baseline standards for minimum lot sizes and the ADU size and height.</p><p>I didn't sponsor that bill, so I don't know all of the technical details, but I do know that it works in concert with House Bill 1110.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And then one other worth mentioning, just for my friend Mike's sake, is single staircase buildings have been legalized. This is way nerdy in the weeds for housing people, but this is something that a lot of people have really set their hearts on. Were you involved in that at all? Or could you explain the benefits of a single staircase building or why that's an issue at all?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah, I wasn't involved at all, but I was thrilled to see it move forward. And I think we made some changes in the house that requires the state building code to develop recommendations for single stair buildings for up to six stories and to adopt those changes by 2026. And that's important because when you have the requirement of two staircases that takes up valuable space that could be used for housing people, it also puts limitations on where things like windows can be in terms of the architecture of the building and the design of the building. So it can make it a much more livable space by being able to utilize that square footage for something other than a staircase.</p><p>They do that in other countries and it's completely safe up to six stories. So it was really a common sense solution, I think. And I know that the people who build houses and architects and designers are very excited about it, and rightfully so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the things that has vexed local urbanists here in Seattle and I'm sure in other cities too, is what's called design review, which is you propose a building, you come up with the plans, your building, obeys all the codes, is ready to go. And then it has to go through this design review process where a board of architects ...</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Volunteer architects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, volunteer architects come and be like that brick shade is a little too dark red. I'm into more of a lighter red. And then you have to have another meeting and another meeting, and this adds millions of dollars onto the cost of building anything and takes forever and appears to benefit no one, as far as I can tell, other than the volunteer architects who get a sense of power over all the buildings.</p><p>So that ODS process has been not nuked. There was a bill that would have nuked it that didn't pass, but it's been ...</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I know, I wanted that one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's been reduced to one meeting, right? Is that what happened?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah, one meeting. And it requires the local design standards to be clear and objective. And so that means subjective is what the current process is, where you have volunteer ... listen, I get it. Architects, that's what they do. That's their job. And when you're given it's like the luxury of infinite choices and the luxury. So much of this process is all centered around the people that already have housing. Like the people that are on the committee, the volunteer architects, they have homes and they're being asked like, what shade of terracotta versus brick red should it be? And when it's the most obnoxious.</p><p>It's when they're making these decisions about something that is currently a parking lot, a completely unused space that could be housing during a housing crisis. And they're taking years to do it. And so by establishing this as clear and objective and not subjective is a huge improvement. And then also by not allowing more than one public meeting is also a huge improvement. One of my observations is this is so asinine for people that are not in these circles, that don't see these processes all the time, but the people that have been doing it for years, that are on these design review or local governments, this is just how they work.</p><p>Right. And so it takes people from the outside looking in, going, this is not the best way to do things we do need.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh my god. Anybody I try to explain it to, they're like, really? That happens to every building. What?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Right. And you can have a set list of like, here are the shades of color for a certain area. It's in a book. Like, it doesn't have to be this group of people that is really subjectively looking at this and evaluating it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. There were a couple of other bills that reduced permitting barriers that were good. The one other bill I did want to call out is 1181, which is basically tells cities to integrate climate change into their planning. Maybe you could just tell us what that bill does.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah, House Bill 1181 is sponsored by Representative Davina Duerr and it requires cities to add a climate element to their comprehensive plans, which is a mandatory planning process they have to do. It's incredibly important because it does things like have them account for how are you going to reduce vehicle miles traveled and making the connection between land use and vehicle miles traveled and where you put housing and how you have energy in your buildings and putting those things all together. It's really essential for cities to be required to do that. Some cities were already doing things like that, but it was really only certain cities and usually more progressive liberal cities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So this is just you have to consider that stuff. You have to take it into account.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>You have to take it into account. You have to plan for how you're going to address it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. That's a lot of bills. A lot of pretty big bills. There are a couple of big ones that didn't pass. I think probably the most significant one that went down this year was the one about transit-oriented development, which again, for non-nerd listeners is just this idea that transit stops, transit locations are obvious areas for density. That's where you want to put a lot of people. You want a lot of development around transit stops. And a lot of times that's just prohibited by current law. I saw a lot of predictions at the beginning of the session were that that was the one that was going to pass and that your bill was going to have trouble.</p><p>And then one thing happened, and then another thing happened and somehow yours got through and this one didn't. Can you explain what that bill does and is it going to rise from the dead next time around?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>So the Transit Oriented Development Bill is sponsored by Senator Leos and it would require cities to legalize higher density housing near major transit areas and more frequent transit. The idea being like in Seattle and these high economic opportunity areas in and around transit, you want to have more housing be the standard. So things like more stories of housing being an option for multifamily housing, more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Than sixplexes, presumably. Right.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>We're talking about 100, right? Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Big buildings.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah. They ended up using far floor area ratio in the bill, which is really talk about wonky and confusing. No offense. Sightline. Thank you. So the bill did not it made it through the Senate. And I think, honestly, that people didn't really understand what it did, which happens sometimes. And then when it got to the House, a lot of emphasis and focus was on the fine details and there became a lot of negotiation and concern and feedback, a lot of conversations about minimum affordability requirements. There continues to be a growing number of people in the Democratic Caucus in the House that really believe that you have to have affordability requirements if you're going to let developers build this higher density housing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't want to beat the subject to death, but I have to pause there. Again, I'm sure you've been involved in these discussions. I just want to know. It sounds to me like those worries about affordability requirements were a big part of what led to the bill not passing. And I'm just like, in what world is the no bill passing better than the status quo? Because as we were saying, build a bunch of big apartment buildings around transit, it's going to lower the average housing prices. Like it is an affordability strategy. So what is the ... could you explicate that debate a little bit more so I understand what the hell is going on.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I've heard people say that it's possible to build more affordable housing because where I come from, you know, the work that I've done, you know, I've talked with developers. I'm not an expert in the creation or construction of housing, but I tend to believe that we should make it easier to build housing of all shapes and sizes because we make it incredibly difficult, expensive to do. And we have to own that. We have to be really honest about that accept what the problem is. And then if we want truly affordable housing, we need to subsidize it, we need to pay for it because expecting someone to do that themselves, whether or not that's a noble goal, it's less likely to happen than if we make it easier to build the bare minimum.</p><p>You can't build what's not legal to build, so you can't build a seven story building if it's illegal to do so. Middle housing, you can't build a sixplex if it's not legal to do so. In my bill, there is an incentive to go higher and include affordability. That's a choice. Some non-profits, especially things organizations like Habitat for Humanity, will take advantage of that. We have folks that believe that the developers can, if we do a minimum threshold of affordability requirements, that they absolutely can do that. We should expect them to do that. And then we have folks that think that you should let the market decide.</p><p>And then some folks like me that think we should also be investing more in affordable housing and subsidizing that cost and increasing that investment. There's a lot of other tools and things that we can do to do that. Also things like Land Trust and how can we partner with communities so they can invest in some of these opportunities and create truly affordable housing with our help and assistance? At the end of the day, if the housing doesn't get built, no one gets housed. And that figure of up to a million people over the next 20 years, half needs to be truly affordable and half needs to be 50 AMI and above.</p><p>We still need housing for the 50 and above. So no housing versus housing. I mean, I can't really understand that argument either. However, what I will say is that Representative Reed was the person who worked diligently once it got to the house and she did a tremendous job trying to piece that thing together and keep it moving and ultimately was not able to do that. The other thing I would say is that 1110 was worked on much further in advance, had more time for people to process. It was introduced last year and then during interim I was meeting with people across the state, building a coalition, visiting with the AWC.</p><p>The TOD bill was relatively new for people. They didn't weren't as familiar with it. We are going to have to come back to it because if we're going to be honest with ourselves about transit and the CO2 that comes from it in Washington, I don't see how we're going to be able to address that without having TOD.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, people have a lot of really weird hang ups about tall buildings. I think this bill invokes a lot of those. But if you go to the Vancouver suburbs, they have rail stops and they're surrounded by tall buildings and then they sort of go out from there and it's perfectly nice tall buildings are not scary.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're running out of land. We have a growth management act that stipulates where we need to build new housing, which is in cities. We need to preserve our rural areas, our farms, our forest lands and ecosystems. We have to build up. And what I ask people when they're opposed to housing is where are the magical homes going to be built? Because we have to build them somewhere. We are not going to stop people from moving here or people from having children. You have to go up. That's the only option. So I'm looking forward to a future where we have abundant homes of all shapes and sizes for everyone and where people aren't afraid of taller buildings and it doesn't disrupt what they think is the character of their neighborhood.</p><p>I think the character of the neighborhood is defined by the people that are in it and a sense of community and opportunity. So I think we're in the liminal space right now where people are coming to terms with the single family home with the white picket fence and the garage and the lawn. That's not the reality for all the homes in the future like it was in 1950. And it wasn't environmentally good back then either.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're pretty confident the TOD bill will be back next time around?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I think so. And I think there's going to be a lot of work that will be done during interim to see where we can get more support for that bill and see how to move forward.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then another bill that failed was lot splitting, which maybe just very briefly explain what the significance of that is and why you think it failed.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Oh, boy. So it was really sad that the lot splitting bill died. That was by my co-conspirator in housing Representative Barcus, and it allows for people to more easily split a lot. So, for instance, I have a good friend, single mom, she's got a lot. She's got a single family home. It's large enough. She'd like to split it and build an adu and sell it. And the process is quite cumbersome, difficult to navigate and expensive. And so this bill would make it easier for people to do that legally so they can sell the second unit.</p><p>And it's important for opportunity when we have bills, legalizing ADUs and middle housing because people will want to take advantage of those things and they want to be able to create equity and make an investment. So it makes that more difficult.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And this, you think, will also be back, or is there some irradicable level of opposition somewhere or is this just something that also you think people need to sort of wrap their heads around?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I think the bill will come back next year. I think that there's an entire year from now for people to kind of wrap their minds around all the bills that passed. And I think they'll become more comfortable with something like that. I think there was some concern around the overabundance of housing that might be created if lot splitting passes two. I definitely think that was a part of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, right. Because if you split your lot in two, then all of a sudden you can make four units because you have two lots, right?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Theoretically. However, there are some real constraints that are just naturally occurring. Like, you can't feasibly build more than so many units on a space because cities still have the ability to maintain and create things like setback requirements, minimum lot sizes, et cetera. So height restrictions, if they have a two story height restriction in a single family neighborhood, that would apply to a Duplex as well. So I think so much of this is making people comfortable with what is the new normal and that this is not going to result in a complete overhaul of neighborhoods, that the cranes aren't going to come in and make everything look completely different.</p><p>It's going to kind of meld seamlessly. I live in Olympia, and I live down the block as little apartments and ADUs and a school, and there's a shelter and a grocery store. It's all a part of my close knit community and it's cool.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it's fine. It's all fine.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Right. And it's going to be great.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The one other thing that didn't pass that I wanted to mention, because insofar as there's any sort of note of off note or note of dissent about all the great housing progress that got made this year, is that the tenant protections bill did not pass. And I think there are people in the environmental justice community saying sort of the housing supply without the tenant protections is just going to screw us again. So maybe just explain what were the tenant protections and do you think they'll be back?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah. There were two bills. One was basically a rent anti-rent gouging bill that would have given the Attorney General the authority to take people to court if they are deemed to be increasing rent at a rate that is exploiting people and rent gouging super important. That did not pass. And then we also had a bill that would cap, like an inflationary cap on how much a landlord can increase rent year over year. Neither of those bills passed. These types of bills have for years failed to move forward in the legislature. I think there's a significant skepticism amongst lawmakers that these are bills that will help solve the problem.</p><p>So I think there's a lot of work that continues to need to be done building a coalition to make that reality different, to see a different outcome.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you think they'll solve the problem? Like, is this the policy you would pick to protect sort of low income homeowners?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I support a reasonable cap on, like, an inflationary increase like they did in Oregon. I don't think that's going to solve the problem. I think it's going to be a near term fix that will ultimately not address the underlying issue, which is a lack of supply. I haven't seen a lot of data tell me that rent control actually results in lower prices for renters. And the underlying solution is really that we need to make housing available to more people. We need housing that's abundant. We need people to have choice. There needs to be competitive options for people, which right now it's essentially a monopoly.</p><p>And there's so much of a limited supply that people are able to just the demand is so high, they're exorbitant costs. But this is going to continue for a while. So in the meantime, we will continue to have people that are getting hundreds of dollars rent increase, $1,000 rent increase. And I am terrified as a lawmaker about my constituents being evicted and not having anywhere to go, because there is literally nowhere to go. So I see that as an interim step. The rent gouging. I think that if there is an aggressive and systematic increase in rent that is deemed to be gouging, I think that the Attorney General should have the ability to investigate that and hold people accountable for that because that is happening.</p><p>But there are people that really fundamentally believe that rent control is an essential solution and without it, that we are not going to see people be protected, that people will continue to fall victim.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. This is a deep and long standing debate in the urbanism world, a very heated debate. Are those kind of forces fixed in place or do you think there's enough wiggle room that this has a chance next time around?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>There would need to be a significant amount of work to build a coalition and to talk with lawmakers and to make I mean, the reality is that rent control bills and rent stability bills have died year after year in the legislature. So you have to be really honest about how do you change that outcome. And if there's not enough support amongst lawmakers now, how do you change that? And you do that by talking to them, getting broader coalitions of people together to talk about what's happening now to people and what will continue to happen, and coming up with a solution that legislators can support.</p><p>The legislature is filled with groups and organizations that represent them and the people that represent the landlords and the multifamily housing associations have a very large presence in the legislature and are there every day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And people who get evicted do not have a large lobbying presence.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>No, they don't.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Speaking of forming coalitions and changing the political balance of power and political dynamics, I got some questions about how that happened. I talked to some of your colleagues and people who are involved in and around this stuff and they all you were singing your praises along exactly this lines, which is this middle housing bill failed last time and then you did the work of building a bigger coalition. Because in the politics, from my point of view, like someone who lives in Seattle and is continuously frustrated, it just seems like NIMBYs are like, everywhere and have a lock on everything and have a lock on every process from the local level to the state level. Somehow you overcame that.</p><p>So maybe just tell us a little bit about what the modern pro-housing supply coalition looks like.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Well, first we had the most diverse freshmen class of lawmakers arrive this year, and so ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The young people are coming. The young people are coming.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Exactly. Young people. They're closer to the issue of housing instability, insecurity. They're more likely to be renters.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, they're all living it.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Right. We've got members of Color now in our caucus. That number keeps growing as well. They also are disproportionately them and their constituents are disproportionately impacted by a lack of housing. So that was huge because they ultimately really changed the dynamic towards the more progressive side of this conversation. And I made it my mission. Last year, I went out and met with people in District. I went and met with the association of Washington Cities who was very much opposed to my bill last year. I met with their Legislative Priorities Committee and said, this is why I'm passionate about this topic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They ended up endorsing your bill, didn't they?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah, a week before it passed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Still though.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>After 25 hours of negotiating with them, they ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Still kind of blew my mind, I mean, this is for listeners. This is the AWC. The association of Washington Cities.They just represent all these little, whatever, 260, all these little cities and towns around Washington. And I would say it's fair to generally characterize their past behavior as on the NIMBY-ish side of the spectrum.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>They've been opposed to legalizing middle housing statewide for years. And so last year they didn't take it really seriously in terms of negotiating. And this year we did a lot of work. Prior to session, I reached out to them, and then during session I continued to do that. But I think fundamentally, when I looked at the problem of the bill not passing last year, I thought, this bill is being talked about in such a wonky way. From a zoning perspective, we have to talk about this like it's a kitchen table issue because it is. It's impacting where people are growing up, where they're not growing up, where they're taking jobs.</p><p>If they're taking jobs, it's impacting people like my dad who contemplated postponing retirement so he could help his daughter with a home. It's impacting people's daily lives in all types of ways. And we needed to talk about it like that. And because it impacts the environment and climate change is something we've talked about, we need to be talking to environmental organizations. And because it impacts and exacerbates these inequities with opportunity we need to be talking to organizations and communities of color labor, and we also need to be talking with people that build housing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. How would you characterize labor's disposition toward housing supply currently?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Well, the Washington State Labor Council last year at their conference passed a resolution stating that they supported eliminating single family zoning.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hey, well, alright. It's one of these things that I've learned when talking about unions, never to sort of assume the obvious thing, but you'd think, like, building lots more housing would be looked upon favorably by the people who build houses. But I guess you can't always assume that.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>It took them some time to come to that conclusion. The young people are coming. Like the environmental organizations that supported this bill five years ago, I don't think that would have happened. They had an influx of new, young, diverse members getting on their boards and saying, hey, climate and housing are definitely linked, and we need to be taking this seriously.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you think environmental groups coming around that was significant in the politics of this?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Oh, 100%. Absolutely. Futurewise was the premier organization that I worked with last year. It was sightline. So to have Futurewise really leading the charge with an actual dedicated lobbyist, this was one of their two priorities that their board voted on. Sierra Club, Washington Conservation Voters. Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's great.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>We have folks that are serving in the legislature that they associate the old school environmentalism as a different one than today. Today we know that dense housing is good for the environment, and it didn't used to be associated that way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And population, the old school environmental, if you told them if you limit housing, you're going to limit inflow of population, they're like, exactly right. Population. People are bad, people are bad. You still hear some of that, but I think that's fading, at least in terms of their active public.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I've been working on this issue for eight years, and I've seen a change in how environmental groups talk about this issue and who's showing up at those tables for environmental organizations. Personally, when Futurewise told me that they were making this bill one of their top two priorities, I almost cried. And I said thank you, because not only I would love your help as a lawmaker, it really helps to have an organization support your work, but also to me, it did represent a C-change in how we're talking about housing and land use, and that gives me a lot of hope for the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you got environmentalists on board more or less. You got unions more or less on board. Even the AWC, the Association of Cities, is titularly on board. If I'm thinking about state politics, who do I identify as sort of the concentration of opposition? Is there like, an organized faction that opposes this stuff, or is it just kind of ambient NIMBY sentiment?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Before it was the AWC, but not this year. So the entire time that I worked with them, they were negotiating in good faith in terms of wanting to eventually get to a yes if they could. And so they were not actively opposed to the bill. They were neutral, and then they got to support at the very end. We did have a lot of the old school environmentalists individually emailing legislators and saying that middle housing conflicts with preserving the environment and tree maintenance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The trees, my God, it's like a trigger word for me.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Now. Tell me about it. I was on city council for five years. So yeah, that was kind of it. And then individual cities that were members of the AWC, but not speaking for the whole association, like the city of Auburn being a prime example, they were very much opposed. But that was basically it. There was no organized those were more tangential. There was no organized group.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And a similar question, how would you characterize the Republican Party's disposition toward these issues? Certainly at the federal level and in the sort of face of the party is very much like, we must preserve the suburban style of life at all costs. Joe Biden is coming to force you out of your house, et cetera. But you had a Republican co-sponsor, which is somewhat brain scrambling for me. So are they split on it? How would you characterize where they're at on these issues right now?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I would say at first that politics nationally is different than it is at the state level. And I know that's what we see in the news, and I don't watch the news, but that's what people are used to and accustomed to for their lens at the state level. I work with Republicans. I get along with Republicans. We could be on the opposite sides debating a bill, and then we go to lunch in the member cafeteria and we sit next to each other and talk about kids and pets and it's very cordial and affable. So I would say that legalizing middle housing, despite being like a free market, right aligned theory policy, that a lot of Republicans, it conflicts with their big government, the state telling cities what to do, when actually, in reality, cities are telling property owners what they can and cannot do with their properties.</p><p>So it really ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>These people are supposed to hate meddlesome regulations, right.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>The message of local control, which is current law, middle housing cities currently have the authority to make their own local zoning decisions, and that's called local control colloquially. Well, this is when people talk about it, they call it preempting, preemption of local control. It's very much of like the federal government coming in and the state government coming in and preempting. Well, local control doesn't have a really great history either if we want to go back in history on that. And yet that message is really hard for Republicans to get away from because that strikes a chord with them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, also local control disproportionately empowers the aforementioned older and whiter people, which also coincidentally happen to be the sort of base of the Republican Party, so it's not the ...</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Also the Democratic Party.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is not all about policy. It's very much about them having power.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, the people who vote in elections tend to be older whiter property owners. So that could be said, it could be true of Democrats as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>True.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>However, we did get some Republicans. So the fact that Representative Barcus was a co-sponsor was huge. He was my number two on the bill. He didn't just co-sponsor it. He was the number two, which is extremely significant. Actually. His office is right across the street from my house.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Who does he represent?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>He has a property management company and then he represent, I think it's District 2. It's like right abuts my district, south. So Lacey and Tumwater south. And so he believes fundamentally that we need to have more housing that's available and that abundant housing is a significant pathway to a solution. That's why he co sponsored the bill. And he did a tremendous amount of work outwardly, talking with people, going on interviews, podcasts, radios, really stepping out and defending this bill. And then in his own caucus, when it came to the floor, he had to describe it to his caucus members and whatever he said to them inside, that caucus was successful because we got a ton of Republicans to support the bill in the House.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Yeah, it was a vote. We have 98 members.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this was bipartisan in a real way, not just the, like, one rebel Republican?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>No, they voted a significant number of them voted for it on the House floor.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Does that extend to other housing bills? Is that a general move on housing policy? Or was there something in particular about middle housing that resonated, do you think?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I think the middle housing bill, I mean, it was pretty amazing objectively how much support it got. I think some people voted for the bill honestly because they just saw how hard I worked it and were like, just, okay, fine, leave us alone, Jess. I hope not. I hope that they really wanted the policy, but me meddling and getting in their way might have had something to do with it. But he really cultivated a sense of what the bill was, helped them understand it. That's the other thing that people underestimate the influx of bills that we get and how the sheer number and magnitude.</p><p>So when you have someone right in the other party that is shepherding it, that's the other thing. Like throughout the whole process when I was negotiating with the AWC, I was constantly checking in with him, letting him know what was happening, where it was going. So he was attuned so when it eventually got to the House floor, he knew the bill. It wasn't like a different bill because it changed a lot. But then it went to the Senate and we didn't have a Representative Barcus in the Senate. So all the Republicans over there, that was a brand new bill to them that they didn't understand and know.</p><p>And Senator Trudeau was the sponsor in the Senate. It didn't move in the Senate. So then she was the person who shepherded it over there and did an incredible job getting that bill passed. I still don't believe that it passed. It's going to be signed on Monday and until it's signed, I still don't believe that it happened.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is how I feel about the Inflation Reduction Act to this day. Is there a Republican co-sponsor for the TOD bill, for the Transit Oriented Development Bill or any of these other sort of big ones?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I don't think that the TOD bill got a Republican co-sponsor. And a lot of the supply bills, they garnered Republican support because like the streamlining permitting process and design review, et cetera. But the TOD bill the Republicans are not shy about telling you they will not support a bill that has minimum affordability requirements in it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's just what a bizarre place to draw a line in the sand. We will not help poor people. If you try to help poor people, we're out.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Well, they view it as and you could talk to Representative Barkus about this because he's kind of the housing lead over there. But I think from what I've heard, the best way to get more housing is to make it easier to build more housing. And there's certain things I agree with that, I think ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Why not both?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Right. There's also politics and I think there might be political reasons why they might have that position as well. I'd let them articulate that. But my point is that if we want a bill to pass, we have to figure out we have the majority in the House so we can move it on our own.</p><p>It always helps to have Republican supporters as well, if possible. So any path forward would have to figure out that in some way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm just so curious just from a political standpoint about because this issue does not on the merits cleanly fall along what you would think of as ideological lines. It's more of a culture war split. And I'm just so curious. But to summarize, it's not monolithic opposition to anything having to do with housing as it is on, let's say, many other public policy issues, at least it's mixed.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>In the House especially. I mean, the Republicans, they have a listserv that I subscribe to and they talked about the progress that they made on housing and they mentioned the middle housing bill. And so leadership has supported the fact that their members supported that bill and they're talking about it publicly. That's awesome to a significant degree. Yeah. But I think the Senate was a little different. We heard the floor speeches on the Senate be different than they were in the House, much more focused. I mean, Senator Fortunado in the committee, in the Housing Committee, his first question was, he said, I don't like this bill, and I don't like it because my next door neighbor might sell their property and someone might build multifamily housing on it, and that would be right next to me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, at least he's effing honest, right? This might personally inconvenience me and reduce my property value.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I think he also added renters might live there because then ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Worse yet, imagine they might even ride bikes.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>And Representative Barcus, I looked at him and I was like, do you want to respond to that? And he said, well, first, we love renters. Thank goodness. Because I was like, I don't even know where to go with that. I mean, I was in shock. I'm newer here, and this is my first in person session. So I was a little surprised by the comment, but Representative Barcus did a really good job. But my point is, I think as younger Republicans maybe get elected or the same kind of diversity of their caucus happens, hopefully we'll see the change in attitude around what used to be a controversial issue and I think is now becoming much more mainstream and honestly supported by the average constituent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. I'm a little curious. When will the middle housing take effect? I'm sort of curious. Once the aforementioned older whiter people who live in the single family neighborhood see things happening, I'm guessing at least some of them are going to go complaining to the representatives, and it will be the politics for Republicans will get complicated somewhat. So A, when will things start happening as a result of this bill? And B, are you worried at all about kind of backlash to implementation?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I'm not worried about a backlash to implementation because of my own experience in the city of Olympia after we passed our own middle housing. It is not a fundamental change that happens overnight. And in fact, we're going to have to do more work. It's not just about legalizing these home types. It's making sure that we have the workforce to build them, which we currently don't, that we have financing products for people to buy these different types of homes that typically haven't been purchased by people. There's a ton of work that's going to have to go into incentives, like a ton of stuff, when it will be implemented.</p><p>It's going to be a rolling implementation based on cities and which counties they're in based on their comprehensive planning process updates, super wonky. I know the largest more populated counties, Snohomish, King, Pierce. They're going to be implementing in 2024. They're the next cycle. And then 2025, another group of cities, and 2026, et cetera. So it's going to be a rolling implementation. They have six months to adopt building codes, which are the codes that allow for the housing. Department of Commerce is going to be doing model ordinances for them because some of the smaller cities are like, we don't have the staff, we don't ever done this before, which isn't a hollow argument actually.</p><p>And so Department of Commerce is going to be doing a lot of work in the next year and ongoing I anticipate coming back next session and there are a lot of other things that we're going to have to address and so I'm looking forward to working on more housing legislation in the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Okay, final question. I kept you much longer than I said I would, but I love this housing stuff. I think most of where housing policy, the rubber hits the road is the sort of interplay in local municipalities and states. But is there anything in particular that the federal government could do that would make your job substantially easier, that would make these housing reforms substantially easier? Is there one or two things you could point to?</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I mean, they could say that any federal funding, the requirement is you have to legalize, you can't make it illegal to build middle housing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right nationwide middle housing bill, that would be something.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>I mean, it's not legalizing middle housing nationwide. It would be saying if you want our money, you need to have policies that are aligned with our climate and equity goals. You can't have climate and equity policies that conflict with our goals if you want our money. And right now they've taken what was considered a proactive and progressive position of incentivizing based on making these good decisions. So much more of a carrot approach. But listen, we are not going to make progress like New York. They just went through and we're trying to be more aggressive with legalizing, more modest home types statewide and that quickly fizzled out with pressure from stakeholder groups that were opposed.</p><p>And that was a governor supported initiative. Just like last year, 1782 was a governor request legislation. We don't have time. The urgency to make sure that we have a planet that we can live on, that we have housing that's affordable for people in places where they want to live. I mean, the time was ten years ago and we need to take it really seriously and do everything. There's just really common sense things and making funding a prerequisite that you have policies that allow people to live in your cities is one of them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Well, thank you so much for this super educational and interesting and heartening and thank you so much for all your work on this issue. I feel like the state is going to be better for your efforts. So, Representative Jessica Bateman. Thanks again for coming on.</p><p><strong>Jessica Bateman</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for the opportunity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/washington-state-democrats-are-tackling</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:118956265</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 17 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/118956265/9eb7c1fbb1421a37e9e121f33809a01d.mp3" length="61481451" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5123</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/118956265/c463e70c4f6a6c314b85b7760ebcd4d7.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Getting rooftop solar onto low- and middle-income housing]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Vero Bourg-Meyer of the Clean Energy States Alliance discusses the barriers that keep lower- and medium-income customers from installing rooftop solar, the types of efforts most likely to overcome these barriers, and how to keep momentum moving forward.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAA0nsA_mUBTzBwx9J7rlBiJa/volts23.04.28%28vero.bourg-meyer%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/getting-rooftop-solar-onto-low-and-middle-income-housing"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>For all its explosive growth in recent years, rooftop solar is far less frequently installed by low- and middle-income households than by wealthy ones. Though that disparity is <a target="_blank" href="https://escholarship.org/content/qt3648q6sm/qt3648q6sm.pdf">diminishing somewhat over time</a>, it remains large.</p><p>The barriers keeping lower-income consumers from solar go well beyond the financial (though financial barriers are substantial), ranging from credit histories to low-quality and poorly insulated buildings to lack of supportive policy.</p><p>State policymakers, foundations, and non-profit groups have been trying for years to overcome this problem. Finally, the pieces are beginning to fall in place and it is becoming clearer which kinds of interventions work and which kinds don’t.</p><p>No one knows more about the history, design, and successes of these programs than Vero Bourg-Meyer of the Clean Energy States Alliance. She has been analyzing and advocating for these policies for years (she just came out with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cesa.org/resource-library/resource/energize-your-impact/">a report on how foundations can help</a>), so I was eager to talk to her about the rationale for low-income solar programs, the features that make them work, what's in the Inflation Reduction Act that can help, and what further policies are needed.</p><p>Okay, then, with no further ado, Vero Bourg-Meyer, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Well, thank you so much for having me. I'm delighted to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Cool, so there's a lot to talk about here with this topic, which I've had sort of, like, in the corner of my eye for years and years now, these programs for low-income and mid-income solar, getting solar to low-income, mid-income people, I sort of had it on my periphery forever. And so I'm happy to jump in directly. My sense of the sort of state of play among the wonks is the best way to help poor people is to give them money. And if you have money to help them and you want to do something other than just give it to them, you need to sort of justify, like, why is this better than just giving them money?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I guess to start with, my first question is just why should we care about specifically getting solar on these households versus just helping them with money? So what is the sort of justification for this kind of whole area? Why do we want to get solar on low- and middle-income households?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Well, so there are two questions in there, right? So one question is that there's a climate question. Obviously, we want solar not because we think it's great for savings and all that, but also because we have a climate crisis that's ongoing and we need to do something about this. So that's the reason why we want solar. But why LMI communities and I'll use LMI in a kind of loose way. LMI stands for low- and moderate-income. LMI sometimes is just low-income and that generally means kind of in this area, generally it means below 80% area median income.</p><p>Some people also define it as below 120%, but without going too much in the details, that's generally what it means. So the reason why you want to make sure people have access one of the reason you want to make sure those people have access to solar is they spend a much higher percentage of their income on their utility bills as the rest of us. About almost four times as much as you or me. And I'm lumping us in the same income brackets. I don't know if that's correct. So they spend a lot of money on their utility bills.</p><p>And so obviously when you're giving them away month after month after month to reduce those utility bills, that can have a really outsized effect on them. Right? So it's not just the cost of purchasing the solar to begin with, it's the continuing saving over the lifetime of the asset that you'd have to kind of look at.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's kind of like giving them money every month.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah, essentially. Yeah. Assuming there is a saving, which it has to be structured that way. It doesn't just happen like that. And then there is the resilience benefit that you can get when paired with batteries. And I was saying earlier, I'm going to use low-income communities as kind of LMI communities, very generally speaking. But we're also talking here about communities of color in communities that generally, because of redlining, have older housing stock houses that are not well insulated. When you start with that and you add storage, you get a really huge resilience benefit for them.</p><p>LMI also means higher rate of chronic diseases, right. So you need your dialysis machine to work all the time, not just some of the time. So that's another really big reason. But I'd say your question though, about why not just give them money? If you kind of put aside, is it politically pragmatic to just give them money? Which I don't think at this stage it is. We tend to wage a war on the poor instead of waging a war on poverty in this country, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>So setting that aside, if you're looking at who deploys the solar in this country, it's the private sector, right? And there are other barriers that are kind of standing in the way of LMI communities getting solar other than just the initial funding. The initial funding is a big part of it, but there's also lots of other reasons why customers don't trust the developers. Developers are not interested in serving or generally not all of them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about those a little bit. Let's talk about those barriers. Because I know intuitively, as you say, the obvious barrier, I think, which jumps out at everybody is just not enough money. That's what low-income means. But that's not the only reason that deployment of rooftop solar is lower in these communities even than what you would predict based on income, right? The barriers that go beyond income. So let's talk about some of those. Like, what are the kind of things that are stopping these households from accessing rooftop solar?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Well, so the funding one, I don't want to just fully put it aside, right. Because that's a really huge one, the upfront cost, and just for your listeners who may not be familiar with the cost of solar for a regular household. So if you look at the average size of a solar asset in this country, which is about seven kilowatt, I believe, and then the average cost between $3 and $4 per watt. So that's what? That's $25,000, roughly, that you have to find.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's not small for anyone ...</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>It's not small. And that upfront cost you and I have access to other kind of funding. We have access to financing, right? Low-income communities might people might have a lower FICO score or no FICO at all, or maybe even no bank.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>FICO is just a credit score, right?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yes, that's right. Yeah, that's a credit score that's being used by lenders to decide how much they want to charge you, essentially, and whether they will even charge you, whether they will agree to give you a loan. Not to mention if you are really struggling to put food on the table, the idea of taking on additional debt is just not always interesting, at least not for everybody. We can get back to that. So a big barrier beyond the funding is the physical barrier, right?</p><p>So the site suitability, what's called site suitability criteria, roofs could be in a really poor shape. If you have issues of lead and asbestos in your house, it's really hard to get a contractor to go in and crawl in your attic to go install something. They're just not going to want to do it. And then there are some things that are kind of more linked to the type of housing you might be looking at, right. So single family homes is one thing. Multifamily homes have specific issues. You could think of where the meters are located. That's kind of a dumb one, but it really is a problem.</p><p>So if you have meters that are specifically dedicated to apartments, that's great. If you have one meter and then everybody kind of shares, that's creating kind of more issues. So, yeah, physical barriers are a big one. And also the way that the subsidies that we've mostly been using for solar up to this point so the tax credits, primarily. So the investment tax credit, up to this point, the PTC, the production tax credit, wasn't open to solar. Now it is with the IRA. You can't monetize the ITC if you don't have a tax basis, right. The non-taxable entities, affordable housing, the non-profit developers, none of those can access the ITC.</p><p>Could access the ITC until the IRA with direct pay. And then as an individual, a homeowner that does not pay taxes cannot utilize that in a very obvious way. So there are ways to kind of go around that. But generally speaking.</p><p>Isn't it also the case that LMI people are more likely to rent or more likely to live in apartment buildings where they don't?</p><p>Well, it depends actually ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Isn't that also a problem?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>I mean, it is an issue. You'll find those traditional kind of split incentive issues, but it's not necessarily the case that it's everywhere. I don't have in mind the number, the percentage of renters versus homeowner on top of my head, but it really depends on the states. And I think that's when you're a state policymaker, you're looking at kind of building a solar program. Your housing market is not a monolith, and your solar market as a result is also not a monolith. So you have to really dedicate brain space to creating solutions that are really tailored to what you're trying to tackle to specific issues in your state.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, barriers, we've got the obvious one. Finance and funding got physical site suitability, meaning like, the actual buildings themselves might need work before they're even ready for ... One that springs to mind always when I think about these communities is just who's reaching out to them and talking to them and educating them. Is awareness a big barrier?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Big time. And I would say those kind of behavioral barriers exist both on the developer side and on the customer side. On their developer side, they just will not market to them, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>They just viewed as not good customers, which is definitely not the case. There are studies out there showing about the same kind of default rates as ODA loans, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Good enough. Yeah. So if it's good enough for a giant trillion dollar industry, I think it should be good enough for solar. And there's nothing as boring as an ODA loan. So I think we could do this. But on the developer side, that's really just a perceived risk kind of issue. And on the customer side, there are trust issues as well. Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Lots of fly by night action.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to say scams are quite common. These people tend to be targets of a lot of scams.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah. So one that you hear about and I don't have specific data on this, just kind of stories, but one that you hear about all the time is developers coming in and then promising a big government subsidy because they're thinking about the tax credit, and then a homeowner will just go for it and then realize oh, wait. I can't monetize this at all. This is not working for me. I'm not getting the money. This money is just paper and I don't have anything to apply it to. So, yeah, that's dishonest. Business practices are also out there.</p><p>So all is to say it requires a lot more effort for customer acquisition and you can't just sit and expect those customers to come to you. And obviously, as a developer, if you have the choice between targeting that group over here that you think is going to be much better at paying, which it isn't, but you think it's going to be the case, and also naturally trust you more versus a population that trusts you less and it's harder to get to. Well, the choice is easily made.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, there's all these sort of like, I don't know what to call them, soft costs, I guess. Just like developers tend to be in the socioeconomic bracket of a certain type of customer and then everything becomes easier. Communication, right. Like they understand one another, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>And then you have other things like language barriers, obviously.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>And that can be a big one in some communities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's not just effort, it's who is going to talk to them. Like choice, finding someone that is trusted within those communities to communicate absolutely is a big deal.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we're going to get a little bit into how states are doing this later. But just I want to start with the IRA because obviously everything in the energy world is different now. We're in a new world. We're all discovering this new world. So what specifically did IRA do for LMI rooftop solar?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Lots.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of course.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>I would say lots, but lots in ways that aren't necessarily fully clear at this stage. I mean, the way I think about it is because I work at the Clean Energy States Alliance, right? I look at it from a state policy maker perspective. How can they build programs around what the federal government put together and that kind of funding? So the three big buckets and I'm not telling you anything you don't know, obviously, but just to organize my thoughts, the three big buckets are the tax credits, the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund, and the Loan Program's office.</p><p>And I'll start with the least obvious one, which is the Loan Program Office, the innovation ... so there's something called Title 17 that offers clean energy loan guarantees, right? And that up to IJA. So that's pre-IRA, until IJA, someone applying for this, was required to show some sort of innovative element, right?</p><p>So the loan program's office wasn't going to say, "Oh sure, I'll guarantee your solar thing over there, that looks great." No, it has to be something a little bit more exciting than that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's sort of the point of LPO, right? Seed innovative things.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, since IJA that's not the case anymore.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And by the way, we. Should say IJA is the hell I don't know what it stands for. The infrastructure ... the Infrastructure Act.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>The Bipartisan Infrastructure law. So what does I stand for? Infrastructure and Investment and Jobs Act or something. So the kind of the first big piece of climate legislation passed in this new era that we are in the projects that are supported by a state energy finance institution can access loan guarantees now from Title 17 from LPO without having to show that they're super fancy and innovative. And the funding then for LPO was also expended through IRA. The IRA really put in a lot more cash into this thing that they started doing. I'll give you an example to show you how this relates to low- and modified-income solar.</p><p>So imagine a community solar developer wants to develop some solar that benefits LMI communities and they go and get some grants from the state to serve a specific area. The developer now has access to an LPO loan guarantee and they could say, I need a construction loan. Go out, find that construction loan is typically the most expensive part of the process in terms of capital cost. And now they can talk to their private lender and say, hey, I got this grant from the state. That means I can apply for this loan guarantee. How about you give me a lower rate because DOE is going to be there and guarantee that I'm a good bet for you. Right?</p><p>So that's a really interesting kind of piece of the equation that I guess doesn't really get talked about much unless you work at LPO.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Federal loan guarantees can basically lower the cost of capital for developers.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>And it doesn't have to be that the state participates in the way of grants. They could be doing things like a loan loss reserve or straight up loan. They could invest in however way that they want. They just have to support the project, at which point the project becomes eligible for an LPO guarantee. And that's as long as that support is being done by this state energy finance institution. Which can be a big number of things, but it could be a state energy office. So the folks I work with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or a state green bank.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. So that's one pocket of money in the IRA. The next kind of pocket of money that can really have an impact on LMI communities in terms of solar deployment would be the Greenhouse Gas Reduction fund. So that's an EPA program in total. So it's got a bunch of buckets, it's got a $7 billion bucket that they're calling it Solar For All. Actually, the implementation framework came out yesterday from EPA, so it's all very new and exciting. This was the talk of the town this morning. So there's a $7 billion bucket for cold solar for all that will only apply for the benefit of LMI communities.</p><p>And that's $7 billion that the states can apply to, in its states, municipalities, tribes. But essentially what EPA wants to see is they want to see solar, rooftop solar, community solar distributed storage and upgrades. And the really cool thing about that and the rules that we just learned about yesterday is that electrical panel upgrades, roof repairs, they are covered under that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This addresses the site suitability stuff we're talking about so you can get some money to prepare your house for solar.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And hopefully you can enjoy the benefit of a well built solar program that your state are going to put together.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So states put together some kind of program and then go to the EPA and say, hey, we have this program, give us some money to fund it.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>That's the idea. That's the idea. And then there are two more buckets in there that could apply to solar. I mean, solar is part of it, but then it's open to kind of different types of applicant. There's a $14 billion bucket that focuses on kind of clean investments. So that's going to go to two to three national non-profits. So the point there is to leverage funding and private sector lending or investment, generally speaking, at a national level. So do things really big, essentially. And 40% of that is as part of the justice 40 framework, is going to go to LMI communities and the remaining $6 billion is to capitalize organizations that are directly lending or providing financial assistance and technical assistance to LMI communities.</p><p>So the $6 billion bucket and the $7 billion bucket are all LMI and the $14 billion bucket is 40% LMI.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a lot of billions.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a lot of billions. Exactly. And I think the fun part of this is when you work in and around state government is everybody is super excited but no one knows what's going to happen. And there's a lot of like, how are we going to do this?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I guess it goes without saying that these monies have not started dispersing yet, right? We're just figuring out the rules for them. So no state has yet gotten this money?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>No, not yet. But then at CESA we are actually going to be working on trying to build some sort of a template program for states that they can use and replicate. Because the key here, particularly with the $7 billion bucket, is that it's going to go quick. I know it sounds ridiculous, it's a ridiculous thing to say, but they are opening in the summer and then the money has to be out of EPA within like a year, essentially.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No s**t.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wow.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there's like a bunch of we're hurting toward the trough here.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yep.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And once you divide that up among 50 states, I guess it's maybe not as big as it looks on the surface. So I guess the other bucket is the tax credit which ...</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yes, the tax credit. And so the tax credit is a fun one because ... I mean, they're all fun.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Nothing like money. Nothing like money for the study.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. Going to solar for LMI communities to get us excited. But the tax credit is really big, right?</p><p>And it seems like every other week there is another study that comes out and says, "Hey, this is going to be this big. No, it's just kidding. It's this big."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? It's uncapped. Which means we've been over this on the pod before, but just for listeners who don't know, these tax credits are not ... there's no upper limit set. So how much money the Feds are going to spend on these tax credits depends entirely on demand just how many people apply for them. And so, as you say, we keep getting these new analyses saying, "It's going to be a $3 billion program, no, $5 billion, no, $10 billion." The estimates of how much of this is going to be demanded keep going up and up.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it's really big. There's one piece. So the part of it that ... there are a couple of parts that are exciting. There's one piece that's the structure, the change in the structure of the tax credits that can make a huge difference in some institutions that before the IRA did not have access to tax credits, now can have access to tax credits. And then there is a piece of it that actually is capped, but that we don't exactly know how that's going to work. So let me start with this last one first. There is a new LMI, what we're calling an adder.</p><p>So it's an allocation and it will be either 10 or 20% extra. So 20 percentage points or 10 percentage points extra on top of whatever else you have. So either your 30% base or your 40% or your 50% if you're meeting all of the criteria that the statute has set. And that is capped at 1.8 gigawatt per year. So the way this is going to work is not like the rest of the tax credits where you just kind of go through your projects and your tax credits work the normal way. This one is allocated after the fact.</p><p>So it's a whole process that projects are going to have to go through with treasury. And at this stage, it's a little bit unclear how this is all going to work. There are some rules that were just issued, I want to say about a month ago, but don't quote me on that just recently, let's say. And the way this is working for 2023 at least, is that we're only going to have about 60 days, depending on the category. You find yourself in 60 days to apply for the tax credit within a whole year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>After your project is done.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Well, no, that's the kicker. That's the kicker. You can't apply retroactively. You have to wait. You can't place in service your project before those 60 days. So that's the part where we're not too sure how this is going to work. And then DOE, treasury are going to have to figure this out because it doesn't quite fit a traditional residential solar business model.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is sort of like where non-profits like CESA come in, right? Like you figure this out, hopefully you set up some sort of template, right, some sort of template that businesses can use so that every project doesn't have to sort of learn all of this from scratch.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>We can help find the information list. But yeah, at this stage, we're not sure how that's going to work, but it's potentially still very big. And then on the structural front, so direct pay and transferability are those new two fancy things that we can do with tax credit. So direct pay being you go through your project, you finish your pleasant service, et cetera, et cetera, and instead of receiving tax credit at some point, so after you file taxes and request all that, at some point you get direct payment from the government. So that's really exciting for all the non-profits that previously did not have access to that.</p><p>And I'm talking there's so many non-profits, I think maybe that's something that people don't necessarily see. There are a lot of non-profits working with and for and organized by as well, LMI communities, right?</p><p>So we're talking affordable housing, we're talking health clinics, we're talking homeless shelters, all sorts of stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So just the shift to direct pay alone is sort of an equity is a justice thing, right, because it's mostly going to be non-profits.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, it's too bad that they didn't want to just when we're talking about kind of giving money directly, I think tax credits are way that the government kind of gives out money directly, right? And they decided when they passed the IRA, Congress decided, "We're going to do this only for non-profits." Why not for people? I don't know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, you do know, though. His name is Joe Manchin, right? Let's not pretend we don't know why all the flaws in this bill are in there.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so there's buckets and buckets of money in the IRA of various places for LMI communities, LMI developers, non-profits who want to work with LMI communities to go get so let's talk a little turkey then about what these programs look like. What are the sort of tools that states use to reach these communities? And maybe if you want, you can use Connecticut as your sort of standard bearer, because as I understand it, they have the top of the line program.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah. But I should say they had because it's finished. It terminated. The program terminated.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, it was like a set amount of money they dispersed and then ...</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>No, they were looking for a specific megawatt capacity and they reached out and then the legislature was like, "Yeah, you're done. You're moving on to solar, to solar and storage." So now they're doing solar and storage with justice instead of just solar with justice, which is also really exciting. And I should say part of my work at CESA is working as part of the Scaling Up Solar project, which is a DOE funded project. So my salary, part of my salary comes from DOE. We tried to help states replicate the Solar for All program from Connecticut, and it was a really successful program.</p><p>I like to talk about it in terms of how much of the savings that people get, because that always blows people away. So there is a VIC study that kind of shows the kind of savings that the customers from the Connecticut Solar for All program received. And we're talking $1,300 a year. That is ginormous.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Per household.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yes. That's not chump change, nothing. And then within that, you have about $700 worth of solar and then you have efficiency stacked on it. So what they did that was really smart to start with is that they looked at all the incentives that were available in their states and there was part of it, the efficiency part, that was really just managed by the utilities, and they were like, well, let's make sure that we do those two things together.</p><p>And solar plus efficiency in general, it's a winning combination. I want to say, in terms of savings for anyone, not even just for LMI communities, but if you stack your incentives and you stack your products, solar and efficiency together works really, really well. So you remember at the beginning when we're talking about how this upfront cost is really an issue and there is no access to financing that's available for you if you are in a certain income bracket. So the program is really a lease program. So it's third party ownership, TPO. And I should mention that there is a bit of a debate in the advocacy world out there on the kind of the value of TPO versus direct ownership.</p><p>So some people are really married ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I've been tuned into this for a long time and I heard debates about it. Not only like, financial debates, like, which is better financially, but also which is better for the homeowner and obviously third party ownership, which, just to explain to listeners who don't understand it's, just a company owns the solar panels on your roof and what you're buying from them. You buy the power from them, basically. So you as the household do not have to pay for the panels and the installation. The company pays for that, they own it, and you're just basically buying the cheap power.</p><p>So that's what third party ownership means. So what is the debate?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>So the debate is, when you're using third party ownership, some people will say, well, you're not getting all the benefits, all of the wealth creation that happens with solar, which if you're looking purely financially that's true. Yes, that's correct. I don't think there is any need to debate that. Anyone who's ever looked at a solar model can tell you that's true. But the issue there, I think, is that what I personally think is that we can walk and chew gum at the same time. We can utilize third party ownership models for what they're really good for, which is giving access to solar, to families, so that they can get savings right now, right?</p><p>Not tomorrow, not in five years, when we figured this out, not hypothetically, once a project magically comes online, maybe potentially, perhaps mayhaps in the future, but like right now. Right. And in most of the programs that I can think of, state programs that focus on third party ownership, there is some aspect of trying to convince the developer that there needs to be a pathway to ownership. Right?</p><p>And I think that's actually been folded now into the greenhouse gas reductions fund solar for all competition that we were just talking about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Isn't it standard in these TPO arrangements that you can buy the panel at the end of whatever the lease period is?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Right. Yes, it is very standard. I think what we're talking about here is accelerating that. Right. So how do you make a pathway so that at the end of, let's say six years? Because that's about when tax credits or tax equity investors would get out of that investment. In about six years or seven years, is there some way that you can help that customer actually purchase the panels directly? Straight up. Right. And I think there are developers out there thinking through this. There are states out there thinking through this. And I don't think we need to be married to one system or one deployment model over another.</p><p>I think they all are good for some things and less good for other things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you can get a little bit of a hybrid, then you can get some sort of benefits of TPO and then maybe ownership in the longer term.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. And then to go back to the Connecticut, because I kind of went astray there to go back to the Connecticut model, it's a public-private partnership between the Connecticut Green Bank and a company called PosiGen. They are a developer that was born out of Katrina, essentially, and that really was born in New Orleans to try to help folks get over the consequences of Katrina and really bring some resilience benefit to customers. So what they do is that they stack up efficiency and solar incentives, as I was mentioning earlier. And what the state of Connecticut also did with the Connecticut Green Bank did, is that they created an elevated incentive.</p><p>So an extra amount of money if you met some income qualification criteria. So if you are meeting those criteria, you're getting extra money, PosiGen comes to your house, and then no matter what, you have to go through what's that called? An efficiency test, essentially.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Efficiency audit.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Thank you. So you go through your audit and then the company will tell you, okay, well, here are the things we can do kind of on the cheap, the minimum we can do. Or here are some extra kind of much deeper retrofits that we could do on your house that will bring you much deeper savings.</p><p>Which one do you want? And they give them a choice. And in addition to that, you get your solar. So the other thing that the Connecticut Green Bank did at the time, which is not necessarily required for that kind of a project to work or that kind of a program to work, but that was really helpful in the context and that's something that states have to think about was to support the company in a different way financially as well. So they offered subordinated debt to the company because at the time PosiGen was a new company, the market was untested.</p><p>They were like, "Okay, well, if you need to be successful serving these customers, if you need an extra bit of support over here, we'll provide that and that money goes back to the state." So it's just an investment like any other investment. And that really helps that developer be motivated to serve those customers really well. So these are kind of just on the financial side and on the behavioral side ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just pause here on the financing. So the idea here is PosiGen comes to your door and says, we'll give you an efficiency audit. We'll figure out what you'll need, you'll stack it up and we'll do it for no money down.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>For no money down, right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>From the homeowner or the building owner's perspective, this is just a no brainer, right? Does anyone say no to this?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>The no money down is just the first piece, I think it's no money down and cash flow positive, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So you're making money off it from the word, from the word go.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>From the get go, you got to make a certain target. And the way that they access those customers as well and how they decided who to enroll in the program, they did not use FICO scores. So as a company, just generally speaking, they do what's called underwriting to savings. So they look at how strong of a saving they can give a customer and then they essentially bet that it's going to work and that it's going to be strong enough for them to be able to recover their money. So if the customer doesn't make money, they don't make money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay. So that seems to me to overcome or at least substantially overcome the funding barrier. And then if you're not using FICO scores, you're sort of overcoming or getting around the kind of credit score barrier. What about just the sort of like education and community engagement piece? How did Connecticut approach that?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>So they did a lot of community based marketing and that's been shown to work really well to sell solar in general. And there's been actually also studies looking at the type of messaging that works in LMI communities versus non-LMI communities and turns out the messages need to be about the same. People want savings. People want something fancy and new that works really well, and they want environmental benefits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let me put something cool on your house and you'll make money from the second yeah, you don't have to fine tune that a lot for different audiences. It seems like a pretty universal appeal there.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah. But one of the reasons that really worked is that the Connecticut Green Bank was super involved in selling the program really hard. Right. So no one wakes up in the morning and says, oh, I'm going to figure out how to put this expensive piece of infrastructure on my roof.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not these households, right? That's probably not the top of mind.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Exactly. And even without that, I can't remember when that was exactly. But a few years ago there was some study about priorities in spending for people. Energy was like the last one.</p><p>No one wants to think about it, basically.</p><p>No one wants to think about it, just people interested.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So Connecticut was aggressive then at sort of like very aggressive reaching these communities.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah. And that means going to fairs and running solarize campaigns, which are bulk purchasing campaigns for solar and co-branding stuff. Right. So you talk about this trust issue question if the state is there to say, no, seriously, this is a good program, we stand behind it, we picked these people. And then in addition to that, they also vetted all of the contractors that were being used. So it's more believable for a customer that has trust issue than if some guy came to your door and said, yes, trust me, I'm totally going to put something free on your house.</p><p>It's going to be great.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it has official state backing, right?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. Which I think is really important.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are there other pieces of the Connecticut program that are particularly that other states should.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>If you're looking at purely the lease program? Well, I should also mention it's a lease, right. It's not a PPA, so as opposed to a PPA where and there are pros and cons to using each of those. But a PPA, a customer's bill will go up or down depending on how much the sun is shining that particular month, right. And if you're very low income, that could be a problem for you. Right. Seasonality could be an issue. If it's the summer and I don't know, if you're not in a state that has good net metering policies, you could end up paying more than you anticipated.</p><p>And that's problematic, obviously. A lease the big difference is that the payment is stable. It's always the same thing every month. So it's nice that kind of being able to see over the horizon and say, yeah, this is how much I'm spending for energy. And so there are lots of other things that they did on the financing side and on the kind of the state programming side that are, I'd say, a little too complex to explain without a paper support. But they're really cool programs at the Connecticut Green Bank. I encourage anyone who's even just a little bit interested in kind of state level policy innovation to really go and look at the annual report is a great place to start because they do really cool stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are other states taking note? I know Rhode Island. I've seen in your work that Rhode Island sort of learned, seems like learned from Connecticut and more or less kind of took those lessons. Are these things actively spreading in states or other states?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Hopefully, if we do our job right. Hopefully. And in Rhode Island. So the format that was followed was pretty much the same, except that we didn't have efficiency there. As an added piece, the main difference is that Rhode Island, the Rhode Island program, so the Affordable Solar Access Pathways, or ASAP, that came out post IRA. So that means the low-income adders, the ITC adders, are folded into the program.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's sort of built around the IRA money.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yes. And then the way that this is going to work so they also just selected they ran an RFP and selected a vendor, which also happens to be PosiGen. That's going to be the first. So that's brand new information. I think it's public for PosiGen, but I'm not sure whats fully public yet. But I cleared it with them. I'm allowed to say it. The big thing there is that when the RFP was launched, we asked the private sector, what level of incentives do you need to get to this level of savings for a homeowner? And then not only that, but what levels of incentives or what kind of money are you going to send back to the consumer or to the program?</p><p>Whichever you choose. If you get access to extra incentives through the tax credits. Right. So now you have not 30%, but maybe 40%, maybe 50%, maybe 60%. How is that shared with the customer, with the ultimate customer? So that's one of the questions that was being asked in the ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I guess you do want to take care to design these things. So you're not sort of like inadvertently just using public money to make a particular solar company richer, super rich.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yes. Because, I mean, it's great that they're motivated to do this and you do want the private sector motivated to do this, but ultimately it's got to create benefits for the LMI consumer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>That's the most important piece of this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So if I'm a state and I am looking at Connecticut and saying, "Hey, that's cool what you did. You created enormous savings for these households. You installed whatever megawatts of new solar. Our state wants to do something similar." It strikes me that this is, among other things, just administratively there's a lot of pieces of the puzzle here. There's a lot of sort of so what are the kinds of things that if I'm a state that wants to replicate this or do something similar, what do I need in place before I do this? And then one of the questions that always comes up for me is a simple one, which is just sort of how do you identify LMI communities?</p><p>Is there a common national metric or is every state sort of every state kind of bespoke figuring it out on their own? And just in general, if I'm a state, what do I need to do to get ready if I want to do something like this?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>So on the question of what the states have to do to get ready, I think that probably the most important thing. If you wanted to do the same thing as Connecticut, would be make sure that your legislation enables third party ownership very clearly because there's nothing that turns off a contractor or developer quite so quickly as telling them. So we're not too sure, we're not entirely sure what the regulatory context is like. But just before you can enable LMI solar, you have to have a friendly solar policy, just generally speaking. Right?</p><p>So do you have net metering enabled? What I'm going to say is not relevant to the Connecticut program, but do you have community solar enabled? Is it authorized in your state? Can everybody do it? Or is it something that only the two utilities that are in the state can do and oh, by the way, they don't want to do it, so it's just not happening. So these things are good places to start. But in terms of how you figure out where your low- and moderate-income communities are located, there's tons of different ways of doing it.</p><p>There are states that have gone through very lengthy process stakeholder processes and regulatory processes you can think of. California is one, New York is another, to try to figure out what constitutes a disadvantaged community or low- and moderate-income community. There are lots of different terms floating out there. And those states have gone through the process and they've talked to people whose livelihoods are really directly touched by these things, right. Not just policymakers, but people in communities. And then the federal government kind of stacks on top of it and says, well, I'm going to define low-income community for this program this different way, and then for that other program a different way.</p><p>So it's a bit of a mishmash of all sorts of definition. Often you'll have for the state definitions, a mix of ethnic and racial kind of threshold, foreign languages. You'll have poverty levels, essentially. You can have sometimes unemployment levels. But yeah, this mapping question is complicated.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, the IRA has a ton of adders and sort of set asides for justice communities. So it seems to me like this is a national concern. You need some common metric because there's so much money at stake here, it really matters how these things get defined.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>So you do need some common metric, but also states are very different, right? So a state like Vermont, which is very rural and very white, is going to be different from a state like, I don't know, California, which has a lot of urban spaces and a lot of people of color, big Hispanic population. So you can't quite blanket define everything. But I think some at least definition of what the factors need to be. Right?</p><p>So states maybe need to have a definition that fits those four criteria that include race and ethnicity, that include poverty level, that include XYZ with kind of flexibility, and what those need to be might be helpful. One of the things that we're trying to do that we're working in Colorado on a community solar program and on a community solar project or pilot project for manufactured homes. And Colorado does a lot of work with the Weatherization Assistance program WAP. They've been doing a lot of work on that for a long time. And they were the first state to use federal dollars to be authorized to use federal dollars from the WAP program to install solar.</p><p>They're moving away from that at the moment because it's too complicated. But they still want to coordinate the WAP program and the solar program. The Web program is going to use whatever the WAP program uses, which is a percentage of the federal poverty level, whereas the other programs that they're going to build are going to be using their local flavored, definition of income and race and ethnicity and et cetera, et cetera. Right. So it's all a big mess, but a big beautiful mess.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Big, beautiful mess. Oh, one thing I wanted to double back on, I meant to ask you this when we were talking about Connecticut, specifically about the renter issue, because this is something, this is something I get questions about all the time, like I rent, like what can I do?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Community solar.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is this how I mean, you mentioned that Connecticut doesn't have community solar as a big piece.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>No, they do have community solar.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is this the primary way of overcoming this sort of landlord tenant split incentive?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>I think it is. I think it is, although so there are some programs there's a program in Hawaii, for instance, through the Hawaii Green Infrastructure Authority that's allowing renters to participate in leases, essentially, and they have on bill financing that's enabling that with the Hawaii Electric Company. And that's working, I think hopefully it will work really well. That's a new program. It's called the Gems Energy Services program. But yet, just generally speaking, outside of exceptions like that of Hawaii, community solar is definitely the way to go. I mean, it's the way to go not for renters only, but also if you just have trees around your house and you can't access the sun.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What if you want to get solar panels on a big apartment building, an apartment building, say, that is occupied mostly by LMI people? Is there anything in these programs that can work with landlords or get around that?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yes, so I think the SOMAH program in California would be one that applies to that. And it applies to affordable housing, really. So the way that it's structured, and I'm not super familiar with it because it's not what I focus on. But one of the interesting pieces is, so heard, the way that they define the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the way that they provide funding for folks is that they request that the rent and the utility be kind of lumped into one payment, which is good for a number of things. But then when you start installing solar on something, it makes it more difficult because any changes to how much you pay in utility will trigger an increase in your rent.</p><p>So that's not super helpful. And they worked with the program in California. They worked with HUD to kind of get rid of that. So that was a good piece of the puzzle. And they are renters. They're renters. But you got to work directly with the non-profits that own the affordable housing. And that's not easy. They have lots of things to figure out and lots of other issues to figure out. Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. That seems like an area where, like a super simplified model that you could just replicate across would be helpful. We're running out of time. And one of the big things I wanted to ask you about was the reason that this whole conversation was prompted in the first place was a new report that just came out, which is specifically looking at how non-profit foundations can sort of enter this LMI solar space induce, help, support. We don't have a ton of time, but maybe you could just say a few words about if I'm a foundation and this seems like a good thing that I want to do, are there models?</p><p>How do I get involved?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah. So first you should read the report.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of course, always read the report.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Energize your impact. It's on the CC website. But what I'm going to say is true, I think, for states, it's true for the federal government, it's true for the foundations, it's true for the green banks. If you are building or looking interested in supporting LMI solar, you need three pieces. You need the capital, you need the customers, and you need the capacity, the capital. There are tons of different ways for foundations to provide capital. That's what the report is about. And we focus on really we go in depth in some of the fancier ways, the guarantees, the equity investments.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's grants, there's loans, there's loan guarantees.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah. And equity. I didn't know that before starting this research. I had absolutely no idea that foundations could do equity investments. It blew my mind when I thought that was possible. So that's your capital. Then you have your customer side. Where are you going to find your customer? How do you help people find customers? That's the second big bucket. And the third bucket is the capacity. And there are models in there that kind of look through how you build capacity in LMI communities, and particularly in either the LMI serving institutions or the non-profits that kind of support these communities.</p><p>And one model I guess that I'd like to point out is called Technical Assistance Fund from our sister organization, the Clean Energy Group that's explained in the report is really about finding that trusted third party advisor to help a community figure out or a community institution figure out, like, what are the options out there. To start with, if you want to build a pipeline of projects, you need to actually help the projects be born. And that sounds completely obvious to say, but you can have all the capital in the world if there are no projects to apply it to because people don't know what they need. Do I need a big battery or a small battery?</p><p>Do I need a battery at all? Like, what kind of solar can I use? Can I put it on my house? Can I put it on my hospital? Should I put it in a field over there? How does this work? Just generally speaking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Who is that? Who is that? Who are those trusted? How do you find those people? Who are those entities?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>They're contractors. And I think the fact that they're trusted just means that they're not selling you the final products, right? So generally speaking, developer will be the person that tells you, this is what you need. Believe me, this is what you need, and I'm going to sell you. Exactly. And that does not necessarily inspire trust. So you really want kind of a third party there to be able to help figure out what the options are. And these are just essentially engineering firms that look at your situation, look at your needs, and try to help you make sense of it.</p><p>So that's a big thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So a foundation can just support and fund those?</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. I think that's a really fundamental piece of the equation. There's a piece, an editorial piece that was written by Joe Evans, who works at the Kresge Foundation and who is absolutely brilliant in all this stuff, but also wrote an op-ed aptly named "It's the demand side, stupid." And I think it's not subtle, but it gets to the point, right? It's like you need all of it, right? You need the capital, the consumers, and the capacity for this to be successful.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you need to basically cultivate and educate customers. Like, this is one of those kind of areas where you just can't rely on a market in some sense because you're creating market demand by educating.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Oh, it's absolutely it's all about building markets. It's all about building markets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. This has been awesome. As a final question, I just was wondering sort of what is the prize here? Say we just got low- and moderate-income households up to parity so that they're installing solar at the same rate, say, as other households. How much power in terms of like megawatts and gigawatts, is this a substantial amount of energy we're talking about, or is this mostly about these sort of extra energy benefits for these communities or is this really a substantial amount of it's big.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's big. I was thinking earlier, if you don't care about all the reasons why you would need solar on LMI buildings, if you have no human there's not a human bone in your body that thinks it's just fair and good and just and for some reason you only think about the grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know some people like this.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah. They're out there. There are some of them. The solar potential of low- and moderate-income household is about 40%, 42% to be precise, according to NREL, of the total US residential potential, right. It's a pretty big chunk that's out there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's almost half the rooftops.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's not a small market too.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>No, it's not a small market. It's a big market. It can have a huge impact in terms of the grid and the climate and obviously a huge human impact for the people that are buying it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And it's worth saying, because I don't know if we mentioned it earlier, but the households themselves get immediate benefit in terms of their energy bills lowering, and they get positive income to start off with. But over time, this stuff also accrues right. These benefits also accrue to the next generation. Air pollution lowering affects children. So these benefits are ...</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Compounding.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Compounding over time.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Vero, thank you so much for coming and decoding this area for me. It sounds like lots is happening.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>No, thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The money is raining down and we're all dancing around.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're all dancing around trying to figure out how is this all going to work? This is a very exciting time. And if there is one thing that I would want people to remember, is that LMI solar really matters. It can make a huge difference in people's lives. And it doesn't happen by accident. It needs to be designed. So get out there and design stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Thank you so much for coming on.</p><p><strong>Vero Bourg-Meyer</strong></p><p>Thank you so much. Bye.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/getting-rooftop-solar-onto-low-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:115763821</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 01 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/115763821/1b832f5b62f6002429cba780a060dabc.mp3" length="41064832" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3421</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/115763821/565c0a9249c50be81bdee99764068d55.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Building a movement that can take full advantage of the IRA]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>The Inflation Reduction Act is ambitious climate policy, but history shows that ambitious policy is not always followed by ambitious implementation. In this episode, Hahrie Han of Johns Hopkins University and David Beckman of the Pisces Foundation talk about Mosaic, a grant-making coalition that aims to help build a robust movement infrastructure to ensure that vulnerable and underserved groups can take full advantage of the significant funding offered by the IRA.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAs2X7Yz1sOYFpTkOVk6e2-a/volts23.04.26%28hahrie.han.david.beckman%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/building-a-movement-that-can-take-full-advantage-of-the-ira"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>For all that has been written about the Inflation Reduction Act, the most salient fact about it remains widely underappreciated. What is significant about the bill is not just that it sends an enormous amount of money toward climate solutions, but that the money is almost entirely <em>uncapped</em>.</p><p>The total amount of federal money that will be spent on climate solutions via the IRA will be determined not by any preset limit, but by demand for the tax credits. The more qualified applicants that seek them, the more will be spent. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the bill’s spending at $391 billion, but a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2022/10/inflation-reduction-act-climate-economy/671659/">report last year</a> from Credit Suisse put the number at $800 billion and a more recent Goldman Sachs report <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/inflation-reduction-act-subsidies-cost-goldman-sachs-report-5623cd29">put it closer to $1.2 trillion</a>.</p><p>Big companies will have teams of lawyers to tell them when they qualify for the tax credits, but there are also billions of dollars in the IRA that are meant to be spent on vulnerable and underserved communities. Those communities do not typically have teams of lawyers.</p><p>Who will work to enable them to take full advantage available of the money? Getting that done will require campaigns, relationships, and grassroots mobilization. It will require <em>movement infrastructure</em>.</p><p>A relatively new grant-making coalition called <a target="_blank" href="https://mosaicmomentum.org/">Mosaic</a> is attempting to help build that infrastructure by dispersing money to the frontline organizations that comprise it. Mosaic is a cooperative effort among large national environmental groups like NRDC, big foundations, and various smaller regional, often BIPOC-led groups.</p><p>It has pooled philanthropic money and thus far given almost $11 million of it to dozens of relatively small groups and campaigns — 85 percent of them BIPOC-led, 87 percent of them female-led — selected by a governing committee from well over a thousand applicants. The governing committee contains a super-majority of representatives from frontline communities; the foundations have a super-minority.</p><p>To discuss the need for movement infrastructure, the Mosaic effort, and the possibilities IRA offers for frontline communities, I contacted Dr. Hahrie Han, a professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, and David Beckman, one of the founders of Mosaic and the current president of the Pisces Foundation. We talked about what movement infrastructure is, the failure of the climate movement to build enough of it, and Mosaic’s theory of change.</p><p>So, without any further ado, Hahrie Han and David Beckman. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Thanks so much for having us.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Yes, thanks David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to start with you, Hahrie. You have written in the past, and one of the themes of your work is that social welfare legislation or policy can often fail to reach, let's say, its full potential if there isn't the sort of civic and movement infrastructure around it to help it succeed. So maybe you can just talk for a little bit about what do we mean by infrastructure here? What does infrastructure mean? And maybe also what I think would be helpful is maybe you could cite some examples of times you think legislation or reforms fell short of what they could have done because of a lack of infrastructure.</p><p>And then maybe some examples of when there was infrastructure and that was helpful.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that's a great question. There are so many instances when in trying to tackle some of our stickiest social problems, we put an enormous amount of attention and effort into trying to build the coalitions that we need to pass the policies that we want. If we think about any of the landmark legislation that we've had in recent decades, from the Affordable Care Act to the IRA to any other of these big kind of efforts, they've taken years or decades even to pass because of all the work that it takes to get them through. But then what so much research and so much history has taught us is that if there isn't the same kind of effort that goes into the implementation, that the gains that we made with policy alone are really fragile.</p><p>There's one famous book that looks at some of these gains, these policy wins, and calls them a "hollow hope" if they're not accompanied by the kind of infrastructure that you're talking about. And we just have a lot of those kind of examples throughout history. So to give a couple of them. For example, this book, "The Hollow Hope," starts with landmarks court legislation like Brown v. Board of Education, where, if you actually look at the ability of that one decision by the Supreme Court to actually translate into integration on the ground. It didn't actually achieve its goals, and its actual outcomes felt really hollow until you saw this mobilization of a lot of the school districts and parents and communities on the ground to make real the promises that were in that Supreme Court hearing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That particular example is kind of telling since that infrastructure withered a little bit and now those gains are being reversed. So it's not just a one time thing like sort of implementing it and making it real is perpetual effort.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that's a great point, right, because the thing that I always like to remind people is that any policy gains that we have are really fragile because they can always be reversed on the one hand, as you point out. But then also because oftentimes when policy gets implemented, it drifts away from what the original goals are. There's a famous political scientist, Jacob Hacker at Yale who looked a lot at basically welfare policy and a lot of social policies. And what he finds is that if you look at the impact of those policies on people's lives, that often there's a big gap between what legislators intended and what actually happened because of that process of drift.</p><p>And that I think is also a really important point because what it tells us is that you don't need Congress to take another action to reverse policy gains, but in fact, it can just be ignoring a process that can lea to that kind of drift.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Entropy, basically. Like if you're not continually reinforcing it, it naturally will start to erode.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. That there's just kind of natural chaos in the system. Or sometimes there are people that are actively working to undermine the ability to achieve those goals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And they never quit. And they seem to have great infrastructure. If I could just insert one of my perpetual gripes in there. Like infrastructure working against social welfare legislation is just robust and seemingly permanent.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's easier to stop something than to create something new. And it's also easier to organize people around their prejudices and to organize people around hope.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, indeed. So what are some examples then of the other side where sort of the infrastructure has come together around a law and made it?</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>So one example that I like actually is the Community Reinvestment Act, which is not a perfect act by any stretch of the imagination. So I know that there are lots of ways in which we wouldn't necessarily hold it up as a paragon of legislation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can you tell us what that is?</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Basically, the Community Reinvestment Act was passed essentially to try to stop redlining in poor and Black communities. And so when it first began to come out in 1970s, 1980s, a lot of banks weren't lending to certain communities because they would literally draw red lines around neighborhoods where they wouldn't make investments. The Community Reinvestment Act was passed as a way to try to stop that redlining. One of the things that was really important that they did in passing the Community Reinvestment Act is that they essentially created these mechanisms through which communities could have continual oversight over the way that banks were acting.</p><p>And so the Community Reinvestment Act essentially created these boards that were an accountability mechanism for banks. And alongside the Community Reinvestment Act, there was a bill called the Home Mortgage Data Act. HMDA, it's what it's called for short. And what HMDA did was it made available the data that these local communities would need to be able to look in and see whether or not the banks were making investments in the ways that they should. So that alone doesn't actually cost government a ton of money. But by creating that accountability mechanism, what it did was create this ongoing hook, essentially around which communities could organize and essentially hold banks accountable.</p><p>And so over time, we've seen trillions of dollars of investments being driven into lower income communities because of the Community Reinvestment Act.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so what do we mean then? I mean, we're talking about infrastructure here, sort of vaguely. What do we mean concretely by having the infrastructure in place to make these laws perform the way we want? What is it comprised of?</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>So, that's that's a complicated question. In my mind, movement infrastructure has a lot to do with the relationships, with the structures and the vehicles and the resources that a movement needs to be able to respond to the kind of strategic challenges that are going to come its way. And so I think one mistake that people make a lot in thinking about movements is to think about the most effective movement as being the one that has the best plan at the beginning. But actually, what we find is that the most effective movement is the one that can best respond to the contingency that comes up that it didn't expect.</p><p>And what do you need to respond to contingency? Well, you need to have strong leaders, good people who are interconnected with each other. You need to have resources that you can deploy. You need to have vehicles that can move nimbly and agilely in response to things that might come up that you don't expect. There are a range of those kinds of things that I think comprise the movement infrastructure that enable that response.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>David, let's go to you for a second. The Mosaic effort is an effort to build this kind of infrastructure. So I want to talk about what that infrastructure is, but let's back up a little bit. Mosaic is a coalition of all these big, long-time foundations and big green groups that have come together with the sort of explicit goal of changing the way environmental philanthropy is done. So let's start then, with that. What is wrong with environmental philanthropy? Why does it need to change? What are its sort of flaws and shortcomings today?</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Well, that's a big question, too. Let me just say about Mosaic. It is really the name hopefully paints a picture of the idea and the theory, which is that it's not just the big organizations, but it's all of the organizations and the people, the activists and the advocates that are individually doing important work but are not collectively able to keep pace with the extraordinary challenges and the opponents that you referred to. They can do better in a more connected fashion. And what's been missing is the investments in that connectivity and the tools that Hahrie discussed. And we can talk about what they mean in the context of the IRA.</p><p>But part of the reason that those tools that are so essential to movement success are missing is because, in the main, big philanthropy hasn't invested in them. Bridgespan, one of the leading social sector consultancies, has published a whole report about how field building, which is another way of looking at this, is one of the most effective, yet underinvested strategies in philanthropy. So this is an endemic problem, I think, that has a lot to do with the fact that infrastructure is so important, but it's invisible in some sense. It's not vivid. It isn't like you can't take a picture of the forest that you've saved.</p><p>It's the conditions, the how that you get to that result.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, it's not obvious also what the metrics are, right? Like, if you're doing it right or not, it's not clear what you're it's difficult to measure.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>That's right. It's difficult to measure. So your question about philanthropy, of course there's lots of different philanthropies and there's more coming on the scene happily every day. But in the main, big environmental philanthropy funds in an atomistic way. It funds narrowly. It funds in a way that is exclusive instead of inclusive, and it tends to concentrate power. So four aspects that are not well suited to big scale social change and not well suited to implementing something of the scale of the IRA. And let me just give you a couple of facts about this. The atomistic part is really concentrating resources in single organizations and not building the fields that make them stronger.</p><p>The connections that Hahrie is talking about narrow. In 2018, the Environmental Grant Makers Association, which is not an association of every environmental funder, but many of the really large ones, surveyed its members and found that just 200 nonprofits of the perhaps 15,000 that focused on the environment got over 50% of the $1.7 billion that its members donated in 2018. And that is astounding, if you think about it, 15,000 or so registered 501(c)(3)s and 200 are getting half the money. And that year, five nonprofits got 13% of that $1.7 billion funding pie. The Nature Conservancy, World Wildlife, EDF, and the place I used to work, NRDC, four of those got $100 million dollar grants from the Bezos Earth Fund a couple of years later.</p><p>So you've got deep concentration. And then BIPOC organizations are funded at just a fraction between, say, 1% and 10%, depending on the study you look at. So there's not an inclusive focus. And last, something we're trying to address with Mosaic, most of the decisions are made by program officers and boards. Relatively few people with a certain type of demographic background, usually not always. And so there isn't much investment in participatory grant making, which is what we're modeling with Mosaic, where leaders actually get to compare and to cogenerate strategy and then to deploy money themselves as opposed to having to ask for it from a philanthropy.</p><p>So atomistic narrow, exclusive and concentrating isn't a recipe for success in general, and certainly not with respect to the IRA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is so reminiscent like this is a critique of left versus right philanthropic funding that goes back decades, since I remember paying attention. It's always the right is investing in infrastructure, right in the organizations, in the relationships. Like, you look at the Federalist Society that is basically all about relationships and look at the tentacles it has sent out into US society, just remarkably successful. And then you hear people on the left saying, "I can get a grant for a particular campaign or a particular accomplishment or a particular policy, but it's impossible to get just operational funding, just basic funding for my organization to survive."</p><p>And those who do get it, as you say, are so concentrated, and when a single group gets so much money, it creates this perverse incentive for the group to sort of put its own interests first, right, to keep getting the money. So you get almost a resistance to cooperation and a resistance to working with others.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Yeah. Well, the competition for money I have experienced myself when I was an advocate and lawyer doing environmental justice work and water advocacy and the things I did at NRDC, there's no question that it gets in the way. And part of the problem is there's not enough money because the organizations I mentioned, I think, are good organizations. So the issue isn't that they shouldn't be funded. It's that everyone else needs to be funded, too. And money needs to flow in ways which are both equitable and fundamentally effective for large scale social change and philanthropy in the main.</p><p>Not always, but in the main has missed that. And that's a big problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I wanted to ask kind of a practical question about Mosaic. So you have this grant making board, this representative board that has a lot of diverse people on it, and you have over 1000 relatively small scale applicants and what sounds like a really labor intensive process by which all these applicants are vetted. And the board discusses them with one another and they're winnowed down and et cetera, et cetera. I mean, I was reading about this in The Chronicle of Philanthropy or whatever the heck it's called, and it just sounds exhausting. People involved were saying it's exhausting.</p><p>It's like finals week all year. And yet the result of that is $11 million, which is, in the context of these small groups, obviously nothing to shake a stick at. But like Bill Gates, it's just dropping $100 million here and there on this and that company. So I'm just asking about, I guess, the ratio of soft costs of work, of time intensiveness versus the amount of money that's being deployed. Do you think that's sustainable in the long run?</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a good question. Well, the good news is that Mosaic is about to announce $10 million in additional funding. So it's a new effort that is beta testing a lot of the concepts that we're talking about and learning along the way. So I've been able to participate, which is a really interesting experience as somebody who also spent a decade and a half as an advocate and then runs a foundation, a private foundation that's in a more traditional mode. And it's true it takes a lot of time, but I'll tell you, it takes a lot of time the other way, too.</p><p>So it's not really a question so much of how much time, but what is the quality of the time that's invested. And I think the benefit of participatory grant making that I see, particularly when it's done well and leaders are involved, is that it itself is infrastructure. There are relationships that are formed, ideas that are exchanged, trust that is built, theories of change that are debated. And the environmental movement, as you know, both of you know, is fractious and doesn't always agree with each other. And so there's a value there that I think is differentially impactful compared to several program officers or one making decisions.</p><p>Should there be more money in participatory grant making? Absolutely, and in fact, there's a study that says that just a fraction of foundations participate in any way with grant making approaches that devolve power to other people. And I think that's partly because there's not a lot of good examples of where it's worked. So hopefully, one of the things that Mosaic and other efforts can do is to demonstrate the benefit of this approach for others.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can you just very briefly describe the approach? It's a committee and there are meetings. Is there more to it than that?</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's just like a meeting, David. There are a couple of things. First of all, the application process seeks collaborative proposals. So that in itself is different. Usually, in my experience, it's like a single NGO approaching a single foundation. So already, from the beginning, the proposals are done in a different way. They're done online, they can be done verbally, which I think is a really good progressive approach. There's no long 15-page proposal that is required. So that's an attempt to lower the barriers of entry. And then there's this fabulous staff that has incredible data crunching capacity, that looks for heat maps and does some initial vetting.</p><p>And then the leadership that makes the decisions is not involved in all of that. So it's not that everybody's engaged at that stage. But then we met in for three days and went over, did a whole kind of retreat, and reviewed the top section of proposals that the staff had prepared. And that was a debate like some of the best debates I've been involved as an environmental advocate, where people are talking about what is needed, where how do you compose a grant slate that's equitable and effective? How do you fund the grassroots? How do you fund relationships between the Big Greens and others, networks and communications and the rest?</p><p>So what comes out of it? I think and I can compare because I run a foundation, I think is a really good way to approach things that really deserves a place much more solidly in the mainstream of environmental grant making.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hahrie from your perch as Mosaic is sifting through all these applicants, what kinds of things should it be looking for? What are the ingredients of this sort of movement infrastructure that you're talking about that you can identify in groups? Are you looking for certain kind of people, certain kind of strategies, certain kind of goals or financial structures. How would you go about building movement infrastructure? What are the sort of indicators that you're looking for among grantees?</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>It's a great question. So I think that in thinking about movement infrastructure, in the end what we're trying to do is identify individuals and organizations that aren't just the kind of individuals and organizations that can do a thing, but that can become the kind of people that do what needs to be done, right? And so this kind of gets back to the idea that when you're thinking about implementing a bill as large as the IRA or building a movement as broad as what we need in the environmental movement, you have to anticipate the fact that there are going to be challenges coming your way. You can't anticipate.</p><p>And so I have to think about who are the kind of people that are going to be able to respond to that? What are the kind of organizations that can respond to that? And so then how do I actually think about and identify that at time one without knowing what the challenges are that they're going to be investing in time two?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>The things that would look for would be things like what is the extent to which they're building networks among their people that are bridging versus just bonding. And so the idea of a bonding network is one in which people are connected to other people who are a lot like them. Bridging networks are ones that not only create those bonds, but also enable people to bridge across to different kinds of people who aren't necessarily like them. And so what that means is that you have an organization that's constantly growing and renewing itself. I would look for organizations that are investing in building a kind of inclusive leadership in the way that David was describing, partly because I think obviously there are moral reasons why we would want to make sure that we have an inclusive leadership, but partly also for strategic reasons.</p><p>There's a lot of research that shows that the movements that can best anticipate and respond to contingency this is true not only for movements, but actually for corporations as well are ones that have lots of different kind of for lack of a better word, kind of sensors out in the community to sort of understand what are the changes that are coming our way and how do we figure out how we can anticipate, how we need to remake ourselves for the future. And so if you don't have that kind of diversity of people giving you input, then you're not able to respond nimbly to the constantly changing world around you. So there are a lot of things like that that I think begin to give us a sense.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think this is such an important point and maybe I'll touch that back to you also, David, because I feel like and I've done a couple of pods on this recently, been thinking about it recently and this idea of trying to fund a more diverse give money to more diverse groups and et cetera. It's so often framed in terms of sort of representation as kind of an end in itself, like a moral good in itself. It's just good to have other people there because you want to check the box. But the point of all this and this is the point that comes across in management literature and all this is not just that it's good, but that diverse groups make better decisions.</p><p>It's an improvement in your ability to do good things. It's not just for looks or not just for box checking. It makes you perform better. And I wonder David, if you've you know now that you've really gotten your hands dirty trying to assemble a group like this, I wonder your thoughts on that, if you found that to be the case.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And I would just to add to what you said a second ago for many grant makers, again, not all, but I see and hear a lot that makes me think that equitable grant making for some is their charity, not their strategy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Yes.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>And there's a big difference. There's a big difference. There's certainly a moral imperative to fund communities and people who have more than their fair share of problems and who have been deprived of money from big institutional funders historically. So that stands on its own. But the point you're making is not only I think about the fact that better, more creative and interesting solutions come up which do, but that you can build power that way. As Hahrie's pointing out by bridging between what could be sort of atomistic, semi-competitive or worse, communities within a movement and to find some sort of working relationships, if not stronger relationships, productive relationships that allow big, important social change to happen.</p><p>And that I think is one of the most important things that's missed when we pick fractions within a movement, either the Big Greens if you're talking about the environmental movement or frontline organizations, I think both can play a role and they can play a synergistic role when their collective impact is built on some relationship. And sometimes that isn't that we're going to totally agree, it's not kumbaya, let's all get along. It's that often when you're in relationship and you're in those rooms you can find that you might disagree about two or three things and maybe those are not going to get resolved but there's three or four things that you can agree on and through that kind of doorway you can make progress that you couldn't make otherwise. And that's why some of the effort in answering the question you asked earlier I think is worth it because it's not just process or overhead, it is actually the work, it is actually the infrastructure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Another question for you Hahrie is about backing up from the implementation, just the legislation itself. It seems to me like not only should environmental philanthropists be thinking in terms of infrastructure and implementation, but obviously legislators should too. Like, you can do better or worse in the text of a law on those terms. And this is something I feel like this is another critique of Democrats that goes way back, which is that they don't lose well, right? Like they don't lose in a way that improves their chances the next time. And even when they do pass legislation, it's not like always part of the goal of the legislation should be to make future reforms easier, to make future reforms more likely.</p><p>So I wonder, a. do you see anything in the IRA that qualifies as kind of that like an eye on infrastructure building?</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And if not, what would you like to see, like, in future legislation? What are the sorts of things you might put in legislation that would help this infrastructure building?</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Yeah. I think it's so important in designing policy to think about what the feedback effects that you're creating, because a lot of the most effective policies that we've seen throughout history are ones that have these feedback effects that essentially what you want to do is create a feedback effect that strengthens the constituencies that you want to strengthen and then either weakens or divides the opponents to the bill, right. And that's how you create the kind of loops that you're talking about that enable the passage of the next set of reforms, make them even more likely than they were before with the IRA.</p><p>I think the opportunity that's on the table is the fact that so much of this money is essentially being delegated out through state agencies and other local governmental agencies that are operating at many different levels of government. And the extent to which this money can be doled out in a way that builds what I like to think of as relational state capacity, right. The ability of these governments to co govern and work in partnership with community leaders and community groups on the ground that only then makes the next generation of reform and policy and funding and implementation that much stronger.</p><p>And so I feel like a lot of the design questions that we have on the table right now about how this money gets allocated through this network of state and local agencies and other intermediaries is going to be really important in helping determine the extent to which we have those kind of feedback loops or not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And something I've actually heard from people in the back rooms involved in building IRA is that among Democrats in Congress, there's been a learning, let's say, that you don't necessarily want to channel all your money through state governments, right. Because there are a lot of perverse state governments who will do things like refusing billions of dollars of free. Federal money so that they can keep their poor people from having health care, that kind of thing, right. Like they've learned from the past that you can't rely on. So a lot of the IRA is sort of built around the idea of going straight to communities, straight to local communities, which I thought is heartening that the Democratic establishment is learning things.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Right, yeah. And it's heartening, partly because it's learning how to play that political game, right. But also heartening because then that implicitly builds this capacity and these capabilities in these local communities in a way that can have greater effects down the road.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Yeah. And if I could just add to that, just to connect something we've been talking about. So what does it look like to make a grant on movement infrastructure? A couple of the grants that Mosaic is making this year focus on a really bridging network of 17,000 plus climate advocates, policymakers, academics. It's just connecting that group. Another grant is facilitating rural implementation and trying to create networks that make it easier for folks who may not be as commonly working in the areas of electrification and tax incentives and so forth to pry those opportunities. And there's another grant that's actually focused on government officials themselves and educating them about the opportunity, not in environmental terms, even necessarily, but in terms of what they can do for their communities.</p><p>So those are ways of sort of spurring the kind of relationships that Hahrie is talking about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>From where you're sitting here. So you got a bird's eye view of dozens and dozens and dozens of small groups who want money. So I wonder part of shifting funding from a couple of big groups to a wide variety of small groups is about just sort of like hedging your bets and building infrastructure. But I wonder if you found among the applicants just ideas and strategies that are not represented among the big groups. In other words, like genuinely new ideas for how to approach things. I wonder if you could just talk about some of the applications and the patterns that emerged.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Well, one of the things that's amazing is that it's such a diverse set of ideas. And from a philanthropic practice perspective, when you're not relying on a single individual to vet potential proposals, I mean, nobody knows everybody, and everybody's got a limit to their day. You just get an eye-opening kind of response. And I think that was something that everybody CEOs of big groups are part of Mosaic CEOs of smaller groups, EJ groups, felt. So some of what we saw is a desire to sort of shift the terms of debate. And I don't know how that, I don't think, is very well-funded in mainstream environmental philanthropy.</p><p>Different theories of change, different approaches to the economy, questions around how to frame economic growth in different ways, indigenous perspectives on the protection of the environment and elevating the rights of nature. As a theory, these are not directly related to a tax incentive for decarbonizing your house, but they come through and they're interesting perspectives that don't get a lot of play. More practically, we saw a lot of really interesting collaborations between different organizations, some of which work together, some of which don't, and are using the opportunity to apply for a collaborative grant to stretch their wings in ways which, as Hahrie saying, may grow into something that has nothing to do with the proposal before us. One interesting proposal was to build solar capacity in communities of color using the tax incentives and actually, I think, direct grants that are available for solar installation, not only generally, but in underserved communities to turn that into a workforce development effort for brown and black people.</p><p>So there's a whole set of things that I think are going to be helpful in actually reaching the goals of the IRA which are not guaranteed to happen and can build for the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One other question I wanted to ask in terms of what was on your mind as you're picking grantees is, and this is anyone who listens to the pod will know that this is an enduring obsession of mine. But it seems like one of the basic headwinds facing implementation of the IRA, facing basically any progressive effort, is this massive, extremely well developed propaganda apparatus on the other side that has basically captured rural America, has almost entirely captured rural America. And in a sense, like any attempt to do anything reality based in the face of that just gets swamped. So I wonder if there were a lot of ideas among the applicants about, to put it dramatically, information warfare about how to fight back against what is the inevitable tide of misinformation about this bill, about these technologies, et cetera, et cetera. Was that a theme?</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Yes, but maybe in a more positive sense that the IRA, I think to the credit of its designers, is itself a pretty profound attempt to push back on that narrative. But because really what we're talking about is decarbonization in theory, but the practice of it is through electrification of power and cars and incentives for clean energy and right down to what any of us, as people who live in a home could get a credit or a refund for purchasing like a heat pump. And there is, in the IRA, specific money that goes both to vulnerable communities, EJ communities, as well as to rural communities, which there are 40 million people in the US who live in rural communities, 50% of the land mass of the country.</p><p>And so we're talking about a significant space in the country and a lot of people. The opportunity, for example, to decarbonize rural electrical cooperatives which have really relied on coal, which has very significant public health impacts, in addition, is a huge opportunity that isn't necessarily cloaked in environmental terms. It's a great opportunity to reduce cost and to create jobs. And there's a whole set of parts of the IRA that are entirely focused on farm communities and forest communities that involve credits and other types of incentives for regenerative agriculture, for dealing with water scarcity, increasing water scarcity, and things that just have basic bottom line benefits economically and are part of cleaning up and making the economy greener in those areas.</p><p>So I see those set asides, or those components, set asides is probably not the right word, for environmental justice and for rural communities as a really powerful step. And I think it connects a lot to what Hahrie is talking about in terms of will this change the experience of people who might think of environmental groups as not their friend and really recontextualize what this is about.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>And if I can chime in here just on the question of disinformation that is spreading in so many of our communities and especially in a lot of these rural communities. I've been doing a lot of work recently studying evangelical communities which operate in a variety of different kinds of contexts. But one of the things I've really learned from the way a lot of evangelical churches organize their communities is they have this idea that belonging comes before belief. That so often, I think, when we think about building an environmental movement, there's sort of this implicit assumption that belief comes before belonging, right?</p><p>Like that you've got to sign on to this idea that we all need to decarbonize before we're going to invite you into our meetings. And if you show up in your Range Rover and your hunting gear, maybe you're not going to feel as welcome as you do otherwise. And these churches have the very opposite idea where they say, look, you don't have to believe in God. You don't have to believe in any God, and especially our God. We're not going to be shy about what we stand for, but you're a part of us no matter what.</p><p>And they have this attitude of radical hospitality. And that's really undergirded by a lot of research that we have on disinformation, where when you're trying to combat that kind of propaganda, the least effective thing you can do is throw a lot of scientific evidence at someone who ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Fact sheets.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Right. But the best thing that you can do is have someone who they trust, with whom they feel this sense of belonging, come and talk to them and present an alternative narrative. And so, in that sense, I feel like a lot of the work that Mosaic is doing in investing in these community based organizations that can build those communities of belonging in rural areas across America is another really important piece of combating this kind of disinformation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that's such an important point. I mean, you have results that support this basic conclusion from sociology, from neurology, name your field. It all is coming together to basically show that social relationships are primary and very often your beliefs are derived from those rather than vice versa, as you're saying. This is also a long-time criticism of the left and this is sort of conventional wisdom at this point. Unions were sort of the left's tool. Unions and liberal churches were the left's tool for doing that, just for literally bringing people together in the same room so they can see and smell one another and share beers.</p><p>And that stuff is so important. And unions have withered notoriously and liberal churches have kind of withered and the left has nothing to replace them. So in that sense, I think it's just great to be funding these super basic, just like get in a room together, group type things.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>And if I could just say, one of the challenges practically with the Hahrie's talking about radical hospitality is that let's just say that the federal government doesn't come with radical hospitality even if it's offering billions of dollars that can be used. So breaking that down, how do you apply for money? How do you even track? I'm a lawyer. I have difficulty with the Federal Register and I was trained and supposedly I'm supposed to be competent in that. And a lot of the investments that we're making and others I think hopefully will be too, is about creating some basic kind of open doorways that make the opportunities accessible and relatable when they are not, in any of our lives necessarily top of mind.</p><p>We're also supporting faith communities through Mosaic and veterans who are trying to organize around climate change and other new or newer voices, nurses and healthcare professionals who I think reflect some of the experience and the research that Hahrie is talking about where it's a lot better to have somebody who you trust, who is in relationship with you, talk to you about an issue that you might not hear. The same if it's sort of an environmental leader on television or something like that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And this is to Hahrie's earlier point. Once that relationship is established, it works for the next thing too, right?</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's, I guess, what we mean by infrastructure. Like, once it's there, it's built and it operates beyond the immediate context. Hahrie, I wonder one sort of question I had is a lot of the money in the IRA is just for very practical, prosaic stuff machines, retrofits, whatever. And so most of the attention around all this is sort of building these networks, building this infrastructure to allow people to access that money. But I wonder if you've given any thought or David, I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on this too, is whether the money itself can be spent in such a way as to serve this goal.</p><p>Spent in such a way as to encourage infrastructure. You know, not only sort of trying to get the money, but trying to direct the money in ways that are reinforcing of this larger goal.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>You know, one thing that I think about is this question of what are the mechanisms of accountability that are being created through the way the IRA gets deployed? Because ultimately that question of accountability is the one that's going to determine the extent to which these ongoing feedback loops are created in the ways that would favor ongoing reform or not. And so as all this money is being deployed for heat pumps or other basic machines that are needed to help decarbonize the entire economy, I think it's not just about spending that money once, right, but it's about restructuring the way the economy works in these certain kind of communities. And how can that be done in a way that will continue to ensure that the kinds of voices that we want at the table are continually there and that those voices are strengthened through the development of this whole new system?</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Yeah, two thoughts on that. One, that a very kind of visual thing came to mind because there's a part of the IRA that is focused on environmental justice and on transportation projects in the that literally physically split communities, usually Brown or Black communities. And the opportunity actually to reconnect is quite a beautiful visual metaphor for what you're asking about and I think would almost naturally create the opportunities for communities to rediscover their connections in ways that have been literally physically severed by decisions. But beyond that, and more broadly, I think this is where advocates activists come into play because I think a couple of possibilities are out there.</p><p>One is that the IRA is successful, but the experience of individuals and even companies is very solitary. I go to Home Depot, I get something from my house that costs less, or I can fill out a form and get a rebate check from somebody. That's a solitary experience. It may be very marginal in terms of anybody's psychological thinking about these issues, but if environmental organizations or those that are interested in these issues are able to surround those sorts of economic activities with new connection opportunities, information that as Hahrie says it is relatable where trusted messengers are delivering it.</p><p>So that act of participating in the IRA's opportunities is also an act of stepping forward and opening yourself up to, well, you know what? That heat pump actually performs better than what I had before. Maybe some of these environmental ideas aren't so crazy. That's where you get chess not checkers. And that's so essential that activists and advocates working on climate really seize this opportunity to work dimensionally around these opportunities. Because if they don't, I think we could have a different level of success, but not something that would be as systemically transformational as is possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, yeah, I think about the analogy in fitness or weight loss, one of the sort of most common forms of advice now is find a group or a community or even just another person and make your goals public like put your goals out there and then be sort of accountable to that other person. Or I think about the conversation about game-ifying things. Just sort of like make things that are solitary social in some way, where you get social reward or social feedback or you have social accountability. A., that's good for you to have those networks, but also, like, you're just more likely to do those individual things if you have some social network that they're involved in.</p><p>And your answer made me think of how you would think about doing that with IRA, right? Like somehow making the act of going to get your heat pump social in some ways so that it brings some feedback or accountability or so it weaves you more into some sort of group setting.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Right, that's the play. That's the thing to do. And that can make a huge difference. Ask can organizing around money that is not actually available to individuals but is going to so many parts of the economy that impact people directly? Like ports, there's $3 billion for ports and $3 billion for reconnecting communities, I mentioned that a minute ago. And on and on. And that involves influencing government actors, as Hahrie was pointing out earlier, both to take advantage of the opportunities and then to do so well to propose projects that are going to make a difference. That's a classic organizing opportunity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And of course, if you have the infrastructure in place, you can reward politicians who do the good thing, thereby showing the other politicians that there's positive feedback to be had in this direction.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>David, one more question for you, which is slightly prosaic, but I have been thinking about it a lot, which is just this sort of initial round of throwing open the gates of environmental philanthropy money to this much wider variety of participants, smaller groups, et cetera, et cetera. In a sense, the initial rush of it is like a sugar high. Like it's great, I think everybody's excited. But over time you do need the foundation's obsession with metrics and accountability, I think we can all agree, has maybe sometimes gone overboard and results in a lot of paperwork and a lot of unnecessary difficulty and gatekeeping.</p><p>But those needs are not made up, right? So are there any sort of performance metrics or what does accountability look like when you're moving into this kind of fuzzier relational stuff? What would it take for a grantee to lose their funding? What do you have in place in terms of accountability? Or have you thought about that a lot?</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Well, it's a good question and it's a question, I think that people in philanthropy and people who are looking for money think about a lot. The baselines, I think, are important, what's the context in which we're operating and a lot of the there's kind of basic due diligence that an organization is a 501(c)(3) and so forth and so on. But beyond that, whether it's a Mosaic context or a more traditional foundation. A lot of the metrics are artificially simplified, and they become, at times, bean counting operations. And I know this because I used to propose those to foundations when I was doing advocacy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's easier, right? I mean, one of the things about it, it's very easy if you have a simple marker.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Right, I'm going to write a report, and then I can send the report to the funder and say, look, I wrote a report, and if I'm lucky, I got on David's podcast, so I got brought attention to it. And I'm not suggesting that those things don't make a difference. I used to write reports, and I think they can make a difference in the right circumstances. So the question becomes, what are we comparing to? And I think where we are right now is sort of a bit of an artifice. Having said that, you can evaluate and learn from movement building just as you can grants, just as you can from any other.</p><p>You just need a much more relational touch. And I would ask Hahrie might want to jump in on this because she's looked so carefully at the types of outcomes that occur. And I think the outcomes that we're looking for, we're looking to be patient funding. We're looking to recognize that we're not going to necessarily see some sort of vivid and tangible, like ribbon cutting, in a year, and that we're not really asking people to propose things to us which we know as a collective. Making decisions from the advocacy community, from the field, are simply unrealistic. So I think one of the most important things to do is to recognize that if we're going to build resilient organizations, that that in itself is the outcome we're looking for, as opposed to some sort of simplified, kind of artificially linear, kind of gantt chart that we can say was met or wasn't met.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>I totally agree with what David was saying. And an analogy that I use sometimes in thinking about this is the idea that in the corporate world, in the for-profit world, we invest in companies all the time based on their assets, right? And that I would be foolish, in fact, as an investor, if I only evaluated a company's profits in the prior year and didn't look at their assets going forward, that I should, in fact, be really making judgments based on what they can do in the future. And I think in the same way, for movements, a lot of philanthropy, I think, tend to only hold movements accountable for the equivalent of their, quote unquote "profits."</p><p>But really, what they should be investing in is what those assets are going forward. And I think one of the things that's really exciting about what Mosaic is doing is trying to strengthen those assets and then continually invest in them over time.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Yeah. One, just as a quick vignette, we've been doing this only a couple of years but it's long enough now to start hearing from grantees who themselves report in excited tones how amazing it is from their perspective to be able to get funding for things that would simply not even be possible in other contexts. And what it means if you're a small hub for advocacy in appalachia to have some communications money or to have some of the things that maybe the larger organizations just take for granted. And we're going to be developing a lot of that information because I think you're onto something, David.</p><p>That mainstream philanthropy. To move hundreds of millions and billions in these directions is what we need to do. And that we're not going to be able entirely to tell people just to trust us, that we have to meet folks where they are and focus on developing sort of a comfort and a conversance with what we're attempting to do here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about and I guess I throw this one to both of you too. We're so behind the eight ball on climate change and a lot of other environmental problems that a lot of solutions are relatively obvious. Like, a lot of the things that need to be done are relatively obvious and uncontroversial. But you can sort of imagine different demographics coming at this from different places having some pretty fundamental disagreements about the theory of change or even sort of what kind of society we're shooting for. There's sort of a climate socialist left and then there's like a very sort of establishment center-left kind of big environmental group.</p><p>And there are real philosophical and ideological disagreements. And I wonder just how do you deal with those when they can we find enough in common that they can be kind of papered over and we can move forward together? Or do you worry about those emerging in a more enduring way?</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, as you know, David and Hahrie those cleavages have already emerged in enviornmental advocacy. And I think we're in the midst of a reckoning about how larger organizations have operated, how big philanthropy operates the role of a just transition versus simply looking for tons of reduction. Part of Mosaic's, kind of, birth came not from me but from 18 months of really cogentive development with 100 different leaders that really looked at those questions. I think as much as infrastructure is important intangible ways as Hahrie is emphasizing, the relational components are essential. And they don't resolve every question whether you're in business or you're in sports or whatever you're doing in life, your own relationships.</p><p>The fundamental question isn't whether people can truly agree on every last detail. It's whether they can form more productive relationships in the advocacy work they're doing. That's the goal. And if you can make an advocacy community of 15,000 organizations like 10% better that is a net effective investment that's huge in terms of its outcome. So we're having these conversations as part of Mosaic and they're going on across the field. And the question is, where do you build the infrastructure to have them in ways that are reperative? One of the focuses of Mosaic is about relationships and trust.</p><p>And some people look at that when we show a PowerPoint. They're like relationships and trust. What does that have to do with the environment or climate? Well, actually ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It has everything has everything to do with everything.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>That's right. But it's not a commonly you can look at a lot of foundation websites before you're going to find relationships and trust.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Difference and disagreement is inherent to any kind of collaborative effort, especially one at the scale, though, that we're talking about. And I think the idea that we're going to be able to either paper over or ignore those differences or get everyone to just get along sometimes feels like it's a frustrating way to approach the problem. And what we know from a lot of previous experiences and research and so on, is that what makes it possible for these kind of coalitions to navigate those kind of deep strategic differences like the ones you're describing about? Is the extent to which they create equitable power sharing agreements so that the super left-y groups and the center-left groups can kind of have the sense that we know we're not going to all agree on everything in the end, but we're going to be really clear about how we're going to make decisions together, about what we're going to do and how we're going to allocate resources.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We're going to be heard, right. So often it's just about that as much as anything else.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Right, and so having a participatory board where there's this transparent governance process just kind of starts to create those habits of learning how to share power across lots of different theories of change.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think that working together in person or like face to face often shows people that despite our differences, there is actually a time we can work together on there and we do have more in common than we thought. Whereas the common communicative environment these days of social media is more or less structured to have the opposite effect, right, to sort of exaggerate differences and to encourage people to dig in and be the most extreme version of their selves. So anything that works against that is a social good in my book.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Yeah. I think that sometimes we mistake attention for power. And part of why social media can be so alluring is because it gets you lots of attention and the more divisive you are, the more attention you get. But to actually build power, you have to build those kind of bridges. And so what we have to do is kind of break that idea that having more attention is necessarily the same as having power.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I'll just say quickly that Mosaic launched into the teeth of the pandemic and we've made far more progress when we were able to actually meet together. It's a very different thing to look at somebody through. Effectively, whether it's your handheld screen or a screen on your desk, tends to reinforce the sort of archness that people can bring into a room where there are diverse perspectives, but there's nothing like the in-person meetings and even the socialization between people who don't know each other just to create a little bit of grace between them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A final question that I'd like to hear you both weigh on, which is very general, but just this shift in approach that Mosaic sort of represents, of focusing on movement infrastructure, focusing on relationships and just sort of infrastructure building and having a much more diverse, pluralistic decision making structure, sharing power, all this kind of stuff. Very much for reasons we've discussed. Tax against a lot of the sort of trends and tendencies on the left in the past few decades. What's the theory of change here? What would you like to see if this catches on? Like, you know, in a positive world where this new strategy catches on?</p><p>What would you like to see in, like, five to ten years? What can you imagine improving? What is the sort of theory of change here if this new approach takes over? What do you think is possible in the next five to ten years?</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>My mind goes back to the point that you were making, David, earlier, which is that there's been this long standing pattern where it feels like the right invests in the kind of deep work that is needed to make large scale shifts in society and politics. And the left feels like it's swimming along in the shallow end all along the way. And we're in a moment right now where clearly the change that we need is deep and not shallow, and it's got to operate quickly and also in the long term. And so for me, it's like when you build this kind of infrastructure and mechanisms like Mosaic, what I would love to see in five years, ten years, is a kind of deepening of the movements and the network of organizations that are able to continually advance the kind of agenda that we really need.</p><p>And so you can think back to the early decades of the rise of a lot of the kind of organizations that comprise the right. They sort of started at the same place that we are now, in a way, and steadily built over a couple of decades. That kind of death that is now being deployed.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I'll just build on that. I think, from a very practical sense, the conversation we're having today is about profound existential challenges that we're facing with climate change and beyond. I hold, as somebody who's devoted my professional life to this, both real pride in our grantees and the work that's being done. Where would we be without the laws that we've got and the work that's. Been done. And at the same time, this recognition that so many have that notwithstanding our best efforts, that those efforts aren't adding up to keep pace with the scale of the change that we're facing.</p><p>And so, very practically, Mosaic and things like it, if it can be a model, is designed to create a more powerful and effective environmental movement that can effectuate the big change that we need. Not just theorize about it, not just plan for it, not just write about it, but actually implement it at scale and over the time period that's available to us, which, with climate, is not that long, by 2030. That's what we need to be focused on, and that's what Mosaic and things like we've been talking about today are really directed toward.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A positive note to wrap up on. Hahrie Han, David Beckman, thank you so much for coming on and talking through all this stuff, and good luck with your efforts.</p><p><strong>David Beckman</strong></p><p>Thanks so much.</p><p><strong>Hahrie Han</strong></p><p>Thank you for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/building-a-movement-that-can-take</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:116216240</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 01 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/116216240/b20bb27161ed2506327be999cf54be3c.mp3" length="43615263" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3635</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/116216240/ff74746825ba147bdc6dd528175be62d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The wonky but incredibly important changes Biden just made to regulatory policy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Sabeel Rahman, former acting administrator of the federal Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, discusses updates to regulatory policy that reflect a positive new approach to how climate (and other) regulations will be assessed and crafted.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAC_rfP7tpTH83_t8wYENwJRa/volts23.04.21%28sabeel.rahman%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/the-wonky-but-incredibly-important-changes-biden-just-made-to-regulatory-policy"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When President Biden first took office, his administration released a series of "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-president-elect-bidens-day-one-executive-actions-deliver-relief-for-families-across-america-amid-converging-crises/">Day One executive actions</a>." Among them was reforming the way federal regulations are developed and evaluated. This is not exactly something the public was clamoring for, or even aware of, but it is foundational to the administration's ability to achieve its other goals.</p><p>The agency in charge of reviewing proposed federal regulations is called the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, or OIRA, which sits inside the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). It is a fairly obscure corner of the federal bureaucracy that doesn't come in for much public scrutiny, but as the gateway through which all federal regulations must pass, it is immensely powerful in shaping the space of possibilities for any administration.</p><p>A few weeks ago, OIRA answered Biden's call by issuing updated versions of two crucial documents: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/04/07/2023-07364/request-for-comments-on-proposed-omb-circular-no-a-4-regulatory-analysis">circular A4</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/04/07/2023-07179/public-comment-on-guidelines-and-discount-rates-for-benefit-cost-analysis-of-federal-programs">circular A94</a>. The former contains guidance for agencies on how OIRA will evaluate regulations; the latter contains guidance for how it will evaluate public investments.</p><p>These guidance documents have not been updated in more than 20 years, so this development is long overdue. The new circulars contain some fairly technical updates to the way OIRA does cost-benefit analysis — and the goals toward which it deploys cost-benefit analysis — but they are incredibly important, evidence of a generational philosophical shift.</p><p>To unpack these changes, I talked with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.brooklaw.edu/Contact-Us/Rahman-K-Sabeel">Sabeel Rahman</a> of Brooklyn Law School, who served as acting administrator of OIRA last year while its current leader was being confirmed by the Senate. Rahman was intimately involved in designing the updated guidance, so I was eager to talk to him about the new approach, how it was developed, how it reflects Biden's priorities, and what it means for the future of climate and other regulations.</p><p>I know this sounds wonky, but it is worth your time. I promise you will come out of it excited about cost-benefit analysis.</p><p>With no further ado, Sabeel Rahman, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Thanks so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is awesome. I'm so excited to talk about this.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>It is wonky, but it is awesome ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wonky and awesome. I've had sort of a side obsession with these issues for a long, long time, and this is really a perfect opportunity to jump into them. But before we jump into too many wonky details, I want to do some scene setting just so people know, kind of have a sense of what we're talking about in general. So when Biden came in, he issued this sort of list of "Day One," what they call "Day One priorities." And one of those was to update regulatory policy, basically how regulations get assessed and crafted. This is not something I think the public is beating down the door demanding this.</p><p>This is something that has a behind the scenes air about it, but it's also clearly a political priority. So maybe just to start with, let's just talk about what is the Office of Management and Budget, OMB, what is OIRA, which is the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yes, absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>First try.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>There we go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What, OIRA is within it, and why what they do seems to have such political presence in the administration that it made its way to the top of this Day One priority list just to sort of set the scene.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. That's great. And thanks so much, David. And you're exactly right. This is very much kind of behind the scenes type of sets of issues, but really, really important for all the day-to-day stuff that government needs to do, and especially in this moment when we're thinking about the climate crisis or we're thinking about trying to address systemic inequality. So the fact that this was part of the Day One suite of actions from the present is, I think, pretty indicative. So there was the headline stuff, the new climate regulations, the Equity Executive Order, responding to COVID right there's, all of that headline stuff.</p><p>And then this regulatory review piece was also there because that's actually part of the back-end to make all those other policies work. So we're used to thinking about the President comes in, president can make all kinds of sweeping policy decisions or kind of really important policy decisions. The day to day of how that happens involves the federal agencies. And the agencies, they can make enforcement actions, they can spend money or they can write rules. And it's that rule writing part that goes through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. And so this office that you talked about, OMB, the Office of Management and Budget, builds the President's budget every year.</p><p>They handle the budget side, but they also do a lot of really important work in terms of management. So how do agencies manage their personnel, operate strategically, have the highest impact for the resources they have. And then there's OIRA, which is the regulatory part, sort of the third pillar of OMB. OIRA works with the agencies will review under executive order going back to Clinton era and a practice actually dating even further behind that, OIRA will review major federal regulations, in part for the policy, in part for legal issues, but also, most importantly, to make sure they're consistent with the President's vision.</p><p>And that makes it a really important nexus for all of this stuff, which is also partly why it can come in the crosshairs at times.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? And a question about that, OIRA, what sort of police powers does it have? If an agency develops a regulation, sends it to OIRA for review, and OIRA finds a problem, can OIRA just say, "No, you got to go back and try again"? Or is it suggestions? What power does it have?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Right, so it's quite a powerful office, and I should say, obviously spent the first years of the Biden administration in OIRA and was acting head of the office until the confirmed administrator came in a few months ago. But the powers under the original Clinton Executive Order, which continues to be in effect to this day, really makes OIRA the kind of last stop in the policy making approval process. So agencies have to get OIRA clearance for significant regulations now to get OIRA clearance. That's not just what does OIRA think, what does that office think? The wire clearance process is really a kind of governmental peer review.</p><p>So the idea is that through OIRA, OIRA will get sister agencies, other parts of the West Wing, anyone who might have a point of view on the policy at hand to make sure everyone's on the same page. Right? And it's really that coordination that's the biggest kind of stick in that. If someone's got a problem, if people aren't on the same page, the rule is not going to go forward until there's at least an understanding about, okay, here's what it does, here's what it doesn't do. Everyone's comfortable with this, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's sort of like the last stop a regulation goes to before going out to the public and consequently has enormous gatekeeping significance, even though it's completely more or less outside of public view, unless except for a small handful of nerds paying close attention to these things. And just to mention, you mentioned this in passing, but just to clarify to listeners, you were the acting administrator of OIRA for the first two years of Biden's term while the current administrator was going through the process of getting confirmed. So these changes we're going to talk about. You were central in shepherding them through and shaping them, were you not?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that's fair to say. There was an acting administrator in the first year, and I came in as the number two and then took over in the second year. But this was very much a big part of our day to day and a big part of the important work. Because going back to your first question, you can think about the individual regulations that are important trying to move good policy on labor issues or on COVID or on equity or on climate, but they all have to work through this existing regulatory review process. And so if we don't update that right.</p><p>This process has been in place for decades, then you're trying to shoehorn kind of cutting edge policy through very old procedures, right? And it's got to be updated. So this is a big part of the work for sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and a final note on staffing, the administrator in question who has just confirmed is Richard Rivez. Richard Rivez, who is a law professor at NYU, one time dean of the NYU Law School, and a longtime heavyweight academic expert in exactly this stuff, cost-benefit analysis, et cetera, et cetera, which I just think is sort of an indication you watch staffing to see what administrations care about. This is, to me, appointing him indicates that Biden is taking this very seriously.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that's right. And Ricky is fantastic. His leadership has already been tremendous in his first couple of months. But exactly right. He's certainly an expert in cost-benefit analysis in the regulatory state. He's done a lot of work on climate and energy. A lot of his academic work coming in was also about how to make sure that distributional questions don't get lost in conventional analysis. And when you look at the draft, you'll see a lot of those sensibilities woven through. Now, that's not just Ricky, right? The President, in his Day One memo calls out specifically climate, equity, distribution, future generations, human dignity, all these things that we want good policy to be able to speak to.</p><p>The charge was to go look at the review process and make sure that those values don't get squeezed out, don't get lost, that they're incorporated in a way that's rigorous and evidence based and all of that kind of stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. One more background kind of philosophical note just to sort of set the table here also is debates about cost-benefit analysis go way back and are vigorous and ongoing. And there is a school of thought that says the process is sort of inherently conservative, inherently against pro social, long term action, and it should be scrapped in favor of something else. And then there's this other sort of school of thought, which I think Ricky Rivez is a good example of, which says, no, it is possible to sort of rethink and reimagine cost-benefit analysis in a way that serves pro-social, dare I even say progressive ends.</p><p>And what we're looking at here is that school of thought showing what it can do. Overall, what we're seeing here is an effort to make cost-benefit analysis more, let's say, pro social and far seeing and less of the sort of conservative process that it has traditionally been. Is that fair?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>I think that's fair. And I would say it's an effort to make the cost-benefit really the impact analysis because it's not just costs and benefits, right? There's other stuff that don't fit into those buckets. So it's really about a more holistic impact analysis and to make that sort of as strong and robust and cutting edge as it can be. And this was part of the President's Day One charge as well, because if you look at that original memo, that memo sort of reaffirmed the President's commitment to the enterprise of impact analysis, to the conventional sort of role that OIRA plays, but set this task that the role needs to be exercised in this more modern, cutting edge way.</p><p>And that's what for me, reading it in context of the other sort of substantive Day One commitments was really important because that's the substance that the process has to be in sync with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Because we got big things that we're trying to do on climate, on equity, on all the crises that were swirling at that time. So I think you're exactly right about the broader philosophical debate. I should say this is so important because my own entrey into this, I'm a political theorist by training I spent before the administration I was President racial equity advocacy organization Demo.</p><p>So we did a lot of work on these kinds of issues. And it's a very real debate that I imagine will continue and should continue about what is the right way to review and analyze public policy. But what I think is true, sort of regardless, is that we need something much more multifaceted holistic flexible than what we had before, even under previous Democratic administrations.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, what we've got now clearly doesn't work. So let's talk about then specifically what's happening. So there are two documents guidances being updated here. The first one is called Circular A4, which is basically guidance on how OIRA assesses regulations. And then there's Circular A94, which has to do with how OIRA assesses public investment. And my understanding is that the issues and updates in A94 regarding public investment more or less track what's going on in A4. So I'm going to mostly focus on A4 we can touch on. If you have specific things to say about A94 later, we can get back to it.</p><p>But I think if we cover A4, we'll more or less be hitting the big issues in A94 too. So A4 is a guidance for what OIRA is doing when it does this regulatory review. So maybe let's just start with what is this circular A4? Where did it come from? And how long has the sort of existing guidance been around? Like, who wrote the one we're using now?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. So there's a whole world of government documents that is not beyond the executive orders, and we're entering into it now. So Circular A4 has never been updated. It was first issued in 2003 during the Bush years and has stayed in place since then. So that, right off the bat, I think tells you a lot, right, about just kind of how important this update is. The fact that it's a circular that's really guidance not just for OMB and OIRA, but it's meant to be guidance for the agencies. The idea is that the agencies are using it as their sort of touchstone of here's what we should be striving towards.</p><p>This is also the kind of stuff that OIRA, when your rule comes in to OIRA for final review, this is the stuff that OIRA is going to kick the tires on. And so it really kind of sets up those conversations. The other thing that's really important to know that it's a technical document. I mean, it's technical. If you read it, it's technical to read. But even its status is as a technical document, less as a political document because it actually goes through and the version that's released now is about to go through public comment and peer review.</p><p>And so the idea is that it's supposed to represent a sort of expert state of the field that is not meant to be kind of changing every time the White House changes hands. It's really meant to be. This is what public policy and social science across the board, people agree that this is a kind of best practice. Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>And so the ambition here is to update that old document but really update it in a way that has that seal of approval from, you know, the evidence and the research and, and, and the field yeah. So that it can have some lasting, lasting staying power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So this is not something that was ever intended to be sort of updated administration to administration. It's supposed to be sort of a stable guiding document over time, but maybe like having it be 20 years old is maybe a little bit longer between ...</p><p>20 years is probably too long. And I'm sure we'll get into the weeds of you can definitely see the drift that has happened right. As the world has moved on in the last 20 years.</p><p>Yeah. So several changes to A4 substantive changes that I want to get into, but one just sort of kind of technical change right off the top that I kind of thought was interesting is because I've discussed it on Volts before, is what triggers OIRA review. And so currently the threshold was if the regulation has $100 million or more of impact, that triggers full OIRA review, which is a pretty exhaustive process. It's time consuming and staff consuming and that threshold has been raised to $200 million, as far as I can tell, just to sort of reflect inflation, et cetera.</p><p>But the effect will be fewer regulation, like the number of regulations that needed OIRA review is sort of piling up and getting unwieldy and staffing shortages. So among other things, this will free up OIRA staff a little bit to focus a little bit more on the truly significant regulations. And I always like administrative capacity is one of my passions.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is sort of a way of freeing up some administrative capacities.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. And the new executive order also puts a provision that that now $200 million dollar threshold will be updated automatically every three years indexed to GDP. Which is ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Makes a lot of sense.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>... technical and wonky, but just removes this problem of like a number that may or may not have made sense 20 years ago, definitely doesn't make sense now. Just like make it an automatic thing. And it is really a capacity management tool to your point. Like our civil service, I think is incredibly important. They're a crown jewel of our democracy as far as I'm concerned, and it takes staff time and attention and resources to make good policy in service of the public.</p><p>You got to focus the efforts right on the most important stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Alright. Okay. So let's talk about we're going to go through three big changes in A4. The first one is an update of discount rates. And discount rates are not something I think that are widely understood or widely discussed in the public. I once did a long piece on it. It was one of the first sort of super long wonky things I ever wrote. Just the wildly positive reaction sort of set me off on my career path. So I have a sort of fondness for discount rates, but let's just explain briefly, if that is even humanly possible, what do we mean by a discount rate and what is its significance?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>So the basic idea is how do we trade-off or weigh impacts that might happen today versus impacts that might happen a long time in the future? And in general, if you have a higher discount rate, you're really favoring impacts that happen right now because you're discounting impacts that might happen, say, 100 years, 200 years in the future for a lot of day-to-day stuff that doesn't really matter all that much. But anytime you're talking about policy, the obvious big one is climate crisis policy. But anything that is going to have a longer term multigenerational tale of impact.</p><p>If you don't have the discount rate right, you're going to be systematically off. You're either going to be overweighting to the present and undercounting the future right in terms of costs or benefits. And we talked about how long it's been since A4 is updated. A4 has written into it a 3% discount rate that was written in in 2003. And so that's been the rate that agencies have been using for a long time. That's not the rate now. By all the best science out there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The way sometimes I try to explain it to people is like, what if I offered you I made you choose between I could give you $100 today or $105 in a year.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or how about $106 in a year, $107? How much would it take for you to delay getting your money? And if you would take $200 a year from now to compensate for $100 now, you have like 100% discount rate. Or conversely, if you're like $100 a year from now, $100 now, either one is exactly the same to me that's a 0% discount rate, like future benefits are worth exactly as much to me as present benefits. And it's just I think a good heuristic sort of indicates how much do we value future benefits. So a couple of things about this.</p><p>One thing I want to ask about is the 3% discount rate that's in the previous A4, the unupdated A4 was developed via a procedure. And the new I saw Ricky give a presentation on this. The new discount rate, which is now 1.7%, was developed basically by using the same procedure, just updated numbers. So what is that procedure? How do you come to this number?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>It's super wonky. There's a model that OMB and a lot of folks in the field have been using to basically try to take into account all the different complicated factors that might weigh into the kinds of policy impacts that might happen over the long run. You're trying to factor in changes in human behavior, changes in market conditions, all the stuff like that. So what the proposal? The new A4 proposal has actually done is two things. One is it's done a straight, just keeping the old formula, but updating the data with the latest data that we have right up to 2022, or at least through 2021 as far as data was available, and running those numbers, that gets you on the same model, a much lower number because it's got more recent data baked into it of 1.7%.</p><p>But the new version is also put out for peer review and public comment. And one of the questions that is being asked of expert reviewers is, are there variations to the model that should be considered now? That's a heavier lift, right? Because then you have to construct a new model. It has to be sort of something that meets field wide approval in terms of peer review and all of that. But the advantage of putting both of these out is say, okay, if we take a kind of small C conservative approach and keep the old model but just update the data, that already gets you a much more up to date number.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But the old formula is drawing on it's sort of indexing on market interest rates, right? Mainly, is that the main sort of indicator that the discount rate is being derived from?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>There are a lot of inputs. That's one of the biggest ones. And in fact, one of the debates is basically in terms of the methodology, how much should one just sort of look to market interest rates full stop? And that's one of the modeling questions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We're calling it a modeling question, but really it's a philosophical it's a philosophical question because if you're looking at market rates, you're looking at sort of intra generational, like how much do individual investors care about their individual benefits in the future versus their individual benefits today? But when you're talking about something like climate change, you're talking intergenerational sort of how much do I value benefits for my children versus costs for me? Which might not be the same thing. Market rates might not be a good indicator of how much we value subsequent generations, right?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Totally. And it's also not clear how much are market rates, in fact pricing in the real catastrophic risks of climate or other types of existential threats. And in the new A4, there's some nice language sort of framing that the point of discounting is to really try to also take into account some of those kind of really hard to quantify really catastrophic dangers that might come down the line. So it is a broader kind of conceptual and as well as analytic question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this was sort of the point of my piece that I wrote originally which is really like moral these are moral and philosophical debates sort of being waged undercover of math or undercover of models. So I wonder running the same formula gets you to a 1.7% discount rate, but then you also put the model out for comment, and I wonder, is there any sort of room in the guidance if an agency decides, well, the regulations we're developing have extraordinarily long time horizons and intergenerational effects, and so we would like to use a smaller discount rate? Like is there room for agencies to have sort of their own initiative here?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>So there is room for that. And arguably the old A4 had some room for this too, although you can imagine this was rarely took up on that offer because it's really hard to calculate this stuff, right. Agencies often don't have the bandwidth or the kind of person power to build their own model from scratch. So that's why the default number is really important. But the new version does include a discussion about or the new proposal anyway. It does include a discussion about there might be instance circumstances where the particular nature of the policy or the issue might have different dynamics and in those cases agencies can and should come up with variations and probably just as a best practice like run it with the 1.7 and then run it with the variation.</p><p>So you kind of can show like have some an informed decision. But that's absolutely in there. And I think a general theme I would say of this new A4 is creating much more informed flexibility, right? That where things don't fit. Here's a good default, we've updated it, but where it doesn't fit, let's talk about how to make it work because the policy goal should be front and center and then you should build an analysis that can inform that rather than trying to shoehorn everything into a straitjacket.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One other question about discount rates is one of the places where discount rates come into climate policy is the effort to determine a social cost of carbon. Which is another thing we've talked a lot about on this pod and another thing that I think Biden is updating. So just maybe talk a little bit about just even if you just change from 3% to 1.7% how that might sort of affect how highly you price carbon, right?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>So it is very big direct effect. Now we can talk in a minute about sort of the mechanics around the social cost of carbon update because that's happening in a different process. But basically this point about discounting future impacts has a big implication for how we might price the economic costs, the social costs of a ton of carbon pollution in the air. Basically, the higher the discount rate, the lower that social cost of carbon is going to be. Because many of those costs that might arise from too much carbon are long term costs, right? They're going to really manifest in the future.</p><p>And so for discounting that then the cost can look really small. Now, this is important because you know this better than me, David, but in the social cost universe, one of the things that the Trump administration did, they put out their estimate of the social cost of carbon as extremely low. And part of how they got to that low number was to say, well, we're going to have a really high discount rate, among other things, right? And so if you do the math, then you get this really low number. Well, okay, but if that discount rate is not rooted in reality, then of course that number is kind of meaningless.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also to get back to the intergenerational thing, you can derive some pretty absurd results from a high discount rate. All of humanity goes extinct in whatever 2100 under like a 7, 8, whatever, percent discount rate. We would hardly care today that's going to happen. So you can get absurdities on both ends with discount rates. Okay. So the sort of default 3% discount rate now has been lowered to a default 1.7% discount rate. And that is, all things being equal, going to make more regulations look cost justified as a rule of thumb. It's going to be easier to justify regulations that have long term benefits under this new discount rate.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I would say that's just that it's more accurate, right? Because a lot of those regulations have those long term benefits. If we're talking climate, if you're talking lead poisoning, say, is another example inter-generational, not quite in the climate space, those benefits are there, we just weren't counting them. Right, and that's important to your point that regulations, people care as a policy matter, as a political matter, as a legal matter, how do the benefits stack up against the costs that we can put numbers to?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I think it's intuitive too. I think if you just ask average people on the street like, do you care a lot about the welfare of your children? I think this is reflective, I think, of ordinary intuitions too. Okay, so discount rate is the first big thing that's updated in A4. But there are a couple of other really big and interesting changes too. The second one I want to talk about is distribution, basically. So I think tell me if this is accurate. I think traditionally OIRA cost-benefit analysis just looked at aggregate costs and aggregate benefits without distinguishing among who, what is the nature of the recipients of those costs and those benefits.</p><p>And that has some pretty straightforwardly counterintuitive results. So, for instance, one regulation would prevent a disaster in a poor neighborhood. One regulation would prevent a disaster in a rich neighborhood. The latter clearly has higher benefits, right. Just because the property on the line is worth more. And I think it's intuitive to people that there's something wrong with that. Right? There's something wrong with that. So for the first time, this new A4 tries to introduce sort of distributional impact analysis. So maybe just tell us, what would that look like? What does that mean?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, and this is another one of those things that I think under the old version there are a few sentences about, oh, you might consider a distributional impact it's not really dwelled upon. And there are definitely folks in OMB who had been pushing for this for a long time, just as pure analytic to your point. You can't really say you're doing a real analytic treatment of a policy if you're not thinking about those types of very real impacts. We would all say that, or I hope you would all say that, like $100 extra dollars for Jeff Bezos is not the same thing as $100 extra dollars for really anyone else, but in particular working class folks, right?</p><p>So the new version has a much more expanded in depth discussion about distributional analysis. First, in terms of pressing agencies to really take it seriously. Second, in terms of giving just much more detail about how and when one might do that. So you should pay particular attention to distribution analysis to the new A4 talks about when you're choosing between different alternative policy designs. Suppose you have one version that might score a little better in terms of net benefits, but like, it's concentrating all the costs on people who are least able to bear those costs, and another version which is still scoring, you know, net beneficial, but is a much more even distribution of those benefits and of those costs.</p><p>That's a relevant fact for decision makers before they decide on what the final policy should be. So that's something that the new A4 says agencies should look into.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Does it provide a formula sort of telling you how much weight does income, or is it just sort of like pay attention?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>It does a little bit of both. I think the general charge, as I read it in the new document is saying that you should look into this. And here are some methods by which you might do that disaggregating the impacts by the relevant constituencies, whether that's by income or taking a racial breakdown or whatever the right bucketing is. But it also gives a discussion of what's called income weighting. And this is provided not as a requirement, but as a like, here's a tool that you could use as a way to sort of shorthand estimate how much should we weigh a dollar to a poor person versus a dollar to an ultra-rich person.</p><p>The new document has put an estimate of 1.4 as an estimate for what's called the income elasticity of marginal utility. Meaning how much more is that marginal dollar worth to you, depending on where you are in the income level. And so that's a pretty new important thing to actually have that number crunched and they're available sort of on the table for agencies to use as a shorthand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is a little bit of an aside, but it's a point that I think is worth making, which is, I think when people think about at least people in our world, when they think about federal agencies, I think, tend to think about like EPA, which has a sort of staff of dozens and all these sort of PhD economists on staff, armies of analysts. But most agencies are not that big and don't have that much administrative capacity and can't sort of sit down and develop their own models for these things. This is not like a heavy hand of central wonks here. The agencies need this.</p><p>They need this guidance, they want help doing these things.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that's such an important point and I think this is also not a flipping of the switch, right? Like having the new guidance, you also then need to your point kind of to have some time for the agencies to get used to this, to build some muscle, to build some capacity. And so I think getting this out now with a couple of years still left in this first term, to actually then have some runway for agencies to start using these new approaches, see what's working, see what's most helpful. I think that's the kind of work that I would anticipate Ricky and Revesz and the team to be digging into going forward.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One other question about this. When we're talking about distributional impacts, are we just thinking of income or are there other indicators?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Right, so absolutely income, but also could be broken down in different ways. And so you have to look at in the guidance itself, it actually has this whole section saying that the agency, depending on the policy, should really be thoughtful about what is the most informative and relevant set of breakdowns. And it might be more than one income, race, geography, sexual orientation, there are a bunch of different ways that one might break it down. You obviously can't do every category for every policy that would be multiply really fast. But I think the point of the guidance is to say think about what are the constituencies and communities who are most likely to be impacted differently by the policy.</p><p>And then devise an approach, ideally quantitative, but if not even using qualitative assessment of what you can to think about rigorously, how are those different communities being impacted? And then having that inform the policy choice. Because at the end of the day, it's not a make work exercise. Right. The point of this is are we making good policy that serves the public and that is attuned to the very real disparities that we have in our country, right? That's the issue. So this gives a framework to do that, but it's really going to then be up to the agencies working with OMB and OIRA folks to make it real.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Kind of already asked this once, but I want to return to it. So if I'm an agency reading this, do I read this as I have to convince OIRA that I thought about this? Or is this a gentle suggestion from OIRA that I can take or not take? Is this now going to be a sort of a requirement for new regs?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>It's a great question in part because I think different OIRAs have different styles depending on the administration, right? When I was there, we very much saw ourselves as working hand in glove in partnership with the agencies to make good policy, right? But that said, OMB's role is also to sort of kick the tires on whether it's the budget or the regs. And so I do think it's not a you must do this, but it is a very, very strong suggestion about the kinds of things that one should look into. And look even now, under the old A4, it's not like every regulation does every single thing that A4 talks about because there's so much in there.</p><p>So in that sense, there's lots of tailoring, lots of flexibility on what's needed. But it is very much a like, this is the bar, this is what we're going to be looking for. And when OMB comes asking for stuff, the agencies know that they got to pay attention to that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay. So first, updated discount rate, second, the strong suggestion that agencies do some distributional impact analysis. The third thing, which is also quite interesting, I think, for insiders, because this has been a point of contention for a long time, is the suggestion that agencies take the international impacts of regulations into effect. And it was, we mentioned earlier, the Trump administration's sort of ludicrously low social cost of carbon. Part of how they came to that ludicrously low number is very explicitly ostentatiously, even saying we don't give a damn about how our regulations impact other countries, that we just don't care.</p><p>The only numbers that are feeding into our calculations are how does this benefit or cost Americans? I think just as sort of ostentatiously says, no, that's real dumb and also morally horrific. So what exactly does A4 say about international impacts? Is it similar to distributional in that this is a strong suggestion?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>I think of it as opening up the aperture to allow first stuff that had been squeezed out before. Right? So not every rule is going to have massive global implications, but many of them will, and those ought to be taken into account. And so I read this section for those falling along at home. The geographic scope of analysis, there's a lot of great language in there about the different ways in which global effects might come into play. So it might be that there are non US citizens who are living abroad and face certain impacts that might have parallels in the US.</p><p>So they're good proxies. There might be experiencing an externality of US decisions. Climate comes to mind there as well. So there are a lot of different kind of variations laid out in the guidance. The point is that the guidance says that you should think about the global effects and incorporate them into your analysis. It even talks about how, if it makes more sense, include that as a separate thing, right, that you have your traditional analysis, but then you could also sort of provide a separate analysis of the impacts abroad, if that's the more sort of feasible way to get at it.</p><p>But you really should be thinking about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And is this similar in that you've provided a formula that agencies can use or not use? And if there is a formula, I'm wondering sort of like how much less do we value a foreign life relative to an American life? Is there a number there on how much discounting we're doing geographically?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Right. So not in A4. The discussion A4 is more qualitative in terms of just guidance to the agencies. And I think, like with distributional analysis and discount rates, there'll be rules where there will be trade offs that have to be weighed, I think, compared to right now, where we don't have consistent analysis of what those trade offs might even be, it's hard to even make good judgments about them. Right? And so I think the idea here is let's take that on, do the analysis, do the work. And then there are all sorts of reasons why a policy might come down one way or another.</p><p>It's hard for A4 to be prescriptive in that way, but A4 can say you need to take these issues seriously, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>At least think about it.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So those are the three big things. And like I said earlier, roughly those same issues are reflected in A94. When they're talking about public investment, I think maybe one thing worth picking out on A94 and talking about specifically is and this was a little bit of a mind blower to me A94 as it exists has a 7% discount rate for investments in public infrastructure. Which just seems to me crazy, because public investments in particular are designed for long term benefit. That's the whole point. Like infrastructure investments and stuff like that are like we have a whole history in our country of huge investments we made that paid off handsomely over the long term but wouldn't have penciled out under a 7% discount rate.</p><p>So where the heck did that 7% discount rate come from in our public investment considerations. And how does A94 change that?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Big difference between A4 and A94 is that A94 is focused exactly on, as you said, David, the kind of government's expenditure on public investments. It's always been sort of related to A4, but a little bit different. The 7% number in A94 was aligned with A4 originally, and that A4 had a 3% number and then also had as an upper bound for those types of capital investment related rules, had that 7% in there. But that also is really in sore need of updating. And so that's what A94 does. I think what you'll see in the new version, without getting too deep into the weeds, is that the new version is more aligned with the new version of A4.</p><p>The numbers are a little bit different to sort of take into consideration the particularities of what, say, the budget side of OMB has to take into account when they're dealing with federal investments in buildings and stuff like that. It's a little bit different from regulation. So that's where the divergence comes from. But that old 7% number, I think, is reflective of where we were with the thinking on this stuff in the early two thousands.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there a new number for discount rates for public investments or is it not that simple on this side?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a little bit more complicated for the investment side, but that's also going for the same kind of peer review and public comment. So I think we'll know more in the coming months about where A94 lands. Exactly. But what's exciting and important is that A94, the last revision was in, I think, 1992, not quite as old as A4, but still pretty old.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's wild. And A94 also gets into distributional stuff and international stuff.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Really important, yeah, really important distributional and global effect language in there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And part of this, I think part of the point of all this, one of the points of all this was to align A4 and A94 better, so we have some sort of coherent they had kind of drifted apart in a way that made no sense.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Totally. And full props to the OMB Chief Economist team who they sort of are the keepers of A94 in the sort of OMB ecology. I know they've been working really hard on all this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So those are the three big changes. Are there other changes in A4 that you think are worth calling out? Like there's something having to do with risk and risk tolerance and risk assessment that I don't even know how to create a coherent question about, but feel free to talk about it.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Totally. Yeah. No, I appreciate that. I think there are three other buckets of things that I'll just highlight briefly because they're important and also, I think really brings this up to 2023. So one is what you were just alluding to. There are a bunch of things that will mean a lot more to our economist and economic modeler friends who might be listening, but they really amount to kind of bringing A4 into line with sort of cutting edge of economic theory. So how do we take into account uncertainty and uncertain effects that we don't know with perfect certainty these estimates, right?</p><p>Let's factor that in. Taking into account risk and risk aversion, right? People are willing to pay more to be protected from the risk that something might go haywire. It's kind of typical understandable human behavior, but that's not always baked into the models. So there's some technical stuff. That's bucket one. The second bucket is there's a lot of really interesting what I think of as like macroeconomic structure, things that are baked into this new version. So normally reg reviews, reg analysis would be you're looking at the new regulation almost at a micro level. Like, you're just looking at that regulation and you're kind of holding the rest of the world kind of constant.</p><p>But the new A4, it talks about, for example, business cycles. There might be regulations that have different benefits and costs when we're in a recession versus when we're not. If you think about, for example, social insurance policies, if they're designed to be countercyclical, those benefits really only kick in under certain conditions that may not be around when the regulation is being written, right? So it incorporates that. It incorporates a lot of great new thinking about market concentration and competition that's been a big focus of this administration, being attuned to the ways in which concentrated ownership of industries can lead to higher prices, less stable production, kind of all the antitrust, anti-monopoly stuff that is happening.</p><p>So that's baked into A4 much more. So these kind of like big macroeconomic conditions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Macroeconomic context, which you would think is like totally like duh, of course.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Right. And then the last bucket is also another like you'd think, of course it's not rocket science, but it's a really important shift is that the new A4 has a lot more language and guidance about what to do with those impacts that you can't put numbers to because they're obviously real. And there and it even talks specifically about things like civil rights and civil liberties, democracy, equity. These are goals for good public policy. They may not have number values and in some cases ought not to have number values.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or the welfare of other species. If I can just ...</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's a section there about ecosystems and ecological impacts as part of the hard to quantify discussion. So there's tons of really important implications of that that you could imagine for everything from ecology to equity that I think this new A4 is much, much better at.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And those, I think, are really sticky to deal with because there's no formula. I mean, even a candidate formula, right? There's just no way to come up with a formula for how, like, you know, how much should EPA weigh beauty or whatever. Or whatever. But as you say, those things exist and matter. So is this just basically OIRA saying to agencies, take note of think about these things, like, take these things into consideration. Is that all there is to it?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>I think it's two things. One is that take into consideration and bring those considerations into your analysis. Because a lot of times agencies are thinking about that stuff, but they've struggled in the past at times to bring those very real considerations into an impact analysis, given how narrow the old A4 used to be. And so then you had this kind of weird, right? Like, we know that part of what we're trying to do is protect ecosystems or protect the dignity of disabled persons who a curb cutout is expensive to have on every sidewalk, but absolutely critical to just look at basic human dignity if you're a disabled person of a particular kind.</p><p>Let's take that obvious real factors that are in any human decision about this kind of stuff and let's actually give it a proper pride of place in the analysis, and then it's up to the agency to sort of make the all things considered best decision. And that's something that would be worked out through the review process with DOT might come to a particular view about what the rules should be for lavatory access for disabled persons on an airline. That's going to have costs. It's going to have qualitative considerations about basic civil liberties, human life and safety and dignity.</p><p>And then if we can get everyone on the same page through the review process that this makes sense, this is good, then that should be the way we go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so this is or saying we're going to give you wide-latitude to think about these things and incorporate these things.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. And a lot of times I think people who are more attuned to the hard sciences might feel like this stuff can be squishy and amorphous. I always found it very straightforward. Give us your reasons. Like any good like any good piece of writing. Give your reasons, give your evidence. And just because it's qualitative doesn't mean you don't have reasons and you don't have evidence. So talk about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And even if you think it's arbitrary to pick a particular number, it's quite clear that the number is not zero, right. The default has been zero, which is clearly against our common values.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so that's a lot of changes. A lot of changes to pack in this technical circular. One other thing I saw at one point the term cost-effectiveness analysis. Is there some effort to replace the whole sort of notion of cost-benefit analysis with something else? What's the deal there?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, I would put in the theme of much more flexibilities right, to get the right kind of analysis for the policy at hand. So I think people are familiar with traditional benefit cost-benefit analysis where you kind of monetize everything on both sides of the ledger and then you sum it up and then you're done. But especially when you're talking about things that might not be quantified quite as well. Right. There are other variations that the new A4 talks through in more detail. So cost-effectiveness is one suppose you have a kind of easy to understand qualitative goal that may not have an exact number that you can measure, but you can measure the costs.</p><p>Right. So we want to increase safety in the workplace. We can proxy that in different ways, but the proxies are all kind of imperfect and we know how much it would cost to increase the safety requirements or slow down production so that people aren't hurting themselves in a horrible way. Right. So then you can sort of do a cost effectiveness comparison of how much boost to your goal are you getting for some higher cost? And then the policymaker can say, yeah, that's justified because that goal is really important. We've done some work to know what the costs are, and we think this is the overall more cost effective way to get to that goal compared to some other variation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. This is something that debates over cost-benefit analysis have been batting back and forth for a long time, which is the sort of premise of cost-benefit analysis is you let the cost-benefit analysis tell you what your goal is, whereas cost-effectiveness is, here's the goal. Now let's work backwards what is the most cost-effective way to reach that goal, which is a very different way of approaching.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. And I think if I could pin down sort of the ethos of this overall A4, I think you just put it really nicely, David. The analysis should be informing the policy, not the other way around. Right. And so there's another variation on this that's called breakeven analysis that's also talked about in the new A4. It's a similar kind of idea that let's say we can't actually put a hard number to the benefits, we can't monetize it for whatever reason, but can we figure out sort of like, what's the threshold that if we think the benefits are above that number, then we know we more than break even.</p><p>So even if we can't put a hard number to the benefits, we know with good certainty that the benefits are above this level of what the cost might be. And so these are all imperfect, right. I think for folks who are wary of quantified and monetized cost-benefit analysis, I think these will not get you all the way there from that critique. But what it does do is give you a lot more options to say, let's stop shoehorning good policy judgment into an old straitjacket process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Another of the Biden administration's big priorities, big pushes, is to bring the public more fully into these deliberations.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yep.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I just wonder, I have a couple of questions about that. One is just what does A4 say about that? In what way do you recommend that agencies do this?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>I'm really glad you asked this because this is also something I feel super strongly about and I think they've done some good work on this. So alongside A4, the President also issued, when the new A4 came out, an Executive Order, which included some new requirements around public participation. So one, it's a much stronger emphasis for the agencies to do more proactive early engagements with impacted constituencies as they're designing their rules. So by the time a rule comes into OIRA review, a lot of it is I don't want to say cooked already, but a lot of work has already been done.</p><p>And a lot of times it's much more impactful and meaningful to have robust public participation earlier in the process, especially if you're talking about underserved constituencies or impacted groups, right? Those are the voices that you need to hear early on. So there's a general charge under this administration in a number of different Executive orders actually, to press agencies to do more of that proactive early engagement. Then there is a switch to the OIRA review process itself to open up that process to more participation as well. So right now, an interested party could request a meeting with OIRA when they're reviewing a rule to give their views.</p><p>It's kind of a wonky thing. Not that many people know about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How is that different from public comment?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>It's very similar to public comment, but it basically takes place during the OIRA review process before the rule goes out for public comment. And the rationale is there might be nuances or details that if you're from an impacted community, you might have some additional information that might be worth making sure is emphasized or shared as an input. Those are not backs and forths. Right. They're basically listening sessions. But the new Executive Order continues that practice and charges OIRA with making that much more accommodating and inclusive, especially to historically marginalized communities, communities whose voices may not have sort of K-Street lobbyists, right. Easy for them to go.</p><p>And then the last thing that it does, it also puts a lot more meat on this process that's called petition. So communities, civil society groups, individuals can petition agencies to push them to take action on an issue that maybe the agency hasn't thought about before or hasn't been as proactive on those petitions, then kind of sit there. The new process creates some more coordination so that when someone brings a petition, OIRA is also aware of that.</p><p>OIRA can then also sort of check with the agency, like, hey, this petition, what's the response to this petition? How are we responding to the needs that folks are bringing to you? So these are a lot of little pieces here and there but the sum total of it is to try to improve that participatory and inclusive aspect of the rulemaking process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, one other question about that, which is I'm sure you're aware of the sort of larger conversation going on around liberalism these days which is that it's become slow and that NIMBYs are stopping everything and it's hard to build anything and it's hard to move quickly. And basically we've become sclerotic. And sometimes that critique takes the form of saying basically like the public has too many ways of inserting itself and exercising a veto here and we need to streamline things and do things faster. And this seems intuitively on the surface at least, to tack against that.</p><p>So how do you think about the kind of need for moving expeditiously relative to the need for public participation?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Right, it's such an important question. I'm glad you asked it. I think there are two things to bear in mind. One is just on these proposals here. These are all very much sort of inputs. These are not decisional or veto types of discussions. Right. So I think things still move along and the overall time frame of the regulation OIRA has a clock under the old Executive Order which has stayed in place for how long it ought to be taking on rules.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Although can we just say it has frequently exceeded that alleged clock. I remember all the complaining about OIRA that used to go on when Cass Sunstein was in charge under Obama. Like OIRA was frequently charged with slow walking these regulations.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>I wasn't there during that time. But one of the things that I'll say is when there's a delay, usually it's because there's actually a dispute as opposed to someone's just kind of holding it up. But one thing I'm really proud of with this administration and this OIRA is that if you take ARP, for example, we set an OMB, a two week cap, a two week ceiling on any this is American Recovery Plan at the height of the economic freefall right in spring 2021. All that money had to get out the door because the economy was in such grave danger.</p><p>People were hurting right during COVID, so we set and we kept to a two week turnaround. Every single piece of ARP policy came through OIRA, went through OIRA review and was done in two weeks or less because we had to, right? And I say that to say where there's will and focus and dedication, the process moves. And one thing I really like about this administration's approach is that it has tried to balance we got to get stuff done with. We got to also kind of have evidence and do things robustly. So to come back to participation then I think that the critiques are important and well founded.</p><p>But to my mind it's not a choice between participation or effectiveness, it's a question about what kind of participation to make the policies effective. So you're not going to have good policy if you don't hear from the people you need to hear from. But b, there's a way to hear from them in a way that is efficient. Right. This is why that upstream early engagement is so valuable because you get everyone together, you get all the inputs you need and then you design the policy right the first time around and then you don't have to have 50,000 kind of nipping at your heels types of conversations downstream.</p><p>People are going to disagree, that's fine, you can litigate disagreements at the next election or with the next regulation or whatever, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't be hearing from people.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and there is a value just to being heard. I think a lot of people, they might not say this explicitly, but I think a lot of these groups will feel like there's progress being made just if they are convinced that they are genuinely having a voice in this.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>And that's something I saw a lot of in the time I was in government too, that it is really important the government serves the people and it's hard to convince people you're serving them if you're not actually hearing from them or seeing them. Right. And that doesn't mean that you have to do everything that everyone says because we have a big country. But I do think that's an important piece of this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What's the process now? So this is A4 and A94 have been put out for both public comment and peer review, which are separate processes. So what happens next? What's the road?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>So over the next maybe couple of weeks, there's still some time left in the public comment period. So if you have listeners who might have views about either of these documents after listening to this, they should absolutely weigh in, particularly if they have expertise on some of these issues. So public comment is ongoing that will close in a couple of weeks ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Kind of pause there on public comment. I'm just curious if you have any sense or guesses about how public comment is going to unfold. My gut instinct is because most of these changes will have the effect of making it easier to pass big regulations in the public interest, that industry is just going to knee jerk, be against them and rail against them in public comment. Is that sort of how you expect public comment to shape up this sort of like public interest groups versus industry yet again? Or is there more nuance to it?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>I hope it ends up being more nuance than that because there's a lot here. Obviously. I think that's anytime you're talking about regulation, we live in the world, we have to be attuned to that dynamic. But I think my hope would be that there's enough here that is evidence based, empirically, rigorous, and just like obvious updates, right? Like what you're talking about on discount rate and on distribution analysis and so on, that I hope we'll get a range of comments. It'll be particularly important, too, to sort of get comments from the field, as you were saying, from economists, but also anthropologists and sociologists and people who are working it in community on the grassroots level about what kind of distribution analysis will actually help, you know, make sure their voices are counted right.</p><p>Like, I think we want to cast it open so it's not just the same, you know, conventional wonks as as much as we do want to hear from them too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Industry lawyers.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Right. I think a bigger set would be lovely because this is some of the source code of an executive branch that can honest to God serve the public interest and serve all of us. I really believe that. So I hope we hear from more people. So first there's comments. Once that comment period wraps up, the peer review should be happening. I'm not sure exactly when, but I assume they'll be doing it in parallel to that because peer review can take a long time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And is this peer review just like the same that academics are familiar with?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. It's meant to be a similar process. So the government actually has a pretty standard peer review process for technical documents that this review, I assume, will be following. And that's modeled on sort of scientific, academic peer review procedures. So that will go for a couple of months as well. And then these documents should be finalized. The timeline they gave was no longer than a year. Basically by play it forward a few more months, maybe it's a little sooner, maybe it's a little later, but I think it's going to move pretty quickly, especially once the comment period closes, just because this is way overdue and is important.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you think these will be finalized in time to actually inform the writing of substantial regulations from the Biden administration?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>I hope so. I think that certainly is the goal with this charge coming out on day one and then now the full proposal out here at the start of year three. So I really hope that's the case.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And once they're in place, I guess I'm wondering how resilient they are. Like, if there's a DeSantis administration in 2024, is there anything stopping them from just ripping these up and going back to something older? Do these have any resilience against political chicanery or an administration can do what it wants?</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>That's a tricky question in a world where when you look at what's happening in places like Florida and elsewhere. I think what ... I'd say two things about that. One is that it is meant to have staying power. And part of the point of making sure this document goes through peer review and goes through public comment and goes through all the things that a long lasting, non political technical document ought to go through. This is that kind of enterprise. And so the old A4 lasted for 20 years, and this new version is very much an update to that.</p><p>It's not junking the old enterprise at all. So I think the hope would be that that would continue. Now, that said, when you have people on the right continuing to organize around things like Schedule F, the Trump administration's plan to junk most civil service protections, for example, there's a lot of stuff that is brewing on the right. Just to say that is really aimed at destroying a well functioning, evidence based and transparent bureaucracy. But that's a broader question. That's not an A4 question. That's a broader question for all of us to say that, okay, yes, we're having a debate about policy and about all sorts of kind of horrifying other things that are happening too, on the far-right.</p><p>But at some point, we got to say, if we got to have a government that serves the public understanding that the public doesn't always agree on a lot of policies, we can do that, right? We can do that with evidence and with transparency and with good procedures that allow for participation and evolution of ideas. There's a way we can do that. It's possible to have a government in this country that is effective and that deals with our complexity and our diversity, but not if you have bad actors who come in with a desire to bring a wrecking ball, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If they want to come nuke the administrative state, A4 is not going to stop them.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Right. And I think it's sort of for all of us who care about these issues, I think it's important for us to care about wonky stuff like A4. But I also think it's important for us to care about those kinds of existential threats to the project of shared collective government in the first place.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Alright, well, that seems like a great place to wrap up Sabeel Rahman, this has been so helpful, so clarifying, and I love getting into the wonky guts of stuff because, as you say, it's a source code. It's going to affect everything that comes out of the government after this. So it's really great to get a clear view of it. Thanks so much for coming on.</p><p><strong>Sabeel Rahman</strong></p><p>Yeah, thanks, David, for having me. This was great.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming paid volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-wonky-but-incredibly-important</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:115129297</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 28 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/115129297/71fd4e915887708db036d78bc7c0e3aa.mp3" length="49144863" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4095</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/115129297/1f17c2c28e490d1de5f8d5115aa4df2d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's going on with hydropower?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Jennifer Garson of the Department of Energy’s Water Power Technologies Office discusses the state of hydropower in the US and where the industry is headed.</em></p><p><strong>(a)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/what-s-going-on-with-hydropower"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>For decades, hydropower has been most common source of renewable electricity in the world. (In the US, it was <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=55960">passed by wind a few years ago</a>.) Pumped hydro — large hydropower facilities in which water is pumped up and run down hill to store energy — remains the most common form of energy storage, both in the US and in the world.</p><p>Even as the vast majority of media attention in the clean-energy world goes to wind and solar power, hydropower continues churning away in the background, generating and storing vast amounts of renewable energy.</p><p>Hydro has a long and storied past, but does it have a future? What's going on with hydropower these days? Is there any prospect of building new dams or of finding more power in existing dams? What's going on with small hydropower, on rivers, streams, and reservoirs? And is ocean energy ever going to be a real thing?</p><p>I've taken hydropower for granted for a long time, so I decided it was finally time to dig into these questions. To do so, I contacted Jennifer Garson, head of the Department of Energy’s Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO). The WPTO oversees a sprawling network of prizes and grants meant to encourage hydro and marine energy projects. I talked with Garson about the future of large dams in the US, the promise of small-scale hydro for local communities, and the uncertain future of marine energy.</p><p>Alright, with no further ado, Jennifer Garson, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Alright, so we normally normally here on Volts, we do the sort of deep dive into one thing. But this here we're going to attempt something slightly different, which is a broad overview of a fairly large category, larger than I think I appreciated before I started digging around and just try to get a sort of global sense of where it's at. Because I know that from my experience in clean energy, I've sort of, like, had hydro in the back of my head as kind of this steady presence, a little bit like nuclear, like a steady presence in the background, but not something where anything kind of dynamic or new is happening. And I think you probably disagree with that.</p><p>So let's get into it. So just to start with, what are the technologies encompassed by the terms "hydro" and "marine energy" that your office covers? What is the remit?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Yeah, so glad you asked that. And it is, sort of, just by nature of our office as we're structured that, we have two very interesting, but two very different types of water power technologies. So the first that you mentioned is hydropower. Hydropower really has been delivering power for the last 100 plus years. It's both the conventional hydropower, so very large behind the reservoir, big dams that people usually envision when they're thinking about hydro. We also have smaller non-powered dams that we power with hydropower. We also have run-of-river systems that actually have diversions in addition to dams, where you actually have water flowing to the side of the river. And then we also are thinking about hydropower. Even in conduits and canals, how do you use existing water infrastructure to provide power, whether it's for water treatment or irrigation, a whole number of different ways that you could use existing infrastructure for water power.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>On the other side of the portfolio, we have marine renewable energy. So while hydropower is probably the oldest form of renewable power — although potentially, arguably wind is too — marine renewable energy is the most nascent form of renewable energy. And that's really looking out to the power of the ocean. Everything from how do we kinetically capture power, how do we use gradients to capture power. So everything from tidal power, wave power, ocean thermal energy conversion, even salinity gradients and even pressure gradients, really looking at a multitude of ways of when you look out at the ocean and see all the power that's contained in it, how do we use different power capture systems to harness multitude of ways that the ocean generates power?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. So water on land and water at sea ...</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Water everywhere.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Water everywhere. So let's start then with big dams, because I think this is when you say hydropower, this is what springs to people's minds as sort of the conventional form. I think conventional wisdom is that we've got a lot of big dams in the US creating a lot of power and it's steady and it's good, but that's more or less it. And so this is my first question. It's just do you think we're going to build any more large dams in the US or large, dam-wise, are we basically tapped out?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>So that's a really excellent question. I think there's a general agreement that we are not going to be building. Any large dams on existing waterways. I think in terms of large conventional hydropower, we are most likely tapped out. Particularly here, I should say, in the United States. That isn't necessarily true elsewhere across the world.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>We do think about building other big structures like pump storage, but those have been now leaning more towards what we call closed-loop systems, which are two bodies of water connected, but they're usually constructed and fabricated bodies of water. They're not connected to an existing large river. So I think for the United States, we're not going to see any large behind the reservoir, conventional hydropower, big dams built on any of our riverways anytime soon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Also on the subject, I've heard conflicting things about the carbon emissions of big dams. I feel like there's been some new research lately that shows that those emissions are higher than we thought. Because you're disrupting a bunch of soil, you're creating a pool where things rot and produce methane. So what's our latest state of thinking on the large dams that exist? Are there large dams that exist that we think are less of a carbon asset than we thought, that we think need to be closed down for environmental reasons?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>So I think those are actually two separate questions, one is what is the science behind say, methane or reservoir emissions, particularly given vegetation? We are conducting studies right now at the Department of Energy really trying to understand what types of sensors and measurements are needed to either validate or invalidate that as a theory. I think that there's still unsettled research on the magnitude of the impact, also the timing of the impact. So the other thing that we talk about when thinking about reservoir emissions is, if you're talking about vegetation rot at the bottom of a reservoir for a dam or a facility that's been around for a long time, does it still hold that you have emissions or methane challenges? And I think we still need to do more research on both the kind of temporal nature and the magnitude of the problem. It's not to say that we think there's no problem at all or there's a major problem.</p><p>I really think it's a critical research question that we are fundamentally trying to address with kind of true scientific method. On the environmental piece, there's obviously been a lot of both discussions and controversy about dam removal. And I would say even ten years ago, it was not a conversation that the hydropower industry was really actively engaged in or even potentially willing to engage in.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>But over the last few years, there's been a really interesting kind of convening between the environmental and the hydropower community actually under ... it's called "The Uncommon Dialogue", it was run by Stanford University that was really trying to get together the environmental and hydropower community to have tough conversations like dam removal, but also dam repair, rehabilitation, and retrofits. And we actually just announced a few weeks ago, through funding that we received under the bipartisan infrastructure law, that DOE is actually going to fund more participation in that uncommon dialogue stakeholder strategy sessions, so that we can really understand where some of the opportunities at both environmental benefits like flood management, temperature control, but also the types of tools and research that we need to understand, "What are some of the environmental implications either of leaving power dams in existence?"</p><p>Dam removal isn't necessarily something that we do within DOE, but we do support this kind of ongoing dialogue between the environmental and hydropower community, because ultimately the future of hydropower needs to be one that is sustainable and compatible with both from a climate perspective and from an environmental perspective.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, on the flip side of that, my other question is not all large dams in the US are producing power, and the ones that are powered aren't necessarily producing the maximum amount of power they could produce. So how much sort of runway do we have in powering existing dams or upgrading existing hydropower facilities?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Yeah, so there's kind of a couple of pieces in there. One is that there are 90,000 dams in the United States, and only 3% actually have power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, no kidding.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it mainly small versus big is, like, the biggest ones have power and a bunch of smaller ones don't? Or is that not the dividing line?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>It really varies. It's not necessarily the big ones do, I mean, you think about some big dams that do have power. I think predominantly you're looking at small to medium-sized dams that aren't currently powered, and many of them were built for other reasons, like flood control, recreation, irrigation, you name it. But still, it's always been incredible to me to kind of dig into those numbers where you think that every dam must have hydro associated with it, and it doesn't.</p><p>We've been doing a lot of research, looking at what are the attributes of non-powered dams that we could potentially tap into for power purposes; how do we take advantage of this existing infrastructure and potentially provide power to it? And so, only about the top 600 dams that we have have more than 1 megawatt of potential, but they account for, actually 90% of the total non-powered dam potential. The top hundred largest dams represent about 8 gigawatts, and the top ten represent about 3 gigawatts.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>So there is quite a bit of power even within those non-powered dams. And actually, from 2000 to 2020, there were actually 36 non-powered dams that were retrofitted that added about a half a gigawatt of capacity. But then you also talk about, what do we think about for the expansion of the existing hydropower fleet?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>We all know that hydropower right now accounts for about six and a half percent of total load nationwide, but the capacity expansion, even at looking at what do we do with the existing hydropower fleet that we have, you could actually have a combined growth of about 13 gigawatts of new hydropower generation capacity through existing plants, adding power to non-powered dams and some new stream reach. We had initial estimates of about 36 gigawatts potential for new pump storage hydro capacity, too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there are then potentially gigawatts of new power to be had with dams that are already built?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Yup.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so why is it that already happening? Is it the economics? What needs to happen to really ... because we need all the clean power we can get, so it seems like this is something we should be pursuing unless there's something stopping us. So what are the barriers to making that happen?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>I mean, the answer is it's complicated because it's very dependent upon the site that we're talking about. So it could be that adding existing capacity requires additional capital and if the capital gets too high is there a customer willing to pay for that higher price of electricity? There's also complications, especially for the existing fleet for relicensing. The relicensing process for hydropower is incredibly difficult. It's surmountable, but it is difficult.</p><p>It's actually more difficult. We did a study about a year ago looking at the licensing and relicensing process for hydropower, and the number of agencies even involved in hydropower licensing actually exceeds that for nuclear.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Take that, nuclear-whiners.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Exactly. Hydro has got it worse. But even with the challenges for licensing and finding capital, we still think that there's enormous promise by tapping into this existing generation fleet, particularly given the firm flexible, baseload generation power of renewables through hydropower, specifically. We even looked at a study looking at what's the black start capabilities that hydropower currently provides. Right now it's 40% of the black start capabilities is actually provided by hydro.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>And whether you're talking about spinning reserves, ancillary services, other grid services, I think we're going to need to both expand what we have in our existing fleet, but also maintain that existing fleet in order to provide the critical services that we need as more renewables come online.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the big worries in nuclear is you've got these plants that are up and running and they're scheduled to close, basically. And so there's all this agita about we've got this clean power, we're about to take it off grid. It's crazy. Are any of our big dams scheduled to close or are they more or less like can run forever as long as you maintain them?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Again, it depends. Some are subject to licensing and relicensing. Also half of the hydropower fleet is actually federal, so part of it will stay online as long as the federal government wants to maintain those dams. But the threat of licensing or the threat of not being able to get through the relicensing process for our existing fleet could leave up to about 50% of our fleet in the next ten years is up for relicensing. We don't get that through relicensing. That means we lose a substantial amount of our power if they can't get through the regulatory process. And so we're trying to focus on even things like how do we improve the environmental performance of existing dams? How do you really think creatively about some of the upgrades that could expand some of those grid capabilities? Because if you're going to take a facility that's been online and it's been load following, it's really for keeping the lights on.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>How do you change the operational nature of those plants to also provide those grid services without degrading the existing hardware at those facilities? It's a totally new operating environment, one that we can almost take advantage of the relicensing process and do these types of upgrades, but it does mean that we have to get that non federal fleet through the relicensing process in order to keep them online.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This story of excess bureaucracy and paperwork slowing things down pops up ...</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Everywhere!</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everyone I talk to.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Yes, sadly, but I will say we've actually seen a lot of interest on the Hill, on Capitol Hill, over the last probably two years, I'd say through a bipartisan nature at thinking about some of the challenges and opportunities in particular on hydropower regulatory reform. Now we again at DOE really just take a sort of analytical approach to understanding what that regulatory process looks like and how it exists. But even last spring there was actually a Hill committee meeting specifically on the regulatory process. It was actually in a follow on a Hill committee staff meeting that was specifically on hydro last January. So I think there's both a recognition that something needs to change and I think potentially some momentum behind trying to really take a hard look at what the hydropower fleet has to go through from a regulatory perspective.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I guess it just strikes me it would be a little crazy for us when we're in this mad scramble for clean power and we have this infrastructure, a lot of which is already built, that we could just get a lot more clean power out of that we're not going for it, Gangbusters. final question about large dams, which is one of the things you hear about the future of hydropower is the threat of climate change itself and the threat of droughts and the threat basically of hydro output, which has typically been fairly reliable, becoming more sort of unpredictable and variable and a little bit less reliable. Is that something you think about a lot?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>So actually last year we conducted a really comprehensive look at the effects of drought on hydropower generation in the United States. So we did a couple of different analyses, but I'll touch on this one first. Drought obviously can and has impacted hydropower in the west, but if you actually look at it from a fleet wide perspective, the Western hydropower fleet still sustained 80% of its average generation during the worst drought this century. Now, that was a lot of times reliant on what you had as storage behind the reservoir and so we are doing a second order analysis to say what happens when you have less reservoir ability to really do an overall assessment. But there are so many smaller subregions in the west that still they don't typically always have drought super decentralized. It's usually essentialized in certain areas. So it is certainly a threat and we have a lot of work, I think, that we've been doing it. How do we look at from a forecasting perspective, not just looking at hind-cast models, don't use past as precedents, also look to the future for future climactic modeling and how do we begin to plan from both a climate resiliency perspective?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>What are the localized impacts going to be on individual sites? But when you look at it from a fleetwide perspective thus far, we actually haven't seen that much of a decline in power production across the west. That's because sometimes where we have more acute drought in some regions, we might have an abundance of water in others. If you take a look at even California, whether it's through the impact of atmospheric rivers or a historic snow pack.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The snowpack they've got now historic highs. Is there going to be an abundance of hydropower next year?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>It certainly could help make sure that there is a reliable amount of water to help sustain hydropower production. There's a lot of hydropower in California, but I think we still have more work to be done on both what's the forecasting and looking at snowpack melt and what it's going to mean for a next season's. Hydropower availability and how do we plan not just on a year to year basis, but over a longer period of time? So we're committing a lot of resources towards this hydrologic and climate science analysis. We also just did the most comprehensive assessment through Oak Ridge National Laboratory, it's called. And this is because of the Secure Water Act, the 9505 assessment, which really looked at an analysis of hydropower generation affected by long term climate change, specifically at the Power Marketing Administration.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>And our most recent report, which we actually just published last year, is that long term average runoff and hydropower generation are actually projected to slightly increase across the continental US, but some summer runoff is projected to decrease by the mid 21st century. So you're talking about seasonal change and so that will require us to think about storage in different ways when we can rely on hydropower. Do you shift the kind of seasonal expectation of it really fitting summer loads and potentially more in spring or even winter loads? But maintaining that flexibility and operation is going to be a key challenge, whether it's because of projected seasonal availability or just water management strategies or just the fact that when you look at it from a purely sort of quantitative perspective, our ability to know where water goes is not nearly as sophisticated right now as where electricity goes.</p><p>Like, our sensors and measurements are so far behind that which you see in the electricity sector that we feel like there's a lot of opportunity to increase sensors, monitoring and models to be incorporated into hydropower forecasting so that we have more predictability and a better understanding of just how climate change is going to impact hydropower availability. It's not to say that it's going to be easy, it's just it's more complicated than what you would imagine just looking at pictures of drought in the west.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's talk about then smaller scale hydro on rivers, streams, canals, conduits, smaller forms of river. I've heard about these sort of in the background for many, many years. As far as I can tell, it hasn't really amounted to much. And just like intuitively, when I think about building like a little dam or a little generator just for the amount of power that's coming through a stream or a river, it sounds like a lot of infrastructure for a small amount of power. So I wonder about the economics. So maybe you just tell us what is the deal with small scale hydro?</p><p>Is it a real thing? Is it growing or shrinking? Is there a lot of potential there? What do we know about it?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Sure, I want to just set a little bit of context.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>When we talk about small hydropower, we're talking about anything between as small as 100 kilowatts, all the way up to 10 megawatts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>And, we do have this picture that large-scale hydropower is really the predominant form of power. But actually, 72% of our hydropower fleet — it's almost 1,700 plants out of the almost 2,300 total plants — produce less than 10 megawatts apiece. So even though it may be more obvious that we think about hydropower as large, it's actually almost 3.65 gigawatts of hydropower capacity is actually small.</p><p>And I think that when you think about these small hydropower facilities, a lot of times they're in places that it's serving a local load or it's serving a direct facility. And so, to me, I think the value of these smaller facilities is how they're providing power to local customers. Many of them are owned even by what you would consider more like mom and pop hydropower operators. But also when we think about the potential for non-powered dam development — so we talked a little bit earlier about, "Are the big non-powered dams big or are they small?" — 71% of the potential for non-powered dam development is actually in small dams with small reservoirs. So it may not be a simple form of power capture, but there really is a lot of potential untapped through non-powered dams.</p><p>And then you talked a little bit about run-of-river. The run-of-river potential is also there. We have been talking to different communities that are considering run-of-river systems for power. And a lot of times soon we're thinking about some of these small power dams. We get approached a lot by say, communities in Alaska where they're looking at what are their power potential in places where they're not going to be able to harness solar on a year-long perspective or be able to potentially get wind reliably. And so some of these small hydropower facilities in more kind of remote and isolated areas could provide really meaningful power to places that may not have another form of renewable energy accessible to decarbonize their systems. And to me, that's just as meaningful as adding big, huge gigawatts everywhere.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>We need to add big, huge gigawatts everywhere of renewables. But I think the potential for some of these smaller hydropower facilities could be incredibly meaningful. We also even just did an assessment last year, looking at underserved and distressed communities in the Appalachia region, where could you power non-power dams and add different forms of storage to provide almost essentially quality-base load power. And there were quite a few sites where you could provide reliable, relatively cheap power for these communities.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Now, when it comes to the economics, it is more expensive when you look at it from a per megawatt basis. But when I think about the critical value of having hydropower serve, essentially, around the clock, I think this is where we think about decarbonizing everything from the electricity sector. We're going to have to have a higher willingness to pay for firm, flexible power.</p><p>I think, when we're thinking about the economics of small scale hydropower, we think about it in a couple of different ways. One is, what is that power going to provide at that small scale? When you're thinking about it as a firm baseload power, is it providing power to places that might not have otherwise access to renewable electricity or a clean grid? Is it in combination to with, say, a solar array and storage? We've seen a couple of small hydropower developers who are looking at it as almost like a mini micro-grid with hydro as the small baseload power. And so rather than it just being the project economics is just the hydropower facility itself, thinking about it from a project perspective: hydro with storage plus solar. And how do you think about it within that overall kind of portfolio context and not just the facility itself? That being said, funding these types of projects is not easy, whether it's because of the licensing or relicensing process or because of the high capital costs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that a hassle for small run-of-river stuff too, the licensing stuff?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Sure, you still need a license to operate. There are some exceptions, but you typically still need to get a license from FERC. But they have been trying especially for non-power dams and closed lip pump storage. FERC has been trying to have an accelerated permitting for these types of facilities. So the new stream reach, which is where there's no dam, that's a little bit more complicated, but for powering non-powered dams, FERC and other partners have recognized that there's already essentially been disruption to the local ecosystem. So you're not talking about a complete new build, you're talking about adding infrastructure to existing infrastructure.</p><p>But it also depends on who the owner of the dam is. A lot of developers are actually looking at powering non-powered dams that are owned by the Army Corps or the Bureau of Reclamation, trying to take advantage of existing infrastructure that's already been built by the federal government and add power. And there are a number of developers that are trying to think about developing these non-power dams through a portfolio of different non-power dams. So rather than treating it as a kind of one off project, how do they do kind of feasibility analysis, looking at a number of different non-power dams of power and treating it more like a portfolio package of power.</p><p>And that is different from the way that we've traditionally financed non-powered dams. I still think we have a way to go, and we're actually about to set out on a study with the National Renewable Energy Laboratory and Deloitte to really look at the investment landscape in hydropower. Because ever since I've been in this space, I've always heard that investment in hydropower is really hard. But when you start asking the second order question of why, you kind of get a jumbled answer of, "It's the licensing, it's the customers, it's the PPA."</p><p>So we're really trying to put a lot of rigor behind, "How do we get more momentum into developing non-powered dams? How do we try to increase the investment appetite to looking at these types of facilities and facility buildouts, whether it's expanding existing capacity at hydropower facilities or small hydropower through non-powered dams, to really fill that gap that we see 10-20 years down the line of the need for firm, flexible power resources." So I think we're in the midst of a changing investment landscape, too, about how do you value firm power?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So it's fair to say then, when it comes to the smaller hydro on rivers and such, it's not so much the raw sort of like dollar per megawatt where you find the value. It's more in the firmness, right, which we don't fully value yet, but will, I think, soon. And the local benefits, local resilience and stuff like that.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Yeah. And even so, we just did a demonstration last year in Idaho Falls, the Idaho Falls Power, and they were looking at how do they optimize their smaller run of river hydropower systems and tried to see whether or not adding some sort of storage medium. Ultimately, it was super capacitors. But if they add a storage medium to those smaller facilities, can they actually provide black start capabilities for their local community, recognizing that they're tied into a larger grid? And if the larger grid goes down, they don't want to lose access to the electricity they need for critical services.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>And so it's thinking about, too, in the context of some of these smaller projects, can you use them to help jumpstart the grid or provide more consistent power or provide a more predictable load for electricity consumption? But I still think it is still higher on a project economics of $70 a megawatt, roughly. But what we're trying to really dig into is what is the value inherent between, say, the $20 per megawatt you would see for solar and the 70 for hydro? Are there enough services and economics behind that higher threshold to really kind of catalyze investment into that space?</p><p>How do you provide that investment theory that shows why it's really important that some power you're going to have to pay more for?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's probably a ton more to talk about there, but we have other things to hit, one of which is storage. I think Volts listeners are probably savvy enough at this point to know that the vast, vast bulk of existing energy storage is in the form of what's called pumped hydro storage, which is basically just you pump water uphill when you have power, and then when you need power, you run the water downhill through generators. Pretty simple. This is how we do most of our energy storage today. So one of the things that people say about pumped hydro is that it is geography dependent.</p><p>You have to find the right body of water in the right place with the right whatevers. So I'm curious, have we built out the sort of traditional pumped hydro that is possible or is there more room sort of same question about the large dams. Is there more room to build new pumped hydro and is there more room to get more capacity out of existing pumped hydro facilities? I know we have this new technology that's closed-loop pump hydro, which we'll talk about in a second. But just in terms of the traditional kind, is that tapped out or is there more to be had there?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Yeah, put it in order of magnitude. About 93% of the long duration storage or even just storage capabilities. Right now on the grid is pump storage. And that's actually just from 43 pump storage plants.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They're very big.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>They're very big. They were actually originally built to complement nuclear.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Yeah. So now we're thinking about what's going to complement next or continue to complement nuclear. But when you think about even the potential in our existing fleet, between 2010 and 2019, we added 1.3 gigawatts of PSH capacity just at the existing facilities that we already have online.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. That's a lot.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>It's almost the same amount as all other energy storage types combined that were added at that period of time. Yeah. So just making these capacity upgrades is huge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How do you add capacity? Is it bigger pipes, bigger pumps? Is there any magic to that?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Bigger pumps, different turbines, different upgrades to better not impede flow, even management practices utilizing it more. So even some of our storage facilities aren't necessarily utilized to their full capacity. And so you usually either need better control systems or kind of control strategies or equipment upgrades or environmental upgrades. There's a multitude of different upgrades that can happen to add capacity at our pump storage facilities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's ongoing. There's still more. There's more to be had there.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>There definitely is more to be had. But I actually also want to point out we have typically thought of pump storage as these big open-loop systems. So you mentioned closed-loop. All of our facilities right now are open-loop, which means they're connected to existing waterways and rivers. So if you looked at where are we going to have big diversions from big existing waterways to other storage medium to other reservoirs, that's probably more limited. But we actually just did a whole assessment on pump storage resource characterization and resource assessment here in the US and found there's actually 15,000 additional sites for pump storage development.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, good grief. And that's the open-loop kind you're talking about.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>That's closed-loop, actually, specifically. Closed-loop, there are more than 15,000 sites that you could actually have for additional facilities to be brought online. And there are some major closed-loop facilities that are getting pretty close in the regulatory process, and we've actually been working with some of those sites through our pump storage valuation project where we were looking at what's the cost benefit analysis and return for these different types of closed-loop systems.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Explain what a closed-loop system is just so people get it.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>It's basically very simple mechanical energy. You have an upper reservoir, so basically an upper ground tank, for lack of a better term. It could be at the top of a mountain, it could be at the top of a hill, but you need some sort of head so it can run down. But you have a top reservoir and a bottom reservoir and basically pipes that connect between the two. And when you have excess electricity, electricity pumps the water from the lower reservoir up to the upper reservoir. And when you need that power, you run that water right back through the turbines to go back down to the lower reservoir. So it's just basically mechanical movement of water between two bodies of water.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so if you can create your own reservoirs, then all you really need, geographically, is a hill.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And there are lots of hills.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>We got a lot of hills.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about underground? I feel like I've seen this bandied about where you just dig a hole and sort of use the surface of the earth as your upper reservoir and the hole as your lower reservoir. Is that a thing?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Yeah. We've been working with a couple of different companies that are looking at underground reservoirs. There are ideas, everything from utilizing old mines, which there's some worry about from a geotechnical perspective. Will you actually have enough stability to have an upper reservoir and then the lower reservoir in the mine? But there is potential. But then there are companies like Quidnet who is essentially injecting water underground and using it to come back up and spin through a turbine for more modular underground pump storage. So I think there's definitely opportunity both above and below the ground. It just all really depends on sort of the geotechnical feasibility, site availability and just what are you going to get from round trip efficiency for different types of power?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this closed-loop pump storage seems like a huge opportunity. Do we know, I mean, if there isn't any built yet, do we know what its economics are going to be relative to other storage possibilities?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Yes, we know the economics pretty well. I mean, obviously the economics has changed as with every other storage technology out there with the inflation reduction act passage. But we have done a lot on sort of valuation from a per megawatt perspective. How much would you pay for these newer closed-loop pump storage facilities? The biggest challenge with anything pump storage-related is the high capital cost at the beginning of a project. And so where some of the project economics get a little more complicated is: are you looking at a ten-year payback period for storage or are you looking at it from ... some of these assets can last 100 years.</p><p>Like what's the appetite when thinking about entering into a PPA or building out a project? And there's also the complication — and this is similar to other forms of storage: Are you generation or are you transmission? Are you deferral or are you providing that power? How does your power count essentially within a PPA? The other challenge is too is oftentimes when we're looking at some of these bigger closed-loop pump storage systems, you're building them to complement renewables that haven't come online yet. So how do you also enter into types of contracts?</p><p>You're like, "Hey, we want to build this facility because there's going to be a ton of wind and solar." And if there isn't a ton of wind and solar, it's like, well, we actually need that storage. So you run into this chicken and egg scenario. What do you build first? A big closed-loop pump storage facility that's going to take seven to ten years to commission? Do you wait for the intermittent renewables to come online to a point where you need the storage? Or do you really start to look now at thinking about what does your grid look like in ten years and take a more long-term capital risk to build out some of these larger things?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Weird planning for the future. What a thought. When we think about the potential, if there are 15, what did you say ... ?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>15,000.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>... sites where closed-loop pumped hydro could work, then do we know what sort of capacity that represents? I mean, that's a lot of storage.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>It's a lot, a lot, a lot, a lot of gigawatts. Now that's the site feasibility. The practical feasibility of how much could we actually develop is something that we're analyzing right now because it was only just last year that we decided to kind of reopen the book on, okay, let's not just thinking about it from where we see site developers coming in and applying FERC permits, FERC licenses, where others are really trying to determine where the best sites are suited. Let's use an analytical perspective to say, where, from a geographical perspective, could you feasibly build closed-loop pump storage?</p><p>But we're working on a second order analysis to kind of scrub, what does it look like from a total, not just technical feasibility, but practical feasibility of how much pump storage we could add? Because we don't want to say that it's going to be thousands of gigawatts without really having some analysis behind it. But we are really looking at this through both a hydrofuture study and a pump storage study that we'll have going pretty soon to look at that total, feasible storage that we can actually capture through closed-loop pump storage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because you hear all these talks about long duration storage, all this buzz, people are banding about all kinds of wacky technologies and possibilities, but you just don't hear pumped-hydro mentioned a lot in those discussions.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>I think ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Need better PR.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>We do need better PR. We need better PR and all forms of water power technologies — no offense to the technologies I care about a whole lot. But no, you're right. A lot of times we're talking about long-duration storage technologies that are still kind of bench-scale prototypes. And it's things that I fundamentally believe in. But I actually, before I was in the waterpower office, spent a majority of my career in DOE on commercialization, and I've seen how long it takes for products to get from a lab prototype to bench scale to first of a pilot to actual commercializable technologies.</p><p>And my concern is if we bank all of our long-duration storage needs on technologies that are still at that pilot or commercial demo scale, we may run into kind of a tipping point on the grid where we really need what works now. But I do think that there has been more momentum both here and abroad looking at pump storage as a practical solution. And even Secretary Granholm has expressed interest in pump storage. The Loan Guarantee office is also looking at pump storage. So I do think they're slowly but surely gaining more momentum at the potential feasibility for pump storage.</p><p>We're even working now with the Tennessee Valley Authority actually looking at pump storage. Duke is looking at pump storage. I just talked to someone in Pennsylvania, in the governor's office, that's also looking at pump storage. So I think as people are looking at the practicalities of the grid, 10 to 15 years out, if we really are going to scale wind and solar, we need to start planning for storage facilities now. And the reality is that closed-loop pump storage can work. You do have high capital costs. There are geotechnical concerns, but we know that it works because it's a water battery.</p><p>You're pushing water up the hill to let it come back down. We know how to do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Very simple.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>We've been doing that a long time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Final question about water as storage, which is just, and this might be kind of a naive or a silly question, but it just seems like in the future, one of the things you're constantly hearing about is water is going to become more scarce. Basically, there's a lot of competing demands for water, and climate change is messing up a lot of our sort of seasonal water provision and just there's going to be water wars, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So I'm just wondering, is that something you worry about, using water for this versus using water for other things? Do you think water itself is going to become sort of contested and difficult to get your hands on?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>I mean, I think clean potable water is a challenge that we are definitely going to face as a country and as a world. I mean, as a country, we're actually pretty privileged to have pretty abundant freshwater resources. Now, whether or not those would be clean enough to drink I think is a key outstanding question. But in places like the Pacific Northwest and New England and even the Midwest, water availability isn't necessarily the top concern.</p><p>Is it in the West? Yes. We actually wonder sometimes, or have been analyzing the potential for almost water abundance in areas where we don't want to have too much water because of flooding concerns or extreme events. So there's the kind of flip side of that, is it's not just about lack of water availability. Are we also building out infrastructure that can withstand higher forces of water, particularly through rivers and streams and waterways? But if you're looking at things like closed-loop pump storage, you're not going to have a ton of evaporative loss. So when you have these storage facilities, you're not really competing for fresh water availability.</p><p>You're just trying to keep the reservoirs filled. And that is very different than trying to have the water needs for, say, fossil fuel plants or even nuclear, which have pretty high intensity water needs. But on fresh water availability, that's something that on the marine side of our portfolio that we think about as a potential for wave power to actually address, is the delivery of potable water. Because I do worry a lot about our ability to provide continuous fresh potable water for not just here in the United States, but abroad.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, you've set up my segue perfectly then. So let's talk about the other side of your portfolio, which is energy in the ocean and how to get it out of the ocean. This is another area where I feel like it gives me like cellulosic biofuels vibes in that there's like super exciting ten years out and then was like super exciting ten years out 20 years ago and still super exciting ten years out. Is there —</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>It's like fusion! No.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not that bad. Come on now. Not that bad. I'm wondering, is there reason to think that any of these ocean technologies are any closer than they were ten years ago? Is this a real thing? And maybe just also, while you're at it, tell us, what are those technologies? I know there's tidal. I know there's something with buoys going up and down. There are probably others. What are we talking about in the ocean? And is it real? Is it really going to happen?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>I think I wouldn't be directing a program for marine renewable energy. If I didn't think it was real, I'd probably try to find myself another job. No, the second question you actually asked is what are we talking about in terms of marine energy? And so the biggest sort of marine energy capture that we concentrate on are waves, tides, and then river and ocean currents. So the big buoys that falls into sort of the wave category, you can have everything from bottom mounted flaps that are trying to capture wave power to surface riding systems to systems that are within the water column.</p><p>So the complication with waves, there really hasn't been a kind of convergence on the right structure or even where in the water column is most optimal for a power capture system. But I would say unlike even ten years ago where wave energy, you had a couple of projects that were out in Europe, we now are seeing an increasing number of in water deployments of wave energy systems, and it's working. So I would say here in the United States, we just had the longest wave energy demonstration project off of the Scripps Pier in California with Calwave, where they were producing electricity using the power of waves. And they even were able to sustain through a pretty powerful storm surge because that's always really complicated matter for waves, is being able to withstand a range of different forces.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, this is what comes to mind. Intuitively, out in the ocean is just a brutal place. You got the wind and the tides and the storms, but also just saltwater corrosion and I don't know, fish. There's so many things to deal with. Are they being dealt with?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>I think this isn't the first time we've dealt with infrastructure in the ocean either.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>It's hard, but it's not insurmountable. We're talking about materials for corrosion. We're doing research and even looking at can you use different methods to reduce corrosion impacts? Everything from coatings and materials to even the use of lasers for different etchings into materials to reduce corrosion? Biofouling is an issue. I mean, there's a lot of stuff that grows on infrastructure that's in the ocean, but we're trying to work on a multitude of ways for us to address or even potentially embrace biofouling from an environmental perspective. We do a lot in environmental monitoring around these devices. We put a substantial amount of funding on trying to understand the interaction of mammals, fish species, both from an acoustics perspective to any sort of entanglement perspective.</p><p>And thus far, with our in water deployments, we're actually seeing compatibility instead of conflict. From an environmental perspective, that's because we're trying to design these systems with the environment in mind. But it is a hard environment. But the thing is, waves, tides, they're more predictable than other forms of electricity. So if we're really trying to hit our 100% decarbonization goals in 2050 or beyond, we're going to need solutions like marine energy in order to actually hit those targets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Tides come in every day.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Tides come in every day. And actually on the West Coast, waves are predictable because you're talking about predicting waves that are coming basically from Asia. We have waves. I'm serious. It's why actually wave energy is almost easier on the west coast of Europe as it is sort of the West Coast or here for the United States because we have pretty complex models that actually can give us forecast for what our wave conditions are going to be like. So it gives us some good sense of predictability. Tides definitely 100% predictable. Unless the moon changes, which who knows?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Who knows? What does tidal energy look like? What do those machines look like?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>So there are a couple of different types of device designs right now in tidal energy. You're seeing more of a convergence on what tidal energy systems might or could look like, particularly looking both in the US and out in the EU. Some of them, like Verdant Power, which we supported a demonstration in New York, would look familiar to any of your listeners. It looks almost like tiny wind turbines on a triblade that goes underneath the water. So it's using the same kind of findings from wind of running a turbine, generating electricity, providing it to shore. There are other systems that are surface riding.</p><p>So there are some European companies and Canadian companies that essentially have the operations and maintenance basically on the surface and then have turbines that go and submerge underneath the water, but they're still running either two or three blade turbines to capture power. So it's taking a lot of the lessons that were already learned in the wind industry and applying it for tidal power. And tidal power, I mean, we believe it a lot for here in the United States. Is it the largest resource to capture? No, that's wave. But there's a lot of tidal energy in New England, in the Pacific Northwest, and in particular in Alaska, where the potential resource is pretty massive.</p><p>So actually we are in the next coming weeks, we have a notice of intent out already on this, but we're going to be funding a $45 million solicitation focused on tidal energy here in the United States. So both a commercial site with about $35 million and also for remote and islanded communities, and isolated communities another 10 million. So I think the the maturity of the tidal industry is definitely more mature right now than wave, but I think wave is starting to catch up. But if you look over at Europe again, they've had gigawatt hours of power provided by tidal energy at some of these sites that have already been delivered to the grid.</p><p>So it may not always be as visible. Maybe it's because it's underneath the ocean or just on top of the ocean, but there's a lot of technological progress that we see in tidal and I see in the very near term for wave.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is in financial terms the same challenge basically you're facing with all these other technologies we're talking about, which is high upfront capital costs and then that pay off over a very long period of time, which is just always a difficulty when you're talking about financing.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>It is. And one of the challenges, too, for marine energy, and it's similar, I would say, to newer geothermal energy or long-duration storage, is in order to prove that it works, you have to be willing to fund some pretty serious demonstrations. And that takes a lot of capital that oftentimes, say, venture or even philanthropic capital isn't necessarily willing to take a risk on. Because to prove that the marine energy works, you have to get it in the ocean. And putting things in the ocean is a non-insubstantial cost. And so we're really trying to think about how do we demonstrate these systems take a lot of the risk and ownership on the US federal government in a way that we think will ultimately pay off. But that willingness to pay for demos or demonstrations of arrays is still going to be pretty high until you get to economies at scale.</p><p>And so we either have to bet big, which I really hope we do here in the US, or we leave potentially this enormous 57% of all US power generation potential in the US stranded because you don't have that willingness to pay for these really expensive demos. But those demos are the only way we learn.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Didn't we just pass a bunch of legislation that is basically fire hosing money at all these things? Is some of that money going to do what you're just talking about going to kind of kickstart marine and tidal?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>So in the bipartisan infrastructure law, we did receive about $110 billion for marine renewable energy, $40 of that is for our national marine energy centers and the other $70.4 was actually for marine energy. But if you look at that in comparison to say, the funding that we're putting into direct air capture or hydrogen, it's nowhere near the level of investment that we've received from the federal government. And it's not just ... for us, I think we've seen the same thing for sustainable aviation fuel demonstrations or geothermal demonstrations, like, I think there are still a number of technologies that's going to take a lot of capital in order to really demonstrate the feasibility and get to economies at scale that weren't necessarily funded with the enormous lug of funding that we got now. There's a lot of money going around, and it's very exciting for me as someone who's been at DOE for 13 years, but it's not going to be sufficient, I think, for really driving down the cost of the whole portfolio of solutions that we're going to need to decarbonize everything by 2050.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, and the loan office plays some role there and there's supposedly going to be a green bank did that end up making it in? I forget what ... I think the Green Bank made it in. So maybe there'll be some ongoing sources for some of this funding.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Totally agree. And we work with our Loan Guarantee Office partners to understand what are those pathways into kind of commercial viability that. And we are also working with the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations to understand what's the role of the Water Power Office at Derisking. Some of these pilot technologies moving into an office like the demonstration office and eventually being well primed for the Loan Guarantee Program office, because LPO really wants to see that these technologies have been successful at a pre-commercial scale. But even that gap between pilot and pre-commercial scale for some of these energy systems is more complex than just one off projects.</p><p>But we're thinking about it critically at having kind of an all of DOE approach to derisking and investing in these technologies and ultimately helping them scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The one marine technology we didn't mention is ocean thermal something something.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>OTEC is the acronym. It's Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. I feel like I've been hearing that about that also for years and years and years and it never seems to amount to much. Is that going to, well, first of all, tell listeners what the heck we're talking about, but is that going to be a thing?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>So OTEC, for anybody who isn't as familiar with all forms of marine energy, is basically using the thermal differentiation between the warmer surface water and the deep sea cool water to, essentially, use that to harness power, without getting into more technical details.</p><p>OTEC is also really hard. The round-trip efficiencies that we've seen for OTEC have been not awesome, but there are a number of sites that are looking at both. How do we potentially use seawater air cooling, so more like ambient temperatures instead of for power generation. There are some OTEC facilities too, particularly in the Pacific Islands. It is so geographically specific for OTEC feasibility. You really need to have a pretty quick drop off of the continental shelf in order to actually have that really cold deep water and warm surface water. So it's geographically constrained. The round-trip efficiency right now still needs a lot of work and similar to the story of other types of marine energy in order to do demos, it takes a lot of capital.</p><p>But I know that there are developers looking in like Puerto Rico and Hawaii looking at the feasibility of OTEC. So I wouldn't discount it. It's just it faces some of the same challenges. But we've also been looking at even, can you lessen the amount of gradients that you need to think about Ocean Thermal Energy Capture? So we're actually working with a startup that is trying to use smaller gradients to power ocean observing systems. So if it can power it by essentially dropping the system down not that far, and using the same principle of warm to low generating power, maybe we can think about gradients in a different way, to not just be the really big, really deep pipes that are trying to run from the surface down to the deep ocean.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One more thing about marine energy. Tell us what is the connection between marine energy and desalination? Or what is the, let's say, the hoped for connection between marine energy and desalination? Because I often hear them kind of discussed in the same breath.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>So over the last few years, we've really been looking at the potential for how would wave energy provide potable water. It started actually with analysis that we did at the National Renewable Energy Lab, looking at the feasibility from a power perspective. Does the power performance potential for waves, is it potentially compatible with reverse osmosis or for desalination processes? And interestingly enough, we found that it could actually be a good power source. So we actually developed a prize competition called waves to water prize, where we basically opened the aperture to say, there's only a limited number of ideas here.</p><p>Can you bring us some really good ideas for wave power desalination, but starting small for things like disaster relief and recovery scenarios? Ultimately, over the course of three years, we developed systems that were both hydraulic, so kind of mechanically driven, and production of electricity to run RO systems. And what we saw through that prize, and now a subsequent $10 million solicitation that we're running right now, is there are a number of really promising solutions that, particularly on the hydraulic side, although some of the electricity, but using essentially the power of waves to run through membranes to desalinate water.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I have a super dumb question here, which is I'm picturing these wave machines out in the middle of the ocean. Are they producing clean water like on-site? Do you have to go harvest the water from the machine? How does the delivery of the water from the machine to where it's needed work?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Great question. The answer right now is maybe both. I think it's more feasible to imagine that essentially the reverse osmosis system is running. You're basically pumping water back to an onshore reverse osmosis system in a high pressure pump. And so you're getting the fresh water at a tank act, actually at a pier or on the shore. So you're essentially just using piping systems so that the water delivery is onshore. There are some companies that are thinking about almost like bladders to be filled out for production in the more near shore. You're not looking at right now, like, really deep offshore, but could you collect water through these bladders, have some sort of collection methodology, and bring it back to shore?</p><p>So I think we're both looking at kind of on device production and essentially the system just being a conduit for either that power mechanical force to run a reverse osmosis system onshore. We're hopefully going to see over the next couple of years we're going to be funding a number of demos and we're seeing a number of demos also pop up in Europe in particular at looking at wave power decal. But I think we're going to need solutions for desalination that doesn't just require either really big, large energy systems or only diesel generators because we're going to need fresh water everywhere.</p><p>And we're trying to think about the simplicity of design of some of these systems so that you can essentially just throw them out in the water with an anchor and be able to provide potable fresh water.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That would be nice.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>It'd be awesome. Yeah, use the water to make water. What could be more simple but elegant if we can make it work?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So on marine energy, then, as you said at the beginning, this is unlike hydro. Marine is in a sense among the newest or nascent or sort of cutting edge versions of renewable energy. So I guess before we leave this subject, I'm just curious, the next decade in marine energy, do you expect it to reach meaningful scale in that decade or is the next decade mainly going to be about figuring it out? Sort of like where do you expect marine energy to be in ten years?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>It's a complex answer I think when you're talking about grid scale marine energy devices. I think it'll take us the next ten years to really figure it out, get these systems in and out of the water and really producing larger volumes of electricity. But what I think the next decade really holds, it's really interesting, is the possibility of marine energy powering. What maybe from an energy perspective seems less meaningful, but from an end use perspective is incredibly meaningful. And what do I mean by that? I think we're seeing a lot of interesting solutions for powering, things like ocean observing.</p><p>We know more about the surface of Mars than we do about the surface of our ocean floor and part of that is because of power limitations. And so we're working on a number of different companies that are either using kind of fixed platforms or floating platforms to provide power where we need it and that's to both understand and observe our ocean.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>And I think over the next ten years you're going to see a lot of different devices that are harnessing power for ocean observing. There's also been a lot of meaningful progress at sort of the micro-grid scale for marine energy, whether it's tidal or it's wave energy, where we actually have a device up in a community of only 75 people in Alaska and Igiugig that's producing power to their grid right now. And I think we're going to see more of these small scale devices in places where power is incredibly meaningful. Even if it doesn't sound like a lot from a megawatt or gigawatt perspective.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's sort of bulk energy. Like we just need a lot of energy. But then there's also these, as you say, these local sort of resilience benefits and these benefits specifically to a lot of vulnerable communities. Maybe just say a little bit more about that sort of how you envision hydro working. Maybe not at a large energy scale, but in some of these, but like in this community in Alaska, that's quite significant for them to have steady power. So talk about that a little bit.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>I think it's a story for both hydropower and marine renewable energy that there are parts of our United States and parts of the world that they need to look to their waters in order to actually provide power, whether that's because of the seasonality or available resources. And we've been working with a number of communities, actually through a program called our Energy Transitions Initiative Partnership Project, where rather than say, here's a solution that you should have, maybe it's marine or hydro, but working with these communities to say what are your power and energy needs? And what are the types of systems that can get you to 100% renewables and off diesel dependency? And many communities that we're working with in Maine, the Pacific Northwest and Alaska in particular are looking at marine energy and small hydro as their pathways to releasing dependency from diesel generators or from really high cost other forms of energy.</p><p>And even though these are kilowatts or megawatts, it's huge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, just to sort of put an exclamation point on that, you're talking about the sort of economics overall. But if you look at the economics specifically in these local situations, like diesel is gross, it's very expensive, it pollutes like crazy.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Not only that, it's the cost, right? And right now, the last couple of years, the price vulnerability of some of our more vulnerable communities in the United States are so impacted by diesel going up to prices that are literally unprecedented. And if you're a small community, how do you absorb that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, getting steady, predictable, just the predictableness of it, the predictable price of it. It's hard to put a value on that. That's very valuable in these local contexts.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>It is. And because if you are already paying a dollar, $52 a kilowatt hour, even if we're developing solutions that come in at say, 50-60 cents a kilowatt hour, that's still a substantial price savings, more predictable power and we have better health outcomes, better localized impacts. And so we take that really seriously and view it as a kind of core objective for our program, is that we really want to think about ways that we derust these technologies to give better pathways to getting off of diesel and providing more predictable power. And so when I think about the impacts in the near term, particularly on marine energy, this is one area where I think we do have the potential to make a real material impact on people's lives if we can really do wit these technologies and design them with the communities as partners and with them in mind.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, okay, well, I've kept you too long. This is all fascinating. I'm sure we could do an hour long pod on any one of these issues or topics or technologies. So by way of wrapping up, final question then. When you look ahead, you're sitting in sort of a unique place where you have a view of all these water related energy technologies over the next decade, let's say through 2030 or 2035, which is a very crucial, as you well know, a very crucial period for decarbonization. What do you think are going to be the big water power stories? Like, some of these are nascent, they're going to be developing. What do you think are going to be sort of the breakout significant stories in water power? If you had to pick a favorite one of your babies?</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Oh, you can't make me pick a favorite one. I'm going to give you a couple and break your rule. I think it's going to be the increasing importance of the role of the existing hydropower fleet in an overall grid context at really maintaining grid stability. I think we're going to see a first pump storage project, at least one break ground and start serving the grid in a way that we really need it to. And I think we are going to see a number of communities with small marine energy systems that are providing incredible, meaningful power. That's going to demonstrate the criticality of us thinking about this decarbonization at literally all scales that we need to solve everything from watts all the way through gigawatts.</p><p>But I think the backbone of the existing fleet pump storage and the criticality of small microgrid systems for places that may not have other options, where this is really well suited, are the things that I'm really excited about in the next decade.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Well, Jen Garson of DOE, thank you so much for coming on. This has been hugely educational. I really appreciate it.</p><p><strong>Jennifer Garson</strong></p><p>Of course. Well, thank you for having me on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-going-on-with-hydropower</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:112788507</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 19 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/112788507/dd3101c0595ab7f447883bedaa4721ae.mp3" length="48454290" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4038</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/112788507/672257c3d9e7abe5e1a28c4f14dad8fc.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The importance of upcoming EPA regulations on power plants]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Various options are at play in the EPA’s planned greenhouse gas standards for new and existing power plants. In this episode, Lissa Lynch of NRDC discusses the implications.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAB65GKlpy_PTe1wSg-PM-Aka/volts23.04.12%28lissa.lynch%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/the-importance-of-upcoming-epa-regulations-on-power-plants"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A couple of weeks ago, the policy analysts at the Rhodium Group put out <a target="_blank" href="https://rhg.com/research/ira-us-climate-policy-2030/">a new report</a> showing that the Biden administration's legislative achievements are not quite enough to get it to its Paris climate goals. But those goals could be reached if the legislation is supplemented with smart executive action.</p><p>Some of the most important upcoming executive actions are EPA's greenhouse gas standards for new and existing power plants. The Supreme Court famously <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-jay-duffy-on-the-supreme#details">struck down Obama's Clean Power Plan</a> — his attempt to address existing power plants — judging it <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-jack-lienke-and-kirti#details">impermissibly expansive</a>. So now EPA has to figure out what to ask of individual plants.</p><p>The agency's decisions will help shape the future of the US power sector and determine whether the Biden administration gets on track for its climate goals. </p><p>To talk through those decisions in more detail, I contacted Lissa Lynch, who runs the Federal Legal Group at the NRDC’s Climate & Clean Energy Program. We discussed the options before the EPA, the viability of carbon capture and hydrogen as systems of pollution reduction, and whether Biden will have time to complete all the regulatory work that remains.</p><p>Alright. With no further ado, Lissa Lynch from NRDC. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Thank you for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is a subject that I used to spend a lot of time thinking about back in the day, and it's sort of receded for a while, and now it's back. So it's very exciting for a nerd like me. So I want to just quickly walk through some history with this and then sort of hand it off to you so you can tell us where things stand now, because I don't want to assume that listeners have been obsessively following this now nearly two decade long saga. So let me just run through some history really briefly. So listeners will recall in 2007, there's a big Supreme Court case, Massachusetts vs. EPA, in which the Supreme Court ruled that CO2 is eligible to be listed as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act if EPA determines it is a threat to human health.</p><p>And then shortly thereafter, Obama's EPA officially determined that it is a threat to human health via the endangerment finding. So this is one thing I'm not sure everybody understands, and I just want to get it on the table up front. So for context, the combination of those two things, Mass vs. EPA, plus the endangerment finding, means that EPA is lawfully obliged to regulate greenhouse gases. This is not a choice. This is not something it can do or not do, depending on how it feels or who's president. They have to do it. So then that triggers the obligation, three separate obligations.</p><p>You have to regulate mobile sources, which Obama did with his new fuel economy regulations, which are still in place, as far as I know. Then you have to regulate new stationary sources of greenhouse gases, which Obama did. And as far as I know, we can come back to this in a second, but as far as I know, those new power plant regulations that Obama passed are still in effect. And then thirdly, you have to regulate existing stationary sources of greenhouse gases, which mainly means power plants. And so Obama's effort to regulate existing power plants is called the Clean Power Plan.</p><p>People may remember the fuss and ado about the Clean Power Plan as it was under development. Lawsuits were immediately launched. Of course, the Supreme Court took the extremely unusual step of putting the law on hold, basically not letting it go into implementation until it had heard this case. And then it heard the case, rejected the Clean Power Plan on the basis of the newly dreamed up, rectally, extracted Major Questions Doctrine. So that's where we stand now is we've got the mobile regs in place, although Biden is updating those too. I think we've got the new power plant regs in place, although Biden is also updating those.</p><p>But as for existing power plant regulations, there are basically none. It's been a legal mire and so Biden's got to do those too. So let's talk about what Supreme Court said about the Clean Power Plan in their ruling and how that constrains the sort of solution space that we're looking at now.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>So in West Virginia vs. EPA, that was the Supreme Court decision from last summer. The Supreme Court held that this section of the Clean Air Act that we're talking about here, section 111, does not clearly provide authority for the approach that EPA took in the Clean Power Plan. And what they did there we sort of refer to as generation shifting. In the Clean Power Plan, EPA looked at the power sector as a whole and they concluded that the best system for reducing fossil-fuel-fired power plant emissions was a combination of measures including shifting generation away from dirtier fossil power toward cleaner power.</p><p>So essentially retiring dirtier power plants and replacing them with renewables.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the unit of analysis here was a state's whole power fleet, not the power plant individual, but the whole power fleet.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Right. And the reasoning for that in the Clean Power Plan context was supported by the companies themselves, the power companies themselves and the states who said, yes, this is the way that we are dealing with decarbonizing our fleets. We are looking out across our whole fleets, retiring the dirtiest sources and replacing them with cleaner generation. That's how the existing RGGI program in California cap-and-trade programs work. That's how many of the power companies that have emission reduction or clean energy targets are doing that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And let's just say Republicans have been saying for decades that regulations are too restrictive and they're not flexible enough and states and power companies need flexibility. And this was perfectly flexible. This is absolutely as flexible as you could make a system. It just said to the state, do whatever you want to do to lower the average emissions of your power plant fleet. And then conservatives got what they wanted and hated it for other reasons.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>One of the things that's important about what is left on the table after this decision is there is still a considerable amount of flexibility on the compliance side. So what the Supreme Court was really dealing with was the method EPA uses for setting the level of the standard, basically setting the target that industry has to meet. So the Supreme Court explicitly took that generation shifting approach off the table for purposes of setting the level of the standard itself. And so after this decision, EPA can still set standards, in John Roberts words, "Based on the application of measures that would reduce pollution by causing the regulated source to operate more cleanly."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? So the idea here is EPA, by interpreting the Clean Air Act in such a way as to apply to the power plant fleet overall, and sort of telling states how they have to shape their overall power plant fleets. EPA was assuming too much authority, basically. Like doing something major, despite too major for the words in the Clean Air Act, which I don't want to dwell on this too long, but let's just pause here to acknowledge that. No one then in the ruling, now in the subsequent ruling, since then in all scholarship knows what the hell "major" means or when it is that an agency has crossed the line from proper regulatory interpretation into "Oops, too major."</p><p>It really just kind of sounds like and seems that major means anything bigger than John Roberts is comfortable with.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Right? I mean, this is one of the really concerning things about the Major Questions Doctrine, just generally is that it is murky and it does have this sort of paralyzing effect on ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, intentionally.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Exactly. It is explicitly anti-regulatory and explicitly sort of intended to stop agencies in their tracks and make them question, oh, is this too major?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And there's no answer. Right. So naturally you're going to be cautious because there's no definition of major. It's just whatever irritates John Roberts when he wakes up one day. So this was the opening salvo, I think, in a longer Supreme Court effort basically to brow-beat agencies into being timid. So anyway, point being EPA can't use the overall power fleet as a sort of benchmark through which to set this standard. So what does that leave? What's the sort of range of motion that we think we still can act in here when we're talking about these new standards?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>So now that we have this Supreme Court decision in place. EPA's got some guidelines, and they can base the next round of standards on, as Justice Roberts put it, measures that make the plants operate more cleanly. So what they're looking for now is a rule that looks more like what traditional pollution regulations of the past looked like based on scrubbers, bag houses, the stuff that you can physically attach onto the plant or do at the plant itself to reduce that plant's emissions. When it comes to reducing CO2 emissions, the options are limited.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let me pause there. Before we get into that, I just want to say one thing that I learned from your writing that I had not known, and I don't know that it's widely known. So there's been talk ever since Mass vs. EPA that bugged conservatives, and they would love to undo that, right? Because they would just love to moot this whole thing by undoing that ruling and saying that CO2 is outside the context of the Clean Air Act and have been muttering about doing that. So the Inflation Reduction Act statutorily locks into place that ruling.</p><p>Right. It says explicitly CO2 qualifies under the Clean Air Act, and it instructs EPA to develop new standards. So there's no ambiguity about that. And it says EPA needs to set standards that are going to reduce emissions relative to baseline, where the new baseline is taking the Inflation Reduction Act itself and all its subsidies into account. So it's telling EPA calculate what all these subsidies are going to do, what the new sort of business as usual trajectory of emissions would be, and then develop regulations that reduce it further. I didn't know any of that.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, this is huge. And I mean, obviously the Inflation Reduction Act is enormous. It is going to accelerate the clean energy progress that we've seen in the last decade or so by many fold. It is a huge, huge deal. And one of the provisions in this quite large law essentially reaffirms EPA's not only statutory authority, but its obligation to go ahead and set CO2 emission standards for fossil-fuel-fired power plants. And so that's a clear statement from Congress last year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Clear enough even for John Roberts.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Right. So we have always thought that that authority and obligation under the statute was quite clear, but now it's crystal clear, and they need to move.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I think it's also important to absorb this new baseline idea, because the IRA itself and all the historical progress since the last round of these regs, the new expected baseline for power plant emissions is much lower now than it was when Oobama's EPA was calculating these things. Which commensurately means you're going to need tighter standards if you want to reduce further than that new baseline.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it is kind of wild to look back on ten years ago. So it was ten years ago, 2013, that President Obama announced in his big climate change speech that he was directing his EPA to go ahead and set carbon pollution reduction standards under Section 111 for fossil-fuel-fired power plants. The first time that was being done. So much has changed in ten years in the power sector. And I think anyone listening to this podcast knows we are smack in the midst of a clean energy transition in the power industry. Industry itself says so.</p><p>The Edison Electric Institute says we are, quote, "In the middle of a profound long term transformation in how energy is generated, transmitted and used." Lazard, the investment firm, estimates that wind costs have fallen by 46%, solar has fallen by 77% over the past decade. So we're just in a totally different world now than we were ten years ago. And so we passed the Clean Power Plan's 2030 emission reduction targets in 2019 without the Clean Power Plan ever having gone into effect.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which in retrospect makes all the Republican arguments about how this is an economy killing regulation and it's too strong and it's unrealistic and there's no way we can move that fast look utterly ludicrous, which we all said at the time, but we had to pretend that it was a real live argument. So they're saying it's too stringent, it's going to destroy the economy. And here we rocketed past it in 2019 without any regs.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Right? And that is part and parcel with each time. There are new ambitious pollution standards set ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Every time.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Under the Clean Air Act, industry claims the sky is going to fall. This happened with the acid rain program back in the American Electric Power predicted that it was going to destroy the economy of the Midwest. Like the lights are going to go out, the sky is going to fall.</p><p>Every time and we never learn. We never learn from those previous examples. It's crazy, right?</p><p>And so the actual costs of complying with the acid rain program and reducing sulfur dioxide ended up being, I think, around a 10th of what industry had estimated. Sulfur scrubbers are now widely used. The program has been a great success. It is this great example of how we can set pollution standards and then innovate to meet them cost effectively and quicker than anyone expects. We do it over and over again.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Over and over again.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>And we can do it in this context.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? One more thing. Before we get to what's available for the new standards, we should mention I should mention that when the clean power plant got shut down, the legal obligation to pass regulations on existing power plants then passed to the Trump administration, which did that sort of passed a ... what was it called? The clean America ...</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>The Affordable, Clean Energy Plan.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, Affordable Clean Energy, the ACE Plan, which several analyses showed would on net have raised emissions in the power plant sector. So those got shut down in court, too. They were just completely a joke. Ludicrous so that's all the history. So here we are Biden's EPA has got to regulate existing power plants and new power plants. And it can't take this so called outside the fence line holistic approach that the clean power plant took. So it's got to set standards based on what you can do at the individual power plant level inside the fence line, as they say.</p><p>So what are the options? Actually, I'm talking way too much, but let me get one more thing out of the way and then I'll let you talk. But one of the things that faced the reason I just want people to understand this too, the reason Obama took this approach, the reason Obama's EPA took this outside the fence line holistic approach, is that if you're just restricting yourself to the individual power plant, you're stuck with either marginal improvements, right? You get the boiler to work more efficiently, you tighten up efficiency, and you can sort of marginally 3% to 5%, reduce emissions.</p><p>Or on the other side, there's carbon capture and sequestration, which especially ten years ago when Obama's EPA was contemplating it, was not very well tested, not very well proven, super expensive. So you either had sort of like a fly swatter or a nuke when it comes to the individual power plant, which is why they went with the holistic approach. So now the holistic approach is off the table. We're back to the fly swatter or nuke problem. So just tell us sort of like, what are the available options here?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Yeah, so you kind of covered the two ends of the range, right? On one end, the very low ambition end, you can make minor improvements to the operating efficiency of the plant, the way the plant operates. That was the basis for the standards that the Trump administration issued. And as you noted, improving the efficiency of the plant makes it run better and it can be called upon to run more and therefore can end up increasing its overall emissions. That sort of rebound effect. That's a possibility. You can still reduce emissions through operating efficiency improvements. And I think there's more options that could achieve greater reductions than the ones that the Trump administration included in their rule.</p><p>But still, we're talking the very low-end, single percentage reductions in the middle, there's this option of cofiring with a lower carbon fuel. So if you're talking about coal plants, you can co-fire that coal plant partially with gas. In a gas plant, you could co-fire partially with hydrogen and you're going to bring the emissions rate of the plant down somewhat. In some of our analysis, we've estimated that a 40% cofiring coal with gas. So cofiring a coal plant with 40% gas gets you about a 20% emission reduction. So it's not nothing, but it also involves additional fossil infrastructure to get gas to a coal plant or additional infrastructure to get hydrogen to a gas plant.</p><p>And on top of several other issues with hydrogen that we can talk about a little later.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, a legal question, I guess all of this in some respect is arbitrary, but where is the line between forcing fuel-switching, which I think Supreme Court said was out of bounds, and too far, versus a rule that requires cofiring, which is like kind of like halfway to fuel switching? Is there a legal distinction there between those two?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>There's absolutely precedent for requiring cleaner fuels or fuel processes. What the Supreme Court mentioned, at least in dicta, was we don't want to see standards that would force a plant to stop existing. And so essentially, if EPA were to base the standard on total conversion from coal to gas, which some coal plants have undertaken with cheap gas prices, that I think, based on our reading of the decision anyway, would probably be too far. So full conversion probably off the table along with generation shifting. But partial cofiring is actually one of the technologies that the Obama administration considered for their Clean Power Plan, as was carbon capture.</p><p>And as you noted, the approach that they took in the Clean Power Plan, they selected because it was the most cost effective. So they ruled out carbon capture and cofiring, not because they weren't adequately demonstrated or available, they were just more expensive than the approach that EPA ended up going with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But now we're forced back basically to that more expensive approach.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Right, as I mentioned before, but want to keep reiterating, this is all about setting the level of the standard, finding it's a math problem. EPA looks at the options, and so the options as we see them are efficiency improvements, getting very little cofiring, getting somewhere in the middle, or carbon capture and storage, getting the most amount of emission reductions. They look out at that and they select the best system. Then they apply it to the plant and essentially do a math problem and come out with a number, a numerical limit for the amount of CO2 emission reductions that the plants need to achieve.</p><p>Then they hand the baton off to the states for existing sources and to the companies for new sources. So this is not a requirement to install that specific technology. It's a way to derive the level of the standard and then pass that off to the states and the companies to comply with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. EPA sets the standard and then says to states and companies, do what you want.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Right, as long as you can meet this number. Be creative, innovate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The central question is what upon what technology is the number going to be based on exactly? This low-end, this something in the middle, and this high-end, which is carbon capture and sequestration. So here I want to talk about what the sort of arguments are around this. It says in the text of the Clean Air Act that EPA should set the standard based on the best available system. That has to be adequately demonstrated so I just want to dig in a little bit on the technical legal language here. Like what exactly or what have courts interpreted that language to mean exactly?</p><p>What is required to be adequately demonstrated? A single demonstration plant somewhere? like some good charts and graphs in a lab? Or do you have to be commercial, or does price and, you know, financial viability come into that? Like, what is EPA thinking about when it thinks about what is adequately demonstrated or best?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Yes. Okay, so I'm a Clean Air Act lawyer. This is my favorite part. I love the Clean Air Act, and I love to talk about the language of the statute because that's actually what we're really fighting over here. EPA is tasked with establishing the standard of performance, and so that definition is in the statute. They have to determine the degree of emission limitation that can be achieved through the application of the best system of emission reduction that is adequately demonstrated considering cost, energy factors and essentially other factors. And so there's this really defined set of criteria that EPA needs to go through as they're determining what's the best system of emission reduction.</p><p>So we've been talking about adequately demonstrated that it can't be a made up technology, but it also doesn't have to be widely used by everyone. Already, the Clean Air Act is technology forcing it's forward looking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>It requires the regulated source to reduce its emissions commensurate with the best control systems that are available, not the ones that are already sort of out there in use, that plants are choosing to use of their own accord. So again, in a lot of ways, this is analogous to so SO2 scrubbers which were not in widely used, they were not widely produced in the 90s, and there were all these doom and gloom predictions of how much it's going to cost.</p><p>We're not going to be able to do this. So right now, there's no limit at all on CO2 emissions from power plants. There's been no reason to innovate on carbon capture for power plants, and there is not a ton of projects out there in the world, but there are plenty to serve as an adequate demonstration for purposes of the Clean Air Act. There's essentially three parts here of carbon capture. There's capture, there's transport, and there's storage. And each part of that process is well established and has been in use for decades, especially the capture part. We've been capturing carbon for decades.</p><p>And so there's plenty of demonstration in both pilot projects and at commercial scale to be applied in the power sector. It doesn't have to be something that's already widely out there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's sort of a holistic consideration. And EPA is sort of attempting to apply something like wisdom here. There's a balance of considerations. And I assume, and tell me if I'm wrong, that the usual suspects are arguing to EPA that that would be too strict, that a standard based on CCS would be too strict. And presumably the way they're making that argument is by saying CCS is not the best or adequately demonstrated. So what is their argument? Have you read, like, their briefs, or do they have a specific argument here?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>They do, and they're familiar. It's the same set of arguments that we've seen over and over. It's too costly, we can't do it yet. We're getting there. Just let us do this at our own pace. One of the concerning things is the argument that we need gas now, and we're okay with standards that are based on something we might do in the future. So set the standards only at a level that were ready for CCS, that were ready for hydrogen sometime in the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>CCS ready.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>CCS ready. Hydrogen ready.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I love that phrase.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>It's just kicking the can down the road.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like your own David Hawkins once said, it's like saying, my driveway is Ferrari ready.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Exactly. And I think what's at the heart of this industry estimates that CCS can achieve 90% capture and emissions data from the projects that have been built back that up. That is not to say that EPA needs to go ahead and require a 90% emission reduction from every single coal and gas plant in the country. Right. We think it makes the most sense for EPA to draw some distinctions based on the role that the plants perform on the grid. Right. So there's a big difference between ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Yes, there's a big difference between plants that are used for baseload power that are running constantly all the time, and those that are used intermittently for reliability as backup power during times of high demand.</p><p>There does not need to be the exact identical standards on those two types of plants. So plants that are running full time are emitting the most, and they should be required to reduce their emissions to the greatest degree. So we think it makes sense to have a 90% capture based standard for plants that are going to serve as baseload, that are going to run all the time. And it's the most cost effective for those types of plants to install CCS, especially when you consider the tax credit. Plants that are operating intermittently as backup are already emitting less pollution simply by running less.</p><p>And those plants can face a less stringent standard, stay on the grid as backup, and serve that really important reliability function without being required to install CCS, they can meet a lesser standard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there a distinction between those two kinds of plants that is clean enough and clear enough to set legal limits around them because there are some fuzzy edge cases? And then, number two, are we sure that EPA like that's within EPA? Sort of. That's not major for EPA to be thinking to be sort of specifying which standards applied based on function based on operations.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Yes. So this is the kind of detailed analytical and technical decision making that is well within the expert agency's wheelhouse. This is exactly the type of thing that the experts at the agency are normally tasked by the statute to do. They're the ones who run the numbers and figure out what's most appropriate for the specific type of plant that they're regulating. And in fact, the existing standards for new sources do include these sorts of subcategorization based on the use type of the plant. So this is not something complex and mysterious. This is based on true and visible distinctions between types of plants based on the way that they're used.</p><p>And I think it really is yet another layer of the sort of flexibility that EPA can and should build into this program. Again, none of this is a particular mandate. And so the states and the companies then have that additional choice. Well, they can run a plant full steam and install controls, or they can run intermittently, keep that plant online and face a lesser limit, or they can retire it and make their own choices about what to replace it with. This is providing more and more levels of choices to the regulated industry to comply in the way that makes sense for them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And something you mentioned in passing, I want to just highlight and put a pin in here, which is that a big argument here on your side is CCS is now being showered with subsidies. Like there are huge subsidies coming down from the Inflation Reduction Act for captured hydrogen, enough to make them economic in some cases or certainly a lot closer. So these are synergistic. I'm saying like the Biden administration's legislation is bolstering the case for these tighter standards because CCS is not just on its own now. Now it's explicitly being helped and shaped and stood up by government grants.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>That's right. And at the same time, the Inflation Reduction Act also contains a ton of money for renewables. And so that level of investment across these types of technologies really changes the overall cost of the regulations. And that's one of the things that EPA has to consider, is the overall cost of compliance to the system. And so again, when these standards are in place and states and companies are looking out across their fleet and saying, oh, what should we do? All of those incentives are going to come into that consideration for them. And it makes renewables really cheap to replace your older dirtier generation with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I got one more question about the standard setting before I want to get into the politics a little bit, but some energy heads out there may be familiar with a company called NET Power, which has come up with a new, I guess it's a couple of years old now. They've built one demonstration plan, a new technology that without getting into the technological details, it's really fascinating. I might do a whole pod on it, but basically it burns natural gas. Emits no particulate pollution at all and captures 100% of the CO2 emissions as a purified stream of CO2.</p><p>So you have in NET Power a natural gas power plant with zero particulate emissions and 100% carbon capture. They've built one, it's running and working. So has there been any talk about using that as a standard? Because that would be 100% carbon reduction. Has NET Power's tech come up in these discussions?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Yeah, for sure. I mean, it's very cool, right? It was included, the EPA put out a white paper last year asking for input, sort of preregulatory input on the technologies that are available to reduce emissions, specifically from gas plants. And they took comment on the NET Power approach, which I cannot remember the name of. Allam something.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Allam Cycle, I think is right. I was trying to think of that.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>And it is really cool and innovative and I hope that that is a direction that we're going to see any remaining fossil generation go in. And I think we may see that in the proposal. Again, all of what I'm talking about here is we have not seen a proposal from EPA. This is sort of NRDC's perspective on what is possible, justifiable achievable and legally defensible in court. And this is what we've been advocating for before the agency, and then we'll have to see what they come up with. We're expecting a proposal relatively soon, probably within a month or so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What's really interesting to me about this, just from a political perspective, is it's a sort of weird inversion here of the typical roles. So you've got the power sector, which has been touting CCS for years, to sort of like defend the ongoing existence of fossil power plants. They sort of wave their hands at CCS and say, no, we can go clean too. So they've got Joe Manchin out up there saying, I want to go clean, but I want to do it with fossil. I literally think they've convinced him that they can eliminate their carbon emissions. And traditionally you've had sort of greens and climate people saying that's big and overly complicated and overly expensive and stupid and nobody's ever really going to do it and it's just going to make more sense to switch to clean generation.</p><p>And so now we've got this odd political inversion where the power companies are saying, whoa, whoa, whoa, CCS is not really ready. We didn't mean "ready ready," we meant just over the horizon is what we meant. That's where they like it. They like CCS just over the horizon. And all of a sudden this is like calling their bluff. Like, oh, you've been talking about this for decades. Well, how about you use it? And then on the green side, on the climate side, you have a similar inversion where now greens and green groups like yours are arguing like CCS.</p><p>Oh, it's great. Yeah, it's right there, it's ready to go, absolutely ready to serve. As the basis for a standard. It's just odd and funny and I just wonder if you have any comment on the politics of trying to herd the cats in the climate community around this message of like CCS is ready and viable, which I don't think comes naturally to a lot of factions, let's say, within the climate community.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Well, that's well phrased. We're walking a fine line. I think our vision for the power sector and the power industry is one of net zero. And in order to get to net zero, that means a heck of a lot of renewables and a heck of a lot less fossil.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>For the purposes of setting pollution limits, we need a technological basis and by far and away CCS is the most effective of the options that we've got.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That the Supreme Court left us.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Exactly. And I think it is very important to have limits on the CO2 emissions from power plants. I think that is sort of the baseline, most important thing from our point of view.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, well, lots of, I mean, reports, we should just say lots of reports have been done saying the legislative progress is great, but it's not enough to reach Biden's stated goal. And to reach Biden's stated goal, you need a whole of administration approach, including these standards.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Exactly. And just to put some actual numbers on that, if we want to meet our international and domestic greenhouse gas emission reduction targets for 2030, we need to get our power sector emissions down by 80% from the 2005 sort of peak emissions. We're already about a third of a reduction, 33% -ish reduction since 2005. Our analysis and RDCs of the Inflation Reduction Act puts us now on track to cut our power sector emissions by about 65% by 2030. So that is massive and also not enough.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>And our estimate there is somewhere in the middle there's a really wide range of modeling of the Inflation Reduction Act and a lot of work is going to need to be done in order to get those emission reductions that we're sort of showing in that modeling. It's not a foregone conclusion.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, one of the wildest things going on right now is just the incredible range of projections about what the IRA will do. Right. Like the sort of government came up with, oh, that it's going to spend $370 on these tax credits and then Credit Suisse is like, actually it's more like a trillion. And then I think there was another one last week, it was like actually it's more like a trillion five. So the range of amounts of money that could come out of this bill are just huge. It's so opaque.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>It is. And a lot still remains to be written in all the guidance for these tax credits. But that sort of uncertainty aside, I think the Inflation Reduction Act is going to accelerate a bunch of clean energy and it's going to get us a bunch of emission reductions in the power sector. And at least based on our analysis, that's not quite enough. And we absolutely are going to need limits on the CO2 emissions in addition to investments in clean energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So maybe the way to summarize is just to say endorsing CCS as the basis of a performance standard is different than endorsing CCS, full stop.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Yeah, well put. And I think what we see in the modeling reflects what I've been saying about the decision making that comes once EPA sets the standard. So when we model standards that are based on CCS and we've included the Inflation Reduction Act in the baseline, we overall get to around between 70% and 77% CO2 emission reduction by 2030. And what we're seeing in the actual generation results, there is some CCS deployment and also a ton of clean energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is my next question, actually, and you're here answering it before I even ask it, but I just wanted to ask, as a matter of curiosity, has someone modeled what would happen if EPA sets the standards where you are endorsing and what does the modeling say about the decisions power companies are going to make? Like how many fossil fuel plants will shut down versus installing CCS? I don't know if there's like an easy answer to that.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Well, so we have done lots of modeling and we've been doing it for quite a while because even before this Supreme Court decision last summer, we were anticipating that EPA was going to be constrained and in this sort of inside the fence line way. And so we've really been looking for ways to get the most ambition and the most emission reductions out of these sort of source specific basis for the standards. That range that I gave you is based on CCS and partial CCS runs. So 70% to 77% overall emission reductions depending how much you crank the dial on the ambition.</p><p>But still with some of those sort of flexibilities that I talked about in terms of the type of use of the plant and what we see in those runs is renewables and energy storage capacity tripling from now to 2030 and quadrupling by 2035. And I think that is in large part based on these new Inflation Reduction Act tax credits being just so much more cost effective. And we still do see some retrofits with carbon capture and storage and some new builds of gas with carbon capture, but not a massive amount. And so there is some uptake of the technology and there's also some reinvestment in clean energy and that kind of tracks with what you would expect, right?</p><p>And that kind of goes back to that was essentially what EPA was counting on and basing their standards off of in the Clean Power Plan and that's why they did it that way. I think we can do it this way. And that carbon capture and storage based best system of emission reduction can be shown to be available to the plants that could use it. And not all plants are going to make that choice. It's going to be up to the states and the companies to look at their options and choose whether they want to keep that plant online, and that should work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So NRDC is recommending a CCS based standard for both existing-source regs and new-source regs. Is there any difference between those two that's worth sort of pulling out here?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I think industry estimates that CCS can achieve 90% capture. And so given that that technology exists, we think it should be used to set the standard for at least the plants that are operating at full bore, both new and existing. When you're building a new plant, you have much greater options in terms of where you're sighting it, how you're building it. You should be required to use the latest and greatest technology on a brand new plant. So that's pretty straightforward for existing plants because they're all over the place. We rely on them already for power.</p><p>There needs to be more flexibility, there needs to be more of a phase-in sort of glide path to compliance and some flexibility for how you're going to comply and some exemptions for those plants that are going to commit to retire. You don't want to make them retrofit right before they're expected to retire, you want to just let them plan to retire at the natural end-of-life of the plant. And so giving that flexibility on the existing source side is going to be really important and has long been part of the way that the section 111 standard setting has worked to differentiate between new and existing plants.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, CCS based standard in both cases, but maybe more flexibility and implementation for the existing plants.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If EPA does use CCS or hydrogen, something like that, as the basis for its performance standard, does it have any say at all in the details of sort of how CCS or hydrogen are used or measured? Because Volts listeners just got an hour and a half earful of discussion of the clean Hydrogen Tax Credits last week, and the details are many, and they make a big gifference in how clean hydrogen is used, how it's measured sort of how its carbon intensity is assessed, how much end users are allowed to claim reductions from using it, et cetera, et cetera. Does EPA get into any of that? Or is this purely just, we're using this tech as a way to set the numerical standard, but the details of how a power plant might implement this is somebody else's problem.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>So they absolutely have some authority over how it gets used to comply with this standard. So for purposes of standard setting, they're looking kind of broadly at what the technology is capable of achieving, how it's been used in the past, how it could apply to power plants that exist now in terms of compliance, though, they've got the authority over CO2 essentially in this rulemaking. And so if a plant is going to demonstrate compliance using carbon capture and storage or hydrogen, they can absolutely include the types of rigorous monitoring and verification requirements they would need to see in order for a plant to be demonstrating compliance using one of these technologies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? So they can get into saying, here's what does and doesn't qualify as full CCS like measured every so often, or this kind of geographical storage. They can't get into that?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>I absolutely think so. I think they have authority to say you need to have rigorous monitoring and verification from the point of capture to the point of sequestration. And that needs to be part of your demonstration of compliance for using carbon capture. For hydrogen ... It's a little trickier.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm very aware at the moment.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>To the extent that there is going to be a pathway for hydrogen to be used for compliance, it's got to take into account where that hydrogen comes from, how it's made in order to avoid net emissions increases. And I think they absolutely have that authority. Given that the purpose of this is for the best system of emission reduction, they've got to ensure that it is truly reducing emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Maybe they can just borrow whatever treasury comes up with for the hydrogen.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Assuming it's good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, true. If EPA doesn't go with CCS, doesn't go with the high end here, what do you think it will do? Will it fall back to something medium, something in the fuel blending sort of range? And just more broadly, do we have any sense at all of what EPA is thinking or which direction it's going or what to expect?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>I think in terms of publicly facing tea leaves, what we've got to look at really is that white paper from last year where they had laid out the options and said, hey, give us some comments on what you think of these options for reducing CO2 emissions from combustion turbines. From everything that we have seen from this administration, we are hoping that they're going to be ambitious. They know that this is a critical moment. They know that this is an important wedge of emissions, that the power sector is still a really significant percentage of our emissions, roughly a quarter, and that we need standards on those CO2 emissions and they need to be strong.</p><p>And it's not going to be worth all this work, honestly, if they don't make them strong. And so that has been our message to the administration, is, look, if you're going to go through the trouble of doing this all over again, let's make it worth it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is Manchin he's like the monster under my bed at this point. Is there some way Manchin could burst out of the closet and screw this up somehow? Or is he ...</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>I hesitate to even speculate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can I just not think about him in this respect, or does he have some way that he could theoretically muck this up, or is this something that's finally just sort of beyond his reach?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>I think for now, the ball is in EPA's court to come out with a proposal and to take public comments and to consider them. And so for right now, this is an EPA project. Once it's finalized, it will presumably be subject to a Congressional Review Act resolution, and it will depend on who is in charge as to what happens there. And so that's when Congress gets to have its veto opportunity over regulations, which is unfortunate, but it is the world we're living in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And does that just require a majority or a supermajority?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>I believe it's just a majority, but it can be blocked by the President.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And by the time there's a new president, it'll be too late. We're coming in under the deadline that the Congressional Review Act, if it's going to happen at all, would happen under Biden and thus would be vetoed. So that's not really ...</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>And so that takes place at the final rule. So we're only at the proposal stage. We've got a long way to go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it going to get done under the Congressional Review Act just to just explain to listeners? Congressional Review Act says basically Congress can undo or veto a regulation basically within a certain window of it being finalized which is 60 ...</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>60 working days, which does not equal the calendar days.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So what you want to do is get your regulations on the books more than 60 working days prior to the next presidential election.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just so you're sure your guys in charge, if it happens.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>The date that we are looking at is next April, roughly a year from now, for all of these regulations. Right. Like it's not just ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's a lot these are not the only ones. There's a lot of there's a big backlog.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>It is. And we are seeing the use of the Congressional Review Act right now as we speak in this Congress with attempts to invalidate the rules that the administration has recently finalized. It is a terrible tool. It is not a good thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a Newt Gingrich special, isn't it? Am I right about the history? Of course, like so many malignant things in our government treat.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>But it is the world we're living in, and I think the administration is aware of the timeline that's facing them next year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So you think a proposed rule is going to show up in the next month or two?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're expecting a proposed rule maybe by the end of April. And then when ... you know what happens, that gets published in the Federal Register. There's an opportunity for public comment. There's public hearings. And so there will be sort of a flurry of activity as everybody gets their comments in, and then the agency has to review those comments and address them in the final rule. That's part of the sort of Administrative Law 101. And then they have to issue the final rule and demonstrate yeah, we heard all your comments, and this is why we made the decisions that we made.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's when the lawsuits kick off.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>And that's when the lawsuits start. Exactly. We do it all over again. It's the circle of life.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And what do you think of the chances that this Supreme Court ends up hearing a case on this again? Do you think the conservatives can mount a legal case plausible enough to get it back into the Supreme Court?</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>I would never speculate about what this Supreme Court will do, because who knows, right? Our job is to make this thing as airtight as possible. And Chief Justice Roberts gave us some guidelines and a roadmap in the West Virginia decision. He told us what he's looking for, and it's this sort of traditional looking approach to pollution control. And so that's what we're operating under. And we are urging EPA to follow those guidelines and do the most that they can within those constraints, and we'll be there to defend it with them if it comes down to that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, awesome. Lissa Lynch of NRDC, thank you for coming and forecasting and explaining all this with us. Maybe we'll talk again in that distant future day when these things are actually on the books and the lawsuits have started. We'll talk again.</p><p><strong>Lissa Lynch</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-importance-of-upcoming-epa-regulations</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:111161496</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 19 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/111161496/384bb6f9aa7db3569fa7479f5820a5f4.mp3" length="43315899" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3610</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/111161496/76dba69e59d1b1a8140faf74e0319518.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's going on with biofuels?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Dan Lashof of the World Resources Institute discusses the trajectory of biofuels since the early 2000s and the implications of new biofuel standards recently proposed by the US EPA.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAC52OXag9cLaLZvGygdQZLua/volts23.04.07%28dan.lashof%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/what-s-going-on-with-biofuels"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>My fellow olds will recall that, back in the 2000s, biofuels were an extremely big deal in the clean-energy world, one of a tiny handful of decarbonization solutions that seemed viable. Biofuels — and the many advanced versions thereof allegedly on the horizon — dominated discussions of climate change policy.</p><p>Much has changed since then. Principally, it has become clear that electrification is the cheapest path to decarbonization for most sectors, including the transportation sector. The Biden administration has explicitly put electrification at the center of its <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy.gov/eere/us-national-blueprint-transportation-decarbonization-joint-strategy-transform-transportation">transportation decarbonization strategy</a>.</p><p>Biofuels, in the meantime, have gone exactly nowhere. Advanced biofuels remain almost entirely notional, old-fashioned corn ethanol remains as wasteful as ever, and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-018-0757-z">new scientific evidence</a> suggests that the carbon costs of biofuels are much larger than previously appreciated.</p><p>It's not clear if anyone has told the EPA. For the first time in 15 years, the agency is on the verge of updating biofuels production mandates first established by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, and its proposed standards do not appear cognizant of these recent developments, or of the administration's larger transportation strategy.</p><p>To discuss the latest developments in biofuels and the EPA's puzzling blind spot, I talked to Dan Lashof, director of the World Resources Institute. We discussed how biofuels have developed since the early 2000s, the lack of progress in advanced biofuels, and the stakes of EPA's coming decisions.</p><p>Alright then. Dan Lashof. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Really happy to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I've been wanting to do an episode on biofuels forever because I often just pause to think, whatever happened to biofuels? Because old people like you and I will recall way back in the day, in the early times, biofuels used to be a very big deal. They used to be the top line item, the sort of the hot subject of conversation, and it's really flipped since then. So maybe just to start, let's use our little time machine squiggly squiggly fingers, time machine, go back to say 2005 to 2010, the early 2000s, and just sort of tell us what was the state of the decarbonization conversation then and what role did biofuels play in it?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Right, well, back then, Tesla hadn't built its first car. Photovoltaics cost ten times or more what they do today. And the big fight was to prevent hundreds of new coal plants from being built. So the idea that we would replace gasoline with electricity seemed far-fetched at best. And a lot of environmental advocates were focused on fighting coal. There was some discussion of alternative fuels, but when you looked at the transportation sector, biofuels seemed like one of the best options out there. And then there was this idea, there was a debate about corn ethanol from the beginning, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Corn ethanol goes back. I mean, I kind of want to distinguish between corn ethanol and kind of biofuels. The larger category, like corn ethanol, goes back farther than the rest of this stuff. Right?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Right, but back then we weren't making much of it, right? So in 2007, there was about 6 billion gallons of corn ethanol being produced, which is about 4% of gasoline consumption back then. And there was a debate about it. A lot of that debate was like about net energy balance. Remember that one?</p><p>Does it take more energy and fertilizer and tractor fuel and trucking than is in the fuel? I think that debate sort of missed the point, and it was gradually shifting to, well, we don't really care about BTUs, we care about carbon and what's its net carbon impact.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I feel like the limitations of corn ethanol were around even then, which is why I remember so much buzz around cellulosic biofuels.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, right. At that time, there was new research that seemed very exciting. I was convinced that that was the future of biofuels. Right. We were going to make ethanol not from grain, not from the corn kernels, but from corn stalks, maybe from some perennial grasses like ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Switchgrass.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, right. And that was going to be awesome because you wouldn't be competing with food as much, and it was supposed to be cheaper because you weren't ... as waste material or the yields were higher. So that was going to take over.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Wow. We were so young then. And so then this is the sort of political atmosphere in which came the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, which, among its other sort of puzzling features in retrospect, was a big bipartisan energy bill passed in part to address emissions and I guess just wasn't the poison that it is now, I guess. But so part of that bill was about biofuels and setting those standards. So just tell us kind of what we did about biofuels in that bill.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>To set the stage. The big political driver really was concerned about imported oil, which was peaking. It actually peaked in 2005, but it was about the same level through 2005, '06, '07.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Because this was before the fracking revolution changed all that.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Right. And fuel economy standards for automobiles had been stagnant for a long time. So the bill had three main components. One was reform of the fuel economy standards, actually setting them on a size basis, which allowed the auto companies to kind of accept it, and then setting a target to increase them to 35 miles per gallon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that when the light truck loophole made its way into ...</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>No, that was already there. This was actually designed to help address that by saying it did leave trucks and cars separate, but it said, we're going to base the fuel economy for a manufacturer based on the mix of sizes of vehicles they make. So if they make bigger cars, they don't have to hit the same level, but it reduced the sort of clip effect between a truck and a car. So it actually allowed more of these crossovers, but it also allowed unlocking an increase in the standards which had been stuck. So that was a big component. And one of the things that environmentalists were most excited about in that bill, there was also a set of energy efficiency provisions, appliance standards and other things.</p><p>And then the third big piece was the Renewable Fuel Standard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And did the Renewable Fuel Standard exist prior to this or was it developed for this bill.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>It did exist. I think it was first passed in 2005, but it was relatively modest. And then in the 2007 bill, well, there was this buzz about cellulosic ethanol. The thought was set a long term trajectory of increasing uses of biofuels and make sure that by 2022, most of that was supposed to be cellulosic ethanol.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>So the standard ramped up to 36 billion gallons of total biofuels by 2022. That was the target of that 21 billion gallons was supposed to be advanced biofuels, either cellulosic ethanol or other biofuels made from something other than corn.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And this suffice to say did not happen. It did not play out that way. So maybe sort of take us forward from 2007 to what happened to actual production of actual biofuels. Like how has the industry developed in the 15 years since then?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Well, so the corn ethanol industry grew as expected up to about 15 billion gallons which was sort of what it was supposed to be capped at subtracting 36 - 21 is 15. So that was what corn ethanol was supposed to provide. Right, they did that. Cellulosic ethanol not so much. The actual gallons of cellulosic ethanol produced in 2022 were zero. Literally zero.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wait, say that, say again.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>There was no cellulosic ethanol produced in 2022. There had been a couple of demonstration plants, none of them were actually operating in 2022. There was a little bit of what was considered cellulosic biofuel, about less than a billion gallons of biofuel equivalent. That mostly came from landfill gas, which was considered cellulosic. Because ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Weird,</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Most of what's in a landfill is woody stuff that's decaying and making methane. So if you capture that and use it in a CNG vehicle, that's considered part of this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But the whole infrastructure of wild hopes about switchgrass and waste products and all of this, it came to literally nothing.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>It came to literally nothing so far. Now, there's still some true believers, it's still right around the corner, kind of like. But the thing that did happen and there's about 5.6 billion gallons of the total biofuel produced in 2022 is something other than corn ethanol.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What is that stuff?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Most of that is bio-based diesel and that's a couple of different things. So some of that is from waste oils. So like used cooking oil.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. I remember so much talk about used cooking oil.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>So there's a little bit of that, but a lot of it is biodiesel or so called renewable diesel made from oil crops like soybeans or palm oil, which is imported and a huge problem or other oil crops.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Now, are those in the renewable fuel standard like or do those have a category of their own in the, in the standards?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>There is a category of bio-based diesel. It's required to produce a billion gallons in 2022, and it exceeded that. But it also counts as part of this larger advanced biofuel category.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. You mentioned before the call that in terms of land use, that biodiesel is now rivaling corn ethanol.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, this actually shocked me when I looked into it. So we use about 30 million acres of land to produce corn that goes into making ethanol. We use another 30 million acres of prime US farmland producing soybeans that goes into biodiesel wild. And we hear much less about that, partly because it actually produces much less fuel. It's overall much less efficient.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, the diesel process.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, it takes a lot more land per gallon of diesel than you get per gallon of ethanol because corn is not that great. No, corn is not great, but the biodiesel is even worse. And when you think about the global market for oil crops so palm oil, for example, is a major driver of deforestation around the world.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>And that's totally fungible with soybeans and canola and other oil crops. So if we're diverting soybeans to make biodiesel in the US. That means somebody else is probably producing palm oil and may well be deforesting the rainforest to do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the amount that was set for advanced biofuels in 2007 for 2022 just isn't being met. It's not as much biofuel as that legislation anticipated.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, so the law allowed EPA to waive the requirement if it determined that the supply just couldn't meet the number and set a level that they concluded could be met by the industry. And so that's what they've been doing consistently every year for the advanced biofuels requirements.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I guess I knew on some level that things had not panned out the way we hoped in 2007. But the notion that the whole hype about advanced biofuel came to literally nothing and all we basically did is just keep growing corn ethanol and biodiesel like we were before, with all the flaws. I mean, we already knew about the flaws, some of the flaws then. Speaking of the flaws, tell us about what we — insofar as you can I'm sure there's a lot, and it's difficult to summarize — but tell us what we've learned about the environmental and carbon impacts of biofuels that we didn't know when we passed this law in 2007.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Well, I'd say there's two main things. First, we know that there's a much better way to eliminate emissions from passenger vehicles. So, like I said, we didn't really believe, at least I didn't really believe, electric cars were going to be a thing back then. Now, that's clearly the way we get rid of emissions from the road. And if you do the calculation, it takes 300 acres devoted to corn ethanol powering an internal combustion engine car to move it as far as one acre of land dedicated to solar photovoltaics, to power an EV 300 to 1. And we can put solar farms in the desert and not just on actual farms.</p><p>So it's just like a completely different landscape in terms of what are the pathways.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And as I point out to people, solar has only gone in one direction and cellulosic biofuel has also only gone in one direction, which is nowhere. At a certain point, you got to learn from trajectories.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>So that's the first thing. There's a much better way. The second thing is, I think the key conceptual shift is really, and it hasn't been incorporated into policy yet, is that land is scarce. We need to focus on the overall use of land and not just land use change. So the way I think about this is if we want to achieve net zero emissions globally by 2050 and feed 10 billion people and protect biodiversity, how do we optimize the way we use land to do all of that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>And if we dedicate an acre to producing biofuels, we can't use that same acre to have an old growth forest that is storing carbon in the trees and providing biodiversity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So for any given acre of land, if you use it for one thing, part of the cost is the opportunity cost of not using it for something else that would have absorbed more carbon.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. And of course, the opportunity cost is a pretty familiar concept in other contexts. Right. We know that if we spend $1,000 on a vacation this summer, we can't invest that money to pay for travel when we retire.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>But for some reason, that it hasn't really been built into the way people think about land. I think there's still this notion that there's going to be a lot of spare land out there, we can reclaim land, but when you do the math, it just doesn't add up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, about the math, though, how confident are we that we know and understand all the ins and outs? Do we have a ranking of land uses by carbon absorption? Do we have a clear sense of that ranking?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>I mean, I think that's a good question. So if you've got a old forest, the best thing to do from both a carbon point of view and a biodiversity point of view is protect it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Keep the carbon in the trees, keep the birds and bees flying around. And anytime you use land for something other than feeding people, it's going to put more pressure on those remaining old forests. So that's one way to think about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Because I'm thinking all these land use arguments, as you well know, are frequently deployed against renewables as well. There's an opportunity cost for food production. There's even some people who say there's an opportunity cost, like whatever, put a nuclear plant, get more power for less area. There are opportunity cost for putting mirrors. So this question of the highest, best use of land from a purely carbon perspective cuts a lot of ways.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's true. And we have not really done a full kind of optimization of land use for achieving decarbonization. That's something I'm actually hoping to work on over the next couple of years. I think it's badly needed. There's some work that's been done that points in that direction, but not a fully integrated analysis. But to give one example, yes, there are issues around land use for renewables and certainly legitimate conflicts over how people want to see their community or their landscape look. But NREL did a study of what it would take in terms of land to get to 100% clean electricity grid by 2035, which is the Biden administration goal.</p><p>And they looked at the total amount of land that you had to dedicate to wind/solar transmission lines. That amount is smaller than the amount of land we're using for biofuels today. And those biofuels are supplying less than 10% of our transportation energy. So there's no comparison in scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Got it. So even if we don't have perfectly tuned, fine-grained distinctions here, there are plenty of crude distinctions we can make. Some of the cases are obvious, more obvious than others. And so given this new way of seeing biofuels, this sort of opportunity cost of lands carbon opportunity cost, and I assume we probably learned more stuff about biofuels in the interim in terms of the amount of energy in versus out and all this. So how do biofuels look now relative to how we thought about them then? I'm going to guess that based on our new knowledge, they look worse.</p><p>But how much worse? Like corn ethanol, for instance.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah so ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not good. Not good.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>No, I mean in terms of energy in versus energy out, actually, the ethanol industry has gotten more efficient. If you're ignoring the land problem, it's starting to look, you know, it looks okay. I mean, it doesn't get you to zero by anybody's calculation. But if you ignore the land issue, 30-40% reduction relative to gasoline is plausible. But once you take the carbon opportunity cost of land into account, then anytime you're dedicating an acre to grow fuel rather than either food or forests, you're going to lose. And you're going to lose it's not close it's by factors two, three or more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's true of any crop, any kind of fuel across the board.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, just because that opportunity cost is so large.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So let's take this knowledge then and gallop here into 2022, I guess we're in 2023 now.</p><p>So tell us first of all, why is EPA revisiting these standards? I guess they decided in 2007 that they could see exactly 15 years into the future of biofuel demand, but no further. Was it always built into the law that 15 years, and then we'll start revisiting it.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Exactly. So Congress specified exact volume targets for every year through 2022. And again, it gave EPA the ability to adjust those if it concluded it wasn't feasible, which is what they had to do on the advanced biofuel side. But starting in 2023 ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wait, can I pause? Before we get into the change in the line, I want to ask one question about the volume thing, because it also strikes me as kind of crazy, like how gasoline performs with ethanol in it. Depends on the level of ethanol in it, right. The percentage of ethanol. And there's been a lot of arguing about how much ethanol you can blend into gasoline. But if you're specifying volumes of biofuel, you can't specify volumes of total gasoline demand that's going to fluctuate out of your control. So if demand goes way up, then the same volume looks like a smaller percentage, and if gasoline demand goes down, then the same volume looks like a larger percentage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It just seems like specifying volumes is a bizarre way to approach this question, especially 15 years in advance, when you have no idea what total demand for gasoline is going to be. So you really have no idea what percentage of the total these volumes are going to be. Am I crazy, or is that just a weird way to approach this issue?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>That's correct. What EPA actually does under the law when they set the targets, is they look at the volume target. They project how much gasoline will be consumed, and then the actual requirement on refineries is a percentage. So they convert the volumes into percentage when they implement it. But they've only been doing that sort of one or two years in advance. Or actually, sometimes they get to the end of the year, and then they do it looking backwards, which is a little weird, too. So then in a year like 2021, when the Pandemic shrunk demand for gasoline, it was actually the percentage requirement that was binding, and the volume was much less than what EPA had originally projected.</p><p>So that's how they implemented. But it's still a strange way to write the law. I totally agree with that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The reason I ask is, it seems to me, sitting here in 2023, that the next 15 years of gasoline demand are even more difficult to forecast than they were in 2007. There's more going on. There's more forces converging from different directions. There's a lot of it's a really open question. So if you're specifying a volume, that just seems crazy. Are they doing that again? Are they going the volume direction again?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>They are, but again, they convert it to percentage, and they're only looking three years. Their current proposal looks three years in advance, not 15 years in advance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. Okay, well, let's back up. Just tell us what's going to happen. What is EPA doing in 2023 about this? Now that these original volume standards are over, the time period is over, what's EPA going to do?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Right. So EPA has this broad discretion now, and so they proposed a rule to set the volume targets for three years, 2023 through 2025. But they basically ignored all these changes that we've just been talking about and sort of blithely went forward as if nothing has changed. And they've proposed to increase the amount of biofuel required each year, not by a huge amount, but by some. And they've said, okay, the amount of conventional corn ethanol that would be implied by these requirements is going to stay constant at about 15 billion gallons. But because of what you said, that's a huge problem.</p><p>Right. So if we're actually on a trajectory to meet our climate goals, we've got to electrify the fleet. And that means gasoline consumption over the next 20 years should go down by about 80%, according to at least some scenarios. So the current standard gasoline is blended 10% ethanol, and 15 billion gallons is already more than you can absorb at 10% of current gasoline demand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that true? What happens if there's too much if there's too much corn ethanol and you can't blend it all in? What do they do with it?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>So some states allow up to 15% ethanol.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>And the original theory was we were going to have flex fueled vehicles that would use 85% ethanol.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You still see those around sometimes.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah. The auto companies got credit towards meeting their CAFE standards.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Producing those even if they never saw a drop of E85, right. So there are a few of those vehicles around, but they're just using 10% ethanol or maybe 15% ethanol, depending on where they're fueling up. So you can maybe absorb a little bit more than 10%. But basically, by setting the requirement at a level that is more than 10% of gasoline demand, what EPA effectively has done is forced more biodiesel, because that you can substitute for diesel in the freight sector. And as we discussed, that's even worse than corn ethanol.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, you mean because they're holding corn ethanol steady and increasing the overall amount of biofuels, and we now know that cellulosic is going to be 0% of that, then all the remainder has to be biodiesel, doesn't it?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Most of it will be. I mean, again, there's some what's called renewable natural gas. So if you harvest landfill gas or dairy digesters, you can produce some fuel that way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But most of the increase will come from biodiesel.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Most of the increase is biodiesel. And again, the way the law is written, it doesn't actually specify corn ethanol. It specifies conventional biofuels. So you could use biodiesel to satisfy part of that. Right. Now, this is the so called 10% "blend wall", ethanol "blend wall". That's about 14 billion gallons.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>And it's going down every year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wait. why?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Well, because gasoline consumption is going down.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>And it's already going down because cars are getting more efficient under the fuel economy standards, particularly the ones that the Obama administration promulgated. And as we get more and more electric vehicles on the road, it's going to go down faster.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Given what we've learned about biofuels and given how they performed since 2007, what on earth is EPA doing? I guess I'm just wondering, what are the political forces, as you see them, that are pushing to keep this Frankenstein alive when it basically looks like we should just we'll talk about future uses for biofuels later and there might be something to that. But in terms of shoving corn ethanol into gas tanks, it just seems like the whole enterprise is kind of silly. So what's keeping it alive? What's propping it up? Because EPA looks like they're just, like, going forward, like you said, as if they've learned nothing.</p><p>And yet we know they have learned stuff. So what is going on? I guess I'm asking.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Well, I think there are a couple of things. Obviously, politically, you have this now incumbent ethanol industry. Companies like ADM that make a lot of money making ethanol, and they're in Midwest states that don't necessarily have a lot of people, but have two senators each.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But are no longer going first in the Democratic primary lineup. I wonder if that's going to change anything.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>It may make a little bit of difference, but Iowa is not the only state. It's not the only state where ethanol is produced, so they still have a lot of sway. Also, I think that this idea of the carbon opportunity cost of land really has not been absorbed by policymakers at this point. So there's still, in their minds, an active debate about, oh, maybe it's 20% better than gasoline, maybe it's 40% better than gasoline. There's some studies which say that it's a little worse than gasoline, but there hasn't been an acceptance yet of this view of land as fundamentally scarce and something that you really have to be much more intentional about how you use it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, the ethanol lobby is obviously one thing, and of course, corn state senators are, of course, one thing. I think you and I will recall when John McCain was running, what was it like the first time he ran? He was very bravely standing up against ethanol and then just got pilloried and caved on it later, as I recall. Am I making all that up? It's had such a grip on politics.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, that sounds right. And certainly I think both Obama and Clinton who were running in the primaries during the time the 2007 bill was written, were staunch supporters of ethanol. So, yeah, there's been this bipartisan support for it across the board. One notable exception has been Senator Diane Feinstein of California has always rallied against ethanol.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>But to no effect.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what about fossil fuel companies? Like, where are they on this whole thing? Where are they throwing their influence?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Historically, they opposed ethanol mandate. They were kind of outmaneuvered when the RFS was first done because you had both environmentalists who supported the overall law, whether they focus on the RFS or not because of the fuel economy standards and kind of the farm state senators and representatives supporting it because of the ethanol piece. So that's actually a fight they lost. Now it's a little challenging because both the fossil fuel lobby and the ethanol industry feel threatened by electric vehicles. And so there are cases where they're actually teaming up to fight electrification, which is definitely a toxic mix.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And isn't there some overlap of plastics and biofuels now that the fossil fuel industry might be? Because I know fossil fuel industry has big hopes for plastic to help them survive in a post fuel world. Isn't there some sort of like biofuels made out of plastics? Or am I groping here? What am I talking about?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Well, there are ways to make plastic substitutes from biomass. So you see some compostable forks that are made from cornstarch, for example. I don't think a big market compared to the ethanol market. So I don't know that that's a big player. I think from the fossil fuel industry point of view, they definitely are looking at plastics as their get out of jail free card. As oil demand for automobiles goes down, they're looking to divert both natural gas and petroleum into a huge number of new petrochemical plants to produce plastics and other things. So yeah, that's a real issue.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But returning to here to Biden so there was never, I guess, really a road through biofuels to zero carbon. I mean, maybe people waved their hands at it like super-future cellulosic, whatever, but in the 15 years since, we have not progressed down that road, hardly even a single step. And yet here the EPA is sort of acting like, yeah, that's still our thing on transportation. We're still going to labor away at biofuels and try to sort of marginally reduce the impact of gas. Meanwhile, you have over on the other side of the Biden administration, Biden himself the bills he's passed, his own transportation secretary on and on, being very explicit that their transportation strategy is electrification. So why isn't the right hand talking to the left hand here? What is this Janus-faced transportation strategy?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a huge disconnect. I mean, right as EPA was proposing this renewable fuel standard continuation, the administration published a transportation decarbonization strategy which, as you said, absolutely focused on electrifying certainly all the passenger cars for freight. It's some combination of battery trucks and hydrogen fuel cell trucks. The one place they point to biofuels and we can talk about this more is with respect to aviation fuel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I want to get to that. In a second because that seems like a big piece of this. But just in terms of, well, a. why? I guess no one really knows why. I mean, maybe it's just path dependence, maybe it's just lobbying, maybe like EPA is not meeting with Pete Buttigieg enough. But what would you recommend, what would WRI recommend that EPA do in this situation if it had read its own administration's transportation plan? What would renewable fuel standard setting look like in light of sort of sane response to Biden's electrification push?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Right. So it's important to point out that right now we have a proposal from EPA. It's not a final rule. And so part of what we're trying to do is point out this disconnect between this proposed rule and the rest of the administration's climate strategy and transportation strategy. So hopefully it'll have an impact. We'll see. So what we recommended is setting much lower volume targets for renewable fuels going forward that are based on the amount of fuel that you can produce from biomass waste. So this is the key distinction that we're trying to make. It's one thing, the carbon opportunity cost, if you're dedicating an acre of land to produce biofuels, is high.</p><p>But there are some genuine waste resources and a lot more work needs to be done to figure out how substantial they really are. But they're not 36 billion gallons. But there are certainly significant amounts of things like corn stover, which is what's left over after you harvest the corn. You've got wheat hulls, in orchards you trim them every year, so there's woody biomass there, there's waste in the pulp and paper industry that they currently burn to make electricity, which there's much better ways to make zero carbon electricity. So there's those resources and then there's this huge amount of biomass which is starting to be pulled out of the Western Forest to reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfires.</p><p>And what happens to that now is mostly it's either left to decay at the edge of the forest or it's actually burned in a pile.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Either of those produce greenhouse gases, don't they?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Right, exactly. Well, you're taking carbon that was in the forest, but that had the risk of going up in flames at any point and turning into CO2. You're kind of speeding up the conversion to CO2, but hopefully reducing the risk of catastrophic fires. You look at what would happen to the biomass if you didn't use it for biofuels. And if the answer is that carbon was going to go back into the atmosphere quickly, that's a biomass resource that it makes sense to use.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So WRI's recommendation is that basically standards be required or volumes be required only for waste biofuels?</p><p>Only for volumes that could be produced with waste biofuels. And that essentially the conventional corn ethanol should not be viewed as achieving any greenhouse gas reductions. Now, it's important to say that doesn't mean that the ethanol market is going to disappear overnight.</p><p>Yeah. I was going to ask, are you here proposing that we basically abandon both the corn ethanol and the soybean-biodiesel markets? Because I would be all for that, but those are big, powerful players. It's not a small thing to propose abandoning them.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, this is definitely not going to be an easy push right. To the administration, for sure. But I think it's really important to lift up farmers in this transition. So if we eliminated the Renewable Fuel Standard overnight, the gasoline suppliers would still probably and according to EPA's analysis, they would still blend 10% ethanol into gasoline because ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really? Why?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Well, they need it to provide oxygen and octane. So one of the other factors that we haven't talked about that was going on during the early 2000s is gasoline used to contain this thing called MTBE.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, I remember.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Which was the way in which they got octane, and that created a lot of groundwater contamination. California banned it in 2002, new York banned it in 2004, and other states were moving to ban it. And so the sort of chemical function that MTBE was playing in gasoline got replaced by ethanol.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. So they do need some kind of additive?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, there may be other things out there, but I think for now the expectation is they would still blend 10%, which would mean as we phase down gasoline consumption, as we electrify vehicles, a gradual phase down of ethanol demand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of course.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>But not an overnight elimination. So I think that's the first thing to note. The second thing to note is US farmers in particular are really good at growing food. And we need that food. The world needs it more than ever.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Isn't global food demand supposed to double? That's the statistic I always see by 2040 or 50 or whatever.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, you got a population that's going to go from about 8 billion to about 10 billion. But then also as people get richer, they eat more meat, for better or for worse. Often for worse. But in low-income countries, actually increasing protein consumption is important from a health perspective. And that means you need more animal feed. So the total amount of grain that's needed goes up by much more than the population.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the contention here is that farmers would be okay if we abandoned or started ramping down our current biofuel production. Farmers would not simply be cast out onto the street.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>I mean, I think this needs more work to look at what that transition is like. But like I said, corn prices right now are very high. The renewable fuels mandate probably contributed some to that, but corn prices have also been very volatile and that volatility didn't go away with the Renewable Fuel Standard. So being a farmer is still really tough and we need to recognize that. I think we have to look at a whole range of alternative or complementary income sources that we need to boost the rural economy. And that can include wind and solar revenue, right.</p><p>And it can include using biomass waste like corn stover to produce hydrogen or other carbon benefits, which we can talk about more. And then there's an opportunity to increase fertilizer production more locally using clean hydrogen. Right now, all the fertilizer that's being used, almost all of it in the US. Is being produced from natural gas, and then this CO2 just goes into the atmosphere. So if you've got sources of clean hydrogen, whether it's from electrolysis using renewable electricity, or if it's from biomass waste with carbon capture, one thing you can do with that hydrogen is make fertilizer that could be more distributed than the big fossil fuel based fertilizer plants that we currently have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. And so when you say EPA should set volumes based on what can be met with waste, what does that mean numerically? Like, right now? It was 36 billion in 2022. Is that right?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>That was the original law.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And they're proposing for 2025.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Less than that, let's see, because, yeah, we never got to 36, we got to 21. And they're proposing a modest increase from that. And we're talking about the waste being more on the order of less than 10 billion gallons.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, ballpark, you're recommending that they cut the volume requirements for biofuels roughly in half, or a little bit more than in half, down to what could be met through waste?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And aren't you also encouraging them to use a shorter time period, shorter than three years?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Right. Well, in general, I think having a little bit of a runway setting a standard for several years out makes sense. But in this case, what we said was, look, things have changed since 2007. You really need to rethink this policy and how it fits into the administration strategy. So to give yourself some time to do that rather than setting a target.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They had 15 years. This is what's bizarre about this. It's like they woke up yesterday morning, they're like, oh, we have to do this thing again. None of this stuff is a secret. What we're talking about, the biofuels performance, is not a secret. It's weird to me that they seem to be kind of sleepwalking into this.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>That's a fair point. I don't have an explanation for that. But given where we are, we thought one of the things that we could suggest to give the administration a little more time to rethink this would be to start with only one year standard, and then hopefully the next phase, they would more fully account for the changes, particularly in electric vehicles going forward.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it in law that they have to set standards every so often, or is this going to be like setting new standards every year or two years or three years forever? Or how does it work going forward?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>They have to set standards for each year, but they can choose to set it for one year at a time, or three years at a time, or five years at a time? That's up to the EPA at this point.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A slight side question, but I would like a little bit of international context here. Like, are other countries that have been sort of doggedly pursuing biofuels all this time, despite all the trends heading in the other direction, are they a big dominant industry? And question in other countries, what's the international take on biofuels right now?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Well, the one country that has probably the most significant ethanol industry other than the US is Brazil.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>And they make ethanol from sugar cane, which is more efficient than corn. But I think it's still subject to similar carbon opportunity cost problems.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you think it still fails the land test?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>I think so. I haven't actually done that calculation, but I think it's a similar issue. And then the other issue where biofuels are used not for transportation, but there actually have been a significant part of the European renewable mandate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, biomass for electricity, right?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Well, yeah, electricity and co generation plants. So they're using wood pellets, some of which come from the US southeastern forest. A bunch of them come from Romania. Scientists have been raising concerns about this for a long time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's very controversial, too, right? Biomass in Europe's standard.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Right. And they've been supposedly tightening their requirements so that it's supposed to be like waste. So if you talk to the wood pellet industry, they'll say, oh, no, we're not harvesting trees, we're using these biomass waste. But there was an investigative report a few months ago that looked at Romania where it's very clear that biomass pellets that were labeled as coming from waste were actually big trees that had been harvested and chopped up. So there's a huge problem there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>This all comes back to this unfortunate notion that biomass is inherently carbon neutral, because after all the carbon in the biomass that came from the air through photosynthesis so putting it back to the air, that shouldn't be a problem.</p><p>Right. But the problem is, of course, that's true of fossil fuels also, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>True.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>There's a time issue that you have to take into account. And so this notion of the carbon-debt, if you harvest forest to produce energy, has not been factored into a lot of these standards.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It sounds like over there, it's probably more of a forestry-industry shenanigans thing than a farming industry shenanigans thing.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, it is. But then I think around the world, there's also various places where biodiesel is being used and promoted through policy, where you've got a palm oil industry in Indonesia, for example, and other places where that's been promoted. So there is a global aspect to this that also needs a lot of attention. And I think what the US does sets a precedent that other countries look to. So it's another reason why we really have to get this right, but nobody.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Else is dumping corn into gas tanks specifically.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Not at these volumes, no.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And really, why would you? Okay, I wanted to leave a little bit more time for this, but just sort of by way of wrapping up. I think we can agree, for reasons we've discussed, that biofuels in personal transportation are silly. We're electrifying, we're on the way, there's just no point anymore in — I guess you could make an argument for gas. Cars are going to be around a while longer and at least you can marginally reduce the impact of gas. But given what we know about the carbon opportunity costs and all that, it's not even clear that's helpful.</p><p>So in personal transportation, biofuels are silly, I think, but there are, as people are constantly saying, areas we don't know how to decarbonize yet. And so I wonder if you were sort of canvassing, what are the plausible positive uses of biofuels in the world? We're heading toward a decarbonized world. What are they still good for?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Right, so I think there's a couple of use cases that could make sense, but again, really depending on taking the carbon opportunity cost into account and really focusing on waste feedstock. So one is aviation. Of all the sectors that people have said are hard to abate, aviation really is hard to abate. And I don't think we know what the long term answer is there, but certainly whatever biomass resources we have that are truly beneficial to use for fuel, replacing jet fuel with so called sustainable aviation fuel, that's one possibility that could make a lot of sense.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Pausing on that, I mean, I saw a calculation on Twitter, so take this for what it's worth, but if you're comparing the volumes necessary to, say, replace 10% to 15% of gasoline volume and the volumes necessary to replace total aviation fuel volume, they're not way off from one another. So in other words, if biofuels really, if we're really setting out to replace all bunker fuel, not just jets use, but has other uses too, with biofuels, that's going to be a lot of biofuels still.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>That's right. And I don't think there's enough waste to supply the whole aviation sector, but it can supply a meaningful part of it. So that's one use. What we do with the rest of the aviation ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Fly less, Dan.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Fly less. That could be a thing. I don't know that that's very likely, but it would be good. They're short haul aviation. There's electric planes, which ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Trains!</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>... really cool. Trains would be a lot easier for short haul. And people are talking about hydrogen. I don't know if that's going to be a thing for aviation. The solution there, quite frankly, might be that's the one place left where you would actually burn petroleum and then compensate for those emissions with direct air capture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>I don't love that solution, but right now I don't have a better answer for aviation. So that's a tough one. The other thing for biofuels, and this figures prominently in a lot of decarbonization scenarios, such as the Princeton Net-Zero study is making hydrogen by gasifying biomass and then capturing the CO2. And if you put the CO2 underground, the net effect could actually being a negative emission fuel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. It's similar to BECCs. Right. Similar to burning biomass.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Right. It's a form of BECCs. But instead of making electricity, where we have lots of options of better ways to make electricity, if you make hydrogen, you're competing with electrolytic hydrogen, which in the long run is probably cheaper. But if you account for the benefit of actually removing carbon from the atmosphere this way so if you're using, for example, corn stover, there's several hundred million tons of corn stover produced every year in the US. Given how much corn we're producing now, now a third of that corn is currently being produced for ethanol. So maybe that declines somewhat, but there's still going to be a lot of corn stover.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you take the corn stover, you gasify it and you get CO2 and hydrogen, you bury the CO2, you use the hydrogen to make fuels. Is that the idea?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Right. Use hydrogen to make fuels, or use it to make fertilizer or use it to make steel, whatever you're going to use hydrogen for. That makes sense.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is such a long chain of conversions. It's just like you're losing so much along the way there. It's hard for me to believe that that's going to end up being the best we can do. But I don't have any other ideas either.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, there are a few companies that are trying to commercialize it. Like I say, it's not a large source of the total hydrogen. So if you look at Net-Zero study or others and say, what does the energy system look like in 2050? We're using a bunch of hydrogen. Most of that comes from electrolysis, some of it in these studies comes from this biomass pathway. But it's actually a significant share of the net carbon removal because every ton of corn stover that you convert to hydrogen plus CO2 is actually producing 1.8 tons of CO2. And so a couple hundred million tons of carbon removal potentially from doing this.</p><p>And if you value both the hydrogen and the carbon removal, it starts to look like a sensible thing to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. But aviation and maybe hydrogen, those are sort of like the biofuels of the future. That's more or less what we can think of to do with them.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>And then I think the other thing is to substitute for plastics made from petroleum. That could be another ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that ever going to I mean, I feel like that's been right around the corner almost as long as cellulosic biofuels. Is that a thing that's really going to happen?</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Not as long as natural gas is super cheap and they keep producing more of it. Right. So, I mean, it's hard to compete, but if you're trying to squeeze the last ton of fossil carbon emissions out of the system, then it starts to look like a plausible thing to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Okay, well, this is substantially more than I've thought about biofuels in many, many years. Thank you for coming on it and catching us up. And I guess if we're just sort of taking away the main takeaway here, it's just that EPA should, like, read Biden's Transportation Decarbonization Strategy.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>That would be a good start.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right. Dan Lashof, World Resources Institute. Thank you for coming on and catching us all up.</p><p><strong>Dan Lashof</strong></p><p>Alright. Thanks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-going-on-with-biofuels</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:108097380</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 12 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/108097380/911387d5e0771c8b9dc9eb243ddcb208.mp3" length="40158636" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3347</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/108097380/9041b7d577281305e58367a9c0bae773.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's going on with geothermal?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Project InnerSpace founder and executive director Jamie Beard, who has been instrumental in influencing oil and gas personnel to move into the geothermal industry, discusses exciting recent developments in geothermal and the opportunities ahead.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADlO8fDFsj65IZx2_Ox9pQEa/volts23.03.31%28jamie.beard%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/what-s-going-on-with-geothermal"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Things are starting to come together for geothermal. Political awareness has seen an uptick. Investment is flowing in. Startups, many staffed by veterans of the oil and gas industry, are swarming to take advantage of existing geothermal opportunities and expand those opportunities. New technologies and techniques are reaching the demonstration phase.</p><p>It’s an exciting time. </p><p>At the center of it all is Jamie Beard, who for more than a decade now has served as a kind of pied piper luring people out of oil and gas and into geothermal. (Here’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ted.com/talks/jamie_c_beard_the_untapped_energy_source_that_could_power_the_planet">her 2021 TED Talk</a>.) A one-time energy and regulatory lawyer, Beard founded the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.texasgeo.org/">Geothermal Entrepreneurship Organization</a>, dedicated to educating and training oil and gas personnel to move into geothermal. (GEO recently helped launch the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.texasgeo.org/team">Texas Geothermal Institute</a> to expand that work.) </p><p>She is also the founder and executive director of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.projectinnerspace.org/">Project InnerSpace</a>, a nonprofit dedicated to advancing the geothermal industry. It recently <a target="_blank" href="https://www.prweb.com/releases/project_innerspace_launches_major_collaboration_to_map_geothermal_resources_around_the_globe/prweb19184585.htm">launched</a> an initiative to build a Global Heat Flow Database, which would help map subsurface resources across the globe. It also plans to invest in new geothermal technology companies that are ready to launch first-of-a-kind demonstration projects.</p><p>Beard has been my go-to resource on geothermal for years, so I was thrilled to bring her on the pod to discuss the current state of the industry, the migration of personnel and expertise from oil and gas to geothermal, and the path to global scale for the industry.</p><p>All right then. Jamie Beard of Project InnerSpace. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Oh, my gosh. David Roberts. Hello. It's nice to see you again.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's been a while since we talked. You know, when I was working on a piece on geothermal for Vox a few years ago, I don't know how many years ago, my family makes fun of me because everything pre pandemic is about five years ago. Yeah, I guess it was 2020. And my sense then around geothermal was that there was this sort of kind of a surge of interest, call it ten to 15 years ago, and a surge of investment. And then that kind of tailed off, kind of the air went out of that balloon a little bit lost steam.</p><p>There you go. That's the pun I was looking for. And then my sense was that as we were talking back in 2020, a bunch of strands trends were just starting to come together for a new big resurgence, a renaissance of geothermal. I want to talk about the future of geothermal, the immediate future, the near term future, the midterm future. But first, I would like to just start with a snapshot of, like, what is happening in the industry now? Is it still the case that only conventional geothermal wells are actually being dug and operating? What's the kind of snapshot of the industry?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Well, no, it's no longer just the case that conventional is being dug, which is really cool. And that's actually a difference between now and 2020. So when we talked back in the day, you're right to use renaissance, we were just about at the beginning of one, right? So it was like there's all this stuff that was very buzzy, but there wasn't really a whole lot in the ground. There were some teams that were kind of thinking about it, but nobody was really doing it yet. So there are some teams that have gotten out and done stuff in the last couple of years, and that means demonstrations, and that means that wells have been drilled, and that means that demonstrations and pilots have been done.</p><p>And that's also meant that the oil and gas industry has gotten increasingly excited and started investing. So the landscape has changed quite a bit in the last three years in terms of momentum and also investment dollars, which is really cool, I guess, to start with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I should have done this at the very beginning, but I shouldn't assume that listeners read that piece on geothermal.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Well, everybody in the world has.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I would like to think so, but just in case there's a few out there who have it, I just want to make a very basic distinction. Geothermal to date, mostly, almost exclusively has been what's called hydrothermal, which is you go find places where there are natural riffs and reservoirs of thermal activity, and then you go down there and exploit that heat. So that's what geothermal has been from like the dawn of time up until about five minutes ago. You go find these areas where the heat already exists, that's conventional geothermal, and you stick a straw down and get the steam up and make electricity.</p><p>Then there is coming what's called advanced geothermal, whereas you go make your own reservoir, you dig down and you crack the rock to create basically an artificial or a human made fracture, which then the hot water comes, fills the cracks, then you stick a straw down, et cetera. You make your own reservoir. And then there are sort of beyond that, kind of like what you might call cutting edge. I don't know what the exact term is. Cutting edge technology research where people are trying to do things like closed loop geothermal, where instead of just having the heat be dispersed in this natural reservoir, you're just tubing water down, letting it heat up and tubing it back up.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>These are very accurate terms.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I hope everybody's keeping up. And then there's wacky cutting edge drilling technology, like using lasers and plasma sound waves, plasma millimeter waves, god knows what else. That's the cutting edge. That's just like the landscape, just in case people don't know. So most of what's happened to date in the history of geothermal has been conventional geothermal. And as far as I know, in terms of commercial operating geothermal plants, they're still almost all conventional hydrothermal, are they not?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. There are a few commercial egs plants in the world, but they are very few. And the rest is the Iceland kind of geothermal, the geothermal that we see on the surface. So it's the traditional stuff, but even that there's not much of it in the world. Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>It's still quite small, but anyway, yeah, so you caught everybody up to 2020 with your article. So everybody that's listening, go read David's article from 2020. It'll catch you up to then, and then we'll cover the last three years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Now, right now what I want to know is, is there still interest in conventional hydrothermal? Are people still trying to dig those wells? Is that still like a going concern? Or is everyone turning their attention now to egs, which is enhanced geothermal systems, which is this make your own reservoir thing, scalable geothermal? Is everybody going in that direction now?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>No, not everybody, and I don't think everybody should. When it comes down to it, there's a whole lot of conventional geothermal in the world that has not been developed. There a lot. Even though conventional geothermal, or hydrothermal as it's called, is geographically limited, there's still a whole lot of it out there that we could be leveraging. Right.</p><p>So if you look at the oil and gas industry and how they're engaging in geothermal, about half of the entities are going to dip their toe in to geothermal by pursuing conventional hydrothermal projects first and then the other. Half is looking and thinking, well, we'll just skip over that and go for the gold. Go for the stuff that we can scale and do anywhere. Right. And so there definitely a split in the community on that. But I think when it comes down to it, we're going to, over the next ten years or so, develop a whole lot of hydrothermal before we end up in scalable stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>My impression of hydrothermal was always that there are a couple of places where the sort of activity is intense enough to give you the heat you need to really make electricity efficiently, but there wasn't a ton of it because it couldn't compete kind of with wind and solar. Have there been developments in conventional hydrothermal geothermal that make it more attractive for investment? Like have costs come down, has permitting or siting gotten easier? What's the kind of state of play?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Sadly, that's not the case with we're going to get into that. Yeah. No, there's not been much by the way, of regulatory, unfortunately. But I think your question about costs coming down yes, a lot of that has happened because of technology transfer from the oil and gas industry over the past years that have helped revitalize, for instance, underperforming wells for hydrothermal. The heat is not usually the problem. The problem is having sufficient water naturally occurring underground in your reservoir to sustain your output. So you need to have enough water coming up out of the ground to run your power plant.</p><p>And if you don't have enough, or if your well declines, over time, which does happen with hydrothermal. Eventually you start running out of water and wells decline. There are ways to revitalize old wells, and that's being tried. There are ways to enhance the fracture network in hydrothermal systems and that's being tried, right? Yes. And quite frankly, hydrothermal is a really nice 24/7 baseload source of clean energy. And so what we're finding in terms of cost is that there are markets that will sustain a premium for baseload simply because there's so much solar and wind. Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's what I've been thinking about, is just that the value of dispatchability in and of itself is rising. So I thought that might be sort of affecting the economics of geothermal.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Actually, let's pause here to talk about permitting and siting. You hear a lot of complaints, really from everyone about this subject, from every industry. But the geothermal people complain that it's very difficult to get a well started, even relative to oil and gas wells.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So maybe just tell us quickly. These permitting and siting problems, I assume, face all kinds of geothermal, the hydrothermal and the advanced stuff. So what's the problem now? And is there any solution on the horizon?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>All right, so in a nutshell, so we don't put everybody to sleep. In the United States, most of the really low hanging fruit for geothermal development exists on Bureau of Land Management land, federal land that is subject to the National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA. And it's an extensive set of environmental regulations that require a lot of review before doing a project on federal land. And geothermal projects are subject to NEPA. What that means, essentially, is that for the multiple phases of a project, in order to get a project developed on federal land, you're looking at a permitting timeline of six or eight or even ten years to get a project off the ground, which is completely ridiculous.</p><p>You can't get projects funded under that scenario.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that also true for oil and gas well? Is that true for everything, or is there unique barriers?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>So here's the thing. This is what I was just about to point that out, which is oil and gas drilling on federal land has been excluded from this process through a categorical exemption.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What? Isn't that nice for them?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Well, that's whether they lobbied for it. And here's the problem. Geothermal doesn't have a lobby. And so what we end up with here is a scenario where you can get an oil and gas well drilled on federal land in no time, very quick, in a geothermal well, which is clean energy. And the same process as drilling the oil and gas well is going to take you a decade. It kills projects. This kills projects, right? When you ask what's the solution, I am loathed to say politics, because who knows, right? And are we going to wait around for that?</p><p>My personal opinion is no. Let's go around it so that's why I've been focusing all my efforts on state and private land, because we're just not going to do the federal you're.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just going to throw your hands up about federal land and go to other.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>And that's how we go fast. And that's why most of these demonstrations are in Texas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. That's hilarious. And are there state permitting and siting issues or are things generally better at the state level?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Well, look, if you focus on oil and gas states that have streamlined permitting for oil and gas and that have friendly regulatory environments to oil and gas, no, you got no problems. Right. I think the trend is going to be and quite frankly, this is the way it should happen if we're not going to sit around and wait for politics, we need to be focused on deploying pilot geothermal projects in states that are used to oil and gas permitting. Right. Those are going to be the oil and gas states. And they just so happen, many of them, to have excellent geothermal resources so we can get projects permitted in twelve months or less instead of a decade.</p><p>And we've seen that happen with one of the projects in Texas. They were off to the races in a matter of months to do their pilot. Yeah,</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Texas.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Go go drill, baby drill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Does have its merits.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Since you sort of brought up oil and gas, let's talk about a little bit about how in the last ten years, techniques developed and perfected by the oil and gas industry are coming to geothermal. I think people know, once again, assuming they read my article.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Read the article.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They know that fracking is part of that, but it's bigger than just that. So what is the sort of knowledge transfer that's been happening?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Yeah. So it's all of the learnings of the shale boom. Let's back up on the shale boom. So all of a sudden, 20 or so years ago, global geopolitics got rearranged by natural gas. And I think a lot of folks kind of skip over why that happened. Right, it happened, and we all realize it happened. But why? Why is the reason geothermal is now a thing? Because it was this gigantic flourish of technological development that came out of the oil and gas industry and 10 or 15 years of massive leapfrogs in what we can do when we're drilling and engineering the subsurface.</p><p>And that includes fracking, but it also includes a lot of other cool things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When we say fracking, we mean fracturing rock to create natural gaps that are then filled, in natural gas's case by natural gas, in this case by ...</p><p>Fluid.</p><p>Hot water. But that's what we are referring to, by fracking. I just didn't want to assume people knew.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Yeah, right. So hydraulic fracturing, so the process of applying pressure to a well bore in order to enhance or create new fractures or pore space in rock. And that process can be used for more than one thing. Like right now, we use it to produce more gas than we normally could from a reservoir. But it just so happens that that technique in creating or enhancing fractures and rock is really helpful if we want to engineer the subsurface to create a geothermal reservoir. Right. So it's a really good example of kind of a bad word that comes out of the oil and gas. Really polarizing word, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>That can kind of be repurposed into a really interesting and big opportunity for the future of clean energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Kind of a side thing. But I wanted to ask in the industry, what is the sort of state of thinking on how to tiptoe around that?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Oh my gosh.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do they want to just address it full on and say it's fracking but it's different? Or do they want to just come up with a different word for it? What's the kind of state of play?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>What a good question. David, I love talking to you. This is an excellent question. So it's super controversial what you just asked and nobody really wants to talk about it. Right?</p><p>So this is the way I see it going. You've got geothermal entities and the government tiptoeing around it, so they're trying to call it something else because they don't want to get mixed up with oil and gas and all that. Right.</p><p>So let's keep it nice and simple and let's call it other stuff. So they've called it things like hydro-shearing and hydro-fracking just to try to avoid the word fracking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Come up with a boring enough term and everybody will just slide right past it.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Right, right. Like nobody's going to notice kind of thing. Right. The oil and gas industry, by and large, adopts the opinion, "well, that hell, we just spent the last 20 years perfecting this amazing technique that rearranged geopolitics and can revolutionize the future of geothermal. We're going to call it what it's called, damn it." Right. Then you have some entities saying, yeah, but it might be easier from a community relations standpoint to not dive right in there. So you do have some controversy in oil and gas. My personal opinion is we need to call a spade a spade. Right.</p><p>And I think there's going to be some intellectual work that we need to do as human beings to get over polarized and loaded terms. But we need to be honest with one another about what we're doing. And if we rename something that is what we are doing a technique for geothermal. It's not producing oil and gas, it's producing clean energy. That's awesome. But we are doing a technique that's called a thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it looks a little shady when you ...</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Well, it doesn't build trust. Right. If we start trying to call it something else, that's not a trust building exercise. And I think that's a lot of what we need to be doing for geothermal is trust building.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let's briefly address here then, the kinds of concerns people might have when they hear the word "fracking". So I think people have a lot of muddled ideas in their head about what the dangers of natural gas fracking are. But tell us why this is different and why people shouldn't worry, or if they should worry a little bit, how much should they worry?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Well, okay, you're going to get the direct story from me, David. This is the no b******t answer here, which is the way hydraulic fracturing has been utilized by the geothermal industry so far has been a very simple version. It's been very low tech. So they're just trying to apply pressure and enhance existing fractures. But it's a very basic method of hydraulic fracturing that's been used. And I think when it comes down to it, when you're fracturing to enhance a reservoir to circulate water or another fluid, like, we can get to this later, but like, supercritical CO2 is the new cool trend to use as your working fluid for geothermal systems.</p><p>And it's a really cool idea, but if you are enhancing the subsurface to make that clean energy system work better, why not? As long as you're doing it safely and responsibly and leveraging the learnings of the last 20 years about how we do that safely and responsibly. I think when you start thinking about hydraulic fracturing in the oil and gas context, the types of images that come to mind are lighting your faucet on fire kind of these very polarizing and upsetting images. Right?</p><p>And I do think that that is a result of ten or 15 years of bad blood. Mistrust and bad blood between oil and gas and environmental and climate activists. And I'll just go ahead and say, just for full disclosure, I am an environmentalist and a climate activist. I am not in or from the oil and gas industry. In fact, quite the opposite. So I understand all of those sentiments. I grew up wanting to oil and gas be damned. I mean, I was going to bring them down kind of thing. So I get all that. The differences, though, between the way geothermal wells are fractured and oil and gas wells are fractured.</p><p>There are some in oil and gas. They're using a variety of chemicals to enable that process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is what I emphasize to people, is most of what you associate with the damages of natural gas fracking have to do with the fluids being injected and leaking into the groundwater and etcetera. And geothermal just doesn't use those same fluids.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>That's right. Well, right now, let's pause for a second and say, yes, there are a lot of differences in techniques and fluids used and also where natural gas is located, you oftentimes have to drill through water tables to produce and get to natural gas reservoirs. And when you have those sorts of close in geographical distance between water tables and oil and gas resources, you have the potential to have problems, particularly if you're fracturing the subsurface. Geothermal is different. Right. So because in the case of hydrothermal, you're in a hydrothermal reservoir, you're in the water table, it's a reservoir that's full of water, and your intent is producing that water to the surface.</p><p>Right. So it's a different kind of game in geothermal. Just off the bat, but I'll say part of the excitement, this is where we need to do some intellectual work, in bringing people together and not fighting about this. But but we're going to have to think about this. A lot of the benefit that we will see over the coming years, coming out of the oil and gas industry into geothermal, is actually adapting some of those more complex techniques that they use in hydraulic fracturing and oil and gas and adopting them into geothermal, applying them to make the geothermal reservoirs function properly.</p><p>Does that mean we need to transfer the chemicals and these ... no, not necessarily. But what we do want to do is transfer the really cool, cutting edge stuff like multistage fracturing, where you're actually engineering the reservoir in really specific ways to where they're parallel structures that you're fracking to connect with one another, and therefore you can predict how the fluids will flow amongst them. They're more complicated engineered subsurface reservoirs. And if we can do that like we're doing it for natural gas. Now in the geothermal context, EGS in particular, what we're saying is engineered or enhanced geothermal systems, they will work better.</p><p>And what that means is they will have better output. What that means is they will be cheaper to build. Right. So some of that transfer we do want and we should support, but I think we need to figure out how to separate the good from the bad when we think about fracking or the "f" word. So we call it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also the other question that I get constantly, I'm sure you get it several times a day, is about earthquakes. People have this real fixation on the idea that geothermal digging is going to cause earthquakes. Was there ever anything to that? Is there currently anything to that? Is that a real worry or is that kind of a myth?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>No, it's a real worry. Absolutely. It's something that we should absolutely be focused on and considering. Here's the thing. The cases in the world where seismicity, or I'll back up induced seismicity, so geothermal systems have natural seismicity associated with them all the time. It just happens. What we don't want is to be causing that seismicity by our actions. So we are interfering with the subsurface in a way that causes seismicity, particularly seismicity that is detectable by humans. Right. So seismicity that is above a level that becomes noticeable. And there have been cases where geothermal systems, particularly EGS projects, where they're going in and fracking these reservoirs, have caused induced seismicity and some of them have been significant.</p><p>They not only detectable, but damage causing induced seismicity. And I will say there is kind of an obsession in media, right, about geothermal. It's like, oh, there's all this awesome stuff happening, but earthquakes, it's always this thing. It's kind of the boogeyman. And I would say in those situations where there has been induced seismicity related to an EGS project, in 100% of the cases, that was because the system lubricated an existing fault that was underneath the system. Therefore, that system should have never been located or sited where it was being developed. And there's a reason this is happening, which is the geothermal industry is so fractured and regional.</p><p>It's kind of a mom and pop shop kind of industry. You've got entities out there just kind of developing projects, but not really sharing best practices and standardization, developing protocols that everyone is following, et cetera. And in those types of situations, you'll have mistakes and some of the mistakes end up on international news, right? And that's what you have for geothermal. And that's also David, kind of, and I think this is going to be ironic to probably some of your listeners that I'll say this, but standardization and establishment of protocols and data sharing and getting things like this under control at scale, the oil and gas industry is really great at that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, we're going to get back to that, but that's a great segue to my next question, which is tell us about what Project InnerSpace is. Project InnerSpace is nonprofit. You have to advance geothermal. The plans have two phases, which I would like to talk about in turn. The first phase, what you're trying to do now, what just got launched and is underway, is basically, as far as I can tell, an attempt to map and better understand what's beneath the surface. So just tell us a little bit about InnerSpace and what this phase one looks like.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Awesome. Thank you for asking this. We kind of forgot about that part right at the beginning. Hello, I'm Jamie Beard. I run Project InnerSpace. Project InnerSpace is a nonprofit that I founded this last May. So it's a newly launched entity. The purpose of InnerSpace is to address two major barriers that are standing in the way currently of geothermal reaching exponential scale in growth. And essentially what we're trying to do at InnerSpace is put ourselves out of business by 2030. So we're trying to run a sprint and make ourselves completely irrelevant by the end of this decade.</p><p>First is phase one, which you mentioned, which is building a global, high resolution, global map of where the geothermal resources are and how deep they are so we can understand the low hanging fruit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this doesn't exist. Imagination, like in some library somewhere that seems like that should be happening already.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>You'd think, amazingly, it doesn't exist. Some places in the world have done a better job than others at estimating we have some maps of the United States that were done by Southern Methodist University in the early 2000s. We did a little poking around on that, actually, with SMU a couple of years ago to see how accurate those maps were. And it turned out the maps are a little bit inaccurate on the wrong side for geothermal. So it's actually a rosier picture for geothermal than those maps show, which could interfere. And frankly, since so many projects are on the margin economically, having maps that are even 10% off matters.</p><p>It matters, right. So we need to get this stuff right. We need to know where the resources are, how deep the resources are, and what temperature they are before we start siting projects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So right now a geothermal company just wanders out into the landscape and starts digging.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. Yeah. I mean, they do the best they can, but there's a lot of money that goes into subsurface exploration. Oil and gas spends billions of dollars doing subsurface exploration for oil and gas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm surprised some of that isn't transferable, they would know enough.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>That's what InnerSpace phase one is. Right?</p><p>So it's like, all right, oil and gas industry, y'all have a lot of data and we would like to use that to build a really high resolution, detailed global map that's interactive and free for the world so that everybody can use it, including governments, but also startups and everybody in between.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this will just save a lot of exploration costs. It will help startups skip some of that exploration stage and just know where to go.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>That pre-project risk. Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it will give us a better global sense of what the resource is.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>That's right. So it's not going to be high resolution enough to say this is the exact spot we want to put our plant. We can't do all that. That's a little bit too much for a map of this size. But what we can say is these are the regions in the developing world where there's a lot of low hanging fruit for geothermal and there are huge population centers here and wow, this country is poised to be adding a lot of coal capacity over the coming decades. So, wow, let's just slip geothermal in here instead.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is this about sort of like rationalizing and checking and ordering existing data? Or does this involve people going out into the field and I don't know what it would look like digging holes ...</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Drilling a hole.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Drilling holes and testing.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>We will not be drilling any holes in phase one. Thankfully. Phase one is a fast sprint too. So we're going to publish in 24 months. What we're doing is we're grabbing all the data that's out there that's imperfect. And most heat flow data in the world that's out there is imperfect, meaning it's not cleaned, it's not organized. It needs to be QC'd before it can be utilized and relied on. So. We're going to take all the data that's out there, clean it and get it in really good shape. Then we're going to collect as much oil and gas data as we can.</p><p>So this is data that the oil and gas industry has from the millions and millions of wells they've drilled globally. So they know ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's not proprietary, they're willing to share it?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Some of it is, but they're willing to share the pieces that we are able to clean to keep proprietary. So we can do that. So we'll have a subset of data that's never been used for the purpose of geothermal exploration before, which is going to be really helpful because it turns out when they drill for oil and gas wells, they take the temperature of the well as they drill all the way down to the bottom. And that's really helpful in predicting how hot it will be deeper and also in like formations in other places in the world. So what we'll do after we get all this data is add in some AI.</p><p>So we're going to do some predictive analytics on it, right? So we'll be able to predict more accurately than we do currently places in the world where we don't have a lot of existing data, what to expect in those formations in terms of depth and quality of the geothermal resources.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. And then phase two will be investing in sort of demonstration projects, first of a kind projects helping a lot of these new technologies, these new startups, establish the fact that they are possible ...</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Game changers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is what I want to talk about is we discussed earlier there's Egs, which is just sort of fracking making your own reservoir, but then there's deeper and deeper and deeper stuff people are pushing towards. And that super deep stuff is where you get into really mind blowing, game changing type of stuff. We're basically like super-efficient, super-hot, always on available anywhere, this kind of stuff.</p><p>So the second phase for Project InnerSpace is investing in some of these first of a kinds. And what I am curious about is sort of of all those technologies that I wrote about and that people are passing back and forth and some of them sound quite Sci-Fi. Who is ready to go start digging. Like what are the advanced geothermal technologies that are to the point that they're ready to start producing. When you start investing in these first of a kinds, what are they going to look like? Like first of a kind, what?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>So phase two is a fund. It's a billion dollar fund and it will invest in up to 20 1st-of-a-kind pilot projects in different places in the world. And phase one will help inform where we put them right. So we're going to use that data to help inform that process. But the portfolio will be broad. So geothermal is vastly underfunded in every possible way across every single concept to be honest. And so we're going to cast as broad a net as we can to have as high an impact as we can in terms of proving out scalable geothermal concepts.</p><p>And so geothermal, I don't think that we should look at geothermal as a one size fits all type of thing, where if we can just make this one kind of system work, it could be applicable anywhere in the world. That's probably not going to be the case because the subsurface in different places in the world looks really different. There's different types of rock, there's different types of heat flow, right? So different types of geothermal systems will excel in different types of subsurface reservoirs. And so I think we need to cast a really wide net on the types of concepts that we'll fund with phase two.</p><p>And so that will include EGS, but it will also include closed-loop. It will include EGS and closed-loop hybrids. So systems that mix both so they'll go down and they will directionally drill this radiator style, radiator style system into the rock, but they will also fracture around that to enhance heat flow going to that well bore, right? So that's pretty cool because what you do in a hybrid kind of system is you eliminate the risk of fracture evolution over time. You're not pressurizing the fractures and trying to circulate fluid through them and then making them change over time.</p><p>They're static, right? They're just sitting there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You fracture the one time and then it does the rest of the work for you. And closed-loop is so, I mean, I'm the farthest thing from a technical person in the world, but it's intuitively appealing because it's just so much more contained. Like your fluid is exactly you know, exactly what the fluid is, exactly how much it is, how fast it's moving.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>And you get out what you put in. Right? And also closed loops are really cool because you can use non-water working fluids that work better than water in closed loop. And that's where supercritical CO2 comes in. It heats up faster than water. We have a lot of CO2 laying around. Let's use it, right? It's cool. And the turbines on the surface can be redesigned to actually run directly off of supercritical CO2. So direct drive by CO2, which is very promising and very cool. So the fund is going to cast a wide net on these things, right?</p><p>We're looking at power production projects with Cogeneration of industrial heat. So looking at industrial heat decarbonization with some of the concepts, a coal plant conversion might be possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about the lasers? What are ...</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>The drilling concepts? Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are those real enough that they're ready to start digging?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Well, I don't imagine that we will be deploying one of these next gen drilling concepts in phase two, because we are deploying phase two starting in a year and a half or two years. So those concepts are not quite ready for commercial deployment, and these are commercial pilots. So we're going out and building power plants with this money. And we'll have 20 power plants when we're done. They're not quite ready, but that's not to say they won't be. Right.</p><p>So these cool, we're going to vaporize rock kind of concepts, they're sexy enough for venture capital and they're well funded. Right. So they're running a sprint. And we may see some of these concepts deployed in the near term, but probably not near enough term for phase two. Let's see, definitely by the end of the decade, we'll see one in the field, my guess.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is all basically different ways of bringing up heat that you use to boil water and create steam and run a turbine. Right. I mean, this is all ...</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Very simply yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just about getting heat.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>That's right. We're just trying to harvest heat so we can harvest heat for heat, so we can harvest it to use in an industrial process so we don't have to burn fossil fuels to produce that heat, which I think is a no brainer for geothermal, but we can also use the heat to produce electricity. And we're focused on that as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Since you mentioned it. I wanted to ask about this, too. A lot of this is another thing that I feel like has sort of captured public interest, maybe slightly out of scale with its reality. But how big of a piece of the geothermal pie is going to be repowering fossil fuel facilities? Because people really love that idea.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>You mean converting existing plants to geothermal?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, like a coal plant. Instead of getting the heat to run the turbine from coal, you just get it from underground. But the turbine already exists. The power plant already exists. The ...</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Transmission structure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Transmission to and from already exists. So it's a great idea. I just wonder great idea. How big of a deal is that going to be?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Well, so there are a couple of things about geothermal right now that are really good at catching headlines because they sound so cute. Right? And that's one of them. And another one is oil and gas well reuse. You hear that one all the time, right? Yeah. Oh, let's just reuse. All right. Okay.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Both those I wanted to ask about. The second one I'm super skeptical about, just for obvious ...</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Which one the coal plant?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Reusing wells.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You're drilling in different places, looking for different.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Yes, Right. And you're not looking for heat when you're drilling for oil and gas. You're looking for oil and gas. You're avoiding oftentimes. Yes, that's true. All right, so let's look at coal first. I really like the idea. In fact, InnerSpace has just funded a coal plant conversion study. Right.</p><p>So we are studying the top 20 candidates for coal plant conversion in the United States to geothermal. We're going to prioritize them by economics and subsurface characterization and we'll get a good picture of that. I like the idea. Could we go and do a megawatt to megawatt coal plant conversion today on the existing footprint of the plant with geothermal? Maybe ... Maybe in a really hot place, a hot subsurface. Hot in the subsurface, right. So say we go to Nevada, where you've got really attractive geothermal gradients and you try your very best. So we get the best in oil and gas to drill this well as cheaply as they can.</p><p>And by the way, it's not one well, it's many wells to do it. Megawatt for megawatt. We could probably technologically do it. It's feasible to do it. The problem becomes this, though. It's not economically feasible to do it. Not right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It all just comes down to how deep you can get. Right? I mean, ultimately it all just comes down to getting deeper. Getting deeper, cheaper.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Well, yes. So it depends. This is all about energy density, essentially. So if you want to look at it like energy density, the deeper you go, the more energy dense your output for geothermal. Right?</p><p>So if you're drilling to 600 degrees Celsius and you're producing at the surface 600 degrees Celsius fluids, that's awesome. I mean, that is natural gas power plant style enthalpy. And that's pretty awesome. And then you can start talking about plants that are gigawatts, right? Big plants, like coal plants. But right now, what we're calling that in geothermal land is super-hot. So super-hot rock or SHR, my favorite.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Finally the energy world comes up with a cool term, finally, right?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Exactly. Just add super to it and that makes it cool. Right. So those systems are theoretical right now, not super well understood. How we would fracture in, for instance, you've gone so hot that the rock is now plastic. It's not hard anymore. It's soft. So how do you fracture that and have the fractures not close</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And have your drilling equipment not melt?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>It'll melt. But that's the thing. That's why all these kind of cool new drilling methods are being researched and produced, because they are relying on materials that actually just melt and vaporize the rock instead of drilling them. There may be a situation where we can actually drill into 600 degrees Celsius semiplastic rock in the future. I think what this comes down to, though, is economic feasibility. We can probably do it now, like I was mentioning with the coal plant conversion, right? We could get the best in class to go drill those wells, and they've done it.</p><p>Like oil and gas has drilled 300 Celsius offshore, no problem. We could do it. But do we have the $500 million to do it? No, we don't. No, we don't, actually. Right. And that makes it economically infeasible right now. So the question really will become for these kind of cool, sexy, super deep systems, is can we get the cost down? Or is something so dramatic going to happen over the next decades in terms of our energy markets, that we're going to be able to afford to develop these systems. And I'm hoping yes. Right. That's my hope.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What you want to do just in terms of broad, big picture for the industry is get the low hanging fruit first. Build a bunch of plants, get the learning, bring the cost down.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Learning curve.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it's not necessarily the case that the places the coal plants are, are where the low hanging fruit is.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Right, exactly. Though some of them are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No reason to start there.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Yes. And we're going to find the ones that are, because some of them are, but not all of them are. And you are exactly right. That where we start is baby steps. And that is exactly, David, how shale happened. Right. We ended up with a little bit, a little bit, a little bit more, uhoh, this is a lot, a lot, a lot, bam. Change the world. Right. And it was just like this was about taking baby steps. And so for geothermal, it'll be the same. Right? Let's go and find the easiest stuff to do first. That's probably going to be in sedimentary basins, because they're soft, the rock is soft, and oil and gas, for instance, understands how to do it because they've been doing it for shale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let me ask this, because I had a pod recently on learning curves and on what kinds of technologies do and don't get on them. And a big piece of what gets on a learning curve is technologies that are more modular, more factory produced, and not so kind of bespoke to each individual location. So I'm curious sort of in the current state of play for geothermal, how bespoke is it in an individual location? How modularized is it? And what room is there to sort of modularize it in a way that will accelerate that learning?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>It is the perfect example of getting on a learning curve and particularly transferrin from oil and gas to geothermal. I think, David, you saw it recently we published a report called The Future of Geothermal in Texas. And there was a chapter in that report that dealt with transferable learnings from oil and gas and learning curves. And the outcome of that report was essentially, well, hell, if we just transferred what we've already got, let's not even talk about what we need to develop or what we could. Let's just talk about what we've already got in oil and gas and let's transfer that into geothermal.</p><p>How much do we reduce cost off the top? Just transfer what they already do in oil and gas into geothermal. And yeah, modular, the way they do oil and gas, David, is called pad drilling. It's manufacturing. It is ultra-modular. I mean, they literally stamp out oil and gas wells, 200ft from one another in a line. Right. It's manufactured. Right. It's the definition of modular. But if we grabbed all of that technology and just transferred it in wholesale to geothermal. No innovations required. We've got 43% cost reduction off the top for geothermal. That's huge, right? I mean, that is not considering new stuff.</p><p>That is what we've already got. That is a huge opportunity. Huge opportunity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is another good segue then, because I want to talk about this larger sort of relationship between oil and gas and geothermal. This is of course your bailiwick, your sweet spot. This is your bag. So this is another one of these sort of like folktales about geothermal going around. Oil and gas, You can just transfer to geothermal. Same skills. It's great. It's going to cause this flow.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>It's becoming a headline too. Yeah, it's another cute headline.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I'm just curious, to what extent is that a reality? Number one, to what extent are the skills really transferable? And number two, to what extent is it happening? The geothermal industry is so tiny compared to oil and gas, so it's not like leakage to geothermal is going to show up in the statistics of oil and gas employment, I think, anytime soon. In a major way. I mean, tell me if I'm wrong.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>But no, you're not wrong.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What is the nature of that? How much of that is reality and how much of that is acute headline?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>So I think the headlines get it a little bit wrong, but I think we need to look at it differently. So we need to adjust what we're thinking here. So skills transfer and all that? Yes, I mean, almost 100%. It is so synergistic in terms of skill set, transferring from oil and gas to geothermal that we're talking about minimal training certificate level, let's just get you up to speed kind of thing, but otherwise go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting, so drilling really is just drilling then.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>It is drilling. Drilling is drilling. You're either drilling for oil, you're drilling for heat, you're drilling for water. It doesn't matter, you're drilling.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>So when it comes down to it, awesome. So you've got this highly skilled workforce of millions globally. Let's go, right? We don't have to build that for geothermal. It's there. So how do we transfer it? Right, well, this is my opinion. We transfer it not by taking people out of oil and gas and putting them in this nascent and tiny industry we call geothermal. We do that by turning the geothermal industry into oil and gas or vice versa. Right, so we get the oil and gas industry to look at geothermal as a viable and exciting future business model where they themselves, the oil and gas entities, then become massive geothermal developers and producers using their own workforce.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>And we've started to see that already. We're starting to see the very beginning of that trend where you've got Chevron that's about to develop a geothermal project in California.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there a big major, is there an oil major with like a full fledged geothermal ...</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Team!</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Department, team, whatever.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>They all have them now, all of them. And David, in 2020, when you did your article, none of them had them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>That's how fast this is happening. Every single oil major has a dedicated geothermal person. Some of them have like VP of geothermal. We've got executives in geothermal now with whole funded teams. Some of them have a portfolio of geothermal companies that they've invested in. I mean, this has all happened in the last three years. So we're talking about traction. Like, read David's article first to get a 2020, but then between 2000 and 2023, there has been so much that's happened within the oil and gas industry for geothermal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And in terms of their motivations, the oil and gas majors motivations, how much of this is hedging against us being in what is possibly a dying industry and we need something else to do versus geothermal actually being like remunerative to the point that it would actually attract their attention regardless.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>All right, both I think if you're an oilfield service company or a drilling contractor, so you're the one with the skilled labor and the rigs. You're looking at geothermal and thinking, okay, there's our future business, right? They need rigs, they need drillers. That's what we should do. Right? So you have some very fast movers in that space and they are leading the pack in oil and gas. So you have like Baker Hughes is out there kicking butt. They're one of the ones that has a geothermal team and they're out there really pushing another one Neighbors Drilling contractor, just really pushing hard and getting out there and making investments.</p><p>That's awesome. But you have the operators, the majors, like the Chevron, Shells, BPs of the world who are also looking at geothermal and thinking, where in the world is this most relevant for us in terms of where we own assets, where we operate assets? How can we pull geothermal in as a value add into a portfolio and eventually, maybe, build it into a massive, globally scalable opportunity where we're drilling millions of projects, right? And so you look at geothermal in terms of scale. If we were drilling at the scale of oil and gas, if we're drilling geothermal at the scale of oil and gas, we solve energy.</p><p>That's it. We solve energy by 2050. Right? And that's the opportunity for oil and gas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you genuinely think it's not a PR play for the big oil and gas?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>No, I mean, you can't greenwash with geothermal, right? It's core competency. I'll be the first one to say it. You go on any majors website and they've got wind turbines splashed all over the place.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Algae. They used to have algae.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Yeah, algae, whatever. Solar panels. I mean, you'd think you were at a solar manufacturer or whatever. You're on oil majors website, it's all crap, right? I mean, that is greenwashing. Absolutely. If you look at the scale of their renewables investments versus the scale of their investment and their core competencies. Note, core competencies meaning subsurface. So what do we do with that? Well, we grab that core competency and we turn it to something that is future facing, right? Which is like, fine, stay subsurface experts. Awesome. Do CCUS, geothermal, and mining because we need lithium and we need clean, baseload power, right?</p><p>And we need to store a whole lot of carbon. So you all are the subsurface experts. Go. And that is really working. And I don't think you can really shake a stick at that in terms of greenwashing because it's core competency. They're doing what they know how to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I have to believe that there are as a card carrying greeny, I have a deep and abiding hostility toward oil and gas companies. But I have to believe there are people in there who are good people and want to do good things. And this is an actual I know you share this sentiment. This whole notion that they were ever going to get into renewable energy in a big way I thought was always kind of silly. It's just a different just a completely different business.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Not the same business model.</p><p>But this, I have to believe that psychologically, there are a lot of people, oil and gas, who are gratified by this and excited by this because it's a real exit. It's a real exit out of the past into the future, not just BS hand waving.</p><p>Yeah, you are absolutely right. Over the past three years in some of the majors. The way this has happened and built into what it is is through grassroots movements in the employees. They start beating down the doors of executives and having roundtables about geothermal and all of a sudden it builds into this thing. And all of a sudden they're presenting it to the board and the C suite and then they've got a program. I mean, that's awesome. And I can absolutely attest to oil and gas as a villain industry. It's not so easy to look at an individual across the table that works in the oil and gas industry and be like, you villain.</p><p>That's not the case. Right. It's just not. I mean, these are people that love the environment and have families and are really freaking skilled at what they do. And they're humans, right? And you sit across the table from these guys and they know how to drill. Good Lord. Y'all go drill. Let's just change what you're drilling for.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You made a point. I heard in another interview, which I found really interesting and you sort of implied it or talked around it a little bit so far. But I want to get straight at it, which is the question of how to scale geothermal up so that it's more than a niche, kind of extra. I was looking at the new electricity capacity installed sort of graph that the EIA just came out with and I was sort of gratified that you can actually see geothermal with the naked eye now.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah, really? So it's like 1%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's like a tiny little stripe at the top. You can see it, but so we all want the idea is to scale it up so that it's a big player to rival wind and solar. Your sort of argument is that the way wind and solar got to where they are was by all kinds of policy help and subsidies over the course of decades, basically. And so if we want geothermal to follow that route, it will also take decades. And we don't have decades. So your theory, how do we scale it up quickly? And you have an answer to that, so that's what I like to hear.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean the answer to that is the oil and gas industry, right? So we can sit here and wait 20 years and fund startups to grow into giants and fund RnD and hope for the best. Or we can convince an incredibly capable and skilled industry that there's a market based approach here and that they can do what they know how to do and also solve energy and climate. And we're talking about the type of scale here that we start drilling for geothermal like we drill for oil and gas between 2030 and 2050. That exceeds world energy demand, I mean future world energy demand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you mean if the scale of geothermal drilling were equal to the scale of oil and gas drilling?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Correct. In number of wells per year, yes. So we're talking about if we did that, I'm talking about with conservative estimates too. So 70,000 wells a year globally, 10 megawatts a pop, which is pretty damn low for a geothermal project. We end up at 146% of future global energy demand by 2050, and that's for heat and for electricity, 77%. Bam.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. I mean, that's not going to happen, is it? That's like a theoretical boundary. But how realistic do you think it is to get to that scale that quickly? Like it would be? Not many industries have ever done that.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Well, oil and gas did it with shale, let's just do it again.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just do it again. Is there as much money in geothermal as there was in shale, though?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Well, so, look, I think you have to ... you can't compare geothermal to oil and gas in that way, right? Because geothermal is never going to make for oil and gas companies what oil and gas makes for oil and gas companies. But you also have these companies trying to build offshore wind farms and struggling with single digit returns. Geothermal is going to be higher than that, right? So there's going to have to be a little bit of a shift where you look at geothermal as an oil and gas entity and you say, "Ha, we're probably going to max out at about 15% return, but hell, we can drill a million of them. That sounds pretty good. Let's go." Right, so there's going to be a little shift. It's going to be a lot of wells for less returns than oil and gas. And I think if you compare geothermal with wind and solar, it looks pretty darn good to an oil and gas company.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And of course, what the rate of return is, is somewhat affected by policy. So policy could get in there and at least tweak the incentives.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>You can keep having hope for this, David, you keep hoping for the politics and whatever. We'll just go drill in Texas or what ... you know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>IRA happened. Well, let's conclude here then, and let's just talk because I'm a policy guy. And I have to ...</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>I know you do that. You keep doing that, David. I love it. Somebody's got to work on it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, two questions by way of wrapping up. One is, was there anything in IRA in the Inflation Reduction Act or the Infrastructure Act or CHIPS, now that I think about it, in the legislation that Democrats just passed, was there anything for geothermal? And did you feel like in all the frenzy of activity leading to that stuff, that geothermal had a voice up there in those circles? Like, does it yet have a voice? That's my first question. The second question is just what policy, if you were less cynical about policy and still had policy hopes, what would those hopes be for?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Oh, good, these are great questions. Okay, so, yes, there was lip service to geothermal in the IRA, unfortunately not well fitted. So it's ITC and PTC, they're meant to apply now across all types of renewables with a longer time frame to benefit from them. The problem, though, with geothermal, particularly on federal land, is the development and the permitting. Time frame is so darn long that you almost can't even make it even with the extended window under the IRA. Your second question was, well, did geothermal have a voice? Clearly no, because we ended up in the same spot.</p><p>Right. Where it's like, well, we're trying to fit geothermal, which is pretty darn unique, under a one size fits all policy to fit and solar and wind that are very streamlined in terms of permitting and much more predictable with very little ... no subsurface risk. Right, so it's like no, essentially no. Is it better than it was? Yes. But is it going to fix anything? No, probably not. So that's my answer there. I have hope for the future, though. I think when it comes down to geothermal, we're probably going to need to build a lot of individual state alliances that then go and build a coalition that go after federal.</p><p>Right. So it's like when we get a bunch of states and governors and state legislatures involved and motivated and feeling like that geothermal could be a really viable future economy in those states. And this is what. We're doing right now in Texas, if we can build that across other states that would really benefit from geothermal in the future, we may have a shot at getting geothermal a more impactful voice on the federal level.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But if that coalition came together, pressured the feds, and the feds did something, would that just be under the general heading of permitting reform, the kind of permitting reform that everybody is clamoring for now, or is there something more unique?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>No that's so boring. Yeah, you told me I could pick just whatever, right? In terms of what the federal government could do, that would be really cool and impactful. And if you're going to let me have that leash, I will just take it and say, yeah, sure, fix permitting. Yes, please. But that's easy. If we want to really accelerate geothermal in a way that it catches geothermal up with other renewables, that geothermal has been substantially underfunded comparatively. Right. If we really want to catch geothermal up, then we need to say make an office of subsurface energy, put geothermal CCUS and lithium in it, and build it ARPA-E style.</p><p>Interesting, right? So we've got high risk, high reward type, big investments going toward trying to figure out how to do all these three things really well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>DOE has got the Earthshot, right? I mean, it's putting some money toward that kind of stuff.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Yeah, but David, we're talking about like $200 million here, $100 million there, and we're comparing that for geothermal with a billion here and a billion, right? And so it's like, what are we doing? You all right? What are we doing here? So I would put the billions in the office of subsurface energy, put an industry advisory board, engage with that, and go, that would be ARPA-E style, high risk, high reward. How do we build this fast? Go, if I was in charge, that's what I would do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the game plan then the strategy here is get oil and gas interested, get them moving, get them funding startups, get them interested, get states interested and on board via oil and gas being interested. And then take your coalition of states and oil and gas industry to the federal level and move the Feds on permitting and just general more attention and money to Geothermal. That's the game plan.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>That's the game plan. InnerSpace is launching ten more. So we did the future of geothermal in Texas. We just published that a couple of months ago. We're launching ten more states this year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>We're building the coalition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is Washington just at a ...</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>No sorry</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No geothermal activity in Washington?</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>No, it's not that. Washington is great. You've got awesome geothermal resources. We're focused though, on oil and gas state, traditional energy states, oil and gas states, right. So we're really focused on states that have a real interest in their current oil and gas economies and focused on getting them excited about building that into a geothermal economy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I got to say, if you manage to navigate the red-blue divide with an energy source without getting Hoovered into culture war on either side, that's going to be a real historical accomplishment.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's something to keep eyes on. More on that later. We'll talk about that one. We'll come back in a couple of years, David. We'll see. How that's going.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Well, the pace things are going, I'd love to have you back in three years. I'm sure it'll be transformed. Exactly. We'll be on to some other use for lasers. All right, Jamie Beard of InnerSpace, thank you so much. I've been meaning to have you on forever. This is beautiful. This is exactly what I wanted. Thank you so much for coming on.</p><p><strong>Jamie Beard</strong></p><p>Awesome, David. Thanks so much. This is fun.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's Volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-going-on-with-geothermal</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:108930397</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/108930397/ad0a90f99e102526402217df6a703941.mp3" length="48011357" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4001</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/108930397/0acc9a9d811a4090e13d42c316b964b4.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[We're about to give billions of dollars to clean hydrogen. How should we define it?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>The exact definition of “clean” hydrogen, interconnected with the definition of “clean” electricity, has enormous implications for the distribution of federal tax credits to boost the industry. In this episode, hydrogen expert Rachel Fakhry of the Natural Resources Defense Council discusses what’s at stake.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACZ3Qtnn3XWyw3BnTSCnZh-a/volts23.03.29%28rachel.fakhry%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/we-re-about-to-give-billions-of-dollars-to-clean-hydrogen-how-should-we-define-it"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Volts subscribers understand that a decarbonized energy system will require lots and lots of hydrogen, to store energy and to serve as a fuel in applications that are otherwise difficult to decarbonize. They also understand that while 95 percent of the world's hydrogen is currently produced using fossil fuels, there is a carbon-free way to produce hydrogen.</p><p>It involves running electrical current through an electrolyzer, which splits hydrogen out of water. (Volts listeners heard <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-electrolyzers#details">all about electrolyzers</a> a few episodes ago.) But the resulting hydrogen is clean only if the electricity that is run through the electrolyzer is clean. That's the recipe for clean hydrogen: clean electricity plus electrolyzers.</p><p>Democrats also understand the need for clean hydrogen to scale up quickly, and they included tax credits for clean hydrogen production in the Inflation Reduction Act. </p><p>And therein lies the rub. The IRS is currently in the process of determining exactly how those tax credits will be structured and to whom they will be available. At issue is a question that sounds simple but turns out to be devilishly complex: what exactly counts as clean hydrogen? More specifically, what exactly counts as clean electricity?</p><p>The details matter enormously — up to $100 billion worth of subsidies are on the line.  Big companies from BP to NextEra are lining up to try to make the standards as lax as possible, to maximize their short-term profits. But lax standards could perversely end up <em>increasing</em> greenhouse gas emissions, as electrolyzers come online, gobble up the available clean energy, and push grid managers to start up fossil fuel plants. (For more, read Canary Media’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/hydrogen/the-great-green-hydrogen-battle">deep-dive series</a> on the hydrogen tax-credit battle.)</p><p>To get to the bottom of all this, I’m excited to talk with Rachel Fakhry, who runs the hydrogen and energy innovation portfolio at the Natural Resources Defense Council, about the technical details of this fight, the ability of the industry to meet higher standards, and the enormous stakes involved, for the industry and the larger project of decarbonization, in getting it right.</p><p>So with no further ado, Rachel Fakhry. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Thanks so much for having me Dave.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You're brave to come on and address this subject. It is big and complex and hairy. There's a lot of ins and outs, "a lot of strands in the Duder's head." So let's start. So we get we need a bunch of hydrogen. We get we need it to be clean. We get basically what clean hydrogen is, sort of. So let's just start first by talking about what are these tax credits? What does the Inflation Reduction Act contain for clean hydrogen?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>So the IRA offers one of the largest subsidies for clean hydrogen in the world. It is a production tax credit which ranges between $0.6 to up to $3 per kilogram of each hydrogen produced. And the three kilogram, as I'm sure we'll talk, is kind of the big prize that all the projects are gunning for. It is a technology-neutral credit. So there's no colors green, blue, pink, any of that. It all depends and is tied to the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of hydrogen. That top prize of $3 can only be eligible for clean hydrogen that achieves zero point 45 kilogram of carbon per kilogram of hydrogen relative to today's status quo hydrogen that's gas derived uncontrolled, which is roughly around ten.</p><p>So to get that top rise, you have to reduce emissions from status quo by 95%, which is a lot.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>You have to be very clean to get that. And it's a very long list credit. It lasts for ten years for each project that gets it, and projects that commence construction as late as early 2033 would still be eligible. So what this means is that by 2045, you could still have hydrogen projects that are getting taxpayers dollars. Even if we think the technology is going to improve and drop in price and so on, there are going to be projects still heavily subsidized.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a lot of money. One thing I would add, just in case listeners are not familiar ... listeners have probably heard production tax credit and investment tax credit, PTC and ITC, tossed around just for anybody who doesn't know a production credit, you get a certain amount of money per quantity of the subsidized thing produced. So, in other words, this is you get the subsidy per ton or per kilogram of hydrogen produced versus the investment tax credit, which subsidizes capital costs of building the thing in the first place. And these have somewhat different dynamics, which I think we can return to later.</p><p>But this is specifically, it's the production of hydrogen per kilogram that gets the subsidy. And you note the subsidy for the lowest, for the cleanest hydrogen, is $3 a kilogram, which is huge. What's the next tier like? What do you get if you don't quite reach that threshold?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>It's a big cliff. You drop from three to one dollars per kilogram.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Yeah. And this is, I think, an excellent indicator of the type of hydrogen Congress really wanted to incense. They really wanted to incent the cleanest of the cleanest.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So this is actually an important background fact about these subsidies, is they're non-linear. They don't scale up linearly with the cleanness. There's, as you say, a big cliff like the jump from not meeting that top threshold to meeting it gets you from one dollar per kilogram to $3 per kilogram, which is a huge increment. So all of which is to say, how you define how exactly you structure who is in that top tier matters enormously. There's an enormous amount of money on the line.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely, we'll get to that. But it all hinges on how treasury guidelines will look like for determining the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn will determine whether you get the top prize or something much more reduced. But since you mentioned that it's a lot of money indeed, this is an uncapped credit. It depends on how much hydrogen you actually produce, but we think this could be more than $100 billion. Our colleagues at Energy Innovation have produced a really useful number, essentially taking one of the larger hydrogen projects being announced in Texas between AES-Air Products, large electrolyzer powered by wind and solar on-site.</p><p>They estimate that between the hydrogen tax credits and the renewable tax credits, it could be a $30 billion subsidy for just one project.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Holy s**t. So I just want to flesh that elbow just to make that clear for listeners. You have a big sort of solar and wind renewable energy installation attached to an electrolyzer in this Texas project and you're getting the tax credits for wind and solar and you're getting the tax credits for producing the hydrogen. That just means like, as you say, $13 billion. That's a huge ...</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>It's a $30, actually 3-0.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>$30 billion in subsidy. Criminy, yeah. So the point is, as a background for all the rest of this discussion, we are dumping a ton of money on clean hydrogen specifically, all of which is to say this fight over how to define it, over what counts and what doesn't is not an arcane technical matter here.</p><p>There are billions and billions and billions of dollars of subsidies on the line depending how we answer these questions that we're going to get into.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>That's absolutely right, Dave. Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So NRDC and a coalition of partners has put forward what they call the three pillars of clean hydrogen. Did that originate with you? Where did the three pillars framework come from?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>I'm happy to say we had nothing to do with the origination. Also very happy to claim credit. The three pillars are decidedly not new. They're already at the heart of a debate around the effectiveness of voluntary renewable corporate procurement. So these are not new dynamics we're bringing to the hydrogen debate. We're actually having the hydrogen debate ride the broader issues within the market like any other energy resource.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So these three pillars are the idea is if you meet these three criteria, then you count as truly clean hydrogen. And every one of these criteria is controversial. Every one of these is being fought out now between industry that wants lax standards and your coalition that wants strict standards. So let's go through the three pillars.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Great.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The first one is additionality, which I think people probably have some vague familiarity with. But let's spell out what it means in this context.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Before we do that actually, just to step back on a couple of things. Yes, you're right. There's a lot of contention around at least two of the three pillars. But it's funny because everyone is kind of picking and choosing what they like and don't like. So you have folks who are fine with hourly matching others who are okay with additionality. So everyone will get to it. But within the opposition, we're seeing this kind of like cherry picking within the bouquet of pillars, what works and what doesn't work. But let's start with why do we even need the pillars? And as you noted, the pillars are additionality, deliverability, and hourly matching.</p><p>So why do we even need those pillars? As you've alluded to, the credits entirely hinges on how the lifecycle of hydrogen or lifecycle emissions of hydrogen are determined, which means that the Biden administration treasury, in collaboration with the OE, EPA, and the White House, will essentially determine how this credit will impact our energy system. But calculating life cycle greenhouse gas emissions can be quite tricky, and the complexity really varies from project configuration to another. So, for example, if you have an AES-Air Products-like project where you have a big electrolyzer not connected to the grids, only powered by renewable energy on-site, easy, that's a zero emissions rate.</p><p>However, when you move to a different configuration of electrolyzers that are grid-connected, drawing grid power and buying credits or offsets to net out those emissions, it becomes really complicated. And this is the classic kind of complexity of offset systems.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, anybody familiar with the arguments over offsets will be somewhat familiar with these concepts.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Exactly. So we need some parameters and rules around how these offsets are accounted for since there's so much money at stake and so much emissions at stake. And this is especially true for electrolysis. Now, electrolysis is an energy-hungry process, which means that even if it draws small shares of fossil fuel electricity, that would have significant emissions. So, for example, an electrolyzer that is powered by the average grid today would have twice the emissions of status quo hydrogen and 40 times the threshold of 0.45 threshold to be eligible for the $3 per kilogram.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. That's so wild that I just want to put an exclamation point next to it. So everybody understands our starting point here is if you just make your electrolyzed hydrogen with the average grid electricity, with the sort of average mix of sources that we have on the US grid. Not only will you be 40 times more carbon intensive than the threshold for the subsidy, you'll be twice as carbon-intensive as making the hydrogen directly from fossil fuel. So the difference between drawing on, as you say, this project in Texas has its own renewable energy installation next to it. so right, it's very clear where that's getting energy.</p><p>The difference between that getting clearly clean energy and getting average grid energy is not a small increment of greenhouse gases. The average grid electricity is vastly more carbon intensive than what we're aiming for here. So all of which is just to say you can't just build an electrolyzer and plug it into the grid and call it clean because you're not getting clean power. Basically.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>That's absolutely right. So if we are subsidizing projects that have twice the emissions of today's status quo hydrogen, then that's going to increase your emissions of the system as a whole. And now this is inarguable, what we're seeing coming out of Princeton. An upcoming study by Energy Innovation, a recent study by Rhodium Group, all agree that absent the three pillars which we'll discuss, emissions will increase in this decade, completely contrary to where we need to go and subsidized by what is a climate bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, it would be wild to spend $100 billion of public money to substantially raise carbon emissions. That would be a perverse outcome, let's just say.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely an awful story. Let's now dig into the pillars. You can think of them as parameters around those offsets that will be used, that are the only ones that will ensure that the offsets are effective at truly netting out all the emissions being driven by electrolysis. Happy to dig into it some more, but I should note from the outset that after a thorough legal analysis, I can announce with confidence that the three pillars are legally necessary and that treasury has all the authority it needs to implement them rigorously.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I want to get into this a little bit later after we go through them, but my question is, can they not are they legally allowed not to use them? Because the industry is encouraging. But we'll get into that in a minute. First, we've been talking around the three pillars. Let's go through them. The first one is additionality, which people, I think energy aware people understand is if you just plug your electrolyzer into the grid, you're getting grid power, which is dirty. If you plug your electrolyzer into the grid and specifically consume renewable energy from the grid, the way that where you can just buy renewable energy certificates RECs, and say, I consumed this much and I bought this many RECs to offset it.</p><p>If you're doing that, you're not necessarily using clean energy because you're drawing from existing renewable energy, which means whoever else was using that existing renewable energy now gets bumped to something else, et cetera, et cetera. Bump, bump, bump down the line until the last person in the line is using whatever gets turned on when demand exceeds supply, which is generally fossil fuels. So all of which is just to say you're not using clean energy unless you're using new clean energy that you are bringing online to power your project. Is that roughly the sum of it?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>That's absolutely correct. If you're going to bring new load on the system as an electrolyzer, you have to support new clean supply or additionality, although we're starting to move more towards new clean supply, which is going to be a more intelligible term for a lot of people. As you said, if you add demand to the grid, you don't bring new supply with it. As you say, the marginal generators will turn on to supply the added demand, and this will be gas. So you're going to end up having highly emitting hydrogen without supporting nuclear supply. And I always like to use this kind of visual of a world where additionality or new clean supply are not required.</p><p>This means that technically all existing nuclear generator in the US can sell their credits for hydrogen production because there's absolutely no requirement for the credits that will be used to offset emissions to come from new resources. They can come from existing resources which could be nuclear generators. There is enough nuclear generation to supply enough nuclear credits to dwarf even a high estimate of hydrogen production between now and 2030. So what this means is hydrogen production between now and 2030 where hydrogen electrolyzers could plug to the grid, do absolutely nothing, draw on grid power, have high emissions and purchase these cheap nuclear credits without really doing anything to the grids to really net out their emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? And just to reiterate, all that power that is going to the electrolyzers from the nuclear used to be going somewhere else. So whoever was using that power before that's now additional demand on the system. And again, when demand exceeds supply, the marginal generator gets turned on and that's fossil fuels. So all those electrolyzers coming online and simply claiming that nuclear power, you'd get the truly perverse outcome of the electrolyzers claiming to be clean, but total emissions on that grid going up substantially.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>That's correct. Absolutely. This is becoming, I think, inarguable in many sense that additionality is fundamental for the system to remotely work. And again, this is corroborated by all the studies that we're seeing here princeton Energy Innovation, Rhodium, and many, many EU studies which we can glean a lot of things from.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But you say it's clear and fundamental nonetheless. There are industry players specifically saying that the additionality, I mean, the additionality pillar is sort of the main axis of dispute here. This is precisely what big utilities don't want, an additionality requirement. And they have a lot of arguments for why. But one of the things they say, one of the arguments they had, which struck me as at least semi-plausible, is their sort of thing is you're doing these models like Princeton modeled all these electric ledgers coming online without the additionality requirement showing that it raised substantially raised grid emissions.</p><p>The industry's counter is, well, we have all these broad emission reduction policies. We got like cap-and-trade in Washington and California. We got the EPA coming out with standards on power plants and we got blah, blah, blah. So it's just not plausible that emissions overall are going to go up. It's the broader economy-wide emission reductions that are going to take care of emission reductions that shouldn't be our responsibility, basically, like we should just be able to use the existing clean energy.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Let's address that because we always hear this argument, right? Like why are you adding all these rules when the grid is getting cleaner and everything's going to be merry and great and we don't need to think about it? Let's take the IRA because it's always posited as the reason why we know the grid is going to get cleaner, so we don't have to worry about anything. The IRA is historic, right, and we're all very excited about it. And it has the potential to be a game-changer for the market. However, it's mostly carrots, very little sticks, so the outcome of it remains really not guaranteed.</p><p>We have a lot of work to do to make sure it's implemented in a way that actually delivers on all its potential. That's one, two, no matter how clean the grid gets in the next seven, eight years, you're still going to have the issue of marginal emissions. Right. Because marginal generators for the foreseeable futures will still be gas. So even if the grid is getting on the whole cleaner, and your electrolyzers are still running during those evening hours when the sun isn't shining, the wind isn't great, turning on marginal emissions or marginal generators, that would still be, on the whole, a very dirty hydrogen resource.</p><p>So essentially basing loosening up rules based on the hubris that everything is going to become clean. So when I have to worry about it, it's just demonstrably false.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. It seems premature to be making policy premised on the notion that we're going to succeed in this long term thing of reducing emissions. It's a little early for that.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Exactly. And actually, right before I came in, I was doing a quick back of the napkin envelope calculation. Even if the grid were to be 80 plus percent cleaner than today, by 2030, you really still don't have a lot of margin to use grid power. No more than 10-20%. Again, electrolysis is power hungry, so even the smallest amount of fossil fuels will blow you right out of the IRA threshold.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And I'll pause to say this, and I might repeat it a couple of times throughout the pod. This is not to say that an electrolyzer can't plug into the grid and start making hydrogen. It's just to say you're not going to get $3 per kilogram of subsidy if you do that. Right. These are not like harsh restrictions. We're talking about whether we're going to give you tens of billions of dollars. That's not the mean parent.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's just some basic rules. We don't want to subsidize increased emissions. So it sounds simple, right? Like, if I'm I'm going to bring an electrolyzer online, I just bring a solar farm along with it. I use the solar farm's energy to run my electrolyzer. That's clearly additional, right. If I'm building on site renewable energy next to my electrolyzer at the same time, that's clearly additional. It's not as clear in some other fuzzy cases. So, like, let's say I come online and I sign a PPA for power with a solar and wind farm that was built a year and a half ago.</p><p>Right. So it's new-ish, but it's also the case that maybe if my electrolyzer hadn't come online, that clean power would be going to someone else, so I'm just displacing existing clean energy. So what exactly in these edge cases? What are we defining as new and additional? Is there some sort of threshold like the renewable energy must be built within six months, or how do we get specific there?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a great question. There are several schools of thoughts. We haven't settled it. I think everyone agrees that this has to be the most straightforward way for developers, because, believe it or not, we're not in the business of suffocating this industry, Dave. We just want to make sure it's actually clean and in line with what we need. So you have a school of thought that says, look, simplify, just say anything after the IRA, or anything built after the IRA will count as new.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>For ten years.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly. Yes. Pro. It's very easy to administer. I'm not a big fan of it because you put it well, this would have been built anyway. So by adding demand to a system that was being built not for me, something else will turn on the system, and that will likely be at least a mix of fossil fuels. You have another school of thought that wants to mirror what the EU did, the Europeans did. So they adopted a moving vintage, as opposed to that fixed vintage, and said, okay, additionality counts as a PPA signed with a new window solar farm that comes online within 36 months of the electrolyzer.</p><p>That is interesting. It's not perfect, but we have to be able to administer the system. I like this moving vintage. You can add the condition that additionality could be met by showing, say, in signing the PPA, that the electrolyzer accounts for much of the financial risk or helps secure the funding. You could add more conditions, but I like the moving vintage a lot more than the fixed vintage. And then you can layer on some PPA conditions to carve out the incremental financial effect of adding electrolyzer on the grid to window solar farm.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And we should acknowledge in the end, there's some element of the arbitrary here because there is no absolute metaphysical correct answer in a lot of these cases. Right. Like, these are all about counterfactuals. Would the renewable energy have been built in the absence of this electrolyzer? And like any counterfactual, there's no definitive ... there's no way of being definitive. Right. You're just using heuristics in the end, you have to define some thresholds somewhere. But this is not an area where sort of precision and certainty are really possible.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>That's correct. A system that works well, that is rigorous enough to minimize against the worst, I think, is good enough for us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the last thing about additionality is, of course, the big argument from industry is this will substantially raise costs, it will wipe out the cost advantage we have against existing gray hydrogen and it will strangle the industry in the crib and it will never get going. And in some sense, this is all too about a counterfactual. We're all arguing about what would happen if we did x and so no one can really definitively say, but what evidence do we have that that's wrong?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>The dead on arrival claims obviously are being branded right that we are going to say ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, dead on arrival.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. So I would love to talk about the costs for the three pillars as a package because I think this is the really interesting one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, but yeah, let's put the cost off tour through the pillars then. That's a good idea. The second pillar is much more simple, we can get through it pretty quick. So the first pillar is additional. For your electrolyzer to be clean, it has to be drawing from new renewable energy. The second is regionality, which means your electrolyzer has to be drawing new clean electricity from the grid you're on, from the regional grid you're consuming on. So you can't just buy like if you're on a super dirty grid and you're buying clean energy, that's made in California, right?</p><p>Like clean energy in California is not displacing nearly as much carbon as clean energy on your dirty grid where you're operating would. So grids are not equivalent right, in terms of carbon emissions. So you need to be displacing carbon on your grid. And that's pretty straightforward. And as far as I can tell, most everybody agrees roughly with this idea. I think insofar as there's any controversy, it's just sort of like where do you draw the line? What is the same grid? Is there controversies there worth getting into?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>You're right, this is one of the least contentious pillars. Everyone agrees that there has to be some geographic bound to the clean energy you claim is netting out your effect.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>In terms of how do you define the boundaries, there are several options that could work. We're still considering which one makes the most sense. The simplest one is to say, look, as long as the electrolyzer and the new clean supply are located in the same load balancing authority, that's good enough for us. That's very simple. However, it could have some issues because some load-balancing authorities are very large and streaked with a lot of congestion. Like for example, MISO is an excellent one, it's the one load-balancing authority and yet there's a big transmission constraint between MISO North and MISO south.</p><p>Meanwhile, under that system you could still locate your electrolyzer and your new supply anywhere you want with disregard to the actual congestion and whether you're actually netting out your emissions with this clean energy project that you supported or not. So the other approach, which is a hybrid, quite interesting, and I'm leaning towards that one. It says, okay, let's break it out between RTO regions and non-RTO regions. Within RTO regions like PJM, MISO, ERCOT, so on. We have to look at the LMPS, which are a good proxy for congestion, locational, marginal prices, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And those are set around a particular node on the grid. And the node on the grid is what just is there a clear definition of what counts as a node? Is it just where there's a transformer or what?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>That's a good question. I mean, usually, it's going to be the place that sets the price. I don't know how to explain it in engineering terms, unfortunately.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, just say it's the atomic unit. Let's say if you're looking at grids, sort of like a grid is made up of nodes.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Correct. And it's the excellent, kind of the best proxy. We have to understand the supply and demand dynamics around a granular piece of the grid. So I like this because RTOs already report LMPs they already report them and collect them and so on. So the notion is that electrolyzers and the clean energy supply that is netting out their emissions need to be located within a region where the LMP differential is not bigger than X.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>That is a very good proxy for okay, there's no congestion between the two that's roughly deliverable or mostly deliverable projects. Developers already hedge against LMPS and signing contracts. This is not new to look at forecast of LMPS. So we think this is a familiar tool.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so the data and information is there to make these calculations. Now, we wouldn't have to produce any new data, right?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>But to continue that for non-RTO regions like the Southeast, where utilities don't necessarily report those, we're fine keeping it to the LBA or the load balancing authority because anyway, those tend to fit nicely with state boundaries. So congestion will not be unmanageable there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so that's additionality got a new clean energy, regionality it has to be in some definition, local clean energy. And then the third pillar is another controversial one. This is temporal granularity, which to put it in a more human-normal way is just you need to match your consumption to production of renewable energy or clean energy on an hourly basis rather than the more conventional yearly basis. So again, Volts listeners who have been paying attention will be familiar with this general notion. There are lots of corporate players now like Google. Google wants to go zero energy.</p><p>And the easiest low-impact way to do that is just say we consume X a year, we're going to go buy renewable energy certificates for X amount. Boom, we offset our use, we're clean. That's sort of like step one. But Google realizes that's not really accurately, that's not accurately about your emissions and how much you're offsetting. So Google wants to move to an hourly system where it's measuring how much its consumption is matching up to renewable energy production on an hour-by-hour basis, so that it can truly be zero carbon, so that it can truly offset its actual emissions in the actual world, not just as an accounting practice, right?</p><p>So this notion is out there. So the idea here is that electrolyzers that want to be counted as clean should be required to do that. They should be clean on an hourly basis. This is extremely controversial for a bunch of reasons, but let's start what industry wants, or what the constellation or next era the utilities want is just they're like, look, we have this system of yearly renewable energy certificates, yearly RECs, it works perfectly well. Why can't we just offset our energy on a yearly basis like everyone else does? Why are you making us do this bespoke granular thing?</p><p>So just what's wrong with yearly offsetting?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>You've already teed it up really well. This is not a new dynamic, right? This is where there's much more demand for granular tracking to really effectively claim that you are powered by clean energy. Annual matching is just no longer seen as an effective way of reducing emissions and still sends a signal that fossil fuels are needed. And this exact same thing applies to hydrogen, right? So suppose there's a Dave Roberts electrolyzer contracted with a new solar power project, but you run this electrolyzer at night or both when the sun is shining, when there's no sun, turning on the marginal generator and producing very high emissions.</p><p>However, you have the sufficient volumetric amount of solar RECs that were produced from the solar project you contracted with that are enough to on paper.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So on an accounting basis ...</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I have offset my emissions. But in the real world, the solar is producing the energy during the day, I'm consuming energy during night. So in the real world, I consumed dirty power almost that entire time.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>And there's something perverse here, which is the cleaner the grid gets, the less your solar power will likely start abating emissions during the day because you'll have more solar on the system. And when you turn on at night as an electrolyzer for the foreseeable future, gas will always be the marginal resource. So on the whole, you'll be producing a lot more emissions than you're actually reducing. So it's an interesting perverse effect that may happen with a cleaner grid. All this to say that hourly matching is necessary to meet statutory requirements to meet the IRA threshold of 0.45 kilogram per kilogram to get the $3 per kilogram.</p><p>And this is corroborated by, again, Princeton, upcoming Energy Innovation study, even Rhodium study, which was not very friendly to hourly launching in near term, found that without hourly matching, emissions could increase cumulatively by roughly 100 million metric tons this decade. Enormous, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We spent $100 billion to raise emissions. 100 million tons.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>There we go. That's the US scarce system for you. This is why we absolutely need this. It's corroborated by studies, you cannot reach the IRA threshold without tracking your consumption on an hourly basis with the clean energy project that you procured with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So there's two big objections to this from industry. The first is from industry and also is shared by some other analysts, which is just that the system of hourly matching, basically producing hourly RECs rather than yearly RECs is just not mature. It's just not ready. There's not enough people doing it. And forcing the industry to wait on that, getting stood up and sophisticated enough to work would delay the industry in these crucial first few years. So a lot of the argument is just over. How baked is hourly matching? How ready is it?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Yeah. I find this to be a little bit of a lazy argument because it clearly does not look at the state of play on the ground nor what the experts say could happen within less than two years. So I think now even for folks who are out there saying this is not doable in the near term, it needs time. Even those folks agree that there are no technical challenges to doing this. This is really not rocket science. Generation is already metered. Consumption is already metered. You just need a REC in the middle that can capture the hourly variations.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And people are doing it. It's not just that it's doable now, but people are doing it.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Exactly. The two biggest registries in the US. M-RETS and PJM are now offering hourly tracking. M-RETS has been doing this for three years, even in places where M-RETS and PJM, I mean PJM is new. But even in places where M-RETS does not track, there are third-party tracking mechanisms. There are utilities that are not sophisticated, necessarily smaller, kind of like Madison Gas and Electric, for instance, in Wisconsin offering 24/7 tariffs that require hourly matching. The momentum is in this direction. The Biden administration put out an executive order now requiring that the federal government by 2030 hourly amount.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The federal government's going to have to start accounting for hourly ...</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>If the Feds can do it anyone can do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And let's just pause and stress here that PJM is a big Midwestern wholesale power market and balancing area that has developed and implemented hourly matching just in the last year. So this is like a big industry player. These are not like little startups or whatever that are doing this.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>And they did that because of customer demand. Right. Again, everyone tries to blame the pillars on hydrogen. The market is heading in this direction anyway. This is just about meeting what the law requires and making sure we're actually consistent with the direction of the market. So it's already being done. M-RETS has said multiple times, look, we're willing to track anywhere in the US or roughly anywhere in the US. But if registries want to scale themselves from annual to hourly, experts say, look, you can scale very fast because there are no technical issues here. You could scale within 12 to 18 months.</p><p>That is much less than what electrolyzers will need to scale. Right. They'll need two years plus. So again, I always say it's a lazy argument because it doesn't take into account what's already happening, how long it took for it to happen, and how fast things can scale if everyone else wants to do it as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, and one thing I also point out is right now the big companies that don't want to mess with it, don't want to mess with hourly matching are whinging and whining about it. But if you put it on paper and made it a requirement, all of a sudden they would be advocates for it and boosters of it and would be accelerating it. This is the thing. It's like if there's $100 billion pot at the end of the rainbow, of course, utilities are going to figure out how to hourly match. Like utilities will do a lot of things for $100 billion, you know what I mean?</p><p>So this whole idea that like, oh, thanks for offering the $100 billion, but it's such a hassle, come on guys, if there was $100 billion on the line, I'm pretty sure you all could figure out how to do this.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I mean, Hydrogen Europe in the European context was a big trade group for hydrogen companies and so on, who fought the European Commission tooth and nail for two years against hourly branding messages that this is not doable it's. Impossible after the passage of the European rules requiring hourly starting in 2030 but with no grandfathering. Which means project have to start doing hourly really effectively today. Anyway, they came out to say, yeah, this is doable, singing the same song. It's going to be more expensive, but hey, it's going to be doable. So it's a really interesting sneak peek into what you were saying of when there's such a big prize at the end of the tunnel and something already happening with all the technical elements already in place, we should not be worried, it should not happen, it can't happen, it will happen and it can't happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Like you say, this whole fight went down in Europe and got settled and now they're doing it. So it's doable. So you're confident that if this was made a requirement by the time the first electrolyzers started coming online, which would be two or three years out at least, just to get them built, hourly matching could be ready. You're confident of that?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Yes, and I'm definitely not the expert about that. I have listened to the big experts who have done this, who are the ones who have the biggest stake in doing this. They all agree this could be done in a very short period of time and it's already being done. So technically, M-RETS, again, I have to repeat, can do it almost everywhere in the country. If there needs to be some nationwide harmonization between various regions and so on. This could be done really fast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the other thing that sometimes comes up in the context of this hourly idea is that if you are really only going to be operating your electrolyzer in the actual hours where clean energy is producing, you are by necessity going to be starting and stopping your electrolyzer. You're going to be cranking it up when the clean power comes online and cranking it back down when the clean power goes offline because there's no point in producing if you're not getting that big fat subsidy. And the sort of conventional wisdom is, I think that electrolyzers are one of these big industrial applications where the finances, the business case depends on it running constantly and that if you force it to ramp up and down to matched coming and going power, you're going to ruin the economics and people won't build them.</p><p>What do you say about that flexibility question of electrolyzers?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Great, let's address that and then definitely want to get to the cost because the jury is no longer out as to whether it's doable. Hourly margin is doable. Now the jury is out as to, wow, is it going to be super costly and suffocate the industry. So I would love to get to the cost piece, but on the flexibility, false period. Electrolyzers are designed for intermittency, specifically PEM electrolyzers. And I know you've had that great conversation with Electric Hydrogen and Raffi Garabedian. They're one of the foremost PEM manufacturers. They're designed for intermittency, so they can absolutely handle that. Now, this is where kind of okay, from a technical standpoint, there's nothing that stops electrolyzers from ramping up and down.</p><p>Let's get to the cost piece, which is the real big one here. I think the first question we need to ask is what are the operational parameters that will make electrolyzer pencil out? Is it running 24/7 or something less than that? And what we're seeing is that they don't need to run 24/7 to achieve cost-competitive economics. It's somewhere closer to 50% to 70%. And the reason is that the more you operate, that's okay for your CapEx, that's good, but you're going to start capturing higher and higher power prices. Electricity prices are the biggest cost component of electrolyzer.</p><p>So at some point you're going to start having diminishing returns with higher and higher operations. And that is not at all kind of new information. We've known this for a while. The IEA, IRENA, even Hydrogen Europe. Again, that industry trade group I mentioned have all agreed that or shown that really optimal operations are between 50% to 70%. So we've established it. We don't need 24/7 operations. We need somewhere between 50% and 70%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And 70% capacity factor, what they call running 50% to 70% of the time.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Correct. Absolutely. The good news is what we're seeing from a range of analyses being done by developers, OEMs, independent research groups, is that with hourly matching. You can achieve those levels in many places in the US. And the winning strategy is to oversize a wind and solar hybrid in a region with decent wind and solar, it doesn't have to be best in class and you can achieve those levels of operation and be very cost competitive.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, just to flesh out that picture you just painted, because I think it's really interesting. So we were talking about how if you build an electrolysis and you build say, a wind and solar hybrid power plant next to it, attached to it, not even attached to the grid, just attached to it, obviously the resulting hydrogen is clean, right? That's the unambiguous case. Then there's a second option which is also unambiguously clean, which is building the same arrangement, connecting it to the grid, but never drawing power from the grid. Right. Only using the locally produced power, but then overbuilding that wind and solar power so that it's producing more than you need.</p><p>And then exporting the extra to the grid as another income stream. So you get a couple of things from that. One, wind and solar tend to be anti-correlated, right? So like one's on when the other is not. So you're going to cover more of your get your capacity factor up and you get extra money from selling your extra renewable energy to the grid so that's the completely off-grid and then the sort of one-way connection to the grid. Both those are viable options where you're only consuming the local clean energy you generate. But in the second case, you're also selling excess clean energy, which is improving your economics.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And it could be good for the grid too because you're probably only going to sell that power during high grid hours or high grid prices.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Which means that the grid really needs it, right? So you could actually be helpful. You don't need to sell that much excess, right, because some folks are saying, well, what if you don't have that ability to sell your excess? The economics will still work. Oversizing a wind and solar hybrid seems to be a really interesting case for those early electrolyzers that need to run more than a certain share because they're so expensive.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you oversize your wind and solar to the point that you get your electrolyzer up to the capacity factor that you need it to be economic. And then if you just curtail the rest of that wind and solar waste, it basically still the economics work out you say.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>What we're seeing, yes, it would still work. The credits are rich enough to make things work. And let's translate the credit from a dollar per kilogram to a dollar per megawatt hour because folks kind of understand the dollar per megawatt hour a little bit more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>At the current efficiency of electrolyzers, you can generally produce about 20 kilograms hydrogen per megawatt hour of power you consume. You're getting $3 per kilogram for every kilogram of hydrogen you're producing. So that's a total of roughly $60 per megawatt hour of subsidy, which means that you're willing to pay power price of up to $60 per megawatt hour and the PTC is still going to kind of make you whole. Now, things are a little bit more complicated than that, but this shows you just the significance of this subsidy in terms of how much it could reduce the input costs to your system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Coming back again to the enormous size of this subsidy relative to the industry. So the industry's sort of complaint, as is familiar with the proposal for any new regulation of any kind, is that this regulation will cripple the industry. It's too much, too restrictive, too much hassle. It's going to strangle the industry in the crib. It's not affordable. And just to throw a specific worry in there amidst that, one of the sort of concrete worries is that if these restrictions raise the price of green hydrogen in the short term, one perverse effect might be that more of the market turns to blue hydrogen, which is hydrogen made with fossil fuels, but then with carbon capture and storage attached to it.</p><p>And that carbon capture and storage is also going to get a big fat subsidy out of the inflation reduction act. So the worry here that I've heard articulated is you make truly clean hydrogen more expensive. You're just going to shift the whole market to blue hydrogen and then they're going to get sort of locked in. You're going to get path dependence, you're going to get blue hydrogen sort of making itself a place in the market, even though everybody knows in the long, long term we need it all to be green.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you think there's anything to those worries?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>I would love to say one more thing before we close up on the pillars because it kind of is related to this argument that oh, we're going to suffocate the market so much that blue is going to win. What is really interesting in what we're seeing from opposition to the pillars is something I alluded to earlier, which is we're now seeing the opposition sort of splitting. And you have renewable developers that do not like any of that starting to come around to additionality or new supply because it's like, hey, I could sell more wind turbines.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Why on earth would they be opposed to this? This is a requirement that a bunch more renewable energy get built.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Exactly. This is where the hourly matching piece comes in. Right. So you have a next era in Florida that has very little access to wind, if any. Well, maybe it can't do hourly matching because it's going to be pretty low utilization of its electrolyzer if it's only following solar. Today that may not work. Now, in a few years, as electrolyzer prices drop and you can run your electrolyzer much less, hey, let the market be the market. Right? But today what we're subsidizing, we want to make sure they're actually clean projects. NextEra may not be able to do that.</p><p>So now you have NextEra kind of saying, "Maybe additionality is fine, hourly matching is out of the picture." Meanwhile, you have Constellation, the nuclear giant, right? Would love to talk more about their plans because they're truly incredible. They're fiercely fighting additionality or new supply because it doesn't allow them to utilize a lot of their existing nuclear plants. But they love hourly because nuclear generates 24/7.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hourly is nothing to nuclear.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Nothing to nuclear, right? They come on top compared to any other resource. So you have Constellation fiercely supporting hourly, fiercely opposing additionality. So it's kind of a bouquet where everyone just chooses whatever maximizes their own.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Whatever is going to work best for their short-term profits. Let's just say.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Emissions be damned. Right. But let's get to the blue hydrogen question because this is a new argument that I'm truly fascinated by. I don't see any evidence of that. So the 45Q carbon capture and storage tax credits are indeed generous and in some pockets of the US. Yes, indeed. We expect that blue hydrogen could be competitive and be deployed by utilizing the 45Q credits. But we're not seeing blue hydrogen projects' levelized cost of hydrogen dropping to less than $1, which is kind of the threshold for today's hydrogen, or dropping to even zero and negative, which we're seeing in some places in the US.</p><p>Where renewables are particularly great. We're hovering around zero, right? So I don't see the huge subsidy that we're seeing in some pockets for electrolytic hydrogen. And blue deals with its own challenges. Right. You need to be close to a carbon storage basin. You may need carbon pipelines.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, you need carbon capture.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That works, which is itself. It's not something that's been shown in the US.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Exactly. Blue hasn't had a merry, or CCS hasn't had a merry trajectory so far. I don't know why blue hydrogen is going to just mushroom all over the place. If you take the one blue hydrogen project that's been proposed in Louisiana by Air Products, that's been held up in public opposition for months now. So besides the fact that CCS has not been easy to deploy, you have to be close to a carbon storage basin. You may need pipelines. Public opposition is a real thing here for more gas infrastructure. So it's one of these illusory scare tactics being branded that if you actually unpack dynamics, I don't see any evidence of that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So no worry about blue hydrogen. And I kind of agree. Everybody keeps deploying CCS in these theoretical model ways and I keep kind of thinking like somebody needs to actually go build a couple of these things and show that they work. Before we continue any of these conversations.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Build a couple that work. First yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One way to address the sort of notion that these three pillars raise costs too much is to point out that there are existing projects being built that will meet the three pillars that are penciling out. Talk a little bit about what we're seeing happen now.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Sure. The AES-Air Products project that we discussed, that's one of the bigger projects in the US. That's going to be three-pillar compliance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are they building on-site? They're entirely on-site renewables?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>I believe so, yes. Fully hourly matched. So it will go up and down with the production of wind and solar. Intersect Power, historically, big solar developer moving into hydrogen. They have a bunch of projects in the pipeline that are three pillars compliant. They're one of the best voices out there demonstrating this is doable. Right. And I do want to point that I know we've joked around and there's a lot of industry players that are trying to steer billions of dollars to maximize their profits. But there's a subset of industry players have been just excellent. Right.</p><p>Intersect Power, Electric Hydrogen, whom you met with, Synergetic, others have been really just fantastic at showing that this is absolutely feasible. And if you look at Europe and the rest of the world, these three pillars compliant projects are popping up everywhere.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the European hydrogen, whatever, body that has more or less came out and said, "We've looked into this, we believe the three pillars are doable."</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I mean, everyone keeps pointing to and happy to speak to the EU case, but everyone keeps saying, look, they pushed their hourly matching to 2030. That's not doable. It's a wildly different context. First of all, if you look at, there's no grandfathering. So projects can start monthly, that's fine, but they have to switch to hourly by 2030. They sign long-term contracts. No one's going to sign a contract for 15-20 years based on first monthly matching and then hourly, they're going to set themselves up from the outset to be able to hourly match that's one.</p><p>Two, the Europeans have a regulatory barrier to implementing hourly matching that we don't. They have to pass a federal law first, have it translated to 27 member state laws.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>That was one of the reasons why the delayed hourly matching, again, without allowing grandfathering, we don't have any of that. Right. So just the EU context keeps getting branded left and right, but the devil is in the details and we can glean a lot from that. And I'm hoping we can get back to that because it's an important example.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the things you hear industry say is if you force us to make the hydrogen in close physical proximity to the renewable energy, we're going to end up like renewable energy far away from load. And that will mean we'll have to transport the hydrogen, we make long distances to where it needs to be used and that transport, the building of that transport infrastructure is going to sort of offset whatever emission gains you think you're making by forcing us to be near the renewable energy. You're not taking hydrogen, the transport of the produced hydrogen into account. So how do you think about that?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Well, first of all, no one's opposed to grid-connected projects. So I don't know where this hypothesis comes from that we're forcing projects to be very close to renewables.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hey, if you well, at least in the region, right? The same region.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Correct. If you can do your three pillars and connect to the grids and produce your hydrogen closer to your load, that's great. We support that as long as you do your pillars. The second kind of comment I have to this is if you look at the map of where hydrogen demand is today, it's going to be in areas where there's a good resource of renewable energy. So it's mostly Texas and the Gulf, but also in the Great Plains midwest region for ammonia and refineries. And we know that those existing customers will likely be the biggest source of demand in this decade for clean hydrogen because they already have existing supply chains, and so on</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Making clean fuels.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Yeah, replacing existing status quo hydrogen with cleaner hydrogen. Let's put it this way. Yeah, that's going to be the bulk of demand in this decade. Which means that if you look at the map, you're not far off from sources of good within solar. Which means that this transport thing looks pretty manageable. If you consider where the sources of clean hydrogen in this decade will likely be, they're in pretty good resource regions. The third piece that I think is key to keep in mind is that the 45V tax credits are not the only subsidy on the table.</p><p>Right? They can't solve every single industry problem. This is where it becomes kind of part of a menu of subsidies. So the DOE Hydrogen hubs, money biggest DOE demonstration project in its history, is going to help address a lot of these ecosystem issues.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, the idea is to build these hubs where you're sort of like you've got the renewable energy and the electrolysis and the hydrogen consuming end use basically being built next to one another. So you eliminate ...</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. You have other stuff that you have the hubs. The Doe hydrogen shot is also spending a lot of money to create a hydrogen ecosystem. States are now passing and contemplating hydrogen-specific tax credits for end uses. So all this to say that we can't burden the tax credits with solving every single industry question, we can't gut them just because we want to think about all these things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also I'm inclined to say, like, look, guys, we're like we're subsidizing the crap out of the renewable energy, we're subsidizing the crap out of the electrolysis to the point that some of these projects basically the US government is going to be paying you to do this. You guys can maybe cover transport. It doesn't seem like a huge ask.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>I have a feeling they'll figure that one out. This feels to me like a grasping-at-straws kind of thing, but the transport is going to be impossible. There are options. Do grid connections just meet your pillars? Essentially.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's go back to Constellation for a minute because this is just a gripe, but I feel like I want to cover it. Constellation is a utility that is benefiting from recently passed subsidies designed to keep existing nuclear plants open. Right? There's a whole separate debate in the energy world. People are familiar with it. Should we let them close on schedule? Should we pay to keep them open? A couple of states have passed these huge subsidies to keep them open, and Constellation is currently wallowing in those subsidies. And it's worth noting a lot of the people who it is now criticizing and fighting against in this hydrogen debate are some of the very people who went to bat for it to get it those nuclear subsidies, right?</p><p>Like it's now badmouthing Princeton's modeling. But of course, that crew at Princeton has been laying itself on the railroad tracks trying to get these existing nuclear plants subsidized. So just to say, like, we're wallowing in nuclear subsidies and now we want to turn around and be allowed to just plug electrolyzers into our existing nuclear plants and layer on a whole new giant subsidy is just like I don't know what the right word is. It's greedy. It seems crude and greedy if I'm being totally honest. Maybe you have nicer words.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Sadly, don't. Well, yeah, of course, they're not very happy with the Princeton folks who are kind of standing between them and enormous profits above and beyond what they were already doing. So fully agree with you. First of all, I think Constellation is basking in subsidies at this point. They're very well taken care of. Actually, right before this podcast, I was speaking to a nuclear lawyer, NRDC, and kind of asking her, hey, could you just remind me of all the subsidies that the nuclear can now tap into? She actually had to take a couple of seconds just to see where she could where to start because there are so many buckets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Get the calculator out.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Exactly. So Constellation, as I alluded to earlier, is fiercely fighting and loving policymakers against requiring additionality or new clean supply because that would not allow them to utilize their existing nuclear plants for hydrogen production and maximum profits. No new clean supply or no additionality would be an absolute gold mine for Constellation.</p><p>Yeah.</p><p>They have two very lucrative options. One is to divert their existing nuclear power to hydrogen projects. So essentially collocate electrolyzer with their nuclear plant and divert a share of the output of that nuclear plant to hydrogen production. And this seems to be Constellation's main plan.</p><p>As I mentioned earlier, the tax credits, the hydrogen tax credits are roughly equivalent to $60 per megawatt hour. Constellation is not getting that at the market. On the market, power prices are way lower than that. Maybe 2022 was an off-year, but generally, they're way lower than that. So they're like, "Light bulb. There's a huge lucrative opportunity for us to divert our power away from the grid and utilize this very lucrative opportunity to produce hydrogen with our power."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Basically changing nothing else, right, like just harvesting a giant new set of subsidies, having changed operationally almost nothing.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And that would be terrible for emissions. Could you imagine megawatts and gigawatts of diverted nuclear energy from the grid? That would be terrible for emissions, result in nefarious grid impacts in terms of prices, reliability, and emissions be damned. Actually, this is playing out in Illinois right now. This is Constellation's powerhouse where they have a lot of their nuclear capacity. They have plans to divert their power away from the grid. We estimate that emissions in Illinois could increase by 7% somewhere up to 45%, depending on how much of the output you're actually diverting and completely torpedoing over the state's clean energy goals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, basically wiping out the gains of their big, hard-fought, complex clean energy legislation, which they just passed.</p><p>Which, by the way, supported Constellation, even if they're not getting a lot of money from it for multiple reasons. But it supported Constellation because supposedly it was helping support that decarbonization. So it's a perilous terrain that's, number one, it's divert our power, get $60 per megawatt hour. We're not getting on the market. Hugely lucrative option number two is just sell large volumes of credits, kind of like Rex, but for nuclear from their existing nukes, because there's currently no market for those credits outside of a few states. And this is a huge volume of credits. Right. As I mentioned to earlier, there's enough potential nuclear credits to completely cover all hydrogen production that we could expect between now and 2030.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>So this is the same thing, is you're doing nothing on the grid, getting paid for generation already very heavily subsidized by the US taxpayer, and allowing electrolyzers to just plug on the grid, purchase credits that mean nothing, and increase emissions, right? So to sum up, this is a gold mine for Constellation without doing anything.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, it's a gold mine for them, whichever way it turns out. That's kind of the rub here. Like they're awash in subsidy money no matter what they do. They're just trying to stack it now.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And again, emissions, impacts on the grid, so on and so forth, to be damned. So it is, unfortunately, blatant greed. And they're out there claiming that nuclear is getting left out and that this is unlawful. And the best part is that no one wants to outlaw the use of nuclear for hydrogen. There are options, right? For instance, if you operate your nuclear plant that can count as nuclear supply, you could do that. They refuse that, not lucrative enough.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You could build new nuclear. Everybody keeps saying how great nuclear is, but why didn't build some new on it and hook that up to electrolyzer?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>We even gave them the option of, hey, look at what the Europeans did. They said during low-priced hours, which are a good proxy for clean grid, we can relax hourly requirements and sell your credits during those low-priced hours because it's a proxy for some generator curtailing somewhere. So this kind of can count as nuclear supply if you spur that generator. Not enough hours for us. So we are not in the business of suffocating nuclear. We're in the business of making sure it meets the same requirements as everyone else.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Or they could just make the hydrogen and not get a giant subsidy. There's no one telling them they can't do that. Again, nothing's being prohibited here.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's just like if we're going to give you a bunch of money, we'd like to have a few conditions on it.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. That's absolutely right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So just to review where we've been so far, there's these three pillars that characterize truly clean hydrogen. It's additional. It comes from new energy, comes from energy that's on the same grid you're on and it is matched up hourly with your consumption. Europe has more or less embraced these conditions. It's different timing on the hourly for various reasons. But the European Commission has said these are absolutely doable. This will not strangle the industry in the crib. So I have two questions about this. One is one argument you hear is it just stands to reason that more requirements and tighter requirements are going to slow the pace of development relative to no requirements.</p><p>Right. We'd build more electrolyzers if we could get the subsidy for any damn thing we do. So it's going to slow the industry. And what's most important here, and this is the argument I think appeals to a lot of people and this is the argument Rhodium uses, I'm sure you're familiar. Their whole thing is, yes, slightly looser additionality requirements would potentially raise greenhouse gas emissions in the near term. But that is worth it because you're radically accelerating the scaling up of electrolyzers and the scaling up of green hydrogen, which is going to reduce way more emissions in the long term than whatever this short-term surge is.</p><p>So basically like the short-term surge is worth it because you're buying huge long-term reductions. So what do you make of that trade-off is my first question.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>First of all, increasing emissions is against statutory requirements.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to get back to that. But first, on the merits.</p><p>Yeah, you're blatantly flouting the law, right? The IRA is meant to be given to projects that reduce emissions by 95% relative to today's hydrogen. You are subsidizing projects that have twice as much. So if you're already flouting statutory requirements by adopting some sort of a phase-in or transition periods like what Rhodium suggests. That's one. Two, I have full respect for Rhodium and we have worked with them a ton, but fully disagree with this notion of a trade-off. Right. As I mentioned earlier, what we're seeing from financial analyses, from projects already being kind of doing the three pillars.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>The three pillars will not harm scale. They will ensure healthy, durable scale. NRDC has been one of the first big enviros to come out in support of hydrogen three years ago and say, look, this is an important tool in the toolbox, we should scale it. However, this doesn't mean we have to scale it recklessly. Right. We have to make sure it's actually being done right. So I fully disagree with this notion of a trade-off between near-term emission increases against the law and scaling the industry. You could do both. The third piece, which people tend to forget, what will slow down this industry is public opposition.</p><p>Could you imagine if the US taxpayer knows that they're subsidizing increased emissions? That's not going to be pretty. And hydrogen is already a very contentious resource.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's contentious, but also it's still a little bit kind of undefined, a little bit it's a little bit fuzzy. So like, these next few years and how it gets treated and how it gets introduced to the broader public is very important. Right.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>That is the first touch point. I fully agree with you and I love one of the quotes by Paul Wilkins, I think is the vice president of Electric Hydrogen in Washington Post. He said, look, if in five years this tax credit shows that this industry is increasing emissions, that's going to be terrible for our industry. So that will slow down scale. It's not the and that always gets just glossed over.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Love to discuss this EU approach because I know that Rhodium ended up recommending that, but keeping it quite open ended.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I think Rhodium endorsed the idea is just that you start with yearly accounting and work your way up to hourly. You start with sort of broad regional requirements and then work your way up to more specific. It's same like you start with I think they want to start with monthly RECs and work their way, this idea of phasing in, so you can get started quickly and then phase in tighter requirements over time. What do you think is wrong with that approach?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>It's trying to mirror the EU, and I think this is very misguided. Right. Because the EU has a wildly different context. First of all, the EU has sticks. They have their emissions trading system which will help climb down and really minimize any emissions increases from loose rules in the near term. We don't have that. That's one. Two, the EU does not have a production tax credit like we do. All of their subsidies are more on the demand side. So creating demand signals. That means that there's going to be a rush to the cheapest supply. Cheapest supply generally means that you want to operate during low-priced hours as an electrolyzer because that's the biggest cost for you.</p><p>And this generally means you're going to hover around the cleaner hours. We don't have that. We have a production tax credit that is worth $60 per megawatt hour that will incentivize electrolyzers to keep running as much as they can because ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They're going to run maximal. When you're paid not for your sort of CapEx to build, but for your output, you obviously are incentivized to output as much as possible, as many hours as possible.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And then the third piece, which I alluded to earlier, the hourly matching phase in wildly different contexts in the EU, again, they have a regulatory barrier we don't, which is one of the reasons why they delayed it. We don't need to do that. Wildly different context. We should not be blindly mirroring the EU. So I think we're open to discuss what a rigorous phase-in period could look like for the US, but it should not be mirroring the EU.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, well, energy Innovation, and by the way, I should just say a lot of what I learned about this, I learned by listening to Chris Nelder's Energy Transition Show where he interviewed Eric Gimon from Energy Innovation. If you want, like the super nerdy technical dive into all this, if this isn't giving you enough, whatever freaks out there who still don't feel like they got enough from this, there's plenty more there. But one of the things energy innovation is recommending is a phase-in but sort of different starting strict but crude, not relying on sort of sophisticated hourly matching at the beginning but just starting with sort of rough and ready but relatively strict guidelines. And then evolving over time to something that's a little bit more granular and precise and a little bit looser.</p><p>Because Eric's point, which makes sense to me, is you don't often see industry passively agreeing to standards that they've gotten used to getting tighter. Right. But every industry would welcome standards that they're getting used to getting looser. Right. So his sort of thing is like, we don't have the sophistication to do it precisely. Now let's be strict and crude and then evolve toward slightly looser and smart. What do you make of that?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think this is more related to the point they made in their comments that the most precise way of calculating life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of hydrogen projects is to adopt the marginal emissions approach, which I know you hate that term, Dave, but emissionality essentially you net out. You have to have a very granular way of accounting for what you're inducing on the grid and what you're netting out by locating somewhere and kind of going that way. I know that they're slightly moving away from that because it's not easily implementable that's something we flirted with as well a few months ago. And what we're hearing is like this is elegant and nice, but from a developer standpoint this may not be very workable.</p><p>So the three pillars are very good proxy right, for ensuring that your emissions are close to zero.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. The ideal here is a sort of shimmering ideal in the distance is that for any given hour of power consumption, you know, in the end eventually you're going to be able to know specifically which generators provided it and specifically how much greenhouse gas were involved. Like just as you can precisely know how much power you're using, you're eventually going to be able to precisely know how many greenhouse gases you're producing or displacing or avoiding. Right? That's all going to be sort of available in one giant transparent registry and everybody's going to agree how to calculate it and we're going to be able to base a lot of policy on that.</p><p>I mean, it's going to solve a lot of tricky kind of short-term accounting and tracking and policy puzzles are going to be solved once all that information is transparent and available. But as you say, that's a ways off.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. We strongly support this move to more granularity to give really the more accurate signals for what to invest in. I don't think it's necessary for this credit. The three pillars are straightforward enough for developers. They're rigorous enough to meet the IOA requirements. I'm supportive of just retaining that. Now one can create a little bit of exceptions or derogations like what the EU did. So for example, if the grid gets really clean, like 90-95% clean, then maybe we can relax the additionality required. Or if LMPS are extremely low, which indicates renewable energy curtailment for instance, then maybe we can relax hourly matching.</p><p>We're open to that as long as the rigor of the system is maintained. So I don't think we need to completely overhaul to a marginal emissions approach to bake in a little bit more precisions for the outer years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And presumably, there'll be a lot of learning as we do this, how to make it work better. So this might be a dumb question but so say you're treasury and you read the Rhodium report and for whatever reason, it strikes you as highly compelling and you're thinking, yeah, let's set some relatively loose additionality requirements. Even though we'll get a little bit more greenhouse gas emissions in the short term, we'll get a lot more reductions in the long term. My thing is which, as you said, that's just against the law. The law says very clearly 0.45 threshold for greenhouse life cycle emissions is very clear.</p><p>So I guess my question is just isn't some of this kind of an academic debate? Like the IRS can't just contravene the clear written intent of the law. It's got to hold whatever details it puts in, it's got to result in that threshold, or else it doesn't meet the law. Right. So is a lot of this just an academic debate? Like, what am I missing? They don't seem to have the latitude that industry is acting like they have.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely fully agree with that. And the treasury has been pretty tight-lipped about all this, so it's really hard to see where they're landing. But you're spot on. Weak rules that clearly flout statutory requirements would be both unlawful and a complete abdication of responsibility. So I wouldn't be surprised at all if many groups end up suing, should the rules be very weak. But let's talk about this legal piece. We have been doing a bunch of legal analyses with other groups, and look, the case for the pillars is ironclad, right? Because the way lifecycle emissions are defined in the law requires that they account for emissions that projects induce on the system.</p><p>So if I'm an electrolyzer and I'm purchasing cheap credits from the existing nuke or renewable or so on and driving more gas on the system.</p><p>Right, you induce that grid operator to turn on that extra gas.</p><p>Correct. There is virtually no project in the US that today will qualify under this boundary of emissions. If they're not driving nuclear supply that is hourly match and deliverable, it's impossible for them to comply with 0.45 without these three pillars.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>If you want to make this credit workable, those need to be in. If you want no projects to qualify unless they're colocated with a new source of supply, then you can do that. But I don't think that's the intent of the law. I don't think developers will be happy with that if it's only the behind-the-meter projects are able to qualify. So the three pillars are absolutely necessary, and if they're flouted so blatantly then that's just unlawful in a sense.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All this feels a little bit pointless to me because the law is super clear and if they come out with standards that allow higher threshold they're just going to get sued by a bunch of environmental groups. I mean that would be a crappy outcome to have to wait. We don't have a lot of time to wait and mess around with lawsuits. But surely treasury knows it doesn't have as much latitude as industry seems to frame it as having.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Hopefully, Dave, let's send them this little excerpt.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You don't have to; it's crazy. I'm not a lawyer, but the law is so clearly written that there just doesn't seem to be a lot of fuzziness here. But who knows what our beloved Supreme Court could find if it ever finds its way up there. It's just a small side question in terms of projects built entirely off-grid, right? One and then projects built with a one-way connection to the grid. Two and then projects that are just grid connected that just contract to have new solar and wind added to that grid. Do you have any sense of what the balance will be like right now?</p><p>There's some off-grid projects being built. Right. So clearly, those are workable. Are people going to gravitate toward grid-connected over the long term because it's cheaper, or do you have any sense of what kinds of projects are most likely to get built?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's very unclear. What we're seeing is most of the projects moving now are behind a meter. Indeed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you know why? Is there a clear answer to why?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>If I had to speculate, there's so much less risk.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, everything's much cleaner. Every answer is much clearer.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Exactly. There's less risk overall, which I'm sure is very great for your rate of capital and so on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, right.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>But the level of fierce opposition we're seeing for the grid-connected kind of three-pillar system tells me, oh, there's a lot of interest in connecting to the grid at some point soon. So we're seeing mostly behind the meter. But I expect that the grid-connected projects will certainly start popping up soon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Be really interesting to see how that plays out. Okay, final question, and God bless all you listeners for your extraordinary patience. This is a complicated one. There was really no way to boil this one down. But final question. This is like everything in IRA. This is a carrot, right? A big subsidy, a big payout, and specifically, it's a supply-side subsidy. This is literally a per kilogram of output subsidy. So it's all about supply. If you are taking a step back and thinking about, in the long term, how to construct a robust and effective market for hydrogen in the clean energy system, are there demand-side policies that you think would work well to complement this really giant battering ram of a supply-side subsidy?</p><p>What should we be doing on the demand side? Or is supply side is the battering ram enough?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Great question. And this really gets to the core of, look, the tax credits are a big prize. They're not the only one, right? So we can't burden them and loosen the crap out of them because we're worried that the industry won't scale otherwise. I disagree with that. I think there's a good analogy to the renewable energy growth. The wind and solar tax credits obviously were a big driver of deployment. They were not the only driver. Right. State RTS has played an important role, corporate voluntary procurements played a really big role.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, demand side was huge all along.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. So that's exactly the same case here. There's this giant, generous supply side push. It has to be and already is coupled by subsidies on the other side. What we're seeing globally, and this applies to the US, is one of the main barriers of getting hydrogen projects built is the lack of end uses. It's the lack of demand. Right. That's why only a very small share of projects go from announcement to FID.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And just to be clear, this is not lack of demand for hydrogen. There's lots of hydrogen used. It's lack of specifically demand for the still slightly, somewhat more expensive clean hydrogen.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Correct. No longer in many places. Yes, spurring end-use is going to be important, especially since we didn't speak of that, but maybe that's another episode. Hydrogen should not be used everywhere. Right. This is a resource that is energy intensive. It has its place in some important hard-to-electrify sectors like steel and maybe shipping and so on. Not widespread in the economy. So focus demand side policies could be really interesting here to really divert the market to the, quote unquote, "good uses." Right. So the hydrogen hubs are going to be really interesting. And again, this is a big subsidy we keep forgetting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Have they talked about what end uses qualify or what they're going to put in those hubs as end uses?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>It's very unclear. But the DOE's hydrogen roadmap, which kind of sets the vision for the department, for how they will go about their hydrogen deployment, is pretty damn good. It's all focused on deploying hydrogen in hard-to-electrify applications where it's actually needed and doesn't have better alternatives. So if they were to make good on that roadmap, and I really hope they do, they will select the hubs that actually have the high-value end uses and not the low-value end uses like blending in pipes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Let's just say when we talk about low value, like the idea of blending hydrogen into natural gas pipelines to marginally reduce the climate impact of natural gas just seems to me like the lowest possible use of what is effectively like champagne. Be like dumping champagne in your water supply or something. I don't know what the right analogy is. You want to save champagne, it's expensive and you want to save it for the best highest uses of it. And this is a big fight with the natural gas industry, of course, because they want their natural gas pipelines to stay up and running as long as possible.</p><p>They want all that infrastructure, they want themselves to survive. And so the idea that they could mix in a little hydrogen and go on, they love it. But as you say, that's a whole separate fight, a whole separate pod about hydrogen end uses.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And this has a real implication on the production because if we recklessly open the floodgates of supply in this decade with very loose rules, then where is this hydrogen all going to go? Right. The end uses that are the most primed to go, unfortunately, today are the ... Barring, replacing existing hydrogen with cleaner, which is good. It's all these other bad end-uses, including blending, because steel and other good end uses aren't quite commercially viable just yet. So all this to say the hubs are going to be a big end-use driver. Public procurement tools are really interesting.</p><p>So the federal government is one of the largest buyers, for instance, of steel for public infrastructure projects. There's a lot of money in the IRA now for the federal government to clean up some of their cement and steel and so on that they purchase. If there is a procurement for green steel that is hydrogen derived, then that's really interesting. Right. You're trying to create a very strong, stable demand signal, and we're seeing some states like Colorado, Illinois, Pennsylvania starting to contemplate state-specific tax credits focused on using hydrogen in specific end uses. I'm not going to get behind those proposals.</p><p>They're not great, but I think it's the right kind of thinking, right? Let's start trying to be more targeted with where we're driving this resource in the economy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So you're saying if we're going to sort of jam an enormous amount of supply into the system really quickly, we should also implement some demand-side policies to guide the hydrogen thusly produced to its highest and best uses?</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Absolutely. We have to be very cautious about where we're using it and divert it to the right places, for sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay. Goodness, that's a lot. It just goes to show in the energy world, you're like, clean hydrogen. Let's do that. And then so many devils in the details.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>I'm hoping this was less wonky than Eric Gimon, whom I have utmost respect to, but even my mind was turned into a pretzel listening to that episode.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think we hit a nice, good middle spot. This is like the 301 class. More than the 101, but less than the grad seminar. That's my aspiration.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>That's where students either drop or ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The ones who can get past this pod. They're definitely headed for expert expertise. Rachel Fakhry of NRDC, thank you so much for coming on and talking through this all so plainly and simply and clearly. I super appreciate it.</p><p><strong>Rachel Fakhry</strong></p><p>Thanks so much, Dave.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/were-about-to-give-billions-of-dollars</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:109719222</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/109719222/6593f452c9a951497b7e280ba6cdd3f0.mp3" length="43595513" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5449</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/109719222/e863ccf0c18b871f3684f126080159d6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why electrifying industrial heat is such a big deal]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>A full quarter of global energy use goes toward heat that powers industrial processes. To provide clean industrial heat but avoid the variability often associated with renewable energy, a company called Rondo makes a thermal battery, storing renewable-energy heat in bricks. In this episode, Rondo CEO John O’Donnell talks about this breakthrough technology and the opportunities that thermal storage promises to open.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACbhHIXAFVD7jnWmbfmvTzYa/volts23.03.24%28john.odonnel%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/why-electrifying-industrial-heat-is-such-a-big-deal"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Electricity gets the bulk of the attention in clean-energy discourse (this newsletter is, after all, called Volts) but half of global final energy consumption comes in the form not of electricity, but of <em>heat</em>. When it comes to reaching net zero emissions, heat is half the problem.</p><p>Roughly half of heat is used for space and water heating, which I have covered on other pods. The other half — a quarter of all energy humans use — is found in high-temperature industrial processes, everything from manufacturing dog food to making steel or cement. </p><p>The vast bulk of industrial heat today is provided by fossil fuels, usually natural gas or specialized forms of coal. Conventional wisdom has had it that these sectors are “difficult to decarbonize” because alternatives are either more expensive or nowhere to be found. Indeed, when I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/10/10/20904213/climate-change-steel-cement-industrial-heat-hydrogen-ccs">covered an exhaustive report on industrial heat</a> back in 2019, the conclusion was that the cheapest decarbonization option was probably CCS, capturing carbon post-combustion and burying it.</p><p>A lot has changed in the last few years. Most notably, renewable energy has gotten extremely cheap, which makes it an attractive source of heat. However, it is variable, while industrial processes cannot afford to start and stop. Enter the <em>thermal battery</em>, a way to store clean electricity as heat until it is needed.</p><p>A new class of battery — “rocks in a box” — stores renewable energy as heat in a variety of different materials from sand to graphite, delivering a steady supply to various end uses. One of the more promising companies in this area is <a target="_blank" href="https://rondo.com/">Rondo</a>, which makes a battery that stores heat in bricks.</p><p>I talked with Rondo CEO John O'Donnell about the importance of heat in the clean-energy discussion, the technological changes that have made thermal storage viable, and the enormous future opportunities for clean heat and a renewables-based grid to grow together.</p><p>All right, John O'Donnell of Rondo. Welcome to Volts. Thank you for coming.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Thank you. It's a great pleasure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I am so excited to talk to you. I've been geeking out about thermal storage for over a year now, just wanting to do something on it, and there's so much there. And I find that unlike a lot of electricity topics which I cover, there's just not a lot of baseline familiarity out there among, let's say, normal people. So there's a ton to cover from the ground up. So I want to start at the highest possible level, which is to say, let's just talk about heat. Like in the clean energy world, electrical power gets a lot of attention, a lot of discussion, a lot of technological development.</p><p>Everybody's got their favorites, everybody knows what's going on. But then there's also heat, which is the sort of weirdly ignored not so much anymore, but up till pretty recently ignored. So maybe just start with an explanation of why heat is important if you care about clean energy, why you should care about heat?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Thank you. Sure. That's a great question. And that context you just provided is, of course, dead on. There's a really simple answer. Heat. Industrial heat is 26% of total world final energy consumption. Whether you are making baby food, or fuel, or cement, or steel, the manufacturing processes vastly predominantly use energy in the form of heat, not electricity. Globally, it's three quarters of all the energy used by industry is in the form of heat. Again, whether you're pasteurizing milk or melting steel. And the DOE has just created a new office focused on this topic. We're thrilled about it.</p><p>Their assessment is that industrial heat is 11%, I think, of all total US CO2 I'm in California. Here in California, we burn more natural gas for industrial process heat than we do for electric power generation. And to a first approximation, as you just mentioned, no one knows that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So heat is a huge portion of final energy consumption. It's a huge portion of global CO2 emissions. So maybe give a sense of like, what percentage of total heat final consumption is industry, like how's the total heat-pie divided up.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>So when I said 26% of world — that's industrial heat, right. So that's not buildings, that's not other heating sources.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Heat is a bigger category than that.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>I mean, if you take actually heat for buildings and heat for industry, together they're like 60% of all the natural gas used in Europe. But within industrial heat, people sort it out by a couple of different things. One of them is the temperature. There's a lot of heat in cooking processes. That's around 150°C in the form of steam all the way up to the highest temperature heat in making cement, that's around 1800°C. About 95% of total heat is used in processes that need it below 1500°C, about maybe half to two thirds of industrial heat is below about 400°C.</p><p>There's a fairly steep curve. About half of all industrial heat, something like that, is delivered as steam.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Steam is the lower end of the temperature spectrum. I recall looking at these charts of sort of what industries use, what levels of heat. Up at the super high heat, you have pretty singular industries, like steel's up there and concrete's up there. But down in the lower heat registers, where you're using just steam, there's a bunch of little industries clustered up there. Most of the industries are using that.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right. All of these have been things that people say are hard to decarbonize because across many of these industries, they're making commodities, whether it's steel or tomato paste that are relatively low margin and for which the cost of heat is a very significant portion of the total cost of production. So this is a sector where all these processes use heat in somewhat different ways. The cost of that energy is really critical to the competitiveness of that industry and what commodities cost consumers. And there have not been great solutions until recently that could provide decarbonized heat at the same or lower cost.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the situation is there's a huge chunk of our energy that goes toward heat, a huge chunk of that goes toward industrial heat. And there's been comparatively little work on finding zero carbon versions of that heat. That's the problem we discussed the last time we talked, probably three or four, five years ago. Everything pre-pandemic is a haze. But I think it was around five years ago I covered this big comprehensive report on industrial heat options, like, what can we do about industrial heat? And it went through the options, and basically the conclusion was that continuing to do it with fossil fuels and just capturing the emissions post combustion was the cheapest option for a lot of these heat uses.</p><p>And I dutifully reported that. But I didn't like it. I didn't like the idea that that's the best we can do is create these Rube Goldberg machines where we're digging up carbon, burning it, capturing the carbon, burying the carbon again, et cetera. I was like, surely that's not the best we could do. But things have changed a lot, since then. So maybe just run through what are the low carbon heat alternatives and which ones have emerged recently, and what has changed that has helped them emerge?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah. Thank you. You said for a long time there hasn't been much work on this. I would say partly there hasn't been so much success on it. I've been working on for 15 years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No offense, John.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>And in two previous solar companies we wound — who are a lot of the team here at Rondo worked with me there — we wound up delivering more than half of all the solar industrial heat that's running worldwide right now. But to say that's a drop in the bucket is oversizing a drop you asked exactly the right question. What are the options? Because the world has really changed.</p><p>There has always been the option of burning biomass, which is more or less sustainable, but very high cost, high air pollution, and very, very limited availability. Other kinds of biofuels, like renewable natural gas, if we take it to a giant scale, it might power as much as 1% of our industrial heat. And it's easy to laugh about, but it's true. The thing that has profoundly changed is what the wind and solar PV industries have accomplished over the last 15 years. The 95% reduction in cost means that intermittent electricity is becoming — has become — the cheapest form of energy that humans have ever known.</p><p>And it's now cheaper than burning stuff as a source of heat, but it's intermittent. So how do we take that intermittent electricity and use it to deliver the continuous heat? I mean, you turn on a smelter or a factory or even a tomato paste plant, you run it for months or a year on end, it has to have continuous heat or it will be damaged.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's worth just pausing to emphasize this. The vast majority of industrial processes are continuous. They cannot run intermittently. They cannot stop and start with the sun and the wind. It just would be wildly uneconomic.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's a beautiful and concise way of saying it. Like there are processes where if they get a half second interruption in their energy supply, it takes a week to restart the process. Reliability is a very big deal. So what are the tools we have for that? Intermittent electricity, which is becoming plentiful. And in places right now, you can have essentially unlimited amounts briefly every day at prices far below fuel prices. We have hydrogen, electrolytic hydrogen, make hydrogen, compress it, store it, and then combust it. That works. Although electrolyzers are today expensive, they're coming down in cost.</p><p>But the laws of physics bite you in that you get about one unit of heat for every two units of electricity because of the chemical steps involved.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. All the conversions.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But can you just dump hydrogen into existing boilers and kilns? Like, is existing equipment hydrogen ready, as they say?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Not exactly. It's hydrogen ready for a few percentage of hydrogen. But when you look at a boiler, 95% of its lifetime cost is the fuel, not the boiler. So upgrading boilers to run that other fuel, that's something that you would do if the economics of that fuel were sensible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Right? Now at taxpayer expense. We're creating a period where hydrogen, electrolytic hydrogen is going to get down to the same cost as fossil fuel in the US with tax credits. But again, intermittent electricity by itself today is cheaper than fossil fuel. Doesn't need tax credits to get it to that point. And now there is this emerging class of electric thermal energy storage systems that don't do chemistry. They just convert electricity to heat directly and then store the heat. Because heat storage, another thing you could do I skipped over is you could, of course, store electricity in a battery.</p><p>Right.</p><p>Which would be the most expensive thing.</p><p>But if you have a coffee thermos on your desk, it's storing energy as it happens. The energy stored in your coffee thermos is more energy than the energy stored in your laptop battery, and it's a bit cheaper than your laptop battery. Storing heat is cheap right now in the thermos. What do you have? You have hot water, which stores a lot of energy per degree, and an insulation thing around it, depending on how good the insulation is, that'll tell you how long that thing will store energy. All those things have been around for a long time, and suddenly, okay, how are we going to heat these things electrically?</p><p>How are we going to use simple technology? Because most people who are working on electric thermal storage are doing simple things. There are some exotic things using conductive materials, liquid metal things, but there are simple things that people are doing also.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You're hitting directly on something. That is why I love this area so much, why it sort of kind of caught my imagination so much. Like, you really have a situation here where electricity was just more expensive than fossil fuels for these purposes up until like five minutes ago.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In terms of looking for opportunities for just storing. Now that electricity is cheap, we're looking for ways to store it and use it as heat in a lot of ways for the first time. And what that means is there's like, very simple low hanging fruit all over the place. The way I think about it is, like, my generation maybe like younger people than me, when we think of technology or advanced technology, we generally think digital, and that generally means opaque. Like, we don't know what's going on in there. Even cars these days. Like, so little of it is mechanical anymore and so much of it is digital and computerized.</p><p>It just seems opaque to us. And these technologies of storing electricity as heat are so delightfully simple. Like, you're literally just heating up a rock and that's, like, you might say that heating up a rock is literally the oldest energy transfer mechanism that humans have available to them. It's probably the very first way we moved energy ever, literally. So it's just fun to me in that it's almost like a childlike sense of discovery to it. Anyway, that's just my that's completely off topic, but ...</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>One of the electric thermal energy storage technologies actually uses rock. And on the outside of the pilot it says, welcome to the new Stone Age. And there's a mastodon as the mascot. So, yes, it's a well understood thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So just to sort of summarize where we've been so far, you need all this heat. Up until very recently, it was overwhelmingly cheaper to do it by combusting fossil fuels. A lot of the alternatives to fossil fuels are more expensive than fossil fuels. But now recently, along comes renewable wind and solar electricity, which are cheaper than anything. So now the challenge is, well, how do you get the heat from the wind and solar electricity? As you say, the applications are running around the clock. Wind and solar come and go. So in between the wind and solar and the applications, you need something that's going to store that wind and solar that can release it in a steady flow.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's the new thermal storage technologies that are emerging now are sitting right in that space, including Rondo. So if you're talking about something sitting in that space, what do you need out of it? What are the sort of metrics by which you judge the performance of that thing that's sitting in between the renewables and the application?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Great question. So obviously you need safety, efficiency, cost, temperature at which the heat can be delivered.</p><p>Right.</p><p>Some other things as well. One of them is the faster that you can charge the system and deliver energy continuously. If you can charge it, if it takes you typical batteries, they charge and discharge at the same rate. But here we'd like to charge perhaps during the solar day in six or 8 hours and deliver for 24 hours continuous. If you could charge in about 4 hours, we find that's even more valuable. The periods of curtailment and the periods of zero and negative electricity prices in electricity grids are short.</p><p>So the ideal thermal storage can charge very rapidly. You can control its charging like other batteries, it could participate in providing grid services and it can run continuously, shut it down once a year for inspection and when the factory that it's connected to is shut down and just sit there and require low O and M, operating and maintenance, costs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I presume low losses too.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But I want to pause and just emphasize the first point you made just so people get it. We have these wind and solar all come online at the same time because they're all using the same wind and sun. So what you have are these periods of oversupply. I think people are familiar with this. You get oversupply more than the grid can use and today that just goes to waste. It's curtailed. That energy is not used. And so what you're doing is proposing to come along and use it. But if that's your economic sweet spot, those couple of hours of curtailed energy, you need your battery to charge as much as possible during those couple of hours.</p><p>In other words, charge really quickly because the amount of energy available in those curtailed hours, especially in coming years, is going to be potentially huge. Right. So you need to stuff a lot of energy in your heat battery really quickly.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right. Now the early deployments of heat batteries will use what is curtailed today. One of the things that we see that's uniquely pretty cool about this class of electric thermal storage is the total amount of energy that industrial heat needs is really large for scale. I think we had a 52 gigawatt system peak in California not long ago. We've got about 20 gigawatts of PV in the state. Just repowering the boilers and furnaces that we have right now in California needs 100 gigawatts of new generation to replace those fuel BTUs, about 40 of those gigawatts can actually be built without any connection to an electricity grid.</p><p>One of the things that's great about ETES powering industry is we're headed for a world where industrial electrification is not creating more problems for the grid, but we'll get there. But this matter of fast charging rate means that new generation projects that are serving the grid, the best ones, the cheapest ones, will be built selling part of their power to thermal storage. Like during the peak and curtailed hours and then delivering those broader shoulder renewable power to the electricity grid. And we're seeing again and again that that's a formula for low energy prices for the industrial and for lower prices to the grid.</p><p>There's an interesting synergy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're going to get into that synergy in just a second, but I want to focus on how we're evaluating the heat battery. So we want it to absorb a bunch of energy quickly.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Fast, charge. Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then we want it to hold that energy with very little losses. And this is the other fact about thermal storage that blew my mind that I do not think is widely appreciated, which is the incredibly low losses here. People are accustomed to, I think if you want to store energy in hydrogen, you're losing about 50% of your energy through all the convergence. Like a 50% efficiency ish yes, batteries, lithium-ion, depending, you're getting up to don't know what the standard average is, but just heating up a rock, you get 90% to 95% of that heat back out of that rock.</p><p>That is wild to me.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right. Yeah. The least efficient of the thermal energy storage systems are around 90%. We happen to be 98%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's just crazy. So the heat just sits there in the rock and doesn't go anywhere?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Well, fill up your thermos with hot coffee, take the thermos and wrap it in a couple of blankets, open it up, three days later the coffee is still hot. It's not like a chemical system where there's self discharge or something. The only place energy can go is either lost to the environment through insulation or delivered to the target. So it's a lot easier than it sounds. A lot of people think, "Oh, this efficiency couldn't be possibly the case." It really is almost embarrassingly simple.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And now my question though is when we say 95-98%, what are the time horizons of that? Like if I fully charge your thermal battery and we're going to get into the guts of your thermal battery here in a second, but if I fully charge a Rondo battery and then just don't do anything to it, how long would it take for all that heat to be lost? Like what is the time horizons we're discussing here?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Again, the use case that we're considering that we're targeting, is it's discharging continuously?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. It doesn't need to hold it that long. Theoretically, I'm wondering.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Theoretically that's right, because the one place where you are holding energy, we've got a food factory that runs shift work. They operate one shift five days a week. So yeah, you're storing some energy and you got more energy on Monday than you did on Friday afternoon. The short answer is we lose about 2%, 2.5% per day. So if you were holding energy multiple days, there would be self discharge. But that's because we were designing for a particular use case. Again, you could decide the rate at which your thermos loses heat by if you wrap it in a blanket ... you could make it store energy for months on end.</p><p>Then the question is, is that valuable? If you really want to store energy for months on end? If you want to move energy from July to January, chemical storage is a great thing because it doesn't have self discharge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>If you are in a place where you can have a salt cavern and you can make hydrogen in July and pull out in January, okay, that's great.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? Because the hydrogen you pull out in January contains the exact same amount of energy ...</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>... as you put in the hydrogen.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>As long as it didn't leak out. But yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So in the hours today's, maybe multiple days, rarely a week time horizon that you're working in, you're getting 98% efficiency. 98% of the energy that goes in comes back out to the application.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yes. In that use case. That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think now that we're focused in here on the heat battery, let's just discuss what the Rondo heat battery is, and maybe while you're telling us, tell us what some of the other options in this space are. I know people are heating up. You're heating up bricks. Some people are heating up giant chunks of graphite. I think sand is on the table. I don't even know what all the options are. But what are people trying in that space?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>The one technology that's been at scale for quite a while, that's been used by the solar industry since the 1980s is using nitrate salts, which melt at around 250 degrees. Salts? That's right. They're stable up to about 600°C. And so you can have a big tank of cold salt, which is something like 600 degrees Fahrenheit. It looks like a transparent liquid, but stay away from it. And a tank of hot salt, and you heat by pumping from one to the other and pull the heat out going the other way. I built my first molten salt test facility back in 2008 at a national lab.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I remember there was a hype cycle around molten salts that has kind of faded. Why has it faded? Like, why are rocks preferable?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>The more you know about it, the less you like it. It's one thing to use it in a solar power station where there's nothing in there for a mile away except for the turbine. It's quite another thing for an energy storage facility to be put inside a factory where people are working. When I mentioned safety first, you don't want a system that can catch fire or spill a superheated liquid that would burn everybody or release toxic gases. I'm not aware of any molten salt projects that haven't sent at least one person to the hospital. So there's the molten salt systems.</p><p>And again, they work. They're proven but they have proven challenges.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They just require a lot of engineering to contain.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Well, and that's another matter that you've talked about previously, which technologies get cheap, right? Molten salt systems are a lot like they have the nuclear reactor characteristic that everyone is bespoke, those tanks at that site with that engineering and there has not been much learning capable to drive cost out. The modular approach, the factory manufactured approach, eludes that technology. Now there are a lot of people exploring how do we do modular factory manage. And one of the things that you first do if you want to store heat is, okay, what's it cheap to store heat in?</p><p>As you mentioned stone, crushed rock, various kinds of rocks in a box or sand in a cylinder where you build an industrial strength hairdryer. You blow superheated air through the rock or the sand bed. And then when you want heat, you push cool air the other way through the sand or the rock bed. That works. There are people taking it to scale. It has temperature and cost challenges. What you find in every one of these cases, the rock is cheap, but the box costs a lot.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the fans, I assume like the fans and that kind of engineering adds to the ...</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right. And remember now that your fan has to blow at your peak charging rate. And there's an example of a technology that leads you to it's more expensive to charge fast. But the big problem with those unstructured materials is when they heat up, they expand and you have to have a container strong enough and then when they cool, they shrink and settle and then the next day they expand again and they slowly turn into dust over at a rate. So the material looks really cheap, but the system turns out to be not so cheap.</p><p>Right then you mentioned there are a lot of interesting science experiments with new materials that have never been used this way before. When we started Rondo, we did a really careful look at everything that's out there. There are people using liquid silicon. It melts at 14° Celsius stores a lot of heat. Just like ice melting in a glass absorbs a lot of heat melting and releasing silicon. Freezing silicon is a really good thing for high temperature heat. But what do you make the glass that's holding that silicon-ice? How do you keep it like there are a lot of challenges that companies have been working on for years and it's probably going to take another decade before that technology is at the point that an ordinary project finance guy will say, yes, that's as low risk as PV. I'll invest in that at the same finance rate. And that time to bank ability is one of the biggest issues. If you want a technology to go big fast, everybody's got to agree it's boring and low risk and that's a challenge with new materials. Graphite is another material that's interesting. It has higher heat capacity than rock or brick, especially when it gets hot, but it catches fire at 560°C. So you want to store energy at 1500° or 2000°.</p><p>You've got to keep it in some atmosphere so that it can't catch fire for 30 years and it's conductive electrically, which could be great. But anyway, there are interesting engineering challenges and there are at least four companies working on that. One of them is also looking at using that graphite not for electricity to heat, but electricity to heat to electricity. Using PV cells to capture the light from the graphite.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that Indora?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Antora.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Antora. Yeah, I talked to them, too. And in terms of like science-fiction geeky fun, that one is just a great one. They heat the graphite up, it gets so hot that the energy comes back out as light.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Light.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So they have it covered in shutters that they can open incrementally. And the light can either shine on tubes full of fluid if you want heat, or these special PV modules that they built especially for it. If you want electricity, like the whole conceptually, that's very satisfying.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>It's super cool. My first job was infusion power, where you have a reactor that wants 100 million degree plasma right next to a superconducting magnet that has to be five degrees. The Antora PV challenge when they solve that that technology is cool for electricity to electricity because it could turn out to be long duration, no moving parts storage. It's hard for us to see that. That's an example of we're going to do something deeply innovative. How long will it take to prove that it's bankable and what we're doing is much more boring? The back to electricity is their superpower is back to electricity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I want to discuss that. Like the ability to go back to electricity and what, you'll come to that. We'll get to that. But you guys have settled on rather than any of these materials science fun time experiments. Bricks.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah. Okay. Somebody told me this the other day. How many gigawatts of batteries are there in the world right now, do you know?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Somebody told me there are about three gigawatts of batteries in the world right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Lithium-ion batteries, you mean?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah. So how much heat storage is running in the world right now? As we speak, there's about 30 gigawatts of heat storage running right now. In 1828 was the first patent for a thing called a cowper stove, which is a tower with a thousand tons of brick in it that has air passages that on a 1 hour cycle. The still combusting exhaust of the blast furnace is blown down through that tower and heats all the brick to about 1500°C. And then for about 20 minutes, fresh air is drawn up through the tower and it's providing the inlet air to the furnace and it's delivering 115 megawatts heat for about 20 minutes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Crazy.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>And then it's heated again. These. Things are heated and cooled 24 times a day. They last 30 years. There's a million tons of that brick in service right now at the blast furnaces around the world.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And these are just ordinary brick-bricks that people are familiar with. Like, what are bricks made of?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>What, are they the term they use? Yeah, there are a bunch of different materials, but two of the most abundant elements in Earth's crust are silicon and aluminum. Silica, silicon dioxide, alumina, aluminum oxide are two of the most important minerals. Different bricks are made of different mixtures of silica and alumina. And there are other kinds of bricks as well that are even higher temperature, but they call it aluminosilicate brick. It's higher temperature brick than in your fireplace. Looks a lot like it. And it's what is in every if you have a ceramics kiln, that's what's in your ceramics kiln liner.</p><p>It's in a cement kiln, and it's again, used in all kinds of areas. People have been making brick like this for thousands of years. Brick is made from dirt. I mean, certain kinds of dirt. You mix it up, you put a little binder, you throw it in a kiln, and you've got your brick.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So if I'm looking inside a Rondo box, am I literally just looking at a stack of bricks?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Pretty much. The one thing that's different ... our breakthrough. So the brick, as you know about brick, it's brittle. If you drop a brick, it'll break.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>You also know that brick is not a good heat conductor. That's why we make fireplaces out of it. So if we want to heat it fast, we have to heat it uniformly. If you stuck a brick and you had, like, one side in a bucket of water and the other side in a fire, the brick might fracture. But if you put the brick in the middle of the fire, it'll heat up rapidly to the temperature of the fire. It's one of those ideas that once you see it, it's obvious. But it only took 80 design revisions.</p><p>If you look inside a Rondo unit, what you'll see is a brick stack that's full of these open chambers. It's a checkerboard of open boxes surrounded by brick, and brick surrounded by these open boxes. And electrical heaters are embedded directly in the stack, and they provide radiant heat within those open boxes. And because thermal radiation of every object in the universe goes as the fourth power of its temperature in degrees Kelvin, as I know you remember.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of course.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Things that can see each other get to become the same temperature by exchanging heat. So the result of this was we found a way to directly, rapidly heat the brick.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is an alternative to blowing hot air over the bricks.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which, a. would require more engineering and more money, but b. also might not heat them uniformly, like might heat one side before the other side or something like that.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Hot air. You can heat them uniformly, like the blast furnaces do that. But in that case, you have the same electrical heater that's in something like a hairdryer. And inside a hairdryer, the heaters are mostly radiating to the metal plates, which in turn are heating the air, which in turn would in this case, heat the brick. There'd be a couple of hundred degrees difference between the final temperature of the brick and the temperature of the wire. In our case, that's about five degrees.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So instead of using the wire to heat the air, to heat the brick, you're just sticking the wire in the brick, and the wire is heating the brick directly.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right. So we just last week, we announced the world's highest temperature thermal energy storage system running. That's not because we use different heating materials than others. It's because of that physics insight that led to that structure. That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. Okay, just quickly, what are some of the engineering challenges here? Do the bricks expand and contract when they are heated, or do they degrade over time? What sort of things are you dealing with here with bricks that you had to overcome?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah, there were lots of things because what we're talking about is kind of at some level obvious, and people have done really good work on this previously. But the challenge is you have to think about, yes, the bricks expand and contract, so build your structure. But the nice thing is they're freestanding. They don't need a container to hold them in. So if you build your structure properly, it can freely expand and contract.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there are like spaces between the bricks in which they can ...</p><p>Where they're touching when they're hot and spaces open up when it's cold. Exactly. Other big challenges consider if you have a storage system and one area has some airflow blockage so that during discharge, it's not getting as cool as another area the next day when you put heat in, it's going to wind up hotter than another area. And the day after that, even hotter thermal runaway that would cause failure because one part was too hot. If you have that possibility, you have to run the whole thing cooler. So it turns out one of the hard problems, one of the hard engineering problems is making sure that the temperature inside the material is uniform.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>And it's uniform not just when the unit is new, but when it's 30 years old.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Your promise here is that this Rondo battery has the same capacity and the same performance characteristics in 30 years that it does today. Is that the idea?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's exactly right, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And no other battery? There's no other battery that can say that.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>I think that's true. But here, there's a million tons of this material running in the world, and those guys have much higher mechanical force on it. They build 30 meters tall things. We build eight meter tall things. They heat and cool it 24 times a day. We heat and cool it once a day. Lasts 30 years for them. Pretty clear it's going to last longer than that for us. Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And let me ask about getting the heat out to where it needs to go, because as I have been reading about, I did a thing on a company a while back that was using concentrating solar to superheat a fluid. And they could get to these levels of heat that are germane to concrete and whatever the higher end, the higher temperature applications, but only at a particular spot. Right. It's got to be right where the sun is and where everything's coming together in that one spot. And then, of course, you face the challenge of how do I get that heat to where it needs to be without losing a bunch of the heat?</p><p>And this is sort of, obviously the other half of the thermal energy challenge. And there's sort of two challenges. One is making it into steam right. For all these lower temperature applications, and then, I don't know, making it into what, for the steel or the super high energy. I don't even know how you transfer that high version of heat. So what are you using on the back end?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah. So every combined cycle power station in the world has a jet engine that's generating electric power. Its exhaust is around 605 C. That exhaust is passed through a boiler, a heat recovery steam generator that drives a steam turbine that makes extra electric power. So the world knows how to build those boilers that run on about 600 C air.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>The Rondo storage is much hotter temperature than that we mix down. And for the systems that are delivering steam, we work with leaders who build conventional boilers and we've engineered the heat battery to include that boiler. So the basic heat battery models are exact drop in replacements for particular models of industrial boilers. They're just about the same size. Stick us next to your existing one, hook us up to the pipe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You're replacing a fossil fuel run boiler with a heat battery and a boiler in the same space.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah. We think of the heat battery as from the substation to the steam flange in that case. So it is a like for like drop in replacement. The less work the customer has to do, the better off we are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to ask it. We might as well discuss this now, because this is obviously one of the this is something you run into with battery chemistries all the time. Right. Which is just like there's so much existing infrastructure that even if you have something clever and fancy and new that's super cheap, if it requires all the facilities to update themselves, you're just starting way, way behind the eight ball.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So to what extent is the sort of Rondo heat battery plug and play like in a low temperature steam application and like a steel plant, can you wander into any of these and just switch out with no pause.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>All of the energy. So the top four categories in the United States, the Doe just gave a talk recently and the top four categories in descending order of industrial heat use are chemicals, food and beverage, paper products (That includes everything from toilet paper to cardboard,) then cement, and then steel. So for chemicals, about a third to 50% of all the heat is steam. For food and bev and paper products, it's all steam. And for cement and steel, none of it is steam. So we are simultaneously, we're delivering drop in boilers today and simultaneously with our investors and partners building and developing the calciners, the ethylene crackers, the kilns, to drive particular industrial processes.</p><p>Because you made this point about the solar tower. Yeah, you have a spot that's 100 meters up in the air where you can have your heat. But what we want, the heat is in some process unit. And look, we have 200 years of designing industrial process units that are powered by fuel. Which of those can we retrofit? Where will we need to design new things? We were given a grant by the Danish government. We have a project underway to design and pilot a true-zero cement process, intermittent electricity to zero-emission cement. Most of the work in that project is the design of a calciner that instead of internal combustion, runs on superheated air or superheated CO2.</p><p>So it doesn't all happen all at once, but it does all happen, but some of it will. The high temperature things will take more work to integrate because industrial plants today were designed with magnificent engineering and heat balance and efficiency burning fuel. And so, as it happens, everything that runs on steam, easy drop in all the high temperature processes. We have work underway now and hope to have results over the next couple of years that use the same thermal storage platform.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But this first commercial battery that you've deployed now, which by the way was just last week, I think, what application is that or what temperature level is that?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's targeting steam, steam, steam, steam and steam. The particular installation is at a fuel producer and it's at a biofuel producer. Whether you're making renewable diesel from soybeans or animal fat or ethanol from corn, about half the total carbon intensity of that fuel is fossil fuel that was burned to produce that biofuel. And we can set that to zero. So we can produce biofuels that are about half the carbon intensity of what they are today. Interesting, our customer is really a visionary that's going to zero because the other thing that's been talked about a lot with biofuels is combining carbon capture of the biogenic CO2 in those facilities.</p><p>As it happens, using Rondo for the heat eliminates about half the total carbon intensity using carbon capture, eliminates about the other half and together you get about essentially a zero-CI, zero-carbon-intensity fuel. That little unit we just started up is the pilot for deployment of a series of larger ones to do exactly that, to produce zero carbon biofuel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Very interesting. So let's pull the lens back a little bit, maybe talk about business model. Is the idea long term that if I'm say I'm a manufacturing facility and I'm making I don't know what baby food, is the idea that I buy a Rondo unit and install it in my factory? Or is the idea that Rondo comes in, sets things up and sells me heat as a service? In other words, am I buying the equipment or am I buying the heat? Or some of both.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah. Over time, there are as many answers to that question as there are to how conventional gas turbines and steam turbines are sold. Right. Sometimes people own their own cogeneration plant. Sometimes they contract with someone else to provide them electricity or heat as a service. The renewable heat as a service business will develop the same way. In the United States today, there's a huge community of developers who know how to shave a few pennies off solar and wind electrons, but have never really looked at these industrial facilities. In Europe, actually, there are already renewable developers who are out there originating renewable industrial heat projects.</p><p>So, first of all, Rondo is offering, on four continents, commissioned, guaranteed installed heat batteries. That's the foundation. We are also originating and financing heat as a service, principally in North America.</p><p>Interesting.</p><p>Because, again, whether you make baby food, as you said, or steel, you don't drill gas wells to get the fuel to run your process. You buy energy as a service, your capital dollars, most folks want to spend it on their own processes. And this class, this thermal energy storage class, is arguably creating one of the great business opportunities of our time for the development community, because we all know wind and solar deployment is slowing down, not because of reduced demand, but because of congestion.</p><p>And I think the interconnection queue time in England is now 13 years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, there's like a terawatt now, I think, waiting in the queues.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Right. Rondo heat batteries. Our basic unit, the RHB 300, needs 70 megawatts of generation. Typical installations may have two to ten at a single site. These are utility scale energy demand and they can be built with no grid connection.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the idea is you go build a solar farm or a wind farm that is just attached to these batteries.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then you're selling the heat from the batteries. So at no point do you need the electricity grid. You're not waiting for the interconnection or anything else, that these are a coupled unit. Wind and solar being so cheap, the implications are endless and often counterintuitive. Like when I hear I could either buy heat from a conventional boiler or I could buy heat from someone who had to go out and build an entire utility scale renewable energy installation and a couple of heat batteries. Intuitively, that just sounds more expensive. But are wind and solar so cheap now that that's competitive?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yes, absolutely. And it depends, right, because one of the things that's exactly the right matter that you just raised someone is making an investment that's going to provide 40 years of energy to your facility. They're going to sell it to you on a contract, they're going to care about your credit worthiness and your willingness to sign that contract. That's one of the things that's unique here. It's different than selling electricity to a utility. On the other hand, from your standpoint, someone is saying you can get off the fossil fuel price roller coaster. Not surprisingly, there are a lot of people in Europe who ... and we've seen that in US.</p><p>Prices have been fourteen, they've been two, they're ten. And they are also in places that have carbon prices. You can have a permanent. This lack of volatility and exposure to regulatory matters also is a strategic advantage. A friend of mine said, why were all the factories in England built on the coast? Because where it was cheap to bring the coal, low cost, reliable energy supplies are the foundation for industrial investment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're free from fluctuations in fossil fuel prices and you're free from any worry about escalating carbon prices or other carbon related regulations. Basically, like two huge worries because as you say, for a lot of these facilities, the cost of energy is the bulk of the costs. And to have the bulk of your costs fluctuating 500x back and forth over the course of a couple of years is just an insane way to try to run an industrial facility.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right. This matter of what kind of risks do we take? People say, oh, it's risky to work with this new technology, but look at the risks that we just were used to taking. And we're entering this new world where we're not talking about a green premium, we're talking about the same or lower energy cost with these reduced risks. And then, of course, depending on what the commodity is, low carbon aluminum trades at a price premium on the London Metals Exchange. Low carbon fuels trade at much higher prices in California and Germany. And for consumer facing brands, there are buyers, coops of producers who are seeking low cost effective renewable heat sources so they can offer to the market low carbon commodities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, it seems like there ought to be a bunch of market actors that are just ready to embrace this. Like, for one thing, as you say, just on a quantity basis. If you take all that energy that we're using for heat and transfer that to electricity, you need a lot of new electricity and a lot of new clean electricity. So it seems to me like renewable energy developers ought to be over the moon about this, like beating down your door. Are they lining up to be proponents for renewable heat in the industry generally or have they not caught on yet?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>In some places the answer is yes. As I mentioned, Europe is very aggressively moving in this direction and a number of folks over the last few years have said "this Rondo thing sounds too good to be true. Come back to me when you're operating something commercial." We're now operating something commercial. So the short answer to your question is yes, because again, these projects offer this mix of speed and certainty that we're not tied up in a grid queue. Scale, utility scale, there's a lot of commercial industrial C&I Solar, where people are building 2 MW here, 2 MW there.</p><p>It takes the same amount of brain power and lawyer time to do the two megawatt project versus the 400 megawatt project that the same facility would use for heat, and returns now that we're in an era where that's the coolest thing is that the numbers work for the heat user, they work for the financier, they work for the builders of the solar fields and they work for us. And that's a new world and economic tailwinds driving it. It will keep going faster and faster. The size you mentioned, I think at the end of 2021, there was about 1000 gigawatts of wind and 1000 gigawatts of solar each in the world.</p><p>The IEA did an assessment of industrial heat and their number is it's about 9000 gigawatts of new generation that's going to be required to replace the oil, coal and natural gas now being burned.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good grief.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's worldwide, right? And so it's only, what is it, 20% of that in the US. Yeah, that's right. It's only a few thousand gigawatts in the US.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>An enormous opportunity to build more renewable energy.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A similar question is, and I have always had this question about electric vehicles too, which is electric utilities are sort of notoriously stressed, worried about this death spiral, they're worried about grid defection. And you represent potentially just a wild new load, a new responsibility for them. Something that natural gas utilities were doing, were handling, is now all going to transfer and be their responsibility, which is just a way for them to grow and invest and just a wild new opportunity for them. Why aren't they at the front of the line beating down the door, trying to make this happen faster?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's a great question, and they are. One of our investors is Energy Impact Partners, whose backers are the North American electric power industry. And for sure the lowest cost way that we're going to decarbonize all of civilization is electrification. And for sure the electric industry is at the heart of that. One of the things that's really profound about what we're doing for them is that electrification, you install an electric furnace. That furnace is now running on wind power 30% of the hours of the year. And the other 70%, it's a new load on gas fired or coal fired power stations until the grid has fully decarbonized.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>These thermal storage systems, these things can be dispatched by the utility the same way they dispatch generation. The deal is not that I want a megawatt continuously, the deal is I want 24 megawatt hours today. You deliver them when it's convenient. These things become an asset in the electricity grid and a solution to these problems of variability and over generation and balancing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. In the same way that sort of any controllable load helps grid stability. These are controllable.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah, but people talk about controllable load, demand response, for example, is a load that you expect to run all the time, but you can turn it off during emergencies. That's not this, this is something that no, no, you're going to dispatch it so that it never takes a single megawatt hour of spinning reserve or gas fired power generation. You're going to dispatch it so that it never raises the peak demand on your transmission or distribution system. You can manage it with telemetry from the grid operator. It's different than anything that's come before. It's like lithium-ion batteries in that sense, but at a tiny fraction of the cost.</p><p>And we're not trying to solve from moving electric power from noon to 07:00 p.m.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>We are taking that electric power and replacing gas combustion principally in North America, and oil and coal combustion. We're opening an entirely new segment to renewable deployment. So, yeah, the electric utilities are getting engaged now. They face all kinds of issues with the regulatory frame that we have for electricity. Of course, they're already facing those matters as renewables deploy. And there are some new challenges, but there are people actively working that issue and we're thrilled to be working with them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So if I'm, I've got this manufacturing facility, I've got a big Rondo battery and I'm trying to decide between two options. One is I could build my own off-grid behind the meter generation, solar and wind. I could put my own solar and wind up, or I could just get on the grid and time my charging so that I'm chasing the clean energy on the grid so that I'm only charging when there's clean energy on the grid. Do we have any sense of which of those will be more economic or why you'd want to go one way rather than the other?</p><p>I'm just wondering how many of these sort of self contained, off-grid, purpose built renewable energy installations there are going to be, it seems to me intuitively like that ought to be more expensive and what you ought to prefer is just for the grid itself to clean up so you have more, so it's easier. But what are the choices there?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>These questions are right at the heart of the matter. You're dead on. And I'll give you the long answer. The short answer is it depends. And it depends primarily on where you are. Pre-war economics, one project in Europe, large operation, that wanted to replace a 250 megawatt gas boiler. They could install a 250 megawatt electric boiler and eliminate their scope one. Their actual scope one, plus scope two would go up because they're in an area that's about 40% wind. And now, if 60% of the energy is coming from a coal plant, you were worse off.</p><p>But from an economic standpoint, they were paying $35 a megawatt hour for gas fired heat. The electricity price annually would have been about €68 sorry. Per megawatt hour. But upon a study, given the presence of offshore wind in that area, their expected energy price on a long term buying in the cheapest 4 hours a day was under €10 a megawatt hour. So that's an example where the grid connected thing is exactly right, and it will only take four years to get the grid upgrade done, of which about three months is construction. So in a lot of places, the grid connection for grid projects is a matter.</p><p>Oklahoma last year had 2000 hours of negative wholesale prices. If you put a project in Kansas or Oklahoma, you have energy prices that are slightly negative on an annual basis. If you can charge very rapidly, if you are allowed to participate in the wholesale market, there are regulatory obstacles.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But in theory, in Oklahoma, during a time of negative wholesale prices, your facility that's running off a Rondo heat battery could be paid to charge itself.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that how that works? Is that what negative prices means?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's what negative prices means.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's so mind-blowing.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Well, again, and we have lots more of that coming. I know you've spoken to folks about the IRA. The production tax credit coming to solar is going to broaden the areas of the country where we see intermittent negative prices. Because, of course, if I'm getting $20 megawatt hour for tax credit, I'm perfectly happy to generate when prices are negative $19, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. That's just crazy.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Technologies like this that can absorb those periods are going to lift the price floor. They're going to benefit all the generators, especially the generators that can't turn off. And we're pretty excited. But again, it's can we connect to the grid? Can we capture those prices?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because if you can, there's enough heat to absorb all the curtailed power in the US, times a gazillion. Theoretically, if you could hook up all heat to electricity, you'd never curtail again, or at least not for decades. Probably.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Of course, subject to where is the heat-load versus where is the curtailment? Some curtailment is regional associated with total generation. You know, some of it is transmission constrained. But to a first approximation of the answer yet, that was correct, yes?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that again, seems just a crazy business opportunity for everyone involved.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah, we agree.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But you do expect to see these off grid, custom built renewable energy installations, purely powering heat batteries in areas, say, where the grid is congested, or the grid is dirty or the interconnection queue is unusually long. You do expect to see those pop up?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Well, as I mentioned earlier, and just for scale, California has on the order of 20 gigawatts today. We need 100 gigawatts of new PV just to replace the BTUs of fuel now being burned for industrial heat. About 40 of those gigawatts, because of where the things are cited, could be built with no grid connection at all. And most of them will need some kind of grid connection. We see again and again that the new renewable project development model is going to be building a project that part of its electricity goes to industrial heat, into a heat battery, and part of it goes to the grid.</p><p>And that, that's the sweet spot that delivers lower cost electricity to the grid. And we're absorbing what would have been curtailed power from that new purpose built thing to get all the power we need for the factory or the cement kiln or whatever.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Yeah, if I'm a renewable developer and I catch wind, that there's this whole category of renewable projects that don't require this unholy paperwork nightmare that they all go through. Now again, I just can't imagine that they're not going to be stampeding in this direction. I mean, I hear them complain about this constantly.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>What are the required conditions? Obviously the financial community we have to get our minds around. Okay, how are we structuring these projects where most of the energy is going to a single factory rather than to the utility? Let me think about the credit worthiness of that. And then for the moment, how long will it take to retire the Rondo technology risk? How do we backstop that? And we're busy building systems and projects that this first one of course, is the first step at commercial scale to build the track record. But again, there's a reason why we chose these century proven materials specifically, so that once you turn one of these things on and operate for six months, there's nothing left to prove.</p><p>We know it works and we already know everything is durable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The brick heats up, the brick cools down. It's not again, it's so simple.</p><p>And exact ... but that exact material, there's a million tons of doing that around the world. Doing that right now in much more severe service. But yes, it's simple. That's right.</p><p>And I would imagine also that this space is going to see a lot more entrance competition. Of course, once it's kind of uncorked and it becomes clear what the opportunity is.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Look, trillion dollar markets don't happen without lots of people trying to enter them and nothing could be better, right? That's what we urgently need.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. One other question about industry, about location matters. You mentioned industry clustering along a coast where the coal is available. As more and more of our industrial activity in general and civilization gets hooked up to cheap renewable energy. Do you see something like over the course of I mean, I guess this will take years and decades, but do you imagine areas of intense renewable capacity like with lots of sun and lots of wind becoming new attractors to industry? Do you see global industry starting to migrate to renewable energy? Is it that much of a chunk of the cost of an industrial facility that it might be worth someday literally moving to it?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>The short answer to your question is yes. Just look at what happened with the shale gas revolution in the US. Vast investments in petrochemical and other manufacturing immediately shifted to where huge employment growth shifted to where that low cost energy was. And there's a question of how fast these transitions happen. Vasila Smill likes to talk about, "oh, it takes a really long time," but there are lots of examples where that is not true. Just, again, when the rules changed and combined cycle gas fired power generation was allowed in the US. We saw giant capital flows and giant rates of transformation.</p><p>Now, that took awareness. It took enough experience that investors could say, oh yeah, I'll build that giga project because I know it's going to work. It took awareness of the kind that you are building that these opportunities exist, but the long term. Yes, absolutely. That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That'll be such an interesting geopolitical like of all the forces in the last 50 years or whatever that have moved industry around the globe, this will be just a completely new version of that. It's going to scramble all the previous alliances.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah, but there is one example that's even faster, which is not just the long term, but the right now. A couple of weeks ago, I spoke at the Munich Security Conference in a session with a number of industry CEOs and Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president and president. Wevine said, look, there are three wars underway. There's the ground war, there's the energy war. He thought he would bring us to our knees. And there's a clean energy war, mostly with China. And a huge challenge before us today is how do we get off gas? But we need to get off gas without deindustrializing.</p><p>There have already been giant plant shutdowns and layoffs because of the unavailability of gas right now and the forecast unavailability of gas longer term. Europe's bullets in the energy war are clean electrons, domestically produced, stable, low cost sources of energy. And again, we and all the other electric thermal storage technologies because we save twice as much gas per kilowatt hour as hydrogen. We're an important part of speeding up that transition there and preserving an existing industrial base. I think the same thing is true in the US as well as carbon prices come into the world. As gas prices rise, the competitiveness of US manufacturing on the world stage is going to be affected by how fast can we make this transition to renewables.</p><p>And it doesn't happen all at once. But there are beyond the climate drivers, beyond the huge business response that we've just seen in the last five years, to the climate drivers, the pledges, and not just pledges, but action that we're seeing across all kinds of industrial producers. We are really at an amazing moment. I kind of wish we had gotten started with what we're doing here at Rondo five years ago. But five years ago what we were doing was stupid, right?</p><p>I mean, go back ten. What we're doing somebody could have figured out earlier.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I said it at the outset, I'll say it again, I say it over and over again. Wind and solar being as much cheaper now as they were five to ten years ago is just like it's not an incremental change, it's a phase change. It's a flip to a different system. All we're doing now is just like sort of one at a time here and there in different industries, in different places, kind of opening our eyes to like, oh, this is a completely different landscape, like completely new opportunities. It's a different world now. It's going to take a while just to absorb the implications of super cheap renewables.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yes. And the thing we know for sure is that every year somehow those cost reductions will continue, right? We have some short term supply chain things, but somehow, I mean, I worked in the electronics industry for decades and everybody every year said, oh, Moore's Law is over, it can't keep getting better.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They say it every year for wind and solar too, right?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. And you look back over every five year period, every year's forecast was wrong, it fell faster than that. It's reasonable to assume we're going to continue to be in that, so that this era that we're entering, it keeps getting better and better. Our storage technology and the other storage technologies will cost reduce as they come down. But the storage technology is only 20% of the cost of the total project. The fact that the wind and solar are coming down so steeply, this cost advantage is going to continue to open for the people who have made this transition onto renewables.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's really interesting watching people in industry try to sort of skate to where the puck is going to be, as they say, sort of like start off on something that might not be economic when you first start developing it, but you're going to meet that cost curve, right, in five years, and then your business model will become viable. It's a real tricky timing there. There's a lot of people trying to sort of coordinate that dance just right.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yes, but my point is we're already at that point where we're at break even or better, we're not waiting five years. That's one of the big difference of this class versus there are a lot of things that are just as you said, we're investing now because we're hope it's going to be cheaper in the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We're already at that point, right, so a final question. I wanted to ask you a little bit more about this, but maybe we can try to do it quick, which is just you've got these things that store electricity as heat, fairly cheaply for a long time, with very low losses. The applications you're overwhelmingly focused on are industrial, because as we've discussed, industrial heat is huge, difficult to decarbonize, giant market opportunity. But I'm just wondering, it seems like there are probably other uses that we could think of for boxes of heat. Are you actively pursuing any or alternatively, like, do you see any out there over the horizon that you might get to eventually?</p><p>What else could we do with heat batteries?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>There are two big things we've been pulled into that. If you'd asked me a couple of years ago, I would have said, oh, that's going to happen much later. One of them is industrial Cogeneration. PURPA back in the 1980s established special tariffs for Cogens because it's the most thermodynamically efficient way of delivering electric power and heat. Repowering Cogens with renewable heat makes them more efficient. A unit that delivers industrial steam and electric power is 95% efficient. It's more efficient than any lithium-ion battery, although it's only delivering about 20 or 25% of its energy as electricity, and the rest is heat.</p><p>Almost every industrial Cogen, the industrial needs so much heat that that Cogen is exporting power to the grid as a side effect of delivering all that steam. So, renewable cogeneration, or they also call it combined heat and power, is an area that we see distributed generation. 20 MW here, 50 there, ten there. That is decarbonizing small industries, but providing baseload distributed high value generation to the grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Briefly, what does that look like, though? What is a cogen? Because cogen, just for listeners maybe, who aren't familiar, you're using a turbine to generate electricity and then you use the excess heat from the turbine ...</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>For whatever you need. So what does it look like in this case?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>You said it exactly right. Instead of throwing the heat away into a condenser, you are using that heat as medium pressure steam, making tomato paste or paper or chemicals or any of the things. And so you have a facility that the heat battery, or today, a natural gas boiler makes high pressure steam, goes through a turbine, medium pressure steam goes to the factory and electricity comes out from the turbine. Exactly the same thing. Now you've got a heat battery making high pressure steam and driving combined heat and power. So really it's 95% efficient. Electricity in to heat and electricity out and you are exporting back to the grid.</p><p>So that's one. The other has been a surprise. Again, it's something I would have said we wouldn't be engaged in. I think just today there was the announcement that the latest EPA rule is going to cause another 15 gigawatts of coal retirements. Coal-fired power stations people think of as about 40% efficient. That's about right. But that's about an 85% efficient boiler, times a 47% efficient turbine, minus the loads associated with air pollution cleanup.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. All the filters and whatnot.</p><p>Keep the turbine, knock down the boiler, make that a giant long duration electricity storage. That's now in one of those places where there was negative prices, you have anchors for development. We have several projects where developers are looking at these conversions as enabling the construction of a huge renewables cluster, sometimes an offshore wind landing point, or onshore wind development. And right there, reusing one of those things.</p><p>So this would look like, say, a bunch of offshore wind turbines generate electricity. They generate excess. The excess is stored in a heat battery, and then that heat battery is used to run an existing turbine.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like at a coal plant to produce power. It would just be a dispatchable. It would be like a peaker plant.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>However you want to use it. That's right. Whether you want to use that to take intermittent and now get to base load underneath the intermittent. But it's an electricity storage approach that reuses all the infrastructure, including the turbine. It is lower efficiency than electrochemical batteries. It's far lower cost. Those are large projects. I'd say that's the other one that's a little longer term out the cogeneration, though, the combined heat and power is more efficient than any other electricity storage technology. Right. More efficient. So I think those things will happen first, and we'll see about both of them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If I'm repowering a coal plant turbine, that electricity to heat to electricity conversion is lower efficiency than what I would get from electricity to lithium-ion battery to electricity.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>That's right. But the coal turbine provides other services, like inertia that are needed to make the grid work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it's already there.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>It's already there. It's already operating. There's. The first of these conversions using molten salt. That's underway right now in Chile.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>AES announced a project recently that had been in development for a long time. We're very interested to see how fast that sector moves. And all of our focus is on the industrial side. But as I said, we've been pulled into some of these projects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's interesting. There's a lot of talk from a lot of different directions about repowering these turbines, these existing turbines that exist. I know the geothermal people are big into that idea, but it just does make intuitive sense. Like, you have all these quite sophisticated and expensive turbines built all over the place. Why not just go take out boilers and use renewable heat instead? To power them and then sort of like open your eyes, you're like, oh, we're like we're surrounded with turbines.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Yes. But this brings us back to one of the little laws of physics about temperature. The higher the temperature of heat, the more efficiently it can be converted to electricity. Those coal plants use burning coal. Geothermal systems make heat at lower temperatures. They can't directly because we're the highest temperature storage. We're the only one today that can repower those coal plants at higher than their original efficiency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that, no limit?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>No, it's removing the losses from the boiler and removing the losses from the station load. So basically, it's getting the net power efficiency much closer to the gross and leaving the gross unchanged.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Pardon me, diving in too deep. But there's very interesting synergy with other lower temperature heat, with waste heat recapture and with geothermal heat, where some of our customers are showing us stuff, where they're combining high temperature heat from storage and recapturing some lower temperature heat. And it's going to be very interesting to see how that develops.</p><p>In terms of innovation for Rondo itself. And I promise this really will be the last question. I'm just wondering, brick is simple and the whole system is simple. As we've been saying, that's part of the that's part of the delight of it. But I'm wondering, where are opportunities for big innovation? Do you have materials science? Is it within reach to heat bricks up hotter than you've got them to get up to the full, whatever 1500°C or whatever insane super hot? What's the innovation horizon for you?</p><p>Well, the driver for us, first of all, is speed, speed and speed to scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>We're manufacturing in two locations now. A lot of our material science will be driven by qualifying other sources of materials. We've produced now on three continents, little pilot scale things. So one chunk of material science is about just getting this 2 million ton a year scale. The company formal goals are 1% of world CO2 in a decade and 15% in 15 years. And there are no material blockers to doing that. It's okay. Did we execute properly? Did we find the finance and developer partners? But to your point, the pieces today we're using the most expensive brick materials, the highest temperature, highest strength there will be innovations in simply reducing cost by the system is way overdesigned for reliability as we gain experience.</p><p>All kinds of cost reductions come from that. But as I mentioned, we have two international cement manufacturers today as investors. We have this project with some Danish universities and a cement plant builder. We're working on high temperature applications where most of the development is the process equipment that will need the heat. And then we'll be taking this core technology and connecting it to those other things. But speed, scale, cost and then temperature and serving these other industries are the priorities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you so much. For spending all this time with me. As you can tell, I find this particular area so interesting and fascinating. And it will be interesting to come back and talk again. Maybe in two or three years, who knows?</p><p><strong>John O'Donnell</strong></p><p>Thank you, Dave. It's a real privilege to speak with you. I'm just delighted. Thanks so much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-electrifying-industrial-heat</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:88697618</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 29 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/88697618/b25f260f45587b4cb0ffa73552eddfb4.mp3" length="61702760" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5142</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/88697618/bcb41c29e86be0afb94ae9077d2f4ac9.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Putting more climate philanthropy toward economic and racial justice]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>BIPOC communities are most likely to bear the effects of climate change, but BIPOC-led environmental justice groups are severely underfunded in climate philanthropy. In this episode, Abdul Dosunmu of the Climate Funders Justice Pledge talks about his group’s aim to challenge big donors to give more equitably.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AABfg9UQpXtHNELZ2a2flNpBa/volts23.03.22%28abdul.dosunmu%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/putting-more-climate-philanthropy-toward-economic-and-racial-justice"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Whether it’s suffering the effects of fossil fuel pollution or fighting back against it, black, indigenous, and people of color (BIPOC) are on the front lines of climate change. </p><p>Yet they are starved for resources. More than a billion dollars a year goes toward climate philanthropy, but of that amount, little more than 1 percent goes to BIPOC-led environmental justice groups.</p><p>The two-year-old <a target="_blank" href="https://www.climate.donorsofcolor.org/">Climate Funders Justice Pledge</a>, run by the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.donorsofcolor.org/">Donors of Color Network</a>, is trying to change that. It challenges big donors to a) be more transparent about where their grants are going, and b) within two years of signing the pledge, raise the amount going to BIPOC-led groups to 30 percent.</p><p>The pledge, featured in a just-released <a target="_blank" href="https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publication/funding-climate-action-pathways-for-philanthropy/">report from Morgan Stanley and the Aspen Institute</a> on how to increase the impact of climate philanthropy, has already <a target="_blank" href="https://apnews.com/article/business-environment-race-and-ethnicity-philanthropy-280f805c4e08d456d470cec1344234e1">led to more than $100 million in annual commitments</a> to BIPOC-led groups.</p><p>I talked with Abdul Dosunmu, who runs the pledge campaign, about why BIPOC leadership is important to the climate fight, how transparency changes the behavior of foundations, and how to improve the relationship between environmental justice groups and big funders.</p><p>Alright. Abdul Dosunmu. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is an interesting topic to me with lots of ins and outs, but let's start with just, I'd like to get a sense of what is the pool of philanthropic money available to climate and environmental organizations? And then how much of that currently is going to EJ groups?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>The Morgan Stanley-Aspen report, that we were honored to be part of, and was just released really details a stark challenge in terms of what the author of the report, Randall Kempner, says is both the quantity of climate philanthropy and the quality of climate philanthropy. So, on the quantity side, according to the report, only about 2% of all global philanthropy is focused on climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's wild to begin with, honestly.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Insanely wild. And what's interesting about that, what's hard to square about that is the fact that if you ask philanthropists how urgent the crisis is, 85% of them say it's extremely urgent. So they're talking one game but walking another game.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>So, of all global philanthropy, only about 2% is focused on climate. And then of that 2%, only about 1.3% of it is focused on BIPOC-led environmental justice organizations. So if you think about the quantity versus quality framework that Randall has, the Morgan Stanley-Aspen report is really focused on the quantity side of it. The climate funders justice pledge, which I lead, is focused on the quality side of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. We'll get to that in just one second. I got a bunch of questions about that, but I just want to in terms of quantity, do we know that 2% that goes to climate related stuff. Do we know what that number is? I don't have any sense of scale at all.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that a billion dollars? A few million?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>So our data, and I'm not sure Randall goes into this in the report, but our data is really focused on about 1.3 billion or so of climate funding.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>So we're looking at single digit billions. But we also know that in recent years, frankly in recent weeks, that number is steadily escalating as new Climate Funders come onto the scene with last names like Bezos, and Powell, Jobs, and others. And so we really don't have a solid sense of what that new number is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>But in terms of the 1.3% number that we focus on at CFJP, we're looking at about 1.34 billion of that which was awarded to National Climate Funders. And of that, only about 1.3% is going to BIPOC-led environmental groups.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's less than 20 million. Say something in that neighborhood, right?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One other distinction on this is I know that there is giving that gets categorized under EJ activities, which is separate from money actually going to EJ led groups.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>That's right. So that's a critical distinction, and you've really just jumped in on the core part of the work that I do. We believe that it's important that EJ work is funded when it is BIPOC-led just as much as it's funded when it's not. And currently what we have is a system where EJ work led by communities of color, conceptualizing communities of color is not funded at the same scale that other work might be funded. And the reality of that is that there are deep consequences because as we often say, the communities that are closest to the problem are closest to the solutions, but they're also the furthest away from the resources.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's get right into that then. I guess probably a lot of listeners will take this as self-evident, but when you go to big funders, people sitting on big endowments and stuff, and you are trying to make the case that BIPOC-led groups are important to tackling climate change, what's the case? What's the evidence? What do you tell them?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Well, we start with a basic concept that says that the climate does not discriminate, people and systems do. And the reason we start there is that we really want to drive them to the data that most of your audience will probably be familiar with around the fact that most frontline communities, the communities that are hit first and worse by the effects of climate change are Black and Brown communities. Most fenceline communities are Black and Brown communities that when it comes to the ways in which this crisis is manifesting itself on the ground and in people's lives, it disproportionately impacts BIPOC communities. So we start there.</p><p>That if you're actually interested in mitigating the effects of this crisis, by necessity, you would start with BIPOC communities, right? The second piece is if you're actually interested in shifting the systemic landscape that has led to this crisis, you would start with BIPOC communities. And here's what I mean by that. Power differentials in society is what has created the condition for exploitation, extraction, and pollution. It's the power differentials that have created the foundations of this crisis. It's the fact that certain communities have been politically disenfranchised and subjugated and those are also the communities that have been impacted by environmental exploitation and extraction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I feel like this is an important point because sometimes what you hear from, I don't know that they'll say it publicly a lot anymore, but sometimes what you hear in private from climate people is climate is about emissions. And we should attack emissions, right? We should be lowering emissions. And insofar as you are being distracted by other social, like you're mixing your ice cream of peanut butter or whatever, like you're letting your social issues get involved in your emissions issues, you're just going to be less effective at reducing emissions. I think that mindset still has quite a hold on quite a few people.</p><p>So this point that they're linked is important, I think.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>You said. You don't know if people will actually share it publicly. I hear it almost every day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So they still do say it publicly.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>They still do say it publicly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, that there is a sense that you can somehow disconnect the climate crisis from the social and racial inequities that exist in our society, when in fact, the communities that have been the most exploited and the most extracted have been communities that have been denied political voice, right. And they've been BIPOC communities. I often tell the story of a neighborhood in my hometown, Dallas, Texas, called the West Dallas neighborhood. And it's largely Black and Brown, historically has been as a result of housing segregation. And this community was home for 50 years to a lead smelter plant. And this lead smelter plant obviously polluted the environment.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>It also poisoned generations of young Black and Brown kids growing up in that community. And it was the political powerlessness of that community, it was the political subjugation of that community that allowed that lead smelter plant to operate with impunity for 50 years. And this is the critical point that we make. It was the rising up of that community. It was the mobilization of that community that ultimately booted that lead smelter plant from the community. And so it's important for us to see that these things are linked</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just to sort of restate, the whole problem of environmental pollution generally, including climate, is this ability to basically produce waste and impacts that you don't pay for.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But you can't do that unless there's some community that's disempowered enough that it can't stop you from doing it, right? I mean, the whole setup relies on there being disempowered communities that have no choice but to accept this junk.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. I have a dear friend in the movement, Felicia Davis from HBCU Green Fund, who says we don't just have a climate crisis, we have a power injustice crisis.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And relatedly, I think, another old piece of conventional wisdom, though, this I think has been changing in recent years. But if you go back I've been doing this for close to 20 years now, and if you go back like 15 years, I think the sort of conventional wisdom was climate is something that educated, affluent, White people worry about because they have the luxury and time to worry about it. And BIPOC communities, vulnerable communities, EJ communities have other things to worry about that are more proximate and more difficult and they don't have time to worry about climate change.</p><p>And thus those communities are not going to be a big part of a social movement for climate change. And of course, now the data shows that that's wrong, like almost inversely wrong. So what is the level of kind of knowledge and engagement among these communities on the subject of climate change?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Well, and this is a key point that I like to make. The first part of that that I would like to deconstruct is this notion that climate is separate from the other issues that impact these communities, right? That in many ways, part of the innovation and the imagination that these communities are bringing to the fight is to recognize the interconnections between climate and housing, climate and labor policy, climate and transportation, right? That they are uniquely positioned to see that climate is connected to a whole range of other systems that decide and define how we live. So that's part of the deconstruction that has to be made.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you might also say that a White affluent businessman is uniquely positioned to want to not see those interconnections, right? Like there's a lot of incentive not to see them if you benefit from them, basically.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Right. There is a desire to focus the fight against the climate crisis on a little intervention here, a little technology here. And the reality is that the crisis is the result of systems that shape how we live. And in order to fight the crisis, we've got to actually change those systems, right? And communities of color are uniquely positioned to be able to understand that and to lead that fight.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that shows up in the data, and surveys, and polls and stuff. Do you feel like that sentiment, that knowledge is pretty widely dispersed in those communities at this point?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Oh, absolutely. I think one of the things that we do at CFJP is we actually look at and profile a lot of the movement work that is happening on the ground in communities. And so we're not just talking at a level of theory, we're talking at a level of understanding the movements that are being led by communities of color. So there is a reason that billions of tons of greenhouse gas emissions are disrupted every year by indigenous organizers. There is a reason that it was the BIPOC-led organizations that pushed President Biden on Justice40, and that conceptualized the New Jersey and California environmental justice laws that preceded Justice40.</p><p>There is a reason that the Climate Justice Alliance, for instance, has had a massive impact on shifting away from extractive energy practices. And so it's important for us to see that we don't need a poll to tell us, all we need to do is look at the work and the organizing that is happening in these communities and see the ways in which it is moving the needle on this conversation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I'll just say, from my perch, my perspective, like, I remember when the climate bill was being put together back in 2008 and 2009, I don't know if you were unfortunate enough to be in this area when that was happening, but EJ was it wasn't absent, but it was clearly an add on, right? It was like an amendment. It was like a thing you stick on at the end as an afterthought. And it's been remarkable to me just to see, over the years, EJ just becoming much more assertive and having a much bigger place at the table.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To the point now that the Democratic, official sort of Democratic Party climate agenda has it right there at the core, and it's included in a lot of these Inflation Reduction Act grants. So it's like night and day in terms of the engagement on both sides. To me, obviously there's a long way to go, but I've seen the change.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>That's absolutely right. And that change was led by BIPOC-led organizations. And here's why that's important, right? Obviously, you know this better than I do. We're dealing with a movement that has historically excluded and alienated the voices of People of Color. And there are organizations out there that are doing this work around diversity, equity, and inclusion in the environmental movement, right? And the data has never been good. It's always been bad. And here's the core point that we make. I draw an analogy. One of my favorite football teams, I'm a great Texan, I'm a great Dallasite.</p><p>So the Dallas Cowboys, what we're doing right now in the climate movement is the equivalent of the Dallas Cowboys finally making it to the Super Bowl but fielding only about a 10th of a team on the field. That's what we're doing right now in the movement. Our best players, our most imaginative players are not on the field because we have historically excluded them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about that. So the Climate Funders Justice Pledge, what is it specifically? What is it asking of large philanthropies?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>So it's pretty simple, which is not to say that they always receive it as such.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not easy. Easy and simple are different.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Easy and simple are different. But it's pretty simple. It says two things. Number one, it says commit to transparency. So we call on the nation's top climate funders, primarily institutional funders, so we're talking foundations, big foundations to commit to transparency, right? And what that means is we ask them specifically, "how much of your current climate giving is focused on BIPOC-led environmental justice organizations? Not just environmental justice organizations, but BIPOC-led EJ organizations." And we define that very concretely.</p><p>We say 50% of your board has to be People of Color, 50% of your senior staff has to be People of Color, and you have to have an explicit mission of serving communities of color. So how much in dollar amounts of your current climate giving is going to BIPOC-led environmental justice organizations? That's a transparency component.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that information is not available today.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>It's not easily available. And to be honest with you, most funders have not asked themselves those questions, right?</p><p>So one of the things that has been a learning journey for us is actually getting feedback from funders that have taken the pledge. And what they tell us is that for them, the most transformative part of it has been the transparency component because they had never actually looked at the data.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I bet they're not finding out good things, right? They're not pleasantly surprised.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>No, they're not. In the main, they are not pleasantly surprised. I mean, the data is what it is, right, nationally. And part of what we wanted to do with this pledge is we wanted to make that data available to communities and movements so that they could actually hold these funders accountable, right? And so that the funders who are committed to environmental justice can hold themselves accountable. So it matters that a Kresge Foundation, for instance, says, "you know what, what has been most imaginative about this for us is that it has forced us to go internal and look at our data."</p><p>So that matters. And we don't just ask for the data, and hoard it, or put it in a report that we release annually. We actually post that number on our website. So if you go to our website, you can find that number for each of the funders that have taken the pledge. And then we do a whole bunch of media amplification around it because we actually want communities to organize around this data.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What's a typical number, like Kresge or whatever, once they looked, what are they finding?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Well, Kresge is actually, they're an anchor pledger of ours, which is great. And I don't want to misquote their number. If I'm remembering correctly, they were under the 30%, probably in the 20s range. And it's important to note that, again, they have had this as a commitment for a very long time. So actually challenging them to, "okay, let's look at the data," has been super helpful for them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Okay, so transparency is step one.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Step one is transparency. And I actually looked at the number. They're actually at 33%. Let me give Kresge their credit, they're at 33%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm going to guess that's unusually high.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>They are one of the leaders in the field, no question about it. It is very high for the pledgers that we have, and they are making continued strides. So the transparency piece is very important because it allows us to have conversations like this one. "Where is this funder? Where is that funder, and how can we hold them accountable to the commitments that many of them have?" Right? So let me just put a pin in this and say after George Floyd, we saw a number of funders make new commitments around environmental justice, around BIPOC communities. And in the couple of years since, we've seen most of those commitments fade into the background, right?</p><p>And so this has become a tool that communities can use to actually hold funders accountable to what they say they're going to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>And then the second component of the pledge is the 30% requirement. So what we say is after you tell us your number, if you're not at 30% and a good number or not, we challenge you to within two years of taking the pledge to get to 30%. So scale your grant making to at least 30% going to BIPOC-led environmental justice organizations over the course of two years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can I ask where 30% came from? I mean, is it just sounds reasonable or is there something more to it than that?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>You know, if you look at it, BIPOC communities, about 40% of the population, what we said was 30% seems like a good floor. It is not intended to be a ceiling. And what we hope to see is that over time, that number is far exceeding 30%. But at least as a floor, 30% felt right to the networks of movement organizers and leaders that we pulled together to help develop this campaign.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so this funders pledge has been going on for how long, and what's the state of play? Are foundations signing on? How much money have you shifted? How long has this been running?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>So you're talking to me pretty much on the eve of our two year anniversary. And so we've been around for a couple of years. And to date, twelve of the Top 40 climate funders have taken the pledge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>32 foundations overall have committed to at least one portion of the pledge. And so some of them will say we'll do transparency, but we're not quite ready to go to 30%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>And we accept that because sunlight is the best disinfectant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think you're right that transparency is the big piece here. It's like that dream where you wake up in school, and you're naked in school or whatever, all of a sudden everybody can see ... that alone, I think is going to create a lot of push.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Right. Nobody wants to be at the bottom of the list, right. Nobody wants to be in single digits when everybody else is in double digits. And the ones who are in double digits, like Kresge, they want to do better, right? They want to get more shine. They want to tell their story, more impactfully. And so we offer the transparency piece not just as stick, but also as carrot to those who are doing well in this fight, and want to help us tell the story, and amplify the mission. And so what we have seen is that there is momentum around the pledge.</p><p>And we're very proud to say that we have helped to catalyze a new baseline, funding baseline through the pledge for BIPOC-led organizations of around $100 million in the two years that we have been around. But $100 million is really just a drop in the bucket because right now we're seeing, again, as I said earlier, new funders come into the field every single day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this was my very next question, is do we have any sense of what sort of dollar figure we would be talking about if this succeeded, if all the big philanthropies signed on, and if all the big philanthropies actually did it? Do we have any idea sort of like, what the ultimate pool of money is?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>So I don't have that hard number, but I can tell you that our campaign has a goal, right? An aim of catalyzing $500 million. So if we could get to $500 million, we feel like we would be radically transforming the possibilities for BIPOC-led environmental justice organizations. But that's going to require that we make the transition, the pivot, from what I would call the legacy funders, right? So legacy funders like Pisces, and Kresge, and Schmidt, and Rockefeller Brothers and Hewlett and ... a number of the ... MacArthur, a number of the others that have Heising-Simon's Energy Foundation, Packard Foundation, a number of those that have taken the pledge.</p><p>We've got to make the transition from just those to now some of these more entrepreneurial startup funders in the space, like a Bezos, like a Waverley Street, like a Sequoia.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Have you talked to any of them? I mean, I assume you're reaching out. I guess one of the questions I'm sort of curious about is, is there a big difference in culture that you found between these established groups and the new ones coming in?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>There is. We are outreaching every day to the new funders. One of the reasons I make the distinction between legacy and entrepreneurial is that when you're a legacy funder, you have deeper roots in communities because you've been funding them for a long time, or at least you've been giving lip service to funding them for a long time, right? And so you're more susceptible to their accountability, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>You're more accountable to them than a new funder who's coming in, who is somebody who's made a bunch of money in tech and just wants to give it away out of a good spirit and a good heart. But there isn't the same level of connectivity there to communities, and so that has been the biggest challenge. And then the other piece of this is when you're an entrepreneur and you've come in right on the heels of having made a lot of money, a lot of money in business, you tend to think you know how to do things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What? Tech guys?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>I know, it's a crazy thought, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I was going to say I don't want to cast aspersions, or use any stereotypes, but when I think about tech-bros fresh off making billions of dollars like sensitivity to racial justice is not what leaps to mind.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Well and they may have the sensitivity, some of them, but they also have the kinds of neurosis that come from having made a lot of money and been very successful, and you think you kind of know everything, right? And so oftentimes they will come into the field and say, "here is what I want to do on climate," and it has no relationship to what communities actually are doing and need to do. That's really probably the biggest culture challenge that we face is that it's both the accountability piece, and it's the part of this that understands that, ultimately, this is a learning experience both for the funder and for the broader field. This is not top down, it's bottom up, and the best solutions come from the bottom up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As you've talked to foundations, have you received any straight up kind of disagreement about your goals?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Well, we mostly don't get that, right. We mostly get, "well ... we're going to work on ... " That's my impersonation. "We're going to work on it, and we're going to see, and talk to us in six months and ..." that sort of thing. But every now and then you do just hear "no, we're just not going to do it."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>But generally that doesn't come from a disagreement with the goals or the objectives of the campaign because it's hard to disagree with the goals and objectives of the campaign. It generally comes from a sense of, "you know what, this is just not part of our agenda. This is not what we do, and we're not going to have anybody external to our organization directing our strategy."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>And so that's generally where most of the resistance comes from.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If you imagine a huge new flood of money descending on these groups, over the course of the next two or three years, you can imagine ways that that could go poorly. That's a big disruptive thing. And one of the things I was thinking about is when you talk to these small groups, often what they'll tell you they need is just operating expenses. Like they need to be able to pay decent salaries, right? Just to begin with. Trying to run a whole movement on underpaid people is difficult, and they need sort of just like cost of living, cost of operations, operations money.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what you often find, or what they tell me they run into when they talk to funders is, of course, funders are wealthy, and therefore overestimate their own cleverness, and often have their own ideas about what they want groups to do. So I worry, like, is this going to be the right kind of support? And you can certainly imagine a big new pot of money coming with a bunch of sort of big footed demands about how these groups do things, right? Like, you can imagine big funders trying to sort of dictate the strategies of these groups rather than listening and learning from them.</p><p>So I don't know how you go about, I mean, I don't know exactly what I want you to say in the switch, but are we confident that this support is going to be the kind of support that these sort of small struggling groups need most?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Right. You are really touching on a critical part of this that our campaign is going to be doing more work on. It hasn't been a core part of it thus far because we really see ourselves as the accountability mechanism in the field, but we do think there's an opportunity for us to engage on these questions. So to start, what we really need is a shift in the culture of philanthropy, right? And so part of that shift is a shift in the "philanthropy knows best" mindset. And we've been talking about that. Part of that shift is a shift in the desire of philanthropy to really dictate all of the terms of engagement. And they do that primarily by focusing most of their grant making on program grants.</p><p>Right.</p><p>And so you might get a grant to run a specific program, but you're not going to get a grant to actually scale your organizational capacity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. This is a notorious complaint from nonprofits across the board from time immemorial, right. They're like, we can get a grant to do a specific thing, but we just need, like, printer paper,</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Right! "We can get a grant to do a specific thing, but we need to hire people to do the thing, and we need to be able to offer them insurance, health insurance, and we need to be able to keep the lights on in the building." And that is a part of this conversation that, again, we have not touched on, but we see there's an opportunity for us to touch on as we continue to move forward. So those are really the two of the areas where there's room for additional intervention. The other thing I'll say is this. It's a bit of a vicious cycle that these groups are in because they don't get the funding, so they can't build the capacity. And because they don't have the capacity, that lack of capacity is used as a pretext to deny them more funding, right?</p><p>So it's a vicious cycle. And now we're in a moment where there's some $500 billion coming down from the federal government, on climate related resources. And a lot of that is sort of focused on, or earmarked on a climate justice lens. And we're happy about that, right? We fought for that, the movement organized for that. But the concern that we have now is that because of this disparity in funding and private philanthropy, many of the organizations that are BIPOC-led, that are going after these grants won't be able to successfully compete because they've been locked out of the private funding, right?</p><p>And so a lot of work is being done on the ground, and movements, and organizations to actually try to help organizations build capacity over time to be able to compete for these new dollars that are coming down and to actually be able to fulfill the spirit of Justice40, but we need more funding to do that, and the private funding market is critical.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And another thing I've heard from these groups, these are most often pretty small under-resourced groups. And another thing I've heard is that even the process of applying ...</p><p>Right ...</p><p>For these things, is burdensome, and difficult, and expensive. Like, if you're a two, or three, or four person operation, it's nothing for a Kresge to sort of send someone out to hear your pitch. But for you to make the pitch is a lot of hours of labor which you can't really well afford. And I've heard from groups where they say, they'll come consult with us and ask us how to do better in their EJ funding and et cetera, et cetera, and we make these elaborate presentations and then they vanish and we never hear from them again.</p><p>So I just wonder, are there broader ... you could imagine a regime where a big wealthy funder pays some small stipend to a group to offset the cost of consulting, the sort of free consulting they do, or the cost of applying for grants or something like that. And that would just be can you think of are there larger ways that we need to change the relationship between small EJ groups and big funders, beyond just the monetary beyond just giving them money, in terms of just the kind of social aspects and cultural aspects of their interaction? Are there larger reforms we need in that aspect?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>How much time do we have?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I thought you might have something to say about that.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Right. I have the privilege of wearing a bunch of hats in my work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I meant to say, I read your LinkedIn page. I had to take a nap halfway through. You're a busy man.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>I'm a busy man. I do a lot, and I sit across a lot of different buckets, right. And so on the CFJP side of things, obviously, I'm wearing a bit of a philanthropic hat. We don't necessarily consider ourselves philanthropy, but we're not movement. We're somewhere in between, right. But we definitely wear a philanthropic hat. And then in my other work, I actually lead a grassroots voting organization of Black lawyers and law students. And so on one side of my work, I am challenging funders to do more. And then on the other side of my work, I am living every day the ways in which this system is inequitable toward founders of color and leaders of color.</p><p>And so I see this from both sides. Really, I think the first place to start in this conversation is with a conversation. And so typically the exchange between funder and organization is a one-way conversation, right. It's a one-way street.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Speaking of power differentials.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Exactly. These broader power differentials in society are being replicated in how foundations engage with organizations. "And so you can apply for a grant if we invite you to apply, we want it in this 60-page application format."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then you get the grant. And like we need a 60-page report every year.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>That's right, "we need the 60-page report every year. Oh, and by the way, you probably won't get the grant in time to actually do the work you need to do with it because we're going to take our time delivering the grant to you, and you interface with us and interact with us when we invite you to."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>That has to change. And so part of the culture change that you're talking about that so many organizations are advocating for, starts with making that one-way conversation, a two-way conversation, and actually listening to organizations on the ground and having those organizations inform your grant making practices, right?</p><p>So let me go back to Kresge for a minute. One of the other things that they have said to us has been impactful for them is actually the transformation that the pledge has wrought in their grant making practices, in their day to day grant making practices, and how they engage, and how they interact with grantees.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that just means they've been learning by doing, they've been learning by interacting with these groups?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>That's right. That's right. Absolutely. And we've heard that from multiple funders. And so really what has to happen is that the funder has to become a learner, right. And that's what we're pushing through this pledge. We're challenging funders to become listeners and learners and actually hear from the organizations on the ground about what needs to change in their grant making practices in order to be more equitable. And a lot of them are making changes. I think that's really where this starts is the conversation, shifting it from one-way to two-way.</p><p>And one of the things, by the way, that we have tried to do is that a number of these funders have said, "well, how do I actually get this data? How do I actually get the demographic data information? How do we kind of navigate that?" And what we have done is actually provide resources for them, so that when they're seeking out this data, they're not creating more layers of burden on these groups, right? So we have tried to incorporate that even into our own program.</p><p>Right, so these groups don't have to sort of do another report on our demographic makeup, et cetera, et cetera. So that's a little bit more public. And it also occurs to me I mean, maybe this is even too obvious to point out, but it also occurs to me that it would be nice if these big funders going to these groups were not like 18th century British royals visiting the islands like strangers in a strange land. Like, it might be nice if they were composed if the makeup of the actual big funders changed.</p><p>Well, there you go. There you go. I mean, you've made exactly one of the critical points, which is that the work that Green 2.0 and so many other organizations are doing to actually change the makeup of these funders is directly connected to our work. Because you're absolutely right. You should not be visiting these communities as though you're visiting from Mars. You should have people on staff in senior positions who are deeply rooted in these communities, that know the work that's happening, that know the challenges facing these organizations and are directly invested in this work, right? Part of what I have seen in the time that I've been doing this work is that there are so many brilliant folks across the country who are directly and deeply invested in this work, and they are the people who have been laboring in obscurity.</p><p>They are the people who've been laboring without resources. And in order for this system to change, the system of philanthropy to shift, part of what we've got to do is bring those voices from the outside in and make sure that they actually have the ability to transform these funding institutions. And that last point is critical because it is not enough to have People of Color faces in high places if they do not have the ability to actually engineer change.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I used to work for a nonprofit. The first journalistic organization I worked for, Grist, was a nonprofit. And especially back when I first started, we were very small. There's like four or five of us. So I became intimately familiar with the grind of begging foundations for money. Luckily, I didn't have to do that part for long, but I saw enough of it. And one thing that just struck me immediately and overwhelmingly is that we were an organization that was specifically targeting young people. We wanted to be sort of irreverent, and funny, and just all these kind of things that appeal to young people.</p><p>But the people we're talking to and begging for money are, to put it bluntly, White boomers. They're older White people who are not necessarily who you'd go to to learn about what the youth of today want out of a journalistic outlet, right? And so I wonder if you have gotten any sense that younger people in general are hipper to this issue than their elders?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>In some ways, yes, and in some ways, no, right. And so what's clear is that younger people just generally understand the climate crisis better than their elders. So we start there, right. You have less of a case to make to younger folks about the urgency of this crisis, but I think it's important for us to be clear that when it comes to age, that does not necessarily portend more enlightenment on racial justice issues.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Again, I work in sort of the democracy space, and I think there's always this assumption that the younger the electorate gets, the more progressive it's going to get, just because younger people have grown up in more diverse environments. On some level, I think that is true, but I would not want to bet the house on that. And I think we have to continue to be more intentional about cultivating, even among younger people, an understanding of the racial justice implications of this crisis. And so, as a case in point, I was in Miami for the Aspen Climate Conference last week.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>And I did a number of panels during the week, and most of the programming had a climate justice angle to it, right. Most of the speakers referenced it. It was rare that you would sit through an hour long panel, and it wouldn't come up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>But I'll be honest, there were still rooms that I walked into where I was the only Black person in the room. And I don't want to put any blame on anybody. This is not me trying to do that. This is not about assigning blame. But it is about recognizing that even among the cool, hip kids who are invested in the climate movement, that investment in racial justice still needs to be intentionally and actively cultivated. And we cannot assume that it is going to happen by osmosis.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Or that it will happen just because younger people are younger people, right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just because the arc of history right.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>The arc of history is long, but it bends towards justice. I firmly believe that. But I also believe that we have to bend it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's a reason it bends towards justice, because all the people are working to bend it, right?</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>All the people are working to bend it. And so I think there is more consciousness than ever about climate, and there's more consciousness than ever about racial justice, but we still have to do the work to actually translate that consciousness into action.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well said. Well said. Thank you. Abdul Dasumo, thank you so much for coming on. This is very illuminating. I'm glad you took the time.</p><p><strong>Abdul Dosunmu</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me. Thank you for the platform. It was an honor to be with you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/putting-more-climate-philanthropy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:107936836</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 29 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/107936836/8c63ba60b277bfde4663bf2f300a00c6.mp3" length="34703015" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2892</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/107936836/36c7d9d141a74bbe62e92f532e0d193b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How big business sold America the myth of the free market]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Erik M. Conway discusses his new book </em>The Big Myth: How American Business Taught Us to Loathe Government and Love the Free Market<em>, coauthored with Naomi Oreskes.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACyTrB6_GyIybQJYRrQ1jaAa/volts23.03.17%28erik.m.conway%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/how-big-business-sold-america-the-myth-of-the-free-market"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In 2010, historians of technology Erik M. Conway and Naomi Oreskes released <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3ZXrclp"><em>Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming</em></a>, a book about weaponized misinformation that proved to be extraordinarily prescient and influential.</p><p>Now Oreskes and Conway are back with a new book: <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3ZHzNc3"><em>The Big Myth: How American Business Taught Us to Loathe Government and Love the Free Market</em></a>. It's about the laissez-faire ideology of unfettered, unrestrained markets, which was invented and sold to the American people in the 20th century through waves of well-funded propaganda campaigns. The success of that propaganda has left the US ill-equipped to address its modern challenges.</p><p>On March 8, I interviewed Conway at <a target="_blank" href="https://townhallseattle.org/event/erik-m-conway-2/">an event</a> for <a target="_blank" href="https://townhallseattle.org/">Seattle's Town Hall</a>, where we discussed the themes of the book, the hold free-market ideology still has over us, and the prospects for new thinking. The organizers were kind enough to allow me to share the recording with you as an episode of Volts. Enjoy!</p><p><strong>Megan Castillo</strong></p><p>Good evening, everybody. My name is Megan Castillo. I'm Town Hall's program manager. On behalf of the staff here at Town Hall Seattle and our friends at Finney books, it's my pleasure to welcome you to our presentation with Eric Conway and David Roberts. Conway's new book, "The Big Myth," is the subject of tonight's talk. Please join me in welcoming Eric Conway and David Roberts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hey, everybody. Thanks. I'm just going to jump right in. Several things I'd like to get into, but just to start, one of the things that really the book really gets across well, I thought, which I don't know that I fully appreciated, is the extent to which this idea of unfettered, unregulated free capitalism is an invention of the 20th century. It's not what capitalism ... the founders and architects of capitalism, it very much goes against their larger philosophy and their larger kind of moral sentiments. And the way it does this is by elevating property rights, basically trying to they call it the "indivisibility thesis" that property rights and political freedom are one and the same.</p><p>And any limitation on property rights is de facto a limitation on political freedom. That's new, that was not original to capitalism. So maybe talk a little bit about property rights and how they sort of what the pivot these groups did with that concept in the 20th century, in the early 20th century.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Okay, so that's a jump forward from a book that starts with child labor laws in the 19th century. What I think you're bringing up is the tripod of freedom that the National Association of Manufacturers concocts in the late 1930s as part of their effort to undo the New Deal of the Roosevelt administration. And the idea of the tripod of freedom was, if you think about a three-legged stool there's what they would call industrial freedom or business freedom, religious freedom, and political freedom are the three legs of the stool. So if you remove industrial freedom, businesses freedom to do what they want, then the stool falls.</p><p>This is a slippery slope argument that equates business freedom with the other two first amendment freedoms. That's what they spent a decade and millions of dollars, 1930s dollars, promoting through billboard campaigns and materials made for schools and movies and so forth in order to try to convince the public that that's the American way, even though it is a pure invention. In the 19th century, of course, lots of business was regulated and the corporate form itself was primarily a tool used by states. States would create a corporation to accomplish a thing like the Erie Canal Corporation to build and run that canal system for the state.</p><p>And roads were done this way and so forth. And through a whole complicated process, the corporation sort of slowly gets disentangled from the state in the 19th century so that by 1935, we can imagine corporations that are no longer state functions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, one of the wild things is learning that early corporations had to go to states and say, "Can we be a corporation?" And the states would be like justify why? Like tell us why. What public good are you serving? It's just a wild inversion of things. And also another piece of this is, and maybe this doesn't come into it as much until the Austrian economists that get brought over, and I guess this would be in the 60s, kind of 50s and 60s, Hayek and the other one whose name is not coming to my mind. Yeah, but this idea that not only is business freedom core to American freedom but the role of the business person, businessman, I guess they always said back then, is explicitly not to be decent, not to be good, solely to make money.</p><p>So the idea is that if you have these like purely self-interested actors, the magic of aggregating them produces social good, but the individual not only has no obligation to do public good with their business or their corporation, in a sense they're sort of like violating the spirit of capitalism if they do it. Which again is like would send Adam Smith rolling in his grave. Only if you could just say a little bit about how they conceive of the morality of the business person or the morality of business and how that changed from what Adam Smith laid out.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>So that invention of what we now call shareholder value we can trace really back to Chicago school economist. It's mostly popularized by Milton Friedman, though he didn't concoct the term. The idea is, in his 1962 book Capitalism and Freedom he takes a more extreme view of that than the Austrian economist did. Hayek, for example, actually thought there was grounds for workmen's rights of some kind and that there were some justifiable kinds of social mitigations of industrial freedom, as did Adam Smith. Yet Friedman's ideals are what take over in the course of the early eighties. I think it's in the 1980s that the idea really takes off around General Electric Corporation.</p><p>For example, those of us of a certain age remember Neutron Jack just dismantling General Electric and removing the basic ideas that the company had served in the 30s and 40s, for example, of investing in its community in order to have healthy communities around its plants and so forth. And all that goes away in that era of the 80s. So you can see, for example, in the movie "Wall Street," if anybody remembers that from the 80s, there's a great speech about Teldar paper by Michael Douglas and how it exists only to serve its shareholders. And that's where all the profits should go, and its only social good should be ensuring the continued flow of finance to the shareholders.</p><p>And all other good things are supposed to fall out of that, except what else actually fell out of that is workers livelihoods and so forth. It's a fascinating reinvention. In fact, as we begin to bring those Austrian ideas into the US in the 30s and 40s, they become simplified, and they become oversimplified as they're put through the businessmen cycle. Because the businessmen in the United States were simply unwilling to accept even the social protections that Hayek and Adam Smith and so forth had thought were necessary in that decade. And so they commissioned economists to essentially rewrite Hayek.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Globalization goes with this too, because the more you're a multinational company, the less pretense or need you have to pretend like you need to nurture a particular community, right? If one falls apart, you just go find cheap workers somewhere else. Another thing the book really brought home that I did not fully appreciate... I mean, I guess I knew just from being a journalist that business is out there advocating for leave us alone. But I don't think I appreciated the scale and how long that's been going on. I mean, your book sort of describes waves starting in the late 19th century of government would try to do some decent thing.</p><p>There'd be a huge propaganda effort against it. Finally, government would win some new protection for workers. Then business turns around, claims moral credit for the protection against workers, and argues against the new thing that's about to happen via billions of dollars of propaganda over and over. There's like three or four waves of this. So maybe just talk a little bit about how extensive this effort was. Like they're going after schools and libraries, morning cartoons. I mean, they really thought it through about how to go wide.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Well, so we started the book with child labor laws in the 19th century because it's the beginning of the conversion of the National Association of Manufacturers from what had originally been a very protectionist organization. They were founded not at all for free markets, they were founded to promote tariffs, the idea being that tariff walls would protect American manufacturing during the period in which the United States developed. And they begin turning against the idea of government itself around the issue of child labor and workplace safety because those things both threatened to cost the money in various ways. They used child labor in order to reduce wages, and they used well, frankly, they managed to convince the courts that workplace safety problems were actually the fault of the workers and not themselves.</p><p>And so there's a long fight by reformers in the United States to both provide better workplace protections and to eliminate child labor that ultimately businesses lose and then basically change their tune and decide that, well, we supported removal of child labor all along. That's sort of the first wave of the story. And that first wave takes it set in in the 1930s and then NAM changes actually kind of fundamentally in the 30s for a very internalist sort of reasons. The National Association of Manufacturers had originally largely represented small businesses, not large. They have a leadership change in the 30s in which essentially they're taken over by large manufacturers.</p><p>And then those large and much wealthier manufacturers begin to believe that it's in their interests to try to change the political tone of the United States. And World War II really helps them show how the Roosevelt administration engaged in an enormous public propaganda campaign to support the war. And our manufacturing friends learn a whole lot about how to spread messages. And we don't get into it a great deal in the book because there's so much material. But for example, I pick up with a story of a congregationalist minister in los Angeles becomes quite famous nationwide for setting up an organization known as Spiritual Mobilization.</p><p>Spiritual Mobilization's idea was to try to reconvince Americans of the moral basis for free market capitalism and to spread that through the churches. He was a minister. He attracted, of course, the interest of the National Association of Manufacturers, very key to our story. And in particular, one of their leaders by the name of J. Howard Pew, who is president of Sun Oil and Pew, becomes Fifield's biggest backer for spiritual mobilization. Spiritual mobilization operates throughout World War II, actually and into the 1950s. And they tried to develop curriculum to push out into seminaries as well as putting materials out into churches and so forth for free market ideals.</p><p>Now, it's important to understand that as a congregationalist, Fifield was a theological liberal and J. Howard Pew was not. He was very much a theological conservative. So he takes that idea in 1946 and he starts founding new organizations to do the same thing but into the conservative churches. And so the Christian Freedom Foundation was one of his creations. Magazine Christianity Today is one of his creations. He attracts Norman Vincent Peale from the first marble church and so on. And he becomes an enormously successful entrepreneur of the idea of shoving free market capitalist views into American religion.</p><p>And that's just one thread of the propaganda story that we tell.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to say it's creepy enough trying to sort of conflate free market capitalism with America, with America's founding and America's founding values, but then it gets conflated with Christianity. They get merged in a way that only has gotten creepier and creepier over time. I frequently look around today at various and sundry propaganda campaigns still ongoing and wish to myself that the institutions we have set up to seek truth and accuracy, namely academia and journalism, would be more stalwart in their resistance to propaganda campaigns. And it's tempting for people in the present day to say, oh, what's happened to the media?</p><p>What happened to the old media? But you read through your book and you sort of realize, like academia and journalism were never particularly they didn't put up a very good fight, let's say, against all this stuff.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>No. Another of the stories we tell again about the breadth of these campaigns, it's around the National Electric Light Association, which doesn't exist anymore. It folded after its propaganda campaign was exposed. This is an organization that existed into the 1920s, like the National Association of Manufacturers. It took up the effort to prevent regulation of the electrical utility industry. And one of the ways they did it was by paying academics to author studies that they could use to prove, quote unquote, "that privately provided electrical power was cheaper and more reliable than publicly provided and produced power." Except there was lots of evidence that that wasn't true for both Europe and Canada, which not only tended to have cheaper electricity rates, but also much more widespread electrification.</p><p>One of the things that we've all forgotten by now, because we were almost all, maybe all of us, were born after electrification is completed. But in the United States, electrification stalled at the city borders and it stalled at the city borders for decades because utilities figured it simply wasn't profitable for them to string lines across rural America.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Europe beat us to rural electrification. I don't think I really knew that before I read ...</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, most people have forgotten, but they beat us to rural electrification because they saw it, well, in a couple of different ways. One was program of improvement, but another big one was, remember, there really was a threat of the communists and socialists taking over in Europe, and that was, of course, used as a foil here in the United States, too. But what the European politicians did was they simply decided, well, we're going to take on some of the claims of the reformers and actually do them in order to forestall the revolution. Bismarck was actually pretty successful for a while, and many other of the European countries were successful at more than a little while.</p><p>And we kind of tell that story, too. But to answer your question is there were paid academics then as well who were not only not attempting to get at the truth, but were fairly well, I would say that they had already been indoctrinated. They already believed that free market, if you couldn't even say such a thing existed, was the proper way. I would say the better way to say it really is private enterprise is a better way to do it. It's a better frame. One thing I haven't said yet, but I want to make sure I do, is that Naomi and I don't believe there's such a thing as a free market.</p><p>Markets are constructs. They're social constructs. Birds and bees and so forth don't have them. We all regulate markets in some way, either by law or by the guys that break your knees if you don't pay up. They're all forms of market regulation, and some are preferable to others.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and they bought off so many editors and newspapers, too, in just like the chintziest ways. They just mail them a pamphlet or take them out to dinner and boom, they got great press coverage. It's very disheartening.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>But I would even say that they didn't have to be bought off, necessarily. Partly that's social pressure you're talking about, which we've all experienced, being invited to the right parties and so forth, and we don't really get into that because sociology is not our subject. But it's also the case that many of these editors were raised in the same propaganda, especially nowadays were raised in the same propagandaized malu that everybody else was. And it's hard to decide that all these things you've been taught for most of your life are wrong. It's very hard to decide that.</p><p>I'm sure that most of what I've been taught through most of my life is sort of true, at least. But I'm not always sure, and I have to think hard about it nowadays.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One thing that comes across also is big business has been organized and at this for a long time, well over a century now. But they weren't really successful for a while. Like, they fought and fought and fought against the New Deal. But the New Deal mostly went forward and mostly remained popular. And it's like wave after wave of propaganda until around, like, the 70s Carter era and Reagan era. So what converged there in history to allow this to break out from basically being kind of a fringe view to it's common sense now, sort of common wisdom, meddlesome bureaucrats and government inefficiency and picking winners.</p><p>These are all phrases that ordinary people know now sort of sifted down into the popular consciousness now. So what was it that allowed it to finally overwhelm resistance and win?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Well, I think the first thing we've already said we've had this decades long propaganda campaign that helped lay the groundwork, and that's the main subject of our book. And then part two is the 70s. We have a whole series of intersecting crises in the United States. And we talk about the inflation of the 70s from the economic perspective being that big crisis. And the advantage that the free marketeers had was that they had an answer that was different than the standard answer. And Naomi and I are not the first to think about it this way. They had a different answer than the economics of the last 40 years, which had been successful, maintained a relatively growing and prosperous economy, much more prosperous for how do I want to put it more equitable prosperity than what we have now or prior to World War II, frankly.</p><p>And yet that seemed to be breaking down in the so that's the way we see it. And because they had an answer and because Carter then has, of course, a great foreign policy crisis as well. And honestly, I think Jimmy Carter believed some of the free market mantra in that his administration really launches the era of deregulation, right? It's the Carter administration that undoes airline regulation and trucking regulation and begins undoing rail regulation. And there's even banking deregulation in the Carter administration. And so they begin getting rid of a lot of, in fact, the leftover artifacts of the New Deal in the Carter administration.</p><p>And what Naomi and I do is we discuss that, what was done, what effects they began to have. And honestly, to some degree, we are supporters of it. Except there's one place that we think they went wrong, really, and that is they didn't apply labor protections that had existed under the New Deal laws. So trucking, for example. And that's they're kind of the poster child for deregulation because ten years after the trucking deregulation law, most of the trucking unions had collapsed. Most of the trucking businesses that had existed collapsed and they'd been reformed into new nonunion trucking organizations.</p><p>Wages collapsed and so on. And so deregulation helped reduce the inflationary period. Trucking is a major expense to move stuff around, but at the same time it also crushed wages, which benefits inflation, but not the workers and so on. So that's our story of the conversion. And I'm sure you could write others because in the couple of chapters we had, we could barely scratch the surface of what it was, I think, a very complex and challenging period.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know you're a historian, so history is your thing. But as you look around now, maybe you and Naomi have talked about this. Do you feel like the hold of kind of the free market mythology is loosening? Do you think we're heading in another direction now? What's your take on the current state of this? Because it seemed to sort of hit its peak in sort of like Bill Clinton. When you got a Democratic president saying the era of big government is over, you've sort of, like, won at that point. You've won the argument. Where do you think we are now with all this stuff?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Boy, I wish I knew. Being a historian, we're bad at crystal ball kinds of things. It's certainly interesting to me that the current president and his predecessor are not free marketeers, neither of them, but in quite different ways. Right. Trump is still backers of kind of Reagan style deregulation gutting environmental agencies and that sort of thing. He did those kinds of things but at the same time was almost doing the 19th century idea of tariff protectionism.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really old school.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Really old school. I know some people have called it neo-feudalism, but I don't see it that way. But then again, since I'm a 20th century guy, there wasn't a lot of feudalism for me to study. So maybe I'm wrong. But I do find it intriguing that it's no longer the default position of either party, that the idea of unregulated markets are to continue to be dominant. But what comes next? I don't know. That's the challenging and terrifying part to some.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And neither of them seem to get much internal pushback from their own party over that.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>No, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There doesn't seem to be like an organized presence for it anymore.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Right. And instead it's patchwork. But that's not the word I want. It's more a matter of what they perceive to be immediate self interest at the party level. And so there's lots of discussion now of big-tech regulation and to some degree I would support it depending on the details, but it's not clear to me what that would be. For example, it's an interesting political moment to live in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Antitrust is sort of poking its head up again.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Yeah, we might actually enforce antitrust statutes for the first time in decades, maybe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Final question, and this is my plaintive question I ask everyone, and especially when I spend a lot of time talking about the media environment, the sort of epistemic environment and Fox and the right wing media and all of this misinformation and stuff. But one thing I'm constantly lamenting or wondering about is why, when you look back over this 150 year period almost, and you see these repeated waves of propaganda against government, basically against government as such, not against this or that in particular, but just government is bad. Like government's inefficient and bad, wave after wave. Why do liberals or progressives or whatever you want to call them, why does the left, why do the people who believe that government can improve people's lives as it demonstrably has many times through our history?</p><p>Where are their propaganda campaigns? Where is the think tank that's just devoted to arguing that government is good? I can name ten on the right that are devoted purely to the subject of how government is bad. Is there one on the left that's just government is good as opposed to this immigration group and this crime group, whatever? Why does the side of social democracy, mixed capitalism, the stuff that seems to work, why does it not have a propaganda arm or effort? Or why does it never seem to fight for itself as such? Do you have an answer to that question?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>I don't have a good answer. The usual joke you get is that they just don't have the money. And maybe that's true, but I think there's actually a better argument in another book, and I'm really hoping the name of this author comes to me. But unfortunately, I read this. It was published after we'd finished our manuscript. But there's an argument about back in the 1970s that the Consumers Rights Movement undermined precisely that argument because the government was so complicit in allowing itself to be used by corporate lobbyists because the corporate lobbyists had been so successful in ensuring regulations were written in ways that benefited the incumbents right.</p><p>The existing big three carb manufacturers and so forth. And I can remember when we were doing the book tour for what little book tour we had for Merchants of Doubt. I was up in, I think, Alberta province in Canada, and I wish I knew who this was, but I was talking to an economist over a beer who told me a great story about one of the Carter administration's economists. And the person I was talking to was saying that really, it's not that he believed in free markets, it's that he believed that corporations could rig government to do essentially whatever they want to use the government to build and sustain their own monopolies.</p><p>And the only solution to this was to sweep away all the rules. The problem with that is that then you have to keep doing that, right? Because every generation of corporate titan gets the rules written again to protect itself. And I mean, that was the only fly I could see in that argument. But to go back to your question, the problem that liberal activists would have is that because a lot of people on the left, I think, actually agree with that. And I even think that there's merit to it because I've seen it so often in my own research career.</p><p>Corporations do get state and federal governments to write rules that benefit them. And so that undermines the whole notion of a pro government propaganda campaign, right? Because maybe it's just that all of the leftists have very mixed feelings about it. And honestly, I think we should I don't want to say one of the things I hope you will get out of our book is that we're not saying that all corporations are bad or that the government is always good because neither of those positions are true. They're not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, well, I'd love to hear from the audience. Let me just say this is a subject about which I feel many people will be tempted to have more of a comment than a question. And I just want to get out ahead of that and say, if you have comments, save them for afterwards. You can talk to us afterwards. People came to hear Eric talk, so try to keep your questions concise. Yeah, just come on up to the podium if you have questions, or if not, I'm going to keep asking them.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>I have a process rather than content question. So I'm a retired oceanographer. I'm familiar with your co-authors work in the scientific field. So it's kind of a dual question of, you guys seem to be stepping out of your area of technical and scientific expertise into the economic world, and I'm curious about the process of how the two of you work together on this?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Okay, so we did the book because we wanted to follow up "Merchants of Doubt", in which, if you're not familiar, was really a history of four physicists and how they spent their retirement careers working to cast doubt about the truth of environmental problems. And what we concluded was that they were believers in market fundamentalism, the idea that only free markets could protect political freedom. In other words, basically a 1980s version of the Tripod of Freedom from 1935. And so in this book, we wanted to tell the history of market fundamentalism, so that's why we did it.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>Can you tell us who we is?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Oh, sorry. Naomi Oreskes. She's the lead author in the book, and I'm Eric. Process, so I guess I'm the one who had spent a lot of time or a lot more time in economic history initially because I'm a historian in technology, and you really can't separate technology from business and economics to a lesser degree. So I guess to some degree, you can blame me for the initial ideas. And then once we had sort of gotten the book proposal sold, process was we separate the chapters, figure out who's doing what, whose expertise more aligned to one idea or the other.</p><p>And then it's a whole lot of researching and writing and mailing chapter drafts, back and forth and so on. Kind of the early core of the book is built around material from the Hagley archives, which it's a business history library and archives on the Dupont family estate in Delaware. The Dupont family did History of the United States enormous favor, frankly, in turning over some of their original powder factory buildings to be a business history archive. And that's how I can tell you exactly what J. Howard Pew was doing and setting up these organizations, because he was proud of it.</p><p>He wrote to people about it. He helped get a textbook by an economist by the name of Tarshis removed from university curriculum on grand claims to trustees and so forth, that the guy was a communist when actually he was just a Keynesian economist. And that prepared the way for Paul Samuelson's textbook to become the dominant textbook in American economic education for most of our lifetimes. But Samuelson, seeing what happened to Tarshis, revised it to make it satisfactory to the market fundamentalists who'd gone. After Tarshis and Samuelson told us that story. But we can know these things because archives exist.</p><p>And sometimes even the people that we criticize are the people that made it possible for us to know that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, they don't come across in the book as any of them as particularly bashful or embarrassed about the fact that They're ...</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>They're proud of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Waging massive propaganda campaigns.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>No, they're proud of it because they believe in what they're doing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I have another question, which maybe is more philosophical, but this is something I've gone back and forth over the years too, which is at no point from the late 19th century forward, really, at no point ever are any of these business titans who are waging these propaganda campaigns acting consistently according to free market principles. All of them happily welcome subsidies. When subsidies are available, all of them will happily tax their competitors. None of them ever in history have turned down something that would benefit them on the basis of free market principle. So you could make the argument that what's going on here is about power.</p><p>They have power and the microphones and the money. They don't even really believe the arguments. So in a sense, the only thing that can counteract that, insofar as you view it as a bad thing, is counterpower. And in a sense, arguing as though sincere ideas are in the driver's seat here is kind of like a bait and switch. I feel like they just laugh when we go off and write arguments and research things and care about facts like they're just playing us. They don't care about the facts. They're just exercising power. How central is the argument to all this?</p><p>And how much of it is just a cover for corporate power that can only be sort of restrained by power?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Well, first off, self interest is fundamental to their depiction of free market capitalism, right? One thing they certainly internalize is that everyone acts in their own self interests, including themselves, and they happen to be in a position to use their power to maximize their self interest, even if it harms others. So you can argue that they are actually acting according to principle. It just isn't a very satisfactory answer, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it's not a free market principle, right?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>It's not a free market ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Principle of self interest.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Yes, that's right. It's not really a free market principle. So you can see, for example, in the paper of J. Howard Pew, and he's writing to Rose Wilder Lane, the daughter of Laura Ingalls Wilder. He goes through some contortions at times to defend his own or what she perceives to be his own violations of principle because, whereas J. Howard Pew is willing to compromise to improve his standing, in a lot of ways, Lane wasn't, she really was an ideologue. Well, she kind of drives herself out of the movement, in a sense, because she's more extreme than they were and continue to be.</p><p>So it gives you an example that there actually were people even inside, for a while, even inside this conservative movement, who were principled and would actually manage to drive themselves away because they wouldn't make those compromises. But they're not the ones that had power, or rather that retained power, as you say, because they were acting in the those that remained were acting more in the interests of power than in pursuit of the free market principles. So, again, I keep saying that there's no such thing as a free market. There's always a regulated market. And it's just how and by whom that we're talking about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, to this day, I think there are like seven true libertarians somewhere in DC. Who are constantly pained by their betrayal by the Republican Party, which is coming up on 150 years now. You'd think they would see the next one coming, but still .. Hi.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>So I'm a little bit outside of my element here because I've not read the book, but usually in a big myth, and I look forward to it that you and Naomi arrestes have written what were the little myths? What are the little myths, and can you articulate them that are backing up that big myths? I mean, we can come to our own conclusions, but can you articulate those?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Oh, they're legion. Well, I kind of told you one. There's the Tripod of Freedom. That's a set of mythologies that the National Association of Manufacturers concoct in 1935. The idea that industrial freedom has anything to do with the Bill of Rights is laughable.</p><p>It just doesn't exist there any more than the kind of maximalist interpretation of property rights. My character, Fifield, to give you another example of a myth, tries very, very hard in his campaigns to bring the clergy around to the idea that property rights are sacred, that they descend from God and not from the fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which makes them, if you ever bother to read it, modifiable by act of law, which we can't modify God by active law. So there's another myth. The individualist mythology is another one. And we don't explicitly criticize that in the book.</p><p>It's already too big a book. But rugged individualism is another area of mythology that is built into this idea of the free market in the so there are a whole network of sub-myths that go into what they are. What we don't do is we don't make give you a typology, a chart of all the different sub-myths, and we just didn't think about the problem that way. We were trying to tell you partly a story and partly a well evidenced history and less rigorous philosophical analysis, I guess you can say.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, one thing that comes across is you'd like to think there's a marketplace of ideas, speaking of myths, just a marketplace of ideas where ideas compete based on their rigor. But of course, these ideas were at every juncture, very well funded and pushed. And I always thought it's not hard to understand why rich, powerful people in society welcome a philosophy that characterizes success in a market as a matter of heroic overcoming individual effort. I mean, of course, the people who won want to believe that, right? In that sense, it's in a tradition of hundreds of years of mythologies that mainly serve to justify the place of the people in charge.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Well, so I guess there's two stories built into that question. In the marketplace of ideas, milton Friedman didn't rise to the top in a free market because the Chicago School of Economics program was built on the funding of a foundation, the Voelker Foundation, which was run by a gentleman, by named Harold Luhnow. And it's their money that got the Chicago School's free market program going and supported Friedrich Hayek there at the School of Social Thought ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got us into Readers Digest, which I thought was just excellent detail.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Well, yes, this is the power of money, right? Because not only could they afford to support faculty members for a decade or two to get the free market ideals built into academia, they could spread them through cartoons and so forth. Right. So none of us live in a free marketplace of ideas anyways, because money can boost the ideas that people with money want boosted. And Milton Friedman is a great example of how that came about. So marketplace of ideas? Well, it's a very rigged market, much like General Electrics, electricity markets,</p><p>Much like all markets.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>You brought up Milton Friedman. So shock therapy, right?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>Right. All over the world, or especially South America. But I wanted to ask you, your historian, I mean, the more you read, you can become depressed. But one question to you about could potentially the reason why there is no thorough backlash or a fight against this propaganda is because a lot of the intellectual stuff that we learn about just they're so wrapped up in the hypocrisy of all the stuff that we've done as a society, including propaganda, capitalism, that they're just, like, useless, that they can't germinate, they can't forment this type of backlash that you're talking about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, your colleague up here, what do you think about that?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>I would say that they would have a hard time selling it here. I'll take back to the idea. Remember I told you this story briefly about Lorie Tarshis being having his textbook suppressed by a propaganda campaign and aimed at trustees of universities and so forth in the 1950s, and therefore Samuelson's textbook becoming dominant. That's an American story, and it largely didn't happen in the rest of the world. So economics programs in Europe are much more intellectually diverse than they are here because that kind of story didn't happen. Right. The rigged market here resulted in one outcome, a very similar thought throughout most of American academics, which is not really so much true in Europe.</p><p>Now, the question was about the public. But ideas generally have to come from somewhere, right? And if all the economic departments in the United States basically think the same way then where do the ideas get started? In left wing think tanks. There's not very many of those, as we were discussing earlier. And they start out from a position of less credibility precisely because they're think tanks. Right. There's no independent work on that kind of going on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No liberal "Little House on the Prairie."</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Well, there's not that either. So I would say to you that part of the problem is you start out with having fewer ideas that can be marketed and then you don't have the infrastructure for marketing them to get the change across that you might want. But again, that's beyond our subject. Other people have written about the think tank world than not us.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>I'm curious in your research for this book whether you came across any industries where deregulation and free market ideas actually made a more equitable or efficient outcome. You talked about how the electricity market is not a good market for free market principles but I'm curious whether you researched anything where it did improve it.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Well, so efficiency is a difficult term because efficiency is often well, the definition of efficiency matters, doesn't it? If you're talking about cost effectiveness, for example it's much more cost effective to buy property in poor neighborhoods or near poor neighborhoods and make them dumps. Right? So efficiency often leads to inequity. And so we don't often see efficiency and equity going hand in hand at least not in the United States. But to be honest, we weren't looking for that because our story was built around a propaganda campaign by people who weren't interested at all in equity. Not at all.</p><p>In fact, they discuss and we have a little bit about this in the Christian capitalism chapter they openly discuss the idea that some people really are superior and should rise to the top and equity is simply not equity is not the American way. So following that thread we would never have found what you're asking about. So I hope it's true that at some level you can have relative efficiency and relative equity. But that's not what our actors were talking about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, they very explicitly say attempts to improve equity are ipso facto going to suppress economic growth. Like they don't they don't even allow the possibility that you can do both at once. They set them up as being diametrically opposed.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Yeah, which I actually which I believe, anyways is a fundamental misunderstanding of Adam Smith's capitalism. His basic idea is that the circulation of capital improved everything. But what he meant, I think, was circulation top to bottom. Right. The money has to reach the people at the bottom because that's where most people are and improve their lives and that's what drives the system. If you have the concentration of wealth at the top then it becomes not only less equitable, it becomes a less efficient and less generative economy. But that's me. I think a great many economists don't think in terms of top to bottom circulation of wealth that's more circular in their minds or something, but I don't think that's what Smith meant.</p><p>The concentration of wealth strikes me as being less effective long term and it's certainly less stable. I'm sure I've got more questions though.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>So it's certainly easy to be cynical about corporations talking about ESG. But overall would you say that the increasing talk about and emphasis on ESG is a bit of a backlash to some of this capitalism and free market mythology? Or is it pure whitewashing?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Oh, I wish I knew. But being a historian, even the present is blurry to me. It's easier to see the past in a lot of ways, but it seems to me at one level a welcome response to the shareholder value idea in which the company only has the interests of its shareholder at stake. And the EEC movement strikes me as being at least better than that, that there is some other set of interests and values at stake there. I hope it's not all whitewashing or greenwashing rather as the term goes. But like I said, I don't study the present particularly strongly.</p><p>So people ask me questions like what are the best companies for environmental things? And I have no idea, none whatsoever.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's worth pointing out though that as we speak the usual suspects are mounting an enormous very well funded propaganda campaign against ESGs. Specifically like there's Republican states passing laws against it. So it's real enough to cause them to mobilize against, I guess so something.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>Yeah. Comment question. Since 1968 I'm looking at the Gini coefficient from FRED database here. It's risen from 38.6 to 49, which is incredibly high measure of inequality. And since that time there's been six different agencies added to the federal government. And you just discussed heavily on we don't have a free market and we have a very strong governmental regulatory capture system.</p><p>How do we overcome that? And probably the biggest beneficiary we see today is the world's richest man, Elon Musk. With SpaceX, with governmental money. We've got all kinds of carbon capture systems with these batteries and his new cars. All we doing, we're just handing him money. And isn't government the problem there? I mean you talk about this okay ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think we got it. What do you think, Eric?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Absolutely. We have a less and less equitable society and we don't spend a lot of the book trying to figure out what's at fault there. Personally, I would blame capital gains tax more than just Elon Musk or the expansion of or the addition of federal agencies. Don't get me started on Musk because I have always seen him as being nothing really but a successful harvester of federal dollars and also a really good propagandist, until recently.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>He's really off his game lately.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Yes, he used to be good at the whole fanboy thing, and maybe he still is and I'm just left the family, I don't know. But regulatory capture, real problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can we throw in the Supreme Court removing all limits on campaign, on finance spending, and we throw that in there. If you don't like corporate capture, then.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>That's another again, we don't go there in the book. It's already too big a book. But yes, the equation of money and speech is a whole other level of corporate capture. Right. It doesn't just allow unlimited lobbying spending, but an unlimited political advertising spending. And that just reinforces the propaganda power of things. And I guess I would say back to the original question, I actually don't know how you break the cycle here. It's one of those things where historians can help you diagnose the way the world is, but not necessarily help you fix it. Because I don't know how to undo the equation of money and speech.</p><p>I don't know how you build a government that can't be captured somehow.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But I mean, there are governments out there in the world that are more competent, that are less wasteful, that are less captured, like there are better and worse administrative states. So at the very least, you can do better than we're doing.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. And so one of the things we intended to do with the book and ultimately didn't because we decided other people were already writing about it is that the idea that there are varieties of capitalism and Europeans practice much different varieties by and large, than we do and that is wrapped up in the kinds of states they have built, right. And that just takes us back to the idea that there aren't actually any free markets. Markets are embedded in states, they're embedded in particular cultures, and those things can be changed. It's just a question of so what I posed to my audience is the question really is what kind of state versus-slash market do we want?</p><p>Because we're the ones that have to choose and then have to figure out how to make the politicians do what we want. And that's a tough road to haul, particularly when we have this basic problem of the equation of money and speech and therefore the richest man in the world gets to decide who gets heard. And by unabout what.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'll get to your question one second. But I also just wanted to throw in that some of these big states that have huge taxes and robust welfare programs actually have the freest markets, like Finland or whatever. They have fewer regulations on business. They have enormous taxes and enormous redistribution. But the business sector itself is relatively free compared to ours. So we're not even getting the free market we're promised, much less all the rest of it. Alright, final question.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>So I'll get historical 60, 70 years back, the straw man of communism gets beaten to death for a couple of decades. And to what role did business, American big business, play in that particular bonfire? Or was there another path? Or was that whole anti-communism deal more of an invention of the wealthy?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Well, so the anti-communist crusade of the business community goes back well into the 19th century because they were terrified of the communist potential revolution of eliminating private business. So they were always leaders of the anti-communist charge, and they used that as a foil to oppose unionization.</p><p>They would use it to oppose they did, in fact, use it to oppose child labor laws because it was taking children away from their families and making them wards of the state and so on. We tell all that story. So it's been that rhetoric, that anti-communist rhetoric has been a big business rhetoric for more than a century. They were fundamental to helping spread that set of ideas throughout the United States for longer than any of us have been around.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's another thing I discovered through the book is how far back the knee-jerk response of socialism goes. They were using that from the jump. I didn't know how recent that was. It turns out that's been all the way through.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>It's been a universal curse. Now for conservatives for more than a century. It's lost, as far as I can see, any meaning or any relationship to what the socialists actually originally wanted or intended.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Alright, last question. Sneak one more.</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>I mean, there's a lot of corporations that one would argue do a lot of good things. Like Boeing has been a corporation that's provided an immense amount of jobs and pensions, and it's a lot of our economy. And then you could argue that corporations just need regulation by government to be good to create wealth. But I guess my question is, as a historian, what countries in the world have done a better job than the United States on all these things we're talking about? I mean, it's good to criticize all this stuff, and it's definitely lots to criticize, but are there any countries that stand out as an example of what we should be more like?</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Well, first I want to say again, I don't want to come across with the idea that all corporations are bad or that everything corporations do is bad because markets are tools, there are constructs, and they can be very powerful tools for positive things when they're well run. And the second thing I would say is that it's also a mistake to think that government can do everything. Boeing was run by engineers for about half a century and that Boeing did enormously positive things. By and large. I used to study aviation history, and they're still around because actually for a long time, they didn't have a lot of military contracts.</p><p>They managed to survive on just commercial businesses, which almost nobody in aerospace did. And that's a positive thing. And as you were saying, help really build this city. Well, that's a whole other story. Well, Boeing bought Douglas or Douglas bought Boeing with Boeing's money or something. Yeah. Anyway, where I wanted to go with that was that I wish we could also talk about corporate culture changing because in what you see in Germany, for example, is the corporations, the corporate leaders don't fight particularly hard against their unions. They have a different, completely different, really set of social contracts there in which they still are very productive and yet they don't have the very hostile labor management relationships that we do.</p><p>And that's fundamentally to me about the internal culture of corporations and also what business leaders are taught in business schools and economics departments and so forth. So again, I don't want to convince you that the government is always right or that the government is the only thing that can save us, but there are a lot of changes that that would need to be made, one of which is corporate culture. Another of course is would be a better culture of public service and in the government because a lot of the government either stopped doing its regulatory job like FERC and the California Energy Crisis in 2000, decided, well, it just wasn't going to regulate. And that's a failure of the idea of service, public service too, as well as corporate penetration of companies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean that's a classic example of Enron out there propagandizing for markets and just rigging ...</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Unregulated markets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>... up one side and down the other, like farthest thing from a free market participant you can imagine.</p><p>The question was about what about employee-owned corporations.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>What I'd say is a little bit of a dodge of the question because I don't know a lot about the longevity of such companies or what kinds of goods or bads that they do. But what I would say is that again, our study was really of propaganda and we have this idea of private free markets and yet we live in a very mixed economy, as you say. There are not just shareholder owned companies, there are worker owned companies, there are nonprofit companies all over the place. I actually work for one. So that's not the free market mantra we're talking about, is not the whole story of America.</p><p>And sometimes we not just Naomi and I, but we all forget that there are other kinds of business and capitalism possible. And that's what I'd say, that there are other opportunities to build businesses that aren't shareholder valued returns to private shareholders.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Alright, thank you everyone. Thanks for coming. Thanks Eric for coming out. Thanks for the book.</p><p><strong>Erik Conway</strong></p><p>Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf. So that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-big-business-sold-america-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:106715301</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 23 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/106715301/d919076d476c8292105366db98ba3123.mp3" length="44166028" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3680</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/106715301/f34cac0c86e6e3d7ccb2064db1e6a53e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Clean energy's yearly report card]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Every year, the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.bcse.org/about">Business Council for Sustainable Energy</a> partners with <a target="_blank" href="https://about.bnef.com/">BloombergNEF</a> to produce the <a target="_blank" href="https://bcse.org/market-trends/top-trends/">Sustainable Energy in America Factbook</a>, a compilation of charts, graphs, and statistics about the US clean-energy industry and where it's headed.</p><p>The 2023 edition is out and it shows a record year for investment in clean energy and installations of renewables — alongside record demand for natural gas and record investment in gas infrastructure.</p><p>To chat about some of the numbers, I contacted Lisa Jacobson, president of BCSE. We talked about the momentum behind clean energy, the enormous investments uncorked by the Inflation Reduction Act, the supply-chain difficulties that plagued the industry this year, the backlash to ESG investing, and the surge in energy storage.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/clean-energys-yearly-report-card</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:107120339</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 23 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/107120339/46c83fa1691d19470e7b6e331f25e4e6.mp3" length="38913535" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3243</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/107120339/7f448eb53193126b856ee95c6167e0be.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Taking carbon out of the air and putting it into concrete]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Under a new partnership, Heirloom Carbon Technologies captures carbon dioxide from the air, then passes it to CarbonCure Technologies, which permanently sequesters it in concrete. In this episode, CEOs Shashank Samala of Heirloom and Robert Niven of CarbonCure give the lowdown on this pioneering carbon removal project.</em> </p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACnEMheD4sxQgQpr7ARBkCwa/volts23.03.01%28shashank.samala.robert.niven%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/taking-carbon-out-of-the-air-and-putting-it-into-concrete"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Last month saw the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2023/02/03/2601156/0/en/Heirloom-CarbonCure-Technologies-and-Central-Concrete-Achieve-First-Ever-Storage-of-Atmospheric-CO2-Captured-By-Direct-Air-Capture-In-Concrete.html">announcement</a> of a pioneering project: a company called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.heirloomcarbon.com/">Heirloom Carbon Technologies</a> will capture carbon dioxide from the ambient air and then hand it off to a company called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.carboncure.com/">CarbonCure Technologies</a>, which will inject the CO2 into concrete made by a company called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.centralconcrete.com/">Central Concrete</a>. It will mark the first time ever that carbon from the air is permanently sequestered in concrete.</p><p>Heirloom, with runs the US’s only operating direct air capture (DAC) facility, does not use the familiar capture technique that involves giant fans. Instead, it binds carbon to exposed rock and then cooks it out using electric kilns — and then binds more carbon to the rock, in a circular process. It claims the capture is cheaper and more efficient than previous methods.</p><p>CarbonCure injects the CO2 into a concrete mixer, where it mineralizes, becoming permanently captured even if the building using the concrete is demolished. In the process, it strengthens the mix, requiring less cement and cutting costs.</p><p>Direct air capture (DAC) has faced a great deal of skepticism, and concrete has the reputation as one of the worst carbon offenders, so this project — one of the first that can fairly be called <em>carbon removal</em> — could go a long way toward convincing investors that the former can help the latter change its ways, with a technology that is, at least some day, commercializable.</p><p>I talked with Heirloom CEO Shashank Samala and CarbonCure CEO Robert Niven about their respective processes, how they work together, and what the project says about the future of carbon removal.</p><p>All right, Shashank Samala, CEO of Heirloom Carbon Technologies, and Robert Niven, CEO of CarbonCure. Welcome to Volts. Thank you guys for coming.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Thanks very much for having us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is really a nifty project you guys are working on together. It's two separate pieces that normally I would probably do a pod on each. So we're going to have to, or at least I'm going to have to be less wordy than normal to squeeze it all in in 1 hour.  I want to talk about both halves of it. So let's start with Shashank. The first half of this process is Heirloom’s process of removing carbon from the air. Can you just explain quickly how that process works, what it looks like?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Sure. So, Heirloom, if you're not aware of who we are, our goal is to basically remove a billion tons of CO2 from the atmosphere annually by 2035. And our whole goal is to help reverse climate change. And the way we do that is through a process called limestone looping. Essentially what that means is we use a rock that is very abundant in nature, limestone, that has a natural propensity to pull carbon from the air. What we do is we basically give superpowers to limestone to pull a lot more carbon than it otherwise would naturally.</p><p>So how it works is we start with limestone, we put that into a kiln, we heat it up, and we pull out the CO2 that's already sequestered in the limestone, which makes the leftover lime highly thirsty for CO2. So we take advantage of that natural property by laying it out on trays. Think about baking trays. I lay them out on trays, and then we vertically stack those trays, very tall, and the air brings in the CO2. And the the lime sitting on the tray acts as a sponge, pulls up the CO2 molecules. From there, it becomes limestone again after it pulls it up. And we do that in about three days.</p><p>Naturally, it would take many months to pull carbon from the air. We did that in three days using our well treated algorithms and technology.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So in three days means the lime is full, absorbed as much CO2 as it can.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Exactly. We don't go all the way up to 100%. We go up to about 85%, which is sort of the optimal point, we realized. And then, yeah, it becomes limestone again, which is great, because that's what you started with. So we can recycle limestone by putting it back into the kiln, pull out the CO2 we captured, and then store it underground or store it into concrete, which you're doing with Carbon here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So one of the questions I had is you crush up this lime and spread it out on, well, calcium carbonate is limestone. Calcium carbonate ...</p><p>The chemical formula. Exactly right, the calcium carbonate.</p><p>And then after you bake it, take CO2 out. Then what is the chemical remainder?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Calcium oxide.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Calcium oxide. Right. So you have calcium oxide laid out on trays, becoming calcium carbonate. Then you take the calcium carbonate, cook it, get the CO2 out of it, and then do the whole thing over again.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Exactly. We just keep doing that. It's a super simple chemical process to pull carbon from the air.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You have this calcium oxide, and it's absorbing CO2 from the air. That just sounds like an ambient chemical process. How can it be accelerated? What does it even mean to accelerate that?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>So, technically, calcium oxide, we hydrate it, it becomes calcium hydroxide. Basically, there's a water molecule binding onto the calcium oxide. But essentially what we realized is that there's a specific parameter space where particle size, particle size distribution, thickness of the bed, humidity, temperature, airflow, there's all these different variables that dictate how fast calcium hydroxide likes to bind on to CO2 molecules. So it just so happens that in nature, there's a specific parameter space where this happens, and in nature, it doesn't see that parameter space as often. What we do is essentially make it see that all the time.</p><p>And how we specifically do that is really the IP. But we've collected millions and millions of data points over the last few years, doing lots of small experiments, adjusting thickness, adjusting particle size, surface area, all of these things. And we found that parameter space. And as the weather changes throughout the day, we have to change that parameter space. So essentially, we babysit these trays. If you look at, essentially, what this technology looks like is you have these tall stacks of trays, and in the middle, you have a little robot that goes up and down, and every few hours, it's babysitting these trays so that they can be carbonating as fast as they possibly could.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So is this all in a big climate controlled facility of some kind? I mean, presumably, you have to control the climate because you need specific conditions.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, fortunately, we were able to not have it be fully climate controlled. So if you actually if you come to Brisbane, our headquarters, where we have this pilot facility, this is actually sitting outside in ambient conditions. Yes. So this robot is actually creating a microclimate for each tray every few hours. So because what we're trying to do is try to symbiotically work with nature to pull carbon, right. And nature gives you humidity and temperature and airflow. Right. We don't want to put forced airflow, these large fans, pushing air through. We want to leverage wind. We want to leverage humidity.</p><p>And then when it doesn't get enough from nature, we complement it. We accelerate it with a few things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so when you have this calcium carbonate that's absorbed all the CO2 and you put it in the kiln, what does that kiln look like? How's it powered? And how hot does it have to get?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>So the kiln is actually super simple. It's like your toaster oven. Effectively, it's electric. It can be run by renewable energy. Essentially, it's a metal tube, and you have an electric heating element, and just like your toaster oven, that sort of surrounds it. And then you have insulation ceramic that keeps the heat inside. And then that's it. You essentially send calcium carbonate through that metal tube. It stays in there for the order of minutes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And how hot is the inside?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>It's about 850 to 900 degrees C.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, wow. Really hot.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>It's hot. Electric kilns can actually go way higher than that. That's one of the questions we get. It's like, oh, you're using electricity. Why are you not? You would think that you would use natural gas or some other form of combustion to get that temperature. It's like no, the electric arc furnaces for steel actually go up to, like, 14,000, 15,000 degrees C. So, yeah, we need about 850, 900 C. And then, you know, it's only there for seconds to minutes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really? So the CO2 comes out pretty easily.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. So there's only two things that come out. It's CO2 and calcium oxide. The CO2, it's pure. We capture that gas and compress it. And then the calcium oxide, we reuse it again.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what's the sort of energy balance here? It just strikes me that it must take a lot of you're saving energy by letting natural conditions do the air circulation and humidifying and all that, but you're using a lot of energy in the kiln. I'm just sort of curious how energy intensive this is per sort of captured ton of CO2. I guess there's not a big comparison base of other carbon capture technologies to compare it against, but well, the lens.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>We when we first started looking for which approach to use to pull carbon from the air, two things were important to us. One was use abundant, abundant minerals, abundant processes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Did you start with the idea of mineralization, or did you just come to this with just a blank sheet of paper and say, what's the best way to capture carbon?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>So I actually came in from the mineralization perspective. So I was looking at rocks. I was talking to lots of scientists working on using rocks to pull carbon because it's just like an abundant mineral to start. And if you want to pull gigatons of CO2. You need to have abundant minerals that are also trillions of tons of rock in the Earth's crust. And then we realized, actually, just using rocks won't get you the economics and the land. We wanted to use as little land as possible. We want to use as little water and energy as possible.</p><p>So we needed to engineer it a little bit to ensure that we use as little energy as possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In terms of materials, how much is lost in the full cycle of sort of you're mining the limestone to begin with, I guess, right? There are limestone mines around already. Limestones abundant. So you're mining the limestone to begin with. Once the limestone goes through, one of these whole cycles gets cooked, replaced, absorbed, absorbed again, cooked again. How much material is lost in those cycles?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>So, so far we found very small material losses. Essentially, that's one of our main metrics over the last couple of years as we were scaling it up to actually putting this outside. And one of the things we get, it's like, hey, if you put these rocks out there, doesn't the wind blow everything off? Essentially what happens is when this is hydrated, it actually turns into a crust. It's like a cake. So, yeah, we've seen very small material losses, and we will continue to tweak the entire process to reduce it even further.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But your materials are pretty cheap. They're not the big cost center.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>It's not. I mean, the material itself is like less than half a percent of the entire CapEx. Limestone is, You can buy it for $20 or $30 a ton. It's the second most mine material on the planet. You have way more than you need.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One additional question I wanted to ask about the process is you make a big deal about modularity. And this is a subject close to the heart of Volts listeners. We just did a pod a few weeks ago about sort of what kinds of technologies get on learning curves and what kinds don't and sort of what features of a technology lend it to rapid learning. And one of those features is of course modularity is it have easily reproducible bits. So just say a little bit about how you sort of had that in mind as you designed the process.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>It was absolutely number one for me. I come from a manufacturing background. Before this I had an electronics manufacturing company where we basically built lots of circuit boards in a factory. One of the things that humanity really understands and knows is how to build things in mass volumes with a very steep learning curve. Right? And we saw that with solar panels, lithiumion batteries, cars. Tell the team here it's like you're trying to build cars, not airports. Right? Airports are on site custom construction and the folks who are working on one airport are not going to the next airport.</p><p>The learnings don't don't translate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When people think about a big direct air capture facility. I think probably what comes to mind is something like an airport, a big bespoke one time thing, but you are trying to avoid that.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Yeah. So there's a difference between modularity and the plants, right? So the plants themselves need to have modules that are mass produceable or built in a factory so they can just be brought to the site, bolt them to the ground, ready to go, instead of having to build up from the ground up on the site. So essentially you're trying to minimize on site construction. So there's always like solar panels, right? They need to be bolted down to the ground. There is some concrete slabs involved and wiring and plumbing, et cetera. But you want to minimize that as much as possible and that's the fundamental idea behind Heirloom.</p><p>Like our tray is basically the smallest module and we make lots and lots of trays.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One doesn't think of trays as something that have a lot of room for innovation. Is there anything special about the trays?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>There's a few things that are custom and it so happens that the world, we needed such large trays that we went to the vendor that makes the largest trays in the world and they just would not make the trays that we needed. So we actually make custom trays. Yeah, they're large, so we make the world's largest trays. They use traditional manufacturing processes, extrusion, thermal, formula, et. They're not complicated and that's one of the principles behind Heirloom too. We don't want to come up with a new manufacturing process. The world has immense just lots and lots of experience building all sorts of things and we just want to leverage them and scale them to the max because that's how you get 2 billion tons of CO2 remove it as fast as possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the trays a module, the trays stack.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Are also and the next level of module.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is a module. And presumably the kilns are pretty standard issue. They don't have to be tweaked or whatever for individual.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Yeah, traditionally, if you go to a cement factory, kilns are actually these massive onsite built kilns. But we use an electric kiln technology that we're actually going to be releasing a few weeks here that is modular. So you essentially stack a couple of cylinders on top of each other.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting. So you did a little design work of kilns of your own?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Yeah, we did some here. We were working with a technology partner to do that too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This whole process, presumably, if you sat down to try to figure out what's the best process for capturing air carbon, you looked at the traditional. I think when most people think of direct air capture, if they think of it at all these days, the few people who think about it at all think about the big machines out in the desert with the fans sort of pulling air over a sorbent. Is your process more efficient than that in terms of sort of energy and material input versus CO2 output?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Yes. At the end of the day, what we're trying to do is use abundant materials that are incredibly cheap and use as little energy. That is thermodynamically possible. Really, all of our energy is in that back end where we are regenerating the sponge, which is common across all directory capture technologies. That's sort of second law of thermodynamics. You have to put in some energy to regenerate the sorbent. And for us, we want to essentially lower that regeneration energy as much as possible and then not use energy when we can leverage nature and other things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It strikes me then that the cost of energy is going to be one of your big top line items. How big is the cost of energy in your overall picture?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>At scale, it's more than half. And that's exactly where you want to be, right? Because laws of physics tells us that you have to put in energy to do gas separation, especially gas separation that is as hard as 400 parts per million. So if you design a system and you look at the long term economics, you want to make sure that, you know, at long term, almost all of all of that is energy, because that's something you cannot beat. Like energy creates your cost floor.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>If your CapEx ends up being a much bigger proportion, well, you haven't really designed or engineered it. Well, that's what I tell the team. It's like you want your cost floor to determine by physics and not engineering. So that's why we use very simple trays. We're just putting a bunch of rocks and a bunch of trays and using a metal tube, on the other hand, and putting some insulation around it. So you want to keep that as low as possible so that your your $100 a ton. That's really our cost target. You've probably heard of the cost target.</p><p>$100 per ton. That's really the cost point where it's affordable for humanity to do this at a billion ton scale and actually make a meaningful impact.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And of course, it's like renewable electricity is galloping down the aforementioned cost curve. So insofar as you can hit your ride to it, it's going to tear you down the cost curve too.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. The nice thing about renewable energy for us is you can pull carbon from the air anywhere, right? It can be in the Gulf Coast. It can be New Zealand, it can be South Africa, India, Indonesia. Wherever you go, the concentration of CO2 in the air is exactly the same. And that's what our technology works with. So we will go to places where renewable energy supply is high, but the demand is low, so we don't take away the supply that could have been used for food production or putting our buildings.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So ideally then, these facilities would be colocated with some big renewable energy just to minimize ...</p><p>Exactly.</p><p>Transmission costs and all that. Two final questions. One is, you mentioned the $100 cost per ton target. Can you give us a sense of where you are on the road to that? Is there a number?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Yeah, so we're in the sort of high hundreds of dollars per ton right now and essentially we are at the demonstration scale, right? We are building this by hand, engineers are building them. We built a couple of Formula One cars effectively, and we need to get to a stage where we can mass produce Toyotas off of the factory line. What is Formula One cars cost these days? Like millions of dollars versus $20,000 Toyota. So at the end of the day, the material inputs are so cheap, limestone and trays and metal tubes, that at scale, we should be able to hit that cost.</p><p>And for us, it's all about how do you get there as fast as possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And if you're chosen super cheap material and renewable energy, which is super cheap, and if those are your only two inputs, logic says you're going to get cheap eventually as you approach the cost of the materials. So the final question is this. At the end of this process, you have CO2, which you can do anything with. Are you deliberately staying out of the business of doing something with it? I mean, is the model always to just hand off the CO2 to someone else who's going to do something with it?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's a lot of things you can do with CO2, but for us, there's only two things you can do so far. One we are looking at is concrete, working with folks like CarbonCure and putting it underground. And both are permanent. And an incredibly important principle is permanence because CO2 stays in the air for 1000 years. So you don't want to pull carbon from the air only for that gas to go back in the air ten years later, 100 years later, we're just pushing the buck into the future. So for us, it's incredibly important that we permanently sequester it into something so it doesn't come back out.</p><p>And the only two things we've found so far with that type of over 1000 year durability is concrete, where essentially you're binding CO2 into a rock, it mineralizes and then putting it underground. And that is something that humanity has over five decades of experience putting CO2 underground. And it's permanent and we know it's safe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But are you planning at all to get into the permanent storage business? Or is the idea that you produce the carbon and some other entity is running the storage facility, how does that work?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Some other entity is running the storage facility. We're going to be focused on really building an incredibly efficient, cost-effective capture system. And we will work with a whole set of partners to put a billion tons of CO2 stored somewhere permanently.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I've heard you say this in other interviews, too. But just to be clear, the vast bulk of it, especially once we get scaling up towards whatever, billions and billions of tons, the vast bulk of that is going to be stored in underground caverns. The amount that can be used in a way that permanently sequesters it is a relatively small fraction of the total amount that's going to be produced.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, as much as possible, every ton of concrete we can put CO2 into, we will do that. That is our first priority. Right? Because essentially you're creating a stronger building material. It's a value added product and it's permanent. You're checking all the boxes and that's better than putting the waste underground. So every ton of concrete, we can do that. We will absolutely want to do that. And when we can't, we will put that underground. And most likely at a gigaton scale, most of that will likely be underground, but it's hard to predict the future, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p>Rob, let's talk to you then, because here is where we get to the part of the relay race where Shashank hands you the baton, or rather hands you a bunch of tanks of CO2. So describe for us then the CarbonCure process, which starts with a source of CO2. You get the CO2 from Heirloom and then what?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Sure, I'd be happy to jump into that just to help the audience understand, is we're both carbon removal companies, but coming at it from both ends of the process.</p><p>Shashank on the capture ourselves on the relay race, receiving that CO2 and doing something with it. CarbonCure has been in business for about ten years. We're a Canadian company and we have about 700 plus customers worldwide that every day are using CO2 to mineralize it in concrete. To make a better, stronger concrete that provides some cost efficiencies by cement efficiency. By making stronger concrete, you need less cement which provides that economic incentive.</p><p>And low carbon concrete is in great demand in the market, not only private sector, but we're seeing a lot of policy incentives as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're in the business, you're sequestering carbon, you're doing it today, you're getting CO2 from someone and sequestering it in concrete. Do you have any what's the current scale so we can get our heads around kind of what's involved there?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>We have everything connected through the cloud and you can actually pull up our our home page and you can see the numbers go up every second about how many metric tons and it's just about 250,000 metric tons to date. So the key difference here is that most of our CO2 to date is received from what's called post-industrial sources. So these are our large emitters and rather than diverting those emissions into the atmosphere, they're capturing it, compressing it. And companies that are industrial gas companies are taking that CO2 and selling it to a multitude of different industries.</p><p>And we're a relatively new user of that CO2.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The big one is beverages.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Food and beverage is a big one. Yes, food and beverage. Also some CO2 is used in things like enhanced oil recovery which some other DAC companies are pursuing. So lots of different ways that you can use CO2. But the main point is there's a large existing commodity market for CO2. The key thing here and what's really special about our work with Heirloom is that this is direct air capture source of CO2, right? And by getting CO2 from the air it allows you to actually reverse the effects of climate change and pull down the parts per million of CO2 in the air rather than limiting and reducing the rate of emissions that go into the air, so there is a distinction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Additionality is the term of art here. This is 100% additional CO2.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Well, I would still say that it's also additional if you're using postindustrial CO2. The key difference here is like this actually enables you to get into removal, a pure removal kind of category.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>For ourselves, we've always seen this as we'll develop huge and a multitude thousands of storage centers, which is also called a concrete plant to most people. We'll run ahead as fast as we can and develop all of this demand for CO2. And then as DAC gets online is that we'll have the optionality to be able to use that CO2 when it's available.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Will there be degrees of greenness of concrete depending on the source of CO2? Have you thought about that? Sort of like different levels of concrete?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>I think so. We sell carbon credits as part of our business model and we definitely hear from our credit buyers is that they're willing to pay more if it's using atmospheric sources of CO2.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Such as DAC or biogenic source or whatever it is, whatever can get CO2 out of the air. There is a demand for that. The other group that really matters are the people that purchase the concrete. So these would be architects, engineers, building owners. They're also really excited and probably not as sophisticated on the CO2 sourcing question, but I wouldn't be surprised if that starts to become higher in their consideration. The other point that was brought up by Shashak earlier was permanence. That is very, very important for everybody is we don't want to be going through all of this trouble to put away CO2 for it to just bubble out again in 30 days, like what's the point? So that's very important.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So when you say you inject CO2 into the concrete process, spell out a little bit what that means, what that looks like for people who are not that familiar.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Most people, if they're familiar with CarbonCure are aware of our readymix technology. But CarbonCurever the last three years has expanded by creating technologies that use CO2 in the concrete value chain in different ways. But let's start off with the ready mix technology. So whenever concrete, if anyone's visited a concrete plant, there's about 125,000 of these locations worldwide, about 7000 of them in the US. They're basically all the same. They are mixing sites that take aggregates, rocks, cement, water and a few performance enhancing chemicals to mix those all up in a huge mixer. And then they pour that into a concrete truck, which you are all aware of and seen driving around the road.</p><p>And then that's delivered to the construction site so that if we go back and look at that mixer is all those ingredients are being added. And just like Shashank is like if we're really going to meet scale is we want to have a modular system that in our case retrofits these existing concrete plants very, very cheaply and very very quickly without disrupting their production. In fact, it takes us a day, we don't charge any CapEx and the system starts to use that is enabled to start using that CO2 and becomes a carbon removal factory. It starts mineralizing CO2 the next day and it has all these value added benefits without creating a price premium on the product.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting. So this is not some bespoke process that you have to build a concrete plant around. You're literally just going to an existing concrete plant, slapping something on that takes a day to add and then from the concrete plant owner's perspective, that's it. Nothing else changes. They don't have to do anything else operationally to accommodate this at all.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>We automate everything. That's the key. And it's the same design principles that Shashank has brought into his company. Of course, he's done it fully, separately is you want to make this as simple as possible to scale because the concrete industry just does not have the discretionary budget to start. Spending a lot of risk capital in these kinds of solutions. So we've done all that for them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And they're very small C conservative too, for obvious reasons.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Perhaps it comes in all different flavors of concrete producers, but they all want to work on this, but they have a lot of limitations. So what we've tried to do is make it as simple as possible, but also do it in a way that they receive the most rewards and that can be in the form of cost efficiencies and production, being able to tap into this rapidly growing demand in the market for low, so they can sell more. We always recommend to keep the price at parity and also participate in carbon markets. So we create the incentive structure and make it really simple to adopt and quick so that producers can start to mineralize CO2 as quick as possible.</p><p>So back to your question how the process looks like is we're actually adding CO2 into the mixer and please come to our website as well. We actually have footage and video of what's happening and then we also have some animation on what's happening at the chemical level. But essentially by adding CO2, it's a very similar type of reaction and thermodynamics as Heirloom. And that that CO2 is very quick to react in seconds with the concrete and it reforms a mineral, a calcium carbonate, if we go back to that again, but in a specific size called it's a nanomaterial, which provides all these performance benefits for concrete as it develops its strength, which then leads to some commercial benefits.</p><p>And then we also use CO2 to treat the main wastewater from the plant and that's called our reclaimed water technology. So it's a second way that we can mineralize a lot more CO2 on the concrete plant, but at a different site of the concrete plant where all their wastewater is being collected is we can actually treat that water to have it upcycled so it can be reused instead of version cement and water. And then finally we can make CO2 into aggregates, but all three of those can be bundled together to be able to drive down the carbon footprint of concrete.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this was my question when I was looking at your website. If I'm a concrete plant owner, can I get all of those versions? Like, can I get CO2 in my wastewater and CO2 in my mixer and CO2 in my aggregate? And are they additive? Like, will that result in three times the carbon removal?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Yeah. And that's how we're building this business, is to create multiple ways to mineralize CO2 in the concrete value chain and then surround that by doing all the enabling work. So we make it a very easy decision for concrete producers to do that. I will caveat that we don't have the aggregate technology commercialized, but the other two we do. In fact, we had the first pilot with Heirloom that was at the Central Concrete Facility, which is a division of Vulcan Materials in San Jose, California. That plant is the first in the United States to have the reclaimed water and the ready mixed technology.</p><p>So they're one of now two plants in the US. That are able to provide that combo, which is really exciting,</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting and do the strengthening benefits you're talking about, do you get double those too? When you do both the stages of adding carbon.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>The ready mix technology gives you that strength benefit and then on the reclaimed water, jury is still out on redefining the strength benefit. But what it definitely does is it allows you it's a substitution effect, is that you're actually able to recover the cement in that wastewater and then use that instead of virgin cement. So at the end of the day, it's the same effect using less virgin cement to make concrete.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>But you're achieving that by mineralization. What's cool about the reclaimed water technology is we actually won the Carbon Xprize for this technology, which was defined as the world's most scalable CO2 utilization technology.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. What happens to the water today? Is it just thrown out or what happens to the reclaimed water?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Most of it just gets thrown out today. The traditional way of doing that is it would go into large settling ponds, they would scoop out the settled material, which by the way, is valuable cement and chemistry. That producer paid a lot of money for. And there was a lot of CO2 release to make that that would often just get landfilled and then the water would get sometimes treated for PH and then discharged. So we're able to turn all that process and eliminate it by reusing it in a circular manufacturing type of design.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting, a question about the strength benefits, are the strength, by which we just mean the cement is a little stronger and so you have to use a little bit less cement in the concrete. So your savings that way, are those savings in terms of strength enough to pay for the thing? Or do you have to value the sequestration on some level to make this pencil out?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>We are able to provide the low carbon concrete to the market in combination through our carbon credit sales and through these manufacturing efficiencies of using less cement, we're able to provide that concrete at no price premium by using a blend of both contributions. And that's very important. Like a year ago, if you go onto your podcast catalog, Rebecca Dell was on the show talking about how green premium is really, really important. We need to find ways to eliminate that to unlock adoption in building materials. And green premium is really anything can inhibit mass adoption. That's what's really important is that we don't apply that green premium.</p><p>So that the market whether that be the government which is the largest buyer and we're seeing a lot of buy clean type legislation or private sector which have a lot of sustainability targets from corporate actors are able then to make these kinds of procurement decisions without compromising on price and certainly not compromising on quality, and working with the same suppliers that they've worked with for years prior.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Maybe this is a naive question, but if I'm a concrete manufacturer and I can have this done and installed in a day, it's not going to affect my operations. It's going to save me a little money on reducing cement, it's going to make me a little money on selling carbon credits. And otherwise I'm selling a more or less identical product at a more or less identical price. Why wouldn't I do that? What would stop someone from doing this?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Yeah, I would say just education. But we're already, like I would say I don't know for sure, but probably the fastest growing technology in the concrete sector. Concrete sector is not known to be rapidly adopting new technologies, but I would say we are growing at a very rapid rate. And certainly there are different kinds of concrete producers which normally adopt technology faster than other types of producers profiles. And we're seeing that happen. And the rate of adoption is happening far faster when we see those market signals like the procurement policies or even requiring environmental product declarations in the procurement process.</p><p>So those kinds of things really accelerate this transition to the market. There's a reason why so much innovation is happening in San Francisco in the concrete sector, is because there's a lot of companies that operate there that are really walking the talk. And the concrete industry is enabled, empowered to bring their best forward. But if concrete producers are in markets where they're never hearing someone talk about decarbonisation, yeah, they have 20 other things that, that they can prioritize, that they need to work on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? So you need some valuation of the carbon benefits to kind of push this up to the priority list.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>And it doesn't have to be a premium, right. When you say valuation, it just needs to be identified. Like an example would be of Microsoft. When they're building, they're asking all of their suppliers to say, I want to reduce our carbon target by X. And then they go around and they say, what can you do for me? What can you do for me? What can you do for me? When the concrete producer hears that loud and clear, and they may win that bid over a competitor if they have some ideas and they can bring something to the table.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to get a sense of scale before we move on from the process. Sort of if I'm producing concrete and I'm using your process to inject CO2, say I do both of the available options and I get CO2 injected into my wastewater and I get CO2 injected into my mixer, is the end product of that carbon negative or how close is it to carbon negative? Give a sense of scale, like how much of the carbon in the process is being offset by this?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's one piece of the pie. To get to carbon negative or neutral concrete is we're going to need some substantial changes on the cement side as well. And there are some fellow companies within our investors portfolio. A great example would be like a Brimstone who are working on the cement side. We're working with whatever cement is coming down the line and we're adding if you sort of combine the reclaimed water and ready mix, you're getting another 10% to 15%. But that's 10% to 15% off of a global commodity with a huge volume and we can do it today with very little CapEx and it's permanent.</p><p>So if you think about a marginal abatement cost curve, it's like this is the furthest left on that curve. This is the thing that is easy to implement at scale. It has a significant percentage reduction, but off of a huge number, the volume of concrete is enormous. There's about 40 billion tons of concrete produced or 4.2 billion tons of cement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what's the number? I think it's 8% of global emissions, something like that.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>We use the word the number 7% and most of that's cement. And the reason it's so big is because so much concrete is being used, it's second only to drinking water in production. Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you can take 10% to 15% of the CO2 basically out of the final product, but more than that is going to require deeper changes in the process.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>And that doesn't include our aggregate technology. So that will layer in a lot more. But we need to work together all the way along the value chain. The traditional cement sector are doing things like they're using supplementary cementitious materials instead of cement and that means using things like fly ash and slag. The problem is those materials are declining in availability, they're doing things like fuel switching, so using waste materials, energy efficiency, all those traditional things should be done. But then there's also some real deep tech stuff going on right now about fundamentally changing the cement process or chemistry.</p><p>But that's going to take a lot of money and we still have a lot of time ahead of us. So we need to get going today on those immediately deployable solutions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so you've got a solution here you can just slap on existing concrete, plant boom, you get your ten to 15, maybe a little bit more CO2 out.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>And we've shown that this is not only applicable in the United States, but we're operating in many many emerging markets and really only about 2% of cement is being produced in the US. It's the emerging markets. That's where we really impact climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And that's where it's growing.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>That's where people is in concrete they haven't built out. There's a lot of population growth and we're already going into those markets now because we know that it takes a bit of incubation time and in some markets we're seeing that already entering into that scaling phase.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you need CO2 as an input to your process. Is there any supply issue? CO2 easy to get and I'm also curious how much you pay for Heirlooms CO2 versus more traditionally acquired CO2? Is there a big price differential?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>So the first part of your question is, is there supply chain issues? Yes. Our industry, the concrete industry has been massively impacted over the last twelve months by cost and supply of cement and in our case cost and supply of CO2. Really? Believe it or not you can't buy CO2 in certain markets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>a shortage of CO2.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>And the price is skyrocketing because of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No kidding.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>It's a really perverse situation. So we need a lot more air loops and we need them to get them into market faster to start to diversify the supply of CO2 because some of the traditional emitters that you would have been collecting that CO2 are now changing their process so that that CO2 isn't becoming available anymore. Ethanol is the largest supplier of CO2 in the industrial gas market in the United States. So today if the price varies so much it's largely dependent on transportation. Very commonly we're paying well over $500 a ton for CO2. We haven't gotten to that stage with Heirloom where they have the volume, the capacity to have those discussions yet but we really encourage them to move along as fast as they can to get to that billion ton target because that gives us a lot more CO2 that we can work with.</p><p>So we're exploring all different options for CO2 supply because just from a supply constraint or supply chain disruptions we're very encouraged to solve for that problem now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's just something that sort of kind of confuses me. And maybe you both can take a swing at this answer, but I'm seeing a process here at your demonstration plant where we're digging a limestone up, doing a bunch of stuff that strips the CO2 out of it, and then injecting the CO2 back into the concrete process, where it then becomes limestone again. Why not just dig up the limestone and put it directly in the concrete? It seems like a lot of physical processes to sort of end up where you started. Maybe just sort of help me understand that kind of how is this not kind of running in place in sort of energetic and CO2 terms?</p><p>I'm sorry if that was a very vague question.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>What we are trying to do is pull CO2 that is already in the air so you need a sponge to pull up that carbon and we find that calcium oxide which is derivative of calcium carbonate is highly alkaline. It's highly thirsty for that CO2 and then that's how you create the limestone and then you're essentially looping the limestone through the cycle.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The limestone you're finding that you're mining has already absorbed CO2, right? That's what it's been doing. It's what it's been doing. So in a sense, it's already absorbed it. Why not just put it directly into the concrete, do you know what I mean?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Yeah, maybe my perspective solves that on that bit better. The way that I think about Heirloom is if you take a sponge and you put it into your kitchen sink and then you pick up collects water and then you squeeze it out, then you put it back in and squeeze it out. So it just happens to be calcium. But for our process, there may be some listeners who are from civil engineering and understand concrete a bit deeper, and they say, well, concrete already carbonates, right? So there is a natural process that's already happening, but that's limited to the exterior skin of concrete and it's not value added, it doesn't provide those performance benefits.</p><p>So some way of looking at that is like, yeah, if you left concrete exposed to the air for 1000 years, which not too many buildings are around for a thousand years, is you might get that full carbonation extent. But even if you did that, you wouldn't get all the benefits, the performance enhancing benefits that come from carbonating actively in a certain way that create this nanomaterials, which provides the cement savings. And it's also done in a very short time frame within seconds. And so that's a key difference here is the time. And the other thing is, if you let carbonation happen passively, that's called weathering carbonation is it actually has the opposite effects on performance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Yeah, it'll actually cause the PH to drop and then it will make the steel corrode, which makes said structure made with that concrete to have durability issues and may fail. So engineers like myself are trained to limit carbonation because you don't want that carbonation layer to get to the steel, because then that causes that concrete to fail. So you take many, many steps to stop that from happening. The way that we're doing it is different in that we're actually deliberately carbonating to a certain extent. So you get all these performance enhancing benefits and that's a really important nuance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One question is this sort of demonstration project of Heirloom on the one side, CarbonCure on the other side, pulling CO2 out of the air, putting it in concrete. I obviously see the benefits in terms of like educating the public, making carbon capture and sequestration more real and tangible to people, showing investors that things are happening here, all these effects. But looking down the roadways is the sort of direct capture to concrete pipeline. Is that going to be a real business? Is that going to scale up? Or is this mostly just for demonstration purposes?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>If they can provide CO2 for less than $500, we've already shown it scalable. Right. So for us, that's the marker. And we're more than happy to work with Shashank and Heirloom because if they can provide us cheaper CO2 on a reliable supply and the market would prefer atmospheric CO2, I'll do that all day, every day. But we're already showing today that using CO2 and concrete is immediately scalable and used in emerging markets, developed economies, what have you.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Yeah, the awesome thing about concrete is it's the most abundant commodity, the industrial commodity that we produce. It's like 12 billion tons of concrete that we make. So that's the awesome thing, right? That's why this demonstration, I think, is so powerful. This is not just a small test, that it is a signal for what's to come. And I tell Rob every time I see him, tell me what is the price where we can put CO2 in every ton of concrete that they're at and plants that they're not yet at? Right. To reduce that cost per ton on the concrete plant side, where it is just economical, no brainer for a concrete plan to add Heirloom CO2 into the CarbonCure process.</p><p>So, yeah, that's the thing that's exciting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Has anyone done the math on the total sequestration potential of concrete globally? I mean, do we have a sense of scale here? The limits?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Well, the theoretical limit is half the weight of cement could be carbonated.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, wow.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>But I'm not saying you want to do that. I'm saying, theoretically, that Stoichiometry says that if there's 4.2 billion tons of cement, you could conceivably mineralize 2.1 billion tons. And that doesn't include all the aggregate. So you put all the aggregate on on top of that. And aggregate is the vast majority, about 85% 90% of the of the mass of of concrete. So you could really get to certainly hundreds of millions low billion tons of CO2 mineralization in the concrete value chain through carbonating, directly through concrete, like what we're doing, or by using CO2 to make aggregates.</p><p>There's a few companies that are doing that as well. So it does become sizable. But I really want to emphasize it's, the value added nature and the immediate nature of this, like the time value of carbon is important in climate change discussions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>A lot of solutions are targeting to come online and start scaling in 2030-something. This is happening now, right? And we need to do as much that we can, especially if there's very little CapEx requirement and no price premium.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I've kept you long enough, I guess I'd ask the same question to each of you to conclude it's the nature of carbon removal that it's not producing a product that is valuable enough in and of itself to pay for itself. There's going to have to be a market created for removed CO2. We're going to have to sort of generate a market around this if it's going to pay for itself. So I guess I just asked both of you, by way of concluding shashank you first, what sorts of policies can help you or would most directly help you scale up?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>So two types of policies. One is a compliance market that essentially requires corporations to effectively price carbon as an externality and have a cap for carbon emitted so that carbon that is not abated or reduced needs to be offset and removed. And there's a price for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is something a few companies are doing kind of voluntarily, right? Like the stripe constellation of companies are basically sort of modeling what that would look like. But that's got to be made law at some point, right? You're not going to get enough voluntary companies to ...</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>No, according to APCC. We need to be removing five to 10 billion tons of carbon from the air by 2050. And if you want to see that type of scale, if you want to see that type of it's a trillion dollar market at $100 a ton. That's a trillion dollars of revenue every year that we need to get to. So it's amazing and we're so fortunate to work with folks like Frontier Stripe, Shopify, Microsoft, who are all early buyers of this technology, but we need thousands more and policy and compliance markets is what gets us there.</p><p>The second type of policy is what 45Q is doing today. You may have heard of it. It's a tax credit. It's a direct pay for direct recapture that is stored permanently. So, you know, we're fortunate and, and, you know, really we, we appreciate everyone who, who worked on the Inflation Reduction Act, having that passed last year, that is such an important element. It's at $180 per ton subsidy. It's it's stackable on top of what customers pay us that helps us bring down the cost of, of carbon removal so it is affordable to everyone. So, you know, that is something that, you know, not just the US.</p><p>But, you know, every other count ry, europe and Asia should adopt something similar. So compliance markets and subsidies like 45Q really help us come down the cost curve.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there a country doing more than the US for this or they are their models to look to where they're going more sort of gangbusters on on DAC?</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Canada is actually pretty close. I don't think they've passed this yet, but there's a pretty large CapEx, I think it's called the Production Tax Credit that might be even more compelling than 45Q depending on how that's written. So, yeah, super fortunate that US and Canada, that is the type of competitive battle we want, right? This sort of geopolitical competition to see which country can help us decarbonize the planet. And in the past it was some countries in Europe that were sort of good hearted and have these policies like the subsidy for solar in the early 2000s.</p><p>But now you're seeing countries compete against each other to bring clean tech and climate tech into their country. So I think it's warring from a good hearted nature to a competition, which is exactly what the planet wants. So that's what we should all be up to, optimistic and excited about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And how about you, Rob? What's your policy wish list? What's on top?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>I would echo what Shashank said, certainly. And about we need many more credit buyers of some of the same names, like the Shopifys and Stripes. That really the Microsoft's and Patches that drove the world of demand for these credits. 45Q, for sure. For us, though, the most important policy are these low carbon, concrete, or buy-clean type procurement policies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>New Jersey just passed landmark policy just a couple of weeks ago. It was based upon similar work done in New York and Hawaii and California. We saw a lot of it in the Federal Infrastructure Act. That's what really drives us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are there federal procurement buy-clean elements in the Infrastructure Act?</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>Yes. If I recall, it's about $4 billion in incremental spend on low carbon material purchases. That is very important for our business, and that's what will drive the storage piece within concrete especially. And then that in turn will drive the DAC side or the carbon capture side. So that was really important. And they're designed in a way that also requires a strong reporting element using LCA documents like environmental product declarations, and you need those to compare the different options in a third party verified way. So that procurement policy is very important based upon the kind of models like we're seeing in New Jersey with its LECCLA Bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Well, thank you guys for coming on and walking us through. It's really interesting. I think if nothing else takes a very abstract discussion, what can often be a very abstract discussion about carbon and carbon removal and all this and just makes it very tangible. One of the things I love about this is that on both sides, this is not PhD chemistry or whatever. It's trays of rocks and squirting CO2 into a mixer. I love the there's a ruggedness, I guess, to simple processes that I really like. So it's been really fun to talk through.</p><p><strong>Robert Niven</strong></p><p>You're welcome. Although I will say we have a lot of PhDs working on our team as well, so I don't want to diminish the great work that they're doing to make it look this simple. You need to work extra hard.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. There's just a lot of engineering and science that goes into making things simple and scalable. So, yeah, you have lots of PhDs and great engineers on the team.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, Shashank Samala and Rob Niven, thank you so much for coming on and talking us through. This is super fascinating.</p><p><strong>Shashank Samala</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/taking-carbon-out-of-the-air-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:103422623</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 07 Mar 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/103422623/7c2037dcba9a6c0d52e27ffe02ffe407.mp3" length="43204618" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3600</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/103422623/67486f506b85c2b96fb7b93be77ea730.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[How to think about solar radiation management]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Even if greenhouse gas emissions halted entirely right now, we would continue to feel climate change effects for decades due to existing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere — and warming could accelerate, as we reduce the aerosol pollution that happens to be acting as a partial shield. In this episode, Kelly Wanser of nonprofit SilverLining makes the pitch for solar radiation management, the practice of adding our own shielding particles to the atmosphere to buy us some time while we step up our greenhouse gas reductions.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADsya9lIVcBAwegVqWWq0YQa/volts23.02.24%28kelly.wanser%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/how-to-think-about-solar-radiation-management"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the more uncomfortable truths about climate change is that temperatures are going to rise for the next 30 to 40 years no matter what we do, just based on carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere and the reduction of aerosol pollutants that are now shielding us from some of the worst of it. That's going to bring about potentially devastating changes that we do not yet well understand and are not prepared for.</p><p>How can that short-term risk be mitigated? One proposal is to add particles to the atmosphere that would do on purpose what our aerosol pollution has been doing by accident: shield us from some of the rising heat. No one credible who advocates for solar radiation management (SRM) believes that it is a substitute for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Instead, it would be a way to buy a little more time to reach zero carbon.</p><p>My guest today, Kelly Wanser, is the head of a non-profit organization called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.silverlining.ngo/">SilverLining</a> that advocates for research and policy around near-term climate risks and direct climate interventions like SRM that can address them.</p><p>I've long been curious about — and wary of — solar radiation management, so I was eager to talk to Wanser about the case for SRM, what we know and don't know about it, and what we need to research.</p><p>Okay then. Kelly Wanser of SilverLining, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Thank you very much, David. I am a fan and it's a pleasure to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Well, I have wanted to do a pod on this subject forever. I'm going to try to be focused, but I sort of have questions that are all over the place, so let's just jump right in. The way I'm approaching this is, I think, to average people off the street, and maybe I even include myself in this. The idea of reaching up into the atmosphere and fiddling with it directly, thinking that we can dial in the temperature we want, strikes me as crazy. And I think that's probably a lot of people's intuitive response. Obviously, you have thought your way past that, going so far as to found an organization designed to advocate for this stuff.</p><p>So maybe just tell us a little, to begin with, your personal background and how you came to advocacy for geoengineering, which is not a super crowded field.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>I'll say first that you're actually not in the business of advocacy for geoengineering and it will give you some context for how I came to be doing what I do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sure.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Really it was about — I was working in the technology sector in an area called IT infrastructure, and that's the sort of plumbing of data in the Internet and was looking at problems like how you keep networks operating. And I started to read about climate change, and I was very curious about the symptoms that we were starting to see in the climate system and where the risk really was. And I started to get to know various senior climate scientists in the Bay Area and other places, and I asked them the question like you might ask, how would you characterize the risk of runaway climate change in our lifetime? And this is maybe twelve years ago.</p><p>And they said, "Well, it's in the single digits, but not the low single digits."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not super comforting.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, my original degree was economics, so I thought, well, if you had those odds of winning the lottery, you'd be out buying tickets. If you had those odds of cancer, you'd be getting treatment. So that seemed like a really high risk to be exposed to. And then they told me about another feature of what was happening in that carbon dioxide stays in the atmosphere for a long time, keeping things warm. Comes out very slowly. So even if you stop emissions completely and there are other dynamics going on, the system will continue to warm for a while.</p><p>And so you've got another few decades of warming. So wherever you are and whatever you see, you've got some additional warming that's going to happen, which means that whatever risk point you're at, you reach a higher risk point over that period of time. And so I became very interested in that problem, because there's a mismatch between the increased risk profile of really serious and catastrophic climate events and impacts and the kinds of responses that we had to reduce the risk. So really my organization is focused on what we call "near-term climate risk," which is the 30 to 40 year time horizon where the things we need to do to ultimately fix the problem, all the ways we reduce greenhouse gases in the system, they don't work in that time horizon to meaningfully reduce the risk.</p><p>And so that's how we find ourselves here. Because getting back to your original comment, in the absence of the kind of risk situation that we're in, these ideas would be really extreme and you wouldn't consider them. So we like to use the sort of metaphor of medicine because it has many similarities to medical treatments. And medical treatments require a lot of research and they're as useful as the context of where your condition is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So maybe the way to phrase this is you looked around, you saw climate change, you saw that our ways of mitigating climate change are sort of slow, if you will, slow acting and long term, which leaves this short-term risk gap.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there's going to be warming over the next 30 to 40 years, regardless almost of what we do. And you're focused on how to mitigate those risks.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Yeah. So related to that, and again, you can go to the United Nations Climate Reports, and you can see what they think is happening and going to happen they have these charts that show these curves. And the curves go up all the pathways, all the different scenarios for climate change going up through 2050, some of them bend back down because we've done a good job. But in their reports where they describe that they're projecting what's happening to people and different parts of the world over those 30 years. And right now they've come out and said, well, under their projections, as many as 1 billion people get displaced.</p><p>And you can go to websites that have simulations of what's going on and you can see places that get overwhelmed by water, that get overwhelmed by heat. And so you've got a lot of suffering, a lot of dramatic impact that's baked in. And so what we are saying is we need to do really rapid research to find out if we can do better than that. Because in the current projections, it's bad for everyone and it's terrible for quite a few people.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, two things spring to mind confronted with that situation. One is a lot of people looking at that would say, "Well, we need to go gangbusters on adaptation." Let's figure out how to make that suffering less by adapting to some of it. And the other thing that jumps to mind is methane, which, as Volts listeners know, is a greenhouse gas, but acts on a much shorter time horizon than CO2. And so I think that the thought in some quarters is if you could rapidly reduce methane, you could have a much more rapid effect on the climate than in reducing CO2.</p><p>Why not either of those two routes?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>So, also those two routes. I think one of the things that struck me about coming into the climate space was it wasn't very well-equipped to think in terms of portfolios. So if you look at the risk profile, it's sort of like we're having these debates about should it be wind and solar, or nuclear? Should it be emissions reductions or these things? But if you look at the risk and uncertainty involved, there's a lot of uncertainty involved in all the different ways of responding to climate change. And there's a huge amount of risk, potentially existential risk.</p><p>And so from a portfolio perspective, methane reduction is one of my absolute favorites. And there are some great things happening in that field. Adaptation is a harder problem, and it was made harder because people didn't want it in the portfolio 20 years ago. And they didn't want people to think it was adoptable. So they didn't want people looking at it. Well, it turns out when you look at it, you find out it's not easily adoptable, really. You can see, like, look at Pakistan. These big extreme events happen. They're pretty overwhelming. And even in the US, we're arguably one of the best equipped places in the world to manage these things, and Austin, Texas, had a third of the city with no power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we managed to bungle it regularly, even with all our money.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>But really what it was about is saying, okay, we should have a rich portfolio here. If you thought of this as like, shares, or you thought of this as insurance policies, we'd have a portfolio of things so that when you brought that portfolio together and those things that are different profiles and there are different levels of uncertainty, we have a lot of coverage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>And the problem is that this part of the portfolio, if you needed to arrest climate change quickly, if you really needed to get in there and say, oh, the ice sheet is about to go. The wet bulb effects in India are happening and we can't take it. And you needed something that operated in a sub-decade time horizon, then that's the key part of the portfolio that's empty. And we don't want to do those things. But from a risk management point of view, in terms of what's at stake, even evaluating whether we have them, that's something on deck that we really should be doing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And one more thing about the risk question, the short-term risk question, and I feel like maybe more climate types have grown cognizant of this recently, but it's really an under-discussed aspect of all this, is the aerosol effect. So maybe just tell us what it is and why that adds to these worries about short-term risk.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>That is a great question, because as I was digging into this and finding out the things I'm telling you, this came up effectively. There are forces in the atmosphere that trap heat and help keep us in this sort of temperate zone that we're in. And there are forces in the atmosphere that reflect energy away. And so the particles and clouds in the atmosphere, they're reflecting sunlight away from Earth, which is part of what keeps us in this Goldilocks zone. When you look at the Earth from space and you see that shiny blue dot, that's what that is.</p><p>And these particles that come into the atmosphere, they create clouds, they live in the atmosphere. They're part of that whole system, and they come from nature, but they also live in pollution. And the particulates in pollution that come from coal plants, that come from ships over the ocean, they are mixing with clouds that are living in the atmosphere in ways that make the atmosphere slightly brighter. And it's this effect that scientists have reported is cooling the planet currently by reflecting sunlight back to space. And they don't know exactly by how much, but they think it's between a half a degree Celsius and 1.1 degrees Celsius.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's not small.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>No, it's not small. It could be offsetting half the warming that the gasses would otherwise be making.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Just to sum that up. So our particulate pollution to date has had the sort of perverse effect of reflecting away a bunch of solar radiation with the consequent problem that insofar as we clean up our pollution, which we are striving to do, we are going to lose that cooling effect and maybe get another one whole degree of warming which would double...</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...our warming since preindustrial times. So that's a little wild.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>I was just going to say it's right there in the climate reports. And it's been there consistently, but not prominently noted, not highlighted in the sort of climate discussion. And so it's surfacing more now recently, that this was there. And we're getting very good at cleaning up pollution. One of the features of this problem is that in climate reports, when they show these effects, they'll have bar charts that show the different effects on the climate system. And they have these lines that show how much uncertainty there is. This is the most uncertain thing about the climate system.</p><p>And that uncertainty has been unchanged for 20 years. We have not been able to improve our understanding of that. And so when we in SilverLining are talking about our advocacy, we're saying we need to improve our information base, we need to quickly improve our ability to do that problem. That problem happens to be the same or very similar to the problem of what if I want to achieve this effect actively. So we think it's kind of a no brainer for society to say we need to go after that problem really hard, like the human genome, and understand what's going to happen when we take the pollution away.</p><p>And is there a cleaner, more controlled version of this that might help?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, yeah, I'm going to get some of those questions in a minute. So the aerosol effect is you have these particles up there now which talk about geoengineering. We've been geoengineering the climate ever since industrialization by throwing all these particles up, which are shielding us. So, in effect, as we clean up our particulate pollution, we are pushing the target for climate change farther and farther away. In other words, we're making a longer and longer runway for ourselves. So in addition to advocating for research, which we'll get to in a minute, it looks like your organization has because the term geoengineering, I think, as people think of it now, brings to mind all sorts of various and sundry schemes in the ocean and crumbling rocks and there's all these different notions.</p><p>But it seems like you all have settled more or less. Your main focus is on solar radiation management, SRM, which is just replacing the particles that we're taking out of the atmosphere with new particles to continue enjoying that cooling effect. Why focus in on that one rather than the others? Is there a reason to think it is the most out of all the geoengineering schemes? Why focus on this one?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Well, we, we don't use the term "geoengineering." We don't use the term "scheme." But I will answer your question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know, I noticed that you carefully say "climate interventions" rather than "geoengineering."</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Yeah, "climate intervention" was a term the National Academy of Sciences coined in their 2015 report. And it's useful because, like you said, "geoengineering" kind of evokes the most engineering-oriented stuff, engineers in space, and there's really not a lot of engineering involved. There's a lot of science involved, and it's directed at climate. And intervention is a really good term because it's so similar characteristics to a medical type intervention. Engineering has a lot of certainty. Like, if I can do the math, I can engineer a bridge. An intervention has a lot of uncertainty and a lot of trade-offs, depending on where the patient is.</p><p>So this looks a little more like that. But to your question, we are a science-based, science-driven organization, so we follow what the scientists recommend. And so we didn't arrive at this conclusion ourselves. We took what the National Academy of Sciences and the Royal Society in the United Kingdom said. They'd done a couple of assessments where they gathered scientific experts together and asked the same question and if you wanted to reduce warming in the climate system quickly, what are the best candidates for research? And so they landed on this because there's a lot of precedent for this effect in the atmosphere.</p><p>So in addition to what pollution is causing, they've seen this effect when large volcanoes go off and release material into the outer layer of the atmosphere, the stratosphere. And they've seen that cool the climate system globally. So when Mount Pinatubo erupted in 1991, they observed about a half a degree Celsius of cooling for about a year and a half. So when people talk about all these things are terrible. Well, most of us who are 25 or older experienced this already when Mount Pinatubo went off and we didn't notice the sky was different. So we've actually lived it a little bit already.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In a sense, we know it works, or at least we know the physical effect is somewhat predictable.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Again, I'm going to go back to the medical analogy because it's so similar. There are differences in efficacy and side effect profiles based on what we know today. And the reason we want to do research is to understand the efficacy and side effects better.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>And so in the outer layer of the atmosphere, they feel like they know a lot more about the efficacy because the stratosphere is very uniform. They've seen it with volcanoes. And so you can get a pretty good grasp, although they're finding just as early research is going on, there are pretty big differences, maybe in how you do it as to what happens. And you certainly don't want to do it like volcanoes do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Why not, just out of curiosity?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Like all at once big bursts. So it turns out that doing it from — most volcanoes are around the equatorial regions, which for some of what they're finding is like the worst place to do it and that you wouldn't do it like in one giant burst all at once. And of course, volcanoes include a lot of stuff that you wouldn't put in there that is...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>So what we know, or have some handle on, is that in that kind of a burst where there's material in the stratosphere for a year or two and it gradually falls out. We kind of know a bit about what the side effect profile is of that a bit. And I should say we don't know that much about the chemistry effects and the ozone layer and things like that because our measurements aren't very good. But the thing we really need to think about is, okay, if you needed to do this for a couple of decades of 20, 30, 40 years, and it's got a side effect profile in different parts of the system, maybe it's heating up the stratosphere a little bit.</p><p>And that gets to a point where you have big changes in circulation or other things. That's what they don't know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It occurs to me that we've gotten this far in without ever actually really saying what we're talking about. So just for listeners who might be confused, the idea here is to deliberately inject a bunch of these particles, sulfur particles, into the atmosphere to basically do on purpose what our pollution is doing by accident reflect light away. And there are a couple of different versions of this, even if you just focus in on this is called solar radiation management. I don't know if that's the term you all use.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Yup.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's a couple of different versions even of that. So maybe just discuss like what are we concretely talking about doing? There's different layers of the atmosphere, there's different methods of throwing things up, maybe give us a sense of what it looks like in practice.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>So there's the idea that would sort of be lifting off from what they've seen with volcanoes, which is dispersing particles into the upper atmosphere, this stratosphere probably via aircraft and possibly with selected places that they're releasing the material based on what they're learning and models about what produces the best efficacy with the least side effects. And that this would probably happen in a continuous way with planes flying continuously, releasing stuff. And the net effect that they're trying to produce is about a 1% increase in the amount of sunlight the stratosphere reflects. So it's not something that you see from the ground.</p><p>It's not something that would be noticeable except for maybe certain changes in light to certain types of plants, things like that. And that would be the idea.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One question about that, the stratosphere you said is pretty uniform. Would interventions on that level have a uniform effect around the world or would they be localized?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>It's far more uniform. The particles get entrained in really high winds up there and disperse globally. And so you get a global effect. You might have some differentiation in how that plays out down below in weather patterns and things. And that's what people want to study. And because it's not simple, it's a really complicated system. And one of the concerns scientists have is that like reflecting sunlight up there, you're slightly heating the stratosphere and that can affect its interactions with the atmosphere below it. It can affect the way chemicals play out in the stratosphere in a way that affects the ozone layer.</p><p>And so all of those things, again, if you're really good to think about medicine, it's like oh, how does it interact with that part of the body? There are medications. So there it's really about trying to project forward, trying to figure out what is the optimized way to do this, where you get the highest efficacy and the best safety.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And isn't there also a whole other genre of this that has to do with clouds putting the particles in lower clouds?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Great question. Yes, there is. And the particles that they're talking about putting in the clouds are different, too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Different than the stratospheric particles.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>That's right. So in the stratosphere, their starting point is sulfur dioxide, which is like worse than pollution. And they know the most about that because it's what volcanoes put up there. Aircraft pollution is starting to waft up there too. But they're also looking at other things in the stratosphere, like calcium carbonate, which is chalk, like chalk dust.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>And even diamond dust. So those are the kind of the two other methods.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the idea here is trying to maximize reflectivity while minimizing, presumably other...</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everything else.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>And in this case, especially thinking about the ozone layer. And that's important, obviously. And in fact, in the international arena, in the UN, where they've done probably the most scientific evaluation of these things to date is in the part of the UN that looks after the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol. So they're thinking forward about that. And that's the issues in the upper atmosphere, in the low cloud layer. So we have lots of particles going up into clouds all the time, especially over land. The less polluted clouds are over the ocean, although you can see and if anyone listening to the podcast, if you Google Ship track it'll pull up pictures of cloud decks over the ocean and you can see these streaks and the clouds that are made by the emissions of ships.</p><p>And so that's like the ship particulates from the ship pollution brightening the clouds and you can see it visibly where it's really concentrated, but it's also spreading in ways that you don't see visually. So the idea here is, well, could we use a cleaner material and really optimize the effect? And it turns out one of the very best materials for doing this with is one of the materials that's part of making clouds over the ocean, which is sea salt. Sea salt spray from ocean water. And so what scientists proposed two British scientists back in the 90s was, well, maybe you could make a really optimized mist from sea spray spray it from ships in a continuous way and brighten the kinds of clouds that are really susceptible to this, and do it in more localized areas where you get a big bang for the buck.</p><p>And so you still offset a couple of degrees of warming, but you're only dispersing over like something equivalent to three to 4% of the ocean surface.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. And this would also have a uniform global effect because it seems much tighter area, lower clouds. It just seems intuitively, like that ought to be more of a local effect. Does that also end up spreading?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Your intuition is correct. It is localized. And the side effects that you're most interested in is what does that do? Because you are creating concentrated areas of cooling in the system and these are all the mechanisms by which weather and atmosphere move around. So it's almost certainly likely to affect weather flows and patterns. And the thing you would be trying to learn then is are there ways for that to work in your favor and are there ways for that to be really bad? And so I'll give you two examples. And one of the reasons we're such strong advocates for research is because these kinds of questions really shine a light on where our climate models and our climate observations are weak.</p><p>So to answer these questions, you've got to really improve doing that uncertainty problem and also getting better at weather circulation. But in the very early models which we helped fund to try to represent these things, one of the possibilities that arose is that when they simulate brightening clouds over the Southern Ocean, which is one of the places that you might do it. You get these cooling currents because it cools the water below in the air in the low layer that flow onto Antarctica. And so you got this improvement in kind of an outsized cooling of Antarctica, which is a useful thing potentially.</p><p>But on the reverse side, in another targeted area of clouds, when they cooled that region, they affected weather patterns such that you got dryness in the Amazon forest region, which is a very bad thing to have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>So in the moral to this story is that these are just very early bottle based simulations that tell you you have these kinds of questions and that it's probably given the state of the risk that we have, and given that it's one of the top two candidates, and given that studying it will help us understand what the pollution problem is going to do. Really important to study, but really hard to say for sure whether or how you should use it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So these two versions of SRM, solar radiation management, the injecting particles in the stratosphere and then the cloud brightening, are those the sort of two main, most viable sort of targets for research. Like when people think about SRM, are those the kind of the two things that should come to mind?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>They are from scientific assessments and from senior scientists. There's a third one that's sort of like a tier below because it's even more uncertain than the low cloud brightening, but it is something that is already occurring. And this is in the high cloud layer. So between the stratosphere and the lower atmosphere. So the upper troposphere where you get to when you're cruising altitude on a long flight, 30,000 feet, depending on the circumstances, when you put pollution particles or similar into these high clouds, you can have the effect of either thickening them or thinning them, depending on the conditions.</p><p>And those clouds are insulating clouds, so they keep heat trapped in. Infrared radiation trapped in. So if you put particles in them in the right circumstances, you could thin them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let more heat out.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Let more heat out. And this phenomenon is happening from air traffic, from airplanes, and we don't know enough about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I have a bunch of questions about governance and moral hazard and all this, but first let's just briefly touch on the main subject of your latest report, which is just research, advocating for research. I come into this sort of like leery about doing things like this that we know so little about. But when I got into sort of reading about the kind of research we need, what's sort of remarkable is probably like two thirds of the research you're advocating is not even directly on doing these things. It's just understanding what's in the atmosphere right now, like what are the risks of short term rapid changes now?</p><p>Just very basic climate science stuff that you would think we would already be researching. I think even sort of the most committed opponent of these schemes would agree that it's crazy how little we know about this whole area of study. So maybe just like talk about what when you advocate for research, just talk about sort of the basics of what you're advocating for here. I mean, I think people will be a little bit shocked that some of this stuff doesn't already exist.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Well, thank you for that. You're exactly right because I think we were shocked not coming from this field and just kind of looking at it as an information problem. And the problem you want to do is you want to be able to project and evaluate the risk of what the climate system is going to do. So I'd really like to know, be able to project with some confidence how the Earth system is going to respond to this warming over the next 30 years and then what it would look like if you change the things that are influencing it, either in the warming direction, the greenhouse gases, or in the cooling direction, what scientists call aerosols.</p><p>These particles. So we're coming at it saying, "Okay, we just want to help set us up to do that problem and evaluate what it looks like if you are introducing aerosols in different ways and how does that improve or not, like the risk profile of what's happening." And so then we bump into these gaps and what the problems that we can't do in the models and a lot of them center right in the atmosphere, that the models don't represent all the phenomenon that are happening in the atmosphere very well and that we don't have the observations that we need to improve them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's like insane. It's like five, six decades now. Of talk about climate change and talk about all this, but we still on some very basic levels are just not watching what's happening in the atmosphere.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>I think people assume that it's like, hey, we've got this, right? And you hear there are these satellites and you hear the scientific studies coming out that are projecting what climate is going to do. We have satellites looking at everything. And then you sort of dig under the hood and that's where solar radiation management just has an analysis problem. Because what some of the scientists in our circles have said is people want a higher standard of evidence for this. So they're saying, well, you need to be able to tell us what will happen and what the impacts will be.</p><p>And we shouldn't be having that standard of evidence for what greenhouse gas is doing and what these other aerosols are doing, but we haven't. And so we get in there and say, okay, if you really want to do this problem, here's what you need. So to give you example for the very top candidate for this is putting particles in the stratosphere. And so if you want to project what will happen, you first need a baseline of what's in the stratosphere. And it turns out we don't have that. We can't characterize what's in the stratosphere currently. So then it's very hard to do that problem.</p><p>And so the first thing that we did when we started talking to members of congress and working with NOAA is just to say we have this problem of having a baseline of what's there, which is a really important problem to solve. If you want to know if somebody else is adding material to the stratosphere, if you want to know what it will do, and so that was our starting point. And it's similar kinds of things now, where even in the low cogler, we're working on a program to put instruments on ships like the current ships that travel, that would just be taking atmospheric readings of that low atmosphere so that you would have a baseline and you'd be able to help the models and even the satellites interpret what's going on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So just gathering more data about what's actually in the atmosphere. So we have a baseline, because one thing the report emphasizes over and over again is that it doesn't really make sense to talk about the risk of doing these things in isolation. It's always, what is the risk of this intervention versus the risk of not doing this intervention? What are the risks we're facing as a baseline against which we are measuring the risks of this intervention? And we just don't know. That's what's wild to me. We just don't know what the current risks are. So there's no way to make an informed risk judgment because you don't know the differential.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>That's right. And we haven't really invested in it, which is another quite eye-popping reality.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's wild.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Like, globally and in the United States, climate research investments have been relatively flat for decades.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is wild to me. I know. Every time I read that, I read that statistic periodically, and every time I run across it, I'm shocked all over again. Like, all this talk, all this international action, all this agita and angst, and we're not spending any more on climate research than we were two decades ago.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>This really baffled me. Coming into this, I didn't understand it, and I sort of learned there was quite a long period of time where there was an orientation that I'm kind of sympathetic to, which was, we know what we need to know. We need to reduce emissions. And so if you think about it as like two sides of an equation, and you look at the reduced emissions side of that equation, and you just focus everything on that, and you say, don't spend your energy on figuring out what's going to happen if it gets warmer, because we're not going to let it get warmer.</p><p>And really, that combined with a lot of other pressures on climate science, climate science has been in lockdown mode. I can still remember, like ten or twelve years ago. It's brutal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Under siege, yes.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Terrifying. But now we're seeing these extremes, and we've had a flat level of investment. And inside that flat level of investment in climate research, in the part that looks directly at the atmospheric observation of atmospheric basic science has actually declined in real terms.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, my God, that is mind-boggling.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>It's heartbreaking. And that's the fulcrum for everything we need to know about what's happening and how we evaluate what we're going to do. So the good thing is it represents an opportunity if we can improve it. And I'll just finish by saying climate research investments in the United States are about three and a half billion a year, and that's everything on that side of the equation. And if you compare that to the 55 billion we spent on the three most recent storms.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>And even the big money that's gone into these other programs, what we're saying is, hey, to invest an additional 60 or 70% in that bring it up to 5 and a half, 6 billion a year, that seems reasonable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I really encourage listeners to go look at the report because the details of what kinds of research are needed are, like, I keep saying, sort of eye-popping because over and over again you're going to read something and be like, wait, we're not doing that already. We're not looking at that already. We're not measuring that already. That's not included in the models already. A lot of the research recommendations are just like stuff we should obviously be doing. Regardless of what you think about these direct interventions, only when we have a better understanding of these short-term climate effects can we even coherently compare what would happen if we did these interventions right.</p><p>We have a baseline against which to compare, and the details of some of that research are really interesting. But just sort of to wrap up the research part, let's just talk about that price tag so we can get a sense of the of the scale. You want to double from 3.3 billion to 6.3 or something like that, but just, you know, like I hate to be a cliche, but like, compare this to how much we spend on defense research or like pharmaceutical research or like dog food research. It's it's, you know, concretely, what price tag are you asking for?</p><p>And sort of like, where basically would that money go?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Well, so concretely, we're asking for an additional 2.6 billion a year on top of approximately 3.5 billion. So it's less than double. And it spread across kind of the modeling and analysis of scientific workforce side of it, across observational platforms, which are the most expensive piece. So you need the airplanes that fly through the atmosphere to take readings. You need stuff on the ocean at the surface. And shockingly, the satellites that actually can look at aerosol particles in the atmosphere. They're aging out and there are no plans to replace them. Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we're going to know less about aerosols.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>We're going to know less soon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That seems like the wrong direction,</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>So the investment in those platforms. And here's the other hold your gut thing. The US supplies most of the world's data. So if we don't do it in the US, we can't count on it coming in. There are some European programs, but the US is the biggest provider of this information.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yikes. It just seems like how is it in the UN, all this sort of like, poorer and more vulnerable countries organize and they want money in the Green Fund and all this. How is it like they are the ones who are most directly at risk in this 30 to 40 year time horizon in some very direct and scary ways. Why aren't they advocating for research? Like, what's going on?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Well, they have a lot of fish to fry, huge amount of sympathy because they're getting pummeled by the impacts and they're not getting the money they were promised to deal with the impacts or the transition. And what's striking is many of them are still ahead of the developed countries in transitioning away from fossil fuels. You take a country like Honduras, they're over accomplishing against their commitment and they're like the second or third most impacted country by climate change. Like half the country is going to disappear in the period I'm talking about. And so a lot of these countries are really impressive in how they're trying to deal with this, but they don't have good visibility of these research problems because they don't have the assets to do this problem at all.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right,</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>And so that gets into where you talk about the climate system is so big and so complicated that you need very high tech resources like massive supercomputers satellites, stratospheric capable aircraft that only a handful of countries actually have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I guess one additional note about the research to emphasize is just and you have a whole piece about this in the report. It's just the people from these vulnerable countries who are now more or less locked out of this research by the high sort of capital costs of it need to be brought in, right. This cannot be another sort of white dudes around a conference table undertaking. Their interests are most directly involved and they need to be involved in the research. That's just to put a pin in that.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>I'll say one more thing, and I'll give a plug to our partner at Amazon, because we care about that problem a lot and there are ways that technology can help. And so with regard to giving access quickly, getting the climate models and data sets onto the cloud, out of these big supercomputing, one off facilities and onto the cloud where people in different parts of the world can access them, has a huge potential to benefit. Takes a bit of technical work, it takes some money. But then they have supercomputing too. They have climate models, they have the data sets too.</p><p>And so we're working on this very actively right now. It's like Netflix. It's like how do we bring it to the world? And if you want those people to be able to do these problems of what is climate change going to do in my part of the world? And then what would these interventions do? You need things like that and you need them pretty fast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Most research, yeah, you notice of the little there has been, has been focused mostly on developed countries because that's just where the researchers tend to be.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There are huge justice implications to both these interventions. And just to emphasize again, to not doing these interventions, to not doing anything, both those have enormous justice implications which need to be centered. So yeah, if I could just sort of summarize the research bit. The part that struck me is just how much of this research seems like it ought to be happening anyway. It is uncontroversial. It's crazy that we're not doing it regardless of whether we decide or want to intervene directly or not. Understanding the short-term dynamics of the climate and the risk of tipping points and the dynamics of aerosols and all these things, we're just woefully underfunded and need more funding. That seems uncontroversial.</p><p>So I want to get to the problems that everybody when I ask about this online, everybody sort of comes up with the same question, which is just this sort of nest of moral hazard problems. And so just for listeners who aren't familiar with the term, the idea of moral hazard is the worry here. One of the worries here is if this becomes a real possibility, it will serve as an excuse to do less mitigation basically to reduce emissions less. The idea is here we have an escape hatch. Like, I had a guest on talking about modeling a few weeks ago and she was sort of talking about how in climate models we just have CCS plugged in as kind of a carbon capture and Sequestration plugged in as kind of a gap filler because we don't know what else to fill that gap with.</p><p>But it gives us sort of this false sense of security. Like, oh, we can get to the targets. Even though if you look at the models like, oh, here's a kajillion tons of a technology that does not really exist yet on any commercial scale. So it's giving us a false sense of security. And her worry is that solar radiation management is going to serve a similar role. ie. Kind of an escape hatch that you can just plug into models when you want to get the right output. That's one of the remoral hazard arguments is it'll lull us into a false sense of security and will reduce the urgency of mitigation.</p><p>I'm sure you've discussed that issue a kajillion times. What's your kind of take on it?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Yeah, we might need a whole 'nother podcast, but...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know I wish we had more time for this.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>I share the worry that it gets plugged in in a similar kind of way. I might differ in what I think that means about research because I've had this moral hazard issue come into our world in saying it's a reason not to do research, because the research itself creates this impression that you're going down this path and it opens up this option and digging into this coming from outside and looking starting to learn from people the history. Because these same arguments were made about adaptation research, and they were made about carbon dioxide removal research, and they were even made about research into reducing methane that it would distract from looking at CO2. And what kind of happens is they say, well, the research creates a moral hazard, so they sort of suppresses research.</p><p>Adaptation research is a really good example because then you didn't have it. Well, the research might have given you a lot of really interesting information that compelled thinking about emissions reduction because of the kind of adaptation s**t show that...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know, the more you know about adaptation, the more — it's not like you're going to be like, "Oh that's easy, that's easy."</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Let's just do that on planet Earth would have been to have just tons of adaptation research. That really blew my mind, actually. And so when I think, I guess, or our premise is that information actually helps. And when you dig into these climate interventions, they're not magic. And I sat with conservatives and Republicans in Congress and said to them, look, what the science tells you is the least amount of additional things you put in the atmosphere, the safer it is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, which is just completely ...</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>It's showing you where the thresholds are, and I can have that conversation. And so we say there's at least we need to look at the evidence that when we start to dig into this, there's also evidence could be highly motivating of pushing on emissions reductions and pushing on the things we can do, that's in addition to all ... the fact that we want to fill gaps and information that will help all these other parts of the climate problem, we're saying that we think society actually with more information, can do a better job and that information itself isn't bad.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, most people would agree with that up to a certain extent, I think, but then gathering information is one thing, but how do you at a certain point when you're talking about doing these things it's so complex, there's no way to predict or model completely in advance what's going to happen. So ultimately you have to do some of this stuff to find out what's going to happen. And I guess a lot of people just wonder sort of like how do you half do this? What does an experiment along these lines even look like? And ultimately, like how much can you learn without doing it on a big broad scale?</p><p>And then once you've done it on a big broad scale it's sort of like the Pandora's box is open. It's one thing to understand the climate better, but how do you understand doing these things without doing them?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>I think if you think about the steps of what you can learn, in what ways. So the thing that scientists are proposing doing are releases of plumes, like small batches of plumes, like the equivalent of what comes out of the smoke stack of a ship or of an aircraft. And that gives you a lot more information than you have now about how the particles behave when they hit the atmosphere and how they disperse. And that is information that right now, if you want to model this stuff, you're just taking a wild flaming guess, and then everything downstream of that is based on your wild flaming guess.</p><p>And so if I want to know like what are the exactly right size of particles and those really teeny in earth terms experiments give you that first order information that you can plug into models and then your models of what happens at a bigger scale are a lot smarter. And so that level, like I think scientists have said they've recommended it already in scientific assessments, but people are confused because it's sort of conflated with, "Oh, previous folks in the space have said this is cheap and easy to do and we got a guy out there saying you can throw up balloons." It's like I've dug a tiny hole, but I'm building a skyscraper. What you would need to engineer the climate system is tens of billions of dollars of investment in something that would be able to influence the planet at a really big scale.</p><p>And so you have this inflection point where there's a bunch of science you need to do to even advise countries or the world as to what would make sense as far as regards investment like that, if anything. So no one is going to be off doing this at the kind of scale that would really have a major impact without a really big investment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let's talk about this then, because it is sort of...</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>I let myself in for that one, didn't I?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This kind of conventional wisdom, or at least often repeated in this space, that sulfur particles and squirting them up into the atmosphere is relatively cheap compared to other things such that like a single interested country or even a single interested billionaire could do a big chunk of it themselves. So before we discuss the kind of security and governance implications of that, just is that true?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Well, I think what's happened, as some research has started to happen there's the things that sort of physicists and modelers do with the information that they have and the numbers that they have and aren't taking into account a lot of the complexity, a lot of the uncertainty, or even a lot of the way the world really works. And so then you dig in and you say, oh, no, what it looks like is you need platforms capable of reaching the stratosphere if you're going to work up there. There's only a handful of countries that have that one species programs, and you would need to scale up very substantially, like any sort of capacity for that, which is not within the means of more than a handful of countries and really not in the means of any individual billionaire either. And also, by the way, none of them are stepping in to spend their whole net worth this way either.</p><p>So I think that was kind of when you do it in the back of the envelope and you know very little, you can sort of be optimistic about that. But when you dig in, the reality is it's probably a subset of the world's developed countries or countries with a lot of assets who would be players in that. Now, in the low cloud layer, it's a little bit different because you've got these cloud seeding efforts that are coming up and springing up to try to address local impacts and there are ways that cloud brightening could be used that people are starting to look at. And so you could get regional things that could affect other people and things like that that are more widely available or potentially used.</p><p>So these are questions that need to be thought about. And again, science and observation really helps you and it's not a good space to be flying blind in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p>Well, the broader question of governance, I guess, is one thing that really just vexes people about. This vexes me about it, too, which is just like whenever I read or listen to someone like you talk about it, I'm like just like cool heads.</p><p>Reasonable people taking all the right precautions, building institutional capacity such that scientists are in the driver's seat of this thing and policymakers only doing what scientists sort of advise them. And there's international cooperation and there's knowledge sharing, et cetera, et cetera. It sounds delightful when sensible people discuss it as though sensible people will be in charge of it. But of course, a glance at recent world history reveals that quite frequently sensible people are not in charge. You said that the bar for getting seriously involved in this is higher than maybe people think. But it certainly seems like this is something that people could be doing sort of half ass experiments with in various ways.</p><p>How do you I guess just what's your confidence that a sensible international knowledge transparent knowledge sharing system is going to be in place to manage doing this research and taking these experiments and trying this versus scientists losing control over it and insane capitalists or rogue nations or whatever taking it and running with it? Is there an answer to that question like what's the best we can do to try to keep this under the control of sensible people?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Well, that's a good question. And I think one of the reasons that SilverLining exists is really that question, which is if you think about the climate conditions getting potentially worse and worse and people being more inclined to take kind of radical actions how do you put yourself in a position to be smart, to be equitable, and to be as safe as you can in that context? So it definitely appears that when you have a sharing of information and you have cooperation around science and information, it calms everybody down. And there's a lot of when we have conversations with policymakers, whether it's in Congress or the UN.</p><p>And we say, yeah, you know, we're here to talk about science anyd how we step forward on scientific work and cooperation and feel like, great, because we can do that as as policymakers and we can work across the aisle. We can work with people we don't agree with on other things. If we're in the science lane and that's been true in our experience in the US where we've worked across the aisle in Congress and we've gotten Republicans to increase basic climate, basic science budgets in a Republican Congress.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, that's something.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Yeah. And so when you're talking about science and you're talking about ways of the technology can improve science and sharing information, same at the UN level. And then as we started to dig into how do different things work in the UN and where do they work well and where don't they work well and why? And we worked with a couple of experts, Dan Bodanski, who wrote the book on international climate law, and Sue Biniaz, who is the current Deputy Climate Advisor for the US to look at that question in the context of this subject and what emerged is like what we are interested in, SilverLining is what is most effective in terms of outcomes?</p><p>What produces the best outcome in the environment, what produces the best outcome in safety for people? And the absolute best case of that is the Montreal Protocol for the Protection of the Ozone layer. And so we really have gone up close and personal to figure out why does that work? And yeah, people say, "Well, it's a narrow problem, but actually it's quite similar to this one. You've got a smaller number of actors, you've got a sort of focus thing they're emitting. You've got all the countries of the world not only agreeing to that, but they've agreed that changes in it, expansions of it, everybody makes their commitments."</p><p>It's really interesting. And they have this feature that's different from the other UN fora the scientific and technical assessment panels that make the evaluation of what's going on and what needs to be done are fully independent of the nation states. Their reports are written completely independently. And if you look at the IPCC, where the UN does their climate work, they negotiate kind of the top line summary of what those reports say...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>...with the countries. And so, again, we could do a whole podcast on this. But I would say that really looking at the Montreal Protocol, a. because it does apply to this particular thing as it would operate the stratosphere and b. because understanding how that works is really important because all the countries of the world are continuously meeting every year and we went to their meeting.</p><p>It's calm, people are calm. It's incredible. So figuring that out and how we can translate that onto other things, I think it's a really good idea.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. If only all international cooperation and agreements could be as calm and sensible as Montreal.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This does seem like an area where really going overboard to keep the science independent seems super important because this is just this whole thicket of issues here is going to implicate countries in a lot of like sort of our interests versus global interests. There's going to be a lot of ulterior motives, I think involved. Everybody's going to be sort of thinking, on the one hand, how can we improve the world and the state of science? On the other hand is like, how can we make out best in a world where people are messing with solar radiation?</p><p>So it does seem like independent science is more important even than normal.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>And it's really important to your point from before, that other countries, especially the most impacted to developing countries, have the same level of access to information and can evaluate it for themselves.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there kind of a short-term goal of yours? Like, is there a particular development or institution you'd like to see funded or just like a first step, is there something kind of tangible people can look forward to and advocate for if they want to see more progress on this?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Well, certainly they can support SilverLining. We're like a medical foundation, so we fund research directly so that we can help advance some of the initial critical research, like getting the climate model supporting some of these problems, some of the lab work and things like that. And that feeds into our broader advocacy, which is trying to get the US government to invest in research aggressively. And like you said, some of these assets that we need to understand the atmosphere and climate system for people who are in a position to help influence attention on the fact that we have gaps in our understanding of what influences on the atmosphere due to the climate.</p><p>And that's not acceptable. And we need to improve on that really fast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. It's a little wild that we just spent we just passed a bill spending hundreds of billions of dollars on manufacturing and stuff, and literally like a rounding error on any of those sums would have been enough to double our research budget. It's a little wild.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Yeah. So anything people can do to kind of be in there for the atmosphere. We're alone on the Hill right now lobbying for increases in budgets for atmospheric observations and research.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I guess I don't understand. Why are scientists themselves not more self interestedly, advocating for this? Like, why don't you have allies?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Very interesting. I talked to them about because, like, the astrophysics community, the telescope people, man, they get those big telescopes. They're really good at it. But part of it is that climate research is classified and has emerged as a basic science. It's very academic, and it hasn't involved big applied efforts. And technologies have come in relatively recently, so they've been pretty good at getting, like, super computing attached to national labs. But in general, it's very academic. There's been a lot of downward pressure on climate scientists in terms of sticking their necks up. And so it just hasn't had those same drivers, and it doesn't have a commercial community like bioscience or space.</p><p>There's no money in it for anybody.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You got to wonder once we understand these things a lot better and get a lot better at it if there might emerge commercial applications. Can you imagine that?</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>It's changing quickly because there are obviously economic interest in being able to make better predictions. And as the climate system gets more volatile and there are more risks, that information becomes more valuable. So the landscape is changing, but that upstream part, which is, do we know what's specifically in the atmosphere? And can we model that from its tiny components down to what it's doing to the climate system? That piece is so basic and so general to everyone that nobody's there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Well, thank you for coming on and clarifying this. I feel like this is a subject where there's just lots of weird mythologies and hang ups and access to grind floating around and not a lot of sort of basic knowledge of what's actually happening and what needs to happen, so I appreciate your work on this. And thanks for coming on and sharing with us.</p><p><strong>Kelly Wanser</strong></p><p>Well, I really appreciate your questions and the opportunity to talk about it. Love your show. Thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/how-to-think-about-solar-radiation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:102781035</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 02 Mar 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/102781035/d2faae5ae66446464044f6d7412189f2.mp3" length="48001953" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4000</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/102781035/9ace6d165c1bb14622a65bdb03bf1a20.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Meet the author of Biden's industrial strategy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Brian Deese, outgoing director of the National Economic Council and an influential advisor to President Biden, discusses the opportunities and challenges in Democrats’ new focus on industrial policy.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AABU2ifGM5lQCcUarkFSrOG2a/volts23.02.22%28brian.deese%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/meet-the-author-of-biden-s-industrial-strategy"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Brian Deese has had a remarkable two years. As President Joe Biden’s top economic advisor and director the National Economic Council, he has played a key role in defining and implementing Biden's policy approach. </p><p>In April of last year, he delivered some “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/04/20/remarks-on-a-modern-american-industrial-strategy-by-nec-director-brian-deese/">remarks on a modern American industrial strategy</a>” that laid out a vigorous approach to investing in economic sectors deemed important to national and economic security. </p><p>And by all accounts Deese played a pivotal role in seeing the strategy into law, through the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act, which together amount to the greatest reinvestment in US infrastructure and manufacturing — and, specifically, clean energy industries — in generations. </p><p>The pivot to unapologetic industrial policy is a big change for Democrats. Deese has moved in those circles for a long time — ten years ago he was a young wunderkind advisor to Obama, making The New Republic’s list of “<a target="_blank" href="https://newrepublic.com/article/96131/washingtons-most-powerful-least-famous-people">Washington's most powerful, least famous people</a>” — so as he <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/02/02/white-house-biden-brian-deese-economics/">prepares to depart the administration</a>, I was eager to talk with him about what the shift to industrial policy means, why the US needs to onshore key supply chains, and the work ahead for Democrats in implementing their new laws.</p><p>All right, then. Brian Deese, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Oh, I'm really happy to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I had, I'll say, a little banter, maybe a couple of jokes scheduled here for the front end of the pod. But then I looked at my list of questions for you, and we don't have time for any jokes, Brian. We don't have time for any banter.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Very serious, very quick.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We got to get deadly serious right off the bat here. So let's start here in 2012. Ten years ago, you were the deputy director of the NEC under Obama. And in 2022, ten years later, you were the director of the NEC under Biden. And I'm just curious how things have changed, how America's sort of strategic economic outlook has changed in that ten years. And specifically, I'm curious whether the sort of vigorous investment in industrial policy that we're going to talk about here in a little bit, the kind of stuff that has been going on under Biden, whether you were recommending that to Obama at the time, or whether there's something importantly unique about this present moment.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Well, look, I think a lot of the world has changed since that period, both in policy and economic terms. If you think back to 2012, we were both right on the back end of a historic and transformational policy accomplishment in the enactment of the Affordable Care Acts, which changed the fabric of our economic and social safety net in important ways right on the front end of that implementation. And at the same time, in a period of very challenging and slow recovery from the Great Recession that was made worse by a failure of policy, a failure of the ability for Congress to overcome Republican opposition at the time, to invest more, to try to help to drive a stronger recovery. You look over those ten years, we live through a period that a number of people have characterized as secular stagnation where our output was constrained and that had a lot of impacts on quality, on labor markets.</p><p>And then of course, we lived through this once in a century event of the global pandemic and in many ways historically unprecedented in modern human history. And I think that that helped to bring to the forefront a set of economic challenges that had persisted over that decade and much longer. But we're now really to the floor, particularly the vulnerability of supply chains and the weaknesses in our industrial capacity as a country. And so those things together helped to crystallize the economic strategy that Biden as a candidate put out in 2020 and really have been pursuing, that in some important ways have similarities to things we were promoting at the time.</p><p>Significant investment in physical infrastructure is something that has been clearly necessary for a long time, but in some ways have important differences. I think we've got a different approach to clean energy and clean energy deployment at scale, which I'm sure we'll get into here, but also the prioritization of key geostrategic priorities like rebuilding semiconductor capacity here in the United States. So I think the landscape looks very different now economically both because of some of these significant economic changes but also policy changes as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What you're talking about and sort of what's come to the fore over the last ten years policy wise goes under the umbrella term of industrial policy. There's been a lot of kind of hype and talk lately about kind of the return of industrial policy. But I'm not totally sure that average listeners really have a sense of what that means. So maybe just let's just start by saying what do we mean by having versus not having an industrial policy? And where has industrial policy been for the last like two or three decades versus the last two or three years which has seen a really vertiginous sort of pivot around this subject.</p><p>So maybe let's just start by defining what we're talking about.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Yeah, sure. And look, I use the term industrial strategy, which is obviously very similar to industrial policy, but a bit broader in ways that I'll explain. And I think at its core, the idea behind an industrial strategy is that the private market on its own, private actors operating to maximize their own utility, will end up under investing in areas of the economy that have strategic and economic significance and that by using targeted public investment you can unlock greater economic opportunity and crowd in greater private investment in those areas. And so an example of this is in physical infrastructure that allows you to unlock productive capacity of the economy.</p><p>And we have a great history of this in the United States, from the interstate highway system to the intercontinental railroad, where public investments in laying the foundation for private capital helped unlock greater productivity, greater innovation across the United States. I think what happened is that in the late 1970s, early 80s, there was a broader philosophical push around what now people talk about as trickle down economics that basically at its core had the view that any government or intervention was by definition going to pervert markets and crowd out private capital. And so the dominant paradigm became one of tax cuts, often skewed toward the highest income folks. Thus, the trickle down but also deregulation getting the government out of the way in all cases. </p><p>And I think that that philosophy helped to feed a sense that if you were doing industrial policy, it was in fact a dirty word. You were, by definition, perverting a private market or picking winners, the government picking winners versus picking losers. And as a result, a lot of the policy conversations steered away from even mentioning the word. And so I think that obviously that has changed. And it's changed. Things have changed certainly earlier than the last couple of years. But I think in the last couple of years, particularly in the wake of the pandemic, there's been more of a recognition that some of these basic ideas of having active and energetic government investment to help crowd in and build more capacity in strategically important areas is not only not a dirty word, it's absolutely necessary to address the economic and national security priorities we face.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I think one could fairly argue that there's no such thing as a giant industrialized wealthy democracy that does not have some sort of industrial strategy. It's just whether you're upfront and honest about it right. Or whether it's sort of buried in the tax code and you're sort of quasi-ashamed about it, but you can't, practically speaking, literally just let the market do whatever. It's not practical industrial strategy has always been there.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Well, that's right. And I would say that one of the interesting things about, I think, the evolution and the reinvigoration of this conversation, this public conversation, is that one of the hallmarks of effective industrial strategy is transparency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>And so we back our way into potentially really self-defeating the industrial strategy approaches when we, as you say, we end up there. We don't admit it or we don't acknowledge or we don't actually identify what are our policy goals. Transparency is a key element of, I think, doing industrial strategy effectively, both for economic reasons and for political economy as well, so that people can understand why you're doing what you're doing and then can hold you accountable to whether the thing you were trying to get done actually happens.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And this notion of picking winners, I guess I'm curious sort of how the US. learned to stop worrying and love picking winners. All the traditional sort of objections to this, government doesn't know what's going to be next, government makes bad bets, government distorts things. What do you make of those worries? I mean, are you worried about making some bad bets or getting some things wrong? How do you think about the dangers of picking winners, which are real dangers?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Yeah, like any critique, there's a kernel of something really important in that catchphrase of the government shouldn't pick winners and losers. And I think that the caution, the important caution is the closer that the government gets to actually directly picking individual companies or individual counterparties in a way where there is a sort of a high stakes economic interest there. You do need to worry about waste, you need to worry about corruption. And we know that in different countries and different parts of our history, those things certainly are worthy of being paranoid about. But I think the core mistake that people extended from that critique for too long was to say that that was a concern that meant that you shouldn't engage in the enterprise altogether.</p><p>And one of the things that I believe and I think that we have tried to build into our policy approach is wherever possible, the best way, I believe, to try to drive industrial strategy outcomes is to provide long term and technology neutral incentives to encourage investment where the government is not actually going in and identifying and picking a particular winner. Now, there are some cases where that is necessary. And we could talk about the semiconductor program that we're putting in place where because our capacity has eroded as a country and because of the scale necessary to build semiconductor fabrication capabilities, there are only a small handful of companies around the world who even have that capability. And so in that case, we needed to design a policy that was going to provide grants directly to companies on a competitive basis.</p><p>But precisely because of that, we are putting an extraordinary amount of thought into the way to run that competitive process in a way that guards against some of the downside risk and captures some of the upside opportunities, but wherever possible. And a lot of what is in the Inflation Reduction Act around clean energy is actually trying to lay that foundation of signaling to private companies and the private market that there will be long term predictable incentives in place. But then not having the government say, we think that this particular technological application is going to be more successful than this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. More like picking winning areas of investment than picking winning companies, right?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Yeah. The way I like to think about this is look, if you want to know our American industrial strategy in a nutshell right now, we have identified three broad areas that we believe will have big returns in terms of productive capacity and our economic and national security. And those are infrastructure innovation with semiconductors at the center of it and clean energy. And so we are picking those. We're picking broadly that those are areas that for geostrategic reasons and for economic reasons and for what we know about, where you can get productivity enhancements in our economy. But then wherever possible within those, we're not trying to say the government is best positioned to figure out whether this particular technology for generating clean hydrogen in this particular application is going to be more effective than this other one.</p><p>We're trying to say we need more clean energy capacity. Clean energy supply. We need it faster and cheaper than we have gotten it to date. That's an existential project. And if we do it in the United States, we'll build manufacturing industrial capacity here, we'll be able to capture greater export share of a very fast growing global market. And for all those reasons, that's the industrial strategy part of this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That segues nicely to my next question, which is that a big part of the thrust of the big three bills that were passed — the Infrastructure Act, CHIPS, and the Inflation Reduction Act — is onshoring, basically bringing more of the supply chain into the US. So let's just talk about that a little bit. The case for onshoring, if I put my sort of conventional economist hat on, it doesn't fit very well, it's too tight, it constrains blood flow in my brain.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>But I wish we were on video so I could see that hat.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you can imagine me grimacing while I'm wearing it. But the traditional economist take is why not just buy whether it's semiconductors or lithium-ion batteries or the materials for lithium ion batteries, why not just buy them wherever in the world they could be made for cheapest? Would it not benefit all global consumers if whoever can make those for the cheapest makes them and sells them to everybody else? This is sort of the basic Econ 101 justification for trade, right? For international trade is specialization. Some people can do things cheaper than others. Why do we need to make these things domestically?</p><p>What is the threat exactly of international supply chains which are, it should be pointed out, ubiquitous. Like most of the stuff we get and use in the US. We don't make here. We don't dominate the supply chain. So why in these particular areas do we need to bring mining and processing and manufacturing the whole supply chain into the US.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>So I think there's two broad answers to that question. The first is the rise of China in the global economic system. And the second is the embedded risk that we have now seen made explicit around brittle and just in time supply chains. So let me take the two in order. The first is that that kind of stylized. Let's just try to find the lowest cost producer. Again, there is a lot that we shouldn't look through and we should harvest in that basic intuition. But one of the things that it misses is that over the course of the last 20 years, China's rise in the global economy has been achieved through non market economic means in many instances.</p><p>And so the Chinese economic model, where you either steal or expropriate technology, use significant non-market subsidies and other tools to build capacity to then dominate particular industries, is a constructive challenge to that basic model. And there are some clear national security implications where there are technologies that we believe, for national security reasons, we need to deny in certain instances.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can I press on that just a little bit? Because this is I find that a lot of people refer to the danger of China dominating, say, the lithium-ion battery supply chain in those terms, sort of vaguely like it's national security. It's a threat. And I find it all a little hand-wavy. So I just like to hear what concretely do we think China would or could do? Like, China selling us a bunch of stuff? That's a two way relationship. It hurts them also if they cut us off from buying the stuff they're making so tangibly, what do we worry China might do?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Right? So, look, and I think you're right that it's important that we be specific in these contexts and in our policy to avoid broad-brush characterizations. First, there are certain direct military applications for cutting edge technology that we have to be particularly aware of. And without going into the kind of detail that I shouldn't. If you look at, for example, the export control regime that we have put in place for leading-edge semiconductor technology, we are trying to be quite intentional about being specific and tailored and targeted in those purposes, but in controlling some leading-edge, the most sort of advanced chip technology because of its direct use application, in particular military applications.</p><p>Okay, so that's one category. There's a second category about the fact that if part of the Chinese model is to employ slave labor or to violate basic rights and norms, that you don't want to be reliant on a dominant supplier where the basic technological capacity to produce key inputs is subject to those outcomes. And so the upstream solar supply chain is a good example of this. Right. Where over the course of the last decade plus, because of a variety of different means and tools, China dominates those markets and does so in ways that we can't rely.</p><p>It creates instability because we can't rely on a producer, where if the production is only done as a function of unacceptable basic human behavior, then the technology and the capacity doesn't exist elsewhere to pivot. And you've created an acute supply chain vulnerability.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I guess another way of putting that is if there's only one producer, none of the buyers have any leverage over the producer, basically.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>That's right. And that's why I think that the second piece of where I think conceptually why we should care is this notion of supply chain resilience. And one of the things that we did when we first came into office, the first month it was February of 2021 was the president issues an executive order to identify the key supply chains and do a full forensic analysis of where the vulnerabilities and the chokes points were, where you had the dynamic you just described of one dominant technological owner or one dominant supplier, where you might create those types of vulnerabilities.</p><p>Right? And the answer to those questions is not and should not always be that you just need to bring every one of those supply chains to the United States and have the production happening here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I assuming you even could do that.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Because it's neither feasible nor advisable to try to have all of it in the United States. But at the same time, there's clear lessons and clear outcomes where having homegrown industrial capacity and the technological and the innovation benefits that come from that is an absolute necessity. So there are areas like leading-edge semiconductor production where we in the United States do need to have that homegrown capacity to produce and the technological spillovers that come from that. That does not mean that the goal is that the United States is going to produce all or even most of the leading-edge semiconductors that are produced in the United States.</p><p>But once you have that capacity and you have more diversification of players who are capable of doing it, you're reducing your vulnerability. And that's true of the upstream battery supply chain, of the solar supply chain as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's mainly about resilience and national security.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I think you are right, and it is right to push policymakers to be specific rather than vague about the applications in those contexts because there is a risk, as you say, of just sort of justifying any particular market intervention on those terms. But I think that because of the work in the analysis that we've done, at least in the areas where we have taken seriously and put into place industrial strategy policies, I think that we can demonstrate what does resilience mean? Right? What does it mean? What is the goal in terms of trying to get leading-edge semiconductor production here into the United States?</p><p>And certainly as we go and we implement and execute, we should be held to account, to actually identifying those goals and then seeing if we are meeting them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about those cases? And it does seem like there could be cases where industrial strategy is in some tension with climate strategy. And so, as an example, let's take these EV credits in the IRA. They are the new version. The new generation of EV credits are tied to some pretty strict domestic content requirements and domestic manufacturing requirements, arguably so strict that no one meets them yet. So it seems like, intuitively, I can see how that's good for industrial strategy, maybe even good for the US economy and good for resilience to manufacture and do more of that stuff onshore.</p><p>But it also seems like, intuitively, that's going to slow down the spread of EVs in the US. If we are putting a speed bump, basically between us and us adoption of EVs from a climate perspective, you just want to lower emissions as fast as possible, as much as possible, the cheapest, fastest way you can. And this is not the cheapest, fastest way. Right? Deliberately it's not. It's got an eye to resilience and redundancy. So how do you think through that tension?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>I actually think that to have a durable, effective climate strategy that also operates with the urgency that the issue deserves, you have to factor in this concept of resilience or you're not going to succeed across longer periods of time. And I think the upstream solar supply chain example that we were just discussing illustrates that. If the idea into the current global market with the reality of how China and other actors operate, is that a narrow, fastest, cheapest without any factoring in anything else mentality results in China dominating key input components. To the degree that there is no other producer, then it's not a durable strategy to reduce emissions over the time period that we need to do this.</p><p>Because even as we act with urgency, this is a project that is going to operate across the next two decades and longer. And so I think that you need to have strategies that are focused on driving down those costs as quickly as feasible, but factoring in that cost reductions into brittle and unreliable supply chains are not actually going to deliver those cost reductions in a reliable way over longer time frames. So the electric vehicle credit example that you raised, again, the legislative process is imperfect, and there's lots of ways in which the bills are imperfect.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's the kindest way I've ever heard it described.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Well, I had a but there, which is the status quo prior to the enactment of this law, was that the credits had a very different structure whereby many of the leading electric vehicle producers had grown themselves out of getting any credit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>And so the status quo ante was not unmitigated credits everywhere. This approach sets a different bar. Not once you sell 200,000 vehicles, you no longer get a credit. And instead it sets the bar of saying, can you move more quickly to try to get to more resilient supply chains? And while I recognize that that does have some of the impacts that you're describing, I will also say, having talked to a number of the companies that operate in this space, a number have said to me, look, I'll be honest. When this bill was in its final drafting stages, we were incredibly concerned about all of this.</p><p>And in the weeks and months afterward, it has totally changed our behavior. We are reorienting. We are investing in particular ways. Interesting things that we thought were hard or impossible may still be hard, but we're now making them possible. And so, look, we'll have to see. And as I said, I wouldn't claim that we've got that element or some other elements perfect, but it's a high bar to drive toward a different goal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Looking back on this in ten years, say, do you think our move to onshore some of the supply chain will look faster and easier than we anticipated in advance?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Look, I think any strategy to address the climate crisis today needs to do at least two things. One, is have a credible way to massively drive down the cost curves of deployable technologies to decarbonize the power sector, the transportation sector, the built environment, et cetera. And two, to do so in a way that creates resilient supply chains for the input components for all of that building that we're going to need. And that the strategy that will succeed in really driving the mission direction we need. We'll have to have both of those components. And so I am hopeful that because of the action that we have taken over the last two years, we've given the United States now a historic set of tools to achieve both of those outcomes and to achieve both those outcomes at a scale and a speed that many would have thought was not possible even a couple of years ago.</p><p>That doesn't guarantee success in the outcome, but it certainly puts us in a very different position than we were a couple of years ago.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's turn a bit and talk about one of our favorite subjects here on Volts, namely administrative capacity. I would say that serious industrial strategy needs administrative capacity, right? It's almost axiomatic. And so Rob Meyer had a piece in the New York Times recently, sort of making the case that the recent US ambitions, as expressed by these three bills, especially IRA, are somewhat exceeding our administrative capacity. In Germany, for instance, you have government departments that work very closely with certain industrial sectors, sort of hand in glove to do some planning and to adapt along the way to see what those sectors need.</p><p>We don't really have that. And tax credits are kind of a blunt instrument, a blunt force tool, I guess. We have the Loan Programs Office in DOE, which is doing amazing things under Jigar. But our administrative capacity in the federal government in the US seems to have withered a little bit over the last several decades of this kind of neoliberal period we've been going through. Do you think we have the administrative capacity necessary to do something of this scale and speed?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Well, look, I appreciate the challenge, and Rob and I went back and forth on, I think what his thoughtful New York Times speaks to this effect. I think the answer is that we need to build that administrative capacity. But the one thing that we can't do is we can't wait for the chicken to produce the egg at the stylized utopia where the United States builds all the administrative capacity necessary for this kind of big national project and then and only then gets to passing the legislation is not only not how our political system works, but the intensity of the need for speed on clean energy and climate change doesn't really give us the luxury of doing that. But I would say do we need to build more administrative capacity across the board?</p><p>Yes. Are we making big strides and innovating in new ways? Yes. You mentioned LPO and the work that Secretary Granholm and Jigar are doing. There are other great examples of that. We've stood up a joint program office between the Department of Transportation and the Department of Energy to do electric vehicle charging implementation across the country and showing how do you actually build the administrative capacity to get two different agencies to work together with 50 states to coordinate to actually do that. So yes, we are building that car while we charge it or whatever the right analogy is.</p><p>But we're showing good results. A lot of people said you're never going to get all 50 states to even apply for this because some don't even have the capacity to do so. But through an iterative process of building capacity at the federal level, building capacity at the state level, we just yesterday, we're recording this on the 16th, yesterday released the Electric Vehicle guidance for how we're going to get interoperability standards. We worked with key companies, including Tesla around them, announcing for the first time to open up parts of their network. These things need to work together.</p><p>But I think the right answer to that constructive challenge is how do we build this at the same speed and urgency that we need to address the issue. Last point, I'll say you made the point about tax credits. Tax credits are blunt, but they can be enormously effective in the American system. Right. We're going to do this in the American system in a way that is different than some of the European models and otherwise. And having long term technology neutral tax incentives is among the most powerful and efficient ways to give private capital providers the incentive to pull forward investment.</p><p>And we know that that investment is among the most powerful ways to drive cost curves down and it also requires less administrative capacity to your point. So, I wouldn't discount that, even as I agree that there are a number of places where we need to build up that capability and we need to do it quickly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, but by no means do I want to bad mouth tax credits — they made the point many times. They are the quiet workhorses of the progress made thus far. They don't get as much attention and argument and sort of team sports as you get around other policies, but they've been in the background for decades now, just chugging away with demonstrable results. So, administrative capacity is one aspect of implementation, but implementation of course, is a broader subject, a big thorny subject. There's a common critique of sort of people on the left that they fight and fight and get a bill passed and then they go home and watch Netflix.</p><p>And of course with something big like this, three big bills like this, all the devil is in the details in the implementation. So I'm sort of curious how you think about trying to avoid what Leah Stokes calls in her great book "The Fog of Implementation". Sort of just curious what are your worries implementation-wise? What are you worried could go wrong and how are you thinking about just following up and making sure this is done well?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, I think one of the key elements is to maintain consistent leadership and urgency from the president, from the White House, from the key leaders across federal agencies, and to make sure that there is a consistent effort to try to connect the technical and the programmatic implementation with concrete outcomes that people can see in their lives and in their communities.</p><p>And obviously that's important from a political perspective, but I actually think it's quite important in maintaining the kind of culture and dynamic to avoid that fog of implementation that there needs to be a kind of urgency to being able to say if we are undertaking a national project to eliminate lead pipes in 10 million homes and 400,000 schools, that everyone involved in that process, from the EPA administrator down to the regional EPA offices down to the state grantees and onward understand that there are targets and metrics and milestones and you want to go into communities and you want to be able to show and demonstrate when that is happening because that's going to keep people forward, leaning forward rather than leaning back. Other big things that will keep me up at night issues is we do need to reform and change the way that we do permitting.</p><p>That's not just an issue of federal permitting, it's state and local. And the other thing is, I do think that there's a need to, at the grassroots and the community level, help connect and unlock the enthusiasm and the openness to recognize that a particular investment, again, be it in a wind farm or a small scale nuclear facility or in a rail corridor, is actually connected to this larger project. And there's not only an openness and acceptance, but an enthusiasm around trying to move more quickly rather than putting up roadblocks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about workforce? I hear from all over these days like, we don't have enough electricians, we don't have enough plumbers, we don't have enough sort of trade. We're moving into this period where there's going to be a frenzy of building and construction work and just the need for trade labor and we seem short on it. How much do you worry about that and what sort of things are the Feds doing to kind of help with that?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>It's an enormous priority. And for this year 2023 and next year 2024, connecting more people with these new job and career opportunities has got to be a top priority of implementation, I would say. While I recognize and I hear often the concern, I also think a lot of people are missing how much opportunity there is there because for the first time, and this is to go back to our very early conversation about sort of secular stagnation dynamics of having output below potential, we have a dynamic now where incentives are really aligned. Private companies are prepared to invest in job training and invest in paying workers and showing them that there are career paths and opportunities.</p><p>And so a lot of the opportunity is making sure that we are connecting those employers with the training providers that we know work effectively and efficiently, community colleges, union registered apprenticeship programs, et cetera, and then going and being proactive about reaching out to workers and communities that may have been overlooked. Right. So we are looking to try to get a million more women working in the trades and in construction than we've had in this country. And there's extraordinary job opportunities, extraordinary career opportunities. And I think one of the reasons why you see such a gender split is that employers and trainers in that space have either explicitly or implicitly built these things in ways that they haven't reached out to those communities.</p><p>And so we're going to have to be creative about doing things like that. But I think this also creates a lot of opportunity to bring more people into these trades and to do so in a way where you're giving them more upward mobility as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Another big subject that I know you probably had to address a bunch, but I would like to just grapple with a little bit are the sort of foreign policy / trade implications of all this. It looks to me like these three bills represent a pretty explicit pivot away from the sort of free trade consensus that has reigned in US politics in both parties really for decades now. And you see sort of trade partners in South Korea and Europe kind of freaking out about this a little bit. They're calling the stuff in the IRA "protectionism". They're sort of threatening protectionist policies of their own.</p><p>Are you worried that this sort of dramatic disruption of the free trade status quo is going to run afoul of some longtime trade relationships? Do you worry about this sort of global trade regime holding together amidst this?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>I don't. And here's why: The first is that the Inflation Reduction Act itself is going to be enormously beneficial to our trading partners and allies. And I think that we are making real progress with our European partners and others in helping them see and understand that that's the case. And that's because at core, the Inflation Reduction Act reflects two things. One, the United States meeting and stepping up to its obligation to actually meet its clean energy and climate commitments in a credible way, which is a priority that many of our allies, including our European partners but also others, have been urging the United States to do for years.</p><p>And also a commitment to use US taxpayer dollars to dramatically accelerate cost reductions in key next generation clean energy technologies that the world needs in these countries need as well. Now, we also all share the need to have more secure and resilient supply chains to the conversation we're having earlier. And the other, I think key and important part is that we are operating into a sector, we're talking about clean energy in this context where the world is way short supply. So we need dramatically more deployed clean energy technologies and capabilities in the United States. We need that in Europe, we need that in Canada, we need that in Australia, we need that across Asia, we need that everywhere.</p><p>So the United States stepping up and showing a viable scalable model to do so, in a way that will help drive down global costs, and in a way that puts the United States in a credible position to meet our commitments actually creates much more opportunity than constraint. And what it requires is harmonization and effective economic diplomacy and making sure that there is transparency and making sure that we are not doing things that would create unproductive or inefficient subsidy races. But at the core, the United States stepping up and investing in our own industrial capacity in these spaces is first and foremost the right thing to do for our country, the right thing to do for our workers and communities. But it also will have these global benefits as well. And I think that we will, over the course of this year, have a lot of opportunity to actually build partnerships against this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're not worried about sort of like if we put domestic requirements and we put, say, a border adjustment or something like that, and then another nation will do it, and then we'll ramp ours up and they'll ramp theirs up and you will end up in trade wars. That will slow the sort of act as a slowing force on the spread of these technologies. You just don't think that's going to manifest?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Look, I think you're identifying a risk. But I would say from where I sit, both on the substance and the economic diplomacy of this, there is more opportunity than risk in that area. So it's always a risk. It's always a risk that you should take seriously. But if we were having this conversation several years ago, the dominant conversation would be whether, how and in what context could you ever envision building a durable political coalition in the United States to pass any meaningful legislation that would increase clean energy and energy security and do so in a way that would put the United States in a position where it could actually sit at a table with the Europeans and talk credibly about them how to increase global ambition. And that would be the conversation, right? We are in a different conversation that certainly it has risks, but it's a higher class conversation if the goal is how to deploy clean energy globally at scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good problems to have. Another sort of aspect of that similar family of worries is that if the US follows China's lead and starts sort of lavishly subsidizing its own industry and the EU follows, the US. Starts lavishly subsidizing its own industries, these developed nations sort of look inward. There's a worry sort of floating around that developing nations will end up sort of getting screwed, not getting the investment they need. So how do you sort of balance the need, which you've laid out here, for the US. To invest in itself, for a bunch of reasons, with the parallel need for developed nations to invest in helping developing nations build capacity themselves and lower their own emissions?</p><p>Do you think those are in tension at all?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>I don't think they need to be, and in fact, I think that they can operate together. But you're right to absolutely raise the issue. Look, I think it is incredibly important for the credibility of global climate progress for the United States to be able to credibly meet its own commitments. And that's important for developing as well as developed countries, number one. Number two, the United States being a place where we are investing taxpayer money to drive down technologies that will be particularly important in deployed applications in developing economies means that developing economies can also benefit from driving down those cost curves as well.</p><p>But I think it also goes to the need for the United States and other countries together to continue to increase our game in building partnerships with key developing countries to demonstrate that we can together bring climate finance at very significant scale into their economies to help drive this transition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because that has not been happening, right?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Well, look, I would say there is a model that we need to build on the JETP initiative that we have launched, which stands for Just Energy Transition Partnership with South Africa and Indonesia, the partnership we launched with Egypt at the COP this year. These are models to demonstrate the potential of US investment, lower cost clean energy technologies, policy reforms to create more stable investment environments in these countries, and then the ability to actually bring private capital at scale into big, important projects. That's what it's going to take, but we're going to have to do that at a scale that we have not done yet. But I think the action that we're taking in the United States creates significantly more opportunity for that than constraint.</p><p>Again, it's sort of a similar, I guess I would say a similar story. Much work yet to be done, but we're definitely better positioned having taken the action that we have in the United States than if we hadn't.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Let's talk then about the US being slow. This has been an increasing subject of conversation in liberal circles recently. I'm sure you've heard and seen this idea that US is entering this period where we badly need to rebuild ourselves, our industries, our infrastructure, not just because of climate, just because a lot of it is falling apart. We just have been under investing for a long time. But when we do invest, it's very slow and this manifests in a bunch of different areas. But I'm just curious how you untangle all those factors that are going into making the US building in the US slow and expensive.</p><p>How do you increase the pace without running roughshod over vulnerable communities? The fight over permitting reform did not auger well for this debate. It did not seem to suggest that it was going to be easy to resolve this debate. So just on the big picture level, how do you think about the US. Being slow and expensive and what can the federal level, what can you do to shake that loose?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think it may be the biggest and most significant challenge that we face. And to go to your question about what we at the federal level we can do, we can commit to and then execute on doing business differently. Right. So we need to have the kind of accountability and transparency around project timelines that we have not always had in the past. We need to deploy efficiencies and creativity and innovation that we know is out there, but deploy it at a much broader scale. Some things that sound very simple, like we have a program called Dig Once, right, where we are coordinating between road projects and broadband projects and transmission projects.</p><p>So that if we're going to have a right of way, we should be trying to operate all of the digging projects that we're going to do as much as we possibly can in the same right of way at the same time. Now that sounds simple, but actually it's an innovation that if deployed, can have a geometric impact on speed. But then there's also more sophisticated design, technological approaches that we can use and we can borrow from other countries and we can do things like you had mentioned, labor. One of the things on these big complicated projects that project sponsors are finding is having a project labor agreement working up front to actually demonstrate how you're going to make sure that you've got the right people on the right time to do the work that is needed in a quality way.</p><p>Helps to reduce bottlenecks, helps to reduce cost overruns and time overruns. And so those are all things that we at the federal government can do, we've got to do in a more systematic way and at scale. Having legislation that would give some key reforms to the permitting process would help on that score. But there is also a lot that we can keep doing and working. And you made a really important point. We have to demonstrate that we can do all of this in a way that also builds more fairly than we have in the past. And so there's nothing simple about that project.</p><p>But we do have I often hear these conversations about permitting that move immediately to a certain sense of defeatism. Well, the United States just moves slowly and things cost a lot and therefore this is all going to go sideways. And I think we can point to practical examples of success and then we need to build on those.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the big bottlenecks in terms of building, in terms of things going slowly is transmission and energy, long distance transmission famously holding back the rest of the clean energy economy and it's just very difficult to build. There's landowner NIMBYs, there's state NIMBYs county NIMBYs, there's baroque bureaucracy on and on. There was some stuff in the Infrastructure Act, I believe, that did some good on transmission, a little bit in IRA. The permitting reform didn't end up going through. So that was the biggest thing. So I'm curious now that sort of the period of legislating is probably over what tools are left in the Biden administration's toolbox that can shake loose transmission and get that moving.</p><p>Do you guys have ideas on that score?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>We do. It's a great question. It's a super important policy. We've been working hard at this. I don't want to get too far ahead of where we will be,and our agencies will be shortly. But I think I could say that I think you'll see from us shortly that there are tools within our existing authority, under existing statutes that will allow us to very significantly prioritize and streamline the process at the federal level in terms of agency approvals and also use our federal authorities in ways that create stronger and more significant incentives for not only project sponsors, but also states and localities, municipalities to operate in line as well.</p><p>And one of the things that to go back to the culture point that I was making earlier, one of the things that we have now, ever since the infrastructure bill passed, is Secretary Granholm. She's got it, she's trying to make it famous, this map where she's got the transmission lines that need to get built right and they need to get built and they need to get built at scale. And to the point about success, we can already identify that there are a handful on that map that have moved from yellow to green and are moving forward in a way that was not true a year ago or even six months ago. But these additional authorities, I think you'll see us moving out on in the course of the next couple of months will give us more to work with and I think make 2023 a year where we can really accelerate on that front.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sweet. One other follow up on the slowness question another big area of congestion is housing. This is also a hot topic lately. I think it feels like it's become more and more clear to more and more people that constraints on housing in high economic opportunity areas is not just a local issue. It is in the aggregate having serious macroeconomic effects on the US. It is a serious in other words, it is a serious nationwide problem, not just sort of quirk of coastal states. What, if anything, can the feds do? Because so much of that is local or state.</p><p>Are there levers available at the federal level that can shake that mess loose a little bit?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>I'm so glad you raised this question. It's a hugely important issue and we have a housing supply crisis in the United States, which is a crisis that has developed over the course of years, basically going back to the Great Financial Crisis. And if we don't build more supply of affordable and dense housing, then we get exactly the dynamics that you just described and it's harder for people to move to opportunity and find affordable places to live.</p><p>We have been dogged on this issue and there's a couple of things that we can do. The first is that we can build into some of our existing federal grant programs and new federal grant programs in the investments in infrastructure and otherwise incentives that says that if localities actually have more coherent land use and zoning policies that encourage this type of building, then that's going to be a plus up for them in receiving federal grants for something like, for example, public transportation, which makes a lot of sense if you think about it, which is we shouldn't be spending federal dollars on public transportation into an environment where they're not going to build coherent housing.</p><p>Secretary Buttigieg has done this in a couple of ways, but we've never done before and we're now franchising that to other grant programs. The second is we could pass legislation. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit and something called the Neighborhood Homes Tax Credit. Bipartisan support for these pieces of legislation that provide incentives for people to build dense rental, multifamily and single family housing, again in areas where they have local land use policies that encourage this type of building. And there's bipartisan support for that type of legislation. I know that there have been conversations across time of trying to advance this.</p><p>Both of those steps are things that we could do. You are right that the decisions operate in many cases at the state or the local level, but we can provide a powerful incentive to encourage and invest in those communities that are doing the right thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Could have done a whole pod on politics but I mostly left that out. But I'm just curious. Looking back now, it seems striking that Democrats went into this latest session heads full of extremely ambitious dreams. The original Build Back Better Bill was robust. Let's say it had a little bit of everything in it over time. We just saw that get stripped down and stripped down and stripped down but somehow the climate piece, the clean energy piece, survived more or less intact through that entire sausage making process. What are we to make of that? Does it all just come down to sort of like whether Joe Manchin woke up on the right side of the bed or are there larger political lessons to be learned from the sort of resilience of this one piece of the Democratic agenda?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>One of the takeaways that I have is that it has been important for us to change the policy and the political approaches to trying to radically and dramatically build clean energy capacity in the United States. And that one of the important parts of how President Biden has approached this. And frankly, Democrats in Congress — and a lot of Republicans too — is to focus on this as about building our capacity, our manufacturing capacity and our energy security by dint of having more homegrown, affordable, reliable energy and to do that and to build a strategy that can achieve very significant climate ambition. But it is based fundamentally on that investment opportunity.</p><p>And that has, I hope and expect, will be an important takeaway over the last couple of years is that even as this process has been challenging and winding across time, if you look across the infrastructure bill as well as the CHIPS bill, but also, obviously, the Inflation Reduction Act. What you see is that these types of investment approaches have a lot of salience. And they have a lot of salience because they're focused on places and people and giving people economic opportunity and helping to drive significant emissions reductions across the country. But based on that core opportunity, I think that is very different from the political conversation that we had in 2009 and 2010 on this issue.</p><p>It's different than the conversations we've even had over the course of the decade since and I'm hopeful that it will lead to a more durable political environment for us to drive forward these policy pieces that are going to be hugely important for our economy and our country and our planet in the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You are credited alongside Chuck Schumer with bringing Manchin around. I don't suppose you want to give us any secret insight on what was the magic key, the magic phrase, what sort of sorcery achieved that?</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>No. Look, Joe Manchin is an independent thinker, independent minded guy. And he has spent an enormous amount of time thinking about these issues. And he has always, throughout this process, prioritized the importance of energy security and moving on the climate goals and the climate priorities that we needed to move with a focus on American capacity and energy security. And I think that he always brought a ton of insight into what was necessary. And a lot of this was about listening and understanding and understanding places where we had principal disagreements, but at the end of the day, trying to get at those core issues where the policies themselves were less at odds.</p><p>And so Senator Manchin always has and always will operate independently based on his own principles. But I was fortunate enough to be part of this process, part of a team to ultimately get us to the finish line. It was a long process, that's for sure, but better for the country that we're on the other side of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just in terms of being placed kind of at the center of history and seeing things unfold. It's been quite a two years you've lived through there at the center of everything, so I hope you're able to catch up on some sleep.</p><p><strong>Brian Deese</strong></p><p>Well, thank you for that. And I hope that we can continue to have these conversations about what I think are a set of incredibly important climate and clean energy challenges, but also a really high class set of challenges compared to where we were a couple of years ago. And so that's what leaves me pretty fundamentally optimistic about all this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please. Consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/meet-the-author-of-bidens-industrial</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:103212020</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/103212020/6ace7519dae080746ca40ad9ab84c40e.mp3" length="42962933" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3580</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/103212020/8399a73e99464b1b8a238cd25c51e3c8.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The digital circuit breaker and why it matters]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>The lowly circuit breaker was first patented by Thomas Edison and hasn’t been updated much since — until Atom Power CEO Ryan Kennedy came along and made a digital version. In this episode, he describes the basics of the digital circuit breaker, the ways it’s making a difference in the EV charging market, and its gamechanging potential.</em> </p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADG4JuaIzRIfpGwKgwvUJ_8a/volts23.02.17%28ryan.kennedy%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/the-digital-circuit-breaker-and-why-it-matters"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There is perhaps no building block of the electricity grid more fundamental, ubiquitous, and overlooked than the humble circuit breaker. Every electronic device that is attached to the grid runs through a circuit breaker, a device that automatically shuts off current in the case of a fault or surge.</p><p>Currently, though they have become extremely reliable, circuit breakers still rely on technology that was patented by Thomas Edison. They operate purely through electromechanical forces, with no digital control.</p><p>My guest today, Ryan Kennedy, is the first person to develop, patent, pass UL testing with, and commercialize a <em>digital</em> circuit breaker. It is solid state — that is, it has no moving parts — and current is controlled entirely through semiconductors.</p><p>In addition to being faster and safer than electromechanical equivalents, each digital circuit breaker contains within it its own firmware and software, which can be programmed to emulate, and thereby replace, any number of other software-driven devices like demand management systems, load controllers, meters, and surge protectors.</p><p>Kennedy's company, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.atompower.com/">Atom Power</a>, is currently focused on the electric-vehicle charging market, offering smart load balancing and management from a centralized circuit board, replacing the need for complicated hardware and software in the EV chargers themselves.</p><p>But the ultimate applications for a digital circuit breaker are endless. Everywhere they are attached, a grid becomes a smart grid and appliances become smart appliances. If even a substantial fraction of today's circuit breakers could be replaced with digital equivalents, it would bring unprecedented visibility and control to millions of distributed energy devices, enabling all sorts of sophisticated demand management.</p><p>I was extremely geeked to talk to Kennedy about the basics of circuit breakers, their application to EV charging, and the many possibilities that lie beyond.</p><p>Alright, then. Ryan Kennedy, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>David, thank you for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is awesome. I'm so interested in this widget and its possibilities, but I think to help people get their heads around it. Before we get too deep into anything, let's just start at the most basic level. For those of us who were humanities majors and never took any electrical engineering or anything, let's just talk about what is a circuit breaker. I know people are very vaguely aware of circuit breakers. They are in a circuit box in your garage. Occasionally, your power goes out, and you wander out to your garage and flip switches around and try to see what works.</p><p>But, I think that's probably the extent of most people's knowledge. So let's just start there.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Circuit breakers, electrically speaking, are one of the oldest products on the market. They first were invented, at least patented by Thomas Edison to show you how far back they go. But, they're effectively a method of interrupting the flow of electricity when things go wrong. Too much current, short circuits, things like that. The purpose of the circuit breaker is to simply open the circuit when those things happen and protect from fire, primarily.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And, presumably, protecting the appliances and the things on the other end of the wire, too right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Generally, that's the assumption, though I don't know that it's necessarily the explicit purpose. I think the more explicit purpose is to prevent fire. That could mean your equipment may go bad, in the process, but generally speaking, to prevent fire and hazardous conditions from electricity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so, every appliance, or device, or anything that uses electricity from the grid is connected to the grid through a circuit breaker. Is that true? Is that a universal rule?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>That's right. Actually, the easiest way to visualize that is to think about the home or apartment, where you have a panel with breakers in it that typically open the front door and you can see breakers in there, and you flip switches and things go wrong. So basically, you have a big power feed from the utility that comes into that home to that panel, and then out of that panel, power gets distributed through each one of those little circuit breakers out to individual loads in your home, such as hot water, HVAC, lights, receptacles. That scales out. Commercial buildings and industrial buildings and data centers are the exact same thing.</p><p>I mean, there's more breakers, and they often get bigger, but it's the exact same architecture across the entire planet. Or the circuit breaker always is the thing that sits in front of the thing that consumes energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so, the purpose of these things is to basically shut off current if something goes wrong. How do they do that currently?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>There's a couple of different ways, but the most predominant way is it gets into a little bit of engineering speak. So I'll try not to dive too deep, but basically, it's through thermals and magnetics. So, there's kind of two situations you would have. Let's just pick on the home a little bit because the same problems scale upward to commercial, industrial buildings. When you say, plug in way too many things into the outlet, the breaker will trip. And that's tripped through thermals, means that too much current is flowing, things get hot, and some expansion happens inside of the circuit breaker. And, mechanically speaking, it flips a spring, and causes the breaker to open.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's not a heat sensor. It's literally the heat expands something physical, and the physical change trips something.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>It literally expands the metal inside of the breaker to open it up. That's what happens. The second, there's two methods—that was thermal—the second is called magnetic. That mechanism, it operates physically the same way. The actual springs and levers inside of the breaker open up the same way. But what causes it is different. So, magnetic happens when you have, say, a short circuit. Don't do this at home, but if you took one of your wires from your home and just put it into a pool. Lots of current flow all of a sudden, really really fast. That's called a short circuit.</p><p>And you don't want to wait for things to heat up because that's when really bad things happen. So what happens is an enormous amount of current starts flowing through that circuit breaker, creates a pretty quick magnetic field that basically pushes the metals apart inside of the breaker to open it up, as well. So it's very much a passive device in the sense that there's nothing in them that say, oh, that's that, or this is that, so, therefore, I need to do this. It's a reaction of the metals inside of the product itself. It's quite an old technology, actually.If you open up the circuit breaker, it looks like a mousetrap condensed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, tiny little mousetrap that's basically set off by heat or a magnetic field. You think about electricity these days. You think about all our sort of digital devices and digital controls. And it's a little bit wild that on every single line going to every single device, there's this mousetrap, just so old fashioned. That always struck me. It's so weirdly old fashioned. A little piece of metal with, like, springs on it that springs shut to cut off your electricity. So it's very mechanical. Let's say electromechanical, as you say.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yes, very established technology that is, in today's world, relatively ancient from a technological standpoint. But, to achieve those basic results of circuit protection, they work. The basic results of circuit protection.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And it's passive, as we say, just responds to perturbations, and, I guess you would say, dumb, in that, it doesn't know there's no awareness of what's happening or why it's happening. It's just metal expands, it flips, it cuts off.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>That's correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there must be millions and millions and millions of these things. I mean, if there's one of these things between every electrical load and the grid, there must be billions out there in the world.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Likely, yes. I think your first number was correct. Millions and millions and millions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what you've done is make a digital circuit breaker, which works differently than the electromechanical. So why don't we just start with if it's not a physical reaction, if it's not a physical thing happening inside this digital circuit breaker, what is happening? How does it work?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>We can dive into the technical and how it works, and then it'd be good to talk about kind of why we're doing that. So first, the technical. And the reason I say that is because, well, breakers work. Why do anything to them? Right? But technically speaking, what we've done is we've created a digital circuit breaker. More specifically, we call that a solid state circuit breaker. What that is is saying, hey, instead of using mechanics or mechanical devices, meaning like metal on metal, the things we just talked about to conduct electricity through a breaker, let us use semiconductors instead.</p><p>So semiconductors are a broad ranging topic, but basically means that you can control current with a small digital input much like you can on your phone or computer, et cetera. But scale that up to power and say well, let's make a circuit breaker with semiconductors so that you can now interrupt, in the case of protection, the circuits when bad things happen with semiconductors instead of mechanics. With that, we overlay. So, what happens when you go to a semiconductor approach? It is very much an analog, as if you said what's the difference in a rotary phone versus a smartphone?</p><p>It's making that leap all at once. Because now with digital control being semiconductor control at the breaker, it means that you can now put smart things inside of the breaker and make it do things and add value that it typically didn't have. That's what we're doing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I just want to stress on the core function of shutting off current in danger. Even on that core function, it's faster. It's better and faster than a mechanical device. Is that right?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>That's correct. By multiple orders of magnitude. So to give you an idea, we are, roughly speaking, about 3,000 times faster than most mechanical breakers in the market. That equates to two things. One is safety. There's some old footage of us, that we don't do so much anymore, of slapping hot wires together to kind of show that safety function. Don't try that at home either. So that's one thing which is actually quite important when you scale into larger buildings because there's more energy and more utility and short circuits can be explosive events. So it definitely helps in that regard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you say conventional circuit breakers work, but we should note that there are faults, there are fires, there are arc—what do they call them? Arc.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Arc flash.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Whatever—yeah. They're not 100%.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>That's right. What's interesting about—not so much in residential although this can't happen in residential—but when you scale up to, like, the larger buildings, commercially in the industrial space and especially in data centers where the utility services are very large, you can have catastrophic events from short circuits that are balls of fire. Now, the breakers will open, but that doesn't mean a ball of fire didn't happen in the process. Right. So that does happen. I mean, in the worst case in my in my past life, I used to design buildings and also worked for, you know, a contracting firm.</p><p>So I've seen, particularly in one instance in a high rise building where there was a short circuit in the electrical room on, like, the 19th or 20th floor, and it blew the doors off of the electrical room. And these are like commercial grade steel doors that got blown off the electrical room. So it's an amazing force that can be had when you get into the bigger buildings. But, I digress a little bit. It certainly eliminates that problem. Let's put it that way. Go into a semiconductor just purely based on speed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's just because a digital signal travels at the speed of light. Right. And it's just faster than any mechanical reaction.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yeah, inherently a semiconductor is going to be, like I said, including propagation delays and things like that within the compute and sensing, we're around 3000 times. And to give you an idea, that's in the microsecond range as opposed to millisecond range or millisecond spurl in the case of mechanical circuit breakers. Now, okay, micro milli. But electricity does move virtually at the speed of light. So arc flash propagates not quite that quick but pretty quick. Whereas that time really really matters. So yeah, the impact to the safety is effectively arc flash just doesn't happen on the output of our product, even in the largest utility services.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you get the basic function of the circuit breaker is faster and better. But then, as you say, you have this device that has semiconductors in it and you can put other stuff in there too. So maybe just describe like, I know what a circuit breaker looks like. It sort of fits in the slot in my circuit box, so I have the vague idea kind of what it looks like. What does your thing look like? Is it the same size? Does it, what is it composed of? What does it look like?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Today, what we have on the market doesn't look so much like what you would see in your home. It looks more the size of a commercial grade circuit breaker. So can't fit in the residential panel yet, with a strong emphasis on yet, but we do have a similar form factor of commercial grade circuit breakers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And is that just the difficulty of shrinking down little computers and stuff? I mean, is it that simple?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Not quite the compute, it's more the power semiconductors that actually do the switching. So we're on this incredible curve that probably could take up a large portion of this conversation but also simplify it to basically mean that the world of power semiconductors is advancing quite under the hood actually of everything else that's happening. Power semiconductors are what enable electric vehicles to be as efficient and as effective as they are. Power conversion and solar—UPS has lots of things power conversion related. They are advancing at a pretty rapid rate from a power density standpoint. Power density meaning like how much power you can actually pack into that power semiconductor.</p><p>So power density is going up, size is getting smaller. That plays into our own internal strategy as a company to optimize the form factor in the coming couple of years to where it becomes much more of a universal product that can fit into existing panel boards. But today, we have—it looks like a small box that fits into our—we manufacture panel boards as well, so you don't have to figure that out, but we figured all that out for you. Make panel boards, circuit breakers, everything as a whole system.</p><p>I always say that there's two major components to a solid state breaker. There's a brain and a heart. The brain is the control system, the stuff that software defined, that makes the thing work, provides cybersecurity, things like this. And then there's the heart, which is the power semiconductor that the control system attaches to. Yeah, very much like a phone, in a way, in the sense you have a brain, you have a heart and a phone as well. And that combination creates a pretty powerful component. And electrically speaking, that's what we're doing in this space is really enabling far more than we used to.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So maybe one way to think about it is that electromechanical, old school circuit breakers, only had hearts. And now you've added a brain to the equation.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>You could see it that way. Yeah, absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so if all these things are digital and if everyone has a little computer in it, basically, if we could think of these as tiny, tiny, tiny little smartphones, I know one thing that comes to people's mind whenever I discuss digitizing anything is security, cybersecurity. So if your power in your home or your commercial building or whatever, if every bit of it is running through a tiny little computer, people, I think, naturally wonder, like, what happens if they get hacked or someone takes over, can control the power flow through my entire building, et cetera, et cetera. So how do you deal with security?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Ultimately, circuit breakers are life safety devices. That's the core function. That's the phone call and the phone right? It has to make the phone call.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>So we're life safety devices. So when you shift from purely hardware to software defined hardware, in any industry, the right approach is that cybersecurity is the number one priority in software. That's been our approach the whole time. Now, there's a couple of ways to dice that. One is to say, the way we describe it is, there's Stuxnet and then there's hackers. And so we want to guard against both, and we call it Stuxnet as in, if you know what that is, that was the uranium enrichment thing that read all about that some other time. But the point is, in that case, the biggest threat is to make a critical device be something that it's not supposed to be or do something that it's not supposed to do.</p><p>So that is priority one to say, okay, above all things, the breaker can't be made to be something that is fundamentally not and create an unsafe condition. So how we're attacking that is really good. I'll just tell you that, There's some secret sauce there that effectively amount to there's built in safeties that are still digital, but you basically can't get into under any circumstance. So that's priority one. And then the next priority says, okay, well, if we solve that, which we have, then the next one is to say, well, how do we keep folks from coming in and just say, shutting power off or doing funny things.</p><p>Shutting power off is probably the number one funny thing there. But how do we prevent that? So, I'd like to say that in the world of software, there's this standard out there, and you follow that standard and you're good. That is not the case with cybersecurity for anybody. It's always evolving, and you're always trying to tackle it and address issues as we go along. But the core things that we do is end encryption on both software and hardware, which means that we have encryption elements physically on the breaker, encryption elements physically on our onsite management tools and cloud software.</p><p>So that's actually quite critical, is to have the physical encryption as well as the software based encryption. There's many ways you could go about cybersecurity in the sense of many different entities have cybersecurity standards, but the one that we're headed towards now is called FedRAMP. That's really the direction we're headed from a standard standpoint. That's to do work for the federal government. Things like this, you have to be FedRAMP compliant or certified. So that's the direction we're headed. We're not certified, yet. We anticipate later this year we will be. But nonetheless, that's kind of how we've addressed it. That is one of those areas that I wish there were this, like, gold star. You got that. So everyone's good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Because there is a gold star in the circuit breaker safety. The heart part, the UL standard is pretty well...</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yeah, UL is kind of our FDA equivalent in the world of circuit breakers. Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And you guys have passed those tests?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>We have. We're the first and only company in the world who have ever done that, for a solid state digital circuit breaker.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And one thing, I don't know if we mentioned this, but this made an impression on me when I first learned about it, so I just want to throw it out there. I think when people think of networked devices, they think it won't work without the network. So it's just worth sort of emphasizing, here, that every one of these circuit breakers has the firmware and the software and the operating system inside it. So it is, in some sense, a self contained little machine like, it does its thing, even absent networking.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yes. We just call that fully autonomous. So, yes, they're fully autonomous devices.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And one more thing I wanted to mention about the move from conventional to digital and circuit breakers is that this eliminates a lot of equipment that traditionally goes around circuit breakers in sort of commercial and high value areas. Sort of safety equipment that kind of gets larded around circuit breakers. So maybe just talk a little bit about that, sort of like the kinds of things that you've consolidated into one device here.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. So it's worth stating that the easy part of the power distribution world or electricity is that, as we said, there's a circuit breaker that sits ahead of everything that consumes energy. The hard part comes in where if you look at, well, what do we actually do with electricity? All electrical things require really three things. So any application of electricity requires protection, visibility, and control. This is related to HVAC, certainly related to EV charging. In the case of HVAC, you have protection in the sense of a circuit breaker that feeds the HVAC system. Inside the HVAC system, you have a control mechanism that actually controls the flow of energy in its own little way. And then you have visibility either through software or through the thermostat. You could say the same thing for basically everything, electrically speaking. EV chargers, certainly same thing. Every EV charger that's been built out there, with the exception of Atom Power, is fed from a breaker, always, inside the EV charger, whether it's a pedestal or wallbox, there's visibility and control. And you could say the same about elevators and many, many other things that we use electricity for.</p><p>So basically the way we look at it is what do we do with electricity? Well, we want to protect it, but we also want visibility and control. So what we've done is basically to say, okay, well, let's offer superior circuit protection, but let's also have the ability to have visibility and control because, well, that's what we do with electricity. All within the circuit breaker. And so I think you asked a sort of broader question like what are we doing that's kind of adding some of those things in. Inherently being a semiconductor device, it's easy to control the flow of energy. As simple as that sounds, that's monumental because it is extraordinarily difficult to make a circuit breaker that can universally control energy. Meaning, universally, as in the home or in the data center, or in a commercial building or industrial building with the same device.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we should pause here, just to add, because I don't know that we ever actually mentioned it, but physical circuit breakers, old school circuit breakers are also designed for a specific voltage, right? They're sort of locked into a specific voltage. Whereas if you're doing it with computing power, you can adjust to different voltages with the same circuit breaker. Is that right?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>So, think of it more as different amperages.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Amperages. Sorry, I get those confused.</p><p>Yeah, it's okay. So if you go to, name your hardware store. If you go there and you go say, "I want to buy breaker." The questions are going—your menu, I should say, is going to be, well, do you want a 15 amp, a 20 amp, a 25, a 30, a 40, 50, 60, etc. And then, you know, you, you buy that product for what it is, say, call it a 30 amp breaker to feed my, I don't know, hot water heater. That's going to be fairly typical. It's always going to be a 30 amp breaker forever and ever and ever. Which means from a UL standpoint and a safety standpoint, you can only put that on 30 amp circuits.</p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>I will say, yeah, that is an interesting benefit that I think evolved along Atom Power's way, which says, well, now that you become a digital circuit breaker, you can effectively be a lot of circuit breakers in one, which is what we do. And you can program our circuit breakers from 15 amp all the way up to 100 amp. And it's you all listed for each increment in between. So that's pretty powerful when you consider, roughly speaking, it depends on your metric. About 90% of the breakers on the planet are 100 amp and less. So we're hitting a huge market with one single product.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>So that's certainly one thing from a protection standpoint, and thank you for reminding me, on that. That is a feature I often gloss ever, and it is unique for what we're doing. But the visibility, obviously, through the software we have and the ability to see the breaker and control the breaker is the other thing. And to be able to tell the breaker what it is. And I think that's the key thesis within Atom Power, which is to say, well, let's not just create a digital breaker, but let's create it in a way to where you can tell the breaker what it is instead of buying a breaker.</p><p>Well, because you have to for protection and then having to buy a specific built appliance for the application that you need to perform, like EV chargers are a strong symptom of that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is a perfect segue here because the first time we talked years ago, I think you were sort of messing around with big commercial facilities and industrial buildings and kind of a little bit all over the place, but you just got $100 million investment to do, specifically EV charging applications. So tell us why all these things we're hearing about digital circuit breakers, why they're specifically well suited to EV charging.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>So you're right about the earlier engagements we had, with great customers, were in the industrial space, primarily. Certainly prior to the investment, we saw a need, a major pain point, when it came to electric vehicle charging at scale. So charging vehicles has been around quite some time. For the longest time, it's been relegated to if it's outside of the home, to be candid, often optics put a couple here, a couple there just to have them. Right. But as we've progressed, particularly in the 2020s, here we are seeing, and we saw this is why we're in this space is we saw this, that there were some major, major problems with charging at scale.</p><p>Meaning like, instead of a few chargers put in hundreds into a single facility or complex, heck, even tens, but certainly in the hundreds, things become really problematic really fast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's fleets. We're talking about basically fleets.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Fleet, multifamily, and hospitality.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yeah, anywhere where you're going to have lots of chargers. But yeah, particularly fleets, always need lots of chargers. Multifamily, as well. So the problems start becoming quite extreme in those cases. To give you an example of what I mean by this, we, we have a project up in Queens that is roughly now it's, you know, close to 700 charging stations that's going into generally the same location that is on the same, you know, substation grid, network, etc. If you do the math on that, you're basically connecting up to between six and 7 megawatts of potential load onto that grid, just in that.</p><p>So appliances don't solve that very well, which is more or less what level two chargers are today. There are appliances that sit in front of the car and you plug it in. When you start talking about that scale, it's really critical that your infrastructure is the smart thing that can actually solve pain points such as, hey, how do we not do that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How do we not have a bunch of cars charging at once and overload basically the substation, because you could fry a substation if everybody like if you had 700 chargers going all at once.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Absolutely. Things like that. Things like me as a customer, how do I not spend the amount of money that you would otherwise spend on the infrastructure alone to make that happen? Meaning transformers, wires, switch gear, things like that. And then, with that much energy, how do you not just say, don't overload the grid, but how do you actually, effectively, energy, manage in real time against things like peak loads, or peak demand, or time of use and keep energy cost as low as you can and charge during the right times of the day and when there's a grid event and things like this.</p><p>All that requires real time infrastructure intelligence.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the EV charge has to be networked with one another. They have to be communicating with one another, basically. Is that not something they can do now? If I'm looking at a fleet with a bunch of chargers today, are the EV chargers just freestanding, isolated, or did they talk to one another now in other ways?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yeah, oftentimes they are. But there's where the problems really started was in the fleet, because that started becoming apparent, right, the more that they were putting in. To answer your question, can EV chargers today, outside of Atom Power, talk to one another and do some level of energy management? The answer is certainly, yes. That's the start of the conversation though, the devil in the detail says, okay, put that in and make it code compliant with our national electrical code and get the inspector to sign off on it and guarantee the billing owner that that's going to operate always, no matter what, safely. There's where things get problematic.</p><p>So, if you are the life safety device and you're already connected and you got to buy a breaker anyway, for each EV charger, things become so easy to do. Now it's built into our panels breakers. It means the National Electrical Code to the t. Inspectors have no problem with it. And there's a lot of things that become super easy all of a sudden. So without going into a ton of complexity, being the infrastructure, being the breaker, being the panel board where the breakers sit, makes it super easy to solve those major pain points with very little effort from the customers' standpoint.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And I think the way to think about this, and kind of what turned the light bulb on for me, is if your intelligence, your software, your coordination, et cetera, is in the circuit breakers that are in the circuit board, that means the EV chargers themselves can be dumb. So that like the things that are out there in the parking lot can just be dumb conduits. Right. Because the control is elsewhere. And this is something that's always struck me about the EV charging space. It's just like you have these, today, you have these like really incredibly complex high power computers sitting out in parking lots. Which always kind of struck me as a little bit insane, that normal customers are interacting so directly with something so expensive and kind of complicated.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Well, you're hitting on the next pain point, which is, again, at scale that becomes very problematic that your most expensive asset in that ecosystem now sits in front of the vehicle, typically outside.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>So the second question outside of the infrastructure cost is how do we not do that? Can the pedestal or wall box be—wallbox not the brand, but box...electrical—can that thing be very low cost, low maintenance, zero maintenance, preferably? Whereas if it did get damaged, really nothing happens, other than I can easily replace it. And the answer is yes, because... Yeah, you're right. And once you become intelligent infrastructure and you sit safely back in the electrical room, the pedestals that have the cord sets on them become very dumb in air quotes. But the system is really smart.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. I'm curious what sorts of things having this kind of central intelligence, controlling multiple EV chargers can do. We mentioned it's going to prevent, whatever, 700 cars from charging at once. That's the kind of baseline it's going to prevent so much power from running through the system that it fries the grid it's on. But what else can you do with that sort of central computer control?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I would say there's a ton, but the highest value ones are going to be certainly in energy management that we've been talking about here that relates more to than just to saying, hey, prevent 700 cars from charging at the same time. It says, hey, you know what, let 700 cars actually charge at the same time, but let's intelligently distribute so that they can all get a charge and not cause major problems and major electrical bills. So that's one, I mean, I would say the other one is it is extremely easy to create a campus environment as well with the system. It kind of relates to what we spoke of earlier. Like the network connectivity is completely different from any other system, as in like it's really easy to do. So it's very easy from a campus wide perspective to say, hey, how do I connect this campus of chargers to a single system, single pane of glass that also does energy management, that also saves on electric bills, things like that. So things become very easy through that network piece.</p><p>There is another element to it that says, well, kind of goes off. The programmable breaker to some degree is when you buy an EV charger today. This is another pain point. Again, at scale, it can sometimes also be a pain point, not at scale, but when you buy one today, it's fixed. In other words, level two charging, which is most of the charging, goes all the way up to 80 amps. All right, so just take that as a number. Well, if you buy a charger, it's going to come in several different flavors. You can get a 24 amp charger, you can get a 32 amp charger, a 40 amp, a 48 amp, and then on rare occasion an 80 amp because 80 amps kind of hard to do for various reasons. There's just less of those.</p><p>But nonetheless, what you buy is what you buy and you're stuck with that. So if you buy a 32 amp charger, which is most of them on the market, that's it. You're not going to get 48 amp, you know, that a Tesla needs. You're not going to get 80 amp. That a Ford f 150 needs. You got 32. So you're probably picking up this a little bit, that with a programmable breaker now, on the other hand, what I can do is we can just simply go the full range of charging through the same product.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>You're buying a full level two now, regardless. You just tell it what it, again, tell it what it is. And that can happen real time. You know, I could start off as 48 amp charger and then move up to an 80 amp charger, you know, a couple of years from now as more demand picks up for adm charging with the same infrastructure with no stranded assets. And that's absolutely critical. So let's say that's another one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I got the intelligence is in the circuit board and they've got these sort of dumb chargers out in the parking lot. So like a bolt could pull up and charge at that charger and the circuit board knows the right amperage level. And then an F-150 could pull up to the same charger and get more charge because the circuit breaker knows.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Correct. But it's not enough to say, because you were mentioning network a minute ago. It's not enough to say, well, a programmable breaker alone solves that. It solves a major chunk of it, which says, well, I can now program my system to be 80 amp, not 48, yes. But there's another element to it which says, well, to do that, then again, think of that example of 700 chargers. Now, if I, if I boost, say, these chargers over here to 80 amp, say, call it 50 of them, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Now, the entire system has to communicate amongst itself because, well, they sit on the same utility to say, well, oh, those have 80 amp now. So we need to see how we can spread the rest of them intelligently, so these other folks get a charge while these get an 80 amp charge. So it's still a system level network event. Right. And we make that easy and out of the box effectively. Whereas it becomes extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, the way things have been done today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Because I guess if you're buying multiple ones today, you're just sort of bricolaging them together piece by piece.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Seems a lot more like people are being asked to kind of wing it a little bit. And as I'm sure you know, as having interacted with customers, if I'm just like an owner of a hotel or whatever, I don't want to know, you know what I mean? I don't want to have to think about this much. I just want to plug something in and have it work. There's not going to be a lot of electrical systems management from these customers.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>You are absolutely right. And that brings us to probably, I would say, the core of how we're personally selling, but also what we're seeing the market in this space look for, which is EV charging is one of those unique animals you mentioned, hospitality, where it's unique in the sense that if you offer it and it doesn't work, the perception of your facility becomes different.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>If the lights out or the TV doesn't work in the hotel room or something, it causes nowhere near the impact that your EV charger not working does. There's various reasons we think that is. But anyway, so what's happening is and you're right, those hotels, especially hotels, don't want to think about this stuff. So being able to package it up in a way that is highly effective out of the box and by the way, extraordinarily reliable. Because we're a breaker now, we're falling to a completely different standard. That becomes absolutely critical that you have a super reliable, super easy...I don't have to think about energy. I don't have to think about demand. I don't have to think about this stuff, from a hospitality, or multifamily, or fleet perspective...that becomes a very powerful thing. But it's a culmination of kind of all the is stacked on top of one another. Smart breaker panel connected, dumb pedestal system level approach.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And this is like if I'm the hotel owner, do I just plug and play and this thing runs itself forever...or is Atom involved, somehow, in monitoring and running? Are you involved in operations at all? Once you install these things, who takes over operations?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>I'd like to say we have a singular way of selling, but it's such an early market still that we don't. We sell all the way down to just hardware. All the way up to full managed services. So we have a 24/7 network operation center within our facility that we monitor key customer assets that we have service agreements with, particularly in hotels. That's one of those sectors that ask for that frequently because the hotels don't...they want to equate EV charging rightfully so to WiFi. You don't think about the router. Yyou don't think about gigabit or whatever that is. It needs to just work. I can connect to it, and it works. That's it. That's all I care about, rightfully so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And one other question about these EV control systems. Obviously, the first thing on everybody's mind is the sort of EV facing part of it, managing which vehicles are charging and how much at what time. But of course, if you have this intelligence and software you also could think about communicating with the grid. And so, I wonder how much, because once you are getting up to 700 whatever. I don't know why we picked that number out. 700?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>It's actually a project we have up in New York.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh yeah. Well, you've got 700 vehicle charging stations and 700 vehicles charging, potentially. You've also got a fairly large dispatchable, at least somewhat controllable load, which seems to me could be quite helpful on some congested grids. So how big of a piece is the grid facing intelligence in these things? And I guess some of that depends on utilities and whether they're ready to do this kind of thing but I just wonder are you sniffing around in that space?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>I would say the way we're approaching it is, to answer your question, your hunch is dead on. That is a major utility concern at scale is to be able to have some level of at least visibility if not some level of demand responsibility in those events. We're not starting there, really. We're starting to satisfy what customers need right now, like, what are the most important things for them in the sectors we're in. So we see that as an evolution and it is happening. We are engaged in multiple utilities, just to put that out there. But today it's not so easy to say okay, well let's control that.</p><p>What first needs to happen is customers need to start utilizing. The utilization picks up, that utilization picks up more. Then those discussions, the real, like, "what do we do about it" discussions will start happening with utilities we predict.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's going to force the question. If you've got 700 vehicle loads coming on and off your grid I mean, you kind of really can't just ignore that.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>That's true. But with the evolution of electric vehicles and the adoption rate, all 700 aren't going to be on today. I think that's the point is, like, as more and more vehicles come onto that system—in relatively short order the next couple of years—then things become more apparent. Right. Then things become more potentially problematic for the utility. And we do expect that there's an engagement with the utilities, at various levels, for some sort of a demand response tie in. We certainly see that, but we're not day one pitching that as part of—the product is capable, absolutely capable—it's just the connection rate from the vehicles to the chargers has to pick up more and more and more and then eventually that will begin discussions once it becomes problematic for the utility, but not before it becomes problematic, typically.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, that sounds right. So you're out there now selling these systems, these EV charging systems to fleets and campuses. I'm sort of curious, who are the customers so far? What sectors were most eager for something like this to exist?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Well, they initially fleet, so think parcel pickup delivery fleet. That's where we kind of started off our sales, was there. Multifamily is a close second at this point because they have the same pain points. They both need to have lots of chargers and they both have pain points associated with, well, effectively becoming a gas station. Trying to minimize costs associated with that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Yeah. There's one other thing I forgot to mention when we were talking about this earlier, that since you mentioned multifamily, I'll just throw it in here. Another sort of interesting application of this is if you own condos or apartment buildings or something, you might want to have certain chargers dedicated to certain people. Or you might want to have certain chargers that are available only in certain times of day. Or you might want to have one charger that's shared between two people who live in your apartment building. And all of that is of course, you can do, if you have this central control system, you can do a lot of micro fiddling with the individual spaces.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yes, already built in, super easy to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so the EV charging space is a very obvious application of this. A place where some central control of multiple devices is most obviously needed, and the demand is rising very quickly and that whole industry or set of industries is in really kind of like it's a crazy time of ferment in and around that stuff... But as we emphasized early on, as I emphasized when I wrote about this back in 2019, really there's no end to the possibilities here because the way I think about it is every single device on the grid is connected through a circuit breaker. And so if circuit breakers can become smart computing devices, then basically every device connected to the grid becomes smart or at least somewhat smart, without having to put all that programming and smarts and computing power into the appliance itself. You're putting the intelligence in the connection to the grid. I don't know, the more I think about this, the more it kind of blows my mind. That what you could do, eventually, if some substantial portion of the millions and millions and millions of circuit breakers in the country become smart. I don't know, it just seems to open up like the sky is the limit kind of thing. So I'm just curious, like, you're moving into the EV space for obvious reasons. It's hopping. There's a serious demand for precisely this sort of thing. But do you have plans?</p><p>Like what's next after that? Because I could just think of a million different...</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>We do, as I think, hopefully, the listeners have picked up and I think through our conversation here, it's probably become apparent that EV charging for us is viewed as an application of the breaker, but not as the thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Much like many other things are. That will be scaling in the near future, in a way that is unique, in a way that is very easy and primarily of which becomes truly universal. So we are, you know, evolving product into a form factor that, you know, like we're universal today from a product standpoint. In other words, you can put us in any building, anywhere, it doesn't matter, same product, and we're capturing 90% of the breaker market doing that. But we're in our own panel. As we evolve, that will shift into a form factor that fits into most panels, at least in the US. And can be adapted for the European markets and add further ability into the product to effectively be able to tell it what it is.</p><p>So we see a future. That the breaker that you have to buy anyway, instead of going and buying a meter or a control device or EV charger or industrial control, whatever it is, you just tell the breaker you're that thing, and it does it. That's the world we see. Now at scale, at extreme scale, I always like to think in kind of polar extremes, extreme scale of that, because consumption defines the grid, not the other way around, is you effectively could have control of the entire grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Also obsolete about 80% of the electrical products on the market at extreme scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's the other thing I was thinking about is like all those things you're talking about building into the circuit breaker. Those are entire freestanding industries, like long standing industries. This is a huge amount of stuff, consolidation here, if nothing else.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Correct. I think what we're trying to do is—I hate to use the phone analogy, but it's very similar, but in a little different way—is that we are looking to electrically speaking, unify the applications and unify the customers into one platform. I mean, many other industries have done that most visibly, the phone. The applications and the phones get used by everyone. And we want the same to happen in the electrical space. That there's this massive gap...that there are more electrical products on the market than probably any other industry because just over time, as the industry has evolved, we've just made specific things for specific applications for specific customers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>That's what EV chargers are. They don't have to be that way, right? The breakers have always been there, but it's not thought about much. So let's make that thing that actually does it since, well, it's part of the electrical system, right? You have to buy it anyway. It needs to be there. So let's make that the universal thing. And I think that's where you mentioned the investment. I think that's probably where Atom Power differentiated. Because if you were going to go make that kind of investment, the 100 million into, say, an EV charging company, the problem is it may not be a problem, but I mean, the way we look at it is, well, that's all that they do.</p><p>The product charges a car, you can't use it for this, you can't use it for that. That is it. That is what it's going to do. Whereas Atom Power, it's like it being an application of a universal device, means that, well, as we see this market over here take off, we apply to that market and we see this market over here, but we apply to that market. Why? Because all of them require breakers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? So, like a facility with a central circuit board controlling multiple EV chargers, there's no reason that it couldn't plug other types of ICEs into that same circuit board, and it could coordinate all of them alongside the EV chargers, with the EV Chargers. There's nothing EV specific about it.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm thinking about scale here. One of the things I think people are starting to become familiar with are sort of smart panels at home...like this company, SPAN, has the smart panel...which is sort of doing in the home what you're talking about doing with EV chargers at big facilities, which is just controlling loads and balancing loads and timing things and all this kind of thing. So in a sense, a smart panel like this, in the home, would kind of make the home into its own little micro grid, right? This own little independently managed micro grid.</p><p>And I'm curious about scale. What does it look like as you scale bigger and bigger? Is it just stacking these little circuit breakers on top of one another to eternity?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>That's actually a really good fundamental question, is that breakers cover a large swath of land when it comes to electrical space, right? They go all the way from, you know, technically ten amps in the US. All the way up to 5,000 amps.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What does a 5,000 amp circuit breaker look like? Is it..</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>A refrigerator, basically.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>But, but the point is, is like, you know, when you get into big distribution systems, you start off with a goliath utility and you finally work your way down to the small, what's called Brandt circuit breaker. That basically means last breaker in the system. That's where we play, is in that Brandt circuit breaker, meaning the last breaker in the system. And like I said, 90% of those are 100 amp and less. And so you capture that market, you effectively capture most of the grid, you know, at scale. So in other words, it's like saying 100 amp and less, 90% of your loads are on that, you know, and that's what we focus.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, if you let your mind drift in sort of futuristic utopian direction because I think about this stuff a lot. It's like what sorts of things do you think could be unlocked? What sorts of things do you think could become possible? When it's not just, you have this occasional smart load here and smart load there, but suddenly the bulk, the majority of the loads on a grid are smart controllable. I'm just curious what you think sort of like the emergent big picture effects of that will be like what will intelligence do for the grid on kind of the macro scale?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>I think as you scale out, especially at the extreme end, you can do some pretty granular things, like, neighborhoods, electrically, are talking to one another, and that becomes apparent where you can shed load without interrupting someone's life and save a substation or save another generator from having to come online. It kind of speaks to demand response, but in a different way that says it's not brute force, shut things off. Instead, let's all talk to one another and know that, hey, the conditions look like this. This home is unoccupied, likely because the electricity consumption is so low.</p><p>The imagination, there's no limit. This is the thing, again, because the consumption of electricity is what defines everything else...is once that becomes a unified platform and understandable ecosystem made of billions of devices, that becomes very powerful in ways that I don't think we've even thought about yet. But at a high level it means that now, electrically, you can speak to one another, and it's not like by home. It's not like my home is pulling 20 kilowatts, your home is pulling 15. That doesn't tell you anything. What does tell you things is the patterns of usage, of EV charging, of HVAC, of hot water, of lights.</p><p>There's a lot there that, at scale, gives you a ton of intelligence that you can do a ton of things with, that I think the sky is the limit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. At the base level, you are ensuring that every bit of electricity that's generated is used efficiently.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that alone is going to just take a huge whack off. I feel like the demand for new power plants and new capacity, you're going to be able to avoid a ton of new generators and new, maybe even new high voltage lines just by using the electricity you've got.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yeah. You just hit the core of the company, our company's thesis. This is actually what we were founded on...which was in the future, and we started in 2014, there was going to be this probably once-in-a-century event of transferring a lot of energy—think of that, not electrically, just pure energy onto the grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>So that's happened. It's certainly happening now. I think we call that the energy transition now...But we had this thesis in 2014 where we said, well, you basically have like three options there, because the grid can't sustain that level of what we were predicting what's going to be transferred on the grid, primarily by vehicles. You have kind of three options. You either create more generation, somehow, even though we're reducing generation through baseload like coal and natural gas, rightfully so. You either do that, which is going to be really hard to do, or you have large scale energy storage combined with solar, which we have one of those, not both, solar, not so much energy storage, or you have large scale demand response. But the way to do that is through a universal method, not, not a disaggregated, like, you know, thermostat adjustment or smart EV charger here, but not there thing. It has to happen at a macro level scale, at the infrastructure level. So this is fundamentally why we actually started down this path, is sort of seeing that need in the market in the future. And this was 2014.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This comes up over and over again. You talk about transferring the heating load in the frigid Northeastern part of the country to electricity. That's A) a huge load, and B) the timing of that load is very different than the timing of the load it's adding onto. And that's just, you either meet that with brute force by building a shitload of new generators and power lines and everything else, or you just got to get much much much smarter about how you use the power you've got.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yeah. And the low hanging fruit, at least conceptually, is that you can be a lot smarter. But it's hard to actually execute on that without a universal platform that fits all industries—which at the end of the day, because again, everything's fed from a circuit breaker—that needs to be the thing that is innovated on, not a new appliance. But it's really hard to do that, super hard to do. I could go into why breakers are hard to actually innovate on, but nonetheless, it is the hardest path to pick.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But you're there for a big chunk of applications and can see, at least in the future, a form factor small enough to go into residential boxes. Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And once it's in the box, it's programmable, which means it's not the same thing. It can be, like you keep saying, it can be a bunch of different—once it's in the box—it could be whatever we need it to be as needs evolve. This makes such sense to me. Like I remember when I first encountered it back in 2019, I was like, yeah. If you have one kind of device that is required for every single electric load, then why not make that the device that's smart, instead of creating new smart devices for every different kind of load. Why not just make the one lego building block, that's the whole grid, make that smart and then you've got all your smart devices in one? Seemed sort of like a smack your head obvious kind of thing to me. So why are you still the only one with a certified digital circuit breaker? Like I would think other people would be moving in this direction sooner or later.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>You know what's interesting is that, I will tell you this, we were not the first ones to come up with the idea of a salt tape breaker. The idea of that actually is quite old. Traced this back to the mid-80s, of a semiconductor based circuit breaker by some large companies. So two things. One, is, I think, the natural question after that would be well, like okay, well, "why didn't anybody do it?" So, I think, there was probably—let's start there. There's probably a couple of things. One, is that the circuit breaker space is an interesting one. It really is. And the reason is because it is a super old industry. That's basically dominated by four companies, across most of the planet, who have all been building breakers for over a century each. That's just kind of the nature of this industry. So by the way, worst pitch ever. Hey, we're going to build a new breaker, where four companies dominate the planet, and it's all hardware and life safety, side note. But anyway, the point is it's a unique industry in that sense. So I think probably there were some "The Innovator's Dilemma" there a little bit because once you establish a means and methods and that's how things are done, it's really hard as a large company to move away from that and disrupt your own business.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it seems like building tiny computers is very different than building tiny electromechanical devices.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't really know very well, but it doesn't seem like a lot of transferable knowledge.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>It's definitely a different field. Right? I mean, once you say hey, let's build a solid state breaker, you now get into the realm of power semiconductors and physics that don't haven't historically applied in traditional circuit breakers. So, there's a few things. I think one is there were some enabling technologies that evolved since the 80s like computing, especially, in sensing and speed and power semiconductors, certainly. But I think the other piece of that is a bit of "The Innovator's Dilemma" that says, well, if I'm a company who's making breakers, but I'm also a company who's making industrial controls, and I'm also a company who's now making EV chargers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>It's so difficult, so difficult to say, well, why don't we just make that one device.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And cannibalize all our other product lines.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yeah, look, rightfully so it's difficult. Because if you've been set up that way and your company evolved that way, I mean, they're full of smart people... It's a structural challenge, right, to go do that. So I think Atom Power came out would work in a way, and that we're all from the industry. Me, specifically, I was an electrician, so I kind of used to design buildings. So I would like to say I think Atom Power had a view of the world that was much more simple and holistic, that says, well, "why should products be defined by the application? Why can't the product define the application?" Which seemed just a natural question. But then we started from there. I think that there are since Atom Power, there are emerging, I would say, technologies within established companies, as well as some startups who are trying to do effectively what we're doing. My view on this, is we welcome it because, coming from the industry, we believe what we're doing is the right thing to do. We also know we can't service every single customer base on the planet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's millions and millions, as previously discussed. Well, I'm curious, if somebody, if another company makes a digital circuit breaker, do we know already that it will communicate with yours? Or does that remain to be hashed out? Like, is there a standards are there standards issues here?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Well, it depends what you mean. I mean, there's a UL standard now that basically Atom Power defined the path for and establish with UL.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But I meant more of the software kind of intercompatibility. I don't know anything about software, so I don't even know what the question is. But insofar as this is meant to be a universal system, is it going to all be operating on the same sort of software protocols?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Yeah. Yes and no. So we do see a world where from an application standpoint, in other words, if you're say a facility manager and you have one pane of glass you're looking at for software, interoperability between devices is going to be necessary.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>So the way we structured our product is that the sort of core firmware and stuff is proprietary because, well, it's hard to open source that, because it's life safety, it's UL. It's like there's a lot of whizbang stuff that happens in the breaker to make it do what it does, but then the layer on top of that which says, well, okay, well, let's set this up as an EV charger, that layer of software, we're open protocol and API based, as well. So you could tie even today, you can tie an existing building management system into our software, for example, the way it should be for other manufacturers if they come to the market. We haven't seen you actually come to the market, yet, because, like I said, it's super hard to do this, and I think it takes so much time and energy. Atom Power is dedicated years to this, at this point. It's a hard thing to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Was there any sort of public policy assistance or is this all private investment, and are you making money now? I'm curious because a lot of industries, when you're going up against a super giant incumbent industry, you need help to cross those first few humps. Has this all been private money so far?</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>It has, yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you're out selling things for profit now. You don't feel like you need any help.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>Well, I mean.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not like you're going to turn down help if...</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>We always welcome help, but in the form of investment, we're capitalized for quite some time at this point, and our goal is to not ever need to raise funds again. That's kind of... So we need to be... We are post revenue, not pre-revenue, but as a company, we have to get to a sustainable level of profitability, right? Because from an investor, in a markets perspective, the markets are very harsh right now on companies in the new energy space. There's many publicly traded companies, especially the ones that went this backroute, you can see this on right now, which is kind of a Goldilocks scenario because it's a high growth market, yet if you're not profitable, investors are punishing you on valuation, specifically. So we need to become a very profitable company in this space, but to sustain ourselves and to continue to grow products, organically, right, and not continue to raise money. That's what we're headed towards.</p><p>So my point is, it's really hard to make money in the energy space, as the markets have shown. So the best companies are going to be the ones who have a sustainable technology, but also a sustainable business model to where they can take the profits and continue innovating, to further advance and create solutions to the major pain points that are out there. I mean, this is our thesis. Like, we have to become a profitable company.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is really fascinating to think about the sort of these lego blocks that are really kind of composing the entire grid—thinking about all of them getting smart is really just, for a sort of grid geek—really lets your mind spin off and all sorts of interesting directions. So, thanks, for taking the time and explaining this all to us, and good luck in your next steps.</p><p><strong>Ryan Kennedy</strong></p><p>David, thank you. I really appreciate the conversation today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversation like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at Volts.wtf. Yes, that's Volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-digital-circuit-breaker-and-why</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:100390470</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/100390470/4be7508db629a0c8ee03d0f83d3bef07.mp3" length="48869010" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4072</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/100390470/4a5415e569718f1a96c16f160ec0eef6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Minnesota sets out for zero-carbon electricity by 2040]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>A newly signed state law sets Minnesota on course to use 100 percent carbon-free electricity by 2040. In this episode, Minnesota House Majority Leader Jamie Long describes the decisive legislating that took an ambitious climate bill from introduction to the governor’s desk in the space of one month. </em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAChmg9OfT9jrnIxpNbw86l7a/volts23.02.15%28jamie.long%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/minnesota-sets-out-for-zero-carbon-electricity-by-2040"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Back in 2019, I wrote for Vox that there is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/5/15/18624294/renewable-energy-policy-cities-states">one weird trick</a> states can use to ensure good climate and energy policy. That trick is: giving Democrats full control of the government. It has worked in California, Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Illinois, New Mexico, Massachusetts, New York, Hawaii — the list goes on.</p><p>As I covered in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-the-midterm-elections-meant#details">a pod a few months ago</a>, the 2022 midterm elections brought Democrats full control — with trifectas of both houses of the legislature and the governor's office — in four new M states: Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Minnesota.</p><p>Does the one weird trick still work? Well, you’ll never guess what happened in Minnesota last week. </p><p>Gov. Tim Walz signed into law a historic piece of legislation that would set the state on a course to carbon-free electricity: 80 percent by 2030, 90 percent by 2035, and 100 percent by 2040.</p><p>My guest today is the bill’s primary author and sponsor, Minnesota House Majority Leader Jamie Long. Long, formerly legislative director for then–U.S. Rep. Keith Ellison (D-Minn.), was elected to the Minnesota legislature in 2018 and became majority leader this year. He worked closely with Senate sponsor Nick Frentz to shepherd the bill quickly through the legislature, with no extended conference committee. </p><p>It was an adept and decisive bit of legislating — not necessarily the norm for Democrats. I was excited to talk to Long about some of the ins and outs of the bill, the forces that supported and opposed it, and what's next for Minnesota energy policy. </p><p>All right, then. Representative Jamie Long of Minnesota, welcome to Volts. Thanks so much for coming. And I guess the first thing I should say is congratulations.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Thank you. It's a big month out here in Minnesota.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, big news. I want to get into the actual bill and the actual targets and everything, but just let's do a brief bit of history to start with. You arrived in the Minnesota legislature in 2018. I'm curious when this bill was born, basically, how long has this been cooking?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Sure. Well, this was my top-priority bill from my very first day I ran for office wanting to work on climate change and clean energy, and knew that 100% clean energy was the big bill that I wanted to focus my efforts on. So, we introduced this pretty early in my very first year in office. So actually, when we had the bill signing, I was looking back, and it was about four years to the week from when we had a bill signing that I'd introduced it. So, that was the first time we'd had 100% clean energy proposal in Minnesota, but we certainly had a lot of other renewable energy standards that had been tried and had failed over the years. The last time we'd updated our renewable energy standard was 2007 in the state.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>2007. And that was, I'm guessing, the last time you had Democratic control over both Houses?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>No, in fact, it was broadly bipartisan. It was signed by Governor Tim Pawlenty, Republican governor, who later it became a political issue when he ran for President because the Republican primary voters were not that happy that he was a clean energy leader who took climate change seriously. But it got such broad bipartisan support, it was almost unanimous in the House and Senate at the time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wild.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>And that was 25% renewable energy standard by 2025 was what was passed at that time. That seemed really ambitious, but we actually met that in 2017, so we met it eight years early.</p><p>So, at the time it seemed like it was going to be a big deal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If only we would ever learn from experience.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>I know, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's the same story with every single one of these that's ever passed anywhere.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>That's right. But we do have only the second trifecta in the last 30 years in the state. We did have one in 2013, 2014. We didn't update the renewable energy standard then, but we did do some other good climate policy. But yes, unfortunately, since 2007, climate and clean energy has taken a turn for partisanship in the state. And so it has taken until we got this trifecta, and we have it barely in the Senate. This will sound familiar to the congressional story, but we have a one vote margin in the Senate, and we have a two vote margin in the House.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Crazy. And this was pretty rapid and decisive. Like, you guys have not been in office for that for that long.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>You got it. Signed within a month.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's unusual to see the Democratic Party acting with such alacrity and clarity of purpose. I don't know what's going on here.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Well, we felt like we heard loud and clear from Minnesota voters that this is what they wanted. There was a poll in our local paper right before the election asking voters what were their top issues for deciding on the candidates that they wanted to support. And climate was a top five issue.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No kidding.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Our governor, Tim Walz, has been a strong supporter of 100% clean energy since day one. He was at our very first press conference with us four years ago, and he ran on this this past election cycle for his re-election, it was in his first ad. He was one of those Democrats back in the Waxman-Markey days who voted for Waxman-Markey and thought it might have cost him his seat, and it didn't. But he's always been very proud of his climate leadership and has been a really strong leader in our state.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, I want to talk about some of the issues of contention, let's say in a minute, but let's just start by talking about what's in the bill. So, there's two targets for the state utilities. There's a renewable energy target and then there's a zero carbon target. So, tell us just briefly, like why are there two and what are they?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Well, we wanted to have a renewable energy baseline. That was important for a lot of our partners and constituency groups that we were working with. We do have nuclear energy in the state, there are three nuclear plants, all owned by Xcel Energy. So, this wasn't really relevant for most utilities, but we wanted to have a baseline for renewable energy. So, there's a 55% renewable energy standard by 2035. But the big numbers are the clean energy standards or carbon-free energy standards and those are 80% by 2030, 90% by 2035 and 100% by 2040.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. So, the renewable energy target is just an extension of the previous law? Yes, it's just sort of an updating of the previous renewable energy law or does it change anything substantially from that law?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Well, it updates the previous law. So as I'd mentioned, our current law has 25% by 2025 and everybody's gotten there, so there's no real story there. So we have 55% now by 2035. We did update it some. The renewable energy definition at that time had a couple of things that we tweaked. One was that it constrained hydro to only small hydro. And the thought had been at that time that there was some concern that if we did large hydro we would basically push out all of the wind and solar. We would just go towards large hydro or we have access to Manitoba Hydro here and some other large hydro projects.</p><p>And so the concern was that you wouldn't get the solar and wind development that we would want. That's less of a concern now. We aren't seeing a lot more large hydro projects being built. And particularly on the timeline that we're talking about, between now and 2035, you're not really going to get a new large dam sided and constructed. So, the question was just really, were we going to let that count for utilities that are already purchasing large hydro? And we thought that would be fair. And then the other discussion was around waste energy. And so we have a facility in my city of Minneapolis that is located next to the neighborhood that has the highest black population in the city, and also happens to have the highest asthma rates in the state, there's a lot of cumulative impacts with different industrial uses in that particular neighborhood. And so we excluded that particular facility from the definition of renewable energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's Hennepin?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yeah, the Hennepin Energy Recovery Center is what it's known as. So we excluded that as a gesture to the community and to the county that we understand this is a facility that we don't want to see be the long term solution to our waste problems in that particular location.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'd like to pick up both of those a little bit. On the hydro, my understanding is that this was a subject of some contention, I mean, one is what if we just get more hydro and don't do any wind or solar, as you say, that's probably not as much of a concern. Now, although, I'm curious, you're accessing this Manitoba Hydro, could you theoretically just buy more of existing Manitoba Hydro? I'm curious, have you topped out how much you can get from there?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's pretty well topped out. It's all spoken for between Manitoba and Minnesota. So last year there were lower water levels in Manitoba and they wound up being able to ship a little less power to Minnesota because they had to use it all from Manitoba. So both with the existing transmission and the existing need, there's no real extra capacity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Bringing on any substantial new big hydro from Minnesota would mean building new dams.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yeah, and it would take longer than the time allotted.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know there are sort of concerns about the pipeline from those Manitoba, the electricity lines from those Manitoba dams down to Minnesota. How did that play out? Because my understanding is that environmental groups, the reason they didn't want big hydro counted is partially because they don't want more of that. How did that sort of controversy play out?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yeah, there were some concerns from some indigenous environmental groups around large hydro. And so that was one of the reasons why we made clear it was only existing hydro. So we didn't allow for new hydro to count towards that renewable energy standard, so that we would foreclose the possibility that new construction would be eligible. So in the law, it says only as of the effective date of the act, those facilities would count.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I see. So even if they did build new dams.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>It doesn't count towards renewable energy standard. It would count towards carbon-free because we don't have technology limitations there. It's anything that's carbon-free. But for the renewable energy standard, it wouldn't count.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Give us a sense of where non hydro renewable energy is in Minnesota. Are the big Minnesota utilities in shouting distance of that 55% target?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>They are. So last year in Minnesota, we were at 52% carbon-free for the entirety of Minnesota's power generation. Now 24% of that was nuclear. So about a quarter of our power in the state's nuclear, but 28% was renewable energy. So that's pretty good. And then if you look at it based on, by utility, there is a bit of a differentiation. Minnesota Power, for example, which is the utility that services the northern part of the state, they're pretty unique because they serve some really large customers. Mines, timber. They were at 90% or so coal in the 1990s, and then as of even 2015, we're at about 75% coal. And now they're over 50% renewable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, wow. So they've been moving pretty quick already.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>They've been moving very quick already. And so we've had some good leadership from utilities in the state. Xcel Energy, our largest utility, was the first in the nation to say that they wanted to move towards 100% carbon-free electricity. And then both Minnesota Power and Great River Energy, which is our generation and transmission cooperative for most of our rural electric co-ops in the state, have also committed to carbon-free. Now, all three of those had 2050 as their target dates, so we're pushing them considerably faster than they had wanted to go, but they had set the direction that they were going to move towards carbon-free electricity, and all three of them, in the end, were supportive or neutral on the final bill. So I do give them credit for setting a direction and being willing to come along even as they were being pushed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just to clarify sort of the goals that they had set for themselves, that was all internally driven, that wasn't in response to any sort of mandates or government product.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Those were public announcements. And so even before the law had passed, something like 80% of Minnesota customers were already being served by a utility that had themselves, on their own, committed to decarbonizing their electric service.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this is mostly accelerating what your big state utilities are in the midst of doing already.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Accelerating and mandating, which is an important distinction. But they had made these targets on their own and they weren't binding. You know, Xcel Energy at different points in time had described it as an ambition or a goal or, you know, there was a lot of flexibility in terms of how they described it and now there is not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Now there's locked in. Let's talk a little bit about garbage incineration because this sort of like only comes up in some states and not in others, and I've had questions about it over the years and I've never really bothered to poke around and learn a lot about it. But my understanding is two things: one is that the main reason municipalities are doing this is not for energy. It's that they don't know what else to do with their trash. They don't have anything else to do with their trash. And my understanding is that environmental groups are largely opposed to it and would have preferred to exclude it from the zero carbon energy standard entirely.</p><p>So tell us a little bit about, just sort of like, what are the dynamics or how did that play out?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>So it's this interesting interplay between waste policy and energy policy, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>So I think most folks agree that landfilling isn't a good outcome for our waste management system. And there's disagreement though, on how much we can do in recycling and composting, and other forms of waste diversion. Environmentalists like me tend to think that we can do a lot more than we're doing. Pushing hard at the state level to do more in the recycling and organics management side. But a lot of counties in our state have moved forward with waste burning as what they view as better than landfilling. So not the outcome that they want, but better than landfilling.</p><p>You still do have to landfill though. You're landfilling all the ash that's coming out, and the ash is toxic, and you're producing localized air pollution when you're burning it. So it's certainly not an environmentally friendly solution, but nor are landfills. And so there aren't easy choices here. But when it comes to the energy space, when we're thinking about moving towards a decarbonized electric sector, when you're burning trash, it produces carbon. So right now the waste energy, at least for our 100% target, doesn't count as a fully decarbonized source. We have a few pathways that counties could pursue which I can get into if you're interested in terms of how they could continue to operate.</p><p>But they are, under our bill, either going to have to change or pay a little bit more money in a renewable energy credit to be able to continue to operate. And so it will make waste to energy harder, as a long term solution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't want to get too deep into incineration here, but when you say improvements that they could make, does that mean there are safer and better ways to incinerate trash, or do you mean alternatives?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Well, so under the bill, if you are not at 100% carbon-free electricity, one option you have is to purchase renewable energy credits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>And this is a pretty common way to account for that sort of last couple of percent in different standards, and it was also in our previous renewable energy standards that we've had.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I want to get into that later.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yeah, so that would be one option that they could pursue. They could shut down the facilities, they could not sell the power to a utility. Because we're regulating the sales to utility customers in the bill. So there are a few options, but I do hope that this will prompt some conversation in our counties about how they want to manage waste 16 years from now. I feel like there's a lot of time to figure out better alternatives than burning.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's not super clear to me what the ideal state of the art is here. But yeah, like you say, there's time to figure that out. What about within the bill? Is there anything specifically for distributed solar or distributed energy? That's one of the things I heard back from some sort of state advocates is that the big utilities are fine going renewable, but they're more resistant to losing control over assets and having customer owned assets. So I wonder, is there anything, is that mentioned in the bill at all?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>No, we don't have a specific carve out for distributed energy. We wanted to keep our technology neutral approach intact. As you might imagine, there were lots of different requests for specific technologies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Most of those didn't go in the direction that I would call climate friendly. So we tried to keep the overall integrity of allowing for utilities to have some flexibility in how they are getting to 100% carbon-free in the bill. Now, that said, I do believe that there's going to be an awful lot more distributed energy built because of this bill. The utilities are going to need to find as much solar and wind as they can, and it's not all going to be able to be utility scale.</p><p>So I think a lot of it will be distribution grid, interconnected. But I think that a lot of that conversation is probably going to take place in other contexts later this session. So we are one month in to our legislative session, and we've been talking for a long time about our community solar program. We have the largest, I guess now second largest New York just passed us, but for a long time we have the largest community solar program in the nation. There's a lot of conversation on what to do in the distributed energy space with interconnection. I think that's going to be a hot topic in session and there's going to be a lot of interest on policy fixes in that space.</p><p>But for the purposes of the 100% clean energy bill, we felt it was important to keep flexibility for utilities and how to meet their targets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. One other question about sources. I know anytime I mention energy policy on the internet, which is frequently, I get the question, well, what about nuclear? Is it nuclear just better? Why don't we just do nuclear, blah, blah, blah. You knew this was coming. So in Minnesota, you've got three nuclear plants, yes? Who are providing 25% of your power and a good chunk of existing low or no carbon, carbon-free energy. And that counts toward the standard, that energy counts toward the, the carbon-free standard for 2040. But there is also alongside that, a prohibition on new nuclear in Minnesota.</p><p>And I know there was some argument on some quarters that the prohibition should be lifted, that small modular nukes should be allowed under this technology neutral standard. The bill didn't get into that. What's the status there?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yeah, so nuclear politics is obviously complicated, not just in Minnesota. But you're right, we have three nuclear plants in the state and we have a moratorium on new nuclear plant construction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that was a bill that was legislative from previous.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>The 90s. It dates way back. It's not a recent choice. And the reason is that we have the closest community living near a nuclear plant anywhere in the United States, and that's the Prairie Island Indian Community, which lives like a stone throw from the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant. And so it's in their backyard, right behind their houses. And so the Prairie Indian Community has had long standing concerns about the onsite nuclear waste storage, because we don't have any long term storage solution yet for nuclear waste. And so that waste happens to be stored right on site at the Prairie Island Nuclear Plant.</p><p>And so when they were seeking permitting to store that waste on site, the compromise that was passed included a moratorium on new nuclear construction. So that's the history. The tribe remains concerned to this day about living that close to a nuclear energy plant in their community. So removing the nuclear moratorium is fraught. And there's also, I didn't have a single large utility come to me and say, "Hey, I'm ready to build a small nuclear modular reactor and I want this repealed so I can get this going".</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, this discussion is extremely theoretical at all levels.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. That may be a topic of conversation that comes to the state in the future, but it didn't need to be solved in this bill because there is no real live proposal before us. All three of the nuclear reactors in the state are going through relicensing applications with the NRC. They're all at the end of their licenses or nearing them. And so that's the kind of active conversation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, are you talking about several states have taken action recently to extend the life of existing nuclear plants, is that on the table or in the discussion somewhere?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>No, we don't really need to subsidize our nuclear plants in the state. They've been operating within competitive rates and we're regulated state, we're not deregulated. I think some of the states that have had to support their nuclear plants because they're deregulated.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>But I think there is broad support for relicensing for those three facilities. The tribe that I mentioned is in active negotiations with the utility about waste storage next to them in a relicensing application. So there may be discussions there, but I think that there is general support for extending the life of those three plants and nothing more. We really need to do with the legislature on that. But in terms of new small modular nuclear reactors, there's no real active proposals or need to solve those problems this month.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk a little bit about utilities and their sort of disposition towards all this. Let's start a little bit, I think with munis and co-ops, municipal and cooperative utilities. I think, probably, most folks listeners live in cities and are served by big utilities and so might not be familiar with what these things are and why they tend to be resistant to the net zero push. This is not just in your state but in many states. So maybe you could just explain sort of like, what are these little utilities and why across the country do they tend to be centers of resistance to the push to clean power?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Great question. So municipal utilities are pretty straightforward. It's a utility that's run by municipality or at the municipal level to supply power. And they tend to be more of a distribution utility. They're often purchasing their power from somebody else.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They're just not big enough to own assets on their own.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Most of them don't. Yeah, there are a couple of municipal utilities in the state that do own some of their own generation, but most of the time they're purchasing the power that they sell. And then cooperative utilities are managed by local boards that are elected and they tend to be in rural communities. That's the history. It was part of the ability to get electrification to rural America, right? And the big utilities serve the cities and there needed to be a model that helped serve rural communities and so cooperatives was a model that took off. But in Minnesota it's 40% of customers or cooperative utilities or municipal utilities.</p><p>So it's a big chunk. And if we're only focusing on our three investor owned utilities in the state, we're leaving out a lot of folks who have power delivery. So the cooperative utilities are very diverse in terms of their customer size, their location in the state. So we have some that now, once were rural, but now serve kind of a suburban membership, and then we have some that serve very small rural memberships. A lot of them tend to purchase power from these generation and transmission cooperatives. And so there's a handful of those that make the bulk of the decisions that then trickle down to the co-op.</p><p>So I mentioned Great River Energy, in our state is the largest, and so it's complex. And in terms of why they resist, well, there's a couple of reasons. One is that they have tended to not have necessarily the same pressures to move as quickly as some of the investor owned, I think Xcel Energy, Minnesota Power, those are publicly traded companies. They've got a lot of folks who are looking at their future and what might be their risks. And for Xcel, I think part of the reason they went first on saying they wanted to be the first utility to get to 100% was to get noticed, right, to make a mark on the national stage that they were a leading utility.</p><p>The boards of a lot of these local co-ops don't tend to be electricity experts. They're community members, right? They're folks who live in their communities and care about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And we should say, I'll say it if you won't, rural and therefore likely quite conservative.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yes, that's right. And so their understanding of the most up to date energy policy is sometimes a little dated. So I've met often with rural cooperative boards in our state and I even have brought graphs of the cost of solar and wind over time and showed them,"Look, it's cheaper! It's cheaper". And the feedback I'll sometimes get is, "Well, it's not reliable", right? There's always kind of something else. So there has been traditionally a lot of resistance at that level. But I'll give credit to some of the large G&Ts that work with the co-ops. They've understood that moving towards renewable energy is going to save their members money.</p><p>So Great River Energy had a very large coal plant that it sold, that wasn't located in North Dakota, and it lost $170 million at that coal plant in 2019. They tried to sell that coal plant for a dollar and couldn't find anybody who would take it. So they wound up having to sell it with a very valuable high voltage transmission line, which probably down the road is going to carry mostly wind power from North Dakota to Minnesota. And by selling it, they projected that they would cut rates for their member co-ops by over 10%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wow.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>So, the economics are really driving a lot of the transition now for some of these rural co-ops, too. But they tend to be resistant to mandates and requirements.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, I was going to ask how you brought them around, but it occurs to me that maybe you just didn't and didn't have to. Did they come around?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>So, the municipal utilities did not. They were the last holdouts. Every other utility association or utility in the state wound up being neutral or supportive. But the municipal utilities.</p><p>Interesting.</p><p>Were not, and in part they have local politicians who are involved in those discussions, and those tend to be from rural communities, and so you can connect the dots. For the rural cooperatives, to their credit, they came to the table. They have a very diverse membership, as I said, and there were a lot of pressure on that group. But they had one reasonable ask, which was, a lot of our co-ops are starting behind where these large utilities are. They don't have nuclear power, they don't have access necessarily to the same level of hydro as say, Minnesota Power in the north. So, they're behind. And so they asked for a longer on ramp to get to the same place. And so that seemed reasonable to me. So, we have the same standard for them in 2035 and 2040. They've got to get to 90% 2035 and 100% 2040. But for 2030, which, you know, in utility terms is very fast for planning purposes, we said, "Okay, we're going to give you 60% target for cooperative and municipal utilities in 2030". So that they had a little bit more lead time to do planning and to get on board.</p><p>And that got them to neutral. So that was a big deal that they were willing to make that agreement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A couple of other, you know, sort of what are being framed as concessions to utilities because, you know, utilities, of course, if you mandate something, they immediately come back and say, well, you know, they spin this scenario where 2040 is looming, and we don't have enough, and we're spending kajillions of dollars, and we're having blackouts.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you have to formalize some sort of, well, you have in the bill an "off-ramp", quote unquote "off-ramp", which just amounts to, as I understand it, if the dates are approaching and the utility doesn't think they can meet the target without compromising reliability, it can go to the PUC and say, "Hey, we can't do this without compromising reliability". And the PUC will say, "Okay, here's a little extra time". Is that the long and short of it?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Pretty much, so a little more to it. But this has been in our renewable energy standard laws since the beginning, because there was always sort of a concern that when you got close you might not be able to get to meet it, and then you don't want the lights to go off. Right, is the argument.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I always just think it's funny, like find me a state, find me a PUC in the country that's going to be like.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You can't meet the target without compromising utility reliability. Sorry, we're locked in by the law, we're all just going to have to have blackouts.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yeah, too bad. the Republicans in the legislature called this the "Blackout Bill". And my last name is Long, so they called it the "Long Blackout Bill", which I thought was good. It was like maybe if my last name had been Short, then it wouldn't have been as scary. We can deal with a "Short Blackout", but that was "Long Blackout". So the 2007 standard, 25% by 2025, no one ever used the "off-ramp", right? No one needed to. They met at eight years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't know of a utility in a state, anywhere in the country that has had to use one of these "off-ramps". Like they always meet the targets. It's always easier than they think. It's like can we learn from but.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>I think it is important to have this in the bill because I don't want to assume that we're going to come back and change this bill a bunch of times between now and 2040. If passed us any lesson, we haven't done this since 2007, it might be another 20 years until we get back to this. Who knows? And so right now I'm pretty confident that we can get to 100% clean energy by 2040. But maybe I'm wrong. Maybe we can only get to 98% and then do we really want to force that last 2%? So it does feel like it is worth having that mechanism in here.</p><p>But what we did do is we made sure that there were real factors that the Public Utilities Commission would have to weigh. So yes, they have to relay weigh reliability and affordability, but they also have to weigh impact on environmental justice communities. They also have to weigh the social cost of carbon. And so what is this going to mean for the overall impact on our society? So you're right. At the end of the day, if it's going to affect reliability, and importantly now the utilities will have to establish that on the record in a public hearing through the Public Utilities Commission.</p><p>So it's not just the utilities saying, "Hey, sorry, I know I'd said 100% by 2050, but Tesla couldn't do it". No, now they will have to actually put together a record and demonstrate to the Public Utilities Commission, "Hey, here is why I can't do this thing".</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We tried.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's not an easy thing. It's not something they could just screw around for 20 years and then invoke this.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>No, and they have to do it before the public. So does the utility want to go and say, "Hey, I'm going to have to be burning more dirty energy"? I mean, they're not going to want to do that unless they feel like they really have to. So I do think it's important to have that tool in there but, I would not be surprised if it's used very infrequently, if ever.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the "off-ramp" did not bug me at all, but something else that's in there has kind of bugged me, and I read a bunch of articles about this and I just didn't see anybody else pick it out or examine it at all. But it also, in the bill says that utilities can buy RECs for compliance, renewable energy certificates, which basically just means someone else somewhere else generated more renewable energy than they need for their compliance and they're selling the leftovers, and you can buy the leftovers counted towards your total for compliance. To me, that's more of a red flag than the "off-ramp" thing because, as anyone who's been listening to Volts for a long time knows, these RECs are fairly cheap.</p><p>Like if you just want to buy bulk solar and wind, like wind power from the Midwest RECs, they're pretty cheap. And in many, many cases they're going to be cheaper than actually reforming your own operations or acquiring new assets of your own. So why shouldn't I be worrying about that more? It seems like if there's something I'm going to worry about utilities doing, it's not just putting things off, it's just buying a bunch of cheap RECs to cover their obligations. So how do you think about that?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yeah, well so this has been the framework that we've had in state law since the beginning of our renewable energy standard. So it's a tool that's been around and widely accepted. The renewable energy credits vary in cost and it's, you know, hard to know exactly what a 2039 renewable energy credit will cost. But they are real. So, you know, there's sometimes there is a concern around offsets in general, and I think a lot of that is valid, but renewable energy credits are a wind or solar or other renewable energy system where there's retiring their credit for a specific use.</p><p>So it is additional renewable capacity that is being built on the grid and, at least for Minnesota, for the RECs that have been used to meet some of the earlier renewable energy standards, 60% of those are in Minnesota, and all of them are in the Midwest.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that by requirement or is that.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>No, that's not by requirement but that's been the way, the way it's happened and I think the Public Utilities Commission has worked with trying to make the RECs as local as possible. So they so far have been all in the Midwest, and 60% have been in Minnesota. So that is additional renewable energy that's getting built in the state, and those credits can't be retired for anybody else. So if the utilities building their own renewable energy they're going to retire the RECs for themselves. So it is real. In some ways it acts as a carbon tax on the margins.</p><p>When you're getting towards that last little bit of power that you need to meet your targets, then you're going to have to pay a fee. But we know that renewable energy is cheaper right now than fossil fuels and this is only going to put even more of a finger on the scale towards renewable energy. And if you're an investor owned utility you're going to have to go in front of the Public Utilities Commission and demonstrate why it is cheaper for your ratepayers to have a fossil fuel plant where you're paying RECs on it than wind and solar. And I just don't think that is likely to happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you are not worried about RECs forming any substantial chunk of compliance?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>No, I'm not. I think that the most likely use for that will be when you have a last one or 2% and you have some sort of, I don't know, hydrogen peaker that uses some hydrogen that made from fossil fuels or something like that, that it'll take over that last couple of percent. Or something like waste energy, that I was describing before, where there's some other public policy good that you're dealing with. We have a big emerald ash borer problem in the state right now, and are cutting down a bunch of our ash trees, and we have a couple of facilities that are burning that and making energy out of it so. That produces carbon and there might be a need to have a REC for something like that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I also just sort of idly wonder when we're getting up to 2030, 2035 if compliance won't be, if more and more utilities are under compliance standards whether there are still going to be so many.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Well that's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Excess RECs to sell, right? I wonder if that market is going to tighten up.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Market is going to tighten up. I mean these are going to be needed for a lot of different reasons. Corporate purchasers want RECs, utilities want RECs. We're seeing these standards become more common. So, I don't know that we can count on cheap RECs forever. And there does need to be I think some mechanism to account for these hard to deal with marginal sources. And we could say that you can't burn trash and you can't burn wood, but I probably couldn't have passed that bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. A couple of things about the bill itself. I'm sure you're aware one of the bigs from ongoing conversations in the clean energy world these days is about permitting and sighting and the difficulty thereof, that being kind of a bottleneck. Sort of like, even if you have willing capital and willing utilities and willing everything else, you have this process of permitting and sighting that is sclerotic and slowing things down. Did you take that on at all in the bill?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>We did, yeah. We know that transmission is going to be a big challenge. It's a big challenge right now. We have a very constrained grid in Minnesota and a lot of renewable energy projects aren't getting built that otherwise could because the transmission costs are too high. And our regional ISO, the Midcontinent ISO in Minnesota, has announced recently a $10 billion new transmission investment in Minnesota and the region, that's the largest in US History.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh yes, we did a pod on that last year.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yeah, I listened to it. It was great. So frankly, myself and the former Republican Energy Committee chair and the Senate pushed really hard on MISO to move as quickly as they could on this because there were so many constraints. So we've been working at that level, but we also are trying to help at the state level. And we have several provisions in the bill that are designed to help with siting. One would remove a specific certificate that independent power purchasers are currently required to do, that was designed for utilities with ratepayer customers, and so it wasn't really the right fit.</p><p>Another would, for very short tie lines for solar projects, that right now have to get county approval, would move that to the Public Utilities Commission. A lot of the counties don't want to deal with that anyway. So we were trying to do some of these easy streamlining things and they all wound up being really non controversial. But to help just make it a little easier to get some of this renewable energy deployed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And do you feel like there's more to do there? Like, is that something that's going to come up again in the legislative session, do you think?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Well, there may be. We had four specific fixes in the bill, and these had been around for a few years, we've been working on them for a while. There may be other changes that are needed to help out. The big thing we need to do is just figure out how we can get some of these projects built in our state that MISO has approved and we need to keep those on track. Minnesota Power has proposed a really innovative transmission line in northern Minnesota that's going to connect to some new wind power in North Dakota. And so that will be an important project too.</p><p>I think they're getting some federal support for that transmission line, it was recently announced. So we have to build some of these projects out and I think there's going to be some state support to do that. For example, we're going to try to pass a pretty hefty package of state matching dollars to help out with the Federal Inflation Reduction Act, available money for transmission, and we're hoping that that will help deploy some of these projects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm curious both about the prevailing wage provisions, and sort of beyond that, the general disposition of labor toward all this, like the role they played in all this.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>I think that was one of the best parts of the coalition work we did was having the broad support of our building trades and labor partners. It's not always been an easy conversation with building trades and clean energy transition, but I think seeing where the economics have pushed some of the coal plants in our state, and also recognizing that we have really good opportunities to build clean energy. A lot of the building trades in Minnesota have been really good partners in trying to help make sure that we are moving towards clean energy and that we are doing so with good union jobs. So because Minnesota was kind of an early mover in clean energy, even though we haven't been that active in recent years, we did get an early mover advantage in our, kind of the 90s into the 2000's, and we have two of the largest wind and solar installers in the country, based in Minnesota. And combined, they tell me that they've installed over 50% of all wind turbines in the US In the last decade. So we have a lot of opportunity that Minnesota workers have seen over the years to build renewable energy projects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And an existing workforce that's presumably helping you, lobbying with you for all this.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>That's right, that knows that these are good jobs. So we put a prevailing wage requirement for all new large energy projects in the bill, which is a big deal. And then we also included local worker considerations for the Public Utilities Commission, so that they could weigh when they were approving projects if they were in fact helping employ local workers. We also put in there preference for projects that are going to be in energy transition communities where coal plants, for example, will be retiring. So that we're trying to help backfill some of the tax base in those particular communities.</p><p>So we worked hard with our labor partners and I don't know if there have been other states where the entire building trades, the statewide coalition supported 100% clean energy standard, but in Minnesota they did. And we had the bill signing at the Labor Center in St. Paul to mark what a strong partnership this was.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it seems to me like nothing but a good thing that this element of the legislation, the sort of prevailing wages, local workers, all this kind of stuff seems to be a standard part of these state bills now. Washington, my home state of Washington, did some great stuff on this, but it seems like now it's just sort of like a standard piece of the puzzle, which strikes me as all to the good.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>I think that's right. And I think President Biden deserves a lot of credit on that too, to having made this labor climate partnership a real cornerstone of his clean energy agenda.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, before we wrap up with just a couple of political questions. You've said a couple of times that Minnesota is the purplest, let's say, state to pass one of these things.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is true, but, you squint close up, and it's party line vote in both chambers. So, I mean, this almost feels silly to ask, but was there anything helpful or supportive from anyone on the Republican side throughout this process or did you just come into this thinking, "We're Democrats, we got to figure it out among ourselves, there's no hope"? Was that as predictable as I would have expected?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Well, unfortunately it was. It was fully party line in both the House and Senate. We have had some bipartisan clean energy wins in recent years. We were one of the only split legislators in the country in the last four years, and when I chaired the Energy Committee, we had some good wins on energy efficiency and solar deployment. But for the big changes that we really need, we really weren't able to find the partnership that we wanted across the aisle. I don't think that that's true with Minnesota public, though. When you look at the public polling, and we have some public polling on our bill, it's broadly supported by the Minnesota public.</p><p>There are partisan differences, though, even in the polling. So it does show that unfortunately, we are at a place where climate clean energy policy is more polarized than I think is healthy. But I think that the good news is, we have broad buy-in now from our utilities, from our labor partners. And I think if we look back on this in ten years, you'll find that the public is going to be very supportive and the politics on this will change. I think that when the public sees the benefits that this will have for job creation, for overall cost of utility bills, and of course, for climate public health, I think that support will grow.</p><p>But I don't want to undersell what we accomplished either, which is that with a one vote margin in the Senate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, let me just ask about that directly, because the Inflation Reduction Act was a friggin miracle.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because it all came down to the whims of one vain, relatively illinformed person and just sort of woke up on the right side of the bed. We sort of touched on some of the elements of this story, like, you brought the utilities around, at least to be neutral, not against it. Labor was for it. I mean, there weren't a lot of big organized commercial interests, seems like, against it. It's just Republicans against it. So how did you manage to keep every single senator on line?</p><p>Is there some magic dust?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>So Senator Frentz, who was a lead author in the Senate, and I worked really closely together throughout the entire process. And he's a rural moderate Democrat, I'm an urban progressive Democrat. So we were a good partnership. But when the Senate flipped to Democratic control, I was taking a look at some of the new members and hoping that we would be able to pass a bill as strong as the one we passed. And there was a member who won, who was the majority maker, who won in the Trump district, bright red district in the far northwest part of the state, around Morehead.</p><p>And then I started reading up on his background and turns out he's a meteorologist who has been talking about climate change on the air for 20 years in his community, and the impact that this has on agriculture. He spoke on the floor on the Senate talking about how if we don't act now, the agricultural impact in our state is going to be enormous.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's kind of a lucky stroke.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>That was a pretty good draw. We had a member who was in a challenging part of the state in the Iron Range, as we call it, in northeastern Minnesota, but we had all of his utilities that were neutral or supportive and we had the strong support of labor. And so for him, I think it was a vote that he could take and take with confidence. So, you know, the coalition that we built really helped. But we, we didn't we didn't take this to conference committee. We, Senator Frentz and I negotiated together and got to a place where we had a bill that could pass and get the support of folks in Trump districts in greater Minnesota and Minneapolis, districts in the Metro, with one bill with no amendments through the House and Senate into the governor's desk.</p><p>So that took some work, but I'm really proud that we were able to get it done.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The ability to hash this out such that it didn't need to go through a long dragged out conference committee process is really a notable level of party discipline and purpose, which we don't always associate with the Democratic Party. So it's really great to see when it comes up, like, you guys did not faff about you just went straight at this thing and passed it.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>That's right. We knew what we wanted to do and, yeah, we got it done in a month. So it was an intense month, but I think we knew our purpose and we were aligned in our goals. And I wasn't two months ago sure that we would be able to get a bill as strong as the one we got through done. But I think Senator Frentz deserves a lot of credit for the work he did with the senators. And frankly, our partners, the utilities, deserve credit for being willing to come along, right? They understood that this is the direction we're headed.</p><p>They knew this bill was going to pass. And so the asks that they made were pretty reasonable on the scale of things. And now I think we have one of the five strongest clean energy standards in the country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Two very brief questions to wrap up. One is North Dakota says they're going to sue Minnesota over the idea being that, you not buying their dirty power is a matter of interstate commerce. And thus your bill, something, something, dormant commerce clause. The illegal analysis I've read indicates that this suit has no merit. There was a suit back in 2007 that the Republicans won, but apparently it was on different grounds, the law was very different, it's a whole different thing now. I don't know if there's anything to say about this other than, it's likely to fail, but do you have any additional thoughts on it?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Well, it says a lot about energy politics in the state of North Dakota. I think it says more about that than our legal chances. But we're North Dakota's biggest customer for their biggest industry. So energy is a lot of what North Dakota does and, to date, they have tended to focus on fossil fuels. Now they are moving, there is a lot of wind energy development happening in the state and to Governor Burgum's credit, he has said that he wants to move to a carbon neutral economy by 2030, or carbon neutral energy system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, they got a bunch of CCS and hydrogen fantasies to work out.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>That's right. Yeah. So that's where most of his hopes are pinned on. But in terms of the legal challenge, no, there's nothing really there. I mean, the overall framework which is that we are regulating what Minnesota utilities sell to Minnesota customers, has been in law for all of our renewable energy standards since the inception, and North Dakota has never challenged those. So they did win a lawsuit against us after the 2007 energy bill and that was around a restriction that we had on imports of out of state coal. So that is a harder one to hold up in court and it was struck down.</p><p>But in terms of this particular provision, it's not the same. And, as I mentioned, it was in law then and they didn't sue it against it because they knew that they weren't going to be able to win. So it is unfortunate. We'll probably have to go to court with our neighbors, and that's not never fun, but we're going to win this one and the law will go into effect, and hopefully North Dakota can sell us a lot of wind power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I really wonder what North Dakota thinks it is communicating to the rest of the nation with this behavior. Like, how do they think this looks? I know they're all conservative and so they're all in the bubble, they're all watching Fox, so maybe they don't know how this looks to the rest of the country, but like good grief, suing to stop the future. Anyway, so final question this is electricity. Done and done. Check, check. What about transportation? And what about heat? What about natural gas heat? Those are the two big prizes after electricity. Are you cooking up plans to go after one or both of those?</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Yes, we are. So on transportation, Governor Walz has been a real leader on vehicle electrification. He was the first state in the Midwest to sign on to the clean car standards out of California that are permitted for other states to sign on under The Clean Air Act and took a lot of flak for that, but stood up to the naysayers. And that's been a good commitment from him. But now we have the opportunity to do good work at the legislature, too, on electric vehicles. So I suspect there's going to be a really big package there and a very big package on transit, which I know has been something that we have wanted to fund at a substantial level for many years and haven't had the political support to do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you have some really, sort of, in those terms, kind of progressive cities in Minnesota that could use some help, I think, becoming more walkable and transit oriented.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>We sure do. And they very much want it, and haven't had the support to get there. So we got another light rail line we're building out right now, we want to build a fourth. We have a lot of bus rapid transit that's being built in the region that we want to help support, as well as new bike-ped infrastructure. My city of Minneapolis tends to rank in the top five cities in the country for bike infrastructure, but that doesn't come for free, and they want more. So we need more. So that's going to be a big area.</p><p>And then in terms of buildings, absolutely. The governor has a proposal to move our new commercial construction to net zero by 2036, for our codes, which I think would be exciting. And so that would be updating our codes every three years to get to that point. So I'm hoping that we can pass that this year. And certainly that's just the first step, we do need to make sure we're looking at existing buildings, I had a building benchmark bill last year that we are hoping can move this year, too. So there's more to be done. And luckily we have a lot of session left since we were able to get this done in month one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. How novel, just to get something done quickly, and then I imagine even elements of the public who are against it, just like, everyone prefers for this just to be done, right? Nobody enjoys these full year long dragged out, miserable. No one wants that again.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>No, yeah, we avoided the Manchin "Will he? Won't he?" for a year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, thank God.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>And just got her done, so that was, I think, exciting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Well, congratulations again.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Representative Jamie Long. Thank you so much for coming, and thanks for all your great work in Minnesota.</p><p><strong>Jamie Long</strong></p><p>Thanks, David. Appreciate It.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad free powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/minnesota-sets-out-for-net-zero-emissions</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:101798350</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/101798350/6acffa3445172cd92f5d1a440f406c92.mp3" length="43525297" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3627</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/101798350/b4e859cf81ee544c8b52ab4bbb75ee0b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Utilities are lobbying against the public interest. Here's how to stop it.]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, utility watchdog David Pomerantz discusses all the ways that utilities use ratepayer money to lobby against the clean-energy transition — and what regulators and policy makers can do to stop it.</em></p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/4a1nigv79bfgalb40sni0/volts23.02.10-david.pomerantz.pdf?rlkey=rze17m2cmpmx1a209osx80iej&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a>)</p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/utilities-are-lobbying-against-the-public-interest-here-s-how-to-stop-it"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a>)</p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There are many features of US public life that I believe, perhaps naively, would be the subject of a great deal more anger were they better understood. One of those is the role utilities play in climate policy.</p><p>A rapid transition to a low-carbon energy system is necessary to avoid the worst of climate change. Happily, that transition is going to be an enormous net benefit to US public health and the US economy. It's good for quality of life, economic growth, international competitiveness, national security, and the long-term inhabitability of the planet.</p><p>But it’s not necessarily good for the companies that actually sell energy to customers — power and gas utilities. In fact, utilities are using every tool at their disposal to slow the energy transition, from lobbying to PR campaigns to donations to, as the last few years have demonstrated, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cincinnati.com/in-depth/news/politics/2021/06/03/ohio-corruption-house-bill-6-bribery-timeline-larry-householder/5248218001/">outright bribery</a>.</p><p>And here's the even more galling bit: they are fighting against the clean-energy transition using your money. They use ratepayer money — from captive customers over whom they are granted a monopoly — to fund their lobbying. They have effectively conscripted their customers, who have no choice where to get their power and gas, into an involuntary small-donor army working against the public interest.</p><p>It’s outrageous. In a new report called “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.energyandpolicy.org/utility-political-machines/">Getting Politics Out of Utility Bills</a>,” the Energy and Policy Institute — one of the best utility watchdogs out there — details some of this utility corruption and offers recommendations for how to prevent it. These are not futile recommendations to Congress, but actions that fall within the current powers of state regulators and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.</p><p>I have been ranting about utilities for years, and one of my most reliable sources on the subject has always been the report’s author, Energy and Policy Institute Executive Director David Pomerantz, so I was eager to talk to him to air some shared grievances, hear some enraging tales of utility shenanigans, and discuss what can be done to rein them in. </p><p>All righty, then. David Pomeranz. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I was thinking of you just earlier today as I saw a new story in the Washington Post about how the gas industry is under fire and it is now hiring Democratic politicians to shill for it. And I thought: "Golly, isn't that thematically on point?". So it seems like a perfect time to be covering this report. Before we get into specifics of who's done what and how to stop them from doing it, let's just start with power utilities are out there getting involved in politics. And let's just sort of discuss what is their net effect on politics. Like, what are they pushing for and against out there in the states and at the federal level?</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>That is a great question, and I think it will be important in context for your listeners who I am count myself as a loyal one, and I know many are thinking about climate change, and energy policy, and decarbonization, and the energy transition. And if they are concerned about those things then they should be concerned about utilities, political power and their political machines. So let's talk about what their political agenda is. And we're talking about both electric and gas utilities. Oftentimes the same companies, but sometimes, you know, there are utilities that sell gas only and electricity only. And they're all relevant to this conversation.</p><p>So, since you mentioned, gas utilities pushing back against building electrification, and that has certainly been in the news quite a lot this month, so we can start there, because that's really simple. The gas utilities sector is, with almost no exceptions, united in its aggressive political effort to stave off building electrification. They basically see that as an existential threat to their existence. They have for some time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it is.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Yeah, we can be honest about that, I think.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>We'll talk about electric utilities, of course. You know, electric utilities have not only a role to play in decarbonized world and a transition from fossil fuels, but really like the very central role to play in it. And I wish they would, more of them would get religion on that. But gas utilities don't really. Their role is, they make money from putting methane gas in pipes and sending it to buildings and factories.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>These companies that are both, you can sort of see a root out of this for them. But an exclusively gas utility really is, you know, destined for the trash bin of history, and knows it and is fighting it tooth and nail. But some of the stuff electric utilities are fighting, I don't think is as straightforward or obvious. Why they seem hostile to both distributed renewables, sort of consumer side stuff, and hostile to interregional transmission of the big power. So they seem hostile on sort of both ends of that. Why are they out doing that and how significant is their opposition to this stuff in the grand scheme of things?</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's significant. It depends a bit on the issue. So maybe let's start on one end of the spectrum, with the things that they are most opposed to with the lease nuance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>And I would say that that is distributed resources, customer owned resources, like rooftop solar, and energy efficiency, which we maybe don't talk about as much as we should. But, for decades now, electric utilities have opposed those because it presents a threat to their business model, right? As you have kind of, like, in the high priest of helping people to understand this, electric utilities in our current model make money when they build stuff. If people are putting solar panels on their roof, or adopting technologies to use less electricity, either one of those kind of has the same effect on the electric utility. It means they don't have to build as much stuff. And so they make less money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, you're using less utility power.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Right. So they are opposed to that. And we'll talk about some of the most scandalous things that utilities, electric utilities, have used their political machines to do in the last few years, but a lot of it roots from this almost paranoid obsession with stopping the growth of rooftop solar in some places. So that's that. On the other end of the system in terms of, like, the bulk power system, it's a little bit less monolithic and a little bit more of a spectrum within the industry. So there are absolutely electric utilities who have figured out that they can make money by retiring coal plants and gas plants, and instead building wind farms and utility scale solar farms. So Xcel Energy kind of coined the term "steel for fuel" to represent that change. And it makes sense. Now, they're all kind of in a different place on that. Some have really embraced that transition. Some of the dinosaurs in the industry, like Southern Company, or Duke Energy, or Entergy, they're not there yet for a bunch of reasons that I think are largely cultural, frankly. They just have a lot of groupthink in their leadership and their C-suites, and they haven't figured out yet that that solution sort of helps their profits and also helps customers. It's really good for everyone. And so on that, there's some heterogeneity in the whole sector.</p><p>But there are companies who, utility companies, who absolutely, in the very recent past, have used their political power to slow down that transition too. So probably the canon example of that, and I think we should talk more about this because it's really such an important case study, is FirstEnergy in Ohio.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we'll definitely get into that.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the transmission thing too. I think is maybe not intuitive for people just to understand that sort of, if your power generation and transmission is confined to your utility area, you're sort of stuck with the resources you have within that area. And insofar as you connect to other areas, and potentially get cheaper power, right? You lower the price of power generally. And utilities, especially the owners of those plants that are getting those sky high prices, don't want that either.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is really counterintuitive for people. And I think, unfortunately, this narrative has kind of taken over that the main obstacle to building the high voltage regional transmission lines that we desperately need to transition from fossil fuels to renewables, is like some farmers and ranchers and NIMBY, "not in my backyard" protesters.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Or environmentalists wielding environmental review, et cetera, and protecting salamanders.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Right. And I'm not dismissing those things as real. There are people, you know, there is a history of landowners not wanting transmission lines going on or near their property. But in my opinion, far less of a barrier and gets much more attention than it should compared to this really big structural barrier, which is these multibillion dollar companies that don't want to see transmission built, regional transmission. And that regional part is kind of the key when it comes to utilities. So, utilities are very happy to build local transmission. In fact, they're probably gold plating their local transmission assets because they can get it approved very quickly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, super easy to get it greenlit.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Super easy. And it's a money making machine for them. The regional transmission assets, first of all, as with anything, they'll fight the opportunity for anybody to own those assets but them. So they will fight against any kind of merchant development of transmission, which takes a big piece of the market out that could make things cheaper for everybody. And, yeah, they'll fight against transmission lines that weaken their assets. So a good example of how this stuff all interacts is, there was a proposed transmission line to bring clean hydropower from Quebec into New England, and it was fought by local activists.</p><p>But also NextEra Energy paid $20 million to bankroll, very quietly, some of those protests, and to campaign against the transmission line because they own gas plants and a nuclear plant in the region, and so that imported hydro would have undercut the profitability of those assets. There's another case, that we documented on our website, about how Entergy, utility company that operates in Louisiana and in the south, they actually hired sort of an undercover operative, like a consultant that didn't disclose they were working for Entergy, to go to some of the meetings of MISO, the Mid Continent Independent System Operator, and basically kind of try to gunk up the works, and slow down development of transmission lines that would bring lower cost wind energy into Entergy's service territory. So they fight that too. They fight distributed resources, they fight competitive regional transmission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And they fight the creation of new competitive electricity markets too.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Yes, for sure. So, we have competitive wholesale electricity markets in many parts of the country. The ones we have could use some reforms to make them work better for customers. Utilities certainly will fight those. But there are also places where we don't have any, and the biggest one is the southeast. And the utilities there, companies like Duke Energy, Dominion Energy, Southern Company, they are very aggressively using their political power, including paying groups with names like Power for Tomorrow, that pay former regulators to do some of this stuff, to argue against bringing an RTO to the southeast, which many legislators in some of those states have expressed an interest in, for both parties because they want to see cheaper electricity.</p><p>Large customers want to see it, because many of them want to have better access to clean energy, and a regional transmission operator would help with that. And the utilities are fighting that too. So it's really kind of up and down the system. A lot of solutions to decarbonization. Building electrification when it comes to gas utilities, certainly rooftop solar and energy efficiency, and in some cases shuttering fossil fuel assets, regional transmission... All of those are things we need, and all of those are things that in various parts of the country, one of the biggest reasons we're not getting those things fast enough, is because utilities are blocking them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is one of this genre of podcast I think of as the "you should be madder pod", and people really should be madder about this. So it's kind of wild. So, anything that sort of like, brings cheaper power, and decarbonization, and customer empowerment, like all these things that are good socially, and environmentally, and economically, and politically, name it. Everybody wants all these things, except for the companies that control electricity which are out fighting them, which is just really wild. You know, like any widget maker is gonna go politically lobby against a ban on widgets, you know what I mean?</p><p>Companies have, in our collective wisdom, we have decided that corporations are people, and have the right of free speech, and have the right to defend their interests, and whatever the propriety of that, it's a real thing. But, cannot make the point enough that utilities are not just another company, they're not just another private enterprise. So, give us that context too as well. Why? It's like, it's bad enough that the companies that control electricity are out comprehensively opposing better, cleaner, cheaper electricity. But these are not just normal companies, like, these are monopolies.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Yeah, they're basically state granted monopolies and that is a really important distinction. That's kind of everything. So, if you don't like the political position of some company that you buy some consumer product from, if you don't like the political position of a fast food company, you can buy your hamburgers from some other fast food company.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you don't like the behavior of a certain Tesla executive.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Precisely. You can buy an EV from some other car company. It's getting easier than ever. But if you don't like the political positions of your utility, first of all, you have no recourse. You have to buy electricity. In some cases you have to buy gas, for the time being at least. First of all, it's interesting you mentioned how in our collective wisdom, or at least the collective wisdom of the Supreme Court, we've basically created kind of, like, an anything goes campaign finance environment. And that's meant to, if you believe it, if you give credence to the logic behind those court decisions, like Citizens United, it's meant to protect the free speech rights of corporations. I disagree entirely with the construct, but that's the construct.</p><p>What about the free speech rights of utility customers? Right? Like, if my utility is taking my money and spending it to sue the EPA, so that they can poison my air and water with impunity, that's political speech, you know? And I'm basically being conscripted unwillingly into an army of small dollar donors by my utility to fund that political speech. So there's case law about this. I'm not an attorney, but my First Amendment rights are being violated basically by compelling my speech. So that's one whole set of problems.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's just emphasize this real quick, because I don't know that we ever stated it clearly. But it is important for people to know that it'snnot just that your utility is out lobbying against your interests. And it's not just that you are a captive customer of that company and cannot get away from it, even if you disagree with its positions. It is also the case that the money you are being forced to give the company is being used for that lobbying. So you're not just an irritated bystander, you're literally paying for the companies to do this through bills that you have no choice but to pay. Which just seems like as straightforwardly.</p><p>I mean, it's a little wild to me that there hasn't been lawsuits about this. It's a little crazy that we allow utilities to do this in the first place. I don't know what the positive argument is for allowing utilities to conscript their customers into being dirty energy lobbyists. Are there not lawsuits?</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>There have been some challenges and we're starting to see more of them. I think, like a lot of issues, this one kind of only rears its head and becomes salient when a lot of people start to talk about it. Utility political influence and regulatory capture kind of thrives in the shadows, and that's sort of the default resting state almost, like, if people don't talk about it, it just kind of grows and grows like fungus in the dark.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it's kind of true of electricity generally, it's true of your utilities generally. You don't have to pay attention to that stuff.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Interestingly, and this is a parallel to something you just talked about with Sage Welch on your show about gas stoves, there was more attention to some of these issues, like in the early 80s when there was a lot of skepticism and sort of public outrage about utilities for a lot of reasons. Electricity was expensive, it's coming off the back of Three Mile Island, and for a brief period, electric utilities were sort of treated more skeptically in terms of their political operations. And so, that's happened at other times in our history too, actually right after the stock market crash and the great depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s, which utilities had a big role in.</p><p>There, at that time, was a massive degree of concern about the political power of investor owned utilities. A lot of that manifested at the time in this very big struggle between a much larger question of how we would serve electricity in the country, would it be investor owned utilities or public power, which you had FDR sort of pushing for public power, so they're... Detour. But a long way of saying, there have been periods in our history where people do pay attention to utilities political power, and there is a lot of outrage over it, and there tends to be legal action and legislation proposed and sometimes passed and regulation. But outside of those moments, it all kind of thrives in a lack of attention.</p><p>My hope is that we are entering one of those cycles now, for a bunch of reasons.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You would think, right? Because decarbon it is, like, existential threat, blah, blah, blah. Decarbon by 2050, blah, blah, blah. Like, this is here now. And imperative.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Yeah, now is the time for it. And one other thing I would just say quickly about that is, even if your utility is doing some good things, even if your electric utility has gotten the memo that it needs to decarbonize, maybe it's still fighting rooftop solar on the side, but at least it's switching from, you know, it's retiring its coal plants rapidly and switching to renewables, which some are. This corruption and political spending that they do, particularly what they're doing with ratepayer money, and what they're doing, that often breaks the law, that's really bad when it happens by the sort of, quote unquote, "better utilities" also, right? Because you have a bunch of opponents that clean energy transition, like fossil fuel companies and hardcore conservatives, who don't believe in climate change, et cetera, say they don't, they are all looking for a reason, in very bad faith, to criticize the whole thing. So if you have a utility who is investing in a lot of wind, but they're doing it via political corruption, that also presents a huge backlash risk. So it's kind of bad in all its forms and, as you said, the worst part is that we're being made to fund it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I know. I think you could just say, and I think maybe you'd probably agree with this, it's just, it's ludicrous on its face, that publicly granted monopolies, who are providing an essential service that people cannot go without, are allowed to politically lobby at all. It's so familiar. I think we don't think about it, but it's just ludicrous that it's allowed at all. It ought to just be unthinkable. These should be technocratic nerds who follow instructions.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Just as one small example of this, to put a fine point on it, you have all these, like, sports stadiums and concert venues around the country that are named like FirstEnergy Stadium or the Dominion Performing Arts Center. And once you see this stuff, I mean, once you sort of see the elements of the utilities political machine, once you know to look for it, you see it everywhere. It's like they're sponsoring every nonprofit, they're naming every venue after themselves. And part of what I think is so funny about that is like, why does a monopoly actually need to advertise?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>They're not competing for sales.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly. They are not going to lose costumers, by definition.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Right. What does name recognition do for them? You can't leave them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly. Why do they need to have PR departments at all? Customer service departments, yes. PR? Why, it is crazy.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>It absolutely is. And that's a great juxtaposition because most of them have pretty poor customer service and massive PR departments. And that's where it can be hard to quantify and measure the full breadth of their political machine, but that is something we try to do at the Energy and Policy Institute. And when you look at it, they are among the biggest spenders in their states on everything, right? They're always among the top campaign contributors. They're among the top lobbying spenders. Their trade associations are among the best funded and wealthiest in Washington, DC where they do all their lobbying.</p><p>And it comes back to that ratepayer question, right? In a perfect world, I think everyone would agree intuitively with what you just said, David. Like, why should they be allowed to practice almost any kind of politics at all, right? They're given this incredible privilege of getting a guaranteed profit margin and a monopoly. They should be essentially beholden to the will of our democratically elected officials. Not trying to shape it. But at a minimum, at a bare minimum, what we should do is make sure we get into some controls, to make sure that they're not allowed to supercharge and turbocharge that political machine using their customers money, right?That they're not allowed to hack off a few dollars out of your monthly bill every month and use it to pay for their public relations consultants, et cetera. And that is a relatively simple problem to solve with reforms. So that's what we're trying to lay out, how that can be done, in this new report that we wrote.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Before we get to those specific reforms, and kind of the specific channels of utility influence, and how they might or might not be blocked with reforms, let's just take a brief detour for some storytelling. Because I think when people hear the lobbying is technically legal, as absurd as it is for it to be legal, but people should not take from that the impression that utilities are lobbying within legal bounds here. The fact that they are allowed to do this, allowed to use customer money to do it, is practically an open invitation to corruption and how they have answered the invitation.</p><p>So let's talk about a few of the kind of higher profile examples that have come up in recent years. Because I think people, again, unless you really hear it put out plainly, it really boggles the mind, it beggars the imagination. Like, what they're doing is worse than anyone thinks. So, let's start with Ohio. I wrote a whole long thing about this and it was, what a rabbit hole! Like, every twist and turn you go, it's just nastier and nastier. But tell us what went down in Ohio.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>For sure. This is a great time to talk about it. So, last week a criminal trial started for the former speaker of the House of Ohio, guy named Larry Householder. He is being charged with accepting bribes and being part of a racketeering scheme. Here's what happened. So, there's a large electric utility company based in Ohio called FirstEnergy. FirstEnergy for years had been trying to collect bailouts for some nuclear plants, and also for some of its coal plants that were struggling to make any money. They had tried with the Trump administration, they had tried with previous Ohio state governments, but they kept coming up empty and they found their guy in Larry Householder.</p><p>So, what Larry Householder is accused of, and what I should note, this is very important since they're technically allegations for Householder until he's proven guilty, if he is. But for FirstEnergy, that's not the case. They admitted to everything I'm about to say in what's called a deferred prosecution agreement with the federal government, to avoid going on trial. So they paid $230 million and admitted guilt to all the following. They routed $60 million through different dark money organizations. So technically, these are 501c4 nonprofit groups, that do not have to disclose their donors, and FirstEnergy did not have to disclose giving them money.</p><p>So it's kind of untraceable money that was then passed to Larry Householder. He used some of that just for his own personal use, which is what is at the center of some of the bribery charges. So, he like, used it to pay down a home of his, and he used it to pay for his defense in a lawsuit. But most of the money went to his political machine. So in 2018, most of that money went to elect a slate of republicans in Republican primaries that year in Ohio, that had sort of pledged their loyalty to Householder. They were actually in all these text messages that have come out through the legal process.</p><p>They're referred to as the "team Householder" candidates. And through the political power that Householder gained through the election of a lot of those folks, he was able to win kind of an internal Republican struggle to become the speaker of the House. And in exchange, his payback to FirstEnergy was to pass a law called House Bill 6, which passed, it was signed by Ohio governor Mike DeWine. It offered over a billion dollars in subsidies to FirstEnergy's coal plants and nuclear plants. Did some other things that don't get as much attention, but are pretty important. Kind of did this fake decoupling scheme where, some of your listeners probably know, but decoupling is a policy where if a utility adopts energy efficiency measures, so its customers use electricity, they can be made whole from that. This was like one reporter in Ohio, Kathiann Kowalski, described it as a spoonful of sugar without the medicine. So basically it was like, if Ohioans use electricity, absent the energy efficiency investments, FirstEnergy would still get all that money back. And that's ended up being what happened through the COVID pandemic.</p><p>So it was billions of dollars in handouts and bailouts to FirstEnergy. That's not even all of it. They also have, and FirstEnergy has admitted to this, they also paid over the last ten years, over $20 million to a guy named Sam Randazzo. $4 million of that came a couple of years ago, just before he was appointed as FirstEnergy's top regulator on the Ohio, the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. And they have basically conceded, FirstEnergy has conceded that that last $4 million payment at least, was to influence his behavior as their regulator. And he was a big driving force behind passing HB 6.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's not a small amount of money for a dude, for an individual dude. These are not small bribes.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>No, they're lots of money. And in this case, we don't always know, as this money sort of works its way through the utility accounting machine, like, where it originally came from. In this case, we know, thanks to some audits and some good investigative reporting by folks in various states and some people on my team, that this was ratepayer money, at least some of it was, went into this bribery scheme. And amazingly, not even just from Ohio ratepayers. So, at this point, it seems certain that FirstEnergy also took money from ratepayers of its subsidiaries in Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, and West Virginia, and Maryland. And all of that money kind of got hoovered into this machine and ultimately came out the other side, went to these politicians in exchange for these laws.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Amazing. If there's one thing that could be more irritating than your ratepayer money being forced to lobby your state politicians, its having your ratepayer money be used..</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Some other state politician.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>For corruption in some other state. You don't even get the benefits of the corruption. I think a lot of listeners probably were aware of this, or followed this, or read my piece about it a few years ago, or a million other pieces. It was really just to sort of put a pin in it. This is not one of these things where lines were pushed or like, it's impropriety. This is very straightforward bribery and corruption. It's almost like charmingly old school in a way like this. Like, checks being handed over.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Sometimes there are gray areas and blurry lines, but not on this one. And another day that, David Anderson is one of my colleagues who's kind of led our investigative work on FirstEnergy. He said something the other day that it's wrong for utilities to spend their ratepayer money on lobbying and politics. They're not supposed to do that. They're supposed to spend shareholder money on that, which we can talk more about, but they're not supposed to spend anyone's money on bribes. Like, that's just straight up illegal. And that's what happened with FirstEnergy in Ohio.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there are a bunch of examples in your report, and we could go through this all day, but I don't want to waste too much time. But just one other one, which I thought was also telling, is in Florida, which also involved a lot of very sort of straightforward interventions in the political system to get friendly Republicans elected.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>So in Florida case, we're talking about a utility called Florida Power and Light. Also in the news lately because their CEO is a guy named Eric Silagy, who just unexpectedly announced his early retirement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's probably fine. Probably nothing going on there.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Yeah, nothing to do with anything I'm about to say. So, unlike FirstEnergy, Florida Power & Light disputes a lot of this. But it's been reported out, and it's pretty airtight, and they've kind of been dishonest throughout the process, so I take pretty much anything they say with it the biggest grain of salt you can find. What FPL is accused of having done is, they were paying some, again, their political consultants, and these consultants then routed money. Again, you see a common theme here to these dark money 501c4 groups that they basically created for these purposes.</p><p>And then, what those groups did was bankroll unaffiliated independent candidates for state legislative elections, who were designed to siphon votes away from candidates disfavored by the utility. In every case happen to be Democrats, not surprisingly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Spoiler candidates.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Spoiler candidates. And in Florida, this has been referred to as the "ghost candidate" scandal because these people, it's not like, oh, we're going to fund a green party candidate because we think that'll take votes away from a Democrat. But it's like, a real person who really wants to hold the office and for better or worse, is running. These are people who didn't do any kind of campaigning.</p><p>They were candidates only on paper. In at least one case, the main attribute of the candidate was that they had the same last name as the democrat, which is useful if you're trying to knife and go to them. And it's pretty clear why they were doing this. That CEO who's resigning that I just mentioned, Eric Silagi, he said in an email to two other FPL executives, writing about one of the targets of this "ghost candidate scandal", a guy named Jose Javier Rodriguez, a democratic senator in Florida. He said, "I want you to make his life a living hell" to two other FPL executives. And it worked. That senator went on to lose reelection by 34 votes. So, in these state races that can have really close margins, this utility money has an effect, and that's just kind of the tip of the iceberg. FPL also, the same network of consultants and dark money groups and shady characters, they paid to have private investigators follow a newspaper columnist that had been critical of the utility. They paid for a network of these kind of fake news sites designed to spread utility propaganda.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>My goodness.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>They were trying to buy out a municipal utility in Jacksonville. And allegedly, these consultants paid by FBL created a nonprofit to advocate for marijuana legalization, and then offered one of the city councilors who was most opposed to this FPL buyout, they offered him, like, a very high paid job with the fake nonprofit they just created. So it's really like a whole massive political machine.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Pretty f*****g devious though.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>It's diabolical, man.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I guess if you're just getting millions of dollars to sit around in a room and think of fuckery.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>And that's literally what they do. I mean, in that sense, like other companies, this gets back to the monopoly business model issue. Like, other companies, their incentives as a business are to like, keep costs low, make better stuff, keep customers happy, grow revenues, whatever. All of the utilities profit is determined by the regulatory system, like by their public utility commissions, or appointed by governors and nominated by legislators, et cetera. So, their biggest incentive is to game all that. So that becomes the focus of the company. I mean, anything they can do. And, I think some leaders of some of these companies have maybe better ethical systems than others.</p><p>But the incentive structure is for them to do anything possible, short of getting caught by law enforcement officials, to game the system in their favor. And so, we don't need to go through all the examples, it could be hours. But it's not just red states. It's not just Florida and Ohio. ComEd in Illinois, they got busted by the department of justice and paid a 200 million dollar fine for a patronage scheme with the speaker of that House. This has happened really all over the country, and I think people hear the first energy story in Ohio and think, "oh my God. Well that's got to be the bad apple". And I'm not sure that's true. I think they're the ones who were the most egregious and got caught the worst, but if it's a difference, it's maybe a difference of degree, but not of type. Most utilities are engaged in some version of this behavior.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just to reiterate again, this behavior is not just lobbying. There's weird trade groups, there's dark money groups, there's weird public relations campaigns that are not traceable back to the utilities, there's advertising. It's really a full spectrum of fuckery going on. All of which seem sort of inevitable, based on the structural incentives. I'm sure these are a lot of scummy people involved, but if you set things up this way and make it legal for them to do this, of course they're going to do this. So one other question before we get to solutions is just insofar as these things get caught, are the punishments or the threat of punishment enough to deter future examples of this?</p><p>Does anyone get strung up as an example or how far behind are lawmakers on this?</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Very far behind. Unfortunately. This is actually one of the main solution sets, is around deterrence and enforcement. But that's really a missing piece of the puzzle. And I'll give you an example of how broken this is in Ohio. Let's look at what's happened to FirstEnergy. Now, the biggest penalty they've probably actually had to pay is with investor sentiment, right? Like shareholders in the company are a little bit skittish and certainly their stock dropped after the scandal, after this CEO of Florida Power and Light just announced his unexpected retirement. Next area of the parent company, their stock dropped by about 8% that day.</p><p>They may recover some of that or all of it, but they do have some price to pay on Wall Street because investors I think the sort of unspoken secret among utility investors is they see regulatory capture and utility political power as a good thing right up until the point they get caught. For them, it's like, yeah, of course we want you to control the political environment. We want you to have the Euphemism is like, good relationships with your regulators. But they don't I think they kind of are happy to hear encino evil in terms of how that happens, but they certainly don't like when it leads to, like, FBI raids and Department of justice investigations.</p><p>So there is a price they have to pay there, but the bigger price ought to come from the political system, and that has not happened. So just taking a look at FirstEnergy a rational response to what they did in Ohio, which was essentially a full scale takeover, a full scale purchase, essentially, of the legislature that's supposed to be democratically elected. I think a rational proportional response to that would have been at least exploring the idea that First Energy should should lose its charter to operate, like should lose its monopoly, find another utility that can provide those services to Ohioans. Because I would argue First Energy has lost the right to be considered for that.</p><p>That would, to me be a rational response.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's hard to think of what would justify that if not this.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>I agree.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What would be worse? I mean, totally.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>And no one with power has proposed that. I mean, people like me talk about it all the time, but no one in power to do it in Ohio has proposed that. Instead, what we've seen is really a complete abdication. First of all, they haven't even fully addressed the law that was passed via these corrupt means. So the nuclear subsidies were rolled back from HP 6, but not the coal subsidies. Those are still rolling. That law I didn't even mention it before, but that law also stripped the very meager sort of renewable incentives or renewable performance standards in Ohio.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I remember.</p><p>That hasn't been returned. So they didn't even address kind of the law that was bought with it. But in terms of consequences, there's been almost nothing. The Public Utility Commission of Ohio, they say that they have some ongoing audits and investigations of FirstEnergy, those are on hold until the criminal investigations are over. We'll see what comes of that, if anything. Interestingly, they did have to pay this $230 million payment to the Department of Justice to avoid prosecution. But we should just put that in perspective. The company made $11 billion in revenue in 2021. $230 million is significant, but it's less than the ill gotten gains they got from HP 6. I mean, that was billions in subsidies.</p><p>Way less.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Just as one indicator of how broken our enforcement machine is on this stuff. Interestingly, before the HP 6 news exploded, like, before there were indictments and criminal charges, FERC, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, they had just started an audit of FirstEnergy's Accounting practices. And not surprisingly, in that audit, FirstEnergy did not disclose to FERC the portions of the Excel spreadsheet that showed the bribe payments. They sort of left that out. So just a few weeks ago, actually, FERC announced that it was finding FirstEnergy for violating its duty of candor obligation with the commission, because when you're audited, you're supposed to provide all those documents.</p><p>They didn't tell auditors about $90 million in lobbying expenses, 70 million of which were dark money payments involved in that bribery scheme. For that violation, they fined FirstEnergy $3.9 million.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh my God.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>And they said, well, this is kind of a fair and equitable fine based on our practices, but that's $4 million.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Householder got more than that. Personally, bribes, never mind the rest of it.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>It's a $4 million penalty for lying, about $90 million, much of it spent on a corruption scheme that netted billions for the company. So to call it a slap on the wrist is kind of an insult to slap on the wrist. And the way regulators treat this right now, it's interesting. Public Utility Commissions and FERC actually have a lot of statutory power to fine utilities. That is like a key component of what it means to be a utility regulator is that, if you want to, you can penalize them. FERC has authority to find violations that utilities commit in its jurisdiction up to a million dollars a day for every day that they're in violation.</p><p>But they almost never use this authority. I mean, occasionally FERC will use it in cases of really, really egregious market manipulation. But on this stuff, I'm like lying or sort of quote unquote, "mistakenly charging customers for political expenses", that's almost never fined very, very rare cases, and the fines are very small. And when they do catch it, what they say is like, okay, well, you got to refund the money to Raypayers. But that's sort of like telling somebody who robbed a bank if a cop caught a bank robber mid act and said, "Oh, you know what? Just put the money back in the vault and we'll call it a day". That's basically the way regulators treat this kind of misbehavior. So there's almost no deterrent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is to say, even from the perspective of today, what FirstEnergy did was perfectly rational and business positive. And if I were a FirstEnergy investor, I'd be like, "Nice work, do it again". There's no reason not to do it again. They get so much more out of this than anyone penalizes them for, even if they are caught. So in terms of maximizing shareholder returns, it just seems like perfectly rational behavior on their part.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>And they're the ones who got caught, which is the minority, I think. Obviously, we don't know what we don't know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>But FirstEnergy, at least had to suffer some consequences. Like they've gone through two CEO, they fired the CEO who was responsible for much of this, and the next CEO didn't hold his job terribly long, they've had some board turnover.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm sure those guys are suffering, David. I'm sure they're on the soup line now, regretting their choices.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>That's a great point. But to the extent they've had any consequences at all, it's only because they got caught and other utilities are not, or they're caught doing things that are deemed to be just on the right side of legal. So, as an example, Michigan Utilities, not caught in as much attention because there haven't been criminal charges, but they've spent tens of millions of dollars on dark money operations to control the political environment in their state and even in others. I mean, DTE Energy is a Detroit based energy company. They own some biomass plants in California as part of their unregulated part of their company.</p><p>And they routed money through a dark money group, which ultimately ended at a national laboratory, which put out a report talking about how those biomass plants would be great candidates for carbon capture and sequestration, which is what DTE is trying to do. So none of that has been prosecuted. None of it's been caught. We've tried to expose some of it. Sammy Roth at the L.A. times wrote a great story about that scheme. And and I should say, by the way, just quickly, as an aside, there are reporters around the country who are working tirelessly to expose this kind of corruption.</p><p>Too many for me to name individually, but they're really doing an incredible service to not just energy customers, but to democratic institutions that these utilities are undermining. But your central premise is, right, just a newspaper article or two. And even when there have been criminal prosecutions, the consequences are too low to deter utilities from doing this. And part of the reason we know that's true is because they keep doing it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, proofs in the pudding. So with our time remaining, then having griped about this, which is deeply gratifying to me, as you know, griping about this for many years now, let's talk about what can be done. Obviously, in a sane world, in a country with an operational federal apparatus, which you'd like to see is Congress to act, right? I mean, Congress could just write a law saying utilities can't do this anymore, period, full stop. And that would be nice. As we know, Congress doesn't work, et cetera, et cetera. Half of them are bought by utilities filibuster, on and on, usual.</p><p>So we're left basically looking to either federal agencies, that Biden can control, or state governments. So what can those entities do that would have some actual bite and then some effect?</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Yeah. A lot, thankfully. So that's what our new report is about. And usually the stuff that we do at EPI is just kind of like, try to expose and document all these problems. But we've been spending so long doing that, and it does seem like people care that we wanted to at least take a stab at saying, here's what we can do about it. And there's basically three things. One is having utility regulators. So this is mostly Public Utility Commissions simply pass rules and clarify the existing rules to close all these loopholes and just make clear that utilities cannot spend their ratepayer money on any kind of political influence activity and then define that activity really clearly.</p><p>By the way, if you ask utilities right now, they would say, "Well, we don't spend any ratepayer money on politics. We certainly don't spend any ratepayer money on lobbying." But that's just sort of fun with words, like, the way they define lobbying as the narrowest possible definition. And even then they're not actually following those rules, which we can get to how you prevent that problem. But the first thing is to make those rules airtight. So define, Public Utility Commissions can define all of these different kinds of politics lobbying, PR machines, advertising, political advertising, regulatory lobbying, where you're going to regulators and asking for stuff, all of it, and say you cannot use customer money for that.</p><p>If you want to do it, you can do it out of your own profits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Two things. One is, so any PUC can just do this now. PUC has the regulatory authority to just do this. Now, my only question is how easy is it to distinguish utility ratepayer funds from utility, I don't know, like investor...</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Profits? Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Profits. I'm sure there are all sorts of ways of muddling those.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>There are. And that's what happened in the FirstEnergy case. I won't bore you all with it. But the answer, is it's hard to distinguish. And so that's what gets into the second leg of this tool.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, why not just say don't do it at all with anybody's money?</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>That would be the perfect world. So that is something that a public utility commission couldn't do by itself, but a state legislature could. And we've seen some efforts at this. I think it's politically a bigger lift, but that doesn't mean it's not possible. There's nothing stopping a state legislature from trying to say "Utilities are different from other kinds of companies, and we think they shouldn't spend any money on politics". And clearly define what that means. Usually in the wake of big scandals, there have been some legislators, state legislators, who have proposed bills like that, like after utilities in South Carolina tried to spend billions of dollars on a nuclear plant and just built the world's most expensive piece of pipe art.</p><p>There were some legislators who proposed bills like that. I would love to see more of it. I think those kinds of bills will run into challenges in the courts, given our current campaign finance rules, but they're worth trying. And I'm not a constitutional law scholar by any means but there is reason to believe that, I think there is legal justification to treat utilities different than other companies when it comes to campaign finance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean it's an interesting legal question because utilities sit in this really weird ontological space like they're companies. They're kind of private companies, kind of not, kind of public, kind of not. Has it been hashed through the courts whether they have all the same rights of expression as truly private companies?</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>I don't think it has. I'm going to get out over my skis pretty quickly talking about legal stuff. But one thing I will say, interestingly, just as a note, that maybe will pique folks interests, in the Citizens United case, the liberal justices in their minority opinion argued that the framers did not think corporations should have kind of unfettered speech, and they're different from human beings free speech rights. And of all people, Justice Scalia's rebuttal to that. He actually said well when the framers said that kind of stuff they were talking about state chartered monopoly corporations and that might be true for them, because, at the time, we had, that was common then, corporate structures were very different 300 years ago.</p><p>So comments like that do sort of open the door of this tantalizing question like, should there be legal efforts to try to treat monopoly utilities as fundamentally different? Like you said they operate in this different space., they're not like other private free market companies. Should they be treated differently from a campaign finance perspective? And I think if there are constitutional lawyers who are listening to Volts I hope they will explore that question because it's ripe for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But don't you just think like whatever the legal merits, our Supreme Court will end up getting it and doing whatever is corporate friendliest regardless of the legal merits? I mean, law feels so futile these days.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Yeah, well I'm certainly not optimistic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But PUCs are squarely within their rights to say "Don't use ratepayer money".</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Yes, absolutely. So that's sort of why we start there, it's just because it requires no systemic changes, no constitutional challenges, it's really simple for PUCs to say "No ratepayer money on politics".</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that is because, by law, utilities are supposed to spend money in whatever the most just and reasonable.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Reasonable. Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so this would be under that provision basically saying it is not fair and reasonable to spend money this way.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. And then the challenge becomes, as you said, okay well, we can say that but how can we tell which money is very fungible? How can we tell which pot of money this political activity is being funded by? And so that requires basic transparency and disclosure reforms. So, right now, if you want to know whether a utility spend ratepayer or shareholder money on a given activity, the process basically is to wait for the utility to go in for a rate increase, and then there's a sort of quasi judicial rate case. And if you have money and can hire a lawyer, you can intervene and get status to be an intervener in that rate case, and then you can ask discovery questions with the utility and try to find out how that activity was funded. Now, to be clear, like groups do this. Earthjustice, they do an incredible job of that around the country. Sierra Club does that. Consumer advocates in every state try to do that. They're trying to protect consumers from that, but they're totally outgunned. And some utility companies don't have rate cases for five years or longer. Alabama Power in Alabama, they haven't had a legally contested sort of open rate case with public intervention since 1982. So who knows what they're spending money on.</p><p>So what we need is basically, the solution to this is having annual line item granular disclosures that utilities are made to file with the PUC in all of these areas. So anything that is vaguely political, or even adjacent to political, PUCs should be requiring them to basically submit a spreadsheet every year that says what they spent, where the money came from. And then you can kind of check. So that the first step is to make sure the rules are strong. The second step is to have these disclosures, so that you can verify that companies are following the rules.</p><p>And the third step is enforcement. So this is what we talked about before, so I won't dwell on it. But if you make the rules strong, so the utilities know them and they can't say that they screwed up by accident, and then you have the disclosures, so that members of the public or regulators can catch if they screwed up, and they did screw up, or they did break the law and they charged ratepayers for some political activity, then there have to be consequences. Otherwise there's no deterrent. And those consequences should be severe. So we're arguing, like, if a utility takes a million dollars of ratepayer money and spends it on, you know, what political trade association or some kind of politics that they're not supposed to, they should have to return that money, and then be fined, like, at least that million dollars and probably a lot more to make the deterrent adequate. So those are kind of the three steps. We've got better rules, better disclosure, better enforcement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? And is enforcement, at least what's available today that we know works, is that mostly just financial? Is that mostly just fines? Are there other potential consequences? Because for a company like FirstEnergy that's doing billions of dollars of business and lobbying on behalf of billion dollar nuclear plants, there's just unfathomably large amounts of money being deployed here. And I'm just trying to imagine the size of fine that would compete with those amounts of money for their interest in there. You know what I mean? Can fines even get big enough?</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>It's a really good point. Well, I think one answer is let's try some really big fines and see how they work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's give it a world.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Let's give it a college try. But I do agree with your premise there that some corruption, some kinds of behavior, are so bad enough that it is hard to imagine a dollar figure that could adequately deter, especially when they're all counting on not getting caught. And so, in that case, I do think this probably would be something that a legislature would need to do and would be difficult for a PUC to do unilaterally. But I do think in cases like FirstEnergy, public officials in Ohio ought to consider whether the company should be allowed to continue to operate in its current form there. So that can all be part of enforcement as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about a legislature saying "This balance of public and private that we tried in investor owned utilities clearly isn't working, so we're just going to make you public, make you into a public utility". Has anyone tossed that out there? Is that even on the table?</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>I think so. People are talking about that. I mean, there are movements of people where I live, for instance, in California, who's basically suggested it's a little bit different than these political issues, but they've basically said that PG&E's criminality with regard to starting these devastating fires has been so bad that the only solution really is to have them be converted into a public power entity. There have been similar efforts like that in different pockets of the country. There's one ongoing right now in Maine, and a lot of that I think is inspired by this problem. If you talk to advocates of public power, they will say that we just can't trust these investor owned utilities to not run these political machines that threaten the integrity of our state government. And I'm very sympathetic to those views. I'm not sure if that solution will work at scale everywhere. And it's also worth noting, like public power entities aren't perfect, they also require good governance and good accountability. All you have to do is look at TVA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I was going to say, and they don't necessarily perform better. I always sort of caution people about that. Like, the issues that dictate good or bad performance don't necessarily line up with public and private. But it does seem like, at the very least, if it was a public utility, it would have less structural incentive to cheat and lie. Do you know what I mean?</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>I think that's true. I agree with that. And so I think that option should be on the table in places where that makes sense. I'm all for people pushing for it. It's a much bigger lift, obviously.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, all of this is pretty tough.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>It is. Although, just to back up to some of these changes that would be easier for a single public utility commission to do, or a single state legislature. The kind of stuff that we're outlining in this report, I don't think it would solve every single problem when it comes to utility political machines. But something is better than nothing. The status quo is pretty bad. So let's start trying things. And these are all doable within the current system. Some of them are being explored now. So just as some bright spots, some examples. The New York state legislature recently passed a law that banned utilities from charging ratepayers for any trade associations that lobby.</p><p>I think that's progress. FERC has an open proceeding. So, inspired by a great legal challenge from the Center for Biological Diversity. So yes, who's doing lawsuits? Who's doing legal challenges on this stuff? Center for Biological Diversity has an energy justice program with great lawyers that are doing some of this. So they petitioned FERC to take a look at some of this, and FERC opened an inquiry, they got lots of comments. Everybody other than the utility said, "Yeah, we need some accounting changes and some new rules and some better transparency to prevent utilities from charging customers for trade associations, for politics, for their politically motivated charitable giving, for all that stuff".</p><p>Interestingly, even people who I don't agree with about anything agree on this. Like oil companies actually as electricity customers, weighed into the FERC docket and said, we would prefer not to pay for their lobbying. Also that happened, and FERC can act at any time. So you mentioned through federal agencies, FERC is meant to be independent, for commissioners are appointed by the President, but they don't act in his direction. But FERC can do this anytime they want. They've had this notice of inquiry proceeding. It's been responded to by all parties. They could draft a rulemaking that makes it harder for utilities to supercharge your political machine on rates.</p><p>And there are some individual public utility commissions who have disallowed some things, who have done some aggressive disclosures. So we point out those examples in the report. People should check them out just to show like this is possible. And our hope is that more PUCs and legislators start proposing these things and we'll see what comes of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If you're just a listener out there and you didn't realize how bad this is and are now mad per the you should be mad or about this episode, they just listen to what can people do? Is there a particular organization that's working on this? Or is it just a matter of contacting your own state's PUC or writing your legislature? Is there a place to sort of centralize this work that people can go just support?</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Good question. Well, they can learn more about it at our website. So that's energyandpolicy.org. We focus pretty heavily on this stuff. In terms of groups that are taking action, I'd recommend a couple Center for Biological Diversity, as I mentioned, they are doing some great legal work on this. There's a group called Solar United Neighbors who works with rooftop solar advocates and customers, but they have operations in a lot of different states, and they have a national advocacy program, and they are invested in creating some of these kinds of changes. And then if you're not sure, like, those groups have ways in for you where you live.</p><p>The Sierra Club is involved in Public Utility Commission proceedings in most states, and they're very much invested in attacking utility political power. So that's another organization that folks can check out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And worth saying again, as I've said so many times over the years, PUC meetings are pretty sleepy. You're not going to be standing in a long line to get in one of those. So a little bit of noise goes a long way. Especially relative to a lot of other places you could make noise, like, they don't get a lot of noise there, so they care.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>I couldn't agree more. These parts of state government that are responsible for regulating utilities, they're not very well known. And for people who want to become active, they can do a lot as a single person. I'll give a shout out to one activist in Arizona, a woman named Stacey Champion, who pretty much working independently, she's a very skilled person, but she didn't have lots of backers or anything really helped to bring Arizona Public Service, a utility that was behaving very badly in that state, to heal over the last years just by getting lots and lots of attention and doing great organizing work and campaigning.</p><p>So it is a place where people can make a difference and everything's harder alone. So they just kind of need to find some people who are willing to work with them on it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Okay, well, thank you so much for coming on and walking through this. It's like with so many things like you, listeners, probably vaguely know that it's bad, but it's way worse than they thought. So, David Pomeranz, thank you for coming and sharing this with us.</p><p><strong>David Pomeranz</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/utilities-are-lobbying-against-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:100390640</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 10 Feb 2023 17:01:12 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/100390640/f9eae78ec2f080d1368f5e95aacddba9.mp3" length="48199126" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4017</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/100390640/1d926d60a33384e21ea145e95fae4f52.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Decarbonizing US transportation with an eye toward global justice]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Will widespread electrification of the US personal-vehicle sector inevitably be accompanied by a huge rise in environmentally destructive lithium mining? Not necessarily, says a new report. In this episode, lead author Thea Riofrancos discusses options for reducing future lithium demand through density, infrastructure, and smart transportation choices.</em></p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAACxyFVZNxjrJ7k22NVXfmha/volts23.02.08%28thea.riofrancos%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a>)</p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/decarbonizing-us-transportation-with-an-eye-toward-global-justice"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a>)</p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The transportation sector is the leading carbon emitter in the US economy, and unlike some other sources, it is on the rise. Decarbonizing it is inevitably going to involve wholesale electrification of personal vehicles. We're going to need lots and lots of EVs. </p><p>That’s going to mean more demand for minerals like lithium, which is mined in environmentally destructive ways and almost everywhere opposed by local and indigenous groups. </p><p>But lithium can be mined in more or less harmful ways, depending on where and how it’s done and how well it’s governed. And the number of EVs needed in the future — and the consequent demand for lithium — is not fixed. The US transportation sector could decarbonize in more or less car-intensive ways. If US cities densified and built better public transportation and more walking and cycling infrastructure, fewer people would need cars and the cars could get by with smaller batteries. That would mean less demand for lithium, less mining, and less destruction.</p><p>But how much less? That brings us to a new report: “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.climateandcommunity.org/more-mobility-less-mining">Achieving Zero Emissions with More Mobility and Less Mining</a>,” from the Climate and Community Project and UC Davis. It models the lithium intensity of several different pathways to decarbonization for the US personal-vehicle market to determine how much lithium demand could be reduced in different zero-carbon scenarios.</p><p>It’s a novel line of research (hopefully a sign of more to come) and an important step toward deepening and complicating the discussion of US transportation decarbonization. I was thrilled to talk to its lead author, Thea Riofrancos, an Andrew Carnegie Fellow and associate professor of political science at Providence College, about the reality of lithium mining, the coming demand for more lithium, and the ways that demand can be reduced through smart transportation choices.</p><p>Alright. Thea Riofrancos, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Thanks for inviting me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I've been meeting to get you on forever and waiting for the right occasion, and this is just a humdinger of an occasion here, this report. It's right at the nexus of, like, a lot of things I cover a lot, and a lot of things I feel like I should cover more, bringing them together. So before we jump into the details, I just want to take a step back and summarize the report, the framing of the report as I see it, because I've seen and heard some media coverage of the report, and I'm always just a little frustrated by how other journalists cover things.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Understandably.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's just this weird oblique... they don't take the time to sort of say, "what is the main thing?" Before getting on into weird little side questions. So I'll just say, as I understand it, the premise of the report here is we need to decarbonize transportation, yes. And electrifying vehicles is a huge and unavoidable part of that and extracting a lot of lithium is an unavoidable part of that. However, and here I will quote the report, "The volume of extraction is not a given. Neither is it a given where that extraction takes place, under what circumstances, the degree of the environmental and social impacts, or how mining is governed."</p><p>So the idea here is: yes, we have to decarbonize, we have to electrify, we have to electrify transportation. We need electric vehicles, but there are better and worse ways of doing that, more and less just ways of doing that, more and less lithium-intensive ways of doing that, and we should do it the best way we can. Is that fair?</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>That is fair. And you've also quoted one of actually my personal favorite lines of the report, because I agree with you that it really gets at the heart of what our goals are, the kind of questions that we're asking, and also this desire to align goals that might seem in tension with one another, right? Which is rapid decarbonization on the one hand, and on the other hand, protecting biodiversity, Indigenous' rights, respecting other land uses, and those can feel—and to an extent, materially are—in tension with one another in specific instances. But our goal was to say, "Is there a way to have it all from a climate justice perspective?"</p><p>What's the win win? Or what's the way to get away from at least a sort of zero-sum framing?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Or just a north star, a way to look, a goal to pursue rather than just sort of this binary notion of we're going to electrify transportation or not. There's just a ton of room within that to do it in different ways. So that's the main thing here. We're thinking about how to decarbonize transportation in the best possible way, where it's both rapid decarbonization and as just as possible and as light on the Earth as possible. So within that, you sort of take as your primary metric: lithium. You compare scenarios based on their lithium intensity. So maybe let's just start there and you can just explain to listeners why choose lithium as your sort of central metric?</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Great question. Because one could imagine this report being replicated across a whole host of transition minerals, and I actually hope that it is, right? I do see this as a kind of opening to a research agenda that we hope is malleable in other sectors as well. Why lithium? Maybe let's zoom out a little bit and just say how urgent it is to decarbonize the US Transportation sector, right? And so that's why transportation which we can talk about more later, of course.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think in the latter half we're going to get into transportation and US Transportation all the stuff.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>It helps us sort of understand why the battery and the battery helps us understand why lithium. So I'll just treat it in that order briefly, which is transportation sector number one, and main steel sort of rising emissions sector in the US, right. In order to decarbonize that sector, there's lots of forms of transportation. We're focusing on ground transportation here. And the prevailing technology for decarbonizing ground transportation is the lithium ion battery. That may change in the future, and I'm happy to sort of entertain that. We can talk about it if we want. But right now, in terms of commercial viability, scale, and just the actual material production that's going on in the world, it's the lithium ion battery.</p><p>When we sort of dig into those batteries, and I know you've covered batteries on prior shows, there's a whole set of different minerals and metals used in the cathodes, the anodes, the separators, et cetera. Lithium is central, though. Lithium is the kind of non-substitutable element in that recipe. You can go to different cathode chemistries that do or don't use nickel, that do or don't use cobalt, et cetera, right. The iron phosphate versus the NMC. And those have different benefits or drawbacks in terms of energy density, power density, et cetera. But lithium is in all of them right now.</p><p>And so lithium felt like a good first cut, a good sort of catch-all. I'll also say that we expect that if we overall focus on reducing the raw material needs of the energy transition, those benefits carry on beyond lithium, right? A lot of our suggestions would also reduce mining of other materials, including those outside of the battery, right. Like copper, if we look at the broader car. So we chose lithium for those reasons. One other thing to sort of note is that lithium has also been a particular target of a range of public policy and corporate strategies over the past couple of years, right.</p><p>I hate to kind of use imperialist language, but I'll just use it because it's how the media frames it. Right, there's like a scramble for lithium, a rush for lithium, a lithium boom. It's considered essential and strategic by public and private sectors in ways that are also making it sort of a laboratory of new corporate and public policies. And so that's another reason to focus on lithium.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Kind of an early indicator of how these institutions will approach decarbonization more broadly or materials more broadly.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And playing into that and also kind of a result of that at the same time is like the crazy price volatility with lithium over the past few years. And maybe volatility is not the best way to put it, because it's been just consistently rising. Over the past decade it's been super volatile, big crashes, big booms, and busts. But in the past few years, we've just seen steady increases, getting to the point of historic highs last year. So lithium is now a huge factor in the price and affordability of batteries, which are in turn, the main and most expensive component of an EV. So from a totally different angle, we care about how much are batteries an EV is going to cost, and why? What is their cost structure? Lithium is like a good place to look as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about lithium, then. Let's just start with... because it's funny, prior to EVs, the lithium market was looking from the perspective of what it's going to be in a fully electrified world, pretty sleepy, kind of backwater market. And it's one of many things in the energy transition world that is sort of quite suddenly being expected to 10x itself. So let's just start with the lithium market as it exists now. Where does it come from? You say there are four main countries where lithium is mined. We should say—most listeners probably get this—but we should just say lithium, the raw material is spread pretty evenly all over the world, but it's mined in very specific places.</p><p>So talk about where those are.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Yeah, with a lot of extractive industries, but really very much so with lithium, the map of deposits or of underlying existing lithium in the Earth's crusts or oceans is totally distinct from the map of production, right. The map of production is a really small subset, so that's important to keep in mind. But where it's currently mined is Australia, Chile, China and Argentina. Those are the top four. Those have been the top four. They've actually jockeyed and sort of changed positions at different moments over the past few years. But those have been the top four. They are the top four, and they will sort of be the top four for at least the next few years, right. Mines take a long time to build, which we can talk about if we want, so that's not going to instantly change. But I foresee that in the next decade thereabouts, we're going to have some different players on that top, and it'll be more like a top ten list rather than a top four list, right. But that's where it's mined now.</p><p>And one other interesting thing about lithium—we don't have to get too nerdy about lithium per se—but it's a weird element because it's a very reactive metal. So you don't find it as a metal in nature. You find it in all these heterogenous compounds, right. So there's lithium-bearing clays, there's lithium in geothermal brines, there's lithium and non-geothermal brines, there's lithium in the spagamine, there's lithium and other types of hardrock deposits that haven't actually been mined so much yet, but will be on the horizon. There's really low concentrations of lithium in the ocean. I don't see that as per se the next frontier, but it's there. So there's lithium comes in all forms, really, and each of those has, like, different extractive techniques, different environmental impacts, x, y and z, but it's really variable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the things that follows from that, from it being reactive and thus not found in pure form, is that whatever it is you're digging or hauling up, you then have to do a lot of processing to it to get the lithium out, which is tends to be the gross part. So let's get nerdy a little bit. There are two main mining techniques you talk about in the report, hardrock and brine. Let's just briefly go through those. So, like, hardrock is in, as I understand it, Australia. Tell us what hardrock lithium mining looks like. Just like, what's the process?</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>The nice thing about this form of mining from a listener's perspective is it's much more like every other form of mining that we're familiar with, right? So we're removing large quantities of hard rock. This is in Western Australia. That's where the lithium assets are there. And then there's a basic level of processing that happens in Australia which separates out what is considered waste rock, right, from where the lithium is in higher concentration. And then pretty immediately, the vast majority, like 95% of still relatively unprocessed lithium is then sent over to China for further processing and refining. And then that enters rather directly into, of course, their battery production.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then there's the brine technique, which is grosser, I think, fair to say. Maybe just briefly describe what it means to have lithium and brine and what it involves getting it out.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>I had the opportunity to see some of the brine operations in Nevada. I got a very cool mountain view of them when I was actually looking at the Rylight Ridge Project. And that... if you sort of hike around a bit, you can look at the Silver Peak brine production in Nevada, which is the one lithium mine in the US now in production. So we have brine in the US We also have Brine in Chile and Argentina and elsewhere in the world. So, Chile is a place that I've done a lot of research, but the processes are quite similar in Chile and Argentina, and actually also in Nevada.</p><p>In fact, the way that brine is removed and evaporated—which I'll get into in a moment—in Chile, was first developed in Nevada and kind of exported to Chile. So there's kind of an interesting whole story of, like, US Chile mining relations in both lithium and copper, where there's been a lot of back and forth knowledge and technical expertise and that sort of thing. So, anyway, in Chile, you have the oldest and driest desert on Earth, in a way that driest place on Earth, except for some subregions of Antarctica. So it's extremely dry. But the oldness is important because there's a huge amount of scientific value in the kind of evolutionary processes and the origins of this desert that are worth thinking about while all this mining is happening and sort of destroying some of those landscapes.</p><p>So, right now, mining for lithium happens in the Atacama Salt Flat, which is in the Atacama Desert. That really old, dry desert I just mentioned. And the salt flat is enormous. I live in Rhode Island, the state of Rhode Island, which is a very small state, but the Atacama Desert is like two-thirds the size of the state of Rhode Island, right? It's very big, and it is like just breathtakingly beautiful and strange and with a very rich, both natural and indigenous history. And so when you're standing on it, you are in this very unusual landscape that's gray and white and those kinds of shades ringed with these towering Andean mountains.</p><p>So I don't know if you've been had the privilege of going to the Andes, but these huge...very tall mountains, right, very dramatic, some of them are volcanic, right? So that's the kind of landscape the surface is a very crusty kind of surface, but it's not barren. So when you're walking around, especially in, like, ecological preserves and places where there's been good conservation, there are these surface lagoons and there are beautiful flamingo species that are endemic to the region that are just chilling out in the lagoons because they, with their filtered gills, kind of just suck up little species that live in the salty hunter water there. And that's how they survive.</p><p>And so there's a whole ecosystem that relates to the salt flat, and there's a lot of migratory birds, as well as other animals. Underneath the salt flat at various depths, right, there is subsurface brine deposits. So these are deposits of extremely salty water—much saltier than the oceans—that within them have various kind of valuable minerals suspended. And one of those is lithium. And so the basics of the way this works is that the subsurface brine is pumped to the surface. You can think of like a giant straw or whatever, just kind of any well-pumping system pumped to the surface and then it is arrayed in these enormous evaporation ponds. And it is moved from pond to pond with different chemicals being added, removed such that to reach maximum lithium concentration. But what's most important is actually the work of just solar radiation, because in addition to being the oldest and driest desert on Earth, in general, this desert is considered like a poly-extreme environment. That means it's super dry, but it's also super sunny, and it's super windy, right? It's just like the super high altitude. It's everything. And all of those conditions are very auspicious for the evaporation of brine, right. If you're going to put water out in a desert like that, it's going to be thrown up into the air very quickly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's funny, I was reading about this and I got to the part where, you know, I knew that the brine was down there with these elements in it, and I was thinking like, "Well, how do they, you know, reduce it down to the elements?" And it's like they throw it in a big pool and let it sit there for a while and come back to it. It's weirdly...low tech, but also weirdly like space inefficient just like big, sprawling, all that fluid sitting out in the sun. You just need giant swaths of land for this.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Absolutely. You need a lot of land. And then there's a question of, well, we're throwing water into the air in one of the driest desert or in the driest desert on Earth. What is the implication of that? Of course, what mining companies will say is, "It's brine, not water." But what scientists that I've spoken to and read have will say is, "Well, the water and the brine are actually connected in ways that we don't even fully understand because there hasn't been quite enough research on it." But the subsurface water system, they are porous boundaries. How porous they are is a subject of scientific debate between underground freshwater, which is absolutely essential to human life, to animal life, to other industries, right. Porous interfaces between that and then the subsurface brine.</p><p>And so the question is—and this is the real point of scientific debate—is whether pulling out that brine is actually pulling down the freshwater through the forces of gravity and nature of pores, a vacuum and the whole thing. But also because the downward pressure in the nucleus of the salt flat creates a depression, which further pushes down the brine and also potentially further pulls down the water at the edge, the freshwater. So there's a whole complex kind of desert hydrology.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And in terms of environmental impacts, let's just talk about what's nasty about it. I mean, I think people can get sort of a picture when you're digging up big pieces of land, you're using lots of land for these evaporation pools. Presumably, when the water evaporates, it's not just lithium left behind, right? There's all sorts of other stuff. What happens to all that other stuff? What is the sort of environmental risk here?</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Right, so there is like, piled up waste salts that are left behind. The companies will say those aren't toxic, but physical waste being removed from underground and piled around in a place that nature did not intend it. I think the most important thing, though, is what I was just talking about, which is the watershed, because this watershed is already exhausted. And that's a technical definition, not just me being an environmentalist. Like it's called exhausted by the Chilean water agency. And there are multiple reasons for that. There are multiple compounding factors. I will definitely call out the copper industry as being the worst.</p><p>The copper industry uses so much fresh water that they've had to switch to desalination plants because there's not enough fresh water. And they have built the largest desalination plant in the world, I'm pretty sure, to serve one enormous copper mine in Chile.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wild.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>And that desalination plant is on the coast, obviously, the water is desalinated there from the seawater, then—where very energy intensive process—polluting. And then that water is shipped to the highlands where the copper mines are. So that's the number one impact on freshwater is how it's been exhausted, a lot of it because of the copper industry, which is in the same location.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And copper, we should also maybe just say, as a side note, also expected to rise considerably...</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Dramatically.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...under clean energy.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Right. Because of the copper wiring in the cars, the copper wiring and the transmission lines, the charging stations, our whole, "electrify everything" is very copper-dependent under current technologies. So there's that. There's climate change, which is further desert-ifying—I don't even know how to pronounce that—the desert, right? Like it's making it drier. So there's that issue, and then there's agriculture, there's human consumption, and there's lithium, right? So there's a variety of stressors on the same water system, and as a result, it's been called exhausted. And they say that they're not going to give out more freshwater permits x, y, and z, right?</p><p>So that's just like the context that it's in. And where the debate is with lithium is how much removing vast quantities of brine—we're talking about like thousands of liters a second, I believe, if I don't have that wrong—vast quantities of brine by these two major mining companies, SQM and Albemarle, is further playing into this watershed exhaustion. Another thing that's interesting to note, to go to sort of a totally different type of environmental impact that we humans may not think about very much, which is microorganisms.</p><p>So what's fascinating about the brine is that it's actually an ecosystem. It's not just dead salt water, whatever that would mean, right? Microorganisms live in the brine, both in the surface salty lagoons, but also in the subsurface brine deposits. There are microorganisms, and those are important for a variety of reasons, but including they hold clues to evolution and the origins of life on Earth because of how old this desert is and also how poly-extreme the environment is, replicates earlier Earth conditions, but also like Mars conditions. So if we want to understand, could there be life on other planets, scientists say we need to understand how these microorganisms can survive.</p><p>And not only this super extreme in all the ways I listed, but also, like, some of the saltiest environments. And saline is really hard on organisms, right? And so it's amazing that they can survive in this hypersaline context. But we're basically just sucking them out. We're killing...they're not going to survive the process of lithium extraction. And that, again, may not depends on the listener, how much that matters, but there's a lot of science that says these microorganisms are important for a variety of reasons and we should think about conserving them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's a lot more detail in the report, but let's just consider it settled. Lithium...lithium mining, everywhere that it exists is pretty environmentally nasty. And another thing you point out in your report is that almost everywhere it exists, there is opposition to it, local opposition to it. Indigenous and other groups organizing to protect landscapes, organizing to protest the fact that they're not consulted, they're informed consent was not gained. Sort of all the capitalist evils that spring to mind when people think about mining are on the loose in lithium mining, and it's opposed almost everywhere it is happening.</p><p>And that is kind of just the important background here for everybody who's thinking about decarbonisation in this way, which is that, like we said, yes, it's going to be better to do this than to continue pulling gazillions of tons of fossil fuels out of the Earth every second of every day. It's going to be better. But every step you take towards more lithium, there are tangible harms being done to vulnerable people. That's something we can't ever forget as we're tossing these things around.</p><p>Right now, it's relatively small. There's four countries involved. There's a lot of talk about vast expansions coming. There's a supposed supply crunch over the next five to ten years as, like, demand is rising much faster than supply. But there are also, as the report points out, these huge discrepancies in projections, depending on who you believe, how much lithium is going to be needed. So just give a sense, like, how fast and big the lithium mining sector is going to expand. How big is the pressure to expand here? And what do we mean? Are we talking about twice the size, ten times the size?</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>It depends who you ask, as you already noted, right. And everyone agrees: big increase. But beyond that general consensus, there are differences. And I know you recently had a conversation about modeling, right? And like how much goes into modeling. And I have never been more convinced of this than I am now, both in diving into the existing models and what their assumptions are, but also in seeing some of the contrast with our report, which we'll get into later, and how different the findings can be if you change some of those assumptions or play around with them in some way, right.</p><p>Models are not, like, written in stone or laws of nature. There are a lot of human decisions made sometimes with political and economic interests at play, right? So everyone agrees big increase, right. As you noted earlier, like, lithium was, and actually could still be considered a rather small market. For a long time, it's mainly been about personal electronics, but also it's used in some construction glass materials as a coolant. It's used in lithium as a psychiatric medication. But it's really like the EV market that has been a game changer, right? And what's been the case for the past couple of years, and will be the case even more so going forward, is that batteries for passenger EVs, specifically, are the number one driver of demand for new lithium, right? So that's also important to sort of keep in mind. They vastly outweigh any other end use in terms of why there's so much talk about lithium demand.</p><p>So, a couple of ways to cut the cake. And I'm drawing on a mix of our report and other existing forecasters out there. One way to think about it, and this comes from our report, is that if we just look at today's demand for EVs and then project outward to the future, taking into account growth, et cetera, to 2050, the US market alone would need triple the amount of current global production.</p><p>That's one way, because it's hard to wrap our heads. I mean, there's many ways to say the same thing, right? That's one way to say it, right? The US in 2050 would need three times what the whole world needs now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>And that's, again, not thinking about all the other countries that have their needs, right. So that's one way to think about it. Another that I can find a little more concrete because it talks about individual mines, and here we're drawing on Benchmark—they're a big forecaster, which people have opinions about, right, so I'm not waiting into that. But they are a big forecaster and they influence government a lot, particularly. So Benchmark mineral forecasting says we'd need a 200% increase in the number of lithium mines, the just number of discrete mines by 2035. So a closer time frame to meet expected demand for EVs. That's globally, not US-specific. So we need a lot more lithium mines as discrete entities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But this is what breaks my brain about all this. You say it can take up to 16 years to get a mine going. These are not pop up operations. So 200% more mines in the next twelve years just...</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>It seems hard to meet that. Now, what will happen, and this we could talk about the implications of this, and there's a lot of debate in the climate, environmental, et cetera, community, but some of those time frames might get shortened because there's a huge pressure in the US, in Europe, and in some other jurisdictions, to fast track mines. Like right now, yes, it takes a decade...We say 16.5 years. It could be shorter, can be a decade in some cases. But we're talking about at least a decade, right, to develop a mine, to go through financing, getting your financial back errors, the permits to get the quote unquote "social license," which is like an industry term for communities, like, giving you bare minimum sort of agreement or something.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The thought of all that happening lots, lots faster does not calm my heart.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Me neither. And I think there's a whole separate conversation. I know you've dealt with this in other writing and on the show, but like this permitting conversation, I think speed gets equated with outcomes in a wrong way. I mean, saying we're going to do everything faster doesn't actually always make it faster, because what that means is there's various corners being cut, which just turns into lawsuits. So actually making the timeline for NEPA faster in the US case does not actually per se mean we're going to get the lithium faster. So that's a separate conversation, but I just want to throw that in there.</p><p>Okay, so a lot more lithium. I'll throw out one other statistic because it's the one that alarms me the most when I try to grapple with it. It's the international energy agencies from 2020 or 2021, from a report a couple of years ago where they said compared to a 2020 baseline, we need 42 times as much lithium in 2040. That's like an enormous increase. I think that means 4200%, if I understand math. I don't know. Or 4300 percent. Whatever it is, it's really big. It's a large increase, right. It was larger than any other mineral they tracked.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And this is wild. I don't even know that we have to spell it out, but just like, let listeners just imagine what is a global rapid herding toward more mining? How is that going to play out? The idea that it's going to be done more sensitively or with more consultation with indigenous groups, et cetera, et cetera, when everyone is basically panicking and trying to do it as fast as possible, it's just not a great recipe.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As the last comment on lithium, let's talk a little bit about the coming supply crunch and where... one of the big things the report talks about is these four countries are the main lithium mining countries now. But obviously with this sort of global stampede on, there's going to be a lot more mines in other countries. So where can we expect mining to branch out? And what is the timeline of that versus the timeline of this crunch?</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>One thing to note at the top is that there already is a lithium supply crunch, right. We're already in that domain, so to speak. And the way that we know that is that the prices for lithium have been historically high, right? Because supply, demand, price, et cetera, right. Supply is not keeping up with demand. And that is important to our renewable energy kind of wonk and industry folks on the show that are listening to the show, because that, is in turn, changing something about battery pricing for decades and for sure since 2010, which is when Bloomberg started tracking this, but you can go back to earlier data from other sources.</p><p>For decades, lithium ion batteries have been decreasing in price in a sort of secular trend based on R&D, economies of scale, innovation, manufacturing efficiencies, all the things that make things cheaper under capitalism when that occurs, and that is priced in kilowatt hour. And this sort of, like, the idea was we're going to one day get to $100 per kilowatt hour, and that will get us to price parity without taking into account subsidies with ICE vehicles, right? So that was the sort of golden target. In 2021, they plateaued, they stopped that decrease, and we didn't know what was going to happen in 2022, but now we do.</p><p>So in 2022, they rose for the first time, and we went from like 130-something, 135, I think, to like 151 per kilowatt hour. I'm not trying to be like a doomsday or I'm not saying they'll increase now from here on out. I don't actually think that. But I do think it's important because the reason battery prices, for the first time since Bloomberg started tracking this, have increased in price is because of raw materials. So, in an interesting way, because we've done all this manufacturing efficiency in R&D, and we really cut costs on all other parts of the process, the raw material components are logically a larger component of the cost structure.</p><p>At the same time, coincidentally, those raw materials have increased in price in their cost, right. So that is why batteries are now more expensive. I'm sure things will settle in whatever way, especially as we build up a lot more battery-manufacturing capacity around the world, which will depress prices. But it is true that this is starting to call into question, further question the affordability of EVs, because these are the main and most expensive component of an EV.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, which in turn sort of complicates these long term projections of EVs, which in turn complicates the long-term projections of lithium demand. Like the whole...</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>It's all circularly interrelated. But we can definitely say that there's been a huge rush to mine lithium in the US Which is just another reason for people in the US to think about this. It's not just about stuff that happens far away. This is happening here. We have 50-odd projects with some level of financial backing or permitting in Nevada alone in one state.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wow.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>That's tracked by the Center for Biological Diversity by Patrick Donnelly. Shout out to him because he's been tracking that. It's really hard to compile those statistics. And the US government is throwing money, $700 million at Ioneers mine in Rayte Ridge. That's the Department of Energy just gave them a huge loan.</p><p>The auto industry is throwing money. GM just gave $650 million in equity stakes to Lithium Americas for their Thacker Pass mine—which is, by the way, in federal court right now, over fast tracking concerns raised by environmentalists, so, the whole thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All of these are facing opposition. Like, almost everywhere a lithium mine exists, it seems like there's some opposition. It's funny that's one of the things I've been sort of joked about with the Inflation Reduction Act is everyone loves the idea of onshoring the whole supply chain as a slogan. Everybody's super into that. But there are lots of links in the supply chain that are pretty nasty. I'm curious what their political valence will be once people get a little closer look at, like, what mining and processing of lithium really looks like, whether they'll be so excited about onshoring it.</p><p>In the report mentions in the brine area, there are new techniques of mining lithium from brine that are less impactful than the traditional sort of, "leave it out in an open pit while the sun bakes it" technique. So it's not that lithium mining is a fixed quantity of environmental destruction. There are better and worse ways to do it, could be better or worse, governed, regulated, all these kind of things. But we got to move on to the second half of your report. So the report focuses on, it says, "Okay, we need to electrify, but we'd like to do it in the least lithium-intensive way possible."</p><p>And so you focus on the US Transportation sector because, as you note, that's a huge, huge driver of lithium demand, and you focus on personal vehicles, which are the bulk of US transportation emissions, and therefore they're going to be the bulk of lithium demand in the future. And so the whole question here is: how could we decarbonize the US personal vehicle sector in the least lithium intensive way, otherwise known as increasing lithium efficiency, "Getting more mobility," I think this is the title of the report. "More mobility out of less lithium" is the idea here.</p><p>This is, I think, a great part of the report because in some sense, once you see it on paper, it seems obvious, like, yeah, if lithium is bad, we should think about how to use less of it. It just seems sort of obvious, but it is wild how much total auto domination in the US is just taken for granted and invisible in most projections of car demand and for lithium demand, it's just an unspoken assumption that the current pattern of auto insanity in the US is going to continue. So in a sense, it's, I think, a great advance in the state of things just to say, "Maybe we could do it differently." There's other ways, other ways to do it. Yeah, it's not, as you say in that first quote, "It's not a fixed thing."</p><p>We have choices here. There are different ways things could go. So you lay out four scenarios. The first scenario is just: assume electrification of the existing number of cars on the US and otherwise everything stays the same. The car, the auto intensity, the land use, the amount of car use stays the same, and we just try to electrify all the vehicles. In a sense, I think it's tempting to sort of take that as the default scenario, but one of the points you make in the report, which I think is important, is it's not obvious that that's the easiest way to go.</p><p>It's not even obvious that that's possible. So let's first just talk about that, because it seems like kind of what we're stumbling toward, which is just take the cars for granted and try to electrify as many of them as possible. So just tell us maybe what's wrong with that, the sort of status quo we're stumbling toward.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Right. Well, first of all, it assumes an enormous quantity of EVs are going to be bought by people, which is, in a way, an assumption of all of our scenarios to be fair. All of them involve what we could call the mass deployment of electric vehicles. None of them eliminate electric vehicles entirely. They just change their relative predominance within the transportation mix in various ways, right? But in scenario one, the most need to be purchased, right? And so first and foremost, it's a question of millions of individual consumer decisions going as planned.</p><p>And it's a question of how much our policy environment and especially financial incentives will need to change pretty rapidly in order to make that a reality. Because I don't know that IRA is going to cut it. Putting aside all the debates over the specific mechanisms IRA uses, it gives rebates, you know, at a below a certain income threshold that can get up to, I think, $7,500, you know, not nothing. And so that's the approach in the IRA, but I already noted and we've talked about how these vehicles might be getting more costly over time. I mean, there's different trends at the same time, on the one hand, the batteries are getting more expensive, which will make the cars more expensive. On the other hand, now, all the car companies are saying we're going to out compete one another on price and we're willing to forsake a little bit of profit. These are uncertainties. I don't know which will, on the balance, which will be the prevailing trend.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, also in the key dynamic you point out in the report, which is if lithium demand is as high as it would be—looking at the US car fleet—that exacerbates the crunch, exacerbates the high price.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Yes, right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So in a sense, trying to sell more is almost self-limiting.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Yes, that's an excellent point. And so that is one problem with scenario one. Like will we have to increase subsidy? I'm not anti-subsidy. I'm not like anti-government spending. I'm, like, in favor of government spending. So it's not like I'm trying to do some taxpayer-efficiency thing or like star of the beast thing. It's not about that I mind spending public money. It's like on what, right, because all of this involves public money. Whether it's EV subsidies, whether it's those might be more invisible forms of public spending, but the more visible forms are the transportation authorities and then of course, highways.</p><p>So all this involves public money, but this one involves trying to use public money to shape individual consumption decisions and that's not the most efficient way, right. And it would be more efficient and we'll go through this with scenarios two, three and four to actually use that to beef up mass transit. So that's one issue with scenario one, or a couple, I guess. Another, though, relies on peer research, not our own research, but other folks that we cite which say that we will get to zero emissions faster if we get people out of cars. And so we don't directly test that because all we're looking at are 2050 scenarios. So we're assuming zero emissions in 2050. And what we're playing with is like, how we're going to get there.</p><p>But other people that test: will we get to zero emissions? or how fast will we, show...and this stands to reason, right, like the fewer vehicles on the road, the more people are sharing the same vehicles, the easier it is to electrify more quickly, because if you electrify a bus, you deal with many people's transit at once. And also even before you electrify the bus, that's still like a net positive if you're getting people out of an ICE car into a bus, like you've dealt with some carbon emissions before you even make it an e-bus, right? And so there's a lot of...this is what I like to say to the carbon hawks among us, right? To people that really unilaterally focus on...which I, in some ways, count myself among, but I'm less unilateral, like, I'm also thinking about biodiversity and all these other issues, but for people that are like, "All I care about is the emissions trajectory." We will lower emissions faster if we don't do the super car-dependent one-to-one EV to ICE swap, right, or ICE to EV, excuse me.</p><p>And it's not even one-to-one. It's more we have to produce more EVs over time as the population grows.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Demand is rising. Yeah. Population is rising. Yeah. I mean, you point out that there's some doubt in a lot of scenarios and modeling whether we can even hit the 1.5, whether we can get on a 1.5 consonant scenario or even a two degrees consonant scenario with this sheer volume of cars that we have to electrify, right? It's an enormous amount and it's rising all the time. So lowering the amount of cars is lowering the target to more achievable levels. So that's important. So I just want to get I think people maybe think that this is kind of the default thing we're heading toward, which is just samesies with all the cars except they're electric now.</p><p>Whether or not you think that's the best way to go, there's real reason to doubt whether it's possible to do that. Certainly on the time frame we're talking about.</p><p>Especially as the cars get bigger, right? There's that other research that's not ours. We do a lot on battery size, so we'll talk about that. But there's a separate research academic article that just came out a few months ago showing that the e-Hummer, like when we get really large, like really gargantuan batteries, cancel out their climate benefits, meaning that the carbon-intensity of that supply chain to produce that vehicle adds to emissions rather than decreasing them, right? And so that's when we get at the real extremes of car size. I'm not saying every EV is an e-Hummer. It's just not right.</p><p>But unfortunately, our trend is trending upward in size. And so we also, back to our earlier analysis of supply chains, have to think about emissions across the supply chain. Right. And when we produce enormous vehicles that then are shipped on container ships like these just enormous production networks. And if those are not fully decarbonized as production networks, then we have to factor that in.</p><p>Yeah, embedded embodied emissions are huge here. So, you have four scenarios. The first one is just everything stays the same except it becomes electric. And then scenarios two, three, and four are, sort of, I guess, escalating versions of europeanizing American cities. I'll just say upfront, you summarize towards the end here relative to scenario one. With scenario two, you get an 18% reduction in lithium demand. Scenario three, it's 41%. And scenario four is 66% reduction in lithium demand, which is... that's not marginal, right? So these alternate scenarios you're talking about are real substantial reductions in lithium demand.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>More than I expected. Like, honestly, as someone who's looked at this for a while but never read a study like this because...not existed. But my assumption was it was going to be a little lower, though still important, still significant, but it was higher. And it gets even higher over time. Like if we go all the way to 2050, we can get a bigger spread, partly because by that point we have more recycling feedstock to work with and other changes that are more cumulative, take place. And so, it gets really dramatic when we look at best and worst case in like the year 2050, for example.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But...and this is maybe an area where I need you in specific because I know you always have good things to say about thoughts like the ones I'm having, which are I'm looking at these scenarios. Just scenario two, the first level above one, it says, and I quote, "Levels of car dependence in US cities and suburbs are reduced to the equivalent of comparable EU cities." And to me, just that just getting US cities and suburbs on par with comparable EU cities is alone just mind-boggling in its scope and its political difficulty. And I just look at that and I feel daunted.</p><p>And I know you're always going on about we need to expand our imaginations, we need to push the window open, and we need to think more about what's possible and not feel locked in. But, in scenario three goes...</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Much more ambitious.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...farther than that. And then scenario four is basically like: every US city becomes Vienna. Every US city becomes not just average EU city, but state of the art, progressive, cutting edge. And I just have a lot of trouble seeing that happening. So how do you think about or do you bother to think about...</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>No, I do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...the political realism of what are very, very substantial reforms in US land use and habits and public spending and on and on.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Yes. So there's a lot to dig into there because I absolutely do think about it. And I'm a political scientist, for whatever that's worth, and also someone who's done a lot of political organizing, legislative advocacy, et cetera. So as utopian as I can sometimes perhaps sound or feel or whatever, I mean, I have ambitious ideas. I'm a big proponent of the Green New Deal, et cetera. I do think about the brass tacks of moving people on issues and of what regulations or what legislation will be necessary and what's possible at the state or local versus federal level.</p><p>And I want to talk about all those things. I want to say something first, though, is just like a set piece, which is we've been treating these as like four big different pathways, right? Which they are. But what's important to note is that there are subpathways and subpathways meaning there's actually like dozens of scenarios that we test because there's a lot of on-off switches that can apply to each of these. And one key one is battery size. So let's go back to that scenario one that we've been talking about, which is the status quo but electric, or the status quo plus population and consumption growth, but everything EV, and it turns out it makes an enormous difference if we can just get back to where we were a few years ago with average battery size in the US, or where our peer nations are, or peer affluent nations like in East Asia and Western Europe are with battery size. We're now like double the size of a decade ago. We're double the size of the global average. And what's concerning is that...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>God, that's so dumb.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>It's so dumb. Because there's so many reasons it's dumb. Those cars are unaffordable to most Americans. The larger the battery, the more expensive the car. But it's also just being sold in a sort of luxury framework, right, of these fancy pickup trucks and fancy SUVs that contractors aren't using. I mean, it's just like affluent suburbanites for the most part, and they're using them to go to the grocery store, not to go hiking or to, like, haul stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know. And I get that every new consumer product you start on the luxury end, you make it an object of desire, and then you and then you move down. But like, we're like ten years into this s**t, and...</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>It's getting worse! It's moving into opposite direction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know. They're getting bigger and bigger...</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Like, now it's like everything is the Ford e-Lightning or whatever.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know. Okay, let's get like some freaking hatchbacks now. Like we did it.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Is what most working and middle class Americans can afford and drop. And so we're getting really crazy with the average battery sizes double, as I said, the global average double where we were a decade ago. And it's concerning because it's a trajectory. So are we going to be triple that in a few years? Like, where is this ending? But, the good news is, that we can be as car dependent...we can change like, nothing about the political, social, cultural infrastructural status quo. Like, we could stay with our car dependency in all the ways that that's locked in.</p><p>And we could get really significant decreases in lithium volume, especially as we get closer to the end of our...we get to 2050. So in 2050, just snapshot year, because that's our final year that we model. We could have 42% less lithium in scenario one, the car-dependent scenario, if we have more normative—I don't want to say smaller because it's misrepresents it. It's like more normative sizes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Normal-er.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Normal-er.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Normal-er batteries.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Where we were recently, and where most of the world is now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like, when I first read through, I thought that the reduced battery size demand in your scenarios was a causal result of land use changes and walkability....</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>No, it's a separate parameter.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're just turning that knob...</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>For each scenario.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Independently.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Exactly. Which is why—and I'll just say it here because it's my favorite of our findings, because it's the most dramatic—that if we compare scenario one like the car-dependent scenario and with large batteries, ones that are currently larger than average, but is, like the direction we're going. We compare that to scenario four with small batteries, with perfect recycling, with everything, like ideal utopian Vienna, whatever. In 2050, 92% different in lithium volumes, right? So there are radically different futures ahead of us. And it's helpful to look at the extremes, even if our worst case is, like, unlikely on the negative end and our best case is unlikely on the positive end.</p><p>Let's look at the total spread, because that's the spectrum we're working with. And that's where we can use policy, behavioral change, cultural norms, whatever is available to us as tools to shift people towards the best case scenario.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You highlight three specific changes that are the most efficacious kind of levers to pull to reduce lithium demand. There's reducing demand for vehicles overall, densifying urban centers, and then reducing battery size. I get reducing demand for passenger vehicles. You do that with better public transit, better land use. You do that in part through densifying urban centers, increase walking and stuff like that. But it's notable that battery recycling, which people are quite bullish about, doesn't really make much of a dent for quite a few years. So maybe just tell us a little bit about what is the state of recycling, what you expect from it?</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Yeah. So what's interesting about recycling is that you need to have enough feedstock available. Meaning, like, if you're going to use recycled, recovered materials to manufacture batteries instead of new mining, which is the goal, we want to use circular economy kind of approaches so that the end of life batteries and also the manufacturing waste, all the things that are spit out by our system, like reenter the loop. And we close the loop. And so instead of new mining, we're sort of like we're mining batteries, right? Instead of mining the Atacama Desert.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>So that's great. We're super proponents of it, and there's very optimistic results shown in terms of how we can get close to 100% material recovery. The technology is there. That's what I want to start with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Maybe it's too obvious for you to even say, but I'll just put it out there. Signpost is just even best case, recovering 100% of materials. You still have to get enough materials in the loop in the first place.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>That's where I'm going. We're several years out from that being significant because we don't have the level of EV penetration yet. And then forget about just the current level of EV penetration. How long do people own their cars? Hopefully, these cars last a minute, right? Like they're durable goods, right? So, yeah, it might be ten years, you know, whatever it is, right. Until we're actually end of life with those batteries. And then it's interesting. I'll just throw this out there because I think it's it's kind of interesting and it helps people understand how materials cycle through systems.</p><p>So when we get to the end of life of a battery in a car, it no longer gives the power and energy density that a car requires to move quickly and for distance. At that point there are a number of other applications we could use the battery for, and we often go to the grid as the first thing, and that's great. Backup storage or primary storage, even on an energy grid because of variable solar, wind, et cetera. So we can store energy, but also we can even use it for less intense mobility applications, right? So, like, a city bus does not move as quickly, it also gets much more frequent overnight charge. There's a variety of ways in which buses strain their batteries less and can work with a second-life battery. So there's lots of interesting applications. But there's a critical choice there, like, do we put the battery in a second-life application or do we strip it of its materials and use those materials to become feedstock for new...and I'm not trying to make it, like, a zero-sum thing, though I guess at the literal cell level, it is, right, like one or the other is happening.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Don't you want to do both? I mean, can't you completely exhaust the battery and then get them...</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>It puts the horizon back, defers the horizon because if we're reusing then and... reduce reuse, recycle, that old environmental thing is actually useful to remember. So we're talking about reducing lithium demand in this report. We're also talking about reusing and recycling at the sort of end of life. Right, but you first reuse, then you recycle, but it just pushes out the time frame for when we'd have enough recycling feedstock to really be replacing significant amounts of new mining.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>And one other way I like to, just as a metaphor, think about it is: over the pandemic, we've had lots of debates on different public health tools and one thing that public health experts said about the vaccine is that if we don't reduce the spread in other ways we're asking the vaccine to do too much work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>It's not a perfect analogy, but I think that way about recycling. And I think people gravitate to recycling because nothing else has to change and also because it's itself a business opportunity, right? There's a lot of new investment in recycling facilities. So it's sort of like, "Oh, that's the silver bullet. We're going to get recycling to sort of totally replace new mining." Well, maybe in 2050 or 2070 or something that could start to be possible, but not in the near term. And so we need to do other things so that we're not expecting recycling to be the number one demand reducing tool.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so you're reducing demand for lithium in the first place helps...</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Recycling play a bigger role.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Recycling, it helps decarbonization, in addition to helping reduce the need for mining and injustice and all that other stuff, it just makes...the lever you can pull that makes almost everything we want easier to do. So you have these scenarios that basically involve—and this is stuff I know Volts audience knows very well—just your basic densification, helping walkability, bike paths, all that kind of stuff. So, let's just say a bit, because I don't want this to get lost. In addition to all the benefits of reducing lithium demand in terms of our ability to decarbonize on schedule and are just having enough and getting recycling going better, it's also worth noting that all these changes being discussed in the transportation sector have numerous co-benefits and, specifically, are extremely beneficial to the poorest and most vulnerable.</p><p>This is all completely extrinsic to the greenhouse gas discussion. Just these changes you're talking about making in transportation are good for a bunch of other reasons and so I think...probably we mostly get that. But let's just say a brief word about how transportation in the US is specifically a kind of source of injustice and how these reforms would serve justice.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>There's so many things to talk about here that we won't get to them all, because it's such a sort of nexus of where so many injustices inequalities and also inefficient uses of resources kind of intersect. One thing to remember is just how financially burdensome car ownership is for low-income and working class and even middle class people. Buying the car or leasing the car, the auto insurance, the maintenance of the car, and the gasoline—until we electrify, right. Caveat there on gasoline point—but are all very expensive, and they're more expensive the lower income you are, they're like a bigger portion of your overall income, right?</p><p>And they're also more expensive if you're lower income because you're more likely to have an older car, which requires both more maintenance and more gas per mile. And so we think about car use as a form of freedom in the US. And there's tons of scholarly books written on this and just a million pop culture examples and just the advertising of the auto industry itself. It's thought that carnership is like a key to freedom understood as this sort of spatial mobility. Like, you go wherever you want, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Super generational, though. Super generational thing. A real generational divide, I feel like.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Yes, I agree, and I'm hopeful about that. And we should come back to that point because we still haven't really discussed the policy tools and the politics of this in the contemporary moment. But I think of it almost the opposite way, which is, like, total choicelessness, which is unfreedom to me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A single choice. I mean, literally the only way to do something.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>And I know that very firsthand, not to make it too personal, but for many years of my adult life and childhood and everything, I didn't use cars very much. I grew up in New York City, right? So I'm weird in US context. So I grew up in New York City. I use public transit. We just use a car if maybe we're going upstate to the Catskills. But, basically, I'm going in public transit, and I'm walking. Then I become 18, moved to other places. I moved to Portland, Oregon. I then live in Philadelphia. I live in some Latin American cities, et cetera.</p><p>In all of these places, I used a bike. I used mass transit, or I walked. And I did not actually get a driver's license until I moved to Providence, where I currently live. And after the first three months of biking to work, which was really not a great situation, there were no bike paths, like, it was extremely stressful and dangerous. But I did it because I like bike riding. And it was only 20 minutes. It wasn't a big deal. It was just a stressful 20 minutes. Once November came, New England, right? So it got cold. It's like, "Oh, I guess I have to do something else to get to work."</p><p>I looked into the bus situation. Impossible. Like, an hour bus first is, like 20-minute...because I had to go downtown first, go to the main hub. I mean, the bus is for stigmatized poor people in Rhode Island, basically. I mean, that's how our bus system works. It doesn't have commuting in mind. It doesn't have other types of users in mind, and it's just underfunded and a whole crisis.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A very familiar story, all Americans, I think, will have some familiarity with.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>And so I got a license. Like, I was forced to get a license, and I started using my partner's car, which I had never driven before, to get to work. And I experienced that as a constraint, like, I have one option.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And more stress, I mean, this science on this is very well-settled. Like, you probably were taking years off your life by switching to a car just from the noise stress.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Exactly. But so there's lots of benefits of moving us into these other scenarios.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about the policy levers that you're talking about. A lot of these I think, will be familiar to my audience here, just sort of urbanism stuff. But did you have particular...because I know one of the things the report says is that transportation decarbonization policy, insofar as it's popped up in the US, especially at the federal level, is very car-centric. Talk a little bit about better policies.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I want to circle back to something you said earlier that's on this point about can we imagine the US being like a European city, or not the US, but US. Cities. That seems utopian, as you said. And I understand that. But I want to also just note that things have changed a lot in European cities, recently.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>And you reported on this in Barcelona and maybe elsewhere, right. And so we could go to Barcelona, we could go to Amsterdam, Paris, London. Our global cities in Europe, like the cities that have a lot of stature, those were actually more car heavy a decade ago.</p><p>Two decades ago. They used policies ranging from the design of streets, right, the super blocks in Barcelona that you discussed to like congestion pricing to increasing mass transit options, to designs, making mass transit free or lower cost, a whole battery of kind of policy tools. And significant, like in Paris, they decrease car use by 30% over 15 years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wild, what they're doing so fast.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>In London by 40% over the same time period. In Amsterdam—and we think of Amsterdam as like the cycling haven—but that's increased over time. Like they have actually used policies to make it more friendly to cycling. These things that we think of as so, like exotic, like, are actually the outcomes of intentional policy decisions that took those cities off of a track, getting more similar to the US to a track of where they are now. So it's important to not like naturalize, exoticize, essentialize, whatever it is, like, because we could do these things too. And in fact, in cities, you know, cities and other localities and even at the state level, we have a lot more options than at the federal level, so we should look at those urban experiments very closely.</p><p>You know, it's duh. The GOP controls Congress. Like, I am aware, I read the news, right. So I'm not super enthusiastic or waiting on the edge of my seat for some massive infusion to public transit authorities coming from the federal level. I don't think that's about to happen. Thankfully, we got a little in the bipartisan infrastructure, otherwise things would be even more dire. We didn't get anything in IRA. We didn't even get e-bikes in IRA. I mean, it's nutty, like how car-centric that bill was.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't know if this was inevitable and unavoidable, but it is unfortunate, though, that the whole reactionary, backlash, conservative movement as it exists is now more or less organizing around defending sprawl. I don't know if that was just going to happen at some point regardless, but it's just not good that one of two major parties is foursquare against all the reforms you're talking about.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Exactly. This has become a culture war point. But those culture wars are a little bit less intense at the state and local level, though unfortunately, they're there too. I'm not, again, Pollyannish, but let me throw out a couple of things. So what I think would be really cool—which we couldn't directly model because of data limitations, but we do discuss—is e-bikes. So we can't yet break down, like what proportion of cyclists are on e-bikes and how much lithium is in the e-bikes, because again, the data constraints. But we know that e-bikes use so much less lithium just on the battery level and the per rider level when we compare it to any of the other e-transportation options, right. They're better than buses, even, in terms of the lithium use per person.</p><p>And so we have had some cool stuff. So Denver, Colorado did a major ebike subsidy experiment, and it worked. It not just worked in its popularity, but it got people out of cars, specifically. They showed that now in research on the experiment. Hawai'i, I don't know where exactly it is in the legislature, but it's moving along. I think it's been introduced for a state-level big e-bike subsidy program. And there's a bunch of other cities, if we look them up, cities and even states that are looking into subsidizing e-bikes, both for the climate reasons, the affordability reasons, but also specifically to reduce car use. That's like their goal. So they're designed with that goal in mind and they're making sure, like, we're subsidizing e-bikes that could replace cars for grocery store trips or commuting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And of course, the more of your citizens are on bikes, the more political power.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Yeah, you build a constituency which you have in places with a lot of cycling, like Portland. Like literally, there's like a bike lobby. I mean that in a positive sense, right? There are people advocating and watching policies. There's a couple of other things that are interesting. I'm going to do one more on e-bikes because this was surprising to me. I just learned it. In 2021, Americans bought nearly twice as many e-bikes as ecars. There was a huge amount of e-bikes being bought, and I think there's like a variety of reasons for that. Some of it was like pandemic people doing this outdoorsy stuff and the e-bikes were coming on market at this.</p><p>So I think there are some just like circumstantial factors there. But it's interesting. Americans like e-bikes, so we should think about that and think about that as like a climate policy more among climate progressives. Think about how to expand that. There's a few other things. One is bad, but I want to talk about it, which is the so called death spiral for mass transit. So there's been this ongoing thing, but it got much worse during the pandemic where lower ridership, which really dipped, of course, when there were much more limited movement due to COVID concerns. So people stopped taking transit as much, worrying that they'd get COVID if they took transit or they just weren't commuting in the first place.</p><p>And then that undercut a major source of funding for transit agencies, which is the fare. And so you had this death spiral which then they would do fewer buses or fewer trains or subway cars and then that would further depress ridership because it was less reliable or less frequent. And that's the death spiral. So we're at kind of a critical juncture for transit in this country, and we need to sort of decide, like, especially among climate folks who are at least people thinking about this, do we want to actually include refunding? And actually more secure and sustainable funding models that don't just rely on the fare as much or these like emergency federal or state funding, but just have more secure funding over time, more durable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, the juncture we're at is like, are we going to let our lame minimum that we have die completely or are we going to maintain our lame minimum? Effectively, outside of New York City, we don't really have, like, a full-fledged worthy of Europe in hardly any city, much less, like, all these mid-sized cities.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>And they've gotten worse. I mean, some of them used to have better transportation in the past. I mean these streetcars, all this thing was destroyed, partly by auto industry lobbying. This history is very sordid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It would have to be a real huge culture turn.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Yes, but I want to say it's important to remember that the first culture turn was a big one. Like getting these cities off of what they previously did, which was walking and streetcars and commuter rails and that kind of thing, into the current car dependency. That happened not in our generation but in one more back. So this stuff has not been since like the literal founding of America or whatever that...you know what I mean? Like these are all things that happened over the 20th century and dramatically.</p><p>And so we have the climate crisis to deal with. We also have a variety of economic crises where we want to think about redeveloping and making cities more flourish. We have a lot of things happening at once and it's one of those other critical moments of: are we going to just let transit die or are we going to embrace it? At the very least, I would love to see progressives that are climate advocates like, fully embrace transit, e-bikes, all of these solutions that are good for a host of reasons that we've discussed and center that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the things that sort of raise an eyebrow about this is that the modeling more or less assumes that lithium is going to remain dominant for the foreseeable period of the study. Battery chemistry has lurched around a bit over the last few years, and trends in battery chemistry can change pretty quickly. Like, LFP was dead for a while, and then all of a sudden it's roaring back. I guess I just wonder if you're worried you might be underestimating the possibility of technological improvements. Because I know a. people have their eye on lithium as a bad thing because of the mining and all the rest of it, b. they have their eye on it because the prices are rising and it's threatening the entire edifice of transportation electrification. So I know there's work going on trying to reduce lithium, trying to make batteries without lithium. How confident are you that at least for the next 20 years, lithium is going to stay on top? Did you give a lot of thought to that?</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>I have, partly because anytime I tweet about my research on lithium, someone says to me, "Lithium will be dead tomorrow. Don't. Why are you spending so much time on this?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't know if I go quite that far.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>No. But there's a lot of reply guys on this point, on Twitter especially, which has fortunately helped me, like, has had the positive impact of me thinking about this question more. So I in some ways appreciate the reply guys.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you, reply guys.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, the 20-year question is an interesting one because that does feel harder for me to answer. I feel pretty confident, a decade out, that lithium ion batteries will be the prevailing technology. That doesn't mean the only one, but that changes will be at the margins and that they will still dominate when we get out to 15-20 years, I still feel like due to some costs, due to the prior investments, due to the fact that there is just like an energy density advantage with lithium over anything else, those are still all true, and those, I think, will still make it the sort of majority technology.</p><p>But after we get to 15-20 years and beyond that, I think that there could be substitutes. But let me say a couple of things. So people got very excited about the CATL, the major Chinese battery manufacturer, announcing that it was going to really commercialize and at scale, the sodium battery. That announcement was made, I think, a month ago or something like that. When you dig into the details there, they cannot make a whole battery pack for a car with sodium cells. There are still many lithium ion cells, right? Because remember, a pack, the modules, the packs, we get, like, many cells pressed together, so we can't get the energy density a car requires with just sodium cells. We can swap in some of the lithium cells for sodium and maintain decent energy density.</p><p>So that just goes to show two things at once. One is that substitution is possible. But two is that we're not at a point where we have full substitution and we just get rid of the lithium altogether. So that's one thing to keep in mind. I think there's a bigger—I don't want to say philosophical, it's probably not the right word—but just like a deeper question here, which is I've used the word silver bullet already. I think that regardless of what the raw materials are and their specific impacts, and it might be true that sodium has less impact on lithium, and I'm absolutely willing to agree that there would be a set of materials that, for some reasons, involve less environmental impact when they're mined or they're more efficiently used or something other, right.</p><p>I'm also a big believer in making the batteries more efficient with the raw materials that they use, right? Getting more out of less, right. So I'm a believer in all of those things. But what I'm not a believer in is this idea that we can just escape the dilemma of resource extraction just by technological innovation. Right, this kind of sci-fi idea...I like the sci-fi that's more realistic, where extraction is there. Like, if we look at "The Expanse," these kinds of shows that show these problems with extraction still exist in the future or in other landscapes, right?</p><p>I don't like the sci-fi idea that we just escape our earthly impact and presence.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, you build a blue light arc reactor, and it just hums and pumps out energy. Right?</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>And, yes, maybe certain things we can be totally synthetic, or we just...I don't know. But even with, like, hydrogen, you just had your newsletter about that. In the way that we are producing all of these climate technologies, there are going to be earthly impacts, there are going to be extractive requirements, and our goal is always to be more resource efficient, regardless of what the substrate of resources is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And this is kind of the main point I want to make about this whole report and this whole sort of subject matter, which is: it's not like we should improve material efficiency because it'll reduce our mining impact on the environment, but there are countervailing considerations. There really aren't any countering considerations.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>It's all good to do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's better for people. It's better for decarbonization, it's better for our physical and mental health. It's better for, literally the financial health of cities. Like you just go down the list. One of the things I think is most exciting about this report is it is an explicit attempt to get climate advocates, global justice advocates, and urbanist, city advocates on the same damn page, pulling in the same direction, working with one another toward the common vision. And I've just thought that that is like, sort of implicit, but it's like, you don't see it translating into efficacious organizing.</p><p>Like, you don't see those groups really working together as much as you want. So how much of this report was just had that in mind? And is that too utopian? Do you think that's a doable thing to get these interests on each other's team?</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>There are two motivations of this report in terms of its origin, like, why we decided to do it. One is, back when I was first in Chile researching lithium in early 2019, I learned about the impacts, I learned about the protests, the concerns, et cetera. And I started to think, like, is there a way maybe not to eliminate lithium, but at least to reduce the stress on landscapes and to reduce the volume required? And I was reading these alarming forecasts at that point, and I thought, "Oh, there must be a study that shows that there are more and less lithium intensive ways to decarbonize transportation."</p><p>Like, I booked that up on Google Scholar and I tried like, 30 different keywords, and there was no such study. And then I asked every expert that I interviewed who was expert on transportation, battery tech, whatever this question, and they said, "Oh, that study doesn't exist. It would be useful, though, just to know."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's kind of telling how utterly hegemonic the kind of car centric view is. It doesn't even occur to people.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>It's not an askable question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, people don't even ask the question.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>So that was one origin point to this. I just wanted this data so that when I presented my work on lithium and the political economy of it, the contention when people ask me, like, is there another way I could say something other than, "well, logically, if we had more mass transit, we'd need less" just if-so facto or whatever. So I could just say something with data. So that's one origin point. But there's another origin point that's equally important, which is I participate as a researcher, as an advocate, as a think tank person, and wearing different hats, like, in a variety of coalitional spaces with some of the people you just mentioned, but not with all of them at once often.</p><p>So that's important, right? I think that that full spread has not quite happened yet in terms of building coalitions and constituencies that are speaking to one another. But there is some of each in a variety of political spaces. And I find that there are tension points and...this not a novel observation at all, actually. Much ink has been spilled on this. Like, is it totally impossible to decarbonize without harming indigenous rights? These stories have been written. These analyses and thought pieces have been written, but they're not just like, takes. They're also like, real people trying to work through real problems and not always having the data or policy tools that would kind of show a different way forward. And so aligning those, not perfectly, because I do think there's different ideologies, there's different personalities, like, you can't make everyone agree perfectly...but at least showing that these are not as fundamentally at odds as they seem. If we envision a little bit more broadly and creatively like what the energy transition might look like.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, and just do the sort of grown-up thing of explicitly acknowledging that we have multiple goals, some of which are in some tension of each other, and the best we can do is to balance them as best we can and try to pull in a direction that serves all of them at least somewhat, right? Like an adult way of making decisions not characteristic of our society necessarily. Thank you for coming on and talking through this. I mean, there's so much in this report. I feel like any chunk of this report, we could do a whole pot on it. A whole thing on lithium, a whole thing on transportation, a whole thing on justice, and everything else, but I do think it's for just those reasons you said there in your last answer, like, this is much needed and much overdue. So thanks for doing it and thanks for coming on.</p><p><strong>Thea Riofrancos</strong></p><p>Thanks so much. This was a great conversation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/decarbonizing-us-transportation-with</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:99736178</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 23 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/99736178/b5a9c8c67d0086f7296446cd88113850.mp3" length="56212344" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4684</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/99736178/d70ebd66fd7bad83dc1f7788930833e7.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Getting electric school buses in the hands of school districts]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>How can electric school buses be made accessible and cost-effective? In this episode, Highland Electric Fleets CEO Duncan McIntyre makes the case for why school districts should overcome the challenges to bus electrification, and the ways his company’s subscription model helps them do so.</em></p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAzOHjmeFGc7EUgzIFOC4lFa/volts23.02.03%28duncan.mcintyre%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a>)</p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/getting-electric-school-buses-in-the-hands-of-school-districts"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of my very favorite things in the world to talk about — second perhaps only to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/4/22/21229132/usps-coronavirus-electrify-postal-trucks">electric postal vehicles</a> — is electric school buses. It's difficult to think of a more righteous cause than reducing air and noise pollution in direct proximity to the country's most sensitive lungs and ears.</p><p>Currently, however, electric school buses still cost two to three times what their diesel competitors cost, which can be daunting for school districts with tight budgets. Electric buses pay themselves off over time through dramatically lower fuel and maintenance costs, but the upfront costs of the transition are steep enough to scare away many administrators.</p><p>My guest today runs a company called <a target="_blank" href="https://highlandfleets.com/">Highland Electric Fleets</a> that is attempting to overcome that challenge by <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/clean-fleets/us-schools-can-subscribe-to-an-electric-school-bus-fleet-at-prices-that-beat-diesel">offering a new business model</a>. Rather than purchase and maintain the buses themselves, school districts pay Highland a subscription fee, locked in for a 15-year contract, which covers the buses, a depot, charging infrastructure, scheduling, training, and ongoing maintenance and replacement of buses when required.</p><p>In addition to a saving most school districts money immediately, the subscription contract derisks the transition to electric buses. That is about the best thing I can think of that someone could be doing these days, so I was eager to talk to Highland CEO Duncan McIntyre about the advantages of electric buses, the challenges school districts face, and the problems solved by the subscription model.</p><p>Alright, with no further ado, Duncan McIntyre, welcome to Volts. Thank you for coming.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>David, thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is awesome. Volts listeners are so interested in electric school buses, so I just have a gazillion questions, so let's jump right into it. Tell us, what are the advantages or benefits of an electric school bus over the current line of school buses, which as I understand it, are mostly diesel?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>That's right, they're mostly diesel. A little over 80% today. But your question is about the advantages of electric. I think the list is long, but I would highlight a few of the big ones. There's a clear benefit in emissions profile just in the health of everyone who's operating or riding a bus. There's no tailpipe at all, and as a result, they're very clean. Another big advantage is they just operate much cheaper. The fuel is a lot less expensive, there are very few moving parts compared to a diesel bus, and as a result, there's no oil changes, there's no exhaust filters. There's lots of things that just aren't on electric buses, and so operating is much less expensive.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I don't want to get caught up in the whole thing too early, but I'm trying to sort of conceive of the sort of magnitude of the pollution reductions here. Like, have there been measurements or studies about the difference when an electric school bus replaces a diesel bus? Or are we too early to know for sure about that kind of stuff?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>I think there have been plenty of studies about the health impacts of a diesel bus. And the comparison is simply the health impacts of not having a diesel bus since the electric format has literally no tailpipe and no emissions profile at all. But the health studies have been done by groups like American Lung Association, groups like that, and there's quite a few data points that look at reduction in NOx and particulate matter, specifically on things like pediatric asthma. I would say that's one of the main studies that has taken place, but also tying the emissions associated with the diesel tailpipe to just other general health key indicators.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, one thing I would toss out too, because people always forget about this, but is noise pollution, which is the research on noise pollution is wild. I don't think people appreciate the effect that has. And all these kids are effectively sitting right next to a jet engine, more or less. It's extremely loud. But the first question that comes up for everybody is they cost more. So what is the current cost differential between an electric school bus and a diesel school bus?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>The electric school bus ranges from $275,000 to $375,000, really, depending on the state you're in. And your question is about the differential. It's about $200,000 of differential on average. So it's a $200,000 premium to buy an electric.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's not small. That's two or three x the cost.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. It's not small.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's also talk about some of the other barriers other than cost for a school district looking... if I'm in a school district, I have this wild idea I want to replace all our diesel buses with electric buses. The cost of the buses themselves is not the only barrier or challenge I face. What are the other extra challenges that have to be overcome?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>There's a few other buckets. One would be charging infrastructure. You need to establish your depot wherever you operate your buses today as an electrified depot. And that involves installing a whole bunch of new equipment, running an interconnection to bring new power, new electrical service into that depot. I'd say that's one big bucket of sort of a project that's required to get up and running. There's another piece that's all about training. Your workforce needs to be trained. Mechanics need to figure out how to work on these vehicles. Your drivers need to know how to operate them and how to not just operate them, but how to be really comfortable with running them.</p><p>And then there's an operating cadence of charging them. The fueling activity is a little bit different. And unlike diesel fuel, with electricity, you really want to pick and choose when you charge and how quickly you charge, as it can result in lower or higher costs and more reliability if done right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so that'll get into logistics, right? Like routes and the timing of routes and these kind of things?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Absolutely, that's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so these are all fairly substantial challenges. So what is the current market penetration here? What is the base we're starting from? Are electric school buses anywhere, or is it still an extremely marginal sort of market?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>We're at an inflection point right now, David. If you'd asked me the question a year ago, I might have said electric buses made up 2% of the new school buses purchased in 2022. But in 2023, our perspective is it'll be closer to 10% of the new school buses purchased, and in 2024 will be 20% to 40% of the new school buses purchased. So it's changing very quickly right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You think we're on the upswing of that s-curve in adoption?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>We are. There's lots of reasons behind that. The federal government, as well as many states have launched programs that are putting a lot of fresh grant capital as well as tax credits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If I'm a school district now, what is the total kind of pool of assistance available to me? I think there's some stuff in IRA. I think there was some stuff in the infrastructure bill. I know there's state stuff. What is the sort of menu of assistance I can find?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a tidal wave of assistance, David. It takes a full-time person just to navigate it all. But I would put it into a handful of big categories. One is the Clean School Bus Act, which is part of the infrastructure bill, and that's $5 billion that will roll out over five years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And are those just grants to buy school buses?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Essentially just grants to assist in buying electric school buses. I think the second big category is tax credits in the IRA. And the tax credit is not as big on an individual vehicle basis, but importantly, it can be bundled with other grants and so it provides support. And then many states have their own programs. California has had a program for years that's robust, really a grant program. Colorado has a new grant program. There are funding mechanisms everywhere from New York to Maryland to Virginia. And in many states, the totality of bundling a state program with a federal grant program and a tax credit actually make an electric school bus much less expensive than buying a new diesel, so there's a real cost advantage in some parts of the US today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. So we're not just talking assistance. We're talking sufficient assistance at this point.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>More than sufficient assistance, we would argue.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Okay, so we've got a school district that has a dream of switching out fleets, but it is daunted by the individual cost differential of the buses. It is daunted by this notion of infrastructure and how to build it and where to build it and how to run it. It's daunted by, basically, being busy and not knowing... not having time to study how to switch sort of the logistics of the fleet and the dispatching everything. So into this environment comes Highland. What is your business model? How are you trying to address those barriers?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>You've laid out the barriers quite well. The Highland business model is the finance engine behind driving the electric school bus movement. What we found is that while capital, upfront capital is a huge barrier, accessing the grants can help bridge that gap. But it's complex. And on top of that, if you've got the grant money, it's still very difficult to figure out how to design the equipment, build it on time, build it reliably, and then ensure that you can operate, reliably and within your budget. And so, our business model is truly the finance engine. We pay for everything that's not grant-funded from vehicles to equipment, and then we commit to operate that equipment and really support our customers—support the schools—by promising their fleet of electric buses will be fully fueled every morning for 15 years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>15 years. So just to make sure I have this right, the school district pays basically a subscription fee to you, to Highland, and Highland buys the buses, builds the chargers, builds the depot and trains staff, and then maintains, but does everything else, maintains the vehicles, repairs the vehicles if they needed or replaces them. Everything else, Highland does. So the only thing that the school district is on the hook for is a subscription fee, is that right?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>From a financial standpoint, that is exactly right. And from a practical standpoint, you're spot on. The only nuance would be vehicles are often maintained by the district's mechanics. So we will train them and then we will pay for the maintenance. So the staff that's on the ground today is typically very well-suited to actually do the repair work, and they're eager to get the training and be part of this new industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So financially, the school district can be confident that the subscription payment is the totality. There's not other things that they haven't thought of. They're going to come and post costs on them.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>That's exactly right, yeah. The school district knows it's predictable and reliable that our subscription fee is on par or less than what they spend to put a diesel fleet on the road.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'd like to get into a little bit of detail about that. So it seems like just financially, just comparing the cost is complicated. So I assume you've done this math and you've worked through this with some school districts. So what is the kind of cost of a subscription? And how does that compare to... if I'm a school district with a fleet of diesel school buses, the cost of switching the buses, building the infrastructure, training, maintenance, et cetera, et cetera, how does the total cost shake out?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Yeah, that really is one of the key drivers behind this industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm sure it's everyone's first question when you approach them.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Totally. And in terms of your listeners, David, I would imagine solar is a good analogy. The reasons why companies like Sunrun have done so well is because the average homeowner doesn't necessarily know that if they spend $25,000 on solar equipment, they don't know what they're going to get in return. And so a developer can take on the risks, place the capital, build the equipment and promise that the equipment will work. And the result is the homeowner pays ten cents a kilowatt hour and they know that's cheaper than the utility. We sort of do the same thing. We know what the capital costs are going to stack up to be on any given project. And they differ depending on the state that we're in. Illinois is different from Maryland.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, size of the school district, too. I mean, presumably these bus fleets range quite widely in size and scope, like geographical scope.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Absolutely, that's right. But we know what the cost is to build and then we have our own perspective on what the ongoing operating costs will be. Electricity to fill the buses every night, the software we need to run it, all the costs. And then the third big piece is we know what the grants look like and we need to organize our deployments so that upfront costs and downstream costs match up and that can result in a very affordable rate that the school district can pay us under our subscription. But embedded in that is the risk that the equipment will perform and the risk of commodity prices.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>And the risk of keeping the fleet maintained and running. And so it lends itself very well to a business like Highland where we have the scale to bring specialized teams to do all those things really well and deliver it as a bundle.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So presumably the total cost of owning and maintaining the fleet for you is going to be somewhat lower than it would be for the school district just because you have the procedures and the staff and the expertise and the relationships with vendors, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. There's economies of scale around every corner, and we're the largest buyer of electric school buses in the country today. We've got more of them on the road than anyone else. And as a result, we have scale in our operations that others don't have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so this subscription fee is locked in place for 15 years?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>That's correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's part of the guarantee. Like, you will pay X amount each year for 15 years no matter what happens to the cost of electricity or more supply chain problems or whatever else.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. And it's more like per mile, $2.50 a mile might be a contract we would sign, and we know they're going to be driving that bus about 10,000 miles a year, but it could be a little more. It could be a little less.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So a lot of risk you're taking on a lot of risk cost. So can you guarantee—I'm sure you don't want to guarantee because there are lots of different kinds of fleets and a lot of different kinds of places. But, can you come close to guaranteeing a given school district that the subscription fee they would pay you is lower total cost than going electric on their own? Is that something you can sort of set in stone?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Well, the school would have to go through the details and come to the conclusion on their own. But in almost every case, we found that we are cheaper than them doing this on their own. And I would highlight a couple of reasons why. One is simply we're a larger buyer than they are individually and that gives us access to better pricing from all the equipment providers. A second reason is we have invested in all of the technology needed. That creates interoperability between the charging stations, the vehicles, the utility, and the software management tools. And so we can roll that out very inexpensively at scale.</p><p>And a third reason is there's a tax credit out there that has a lot more value in it for a private tax-paying entity that's structured in a way to monetize it. It's the same reason why most solar is privately owned as opposed to publicly owned. It's because there's tax credits that are tricky to monetize otherwise. And so there's a chunk of cash that we take off the top just for the tax credits that schools aren't aren't able to sort out very easily.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's one financial question: is it cheaper than doing this ourselves? But maybe the more difficult financial question is: could you go to a school district and say over the course of the 15 years of the contract, this will be cheaper than continuing to maintain your existing diesel fleet? Can you promise that?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>I can't promise that because we don't know what diesel fuel prices will be two years from now. But we can make a very strong case that we will indeed be cheaper by quite a bit. It requires everyone to agree on some assumptions around diesel fuel pricing. But we have one other benefit, which is: not only are we typically cheaper when you model it out, but we have no fluctuating costs to the school.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>And so that's a benefit. It's a big benefit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is such a big benefit of renewable energy that I feel like manifests in a lot of different areas that gets overlooked a lot of the time. Just risk of commodity price fluctuations is such a huge factor in these financial transactions, such a huge factor in national inflation risk. It's like a huge factor in everything.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>I totally agree. And the reality, David, is we can lock in electricity prices for many years into the future by going into the competitive electricity markets. And that's a lot more difficult to do with diesel fuel, unless you want to pay a big risk premium. And so not only is are the kilowatt hours much cheaper, which just makes the totality of fueling costs lower, but electricity has more management tools for companies like ours to go into the markets and really lock in those prices. So we aren't taking twelve years of completely naked risk either. We're just bringing a set of strategies to bear to offer that to our customers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you can make a strong case that it will be cheaper over the 15 years. What about though, like, next year? If I'm a school district and I have sort of a set school bus budget, can I save money on the first year? Because it's always these upfront—as I'm sure you will know, it's always these upfront costs that are daunting to people and keep people away from these things—is there immediate savings or is it comparable immediately?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's immediate savings, especially in the environment we live in today, where there are some grants available to support project costs. And so year one, year two, year three, there's immediate savings and there's also just a huge savings in the first year because you avoid buying a new diesel bus. So you might avoid spending $140,000 for a capital purchase. And you've gone to a world where Highland gets paid $30,000 a year, which includes a vehicle, it includes all the fuel, it includes repair costs, it includes software and training. So there's cost savings day one and there's a very strong case that there will always be cost savings.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this is a naive question, but you're coming to school districts and saying, "Hey, a. you're going to save money on day one, b. you're going to improve the health of your kids and your drivers, c. you're going to improve general sort of satisfaction and performance." Who says no to this? And why? Does anyone say no to this?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>I ask myself the same question occasionally. It's almost too good to be true. We're at a moment in time where the technology is ready for the task and there's a combination of available services and capital and those are coming together in a really nice way. But what we're doing, David, is still asking municipalities to buy transportation in a different way. They're accustomed to a capital budget to buy vehicles and an operating budget to run them, and we're asking them to blend them into a subscription. So there is a little bit of a new dynamic, a new purchasing dynamic, and then I would say there's always concern about new technology and we're still in the early innings of the electric school bus movement.</p><p>And so there's, I think, a healthy element of skepticism around, "Will they be reliable?" And so, those are some of the obstacles that we run into. But I would say we very rarely get a flat out no. It's more... we just get folks who need to come up to speed. They're on their own educational journey and they need to kick the tires. And so we host a school district almost daily at one of our sites, whether it's Maryland or Colorado or Massachusetts, we're hosting a lot of visitors expressing interest, and they're in various places on their buying journey.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about, god forbid, the risk that Highland goes out of business at some point in the next 15 years? What happens then to these contracts?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>It's a good question. The vehicles are still there and the vehicles will still be operated and the contracts stand independently. We set every contract up in its own entity and we fund each individual entity in a way that's appropriate to capitalize the project. If you think about a project, the risk that we go under is really only for the couple of months at the very beginning when we're building and delivering. Once we've installed all of our equipment at a customer site and we've delivered all the vehicles, the project entity that we own, but the project entity that serves the customer, is simply basically producing profit that goes to pay back the investment. But if Highland were to go under, that project entity will still stand and serve the contract until the end of the contract.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. So the the maintenance and operations side of things is locked in for the 15-year contract, regardless of Highland's fate.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>That's a good way to think about it. That's exactly right. And so there's a lot of details behind how that works, but every one of our customers asks the same question you ask, and they get very comfortable because of that dynamic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So as I'm envisioning the country's school districts, the first thing that comes to mind is just wild variety of size, of financial wherewithal, the number of buses, the geographical scope of the buses, the weather conditions in which buses operate. So how standardized can you get this? It seems like there's this element that's bespoke to every school district that's sort of unavoidable. How similar is what you do from district to district and how much is it kind of customized?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>There's a few things to unpack there. There's a component around the environment that the project is asked to operate in. So whether it be the average temperature by week per year, the topography, are they going up steep hills and down, or is it flat? How many stops? All that stuff gets, gets boiled down to the sort of the operating plans and we build our charging infrastructure and size the batteries. And every aspect of a project design depends on those key assumptions. But we have done this everywhere from scrubbing data from a project in Tok, Alaska, which is arguably the coldest electric school bus in operation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to ask, I mean, everybody, as you can imagine, everybody on Twitter everywhere else, one of their first questions is, "What about cold weather? What about when it's freezing? Blah, blah, blah. What about... don't EVs lose range? How do you keep the buses heated when you pick up your first kid?" All these questions about cold weather. So you've dealt with those.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Yeah, the answer is, it's actually not that complicated. It's just about planning. I'm sitting here in Beverly, Massachusetts, at our headquarters. I'm looking out the window, and we're getting dumped on by snow right now, and the buses are out picking kids up. And it's fine. You do lose a little range. It's better to precondition the batteries and the cabins of the vehicles with some heat before you unplug them. So the vehicles go out pre-warmed with a full tank of gas, so to speak. But that's sort of a segment of your question.</p><p>The broader question is, can you standardize a product offering here? And the answer is, absolutely. That's what we've been working on for the better part of five years. Every project has expertise needed in designing and building a depot. And so you've got parameters that you need to solve for that include topography, temperature, range. You've got people who need to be trained. You have investments that need to be made, and you have a utility that you have to interact with, and you have to put all those things through a standardized process so that you deliver reliable, affordable transportation at the end of the day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You've not run across a school bus route that is too long or too far to do with electric like...?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>We have. We've run into a few, but they're very rare. We serve both very rural and very urban customers. In Illinois, we have a contract that's in a very rural part of the state, and the routes are over 100 miles. That's entirely doable, as long as you plan your charging equipment appropriately. But occasionally we see 150, 160, 170-mile day, and the driver doesn't have the time to circle back. And so those are some of the routes that are less appropriate for electric today, but it's less than 5% of the routes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What is the range of an electric school bus?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>With the products that are available today, between 100 and 160 miles. Most of the buses we have on the road today have 140 miles of range.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And should we assume that that's being steadily improved like everything else? I was going to ask about this later, but let's get into it now. Just about the sort of manufacturing of the buses themselves. I'm presuming that among all the many other things you're doing, you're not manufacturing school buses. Where are you getting them and are you ordering? I mean, is there like a standard offering that you're just buying in bulk from some manufacturer, or is it possible to customize them? And if so, how much? Like, in terms of the physical buses and how you procure them, how does that work?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>We do not manufacture buses. You are correct. We buy them from the top tier manufacturers that have electric products available. Thomas Built Buses. We buy from Bluebird, we buy from IC, all of the major US-domestic manufacturers that have electric product available. We essentially buy one of two or three formats. There's a type C, there's a type D, which is a little bigger but a shorter wheelbase, and a type A, which is a smaller bus. And while there's lots of bells and whistles, you can add safety features, those can all be specced by each individual school.</p><p>It is fundamentally the same foundational vehicle, just with more cameras or seatbelts or whatever someone might add on. So we do buy, in bulk, for a couple of those categories as part of our procurement strategy. And so we end up working really closely with the manufacturers, not only in terms of the features we need to operate the vehicles efficiently, but also the feedback loop. What are the things we found that are tricky for drivers? Little quirks?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm very curious about those people who have road tested these things now and there's... driving school bus routes every single day is a real stress test.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>It really is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What do they find in terms not just of like, drivetrain or whatever, but sort of those bells and whistles? What do they and do they not want in those terms?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Well, first, I would say the drivers, almost universally, absolutely love them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is for the same reason that everyone loves it when they switch to an EV, presumably?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>It's a lot of the same reasons, right? The vehicles have better torque. They're completely silent. The braking is a real pleasure. You really just take your foot off the accelerator and a regenerative braking system slows the vehicle down at an even pace. It's a very calming experience, and it puts more power back in the batteries while it does that. And so it takes a little bit of training and a little bit of practice to get the hang of it. But the drivers love it and it eliminates the wear and tear on the brakes. But I would say, David, the biggest highlight I would throw out there is because the vehicle is so quiet, no engine rumbling, the kids in the back don't have to yell over the engine rumbling to talk to each other, and so it's just a quieter drive to school, the whole experience.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. My memories of school buses in my youth definitely involve a lot of noise, a lot of screaming.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And I would throw out one other just anecdote, which is while the drivers absolutely love the vehicles, there's lots of little quirks that we found, especially in the first couple of years of operating— fewer and fewer today—but little software quirks where if your bus is Idling for more than a minute, it will shut off in the early iterations. So you have to flip the switch and turn it back on. And since there's no engine rumbling, you don't know that it's shut off. And so that was a little inconvenience that had to be sorted out with the manufacturers. But little things like that are pieces of feedback that were, I would say, weekly, monthly for the first year and a half, and now it's more like quarterly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Also in terms of the physical buses... in the EV space, there's this sort of division between sort of legacy manufacturers that are trying to move to EVs. And the thought is among, some people I think probably fewer people these days than before, but the thought is among some people that a company like Tesla, which is just starting on EVs from the beginning and designing an EV from the ground up rather than trying to sort of adapt old existing chassis and things like that, is going to produce, ultimately a better vehicle that in the long term will be cheaper. Is there a Tesla of school buses or of buses generally, or are these all legacy manufacturers?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Lion Electric is a Canadian company that's the closest to what you described in this sector, and they were the first manufacturer to put an electric school bus on the road a number of years ago. They've had a lot of success in California, and they've got the lion's share of the market in Canada. And they're focused on other areas too, other categories of medium and heavy duty, municipal and other transportation, trucking and busing. And they are very... Lion is a very formidable competitor for the incumbent OEMs. I think one of the areas that is really unique to school busing is there's a very tight relationships with the regional dealers, not only on buying the vehicles, but just the ongoing support that's needed to keep them on the road. And, I think it's an area that is harder to break through that network without your own. Whereas Tesla had the benefit of consumers not having quite as tight of a relationship with their dealers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Even loathing their dealers.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. In many cases, I think that's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Final hardware question: what kind of batteries do these buses use? Are they all using LFP batteries?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>There's a few technologies, but they're for the most part lithium-ion batteries.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is not like do you not get parents or school administrators worrying about battery fires? I mean, I know they're rare, but obviously—in this setting—you wouldn't want to take any chances.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>I agree. That has not been a key area of concern for parents or school administrators. We do get the question occasionally, but it hasn't been a key area of concern. We own a lot of Thomas Joulies, which is the Thomas-built electric school bus, and they are powered by a powertrain built by Proterra. Proterra is a domestic manufacturer. They make batteries specifically engineered for the medium- and heavy-duty transportation sector. And the safety requirements and standards in that category of vehicle are such that Proterra had to do a tremendous amount of safety work. And they are one provider. Cummins has a platform as well.</p><p>There are others, but our opinion is the industry has done a pretty good job of designing, you know, the right safety precautions and designing their equipment in the right way just to make them really safe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Okay, there's a whole set of questions I want to ask about utilities and your interaction with them.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Putting aside for now, fancy talking to the grid and all this kind of stuff just in terms of going into a utility area and installing what amounts to really substantial new load and not only substantial new load, but load that when it's running full out, is a really high level of power involved. I just am assuming that you have to tell utilities, ask utilities, interact with utilities in some way just if you're going to show up and do this. Is that accurate?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Yes, that's accurate. David, I would say it's somewhere in between ask and tell because the reality is the utilities, distribution utilities have a mission which is to serve the public with electrical service wherever needed. You don't build a new hospital and the utility doesn't say, "Sorry, you can't do it", right? It just comes down to timeline and cost. And so, we do need a ton of power. We have five sites right around Washington DC and Maryland. And each site has a five megawatt interconnection foot charge, electric school buses, so do 25 megawatts in a very small geographic footprint.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, so that that's like grids are going to have to plan around that. I'm like, I'm curious if you've ever gone to an area where the utility says, like, "We would love to help you with this, but right now we just don't have the infrastructure, we don't have the lines, we don't have the ability to accommodate this much new power." Have you ever run into that?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>We have. And a couple of quick thoughts. The first is: it's always possible it just comes down to timeline and cost. And so it's an exercise in doing our homework, right? So we do all the work. I would advise anyone before you talk to your utility, you do your homework. What does the distribution feeder have available on it? Like what's the amount of power you can draw today? This is available information that can be looked up. Then it's about figuring out how difficult it would be to upgrade the service if it truly needed to be upgraded, how many miles of three phase have to be run from the nearest point of connection.</p><p>And then, it's looking at the landscape, and that is everything from the existing rate tariffs to the Public Utility Commission to the politicians. And there's more and more support in more places for electrifying fleets, electrifying everything from passenger cars to garbage trucks, right? And so the political will is there to support investment, rate-baseable investment, in EV infrastructure. And it's about threading the needle between all those dynamics and coming up with a plan. There are places where we want three megawatts of power, but we'll settle for 1.5, because we can get 1.5 in a year, and we can work on the next 1.5 over the next four years, and plug the gap with some stationary storage or some other form of a charging strategy.</p><p>And so, I would argue it's really about interacting with the right people at the utility to come up with a plan that leverages the utility's assets and capabilities with the needs of the fleet, and it gets married up by the equipment that's available to sit in the middle.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Have you run into a situation yet where you had to wait? Where you had like, people ready to sign contracts, but you had to wait for years, two years, three years, four years, whatever, to let the utility prepare?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>We signed our contract with Montgomery County Public Schools in February of 2021, and we promised to have the first depot up and running in August that summer, which is lightning fast, but we promised to have three more depots up and running 18 months later because we knew they were going to be slower. And then we didn't promise to have the fifth depot up and running until the summer of 2024. So we knew that one would take three years and it will take us three years. We're in the middle of it now. And that was exactly a function of those local dynamics, how to get the power, how to get it efficiently, how to get it affordably, and how to work with the utility to do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I don't know that I would want to be in a business where I'm waiting on utilities to do anything as a general matter.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>It's an inevitability here. But once you're up and running... first of all, for the most part, utilities have been pretty darn good partners. Everyone has this in their roadmap, and so more often than not, they're kind of excited when someone comes and says, "Hey, we've got a real project, let's work on it together."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Beyond just the basics. Once you have a fleet of electric school buses, you have a distributed set of very large batteries which are sitting unused most hours of the day. So I guess two questions. One is about grid to vehicle communication, i.e. do you time the charging of these vehicles in coordination with the utility in some way?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>So I heard two things there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, the first is time-to-charging, which I think of as sort of grid communicating with vehicles. And then the second is vehicle-to-grid, which is vehicles occasionally discharging electricity into the grid when the grid needs it. My sense from talking to people in this space is that just timing you're charging is relatively easy. First step in that vehicle to grid communication is a little bit more complicated and is not all utilities are ready for it but just sort of tell me like to what extent are you getting into grid services?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>We are absolutely doing both and you're correct that simply timing your charging we view as table stakes. You sort of need to be doing that to run an efficient operation. I would say that we coordinate that with the utilities a little bit. But the utilities don't get deeply involved in interacting with customers on topics like that today. What they do is they push out programs. They say, "We have a time-use rate tariff." You, customer, choose if you want to change your charging schedule based on the rate tariff and so we are doing that very actively.</p><p>The equipment that's available today it doesn't come fully ready to allow customer choice around charging times. You really have to do it in more of a manual way. We've had to build a software stack with all these controls to do it in a reliable format but I do think that's an area where the tech is getting better and better and if you do it right you will save 75% on your power costs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No joke. That's a lot.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>If you look in places like San Diego, if you charge at the wrong times, you'll trip demand charges. And without getting into all the details, your bill can skyrocket. And so charging is really important to get right because it just comes down to dollars and cents.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so at this point, you have got software integrated into the buses such that the driver can just plug in whenever without worrying about it and the software does the timing?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. The software allows us to control our charging times and our charging rates from our remote operating center. And the software creates that connective tissue between us and our equipment in the field and helps us to scale and helps us to assess fault codes earlier vehicle health, look at trends, collect data, but ultimately control charging in a very dynamic way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you feel like that's... you've got that relatively down?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>We've got that fully down. We do have a partner, it's a company called Synop, software company, and we've done a deeply integrated commercial partnership with them that's many, many, many years long and then on top of them we have our own systems and processes that effectively ensure that all the hardware speaks and allows the software to do its job. So it's a full tech stack of software and hardware and it's all got to be stitched together in the right ways to work smoothly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. And so what about then vehicle-to-grid? I am assuming that that's rarer that there are only some utilities that can accommodate that. Are there any yet? Is that a real thing yet or is that still like a gleam in people's eye?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>It's a real thing but today it is binary in that either the utility has something you can do or it doesn't. And we have vehicle-to-grid up and running on about a third of our projects today. And in most of those cases, the vehicle-to-grid activity is in its simplest form, we're charging the buses full during the overnight hours in the summer, July and August, and we charge overnight because there's lots of power available. It's very inexpensive, and the grid has it available. And then late in the afternoons, the next day, from 3:00 to 6:00, 4:00 to 7:00, we will actually export all the power in the batteries from the buses back to the grid. And it's because the grid needs the power and they're willing to pay for it. And it's very lucrative and so helps drive down our cost to serve school districts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, when you say lucrative, I mean, compared to saving 75% on your charging costs, is it that lucrative? Like, where is it relative to just sort of timed-charging? Are you, are you making comparable money offering these grid services?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>It's more lucrative than simply saving. Just to put, you know, some round numbers around it, if you charge at the wrong time in San Diego, you could get a $5,000 utility bill for the month for one bus. If you charge in a smart way, that might be $1,000, right? A lot less expensive. Our vehicle-to-grid income on a per bus basis in parts of New England is $12,000 a year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No s**t.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a lot!</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Now, you have some equipment that you have to invest in to do it. So it's not all profit, but what it does is we pass dollar for dollar, we pass that money on to the school district, we underwrite to it as we invest in equipment to serve them, and then we operate the vehicle-to-grid program so that we can make it more affordable for schools. And I'm convinced that we're in the very early days, but in five years this will be happening in more places than it's not and will be a meaningful contributor to eating away at that $200,000 vehicle premium I described in your opening questions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, also presumably, do you use that to lower I mean, is your subscription fee standard everywhere, or is it lower in some places than others based on grid circumstances?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Yeah, our subscription fee is different for every opportunity. Each customer account might have different costs and different expenses, but we use that income to lower the subscription fee to the customer. And there are cases where the customer is saving 20-25% compared to their diesel fleet operation and the vehicle-to-grid is that extra savings.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Vehicles-to-grid is one thing. There's also, of course, if you have this huge set of batteries, what about using them during blackouts for backup power for schools or community centers or things like that? Is that on your radar?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Absolutely. As more and more electric school buses come online, they are increasingly becoming a source of resiliency for local communities. We call this vehicle-to-community. Very much describes the activity taking place. The buses have very energy-dense batteries, and they happen to be energy-dense batteries sitting on wheels. If you've got a community that has lost power, you may need to keep cold storage going at a local high school. You may need to give people the ability to charge cell phones. You may need to set up air conditioners...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hospitals</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Absolutely. Hospitals. Absolutely. These vehicles can be anywhere in a community in a short amount of time, and they can deliver power into buildings if they've been set up with the right equipment.</p><p>We're building out these capabilities for a number of our customers, and I actually think it's maybe one of the most exciting, most promising dynamics that is very much an untold story to date, but it's just really exciting to make an electrified fleet that much more of an asset to its community.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, huge resiliency advantage there. Because people say that the new Ford F-150. People will tell you that can power a medium-sized suburban house fully for like three days on that battery. I don't think people appreciate how big these batteries are. And that's just one truck. I assume the battery on a bus is much bigger. So, this is not a small amount of dispatchable power you've got in your hands in the case of a blackout.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. Our electrified site in Bethesda, Maryland, when it's fully operational, which is a couple more years, there'll be more vehicles arriving. But that site will be able to deliver five megawatts of power in a resiliency format for a period of a little more than 3 hours, or it can deliver half a megawatt for many, many days. That's a large hospital right there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Wild. One other thing about utilities, before I forget, I was reading there was a battle in Virginia, I think, recently. I think it was Dominion. The utility wanted to get into owning electric school buses. Owning and operating. I think maybe more or less along the lines of what you guys are trying to do. Does that make any sense to you?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>It does. That's well-described and it's pretty accurate. Dominion launched a program a couple of years ago where they proposed owning electric school buses and the charging equipment and basically providing them to schools, public schools in Virginia. And they proposed rate-basing all of those investments so paid for on your electricity bill if you're a resident in the state of Virginia. And the case they made was that this is part of the electricity ecosystem, and with the batteries and the buses, we can deliver reliability services. There are varying formats of that being proposed at utilities all across the country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>But in very, very few cases does the utility propose to actually rate base the bus. And so Dominion was challenged by policymakers in Virginia, and the policymakers ended up saying, "You cannot do this in any sort of longer term programmatic format." It may be that they're going to try again.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Was it just sort of like generalized hostility towards utilities? Or was there some specific reason why they thought it couldn't work?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>I don't think so. I think the case was made that the vehicle itself is not something that the average electricity purchaser, the average homeowner should be paying for. That's not a fair expense to pass on to the ratepayer. It's something that should be passed on to the schools. Now, if the batteries have value and you can isolate the value to help balancing the system, then maybe that's an acceptable investment. But, I think Dominion was early on in this movement and I would expect comeback with a modified version of their plan that probably has a higher likelihood of success.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that would be competition to you, would it not? Some of the same services?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>It is and it isn't. They would be providing equipment and agreeing to pay for some of that equipment, but that's not much different than a grant which just pays for some of the equipment. Dominion does not come with a suite of services to basically ensure the fleet gets built on time and operates reliably.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. They're not going to build a depot or repair school buses.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>That's right. And if your charging station doesn't work, are you going to call Dominion? You're not going to call Dominion. So I think businesses like ours have a natural ability to partner with utilities in any format that the utility shows up in. We can plug the gap with additional capital and with services that ultimately benefit reliability and cost certainty to schools.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so then let's wrap up maybe with a final kind of question or set of questions. So we've got the business model here available. It's advantageous for most school districts just on a pure cost basis, to say nothing of not pumping diesel fumes directly into kids lungs and deafening them with jet engines as they get to and from school. And I'm a parent in a school district and I am taken by this and want to advocate for it. Where do I go? To whom do I direct my strongly-worded email? What's the best way for people to try to organize and advocate for those?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>I would send your email to three recipients and put them all on the same email. The first recipient is a board member, a member of the school board who is an advocate for this type of activity. The second individual would be a Chief Business Officer or an Assistant Superintendent, someone who's typically tasked with the operating side of the house and ultimately responsible for finance and contracts. And then the third would be the Transportation Director, whoever's running the current fleet. And what you do there is you get everyone on the same page. They all hear your message. A board member can be an advocate and push that message down, which often creates more willingness to take a deeper look faster. A business officer can get comfortable with the risk and the cost, and a transportation director can ground it all in the reality of: Will this work to pick kids up and drop them off back at home? And so that would be my advice, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This seems like a great and very obvious step for school districts to take. Like, everybody, we needed to decarbonize, regardless. Kids' health is particularly important. This model overcomes the upfront cost barrier. But what if you receive pushback along the lines of the following: we're still early days in both electric school buses and in models like this, business models like this. And it's very likely that a few years of experience are going to scale a lot of things up, bring a lot of costs down, and that the subscription fee will likely be lower in three to five years than it is today. Why shouldn't we just wait until the market is more fully-baked?</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>There's a decision that has to happen every single year to buy vehicles, to replace the oldest vehicles that effectively need to go to the scrapyard. If a school district has to buy ten new vehicles, they have an inflection point that is immediate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>They can buy diesels or they can go electric, either on their own or with a model like Highland's model. And so it's less about "will the cost come down." Sure, the cost might come down for the ten we need to buy next year and the ten we need to buy the year after that and the year after that. But that doesn't change the fact that we have to buy ten vehicles right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>And if it's cheaper, arguably cheaper, with a very, very strong argument to be made that it will always be cheaper, and it's definitively cheaper for the next five to seven years, then that tends to win the day with a business officer. And you really just have to get comfortable that the technology is ready to meet the routes and the reliability standards of your district. And there's enough projects out there at scale that we think prove that in a very strong way. But the last thing I would say is that's why Highland exists, because you don't own the vehicles. You, as the school district, are in a performance-based contract. And so Highland only gets paid if the vehicle operates by the mile. If the vehicle stops operating, there's an inconvenience, but the school is not out any capital or any additional money. And so we are truly incentivized as their partner to keep the fleet operating smoothly, fully fueled every day for a pretty long time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And it's in your financial interest to maximize performance with the lowest possible budget.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All that sort of constant effort of looking for economies and looking for improvements and everything else, that's such a mental time load that is being offloaded.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>We agree. And David, it's not that the model is new to schools. It's new for school buses. But, schools have been buying energy efficiency equipment under energy savings contracts for decades. They're very accustomed to that business model within the operations of their plant, their facilities, and this is no different.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One thing I always say about this model of subscription, rather than buying, and this is true across product categories is if you're just subscribing to your equipment. If a new, cooler, better school bus comes into the world, it's to Highland's advantage to buy it and switch it out. Unlike if you buy a diesel bus, you're just sort of stuck with the diesel bus for whatever it is, 10, 20, 30 years. You can see continuous improvements when you're on a subscription model. You don't have to buy every new model of bus. Someone else is going to do that for you. So you will likely see improvements in hardware and service over the course of the subscription.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. And I would also say that our customers, if you speak with any of our customers, they would say that this whole experience is an upgrade. We give them better insights into their fleet. We provide a technology platform that is state-of-the-art and robust. They have better information than they've ever had on where the buses are located, state of charge, the health of the vehicle, lots of analytics and other tools. And when something goes wrong, we have people there and we're on the phone, and we're opening up power cabinets and solving problems very quickly. And the whole experience is, as you described, an upgrade.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is awesome. Volts listeners know that I have enormous enthusiasm for electrified postal vehicles and electrified school buses. Those are my two favorite things in the entire world to talk about. So I'm so thrilled, a. that you're out there doing what you're doing, and b. that you came on and took all this time with us. So thanks very much.</p><p><strong>Duncan McIntyre</strong></p><p>Yeah, David, I love your podcast. I love what you're doing, and I was very glad that you're interested in hearing more from Highland about our experiences and what we're seeing in the market. So really appreciate you having us on and look forward to hearing it live. Thanks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/getting-electric-school-buses-in</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:98409458</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 25 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/98409458/e05f2da5059e9d1eb8da419ec576ca27.mp3" length="48051482" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4004</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/98409458/e1998e2d13703549c5a7e21ae65d8562.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's the deal with electrolyzers?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Raffi Garabedian, CEO of startup Electric Hydrogen, discusses all things electrolyzer, the current hydrogen market, and the future risks and opportunities for green hydrogen. </em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAj0Axxm3RklcalMybbOQyYa/volts23.02.01%28raffi.garabedian%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/what-s-the-deal-with-electrolyzers"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Volts subscribers are likely well aware of the fact that a fully decarbonized energy system is going to require an enormous amount of hydrogen to fill in the gaps left by wind and solar. What's more, they are probably aware that hydrogen comes in a dazzling variety of colors, from blue to gray to brown, depending on the carbon intensity of the production.</p><p>In the end, though, only one such color matters: green. That is to say, a fully decarbonized energy system is going to require lots and lots of hydrogen made with renewable energy, with no carbon emissions. The way to do that is to run water and electrical current through an electrolyzer, which splits the hydrogen off from the oxygen.</p><p>Currently, about 95 percent of the world's hydrogen is made using fossil fuels. Green hydrogen — hydrogen made with renewable energy and electrolyzers — comprises only a sliver of the remaining 5 percent. Yet it’s going to have to scale up to 100 percent in the next several decades, even as demand for hydrogen rises.</p><p>This is all a familiar story, at least to energy nerds. But if you're anything like me, the more you think about it, the more you realize that, despite the key role they play in that story, you don't actually know very much about electrolyzers themselves. What are they, exactly? What do they look like? How can they be improved? What policy is supporting them?</p><p>To talk through these questions, I contacted Raffi Garabedian, the CEO of <a target="_blank" href="https://eh2.com/">Electric Hydrogen</a>, a startup that has set out to rapidly drive down the cost of green hydrogen. Garabedian, who was previously chief technology officer at First Solar, believes that the market for green hydrogen today is roughly where the solar market was in 2008, with all the attendant risks and opportunities.</p><p>Garabedian (quite patiently) walked me through the basics of electrolyzers, the current state of the market and the technology, the kind of cost improvements he believes are possible within the next five years, the increasingly supportive policy environment, and the future of green hydrogen.</p><p>With no further ado, Raffi Garabedian, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>It's great to be here, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm excited to talk today about electrolyzers because I think I am, and I think probably most of my listeners are already convinced that hydrogen is going to play an important role in a decarbonized electricity system. I think we can just assume that. And I already think, and I think my listeners probably already know this too, that in a true decarbonized system, it's going to have to be so called "green hydrogen," hydrogen made without greenhouse gases. I know there are 50 other colors made from different other things with varying levels of greenhouse gas production. But, I think—and obviously you think, since you've predicated your business on it—that we got to make green hydrogen work.</p><p>And green hydrogen is hydrogen made with renewable electricity and electrolyzers. So, we know all that. But I find that when I think about the technologies involved, I have a pretty good understanding of all the pieces of that puzzle, except for electrolyzers. They're just kind of this thing that plugs into a certain spot in the diagram. But I find that when I actually focus in on it and think about it, I turn out to know very little about electrolyzers. So I'm very excited to have you on the pod today because I suspect I'm not the only one who has that sort of gap in my knowledge. So maybe we can just start with: what is an electrolyzer?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, let's start there. Let's first start by just exploring and defining the problem that we're trying to solve, right? So we're trying to make hydrogen, which is both a feedstock and a fuel, and we're trying to make it using renewable energy. So how does that work? Well, it all starts with the water molecule. So everybody knows water is... what's the chemical formula for water? It's H2O. So think of that as oxidized hydrogen. Hydrogen, the word, actually is derived from hydro: water, gen: produces. So when you burn hydrogen yeah, interesting, right? When you burn hydrogen, you get water as a result.</p><p>So burning is oxidation. So what an electrolyzer does is the opposite of that. It's the reverse of oxidation, which is called reduction. But it does so electrochemically. Now, what does that mean? Electrochemistry is a whole field of science and technology that involves the interaction between chemical reactions and electricity. And generally the kinds of electrochemical systems that are used in industry involve things like membranes and electrodes. But the function of these devices is to drive some sort of a chemical reaction that requires energy towards a desired end state. Now, in this case, what we're trying to do is drive water, which is burned hydrogen, oxidized hydrogen, back to its original state, right back to hydrogen's original state, which is H2, which is just the diatom of the element hydrogen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You're unoxidizing it.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, you're unoxidizing it and and to do—you're unburning it. And to do so requires a tremendous amount of energy. That's because the reaction of hydrogen plus oxygen equals water, releases a lot of energy in the first place. It's, as they say, energetically downhill. So to go the other direction, we have to pump a lot of energy into it. Now, that's the good news. It's not bad news in this case. The good news is: we are able to store a lot of electrical energy as chemical potential energy in the form of hydrogen. And then we're able to extract that either as heat by literally burning it like you would any other fuel or through other mechanisms. For example, you can run hydrogen through a fuel cell and you can get electricity back out again round trip, just like a battery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So all that energy you're using to break up the water is effectively stored in the hydrogen, and you're getting all that energy back out when you...</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>You got it. I've heard people say, "Oh, well, electrolysis is bad because it's so energy hungry." Well, that's exactly the point. It's energy hungry because you're trying to convert, transform that electrical energy from electrical potential into chemical potential, right? That's what an electrolyzer does. So an electrolyzer is the machine that does that, and it's generally got a bunch of parts to it. The heart of the machine is this thing called an electrochemical stack, typically. And that's a bunch of plates, layers of plates, and they're literally stacked on top of each other, which is why we use that term in the art.</p><p>But you flow water through this thing, you pass electricity through it, and what comes out is oxygen on one side in one pipe and hydrogen on the other side in another pipe. It's got an anode and a cathode. And that's where you get the two gases are produced on either side of that cell. Now there's a bunch more to it. There's a power converter that delivers the electric power to the device and controls it. And then there's a bunch of piping, plumbing, valves, control systems, gas, water, separators, whole bunch of things wrapped around it, which we usually call like the balance of plant. Electrolyzers, historically... they've been around for a long time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The metal that the plates are made of is something reactive, right? Such that when you introduce electrical current to it and water to it, it causes the chemical reaction in question, like what do we have other than water and electricity?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Right. There are different technologies for electrolysis, but they all involve a thing called a catalyst</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>And a catalyst is typically, in these cases, metals or metal oxides, which, well, like the word implies, catalyze the reaction. So they sit there, they don't get consumed, but they play a critical role in facilitating the reaction to occur. You can make water break into hydrogen and oxygen without a catalyst. Some of your listeners might remember high school chemistry class, right? You have like a little beaker of water. You put some stuff in the water to make it conduct electricity. You put two wires in it, connect it to a battery, and you see bubbles. Well, bubbles on one wire, oxygen. The other wire is hydrogen. And you can collect those gases. But that's a very inefficient way to electrolyze water. To electrolyze water efficiently, you need a very special kind of a catalyst. So those are the metals you're referring to. So they sit there, they're part of the construction of the device. They don't get consumed in the process, but they play a critical role in the process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so the catalyst is the same, whatever, after a year of production as it was at the beginning. This is not something that is breaking apart in any way or declining in any way.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Well, ideally, that's the case. Now, with any practical device, there are breakdown mechanisms, degradations, all sorts of practical things we technologists and scientists think about. And nothing works forever. Everything in the world breaks down. But, yeah, the first order, what you said is generally true. They're participants in the reaction, but they're not consumed in the process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so you got these basic parts. What is the scale of this thing? Like, what is the smallest electrolyzer you could build? Or the biggest one? Or what is the typical one look like? Is it bigger than a breadbox? Like, what am I looking at if I'm looking at an electrolyzer?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, let's go back in history a little bit, okay? So I think... forgive me, my dates are probably off a little bit, but I think the first electrolyzers were built in Norway, I believe. And they were built to utilize hydroelectricity to make hydrogen. And those were built using a technology called alkaline electrolysis, where caustic soda, or lye, is used as the working fluid, which is water-based. It's an aqueous solution. And those units are extremely physically large. Think of an object the size of a school bus, and they operate at pretty low power levels for their physical size.</p><p>Think about something on the order of hundreds of kilowatts to a megawatt kind of scale for an object the size of a school bus. On the other extreme is this more advanced, I would say, technology called proton exchange membrane electrolysis. And that was invented... gee, I don't know the exact inventor, but I think it might have been Westinghouse back in the... fifties? And it was invented to make oxygen, interestingly, for submarines, for nuclear power subs. So these were relatively small devices operating in the kilowatts to 100 kilowatt regime, literally platinum- and gold-plated, super expensive things. They made it from submarines to the International Space Station to spaceflight again for oxygen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is more like breadbox size.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. But they've been adapted and have been scaled up over the years for the production of hydrogen. They typically go from, again, from that small scale breadbox scale to objects the size of a small refrigerator, shall we say, that could be as big as a megawatt in power capacity. So electrolyzers these days, the largest electrochemical stacks you can get are on that order, about a megawatt. They're physically very different in size depending on the technology.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's not crazy to think that electrolyzers could be used in places where they need to sort of tuck into a relatively small space. Like, they vary widely in size. They could be made custom-sized for custom tasks.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, they've been used industrially for years. They've been used in laboratory settings for years and years. They've been used for on-site production of extremely high purity hydrogen for things like semiconductor applications, for metal processing applications, whatnot. There's kind of a history of using these devices, but generally at relatively small scales. Now, when we think about the energy transition, which is the topic of your podcast and certainly my topic of interest, we are starting to now speak about a much, much different regime of scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So this leads to my next question, which is: currently, I think it's 5%, something like that, of the world's hydrogen is made with electrolyzers. 95% still comes basically from fossil fuels. So those of us who are interested in decarbonization are expecting or asking this technology to scale up super big, super rapidly, relatively speaking, like this is like we're knocking on the door like, "Hey, can you like 2000 x in the next decade or whatever." So my question is just about... is the technology itself ready to scale up that big? Is it mature in the sense that efficiencies have been wrung out? Like we have it down as well as we can? Or do you feel like there's basic tech work to be done before we're prepared for that sort of explosion?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>That is a great question and a great framing of it. There's all sorts of really interesting technology in the laboratory today that promises to ultimately allow electrolysis to expand up in scale and down in cost. But, our problem is clear and present and urgent and so waiting for technology to emerge from the lab, which can take a decade or more because most of these devices are...first of all, electric chemistry is notoriously difficult to transition from the laboratory to reality.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When you say in lab, do you mean something fundamentally than what you described to me, the proton exchange membrane? You mean like fundamentally different kinds of electronics?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>That's right. There are different chemical cycles that people are experimenting with, different membranes, new catalysts, all sorts of really great science.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There was something biological...capillary?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>All sorts of stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We can table that. Maybe we could mention that later.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, all sorts of stuff that's out there. Electric Hydrogen, my company, we of course are aware of all of these kind of more advanced scientific developments. We've chosen a very different path because of the time horizon of the industry. So we are clearly focused on largescale decarbonization and both the market fundamentals, the secular trends and the policy frameworks are now in place to facilitate this industry to expand and become meaningful in the next five years. And that time horizon doesn't really support basic new technology development. And so we have opted to take a very well-developed mature technology, proton exchange membrane electrolysis, and adapted to our new needs.</p><p>Now, that is done through some very core technical innovations. But the fundamental outcome of those innovations is to dramatically increase the productivity of that physical object. So that refrigerator-sized electrochemical stack we're talking about? Think about a five times increase in both the amount of power that we can run through it and the amount of hydrogen we can get out of it. The same physical-sized object. Now we can talk a little bit about how that's done. I'll be cagey about how we do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, this is exactly my set of questions right here. I figured you would be a little bit cagey about it, but maybe you can tell us some general things because we're talking about both kind of the electrolyzer itself, the core, the electrodes, the membrane. And then, as you said, there's all this "balance of plant" stuff. It's a big complex process which suggests that there are lots of places within that process to tweak things and tighten things up and make things more efficient, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p>Can you tell us a little bit about in that whole big messy process where you are going in and tightening the screws and finding these efficiencies?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>The pat answer to your question is "everywhere," but let's peel that onion apart a little bit and explore it. So, let's start with the product we're building. The biggest electrolyzer that one can buy today is roughly, I think, a 20-megawatt plant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What does that look like? What does a 20-megawatt electrolyzer plant look like? Is that a factory?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>It's a huge building that looks like a small chemical plant. And it has, you know, maybe 15 or 20 electrochemical stacks in it...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>...with a lot of plumbing and pipes and pumps and all sorts of things. And it's extremely expensive. That's the key, right? The key isn't actually how big it is. The key is the cost. Now, those things are related because the cost of plumbing, piping, valves, pumps, all of those things scales kind of with size. So to make it smaller is a good thing for cost, but also to keep it large in terms of its production capacity is extremely important.</p><p>Let's talk about the application for a second before we go into the guts of the plant, because I think it's useful to have a frame of reference for scale. So you mentioned the current use cases for hydrogen, of which 95% is supplied using steam methane, reformation of natural gas. So those use cases are roughly 50-50 split between refineries. So hydrogen is a chemical input to the petrochemical refining process. And the other half goes to the production of ammonia, which is fertilizer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's the current hydrogen market?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>That's the current hydrogen market, yeah. Now let's just talk for a second about an ammonia plant. There are dozens and dozens of these around the world. A typical ammonia plant, if you wanted to run it off of renewable green electrolyzed hydrogen would require rough numbers on the order of a gigawatt of renewable capacity and electrolysis. So that's a big number. And remember, we're talking about these electrochemical units which are at their fundamental building block level. They're one megawatt in scale. So it would be a thousand of these things. That's a problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A thousand of these stacks?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Per ammonia plant?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Per single ammonia plant. World scale ammonia plant. Of which there are many, many. And that's just scratching the surface of what we want to do with hydrogen. Because, look, cleaning up ammonia production for fertilizer. That's great. That's some single digit percentage of global CO2 emissions right there. But the world is not interested in green hydrogen just for that reason. The world is interested in green hydrogen as an energy vector for moving energy from where renewables are abundant to where people are abundant and need the energy, for example, right? But also as an input to numerous industrial processes which cannot be electrified directly with renewables.</p><p>For example, the DRI primary steel production process, which converts iron ore to metallic iron.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Industrial fuel, airplane fuel...</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Ship fuel. So synthetic fuels is generally a broad category of applications so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Seasonal energy storage is another...</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>You got it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...big one. Really, hydrogen can do literally anything. So you could go down the list.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah. And when you add up all those things that are very hard to decarbonize directly, you end up with about 50% of global emissions. I think the IEA's official number is something like 30%. But that skips over a very important factor you mentioned, which is the long duration storage of energy for the electric system. And when you add that back in, you get to about 50% of global emissions. So it's a massive, massive problem, requiring ultimately terawatts of capacity to be built and installed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because I know some people have lots of weird hangups about hydrogen. I know there are some people out there who are skeptical about some of these larger uses of hydrogen. But I think it's worth saying that even if that estimate is off by several percent in either side, it's still many, many, many, many, many times the current production. Like, at a certain point, it hardly matters. The target is so far distant.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>That's right. You could be ten times over ambitious about what hydrogen could do for the world and still have an immense scaling opportunity and challenge ahead of you. Because again, we're talking about terawatts of ultimate available or necessary capacity to decarbonize all of these sectors. A tenth of that is 100 gigawatts. So big numbers here that we're talking about. So how do we address the scale of the opportunities and the scale of the plants that have to be built with technology that's at a fundamentally different scale today?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. We cannot meet that scale we need with current technology.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Exactly. So we can just try to make more of them. But the issue with that is that they're too expensive when they're that small. So the other thing we can try to do is make them more productive. And the word I use is: "higher throughput." So again, take those same physical-sized objects and get a lot more value out of them. The name of the game in all of this is to make green hydrogen cheap. Let's not lose sight of that. Some of the applications you mentioned for example, shipping fuel. The economic parity point for shipping fuel is almost impossible to reach with anything other than what's currently being burned, which is bunker fuel.</p><p>It's the sludge that comes out of the bottom of a distillation column and a petrol... super gross. Bunker fuel, because it's so gross, is super cheap. Now we know we can't compete economically against bunker fuel. Nothing can. However, the alternative of continuing to burn bunker fuel is less and less tractable. And so, both by legal restriction and through other economic means, the cost of the conventional approach, the bunker fuel approach, is gradually rising and we see it rising at an accelerated pace as time goes forward. So what we have to do if we want to change that industry, just as an example, right? We have to drive down the cost of green hydrogen-derived fuels very rapidly to intersect as soon as possible with the rising cost of burning bunker in ships.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And we're all presuming and we'll maybe discuss this in a little bit more detail in a minute. But the assumption behind all this is that policy is going to help do this. Like policy is going to be pushing up the price of fossil fuels—one hopes—even as technology and scale are pushing down the cost of hydrogen.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>It's happening as we speak. Okay, let's go back to the machine. So the machine has got to be big.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>And let me just say the product that we are building at Electric Hydrogen, it's about an acre in size. It's funny to think of that as a product, but that's our product.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's multiple... stacks within that?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>It's multiple stacks, but not nearly as many as you might think. And it's comprised of modular process units. So think about kind of tractor trailer-sized frames like you might see in an oil field or a gas field. These are fluid processing units, heat exchangers, tanks, pumping skids, water treatment units and power conversion equipment, right? So we modularize all this equipment so that it can be easily put in place at a project site interconnected to produce a large-scale hydrogen plant. When I say large-scale, our product, that one acre size thing, that is 100 megawatt plant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What is 100 megawatt referring to? 100 megawatts worth of hydrogen coming out or energy going in?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>That's the energy going in to the electrolyzer. And if you want to get geeky, that's about 50 tons per day of hydrogen output at full nameplate capacity. Now, a green hydrogen electrolyzer should almost never run at full capacity all day long.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>The only scenario in which you should be able to do that is if you're connected to a hydroelectric power plant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Are you talking about because of renewables coming and going?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Being variable.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Which is kind of the point of the architecture of our product as well. Is to be able to follow and track those renewables without firming the energy. And it has significant bearing on the choice of technology and the design of both the electrolyzer itself and also the whole plant that's put around it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And to what extent are you improving the electrolyzer itself? From what I understand, the electrodes are made from fairly specialized metals? Like, are you looking for cheaper electrodes? Are you trying to improve the actual physical electrolyzing process itself?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>The latter. So there are really two approaches to making electrolysis more cost effective to making the equipment cheaper, which goes directly to making the gas cheaper. The two approaches, broadly speaking are: make the existing hardware for less money, find cheaper materials to make it out of, reduce the labor content of the manufacturing, et cetera, et cetera. The other approach is: get more out of the same hardware, the same kind of hardware. Now, when we analyzed these two approaches when we were starting the company, we kind of looked at the scenarios and what we thought could be done.</p><p>What's the entitlement for the two approaches? Our conclusion was there might be 30-40% cost to find in the existing technologies if one can thrift the materials, find cheaper materials, lower labor, all that, right? And frankly, we're not all that good at that. I mean, we're good at it, but it's not our forte. What we're actually really good at is driving a technology roadmap around performance. And when we thought that through and really analyzed the entitlement, we found numerous opportunities to get multiples higher performance out of what is essentially existing technology, materials and components that are well developed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is the balance of plant stuff you're talking about, like, stuff outside the elec...?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>No, this is in the very, very guts of the electrolyzer cell itself. So, we take a device physics approach to the problem. For those of your listeners who don't know my background, I was Chief Technology Officer at First Solar for many years. My co-founder at Electric Hydrogen was also Chief Technology Officer at First Solar. Before that, he was with Bell Labs running their device physics department. Long career in electrical and electrochemical devices.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I guess I'm a little baffled how you get more out of the same materials, so please.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah. And the way you do it is by understanding the physics of the device, deconvolving the various contributors to both performance losses and efficiency losses, and designing solutions to those material science and interfacial and transport problems. So it's all around interfaces, material choices, and the physics of how the device operates. And so with that kind of device physics approach, we've been able to quintuple essentially, like, dramatically improve the performance of the electrolyzer cell itself. Now, that gives us the ability to, without changing the size or materially changing the cost of that refrigerator thing, it allows us to get a lot more power into it and a lot more hydrogen out of it, and that's the secret trick. Right, so our hydrogen production is extremely physically dense.</p><p>Now, when you sell an electrolyzer, what does the customer care about? The customer is typically a project developer or industrial owner. They care about the hydrogen production cost. Ideally, about half of that cost is the cost of capital that's involved with the purchase of the plant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>So when you buy a plant like this, you price it in terms of dollars per watt or dollars per ton of hydrogen per day produced. So the more you can get into and out of that thing, the lower its price proportionately on a dollar per watt basis. So if I make that refrigerator size box and I can get a megawatt out of it, its price is a dollar, right? If it costs a million dollars to make or to sell, it's a dollar. If I can get just make up a number 10 megawatts out of it, wow. That same thing costs ten cents a watt.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So those are your biggest gains you're making. Or is it in the electrolyzer?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And the electrolyzer then has knock on effects and ramifications for the rest of the balance of the plant that's around it. If you look at our plant architecture, at first flush, it looks like others. But on more detailed inspection, one finds a lot of very critical differences. Some of them actually add cost to the plant relative to a conventional approach in order to support this really fancy, super high energy electrolyzer stack. But on average, in some total, the cost is greatly reduced even at the plant scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, that's... sort of counter my intuitions. I sort of figured that with nobody having really tried to scale these things up to the point you're scaling up, I would think that all the stuff outside the electrolyzer all that plumbing and structure of the plan itself and.... I figured there's lots of efficiencies in that stuff that just nobody's thought to look at yet or squeeze out of yet.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that's also true. Maybe there's about 500 megawatts of electrolysis installed in the world today. I think the vast majority of those plants are custom engineered and designed and built—stick built by EPCs—for a site, right. So there's not a whole lot of economy of scale or learning yet in this industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And your acre-size plant is a set thing. It's the same every time you build it?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's why I call it a product. It's not a project, it's not engineered for a site. You can buy any size and shape electrolyzer you want from us as long as it's this one. It's like the old black Model T.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, theoretically you could build two if you had two acres. Right?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Modular in that sense.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>That's right. And that modular approach is actually really interesting in the market as well because we're at the early stages of this industry's growth and so project finance is a major constraint. Of course, people who are building a gigawatt-scale plant. They don't want to take the risk on building that whole gigawatt all at once.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>They want to build it in small modules. So it does also serve a market need in that regard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A couple of other questions about cost. How big a factor is the cost of the energy you're buying, the cost of the renewable energy. Like, if renewable energy continues to get cheaper or for whatever reason, you're able to just find cheaper energy, does that make a major difference or is that marginal?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a huge difference. So let's talk about some numbers here, okay? So hydrogen produced from steam methane reforming of natural gas in Texas and Louisiana today, which is kind of the lowest cost region of production in the world, save maybe a few places in the Middle East—which are comparable. That hydrogen costs about a $1.50 to $2 a kilogram to produce and buy. And it's directly proportional almost to the price of natural gas. Okay, so that's the bogey. If you can beat a $1.50 a kilo or lower, the world is your oyster because you're at so called fossil parity hydrogen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>That's—and by the way, that's the dirtiest hydrogen. That...well, not quite. Hydrogen from coal is dirtier, but that's dirty hydrogen, that's so called gray hydrogen, right. Where the CO2 is emitted. If you try to capture the CO2, that price only goes up. Now, when you talk about electrolysis, the energy input to the production of hydrogen for most electrolyzers equates to about, well, every $10 a megawatt hour of electricity price contributes about $0.60 roughly per kilogram of hydrogen production cost.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So really makes the difference whether you're competing with that cheap stuff or not.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>That's right. So the best in class solar energy power purchase agreement that I've seen is just under $10 a megawatt hour in the Middle East. We also see in the US, new build wind in the wind belt that's on that order, below $10 a megawatt hour, is possible. But if your energy is $30 a megawatt hour, you're already going to be north of a $1.50 a kilogram hydrogen production cost just with the energy input, not even counting the cost of capital to build the electrolyzer plant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And you have limited control over that. I mean, in some sense, you're subject to what energy is available.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yes and no. So here's what we know. We know that renewable power all around the world where the resource is rich is extremely inexpensive as long as you don't try to firm it, as long as you can take it when it's produced. Anything you do to try to firm that power adds substantial cost, right? Because batteries are expensive.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>So the key for making low cost hydrogen is to take the renewable energy intermittently is to take it when the wind's blowing, when the sun's shining.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, I'm sure you get this question all the time. One of the, you know, I sort of threw this out on Twitter, and I got many versions of this question, which is: how is it economic to run a hydrogen-making plant where the capacity factor is, whatever, 40% or 50% or lower? How do you pencil out the economics when your energy supply is variable?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Well, your Twitter followers are brilliant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I could not agree more.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>That is exactly why we have been working so hard towards this singular goal of making a large-scale electrolyzer plant that's really cheap. Not cheap on a dollars per unit basis, but cheap on a dollars per watt or dollars per ton of hydrogen produced per day basis, right? That's the key. If your capital plant, your electrolyzer, is too expensive, you can't afford to run it at a low capacity factor.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>If it's cheap enough, now you can afford to use really cheap energy and run your electrolyzer intermittently. That is the secret. That is the way you get to low cost hydrogen production. That's also completely green hydrogen production. The other thing we should note here is that if you try to firm the energy input to an electrolyzer using the grid, what you're literally doing is in the hours when the wind isn't blowing or the sun isn't shining, you are ramping up a fossil generator somewhere to power that electrolyzer. And that is a terrible outcome!</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you no longer have green hydrogen!</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>You have the worst possible thing. You're burning a fossil fuel, which you could have converted directly into hydrogen to make electricity and then convert back into hydrogen right through an electrolyzer. That's a terrible thing to do. By the way, there's a policy...I don't know, maybe I'll call it a food fight going on in the US right now around the rulemaking that results from the IRA. I go back to policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We'll get there. So accommodating intermittent energy input is not so much a specific technological thing as just a price thing. If you can get your plant cheap enough, then you can make it work with intermittent energy.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a bunch of things. We have to make the plant cheap enough so that it can work with intermittent energy. That's the only scalable kind of clean energy in the first place. There's a lot of hydro in the world, but not enough to solve a terawatt-scale problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, people talk about building nuclear energy plants specifically to make hydrogen. People talk about using offshore wind energy specifically to make hydrogen, that way you wouldn't have to string a power wire out to the offshore wind. Is any of that stuff on your radar or you think that's mostly distraction?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Well, the energy problem is extremely localized. It's regional. So if you're in a place where natural gas is super expensive and in short supply for geopolitical reasons, whatever, your fossil parity price for hydrogen might be a lot higher than the numbers I threw out, right? So if you're in Northern Europe and you're concerned about Russian gas supply, you might be willing to spend a lot more for your hydrogen production. And in those scenarios, things like offshore wind could make a lot of sense.</p><p>Nuclear is a tough one for me to understand, quite frankly, because, look, I mean, the best use of a flexible nuclear plant, I think, is to continue to clean up the electric system first and foremost. So if we're able to figure out how to build and scale more nuclear, wow, let's go do that. I'm not sure making hydrogen out of it is the right answer. Also, the price of that power is quite high.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. I can just tell you, Raffi, out there in the world, out there on Twitter world, people really just want nuclear. They want it to be useful for something, and so they propose it for everything. So one more question about the physical thing here, which is: where are these things currently manufactured? Because one of the big arguments going on around all the rest of clean energy is who's making it and who should make it, and is it worth trying to onshore manufacturing? Who makes electrolyzers today?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Today... I mentioned I spent over a decade in the solar industry. When I started in 2008, the solar industry felt a lot like the electrolyzer industry is today. So we had really strong industrials in the electrolyzers today, just like in solar back then. We had really strong industrial players in the US and Europe, who kind of had the core technology and sold the bulk of the equipment. But we're seeing China emerging. They're doubling down on electrolysis, and they're coming up in capacity. I think there's probably more electrolyzer manufacturing capacity in China today than anywhere else in the world. Though, it's a different kind of business than solar. And I think exporting these very, very large units from China to the rest of the world is going to be a different kind of challenge. I'm not sure it rolls the same way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so the plants you're building in the US are manufactured in the US? All your parts and pieces?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, we'll be manufacturing in the US</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the things we've been talking a lot about on the pod recently are learning curves and what kinds of technologies do and don't get on learning curves. And this work out of Oxford last year made such a big splash—claimed that electrolyzers are on a learning curve. So what's your take on that? Is there an answer about the percentage that the cost falls per doubling of deployment? Or is it still, do you feel, like, too nascent to have an answer to that question?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yes, I think we are too nascent. Look, I mean, learning curves are an analysts' way of explaining the trajectory of a whole industry's work in an area. The goal of any given company, technology company, is to be a nonlinear force in going down that curve. Right, so, I don't want to be on a learning curve at Electric Hydrogen. I want to disrupt that learning curve and put it in a new direction. And, you know, the analyst learning curve is simply the aggregate, the average, of a whole bunch of companies trying to do the same thing, which has come out on top with the best solution to the problem. So I don't put a lot of stock in learning curves. I understand why they exist. They're useful, particularly on the buy side, to kind of try to understand and predict the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, they're good descriptive. The question is whether they're predictive at all, right?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah. And predicting the future is notoriously difficult, right, so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But do you think, based on your experience, that costs are headed down? You're confident that costs are headed toward that target they need to hit, and that target is reachable?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>I am. And our explicit goal at our company, at Electric Hydrogen, is to accelerate that cost down curve. So it's not that electrolysis isn't going to be scaled without us. It's not that it's not going to get to the price point it needs to without us. We think our role in this industry, at least with the role we're going to try to play, is to be an accelerant, a catalyst.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Pardon the pun. But it's odd, given what a central role electrolyzers play in this sort of vision of a decarbonized future. I find it odd, I guess, that I just haven't heard of more people doing what you're doing, trying to squeeze costs out of this juncture of the whole system. Do you have a lot of competitors? Do people coming to this...like who's solar? You could name five zillion companies, five zillion research labs. Is there comparable brain power going toward this right now?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>There's a lot of research. So if you look at companies involved in electrolysis, it's kind of bimodal. On the one extreme, you have a group, a mode of companies who are large established players. I'm talking about thyssenkrupp, Siemens, Cummins, folks like that, right? And then on the other extreme, you have a large number of very small companies who are at that low technology readiness level stage. So kind of in the lab playing with new membrane materials or new catalyst chemistries or whatnot. Now, the large industrial players, they tend to be very conservative and slow moving in their technology, road mapping. They tend to be risk averse because they have massive businesses and their reputation is contingent on every piece of that business performing as advertised. So they don't like to take risks. And then on the other hand, you've got the small companies, the material science-y companies, who might be a decade from the market. There are relatively few companies, you could name a small handful today in kind of the middle ground, which is where we are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, right.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Where we're rapidly developing and commercializing technology that has relatively low risk profile.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And part of what you could do if you succeed, and tell me if I'm wrong about this, is de-risk this a little bit and lure some of those bigger players into devoting more resources to this.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Absolutely. Now, I don't know, history is sometimes a good teacher. And again, if we go back to solar, the big industrials all got out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I remember BP bailing.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah, everybody bailed. And whether... you could list the litany of names who no longer exist in the solar industry, who really wilted under very, very rapid technology innovation cycles.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>And resulting steep cost reduction curves. So the learning curve in solar was just brutal and fast and hard. And if you weren't willing to run with it, you weren't going to survive in it. Electrolyzers very well could go that way. They also could go the way of wind, right? So wind power has really been a game that's been dominated by large industrials because wind has scaled the other direction. It hasn't scaled in the volume axis, it's scaled on the size axis. So frankly, the physical size of those units makes them very hard to innovate rapidly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Fairly curious where EVs fall and that sort of... maybe it's too early to tell.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>I think it might be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Whether the big players will be able to pivot fast enough.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'll hold my opinions on that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Alright, so at long last, let's talk about policy. Because one of the questions I got about this, which I think is a very good question, is the danger, it seems to me, of being in the green hydrogen business is that the danger is getting out ahead of policy such that you start producing on a greater scale than there is demand. Generally, the market will opt for the cheapest hydrogen until forced not to by some sort of policy. So is there enough policy support for green hydrogen now that you're confident demand will exist for whatever amount you can produce?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think in the long term, absolutely. Yes both...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Long term is, we're all dead in the long term, or whatever the phrase is.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah. Well, let's frame it more carefully. So five plus years out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>I think the answer is yes. There is still a big question mark around the two to five year time frame. There are gigawatts and gigawatts of announcements globally of companies who are building—air quotes building—fossil-free hydrogen production plants for industrial uses, for energy uses, for grid firm, all sorts of applications that we've talked about and mentioned. But what does it take for those to get to a financial investment decision and for ground to be broken and for electrolyzers to be installed? That's the question, right.</p><p>And I think there is a lot of risk in that. It comes down to understanding, from our point of view as a company in the business of making and selling electrolyzers, we do as much diligence on our customers as they do on us. So our customers are worried about our technology. "It's a new technology. We haven't seen it before, and you guys haven't really built one before. How do we know it's going to work? Okay, great." That's our customers diligence on us. The other side of that coin is, "Hey, we want to understand... who's your offtaker for hydrogen? Why do they want the gas?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Alright.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>"Why is it economical today? What policies are supporting it? What's the end use segment and application? And how does all that work? Why does your project actually make sense?" Because if we believe it actually makes sense, then we can have much, much higher confidence that it will go through, that it will get built.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A little wariness on both sides then, at this point, like the supply side and the demand side.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I would say the reality-to-hype ratio is about one to ten right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, it is right there in that cycle. But, presumably your business thesis, the way you're raising money, is by saying demand is on the rise.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Demand is on the horizon. And we look really carefully and thoughtfully, at least we try to, at the leading indicators that predict demand. Because, look, I mean, this is an industry that essentially doesn't exist and has never existed before, so we can't use past performance to predict the future, right? So we've got to look at leading indicators. We've got to look a layer or two underneath what's being built today to understand what's driving that behavior. And we think the fundamentals are there. So a number of things come together. Certainly the European policy framework has firmed up, continues to firm up, and is driving bona fide, like, verifiable activity on the European subcontinent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that just the cap and trade? Is that just the general squeezing of carbon? Or there's the hydrogen-specific stuff you're talking about.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>There's hydrogen-specific stuff in Europe as well, but there's also a lot of secondary, "Hey, it can only be solved. We can only meet these requirements with hydrogen we don't know how else to do it" kind of things. And then when we look at the US, again the IRA, which I mentioned, that makes fossil-free hydrogen an economic viability, like with the snap of a finger.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's just a big tax credit. That's like a per production tax credit. What exactly is the structure of the...?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>That's right, it's framed as a production tax credit. So for each kilogram of hydrogen you produce, you get a certain number of dollars in tax credit back, which goes to the bottom line of a project.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And does it have any stuff about the other colors of hydrogen, or is this a black and white, sort of like, "We'll give you money if you do green."?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Well, it's thoughtfully framed, actually, in terms of the greenhouse gas intensity of the hydrogen that's produced. It's technology agnostic, it's greenhouse gas indexed, so you can get anywhere from $0 to $3 a kilogram tax credit, depending on your carbon intensity. I mentioned a little while ago there's a bit of a food fight going on around the rules for that because the quality of the electricity going into an electrolyzer is what's being fought over.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah. Some of us in the industry kind of want to take a long view, and the long view says, "Gee, that electricity really needs to be directly fed from a renewal plant." Not on one wire, but at least time-synchronized and locationally matched.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As opposed to just sort of using grid electricity and then buying wrecks or whatever.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>You got it. That's exactly the fight that's going on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is, again, Volts listeners will find this whole discussion familiar from the distinction between going 100% renewable and going 24/7 renewable, matching on an hour-to-hour level.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>It is the same exact thing being fought out right now against this $3 potential tax credit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're advocating for, "we need to be doing this hour-by-hour so we know...not just that we're offsetting, but that we're using clean energy."</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>I will unabashedly say we're advocating to do it right, for God's sake.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is ambiguous in the language of the law. So this will be...who's making this decision in the end?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, like any law, right. There's a of lot rules associated with it. So yeah, the decision is being effectively litigated at this point.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And does the IRA tax credit sort of add a stroke, make your current product viable? Is it enough in and of itself?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Yeah, frankly it does. But I will also tell you that, again, based on experience in solar and the resulting scar tissue, I'm extremely wary of subsidies. I value them highly. They're necessary to get a nascent industry like this off the ground in the face of a much cheaper but dirty alternative, which is fossil fuels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's the iconic case for subsidies.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Absolutely. But having said all that, our goal as a business is to enable subsidy-free fossil parity hydrogen production as soon as possible because the subsidies are always at risk. They're expensive, right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But the ones in IRA are not capped or time as an expiration date or?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>I believe it's a ten-year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's a pretty good runway. It's a great runway assuming it stays in place, right.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Assuming it stays in place. And of course, these things are political at the end of the day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>So for a lot of reasons, both fundamental reasons and also political reasons, our goal is to be subsidy-free to enable subsidy-free fossil parity pricing as soon as possible. And we think we can do that in under five years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really? That's pretty tight. Like, have you built a plant yet? Where where are you at in deployment? Have you got a demonstration plant? Where...what's going on?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>We have a small scale prototype here in California. We'll be building a pilot towards the end of this year. So the answer to your question is no.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The pilot is the full-acre plant?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>It's the indivisible unit of that full-acre thing. It's not the full-acre thing, but that'll be coming in 2024.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And background policy. I know that the IRA is a big, huge deal. I know there are supports in Europe. What about procurement rules? I think, like, the federal government now has some sort of like, rules about the cleanliness of the hydrogen can buy, or big institutions basically saying, "We'll be a market for this, we'll be guaranteed offtakers." Is there much of that, or is it mostly the IRA you're banking on?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Well, right now in the US, it's mostly the IRA that's driving adoption. Well, it's the IRA coupled to corporate procurement and decarbonisation strategies. And just like you see in the world of renewable energy procurement, the same is going on now in renewable fuels, clean fuels, and hydrogen writ large as an element of various industries.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, well, like steel and stuff like that, too. If you want green steel, you're basically saying you want hydrogen. Green hydrogen.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>That's right. And if you survey the steel industry, you'll find a spectrum of opinions from company to company as to how seriously these producers are approaching decarbonization. Some are extremely committed to decarbonizing rapidly, and others, I guess I would say, are making moderate moves, grudgingly in that direction. So you see that in every sector that we work in. You see it in ammonia production, you see it in fuels, you see it in steel. There's a spectrum of opinions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, as you said, specifically in the hydrogen market, there's this sort of like, "You go first. No, you go first." between the buyers and the sellers. It's a very specific moment in the market.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>It is. You could say it's a high risk moment. It is. It's also a high opportunity moment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>One of the things about this industry that I think will track in a similar direction as both wind and solar did, there's going to be a large wave of adoption. And if you're not a participant in that first wave of adoption as a technology provider, I think it could become very, very difficult to get down the learning curve and to scale at a future date.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you think early movers have a big advantage here?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>I do think so. I do think so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But it's worth saying, you seem confident that these efficiencies exist, that the technological possibility exists. So even if, God forbid, your company doesn't make it, you think this is going to happen, these electrolyzers are going to get cheaper and cheaper until green hydrogen is cost competitive? You think that's more or less inevitable?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>I do. I think that's inevitable. I also think the continued reduction in renewable power costs is inevitable. Despite there are short-term disruptions in that market kind of supply, demand, balance thing. But in the longer term, again, it only gets cheaper. It doesn't get more expensive.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. I've kept you a long time, but I guess just by way of a final question, is you're, as you say, specifically not messing with the stuff on the lab right now. You are trying to economize and bring down the cost of existing technology. Is your sort of like business plan open to the idea that if one of these capillary things come along or one of these sort of fundamentally new...because this is a question about storage...that I often ask people in the storage industry. Like, lithium ion is so established and so far ahead that if you want to compete with lithium ion, at the very least, you need to be able to slip stream in to basically the same manufacturing process because otherwise you're just starting from nothing and you'll never catch up.</p><p>Is this the sort of thing where if a fundamentally new kind of electrolyzer comes along that you could just slot it in? Or just how modular is this and how open is your business plan to sort of big advances in the technology like that?</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>Oh, we're not only open to it, we're eager for it. And we expend some of our R&D effort on just those kinds of directions as well as talking to other companies who are more in the lab than we are. So, yeah, we're absolutely open to it. It's early days in this industry and there are very few examples in the world of technology where the solution today is the solution 20 years from now, right? So this is a long game. We're going to be doing this for a while, and the technology will shift and will adapt with it, but not at the expense of losing focus. Again, I think we have an opportunity that's three to five years in front of us to scale this industry from a glimmer in our eyes to something that actually matters at the scale of the global energy system. That's what we're laser focused on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, thank you so much for coming. This is hugely clarifying for me now. I feel like I have a little bit something in that electrolyzer bucket in my head now, and I know our listeners will appreciate that too. Thanks so much for coming on.</p><p><strong>Raffi Garabedian</strong></p><p>This has been a great conversation. Thanks for all the awesome questions and thanks for having me on the show.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-the-deal-with-electrolyzers</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:96997760</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 25 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/96997760/5ad85a9e12ca15fa204c287c73887b3a.mp3" length="45143113" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3762</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/96997760/52fe07278bcfb0e97fa13955f5d63221.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[On the abuse (and proper use) of climate models]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>British researcher Erica Thompson’s recently published book is a thorough critique of the world of mathematical modeling. In this episode, she discusses the limitations of models, the role of human judgment, and how climate modeling could be improved.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAIzCK8pbzvag0jlII_IuZAa/volts23.01.27%28erica.thompson%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/on-the-abuse-and-proper-use-of-climate-models"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everyone who's followed climate change for any length of time is familiar with the central role that complex mathematical models play in climate science and politics. Models give us predictions about how much the Earth's atmosphere will warm and how much it will cost to prevent or adapt to that warming.</p><p>British researcher Erica Thompson has been thinking about the uses and misuse of mathematical modeling for years, and she has just come out with an absorbing and thought-provoking new book on the subject called <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3wc225G"><em>Escape from Model Land: How Mathematical Models Can Lead Us Astray and What We Can Do About It</em></a>.</p><p>More than anything, it is an extended plea for epistemological humility — a proper appreciation of the intrinsic limitations of modeling, the deep uncertainties that can never be eliminated, and the ineradicable role of human judgment in interpreting model results and applying them to the real world.</p><p>As Volts listeners know, my favorite kind of book takes a set of my vague intuitions and theories and lays them out in a cogent, well-researched argument. One does love having one's priors confirmed! I wrote critiques of climate modeling <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/6/8/17437104/climate-change-global-warming-models-risks">at Vox</a> and even <a target="_blank" href="https://grist.org/article/discount-rates-a-boring-thing-you-should-know-about-with-otters/">way back at Grist</a> — it's been a persistent interest of mine — but Thompson's book lays out a full, rich account of what models can and can't help us do, and how we can put them to better use.</p><p>I was thrilled to talk with her about some of her critiques of models and how they apply to climate modeling, among many other things. This is a long one! But a good one, I think. Settle in.</p><p>Alright, then, with no further ado, Erica Thompson, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Hi. Great to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I loved your book, and I'm so glad you wrote it. I just want to start there.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>That's great. Thank you. Good to hear.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Way, way back in the Mesozoic era, when I was a young writer at a tiny little publication called Grist—this would have been like 2005, I think—one of the first things I wrote that really kind of blew up and became popular was, bizarrely, a long piece about discount rates and their role in climate models. And the whole point of that post was, this is clearly a dispute over values. This is an ethical dispute that is happening under cover of science. And if we're going to have these ethical judgments so influential in our world, we should drag them out into the light and have those disputes in public with some democratic input.</p><p>And for whatever reason, people love that post. I still hear about that post to this day. So, all of which is just to say, I have a long-standing interest in this and models and how we use them, and I think there's more public interest in this than you might think. So, that's all preface. I'm not here to do a soliloquy about how much I loved your book. Let's start with just briefly about your background. Were you in another field and kept running across models and then started thinking about how they work? Or were you always intending to study models directly? How did you end up here?</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, okay. So, I mean, my background is maths and physics. And after studying that at university, I went to do a PhD, and that was in climate change physics. So climate science about North Atlantic storms. And the first thing I did—as you do—was a literature review about what would happen to North Atlantic storms given climate change, more CO2 in the atmosphere. And so you look at models for that. And so, I started looking at the models, and I looked at them, and this was sort of 10-15 years ago now—and certainly there's more consensus now—but at that time, it was really the case that you could find models doing almost anything with North American storms.</p><p>You could find one saying... the storm tracks would move north, they'd move south, they'd get stronger, they'd get weaker, they'd be more intense storms, less intense storms. And they didn't even agree within their own aerobars. And that was what really stuck out to me, was that, actually, because these distributions weren't even overlapping, it wasn't telling me very much at all about North Atlantic storms, but it was telling me a great deal about models and the way that we use models. And so I got really interested in how we make inferences from models. How do we construct ranges and uncertainty ranges from model output? What should we do with it? What does it even mean? And then I've kind of gone from there into looking at models in a series of other contexts. And the book sort of brings together those thoughts into what I hope is a more cohesive argument about the use of models.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a real rabbit hole. It goes deep. The book is focusing specifically on mathematical models, these sort of complex models that you see today in the financial system and the climate system. But the term "model" itself, let's just start with that because I'm not sure everybody's clear on just what that means. And you have a very sort of capacious definition.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>I do, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...of what a model is. So just maybe let's start there.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, I mean, I suppose the models that I'm talking about mostly, when I'm talking in the book, is about complex models where we're trying to predict something that's going to happen in the future. So whether that's climate models, weather models—the weather forecast is a good example—economic forecasts, business forecasting, pandemic and public health forecasting are ones that we've all been gruesomely familiar with over the last few years. So those are kind of the one end of a spectrum of models, and they are the sort of big, complex, beast-end of the spectrum. But I also include, in my idea of models, I would include much simpler ones, kind of an Excel spreadsheet or even just a few equations written down on a piece of paper where you say, "I'm trying to sort of describe the universe in some way by making this model and writing this down."</p><p>But also I would go further than that, and I would say that any representation is a model insofar as it goes. And so that could include a map or a photograph or a piece of fiction—even if we go a bit more speculative—fiction or descriptions. These are models as metaphors. We're making a metaphor in order to understand a situation. And so while the sort of mathematical end of my argument is directed more at the big, complex models, the conceptual side of the argument, I think, applies all the way along.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, and you could say—in regard to mathematical models—some of the points you make are you can't gather all the data. You have to make decisions about which data are important, which to prioritize. So the model is necessarily a simplified form of reality. I mean, you could say the same thing about sort of the human senses and human cognitive machinery, right? Like, we're surrounded by data. We're constantly filtering and doing that based on models. So you really could say it's models all the way down.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which I'm going to return to later. But I just wanted to lay that foundation.</p><p>So in terms of these big mathematical models, I think one good distinction to start with—because you come back to it over and over throughout the book—is this distinction between uncertainty within the model. So a model says this outcome is 60% likely, right? So there's like a certain degree of uncertainty about the claims in the model itself. And then there's uncertainty, sort of extrinsic to the model, about the model itself, whether the model itself is structured so as to do what you want it to do, right? Whether the model is getting at what you want to get at.</p><p>And those two kinds of uncertainty map somehow onto the terms "risk" and "uncertainty."</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Somehow, yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm not totally sure I followed that. So maybe just talk about those two different kinds of risks and how they get talked about.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>So I could start with "risk" and "uncertainty" because the easiest way to sort of dispatch that one is to say that people use these terms completely inconsistently. And you can find in economics and physics, "risk" and "uncertainty" are used effectively in completely the opposite meaning.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, great.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>But generally one meaning of these two terms is to talk about "uncertainty," which is, in principle, quantifiable, and the other one is "uncertainty," which perhaps isn't quantifiable. And so in my terms, in terms of the book, so I sort of conceptualize this idea of "model land" as being where we are when we are sort of inside the model, when all of the assumptions work, everything is kind of neat and tidy.</p><p>You've made your assumptions and that's where you are. And you just run your model and you get an answer. And so within "model land," there are some kind of uncertainties that we can quantify. We can take different initial conditions and we can run them, or we can sort of squash the model in different directions and run it multiple times and get different answers and different ranges and maybe draw probability distributions.</p><p>But actually, nobody makes a model for the sake of understanding "model land." What we want to do is to inform decision making in the real world. And so, what I'm really interested in is how you take your information from a model and use it to make a statement about the real world. And that turns out to be incredibly difficult and actually much more conceptually difficult than maybe you might first assume. So you could start with data and you could say, "Well, if I have lots of previous data, then I can build up a statistical picture of how good this model is," whether it's going to be any good.</p><p>And so you might think of the models and the equations that sent astronauts to the moon and back. Those were incredibly good and incredibly successful. And many models are incredibly successful. They underpin the modern world. But these are essentially what I call "interpolatory models." They're basically...they're trying to do something where we have got lots of data and we expect that the data that we have are directly relevant for understanding whether the predictions in the future are going to be any good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Whereas when you come to something like climate change, for example, or you come to any kind of forecasting of a social system, you know that the underlying conditions are changing, the people are changing, the politics are changing, even with the physics of the climate, the underlying physical laws, we hope, are staying the same. But the relationships that existed and that were calibrated when the Arctic was full of sea ice, for example, what do we have to go on to decide that they're going to be relevant when the Arctic is not full of sea ice anymore? And so we rely much more on expert judgment. And at that point, then you get into a whole rabbit hole of, well, what do we mean by expert judgment?</p><p>And maybe we'll come on to some of these themes later in the discussion, but these ideas of trust. So how are we going to assess that uncertainty and make that leap from model land back into the real world? It becomes really interesting and really difficult and also really socially, sort of, dependent on the modeler and the society that the model is in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, it's fraught at every level. And one of the things that I really got from your book is that it's really, really far from straightforward to judge a model's quality. Like, you talk about... what is the term, a horse model? Based on the guy who used to make hand gestures at the horse, and the horse looked like it was doing addition, looks like it was doing math, but it turns out the horse was doing something else entirely. And so it only worked in that particular situation. If you took the horse out of that situation, it would no longer be doing math.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>And I think what's interesting is that the handler wouldn't even have realized that. That it wasn't a deliberate attempt to deceive, it was the horse sort of picking up subconsciously or subliminally on the movement and the body language of the handler to get the right answer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, this is for listeners, this is kind of a show that this guy used to do. He would give his horse arithmetic problems and the horse would tap its foot and get the arithmetic right and everybody was amazed. And so your point is just you can have a model that looks like it's doing what you want it to do, looks like it's predictive, in the face of a particular data set, but you don't know a priori whether it will perform equally well if you bring in other data sets or emphasize other data sets or find new data. So even past performance is not any kind of guarantee, right?</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah. And so it's this idea of whether we're getting the right answer for the right reasons or the right answer for the wrong reasons. And then that intersects with all sorts of debates in AI and machine learning about explainability and whether we need to know what it's doing in order to be sure that it's getting the right answer for the right reasons or whether it doesn't actually matter. And performance is the only thing that matters.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's talk then about judging what's a good and bad model, because another good point you make, or I think you borrow, is that the only way to judge a model, basically, is relative to a purpose. Whether it is adequate to the purpose we're putting it to, there's no amount of sort of cleanliness of data or like cleverness of rules. Like nothing in the model itself is going to tell you whether the model is good. It's only judging a model relative to what you want to do with it. So say a little bit about the notion of adequacy to purpose.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah. So this idea of adequacy for purpose is one that's really stressed by a philosopher called Wendy Parker, who's been working a great deal with climate models. And so, I guess, the thing is that what metric are you going to use to decide whether your model is any good? There is no one metric that will tell you whether this is a good model or a bad model. Because as soon as you introduce a metric, you're saying what it has to be good at.</p><p>I can take a photograph of somebody. Is it a good model of them? Well, it's great if you want to know what they look like, but it's not very good if you want to know what their political opinions are or what they had for dinner. And other models in exactly the same way. They are designed to do certain things. And they will represent some elements of a system or a situation well, and they might represent other elements of that situation badly or not at all. And not at all doesn't really matter because it's something that you can't sort of imagine it in. But if it represents it badly, then it may just be that it's been calibrated to do something else. So the purpose matters.</p><p>And when you have a gigantic model, which might be put to all manner of different purposes. So a climate model, for example, could be used by any number of different kinds of decision makers. So the question, "Is it a good model?" Well, it depends whether you are an international negotiator deciding what carbon emissions should be or whether you're a subsistence farmer in Sub-Saharan Africa or whether you're a city mayor who wants to decide whether to invest in a certain sort of infrastructure development or something or whether you're a multinational insurance company with a portfolio of risks. You will use it in completely different ways.</p><p>And the question of whether it is any good doesn't really make sense. The question is whether it is adequate for these different purposes of informing completely different kinds of decisions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, or even if you're just thinking about mitigation versus adaptation, it occurs to me, different models might work better for those things. I guess the naive thing to think is, if you find one that's working well for your purpose that means it is more closely corresponding to reality than another model that doesn't work as well for your purpose. But, really, we don't know that. There's just no way to step outside and get a view of it relative to reality and ever really know that.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah and reality kind of has infinitely many dimensions so it doesn't really make sense to say that it's closer. I mean, it can absolutely be closer on the dimensions that you decide and you specify. But to say that it is absolutely closer, I think, doesn't actually make sense.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, yeah. The theme that's running through the book over and over again is real epistemic humility.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes, very much so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which I think...you could even say it's epistemically humbling the book. That's sort of the way I felt about it.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Great. That's really nice. I'm glad to hear that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, at the end, I was like "I thought I didn't know much and now I'm quite certain I know nothing at all."</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>But not nothing at all. I mean, hopefully, the way it ends is to say that we don't know nothing at all, we shouldn't be throwing away the models. They do contain useful information. We've just got to be really, really careful about how we use it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, there's a real great quote, actually, that I almost memorize is, "We know nothing for certain, but we don't know nothing," I think is the way you put in the book, which I really like. We're going to get back to that at the end, too. So another sort of fascinating case study that you mentioned, sort of anecdote that you mentioned that I thought was really, really revealing about sort of the necessity of human expert judgment in getting from the model to the real world is this story about the Challenger shuttle and the O-rings. The shuttle had flown test flights, several test flights beforehand using the same O-rings.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...and had done fine. So there's sort of two ways you can look at that situation. What one group argued was: "A shuttle with these kind of O-rings will typically fail. And these successful flights we've had are basically just luck." Like, we've had several flights cluster on one side of the distribution, on the tail of the distribution and we can't rely on that luck to continue. And the other side said, "No, the fact that we've run all these successful flights with these O-rings is evidence that the structural integrity is resilient to these failed O-rings to the sort of flaws in the O-rings."</p><p>And the point of the story was: both those judgments are using the exact same data and the exact same models. And both judgments are consonant with all the data and all the models. So, the point being, no matter how much data you have—and even if people are looking at the same data and looking at the same models—in the end, there's that step of judgment at the end. What does it mean and how does it translate to the real world that you just can't eliminate, you need, in the end, good judgment.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. You can always interpret data in different ways depending on how you feel about the model. And so another example I give that is along very similar lines is thinking, sort of, if you were an insurance broker and you'd had somebody come along and sell you a model about flood insurance or about the likelihood of flooding. And they said a particular event would be pretty unlikely. And you use that and you write insurance. And then the following year, some catastrophic event happens and you get wiped out. What do you do next? Do you say, "Oh dear. It was a one-in-a-thousand-year event, what a shame. I'll go straight back into the same business because now the one-in-a-thousand-year event has happened."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. It's perfectly commensurate with the model.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>It's perfectly commensurate with the model, exactly. So do I believe the model and do I continue to act as if the model was correct or do I take this as evidence that the model was not correct and throw it out and not go back to their provider and maybe not write flood insurance anymore?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>And those are perfectly...either of those would be reasonable. If you have a strong confidence in the model, then you would take option A and if you have low confidence in the model, you take option B. But those are judgments which are outside of "model land."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, right. Judgments about the model itself. And it just may be worth adding that, there is no quantity of data or like detail in a model rules that can ever eliminate that judgment at the end of the line, basically.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, because you have to get out of "model land." I mean, now some parts of "model land" are closer to reality than others. So if we have a model of rolling a dice, right, you expect that to give you a reliable answer, quantitative. If you have a model of ballistic motion or they're taking astronauts to the moon and back, you expect that to be pretty good because you know that it's good because it's been good in the past. And there is an element of expert judgment because you're saying that my expert judgment is that the past performance is a good warrant of future success here. But that's a relatively small one and one that people would generally agree on. And then when you go to these more complex models and you're looking out into extrapolatory situations, predicting the future and predicting things where the underlying conditions are changing, then the expert judgment becomes a much bigger and bigger and bigger part of that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And that gets into the distinction between sort of modelers and experts, which I want to talk about a little bit later, too. But one more sort of basic concept I wanted to get at is this notion of performativity, which is to say that models are not just representing things, they're doing things and they're affecting how we do things and they're not just sort of giving us information there, they're giving us what you call a "conviction narrative." So maybe just talk about performativity and what that means.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, so the idea of performativity is about the way that the models are part of the system themselves. So if you think about a central bank, if they were to create a model which made a forecast of a deep recession, it would probably immediately happen because it would destroy the market confidence. So that's a very strong form of performativity. Thinking about climate models, of course, we make climate models in order to influence and to inform climate policy. And climate policy changes the pathway of future emissions and changes the outcomes that we are going to get. So, again, the climate model is feeding back on the climate itself.</p><p>And the same, of course, with pandemic models which were widely criticized for offering worst-case scenarios. But obviously the whole point of predicting a worst-case scenario isn't to just sit around twiddling your thumbs and wait for it to come true, but to do something about it so that it doesn't happen. I suppose, technically, that would be called "counterperformativity" in the sense that you're making the prediction, and by making the prediction, you stop it from coming true.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly. We get back, again, to, like, models can't really model themselves. It's trying to look at the back of your head in a mirror, ultimately there's an incompleteness to it. But I found this notion of a conviction narrative. I found the point really interesting that in some sense, in a lot of cases, it's probably better to have a model than to not have one, even if your model turns out to be incorrect. Talk about that a little bit. Just the way of the uses of models outside of sort of their strictly kind of representational informational.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, okay. So I guess thinking about this kind of performativity, and maybe counterperformativity, of models helps us to see that they are not just prediction engines. We are not just modeling for the sake of getting an answer and getting the right answer. We are doing something, which is much more social and it's much more to do with understanding and communication and generating possibilities and understanding scenarios and talking to other people about them and creating a story around it. And so that's this idea of a conviction narrative.</p><p>And what I've sort of developed in the book is the idea that the model is helping us to flesh out that conviction narrative. So, "conviction" because it helps us to gain confidence in a course of action, a decision in the real world, not in "model land." It helps us to...and then "narrative" because it helps us to tell a story. So we're, sort of, telling a story about a decision and a situation and a set of consequences that flow from that. And in the process of telling that story and thinking about all the different things, whatever you happen to have put into your model, and you're able to represent and you're able to consider within that, developing that story of what it looks like and developing a conviction that some particular course of action is the right one to do, or that you'll be able to live with it, or that it is something that you can communicate politically and generate a consensus about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And very frequently those things are good in and of themselves, even if they're inaccurate. You talk about some business research, which found that sort of like businesses with a plan do better than businesses without a plan. Even sometimes that the plan, it's not a particularly good plan, just because having a plan gives you that...just kind of a structured way of approaching and thinking about something.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah. And so maybe this is one of the more controversial bits of the book, but I talk about, for example, astrology and systems where if you're a scientist like me, you will say, "Probably there is no predictive power at all in an astrological forecast of the future." Okay. Opinions may differ. I personally think that, essentially, they are random.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think you're on safe ground here.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>I think so. Probably with your audience, I am. But the point is that doesn't make them totally useless. So they can have genuinely zero value as prediction engines, but still be useful in terms of helping people to think systematically about possible outcomes, think about different kinds of futures, think about negative possibilities as well as positive ones, and put all that together just into a more systematic framework for considering options and coming to a course of action.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, or think about themselves.</p><p>And think about themselves and their own weaknesses and vulnerabilities as well as strengths. Yeah, absolutely. It gives you a structure to do that. And I think that is absolutely not to be underestimated. Because there's sort of those two axes. There's the utility of prediction, the accuracy of prediction: "How good is this model as a predictor of the future?" And then, completely orthogonally to that, there is: "How good is this model, in terms of the way that it is able to integrate with decision making procedures? Does it actually help to support good decision making?" And you can imagine all four quadrants of that.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Obviously, we sort of hope that models that are really good at predicting the future will be really good at helping to support decision-making. But, ultimately, if it could perfectly predict the future and it was completely deterministic and it just told you what was going to happen, that wouldn't be much use either. You're back into sort of Greek myths and Greek tragedies, actually being told your future is not that useful. You need to have some degree of uncertainty in order to be able to have agency and take action and have the motivation to do anything at all.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I guess I would say that astrological, astrology wouldn't have hung around for centuries, despite having zero predictive power.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>If somebody didn't find it useful.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, if it did not have these other uses. I just thought that was a little bit sort of tacking the other way from a lot of the points, a lot of the points you're making in the book about the sort of weaknesses or limitations of models, et cetera, et cetera. But this was a point, I thought, where you sort of make the counterpoint that, it's almost always better to have a model than no model, it's better to have some...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Well, maybe. It depends what it is and it depends whose model it is and it depends what the agenda is of the person who's providing the model. And you can maybe take sort of both lessons from the astrology example because I think you can find good examples in the past of sort of vexatious astrologers or astrologers with their own hidden agendas. Giving advice, which was not at all useful or which was useful to themselves, but not to the person who commissioned the forecast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Or like the king deciding whether to invade a neighboring country or something.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Right, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not great for that. So given all these—and we've just really skated over them, there's a lot more to all these—but given these sort of limitations of mathematical models, this sort of inevitable uncertainty about whether you're including the right kinds of information, whether you're waiting different kinds of information well, whether past performance is an indicator of future performance, all these sort of limitations and the need for expert judgment all, to my mind, leads to what I think is one of your key points and one of the most important takeaways, which is the need for diversity. Diversity, I think, these days has kind of...the word conjures is sort of representational feel-good thing.</p><p>We need to have a lot of different kind of people in the room so we can feel good about ourselves and everybody can see themselves on the TV or whatever. But you're making a much more...very practical, epistemic point about the need for diversity of both models and modelers. So start with models. What would it mean to...like if I'm trying to forecast the future of the severe climate events, I think the naive, a naive sort of Western way of thinking about this would be: you need to converge on the right model, the one that is correct, right. The one that represents reality. And your point is: you never reach that. And so in lieu of being able to reach that, what works better is diversity. So say a little bit about that.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's exactly it. So, I suppose the paradigm for model development is that you expect to converge on the right answer, exactly. But I suppose what I'm saying is that because there can't—for various mathematical reasons—be a systematic way of converging on the right answer, because essentially because model space has infinitely many dimensions—go into that in a bit more detail for the more mathematically inclined—but because we don't have a systematic way of doing that, the statistics don't really work. So if you have a set of models, you can't just assume that they are independent and identically distributed, sort of throws at a dartboard and we can't just average them to get a better answer.</p><p>So the idea of making more models and trying to sort of wait for them to converge on this correct answer just doesn't actually make much sense. We don't want to know that by making more similar models, we will get the same answer and the same answer again and the same answer again. Actually, what we want to know is that no plausible model could give a different answer. So you're reframing the same question in the opposite direction. What would it mean to convince ourselves that no plausible model could give a different answer to that question. Well, instead of trying to push everything together into the center and, by the way, that's what the models that are submitted to the IPCC report, for example, do. They tend to cluster and to try to find consensus and to push themselves sort of towards each other. I'm saying we need to be pushing them away.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You talk about this drive for an Uber model, the, whatever the CERN of climate models, this push among a lot of climate models to find the sort of ER model, the ultimate model, and you are pushing very much in the other direction.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, that has a lot to commend it as a way to sort of systematize the differences between models rather than the ad hoc situation that we have at the moment. So I don't completely disagree with Tim Palmer and his friends who say that sort of thing. It's not a silly idea, it's a good idea, but I think it doesn't go far enough because it would help us to quantify the uncertainty within "model land," but it doesn't help us to get a handle on the uncertainty outside "model land," the gap between the models and the real world. And so what I'm saying is that if we want to convince ourselves that no other plausible model could give a different answer, then we need to be investigating other plausible models.</p><p>Now the word "plausible" is doing a huge amount of work there and actually then that is the crux of it is saying, well, how can we, as a community, define what we mean by a plausible model? Do we just define it sort of historically by...stick with climate for a minute. We've started with these models of atmospheric fluid dynamics and then we've included the ocean and then maybe we've included a carbon cycle and some vegetation and improved the resolution and all that sort of thing. But couldn't we imagine models which start in completely different places that model the same sorts of things?</p><p>And if you had got a more diverse set of models that you considered to be plausible and you found that they all said the same thing, then that would be really, very informative. And if you had a set of plausible models and they all said different things, then that would show you perhaps that the models that you had, in some sense, had a bit of groupthink going on, that they were too conservative and they were too clustered. And I do have a feeling that that is what we would find if we genuinely tried to push the bounds of the plausible model structures.</p><p>Now, actually, then you run into the question of plausible, and that's a difficult one, because now we're into sort of scientific expertise. Who is qualified to make a model? What do we mean by "plausible"? Which aspects are we prioritizing? And then we introduce value judgments. We say you have to be trained in physics or you have to have gone to an elite institution, you have to have x many years of experience in running climate models. You have to have a supercomputer. And all of these are, sort of, barriers to entry to have a model which can then be considered within the same framework as everybody else's. So this is another...then the social questions about diversity start coming up, but I start with the maths and I work towards the social questions. I think that we can motivate the social concerns about diversity directly in the mathematics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so you want a range of plausible models that's giving you...so you can get a better sense of the full range of plausible outcomes. But then you get into plausibility, you get into all kinds of judgments and then you're back to the modelers.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you make the point repeatedly that the vast bulk of models used in these situations, in climate and finance, et cetera, are made by WEIRD people. I'm trying to think of the Western... you tell me.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, never quite sure exactly what it stands for. I think it's Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Developed, something like that. I suppose it's used to refer to the nation rather than the individual person. But it's the same idea.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. The modelers historically have been drawn from a relatively small...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>From a very small demographic of elite people. Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I feel like if there's anything we've learned in the past few years, it's that it is 100% possible for a large group of people drawn from the same demographic to have all the same blind spots and to have all the same biases and to miss all the same things. So, tell us a little bit about the social piece, then, because it's not like the notion that you should have a degree or some experience with mathematical models to make one and weigh in on them. It's not...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>It's not unreasonable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Crazy, right. How would we diversify the pool of modelers?</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>So that's what I mean, it's a really difficult question because it's what statisticians would call a "biospherians trade-off." You want people with a lot of expertise, relevant expertise, but you don't want to end up with only one person or one group of people being given all of the decision-making power. So how far, sort of, away from what you consider to be perfect expertise do you go? And I suppose there may be the first port of call is to say, well, what are the relevant dimensions of expertise? And you can start with perhaps formal education in whatever the relevant domain is, whether it's public health or whether it's climate science.</p><p>But I think, then, you have to include other forms of lived experience, you know, and I don't know what the answer looks like. You know, I say in the book as well, what would it look like if we were to get some completely different group of people to make a climate model or to make a pandemic model or whatever. It would look completely different. Maybe it wouldn't even be particularly mathematical or maybe it would be, but it would use some completely different kind of maths. Maybe it would be, you know, I just don't know because actually I'm one of these WEIRD, in inverted commas, people, myself. I happen to be female, but in pretty much every other respect, I'm as sort of standard modeler-type as it comes. So I just don't know what it would look like. But I think we ought to be exploring it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As I think through the sort of practicalities of trying to do that, I don't know, I guess I'm a little skeptical since it seems to me that a lot of what decision makers want, particularly in politics, is that sense of certainty. And I'm not sure they care that much if it's faux certainty or false certainty or unjustifiable certainty. It is the sort of optics and image of certainty that they're after. So if you took that out of modeling, if the modelers themselves said, "Here's a suite of possible outcomes, how you interpret this is going to depend on your values and what you care about," that would be, I feel like, sort of, epistemologically more honest, but I'm not sure anyone would want that. The consumers of models, I'm not sure they would really want that.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>But it's interesting. You say that that's a reason not to do it, I mean, surely that's a reason to do it. If the decision makers are, sort of, somewhat dishonestly saying, "Well actually I just want a number so that I can cover my back and make a decision and not have to be accountable to anyone else. I'm just going to say, 'Oh, I was following the science of course.'"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Well, that sounds like a bad thing. That sounds like a good reason to be diversifying, and that sounds like a good reason not to just give these decision-makers what they say they want.</p><p>There are maybe better arguments against it in terms of...is it even possible to integrate that kind of range of possible outputs into a decision making process? Like would we be completely paralyzed by indecision if we had all of these different forms of information coming at us? But I don't think that, in principle, it's impossible. For example, I would say that near-future climate fiction is just as good a model of the future as the climate models and integrated assessment models that we have. I would put it, kind of, not quite on the same level, but pretty close.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Have you read "The Deluge" or have you heard of "the Deluge"?</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>I've not read that one, no. I was thinking of maybe Kim Stanley Robinson's "Ministry for the Future." But other explorations of the near-future are available.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. I've read both. I just really have to recommend "The Deluge" to you. I just did a podcast with the author last week and it's a really detailed 2020 to 2040 walking through year-by-year. And, obviously, fiction is specific, right? So there's specific predictions, which are scientifically, sort of, you'd never let a scientist do that.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>But you can explore the social consequences and you can think about what it means and how it actually works, how it plays out in a way that you can't in a sort of relatively low-dimensional climate model. You can draw the pictures, you can draw the sort of red and blue diagrams of where is going to be hot and where is going to be a bit cooler. But actually thinking about what that would look like and what the social consequences would be and what the political consequences would be and how it would feel to be a part of that future. That's something that models, the mathematical kind of models can't do at all. That's one of their...that's one of the axes of uncertainty that they just can't represent at all. But climate fiction can do extremely well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to say that book got me thinking about these things in new ways, in a way that no white paper or new model or new IPCC ever has.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Exactly. But if you're thinking of the models as being, sort of, helping to form conviction narratives and they are sort of ways of thinking about the future and ways of thinking collectively about the future as well, as well as kind of exploring logical consequences, then in that paradigm, the climate fiction is really, genuinely, just as useful as the mathematical model.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, we've been talking about models in general and they're sort of limitations. So let's talk about climate specifically, because it sort of occurred to me, maybe this isn't entirely true, but like the epidemiological thing and the finance thing, both, in a sense, models play a big role in there, but there's also a lot of direct experiential stuff going on. But it's sort of like climate has come to us, the thinking public, almost entirely on the back of models, right? I mean, that's almost what it is. You know what I mean? Like you can see a severe weather event, but you don't know that doesn't say climate to you unless you already have the model of climate in your head.</p><p>So it's the most sort of thoroughly modelized field of sort of a human concern that there is. And so all the kind of dysfunctions that you talk about are very much on display in the climate world. Let's just start by pointing out, as you do, the sort of famous models that have been used to represent climate. DICE; William Nordhaus's DICE model is famous. One of the earliest and famous. One of the things it's famous for is him concluding that four degrees—right there is the perfect balance of mitigation costs and climate costs. That's the economic sweet spot.</p><p>And of course, like any physical scientist involved in climate who hears that, who's just going to fall out of their chair. Kevin Anderson, who you cite in your book, I remember almost word for word this quote of his in a paper where he basically says, "Four degrees is incommensurate with organized human civilization." Like, flat out. So that delta. tell us how that happened and what we should learn from that about what's happening in those DICE-style models.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Well, I think we should learn not to trust economists with Nobel Prizes. That's one starting point.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm cheering.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm over here cheering.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>So, yeah, what can we learn from that? I mean, I think we can learn, maybe, for a starting point, the idea of an optimal outcome is an interesting one. Who says that there is an optimal? How can we even conceptualize trading off a whole load of one set of bad things that might happen with another set of bad things that might happen?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Imagine all the value judgments involved in that!</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Exactly, exactly, exactly. You're turning everything into a scalar and then optimizing it. I mean, isn't...that weird, if anything?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And you would think, like, how should we figure out how we value all the things in our world? Well, let's let William Nordhaus do it.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's very odd when you think about it.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>You can read many other, even better critiques of Nordhaus's work and, sort of, thinking about these different aspects of how the values of outcomes are determined and how things are costed, and of course, as he's an economist, everything is in dollars, so it's the sort of least-cost pathway is the optimal one. So it may indeed be that the lowest financial cost to global society is to end up at four degrees, but that will end up with something that looks very strange. Maybe there will be a lot more zeros in bank accounts. Great, fine. But is that really what we care about?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. How many zeros compensate for the loss of New Orleans or whatever?</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Exactly. The loss of species across the planet and coral reefs and all the rest of it? I think even the concept that you can put these things on a linear scale and subtract one from the other just doesn't make sense.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also, one of the amusing features of these models that you point out—which I have obsessed over for years—is, they sort of assume, as a model input, that the global economy is going to grow merrily along at 3% a year forever. And then and then, you know, I have arguments with people about the effects of climate change and they say, "Well, you know, it's not going to be that big a deal. The economy is going to keep growing." And I'm like, well, "How do you know that?" And they're like, "Well, that's what the model says." And I'm like, "Well, yeah, that's because you put it in the model!" Like, you can't put it in there and then go later, go find it there and say, "Oh, look what we found, economic growth." And they sort of they hold that 2% growth steady and then just subtract from that, whatever climate does. And the whole notion that...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>I mean, the notion, I think everything is predicated on marginal outcomes, that, as you say, everything will just continue as it is, and climate change is only an incremental additional subtraction on top of that. I think for anyone who has really thought through—and perhaps we need to be sending these economists some more climate fiction so that they can start thinking through what the systemic impacts are of climate change.</p><p>Because yes, I can sort of see that if you thought climate change was only going to be about the weather changing slightly in all the different places, that you would say, "Well, what's the big deal? The weather will change a bit and it'll be maybe a bit hotter there and a bit wetter there and a bit drier there, and we'll just adapt to it. You just move the people, and you change your agricultural systems and grow different crops and raise the flood barriers a bit." And all of those have a cost, and you just add up the cost and you say, "Well, actually, we'll be able to afford it. It'll be fine." So I can sort of understand how they ended up with that view. And yet, as soon as you start thinking about any of the social and political and systemic impacts of anything more than very trivial perturbations to the climate, it just becomes impossible to imagine that any kind of incremental model like that makes any sense at all.</p><p>And yet this is sort of state-of-the-art in economics, which is really disappointing, actually. It would be really nice to see more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You don't even need to send them climate fiction. As you say in that chapter, even if they just went and talked to physical scientists, if you just ask physical scientists or sociologists or people from outside kind of the economic modeling world, "What's your expert sense of what's going to happen?" None of them say, "Steady economic growth as far as the eye can see, with the occasional hiccup."</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I think economics has become sort of wildly detached from physical reality somehow, and I'm not quite sure how it happened. And, you know, there are good people within the economics profession fighting against that tide, but it seems very hard to counter it. Nordhaus was getting his Nobel Prize in 2018, which is only five years ago.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Another quote that grabbed me is, in the sense of, we don't know how to assign probability to some of these, sort of, big kind of phase shift things that might happen, tipping points or whatever you call them, or social tipping points. We don't know how to assign probabilities to these things and so we don't put them in the model. And so then the model tells us, "Don't worry, these things aren't going to happen." But as you say, "Absence of confidence is not confidence of absence."</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And one point you make, your general point about climate models is that they sort of represent a failure or several failures of imagination. But as you say, making the models this way so they only show marginal changes, so they basically show the status quo out to the indefinite future with just 1% or 2% of GDP growth shaved off. It's not benign to do the model that way because in the model feeds back and affects how we think about the future. The failure of imagination going into the model then comes back out of the model and creates a failure of imagination.</p><p>This gets back to the sort of models not just being predictive engines, but being narratives, stories, ways of thinking.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, these models change how we make climate policy. They change how we think about the future. They change the decisions that we make. They frame the way that we think about it. And so, I think when we have economic models that say, "Four degrees is optimal." or when we have climate models that sort of, I think, are not to the same extent, but somewhat guilty of doing the same thing, of projecting a future which looks much like the past, but with marginal changes.</p><p>I think maybe modelers, physical modelers are becoming more confident about the possibility of more radical change in the physical system as well. It was interesting to see the change in language around the Atlantic meridian overturning circulation, for example, the Gulf Stream, which is such a big influence on the climate of Northern Europe. And of course, it's also because it transfers heat from the Southern Hemisphere to the Northern Hemisphere. If that were to change, it would be a huge change to the climate of the Southern Hemisphere as well. So it's not solely a European concern.</p><p>But I think models over the past sort of 20-30 years have been...again, it's sort of this trying to find consensus and trying to look like the other models. And I wouldn't say it's necessarily deliberate. It's just sort of you run a model and you find that it does something a bit weird. So you go back and you tweak it, and you do something a bit different, and you try and get it to look more like the other models. Because you think that if all the other models say something, then that must be sort of what we're expecting. And we don't want to look too far out, otherwise, maybe we won't get included in the next IPCC report.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And if you're averaging out, it's the discontinuities and the sudden breaks that kind of get thrown overboard if you're trying to...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Exactly. And you start saying, "Well, this one's an outlier, so maybe we won't include it in the statistics. Or this one, it just doesn't look physically plausible." And of course, anything, as soon as you start looking into the details, you're going to be able to say it's wrong or you're going to find a bug or something because it's wrong everywhere, because all models are wrong. But that shouldn't be a problem because we make models, knowing that we are making a simplification.</p><p>But if we investigate the ones that are more far out, with more zeal to look for these errors and problems, we will find a reason to discount them. So that is statistically worrying, because we should have to sort of preregister our model runs and say, "Actually, I'm going to run this set of model runs with these sets of parameters, and it doesn't matter what the output looks like. I'm going to consider those all to be equally likely." Because if you start going back and pruning them, with respect to your expert judgment about what it ought to look like, then you'll end up with a distribution that looked like what your preconception was, not like what the model was telling you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's one thing to say any given sort of discontinuity or outlier might be statistically unlikely, but to me nothing's more statistically unlikely than 80 years of human history with no discontinuities and no sharp breaks and no wiggles in the lines of smooth curves. And another way, this way of modeling sort of turns around and affects us is, as you say, as we are forming policy. And, I guess I had had this in my head, but I thought you crystallize it quite well, which is that if you look at these models, these climate economic models...if you look at the ones where climate change gets solved—right, it's just sort of the steadily increasing curve of solar and the steadily increasing curve of wind and everything sort of just like marginally inches up to where it needs to be—when you think about it, that representation excludes radical solutions. It excludes everything, really, but price tweaks.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes, because that's the way these models are made. They are cost-optimizing models, which are entirely determined by the price that you happen to set. And so the integrated assessment models that we're talking about, they include costs on different energy system technologies. So a cost for nuclear and a cost for renewables and a cost for anything else you want to put in. And depending on what it costs, it will rely more or less on that particular technology. But of course, behavior change could just as well be put in.</p><p>How much would it cost in dollars per ton of carbon avoided to change people's behavior so that you use less electricity, for example? Maybe we're starting to see that with all the stuff about, you know, conserving energy in light of the Ukrainian crisis, but how much would that cost? And it would be completely arbitrary to say how much it would cost, because it's so dependent on social and political whims and the winds of change and the trends in society. It doesn't really make sense to try and put a price on it because it would depend on how it's framed and who's doing it and all of that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Or like, what is the dollar value of a social uprising that results in social democracy like that? How do you price that?</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>And also on the technologies. I mean, I'm sure you've discussed this before on your podcast, but the cost of carbon capture and storage, how much is that going to influence the pathways that we have? And you see the pathways more and more are dependent on a lot of carbon capture at the end of the century in order to make everything balance out. If you put it in with a high cost, then you won't use it. If you put in with a low cost, you'll use loads of it.</p><p>And then is that performative or is it counterperformative? Is it the case that the policymakers look at it and say, "We're going to need loads of this interesting technology and we don't have it yet, I'd better put loads of money into investing and developing it." Or do they look at it and say, "Oh, this means that the economic forces that are acting in the climate domain mean that it will be highly economic to do air capture at the end of the century and therefore governments don't need to do anything and we'll just wait and it will happen because it's determined by the market." Which way are they thinking? I have no idea.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>But those are really different, and they result in really different futures. They don't result in the future that was predicted.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. This gets to moral hazards and model hazards, which I hope you can segue into here because I found that those two concepts also quite helpful.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>So the next one I think that is going to end up in these models is geoengineering, for example. And so you could equally well put into the same model with the same framework. It would be then in terms of sort of either dollars per ton of carbon equivalent in the atmosphere, but negative for the amount of shading that you could get for a certain amount of stratospheric aerosol injection or whatever your favorite technology is, but you could, in principle, stick that in.</p><p>And what is the price that you're going to put on it? If you put it in at $2,000 per ton of CO2, it's not going to happen. If you put it in at $2 per ton of CO2, it's going to be totally relied on and it will be the linchpin of all successful trajectories that meet the Paris targets by 2100. And if you put it in somewhere in between, you'll get more or less of it, depending on that price point. So who decides what price point it's going to go in at?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, and you really capture the sort of oroboros nature of this. So we add up all the technologies we have, there's a hole left, we say we're going to carbon capture that hole. That's how we're going to fill that hole in our mitigation. And then we turn around and look at the model where we stuck this arbitrary amount of carbon capture in and turn around and say, "Oh, well, we have to do carbon capture because that's what the model said is needed." And again, it's like, wait a minute, you went and put that label on the hole in the model?"</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then you went in and found it in the model and are now claiming that the model is telling you you have to do this, but it just says you have to do this because you're hearing an echo of your own decisions.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Exactly. But I think, more generally, that's what these models are doing for us. They encapsulate a set of expert judgments and opinions and they put them into a mathematical language. But that doesn't make them any more objective. It perhaps makes them slightly more logically self-consistent with the different numbers that have got to chime with each other, but it doesn't actually make them any more authoritative and objective than if they were just written down or spoken.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it insulates them.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>It insulates them from criticism.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Public scrutiny.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes, absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It gives them the vibes of expertise that daunts people and keeps people away.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so carbon capture right now is playing that role. We just sort of decided arbitrarily we need x amount of carbon capture because that's how much mitigation we have left to do that we don't know how to do with other sources. And we're arbitrarily deciding on the price of carbon capture because we don't know what that price is because it doesn't really exist at scale yet. So we're making these arbitrary decisions.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Exactly. It was going to be renewables and renewables weren't fast enough, so then it had to be something else. And then it was going to be carbon capture and storage and that wasn't quite enough. So now it's direct air capture and next it's going to be geoengineering. I mean, I can't see another way around that. That is the trajectory that these models are taking. And once the geoengineering is in the models, then it will become a credible policy option, an alternative. So we need to be ready for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this point you're making so disturbed me that I wrote the whole quote down from the book. You say, "If the target of climate policy remains couched in the terms of global average temperature, then stratospheric aerosol geoengineering seems to be now to be an almost unavoidable consequence in its inclusion and integrated assessment models will happen in parallel with the political shift to acceptability." That's just super disturbing. So we're just sort of assuming a can opener to fill these holes in our models and then we're finding a can opener in our model, and we're like, "oh my god, we got to go build."</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes. And so this is why I think it's so important that we move the discussion from technology and away to values. I think that stratospheric aerosol injection could be a perfectly legitimate and reasonable solution, but it must be one that we've talked about, and it must be one that we understand what value judgments are being made. What trade offs are being made? What kind of solutions are being ignored in favor of doing this technological thing? What kind of other options are favored by different people and different kinds of people?</p><p>Because geoengineering, the sort of big, sexy technological project, is a very tech bro solution. It's a very top-down, mathematical elitist, predict, and optimize...it's in the same vein as all of these economic things. It's about optimization and calculation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I always think about the guy who wanted to blow up a nuclear bomb on some Alaska coast to make a better harbor.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, right. So it's about one-dimensional outcomes. If you say, "All we want is a harbor." Okay, go ahead and do the nuclear bomb, because it will achieve your objective. And if literally the only objective of climate policy is to keep global average temperature below two degrees, then geoengineering will probably be the most cost effective and easy way to do that. But, it is not the only thing that matters. The future of global democracy, the values of different citizens. What kind of future are we trying to get to? So I think this is another problem of the way that we typically model, is that it starts with an initial condition of where we are now, and then everything spreads out and everything becomes more uncertain as you look forward in time.</p><p>And that kind of leaves people twisting in the wind, wondering, well, what is this future going to look like? We just don't know. It's really uncertain. It's really scary. It could be this, it could be that. It could be catastrophe. And actually, I think politically and in terms of thinking maybe more in conviction narratives, what we need to be doing is coming up with a vision for 2100, articulating a vision for what the future would look like if we had solved the problem that we have.</p><p>And it's not just climate change. It's resource scarcity, and it's sociopolitical questions. And ultimately, it's a much bigger, kind of almost theological question about how humanity relates to the planet that we happen to find ourselves on. You know, these are big, big questions, and they're not technical questions. They're social and political and spiritual questions about what we're doing here and what we want society to look like. And so, if you if you had a vision of the future, of what you want 2100 to look like and how people should be living with each other and how, politically, we should be thinking about our problems then you say—and then you use your model in a different mode—you say, "If we're aiming for that kind of future, what do we have to do one year from now, five years from now, ten years from now, thirty years from now, in order to stay on track for that future that we want?"</p><p>Rather than just saying, "We are starting here from this initial condition, and we have all these possible outcomes, possible trajectories kind of diverging forward from us." That's a really...much harder sell and it's harder to communicate. And I think it lends itself towards this one-dimensional thinking of saying, "We have global mean temperature is the problem." Well, global mean temperature is not really the problem. Geopolitics is the problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Nobody lives in mean temperature.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Nobody was ever killed by global mean temperature. People are killed by things that happen locally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And if you're envisioning the 2100 you want, nobody's envisioning a global mean temperature.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>But people may be envisioning very different things. And then I think it is interesting to listen to some of the people who might call themselves climate skeptics. What is it that they're afraid of? It's sort of authoritarian global government and all that sort of thing. And is that, in fact, what climate models and the larger scale modeling community are kind of being shepherded into propping up? I mean, what is it, politically, that is convenient about this kind of model as opposed to another kind of model or another kind of way of thinking about the future and orienting ourselves towards the future?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is, I think, something the book conveys really well is that if you think about adequacy to purpose and you think about, "Well, what is the purpose?" And the purpose of achieving a desired sociopolitical outcome in 2100 is very different than the goal of achieving average mean temperature. But just because you're targeting average mean temperature doesn't mean you you're not making a political statement. The political statement you're making is: "We want to preserve the status quo." Right? We want everything to stay the way it is with a few tweaked parameters. I'm sure the modelers probably wouldn't sort of explicitly say that.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>No, and I think it's harder to make that argument for climate models than for economic models. You know, the physics of climate is somewhat different from the economics of climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, the climate economic models, I mean.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, the economic models. No, absolutely. And it's all in there in that one-dimensional reduction of everything to costs. If we reduce everything to costs and we say, then actually the amount that African GDP will change by if African GDP decreases by 80% versus American GDP increasing by 20%, maybe that's an adequate trade off. You turn it into something...again, this just doesn't make sense. Like we have to be thinking about the moral and ethical content of these statements.</p><p>When you say "A dollar is a dollar is a dollar," then actually if you say that and you are happy to trade off 80% of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa against 20% increase in GDP in Northern Europe or the US, which is what some of these economic models end up effectively doing, that's an enormous ethical judgment and one that I think, if it were made clearer, people simply wouldn't agree with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a more elegant way of putting the point that I frequently put bluntly to modelers about this, which is: you could wipe out, I mean, never mind 80% of the GDP, you could just wipe out the entire continent of Africa, and it wouldn't have a very big effect on the course of global GDP. So is that okay? Are we optimized still if we've lost all of Africa?</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>This is one of the successors to Nordhaus. There are other papers in climate economics which take a more, you know, a slightly more realistic view. And so, I was asked for a comment on a paper about, effectively the same thing, the sort of average temperature and the optimal pathways. And so they look and find that an increase of a few degrees would reduce the GDP of Africa by something like 80%. You know, very dramatic. And and you say, "Is this is it remotely credible to think that one could have absolute economic crisis in some of the largest nations on Earth without that having any feedback effect on the rest of the planet?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And they just meekly accept it. They're like, "Whoa, dang it. Dang it."</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Regardless of whether you consider it ethically acceptable, do you really think that it can happen without any geopolitical implications? Is the billionaire sitting there in the bunker in New Zealand going to be happy with a few extra zeros on the end of their bank account as the world collapses around them? I mean, are they really? I really am interested to know what the kind of thought process is there. Like, I don't quite understand how you come to what seems to be the conclusion that you should be hoarding the resources and then holding up in a bunker in New Zealand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, my goodness. I don't know if you saw recently the article by David Rothkopf where he was summoned basically to a panel of millionaires.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Oh, yes, I did see that one</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And they were asking him questions about their bunkers. And whatever low opinion you might have had of them. It's not low enough. The questions about their bunkers are so naive.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's depressing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So in "model land," in some sense, it's absolutely wild.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>But this is the economic mentality of saying that "The zeros on the bank account are all that matters and that I am an individual and I am not part of a society and I can thrive regardless of what the rest of the planet looks like." It's that sort of divorce from reality that, somehow, somehow, some group of people—and perhaps it's an extreme version of the mentality of the economists and the economic models that are making these kind of projections and saying that this kind of thing can happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, taking your recommendations, I mean, you have at the end of the book, five recommendations for better modeling, and I think people can probably extrapolate some of them from what we've said so far. You bring in more kinds of perspectives. You bring in more different kinds of models, you take outliers more seriously, things like that. But if you did all those things, what you would be doing is stripping away a lot of the kind of faux objectivity that we have now and exposing the fact that there's a hole that can only be filled by expert judgment or by judgment, really, by human judgment.</p><p>And that is terrifying, I think, to people, particularly people making big decisions that involve lots of people. They're desperate for some sense of something solid to put their back against, right, something that they can reference if they're questioned later about why they made the discussion. So I wonder if in a sense, this is not problems that are arising out of just sort of bad modeling, but in some sense these problems are downstream from a very basic, sociocognitive need for certainty and fear of, sort of, openly exercising judgment and openly defending ethical positions. Do you know what I mean? In some sense, that fear is what produced this situation rather than vice versa.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, I don't disagree. I think they kind of have gone together and as the models and the idea that the science can give us an answer—and the promise of the scientists that science will be able to give us an answer—as the scientists have kind of gone, "Oh, hey, we could do that. And we could do this. And we could do the other thing as well. And we can give you an answer and just give us a few more million pounds and a better computer and we'll give you more answers and better answers, and then we'll start applying some AI as well, and we'll automate it all." And eventually, you won't even need to think about it. You can just follow the science.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Follow the science.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Follow the science. I really don't like, "Follow the science."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I hate that term so much, I was literally cheering in my bed reading this part. But you say, what to me always seems so obvious, and yet when I try to talk about this on Twitter or in public, I just get the weirdest backlash. But I just want to tell people in the climate world, like, science does not tell you what to do. Quit claiming that we have to do X, Y, and Z because science says so. That's just not the kind of thing that science does!</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Science hopes to be able to tell you, like, in the best case scenario, science can tell you if you do A, this will happen, and if you do B, that will happen. And if you do C, that will happen, but it doesn't have an opinion, in theory, on which of those is the best outcome. Now, in practice, the kind of science that we do and the way that I've sort of described that values and judgments do enter into the modeling process, actually, we do to some extent have an entry of those value judgments into even that beginning section. If A, then what? And if B, then what? And if C, then what?</p><p>But, you can't get from an "is" to an "ought," you have to introduce value judgments. You have to say, "I prefer this outcome." And ideally, if you're making decisions on behalf of a large group of people, that has to be in some way representative, or at least you have to communicate, "I want this outcome for the following reasons." And so, I would really like to see an IPCC working group for, which is about ethics and value judgment and the politics of climate change, and says, "Well, why is it that people disagree?"</p><p>Because I think if you go to climate skeptic—again sort of in inverted commas—conferences, or if you talk to them, they are not idiots and they are not uncaring. They tend to be people who genuinely care about the future and about their children's prospects and all the rest of it. And okay, many people find them very annoying, but the point is that their underlying motivation is actually very similar to most other people, and they just have quite different assumptions about either what the future will look like, perhaps misconceptions about the facts as well, in some cases. But a lot of that is motivated by a worry about the political outcomes of what people saying, "follow the science" are telling you to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, exactly. And I think they sense, in some ways, almost more than sort of your average kind of lefty climate science believer does, that there are value judgments being smuggled past them undercover of science.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>I mean, it's easier to spot value judgments when they are not your own value judgments, because if they are your own value judgments, then you don't really notice them, you just think it's natural. And so this is another good argument for diversity in modeling, because in order to be able to see these value judgments, they are much more easily uncovered by somebody who doesn't share them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Even just to say, "Humanity is worth preserving, we should preserve the human species." That, in itself, is a value judgment.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes, a value judgment. Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Science is not telling you you need to or have to do that. I sort of wonder and this is talk about unknowables, but if the IPC did that and really did systematic work bringing all these value judgments, sort of dragging them out of their scientific garb and exposing them to the light and reviewing how different people feel about them, do you feel like that would? Because, I know your average weird science-model bro. His fear about that is, well, if you do that, then everybody will just think they're relative and they can choose whatever they want and, you know, it'll be chaos. But do you think that's true or do you think it would help?</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>I don't know whether it would help. I mean, I think I think that it would help to separate the facts and the values because I think people who disagree on the values are because there is no conversation about the values. They are left with the only thing that they can get their hands on is the model and, effectively, the facts, the science. And so they start doing...making sometimes, what are quite reasonable, questions about statistics of model interpretation and, sometimes unreasonable, criticisms about, say, the greenhouse effect.</p><p>Now, if we could separate that out and say, actually, we agree that the greenhouse effect is a real thing because this is basic physics and actually criticizing that doesn't make any sense. But we will entertain your difference of value judgments about the relative importance of individual liberties and economic growth versus the value of other species or of human equality or whatever, all of these other things. You can stick it all in there and say we allow you to have a different opinion and then maybe we can agree to agree on the facts. So I think it probably wouldn't work, because things are probably too far gone for that to actually result in any form of consensus.</p><p>But I think if we could sort of bottom that out and say "What is it that you're most scared of?" to everybody. "What is it that you're most scared of losing here?" I think that would be a really revealing question, and I think that would that would also help to incorporate different communities and more diverse communities into the climate conversation because I think then you're into questions about, well, really, what is it that you care about? What are you scared? What future are you most scared of? Are you most scared of a future where society breaks down, in inverted commas? But is it because you're scared of other people? Or is it because you are worried about not having the economic wealth that you currently enjoy?</p><p>Or is it because you are scared of losing the biodiversity of the planet? Or...there are so many things that people could kind of put in that box.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or are you most scared of losing your gas stove?</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes, that's an interesting one, isn't it? So why has that become such a big thing?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really is, right? There's layers to it.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>There's layers, but there's layers on both sides. I mean, there's the kind of the instinctive, "Don't tell me what to do," but there's also, "Well, why are you telling people what to do? What is the information not sufficient?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>What is the kind of knee jerk requirement to regulate versus the knee jerk response against regulation? They're both kind of instinctive political stances.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, and a lot of values...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>With a whole load of other things tangled up in them. Which, I'm not an American, so I hesitate to go any further than that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, well, there are layers upon layers that you can even imagine. They're like local political layers. It goes on and on. I'm doing a whole podcast on it and I'm worried how to fit it all into 1 hour. It's just on gas stoves. And I also think...to follow up on the previous point you're making, the model centric-ness of our current climate dialogue and climate policy dialogue, I think just ends up excluding a lot of groups, who have things to say and values. And, you know, the sort of cliche here is the sort of Indigenous groups, you know, they have relationships with the land that are extremely meaningful and involve particular patterns, and those things are of great value. But if they're told at the door quantify this or...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Quantify this or it doesn't count, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...stay out, then they're just going to stay out. So...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...at the very least it would be a more interesting dialogue if we heard from more voices.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, but I mean, I think we have to sort of internalize and accept the idea that people with less education, you know, formal education in the sense that sort of we consider there to be a hierarchy of people with more letters after their name are more qualified, and therefore more qualified to inform climate policy and more qualified to have a view on what they think the future should be like. I realize it's a somewhat radical position, but I think that everybody has a valid opinion and a right to an opinion about what they want the future to look like.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, we're just back to...it's funny we're talking about it in the realm of climate but as you say in the book, there's just a million realms of sort of human endeavor, especially collective human endeavor. We're running into these same kind of things. We don't really seem to know how to have honest, transparent arguments about values anymore.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>And we find it really hard to talk about values at all. It's really hard, even like if a scientist stands up and says that they love and care about something, that's kind of a weird thing to do. Why would you do that? We're all a bit uncomfortable. You're biased. Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Biased in favor of life.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>When you start saying that sort of thing, maybe your science is corrupted by it. We can't have that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I know. And just like convincing another thing I get yelled at about online just trying to convince people that you are an embedded creature. You have a background, you are socialized to think and feel particular ways, like, you are coming from a place and it's worth being aware of what that place is and aware of how it might be influencing your thinking and aware of other ways...blind spots. and just like people give very...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>And aware that some peoples, places, and situations are noticed more than others. If you are a, sort of, white male, well-educated tech bro, then your personal background and situation is not scrutinized the way it is if you are someone "different," in inverted commas, in whatever way that might be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the more privilege you have, the more incentive you have to think that your opinions are springing from the operation of pure reason.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Are "objective" and "neutral."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When your value judgments are "hegemonic," let's say...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's all to your benefit to keep them hidden, right? You don't want them dragged out into the light. Anyway, okay, I've kept you for way longer than I thought I would. As I said, I love this book. There's one more thing I wanted to touch on just briefly, and this is a bit of a personal goof, but I in another lifetime, many, many moons ago, studied philosophy in school. And you slip a line in here early, early in the book when you're talking about what models are and just sort of what you mean by model, and you talk about how they're just ways of structuring experience so that we can make sense of it and predict it.</p><p>And when you think about it that way, as we said earlier in the conversation, pretty much everything is a model. Like, we're not processing raw data, right? We're filtering from the very beginning through our, sort of, models. And you slip in this line where you say, in this sense, real laws, like, say, speed of light or gravity or whatever are only model laws themselves, which is to say, all our knowledge, even the knowledge we think of as most objective and sort of straightforward and unmediated is in a model. And therefore all the things you say about our relationships with our models and how to do better modeling, it seems to me, all that applies to all human knowledge, right?</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes. I mean, you're really in the rabbit hole now, but yes. What is it that convinces you that the speed of light is the same today as it will be tomorrow?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>I mean, how do you know? How do you know? What is it that gives you that confidence? I mean, I think you can reasonably have confidence in many of these things. And of course, the mathematics is, as somebody else said, unreasonably effective in the natural sciences. There is no a priori reason to think that it ought to be, so don't worry too much about it. I think that we can make an empirical observation that the laws of physics do work really well for us and that models are and can be incredibly successful in predicting a whole load of physical phenomena and can be genuinely useful and can be calibrated. And we can have good and warranted reliance on those models to make decisions in the real world. So, yes, you're right that, technically, I think there is a problem all the way down, but we do have more confidence in some areas than others.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this course you're charting between, on the one hand, sort of naive logical positivism, right. That we're just sort of seeing reality, and on the other hand...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Naive skepticism that says we just can't do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hopeless relativism.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We have this middle course, which I associate very strongly with the American pragmatists, James Dewey, and then on and on later into Rorty. I don't know if you ever got into that or studied that, but this sort of practical idea that we know nothing for certain, but we do know things. And to say that we only believe a model because it's worked in the past—and we don't have any sort of absolute metaphysical certainty that it maps on to reality will work again—is not disqualifying like that's just the nature of this is just the nature of human knowledge.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>It's as good as we can get. You just can't have full certainty.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But it works.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>It works. It's good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like some things work. And something, to me, this is pragmatist epistemology all over again. So I don't know if anybody's ever brought up that parallel with you.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm not a philosopher, and I'm kind of only tangentially involved with philosophy of science, and there are many different streams of thought within that, but, yes, it sounds very much like that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, those were all my beloved...that's what I studied back when I studied philosophy, and so a lot of this stuff that you're saying throughout, I was like, "this is not just about mathematical models, this is just about how to be a good, epistemic citizen." Right? How to think well.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Well, that would make a good subtitle.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I thought you might want to rein in a little short of...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Maybe the next book.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...of those kind of grand claims. But I really do think that, even people who aren't interested in mathematical modeling as such, can learn from this just about how to have, what's it called, "negative capacity." Just, sort of, a bit of distance from your own models, a little sense that you're not bound up in your own models, the sense that models are always, in some sense, qualified and up for debate and change. I just think it's a good way to go through the world.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>And just how to think responsibly about models in society, think critically and think carefully about what it implies to use these models and to have them as important parts of our decision-making procedures. Because they are, and they're going to stay that way, so we need to get used to it, and we need to understand how to use them wisely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. "Good tools, poor masters," as they say about so many things. Yes, and this is what you kept referencing expert judgment. But I kept coming back again and again throughout the book to the term, "wisdom," which is a little bit fuzzy, but that's exactly what you're talking about. It's just...</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Yes, yes it is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...accumulated good judgment. That's what wisdom is.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Wisdom and values and understanding, having leaders, I think, who can embody our values and show wisdom in acting in accordance with those values. I think that's something that has kind of gone out of fashion, and I would really like it to see it come back.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>True, true. Well, thank you so much. Thanks for coming on and taking all this time. I really, as I say, enjoyed the book, and people are always asking me to read climate change books, and, you know, like, 90% of them are like, "I know all this. Like, you're just telling me things. I know." But I would I would say if I was going to recommend a climate book to people who already know about climate and they're familiar with the science, I would recommend this book because it's, just, how to think about climate change, is one of the most important still, I think one of the most live and important discussions around climate change is just, how do we cognize this? Like, how do we act in the face of this? How do we think about how to act in the face of this? And I think your book is a great guide for that. So, thank you.</p><p><strong>Erica Thompson</strong></p><p>Fantastic. Well, thank you so much for having me. It's been fun.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/on-the-abuse-and-proper-use-of-climate</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:96794630</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 25 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/96794630/904a1f24fc3327343e0cdd268d84f641.mp3" length="63499253" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5292</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/96794630/3650762dbaff3bf05f6c423589bc05b1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Fine, we're doing gas stoves]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, climate communications expert Sage Welch gives scientific and social context to the politicized brouhaha around gas stoves.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAB4iRi-Z8E-ZTn_lCZY2qSca/volts23.01.25%28sage.welch%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/fine-we-re-doing-gas-stoves"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Earlier this month, gas stoves exploded into the news. Overnight, everyone had an opinion and Republican Congresspeople were threatening violence if jackbooted government thugs arrived to confiscate their stoves.</p><p>A great deal of this gas stove discourse has been lamentably stupid, and some of it has been educational, but on all sides, there's just been a lot of it, so I thought it was worth doing a podcast trying to tease out the facts.</p><p>To help with that I contacted the Sage Welch of Sunstone Strategies, a climate communications firm that's been supporting electrification policies since 2018. Welch has spent years tracking the science (which has been accumulating for decades), public opinion, and regulatory action on gas stoves. </p><p>Together, we dig into how this controversy arose, the science informing it, how the politics are shaping up, and what it portends for the future of decarbonization.</p><p>Alright, here we go. Without any further ado, Sage Welch, welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Thank you for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we're going to do this, we're going to get into stoves. Those of us who have been following decarbonisation and electrification have known about this for a while and probably have been cooking with induction for a while, but Lordy, did it bust into the popular consciousness in the past week or two and just cause a frenzy of nonsense. So, we're going to try to walk through the whole thing here, the background, the science, what's ahead. We're going to try to get it all, God help us. Alright, so, Sage, first of all, why now? What happened? Why is everybody talking about gas stoves now?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the roots of the past couple weeks debate is the result of three different things that happened in December. So, in December, the Public Interest Research Group held a webinar. The webinar was to launch a report that they had done with the Sierra Club based on a ten state survey of what information, if any, gas stove shoppers were receiving at point of sale from the nation's three largest retailers of stoves about the health risks and how folks can protect themselves, et cetera. And the answer to that was like, not very much information at all.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm guessing none is approximately none.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>None and a lot of disinformation. Don't worry about ventilation. And many folks just hadn't heard of it. And to be fair, the retailers haven't been able to train their sales associates and staff. This just hasn't been on the radar. But they thought it was important to take a look and just see does anyone even get any inkling of this information when they're shopping? And so Richard Trumka, Jr., who is a consumer product safety commissioner, joined that webinar and he used that time to announce that the CPSC would be opening an RFI, a request for information on gas stove pollution in 2023.</p><p>And he used pretty strong language. He said we need to be talking about regulating gas stoves, whether that's drastically improving emissions or banning gas stoves entirely. And this is pretty surprising, even to health and consumer advocates who've been urging CPSC to investigate this in recent years, but also going back 40 years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sounds like it was pretty surprising to his own agency and to his bosses. Sounds like it was pretty surprising to everyone.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>The world was not ready for Trumka Jr. to make this statement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you know why? I mean, is he just the kind of guy who gets excited and gets out over his skis? Do you hear any hint of deliberate twelve-dimensional chess here? Or is this just Trumka getting too excited?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>I mean, it was a PERG webinar, so I'm not sure that, like, there was a lot of chess playing going on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a lot of dimensions of chess if you're starting there.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>The sense I get about his position on this, and again at the CPSC level and we'll get to this, this issue is like, not new. But the sense I get is that he just takes his role and the role of the commission quite seriously as far as duty to protect consumers. And this question about whether gas stoves are safe or can be made safe has been hanging around for a while. But when he says banning gas stoves, I think maybe what he is getting at is like, he made these follow up remarks to Bloomberg a month later on products that can't be made safe can be banned. And I think, again, what he's getting at is just like, there is a duty at the commission to ensure safety of products. And as we'll jump into, there is what EPA and many others deem a safe level of NO2 pollution. And jury's still out on whether gas stoves are safe in that regard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or can be made safe in that regard.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>And can be made safe, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so Trumka says this on the webinar and then it didn't blow up immediately, right?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>It didn't. Some folks actually did cover this. So the Hill Chicago Tribune actually kind of technically broke this story, but it doesn't blow up immediately. And then the following week, I think just somewhat coincidentally, Senator Cory Booker's office released a letter from 18 members of Congress calling on the CPSC to investigate gas stoves, calling out the health harms. And again, not the first time that a congressional body or a subcommittee has made this recommendation. And actually the Senate committee escapes me, but the head of a Senate committee also made this recommendation last August as well. So this is something that's been brewing in Congress in recent months and years. And then that happens and there's a little bit of coverage.</p><p>But then in late December, a new study was published in a prominent medical journal from researchers at RMI Albert Einstein College of Medicine and the University of Sydney. And this study found that 12.7% of childhood asthma cases in the US are attributable to gas stove use. And that in some states, like Illinois, New York, California, where there's really high rates of gas cooking, that number is actually much higher. In Illinois and California, it's over 20%. So that study was fairly shocking, although it's based on statistics that have been around for quite a while that find that kids living in homes with gas stoves have a pretty substantial increased risk of developing asthma symptoms.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Maybe we can touch on this again later, but just to be clear, this new asthma study was not a direct...it's just sort of a regression run on existing data from this 2014 study.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah, this 2013 meta analysis. And actually, they only focused in this study on risk factors that had been established through North American peer-reviewed published data. But it is basically like a math problem. We know that this percentage that living with a gas stove can increase risk of developing asthma symptoms. And, therefore, when we look at the number of kids with asthma living in homes with gas stoves, it's called like a population attributable factor.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Right. The point being, it's not new. It's just that information was sitting there in that meta analysis basically has...</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Exactly. It just helped them put a fine point on the number of cases that could be linked.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so those three happened, and then the Bloomberg story followed up on that.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah. So Bloomberg reporter Ari Natter was covering that report and then also thought to go ahead and do an interview with Trumka just based on those statements made in the webinar earlier. And so Trumka, in that interview, now utters what I feel like is just kind of this infamous statement that "Gas stoves are a hidden hazard. Any option is on the table, and products that can't be made safe can be banned," which is true. And so the Bloomberg piece publishes on Monday morning, and it just goes viral. Like, within 12 hours, everyone starts covering this potential ban. I think the language of the headline made it feel like this was far more imminent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I think he knew what he was doing here. So, just to be clear about what Trumka is talking about—not that the truth of what Trumka was talking about matters at all in this hysteria—but at best, he's talking about launching a process that will investigate things, that will go through rounds of whatever, that may someday result in gas stoves being banned from new construction. That is the worst possible—I mean, if you're scared of this—that's the worst possible outcome here. No one at any point was talking about going into existing homes and ripping out people's stoves. Let's just get that out there.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>No, but the imagery is compelling.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The jackboots.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah. So for whatever reason, and obviously they'll find anything they can I think, but the right-wing echo chamber just goes, like, totally ballistic trying to paint this picture of a full-blown midnight raids of, like, dark Brandon invading with a crowbar, just like, pipes and all that...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, there's no mystery why they do that. They did the same thing with beef around Green New Deal or whatever. They know that this triggers all the right kind of resentment.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so these three things happen and then Trumka follows up these three things with the big old bandword and then this all explodes. Suddenly everyone's talking about it. This is one of these funny experiences that people have in our world where we've been talking about this forever. It's just fascinating, sociologically fascinating to watch the vast bulk of people who just have never thought about this at all, right. This is the first they're hearing of anything about it at all. So it's interesting to watch people sort of like untutored, spontaneous reactions to this.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally. I mean, this is, I just think, the best thing ever. I'm loving every second of it. A, because we've been working to create awareness about the health harms of gas stoves for a long time. But also, and we can get into this, I think Republicans think they've touched on this major kitchen table issue. But I think this is a really shining and striking moment for the climate movement and becoming relevant is not a bad thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, we'll discuss the politics later. I think they're less straightforward than people think. And I think you're right. But first, so this is why it's on everybody's mind now, insofar as we can do so in a reasonable amount of time. Let's talk about the science. Everybody's arguing about the science now. What do we know and how long have we known it? Give us sort of like a capsule history of the science.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>So when you cook with methane gas, you're combusting a fossil fuel, much like you do in your car, but you're doing it in your home, and the pollution that's created goes directly into your kitchen and kind of just like, straight into your face. And ventilation can help disperse some of those pollutants. Ventilation is super important, especially if that ventilation is going outside. Unfortunately, a lot of ventilation circulates straight back to you and/or no one uses it, and/or you may not have a range hood, but we've actually seen ventilation not be super effective at dispersing nitrogen dioxide pollution. And that's the pollutant that we're really concerned about when it comes to the health impacts of cooking and of combusting the gas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well—what about I'm going to jump in with naive questions here.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One thing I hear a lot is that one class of pollutants produced by cooking is just from cooking the food, charring the food itself, which is going to be produced by any cooking.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Any type of cooking. So what are the percentages here? If I'm worried about those pollutants? Are those the main ones or is NO2 the main one? Where do they all kind of fall out?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Okay, so when you cook, that process itself does produce particulate matter like PM2.5, right. There is research that shows that gas cooking produces like 50% more PM2.5. Or homes that are cooking with gas does produce a bit more of that particulate matter. And again, we'll talk more about this, but the gas industry is really seized on this idea that all cooking creates pollution. And it's absolutely true. Even electric stoves. It's a good idea to try and fan some of this particulate matter away from you and out the window.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, ventilation is important in all cooking. Let's just put a stake in that.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>But then the conversation that we're having in regards to asthma and lung irritants, specifically, we really do need to zero in on nitrogen dioxide and NO2, because NO2 exposure is just really bad. This leads to aggravated respiratory symptoms, higher susceptibility lung infections like COVID, increased risk of asthma, as well as, like, IQ and learning deficits, increased risk of cardiovascular effects. I don't think there's anyone that's going to argue that NO2 pollution is not bad. We've regulated NO2 levels outdoors for a very long time. And I actually think that there's steady new research coming out that NO2 is even worse outdoors than we ever thought.</p><p>But there's this funky little thing where no one actually gets to regulate indoor air concentrations. But what we know about cooking with gas is that in the time it takes to, like, bake a pie, about an hour, 90% of all homes, specifically when you're cooking with gas, will have an unhealthy level of NO2 pollution, a level that EPA says is not acceptable in outdoor air. And EPA research shows that homes with gas stoves can have up to 400% higher NO2 concentrations than homes with electric stoves.</p><p>Because with an electric stove, you're not combusting a fossil fuel. This pollution is very specific to that fossil fuel combustion. And that, when it comes to NO2, kids are just really at risk. And so are seniors, and so are pregnant people. There's a lot of populations who, for whom, NO2 produces very bad outcomes. So there's about 57, just by my team's count, peer reviewed studies that have come out since 1976 that find links between gas cookings and various health harms. And these are all, again, peer reviewed journal published studies. And as we mentioned, that latest asthma study is based on some really important work that came out in 2013, which is a meta analysis. It's like a literature review of more than 40 different research papers looking at the effects of NO2 from gas cooking, and it's linked to asthma.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A lot of what I'm seeing about the science goes back to this 2013-2014 meta analysis and some back even to, like, a study in 1991, I think. I guess my naive question is: why isn't there more recent—especially given the rising sort of profile of this whole issue—why is there not more recent empirical, direct empirical research about this?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>I don't know exactly, but I'm not sure that my answer is I think it's just firmly established. I mean, I think the purpose of that meta analysis was to say the science on this is relatively well-established as far as the gas cooking creates NO2, NO2 creates health hazards. And we'll talk about this, but there was a flurry of research on this in the 70's and 80's by the gas industry, but also by the National Academy of Sciences. There was a 1981 symposium on indoor air pollution in Massachusetts and there was no less than 15 papers introduced at that symposium on pollution from fuel-fired appliances. We actually had this very robust conversation about this in the 70's and 80's, and it just kind of died down.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A couple of other naive questions. One is, like, my gas furnace also has a pilot light, right? Is also combusting a fossil fuel, in some cases people's water heater or whatever. Are all indoor gas appliances producing NO2 or do other appliances handle it better in some way?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>So those other appliances are also producing NO2 and a wide range of pollutants. But the difference is they're vented outdoors naturally. The stove is the only one that's not directly vented outdoors. And I think it's important to bring this up, though, because I don't think it's been underappreciated the role that gas appliances play in smog formation. In California, where I'm based, there's air quality management districts and also the California Air Resources Board. These folks are required to meet federal air quality standards. And what I see them focusing on right now because actually there's some movement on this, we can't actually meet these standards unless we do something at the moment about these vented appliances.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So gas appliances in homes and buildings are a notable contributor to outdoor pollution.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>The gas appliances in the Bay Area contribute more like more NOx, which creates smog, than all of the passenger vehicles in the Bay Area.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No s**t.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>In California, in total, these appliances are responsible for more than four times the NOx pollution than our power plants.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is wild.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>It's striking! Which, also helps put the stove in perspective because you're just like, yeah, you're burning a fuel that produces pollutants. There's not really any way around it. And that's one of the reasons why the California Air Resources Board, as a part of the state implementation plan, which is their plan for how they're going to continuously meet these federally mandated air quality standards, committed to basically a zero greenhouse gas emissions standard for heaters and hot water heaters by 2030, which effectively is going to end the sale of those products here in California simply because they are key contributors. And the Bay Area is also working on a rule on this, a NOx rule essentially. But fortunately we have technologies like heat pumps and others that don't produce any pollution. But yes, really underappreciated contributors to smog.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. And second naive question: a lot of the criticisms of the science you're seeing online are saying things like these studies sort of like seal a room in plastic and then run the stove and then of course you find nitrous oxides. But if you ventilate properly, you're fine. Can you get to a safe indoor air level if you are using proper ventilation? What's the story there?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Well, I think that's the question that CPSC is setting out exactly to determine what is a safe level of NO2 and how can we ensure that cooking products are meeting it or fossil fuel appliances are meeting it. I think ventilation can help and it is, again, it's super important, especially as we're having this conversation. Let's talk about mitigating risk factors while also talking about long-term policy solutions. And I'll probably speak rather imprecisely and we can let people attack us on Twitter for that. But my understanding is that ventilation is not entirely or...I would guess I would use the word like "adequately effective" against specifically that NO2.</p><p>My kind of silly understanding of it is that NO2 is like a heavier pollutant and it's harder to disperse. There was a study about whole home ventilation, which is kind of different than super high-powered range hoods, but it's actually kind of considered the gold standard in ventilation as we're learning more about how to produce the healthiest indoor air possible. And that found that that specific method is not effective against NO2. And to be clear as well, you're going to have levels of NO2 in your home because that is the key pollutant that comes from fossil fuel combustion.</p><p>So if you're living by a road, which we probably all are, you're going to have some trace and ambient amounts of NO2. But you're not going to have...I mean, the gas stove is a little mini fossil fuel power plant. It is burning it right in your face. So it just changes that concentration dramatically.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also it's worth pointing out here that what studies we have show that something it's like 20% of people, 30% of people report actually using their hoods, using their ventilation at all, much less on...And one of the reasons they cite they don't want to do it, is it's too loud. And of course, it only works the way it's supposed to work if you crank it up to the right level, right, based on your cooking. So you need it to be kind of loud and kind of running all the time if you want to even approach these sort of top levels of safety.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah, if we ended this conversation with just ventilation, we'd be doing ourselves like a pretty wild disservice. And yeah, not only do folks not really use it and there are questions about how effective it really is. It's also...my last apartment, we had a gas stove with no range hood whatsoever. I can't even actually remember living in a place, which maybe speaks to Bay Area housing, but that has had ventilation paired with a gas stove. And as a tenant, you're very stuck there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We discovered when we remodeled our kitchen that our vent, which we never used because it was loud and rattling, just vented up into the attic. Like it didn't go outside at all. So it was just recirculating. And I forget the exact figures on that, too, but something like half of ventilation fans do that. They just recirculate air in the home, which, of course, is doing next to nothing for you. This is sort of my sign post around ventilation. Like, if you approach it scientifically and set it all up exactly right, you might be approaching safe levels of indoor air, but that is just the wild exception.</p><p>And as you say, I want to return to this later, but we'll just sort of put a pin in it here. Renters and low-income people are the ones most likely to live in shitty setups with bad stoves and bad ventilation.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>And smaller. And this is the other thing that really matters here, is like the room size matters, the airflow matters. And yes, it's the smaller households where this is just really highly concerning. And it's also...I don't know, these could well be folks who are living in areas that are already really overburdened with pollution at the outdoor level. So the fact that you can't find access to clean air, I mean, I'm a parent. It just breaks my heart. It's not...yeah, it's terrible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so this is the science. Is there more to say about there's lots of studies about NOx. Virtually impossible to get a safe level of NOx in your house if you're running a gas stove.</p><p>That's well established. And then there's this other—honestly, really creepy—body of evidence that is coming out about what is in the gas that's in our home and when and how we're being exposed to that through leakage. So there's been a series of three studies in the past year. The first one came from Stanford. It came out in January of 2022. And that found that gas stoves are leaking methane. I mean, unsurprisingly, because gas is almost entirely methane around the clock while they are off.</p><p>This is the pilot light or just something else?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>No, this is like leakage from the fittings, from the stove itself. I think there's just...like this is a gas that wants to leak and it's going to find a way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is an echo of all the recent research about methane pipelines, too, right. The whole methane infrastructure is leaking all over the place.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>And for this reason, and you folks have been making this point, like, gas stoves are a relatively small emissions impact, but they're actually a much more potent climate hazard than we thought. And that's what that research shows us. So that body of research shows that not only are gas stoves leaking a bunch of stuff well off, the methane side of that leakage is contributing to the...it's like the emissions equivalent of 500,000 cars being driven each year, totally separate from the combustion of the fuel. But just that sheer methane leakage is pretty big climate issue. And so that kind of established this point that these are leaking.</p><p>And then researchers from Harvard and PSC Healthy Energy started a project measuring and looking at what was in the unburnt gas that was leaking from gas stoves. And they've done this in two places so far. The first study was in Boston, and they found nearly 300 chemical compounds, including 21 pollutants, that are known to be toxic to humans, including benzene to the known carcinogen linked to blood disorders and leukemia. And the Boston study didn't measure concentrations, but just the presence. We're like, "Okay, stoves are leaking, and they're leaking some really harmful stuff." And I just think at the core of this, it's just deeply fascinating that we don't know—and kind of have never really known—all the different components that are in gas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a little wild, right?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>It's totally crazy! It's coming into our homes. And this PSE study that I'm about to mention, the title of the study is, "Home is Where the Pipeline Ends," because it literally is. From sourcing to transportation to distribution lines to your house, gas is picking up all kinds of stuff, and we don't ever really determine what is in that and how it could affect you. So this PSE study did the same thing as the Boston study. They measured what was in the gas that was leaking from kitchens in California, but this time they measured the concentrations and they found that in California, the benzene levels that were leaking were just off the charts, up to seven times California's recommended exposure limit.</p><p>But those exposure limits are saying...those exist because the state kind of has to say something. But the World Health Organization, any health authority, is going to tell you there is no safe level of benzene exposure to the toxin that accumulates in your body over time, and it gives you cancer in the long term. So they compared this at the concentration level. The leakage in homes in California was about the same level of the benzene concentration that you'd see if you lived with an indoor smoker. And that's kind of interesting because the most recent RMI asthma study also found that that 12% childhood asthma link level is about the same as secondhand smoke.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>So we have two different places where we're learning that the health impacts are just quite strikingly similar to what it would be if you were living with a smoker indoors.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Although I am extremely old, I did not actually live through the arguments, or at least was not paying attention to the arguments about indoor smoking. But from what I've read about them, they took an oddly similar shape to all these arguments we're having now. This is something I say about air pollution all the time, my Volts listeners are probably sick of hearing it, but just, it's been decades now that more or less every time scientists return to the subject of air pollution and they discover the same thing: "it's worse than we thought, it's worse than we thought, it's worse than we thought."</p><p>That's consistent across decades, now, across pollutants. Particulates are this way, NOx, et cetera. So you don't want to sort of say, "Here's what we know today, and this is probably final." It's just, like, intuitively things are probably going to keep going in the direction they've been going. We're probably going to keep finding out they're worse than we thought and worse than we thought.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so NOx is super bad. The chemicals in gas are super bad. Both are being leaked into the home. We've known about NOx for a long time. We're learning about benzene and these new chemicals more recently. So let's pivot from the science then to the politics of this. So you say we've known these issues about indoor air quality related to stoves have been around for a while. Give us just a little bit of the history. Like when did this first start coming into the sort of consciousness of regulators and how has the gas industry responded over the years?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah, so this is super fascinating and I think has kind of been missing from the discourse this week. So I'm really excited that we get to talk about it. But the best snapshot I've seen of this historical debate comes from a paper we found. The paper is called the "Impact of Indoor Air Quality on the Gas Industry." It was published in 1984. And let's just take a moment. Not the impact of the gas industry or gas on indoor air quality.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right!</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah, this paper was commissioned by the gas industry. The purpose was to provide an overview of the indoor air quality issue to gas utility legal representatives.</p><p>And they say over and over, the reason that they are commissioning this report and looking at this is due in large part to the fact that the Consumer Product Safety Commission was, at that time, undertaking a rather robust investigation into fuel-fired appliances. And so scientists, federal authorities, and the gas industry were all engaged in a very robust conversation about this. The American Gas Association actually set up something called the Gas Research Institute in 1976. Fun fact: costs that were eventually passed on to ratepayers to establish that institute through some fees that they were paying for pipeline transportation.</p><p>And in 2000, that merged with the Institute of Gas Tech, or GTI, and they're still producing research for AGA. AGA and the gas industry kind of set up their own research. But what this paper shows us that in 1974, the science of the health harms was not only well-established, but there was like a lot of discussion about this in media. The gas industry in the paper says the gas industry has been researching this since the 70s due to Congress and public concerns. And as I mentioned there was that 1981 symposium they mentioned this in the paper where there's just like an explosion of papers and scientists really interested.</p><p>And this is also around the time where we were really focused on energy conservation, so we were tightening up building envelopes. And I think that's part of the reason why there was also an expressed interest in what might be floating around inside because we were steadily locking people into those pollutants.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, the building ceiling I think you could probably view as like the tail-end of the kind of oil crisis, Jimmy Carter, "Let's preserve oil, let's do energy efficiency," tail-end of the 70's, that movement, which then ran into the 80's and Reagan, which I think our story does as well.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yes. And so yeah, in this paper they give you this really fascinating snapshot, particularly of the media interest. So they're noting that there's a lot of articles running in the Wall Street Journal and Reader's Digest and Consumer Reports. They have some quotes from Consumer Reports. I'll read this one from 1982: "Children from gas stove homes have a greater incidence of respiratory illness and impaired lung function than those from homes with electric stoves." And then in 1984 there's this excerpt from a Consumer Reports article that says "The evidence so far suggests that emissions from a gas range do pose a risk. And if you're buying a new range and you can choose between electric and gas, you might want to choose an electric one."</p><p>And that is just like verbatim what everything has said this week and some new reporting that we're seeing from Consumer Reports. So it's so interesting to me that we were having this conversation and we just kind of developed collective amnesia. I mean I think that's due in large part, and I'm sure we'll chat about this, to marketing of gas stoves, but for everyone being like this is coming out of the blue, it's being manufactured...like no!</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's only about climate change.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Right? Yeah, exactly. This is because we have this hidden agenda? I guess, maybe it's a hidden agenda to keep people safe. But no, we have long been...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what happened in the 80's? All these questions pop up in the early 80's. I remember other things about the politics of the early 80's. Think about all the many things that we started in the 70's that we just kept doing them, we so much better off today. Yes, and it all came to a screeching halt in the 80's.</p><p>So during the 1980's, you have both EPA and the CPSC kind of working on this. Congress created this interagency research group on indoor air quality to coordinate research in 1979. And so that included various EPA investigations, and then, as we said, the CPSC was undertaking these investigations and offering reports about fuel-fired appliances. In the spring of 1986, EPA instructed CPSC, they're kind of exchanging dialogue about the fact that they kind of think there's a problem here. So EPA tells CPSC to identify the level of NO2 in homes that is coming from appliances.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>So they're like, "Alright, this is your sort of wheelhouse," which I think this could also well be EPA's wheelhouse, but they say, "You need to now go out and find out what level of NO2 is coming from appliances and whether or not that's safe." And the fact is that that just never happened. And that's exactly what the RFI that Trumka's is referring to is going to do. So again, this isn't some new thing. It's actually just fulfilling this 40-year-old request from EPA. And I should add that this doesn't seem that uncommon on the consumer-product side.</p><p>Like, I'm pretty sure asbestos and baby powder and lead paint. There was really well-established science for 50, 60, 70 years before...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Leaded gas, too! 50 years we knew about leaded gas. It's wild to look back now in retrospective how long all these things took.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah. And honestly, thanks to industry and the fact that no one is really often is working on behalf of the American people, but a lot of people work on behalf of industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let's segue then into one of the explanations. This concern was big in the late 70's and early 80's. It was moving forward and then got sort of shut down at the consumer agency, probably because they were not, the administration, was not big fans of regulation at the time, and was big fans of fossil fuels at the time. So one of the reasons that this got put on the backburner, pardon the pun, and stayed there for decades, is that the gas industry worked very hard to keep it on the backburner. So let's talk about that then a little bit.</p><p>I think people are...there's a lot of information flying around these days about the gas industry's current sort of propaganda efforts, all its Instagram influencers and whatnot, but they've been at it for a while, so let's talk a little bit about that history.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah. So even while, you know, the gas industry is doing a lot of research and kind of trying to work with regulators to control the narrative on the pollutants, they're also undertaking really aggressive marketing of gas stoves. But actually this goes back much further. So like nearly 100 years. This has been coming up a lot on the internet, and I'm so happy it's coming out, because I think it's one of those things that illustrates just how conditioned we've been. But this phrase, "cooking with gas," that was a phrase that was developed by an executive from the American Gas Association in the 1930's, and he happened to know some writers for Bob Hope and some other radio show hosts.</p><p>And it starts to appear in these scripts and then just gets picked up by other places and really becomes, like, ubiquitous, this phrase and culture by the 1940's. Emily Atkins, in her heated newsletter last week dug up an old AGA newsletter where they're, like, reflecting on this, but pretending that they didn't actually plant it, and it's just a super funny...I thought that was hilarious. The newsletter is like, "Gasmen began to listen as they had never listened before, not knowing whether to be glad, mad, dazed, or dazzled by such widespread free publicity." It's like, they know full well...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How did it happen? What's going on here?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the obvious sort of first questions to ask is, you know, people who are familiar with the subject now know that gas stoves represent a relatively small percentage of gas demand, right. It's not a big piece of the gas industry puzzle. So what explains their sort of obsessive focus on it for so long?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah. So, I mean, I think they recognized really early on that this was the way that they were going to ingratiate themselves to consumers and this was their way to get in the house and stay in the house. This was the only possible appliance that one could have an attachment to, right? It's the only one that's visible. It's the only one that you kind of actively use.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And it's cooking, it's family, it's caring for your family. It's got all that whole web of associations.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah. And they begin to market it as a status symbol. There's tons of marketing by the 50's and the 60's. It's how you're able to cook better. It's how you make food that tastes better. And they're really just, like, selling at the time to basically women. Like, this is how you be a good wife and a good mother, and this is how you feed your family. And they're especially speaking to kind of like, major coastal urban areas just because that's where gas demand was sort of emerging and that's where they had the funds, essentially to put in the infrastructure. So, as you referenced, gas residential use just really skyrockets, very particularly in major coastal urban areas, so, New York and California. And that's still today where we have the highest rates of gas cooking and gas consumption.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, let's just make a note of this because everybody loves to laugh about this on the Internet. Gas stove use is much higher in blue states than in red states. This sort of an inversion of the culture war that we're having. Actual distribution of gas use is almost opposite of that.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally. And so to see, like, the right-wingers pick this up as like this kind of populist kind of issue when it's actually been like, you are much more likely to cook with gas if you are a higher-income person, especially if you're in the Southeast, because you paid a lot to get yourself gas service there. And so there's a huge amount of consumer marketing through these decades. But then there's other ways that utilities specifically and when we talk about the gas industry, there's a web here, but often we're talking about the gas utilities who sell the gas to consumers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and let me just say by way of background, I mean, maybe this is probably obvious to you, but to make sure it's clear to everyone, an electric utility is involved in giving you electricity. It is, at least in theory, neutral toward how to generate that electricity, right. It can accommodate different ways of creating that electricity. A gas utility is very different. It's about the one fuel. And if we use less of the fuel, then the utility shrinks and disappears. Gas is existential for gas utilities in a way that none of these arguments are for electric utilities.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally. And so you see, gas utilities do this kind of interesting thing where they set up, like, culinary centers and test kitchens and they develop relationships with restaurant associations, they sponsor scholarships, and they make gas, this core curricula of culinary schools, which is obviously another very clever way that you are embedding yourself in that culture specifically for chefs and for folks who do cooking as a profession.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>And as we now know, they begin to really lean into this relationship and rely on that relationship with chefs and restaurant associations to fight electrification. We're seeing this across the board in states where we have policies moving, but yeah, they've really relied on gas to be this wedge between them and their kind of competitor, electricity. And then they started to really double down on this in the past five years or so when they perceived that electrification is going to be a problem. We actually have some emails that came out through discovery between the American Public Gas Association and SoCalGas, and I find this particularly egregious because APGA represents municipal utilities.</p><p>So these are like publicly-owned utilities. These are like even more than investor-owned utilities who in my opinion, also should be working for us because they're supposedly providing a public good. But like, APGA and SoCalGas are trading emails about this energy-efficiency proceeding in California and they're like, "Oh, it's coming. Broad scale electrification is on the horizon and it's a huge threat." And APGA actually launched the very first...a lot of folks have been talking about these influencer campaigns. APGA and AGA both had them. But APGA went first with this gas-genius campaign that's like very targeted marketing at Gen X, really trying to sell themselves to a particular generation there.</p><p>And then AGA did the same with this "Cooking With Gas" campaign where they're basically paying influencers on Instagram to gush about their gas cooking. And as much as that got called out and has been this kind of just public source of mockery. We're still seeing them do this. Like, Southwest Gas did this just last year with some really honestly hilarious videos of some folks in Las Vegas, like, burning eggs and talking about how "you can only burn eggs effectively with gas."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's so cringy to us. This is one of those things where, like, how do normal people process these things? I have no idea. It's been so long since I've been a normal person on this subject. It's very cringy to us. Do we know whether it works? Like, do we know, if you're just an average Instagram schmo and you run across one of these things, whether they're effective?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Well, the one reason I would say that it probably is effective is because it's a message that's echoed not just from an Instagram influencer, but at this point, this has been incredibly successful to manufacture a consumer preference for gas and to truly believe that you can only cook better and that food tastes better. And it's like, I can't not picture those chemicals now when I see the blue flames. So this idea of, like...my partner is like his method for cooking tortillas is like, he chars it directly over the frame. But I'm just like, that is not seems super safe or great right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Eggs are better with benzene.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>That is wild.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And we should also just note, as you noted before, but I want to just put an exclamation point on it again. Very frequently gas utilities are using ratepayer funds to do this propaganda! So it's gas customers that are often paying for the sort of lobbying and propaganda that we're seeing.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah, we unfortunately have to pay our gas company to prevent us from accessing better options and prevent us from having a good faith conversation about this. And this is what makes me actually, like, very angry is, even this week, everyone acts because this is the frame they set like a zero-sum game. We don't get to have an honest, straightforward conversation about the safety of what's in our home, how we can protect ourselves, and just the benefits of doing so. And, yeah, it's frustrating.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, as you say, this is precisely the reason they honed in on stoves so long ago, is, number one, stoves are very emotional to people, very connected to a lot of emotion. And number two, if you're trying to electrify and get rid of gas, most people, I think, don't have a super strong preference about their water heater or their furnace or whatever. So if you can switch those out for electric, but you can't cut off the gas line to the house as long as there's a gas stove, right? So as long as there's that gas stove, there you are preserving the gas hookup in the gas infrastructure. That's what this is about. That's why they're focusing on stoves, even though stoves aren't that big a consumer.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally. They know full well that this conversation really is about that infrastructure, but so long as we can keep people sold on this idea and...one thing I think is a little bit wild, a lot of folks feel strongly about their gas stove. It's becoming a Republican thing, which I totally love. And we can talk about how this is like pushing a target audience away from gas cooking, but when people say, like, "We can't switch or gas is just better," like, a. that's been manufactured. But we also haven't been cooking with gas for all that long.</p><p>Like, this is the 50's, 60's, and 70's, we transitioned from like, coal stoves before. There's a chef that we work with, Chris Galarza, and he just makes the point that we can still have culture and tradition. It's not the fuel source. Cooking will remain a wonderful way to unify families. We can learn, we can change. We change to gas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Food still heats...</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Right!</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...and eats! And this is also—I don't know if it's the right time to say this—but for some reason I see these people on Twitter saying confidently, like, "I've used both and gas is so much better." The way that makes me feel is always similar to how I used to feel about the debate about marijuana legalization. Like, you can go out in public and confidently say that "if you smoke pot, you're going to be deranged and wreck your car," or whatever, but I've smoked pot. Like a bunch of people have smoked pot.</p><p>You could fool us about things we don't have direct experience with, but...</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We've experienced this and we know that's b******t! I've cooked with both gas and induction and the idea that just your average run-of-the mill Joe or Jane in their kitchen is so expert that these fine distinctions of like, "Oh, I've got to get exactly the right char." I'm so sure. Like, I'm so sure you're getting the exact right char.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>You get takeout!</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>You're eating 50% of your meals from the burrito shop. As am I! It's fine! We could admit this, but it definitely became the "smartest person in the room" response to the debate. But what I don't like about that or what I would hope folks would understand is, like, you're...I mean, it's just like with cars and massive cars, you've been taught to believe that. That has been manufactured. All consumer preferences.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>People really do not like to hear that their own consumer preferences have been shaped by socialization and by nefarious forces. They really, really don't like to hear that. But it's just true. All of us were born into this. We're shaped, we're socialized, we're given messages, and then we grow up and suddenly we have this passionate idea that gas stoves are better. I just wish people would just take a step back and think a little bit, like, really? Did you was that purely through your experience of cooking on gas that you came to this weirdly, passionate feeling about an appliance. Just consider.</p><p>What I, again love, about this week is you have these right-wing representation—walking representations—of toxic masculinity now, being like, this appliance is the thing that they care so much about, right? I mean, yeah, God, guns, gas stove, but keep it up. They should continue on this.</p><p>Let's talk about this. Let's talk about this. So we've got these health concerns that go way, way back and are fairly well established. We've got this long history of the gas industry propagandizing around gas stoves, making these relationships with chefs and culinary centers really working the idea that high-end, your sort of more sophisticated consumer, of course, will only cook with gas. And so you get this sort of high-end sheen. Your thesis, I mean, I think a lot of people looking at this sort of intuitively would think, "Oh, no, this is another culture war. It's another backlash. This is another environmentalists are shooting themselves in the foot by going after things people love and they're only harming their own long-term goals." And all the usual lecturing of the left is in full flower out there on Twitter. But your thesis is that the political valence of this, the political consequences of this, are going to redound in favor of environmentalists. So tell us why.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah, so there's a couple of key reasons. One is just simply like awareness raising. There has literally been close to 10,000 media stories in the past two weeks about gas flows and asthma. Like, bring it on, keep it up. This has been a phenomenal moment for induction cooking, which the issue with induction in the US, not in Europe or other markets, has just been sheer awareness. It's like 3%, I think, of the market. And unfortunately, to date, manufacturers haven't really pushed this technology super hard. And so there hasn't been a lot of advertising of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, let's just say because this has been also coming out in findings recently, too, and this was in the New York Times story they did. The problem here is not passionate defenders versus passionate haters of stoves. The vast, vast, vast majority of Americans specifically don't know what any of this is about and might not even be aware that induction is a thing that exists.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally. So, yes, when everyone is worried about this, and rightfully, we all understand, they're talking about those old school coil-heated stoves that really take a long time to heat up, and they weren't super powerful and do suck. I think new electric models are kind of fine, but induction is not fine. It's totally awesome.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It rules.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>It really is. But just quickly, on that kind of awareness raising, I think it may not even seem like it today or in two weeks, but my personal experience on this issue and again, I'm a renter and have pretty much all our places have had gas stoves, is that I learned about this about five years ago. I was like, wow, that's interesting, but I'm obviously in no position to change my stove. And then every time I clicked on the pilot light and I saw the flame, I just started to get a little bit worried. And then I started to realize that my five year old is fully eye level with that or like, the baby is crawling towards the stove and it's like alarm bells started to be raised and it's just that sheer little bit of doubt that finally I was like, well, "I'm tired of being stressed about this." So we just bought a Duxtop single burner cooktop, and we cook all of our food for a family of four on a little induction cooktop. And that's the other thing that I think has been missing, in there's been incredible coverage of induction. It's finally kind of coming into the public consciousness, and folks are noting it can be a little bit pricier, and I think there's a lot of cost competitive ranges. But it is true if you're getting like a full blown oven, but you don't need to do that. You can spend under $100 and you can use that and your toaster oven and your instapot and your air fryer.</p><p>I think if you look around your kitchen, you'll probably find you have a lot of electric appliances that can cover all of your kitchen needs. And yeah, maybe this isn't the absolute five-alarm fire from a health perspective, it's certainly worth a look, but there's really easy solutions where we just don't even have to think about whether or not we're getting exposed to NO2.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, this is something I have kind of wanted to say about the whole debate. I might as well say it here, but it's like, if there were super, super compelling reasons to keep gas in your home, then maybe they would offset these health concerns. Because, like you say, there are other bigger health risks out there in America for people to worry about. This is sort of like an exacerbating factor on the edge, but there just aren't. If there's any concern at all, induction is just better, so why not do it? The idea that there are countervailing considerations here is just kind of silly to me. Like, we're talking about a product where literally a better, cleaner, more convenient product is available.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, it's like you don't need that much evidence to prefer the latter.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah, top to bottom. And this isn't just true on the cooking side. This is true for heating. Heat pumps are just a better technology. You're going to get cooling access that you didn't have before. You're getting rid of super inefficient electric-resistance heating and inefficient cooling. And we're going to help solve a lot of our grid demand issues every single—and this is one reason I've been a little frustrated—because I think the climate movement in general, we get super scared when a fight happens. We're like, "Oh, my god, I'm on the spot." But this is the most incredible opening we've ever had. We have no reason to be ashamed of pushing electric technologies because they are literally better at every single level. And it's okay to fight for people's health. It's okay to fight for things that are good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And I particularly love the like, "Oh, you only care about this because of climate change. I'm like, well, even if that were true, it's kind of a big deal." It's true. I am concerned about it. You got me.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally. Don't let them push you into this idea that the hot seat is a bad place to be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Use it. This is awesome.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it seems to be shifting. So let's get back to politics a little bit. You think by the sort of MAGA crowd claiming this as a cultural symbol alongside their guns and their rolling coal and whatever else...burgers? Or whatever else they've picked as sort of their cultural touchstones, you think that's good for the politics?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>I think this is near-fatal for gas utilities, this discussion. So I think that this becoming a culture war, and again, I think gas cooking being identified as a right-wing virtue pushes a really important group of people to no longer or to think twice about identifying with gas cooking as a key part of their identity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Which, as we've noted, is mostly like most of the gas stoves are in blue states.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Exactly. Yeah. New York, California, Illinois, these states make up 25% of gas demand in the US, and they have the highest rates of gas cooking. Nine of the eleven highest gas consumption states are either blue or purple. And electrification is happening in blue states. So, as a lot of folks maybe know, about 20 states pretty much across the Southeast are preempted. So Republicans have run bill with support from their allies in the American Gas Association and otherwise to prevent them from doing any kind of a broad scale, like, local level electrification ordinance. But in blue states where we need support for this, people are now being told that cooking with gas, which has always been the biggest hang up, right? This previous attachment to gas cooking, even for climate-leaning folks, has been this lingering reason to not support electrification or to feel a little worried about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because it still has that sheen of like, sophistication and high end.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So now we have MAGA people telling them... nope!</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah, I personally don't want to be identified with those folks. And I think a lot of the left-leaning folks don't. And these are the exact folks that we actually needed. And honestly, in my view, this is a total act of goddess. We never, ever could have unwinded that 100 years of marketing to position it like this if this week hadn't happened. This is incredible. There's a Yale study where they asked folks what words come to mind in association with natural gas. They use the word "natural." And the words that came up for folks was "energy, clean, fuel and cooking."</p><p>And after this week I think it's going to be like: "asthma, harmful, health...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>MAGA.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>...Republican," right? And also I just think the frenzy on it makes that identification feel a little ridiculous and that the folks who really are going to identify this are folks that unfortunately—I care deeply about them. I wish they could also have access to a pollution-free home—but that's a population we were never ever going to reach on this issue. So there's broad swaths of the people in this country that I think are normal and seeing these other folks taping themselves to gas stoves and making protection of a kitchen appliance the biggest thing in their world, that's objectively funny and it's silly and honestly, ultimately it's weak.</p><p>And it's showing us that a deep identification with just one cooking technology is a little bit silly, especially if you're going to ignore a huge body of science that says that cooking technology could well be hurting your health.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's funny, just that angle sort of hadn't occurred to me that it's specifically now MAGA people telling the blue owners of most of the stoves that ownership of those stoves is now a MAGA right-wing thing. It is, exquisitely, sort of a counter to their own interests. Kind of beautiful that way.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Worst possible messengers. God, I would love to see group chats on this from some other sides because I wonder...because how this went down to Bloomberg started covering it, couple of the right-wingers came out, and then it was like the next day you have Joe Manchin and it really blew up. And part of me wonders if the sending out of the talking points to get the right-wing machine in gear was coming from the more established like Koch brothers things. But I just wonder...and maybe the American Gas Association and others threw up a call for help, but I think probably pretty quickly realized that this was not going to turn out well, again, in the electrification states where the gas utilities are almost entirely dependent on selling their gas.</p><p>And it might be a while before we see how this all plays out, but I just firmly believe that, again, this has been one of the most incredible turning points that we could ever have even dreamed up, or manifested, to help educate folks about the health harms of gas cooking, but also to undo this conditioning, which has barely been a barrier for us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, it's beautiful. So the politics seems like the most predictable political effect of this is going to be in blue states where gas bands are being discussed are on the table now, or are a possibility. This is now going to sort of reframe those gas bands as a way to stick your thumb in the eye of the MAGA movement which is absolutely the best way you could sell those in those states.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah. And also a way to protect your family and get access to funding and everything else that we need to get access to folks. I mean, I think one of the things that also could be going on and folks just get...I think climate folks in general get afraid to be vocal, but I think that this is just a really important time to again bring up that this is like not a zero-sum game, that the electrification movement gas bans or gas ordinances or all the work that we're doing to try and bring folks into healthier, better housing. That doesn't just have the super straightforward winners or losers.</p><p>And I think one of the reasons why we're afraid of harnessing this narrative is like, we're very conscious of organized labor membership or people who don't have the means to electrify. But I think this is just exactly that opportunity to get out there right now and fight for those who have gas in their homes to get that out, get them access to induction cooktops, let's expand IRA funding. Let's use state budget to help supplement the cost here. And I think workers who really do care about climate change, this is our chance to tell folks that this is electrification is huge for skilled labor. There are so many opportunities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I keep reading and hearing stories about how we're short on those workers, those basic trade workers, specifically electricians, which we're going to need a bazillion of in coming years.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yes, this is a chance to revitalize vocational education in this country and beef up unions. Like we need electricians across the board. Also for the plumbers and the pipefitters. And this is what bothers me is that the tops, the leadership and the utilities, are going around telling everyone that, "Yeah, this means your job, your job is over, you're done if we pursue these electrification measures." When, really, we have thermal energy networks coming up as a solution in states across the country, plumbers and pipefitters are going to continue to work on pipes. We're just going to pipe, like, clean energy and use heat pumps.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hot water!</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's electrification. It's labor-lead electrification. And even for the gas linemen and folks, who I would say probably know better than anyone exactly how dangerous gas is, and we didn't even touch on the fact that when you electrify, you're getting rid of explosions and so much beyond just the health. But these workers, if we all agreed tomorrow that we're going to retire the gas system and move to 100% electrification for homes, that's 20 to 30 years of work in which that expertise...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know!</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>...is so central!</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of all things that would do, threatening jobs is just absolutely on the bottom of the list. If there's one thing we know about what that would take, it's a lot of work.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>So much work and an opportunity for solid family-sustaining, long-term work, and the education pipelines. There's a really innovative approach that's being proposed in New York right now to very specifically go to communities where there hasn't been traditionally opportunities and where it's overburdened—y'know there's pollution burdens—and get folks into those pipelines right now. And we can have this like an honest, real conversation about electrification is really important. I think this is an opportunity to have it, so long as we can push the fossil fuel folks out of the way who are preventing us from speaking about what's really at stake here, but also the sheer amount of opportunity that we're presented with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And I think this gets at the politics too. The gas industry would love for this entire discussion to be focused on one asthma study. So the discussion is not just about the one study. It's not just about the history of studies. It's not just about the other risk. It's about all the risks of gas infrastructure. And it's about the way that gas stoves are the sort of cork in the bottle, you know what I mean? Like, once you get them out of the way, the rest of electrification becomes easier. Even though they themselves are a relatively small part of demand for gas, they're a very big symbolic and sort of political flag in the ground for the gas industry.</p><p>So they matter, broadly, for labor, for politics, for health, and for decarbonization. Even though they are a small source of greenhouse gases in and of themselves, they are part of the larger picture of decarbonization. So, I just think we need to keep pulling the lens back.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And honestly, they've been accusing us of banning gas stoves for four years, so we don't really have that much to lose in this moment. Also, this was never: a. no one's banning gas stoves, but this came from a regulator. This didn't come from climate folks. So it's a super fascinating moment. But, yes, let's harness this. There's like, so much education that can be happening, and it's okay to fight for what's right, even if it's uncomfortable. We still lack, like, climate pundits who can get into the country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know! Well, it's all these sort of establishment, like the disease of the left or the Democratic Party in the United States is this posture of cringing presurrender and terror. This whole idea that the power and the momentum is on the side of reactionary forces, and I just don't think that's true. And just confidence, right? Just confidence is what the whole friggin' left, the whole Democratic Party and the whole climate movement needs more of, like, "Yes, you caught us. We're trying to make things safer and stop climate change. Busted."</p><p>Two more quick aspects of this before I let you go that I want to get into. One is just the environmental justice angle, sort of like one thing that reactionaries will say, "This is going to hurt poor people worse because they can't afford these fancy, expensive induction stoves, and so they're going to be hurt worse by this." But another way to look at it is by locking in gas stoves, we focus all our attention on sort of this upscale suburban woman consumer but it's going to be poor people who can't get away from gas stoves, right? I mean that's how it always ends up. The poor people who work at the restaurants, the poor people who are renting...insofar as we let guests hang around, it's not suburban mom who's going to be the modal consumer, it's going to be people who can't get away from it. So how do you think about the justice, environmental justice and sort of economic justice aspects of all this?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah, we are about to see in the next month or two this wave of gas heating bills hit folks across the country. Like the price of methane gas has been up every year. It's like doubling. But this winter has been crazy for this. And I think it's like not fully understood that you have this spot price of gas, methane gas that is passed on by utilities who pushed for pipeline replacements and all this other infrastructure that is also added to your bill, but then claims no responsibility when that price goes through the roof and you're hit with hundreds and hundreds of dollars.</p><p>And a lot of the moratoriums that we had on utility bills shut off have expired and I think we're about to see a really horrible crisis. So when folks say that gas is the cheaper option, well, right now it absolutely is not, and it's certainly not when you look at the concept of as you're speaking to stranded assets. The fact that a lot of folks are going to be left on a gas system that steadily needs a huge amount of investment only just to keep it safe, supposedly, let alone when utilities get their way and pilot all these ludicrous like hydrogen for heating projects and make us pay for renewable natural gas and stuff. So we have a total crisis on our hands on energy affordability across the board, but that's being driven—on both sides—from the fact that we're exporting all of our natural gas and that prices are going through the roof and that's driving up both the price of electricity and the price of gas-heating bills.</p><p>And this is one area where there's folks who are really doing interesting, like push the envelope, work on energy-burden stuff. But we absolutely need to be more vocal and also just like near-term focus on these bills and making sure that power does not get shut off. But yes, beyond that, I think we're starting to see this. So California had, we had close to a billion and it got cut back a little bit and extended over years. So Governor Newsom really would like to see our funding reinstated, but close to a billion in california from last year's state budget to do low-income whole home retrofits.</p><p>So this is, go to homes, get them heat pumps. And super important point here on heat pump efficiency is that in most places that's going to produce great kind of energy savings while offering access to cooling. All across the I-5 corridor, Portland, Oregon can hit 116 degrees for five days at a time. We need cooling yesterday. And actually in Portland, there's another really innovative program, this Portland Clean Energy Fund, that's distributing 15,000 heat pumps to homes in need. I saw some super sick legislation get introduced in DC to do these kind of low-income retrofits. But right now, I think if we could just all focus—and this is the goal, the kind of government funded and incentivized electrification needs to be laser-focused on helping lower-income folks. And folks without the means to electrify do that.</p><p>That's a policy problem with a policy solution. There's a lot of money changing hands floating around in the world and we can absolutely make this happen. And in the process of doing so, we're going to lock in better affordability, but we're also going to clean up the air, get access to cooling, and solve a lot of major kind of urgent crises that are coming with extreme heat. And then we also need to have a discussion on the infrastructure side. Like climate change is posing a very serious problem to all of our energy systems.</p><p>And right now we pay for and we maintain two really complicated energy systems, gas and electricity. We don't have a choice to live without electricity, like that's not happening. So we need to take all of our time and energy and shore up and safeguard transmission, build more transmission, build more renewables. And there's an economies of scale here. We need to focus on systematic, organized, neighborhood-level retirement of the gas system, work with those communities to electrify. And bit by bit we have this really promising future of retiring that gas system and just focusing on what we need to create community resilience, which is like distributed clean energy neighborhood resource centers where, you know you can go for air conditioning or anything else.</p><p>And there's so many solutions. Again, which if we could just focus our attention there and we weren't fighting on so many fronts, we would be much better off.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sage, you're singing my song here. You're singing the Volts. This is like the Volts theme song you're singing. And this is what I would say to people, too. The arguments about this tend to be so narrow, like the cost of this stove versus that stove in January 2023, you know what I mean? Or like the number of electrical brownouts and blackouts versus gas outages and all these sort of narrow comparisons. But I just wish people would like step back long-term on some timescale and on some geographical scale. We have to electrify completely. We have to more or less get rid of as much gas as we can get rid of.</p><p>And that's going to be, ultimately, safer for people, better for their health, more reliable and cheaper in the long-term. So it's not a matter of whether to do this stuff. It's just a matter of planning how to do it right. And as you say, if we didn't have to maintain two concurrent infrastructures, we could make the one that we need and love and need long term a lot better and safer and more reliable.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I just repeated everything you said, but that's my theme song, so I got to sing it.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>It's an exciting proposition and I'm not sure that the kind of end goal of electrification was ever really made clear. But there's just so much about it that's going to be so helpful. I mean, we're going to have extremely responsive energy demand between vehicle-to-grid integration. They're building heat pumps with batteries in them. There's so much innovative technology and what folks are worried about is their own personal resilience. And we can invest in that. There's a lot of solutions. But yes, if we could just shove aside everyone who's trying to force us into that zero-sum game thinking and these really bad faith conversations, then I think that...if we can kind of speak to what we are giving people, which is a s**t ton when it comes to electric technologies, they're going to be on our side.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is my final question. The last thing I want to ask you about: the environmental movement is often accused of only being against things and constantly saying, "no, no, no" and constantly wanting to take things away from you. And that is very much how the people currently yelling at environmentalists are trying to frame this whole thing. So I know that the anti-gas sort of movement, the science organization, it's all underway and that's great. But what about the pro-induction? Like, what about the selling of the alternative? I wish that it seems to me that that's a big missing piece of what's happening right now.</p><p>It'd be a lot easier to have these discussions if average American consumers understood better, that what they're being encouraged to get is better. It's just better. So when I hear about giant propaganda campaigns to preserve fossil fuels or—I talked to Michael Thomas on the pod a few weeks ago about the sort of right-wing funding that's going into all these anti-renewable energy groups and these NIMBY groups—I always come back to the same question, which is, there are millions, billions of dollars sloshing around on the left, sloshing around the big "green groups." Where is the pro-electric appliances, generally, but just pro-induction stove propaganda campaign? Who on our side is funding...? All you need to do is you don't even need to lie to anyone. Just tell them...</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Just show that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>....the truth about induction stoves. Is anyone doing that?</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think folks are doing this. So there's two tracks here. One is that I think we did just open this incredible door for the actual manufacturer. So if you are a stove manufacturer this week and you make both gas and electric models but the New York Times just called your product a kitchen pariah and The Atlantic said it was doomed and House Beautiful said the era of gas stoves is over.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And let's mention this too, Wirecutter the Geek, which all geeks worship, has revised and now no longer says that it makes sense to hold on to your gas stove if you have one. They've revised and are basically saying replace this as soon as you can.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>As soon as you feel like it's feasible. That's huge, right? This trusted consumer resource. If I was on these advertising teams, I would very quickly be reapportioning my budgets to the potential growth industry. I think your question is really interesting. I think that the job of the climate movement on this very specific topic is to sort of push the policy that shows the market exactly where the growth industry is. And I think we're starting to do that, so heat pump sales are through the roof, and, my hope, is that this week will lead to induction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I wonder.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>We just showed them this is how you market it. It's clean air, it's pollution-free, it's worry-free technology for your kitchen. And we have local news folks, actually. I saw two clips that I just thought were adorable of going around to appliance showrooms this week being like, "Are you getting a lot of questions about gas stoves?" And all the appliance people are like, "Yeah, and we're super psyched because we've been sitting on these induction stoves that we're finally getting to tell people about." But my hope is that we're going to see a huge influx in advertising dollars just because also, right now, close to a quarter of the population in this country is living somewhere where an electrification policy is moving.</p><p>And if you make these technologies and a lot of the OEMs make both, you should really start to invest in the product that has a future, rather than the product that simply doesn't. I think it's a little awkward to have climate folks necessarily selling technology because I actually worry that would turn folks off. What I want to see is the cool, sleek folks who know how to advertise stuff to put money into this so that we can show them. And I think the role of climate people honestly should be continuing to push the policies that are going to push the market.</p><p>And I think the OEMs are starting to come around on this. And I also think the technology is improving so dramatically that I guess my hope is that we're about to see a massive influx. But speaking to your other question, or part of your question about why, which I've heard you bring up before, like, why does the climate movement or the folks who hold the big money, which tends to be the big greens and or the funders, not put more money into paid advertising? I think part of it has to do with a metrics issue and part of it just has to do with being wholeheartedly focused on our narrow view of hitting policymakers and that policy line.</p><p>And I do see some general advertising TV spots starting to push back and I think that we should actually be far more aggressive in going after our enemies with those advertising dollars in general. One thing that worries me is like popular opinion or public opinion, like on climate change, for example, doesn't necessarily translate to policy action. So I think funding for paid-on really targeted kind of state-level advertising is a really good idea basically, for lack of a better word, to take down opponents and make very clear who is standing in the way of what I think most people want. I don't think our goal is to shift public opinion on climate so much anymore, is show exactly who is standing in the way of that and overcome that barrier. Because unfortunately just the politics of our country mean that even if something is wildly popular with folks, it doesn't translate into them getting access to that through policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Yeah, I get all that. My instinct is that it just wouldn't take that much money. It wouldn't take that much money to do what I want is, sure the stove industry is going to advertise their stoves and the car industry is going to advertise their EVs, but I always think about this commercial for the Nissan Leaf. I don't know if I'm the only person who remembers this commercial. It's one of my favorite commercial in the friggin' world. But it shows these people waking up in the morning and they go crank up like a fossil fuel powered coffee maker, which starts sort of spewing smoke in their home and then they go crank up their microwave.</p><p>The point being like, "Wouldn't it be ridiculous if your home appliances were powered by fossil fuels and were spewing pollution into your home? Wouldn't that be crazy? You wouldn't want that. Why wouldn't you want electric and clean?" And this to me is sort of like it's the gestalt of electrification that no commercial entity is going to advertise that, but somebody needs to be talking about how look, you got an induction stove with a battery in it. You got your car with a battery in it, you got your whole-home sort of software that's coordinating these things so you can make it through a blackout and so there's no emissions.</p><p>Just to sort of like a better world as possible kind of gestalt. I just feel like that is something we know about. You and I and people like us can envision. But that vision I think, is very not well-known. Products are unsafe. It's a very familiar story to American people, but this sort of, like, this electric utopia that lies ahead of us in coming decades, I don't think any of them know about that.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And yeah, maybe only because I just don't necessarily want to see the in-house comms teams at the big greens produce those advertisements.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just give money to someone who knows how to do it.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Exactly. Let's bring in...and there's efforts underway. There's the Clean Creative Projects that are working to get PR agencies more engaged with climate and saying no to fossil fuel projects and things like that. But, I totally agree. That kind of combo. I would like to see our points and their messaging and advertising expertise and also in part their advertising dollars. Because even if we peeled off money from...I agree there's billions floating around here, but I think it's usually a drop in the bucket compared to what major companies put into their sort of core advertising push to sell products.</p><p>But if we can create that alignment and, again, I think the policy is showing them that at least if you want to salvage it. And just what I would like to make clear is, just don't spend your time trying to salvage the bad stuff. But yes, let's show everyone how amazing the good stuff is going to be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, a lot fewer people will want to fight these rearguard battles if they can see a positive vision ahead, not only for the world, but for their stove company or whatever.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And so all those big OEMs and others with major...that pay a lot of lip service to climate, like, yeah, maybe it's time to start embedding that in the advertising and in the messaging that's going out from your companies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, Sage, I really cannot thank you enough. The stove thing is sudden and sprawling, is both sudden and sprawling. So it was very helpful to walk through it like this and maybe we can do it again in a year and see how induction stove sales are going. I mean, this is such a fast-moving...and as you say, a huge, huge opportunity for the good guys here, the people trying to solve climate change, the people trying to improve public health, the people working for environmental justice. A huge opportunity. So thanks for emphasizing that, too. Thank you for all your time.</p><p><strong>Sage Welch</strong></p><p>Oh, thank you, yeah. Best week ever. Happy to do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Alright, thanks. Bye.</p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/fine-were-doing-gas-stoves</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:97842887</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 25 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/97842887/5ee23baff751d6f4c7225664e6650235.mp3" length="61831282" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5153</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/97842887/6da36df07bd58ba8901151fbfe61c475.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Me, talking about fusion and clean energy revolutions]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, as a guest on Canadian daily news podcast The Big Story, I discuss a momentous fusion breakthrough, just how close we actually are to a future of unlimited clean energy (hint: not very), and where we should be focusing instead.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AABjkO_EPoCNo9O6kTBKdVm1a/volts23.01.23%28the.big.story%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/me-talking-about-fusion-and-clean-energy-revolutions"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A few weeks ago, <a target="_blank" href="https://link.chtbl.com/TheBigStory-DavidRoberts">I was a guest</a> on the Canadian daily news podcast <a target="_blank" href="https://thebigstorypodcast.ca/">The Big Story</a>, chatting with host Jordan Heath-Rawlings about the big fusion news from December, the public’s hunger for energy breakthroughs, and the energy revolution that’s going on before our very eyes while we get lost in sci-fi fantasies. </p><p>It was fun! The team was kind enough to allow me to share it as an episode of Volts, so please enjoy, and go ahead and <a target="_blank" href="https://thebigstorypodcast.ca/how-to-listen/">subscribe to The Big Story</a> wherever you get your podcasts.</p><p><strong>Frequency Podcast Network</strong></p><p>You're listening to a Frequency podcast network production in association with City News.</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>If you've listened to this show for any length of time, you will know that we think scientific breakthroughs are cool, especially when they show us a path to a theoretically unlimited source of clean energy. When you look at the trouble we're in, it's easy to understand why anyone could get caught up in that height.</p><p><strong>Media soundbite</strong></p><p>The power that powers the sun, an abundant source of clean energy to help the planet kick its carbon addiction.</p><p>This is one of the most impressive scientific feats of the 21st century.</p><p>It's a star in a box. Putting it in a box on Earth and tapping that energy that goes forever. It's what Iron Man has in his chest.</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>Now, here is where I get to be a buzzkill. When a scientific breakthrough hits the mainstream media, it's important to look immediately to the people who have covered the sector before that breakthrough. They are the ones who can separate hype from hope. And while, as I said, the fusion breakthrough in December was legitimately cool, ask some of the people who have been covering clean energy and the climate crisis and they'll tell you a story of other technologies.</p><p>The ones that we have right now, the ones that actually are changing the game we are currently playing and those people wonder why can't we focus on these things right now instead of waiting for a miracle? I'm Jordan Heath-Rawlings. This is "The Big Story". David Roberts runs a newsletter and a podcast called Volts, which discusses clean energy and politics. You can find it at volts.wtf. That is an interesting suffix for your website.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. I didn't even know it existed until I was trying to register a domain, and then I made a rather impulsive purchase.</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>Well, at least it's memorable. Now, before we get into what's going to happen in clean energy this year, which I'm really intrigued by, can you maybe quickly take us back to December? And I'm sure many people listening will remember a big headline and discussion about fusion. What was that news?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sure. The National Ignition Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been experimenting with fusion for years and years now, and they just achieved a goal that they have been pursuing for a long time, which is they got more energy out of a fusion reaction than was put into it. And this is a big milestone in fusion research.</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>Why is that milestone, theoretically at least, so important?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, you have to untangle a few things. In the big picture, the hope is that eventually you can master fusion to the point that it can create clean energy because the fuels required to run fusion are cheap and abundant, it's carbon free. Theoretically, fusion power plants would have a very small footprint. So, from the energy perspective it's sort of this tantalizing utopian energy source. In the actual fusion world, the Lawrence Livermore Lab is not even in the business of researching fusion for energy production. They're actually more geared toward weapons research. There are other fusion companies pursuing energy production, but they use actually a fundamentally different technology, a fundamentally different form of fusion which has not reached this threshold, this breakthrough.</p><p>But there's lots of companies pursuing fusion and depending on how seriously you take their hype, maybe they'll be producing actual power plants that produce actual energy in a decade. Some of them are saying earlier than that, but they're also trying to raise money so one doesn't know how seriously to take them. But one thing to keep in mind is the Lawrence Livermore Facility costs about a billion dollars to create this small amount of energy it created. And the alternative forms of fusion claim that they will be able to create power plants for merely hundreds of millions of dollars. So, all of this is speculative and distant, let's say.</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>Well yeah, I mean we used theoretically a lot there, there's a lot of caveats I noticed that you kind of threw into your description of what could happen. But nevertheless, we begin the conversation here because I want you to tell me just a bit about how this went over in the mainstream news cycle because as I mentioned, this was a big deal in early December, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, there's a vision that has a hold of people's imagination of abundant clean energy produced in small power plants. And if you have sort of...</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>Like Sim City</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like Sim City. And if you have limitless energy with barely any fuel and no waste, there's all sorts of things you can think of you could do with limitless energy. You could for instance, desalinate water at scale with something which costs a lot of money and energy now. You could grow endless food. There's all kinds of stuff you can do if you have surplus abundant energy which fills people's heads with these sort of utopian futuristic visions.</p><p>And that vision I think, ends up causing people to sort of clutch to any announcement like this and say oh it's it's closer, it's going to happen, you know. But like fusion, fusion research has been sort of going through Hype cycles ever since 1950, mainly because of this Sci-Fi vision in people's heads. But you know, it just needs to be said over and over again. We are still very very far from that utopian vision of energy production. And, I would just like to remind everyone that we're in a climate crisis and we do not have decades to wait on an abundant source of clean energy.</p><p>So, even if the most sort of aggressive forecast, even if everything went very well, this is going to start generating energy well after the point that we need to have largely decarbonized already. So, there's sort of two categories people can think about. There's the near term decarbonization imperative and this is not particularly relevant to that. And then there's like the long term, post 2100 futuristic, "mankind expands to fill the solar system", all this kind of whatever your Sci-Fi stuff. And this is relevant to that, but we need to keep those two separate.</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>So that's why I came to you, because you've been writing about clean energy and politics for years now, as you've said, more than a decade, and you wrote a Twitter thread about this discovery that kind of opened my eyes a bit. So I'm just going to read out the first tweet to you and get you to explain your thinking to our audience. "It drives me crazy that people are still pining away for some magic blue light arc reactor Sci-Fi energy source to save us when solar and wind are out there doing it as we speak". What are you getting at?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you know there's a lot here, but where I'd start is we have wind and solar right now. We have renewable energy. And when I say renewable energy, I mean wind and solar and all the sort of attendant technologies that enable them making huge progress right now. But it's difficult progress and it's a big political fight. You're fighting at the national level, you're fighting at the community level. There's a lot of community resistance to renewable energy now. So it's just a struggle and a slog to transform the energy system around renewable energy. And I think a lot of people imagine, or maybe wish that if you had this Sci-Fi energy that could produce all the energy you want with hardly any input and no problems, you could in effect skip the politics of transforming the energy system.</p><p>You could do it without politics. I think there's a real, especially among sort of, let's say tech nerds, and I say that with love. I love tech nerds. I think there's a real sort of anti politics at work here. This idea that the sort of grubby work of negotiation and compromise and half steps forward, it's all very frustrating, it's very ambiguous. I think they just are naturally sort of repelled by it and they sort of imagine ways around it, imagine ways you could improve humanities a lot without politics. And this sort of tendency comes up over and over again in a lot of different areas. It expresses itself in a lot of different ways.</p><p>But I think this is a classic case, this idea that fusion could, in a sense, short circuit all these politics or skip all these politics and just sort of transform everything without anybody being upset, without anybody fighting about it. And that's just, I just push back against that again and again wherever I see it. Even if we created this magic energy source, even if fusion somehow miraculously developed enough to not just create a positive amount of energy, but to create a lot positive amount of energy at a cost that's even remotely competitive, with current energy sources. To take that and transform the world energy system with it would still require a lot of fighting and a lot of politics and a lot of slog.</p><p>There is no way around politics. You've got to go through it. And that's why I think, despite the sort of spectacular success of wind and solar in the past decade, people still sort of resist it and want to poopoo it because it's just hard. It's just hard. And it feels like it's going to require too much work. You have to transform too many things. You have to transform the grid. You have to develop all these storage technologies to complement it. It requires a sort of wholesale rethinking of the energy grid. And that's just going to disturb a lot of incumbents.</p><p>It's going to be a lot of change. And people just have a very, very instinctive, brainstem level aversion to change, basically, or to transformation. And that's what I think is expressing itself here.</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>Wind and solar have seen tremendous success over the past decade. How has our reliance on wind and solar been growing? What does that tremendous success look like? Like, just in general, you know, how far have we come with these since, I don't know, 2010?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sure, there's a lot of different ways to look at it. If you're just looking at the technologies themselves, they have plunged in cost. If you look at these graphs of the cost of wind and onshore solar, that's just a steep downhill for decades now. And now we are at the point that wind and solar are creating are the cheapest forms of electricity. The electricity they generate is the cheapest electricity in the world. And that's with or without subsidies. I don't think this has fully sunk into people's heads yet. It is the cheapest way to produce energy.</p><p>They're still early in their deployment and spread. So it's only like, I think solar is like 2% of US energy. It's more elsewhere. I think if you live in Denmark, I think they're getting close to 50 plus percent wind and solar there in that country. So they still early in their march to take over the electricity system. But in terms of cost, they're just dirt cheap now. So that's why, you know people wonder, why do you want to transform the energy system around sources that come and go with the weather, right? The idea is they're not reliable, you can't turn them on and off at will, they come and go with the weather.</p><p>Why would you want to use that? The reason you would want to use that is because it's dirt cheap. So even with all the sort of balancing technologies you need, and even with all the changes you need in the grid to accommodate that variability, it's still way cheaper than the alternative. So we now have, and this is totally different than 2010 when we used to discuss decarbonisation in 2010, as I was, it was all Sci-Fi, I mean it was all speculative. Wind and solar were ridiculously expensive, and the technologies that would enable the grid to accommodate more wind and solar were nascent.</p><p>And so, the whole thing was sort of batting back and forth speculative possibilities. But now, we have a clear trajectory toward decarbonizing grids. We know how to do it now, and we have the technology that is cheap enough to do it now. People say, well, you can't get to 100% clean energy just using renewables. And that's true. To get from say, 85, 90 percent to a 100 percent is tricky from our current perspective. We don't know quite yet how we're going to do that, but as I constantly tell people, we're not even close to 85 or 90 percent yet, so we've got a lot of runway , and we know how to get to that level.</p><p>And by the time we get to 85, 90 percent, tech development will have been preceding a pace , and we'll probably have a much better idea by then how to get to 100. So, there's been this revolution in clean energy that's been happening right in front of our eyes. And it's always strange to me that people want to have this weird urge to resist it or to poo poo it or to find flaws in it, you know what I mean?</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>Because it's not magic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I guess that's it. And I think also it comes back to the politics. Today's grid is built for big centralized, dispatchable energy sources, because that's mainly what we had for most of the history of electricity. So, the grid today is still, and not only the grid physically is built for that, our rules and our regulations and our laws and our practices and utility practices and all this stuff have that hangover, are still built around sort of hub and spoke big power plants sending power out to sort of dumb consumers. To change that system, you have to make the grid much more sophisticated.</p><p>You have to accommodate the fact that end users are now creating, generating energy on their own. They can generate energy on their own, they can store energy on their own, they can trade it with one another without ever dealing with that central source. We just need a much smarter grid. You need much more grid, right? Because if you're reliant on the weather and sun. You have to build the power plants where the sun and wind are, which are not necessarily where people are. So, you got to build a lot more long-distance transmission. You need a lot of transformative.</p><p>You need to transform the grid along with spreading wind and solar. And that is hard, and it's a fight, and it's kind of a drag. Like anything in politics, it's a slog. And I think that's one reason people sort of resist the good news that's happening, unfolding all around us.</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>Has the politics been getting easier though? You just kind of walked us through this massive amount of progress. I would hope at least that as the price plummets and as it continues to be more reliable again, I'm not expecting the magic solution, I'm not expecting the politics to go away. But theoretically this transition gets easier as momentum builds, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, in some ways yes and in some ways no. Wind and solar are on what are called learning curves, which means every time you double the amount deployed, costs fall by a very predictable percentage. And that sort of ratio has held steady for decades now. So, it's pretty reliable and predictable. Which means if we continue doubling deployment to the point we need to completely decarbonize grids, it's going to get super cheap. Not only cheap like it is today, but like super dirt cheap, trivially cheap. So, there might be magic, right? There might be some magic on the horizon.</p><p>People have been underestimating the fall in costs of renewable energy at every stage for decades now. If you look at the sort of official forecasts from the International Energy Agency or the US EIA, all these modeling bodies, they keep predicting over and over again that the costs are going to level out, plateau, right? They're going to stop falling, and they just don't stop falling. They just haven't stopped falling.</p><p>Are they like the people that kept predicting there would be a limit to what we could put on a computer chip and that laptops would never get... Like all this stuff. This is the same science, right?</p><p>Yes, exactly. Very confidently predicting that we couldn't do those things, right? I mean, it was not that long ago that people were very confidently saying a grid cannot accommodate more than three or four or 5% variable renewables before it starts falling apart and becoming unreliable. And we just shot right past that, right? Every supposed limit of renewable energy that people have been confidently pontificating about for the last two decades, we've shot right past those. It's defied all those. So, that's going to continue. And as it gets cheaper and cheaper, it gets easier and easier in some ways just because people like cheap business, people like cheap, like investors are going to go invest in the cheap thing, whatever the sort of team sports people have around different energy sources are irrelevant to big money.</p><p>Big money just goes where the cheap stuff is, right? And it's going to follow renewable energy. That's true. But on the other hand, once we start building these out in real bulk, once we start getting from like 5% to 50%, you're going to need a lot of wind and solar build out and that happens on land and people live on land. And so, these fights about building stuff, and the US sort of famously has difficulty building big stuff these days because we have this thicket of rules. We have this sort of absurd degree of community. Communities are just able to stop things in their tracks, use laws that were originally designed for environmental protection to slow things down. It's really getting even more into the sort of yard by yard fight of politics.</p><p>You have to overcome community resistance to get to the really high numbers. So in a sense, that politics is only starting. It's only going to get harder and harder. So, how those two things interact is anybody's guess. But I will say that the momentum of renewable energy and its attendant sort of balancing technologies, the storage, throw in some geothermal, whatever, throw in some thermal storage and the technologies that make it work have developed a momentum at this point that is effectively unstoppable. Like we are going to transform the grid around renewable energy on some time horizon.</p><p>It's just as always climate change looms in the background, and we just do not have time to mess about. And this is another thing that drives me crazy about fusion. They're like, "oh, in a couple of decades we'll have limitless energy". I was like, we just don't have time. We do not have time to wait a couple of decades. In a couple of decades we're going to be living... In a couple of decades, we're going to be suffering under climate change in a much more visceral way than we are today. Climate change is going to be to the point that its tipping points are going to be looming closer and closer.</p><p>We just don't have time to waste. We have to start, we need to decarbonize the US grid by 2030. That's the sort of target we've laid out in Paris. And if you ask me, I mean, I'll bet any amount of money, there is not going to be a commercially viable fusion reactor generating electricity by 2030. I will bet anybody any amount of money about that.</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>So last question then. What is the next big breakthrough? And, I don't necessarily mean like magic bullet like, oh, we did this fusion reaction, but where's the next big milestone, or where's the next big thing that you're looking for that will kind of tell you something is shifted?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, unfortunately for those of us in media, the real development of the energy system is almost always incremental, right? That's how it's always been. It's probably how it's always going to be. There are very few legitimate, sort of like, turning points or markers that you can celebrate. So, wind and solar is just going to continue getting cheaper and cheaper. What I think where we need to look for exciting tech developments are in these balancing technologies, right? If the core, if the bulk of your energy is wind and solar, they are variable, they come and go with the weather, so you need balancing technologies.</p><p>So, that's storage. I think there's a ton of work going on in storage right now. I expect some big things out of the storage community soon. And another place to look, I think, for possible breakthrough is geothermal technology. So, right now there's such a thing as geothermal electricity where you just sort of find places where there's volcanic activity underground and you stick a tube down there and get hot steam out. But, currently under development are all sorts of ways where you can dig down and kind of fracture the rock and in a sense create your own source of heat down there, which you could do anywhere, right?</p><p>You can only find volcanic activity in some places, but if you can dig deep enough you can find heat anywhere. And there's a lot of work underway about deep geothermal. I mean, people are down there drilling now with lasers and sound waves and there's all sorts of crazy Sci-Fi stuff going on in geothermal right now, and I would expect some big announcements out of that. And geothermal is a) renewable and b) always on, right? It's not variable, it doesn't come and go with the weather. So, it's a great complement to renewables in a sense. It is the same complement to renewables that is currently the role that is currently being played by natural gas, right?</p><p>We got to get rid of the natural gas. We got to replace that with something. And geothermal, I think, is kind of a dark horse candidate for big breakthroughs. That will be awesome, and then I think there will be amazing breakthroughs on the demand side. People constantly overlook the demand side. When you think about how to balance out renewable energy technologies, people are always looking at different energy sources. But there are tons of ways to be more sophisticated about when and where we consume energy. So, we can shift demand to times when there is more renewable energy on the grid - by storing it, by sharing it, by moving it around.</p><p>Just think about your humble sort of home water heater, right? You don't care when the water is heated as long as it's hot when you need it, right? So, you can shift the time you heat the water and the water heater to match times of abundant renewable energy. And you can do the same with every appliance with EVs, this sort of using electric vehicles as a kind of distributed storage technology that helps the grid, that's just nascent right now. That's just in its early stages. So, you're going to see a ton of interesting developments in sort of digitized smart demand management.</p><p>And all these things are going to be incremental. They're all going to come together in unpredictable ways. But I would just say, people are saying fusion is like exciting science in a way that renewable energy isn't, and I just don't get that. Right now, there are thousands and thousands and thousands of people out there in labs doing demonstration projects, working on various problems around renewable energy, and it's just never been a more interesting time to follow technology. I just have faith that, like, there are more people than ever working on this stuff. And the more brain power we throw at it, the faster developments are going to be.</p><p>So, it's just going to be an absolutely fascinating decade to live through in the energy world, fusion entirely aside. Just pay attention to sort of like thermal storage, it's super interesting. That's nascent. Demand management is nascent in a sense. All storage technology is just at the start. Geothermal is nascent. There are going to be amazing developments in all these areas and they're going to interact in sort of ways and have emergent effects that are unpredictable now. It's just fascinating. If you're fascinated by science and technology development, you don't need fusion Sci-Fi stuff. There's stuff going on all around you right now, just like tune in.</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>David, thank you so much for this. It's fascinating.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you, Jordan.</p><p><strong>Jordan Heath-Rawlings</strong></p><p>David Roberts is the author and host of Volts, which you can find at volts.wtf. That was "The Big Story". For more you can head to thebigstorypodcast.ca. I know, I usually talk about the podcast in this space, but since they will never ever let me do an episode about this, I just have to say: Don't sleep on the Detroit Lions. That's all. You can talk to us if you want to, especially about the lions, by finding us on Twitter @thebigstoryfpn, by emailing us hello@thebigstorypodcast.ca, and of course, by calling us. Leave us a voicemail: 416-935-5935. It's old-fashioned, but it's nice to hear from you.</p><p>The Big Story is available in every podcast player, as you know by now. You can hear us ad-free in Apple if you want to subscribe to "The Big Story Plus". And you can get us for free five days a week on your smart speaker by asking it to play "The Big Story" podcast. Thanks for listening. I'm Jordan Heath-Rawlings. We'll talk tomorrow.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/me-talking-about-fusion-and-clean</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:98043850</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 25 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/98043850/b821171241bc4361d31e03fcf63b2d0f.mp3" length="21895909" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1825</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/98043850/d360425239a7b429bdd26ed7324c291f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[On writing an ambitious and terrifyingly realistic novel about climate change]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, author Stephen Markley discusses his new novel, </em>The Deluge<em>, which describes a future affected by climate change that hits uncomfortably close to home.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAHs8hvGhrpcaVrpfyDQt5Ha/volts23.01.20%28stephen.markley%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/on-writing-an-ambitious-and-terrifyingly-realistic-novel-about-climate-change"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>Text transcript:</strong></p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In 2018, author Stephen Markley won near-universal critical praise with his debut novel <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3GLHJ3Y"><em>Ohio</em></a>, a tight set piece that takes place over the course of a single night, as four high school classmates reunite at a diner in their northeastern Ohio hometown. </p><p>“Four characters, one night” is pretty much the opposite of Markley’s sprawling new novel <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3GRo2rg"><em>The Deluge</em></a>, which tracks dozens of characters over the course of decades, from the 2010s out past 2040, everyone from climate activists to scientists to political operatives, as they suffer the effects of climate change (there are some quasi-biblical disasters) and struggle to marshal the political will to address it.</p><p>The novel crucially involves climate policy, reactionary backlashes, and direct activism, among other topics of great interest to the Volts audience. </p><p>On <a target="_blank" href="https://www.thirdplacebooks.com/event/stephen-markley-david-roberts">Thursday January 12th at Seattle’s Third Place Books</a>, I was lucky enough to talk to Markley about the genesis of the novel, some of its major themes, and the difficulties he faced in writing it.</p><p>The crew at Third Place was kind enough to record the event (thanks Spencer!), so I'm happy to bring it to you as an episode of Volts. Please enjoy, and while you're at it, do the smart thing and <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3GRo2rg">buy copies of </a><a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3GRo2rg"><em>The Deluge</em></a> for all the readers in your life.</p><p><strong>Third Place Books Staff</strong></p><p>Please join me in welcoming Stephen Markley and David Roberts to Third Place Books. </p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Where to begin? I'm just going to jump right in asking Stephen questions because I have nothing interesting to say. So, I've been writing nonfiction my whole life and have thought periodically about writing fiction—like every nonfiction author does—and even took a while one summer or one time when I had some time off to sort of sit and stare at the screen for a while and think about doing it. I had kind of a plot for a near future quasi-scifi thing, and there are tons and tons of reasons why I very quickly concluded that I was not suited to writing fiction.</p><p>But one of them was the one I still think about, which is just: "What does the near future look like?" And the more I thought about that, the more I thought, "Boy, I have no idea at all what the near future looks like." I mean, I guess you could say that at any time in history, but it seems like particularly now, there's just so much crazy s**t going on. It's really like, how is it all going to interact and play out? And I found myself completely daunted and shut down by that problem.</p><p>So here you are. You have decided to start a novel basically two years in the past, and then literally just detail what happens—not in some fictional world or some far off world—what happens in this world among these people in this country over the next two, four, six, ten years in detail. And that just strikes me as just, like, fictionally speaking, the highest conceivable level of difficulty that you could set yourself. Why do that? In the book that we talked a little bit beforehand, you were thinking about even before Ohio, it just seems like the hardest thing you could do. Why not write a couple of easy books to start with?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah, it all breezed by. It all went super easy and nothing surprised me. Yeah, it just came pouring out with no...nothing got in the way, historically or politically, that made... Yeah, no, it was an incredibly high degree of difficulty for the reasons you said. And all the problems of writing a 1,000-page novel, combined with the problems of it has to feel absolutely realistic at the moment of its publication. It has to feel as if it's our world sliding into this next world, right. At dinner, we were talking, I started the book in 2010, at roughly the same time as "Ohio," had to set it aside when "Ohio" was published, and then came back to it in 2017. So in that time, I don't know if you guys heard, a game show host actually got elected president. And so, the terrifying presidential character I was returning to was suddenly really unrealistic in his bombasticness. Because, like the real thing was much...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's a relatively muted fascist president in your book, looking at it from our present vantage point.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>I mean, look, it was a mind-blowing project for me because I had to keep paying attention to every little detail of what was happening in climate, technology, politics, our society. And unfortunately, I had found the right veins, clearly, just in terms of how our politics were developing. And that just felt like it accelerated so quickly. And then with climate policy, I think that was another, sort of, murky issue. You've talked about on your podcast before, where there was this dead period after Waxman-Markey failed in the Obama administration, where it felt like everybody was throwing up their hands. And I think that was a tough place to be to...like thinking about the future of where policy would head or how it might develop.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And speaking of difficulty, sort of as you're writing and finishing, finally, Democrats are back in control and coming back to climate policy and debating the Build Back Better bill and then, specifically, the climate bill and, specifically, during that exact time period you were finishing, Joe Manchin was noodling around...</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Prevaricating, let's say.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...prevaricating and noodling around and making everybody wait and wonder. And it was just wildly uncertain right up until the day he woke up on the right side of the yacht, I guess, or whatever happened. But right up until that day, it was just wildly unclear what was going to happen. It was a very big, sort of, historical pivot that was on the line. And it literally...that historical pivot took place during the years covered by your book. So, did this keep you awake at night, the course of actual events?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I mean, in a way, when it passed, I was like both sobbing with relief and pissed at the Democrats. Like, "You should have let this fail so my novel would make more sense." Actually, what happened was I had fourth pass, like the last pass in my hands at the moment Joe Manchin was like, "I'm out on this bill. It's not happening." Right. So I send the book off to the publisher. I'm listening to people, like, cry on podcasts about our dark future, and then the bill passes. So what is going to be the case in the next edition?</p><p>There are some key sentences that will be changed to reflect the reality of the Inflation Reduction Act passing. So this is just a way of me selling more books. You got to get the first edition and then come back to the next edition and buy that one too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's wild, it just goes to the difficulty, like I said, you're writing about things that are literally happening as you're writing them.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>But just to add to that, there was this sense, though, that people were paying attention, understood the Democrats would pass a mostly carrots package if they could get the chance. There wasn't going to be a price on carbon, there wasn't going to be any standards. It was going to be something where we're just going to toss as much money as possible at decarbonization. And so I think having that in mind, I could at least sort of point the direction of what would happen in the Biden administration. Although I do think the language in the book is currently unfair to the enormity of that policy that got passed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I actually had that thought and then I remembered, like, "This is a novel." So, the other thing that you have to worry about in the real world is, of course, science and climate science. And this is something else that breaks my brain when I think about trying to do what you did, which is fictionalize it. Because if you are of an analytic mind, you follow climate science. Climate scientists, like all scientists, will say, "Here's the range of things that could happen," right? "Here are a set of error bars, a set of probabilities." And if you go to a scientist and say, "Well, here's what's going to happen. There's going to be a storm X big in 2029 in August." They'll just be like, "You're insane" if you try to...from a scientific point of view, it's crazy to try to say, "This particular thing will happen instead of that particular thing." So how much did you let kind of a worry about scientific plausibility...because the weather plays a huge role in the book. It's a big character throughout the book. There very key weather events.</p><p>And how much did you let it worry you whether those particular events happening on that particular schedule were plausible to scientists? Like did you do a lot of going back and forth with science?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah, I did. And I think what I landed on is: I'm going to take the edge events as far as realism...to the end of the line, particularly with some stuff happening in Los Angeles and a storm that comes towards the end of the book. I think for me, it was like, "could this happen?" Not, "Is this probably going to happen." At the same time, you guys live in the Pacific Northwest, there was a heat event here a few years ago, and there was a quote by this guy's studied at Lawrence Livermore, I think, which was, "This event was impossible without climate change. It also was impossible with climate change." Like, it broke the model, the heat storm in the Pacific Northwest in '21. And so I think—and correct me if I'm wrong—we're continuously seeing is events outpacing the models that I find that particularly frightening.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and that gets to the difficulty of trying to pick a particular course of events, because even now we're being surprised and we're still in early, early stages of all this. The other big thing that gripped me throughout the novel, and it comes back and forth and up and down through the whole novel, the sort of the novel, insofar as it has a main character, is centered on an activist who gets into first, activism. There's a lot of activism working with politicians and trying to craft bills and create coalitions. And then there's a whole, sort of, other splinter of activism in the book, which goes very direct action...</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Andre's mom-type.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Which goes way down that road of direct action and bombing bulldozers and things like that. And it was interesting. This is probably not how you should read a novel, but I'm trying to squint and sort of figure out, like, "How does Steven really feel about activism and the role of activism?" I think you did a great job of certainly not coming down with any sort of pat-like pro or con, but, sort of, like there are key junctures in the book where activism screws everything up, like legitimately screws up and forestalls the possibility of good things happening.</p><p>And then there are other, sort of, the larger sweep of the book. If you look at the whole thing, like, activism clearly played a big role. So what are your thoughts on the mom...Andre's Mom question, the sort of direct action? At what point is violence against property justified? And then another question that comes up later, which is: at what point is violence against people justified? It gets bad enough that that question is thrust on the activists. So I don't know if you have...where you come down on that.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Well, I think it's important to know...the job of the fiction writer. It's, like, none of these characters can share my point of view, right? Like that is that's the path to hell. That's the path to creating a character that's just your mouthpiece, right? So every character, you have to be, like, deeply in their perspective and see the world through them. So I feel like the way the book should work is if—Shane is the character you're referring to—when you're in Shane's sections, her point of view makes sense. These mealy-mouthed activists that...they're not getting anything done.</p><p>We have to go after pipelines, right? Then you switch over to this other set of people and they're thinking, "These people are f*****g it up for us. They are creating a situation in which, basically we're going to get a Patriot Act for environmental activists and so forth. So I think just also, all of those sections are about unintended consequences. And I think that's something incredibly important to pay attention to in terms of how the structure of the plot works. Whereas just because you want to do something doesn't mean the thing you're doing is going to pan out the way you think it will.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, even at the end of the book, looking back on it, there's still not a clear story to tell about activism was the good guy or the bad guy in the story. In a sense, everybody is kind of f*****g up all the time. Your activists, your scientists, your politicians.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>I write realism.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>None of them really know what they're doing. Nothing works out the way any of them intend. I thought you captured that effect well, like, there's no masterminds.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah, but I do think that there is, at least my sense of the question is that we are all trying to point ourselves in the direction of, like, "How do we change this? How do we f*****g turn the ship? At least a fifth of the degree here, fifth a degree there." And so, in the end, I think all of these characters are pointing to the way in which the ship was turned by those incremental degrees. And even if many things backfired and many things didn't work, and the consequences were sometimes very scary or horrific, it's like trying to look at the aggregate of what has happened and how to change the situation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. It's like the aggregate that comes across. And even with the sort of benefit of hindsight, have finished the book, I'm still not sure I could go back and say to any one of the characters, "This is definitely something you should have done, or this is something you shouldn't have done." It's not even clear, even in the context of the novel, what ends up actually causing things to happen. It's just sort of like, things grind on around, which I thought is a very realistic...as someone who's seen people cast themselves on the shore of these efforts over and over again and nothing work out and lose hope. In a sense, it's hopeful. In a sense, it sort of gets at what's so frustrating about all of it, right?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Frustrating being...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's no A to B causation.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, the third sort of theme of the book that felt like it was written just for me, stuff I think about constantly is the role played by sort of far-right reactionary backlash. And I was so glad to find that in the book. There's a lot I can't predict, but the one thing I feel pretty sure about is that insofar as efforts to deal with climate change get some muscle or some seriousness, there's going to be equal and opposite reaction worse than what we're already seeing. Speaking of things being ahead of our schedule. So how do you think about it? Do you think that's inevitable?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>100%. Yeah, I think death taxes and reactionary backlash are the only things we can be certain of. One of the things that has bothered me sometimes about, anything you watch on TV with politics, anything you read, any fictional setting, is the de-politicized nature of it. That's incredibly irritating because we live in an incredibly politicized environment. So, my only goal with the book was to, sort of, not to write it from the guy who voted for Bernie Sanders and Joe Biden's perspective. This is not, again, my mouthpiece. It's like, how can politics develop, surprise us? How can they swing around in ways that we don't see coming now, but might happen in the future?</p><p>And so there's a character, a Republican president who wants to do something about climate change. There's a Democrat who behaves like a monster. There's all that stuff, sort of, in the way our politics now continues to shock us, like making sure to keep the reader off balance, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I got to say, that Republican president doing something good on climate change.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>I knew you would hate that. Even as I was writing it in 2015, reading David on Vox, I was like, "I know he's not going to like this. When he finally interviews me in Seattle."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That was the one time where my eyebrow went up. I was yeah, and then, of course, everything falls apart on her. I was like, "Yeah, that makes a lot more sense."</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>You see what I was doing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everything falls apart after all. Another big question—I'm hitting you with all the big themes here—is, again, maybe you try to keep your point of view out of it and just put a lot of things in people's mouths. But the net effect of the book is a critique of capitalism, basically. This idea that climate is not isolated, unique, technical problem. It is an outgrowth of the basic way our socio and economic system works.</p><p>Is that you? How much of that is you and how much of that is activists?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>I think if I had to distill my critique of the world into a few sentences, yeah, that would be somewhat difficult, but I think what climate represents is it's not just a crisis of, "oh, we're doing this or doing that wrong." It's like there's a lot wrong with our system that we do recognize, right? And so, as you often say, the point of solving the climate crisis is not just so we can fly around on private jets and keep the world as this inequitable and this miserable. The solutions to the climate crisis point the way forward into actually changing the world for the better in many, many ways.</p><p>And what I think your podcast does so well is explicate that. I'm going to use this little moment to talk about this guy just because...no, you have to suffer through it, you just have to.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Turn off his mic.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>No, because I started reading David before I even started the book, when he was at Grist and he was one of the first climate writers I encountered who had such a clear-eyed view of the issue and, sort of, left the moralizing elements of it to the side. And since then, basically a David Roberts' completist. Like, I've been reading him the entire time, even when he went to Vox for the down years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is very embarrassing.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>No. But anyway, you should check out Volts if you haven't. It's an incredible podcast. When he brings on people who talk about how we solve this. It's like one of the few moments in my day when I'm like, "Okay, there are a lot of smart, passionate and incredibly just intelligent people working on every element of this problem." And I think that's something to keep in mind when we talk about this really scary thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's actually...one of the things you didn't get into that I wondered about was the role...like, one story people tell now about how this is all going to play out is that clean energy is getting cheaperly fast and the markets, people are going to start opting for these things for market reasons and basically, like, the cleverness of innovators and entrepreneurs are going to turn markets for us and save us from ourselves. There was very little of that in the book, I take it you just don't credit that.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>No, that's not quite the case. I think the whole experience of writing it, that was not happening yet, or it was happening, but it was like slower. It's really turned up in the last few years and so for me, it was just like, no introducing geothermal energy that suddenly solves all our problems. I couldn't slip that in and pretend like this is going to be the solution, even though, who the f**k knows, maybe it will.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Who knows?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Right. So, I just think that was an element of the book that, sort of, I was not eager to shove into it. At the same time, I have become more excited about the possibility that stupid capitalism is actually on our side, suddenly.Aand at the same time, I do feel like these incumbent industries, fossil fuels, are going to put up a way more voracious fight than a lot of people are thinking about right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, one of the striking things about your book is they don't quit. The Eastern seaboard basically gets flooded and they still don't quit.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>I mean, look, they're going around I would listen to that podcast with what the gentleman who was talking about...they're going around to a bunch of communities trying to gin up resistance to clean energy that will benefit those communities. And they're just really good at it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, they are good at it. So, I want to get to audience questions before too awful long, but speaking of—this kind of gets back to the capitalism thing—sort of at the end—if we can do this without spoilers—you could have, very easily, I think, and very plausibly, ended this with sort of everything falling apart and everyone dying. Just, sort of, like dissolution on the horizon as far as you look, and that would have been 100% defensible. So how much did you...this is like the most cliché question in the world.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>I can't wait.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How much did you worry about, "Do I want people to throw themselves out of a window after I read this book? Or to what extent do I need a happy ending?" Insofar as you can call a story where hundreds of thousands of people are dying and getting driven out of their homes and migrating and whatever else, happy.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Right, but we're in this very bizarre situation now where we're talking about stopping the heating of the planet at two degrees is the happy ending, which seems insane. And so I guess the book, without spoiling anything, the book lands on a knife's edge, right. It's pretty much exactly what we're looking at right now, which is: we have every tool we need to rapidly decarbonize the global economy. We could be growing much faster. Some of the terrifying results are already baked in because we waited too long and it's going to be, you know, the fight of several generations to turn this thing around.</p><p>And I just think, like, the book ends as really that effort has gotten underway at the scale that it actually needs to affect the correct change, though.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it takes quite a few body blows before that comes around. Another thing, I really appreciate it in the book, I felt this about, "Don't Look Up 2" the movie. Anytime you tell me a work of fiction is about climate change, I go in pre-grimacing and do it completely tensed up.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Me too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Completely tensed up stuff, watching for...it's, like a doctor watching ER or whatever. You catch all the little things. But one thing I was glad you didn't do is this notion that once a disaster is big enough, right. Once there's a spectacular headlining, grabbing enough disaster, it's like a shock. And then everybody is like, "Oh, you're right, we do need to do something about this." And everybody swings around and gets supportive. And as you show in the book—show rather than tell, which I appreciated—it causes some people to do that, but it causes just as many other people react to trauma with fear and nativism and nationalism and anger.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>I think the most important thread in the book is, there's one of the sections is called "Feedbacks." And feedbacks, we all know what climate feedbacks are, but the most important feedback is us as humans is what are we going to do? And unfortunately, one of those feedbacks is the worse things get, the more of that starts to come out. And it's just even more reason to arrest this as quickly as possible because those effects will accrue that kind of resentment, nativism, hostility. It's so inevitable. And so I think making sure that was ever present in the book was, sort of, a key thematic aim.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's a president who runs on...this is something I've had in my head for a long time. A president who runs on like, "We need to put up big walls to keep all these migrants out, and we need to hoard our fossil fuels and dig up all our fossil fuels."</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Carbon maximalism is the name of the...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We have an island here, a walled island, and we're protected from the rest of the world going to hell. And of course, it doesn't and can't work, but 100% plausible that someone...</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>2024 will probably bring about that candidate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you got to wonder.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>You're shaking your head, but, y'know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, well, I want to hear from y'all, so if anyone has questions, please. The question was, "How far out into the future does the novel go?"</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>It ends in the 2040s, so it starts in our recent recognizable past, 2013. So we get like, a taste of where we've all been and then ends in the 2040s.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it really is like present day, you're familiar with, marching right forward to your tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. It's very disturbing in that way...how smoothly it goes from a very familiar situation to things going fucked up in sideways in all kinds of ways.</p><p>So the question is about this perpetual argument in the climate space over individual action and individual responsibility versus structural infrastructural political changes. And as a god-like narrator, you get to choose which of those works more in the end. Did you have that in your head as you were writing?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah. There's no point in the book when flight-shaming solves anything that's actually...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Plastic recycling, though.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah, right. I'm sure we share this sense, which is very quickly into my very basic intellectual encounter with the climate crisis, even back in when I was in college, was like, "Oh, all this stuff is like, mostly virtue signaling garbage." And that's not to say, like, people should live their lives as ethically as they can and they want to like I don't want to like, denigrate anybody who does that stuff. It's just that, like, chirping about it doesn't help anything. We really, really need to accrue political power and change things at system levels, as David often says. It's the most vital thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But what about just a slight twist on the question, which is rather than personal action in the, "Buy a hemp tote bag, drive a Prius, to..."</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>How to green your Netflix binge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That type of thing. What about personal responsibility for activism and political engagement?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>I love that and I wish that was...what do they have memes now? I wish that was a meme somewhere on the Tiktok.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think they're called memes. Anyone in the audience?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Because it is. And just, you know, I was reading Hal Harvey's book, "The Big Fix," which I very much recommend, which is about this topic. And there's a story in Montgomery County, Maryland where a bunch of high school students were agitating about their disgusting diesel-fueled buses and it led to the county electrifying the bus fleet. And that seems like a small thing, but if you start multiplying that across school districts around the country, it's not a small thing. And it dovetails with the strategy that has emerged, which is electrify everything and crush demand for fossil fuels. So I think those are the sort of actions we have to look towards.</p><p>And particularly cities like Seattle and LA and all these other sort of liberals, like bastions, can go a long way in implementing policy and nobody pays attention to any of this. So a little bit of action goes such a long way. Him back there?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The question was, "If you, in a dark alley sometime, come face to face with a climate denier, is there anything in particular, any strategy or fact or emotional valence that you have found useful in moving such?"</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah, so what I like to do is get super upset and really dive into all my facts and just present them in a logical way and get angrier and angrier as the conversation progresses.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Don't forget footnotes.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah. I pull up on my phone, articles from the New York Times and I'm like, "Wait, look, Paul Krugman says this," and that works every time and it's all fine. I think like I, you know, you don't have to say it's, like, look at the Exxon documents from the 1970s. Like they knew. tTheir scientists were out studying this. They said the world was going to go to hell if they kept doing what they were doing. So you don't have to take my opinion for it. You can go look at what Chevron had to say.</p><p>But no, to seriously, answer your question, though, I do think the tech has suddenly become this very interesting tool, which is like, anybody who has an electric heat pump—my dad won't shut the f**k up about his electric heat pump. Not that he's a climate denier. But it's like they should put warnings on that, on electric heat pumps that say, "Your dad might talk about this for a year."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know. Warning to your neighbors: Do not engage on the heat pump.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Exactly. There are these ways of just saying, "you should at least try this thing out," that I think once people start experiencing this very better way of producing heat and energy, it will not move the needle on denialism, but it will at least maybe a little crack or a fisher here or fisher there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. If I could just add, like, I've been at this since early 2000s or whatever, and in the early 2000s, there weren't a lot of people who cared one way or the other. So it was mostly, like, a tiny handful of us who cared and a tiny handful of jackass deniers who were paid to disagree. And I spent several years going back and forth with them and quickly realized a couple of things. One is: if you find people who are invested in denying, they're usually that way ideologically, and you will not change their mind. And the right strategy is to turn around and walk in the other direction as fast as possible.</p><p>The vastly larger problem is: poorly informed and mildly disengaged. Like, the vast bulk of people just don't know that much and don't care that much. And how to get them involved is a much, much bigger and more important question than how to turn around some jerk off.</p><p>So the question was: what was most helpful to you in your research about how to address the problem? And I guess that can...because there is just for you have not read it. To my great delight, there are some pretty weeds-y discussions of policy. There are rooms full of people discussing policy in some detail, which is just totally my thing. Again, not allowed to mention me. What sources did you find helpful?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>I just mentioned "The Big Fix," which was written by this guy, Hal Harvey. He's been on...I discovered him through David's writing, but he works at Energy Innovation, which is a think tank. They were advising Congress on the IRA. And I was so grateful a person who works there read the book for me and sort of advised me on everything. And I'm just so relieved that there are people who are like, "Alright, what is step A? Let's do step A, and then we'll move to step B, and then we'll go to C."</p><p>And it's just that sort of level of thinking of, like, what are the things in society driving this crisis? How do we change them, right? I would be remiss also if I didn't recommend a book by my good friend Lisa Wells, who is here called "Believers." It is a terrific nonfiction book. I read it in the midst of writing "The Deluge" and it's like one of those books that sort of, like, made me feel what I'm supposed to feel right now in the midst of this. And I think that's, as we were saying, like, if that's a difficult thing to do, like all of this just sort of exists in this haze. And every once in a while there's in a weather event that freaks us out. But then we all go back to normal. And even those of us who care about it have a hard time sort of holding on to it. So I very much appreciated those books that I read that was like, no, no, this is keep your eye trained on this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And of course, to add fiction is one of the things that can do that in a way that no nonfiction can. And sort of like reading about this scientist who's been discussing these very sort of cold, wonky things, the whole book careening through a burning Los Angeles to try to save his daughter from her apartment. It really makes things visceral for you.</p><p>So the question is about why there was so little climate fiction or art for so long, and now it seems like it's kind of bubbling up now. There's a couple of big things popping out, really big ambitious works, and whether you have any thoughts on why that's happening. And I'll say, whenever I say on Twitter or whatever, "Oh, there's not enough climate art," people start throwing obscure climate art at me and obscure climate novels. But in terms of big, popular culture stuff, really, this book is the first because you'll get lots of books that are, like, dystopic and you're like, "Oh, it's like an analogy to climate change hovers in the background or whatever." This is about climate change more squarely than any work of art I've ever met. So what do you make of that?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>I think it's bizarre as well. And it's sort of in the course of writing this book, I was somewhat terrified that someone would come along and preempt me with the same thing, basically. And it never really happened. And I don't know, I might get in trouble for this, but I'll just take you through this story. I work in Hollywood now, I don't know if you saw my picture with Tom Hanks. It's up on Instagram. Okay. But we went out with "The Deluge" early to see if we could gin up interest in an option.</p><p>And I just got the same question in every meeting, right, which was basically to the effect of, like, "Well, what about the people who don't believe in climate? Like, I believe in climate change, but what about the people who don't? What's in this for them?" And I always found that, like, the most bizarre, mind-blowing thing, because when you're in it, you're like, this is the most important f*****g thing to ever happen to humans. Like, let alone...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, like somebody proposing a pandemic movie. Like, we don't believe in pandemics.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Right? So to me, there is this weird still, and this is a testament to the power of the propaganda laid out by the fossil fuel industry. There is still, in the US especially, this sort of idea that it is this highly-politicized issue, which it is, but in a way that you can't even make art about it because it will prickle people. At least that's my Hollywood opinion. As for fiction, I think there are quite a few climate novels, but I think they do exactly what you're talking about a lot of the time, which is they're not addressing the issue, they're coming at it from allegory or whatever else it might be. And the project of "The Deluge" was like, okay, straight to the f*****g eye, let's do this. Let's get every issue in this complex subject on the table.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, if you want an explanation for why there hasn't been, I just think because it's super f*****g hard. Like, climate is everything. It is literally everything. It's every fiscal system, every political system. It's like social system, it's emotional, it's allegorical, it's everything. So, it's one thing to understand that intellectually, but fiction is all about specificity. That's what I was trying to get out of my first question. Taking all that and deciding this specific thing, that's just mind blowing to me, and I understand entirely why people haven't done it. It sounds really hard. I'm still waiting for the first good climate movie. I don't know, "Don't Look Up" did this, sort of, like, analogy thing.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, I listened to the podcast with...what's his face? Adam McKay, sorry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>McKay, yes.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>I hope he's listening to that right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Famed Academy Award winning director, Adam McKay. I expect in coming years there will be more attempts at this. I sort of hope that, you did the sort of needful, which is like directly grappling with the horns. But there's ways to get at this through genre. You could do a horror, you could do a heist movie. You can think of lots of different ways you could weave climate change in. That's what I'd like to see is not necessarily just a ton of stuff directly about climate change, but just more ambient climate change in culture. Just sort of more of an acknowledgement that it's whatever story you're telling and whatever you're doing, it's there. It's around you.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>So, David, you're telling me you have not watched the film "Hurricane Heist"? Because that...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I have, actually!</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah, see! What are you talking about? It's a classic, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I thought that movie was so terrible that literally no one else in the world would watch it. I'm glad you have the same appetite for terrible movies.</p><p>Anybody else?</p><p><strong>Audience Member</strong></p><p>But did you sell the options?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>No, it's still available, Adam McKay.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Dear Academy Award winning director Adam McKay...</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah, back there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the question is: was it cathartic to write this for a decade or did you find it innervating to wallow and apocalypse?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah, I definitely thought it was emotionally exhausting, and especially about at the 60% mark or maybe the 70% mark, when I had sort of set in motion the wheels of all these multi-faceted crises happening at once. And I just, like, it felt too real to myself. For me, really, like, the point when I had to shift my own thinking on it was when I started to explore, like, okay, who are the people out there actually trying to do something about this? Not setting their hair on fire, not bemoaning humans as a virus on the planet, but just like, what systems do we have to change in order to do this?</p><p>That's when I started to orient myself a little bit more productively towards the task at hand. Then it was being edited in the middle of 2020 during the pandemic, during the riot of the Capitol, like, all that s**t that just seemed like, "okay, my book, it's, like, not scary enough," you know?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, yeah, what about the riot? What about January 6? That happens during the time period of the book, right?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Either way, without any spoilers, the way I found out about January 6 was my friend, an early reader texted me and said, "How does it feel to be clairvoyant?" And I did not enjoy turning on the television to find out what he meant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We'll leave it at that. You have to read the book. When will there be an audiobook and are you going to be involved in it?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>It is available right now, and I am not reading any of it. So, you can listen to better people than me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Anybody else? Yeah, go ahead. Do you get into the role of animal agriculture in climate change in the book?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>A bit through one of the most vociferous characters, who's a vegan and sort of forces her partner to become one, as most vegans do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hello. There they are.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Oh, wow. It's like that spot-on or something. But also there's this moment at the end when basically a character is laying out, okay, like, what do we do? And agricultural policy, of course, plays a role in that, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Am I dreaming? But people aren't eating beef by the end of the book for some reason? Am I making that up? It wasn't like a policy or anything. Just like, all the cows died, or I may be making stuff up at this point.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's basically like the US government goes around buying up livestock and then basically shutters the industry, I think, is what you're...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, that happens. In that sense, something quite dramatic on that.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>But then you need to precipitate a crisis like in the book, and I think we need to avoid that. Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this is a question about writing process, and it is a big, sprawling book. It's got lots of characters in it, and the question is, sort of, how many is enough? How many is too many? How do you know when you're representing everything you want to represent. What's the thinking there?</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Have you read "Ohio"? Okay, yeah. So with "Ohio," it's like I had the four characters the whole time and knew exactly who everybody was. With this, I probably started off with ten or eleven point of view characters. And as the book progressed, it became clear, like, you're biting off way more than you can chew. And so, they began to drop away. And I think in the last edit, basically, between me and my editor, I cut one more. It was hard because when...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you know how many you ended up with?</p><p>It's seven, basically. But when you have to cut out a whole character, it hurts. It's like chopping off your arm, right? And so I think, like, that last hurdle of getting rid of...but the book had to move. It had to be, and I think it is, like, very readable, very page turnery. And I think that was something my editor and I discussed that was vital, that a book this size with this much policy and science and so many ideas packed into it, it really had to be aggressively interesting. And so a few of the characters who I thought were vital, it turns out they kind of weren't.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>And once you've cut it, once it's gone, you don't miss your arm anymore.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No phantom pains.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>No phantom pains.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I just want to say for those of you who have read Kim Stanley Robinson, "Ministry for the Future", I always want to say "Swiss Family Robinson." I don't know, once I say...</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>That's a different type almost!</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>...like that's not It! "Ministry for the Future." "Ministry for the Future" is a very, like, it says fiction on the cover but it's, like, a little bit of fiction with a lot of, like, white papers sprinkled throughout, which is, like, great if you just want to learn. You'll learn a lot by reading it. But just to be clear, this is not that. This is an actual novel. An actual page-turner of a novel, and not just a bunch of learning, a bunch of briefs.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>David Roberts. F**k learning.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, enough with this learning. Thank you, everyone.</p><p><strong>Stephen Markley</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for coming out. I really appreciate it. Thank you, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/on-writing-an-ambitious-and-terrifyingly</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:96205174</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/96205174/0e8caa06b048dcc5ca9757dfbca223d9.mp3" length="31697784" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2641</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/96205174/f9a376129f372b8ffac62b6df64197b6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[An energy provider attempts to achieve 24/7 clean energy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In December 2021, Peninsula Clean Energy (PCE), a Bay Area <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-david-hsu-on-the-grassroots#details">community choice aggregator</a> (CCA), issued a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.peninsulacleanenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Whitepaper-OUR-PATH-TO-247-RENEWABLE-ENERGY-BY-2025.pdf">white paper</a> on the need for 24/7 clean energy, its rationale for pursuing 24/7 by 2025, and the steps it intended to take to get there. Earlier this month, it issued a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.peninsulacleanenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/24-7-white-paper-2023.pdf">follow-up white paper</a> reporting on the tool it built to map out 24/7 and the lessons learned.</p><p>I am fascinated by the practical challenges of getting to 24/7, so I’m excited to talk to Jan Pepper, CEO of Peninsula and lead author on the latest white paper, about why PCE is setting out to achieve 24/7, the main barriers, and the ways it may get easier in the future.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/an-energy-provider-attempts-to-achieve</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:95976713</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 27 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/95976713/08c16b2f31c72d0e93fee48650e64aee.mp3" length="36505464" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3042</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/95976713/7bd239ab9e2f0ba6071ba08155e8f076.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Which technologies get cheaper over time, and why?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In 2021, a group of Scholars at Oxford University published a paper that made big waves in the energy world. It argued that key clean energy technologies — wind, solar, batteries, and electrolyzers — are on learning curves which guarantee that, if they are deployed at the scale required to reach zero carbon, they will get extremely cheap.</p><p>This is, as they say, big if true. In September, I had one of the lead authors, Doyne Farmer, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/learning-curves-will-lead-to-extremely#details">on Volts to discuss the paper in-depth</a>. He made a convincing case for the paper’s thesis, but when I asked him <em>why</em> these technologies were on learning curves and others weren't, he could only speculate.</p><p>That's the question that's been on my mind ever since. Why are some clean-energy technologies getting rapidly cheaper while others aren't? What is it about particular technologies that make them amenable to learning curves?</p><p>I cast that question to the academic gods, and lo, they returned with a paper, and that paper is what we’re here to discuss today. It’s called “Accelerating Low-Carbon Innovation,” by Abhishek Malhotra of the School of Public Policy at the Indian Institute of Technology in New Delhi, India, and <a target="_blank" href="https://epg.ethz.ch/people/group-head/prof--dr--tobias-schmidt.html">Tobias Schmidt</a> of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, Switzerland.</p><p>It sets out to chart technologies against two basic axes: design complexity and need for customization. That creates a schema that can help illuminate why some technologies developed quicker than others.</p><p>I don't want to say much more than that, since I have my Malhotra and Schmidt here with me to help explain.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/which-technologies-get-cheaper-over</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:94794990</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 27 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/94794990/f3a6414cd4298d5415d5b82f0b5d542c.mp3" length="31704053" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2642</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/94794990/55c709170393d63e357fb942d65c7951.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Cute pictures of my pets! (And also a fundraiser)]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Volts was born on December 7, 2020. It recently turned two years old and I forgot to wish it a happy birthday. I also forgot to send out my once-a-year fundraising note.</p><p>However! Better late than never.</p><p>If you have learned from or been entertained by my podcasts over the last year, if they have helped you become more useful, and if you are in a financial position to do so, I hope you will consider signing up as a paid Volts subscriber. It is a relatively modest sum — you pay less for a year than you'd pay for a nice pair of pants — but it means the difference between me continuing this work and me getting a real job.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/cute-pictures-of-my-pets-and-also</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:94380740</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 06 Jan 2023 20:01:04 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/94380740/d8497645a05e9500d532ba3cf6914d15.mp3" length="11769384" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>736</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/94380740/5a3c7802800a69d983d197a2cdeab3ec.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Reflecting on the work of the soon-to-retire House climate committee]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Florida Rep. Kathy Castor, chair of the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, describes the committee’s ambitious goals and notable achievements over the past three years.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAB7S0-Pm9H6hNh4YFM8RbcVa/volts22.12.28%28kathy.castor%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/reflecting-on-the-work-of-the-soon-to-retire-house-climate-committee"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In 2019, in the wake of Democrats’ congressional victories, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi announced that she would be re-forming the Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, which had been disbanded by Republicans in the previous session. She appointed Florida Representative Kathy Castor as chair.</p><p>At the time, the decision caused considerable controversy in the climate community. Climate activists were pushing for a more ambitious committee, with the power to write a full Green New Deal legislative package. Instead, the committee was to be an advisory body only, meant to do research and develop policy suggestions.</p><p>History is littered with congressional committees that busily produce reports and whitepapers that no one reads. But the climate committee proved much more potent than that. </p><p>Castor set about gathering testimony from hundreds of witnesses — scientists, policy wonks, and average citizens alike — and putting her expert staff to work translating their testimony into policy recommendations. But the recommendations did not simply decorate reports. The Democrats on the committee, and the Democrats educated by the committee's work, took those recommendations back to their own committees, where they found their way into a wide variety of bills. The bipartisan infrastructure bill, the CHIPS Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act contained numerous policies that originated in the climate committee.</p><p>Altogether, hundreds of the recommendations made by the committee found their way into law — a crazy-high success rate for a committee with no real power. As the committee prepares to sunset — of course Republicans are disbanding it again — it has put out a final report, summarizing all its achievements and pointing to the work that remains to be done.</p><p>I called Rep. Castor to get her thoughts on the committee's work, the achievements she is most proud of, and what progress she thinks can be made in the next two years.</p><p>Alright, then. With no further ado, Representative Kathy Castor. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Oh, I'm delighted to be here, David. Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So just to start off, I'm assuming that the coming Republican majority is going to shut down the committee. Has this been explicitly stated yet, or is this just ... are we all assuming? Is that a valid assumption?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Yeah, the ranking member, Garret Graves of Louisiana, did kind of spill the beans. The problem is, on the Republican side, the Speaker-to-be, Kevin McCarthy, does not quite have the votes yet. So that leaves everything in limbo getting organized for the new year. But, they've made it plain that the climate crisis is not a priority for them, and therefore the Select Committee on the Climate Crisis will not exist in the next Congress.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then it's been wrapped up. It's been a whirlwind three years, I guess, since you were placed in charge of this committee. Have you had a chance to kind of pause and step back and think about it all, or are you still kind of in a sprint til' the end of the term?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>It has been a sprint right til' the end, especially since the large appropriations package and the defense bill were not completed due to really foot-dragging of the US Senate. We have so much more left to do. I mean, we are thrilled that this was the most important Congress when it comes to clean energy and climate action and building more resilient, safer communities across the country. I mean, this was the Congress, the one that people inside and outside have been pressing for decades, frankly. But there's still so much more left to do. We're living in a climate emergency, and the world's top scientists tell us it is just urgent that we reduce climate pollution across the board. And now we have the tool. We passed a number of the tools, but implementation will be key, and that's what we're looking ahead towards.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I wanted to ask you, looking back on it, if you can cast your mind back to 2019, when you became chair and you had a majority in the House, but very narrow-split Senate, looking back, were you surprised by the productivity of this Congress? How did it perform, relative to your expectations from back in 2019?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Gosh, it was yes, I think the the fact that we were able to accomplish so much when the United States Senate was divided 50-50 truly exceeded our expectations, but we really didn't have a choice. Policy could not wait any longer, while so many private actors, private sector, clean energy entrepreneurs, some utilities, some states and local communities are going gangbusters. The federal government and the Congress had not responded. So the stars finally aligned when we kind of knitted together pieces of the climate movement across the country, across the economy, and had the plan ready when President Biden was elected. But a 50-50 Senate, that was a roadblock. But looking back now, it's pretty impressive. The bipartisan bills that we were able to pass into law.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, my expectations are so low, naturally, that I was quite pleasantly surprised. So let's talk about a little bit about what I think is one of the most striking features of this last few years, which has been a crazy time. But I wrote a piece back in, I think it was 2019 or 2020, about the climate movement kind of splintered apart after Waxman-Markey back in 2008, 2009, and was kind of just fractured and drifting up through, I would say probably like 2018. And then, of course, I've been writing about these processes, whereby groups are talking to one another, and there's been just this intensive policy discussion and activity.</p><p>And the left seem to sort of pull together around a policy vision, which I sort of characterized as standards, investments, and justice: SIJ. I tried to get SIJ to catch on, but it never quite did. But then your committee comes along, you consult with hundreds of people. You get testimony from hundreds of people. And that's kind of that shared vision is more or less what you came around to. And for all the chaos of the ensuing years and all the sort of ups and downs and roller coaster of it, there was remarkably little, I thought, conflict within the Democratic Party or within the left about policy specifics.</p><p>There seemed to be a weird sort of policy consensus that kind of held firm. Did that strike you too, especially relative to like, 2008, 2009, when, you know, whether you supported cap and trade or not was this, you know, this absolute marker of your purity or your intentions and all this, you know, all the very vicious policy fights back then? I thought there was a strange amount of consensus around policy this time around. Did you find that as well?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>I'm glad that we made it look easy, because it wasn't. And it really started with Speaker Pelosi's vision coming back in tackling the climate crisis, there's nothing like having a professional committee, staff of experts. Some of the other committee chairs in the Congress, they protect their turf, their jurisdiction, but she understood that solutions to the climate crisis cut across all jurisdictions and they needed to be knitted together. So having Ana Unruh Collin serve as our staff director, a brilliant, knowledgeable scientist, but policy guru. And then Alison Cassady is our deputy, who had served under Chairman Waxman, went through EPA after a report and now is helping Codesta in the White House get all of these clean energy and resiliency policies done. Fatima Maud, great on transmission in the power sector. Samantha Medlock, who understood that the climate we have to prepare and adapt, so another professional. So there's nothing like having a team that is in place, ready to listen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Most of them, veterans of the Waxman-Markey fight. So, had seen how things could go, I think, and went in, determined to make them go differently this time.</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>You're absolutely right. And what I learned watching Speaker Pelosi and just kind of growing up as a policy nerd myself, is that from the very get-go, you have to listen. You have to listen and learn. And that's what we set out to do right off the bat; listen to farmers who were hungry for climate solutions because their crops and livestock being impacted, scientists, folks in the clean tech sector, the innovators. We needed to understand what the modern solutions were. The environmental justice community, who had felt so left out of discussions on solutions, on clean energy and technology for many years, and we set out to do that, held a number of those listening sessions, but put out a request for information asking for the climate solutions across the country.</p><p>And at that time, we also Hal Harvey and the folks at Energy Innovation gave us a kind of set-the-table tutorial to really point us in the direction of what gets the biggest bang for the buck when we're talking about reducing climate pollution and clean energy. And then, before COVID came down, trying to go out across the country to listen, one of the first trips was to coastal South Carolina to look at the impacts of climate on ... and coming from the state of Florida, I understand very well the impacts of climate on a tourism economy and your economic wellbeing. But then out to Colorado, to the National Renewable Energy Lab, where we really tried to bring our Republican colleagues along with us, because durable policy oftentimes has to be bipartisan. And I think looking back on the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, the CHIPS Act, everything we've done in the defense bills through the appropriations, they were bipartisan, and they will be more durable. The Inflation Reduction Act, not as bipartisan, but, boy, to have ten years of continuity of clean energy tax credits and energy efficiency across the economy will provide that certainty that our innovators need.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you put out this report in 2020, or not 2020. When did the big report come out? Was that earlier this year?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>It was 2020, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's all a blur.</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>I know. It does get blurred. And in fact, we were set to release it in March of 2020, and I remember very well talking to Speaker Pelosi and Leader Hoyer on the floor, and we said, okay, well, we won't be announcing it next week because of the COVID, but we'll be back in a month to do this. And it took a little longer, but it gave us time because the country was grappling with the murder of George Floyd. And we knew that, unlike Waxman-Markey, kind of technical solution to the climate crisis, that people across America were hungry for solutions that are much more cross-cutting and focused on equity and addressing the communities that have disproportionately carried the burden of pollution.</p><p>So, that gave us time to kind of build up our environmental justice pieces of it. And the other thing that gave us momentum was the youth climate movement at that time. And thank goodness we have environmental advocates across America who know how to organize. And they organized, and we heard them. Our very first hearing was with youth climate leaders, so that they understood that we were truly listening to their pleas for action. And it's important to have those protests they were protesting in the Congress, and they need to continue to press policymakers. But we listened and really turned their passion into policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this report comes out in 2020 magisterial report, I would say extremely I wrote it up when it came out. I just thought it's extremely fleshed out in the report. There were 715 policy recommendations, and your recent sort of wrap-up report that just came out says, "Out of those, 436 passed to the House, and then 314 of them were signed into law." So I did the math: that's a 44% hit rate. You got to be feeling pretty good about that. I don't know what typical expert committees in Congress produce, but that seems like a remarkably high success rate for getting recommendations into policy.</p><p>Were you surprised how much from that initial report, sort of, survived the sausage-making process and sort of came out the other end more or less unmolested?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Yeah. We looked for every opportunity in every bill moving through the Congress to build in some of those policy recommendations into law. And for folks that want to look at that groundbreaking report at climatecrisis.house.gov, you'll see we had legislation in certain areas already drafted that was ready to go, and then we made other recommendations for the need for legislation and to their credit, members across the Congress took us up on our offer. We work very closely with each congressional committee. Almost, just about every committee had a piece of this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I wanted to ask about the ... because the committee didn't have the power to write legislation. It's just an advisory committee, which I think makes it kind of even more remarkable how much of its recommendations became a law. But tell me a little bit about the process, whereby this sort of recommendations that began in an advisory committee made their way to lawmaking committees. What was the sort of process, whereby you kind of diffused your recommendations and tried to get them into things? It seemed to work remarkably well behind the scenes. I didn't read a lot of stories about sort of infighting or backbiting so it seemed like a weirdly rational policy-making process. Tell us a little bit about how these things made their way into policy.</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Well, Speaker Pelosi was very wise to appoint to the Climate Crisis Committee a number of members who are steeped in climate policy and politics. For example, Jared Huffman from California who was an environmental lawyer. He also sits on the Transportation Committee and has kept a very keen eye on those policies. Plus, Sean Casten, a clean energy tech guy from the midwest who understands power markets very well. Suzanne Bonamici of Oregon who is a leader in oceans policy, Ocean Solicitors. Donald McEachin, who recently passed away, was kind of our moral conscience, and had crafted an Environmental Justice For All Act that we recommended, and a lot of the policies in equity sprung from that.</p><p>So, for example, as Chairman Peter DeFazio and the Congress was crafting the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act that we also called the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. We had made recommendations for electrifying the transportation sector and doing it in a way that also built the bridge to workers and labor. And though it looked pretty easy looking back, I'll even say great. But these were very difficult discussions with auto makers, with auto workers, with members of Congress like a Debbie Dingell. But you had a Chairman DeFazio focused on this very important infrastructure law, something that President Biden ran on. So in the end, all of those taking, listening, and hammering out the compromises and policies in advance, we end up with an infrastructure law that includes $62 billion for the Department of Energy over five years to support clean energy transition and infrastructure upgrades, including the $7.5 billion to build the very first nationwide EV charging network.</p><p>So, that had already been built into the Biden administration's goal of 500,000 public EV chargers, and a future where all Americans can have easy access to EV charging. But it also has those important — none of this happens unless we can build the batteries. So $3 billion for battery manufacturing, recycling grants, another $3 billion for battery materials processing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That was in the Infrastructure Act, right? I mean, this is one of the interesting things, is that you sort of seeded your recommendations in the Infrastructure Law and in CHIPS and in the Inflation Reduction Act. And so, we didn't end up in that kind of situation where there was just one big bill with everything this time. You guys were working on everything that had a chance of passing. It seems like.</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>That's correct. And with a patriotic flare. Buy American, build American. I know right now it's causing some consternation for a lot of our allies that also make cars and trucks, but that domestic content and the requirements for manufacturing in the United States, we viewed as vitally important to building bipartisan support for decades to come. And already you've seen the announcements of where these battery plants, where the EV plants are going to be built, largely in the midwest, largely in red states, in Republican areas.</p><p>And I think over time, the GOP is so wedded to oil and gas, but over time, as these workers and these communities have a piece of the clean energy future, it will be changing. It will build on itself, and it will help us address this climate emergency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I want to come back to that, too. So I don't want to ask you to choose a favorite child, but out of all these, out of this report, full, just chock full of recommendations, are there any recommendations or set of recommendations that became law that you are particularly proud of, that you think are particularly sort of central to what we're doing? If you had to choose kind of your favorite thing that you did that ended up actually passing the finish line, what would you point to?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>The electric grid across America. And it's not all the way done, because there are some very significant policy changes that must happen. But what folks like Hal Harvey and Energy Innovators told us right away is the most important way to tackle the climate crisis and to reduce greenhouse gases is in the power sector, getting the lower cost solar, wind, energy-efficiency resources out ASAP, and then especially following on with the transportation sector. So, here I sit in the state of Florida, the so-called Sunshine State, but they've kept us addicted to gas. They've put all the eggs pretty much in the gas basket. And that has really cost my neighbors a lot of money.</p><p>When we have price spikes, especially after Putin's unprovoked attack on Ukraine, we can do so much better. We can lower cost, we can clean the air. We can build more resilient communities. You probably saw that after Hurricane Ian, the one community that didn't lose power and really didn't suffer as much damage was a solar-powered community, Babcock Ranch in southwest Florida. And, I want that for the entire country. And we're on the cusp of getting there, but that's why we have more work to do when it comes to getting the renewables out. But David, there's nothing like having those tax credits now for ten years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Hearing you put the grid at the center, of course, warms my heart. Of the stuff that didn't make it, were there pieces that you were more disappointed didn't make it? This is sort of the flip side of the other question. Is there stuff that you were hoping was going to make it that didn't, that you look back on with regret?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>I wish we could get a national renewable portfolio standard. Again, using my experience here in the so-called Sunshine State, boy, we're a laggard. And again, we could bring that lower cost, clean energy to more of my neighbors here. And it's just so disjointed. You have states that have truly committed, local communities, truly committed. They're going to reap the benefits, and really, the benefits should be available to everyone. So, we recommended a clean energy standard, energy-efficiency standard. You need those goals to press ahead, even as you have the standards investments in justice. I think the goals are very helpful to set the bar.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, that's the standards piece, which is hard to get through a reconciliation bill, right? That's the nature of the beast.</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>And remember, it morphed into making large incentive payments to utilities to get there. But that didn't quite go. And at that time, it looked like the climate policy was teetering. And thank goodness we had a president who never gave up. And Senator Manchin came around to his credit, and a lot of outside groups kept pushing. I don't think that's very evident when you watch what's happening in Washington DC. You think it's so insular, but I think everyone can be grateful for the wide variety of interests, from the environmental justice groups to the innovators, to the scientists who just kept at it, kept pressing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is probably an unanswerable question, and I don't want to get into trying to get you to psychologize Joe Manchin. Thank god that those days are past us for now. But do you think that pressure from outside groups reached him? It's very hard to tell from the outside. He looks, from the outside, like he just doesn't care about most of those outside groups. Do you think that pressure had some role in bringing him around?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Yes, I do. And I think he has children and grandchildren. I don't think he wanted to get up and look in the mirror and be responsible for a planet that is not as livable for our kids and future generations.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about a little bit of the Manchin changes. So he stripped out the renewable portfolio standard or the, I can't remember, the name of what it had become, but the sort of reconciliation equivalent of the renewable portfolio standard.</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Yeah, Clean Energy Payment Program or Performance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>RIP.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that would have been nice. But, the other main thing, as far as I can tell that he changed, was some changes to the EV tax credit. And I'm just curious what you make of the changes to that credit. Were you sort of supportive of those? Do you think they went too far? Because I've heard some concern that the requirements now for domestic content are kind of so tight that no one's going to be able to meet them for a couple of years. So curious if you have any thoughts on that.</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>It is going to be difficult. And when I say that we had a patriotic plan of action that was because we really do want to win the future. We want the United States of America to be building those electric vehicles and have the leading technology. But the minerals and the batteries are going — the domestic content requirements are going to be difficult — and I think everyone is pressing ahead. They're good tax credits and significant dollars to build up those domestic manufacturing, the plants, the workforce. So everyone is kind of pressing along in that direction, now.</p><p>It's only been a few months but yes, we're hearing from our allies. I know when President Macron was here recently that he was bending the President's ear. And there may be some ways for the administration as they go through implementation to listen and do some and things on timing. But I think, mostly, Americans are committed to wanting these to be a pathway to good paying jobs for our people. The industrial base in America, we've got to invest through CHIPS, through everything we've done with EVs, and I think we still have more room on workforce to do, but okay, so difficult, but we've got to try. It's important for competitiveness.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So Manchin stripped out the Clean Payment Program. He tweaked the EV tax credits a little bit, sort of tightening their domestic requirements. But it was striking that, for all the sort of suspense around Build Back Better, is it going to happen, is it going to not? Manchin stripped out the care provisions and a lot of the healthcare stuff. All this drama, through all that, the basic clean energy and climate portion of that bill was mostly left alone. What ended up passing in the Inflation Reduction Act is pretty close to what your expert committee members wrote down on paper. Did you expect Manchin to do more?</p><p>Because, you know, for all that, he's objecting and objecting and saying no. And I just thought, "Well, surely he's going to strip this down. Like he stripped everything else down." But he ended up sort of not doing all that much to it. What do you make of that?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>I make of it that it really was an effort that knitted-together interest and collaboration across the economy that was bigger than the Congress. People knew if we didn't act now, we were condemning our kids to a bleaker future and that now was the time to lay the foundation to slash pollution across the board. It ended up through tax credits. Tax credits will drive investment in affordable clean energy, the electric vehicles, cost-saving energy efficiency technologies, but also through making environmental justice a cornerstone of climate action, a stronger enforcement of environmental laws. Monies will flow into that, increasing the investments to communities on the front lines. Rural communities, tribal communities, energy.</p><p>A lot of the communities that grew up through coal mining and frack gas, they're going to need to see themselves in the clean energy future as well. Bonuses for those High Road Labor standards, domestic manufacturing. Also the cross-cutting approach to reducing methane pollution. I think there was broad bipartisan realization that control of methane is vitally important ASAP to give us a fighting chance to meet our climate goals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So do you think he left it alone because it was good policy? I guess, I love that story, and I hope it's true. So you say several times in this recent report there's a lot left to do. 44% of your recommendations pass, which is remarkable, but that leaves a bunch more that didn't pass. Do you have any hope at all of decent energy legislation passing through this coming Congress with Republicans in control of the House? Or is it more or less up to Biden over the next two years to act via executive action?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Democrats are going to be quite focused on finding bipartisan solutions moving forward, even with the chaotic Congress, the House of Representatives, that is sure to come, because there are some folks on that side that just are ... they live to shut down the government for some reason, I don't know. They're just not constructive. But, hopefully, they don't cause complete chaos. So most of the action, yes, will be in implementation. We have got to get money back into people's pockets through the more energy-efficient appliances and through weatherizing their homes and building the solar plants. My local mayor here in Tampa looked at the tax credits that they will receive and said, "Well, I'm going to put solar panels on top of this brand new big community center, and that's going to save us a million dollars."</p><p>Multiply that all across the country. But it's going to be important to get those monies out into people's pockets. And thankfully, we've got allies that are going to be working with us on that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm just curious if there are particular things that you would like to see Biden do via executive action over the next two years? Any sort of top priorities left over from the report that you would like him to sort of prioritize?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>The Department of Energy now has more resources at its disposal than ever before. That Green Climate Bank, I think is going to be fascinating to see the innovations that come from across the country. It's kind of like community development block grants that go to local communities where they have the most flexibility to determine what meets their own community needs. And I see that Green Climate Bank as a way to speed up some of these climate solutions.</p><p>But back to where there could be bipartisan work that I would hope everyone again can continue pressing policymakers to move on. We'll have a farm bill up, and ranchers, producers, farmers, they are hungry for climate-smart ag policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that true? Because now, traditionally there's been some hostility from the agricultural sector toward climate stuff. This has not been traditionally, historically allies. Do you really think opinion within that community has swung around to the necessity of this stuff or is it still kind of a trench warfare over there in that sector?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>We have work to do. But I'll tell you, I met with a very conservative group here in Florida. The citrus growers, the dairy farmers, all of our nurseries, the specialty crops and they are ready to be part of the solution. There is so much that they learn through our ag extension offices and we have now made these climate-smart ag hubs, where farmers now can do more for soil health, for conservation. They should get some compensation if they are going to be part of the solution and sequester carbon and be smarter and more efficient. The whole entire food system, I would highlight, is an area where we can do so much better as well.</p><p>Then the defense bills now, the past two defense bills have been the most climate forward. For example, we're going to pass this omnibus appropriations bill and well over half of the trillion dollars, I think upwards of 900 billion goes to the Department of Defense. So they can be an important customer, a research instigator, deployment across their military bases, but developing those clean technologies in everything that they do. So that will have to continue. And that's why I'm so happy that the smart people at the Biden administration are there for two years so that we can implement and get these technologies and policies on track.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, if we're talking about executive branch action, you kind of got to think about the Supreme Court. I wonder how worried you are about the Supreme Court. How much of this do you think they could screw up? How safe do you think this entire effort is from the Supreme Court? What's kind of your level of worry there?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Well, the good news was the last term they didn't completely got EPA's authority to regulate climate pollution. So that was an important takeaway. And EPA needs to continue on in all of their important enforcement activities and ways to cut climate pollution from the regulatory side. You may remember, since you've read our 2020 Climate Crisis Action Plan all the way to the end, that we highlighted other policies that are important to tackling the climate crisis involving strengthening democracy. The January 6 Committee, now, has issued their final report. We have got to strengthen the laws relating to big money in elections transparency. There have been scandals across America in various states where electric utilities now are playing in elections. There's no reason that any ratepayer money, or some fungible money, should be going into blocking the deployment of lower cost clean energy. So strengthening our democratic institutions we highlighted as important climate solutions as well and they remain so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It does not seem like the Supreme Court is on your side on that particular issue. This is a little bit of a depressing question, but it's all about implementation these next two years and the nature of the House seems pretty binary whether you have the majority or not. Is there anything you can do from the minority in the House to really make sure this is implemented well? What can you do from the minority in the House? Or is this just a time to retrench and dry your powder for the next fight? or what can you do from the minority?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Yeah, David, the policies, the grants, and the opportunities that flow out of the bipartisan infrastructure law and the Inflation Reduction Act, CHIPS, and everything else are so vast that an average member of Congress could spend every waking minute on making sure that your local community understands and is maximizing what will flow out of that law. So before I went to Congress, I served as a county commissioner and I'm busy already talking to my local partners and nonprofits, my environmental justice folks, but just plain city county governments and others to make sure that they understand what is available. At the same time, we've got to keep an eye on the entrepreneurs and the scientific discoveries. And again, I'll highlight the vast new resources at the Department of Energy.</p><p>In Congress, on the Energy and Commerce Committee, we know that the Republican majority is going to shine a spotlight on the Department of Energy. I anticipate Secretary Granholm will be a frequent visitor for our committee, and there's nothing wrong with oversight. But if you're going to throw a wrench into lower cost clean energy solutions, simply to benefit the legacy oil, gas, fossil fuel industry, that's just plain politics. And we need to stay focused on the people, and people over politics, and there will be plenty to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So big picture-wise, if you step back and you look at, say, the coming ten years, what do you see as kind of the biggest — between us and decarbonization, most of which is supposed to happen in the next ten years — what do you sort of lose sleep over? What do you see as the biggest challenge? Is it education? Is it transmission? Is it going to be politics? What are the sort of big, looming challenges you see that you worry most about as we try to pull off something, which is huge and has never been pulled off before?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Yeah. Again, I come to you with a Sunshine State perspective where we should be a leader in clean energy and where we lag behind. So I see enormous opportunities to lower electric bills and we're suffering through a property insurance crisis and flood insurance is not widely people just don't take it. Maybe they will now a little more these more intense hurricanes. But I see a political system that is not responding as it should for the people to have a plan to expedite the clean energy technologies, the plain weatherization, to use every tool at our disposal to help move to the clean energy economy through good paying jobs with an element of justice.</p><p>Fortunately, we now have a plan like that on the national level. But I worry it will be too disjointed and politics will come into play and the people who need it most will be denied the opportunity to have the lower cost clean energy, or the appliances, or the readily available EVs over ... in ten years that they should have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Speaking of red state politics, I'm curious, looking back, how much help would you say you got in all of this from the minority members of the committee? How on board were they versus trying to throw wrenches in the works? What's your sort of take on where the Republicans on your committee are on all this stuff, especially after three years of work?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Well, they don't outright deny climate change any longer, so they bring arguments on cost that some things are unworkable. So I guess one thing it does is it has us sharpen our pencils and make sure that what we are proposing is workable. There are some bipartisan solutions out there on natural solutions and resiliency and adaptation. We've had good discussions on that and crafted some legislation on that, but still on the clean energy side, they're not totally there. But again, I am hopeful because now businesses, small and large, innovators, universities, red states and blue states, rural areas and not, will, over time, understand and have access to the jobs, the careers, the opportunities that I think will push them. The problem is we're running out of time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to ask about that. So, one aspect of all the legislation they passed this last term, which I feel like doesn't really get enough press, I'm not sure if the public at large understands it very well. It's not just focused on reducing emissions and climate stuff, it is a big, industrial policy package. There's a ton of money to bring manufacturing and factories and mines and processing facilities and battery manufacturing and battery recycling, tons and tons of money to onshore those industries.</p><p>And I swear since the Inflation Reduction Act passed, I've probably seen like a half dozen, at least announcements of new plans for big manufacturing facilities. I just saw one plan for West Virginia yesterday, I forget what it is, if it's maybe battery manufacturing or recycling, one of those. So, one of the things that's going to happen — it's happening already — but it's going to continue happening in the next few years is a flood of jobs to red states. And I just wonder, is that going to change their position on this? Is that going to change their orientation on this stuff just at a grassroots level? Is incoming jobs going to shake people out of the partisanship on this and if so, when?</p><p>I realize there's no way to answer that question, but it seems like this ought to be sort of like an acid eating away at that opposition, right? The more jobs you have, the less opposition. Do you see that dynamic taking root yet or how long do you think that would take for that to sort of put down roots?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Yeah, there is nothing like your home grown, hometown industry and workers, your neighbors tell you these are good paying jobs. We see a future for our children to stay in this community, live here. There's nothing like that in moving a policymaker. And that's why we understood it was important to focus on energy communities. A rural, electric co-op here in Florida, they highlighted to me how important that was going to be to change over from old coal and gas into solar and other clean technologies. Oftentimes, those plants are the largest property taxpayer in those communities.</p><p>They are the largest employers. So, yes, over time that has to happen. But as I stated, we're running out of time, and so we're all in this together. But community engagement, that's why we thought it was also important to focus on building capacity among those energy intensive communities and the communities that have a lot of the polluting plants. And you'll see as the Biden administration rolls out grants and initiatives, they're going to stay true. I trust to that push for environmental justice, and I know a lot of people poopoo the term, but it simply is based on fairness. And we've got to follow through with our promise to make sure we're lifting up everyone, that everyone benefits from this transition to clean energy. Otherwise it will take longer and it will be harder.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I've kept you a while, but to wrap up, I thought it was quite notable that in the 2022 midterms, as contentious as they were, you did not see Republicans organizing around opposition to — I was going to say the Inflation Reduction Act, but really the Infrastructure Act, CHIPS — all these sorts of big, marquee legislative achievements, many of which crucially involved climate stuff. And the Inflation Reduction Act basically was a giant climate bill. They didn't run against those, which is a striking contrast, again, to back in 2010, when opposition to the Waxman-Markey bill, the quote unquote "carbon tax," was a headline feature of almost every Republican campaign.</p><p>They didn't campaign against this climate bill. So what do we make of that? Why did that happen? What what is what can we learn from them?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>You're right. They didn't shoot the Inflation Reduction Act with a shotgun.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly. No one shot it.</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>No, because climate impacts are all too real. All across the country, no one's immune. Whether you're suffering major water shortages in the west, Colorado River drying up, or huge wildfires, extreme heat, hurricanes that intensify faster, everyone ... there's been an awakening to the impacts of climate. And they cost so much. The folks aligned with fossil fuels, they've gotten away for years with saying, "Oh, we can't do clean energy because it's so expensive." Well, for one, clean energy is cheaper energy. But the cost of climate, the years of inaction or smaller steps were really costing us.</p><p>And I think people understand there are solutions out there. We just have to unleash the scientific know-how that we have here and convert a lot of those good ideas into actual solutions. We've got a lot of smart people — and a lot of dedicated people — who are ready to do this. And we're on the cusp of making it happen. I think having these huge gas price spikes, and people watch their neighbor with an EV doesn't even have to stop at the gas station and drives right by it. It kind of made people think twice. I know that F-150 electric truck as it rolls off, that's the number-one selling vehicle in America.</p><p>And they to think that you'll be able to come from the Florida perspective again. We have a hurricane, and they knock out your electricity and you can plug in your air conditioner, your home into that truck and power it for a while. So people now, they're waking up to ... okay, climate is ... if we don't address it now, we're condemning our kids to a bleaker future. And right now, it's costing us a lot, and we've got to get a hold of our wallets, too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you really think that climate denialism and the sort of anti-clean energy has lost its political potency on the right? Are you willing to lay down that marker?</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>I wouldn't say entirely, no. There are still members of Congress. They don't lead with it anymore.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>They don't lead with it, but it's there, unfortunately. But, I think we're poised to deliver again. But that's what it depends on, this implementation. And it's up to everyone. I hope everyone who listens to your podcast understands they also have a responsibility, and I trust they take that seriously, to be guided by the science and rooted injustice and powered by American workers to provide those solutions to our neighbors.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I do think, facts on the ground, as they say, generally do more to change people's minds than arguments and reports and white papers and IPCC meetings. So we'll get to see that tested in these next few years.</p><p>Thank you so much for coming on. I encourage everybody to read this report you guys put out. It's a really interesting sort of summary of what made it from your report into law and what remains to be done for Congress. Again, it's always policy nerds. Policy nerds will love this. It's very in-depth of what has and hasn't been done. And just thank you, again, for your work over these past three years.</p><p>I feel like it's not often, especially in the current American system of government, that you really get a chance to be at the center of something and help change things in a concrete way. And I feel like your committee has done that in a way that a lot of expert committees and meetings don't. So, congratulations on that and thanks for all your work.</p><p><strong>Rep. Kathy Castor</strong></p><p>Well, thank you, David. And again, we had a fantastic team, some committed members. We had the most effective Speaker of the House in the history of America, and Nancy Pelosi. And the Climate Committee was her vision, and she's always focused on making sure we're keeping an eye on our kids and future generations. But thanks to everyone. I bet a lot of your listeners weighed in with the Climate Committee along the way and helped us craft these solutions. And thanks to you for your attention to our work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/reflecting-on-the-work-of-the-soon</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:92217677</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 27 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/92217677/2ca83e39d18f98c785e35478ad15fa40.mp3" length="38301016" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3192</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/92217677/a8524c0a33fd92ed12f9b4ee2d9ec429.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The right-wing groups behind renewable energy misinformation]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>Independent journalist Michael Thomas did a deep dive into the methods and misinformation used by right-wing groups to rally community opposition to renewable energy projects. In this episode, he discusses what he found and how climate advocates can fight back.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAN1A_ShPMZJNdl03pD1J2ca/volts22.12.23%28michael.thomas%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/the-right-wing-groups-behind-renewable-energy-misinformation"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's easy to find stories in the media these days about communities blocking solar, wind, and other clean energy projects. This has prompted an enormous amount of discourse about NIMBYs and the challenges of permitting projects. What's often left out of the discourse — and almost always left out of those stories — is how such community groups receive organizational help and money from billionaire-funded right-wingers. </p><p>Across the country and the internet, there are hundreds of conservative think tanks, groups, and individuals working to stir up community opposition to renewable energy with misinformation and lies. With virtually no public scrutiny, they have secured state-level policies restricting renewable energy siting in dozens of states.</p><p>Independent journalist Michael Thomas set about to learn more about these right-wing groups. He joined anti-renewable-energy Facebook groups, combed through the tax filings of various right-wing think tanks, and tried to trace funding sources. He published the results in his own newsletter, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.distilled.earth/">Distilled</a>. </p><p>I'm excited to talk to him about what he found: the groups involved, the tactics they use, the policies they've helped pass, and the best way to fight back.</p><p>All right then, with no further ado, Michael Thomas. Welcome to Volts. Thank you so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me. I've been a longtime reader and I'm a fan of the Volts podcast. So really happy to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So for some reason you decided to jump in and immerse yourself in the world of anti-renewable-energy people and organizations and communications online. Before we jump into the specifics, what led you to this? Did you get sort of pulled in bit by bit or did you decide to do a project on this at some point?</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah, it was honestly not that intentional. I was reading a lot of stories over the summer about NIMBY opposition to local solar and wind projects and was following a lot of the discourse and debate over the permitting reform bill. And one story caught my attention that was about a group of residents on the east coast that were trying to block an offshore wind farm and a substation that was going to be put on land to bring the power to land. And it appeared to be just a normal resident group, kind of the classic NIMBY arguments that they were worried about property values or didn't like the site of the wind farm.</p><p>And then I read this subtle, just one line mention of a think tank that I had heard of, the Caesar Rodney Institute, and this is a part of a much larger group of think tanks that have been funded for years by fossil fuel companies and far-right billionaires. So I started looking into it and discovered that they were very involved in the effort and giving some of these resident groups money to fund lawsuits and support. And so I started to report on that story, and it kind of got me deep into the world of climate misinformation and clean energy misinformation, and I just really became curious about what was going on and if there was a bigger story here, and ended up working on a series of stories over the last month and a half. And I learned a lot in the process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is a theme I'll return to later, but it really in some sense should not come as a surprise to anyone that this network of anti-renewable energy, "citizen groups" across the country is being funded and coordinated by right-wing operators. Like, of course it is — you know, the Tea Party was — like, we've just learned that over and over again. But it just seems like the pro-renewable energy forces, the pro-climate forces, just kind of sleep on that and just kind of don't pay attention to it, just kind of let it run in the background.</p><p>So it's a little insane that it's not a bigger point of discussion among green types. So I'm glad you did this and I'm glad we're talking about it. So one of the things you did, God bless you, is wade into Facebook and join a bunch of anti-wind and solar groups — Good Lord — so tell us what messages about renewable energy are they emphasizing in these groups? Like, what are the consistent themes?</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I clearly know how to have a good time by joining all of these groups and sifting through the posts. So as context, I was doing this reporting on local opposition and learning about some of these think tanks. And I learned in that research that a lot of these resident groups are organizing on Facebook groups and pages. And that makes sense if you look at the demographics of these groups, they tend to be a lot of boomers and a lot of people who are very active on Facebook. And so I joined a few of them at first.</p><p>And then in the groups there are often reshares of posts and other groups. And so by joining three or four, I quickly started to see that there were way more of these groups than I had initially expected. And in total I ended up finding about 40 groups. I joined all of them and just started scrolling through and looking at the posts and taking screenshots and taking notes and trying to understand how do the people that are in these groups communicate about clean energy? What are the common narratives? Because there are usually between 500 and 2,000 people in these groups, so we're talking about tens of thousands of people in very small communities that are receiving this messaging.</p><p>So it's I think, really important...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And of course, you know, just to point out the obvious, these are probably the hard core and they take those messages and spread them word of mouth to many, many thousands more, right?</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a much larger audience than just the members.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's also — I think — really important to note that these tend to be the most civically engaged people. So on TikTok, a video might go viral about how great solar panels are, but if the people watching that video don't show up to the county commission meeting, then it doesn't really matter necessarily. Or it does matter, but it's not as effective. So these are a lot of people who are retired or who are very engaged in their communities. And so what starts on Facebook quickly bleeds into town halls and county commission meetings. And often the discourse is really intense and really emotionally charged.</p><p>But to answer your question of what sort of themes and messages I saw, there was a range of posts. Some of them were misleading claims about clean energy. Like, an example that I saw a lot of was that solar panels and wind turbines are made using rare earth materials and they're made in China, and China uses a lot of coal. And so the implication is that clean energy is not actually that clean and it's not good for the environment, which, of course, the status quo energy system we have today that relies on fossil fuels, is terrible for the environment, kills millions of people a year, and is wreaking havoc on our environment.</p><p>And these are solutions that are orders of magnitude better, but certainly not perfect. So they're sort of driving a wedge in some of that. And another similar one is that wind turbines kill birds. Of course, famous argument against wind. So you'll see memes like if this was a bird that had been killed by oil spill, this image would be all over the front page news. And that one spread like wildfire. Like that thing had tens of thousands of shares.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, yes, you get the hypocrisy of the mainstream media in there too. You you're hitting all the buttons.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Exactly. And then another that starts to get us into the — from misleading to just lies — is that the wind turbines or solar panels are going to destroy property values. So we're talking about 25%, 50% declines in your property value. And this is, of course, famously shared by Donald Trump in a, I think, RNC meeting a couple of years ago where he says wind turbines cause cancer and if you live near them — BANG — 50% drop in your property values. So...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's just pause to note that Donald Trump is just perfectly squarely in the demographic to be receiving these messages.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Totally. And interestingly, he's been against wind energy for years. I mean, his goes back to like, 2012.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a golf course, right?</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>I think in Scotland there was a golf course that they were going to set up wind turbines near, and so he's been spreading this misinformation longer than most people. So that was a really common one — the property value argument. Of course, again, numerous studies have shown that there's either minimal or no impact on property values when clean energy projects go into a community. But there is one London School of Economics study, which is a big name, very reputable source, that found that it dropped by I think it's something like 8% or 10% that gets shared a lot in these communities and by some of these influential anti-clean-energy thought leaders.</p><p>And important to look at that study and the actual details of it, because if you do, it found that there were only three homes that they looked at. So we're talking about a sample size of three. And again, if you look at much larger sample sizes, there is no evidence that it really hurts property values. And then the last two that I'll share, kind of archetypes of posts I saw, one was the "wind turbine on fire" post.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I love... They love those "wind turbine on fire" pictures. I see those all the time, even on Twitter.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I was really surprised to see these at first. I actually hadn't ever seen an image of a wind turbine on fire or a video. But when I'm scrolling through these groups, they're like every ten posts or something. And I started to think like, oh my God, this stuff is dangerous. Like, if a wind turbine caught fire and it falls down, you can see where it would scare you. So I looked into the data to see how common this was, and of course, I found that the Department of Energy has done a study on this.</p><p>They found that I think in 2017, there were something like 50,000 wind turbines in the country, and only 40 of them had a safety incident like this. So it's an incredibly rare event that is made to seem very common and therefore really scary to imagine a project like that going up in your community. And then the last one that I'll share, this is kind of a famous anti-wind piece of misinformation, was posts about wind turbine syndrome. This is something that I had never heard of before, and I'm clearly in different communities. And so this is based on a 2006 study that found that there were a number of people living near wind farms that would develop headaches and nausea.</p><p>And this study spread like crazy. And there have been something like 20 or 25 peer-reviewed studies on this since then, and none of them have been able to replicate the same findings. None of them have found any association between wind turbines and negative health effects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I feel like I remember one out of England where they had like, wind turbine syndrome, and then they did like, a community comparison in another community. They went in early and paid residents, they basically paid residents, like, a small percentage of the profits of the wind farm, you know, to buy them in. And there was no wind turbine syndrome at all in the second community.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Interesting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Weirdly. A little money can ward off of that particular syndrome, it seems.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>So one interesting thing that I found in some of this research on wind turbine syndrome is that there's one exception that I found where people do start to develop negative health effects, and that's if they've already read information about wind turbine syndrome or about the negative health effects. And so it's actually really sad because a lot of people are posting this stuff and they're reaching a lot of communities that may or may not end up with wind turbines. And there's a great story in BuzzFeed a year or two back that was written by Joseph Bernstein, and he interviewed a lot of people. And in the end, he kind of concludes the story, saying that as he started to talk to more people and he was sleeping in his hotel near the wind farm, he suddenly started to hear it, and he suddenly started to be driven crazy.</p><p>It's unfortunate because I think a lot of people will probably have that placebo or start to be affected by those — in their community.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is so darkly hilarious. So let's talk a little bit about how these groups organize. I mean, it's not like these random groups of misinformed and irritable boomers know instinctively how to organize, how to communicate, how to get results, how to block things at the state level. So how's — Let's talk a little bit about the people who are helping them. And you did a piece specifically about this guy named John Droz Jr. Tell us a little bit about him. He's helping these groups organize. What is he kind of telling them? What sort of advice is he giving to these groups?</p><p>Like, presumably he's on the lookout for these groups and in communication with all these groups. What's his message to them?</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah, so John Droz is certainly one of the most interesting people I've ever reported on. I learned about him as I was wading into the misinformation in some of these communities. I started to see a lot of posts to this guy's website, and I went and looked at the site, and it just has tons of resources on how to block a wind project or a solar project in your community. And they're incredibly effective tools. All, of course, styled in bright red fonts and, like, Comic Sans font and PDFs, but just like, packed with dense, probably really great information if you're trying to kill a project.</p><p>But stylistically, certainly interesting. So some backstory on John Droz. In 2011, he was a retired real estate investor, spent most of his career buying and flipping real estate in North Carolina. And that year, he learned about this bill that was going through the state legislature, debating what to do about sea level rise that was coming and how to adapt to that as a state. So Droz, who has no background in climate science or climate adaptation or anything related, creates 125 slide PowerPoint titled "Our Sea Level Policy: From Science or Lobbyists?". And he goes through and basically debunks NOAA.</p><p>And all of these US agencies, science and all these peer-reviewed studies saying none of this is true and the sea level here isn't going to rise and climate change isn't happening and kind of puts in all of the classic climate denial in this thing. And he was incredibly effective at getting the ear of the Republican legislators. So he met with tons of them, gave this presentation to them and was even quoted in the Washington Post in an article. Somehow the Washington Post fact checking team didn't catch this. But there was a story that ran where he cited as a local physicist and as an opponent to this bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Kind of what you call a lay physicist maybe.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Exactly. So North Carolina eventually decides to vote against this bill. They don't take those climate adaptation measures. And this gets the attention of American Tradition Institute — ATI, which is a climate-denial think tank that became well known when they attacked some climate scientists like Michael Mann and spread a bunch of lies about him. And so ATI brings John Droz on as a senior fellow. And in 2012 they organized this now infamous anti-wind-energy meeting in DC with really a Who's Who of climate deniers and and a group of local residents around the country who are trying to block projects.</p><p>And there was a leaked memo from this meeting that I think is worth quoting from. Do you mind if I share a few minutes from this to give you a sense of what it has? So it leads: "The minimum national campaign goal is to constructively influence national and state wind-energy policies." Then they go on: "The goal is to cause subversion in the message of industry so that it effectively becomes so bad no one wants to admit in public that they are for it." — and they're talking about wind energy — "much like wind has done to coal by turning green to black and clean to dirty." Ultimate goal: Change policy direction based on the message.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How many dozens of sort of vaguely progressive campaigns have you seen that are out there just raising awareness, you know, with — the left loves to raise awareness — and this guy on the right is like screw awareness. We want to change policy! We are after policy changes!</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Totally, and they were incredibly effective at this. So this is back in 2012 and Droz understood long before terms like Fake News or Alternative Facts became really popular. He knew that if you provided people with an alternative story or an alternative set of facts, some small percentage of the population is going to believe it. So rather than debate the little policy details and kind of get lost in the weeds and maybe make a large number of people mildly opposed to clean energy, they spread this misinformation that gets a very small number of people incredibly passionate and incredibly emotionally charged and believing lies about clean energy.</p><p>Things like: Wind energy is bad for the environment. That's an example of "turning clean to dirty", which is what he wanted to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Famously, Karl Rove's strategy, right? He's like, you find your opponent's virtues, what they're selling as their virtues, and go straight at them, right?</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Totally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You go straight at the merits and so you go after sustainability and you go after, you know, good for the economy and good for the environment.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Absolutely. So he ended up teaching all of these activists that were at the meeting and then in the ten years since then, he's taught thousands of people some of these tactics. And as I was going through all of his materials on his site and looking through old documents, I kind of started to write down John Droz's Rules for anti-wind opposition. And one of them that really stood out to me was this belief of his that in order to win, you have to have aggressive demands and stick to them. So it's all about holding your line and saying, we don't want a single wind turbine in our community. It's not about taking concessions like...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wait, not preemptively conceding things, not going in saying: We're reasonable, we want to find a reasonable middle. Wow, interesting, interesting, interesting...</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>So they basically just say, we don't want a single project or a single turbine to go up. And this is part of what creates such a toxic discourse in local communities because there's no attempt at compromise, which is, I think, a really important thing for local communities when they're debating these things. And instead they aim for either outright bans of wind energy through these local ordinances or setback requirements that require a wind turbine to be cited something like 2000ft from a home or like 2000ft away from one another. And when you play this out, wind companies just can't create a project in a community like that. So it's an effective ban — but different language.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I was aware of this happening, but it's kind of amazing. So the Biden administration has these huge goals for offshore wind and has made a bunch of big announcements and started various processes. And since they have made announcements, they have been sued in every state on the coast. So just so listeners are aware of the scope of this thing, like, there are these anti-wind groups seated in every state where there's wind. So one of the things you wrote about in that story is none of the local media stories about these groups — you know, so like, they propose an offshore wind farm and some sort of like "earnest residence for good things" group starts.</p><p>And the local media inevitably treats these as spontaneous democratic uprisings of citizens. And it's not that hard — you don't have to dig that hard — to find out that they're all getting funding from the same sort of network. So, A: Do you have any diagnosis of what the hell is wrong with local media? Why won't they tell the story and then B: Tell us a little bit about the State Policy Network, the SPN, on the right and it's sort of network of funding.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Sure. So the State Policy Network and the group of think tanks that are members of this are really the core of the fossil fuel funded opposition and a lot of the things that we talked about earlier. So there's a group of, I think it's something like 50 think tanks. They're all set up as 501c3 nonprofits and they're in states across the country. And if anyone's read Jane Mayer's amazing book on this topic — Dark Money — about the Koch brothers efforts to try to prevent climate policy from passing in the country, you'll know that a lot of fossil fuel billionaires were involved in setting up these nonprofits.</p><p>So a lot of the think tanks in the State Policy Network were either co-founded with the Koch brothers or given initial seed funding by the Koch brothers, who run — I'm sure all of your listeners know — Koch Industries, one of the biggest fossil fuel companies in the country. And since then, the Koch brothers continue to fund a lot of these nonprofits. But so do dozens or hundreds of billionaires that are in other extractive and dirty industries around the country and don't want to see climate policy pass. So the State Policy Network is the organizer of all of this so that they can take learnings from one state and pass those through to the rest of the states.</p><p>So most recently, a group of bills that I saw that passed through the State Policy Network was some of the preemption bans on local governments that wanted to ban natural gas in buildings. So it's no coincidence that all of those preemption bans had similar, or in some cases the exact same language. It's a combination of the State Policy Network and then ALEC, the American Legislative... — I'm going to butcher the acronym — but there's basically the State Policy Network doing the 501c3 kind of research and then ALEC writes the policy and gives it to legislators to pass. So that's some background on state policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's worth just emphasizing briefly. It's not just that these groups get sort of standardized scripts and directions for how to oppose things. There's a whole network of right wing groups that has these sort of model bills, model legislation, model for every level of government, so that these groups don't have to investigate policy or write their own policy, right? They just take the template and change a few keywords. So it makes things very easy. It's very easy for these groups. Every step is worked out for them. PS.: It's the American Legislative Exchange Council that is incredibly difficult to remember.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yes, thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Probably on purpose, right? I mean, it's meant to be bland and forgettable.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah. Jane Mayer read this article where she did some reporting on the State Policy Network. And there was an internal meeting between these think tanks where the head of State Policy Network described their strategy and their model, like "The Ikea of Conservative Policy" where you just, like, grab all your parts and pieces and assemble them...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly!</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>...yourself and then pass the bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All you need is the Allen wrench and everything else is there for you.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>She's also described that kind of ecosystem as — like an assembly line where groups fund colleges first and universities that do research on something like climate policy or climate science. So the Koch brothers are giving millions and millions of dollars to universities and then the think tanks take the ideas from those universities and they turn them into policy ideas. And then ALEC and legislators that have been given money by these billionaires, they craft the actual policy and the legal language and then they fund the politicians who end up voting for those and it becomes an assembly line of conservative and anti-climate policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's like a vertically integrated Ikea that owned its own supply chain and like its own customers, you know what I mean? It's like a full ecosystem. And so this seems notable, right? So why doesn't the media note it? I mean, it's a little insane. It seems like the first thing you'd do if you ran across one of these citizen groups, is be like, I wonder where this came from. Who's funding these people? But they don't even seem to ask.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah, and it's important because the State Policy Network think tanks are setting up campaigns and are giving legal support to these groups. So they're very much intertwined and it's very much an effort by the fossil fuel industry through these nonprofits to block this policy. Just to give an example, one of the groups I'm currently writing a story on, Caesar Rodney Institute, they sent out 35,000 mailers in 2018 to residents all along the coast that were going to see one of these wind projects. And they sent them all of the misinformation that I mentioned earlier that I saw in these Facebook groups and then also a call for financial support.</p><p>And they ended up raising $50,000 from these residents. They got 700 residents to join the group that they set up that had a very local grassroot name to it. It's like, Save Our Coast. And so now this group can in some ways legitimately say that we have 700 residents from the community who don't want this project to exist when they've really manufactured that opposition using money from fossil fuel companies to do it. So, of course, Caesar Rodney Institute got an award from the State Policy Network for this. It was one of the best communications campaigns of 2020.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it is too. I hate it. You hate to say anything positive about this, but this is all brilliant. I mean, it's all so well done. Well done evil.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>It's incredibly effective. And so to your question of why the local media in these communities aren't covering this, I think this is a part of the larger story of the collapse of local news in America. So there's a part of this that is the story of these hedge funds, or what are known as Vulture Funds, who go and buy up local papers and gut them, fire all the journalists. And suddenly a newsroom that used to have 20 people has two people, and they just graduated from college. So that's not going to produce the best reporting. And then you also have a media environment that is encouraging really quick stories, getting stuff out every single day and not doing deep reporting.</p><p>So it's just hard to catch this when you get a press release. You turn that press release into an article and hit publish two hours later and that's the environment we're in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it seems like a concerted — I mean, I'll return to this later. I don't want to get into it now. — But it seems like a concerted effort to push this information so that local journalists had access to it could be done, say, by a clever billionaire on the left. But before we get to that, one of the twists of messaging lately is something you call Woke Washing. Let's just touch on that briefly. This is from something that the Texas Public Policy Foundation, which is one of these right wing think tanks in the State Policy Network. Another incredibly forgettable name, but it's one of the campaigns they're running. Tell us a little bit about what Woke Washing means.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yes. So Emily Atkin — Heated, another Substack publication — and I ran a story recently about the Texas Public Policy Foundation, or TPPF, and one of the things that we looked at was how they're using environmental laws to block offshore wind projects. And a couple of the laws they're using are NEPA and the Endangered Species Act. And it's worth noting that TPPF in the Trump years was basically attacking these same laws, saying that they're preventing the country from building the energy that it needs and they're destroying the economy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The right has been attacking those laws since the sixties and seventies when they were passed, right?</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah. So TPPF took a pretty dramatic turn when Biden got in office and has suddenly become one of the biggest advocates for the Endangered Species Act and NEPA. And most recently, they funded a group of local fishermen on the East Coast who wanted to sue the Biden administration over their offshore wind leases. And in the lawsuit, they didn't make a lot of commercial claims. It wasn't necessarily about the fishing. It was really all about how these wind farms were going to further endanger the North Atlantic right whale, which is an endangered whale — of course an endangered species and needs to be protected.</p><p>But there's a whole process that a lot of environmental groups like NRDC and Conservation Law Foundation have signed off on and signed an agreement with the developers of these projects. And there are a lot of measures taken to make sure that the construction of these projects don't further endanger those whales, but TPPF is suing the Biden administration using these laws and really just trying to slow these projects down. So the term Woke Washing came up when we interviewed a disinformation expert, and she used this term to describe when far right groups use the language of justice to basically fight for injustice and against environmental law.</p><p>So you're using the language of the environmental movement to prevent its goals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>God, it's effective too, because some of these concerns are not baseless. Like you say, if you're going to protect the right whale, you do need to take measures. So if any of these groups cared about constructively engaging — The concerns are plausible enough that I can see how they work quite well.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's very devious.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>It's also another example of where these groups are pushing for the far extreme solution and not compromise. So in these lawsuits, the end of them says that the plaintiff's request or the plaintiff's claim is that they want all projects that are associated with this new streamlined offshore lease program that was started in the Obama years. They want all of those projects to be stopped entirely. So that's every single offshore wind project in America, and we're talking about tens of gigawatts of power. And so they're not asking for what the environmental groups asked for when they were trying to protect the right whale, which is just some mitigation efforts and some changes to how they were going to construct the farm. They're trying to kill every single project in America.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Organizing these groups — these citizen groups on Facebook — is of course not the only way of reaching people on Facebook. There's also just Facebook ads. So in that respect, let's talk about PragerU, Prager University — it makes me laugh to say the word university associated with this, but nonetheless that's what it's called. Tell us about Prager and PragerU and the sort of revelation that one of their co-founders have and how they sort of implemented that in practice.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>So PragerU is a nonprofit media company that was started by Dennis Prager, who was a conservative radio host, still is, but has been doing this for about 30 years. And when I was in these local opposition groups on Facebook, I noticed a lot of their videos popping up and so I wanted to dig in and learn more about PragerU. I watched a lot of YouTube and have for many years, and so I was already a little bit aware of the channel because...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They're everywhere.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's everywhere.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Anyone who spends time on YouTube will say that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They come up on my feed. My son sees them fly by all the time. They're ubiquitous.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah, they target eleven and twelve year old. You see these stories, parents around of like, what is this group doing sending my son these ads of PragerU? So I looked at their YouTube channel and tried to find all the videos that were related to climate and energy, ended up finding about 20 of them. And the titles of these videos kind of give away the message like, it's so simple. One of them is: "Fossil fuels: Greener than you think". The whole message of this video, which is delivered by Alex Epstein, who wrote a book called The Moral Case for Fossil Fuels, is that fossil fuels are clean, they're good for the environment, and that everything you've heard from environmentalists is wrong.</p><p>And other videos include claims that clean energy is really bad for the environment. These are delivered by people like Michael Shellenberger and Bjørn Lomborg, and they're again making misleading claims based on real problems like wind turbines kill endangered birds, or clean energy projects are built using materials that create environmental harm.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the interesting things you mentioned in the story is that they were sort of big into the straight up climate-denial business, but then Facebook and Google passed policies saying you can't do the straight up climate-denial anymore. And that sort of created a pivot. Talk about that a little bit.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah, so after many years of creating videos with claims like, there's no evidence that CO2 causes climate change, which is of course not true, Facebook and Google changed their policies not to limit their videos. So their videos are still on these platforms, but they limited the ability for them to use ads to promote them. So I looked at Facebook's ad transparency tool and I looked through PragerU Form 990 IRS documents, and I found that they were spending tens of millions of dollars per year promoting videos on Facebook and Google.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wild.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>That's in part how they were able to reach 100 million people with these videos about climate change, fossil fuels being good, clean energy being bad. And I also looked into where they got the money because PragerU is a nonprofit and trying to figure out, like, is there any connection here between fossil fuel companies? And sure enough, what I found was that in 2013, PragerU received a $6.25 million grant commitment from the Wilks brothers in Texas who started FracTech, a fracking company, and they gave them a huge amount of funding to make their videos. It's worth, just for reference, pointing out that PragerU at the time was bringing in about $400,000 a year.</p><p>So this is a huge amount of money for them at the time. And as a part of this, two members of the Wilks family joined the board. And then shortly afterwards, they started making these videos about climate change and clean energy and fossil fuels. And the members of the family were still on the board while they were making them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, but then to get back to the policy, the anti-denialism policy, they sort of have pivoted. And this seems like — it's hard not to see the whole right as a school of fish sometimes — but it seems like they've all kind of pivoted away from the hard denialism toward the kind of Shellenberger-style, Lomborg-style "green energy isn't green" message.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah. And PragerU has definitely started to do this and they are basically able to get around the new policies by Google and Facebook that have limited their ability to spread those pure climate denial videos and are now promoting the videos that say that clean energy isn't good for the environment, which, of course, is going to be almost impossible for these tech companies to regulate. Because what's the difference between a legitimate NPR story about a problem that we really need to figure out and need to solve around the environmental impact of some of this mining for rare-earth materials and the impact it's having on local communities? What's the difference between that and PragerU's video pointing it out but turning a little bit of spin and maybe putting some misleading claims in it?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's one thing to police outright falsehoods, but you really cannot police good faith, right? There is no algorithm for separating good faith from bad faith claims in these videos. So there's no real way to systematically — it seems to me, I mean, maybe you've thought of something else — but it seems to me like there's just no systematic way to stop this stuff or block it or even flag it. There's no real mechanism to do anything about it directly. Am I wrong about that?</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>No, I think this is just a really hard problem to solve. I think that there's definitely ways to prevent some of it or there's better solutions out there between some of these tech companies. Like the last couple of weeks has shown us with Twitter that there's a lot of different approaches that tech companies can take before being legally required to do something. Facebook and Google have said that they're going to flag climate misinformation. They aren't doing a great job — have a lot of room for improvement. They've said that they won't let people spend to promote climate denial in their videos.</p><p>But then now you have Twitter and Elon Musk just unleashing a free-for-all of what he says is free speech but in a lot of cases is hateful rhetoric and in the case of climate change, just misinformation and lies and unsurprisingly, people like Jordan Peterson have come back and are posting a lot of stuff about climate change with claims like CO2 is good for the environment and climate change isn't happening. And so I think there's definitely a lot that these tech companies can do and Twitter is evidence that what they do has a real impact and can limit some of the spread of these ideas. But another thing that I ran across in some of my research — that some tech companies have started to experiment with — is this idea of pre-bunking where you basically expose people to facts about climate change before they click a link that has known misinformation on it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>And this comes out of some research out of Yale, I believe, and the impact of that in some studies seems to be good, but definitely not perfect and doesn't change people's opinions in a big way. So it's definitely not a panacea.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We here on the left come to this dilemma again and again, which is you don't just want to be thinking about how to suppress other people's speech. That's an uncomfortable kind of place for us to be. That's not you know, you're constantly sort of dancing up against ethical quandaries and people who make those videos, what are you going to argue with them about whether it's good faith or bad faith. They can say it's good faith and — you know what I mean — so there's no — it seems like the root of trying to suppress their speech is fraught.</p><p>I mean, A: ethically fraught, and B: on a practical level just doesn't seem to be very possible. But then, of course, you read all these studies about misinformation which tell you that once this kind of information is in someone's head, it is almost impossible to root it out. No matter how many good facts you throw in the wake of bad facts, it's almost impossible to change people's minds. And you read all these studies that, say, being exposed to these talking points again and again, even in the context of seeing them debunked, lodges them in your freaking head.</p><p>So you end up — even if you see a thing debunked again and again — the talking point sticks in your head and you end up sort of like believing it. So it's this horns of a dilemma that the left is on again and again, which is misinformation seems to work, but there doesn't seem to be any reliable way to stop or suppress it.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's a famous study on this that I'm sure you're referring to, which is around some ads that Listerine ran in the 70s where they internally knew that Listerine wouldn't do this, but they ran these ads that said that by using Listerine mouthwash, you could prevent the common cold. Or if you got a cold, it was a really good remedy. And they sold tons of listerine this way. They ran all these TV ads with moms telling their kids, come on over, need your listerine. So the FTC caught them and sued them and ended up making them, as a part of the lawsuit, run ads that basically said, sorry, we were wrong and correct the claim. This is definitely a different time of...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Imagine!</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>...communications and regulation, but even after running this multimillion dollar campaign to sort of correct the record, people, when they were surveyed, still believed that Listerine would prevent or was a good remedy for the common cold. And it was something like 80% of people still believed that Listerine had these effects. So this is a famous study in misinformation science and it just speaks to how difficult it is to change people's minds once that information has hit them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I guess here's where I kind of come around on this. If we think that trying to get tech platforms to uniformly impose standards of accuracy on all the trillions of bytes of information that pass through them seems kind of impossible, and changing people's minds after they've already seen this stuff is very difficult. It just kind of seems like the only solution you're left with is do the opposite, right? Get good information into people's hands. So here's my question to you, and there's no good answer to this question, so I don't expect you to have one.</p><p>But on the right, okay, you've got these billionaires. They funnel tons and tons of money and establish this broad network of think tanks, which then go on to share lessons about how to oppose these things they don't like, which they funnel down to local groups, which are more or less kind of disguised as spontaneous citizen groups. And you got other people on the right, got Prager alone spending like $20 million in the last four or five years on Facebook ads so that they become — they get their message out ubiquitously on Facebook. So, as we've discussed, there's this entire coherent ecosystem of right wing — and this is of course — all of this is just clean energy entering this ecosystem.</p><p>But this ecosystem goes way back. They've been building this forever. They've been using it against all the things they don't like. This is just sort of like clean energy getting absorbed into that Borg. So my question is, what is the analog on the left among people who support renewable energy? Is anybody — are there any billionaires? Where are the billionaires? Is there a network of think tanks that I'm not aware of? Are there astroturf groups, pro renewable energy astroturf groups? Is there someone spending $20 million on pro-renewable energy Facebook ads? Is any of this mirrored on the left?</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>So I think one of the good things that the climate movement has going for it is that the facts are on the movement side and the science.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's such a tiny weapon, Michael. That's the least effective weapon in the whole war.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>I mentioned it, though, because I think that there's a lot of free media, if you will, that comes by reporters and documentaries and all this stuff that has really brought climate change into the public's awareness in the last ten years. I think that is largely a result of media going back, of course, to The Inconvenient Truth and some of the advocacy of Al Gore. But now Netflix has all of these documentaries. Whenever I talk to my friends who are not in this world, they'll tell me that they learned about clean energy and climate change from a Netflix documentary.</p><p>But to me — to more directly answer your question, like more overt attempts to change minds or to influence advocacy. There's a YouTube channel that I've been watching for the last year that's become pretty popular called Climate Town and it's a John Oliver, Steven Colbert style of humor all focused on climate change and clean energy and the fossil fuel industry's attempts to block clean energy. Rollie Williams started this channel and had a career in stand up comedy and decided to use his skills to fight the good fight. And his videos have hundreds of thousands, sometimes millions of views spreading messages like my first time when he made a video about the negative health impacts of gas stoves and talking about alternatives like induction cooktops.</p><p>So that's one channel. He's recently partnered with nonprofit Climate Changemakers that does climate advocacy and trains people on how to be effective advocates in their local community and also in federal politics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I was going to say like the missing piece — what would happen on the right is, if a promising YouTuber emerged and got hundreds of thousands of clicks for spreading their message, they would be descended on by a swarm of people, giving them money and setting them up so that they could do it on a bigger level forever and never have to worry about money again. They would be immediately absorbed into the right wing money train.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Right? Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Where's the analog for that? That's what's missing. It's not, you don't have tons of creative, interesting young people out doing cool things. Where is the infrastructure of money and organization that finds them, elevates them, supports them, connects them with one another?</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Where is that, Michael? I don't know why I'm demanding this with you.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Well, I will also just make a shameless plug and say that I am launching a YouTube channel in the coming weeks and am planning to produce Vox style explainers to kind of speak to your alma mater. I think their YouTube channel is amazing and reaches millions of people.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's fantastic.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>And what I'm planning to do is turn some of these investigations that I've done on PragerU for example — is going to be the first video — and try to get them in front of large audiences and put in a lot of production value to it. So I'm hoping to be able to sort of counter some of those messages.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let's talk in a year and see if any left wing billionaires have gotten in touch with you. After you do that for a while, I'd be very curious.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah, another effort that I think is really valuable and again to talk about your alma mater Vox. I was recently reading some stories in their column Future Perfect about the future of plant-based diets and really talking about the environmental and other ethical harms that are caused by the meat and dairy industry. And I noticed as I was reading that that project has been supported by donors and so I know that Vox doesn't take any money and then let those donors...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Including some uncomfortable donors...</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Future Perfect got a lot of money from Sam Bankman-Fried. That's a whole different subject.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Oh no, really?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just goes to make my point, like even when we try to do the "left wing billionaire funds — good messages things", it somehow still turns into a dumpster fire. We need better billionaires, I think.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah, or no billionaires might be the best solution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Billionaires working toward a world where there are no billionaires.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Yeah, but yeah, I think — to just get to your point, I don't think that environmental groups have figured this out. And I think that the right is so much more effective at getting people emotionally charged. And I think evidence of this is if you look at some of the local communities where these fights are happening over clean energy, even though there's so much information out there on the benefits of clean energy and the problem of climate change. In the example I saw most recently of a community in Michigan, last week, this community polled at like 55% of people support clean energy in their community.</p><p>But someone sent me an image of the township meeting where they were voting on it, and there was hundreds of people packed in an auditorium and this Person told me...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Were they old and white, Michael?</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>They were all old and white, and only three of those hundreds of people were there to support the clean energy project. So I think that speaks to how much emotion plays in this. Like if you hear about how clean energy has some benefits and it might provide some tax base for your school — it's like you might feel like you support it, but you're not going to feel as emotionally charged as if you see a picture of a wind turbine on fire or think that it's going to cause your kids cancer. And unfortunately, that's what the right is doing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I've said this so many times on this podcast, might as well say it again, intensity wins in politics. This is a point you're sort of making again and again. Like a large group of mildly supportive people is useless in the face of a small group of intensely motivated people because intensely motivated people make noise and politicians hear noise. Politicians cannot distinguish large groups from small groups. All they hear is noise. And if you make a lot of noise, you win. And this is something I talked with David Fenton, the left PR guy on a pod a while back, and this is something he told me again and again.</p><p>Like in the green groups, there are millions, hundreds of millions of dollars floating around through these groups and they produce endless sort of studies and white papers and reports and do sort of behind the scenes policy work, but they just don't spend on propaganda — to use the charged term for it. They don't go out and spend $20 million buying Facebook ads. And the point he made is like, it's not that expensive to buy a bunch of ads on Facebook to buy an ad in the New York Times or Wall Street Journal to buy ads to carpet the sort of metro stations in DC where policymakers are walking around. It doesn't cost that much and they have a bunch of money.</p><p>They just are not habituated to act that way. And so I hope that, among other things, your work here sort of showing how this ecosystem works and showing how well it works, will just, like, knock someone's head together who's funding these left groups and cause them to get in the business of communicating and trying to change the public's mind instead of just putting out facts like you say, like good reports, like spreadsheets on the tax impacts and just hoping people take those facts and translate them themselves into emotion. You've got to give people the emotion. You've got to do some communicating and propagandizing and we're doing none and they're doing an amazing amount coordinated across the entire country.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Can I ask a question of you and see what are your thoughts on an effective version of this on the left that I've seen that's very controversial?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, sure.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>So I haven't made up my mind on this debate. But something that has been hotly debated in the climate community over the last year is a lot of the rhetoric around the world is ending; climate change is going to wreak havoc on the planet; your kids lives are going to be terrible because of climate change. These like kind of over the top types of rhetoric. I listened to Adam McKay on your podcast — he came on a couple of times — and the second time when he was talking about Build Back Better, I was just struck by how he was kind of taking this extreme stance of climate change and at the time I was thinking Build Back — or the Inflation Reduction Act rather — was a great bill.</p><p>But after this conversation I'm wondering if that rhetoric is needed and if the sort of emotionally charged language is maybe more effective than some of the debates around permitting reform around the policy and all that. But I guess just to ask the question, do you think that some of that rhetoric and the exaggeration maybe of how bad climate change will be, is effective?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I, like you, am ambivalent about it. I think my take is it's a little bit like one hand clapping. I think fear does motivate people. I think the idea that fear doesn't motivate people is just ludicrous. Like fear motivates people to do all sorts of things. But you need — I mean this is — the problem is on both the right and the left, it's just much easier to oppose things and it's just much easier to gin up emotion in opposition to things. This is one of the reasons that the climate activist movement sort of seems drawn inexorably to fighting pipelines and fighting things and fighting wells and all these things because you can get people in the streets for that.</p><p>That's why the Keystone Pipeline, despite its sort of irrelevance in the grand carbon picture, sparked a whole giant march and a whole giant movement because people are fired up by opposing things. And the riddle to me, which I do not know the answer to, is how, if you're a PragerU or if you're a left wing billionaire, how to spark passion and real fire in favor of things. In favor of building things, right? Because we got to pivot now to building things. You know this we've been talking about this online. The whole movement needs to pivot to building a shitload of stuff like we got to build faster and more than we've ever built in our lives.</p><p>And so how do you create passionate fired up support such that people will go to these meetings and yell and scream in support of building things? And I just hate to end this podcast on a note of bafflement but I really don't know. Do you have any ideas?</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Like you, I am not overly optimistic on some of this but I think there's probably enough cynicism or pessimism out there. So maybe just to end on some inspiring note, I think the most recent abundance movement or supply side progressivism that some of the folks like Derek Thompson at the Atlantic and Ezra Klein at New York Times now are talking about is really important. I think that the left has probably become too skeptical of technology and in some cases for really great reasons. But I think that we need to start talking about a really beautiful and amazing future that we can build.</p><p>And we need to continue to focus on how much harm there will be from climate change and how bad it could be. Because I do think fear motivates. But we also need to give people that picture of the future. That's inspiring. And I think some nonprofits that are starting to do this in terms of communications and policy or groups like Rewiring America and other groups that are talking about how the clean energy transition represents one of the most amazing opportunities to really build this beautiful, clean future that could raise incomes for people and make all of our lives a lot better.</p><p>And I don't think that we talk about the benefits of that or paint that picture for people. Because if we built this sort of clean energy utopia that I think is in a lot of our optimistic vision, we would be talking about ideally not sitting in traffic for nearly as many hours as we do if we built great public transit. Like if you've ever been to countries like Japan or the Netherlands, you know that there's this other model that we can have and it's incredible. Like sitting on a train reading a book instead of sitting in traffic sucking up nitrogen dioxide emissions is pretty incredible.</p><p>And to be able to save millions of lives by reducing fossil fuel pollution and to hopefully use the clean energy transition as a way to shift power and give it to the people who don't have power and who have been marginalized. I think that represents this incredible utopia that we probably don't talk about it enough and I think that that can be motivating and can get some people to act. So I won't put my own but in there — that sort of naive optimism.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm struggling to contain my own but there. So we'll leave it there in a happy place. If there are any liberal billionaires out there listening, that's a good place to channel your money. If not there somewhere else. Please do something. Please witness this network of moneyed groups and intellectual launderers and quasi local groups that have mobilized against you and do something.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And maybe just to make one more call to action that I think everyone can do — to share a really quick story. Over the holidays, I decided I was finally going to talk about climate change more with my family and talk about some political topics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I hope you read all the articles "How to Talk to Your Family about Climate Change". There's about 5000 of those out there.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>I did. And I was honestly a little skeptical of some of this, but had been hearing this from people like Dr. Katherine Hayhoe and the importance of talking about climate change. And so I brought this up and also the importance of plant based diets and how bad the conditions for that turkey that we ate were and how it was in a terrible environment, which was a little bit uncomfortable as the turkey was sitting there — to maybe just paint a picture of my Thanksgiving. But my brother pulled me aside the next day and he's much more conservative and hunts a lot and does not talk to people about climate change often so very different politics than me.</p><p>But he was really pushing back and asking me some questions and I was answering and not really holding back and talking about climate change. And he called me a couple of days later and he said, hey, so I was looking into getting a new car and I was planning on just getting this truck. But after our conversation I got really excited about electric vehicles and so I'm getting an EV and he sends me a text a couple of days later with a picture of this new car. And then I saw him another couple of days later and he says, after our conversation, I was just thinking a lot about the importance of eating less meat.</p><p>And so I decided I'm going to start eating less meat and I'm going to start talking to my friends about it because they don't really hear about this stuff as much. And I think it's important. And of course, I'm like sobbing happy tears at this point, but it was this really beautiful moment and I think that's something that we can all do, even if we don't have a billion dollars. We can just talk about the stuff and talk about the benefits of climate action and clean energy with our friends and our family.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Each one teach one. Thank you, Michael, for diving into this squalid area and wading through bad YouTube videos to bring us all this information. And thanks for coming on.</p><p><strong>Michael Thomas</strong></p><p>Thanks so much for having me. It was a really fun conversation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-right-wing-groups-behind-renewable</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:91559751</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 25 Feb 2023 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/91559751/8c13eaef7c4788461d61c732f45893c1.mp3" length="48571527" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4048</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/91559751/9c076b4d523983e23712496983ba8b76.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Induction stoves with batteries built in, and why they matter]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, scientist Sam Calisch, whose company just introduced an induction stove with a built-in lithium-ion battery, and Wyatt Merrill of DOE, who helped secure funding for the project, talk about the exciting opportunities that stoves with embedded batteries might offer for chefs, consumers, grid operators, and more.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAD38_RWoGd6NfCbTnm6sj9Sa/volts22.12.14%28sam.calisch.wyatt.merrill%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/induction-stoves-with-batteries-built-in-and-why-they-matter"><strong>Active Transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In the last few months, two separate fledgling companies — <a target="_blank" href="https://www.impulselabs.com">Impulse</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.channingcopper.com/">Channing Street Copper</a> — have announced <a target="_blank" href="https://www.fastcompany.com/90814918/these-new-induction-stoves-want-to-convince-you-to-ditch-gas?sponsored=0&#38;position=9&#38;scheduled_corpus_item_id=fc5e5d81-9de0-4707-a311-8873f94ecec2">the upcoming release of a new product</a>: an induction stove with a lithium-ion battery built in. This might not seem like a big deal, but it is actually a peek into a whole new world of possibilities.</p><p>Embedding batteries into appliances opens up all kinds of intriguing opportunities. A stove with a battery can deliver more power at the point of cooking. It can continue working when the power grid goes out. And it can serve as distributed storage to assist in grid stability.</p><p>To explore the new world of battery-enabled appliances, I contacted two experts. The first, Sam Calisch, helped start <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rewiringamerica.org/">Rewiring America</a>, a nonprofit focused on national electrification. He also worked at <a target="_blank" href="https://www.otherlab.com/">Otherlab</a> with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-saul-griffith-and-arch#details">previous Volts guest Saul Griffith</a>, from which he helped launch <a target="_blank" href="https://www.channingcopper.com/">Channing Street Copper Company</a>, where he is chief scientist. Channing’s first product is a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.channingcopper.com/products/pre-order">stove with a battery</a> (for now, there’s a wait list, and they’re only selling in the Bay Area).</p><p>My second guest is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy.gov/eere/buildings/person/dr-wyatt-merrill">Wyatt Merrill</a>, who works at the Department of Energy's Building Technologies Office, where he manages programs related to building electrification. He was instrumental in helping Otherlab <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy.gov/eere/buildings/articles/bto-announces-its-buildings-energy-efficiency-frontiers-innovation">secure more than $2 million in funding from DOE</a> to help launch the Channing stove project. </p><p>I am excited to talk to Sam and Wyatt about the merits of embedding batteries in stoves, the things battery-enabled stoves allow consumers to do, and the future grid benefits battery-enabled appliances could yield. </p><p>With no further ado, Sam Calisch and Wyatt Merrilll. Welcome to Volts. Thank you guys so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Great to be here.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>Thanks for having us. A long time. First time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Sam, I want to start with you putting aside the stove for a moment. Take us back to your work. You've been doing work with Otherlab. You've been doing work with Rewiring America. You're big into the whole Electrification of America thing. You're very immersed in that whole business. Tell us how all that work led to this idea and this proposal.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Great question. So, as you say, I've been spending the last few years really going deep on electrification, both from a technology perspective, which is the majority of my background, but also from a policy perspective, and worked really hard on a lot of the stuff that went into the Inflation reduction act. And so about two years ago, my friend Saul Griffith and I, we were working on this book called "Electrify Together" with our friend Laura Fraser, and we're doing a bunch of data analysis for it, looking at trends in cost of the technologies related to electrification. And the thesis of that book is that we kind of have all the technology we need today and we just need to deploy it.</p><p>And David, you've done a really good job getting this idea out there. I think you said electrification is the main course. Right. Which I really enjoy. And so it's mostly true that we have what we need today. We just need to deploy it. But there's certainly technology developments that we can do that will make it faster, better, cheaper.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>And one of the trends that we were really disturbed about was all these costs were coming down. Like, if you read Bloomberg New Energy Finance, you see battery prices approaching $100 a kilowatt hour, all of this. But if you actually looked at what it cost to install those, to put them on your house or something, those prices weren't coming down. And it was mirroring a very familiar story from residential solar, where now the hardware cost of residential solar is really cheap. It's something like $0.26 a watt for the actual hardware, but it's closer to $3 a watt to put it on your house.</p><p>And we were seeing the same thing happen with batteries and to do what we needed to do. Those trends couldn't continue. And so we started thinking about ways to get around that. And this idea emerged what we now call energy storage equipped appliances or ESE, or if you're feeling cheeky, maybe easy appliances where you can put a battery into an appliance in a factory instead of putting a battery on your house. And by doing that, you can do it really cheaply and really safely when you put it on your house in a sort of a bespoke way.</p><p>You need to have a site plan. You need to get a permit. You need to have someone come out and do custom electrical work. You have to get it inspected. All these things just add tons and tons of cost. So we said, well, what if instead of doing that, we allow batteries to be installed in appliances in a factory at the cheapest possible cost? And then they kind of come into your house, kind of like a trojan horse inside of the appliance, and all of a sudden you have this battery backup, this ability to use more renewables to power your life, this ability to make it easier to electrify.</p><p>And you didn't have to do all that custom, expensive work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. You submitted a proposal to the DOE, right?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>That's right. So we kind of wrote this idea up, and fortunately, our proposal found its way to Wyatt and some other folks who thought there was some potential inside of it and recommended it for award.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a good hand off to Wyatt. So, Wyatt, tell us what you're doing at DOE, kind of what your team is doing and how you found this and why it grabbed you.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>Sure. I'll start with, kind of broadly, my role and the role of the team that I'm part of. I'm in the Building Technologies Office. I'm part of the Emerging Technologies Program in the office. And that office is one of a number of tech offices that comprises energy efficiency and renewable energy, or eer under DOE. So it's org charts on charts. So just to give you an idea of kind of where the project lives in DOE, so broadly, what I work on is R&D across a lot of different technologies. This is one project out of dozens that I manage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>These are all related to building technology, though?</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>Yes, all related to building technologies. And in particular, our Emerging Technologies Program is focused on research and development and sort of pre-competitive, next generation type technologies. So we're always doing like road mapping and analysis for what's coming next to save energy or to make electrification more viable in this particular proposal came as part of our Benefit FOA in 2020. Was the Benefit 2020? I think it was officially on the street in 2021, and that was a pretty broad funding call for a lot of different technology areas. We funded everything from heat pumps to lighting projects and windows and envelope.</p><p>And there was one topic that I was in charge of for that FOA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Tell everybody what a FOA is.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>Sorry. A Funding Opportunity Announcement. So there was one topic that was part of that funding opportunity that was a little bit more on the open ended side. But I really wanted to think hard about certain problems that consumers face when they want to electrify. And one of those things was panel capacity and being able to make the upgrades that you might want to make without having to go through the expensive and often time consuming process of upgrading your panel at a minimum, and sometimes even having to run new service and trench new lines out to homes.</p><p>And that can be a major constraint for certain people. And so I was really looking for creative ways to kind of sidestep this problem. Putting aside questions around national electric code and other kind of bureaucratic constraints, I was really interested in what are some of the technology solutions out there that might make it easier for people to electrify? And when this proposal came across my desk, it was really exciting to me. Not just because, yes, you can get batteries into the home for the purpose of, as Sam said, load shifting and aligning your demand with renewable supply.</p><p>That's certainly an application. But the big thing that actually I don't think Sam has mentioned yet is you can plug this into 120 volts outlet, which is for many people, a big savings on not having to run, have an electrician come in and run new circuits into the kitchen, and potentially can avoid those panel upgrades.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Had you heard of or thought of sort of embedded batteries or what was it? ESE easy appliances? Had you thought of that before you saw the proposal? Because this is one of those things which, when I first saw it, I was like, oh, well, duh. But I didn't think of it until I saw it had you heard of it before you saw the proposal?</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>So I hadn't heard of it specifically in terms of we should put a battery in an induction stove. But there have been some ongoing discussions and we continue to have ongoing discussions around sort of what does the future of home energy storage look like. And a lot of the focus has been on thermal energy storage. And to the extent that we've talked about batteries, it's usually been those larger stationary batteries. But there's been more and more discussion around, well, what if we thought a little differently about this? What if there was a battery in an appliance or in an outlet even?</p><p>Or how do we take advantage of devices that already have batteries, even, like battery backup systems in, like, emergency lighting? In principle, you could load shift with those if you wanted to. And so obviously there's a lot that goes into that beyond just the technology, the innovation protocols and interoperability standards and code. But in principle, there's, I think, a lot of different ways that you could imagine energy storage taking root in buildings. And so I don't want to say that we thought that this was definitely going to take off. It's been super successful just in the couple of years that we've had the project going, in my estimation.</p><p>But I think it's one of a number of ways that we're thinking kind of more creatively about batteries. Of course, the other thing is, if you have one in your garage, how do we take advantage of that? With a bi-directional charger.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>So there's all these different kind of scales and opportunities, I think, for battery storage that we need to kind of think more creatively about, in my opinion.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And one other thing about the DOE program. Is public education a piece of what you do at all, or you just feel like purely immersed in the tech? Because I just wonder, because currently I think it's like 5% of Americans have induction stoves or something like that, 10%. So they're unfamiliar to a lot of people. Is that part of your job or is that somebody else's problem?</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>It's not a major part of what I work on. I'm mostly focused on the R&D, but it's absolutely part of the broader effort that we have at the Buildings Office and across EERE, and we have partnerships with businesses through Better Buildings and with states and local governments to try to get some of that messaging out. So there are programs that are more focused. I mentioned I was in Emerging Technologies. We have other programs that are focused more on deployment and workforce development and education, for sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about the stove. Let's get into the stove.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Awesome.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>First of all, I know what an induction stove looks like, and I think probably most people do. It just looks like a stove. Where is the battery in the stove?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Well, it's funny you say, you know what induction stoves look like? A lot of coverage of induction stove often uses incorrect pictures. It uses pictures of radiant stoves because they actually glow and are sort of more interesting to look at. But induction stoves are just invisible magic stoves.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think they're beautiful, like, all the sleek, smooth surfaces. Like I'd love induction.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And then you take them apart, and they're even more beautiful inside.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>And you paint them yellow. Have you seen the stove at Otherlab?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh yeah, yes.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>So we we've got our demo unit that we take to farmers markets. We cook people grilled cheese and talk to them about induction. This is our version of the public education campaign. It's painted bright yellow and blue, and you can wheel it around the park, and people kind of look at you funny, and that's the goal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But, like, where is the battery in the stove? Is it near the surface? Is it in the back somewhere? I want to get a physical sense of what's going on.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Our battery goes down at the bottom. It's kind of where there's a lower drawer underneath your oven.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>That's the space that we use for a battery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And how big is it? Can I see the battery if I own the stove? Or is it embedded somewhere where sort of out of the way?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>You could definitely see it. I don't think I'll recommend that people go and mess with their batteries or their copper stove, but we're not hiding anything. It's right there down at the bottom.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Bigger than a shoebox. How big is the better physical?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah, most of the plan form, like, most of the footprint of the stove and maybe like four or five inches thick slab.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. So pretty big, and I would imagine fairly heavy too.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah. So that's one reason to put it down low and also to make it kind of a modular component so you can take it off if you need to move the stove around, et cetera. And it's really important to know. These are sealed packs. They've got a robust metal casing around them. So this is about water ingress. This is about making sure they're temperature controlled. But critically, these are lithium iron phosphate packs, which are different than the lithium-ion chemistries that are in a lot of laptops and cell phones. When we think of lithium battery, and you have the vision of fire that's lithium-ion, lithium iron phosphate is an inherently safe chemistry.</p><p>It doesn't have thermal runaway. It's also an inherently long lived chemistry. You get much more cycles out of it. So the kind of degrating that you experience with your phone is not a feature of lithium iron phosphate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We just had a pod on this on Volts a mere few days ago. So all our loyal listeners are completely up to date on this on LFP batteries. So they're longer lasting, they have a longer charge cycle. They can charge more times. They don't have thermal runaway. They don't catch on fire. Their only really disadvantage, if you call it that, is that they don't have the energy density of familiar lithium-ion chemistries, but in most applications, they have enough energy density. Two separate questions. One is, how powerful is it vis-à-vis cooking? Right? Like, what does it do for your cooking that you can't get out of a non-battery stove?</p><p>And then secondarily, is it big or powerful enough to meaningfully play a role in, like, if your power goes out and you need some electricity to run your lights or whatever, does it store enough power to be a meaningful part of kind of a larger whole house backup system?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah. So this battery is about four kilowatt hours in our flagship product. You could think of that as about a third of a Tesla powerwall. And so it is meaningful with respect to your whole homes energy use. Say the power goes out and you have no access to power, you'll be able to run your fridge for about four days. Modern fridges tend to do about a kilowatt hour a day. And depending on how grandiose your meals are during that blackout, you can cook meals for that same amount of time. But the really interesting thing about the battery, or this is actually an interesting thing about our cooking habits generally, so we've taken a lot of data about cooking.</p><p>You put power meters all over the stove and you measure how much power goes to the burners into the oven, and you get to cook nice meals for the engineering team at the same time. And on average, for sort of like windows of about an hour or so, there's no cooking activities that really draw more than one or 2 kilowatts. That's 1500 kilowatts what you can get from the 110 volts outlet that's already in your kitchen. And so, on average, the power supplied by that relatively meager outlet can totally run all of your cooking activities. It's just these brief moments when we're bringing the pot to boil, or you put the 20 pound bird in the oven, or you really want a lot of flashbang, then you're using way more power.</p><p>And those short moments are the only reason a conventional induction stove has that huge 50 amp, 240 volts outlet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A hilariously familiar story, right? Like, this is the whole electricity system in miniature. Absolutely. You're talking about, right, peak shaving.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And so what all this data collection shows you is that in normal conditions, like, not a blackout condition, in relatively normal conditions, it's basically impossible to run out of battery. We put a big one in there to get you through a blackout, but in normal conditions, there's no sort of range anxiety to worry about.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>I'll tell you, when we got this proposal in that funding opportunity I was talking about earlier, one of the main things that I heard from the external reviewers because when we go through the process of making selections, it's quite a long process and I won't bore you with the details, but we do have a round of reviews externally. And some people said, what about Thanksgiving dinner? Are people really going to be able to use a stove like this and cook all these different pots and pans on the turkey in the oven all day long? And I think it was sort of an open question at the time that we made the selection.</p><p>And then, sure enough, this year, if I'm not mistaken, Sam, your team made Thanksgiving dinner on the stove, is that right?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>We did. We did a nice pre-Thanksgiving meal with the team and cooked a bunch of really delicious stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Unplugged, you mean? Because of course you're not going to run out if you're plugged in, right?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Well, it's plugged into the 110 volts outlet, the small one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So is it the case that you cannot use an induction stove with 110 volts outlet, period? Or is that a hard rule or is that like a guideline?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>A conventional induction range. So we're talking four burners and an oven. There's no way in hell you would plug that into 110 volts outlet. That would require 240 volts to your kitchen and either a 40 or 50 amp breaker and all the copper through you all to support that amount of current, especially renters looking to electrify. Like, I did this for many years. I wanted induction in my kitchen. And so I just bought a single burner induction. And those you can plug into 110 volts because it's only 1500 watts that you're pulling. And that's okay, even though a single burner on a full size induction range will easily get you up in 3000 watts.</p><p>And that's just for that flashbang experience of why induction is magic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? So you've got the battery in the stove that can provide those surges. This brings up a very familiar question, which I'm sure you've heard dozens of times, which is whenever I talk about induction stoves online, in addition to the avalanche of dumb myths about gas stoves.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's also the question of what about my wok? Right. This is the one thing that sort of gas stoves have left. Like the induction stove, especially once the battery is embedded, can deliver more just raw energy now than flame can. So all that's left is the wok. So just for listeners benefit, answer the wok question.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Sure. I call these the induction whataboutisms, or, you know, more generally, the electrification whataboutisms. And one of our kind of guiding principles at Copper is we're going to solve all of the induction whataboutisms, and that includes the wok. We have some really exciting technology that will let you use a Wok on our stove. And that's about all I want to say about that right now, but yeah, no.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, at least tell me what that looks like. I don't get it. I don't get how it could work because it's about well, there's two things with a wok. One is the curved surface, which is problematic, and the other is you need the really high heat to get that particular kind of flavor and charred thing. So is this an addition to the stove? Is it an extra piece of something?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly. So this will be an accessory for the stove that allows you to use sort of a wok of your choice.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>On that theme. As I was thinking about this, if you have a stove that is effectively boosting the power from your wall, it seems like you could design other stuff to plug into the stove. Right. And to run off the stove's battery. So it seems like once you start thinking about this, there's all sorts of accessories you can imagine plugging in to various parts of the stove to enhance kind of the stove's usefulness. Is the wok accessory the only one you've got so far, or is this a family of things you're thinking about?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>It's definitely a family of things we're thinking about in the vein of plugging things into your stove. In our flagship product, the pre-order campaign that we just sold out, there is an auxiliary outlet on it which allows you to plug any other thing you want to run on the stove's power system. So kind of the primary use case we think of is plugging your fridge in, and what that allows the stove to do is it can run your fridge when the power is out, and then it could also use that additional load of the fridge for load shifting, for grid support, for things like that. Just having more loads underneath the battery to play with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's interesting. I guess I was thinking more about cooking accessories, although I don't know exactly what that would look like, but I'm not a cook. Just like it just occurred to me, like you have all this power available, like you could run other power using devices related to cooking off of this thing or integrate them almost somehow. I imagine you don't want to say too much about any of that since it's all in development.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is a slightly sensitive area, but basically what I'll say is we've got some chefs on staff, we're doing some things I'm really excited about here, and we're going to solve all the induction. whataboutisms? And this is going to be a really great cooking experience that's from the ground up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And final stove question, which is just how much is it going to cost? Off the bat, I assume a first in class product is going to be relatively expensive. So what's the cost and what's the story you kind of tell about the cost?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Sure. Just kind of the facts are for our pre order campaign, these stoves are $6,000. And that may sound like a lot sticker shock, but we got to remember a couple of things. One is that because the battery that's built in is larger than three kilowatt hours, it can qualify for the investment tax credit. That's in the inflation direction act.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a tax credit for home batteries. Specifically.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>That's a tax credit for residential battery energy storage systems.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>And that's a 30% tax credit. So there's lots of issues with tax credits. They are regressive. It's hard for people to claim them, but it's 30% off the top when claimed as a tax credit. Then on top of that, obviously there's local rebates. So in the bay area, bay rent provides $750 rebate for an induction stove. And then the other piece that we have to think about is this cost gets you everything. It gets the stove into your house working. If you go to home depot and buy an induction stove, you then have to schedule an electrician visit, stay home from work, get them to come over and pay them a significant amount of money to run copper from your breaker box to your kitchen for that new outlet.</p><p>And that's assuming you have the ampacity in your breaker box. If you're upgrading the breaker box, that's a larger project and sort of like chain of potential upgrades start kicking in. So when you factor in those costs in a bunch of cases, this is the cheapest way to get induction. And we're providing all the other sort of energy storage equipped services on top of that, like the ability to run during a blackout, the ability to use renewables, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>It's also perhaps worth mentioning, Sam, I don't know how much you want to get into it, because I know it's still sort of part of the development process in this project. But in principle, if you have time of use rates that you can take advantage of in your area, you could be charging and discharging at certain times, correct?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. I want to talk about that later. Actually, let's let's bracket that for later because I want to talk about the the larger sort of grid questions, just.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>To say it has some bearing on the lifetime cost.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Definitely just one last thing on pricing. We've talked to a bunch of municipalities who are running low income housing retrofit programs. These are cities like city of Oakland, city of Berkeley, city of LA, DC. Chicago, New York. They're all running large programs. And we sort of relied on them for some of the data on setting pricing, especially as it involves the cost and complexity of electrical work. And they said if you can sell a stove for $5,000, that's what we're currently budgeting in our programs for induction stove plus electrical work. So coming in at six in the pre order leaves us room to come down for a large buyer like a municipality to be able to take part in those programs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And then, of course, if you're involved in public policy, there's also the sort of health benefits of removing a source of pollution from the home. Those health benefits accrue, they're not reflected in the cost of the stove, but they're out there.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>That's a great point. A lot of us are familiar with the case for childhood asthma and gas stoves. There's been a really strong link established between these two things. More recently, there's a growing body of evidence for the link between gas stoves and adult dementia. After childhood asthma might be among the most scary things I can think of to have linked to gas stoves.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I guess I shouldn't take that for granted. I assume people listening to Volts are probably aware of this. But just to put it on record, there's a large and growing body of evidence that gas stoves inside your home produce indoor pollution that has all sorts of negative effects. And like any form of air pollution, the more it gets studied, the more effects they find. So there's a good reason to get gas stoves out of your home separate from all of these benefits that we're talking about, just to quit poisoning yourself. So you could say there's two strategies here.</p><p>One is for every home, just bite the bullet, do the big upgrade of the electrical box, of the electrical power system in general, and then just install a big central battery, because you can get all the benefits we're talking about here and more. I think from a central battery you could run things when the power is out, you can provide surges of power when you need extra power more than your outlet can provide, et cetera, et cetera, down the line, all the benefits you could get from a central battery connected to all the appliances in the home. Or the alternative strategy which we're talking about here is sort of bypass that because it's a giant hassle and expensive and then just embed batteries all over the place in homes, in appliances to bypass the need for these upgrades. Does DOE sort of favor one of those over the other?</p><p>Or do you favor one of those over the other? Or how should we think about those two strategies? Like, does the funding of this mean that sort of DOE is all in on the latter strategy? Or how do you think about the relationship of those two?</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>Yeah, sure, I'll do my best to answer and you can tell me if I'm avoiding the question. We are very much in an ongoing process of developing from the buildings perspective, kind of where we're headed with battery storage. There's been a lot of efforts across DOE, of course, when it comes to the battery cell chemistry, when it comes to electric vehicles, manufacturing processes that I'm not really equipped to speak on. And so my answer here is really about batteries in buildings and what that looks like in the future. Speaking personally, I'm sort of agnostic as to how batteries get into buildings.</p><p>I think it's incumbent on us certainly to think about not only technology solutions but realistic adoption scenarios. And so it's not enough to say like, well, you could do this with a $12,000 stationary battery in your garage and maybe you could do it even better if you had a DC microgrid and you tore it all the wiring and you did everything from scratch. But I want to be creative about thinking about sort of serving all types of buildings and geographies and people in different economic situations. And so that's part of the thought process. The other thing I'll say is that I think it's sort of an open question still whether or not getting batteries into homes is on its face, a decarbonisation strategy.</p><p>So I think it definitely has the potential to be. But when you think about the entire sort of lifecycle of mining lithium and developing the batteries and shipping them around, you really have kind of a hole to dig out of when you're setting these up in a home. And so my feeling is whether you're talking about a large stationary system or you're talking about some kind of creative integration strategy, like putting it in a stove or putting it you could even imagine it in like a modular wall type construction or outlets or whatever that we're thinking about operationally, how to do the best we can from an emission standpoint. And that becomes a difficult thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It seems like that would weigh against, not definitively, but at least sort of on the ledger of pros and cons. That would weigh somewhat against multiple batteries, would it not? It seems like you would want from a materials and embedded carbon perspective, you would want to minimize the number of batteries, would you not?</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>The thing that I come back to is that not all homes need a huge battery in their garage that can island the entire home. In a lot of cases it's really sufficient to control one or two or three peaky loads and make sure that they're not coincidental or make sure that those peaks can be curtailed by a battery. And so oversizing big batteries for the entire home that ultimately have a pretty large embodied carbon component is not to me, always going to be the most effective method for decarbonization. Right? But these things are not just about decarbonization, it's about resilience.</p><p>It's about economic benefits. If you want to take advantage of time of use rates, as we mentioned, and decarbonization. And I think there's some questions that are yet to be answered about how we can align those priorities and under which circumstances they are aligned.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So Sam, how do you think about this? Do you think about this as a stop gap until you can upgrade the electricity in your home or do you view it as like a full on different way to go about it, a different strategy?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Great question. And Wyatt roughly just hit a number of the points I was about to make. So that's perfect. This is a full on decarbonization strategy. The way we think about this is we're putting the smallest battery we can at the right place to avoid the most amount of infrastructure upgrades we need to do. So that means targeting the peaky loads like we talked about, and that sets off cascading cost reductions. I've looked at this at a number of places. We're talking a lot about the cost of running copper from your breaker box to your kitchen.</p><p>There's the cost of upgrading your electrical panel. There's the cost of upgrading the electrical service into your house. Those costs are large. The last one I mentioned, just the electrical service in, I did a study on that and it's estimated to electrify the residential stock of the US. It's a quarter trillion dollars just to upgrade the incoming electrical service for the homes that will need it if we don't do something.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's just new panels for homes that need it. That's it.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Honestly, David, that's not even the new panels. That's just the wires coming in. The wires coming in and the distribution transformers on the street.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a lot.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>It's a lot because any time you've got underground wires, you got to retrench. Any time you've got underground wires near natural gas infrastructure, that retrenching is very expensive.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And is there not a shortage of electricians at the moment too? Just to toss that in there.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>There's a very large shortage of electricians. You know, electrical contractors would much rather send their workers to larger job sites where they can make a bunch of money. So getting them to roll to your house for your piddley kitchen circuit is going to cost you a couple grand just to get the truck to show up. So we're in the business of hearing horror stories about this because we solve this problem for people, so they like to tell us about it.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>David, I think you can get a lot of similar benefits in terms of a stationary large battery versus maybe a coordinated group of smaller batteries. But if it allows somebody to electrify that wouldn't otherwise electrify, to me, that's sort of a categorical difference in terms of the benefit space. And then one other thing I want to say around the alignment between resilience and decarbonization. It's perfectly valid to want a battery in your home for the purpose of resilience and for the purpose of keeping the lights on or the fridge running or the stove running during a blackout, especially in places now that have scheduled blackouts.</p><p>And you can count on them like clockwork. That's perfectly valid. But I guess what I want to understand from in terms of the DOE's perspective that you asked about earlier, is, like, if these batteries are sitting idle the other 99% of the time that you're not in a blackout scenario, what can we do with them to really bring some better alignment between supplies from renewable sources and demand? On the other hand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, indeed. So, Sam, did you have any additions to that?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>No. Wyatt said it beautifully, like, roughly, we're looking for the biggest benefit for the smallest battery that's being used most of the time. So we don't want our batteries to sit idle and we don't want to put more batteries than we need.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. Let's talk about this, then, the ability of batteries to be a tool of decarbonization. I think you sort of raised this earlier and I think it's just worth emphasizing. It's not automatic, right? It's just not automatic that if you just throw batteries out to as many places as possible, you're going to get decarbonization. You need to do certain things and have certain policies in place. And a big piece of that is having the batteries play some role on the grid, not just in your home helping you cook, but that when you're not cooking. And when that battery has some capacity and it's sitting there with power in it and you're not using it.</p><p>The grid needs to be able to know that that power is there and how much of it it can use and be in dialogue with all those batteries. So tell us just sort of like briefly what policies you think need to be in place to get the most decarbonization benefit out of these distributed batteries that we're putting in appliances and everywhere else.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>So I'll say a couple of things and then I'm going to toss it over to Sam, because to be honest with you, I won't be speculating as to policy needs, but I'm happy to let Sam do it. But I will say that there's kind of two things here in terms of aligning the choice to install a battery with decarbonisation. And the first, as we've already touched on, is just, is that battery giving you the ability to electrify that you might not have otherwise had? So, in other words, can you get those direct emissions out of homes?</p><p>Can you cap gas lines to buildings? And in doing so right away, you've made some impact on the emission picture and then you have to ask, okay, well, what type of electricity is going to be charging this battery? Is it coming from, when does it come from solar? So then the operational carbon becomes an hour to hour question, and it certainly varies geographically in terms of the grid mix. And it's going to vary temporarily over the next ten years as we scale up renewable supplies to the point where this question would not be so pressing. Perhaps in 2035, if all goes well.</p><p>But it's certainly in the transitional period, we want to be mindful.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, if all the electricity is renewable, a lot of these questions will be mooted.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But certainly between here and there, we need to use them well. So, Sam, I guess you sort of literally wrote the book on this. So maybe you can take a swing at what needs to be in place for my battery and my stove to be a good grid citizen, a good decarbonizer.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>I'll start by just noting that even without communicating to the grid, your energy storage equipped appliance is already helping the grid just by your pattern of use. You arrive home, you cook dinner after the sun has gone down. It's likely that in your area this is a peak time of use and you're drawing most of your power from the battery at that point.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let me pause you there. When you just start cooking, does it draw on the battery first? Do you have to tell it to use battery power rather than grid power? Or how does it decide?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>There are complex control laws that run inside of it to determine what mixture of power sources it gets from where. And so it's not one or the other really, but kind of your ratios and a little bit of it will be user preference. You as a very climate concerned citizen could say, pull no power that was generated during a time likely to be supported by peaker plants and it could implement that. Or you could say, keep me as resilient as possible at all times, keep the battery as full as possible at all times, things like this.</p><p>So a little bit of this is going to be personal preference.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You can program that into the stove somehow.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah, but the larger point is just that any amount of power sort of absorbed during the day during the solar window and dispensed at night during a peak time is already supporting the grid even before a lot of the more complicated back and forth and price signaling and emission signaling, et cetera.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, well, that's our baseline, but say we want to go beyond baseline.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Sure. I think there's a lot of people and to be honest, there's a lot of people that know more about this than me. But doing daily look ahead from the grid operators to know what the projected outlooks of generation mix are going to look like, having those signals dispatched as close to just day ahead is really kind of the stuff we need to make this work really well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what about aggregators? Am I still going to be talking directly to the grid or is this mostly going to go through aggregators just for listeners benefit? And aggregators just an entity that makes contracts with dozens or hundreds of small distributed energy resources. Your batteries in your garage or your stove or your car or whatever, anything. All these little behind the meter resources and coordinates them such that they act like a big energy producer or a big energy storage installation, basically like a virtual power plant, it's called. Is that how you see these things working in the future?</p><p>Are these embedded batteries playing a role in aggregations?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yes, absolutely. And so in that case, we would be the aggregator for these devices.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really? Channing Street is going to get into that biz.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah. What's interesting, though, is that one of the other main reasons we haven't touched on too much here is that another reason to put batteries into appliances is you then gain access to the much larger market of residential appliances compared to the market of residential energy storage. And so you don't have to have a large market share of stoves. You can have single digit market share of stoves for five years, and you'll have deployed more battery capacity than Tesla has.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. You mean Tesla has four home batteries?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Per Powerwall, Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I hadn't really thought of that. But especially if you can get this so standardized that it just becomes sort of like a standard feature, and people don't have to do it on purpose. They're just buying appliances that naturally have batteries in them.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a lot of appliances out there.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah. These ESE appliances, I think people will buy them for the amazing performance they give. Not necessarily the fact that they have a battery. We didn't touch too much on this. But even outside of stoves, other appliances, there's a lot of really good benefits, even with stoves. You know that annoying buzz some induction stoves make?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Running from a battery, you can make that silent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What, why? How, what?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>And then you get to have the fun conversation that we've now had about EVs about what sounds good in induction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So you know the stoves on, right?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hilarious. What makes that noise? PS: Because everybody out there with an induction stove knows what you're talking about, what makes it, and how do you silence it?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>So it varies a little bit, depending on the model. But in almost all cases, that noise is an artifact of the fact that that stove is being driven with alternating current, with AC power. So that buzz is the 60 hz signal that you're hearing, making its way all the way through the driving circuitry and into these sort of vibrations of the pan and vibrations of the driving coil, vibrations of the glass. And so when you're running it through a battery instead, a lot of this is happening in a direct current sense, and that buzz can be completely eliminated.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. I had not heard that bit. I've heard a lot of people complain about that noise. So this is highly relevant information.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>That buzz is terrible. I agree.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>This reminds me. I have a separate project, totally unrelated, but looking at interfacing thermal electrics with various appliances, but dishwashers being one of them. And it turns out if you set up a thermoelectric heat pump in a dishwasher, you can eliminate the what do you call it, the mist, the fog that comes out when you open the dishwasher. That, I guess, is a big consumer preference.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I like that fog.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>I enjoy it. Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's like a little face. So Wyatt and maybe Sam too. But Wyatt first, what other appliances are next? Like batteries are getting small and cheap enough that in theory you could just stick them anywhere, but presumably you'd want to prioritize somehow. So what are the after stoves? What are the next big places where you might want to embed a battery?</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>So whenever we start a project like this one with Otherlab or Channing Copper, we sit down and we come up with different stage gates that we're going to work on throughout the course of the project. And one of the first ones in that operating plan was to answer the question that you're asking, which is like, which appliances are going to benefit the most from this? And I know we looked at water heaters, we looked at refrigerators. I think it dryers as well. I actually do have some of the results in front of me, but I don't want to steal the thunder of the person who actually did the analysis.</p><p>So Sam, do you want to speak to that?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Sure, yeah. So in a lot of cases, the same value proposition can be captured, the avoiding the 240 volts outlet for things that already run on gas. So dryers, good example, gas dryers are common. Gas water heaters are common. Both of these, there's a strong value proposition for avoiding that electrical work. In the case of water heaters, we're already seeing some 120 volts heat pump water heaters hitting the market, Rheem ProTerra unit as an example. It got some buzz earlier this year when it came out, and this is really exciting, but it's important to note that that water heater is not a solution for all climates and all households.</p><p>It's a warm climate, small household solution. And so there's still a huge unmet need in terms of 120 volts water heaters. And so there's a bunch of room there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So a battery embedded heat pump water heater. That's what we're talking about.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah. And so the ability to deploy this amazing cost saving heat pump technology without having to rewire your house, the value proposition is strong. The other one I will mention is replacing on demand gas water heaters. If I walk around my neighborhood, it's like every house less than 1000 sqft has a gas on demand water heater on the outside of their building. Those homes don't really have a viable electrification pathway right now. There are electric on demand water heaters, but they are even peakier than stoves. They require three or four separate 30 amp breakers, all with dedicated copper runs.</p><p>It's cost prohibitive. So if we think about this is an equity issue. If we think about all these houses, they don't have a viable way to get off gas for their water heating because they don't have room for a storage tank.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So a battery embedded on demand water heater, then I would think intuitively that the peak demand on an on demand water heater might even be higher than the peak demand from a stove. Or is that wrong? Like, is an on demand water heater a more challenging load than a stove, or are they comparable?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>It is actually more challenging generally. I mean, these are generalities. there'll be differences, obviously, but for comparable households, yeah, the peak power running to an on demand water heater is exceptionally high. This can be in the 20 or 30 kilowatt range, whereas an induction range, it might usually be around 10 kw peak.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But this is still something you think a battery can handle?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yes. Specifically, a battery is a good choice for it because a small amount of battery can really yield a lot of savings because it's these peak times that aren't really that long.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Wyatt raised this earlier? Why not batteries embedded in your wall, behind your drywall, attached to your outlet, such that anything you plug in the outlet right. Enjoys these benefits?</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>I've seen some proposals for that type of work. I think it's compelling as innovations go. I think there's a lot of questions around fire safety and code that have to be addressed for that to really get off the runway. I hesitate to strongly endorse that approach, but I think thinking creatively about if you can make that installation happen in a factory where they're doing modular type walls, maybe you can do a much better job with all the safety and make sure that it's not going to cause any problems versus somebody doing a custom job on their own home.</p><p>You might be more concerned embedding that in the wall.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>We actually did some design studies on this originally. Fire code is a huge, huge barrier to this. Talk to people who have been through that process and they said, no, no way in hell are you going to get that through. The other point is that this kind of general purpose battery sitting next to an appliance is compelling, but particularly for high power appliances, there's a lot of cost that goes into the power conversion and conditioning needed to go in and out of the battery. And in the case of a lot of these appliances, when you integrate directly with them, you can simply skip a lot of those steps because you know exactly what you're going to be driving.</p><p>You don't need to do as much voltage conversion, you don't need to do as much inversion. So you save a bunch on cost there and you save a bunch on efficiency, because there's a critical efficiency threshold below which it's really not beneficial to store away energy. It's round trip efficiencies of batteries. DC to DC is something like 90%, but if you look at our national fleet of grid connected batteries, it's more like 80% after. It includes all of those other power conversion losses.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. Otherlab, if I'm not mistaken, did some modeling, trying to assess what is the sort of decarbonization potential of easy appliances. I'm going to try to make that happen. These ESE appliances, tell us about that. What are we talking about when we look at the big if we could spread this across the nation, what could we get?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>The overall potential of energy storage equipment, appliances.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Correct. How much decarbonization could we get out of them if we made them ubiquitous?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I did an analysis of this, and the emissions reductions come in kind of three buckets that are when you run the numbers on it, they're roughly equal in size. Roughly. The first is direct combustion, so we're not burning gas anymore in our stoves and our water heaters, et cetera. So there's a savings there. The second bucket is in methane leaks, which this is another thing where the more we learn about this, the worse we find out it is. And because methane is so potent, as the news cycle is starting to remind us more and more, which is good, little leaks are big problems from a climate perspective.</p><p>And so avoiding the leaks of the methane supply chain and of the appliances themselves is another huge bucket. And then finally there's what I call the marginal grid emissions or the avoided emissions of the electricity sector that comes from having this additional battery storage supporting it. And when we add all that up, we find that in the US. It's approximately 330,000,000 metric tons per year of technical potential for energy storage equipped appliances.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What are some sort of like, consumer pain points here that we could concentrate on?</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>I don't know if we've covered it thoroughly enough, but I do feel like it's not talked about enough in general. Is this constraint around panel upgrades, and that I think you have an idea in your head of what something might cost you in terms of the end use, but then the infrastructure needed just to supply power to that end use is often not part of the equation. And then when you find out, oh, by the way, it's going to take months and months of permitting and before we can get an electrician to come out and your furnace kicked in the middle of the winter, a lot of people are not going to wait around for that to happen, even if they can't afford it. And a lot of people are going to have trouble affording that upgrade.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just to emphasize what you just said, because I meant to mention this earlier, it's well known that people tend to be replacing appliances under stress because their appliance died. And if you have a dead water heater or a dead stove, the idea of waiting several weeks for a panel upgrade is even more of a pain in the ass.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that's a big one. And I think a lot of the sort of studies around electrification challenge, if you will, just kind of sweep that under the rug sometimes and then they'll also just upgrade the panel at the same time. And that'll just be just tack on another five grand, and maybe it'll be five grand. Some places it's less than that. In some places it's a lot more than that, especially if you need new service. But then there's also that time factor of, like, not in the middle of the winter, they won't.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And honestly, the more I have sort of studied and thought about and read about any sort of upgrade or difference or thing to do in the household that you rely on a consumer to do, you just have to dial back your expectations for what they will do. They don't want to do anything. They will default almost always to the easiest default choice. Even if you're just asking them to make a phone call or just like one extra step, you lose enormous swaths. It's absolutely got to be as easy as possible.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I have a separate project, not part of the Otherlab work, but a separate project with a couple of our national labs, NREL and Lawrence Berkeley Lab. And it's got a number of partners as well. And the whole point of that project is really to get our arms around this upgrade question of what I think of as the gray area. Right? Because there are certain homes that, yes, no matter how you cut it, they're going to have to upgrade, and there's no way around it. There are some homes that don't need an upgrade, that have plenty of capacity and that might be like newer construction or newer renovations, and then there's people who might be somewhere in the middle there.</p><p>And my sense is really that that gray area in the middle is not very well defined from the current kind of analysis landscape that's out there. There's been a couple of studies that try to quantify this, and I think we can do a better job. And that's what we're doing right now. So we have this project that I mentioned with a number of components. Part of that's analysis, part of it is looking at even future grid mix and then maybe making recommendations for national electric code revisions to try to make some of these transitions more viable.</p><p>And then also there's a lot of really interesting ideas around load management, especially digital load management, that, again, might not be code compliant in all places, but have a lot of potential from a technical standpoint to make sure that your dryer and your EV are not charging at the same time. Right. So you run into a situation where you can come up with a lot of creative ideas around avoiding those upgrades, and then there's kind of what's going to be permissible from a code standpoint. What are consumers actually going to want, as you say? What are they going to put up with or do to make the upgrade possible?</p><p>So that's the big one for me. I'm sure there's a bunch of others we could talk about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sam, what do you go you've been immersed in electrifications. I'm sure you've heard every what-about that there is what are some other others on your list?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Well, there's the classic, but will the grid handle it? And there's a lot of precedent here that we can lean on, but also we're going to have to do things like distribute storage in order to avoid all of the upgrades that might otherwise be necessary. The one I tell folks a lot is between 1950 and 1970, we quadrupled the amount of delivered electricity in the US. And that was largely through consumer education campaigns. That was Ronald reagan hosting a show sponsored by GE and Westinghouse talking about all his electric appliances in his house. And we don't even need to do that much.</p><p>We need to deliver two and three times the amount of electricity we do today in our electrified future, and we need to do it in 20 years. So we've already done more than what we need to do. So that's one we can lean on. But not to make it sound trivial, it's going to require a massive build out, particularly of transmission, and we need to rely on things like distributed batteries to avoid all the upgrades to the distribution network that we might otherwise have to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And what about I bet you've heard where I live, grid mix is mostly coal anyway, so how is this helping decarbonization I'm sure you've heard that one.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Oh, definitely. And the answer there is these electric appliances are inherently efficient. And so in most cases, even if you're exclusively powered on coal, your EV contributes less than your gasoline powered car, your heat pump contributes less than your gas furnace. I think I'm probably preaching to the choir here, though.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. One of my favorite statistics that your friend Saul uses all the time is just the efficiency gains of switching from fossil fuel to electric appliances and cars and everything else. That almost cuts in half the amount of raw energy that you need to put into the economy, which is wild. That is just wild. Which means you can either do 50% more stuff for the same amount of energy right. Or you can dramatically cut the amount of energy necessary. Which is why I think those sort of, like, charts of total energy that's gone to renewables are somewhat misleading.</p><p>You're just not going to need as much energy.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Exactly, yeah, completely misleading. A couple of percent of all of our energy needs are spent just moving around natural gas and pipelines. The mining, refining, and transportation of fossil fuels are responsible for a massive amount of our energy expenditures as a nation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. You don't have to electrify that. It just goes away.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>It's also just a very sort of defeatist attitude to say, well, my electricity is coming from coal, so I'm not going to get fossil fuels out of my home. It's like, well do you think it's always going to be coming from coal forever? It kind of suggests that it will always be that way and I think we know that's not the case.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. grids everywhere are improving and the way I try to put it is that like if you have an EV, if you buy a gas car, it's basically the same dirty for its lifetime. Right. It is a set amount of emissions per mile. But the EV you buy because the grid is getting cleaner and cleaner. Your EV is getting cleaner and cleaner every day. You have it, you don't have to do anything. It just is magically getting cleaner all the time. Same for any electric appliance.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's an appreciating asset. But as you rightfully point out, to get consumers to do stuff, we got to give them multiple reasons. So the climate reason is a great one, the saving money reason is a great one. But I think we also just need to deliver better experiences and luckily electric appliances tend to do that. I just put heat pumps in my parents' house where I'm currently visiting and previously we'd burned wood to keep the house warm my whole life. And this house is more comfortable than it's ever been in my entire life and especially with my aging parents not having to chop and haul firewood.</p><p>It's the benefits are huge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I'm curious, this thing is coming out under the market for you. It's a big shift I would think from being a sort of data analytical nerd to being a consumer facing consumer interacting product company. A company with products. Right.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>I got to tell you David, I actually met Sam for the first time in a program at Cyclotron Road called the Lab Embedded Entrepreneurship Program. So he's actually got all kinds of hidden talents for this stuff. But Sam, you should speak to that.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Well, I appreciate that way. Yeah. My background is in the technology but I've always had a passion about the energy data stuff and a lot of that goes back to being friends with Saul and geeking out on data sets together. But additionally there's just hire a great staff to do this. So I'm just so excited about the team we're building. We've got folks who have background building kind of mass mobilization campaigns. So I think there's really exciting stuff that's going to happen and I'm thrilled that we have a great team to do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, the purpose of that question and this will be we can wrap up with this question which was just we've discussed benefits in actual cooking, right? Like you can get a surge, you can get really fast, tightly controlled surges of energy so you can do your wok cooking with your mysterious accessory. You can boil water super fast faster than anything else. There's the cooking benefits, there's the resilience benefits. Meaning if power goes out you still can run your stove and potentially your refrigerator and other stuff. There's the sort of money saving benefits, avoiding the panel upgrade, maybe even getting a little extra income if you can hook up with time of use or time shifting if your utility is smart enough to do that stuff.</p><p>Behind all that, there's the climate benefit. My question is just if I opened a browser window in a year and saw an ad for Channing Street Copper Stove, what is your top line message to consumers? Which of all those benefits are you centering and sort of hooking your hopes on in terms of just sales?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>I think this is one of the reasons I like calling these things energy storage equipment, ESE Appliances. I want to hang this on, this being a new class of appliance that delivers just a large number of benefits that are incomparable to existing appliance offerings. So you've got the climate benefits, the resilience benefits, the better performance. So I'm doing a good job not answering the question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think if you have an advertisement with a bullet, with a bullet pointed list, I don't think it's going to sell very well. What's the sizzle here?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>That's why we have targeted ads. But I will say in our customer research, the things that really motivate people are the resilience aspects. And so being able to be prepared for what comes is a really strong motivator for people. And it cuts across party lines, it cuts across affiliations in a real way. So if you're going to force me to pick one, I might have to pick that one. But in truth, it's the portfolio.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Especially in California where you're starting, there's a lot of blackouts. The resilience thing is big in California.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah, PG&E shuts off my power once every couple of weeks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And actually, as usual, I lied about the final question. This is the final question. When are you starting out in the Bay Area? As I understand it, just selling stoves in the Bay Area. Do we know or have any idea when the rest of California or the rest of the country might have access?</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Yeah, so we did a pre-order. We sold it out quickly, and we're going to deliver on that pre-order. And as you said, that's just in the Bay Area. And that's to make sure that we can provide really excellent support for the folks that chose to support us early. And then I would say I don't want to be bound by this, but I would say within 2023 we'll be in a broader market.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Well, this is super fascinating. It's just one of those little areas of electrification where you peek through the keyhole, you're like, oh, there's like a whole world of interesting questions in there. So thank you guys for coming on and maybe we can reconvene in a year or two and see if easy appliances, see if our phrase is caught on and see how far they've spread.</p><p><strong>Sam Calisch</strong></p><p>Well, thanks so much for the interview, David. I really appreciate it.</p><p><strong>Wyatt Merrill</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/induction-stoves-with-batteries-built</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:89111813</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 27 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/89111813/f1024f70db79598cf26eb5da10ac7a79.mp3" length="47539586" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3962</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/89111813/96a856873f6592de5d526e8abf997e04.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The state of the lithium-ion battery recycling market]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>To get a grasp on the current state of play in the lithium-ion battery recycling market, I contacted Yayoi Sekine, an analyst who works as head of energy storage at Bloomberg NEF. We talked about current demand for battery recycling, the companies meeting that demand, the technologies used to recycle batteries today, and the coming growth in the industry.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-state-of-the-lithium-ion-battery</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:88152242</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 27 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/88152242/ba5421c952dc904e818a6fe0bc94d56c.mp3" length="39209451" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3267</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/88152242/ad2a133d1a597f3f0f8a587f2a11cfc5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Working on the cheapest possible lithium-ion battery]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>As production of lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) scales up, costs will fall to the levels of the materials involved. The cheapest material that still works well to hold energy in LIBs is sulfur. Today I talk with someone working on lithium-sulfur batteries about their remaining engineering challenges & enormous market potential.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/working-on-the-cheapest-possible</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:88139857</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 24 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/88139857/830bb5efbb3c5141b3ae969957b6b510.mp3" length="42541944" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3545</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/88139857/13e815a42642d4ad0b967056f44988eb.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What the midterm elections mean for climate & energy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>What do the US 2022 midterm elections mean for climate and energy policy? To help go through the results, I contacted Whitney Stanco, a senior analyst at Washington Analysis LLC, an independent research firm out of Washington, DC. She has been tracking energy policy for decades and in particular has kept a close watch on the states. With Whitney's help, I walk through the election results, first at the Congressional level and then in the states, and contemplate their implications for energy policy. We pay special attention to the four states where Democrats have new trifectas and the power see their policy preferences made into law.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-the-midterm-elections-meant</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:84235509</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 24 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/84235509/8f33e3715a457cd591bbf0d613d6ca49.mp3" length="82503961" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3438</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/84235509/9f73bef7e34a8e5cc65fc39873833d19.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Life as a traveling musician in the 21st century]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>A little something different today on Volts: an interview with my favorite singer-songwriter, Cory Branan. His first album came out 20 years ago and his music has been interwoven into my life ever since. Now he's got a new album out, <em>When I Go I Ghost</em>. We talked about life on the road, songwriting, and what comes next.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/life-as-a-traveling-musician-in-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:78533865</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 24 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/78533865/05a639b8387deaaf905137ab3ff3f6fd.mp3" length="116003807" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4833</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/78533865/864058341d59176291b77ec5c4ba143f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Me, interviewed by Brits]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The UK podcast Sustainababble has been around for eight years, but it is shutting down this year. Happily, it had me on as a guest before it turned out the lights -- we discussed the recent US midterms, the right way to think about climate change, & how to keep one's s**t together. Hosts Dave and Oliver were kind enough to allow me to send it out as an episode of Volts, so please enjoy.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/me-interviewed-by-brits</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:84418835</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 24 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/84418835/d56673412fe06c21b6311158dc9578eb.mp3" length="104977208" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4374</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/84418835/6421299f0f3093ccb0c7d41e516f486b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Lessons from a life in progressive PR]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>David Fenton has just released a new book — <em>The Activist's Media Handbook: Lessons from Fifty Years as a Progressive Agitator</em> — that is a combination biography, photo journal, and accounting of lessons learned in the PR business. He tells the stories of his numerous campaigns over the years (alongside pages and pages of vivid images) and tries to boil down what works to capture media attention and advance progressive causes, and what doesn't. I chat with him about it.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/lessons-from-a-life-in-progressive</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:80917695</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 24 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/80917695/84135168d766d640808818131329e852.mp3" length="84982250" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3541</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/80917695/668839ead6f92e8d7011216392c2cefc.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Germany's current energy situation & its past energy choices]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The Ukraine war has seen Germany's supply of methane gas from Russia cut off. Energy prices have spiked as it scrambles to make up the deficit. Some people have taken this to mean that Germany was wrong to move away from fossil fuels as quickly as it has. Others have said it shows that Germany needs to double down on its transition to renewables. To get a better sense of Germany's current situation and what it says about the choices it has made on energy, I contacted Professor Claudia Kemfert, one of Germany's top energy analysts.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/germanys-current-energy-situation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:81326500</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 24 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/81326500/54c4c10c845e4fd3e4c4c3e30e120598.mp3" length="82845642" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3452</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/81326500/e3e58da4da23ce8cb901e2b518326882.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Coal plants are still getting financed, despite pledges otherwise]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Despite well-meaning pledges to the contrary from a wide array of countries, banks, and other institutions, new coal plants are still getting financed, putting global climate targets further out of reach. I talk with Ted Nace of Global Energy Monitor and Paddy McCully of Reclaim Finance about the channels through which coal funding is passing -- and how to close them.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/coal-plants-are-still-getting-financed</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:79515343</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 23 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/79515343/e3198eac7625039c646781e4f84c27fc.mp3" length="70911863" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2955</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/79515343/724974c3793a5f14b32f75f09d64052b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What to think about deep-sea mining for clean-energy minerals]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The transition to clean energy is going to radically increase demand for a key set of minerals, many of which are mined today in social & environmentally destructive ways. In recent years, attention has turned to the floor of the Pacific Ocean, where those minerals are found in abundance. I talk with journalist Daniel Ackerman about the opportunities & dangers of deep-sea mining.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-to-think-about-deep-sea-mining</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:79093150</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 23 Mar 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/79093150/0adaa255b4a6a5d4a14a5b7ef0a43689.mp3" length="69265521" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2886</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/79093150/974493550db0df3de78f4acc40165624.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why social change is so excruciatingly difficult ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>When we look across the broad sweep of human history, what needs explaining is not times of rebellion and upheaval, but the much more common periods of unjust rule facing little resistance. Why do people so often internalize the ideologies upholding systems under which they suffer? Why do they fail to fight back? Psychologist John Jost has an answer. I talked it over with him.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-social-change-is-so-excruciatingly</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:78714757</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 22 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/78714757/ef6852e0f72123fbc743cd1991a6250e.mp3" length="114129887" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4755</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/78714757/aa0b76f6644a28d6d361d523b640ab21.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Making sure electric vehicles help rather than hurt electricity grids]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The massive coming surge of electric vehicles (EVs) could destabilize the grid -- or, if properly managed, become a crucial tool to maintain grid stability as more renewable energy comes online. The key is getting EVs to communicate with the grid, and vice versa. Amanda Myers Wisser and Smriti Mishra of WeaveGrid are working on that. We chat about how it's going. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/making-sure-electric-vehicles-help</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:77910568</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 19 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/77910568/927647dbd515bc9534f07d7666003118.mp3" length="84107043" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3504</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/77910568/38ca046185abec2693bbe36a898c81c4.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Making it easier to build distributed energy in the places where it's most needed]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Emerging economies represent huge potential demand for distributed energy (solar power and microgrids) but to date the markets have been too fragmented to attract large-scale investment. A company called Odyssey has set out to create a platform that can standardize and de-risk these markets so big money can move in. I talk with the CEO.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/making-it-easier-to-build-distributed</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:77157836</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 19 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/77157836/76528cf8e5311f7c55c52051fd5b4616.mp3" length="59225724" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2468</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/77157836/5a6e3d356ae90713fce7fc6787a5a099.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Me, talking about my story and my takes on perennial climate debates]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>I was recently a guest on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.mcjcollective.com/media/podcast">My Climate Journey</a>, a podcast that features various climate types discussing how they got where they are and how they currently think about the climate crisis. Host Jason Jacobs and I had a fun conversation about my road into journalism and how my views on various perennial climate debates — optimism versus pessimism, green growth versus degrowth, technocracy versus spiritual change — have changed over the years.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/me-talking-about-my-story-and-my</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:77516522</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 14 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/77516522/8ea821ab99f801edcac87b22f300407e.mp3" length="109795232" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4575</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/77516522/2fa4488b70d1ed4174fd90705a8104e9.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Puerto Rico's electricity crisis]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, lawyer and activist Ruth Santiago discusses Puerto Rico's latest electricity crisis, as the island struggles to restore power in the wake of Hurricane Fiona. In the wake of Hurricane Maria five years ago, the grid was privatized, but the promised rebuilding still hasn't occurred. Santiago covers what's gone wrong and what can be done.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/puerto-ricos-electricity-crisis</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:74361629</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/74361629/82e9073eeb37191d954c75c8eecf3e49.mp3" length="47248059" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1969</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/74361629/c6467a2c9131814b7d9a10ef36c7284a.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The extraordinary potential value of enhanced geothermal power]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Geothermal power has conventionally been viewed as a baseload, always-on resource, like nuclear. But new research suggests it could play a much more dynamic &amp; valuable role on the grid than that -- and expand much faster &amp; farther than previously estimated. I chat with one the co-authors.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-extraordinary-potential-value</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:74977669</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/74977669/bb712d64d007e4241c8b169493b6776b.mp3" length="93279784" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3887</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/74977669/3417ec7bdb522beff6e103fc9315b564.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Learning curves will lead to extremely cheap clean energy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>A <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://www.cell.com/joule/fulltext/S2542-4351(22)00410-X?_returnURL=https%3A%2F%2Flinkinghub.elsevier.com%2Fretrieve%2Fpii%2FS254243512200410X%3Fshowall%3Dtrue">newly published research paper</a> out of Oxford suggests that a rapid energy transition will not &quot;cost&quot; anything -- it will save nearly a trillion dollars relative to the no-transition case. And the faster we move, the more money we save. I talk with complex-systems scientist and co-author Doyne Farmer about his optimistic projections.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/learning-curves-will-lead-to-extremely</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:74528941</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/74528941/e3ba741454f83f3ff486c68c6e045770.mp3" length="92810207" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3867</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/74528941/b1f36fcf254be0ab696c2254f90f0f46.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Focusing on the climate actions that can make a real difference]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Two veteran climate experts -- analyst Hal Harvey &amp; journalist Justin Gillis -- have released a new book that seeks to home in on the climate policies that offer the most impact for the least effort. I talk with them about learning curves, performance standards, industrial policy, &amp; more. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/focusing-on-the-climate-actions-that</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:71132218</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/71132218/b397dca1c8aa8da21a40fa79e73f4c49.mp3" length="93324924" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3889</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/71132218/c641ff4bd6baaad443218ec9716707b6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The long, sordid (ongoing) tale of California's biggest utility]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, </em>Wall Street Journal <em>reporter Katherine Blunt discusses her new book, </em>California Burning: The Fall of Pacific Gas & Electric — and What It Means for America's Power Grid<em>, in which she details PG&E’s decades of setbacks and missteps.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAC4gvVEJhp8bnpNexLNowUUa/volts22.09.09%28katherine.blunt%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/the-long-sordid-ongoing-tale-of-california-s-biggest-utility"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Reporter Katherine Blunt was still new to <em>The Wall Street Journal</em> when 2018’s devastating Camp Fire broke out in California and she was swept into the biggest story of her career. Alongside colleagues Russell Gold and Rebecca Smith, she wrote a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-wired-to-fail-11577509261">series of pieces</a> on the ongoing travails of Pacific Gas & Electric, or PG&E, the utility whose power lines had started at the Camp Fire.</p><p>The <em>Journal</em>'s coverage was a finalist for the 2020 Pulitzer Prize, and Blunt has now expanded it into a new book: <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3en2c4m"><em>California Burning: The Fall of Pacific Gas & Electric — and What It Means for America's Power Grid</em></a>. It is a rollicking tour through PG&E’s decades-long series of disasters and their roots in the early 20th century.</p><p>I am a longtime critic of utilities, but even I was stunned to see all of PG&E’s incompetence and malfeasance gathered together in one place, alongside its well-meaning but serially failed attempts to put things right. It’s a story of failure and redemption, except the redemption keeps being interrupted by more failure. </p><p>I couldn't put the book down, so I am eager to talk to Blunt about how the utility’s travails began, why is has struggled so mightily to take control of its fate, and what might come next for the electricity sector’s favorite punching bag.</p><p>So, without further ado, Katherine Blunt. Welcome to Volts. Thanks so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This book, Katherine, is a bit of a mindblower. I mean, I probably, because of my job, followed this stuff as it was happening, closer than the average Joe or Jane, but it is still stunning to see it all put in one place. As far as I can tell, for the entirety of the 21st century, PG&E has been in one of three states: either a) causing some disaster that kills a bunch of people, b) dealing with the blowback and lawsuits that come as a result of the disaster that killed a bunch of people, or c) implementing an ultimately failed and useless attempt to mitigate the disasters that killed a bunch of people and prevent future disasters.</p><p>There has not been a period of just normal operation of PG&E for decades now. It's all its perpetual crisis. How how much of that did you appreciate going into this story? How much of that? I mean, it's just such a dumpster fire. I can't believe I wasn't more aware of it. And I can't believe, like, the public's not more aware of it. How aware were you going in?</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's totally true. These last 20 years have been just exceptionally bad for the company. I had some idea of this going into it because of my coverage at the "Journal" that, as you say, I had collaborated on with two close colleagues. And one of the final stories that we did together was a really big picture narrative that tried to take readers through the last 20 years and what that's meant for PG&E. But as I got more into the details, I, too, was really surprised at some things and how bad it was.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let's go back into the recesses of history. One of the most sort of telling tales from the beginning is that the original merger of PG&E with Great Western, another utility. This is the merger that ended up sort of saddling PG&E with all these power lines, that it never really understood. And that, to me, is kind of like the original sin, like the seed of everything that came after us. To tell us a little bit about the story of those two utilities and how they ended up as one.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>There's a couple of ways to think about this. It is a really fascinating part of PG&E's history. So, as I'm sure at least some listeners know, PG&E is a very old company, more than 100 years old at this point. It's got roots dating back to the Gold Rush. It only ever had, in the early days, one real competitor, and that was Great Western Power. Both PG&E and Great Western were competing to build systems to serve San Francisco to support the population growth there. And around this time, you're beginning to see the solidification of the conventional wisdom that utilities should be these monopoly companies. Because, of course, this industry is very capital intensive. And the idea was you shouldn't have a bunch of companies building duplicative infrastructure. And you're beginning to see the regulator emerge to oversee all of this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's some wild quotes from that period where people are like, "nothing scares customers more than an outbreak of competition among you." It's just such a weird perspective based on our current way we talk about markets.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. There was a lot of kind of colorful stuff that I managed to dig up, like a lawyer for PG&E and a lawyer for Great Western, like, almost got into a fistfight at what was known as the Railroad Commission, which is now the California Public Utilities Commission. Pretty funny. So they competed for a while, and then they ultimately merged and it formed the big Northern California monopoly that we know today. And so there's a few consequences of this. So it really did give this company a lot of economic might, this merger, and it allowed it to exist as a pretty good company for most of the 20th century. It did a lot to invest in its system. It helped electrify different parts of the state. It supported economic growth. It was largely run by engineers.</p><p>And as we will discuss in depth, this really begins to fall apart in the 21st century. And quite literally, in that, one of Great Western's power lines, one of the earliest transmission lines that this company built, that PG&E ultimately inherited, failed and started the Camp Fire. The component of the line that broke was literally 100 years old. It was installed somewhere around 1920, and it hung there ever since.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's wild. Great Western built these lines, and then PG&E sort of inherited them in the merger and never really had good documentation of them, or, like, never really did particularly good monitoring of them. It's kind of a gimme for a utility to do well in the 20th century, since mostly what they were asked to do, during the 20th century, is build stuff. And they love building stuff, and that's how they make money. And now we reach the age of maintenance and everything falls apart.</p><p>So before we actually get into the specifics, I wanted to, this is a bit of an axe I have to grind, so I have to emphasize it up front, but I thought your book was just this exquisite extended illustration of a point about utilities that I've been hammering for over a decade now — which is that investor-owned utilities make money by building new stuff. They get a rate of return on investments in new stuff. They do not get a rate of return on maintenance, on spending money, on monitoring and maintaining existing infrastructure. And that's just, that force, you see that at work throughout your entire book. Like, tell us, you know, that the one sort of engineer mentions, in the electricity department mentions, like, "if I spend $100 on a new line, we get 120 back. If I spend 100 on maintenance, that's it." So just, like, spell that out a little bit, that sort of disparity that sort of works its way into PG&E's operations throughout this whole century.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. So, of course, as I'm sure many listeners know, the argument for the investor owned utility model is that having this profit motive allows for greater access to capital. It's a capital intensive business. Okay? And I guess if we're talking about the balance between capital spending and maintenance spending, and the fact that strong financial performers are good at minimizing expenses to free up money to invest in capital, I guess, theoretically this is possible without compromising safety. But PG&E did not do this well. It didn't do this well at all.</p><p>And a really big issue happened in 2010 in which a natural gas transmission pipeline exploded in San Bruno, which is south of San Francisco, and that results in this big federal investigation of PG&E gas transmission operations. The company, I think, provided the prosecutors something like 10 million pages of documents or something like that. And in those documents was evidence that the company had been under great pressure, in kind of the early 2000s to around the 2010 time frame, to reduce expenses. There were a number of reasons for this, but it found that, in particular, gas transmission faced major expense pressures, at the time that the company was still able to maximize its authorized rate of return. As a matter of fact, it exceeded is what some auditors had found. So it had been investing a lot of capital, making pretty substantial returns, and also underspending on operations and maintenance and gas transmission, far less than the company told regulators it had planned to spend.</p><p>You can't draw a straight line between that finding and the fact that the pipeline blew up. But I mean, it's all part and parcel of the conclusion that it had basically broken federal law in the way that it was running its gas operations. And so what was striking to me, in kind of really delving into the underlying issues with the Camp Fire, as we discussed earlier in the program, is that there were a lot of parallels here. The Electric Transmission Division also faced a lot of expense pressure for various reasons. And the consequences of that were just devastating.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like we were saying, it's kind of built in. Like, if you want to be a growing, you want to be on Wall Street, you want to be a traded company, you want to, you have to demonstrate growth and all that. And all spending on maintenance does nothing for that, does nothing to grow you, does nothing to make you any profits. Like, from the perspective of investors, every penny you spend on maintenance is basically just dead-weight loss.</p><p>With that structure in place, the Feds can come along and say, "that doesn't mean you can't spend on maintenance. You still have to spend on maintenance." But like, you can say that all day long, but the financial forces point the way they point. And as you say, the San Bruno explosion was an early example of that. And after the San Bruno explosion, in the court case and everything, one of the things PG&E was forced to do was sort of, and this becomes a familiar story as well, after the disaster, there's this scramble. Like, we've got to do a major assessment of our gas pipelines. Now that the explosion has already happened, we need to go down and see if it's going to happen again. So tell us about what they found when they went down and looked.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>So they did find a lot of problems. One of the issues leading up to San Bruno is that the company was supposed to do more to test the integrity of welded pipes, who seems to have the potential to have some sort of issue. The best means of doing that is draining the line of gas, and filling it with pressurized water, and monitoring the pressure of that water running through the pipeline. And if you can see if there's any sort of rupture, or at worst an explosion...obviously, that takes a lot of time, takes a lot of money, and it's inconvenient for customers, for the company. Not a preferred mode of doing things for a while, but then they had to go back and do it.</p><p>And there were several other pipelines that had issues with their scenes, and at least three, I think, exploded when they were hydro tested. It was also just like other stuff within the division that was antiquated, antiquated systems, antiquated trucks. And so they did a pretty big overhaul. But one thing that's frankly scary, and this is not just scary in PG&E's case, I think it's common for utilities across the country, it does take some sort of disaster to reveal the extent of the problems. And you made reference earlier to kind of someone talking about moving money around.</p><p>Yeah, the CPUC had a really interesting day-long affair in which they had a bunch of experts talk about safety culture within utilities. And there was one guy who was like, "if you invest a dollar in capital, you get 120 back. If you invest a dollar in maintenance, it's just a dollar out the door." So you have this kind of slow decision making over time. All of a sudden, it's a dollar ten in capital and $0.80 in maintenance. And so it goes. And the consequences of that, initially, are next to nothing. There's no immediate consequence.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>So that's scary, frankly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It is scary. And this is another thing that comes up a lot in the book, in the court cases around this stuff, in the gas explosion and later the fires from the electricity transmission. There's this question of what exactly PG&E can be convicted for and whether it can be convicted of second degree manslaughter. Which first degree is, "I'm setting out willfully to kill you." Second degree is "I'm acting with willful disregard to your safety in such a way that I can reasonably predict the results." And so there's a lot of sort of discussion about, you talk about this long effect on decision making over time.</p><p>No single person, no single manager is thinking, "let's break the law, even though I know it's going to kill people to save a buck." It's just a little incremental decision here, a little incremental decision there, a little decision there, and these things sort of snowball on themselves. And you get the sort of aggregate effect of willful ignorance of maintenance without anyone in particular being responsible for it. It brings up all these weird questions about how to hold companies responsible.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. And honestly, this is one of the more interesting questions that I tried to explore in the book. The idea of corporate liability is not intuitive. And so after these disasters, everyone's asking, who is culpable? And the answer, almost inevitably, is like, nobody and everybody.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, we want a bad guy. But there's no bad guy here. There's never a bad guy in the whole book. There's not a single truly malign actor in the whole book.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>That's true, I think. So the trial that came after the San Bruno explosion was a really interesting exploration of this question. And so I kind of tried to go deep in sort of the legal theory that underpinned this whole thing. And I won't, obviously, get too much in the weeds on this, but it was just fascinating to — what the prosecutors did was they brought forward a lot of employees who had some knowledge that the company was not abiding by regulation. And they also knew that they weren't doing enough and spending enough as a result of expense pressure to do inspections that could ensure these pipelines were truly safe when they were running at higher pressures.</p><p>So, of course, you have to prove some level of intent to convict anybody, or a company, of a crime. And the idea of this intent was that, I think the exact definition was that they were, "acting with willful indifference to the regulations requirements," right? And so it gets kind of technical.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it gets kind of philosophical too, right? Because by definition, a group of people doesn't have intent in the way we think about intent. Like intent is always sort of implicit, right?</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah, it does get pretty philosophical. And, in the case of the Camp Fire, it was similar in that PG&E was ultimately convicted on 84 counts of involuntary manslaughter, as you were referring to earlier. And the idea was that the company, or a group of individuals within the company, knew that there was fire risk within the Feather River Canyon, and that specifically the transmission lines posed fire risk, and that they didn't do nearly enough to mitigate it. But in that, though, I think that what you have to understand is that the employees didn't understand the extent of the risk because they hadn't been doing enough to really understand that. So it is remarkable, and it's a lot to think about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's one thing to convict a person, or a company, of something they did on purpose, but these are like counterfactuals, like something you should have known not to do or what you should have known in the counterfactual case. It gets super complicated. But as you say, they convicted them. They convicted PG&E in the San Bruno case, which sort of, I think, was a shock and a bit of a terror to probably not just PG&E, but probably to lots of other utilities too. So just a side question.</p><p>In the wake of the San Bruno explosion, as you say, this guy, I can't remember his name, was brought in to basically shape up the Gas Division because, in addition to the lack of inspections, there's just antiquated equipment, antiquated documentation, paper and boxes, information, and all these different offices not coordinating, et cetera. And he sort of tried to whip it into shape. And my impression from the book is that he more or less succeeded in that division. Now, which is the smaller part of PG&E, kind of got its act together. Is that true? Does it remain together?</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I think that it was widely acknowledged that — Nick is his name, Nick Stavropoulos — did a lot to help ride the ship, and the division operated much better as a result of the actions that he and his team took to modernize everything and to do proper inspections, proper testing. Of course, no one's perfect. Nothing's perfect. I'm sure that there are still some issues within the division. I'm sure some have even emerged since he left, but they haven't had any major issues since then. And so that's good. I mean, it certainly raises ... we're talking about sort of like underlying problems that affect all utilities. There's always questions to be raised, let me just put it that way. But they've not had any major issues since San Bruno.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, I mean, sort of one of the darkly comic chapters in the book is there's San Bruno explosion, horrible publicity. And so the company is like, we're going to devote all this money and time to shaping up the Gas Division and do so. But even as they are doing so, they are electing not to do so in the Electricity Division, and they are cutting back on inspections in the Electricity Division.</p><p>And this is like one of several parts of the book that reads a little bit like a horror story. Like the girls going up the stairs. You're like, "no, don't go up the stairs." And of course, immediately before the gas explosion bruhaha has even really fully wrapped up comes basically the equivalent on the electricity side of uninspected lines now starting fires, deaths, liability, the whole cycle starts all over again. So you have to sort of wonder, like, even if they got the clue on the gas side, they clearly didn't get the larger clue of a larger safety culture across the board, right?</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I think a notable detail in the book is that the Gas Division brought in Lloyd's Register, the British risk management firm. Anyway, so to basically assess where they were kind of immediately after the explosion and how far they'd come after they got everything into shape. And then I think Nick suggested to some colleagues on the electric, within the Electric Division, that they, "how about you have Lloyd's take a look at what you guys are doing?" And they said, "not necessary." That was the response, "not necessary."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. It's wild how many times, especially early in the book, they're like, "fires are for the hot, dry Southern California. We're up in Northern California. We don't really have to worry about that." Which just seems so darkly ironic in light of subsequent events for the Electricity Division, I want to go back a little bit to deregulation. This is a sort of legendary story in California lore already, sort of deregulation and then the subsequent energy crisis, and Enron and all the rest of it. And obviously I don't want you to tell that whole story again. There are plenty of books to be written about that, but sort of talk about how it affected PG&E specifically. Sort of like how PG&E emerged from that mess.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I think in my view, there are two major consequences for PG&E. One is that it resulted in PG&E's first bankruptcy. So after the energy crisis, the company seeks bankruptcy protection. It emerges in 2004 time frame, and they then get a new CEO to kind of lead the company into this new chapter. And he is very, very intent on establishing the company as a strong financial performer, basically regaining goodwill on Wall Street, delivering to shareholders. We've already discussed how companies often deliver to shareholders. So there's a lot of expense pressure during this time. His tenure basically ends with San Bruno.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's Darby, right?</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>That's Peter Darby. Yeah. The other consequence is that as a result of deregulation, utilities in California no longer played the same role in building and operating power plants. They sold most of them during the deregulation push, with the exception of nuclear and hydro. And so that means that as California becomes really determined to bring a lot more wind and solar online, the utility companies are going out and contracting for this power. They're not building the wind and solar farms themselves. And as we know, wind and solar are some of the cheapest forms of generation today. They were not back when the utilities really began pushing on this, so they were signing a lot of really expensive contracts. Those costs were passed on to customers as expenses. This is not something on which the company earned a return. And I think that ironically, served to increase, added a further layer of pressure on the expense side.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So you have sort of two forces working coming out of this post-deregulatory bankruptcy. One, the CPUC is forcing the company to contract for a bunch more quite expensive clean power. So rates are going up. So there's a lot of pressure on the utility to cut back. And then secondly, post-deregulation, this is a privately traded company on the market. And the way you make it healthy is draw new private investment. So the way to do that is to show returns, show quarterly, good quarterly performance. So that also is another huge pressure to cut expenses.</p><p>And all that pressure together, like as we were discussing what expenses get cut, it's the expenses that don't bring in any money. It's the expenses that don't bring in any return. And that's maintenance of this truly gigantic, sprawling infrastructure. So talk a little bit about, I found this really amusing, in a very early 2000s/2010s way, Darby's sort of idea of transformation. And he brought in Accenture. Tell us a little bit about the Accenture chapter, which I found you have to laugh.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>You really do. And also I'll just quickly shout out to my colleague, I guess former colleague. She just retired, Rebecca Smith, who she covered the company during this time, and she knew a little bit about the transformation, and so she did a lot of digging for us at the "Journal" and really kind of helped bring that to light. But then as I started getting even deeper into it, I mean, like, it was both terrifying and funny at the same time.</p><p>So the idea was to transfer on the business. I'm actually looking at a little, foam pyramid that has the goals on it right now. It's delighted customers, rewarded shareholders, and energized employees. Our vision, the leading utility in the United States. So at its core, the ultimate goal is 8% annual EPS growth. That was the goal. And the goal was to bring in Accenture to figure out ways basically to cut expenses. That was the idea. And Accenture, it was a bunch of them. I mean, they hired a lot of these consultants, and PG&E employees called them the greenbeans. And they come in, and they're looking through PG&E's records and data and stuff, and they're like, "hey guys, we're trying to do some benchmarking, and this is really hard because you don't have very good data."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>"Okay, well, proceeding on, we could cut expenses in all these areas because it's been outpacing inflation over a ten year period. So here's where you should be cutting costs." But the thing about, pretty much all of the initiatives that Accenture helped implement were just disasters for one reason or another. And payroll got bungled. Employees were mad. I think they were trying to use some new mapping tool that didn't work at all. So employees literally had to rely on Mapquest when they were trying to figure out where to go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is like every corporate transformation effort in a nutshell. It's like a parody of them. Like whizzbang new systems that nobody understands or likes, ignoring people, ignoring maintenance, producing these elaborate reports. Just, like, it's so early, it's so of that time.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>It was. It really was of that time. And ultimately, it was just a really expensive bust, is how you sum it up. And it was distracting. It made employees angry. And I think so. I've heard various estimates for how much it costs. Like, some people believe it cost a billion dollars. I've settled on the number $300 million, and PG&E ended up negotiating like some sort of discount because they were so mad.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because they didn't get anything. What was the guy's quote? He's like, "it's not like you shopped for a Jaguar and got a Volkswagen. It's like you shop for a Jaguar and didn't get a car."</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's what he said.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so all of that process, aside from the rest of the fiasco, is the expenses that were getting cut were predictably maintenance and monitoring of this vast system of transmission lines. And then the other thing that starts happening, the other thing that's very of our time, that starts happening in the early 2000s and 2010s, California starts getting drier and drier, goes into these mega droughts. The winds comes. Basically, fire danger starts steadily rising even as PG&E is sort of cutting expenses monitoring it. And the sort of predictable result is a bunch of fires start based on failures of their transmission system.</p><p>And so this brings us to an interesting law in California which holds utilities 100% responsible for fires. They start tell us a little bit about that law, like how did that law end up on the books? It turns out to be incredibly consequential law. Why does California have this quirk?</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah, so what we're referring to is, the wonky, official name is "inverse condemnation", and it sounds really complicated, but it's not so complicated. So you think about eminent domain, right? If some sort of governmental agency wants to build something serving the public good, they have the right to take your private land if they compensate you properly, right? The flip of that, I think is why it's called "inverse condemnation", is that if that thing built to serve the public good results in some sort of property damage, you, the property owner, are entitled to compensation.</p><p>And initially this really applied only to publicly owned utility companies, right, governmental agencies. But in the early 90s, there was a case that went all the way to the Supreme Court of California, I think, involving a power ignited by one of Southern California Edison's power lines. And the court determined that the privately owned utilities are substantially similar to their publicly owned counterparts, and, therefore, are subject to inverse condemnation as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this sort of sets off this cycle. So California gets drier and drier, and PG&E has all these old power lines crisscrossing the state. And a fire happens on their watch, and it's huge, and the damages are enormous, and suddenly they have to compensate these enormous ... because they're completely responsible for under this law. They have to come up with, there's all these lawsuits, people arguing, coming to a settlement, finally. And then as that's happening, another fire starts.</p><p>And it's almost comical, and tell me if you think I'm wrong about this, but we have this law holding them responsible for the fires, and PG&E sort of ongoing health, or even existence, depends on not starting any more of these fires. But it simply can't not start these fires. I mean there's no, nobody at any point in the book has a serious plan for how PG&E could eliminate that risk.</p><p>Because just like talk a little bit about the extent of what it would really require to genuinely send out people to go put eyeballs...I mean, this is saying, like you talk about it's pretty labor intensive to test these natural gas pipelines in a proper way. And it's similar with the transmission lines. It's a labor intensive thing to truly inspect them. You're supposed to go climb, literally, climb the tower and look at all the little hooks. Put your eyeballs on all the little hooks. The cheap way is just to drive a helicopter pass. But to really do it, it's quite labor intensive. So just give us a sense of like, what would it take? How many of these lines are out there? What kind of workforce and money would it take to genuinely do the kind of inspection that would reduce this risk, appreciably, close to zero?</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I think that at the end of the day, getting to zero is about as close to zero as it gets because in some ways the risk is inherent throughout the system. So there are two primary risk modes, right? There's the risk that a tree branch or a tree limb or something could touch the live wire and ignite a fire. And so the way that the company tries to get ahead of this is to make sure that it sends out vast numbers of contractors to trim or remove trees that have the potential to contact the wires. But as we know, in Northern California, seasonal winds occur, very strong winds in the fall, maybe it lifts a branch from 50 yards away, and that branch gets tangled in the power line. I don't know how you account for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and trees are quite legendarily growing all the time.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>They are in, most of them, in a constant state of growth of some kind. Yeah. And so I liken this Sisyphus rolling the rock up the hill, right? I mean, that's what vegetation management is. You roll it up, and then it falls back down, and then you go do it again.</p><p>And so then of course, the other risk is that the transmission line itself could fail in some way because of an issue with the equipment, whether that be like a tiny piece of hardware like a hook, or an issue with the wire itself, or the structure. And so that requires inspections to make sure that there hasn't been substantial deterioration of some kind that puts that asset at risk of failure. And the good news is that, I think, historically speaking, climbing the tower or the pole has been the best way to get a look at all of this stuff. They are doing more with like drones, and lighter technology, and things that make it so that you don't maybe have to do that all the time. But just to contextualize all this, the company's service territory is 70,000 square miles.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. There's like hundreds of thousands of miles of lines we're talking about.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Certainly hundreds of thousands of structures. I think probably tens of thousands of miles of lines, but it's still, it's enormous. Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Once again paralleling that the gas episode. Like they have this fire. They're found liable. There's all this backlash, and then there's this scramble to like, "we're going to fix this. Let's send people out inspecting and tree cutting." And they go out and find, just as they went out and found with the gas network, like, it's a disaster. There are decaying lines all over the place ,and trees all over the place. They just go out and discover, yet again, what a daunting and enormous task it is in front of them.</p><p>And they're sort of, like, frantically doing this. And as they're doing it, there's another fire, and there's another whole round of this. So let's talk about the final settlement with fire victims, because you spend some time on this, and it's really wild. If PG&E were literally on the hook to pay all the victims of all the fires that started, the full value of what they lost, PG&E simply does not have that much money.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's no way for it to settle that. So talk about what they end up giving of victims in this final settlement.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Seems like a twisted irony to me there.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Oh, it's completely. This is one of the saddest parts of the book. So I should say, at the outset, after a spate of 2017 fires that that resulted from trees touching PG&E's power lines, and then, of course, the enormous 2018 fire that resulted from the failed transmission line, PG&E estimates it faces about $30 billion in liability costs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wild.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>30 billion. Yeah. So there's three classes of claimants. The first is, like, governmental agencies, other public entities that incurred some costs as a result of the fire. The company reaches a settlement with them first. It's $1 billion in cash.</p><p>Now, predictably, during this bankruptcy, which was enormously complex, you've got all these savvy financial players, the really kind of savvy, distressed investor types, descend upon this whole disaster. And I say that because the second class of claimants is insurance companies that are eligible to seek compensation from PG&E because they paid claims to homeowners that the fire is actually PG&E's fault. So this is a result, again, of "inverse condemnation". So that said, a lot of these companies, these insurance companies, didn't want to wait around for a settlement, so they sold these claims on the secondary market to, basically, the hedge funds. There was one in particular that bought a lot of them at a very steep discount and stood to make a lot of money here. And PG&E reached the second settlement with this group, and this was $11 billion. And the group demanded that it be in all cash.</p><p>And so now the company is out $12 billion in cash. It doesn't have enough cash left to reach, what would be the largest settlement, which is with individual fire victims and business owners that actually lost property.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, we paid off the hedge funds, and now we're a little short.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah. And so it also gets more complicated because there was competition between the company shareholders that didn't want a restructuring plan that would result in a huge equity raise that would dilute the value of their holdings. And the bondholders who were fine with doing that. They could issue equity all day long. And they had a plan that would have basically issued enough equity to compensate fire victims. But ultimately, the company, the shareholders, won. I'm just going to leave it at that. The shareholders won this battle.</p><p>And so what happened was the company settled with the last class of claimants, the individuals, for 13.5 billion in the form of a trust that was funded with half cash and half with shares in the company. So at the time the trust was funded, it was given enough shares that it held, like, a 21% stake in the company. So the irony is that they can't liquidate these shares quickly to compensate victims because doing so would sink the share price.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You're tying victims compensation to the ongoing health of the company. So now the risks PG&E faces are in part adopted by the victims of its previous risks.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Exactly. Exactly. When the other two settlements had no risk. That's what happened. And of course, you know, it's after, you know, a year plus after emerging from bankruptcy, PG&E's share price hadn't really rebounded at the time the trust was funded. It it wasn't actually enough to be valued at that full 13.5 billion. It was actually less. It was something like 10 billion.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, it was premised on an increase in the share price.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>It was. That did happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. It's so twisted that these victims now have to be cheering for PG&E to do well to get their money back. It's wild. And also, it just seems to me, the risk, I even feel like calling it risk almost, is a misnomer. It is...given the volume of power lines out there, and the lack of inspections historically, and the sort of backlog they face on inspections, and monitoring, and tree trimming, and all that stuff...it is, to a first approximation, a certainty that they're going to start more fires, right? I mean, it's just with the drought going on and climate getting worse and worse, it's not even risk. It's just we know this is — we know it's going to happen again. There's no reason to think anything would be different this time, right? Like, there's no more prepared, there's no better system in place. It's just going to keep happening over and over again.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah. A couple of things there. I think that it's also worth noting that we often talk about these huge catastrophic fires that are ignited by PG&E's power lines, because they're very consequential, obviously. But these are not the only fires.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, of course.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Their lines ignite hundreds of fires every year, and it just becomes a question of, "is it going to spread into a catastrophic wildfire?" Sometimes they're very small and easily contained. Other times, as we've seen, they are definitely not. The question only gets more consequential as the climate changes, as the drought gets worse, as the consequence of a single spark becomes much higher, or potentially higher, I should say. If there's any good to take away from this story, at least PG&E is now more aware of the risk than it ever has been, and it has probably never worked harder in its long history to address it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Your book kind of ends in the middle of this saga, ongoing. Like, there's been the latest round of fire lawsuit compensation, but we're almost certainly cruising toward the next one. Do you have any reason to believe, a) that there's not just going to be another fire, another round of the same thing, or b) that PG&E has changed in any fundamental way?</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>So I think that on the day-to-day, they're doing a lot more to try to manage the risk, and they're doing it in a few different ways. I mean, better inspections, more tree trimming, and they're also preemptively turning off the power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not popular.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>No, it's not popular, and it's not a long term solution. It's like, at this point in time, the company can't safely and reliably provide power at the same time all the time, especially during the fall when the winds pick up. And this is really frustrating to customers, obviously, because we are incredibly reliant on electricity and are only becoming more reliant on it for obvious reasons.</p><p>So here's something that I find to be very interesting, and it remains to be seen how the company deals with this, but they got a new CEO in January of 2021. Five-ish, six months later, in the middle of the summer in July last year, a tree fell on a distribution wire that was not far from Paradise, which was destroyed in the Camp Fire. It ignites to become the second largest wildfire in California history. It, like, rose all around some of Great Western's old infrastructure, ironically. And so the new CEO goes up to Butte County, where the fire was blazing, and says, "we've got a new strategy that I'm announcing today, and we're going to underground 10,000 miles of distribution wire."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, she kind of dropped that on everybody. On the shareholders, too.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah, yeah. She had just told the board the night before that she was going to go public with this, and it was risky because the company hadn't really fleshed out the plan. It really hadn't decided which circuits need to go underground, hadn't really talked with the CPUC about what this is going to entail. They had a rough estimate that this is going to cost $20 billion over the course of the next decade or so. This is really interesting to me because we're talking about how a tree is inevitably going to strike a line somewhere, and a tower or a pole is inevitably going to have a problem somewhere, right? You can never completely reduce that risk. Undergrounding is basically the only way to eliminate the chance of the line causing a fire. Like that's it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, in theory, it's possible to reduce the risk to almost zero, it's just with what money.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Right, and so this is an expensive plan, especially. She made this announcement in July of 2021. Since then, everything has only gotten more expensive, right? We're living in a very expensive period. Labor is going to be more difficult and more expensive to come by. So the real challenge here, aside from the engineering challenges, is the cost management. Rates are already really high in California. There's a bunch of proceedings on affordability at the CPUC. So how the company is able to pull this off from a money standpoint is going to be really critical to watch.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is something that the company argues throughout the book, which is infuriating, but not total BS, which is that if you impose too many costs on it or impose too high compensation for victims, such that you basically impoverish the company, then it won't be able to remain financially robust, and it won't be able to attract private capital. And if your model is that private capital is supposed to do the work, then you do need a company that can attract private capital. So that it's like limits on how much you can really punish PG&E, right? Because it does, at least the way the current model works, it does need to stay at least relatively healthy just to keep doing basic day-to-day stuff.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>It does, it does. And for most of the show we've been talking about the trade off between capital investments and safety spending that now PG&E and other utilities struggle with. It's possible, I mean, theoretically, that undergrounding actually threads this needle, right? It's something on which the company can earn a return, and it does a lot to improve the safety of the system at the same time. Instead of building a bunch of stuff they don't need or goal plating, their substations are actually able to earn a return on a real safety investment. But still, I haven't heard of any sort of shareholder sharing mechanism associated with this plan, so it will be recouped through customers. And this is a really challenging time to be passing more costs through.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The final question I wanted to come to, and to me, the most important and interesting question that emerges out of all this. You have at the root of this the infrastructure in place. It is what it is. The costs for properly monitoring it and maintaining it are what they are. And those costs are incredibly high. And you see over and over again through the book how the need to produce returns for investors, siphons money away from that, siphons money away from maintenance and safety.</p><p>And so on one hand, you can sort of blame the for-profit model, right? You can sort of say, like, the investor owned utility model, this is intrinsic to it, this conflict, and you're always going to get shortcuts on safety and so on and so forth. But on the other hand, and you address this a little bit towards the end of the book, like if, for instance, California took the dramatic step of buying PG&E and making it a publicly owned company, all those maintenance and safety costs still exist, and they're still huge, and all that liability still exists, and it's still huge.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So if California bought the company, and then it caused the fire, the company would still be liable for all the damages to the fire. And instead of private investors paying that out, it would be California taxpayers. So, in other words, if it became a public company, all these costs would fall very squarely on ratepayers and taxpayers, and they're huge. So, like, bills would go way up, and that would be politically disastrous. So I guess I'm asking you an unanswerable question, which is just it doesn't seem like private capital covering this massive backlog of costs that don't produce any returns is a good model, but it also doesn't seem like taxpayers or ratepayers understand it well enough to take it over and then take on much, much higher costs upfront.</p><p>So this is like the question I come to at the end of the book. It's just like, where does the money come from? The money you have to spend to make this system safe is what it is. Somebody's got to pay it. What is the right system for paying it? Nobody wants to pay it.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Right. Yeah, exactly. The only argument for an ownership change is to remove the profit motive, right? But it really doesn't solve a number of other problems. It's either, basically, the taxpayer becomes responsible for upkeep of the system as well as the liabilities that result from inevitable system failure. Yeah, a lot of people focus on the ownership question. So there's certainly that sort of philosophical debate to be had about what is the right model.</p><p>But then there's also the practical reality of the fact that PG&E is not for sale, right? PG&E is not selling its assets. And it'd have to be a really contentious some, like forced takeover that would be really unpopular and definitely a protracted fight. So we're stuck with this. I don't mean that disparagingly, but this is the model. The cake is baked, so to speak, right? This is what we have.</p><p>And I think probably the better question becomes, like, okay, so then how do we make it workable? How do we make it so that there's better oversight of spending both within the company and within the regulator? How do you improve compliance? How do you drive down inspection costs? These kinds of things. And I think that everyone I will say that I think everyone who's kind of relevant in answering this question is trying to do so and is trying to do more. But as it's very clear in our discussion, there are problems and challenges of an enormous scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and not particularly unique to California. And I just come back over and over again to the notion that as long as this basic, misaligned incentive exists in investor owned utilities, which is the only way to make money is to build new stuff and maintaining your current stuff is dead weight loss. You can push back against that incentive via really good regulators that are paying close attention, are new specific rules, but, ultimately, it just feels like you're kind of pushing against the tide there until that basic core incentive has changed somehow.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a very excellent point. This is not just a PG&E problem. I think a lot of utilities across the country have historically mismanaged spending or mismanaged risk in some way, and because of this tension between private interests and the public good that's inherent within the system, and maybe they did so with little to no consequence. But my view is that that's really starting to change. We're seeing more extreme weather events that's putting more stress on a system that's aging anyway.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean the bill was going to come due at some point. You can't get away with it for a long time. From some perspective, it's friggin amazing that we built infrastructure in 1920 or whatever, 1915, that is still operating relatively reliably. I mean, all things considered it's crazy, but, like, of course that bill is going to come due.</p><p>And I don't even think it's just in utilities either. Like, you look at critics of suburban sprawl say basically the same thing. Like you build new suburban sprawl, you get a sort of immediate infusion of new money, immediate infusion of new investment, which allows you to go build the new thing. But sooner or later the bill comes due for maintaining all that stuff you build, and it's just not producing enough tax revenue to pay the maintenance costs. And who's going to pay the maintenance costs? All the shenanigans with corporate shuffling money about and shuffling liability about.</p><p>In the end you come to the question of like you just need a certain amount of money to maintain the stuff you built, and somebody's got to cough up that money. And it seems like America built a bunch of infrastructure and has been coasting on it. And now in all these different areas, the bill is coming due. And like, a) we've got corporations that are just not structured to pay it, and then b) we've got a public that has no idea that this dynamic is going on and would not react favorably if suddenly presented with the bill for all this maintenance. So we're just putting it off, in electricity and everywhere else.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah. And if there's one takeaway, I hope it's that PG&E is a good lens through which to view a lot of these challenges nationally. I think we're going to be talking a lot more about in the years to come.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The book stops more or less in the middle of these cycles: fire, lawsuit, verdict, scramble to improve things, another fire, more lawsuits. You more or less just stop in the middle of that cycle. a. do you have any predictions about how this will settle out, or even if it will settle at all? I don't know what even settling would look like. But b. are you going to write a sequel?</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>I won't rule it out. But I'll say not immediately.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You need a little break from book writing.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Maybe a little more content. We'll see what...we got to see what's next for the company.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, you know, they'll comically screw up sooner or later. Start your watch.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>I'm sure that something really unfortunate will happen. But I will say this, I am cautiously optimistic that things will be somewhat better going forward. It remains to be seen how quickly that becomes the case and whether that is sustainable. So certainly keeping a close eye.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. The race between modest improvement and then things getting worse via climate change. Like, how do those two things balance out?</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>Yeah. This book is a story of systemic failure and the convergence of kind of almost an unfathomable number of risks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's the story of our time. Well, thank you so much for coming on, and I really enjoyed the book. Even for someone who lived through all that stuff and wrote something about, it's a real page turner for me. There are tons of details I didn't know anything about that are quite fascinating.</p><p><strong>Katherine Blunt</strong></p><p>So glad to hear that. I really am. Thank you for having me. This was a really fun discussion.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-long-sordid-ongoing-tale-of-californias</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:71750981</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/71750981/3165999f9f2f75deed25b2cd6830590e.mp3" length="76229557" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3176</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/71750981/a7cd8d25a8abf5c7f10be0a39e2612aa.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What's up with Manchin's plan to reform energy permitting?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>As part of his price for agreeing to pass the Democrats’ Inflation Reduction Act, Senator Joe Manchin extracted a promise from Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer to pass a &quot;sidecar deal” addressing the issue of permitting reform. </p><p>Earthjustice president Abigail Dillen thinks it&apos;s a bad deal. I called her to talk through her reservations about the deal, her larger take on permitting reform, and her thoughts on how to build the renewable energy needed to address climate change.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/whats-up-with-manchins-plan-to-reform</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:71456346</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/71456346/0881351733194202356ebdca0f13071f.mp3" length="78777437" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3282</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/71456346/2b26cef8877a03a31856376fcf654d95.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The many social and psychological benefits of low-car cities]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>A few years ago, Melissa and Chris Bruntlett and their two children moved from Vancouver, Canada, to Delft, a small city in the Netherlands where 80% of journeys are taken by foot, bicycle, or public transit. Their new book, <a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://islandpress.org/books/curbing-traffic"><em>Curbing Traffic: The Human Case for Fewer Cars in Our Lives</em></a>, is about what it&apos;s like to live in a truly low-car city, and how other cities can capture some of the same benefits.</p><p>Reading the book was a joy for me -- it reinforced so many of my priors! -- so I was excited to talk to Melissa and Chris about how to design streets for people, the connection between urban infrastructure and social trust, the flourishing that Dutch children enjoy, and the myriad evils of cars.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-many-social-and-psychological</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:68290782</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 Apr 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/68290782/7372d510385fa6b62b75f57c48146e6b.mp3" length="100100878" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4171</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/68290782/fc0f134c9e29d585b4df40b726a5c052.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Talking through the Inflation Reduction Act with Don't Look Up director Adam McKay]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, director Adam McKay returns to hash over some of his reservations about the Inflation Reduction Act and the larger political situation in the US. I try to persuade him to be happy about the IRA.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/talking-through-the-inflation-reduction</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:69189277</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 13 Oct 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/69189277/acd079bf9b4f7d8130bc679f68827c39.mp3" length="82378573" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3432</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/69189277/1c4917ce7533a51a72f0f72c569d309d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Diving further into the Inflation Reduction Act: Part Two]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, energy modeler and expert Jesse Jenkins is back yet again, completing our two-part discussion of the details of the Inflation Reduction Act. This time around, we get into the tax credits, the green bank, the methane fee, and much more.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/diving-further-into-the-inflation-d7e</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:69030299</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/69030299/f90fb0fccadd04490ae99a1d3faa26de.mp3" length="104172845" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4341</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/69030299/149f30ec0d69dacbb551f0d12b37cc6b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Diving further into the Inflation Reduction Act: Part One]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, professor and energy expert Jesse Jenkins returns to the pod to dig further into the details of the Inflation Reduction Act. We discuss what the models can and can&apos;t tell us, the ugly fossil-fuel leases embedded in the bill, and what to think about the carbon capture provisions.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/diving-further-into-the-inflation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:68446026</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/68446026/8e1cc2dd100313fa754f0b7d65004ff7.mp3" length="97193763" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4050</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/68446026/600b3bf7a560f6a799688891211b9da8.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Some thoughts on the Inflation Reduction Act]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, it’s just me by my lonesome, sharing some thoughts about the history and context of the Inflation Reduction Act, the most significant climate legislation ever passed by the US Congress.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/some-thoughts-on-the-inflation-reduction</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:67976881</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Sep 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/67976881/61d8bfec38dc447204eaf1ef659fbb72.mp3" length="83982909" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3499</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/67976881/fb57ed7108f4aa7bb30199753a4c4fcc.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: how to get urban improvements done quickly]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, transportation planner Warren Logan shares his expertise on how cities can make fast, cheap, impactful improvements to safety and walkability.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAD0Tgw2pZCpnKHXu_aLJqEwa/volts22.08.10%28warren.logan%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-how-to-get-urban-improvements-done-quickly"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When it comes to reducing transportation emissions, two main ideas compete for mindshare in the climate space. First is switching out internal combustion engine vehicles for electric vehicles. Second is improving the built environment to make walking, biking, and public transit easier, to reduce the amount of miles traveled in cars and trucks altogether.</p><p>The conventional wisdom is that the former is faster. There are a few key policy levers that can be pulled to get massive numbers of EVs on the roads, whereas urban improvements proceed one at a time, each facing its own bespoke set of challenges.</p><p>But there are people out there at the city level working to increase the speed of those improvements. One of them is Warren Logan, currently a partner at Lighthouse Public Affairs, but before that, policy director of mobility in the Oakland, California, mayor's office, a senior transportation planner for San Francisco, and an intern in the transportation office at Berkeley, California.</p><p>In his time working on transportation projects, Logan has given a lot of thought to, and done a lot of work on, improving city processes to make safety and walkability improvements faster and less capital-intensive. He wants cities to free themselves up to make fast, cheap changes that can have big impacts without an enormous investment of time and money.</p><p>As listeners will have noticed, I have been somewhat obsessed lately with urban design and transportation issues. I hope you will indulge me in another conversation about the nature of resistance to urban improvements, the kinds of changes that can be made quickly to dramatically improve safety, and the larger need to avoid over-reliance on EVs.</p><p>Warren Logan, thank you for coming to Volts and sharing your time.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Thank you so much for having me, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's start with a little Warren background, a little Warren history here. Tell us sort of what your position was and what you're more to the point, sort of what your engagement was in transportation and transportation projects. Tell us about your last few years.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Sure. So before my time at Lighthouse Public Affairs, as a partner in Public Affairs, I was Mayor Libby Schaaf's Policy Director of Transportation and Government Affairs of the City of Oakland, which is two jobs that they pushed together. And I think it's important to share here just quickly that before my time in the mayor's office, I was also a transportation planner in the city and county of San Francisco. And before that was an urban designer as a consultant in the East Bay, in the Bay area here. And before that was a transportation planner again for the city of Berkeley.</p><p>So my point here is I've done a lot of different cool transportation work across the Bay.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you must know so many NIMBYs. It's like a NIMBY survey you've done with your career.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Berkeley to Oakland.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>You got it. And this might come out later in our podcast, but most of the subjects I've worked on have been like, "what's the most contentious issue at the time? Changing parking pricing. Let's talk about bike lanes. Let's talk about ... let's keep the city from falling apart during COVID," easy subjects really.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Tell us then at the sort of high level of abstraction, which is just let's address this argument. If I'm Joe Schmo on the street, I know transportation needs to be decarbonized. And I look around and I was like, "oh, there's the decarbonized transportation right there. It's called an electric vehicle. Let's just stop making the gas vehicles, start making the electric vehicles. Problem done. Let's move on to the next problem." I think that is a fairly widespread disposition toward this issue. So just tell us why you think that at the broadest level, why that kind of thinking is insufficient.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Sure. So to all the Joe Schmos out there, the truth of the matter is that just switching to electric cars is not going to solve all of our climate issues. And I'm sure we'll go into all the different reasons why. But for me, and probably for anyone who's ever been near cars at all, it's not just about the climate that we have to think about. It's like traffic safety as well. And I can only stress this enough, that if you get hit by a car, it doesn't matter if it was an electric vehicle or not. In fact, it might be worse because they're heavier, which is in no way to say we shouldn't be considering electric vehicles.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you might not hear it coming right?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>And you might not hear it coming, right. So, David, your point is so good, though, that there is certainly room for absolutely decarbonizing our vehicles. I will admit I own an electric vehicle, and I own an electric bike, and that together, those two means of transportation get me really far.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But if you're talking to Joe Schmo and Joe Schmo says, "if I switch out all the cars, what is the remainder? What is left?" What is the ... and remember, we're just talking climate here. Like, there are obviously other issues of urban life, but if we're just focusing on climate, what is the remainder that's left after the electric vehicles?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Yeah, the remainder also includes public transit, which also we need to work on decarbonizing here in the Bay. And actually, in California, we passed a bill, I want to say last year or the year before that required that all of the transit agencies shift over the next, I think, ten years to electric buses, or electric and hydrogen, alternate fuel sources. So it's not just that we need more EV cars. We need EV trucks for all of the deliveries. We need EVs for the buses and similarly for trains. Not every train is electric. We're very fortunate here in the bay that Bart runs on electricity, but there are plenty of trains across the country that still use gas and diesel, et cetera.</p><p>So there's plenty of room for improvement across every subsector of transportation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Continuing as Joe Schmo here, I don't know why I chose this name, but we're stuck with it now. Another sort of, I think, intuition a lot of people have in this exchange is, "okay, I get it that maybe EVs aren't enough. I get it that there are other goals. We want quality of life, we want walkability, things like this. We want more public space." But in terms of speed, and this is really where the rubber hits the road in this argument.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Literally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. I think Joe Schmo thinks, just quitting making ice vehicles and starting making EVs. I can see that happening quickly. The market seems to be accelerating, but it seems like changes in urbanism, changes in urban form, changes in building, changes in the way we do streets, this kind of thing take forever. Aren't they just intrinsically slower?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>They don't have to be. Let me kind of break apart what you just shared, the first of which is that I don't think that speed is the only thing we're trying to optimize when it comes to transportation, even though I think you, Joe, and all the other Joes out there think I want to get there quickly. Absolutely. I'm not here to delay your travel, certainly. And yet, one of the things I've learned in my time as a transportation planner is that people really discount just how bad traffic can get at times and that they're part of that issue, and that once you get to your destination, parking is not typically readily available depending on where you're going.</p><p>And so oftentimes when people say, well, my door to door time is only ten minutes, that's not really true. And there are plenty of studies that have been conducted, in fact, by my alma mater at UC Berkeley showcasing that people underestimate how much time it takes to drive somewhere and overestimate how much time they think it will take to take any other form of transportation. And I think that that's incredibly important. The second bit here. And I think this is kind of fascinating, that we've all gotten kind of explore this during COVID Is that the time that it takes for you to travel from point A to B, B to C, and C to A again or wherever you're going may not necessarily be as fast if you are not driving.</p><p>But you are able to recoup the value of that time by answering emails or taking phone calls while you're sitting on an ideally quiet train, getting from your place to place. And then the last bit too, is that not everyone can or even wants to drive. Like fundamentally, driving is, I think, an exercise that people have truly believe that it's like the most fun thing you can do. And that's not really true for most people. Like, driving kind of sucks a lot of times.</p><p>And we kind of have this idea that if only there was one more lane or if only the seats had air conditioning, I would enjoy this really rote exercise that gets really tough. And you're just I mean, there's a thing for it. It's called road rage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, you'll notice that the number one most notable feature of car commercials is that they only contain one car in them, only the car you're supposed to buy. There are never any other cars on the street. I'm like, "where is that?"</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Like, where's the rest of this? Right? You never see a commercial of a car like, "hi, this is you stuck in traffic all day because this is what it's like to drive in a real city, or even in suburbs for that matter."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All of that is interesting about speed of travel within the city, but that was not exactly the speed I was asking you about. I mean, sure, now I'm fascinated and want to follow up.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>I understand your second question, which is like, the speed of implementation, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, speed of implementation. How fast are we reducing greenhouse gas, I guess, is where the rubber hits the road. Full of automotive metaphors today. This is not on purpose.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>I love it. It's great. I'm going to get my book of idioms, and I'll see if I can go toe to toe with you, which there's one right there. So in terms of speed of implementation, I think that I'm going to call BS, right? Like a. some people really can switch their cars quickly. That's true. There are people with means to go out and buy electric vehicles, but they're a. not free, nor are they cheap. The lowest price EV is, I think, the Nissan Leaf maybe. And you're still pushing like 40K. That's an expensive car for a lot of people.</p><p>There are plenty of people ... and I want to just kind of talk about the ways in which people interact with the city, or even with suburbs, or even rural areas, is that there are lots of people who are in some ways so low income they have to drive, which is a really hard thing for people to conceptualize. But let me just unpack that for a second. We in America have actively discouraged people from living near their jobs vis-a-vis suburbanization. And then as more of, I would suppose, like my generation especially, have started shifting back towards city centers the price of housing in, I want to say all the cities, wildly here for a second, has gotten really, really high in places that are close to jobs.</p><p>Which means then that the lower income folks, of whatever age we're talking about for a second, are then actively discouraged from both living in a city and actively pushed to farther and farther places that are not well served by transit, not very accessible by buses, or trains, or even bikeways, or by extension jobs. And Oaklanders kind of face this a lot where I live. But it's true of a lot of places that you have no option but to drive, but for the fact that you barely can really afford the car that you're driving, and there isn't an option for you to upgrade to a more efficient car.</p><p>I think that that's kind of the fantasy that a lot of people want to live in, that if you own a car, you also have the means to maintain that car properly and by extension, perhaps switch the car that you're driving overnight. Oh, I just decided tomorrow I'm going to go buy a Tesla. That's not real. And so for a whole swath of people who are out there on our streets driving, their option for switching vehicles is really, really limited. And I can't speak for many other cities, but I can at least say for the Bay.</p><p>If I step outside of my house right now, I can watch a bunch of cars that were built in the 90s or even early 80s. None of those people, and this is sort of a sweeping generalization, but I would just expect that most of the people driving those vehicles probably can't afford even a moderately priced electric car. Because we're talking about buying a $1,000 car, not a 10, or a 20, or 30, or $40,000 car, let alone financing a car, right. And I'm not even going down a rabbit hole of people's credit and their ability to buy cars.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's just one more way that we've made it expensive to be poor in the US, right? Like they are paying a ton for gas right now, but do not have the means. They could save money in the long term by buying the electric vehicle, but you have to have that upfront capital. If you don't have it, you're just stuck with these ongoing costs.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And so that is just one example of many that I will share with you in just a second of why this fantasy that we're living in that everyone can just switch to electric vehicles is just not real. So let's now shift gears to all of the other tools in our toolbox that we do have at our disposal. And this is kind of the thing I've said to lots of people, right, that we choose not to use effectively. So if we wanted tomorrow to have half of our streets dedicated to walking and bicycling, that is actually possible.</p><p>And I know it's possible because I did it. And so you probably saw the kind of beginning of COVID, let's rewind two years plus a few months, right. A number of cities started implementing shared streets, healthy streets, slow streets, whatever name we gave them. I think that that movement proved that we've just been sitting on this gold mine of opportunity. And I want people to truly examine why is it that we refuse to exercise our ability to make that type of big shift, why we choose not to use that power, right? And so implicit in that question is holding all of your listeners by having them hold aside their opinions of whether or not we should have done that, just like set that aside for a second, because I've gotten enough heat about that for now.</p><p>But to at least focus on the fact that not only was it possible, but it was possible in a lot of different cities with a lot of demographics, a lot of different economics, right, like a lot of different politics, that lots of different places did this really big thing nearly overnight. And not just like when I say nearly overnight, like over a couple of years. I mean, the time and space between a few text messages between myself, Mayor Shaaf and the DOT director here in Oakland, and then them setting up the signs is, I think, 72 hours. So I'm not making this up when I say that truly these types of changes are possible.</p><p>However, and this is kind of the big caveat about speed, is that we have to choose to want that reality. And I think that that's the part that really gets me about let's just switch everybody to EVs, is that it maintains the sort of Americana suburbanized fantasy that, like, we all drive a car, we all live in our homes, and everybody has this perfect little access to all their little resources, and that's not real. And so the moment that you acknowledge that that's not happening for a lot of the people who live around us, including perhaps ourselves, you then have to examine, I would hope, what are the other potential futures that we need to not only just start considering, but truly start implementing, right? Like right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To pause on that for a second, because that was a fascinating ...</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Diatribe?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Natural experiment, sort of field experiment that nobody had really planned very far in advance. What's your sense of how well that is? Because as a good urbanist, what I would like to be true is everyone saw these open streets, strolled down them, saw fewer cars. It was like, "Ah, it's a new world. We can't ever let this go. We're going to make this permanent." But my understanding is that there's a lot of pushback. A lot of cities are under fire for doing it. A lot of cities have reversed a lot of what they've done.</p><p>Do you have a sense sort of overall how well those closures are holding up?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>I think most of them are gone, right? I can even speak for Oakland. Shortly after I left the mayor's office, so did the slow streets. And I won't go down that path right now. But I think that those types of really big decisions require courage and leadership in a way that a lot of people found at the beginning of the pandemic when they said, we have to do something because the sky is on fire here. And in California truly, the confluence of both COVID and the historic fires really felt like the world was falling apart and that suddenly everything was on the table.</p><p>I don't think that we stopped. And by we, I mean, like, cities generally stopped doing slow streets just because they weren't working. Because that's not true. They were working, and a lot of people really enjoyed them, and where they weren't working highlighted, and I'll kind of use the Oakland example is the one I know, but for the streets and the folks who lived on slow streets that said, "this hasn't actually made me want to go outside more. I'm not walking more or whatever," we still measured that traffic was down. We still measured that traffic was safer, right.</p><p>That speeds were lower, that DMT was lower, right. That they did, in fact, have a positive impact, even if people didn't necessarily want to acknowledge it or that that wasn't their primary sort of metric of success. I think that they went away because, it's kind of difficult to kind of go back to this, right, but I think they went away because we're not comfortable with change. And I feel like we're so close to just completely turning over into this different paradigm.</p><p>And honestly, I'm not entirely sure why we look at good ideas and say, "that's not possible. That's not for me, or that's too good for me." And I heard that time and time again as people's feedback about slow streets, not that they didn't want, like, traffic-calm streets, or even cleaner air, but that they felt like, "you're not doing this for me, you're doing it for someone else to try and kick me out of my neighborhood," right. And I completely understand where that distrust comes from because as a Black man myself, I get it. Like, I really do. And we use the G-word gentrification, or by extension, displacement, as a really great tool to actually discourage investments in low income and Black and Brown communities.</p><p>And I will try and avoid going down this whole rabbit hole here with you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But, well, I mean, it's at least worth noting. We have such a dysfunctional urban administration in this country and urban policies that people now basically think, "if you make my neighborhood better, that's a threat to me."</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Exactly right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>"Don't come in here making my neighborhood better," right. When people are out angry and yelling at you because you made their neighborhood better, to me, that is just like the endpoint of so many dysfunctional dynamics.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>It is. It's representative of the history of our country. That's the tough part. That when people ask, just as you did, "why did slow streets fail, right? Or why did they go away?" There's so many like, how much time do you have, right? Like, there's so many different reasons. Part of it is that all of us wanted to go back to normal, even though COVID still raging in a lot of parts of the country, right. The climate didn't get any better. In fact, it got worse at the same time, I think too, continuing to implement slow streets is like a full-time job that a bunch of my staff didn't sign up for.</p><p>And in fact, it wasn't really their job. We pulled together this kind of ragtag team that made this program work at the time, but the moment that everybody got back around to saying, "well, I want all of my other goods and services to be delivered to me from the city, or by extension, whoever," right. The priority shifted back to long-term capital planning and long-term delivery of safety improvements. And my primary thesis around that was like, "don't do that. Don't don't go back to doing things the slow, expensive, difficult way," right? Like choose to have a 50 miles network of slow streets that need upgrades on a regular basis, but that you now have a new, a completely different foundation to build from, holding even in that all of the consternation that people felt about them.</p><p>But truly, one of the things that I repeatedly told people is like, "I don't want to keep apologizing for not implementing the tools that I know we can." When someone gets hit by a car and yells at me and says, "why didn't you do something?" The underlying answer is, "yeah, I could have done something. And we chose not to because of insert any number of reasons," and I don't want to do that anymore.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One thing I always think about this, that the slow streets always make me think about, is several years ago I went to Barcelona because this guy obviously wasn't just one guy, but he was sort of one of the sort of visionaries who envisioned it in the first place and had been pushing for it for years. Salvador Rueda wanted to turn over more than half of Barcelona streets to public space, basically return them to people. But he didn't just go in and do it, he spent years, he revised the bus system so that it was much more grid-based, and linear, and much more frequent. And you have to deal with walking paths and trees, and you have to put the pieces in place, such that when you get the streets turned over to people, they're nice and functional, which is very different than just like, parachuting in one day and putting up an orange cone.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Right. And what Barcelona has that virtually no American city, save for parts of San Francisco and New York, right, is density.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>And that is such a critical issue. And I think this gets all the way back to, "why can't we do things quickly? Why can't we just shift to electric cars?" It's like, yeah, because if we don't shift to electric cars, we then need to acknowledge that we probably should have built denser housing next to each other.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Shoulda, coulda, woulda.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Right. And I think the other part too, though, kind of to your point about Barcelona and a number of other places, is that they did that when we had time.</p><p>And I think that one of the parts that I'm actively, and I think a lot of other climate resilient folks are on the same bandwagon, is that we don't have time anymore to keep having these debates. We don't have time anymore to just keep talking about what the future could be like if we all got our act together. Because the science has proven time and again and just like literally look outside, that we have run out of time on this issue, and so we got to start making big moves yesterday.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, let me ask about that, because this is a tangled and contentious topic in urbanism, but one of the reasons that things tend to move slowly in big affluent cities when you're trying to free up road space — or get rid of parking, or rezone or whatever — is that the mechanisms of democracy in a city basically end up empowering a relatively narrow set of affluent homeowners.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So to the extent there's democracy or what looks like democracy, it's all pushing in the wrong direction. And so when you talk about going faster, when you talk about let's just do things, it's hard to avoid at least the impression of let's have less democracy, let's have less public feedback, let's run roughshod over people. How do you navigate that?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>So, great question. I think that what's interesting, and I got that pushback and continue to, but that what was interesting about, let's say, like "tactical urbanism". I'm going to just zoom out slightly from slow streets themselves.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Define that for our listeners.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Absolutely. So, dear listener, "tactical urbanism" is when you use kind of not found objects but materials like jersey barriers, water walls, paint, signs to affect the type of right of way change that then hopefully you'll come back and literally and figuratively cement later on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, but that doesn't involve really infrastructure change. It's really jury rigged, cobbled together urbanism.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Exactly. It's like style on a dime kind of thing over here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To return to Barcelona, the first superblock they implemented, the first time they actually tried to close the streets and hand them over to people, that's what they did. They parachuted in over one weekend and just put like orange cones and plant pots on the streets and then got the neighbors together the following week and like, "hey, look, you have a superblock. What would you like to do with it?" Not, "should we do this? But now that it's here ..."</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>"What now?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>"What would you like to do with it?"</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Well, and that's what's so interesting about to your point about if by going fast, do we lose democracy? And I don't think we do. And let me kind of play out a bit of the ways that all of these different, again, tactical urbanist projects programs that we launched during COVID actually had more engagement. I met with community groups twice a week for half a year just on slow streets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, my God, you poor man.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>No, but don't get me wrong. I like engagement. I like people. And like well, I don't necessarily enjoy getting yelled at all time. It is actually helpful because once we've really got to the heart of the matter, we found out so many different issues that people had with a lot of the other programs we were running that we would have never found out had we not been engaging with them on such a regular clip. And this gets us back to my point about the trust, or really distrust in government issue, is that you don't build trust by talking about something for ten years and then not doing anything.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wait, that's Seattle city government's central strategy. What do you mean it doesn't work?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Well, I'll give them a call. No, I can't help you there. But I lived down here. But I think that that's the other really critical element that multiple people, I think begrudgingly shared with me was that they're like, "listen, we may not like the Slow Streets Program all that much, and we really hate that you didn't call us the day you did it, but it sure is nice to have all of the senior leaders of one department on a regular phone call with us so we can air our grievances on a regular basis. And then, better yet, see the next week that you've made changes that we ask for."</p><p>And that that is the seminal thing that I want people to take away from these programs, is that you have to expect that level of service from your government, and that anything short of that is not democracy. And that this whole system that we've built so far really only benefits a few people, and they're really good at making sure it stays that way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, a side question related to that. One of the things I heard from city administrators about kind of the COVID thing is, in a sense, by not being able to have meetings in person, they had to have them online. And a lot of them said that actually brought a lot more people into the process and a much more diverse array of people into the process. Like, if you're having a meeting on a Tuesday evening, it's all the old white people in coordinating T-shirts who ...</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Oh, I love coordinating T-shirts, though.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Who have show up. But if you have it online, then, like, normal people can come. Did you find that too?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Yes, absolutely. And frankly, just from a time standpoint, it was much easier to jump from ... now, granted, this is where my mental health probably suffered ... is jumping from one meeting to another over, and over, and over again. But you cannot discount, just your point. The fact that I could then meet with way more people because I didn't need to travel from one side of the city to the other. The other bit was and again, this kind of goes to, like, boundary setting that I'm working on, of course, is that it's also easy to have meetings with people at night or in the mornings at times that are not the best meeting times.</p><p>But if you want to have a 30 minutes phone call with me, that's easier if I can also be cooking dinner for my family at the same time. And that is true not only for myself, but also for the people I'm engaging with that are like, "I don't have time to come down to City Hall and talk to you about this. I'd rather tweet at you and get a response, right?" Like, God forbid any of your listeners go look at any of my tweets. I apologize in advance, but there are plenty of instances where someone or lots of people asked a question, and I took the time to really spell out, "here's how we got here, and if you want to talk more, give me a call, right?"</p><p>That type of engagement via zoom, but also digital in the form of social media, can really support a lot of transportation engagement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it seems also, I mean, this is slightly speculative on my part, but just psychologically, I feel like a lot of the things people bring up as objections to these kind of projects, like, I'm not telling you anything, but just listeners. Like, if you go watch the CSPAN or read the transcripts from some of these community meetings, the things people cite as objections to bike lanes and apartment buildings are so ...</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>They're comical, if not homicidal. It's crazy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They defy parity. But I feel like a lot of that is a little bit of displaced, like, "you're not listening to me, like I'm not being listened to," and that maybe if people got the sense like, "oh, I do have an open channel, there is someone listening and responsive," that some of that might fade. Is that too optimistic?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>I think that's true, kind of. And here's the important part that I really I must stress this, is that you cannot equate me listening to you getting what you want.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>I could have heard you, and the answer might be no.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It could be that you said something, and I did decide it was wrong.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Right. We're not just like, right and wrong, but that if we use that as the barometer for my listening to everyone, we wouldn't actually which is kind of how government works. We wouldn't get anything done because we'd be going left, right, left, right, left, right, left, right. And that's, I think, kind of to the very end. That's why government is slow, because if you truly listen to everybody, you're like, "okay, I got to hold on. I got to take a tiny little step, did the sky fall?" I think the other bit, though, and this is really important, about, again, like tactical urbanism and big moves, et cetera, is that there are lots of activities that cities engage in every single day, every week, every month, every year, that if you called them something else, you would think that they were actually tactical urbanism.</p><p>So I just want to give you and your listeners, like, a couple of examples and hopefully that will elicit ... but like, "yes, it's possible, and we don't have to fight over this so much." One is every single time that someone like a municipal utility does construction on your street, they file for an encroachment permit. It usually doesn't take very long to get that, maybe less than 30 days. So we are, in fact, capable of doing these plans quickly. The next bit is that they go set up a bunch of orange cones and traffic signs and say, "merge left", "road close", "detour", whatever.</p><p>And we all accept that on a daily basis in our neighborhoods, on our freeways, on our site, whatever. That's just like, "okay, that's a change, and we'll see what happens," right? And we kind of adapt to it pretty much immediately. That happens all the time. But instead of it being construction for a gas line, take that out and put kids playing in the street. Which in fact brings me to special event activities. It is not uncommon that cities in my own city, and I'm sure Seattle does this too, because I've been there and I've done it, also permits special events, right?</p><p>So let's say that there's a concert in downtown, and they've closed some of the streets so that people can walk around more easily. Just take those instances. And then instead of it being once a year, it's every weekend, it's every month, and maybe every day. And that's the kind of thing that we also really kind of encourage through our second program. So, like, we had slow streets and we had flex streets, and for a lot of cities, you probably know these as like, parklets or outdoor eateries. But that's the same concept where instead of saying, "well, this is for COVID," it's like, "maybe it's just nice to sit outside and drink a beer."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This gets to another enduring mystery of the of the kind of sociology of this, which is you do those things, you close down a couple of streets downtown for a farmer's market, or a concert, or just a festival, or whatever, an event. People love it.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>People love it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And yet it never occurs to them to think ...</p><p>"What if we did more of this?"</p><p>"What if we did this like, twice a year, right? Hey, what if we did it every week?" Like, why doesn't it translate? Or they're just not channels for people to express that positive feeling.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Or I think it's scale, and it's ... going all the way back to our engagement, right ... like, we never asked you what I mean. So embedded in Oakland's Flex Street Program was actually the sort of Easter egg that I left that was like, "we should think about this for long-term special events. That what if we didn't say slow streets are for people biking and walking," which I think is a net positive, but people have some feelings about that. "What if we said if you want a festival in your neighborhood or if you want a farmers market?"</p><p>Those are things that people say, "oh, yeah, I'd like having a weekly farmers market nearby. Okay, well, we got to close the street for that." And suddenly when you start to identify the activity that people are willing to give up their cars for, effectively, that's where you really get the special sauce. And it's funny because in Oakland, it turns out one of those special activities that I did not expect is rollerblading. Yeah. All of a sudden we have full blown roller discos that popped up across the city, and now there are clubs of people who show up.</p><p>And I don't want to say it's like a flash mob situation because it's planned, but it's amazing, right? And I think that that's the part. That ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>These are the car free streets.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Yeah. So they're not only on car free streets, but they've since taken them to parks. There's like a weekly ... like this is so Oakland, but once a month there's a drag show on wheels called "Rolling with the Homos". And it's fabulous, but it is also an outgrowth of like a bunch of people rollerblading more because of COVID. And that tapping into, like, what activity do you enjoy more than driving? Which, by the way, lots of activities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, almost all of them.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>That's the trade off that we need to make. And it can't just be, "oh, I want to make the street safer," which don't get me wrong should be enough, but I want to make the street safer for kids to play in, which would be awesome on its own, but that people are selfish, and that's great. Like, I love that people are selfish — and I don't love that, but I'm being facetious. But finding out what they value from like a social activity standpoint is often a really winning strategy, for then having conversations about whether it be tactical or urbanism changes to your streets or long-term capital improvements to a highway, for example.</p><p>But I will share even just kind of a similar example is that in Oakland there is a street, I won't name names because then people will be mad. But there is a street that the city planned a protected bikeway on, and a very large number of the businesses were like, "you're going to take away parking spaces, and that's going to spell the end of this district. So hell no, we won't go."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let me just insert here. This is one of many areas in urbanism where the research question has been answered. It is settled. You do not lose business when you lose parking spaces. When you increase bike and pedestrian flow, you get more business. And yet that evidence never seems to play any role in the next round of argument over this thing. This is one of the mysterious things about urbanism, is like, we learn things, but they never seem to ...</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>They never seem to stick.</p><p>And I think let me touch on that for just a second, because having helped manage a parking program in the city of Berkeley, I can tell you what's really happening. I felt like such a varied experience in transportation. Like, "wait, I have the answer to that." It turns out, and this is the people are selfish discussion, is that when business owners and employees say, "you're going to remove parking," I think that everybody else hears, "oh, for your customers." Of course you're worried about your customers. That's not true. I mean, they might be worried about their customers, but truly, if you get down to it, what they're actually saying is," I depend on driving to work," for whatever reason.</p><p>There's plenty of very good reasons why that happens. We're not going to go into that. But what they're really saying is, I get here via a specific mode, and your restriction on that mode then means that you might be compromising my ability to work and to feed my family. And I've met a number of women, for example, who are like, "I get off work at midnight, I work at a bar, I work at a restaurant, whatever, and you're not going to tell me that I need to walk a quarter of a mile to the bus stop at one in the morning. That's just not happening."</p><p>Without diving too far into this, I just want to kind of give air to why people land where they do. That being said, circling back to the sort of tacticle urbanism bit, a lot of these same businesses said, "well, we don't want to live with our parking spaces. Yada, yada." And then when we opened up the Parklet Program, the Flex Street Parklets, suddenly all of them had outdoor eateries. And so I asked them, like, "well, you got rid of 'your parking,' for this dining experience. I thought the sky was going to fall down if you lost your parking."</p><p>And like, "oh, well, the trade off was that I got more business. I can guarantee that I will get more business with more space," and there's a lot of things to unpack there. But the salient point that I keep coming back to is that we need to start asking questions in a very different way, other than, "how do you feel about the ways I want to address climate change? How do you feel about a bike lane?" Because that's not working. And what is working is all of these other tools that we don't mean to be using for this strategy, but I genuinely believe that if we started by saying, "hey, this neighborhood has a monthly eatery stroll, they close off the main street for all the restaurants and you take the kids out or whatever."</p><p>"What if we did that every weekend?" I bet you most people would be like, "that sounds kind of nice. Yeah, let's do that, right?" And then suddenly you might say, "this has been so lovely, maybe we should extend it to Friday, Saturday, and Sunday." Which is in fact what some, I think it's in Toronto, there's a business district, and forgive me if I have the wrong city. So dear listener, if you have the right city, call me. But that they close their bar district to cars a. because then the businesses really enjoy it, because they have way more people, and it's actually safer.</p><p>But the other side of it is that it also means probably fewer emissions because people are like, "well, let's carpool or let's take a Lyft, or let's take the bus, or whatever," because the streets are restricted in a certain way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Did you ever feel that you had enough of these positive examples under your belt? Like, "look, we closed this every so often here, and it went well. And like, the now the businesses are on board." Did you ever feel like you were able to build momentum off those, such that the next one was easier? Because, like, part of what seems maddening about urbanism to me is that every one of these fights seems to start ...</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>All over again.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>From friggin ground zero and cover all the same ground again. Did you ever feel like there was momentum, like you were getting ahead of steam?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>I think that we did a little bit. And I kind of want to use an example of "a tale of two different bikeways" as a way that, I think, we are starting to break through some of this ice. So there's Telegraph Avenue in Oakland that spans, it goes from downtown Oakland, like City Hall, basically, to the foot of UC Berkeley, funny enough, and the portion that runs from downtown through uptown Koreatown Northgate, and then through a district called Temescal all has, what was the time, a tactical urbanist paint and post protected bikeway. And that pilot taught us a lot of things, and most importantly, taught us that we we can't do those types of pilots anymore because they took too long.</p><p>And people were like ... it just got really messy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>People objected to the bike lane when it was there. Like, it was controversial, impractical.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Yeah, like super controversial and still remains controversial for a whole host of reasons. I'll kind of break apart in a second. So as we were engaging on 14th street, which is actually like, it starts just where Telegraph begins in downtown that goes East/West instead of North/South, we said, "hey, we want to put a protected bike lane here as well." And this is the business district that was like, "you're going to take away our parking. This is going to kill our neighborhood. And we don't want what you did to Telegraph," right? "We don't want to have that."</p><p>And that's like a totally fair statement. That pilot had some really big issues, and pilots shouldn't last five years, they should last five months.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>At a certain point. You're making mockery of the idea of tactical urbanism when you're ...</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When your flimsy little posts are five years old.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>But what we did learn, and this is where I hope that we have some momentum, is that when we injected the parklet part of all of this because, like insert COVID and this timeline, watching all of these business owners happily, gleefully take away, in some cases, half of the parking on their block, if not more, for outdoor dining, and not a peep from many of them, saying, "well, you took my..." because they're the ones taking it away, right.</p><p>We got to realizing that the space allocation, again is a matter of programming, where if you just say, "well, I'm making this space, instead of for your car, I'm making it for someone else's bike," that's a really difficult place to start the conversation. But if you said, "hey, can I make more space for your business on this street," and by extension for more just like vital, vibrant activity of people walking around, they might say, "yeah, that sounds great. That's going to be good for me."</p><p>"Oh, well, are you sure? Because that might require taking some of these parking spaces."</p><p>"Well, if I get to use that space for myself as well, then that might work."</p><p>And that's one of the things that we did see in the 14th street design that just went to council. I want to say two weeks ago, that they passed unanimously was that some of the major changes were based on lessons learned from this Parklet Program, where we actually took away even more parking to make these mega, bulb-out plazas, that suddenly make the street more of a destination.</p><p>But it's that type of creative thinking that a. it's just difficult, and b. is the type of thinking that we need to be using to really tackle our obsession with cars.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, my God, are there reforms? I mean, some of this obviously is just psychology, and sociology, and how you approach it, and how you communicate, and all that kind of stuff, and how you think about it. But there are also mechanisms of government, and mechanisms of review, and laws and stuff gumming up the works, in some sense. So are there city government reforms that are relatively simple that you could think of that would just ...</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Fix all of this?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, at the very least, ease the flow, at least move things along more quickly.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>So there are a couple, and I have actually written like little mini essays on my Twitter about this, because I genuinely like, I don't want to gatekeep ideas that I have. I want people to be thinking about them too and saying, "wait, no, I don't like this. Let's switch it to this."</p><p>I will give you two different ideas that I've come up with so far. One is in the traditional, capital improvement process. And let me kind of just zoom out for a second and explain that. Dear listener, whenever there is a multimillion dollar capital improvement, which is just an infrastructure project on a road in your city, there is a planning and engineering phase, which is both, like, the engagement component, there's design, and then just literally like, the engineering component of, like, "will this stand up? Am I going to dig into a pipe?" Like, all of the very specific minutiae that make sure that your street doesn't completely fall apart. And then there's the actual construction phase, and then you get to use the thing that we built.</p><p>That takes a really long time. And let's say, for example, that you're like, "gee, this is a really dangerous street, and we need to fix it right now. Great. Let's spend two years trying to go get $20 million, then let's spend five more years planning and engaging about this street, and then two more years to construct it."</p><p>So we're a damn near a decade in before you've actually fixed the problem. And that's not great. That's bad. And in fact, that's really shitty.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Those are injuries and accidents piling up ...</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Piling up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>While you're missing about.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>And so the pivot that I want us to make is to insert at the very beginning of this conversation a tactical urbanism adjustment or adjustments, for that matter. And it serves two main purposes. One, is that you get some of the benefits you need early, much earlier, so that people just stop dying from getting hit by cars, which is a very serious issue. And by implementing a something in front of people, like, just a physical change to the right of way, helps people talk about the concept that you're proposing as a physical thing in front of them instead of in the abstract.</p><p>Most people have different types of imagination. And it turns out, I just learned this recently, that some people don't even have inner monologues. They don't think.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh my God.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Like, that there's no picture or anything. When I found that, I was like, "that's fascinating."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know the amount of envy I feel. Imagine it being quiet in there.</p><p>Oh my God, I'm right there with you. Just shut up in there.</p><p>Anyway, my point is that not everybody is a city player. Duh. And that if I were to describe a parking protected cycle track to you, like, I can imagine most of your listeners faces are kind of glossing over at this point. But if I were to go out there tomorrow and just put some cones out there and say, "park over here, don't park here, and let's let people bicycle here, and let's just watch what happens for a few minutes." That is a much easier way for people to give feedback that is at least based on reality, instead of based on their impression of what might or might not happen.</p><p>And people have very faulty intuitions. Let's just throw that out there too, even whatever. Well educated city people, just human beings have some very ... things that happen in urbanism are very counterintuitive. The results are very counter ... And it's not something that people, even though, as I'm sure you're aware, every citizen is absolutely convinced that they are an urbanism expert. But in fact, there are lots of weird and counterintuitive results. And you do kind of need to know, you do kind of need to see things before you have a good sense of how they work out. But I'm assuming one reason city governments aren't just like, "while we're contemplating this $20 million capital improvement, we're going to slap together some orange cone type of arrangements here and do like a 60% 70% fix while we talk about it."</p><p>I assume the reason they're not doing that is that they're paranoid about legal liability of some kind.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Well, and that's the part that, again, I'm kind of calling BS. Because part of the structure of the emergency team that I worked in wasn't just planners. We actually had an economic development person, and we had a city administrator, and perhaps most importantly, we had one of the city attorneys. And his voice at the table was so important because I was just like, you thinking, "oh, hold on, we can't do that because we're going to get sued." He's like, "who told you that, that's not going to get us sued." Like, don't worry about that. Like, we have, for better or for worse, a lot of immunity when it comes to changing the rights of way, as long as we've done our homework.</p><p>But again, and this kind of gets me to the next, second proposal here is in the same way that we allow all of these private companies and municipal utilities to adjust the right of way regularly for construction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>The mechanism by which we do that has all the checks and balances necessary for us to approve that. So why can't we open up that same avenue so to speak for ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good one.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Everyday people, I'm trying here, everyday people to make those types of suggestions so that we can talk about them. Because I've met lots of people who are like, "well, why don't you just try ____?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>And what's interesting is that, I tried this with my own staff where I, I don't say bribed, but breakfast burritos will get you a long way, let's put it that way. I asked two of our staff and the DOT to grab, like, I think they had like 30 orange cones and vests, safety vests, safety first. To meet me in downtown and I just wanted to see, you know, as part of our, like, dialogue around 14th street if it was possible to narrow one of the cross streets to make like a really big plaza.</p><p>And I'd had the same conversation with them like a year prior and it was like, "well, we could kind of design it, and then we'd have to throw it in the model, and see how that would work." I was like, "or we could go have breakfast, and you grab the cones, and we'd just put up a sign, and say see what happens."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This should be the new slogan for the tactical urbanism movement grab the cones.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Grab the cones and breakfast burritos.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Forget the model, grab the cones.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>True. But the funny thing though is that in the short, maybe 2 hours we were out there, at prime time, really, or what would be prime time, but people aren't driving it downtown very much anymore. We took one lane away, and we're like yeah, this is nice. Nothing's happening instead of light. So the queue was clearing every single time. So if there was green, all the cars that were waiting got through the light. Then we tried another lane and still the same effect. And it was interesting to watch how traffic flow was actually slowing a bit instead of speeding on through, and that suddenly people were easily walking across the street.</p><p>And the last bit of course, was that we had a couple of business owners come over to us and like, "hey, what are you doing?" We're like, "oh, we just want to see how far we can build a plaza." One of them was like, "well, can I get one on my side of the street?" And we're like, "this this is how we should be having this conversation."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want a plaza.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>We all want plazas. So I lift up those two examples that both rely on this sort of like, "let's just try it for a second and see if the sky falls down." Because what we are failing to recognize, and I think this is so important, is that the existing condition is not an ideal scenario that we are having to negotiate away from. It's actually a s**t sandwich that we have sort of convinced ourselves is the best thing we can ever have, and that anytime someone says "I'd like to change what you're eating," like "no, I have to keep this," like really?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, the modal situation in a prosperous US city is that it's getting worse, right? Is that traffic is getting worse. Not just that we're defending some wonderful status quo, it's that just the natural flow of things makes things worse and worse. If you're car dependant, and you got more and more people coming in, it's just math.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>But you know, David, sometimes math is difficult.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Math is hard.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>But you know, that's the thing is that, and this gets us all the way back to your original question, "what if we just had more electric vehicles?" It's like, yeah, partly, but even if you just swapped all of the cars for electric cars, you'd still be stuck in traffic all day. You'd still have all these traffic deaths, probably more, right. It doesn't put us in the best situation we could get to. It certainly would address air quality issues. Absolutely. I'm not going to pretend like it doesn't, but that can't be the only solution because then you have cemented once again all of these other problems that become stickier and stickier.</p><p>Because if I just bought a $70,000 electric car, the last thing I'm going to hear is somebody telling me, "sorry, you can't drive anymore because you're going to hit somebody." Like, no. You know what I mean?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's slight addendum to the previous question, and I feel like it's often used in a somewhat glib way. But one of the things people like to say now is, "oh, it's the environmental rules. Like all the environmentalists are telling us they want walkability and et cetera," but at the same time it's the environmental rules that they put in place that are slowing things down, right. Environmental review, et cetera, et cetera. Was that your experience? Was that a big piece of the puzzle in your experience? Or is that more just a Twitter thing?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>It kind of depends on the subject. So yes, environmental review can be a major source of delay for certain types of projects. And I think that it is up to the states, sorry this sounds very like states rightsy and I don't mean for to — it is up to your local representative — to streamline those. That each time we identify something that we know is a good right, like, yeah, it's a good thing that we, you know, encourage more infill development or we encourage, you know, more people to ride bicycles. If the first issue, if the first barrier is, "hold on, I got to do, in our case CEQA, the California Environmental Quality Act."</p><p>"I got to do two years worth of CEQA." That's when you got to say, "hold on, time to streamline," at least that exemption, which we now have for a lot of things. The issue that we've now run into in California, and I think this is probably true for a lot of other places too, but it's especially true for California, is that we use CEQA, again or California Environmental Quality Act, to appeal infill development projects near transit. And that is the most blatant abuse and frankly, like misuse of a set of regulations that truly were there to protect us.</p><p>You have to remember that we put in all this environmental review because you had a bunch of companies throwing sewage in the water. So it's not like it came from nowhere. And I won't go into federal politics right now, but we're about to remind ourselves why we have these rules, is my point.</p><p>Oh good.</p><p>Hip hip hooray, right. But my point is though, that if we are running into that as a barrier, we can't just say, "oh, well, I guess we got to slow it down." It's like, "well, maybe we should fix this upstream issue so that we no longer have to have this problem later on."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That brings about another thing. You often hear from city people and city planners. And maybe it's not as true in California as it is in some other cities, but lots of times, city administrations find themselves at odds with state government. Because in a lot of states, what you have is, like your one urban blue area surrounded by the red sticks, and you have a red governor and a red state government and a blue city, and the red state government just wants to stick it to the blue city at every opportunity. But even in California where it's blue top to bottom, did you find that the interaction of city and state is a point of friction for you?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Not since I've been working, it's not as of late. And I'm sure plenty of your listeners have come up with arguments about exactly why that's wrong. But I think that at least for many of the CEQA abuses that we have been running into over the last decade, I would say, we have very fortunately, or it's no fortune, it's very astutely elected people who have gone in and adjusted those rules. I'm very happy and quite proud of our state legislators who are like, "oh, are you having trouble narrowing your street because of traffic safety in the environment because of CEQA? Okay, let's fix that."</p><p>And now there's a fix to it, right? Like we even had. One of the things we noticed with slow streets, was that we depended on an emergency authority to do those programs. And someone kind of mentioned it to some state folks and said, "maybe these aren't perfect, but if cities want to make their streets safer, they probably shouldn't run into this very arcane set of rules. Can you fix that for us"? And now we have a law that says, "yeah, you can totally do that." So I've been really happy to see some pretty strong proactive movement at the state level to try and limit city discretion and kind of like abuse of these types of rules, which is sort of the opposite but exact issue that you're talking about.</p><p>The other thing I want to highlight though is that, and this is a genuine question, I don't fully understand how it is that bicycling has to be like a blue state thing, or that electric cars has to be a blue state thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, why are hamburgers, why are trucks, why are, you know, like the NFL, it's everything now.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>But God forbid everybody just has clean air. You know what I mean? Okay.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I think it's a big part of the answer to me, and it's not just for red states, but for the US. Generally is just that ... as we've said several times, lots of things about urbanism are not necessarily intuitive, and lots of times you just need to see something to understand what it means or how it's going to work. And there just are not a lot of good examples in the US to look to anywhere. Anywhere. Even in the blue states, it's very difficult to go into a community and say, "look, we would like to be more like that."</p><p>You go over to Europe throw a rock, you hit a cute public plaza, they're just standard.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>But David, that's Europe and we're not Europe. Okay?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is what I mean. If you could just get like one or two in some mid-size US city, so you could at least say, "look, like Pikipsee has this great walkable public plaza served by transit," you could just point somewhere. But we've done it so wrong so long, we're so deep in the hole.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Well, the tough part is that we're kind of stuck on this, "well, that's New York. That's Amsterdam. That's Barcelona." And what's odd to me is when you really get at the heart of, even to some degree, our worst sides of American culture, they're like, "we can do anything." Where did that go?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, where's our exceptionalism?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Yeah, like, our American exceptionalism. Like, why is it that we can't apply that to really big thinking around our cities? Right? Like, it wasn't even that long ago that someone well, not someone, Eisenhower was like, we should really have freeways everywhere. And then we just did it with plenty of impacts, primarily to Black and Brown neighborhoods and low income communities. But my point is that what happened to all the folks who said, "we're Americans," if we want to change our cities tomorrow to be walkable, safe, vibrant, lovely places that are better than Paris, that are better than Barcelona, that are better than Amsterdam?</p><p>Like, what happened to that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's wild that nobody's even aspiring or talking about that. It does sound like a very American thing, like, "we're going to make our city better than Paris." We seemed really Stockholm Syndromed into thinking that we can't have nice things, we can't live in nice places.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Which are also the same people who've gone to Europe and experienced, "well, we can't have that."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's like, "yes, we're going to Disney World or going to LA, and going to the Grove," whatever they call them. These horrific sort of simulacra of small towns that they're building now, but with only the retail in it. Yeah. So creepy. Yeah. I don't fully get it. Well, I've kept you too long. Let's just say, as a final note, as a final question, I would just like to hear about a project you were involved in that you felt like worked. People are happy with it. It happened on a reasonably rapid rate of speed. It stuck and still exists. It improved things.</p><p>Is there a project you were involved in that you think of as like "yes, I'd love to have more of that."</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I would say the Parklet Program, the fact that all of them are still up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah. Is that true in Oakland? All the parklets?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Yeah, in Oakland, same with San Francisco. Not that I implemented that program, but it has been really exciting to see that they're all still up. I've even seen businesses upgrade them. I'm getting calls from people who are like, "oh, hey, let me get your opinion on this, because I'm working with this other group, and we're going to upgrade all over parklets next year, and have them all kind of look the same." And the important part here is that Oakland used to, had a Parklet Program before COVID. And what I did with our team was rewrite that program to a. make it free, b. provide technical support, and c. to self certify a bunch of the different requirements, that otherwise the city would have to go through and check over the course of like five years.</p><p>And what that has done is it's not only unlocked all this amazing public space, right, all these parking spaces that are now beautiful areas to sit, and eat, and drink, and hang out. It has also showcased just how creative Oaklanders are, that many of our parklets are wrapped in like beautiful murals that folks paid local artists to do. And so you can't tell me that we can't just overnight change our mind about at least this strip of land that we call a parking space, because that's exactly what we did. We just said, "oh, I want to use this for literally anything else."</p><p>And they're everywhere. And that's awesome.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is another reason it's so important to do early in the process, rather than talk, talk, talk, is first, you just have to convey to people that streets and parking spaces are public space. That alone, I feel like, is wildly counterintuitive and new to most Americans. Just the idea that we collectively own this space. We don't have to have ... cars on it, right. It doesn't have to be for cars. And two is just and this is of course what Barcelona learned, what everybody learns when they do this, is just when you create the public space, when you give people a place to come together, they will do things that you could never, ever predict in advance.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That they would do. They're so creative and so interesting. And people will do the cutest, coolest, most interesting things like walk around Barcelona to these superblocks. They just basically handed the neighborhood. They're like, "we're going to close off traffic to the streets in this neighborhood. Go for it." And so they've done just an amazing array of things like parks, and cafes, and little sculptures, and just everything you could imagine, you could never have predicted at all.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Yes, all of that is so true. And I think the exciting part about parklets, this sounds so silly because it's like I'm so ecstatic about them and probably ... but that the questions we started getting were very much like as if we had planted a seed and suddenly people saw the world in a totally different way for people to say, well, here's one question. Originally we'd opened up the program to businesses that had storefronts, and then the next group said, "well, I don't have a storefront, but this business owner here that does have a storefront said, 'wouldn't it be nice if my bar had a food truck outside and tables to sit and eat?'" Like, "oh yeah, okay, let's expand the program."</p><p>So actually our Parklet Program includes a brand new kind of Food Truck Program alongside it. Then another group of people said, "well, I don't own a business, but why can't I have a parklet in front of my house? Like, I'm not using the park space in front of my house, and maybe I don't want to put a coffee shop there, but like, could I put some plants there? Could I ..."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A couple of benches?</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Yeah, I put some benches, and that was like the final Easter egg. I left right ... when I left the mayor's office was like, there's actually no functional reason why business owners are allowed to take over the parking spaces in front of their brick-and-mortars, but that residential properties can't do the same thing. And that has a, you know, I haven't seen a residential Parklet Program yet. If you're listeners, if you know one, tweet at me immediately because I want to know. Famous last words. I'm going to get a lot of tweets now. But that to me was like watching people unlock the like, "well, if we could do that, why can't we do this?"</p><p>"And if we can do that, then why can we do this?" And I'm like, that type of thinking is exactly how we should be approaching our city.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly. You look at a road for cars or a parking space for cars, it's just that forever. It's never going to get better. It's almost inevitably going to get worse, but it's never going to be any different. But if you just think of it as space, if you take the cars out, and it's just space, there's millions of things you could do to it. The sky is the limit. Your imagination is the limit. And people will find more of those as there are more public spaces. You just hope, as I said before, you just hope at some point that there's like a collective tipping point.</p><p>Even if it's only just in Oakland. I's just like enough people see enough public spaces to have the light go on. Like, "oh, public spaces are cool, and fun, and great, and space for cars sucks and is ugly. Like, let's switch the one for the other."</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>I love my city, and I'm very happy I live here. And in some ways, it's not a big city. We don't have a big budget. And so, in such a weird way, if people look at us and say, "well, if Oakland can do it, so can I," so be it. If that's the way that we start this kind of, like, big change of changing our roads and changing our travel behavior.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly. Any seed will do. Well, thanks so much for taking all this time. Thanks for all your, I'm sure, what was often thankless work, beating back the cars.</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Thanks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thanks for coming on, Warren</p><p><strong>Warren Logan</strong></p><p>Absolutely. Thank you for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-how-to-get-urban-improvements</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:65879458</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 16 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/65879458/29ca620988a6751da671c44d3c2d4135.mp3" length="101697064" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4237</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/65879458/0803d8df4675d4a96f7ab8a4ccbdbf7e.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: when transmission planning actually goes well]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>A long-range transmission plan just announced by the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, or MISO, lays out a roadmap for $10 billion worth of investment in some 2,000 miles of new transmission lines, potentially unlocking more than 50 gigawatts of renewable energy. In this episode, attorney Lauren Azar celebrates this win and traces the years of work and advocacy that went into it.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AABcsWKK0Udqwjhx7wVMGBaca/volts22.08.08%28lauren.azar%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-when-transmission-planning-actually-goes-well"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Volts subscribers are well aware that the US, like most places, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-why-we-need-more#details">badly needs more long-distance power lines</a>. Such lines unlock the potential of regions where renewable energy is abundant but people are scarce. They lower system costs for all customers on the grid. They make the grid more reliable and resilient.</p><p>However, it is incredibly difficult to build these lines. The process is a bureaucratic tangle, with ubiquitous controversies over how to allocate costs and benefits, and the pace of building is woefully short of what will be needed to help the US hit its carbon emissions targets.</p><p>But a ray of sunshine pierced that generally gloomy situation last week, when the market monitor of the midwest wholesale electricity market — the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, or MISO — announced the results of its <a target="_blank" href="https://www.misoenergy.org/planning/transmission-planning/#t=10&#38;p=0&#38;s=FileName&#38;sd=desc">Long-Range Transmission Planning Initiative</a>. It laid out a roadmap that would involve $10 billion worth of investment in some 2,000 miles of new transmission lines, which MISO anticipates could unlock more than 50 gigawatts of pent-up renewable energy.</p><p>To someone like me, so accustomed to stories of failure around transmission, it came as a bit of a bolt from the blue. But it is, in fact, the result of years of long, steady work by advocates, stakeholders, and experts — including my guest today.</p><p>Lauren Azar is a longtime attorney and consultant working in the electricity industry. During her time as a lawyer, she has also worked as a senior advisor to the US secretary of energy on electricity grid issues, a commissioner on the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, and president of the Organization of MISO States, which was deeply involved in the last round of transmission planning in MISO. There's nobody in a better position to explain what has just happened in MISO and what it means for the larger field of transmission planning, so I'm extremely excited to welcome her on to the pod today.</p><p>Lauren Azar, thank you for coming to Volts.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Thank you, David. Looking forward to this discussion.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's rare I get to discuss positive transmission news, so this is exciting. As I said, I think listeners know the basics about why transmission is good, why we need more of it, and why it's so difficult to build. So let's take a few steps back and just talk about MISO, where this happened. So maybe just start by — MISO is what they call a Regional Transmission Operator, an RTO, which means it has an area that includes a bunch of utilities within it, and it runs the wholesale electricity market in that region and plans transmission in that region. So tell us a little bit about where MISO is and what and who it includes.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Sure. So MISO stands for the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, and they operate the transmission grid from Manitoba, Canada, all the way down south to Louisiana and Mississippi. In addition to operating the transmission grid, they also run an energy market which decides what generators are going to run to deliver electricity to customers. And under federal law as an RTO, they are also obligated to ensure that the grid itself is able to deliver sufficient electricity to customers. And so that is where the transmission planning comes in.</p><p>MISO actually does transmission planning all of the time, every year, but it's smaller scale. It's these long-range transmission planning processes that don't happen very often. And the result of some LRTP planning happened and was approved last week.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so this is a process. MISO includes a bunch of states, a bunch of utilities. They're varied in terms of not only their resource mix but in terms of their goals. and aspirations, and political character. So it's quite a milage they're dealing with there. So let's talk a little bit about the process. So what is MISO setting out to do with this process, and who gets to be involved in the process?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>MISO with regards to long-range planning, and that's planning for 20 years out. MISO uses what is called the "Strategic Foresight Process", which essentially what MISO does is it creates a series of hypothetical worlds for 20 years out, and then figures out what kind of transmission grid would be needed for those hypothetical worlds and what you are looking for. And those hypothetical worlds are called scenarios, or MISO calls them futures. And usually, in this process you try to get plausible bookended futures, so one that's more tepid and then one that's aggressive, and you try to then design solutions that would work in both of those bookends.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>With the electricity industry changing so quickly to even imagine 20 years out, there's some element of absurdity to it, like we have no idea. So as I was reading MISO's futures, they got "Future 1", where everybody sort of meets their stated plans and goals, and then they range up to a future where there's super aggressive decarbonization and super aggressive electrification, which raises demands. And my thought was, "that range between those two possible futures is so vast." How on earth do you plan a transmission system that even plausibly could answer the needs of both?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>First of all, let me just say that the portfolio that was approved last week, unfortunately, was only based on "Future 1", which in my mind was a disappointment. But whenever you're dealing with plausible bookends, one of the things that you can think about, and I think MISO is thinking about, is how can one plan build on another plan? So for these long-range transmission planning processes, and I'm going to refer to this as the LRTP process, MISO has already indicated that it's going to involve four different steps. In other words, four different plans are going to come out, and the next one is going to come out and be approved in December 2023. Tranche 3 in December 2024, and we hope December 25 will result in Tranche 4.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And these different tranches will be divided up by time period or by region, by area.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>The first three are divided by region. Tranches 1 and 2 are all in what was MISO Classic. So the states in Central MISO and Northern MISO. Tranche 3 is going to be in MISO South. And then Tranche 4 is going to increase the capacity exchange between MISO North and MISO South.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. So some exchange between regions.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so, as I think about the process of transmission planning and why it's so vexed in the US, one thing is just this wide array of stakeholders who tend to want different things. So I'm wondering when MISO held all these meetings, lots and lots of meetings. Tell me a little bit about the array of stakeholders involved and who wants what. We don't have to identify specific people or companies, but sort of in terms of their interests, who's pulling which direction here.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Sure. And let me just say that MISO has their stakeholder process set up so that there are eleven different sectors. Each sector member is aligned with the other members of its sector. And for instance, I've been working with the environmental sector. But let me just give you a sense as to who would be against larger transmission lines, the interstate transmission lines that are designed for the LRTP.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, this is what confuses people, I think, in my world, is transmission seems so great. Other than sort of like a landowner who doesn't want a power line on their property, it's really hard for me to imagine who else is pushing back against these things. But it must be somebody because they're not getting billed. So who are those people?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yeah, let me put them into four buckets. The first buckets are the "vertically integrated" utilities. And those are utilities that own transmission but also own generators. And the reason they don't want new transmission coming into their service territory is if they have inefficient generators, those generators do not run because lower cost, as an example, renewables will be selected in the energy market and will be delivering electricity to their customers. And so they're more expensive generators, like coal and natural gas, will sit idle, and they're going to lose money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you have an entity here which is financially invested in power plants that wouldn't run if there were a broader transmission interconnection. They're not competitive on a regional basis. So you have to keep your little area insular to keep running those plants, basically.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That doesn't seem very public-spirited, Lauren. It seems like a perverse incentive, let's just say.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Well, and that's one of the reasons that RTOs were created, was to try to chip away at this misaligned interest between the consumer and the utility. So that was bucket one. Bucket number two would be ... it's also, unfortunately, misaligned interest between utilities and customers. Some utilities are wonderful, and they absolutely look out for the consumer's interest. Other utilities, however, really are more interested in increasing their stock prices and their revenues. It is much more expensive to build generators than transmission. And, as you may know, and hopefully your listeners know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh yes, I beat this point to death, so I hope to God they know it by now.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Okay, well utilities make profits off rate base.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. They make money by spending money. They want to spend money.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Well, they want to spend specific kinds of money. They want to spend "steal on the ground" money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>It is depreciated assets, or I should say undepreciated assets. So they want to build the expensive generators. They don't want the cheap transmission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the more regional interconnection you have, the fewer big generators you're going to have to build.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Exactly. And your regulators are going to be looking at, when I say your, the utilities regulator is going to be looking at ensuring that a utility is not overbuilding. In other words, not building too much capacity. So if they are able to access capacity elsewhere, they're not going to be allowed to build their own generators and their own footprint.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Again, that's so perverse. So perverse that an entity is involved in this process that has that interest. It's just wild. Okay, that's bucket two.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yes, bucket three. I'm going to call the "end users". And those are usually large consumers who are mostly interested in ensuring costs stay low today, even if it's going to save the money tomorrow. And so they really don't necessarily even like the shift that's happening in the industry. They just want to stay right where they are. And so they often come back and say, "we don't need any changes, we don't want new transmission, or we want minimum transmission."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because they just don't want to make the initial outlay, the initial investment.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I was thinking about this. I'd be interested in taking a look at that and what the impact, for instance, of mutual funds and needing immediate profits is on that position.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, quarterly profits.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Exactly. Versus understanding that I'm going to make an investment today that's going to save money, when this line is built in ten years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which used to be, like, I guess, in an old-fashioned world, used to be sort of what business thinking was, "how do you make investments for long-term success?" But now it's like we got three months to show the numbers.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yeah. And so I wouldn't be surprised if that trend impacts their positions in this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, that's bucket three.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>And bucket four, it's politics. Some people just don't like renewables, and they see this as a renewables play, which I completely disagree with. I mean we are seeing a transformation in the industry. A lot of this is being driven by cost. A lot is being driven by customer preferences, and frankly, a lot of it is being driven by extreme weather.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it amounts to the same thing, right? I mean, if you follow low cost, if you follow resilience, pull those strings, you end up with renewables. There's not a lot of you can do to get around that.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, that's a daunting amount of resistance. So maybe up against that, who are the sort of entities who are pushing for sensible regional, long-term thinking about this? The environmental communities, I assume.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, let me just start with there are plenty of transmission owners that actually want to build transmission, and so they are leading this effort at MISO, which is fantastic. We do have two independent transmission owners in MISO, which means they're not "vertically integrated" utilities. And so they don't have that misalignment of interests. We also have the environmental sector, as you indicated. We've got the renewable generator developers and frankly, any developers of generation, whether it's renewables or natural gas, are interested in more transmission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They're waiting in the queue, presumably.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Exactly. And then we've got independent transmission developers that are interested in developing transmission under the competitive transmission development process. So they're pro-transmission. The regulators, generally, it really depends on their state, and their state's position, and whether or not their states' have goals, and frankly, how their utilities are performing as to what their position is. But the state regulators in this situation supported the LRTP portfolio.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So these lines they're talking about building here up in the sort of upper Midwest. One of the, I guess, you call it a friendly critique of these results, is saying almost all of these lines that you're talking about in this plan are going to be built by these "vertically integrated" utilities. Which means they will not ... because if they're built by independent transmission operators, there's a bidding process, right? You put up a project, and then transmission developers can come bid on it. And the thought is that competitive process will end up with better results, cheaper results. But there's very little auction here. There's very little independent transmission development. Is that something ... do you agree that that's a flaw here, or are they doing the best they could do? What's your take on the relative dearth of competitive process in here?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Well, first of all, I just want to clarify that in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa, and it may extend into other states, there are independent transmission companies that all they do is own transmission. They don't own any generators. And those are not the kind of developers that you're talking about, that have to use the competitive process. These are public utilities within the state.</p><p>And I'm just going to give an example in Wisconsin here, back in 2000, the legislature decided that they were going to disaggregate the utilities. Well, they were going to give an incentive to disaggregate the utilities and allowed the utilities to create the American Transmission Company. And so ATC owns and operates the transmission grid in about two-thirds of the state of Wisconsin. So that's an example. They're an incumbent utility here. They don't have to go through the competitive process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But, presumably, are governed by regulators, just like public generation utilities are. So, ideally, you would think the regulators would push them toward lower costs in the same way that competition would, although I gather maybe that doesn't always happen.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Well, for the two independent transmission companies in MISO, I think there are only two: it's ITC and ATC. Yes, they are regulated both by the federal government as well as the state government, but they do not have that misalignment of interest, that we had talked about earlier, because all they're doing is transmission. They don't have any generation to protect.</p><p>But let's get back to your first question, with regards to competitive transmission development. And these are companies that essentially aren't necessarily incumbent utilities that would compete for proposals that MISO would put out for transmission. And my understanding, I'd have to go back and look David, but my understanding is that about $1 billion of the $10 billion in costs for the LRTP Tranche 1 would be put out to competitive bid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Would it be, in your mind, better if there were more of these independent operators and more competitive process? Like, how much weight do you put on that in terms of ensuring quality and cost competitiveness of the results?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>The folks out there right now that are competing to do the development are pretty well-known entities. So I'm less worried about ... and I've got my former commissioner hat on, because early on when I was a commissioner, we didn't have any history with them, so we didn't know if they were actually going to build quality stuff. And I think there's enough comfort now that they are in it for the long haul, which is a good thing.</p><p>Would it be better if everything was competitively built? Given the urgency with which this industry is changing and how quickly we need to get things done, if we could competitively bid and still get everything done quickly, sure. But I think there is a bit of a trade-off here with how quickly we would get the build out if everything was competitively built. So I think MISO tried to come up with a middle road, where there still was a nice chunk for the developers to come in and bid for, but opted for 9/10th of it to be done with due speed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The term "quickly" is not often used in this context. It's funny, like it seems to be just conventional wisdom now. Like the time from announcing a line, to having a line, is ten years, which just seems, I guess, a little crazy to me. But is that standard in other countries? Is that, you know, should I sort of, like view that as an artifact of bureaucratic, you know, misalignment and whatnot. Could it go faster? Or is that just the nature of the beast?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>That's the nature of the beast in the United States. It's the regulatory framework that we set up, and it involves the amount of regulatory approvals that are required. How the land acquisition process happens. Once you get all the approvals you needed and all the land that you need, it takes two to three years to build these lines. And so the vast majority of the time spent is on getting to the point where you're putting your first shovel in the ground.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. That just seems like there's some fat that could be trimmed there. So MISO has this "Future 1", and we should mention that the "Future 1" is just utilities meet their stated goals, and the states they're within meet their stated carbon goals, which there are a bunch of utilities and states in MISO that have pretty aggressive carbon goals. So it's a pretty aggressive future. They have this future they're building toward. They come up with these 2000 miles of lines, $10 billion. So who pays that $10 billion? And to back up a step, who decides who pays that $10 billion? And how does that get divided up? Because my understanding is figuring out who pays, tends to be one of the worst tangles here and one of the most difficult sort of barriers to overcome.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yes, and in the transmission world, it's called the "cost allocation for the transmission lines". Ultimately, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is the one that approves the cost allocation rules for the RTOs. And each RTO puts together proposals on how it wants to pay for lines. The project type depends on under what bucket of cost allocation rules, essentially, get triggered. And when we started the LRTP process back in 2020, we knew that the cost allocation was going to be an issue. So there was a concomitant process going on to try to figure out how to pay for these lines, knowing that they were very similar to the Multi-Value Projects that I was ... I headed up the cost allocation process for that back in 2009, in 2010.</p><p>So we went through a lot of different iterations at MISO, through the stakeholder process, on whether or not LRTP needed to have a different kind of cost allocation than the original Multi-Value Projects. And in the end, it was decided. And MISO got approval from FERC to apply the MVP tariff, so those are the MVP rules, to the new LRTP projects with one change. So originally when we did the projects back in 2010, 2009 to 2011, MISO only had a footprint of MISO North and Central, and I'll just call that MISO Classic.</p><p>It was only after that that we added MISO South. And MISO South really doesn't like the cost allocation for the MVPs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>MISO South, by the way, includes Louisiana, just to give listeners a sense of.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yeah, so it includes Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas, as well as, the city of New Orleans.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Very different in character, let's say, than MISO Classic, in a bunch of different ways. So what is the Multi-Value Project? These are transmission projects that MISO planned ten years ago, which were also, I think, held up as sort of exemplars of how to do things well. So what was that "cost allocation process" in the MVP?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yeah, the "cost allocation" is essentially all of the beneficiaries sharing the cost based on their pro rata share of customers. So if you've got a lot of customers, you pay more because you're sucking out more electricity from the grid. And if you have fewer customers, you're paying less because you're using the grid less.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>When you say "you", we mean "you utilities".</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>It's called a "postage stamp allocation". And so the costs are spread broadly based on usage. That's the easiest way to describe it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We should say here as background, the overall process MISO found would be investment of around $10 billion and net benefits. At the end of it all, more than double that. I forget the exact number, something like $26 billion in benefits. So on a macro level, it seems like this ought to be easy to do, right, because the benefits so outweigh the costs that whoever is paying the costs ought to receive enough benefits to more than compensate for it. But of course, it's never that simple.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Can I emphasize that point? So the costs are spread by zone, and there are seven different zones receiving benefits here. The lowest cost savings is $2.1. So for every $1 spent in that zone, they will save $2.1. The highest every dollar spent will save $4.4. And that is only over 20 years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>And these transmission lines last for 60 to 80 years. So we're talking massive savings for every dollar spent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is like the "tearing your hair out" aspect of all this. On the broad level, these are just complete no-brainer projects. The benefits vastly outweigh the cost. But again, you get up in that, it's like who gets what, who pays what, and who gets what always ends up complicated. But dividing up cost based on usage seems quite intuitive and sensible. So what is Louisiana's..what's their problem with that?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Louisiana, MISO South doesn't like a "postage stamp" because they think that rather than just everybody sharing on their load ratio, that we should look at the very, very specific benefits being received by customers and allocating the costs based on those specific benefits. So if one area, for instance, is receiving benefits based on having to use less fuel, they would then be allocated the costs related specifically to using that amount of less fuel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It seems more complicated.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>It is much more complicated.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Almost as though the intent is just to muck everything up and slow everything down. I don't want to cast any aspersions.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Well, for smaller lines that are designed for very specific reasons, like relieving, just call it economic congestion, that sort of approach makes sense. But when you're talking about these large regional lines that are intended to bring regional reliability, I agree 100%. I think going more granular in your cost allocation actually leads to less accurate cost allocation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you're missing a lot of these sort of macro-benefits. Like resilience of the larger grid, benefits to everyone who's on the grid, and even people who are adjacent to the grid. And it's fuzzy where to draw the exact lines on those, but you can't pretend those benefits don't exist.</p><p>So the first round is a bunch of lines, more or less for the upper MISO. You got 2,000 miles of lines here, $10 billion of investments. Presumably, this is all going to trigger a process. Things are going to start moving now. So forgetting the subsequent tranches, which I want to talk about in a second, just in terms of this, like now they've released this plan, this document, this roadmap, what happens now? Presumably, all those, you know, all that whatever, seven years of approval seeking that gets started now, what actually happens in response to this?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>So a few things. Number one, you're absolutely right. What the utilities decide is which lines they're going to be building first, and they're going to be preparing applications to submit to their state commissions, as well as any federal agency approvals that they need, and they will start that regulatory process. What's interesting, there are 18 different lines here, and I suspect there is going to be a rational sequence in which these lines are built. And so part of that I think is probably also going to happen very early on is MISO will be working with the transmission owners to determine which of the lines need to hurry up and which ones can wait a year or two before they start their regulatory process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the things about transmission in the US is how many veto points there are over these things. So I would like to get a sense of how certain we are that this is going to result in these lines being built, or do we still face a bunch of process where say, a random landowner in Michigan can come in and just refuse and stop the whole thing cold? Like how assured are we that there are going to be results from this? Are there still more veto points ahead?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>There are many veto points and that is one of the weaknesses in our ability to build transmission infrastructure. I mean, if you think about building the national highway system, as an example, if any specific municipality could have just said no.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There were a lot of them.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>What our highway system would look like right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>And that's not true for all states. It's really state specific as to how land is acquired for these transmission projects. But for instance, a state like Iowa, indeed, it's very much dependent on local approvals. In Wisconsin, you only have to get the state approval in order to obtain the land that you need. So it's state by state. I can tell you, for the MVPs that were approved in 2011, those, believe there were 17 lines if I remember correctly, all but one of them are already in service, and the one that's not in service is under construction but is in litigation. So there are lots of veto points. But so far, at least if you look at the MVPs, we have a pretty good success record in MISO Classic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I see. So this is not certain that all these lines laid out in this report will be built, but we feel pretty good about their chances.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I have some strong confidence that we'll get these done.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And reading around, I've been given to believe that maybe this first round, this first tranche dealing with sort of the upper regions of MISO, might kind of be the easiest. So there are three more to go. Are they all are all of the tranches going to take two years of process? What's next? And do you agree that this first round was was the easiest?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>I can't say the first round was the easiest. I think Tranche 2, which is also going to be in MISO Classic, the rumor is that it's going to be as big as Tranche 1. So that's a large investment also in MISO Classic. But you have states and MISO Classic, and regulators in MISO Classic, that have worked together over more than a decade on developing transmission. So will we have ... continue to have the squabbles and the brawls? We absolutely will. The cost allocation is set for Tranche 2 as well. The same MVP tariff will be applied.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then you get to Tranche 3, the southern part. What's the what?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How new are these southern states to MISO? I'm wondering sort of how much the, like, shared history has a role to play here.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>I think it was around 2013, but do not quote me on that one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So they've been in MISO awhile?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yes, they've been in MISO awhile. And as a general rule, MISO South stakeholders have not been all that excited about developing transmission, period.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And is that mainly because there's these "vertically integrated" utilities that have these sort of perverse interests we were discussing earlier? Is that mostly the explanation or is there more to it than that?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>I think it's that, and I think it's politics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because of renewable.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They fear you coming in and forcing a bunch of renewables on them, thus, weakening their manhood, or I don't know what they think is going to happen. So do you think that's going to be, I mean, is that process underway at all? Have those talks begun at all? Do you have any idea what to anticipate when ... because presumably the problems that are prompting this process in the first place, congestion, and rising costs, and all this kind of stuff, also face the southern states in MISO. So inaction doesn't seem like a possibility here. So how do you —do you anticipate more difficulty there working through that?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Well, first of all, I just want to point out that the South has very unique challenges as well, with regards to extreme weather, and more than the rest of MISO, they need transmission in order to provide the resilience in those extreme weather events. I mean, Winter Storm Uri was catastrophic, and if they had more transmission, they would not have lost as many lives. So the actual planning process in MISO South, I can't say how easy or hard that's going to be. What I can say is historically, again, they have pushed back against regional transmission in the South.</p><p>As far as cost allocation goes, it is MISO South that wants to have a more granular cost allocation. And we have already started that process to start discussing whether or not there will be a new cost allocation developed that would likely apply not only to MISO South but then also to MISO North.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh really? So yeah, I'm wondering, is there anything in the rules that says you have to have the same cost allocation process for all these tranches?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yeah, FERC, in one of its orders, indicated that for any specific single project type, you can only have the same cost allocation. And so we already have an approved cost allocation for this LRTP project type. The question is whether or not MISO is going to be able to come up with an agreement with MISO South that then could be applied to MISO North, for this LRTP project type.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it also strikes me intuitively that the fourth tranche, which is the connecting the regions to one another with power lines, might be the stickiest of all because all the sort of perverse incentives we were discussing earlier — if you have your little territory, and all of a sudden a high voltage power line comes into it that can share power from all the way down to Louisiana and all the way up to Canada, it's going to lower your costs. It's going to lower your need to build new generation. Which is all, again, as we discussed, very pro-consumer, very good thing from a social point of view, but very bad if your financial viability relies on investing a bunch of money in infrastructure. So do you have any sort of thoughts about whether that might be unique, the sort of interconnecting of regions, uniquely difficult, or what do you anticipate in that piece?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>There will certainly be some stakeholders that will want to slow-roll that. What I can say is I do know that some of the southern regulators recognize that their development of solar in MISO South will be nicely balanced by the wind in MISO North. And so having that kind of enlarged interconnection between the two regions is going to allow for the balancing of those renewable resources. So there's, I think, a growing appreciation for the need for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Looking a little bit beyond even that, beyond MISO, one of the longstanding critiques of transmission is now the way the utility sector has changed, the way the electricity sector, the way electricity technology has changed, we need to be thinking about this on the broadest possible scale. Like, there's constantly calls for a national grid for these regions to be interconnected, one to another, for the US's three big separate grids to be interconnected. So is there anything in this process that could accommodate lines not just within MISO, but connecting MISO to adjacent regions? It seems like if you do that, you get a) even more social and economic benefits, but b) you drag even more of these stakeholders with perverse interest to the table. So is that part of this process at all, or is there such a process?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>It is not part of the LRTP process, but MISO has been working with SPP on doing just that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>SPP is the southern Power?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>I think it's the Southwest Power Pool.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There you go, another RTO, another regional transmission.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Exactly. It's directly to the west of MISO. And so they, for the first time, and I believe this started last year, started doing serious interregional transmission planning based on their interconnection queue delays. So the line between SPP and MISO, the seam there, goes right through some of the strongest and best wind resources in the United States. And so a lot of queue projects are being held up by delays between the processes of SPP and MISO, and they are working hard to resolve those.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So they're working ... there's some sort of inter-RTO process, or at least discussions underway?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>A plan actually has already come out. So, yeah, I'd have to go back and look at the map. But there is a plan of lines. They are developing a cost allocation right now for those lines, and the two RTOs have agreed to do that joint planning process, at least at a minimum every two years. So this is a fantastic development.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's really cool. Are they out ahead of the other RTOs in the country? Is that happening anywhere else? Is anybody else? It seems, like, whenever I look into transmission processes, and thinking, and long-term planning, MISO keeps sort of popping up as, like, the leader, the exemplar, in the US. Why is that? Why is MISO so much better at this than the other RTOs? Is there a simple explanation?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>I do not know the answer to that question. What I can say is other RTOs do have strengths that MISO doesn't have, but MISO is, with regards to transmission planning and cost allocation, is one of the leaders nationally. I wouldn't be surprised at the fact that we do have some of the best renewable resources. So in other words.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Tons of wind.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Right. Our industry is changing so dramatically in MISO that they have to be on the forefront.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So I want to wrap up with two questions. One is just from the sort of baseline US transmission perspective. This is somewhat miraculous. It's amazing, since more transmission announced at once than ever before, and it looks like it's actually going to happen. So obviously the process was successful in some terms. But I just wonder, looking back on it now, or, I guess, you're still in the middle of it. I assume you're going to be involved in these subsequent tranches as well?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>I expect to be, yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm wondering if you have any thoughts on how the process could be improved, whether there are sort of particular roadblocks or tangles that you think could be improved, when they come back and do this again in 2030, or whatever.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Well, first of all, let me just stop right there. One of the improvements is this needs to happen every few years. So the fact that the MVPs were originally approved in 2011, and the next tranche was not really approved until 2022, that by itself is a problem. David, I didn't expect this question, so I would have loved to think about it in advance. There are other things that I think could be improved. The "Futures", I know you identified them. The "Future 3" is being pretty aggressive. We think it could even be more aggressive than it currently is, just given how quickly the changes are happening in the US.</p><p>There were also, and this gets really geeky, with regards to Tranche 1, there I think could be some improvements made, as far as where MISO cited some of the renewable resources in the process. That's off the top of my head.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what about, this is a related question, but what could other RTOs take away from this? And as far as you're aware, are the other RTOs and ISOs watching this, interested, inquiring about it, trying to learn from it? Like is there, is there any reason to expect that MISO having sort of had this notable success, or notable progress, is going to inspire change in other regions, or are they all just sort of so bespoke they all do their own thing?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Most importantly, FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, is essentially going to be requiring RTOs, and ISOs, and other planning areas to do this kind of strategic foresight. So they issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and that will probably be finalized I think by the end of this year. But it requires scenario planning. It requires planning 20 years out. It requires using specific benefit metrics. Actually, it gives discretion on the benefit metrics at this point. They're requesting comments on that. But the good news is MISO successes have led to the federal government recognizing that this works and is going to require it of everybody.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this just being regional transmission planning, which you'd think like of course it works. Of course it doesn't work if you don't do it, more to the point.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Ironically, regional transmission planning was already required by FERC, but some areas weren't doing it using scenarios, some areas weren't doing it using a 20-year planning horizon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>So FERC is getting a lot more specific in what's required.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And just as a very final thing, is there any change on the way from FERC, or anything in the infrastructure bill, or anything in this new reconciliation bill? Because there are transmission reforms, I know, being talked about all the time, being talked about at FERC, and there's, I think, some transmission reforms in the infrastructure bill and some money in the infrastructure bill. Is any of that sort of legislative and regulatory activity at the national level going to affect what you do at MISO in any particular way?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>There are certainly components of it that will improve, for instance, potentially development of some of the projects that are being identified between SPP and MISO. My frustration with where we are from a regulatory framework perspective is it just continues to be a patchwork, and we just continue to put new patches on it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sounds like us.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Yeah. We have a national problem, and it needs a national solution. And we aren't getting it with these one-offs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So what is that? Let's conclude with that then, because this is ... like anybody who sort of studies transmission, or just the logic of the grid, you're led inevitably to the need for planning at the highest possible level, right? Because there are all these sort of synergies and interactive effects, especially now with renewables. They're concentrated some places, and loads are concentrated other places in the country. So the need for national planning is quite obvious, I think, just from the logic of how the grid works. But as you say, all these states involved, and regulatory commissions involved, and FERCs involved, and it's a soup of bits and pieces.</p><p>What would a solution to that look like in your mind? This is a huge question to end on, but I mean, are we talking about a bill in Congress? Something like that? Or like taking some authority away from states and putting it at the national level, or sort of like? I mean, this is obviously well beyond your remit, but I'm curious to your thoughts. It's just sort of like what would a kind of, if we just wanted to cut this Gordian knot, what would a national solution look like?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Well, first of all, it will take congressional action.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>There's no question. And one of the difficulties, unless Congress is willing to put a lot of money into the solution as well, I think what you're going to have to look at is the economic development implications for each state. So as the state commissioner, you're always wanting to ensure that you have sufficient electricity to serve your customers, and at a lower cost so that you can attract potentially new businesses into your state. So unless the United States wants to put a lot of money into the national solution, I do believe that the states are going to need to be at the table as well.</p><p>So it is going to need to be a collaborative process. But I agree. I think, if not a national plan, at least we need interconnection-wide plans. That is going to be the cheapest way, overall, to enable the transformation that we're already experiencing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's real difficult to look at current political situation and imagine that happening, but who knows?</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>And I think that's why we end up with one-off new patches coming in because that's all we can get.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, maybe, as is the case in renewable energy, it's just sort of the brute force of renewables becoming facts on the ground, becoming cheap and built, kind of forces change. Maybe just getting a bunch of transmission built will, in itself, loosen things up and create a virtuous cycle. We can always hope.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Hopefully.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, thank you so much for coming on and explaining this. This is super interesting. I had no idea this was going on. So it was like a little gift in the middle of otherwise difficult political times.</p><p><strong>Lauren Azar</strong></p><p>Wonderful. Thank you so much, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-when-transmission-planning</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:66783184</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 12 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/66783184/66f1582be56b276d8fbd59c4ec52f2c6.mp3" length="70112516" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2921</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/66783184/bbcb677ae8432565e25bbc8721effe15.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: what to make of the Democrats' last-minute climate bill]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, two Volts favorites — Princeton professor Jesse Jenkins and UC Santa Barbara professor Leah Stokes — join me discuss the Inflation Reduction Act, the somewhat miraculous last-minute agreement between Senators Joe Manchin and Chuck Schumer. It represents the tattered remains of Build Back Better, but many if not most of the climate and clean energy provisions remain intact. We discuss what&apos;s in the bill and reasons to be excited about it.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-what-to-make-of-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:66616722</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Sep 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/66616722/d7977b178be51072dea99bb8e54aaf8a.mp3" length="122398583" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5100</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/66616722/1af121681679d928a9eae3e9ccc75026.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: a music festival that treads lightly on the earth]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Zale Schoenborn shares about  emphasizing sustainability at Pickathon, the Northwest music festival he founded.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAvaWYUa3IAP2meVNyEZdika/volts22.07.29%28zale.schoenborn%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-a-music-festival-that-treads-lightly-on-the-earth"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Listeners, today at Volts we've got something a little different, a little off our beaten path. It’s an episode about one of my favorite music festivals. It might not seem obvious to you why you should care about a small music festival in the far northwest of the country, but I think if you are patient and listen for a little bit, you'll get a sense of why I’m spending time on it (beyond self-indulgence).</p><p>By the time 2011 rolled around, I was more or less done with music festivals. I love live music and have been to many great concerts, but most festival experiences were so hectic, stressful, crowded, dirty, and exploitative that it just no longer seemed worth the effort. (That has only gotten more true in intervening years.) So I was a little skeptical when a friend told me about the <a target="_blank" href="https://pickathon.com/">Pickathon festival</a>, held every year about 20 miles outside of Portland, Oregon.</p><p>For one thing … “Pickathon”? Sounds like one of those twangy festivals with crunchy hippies playing mandolins and banjos. That is not my bag. But he assured me that the lineup is diverse, from all genres, focused on acts that are about to break bigger. </p><p>He talked me into going. And listener, it blew my mind. </p><p>For one thing, the land itself is gorgeous — it is held at Pendarvis Farm, a sprawling area of pastureland and wooded hills that is used only once a year for gatherings, only for Pickathon. </p><p>Every attendee camps (the festival lasts three days), but not in some crowded parking lot. Rather, there is a whole network of trails running through the woods, with established camping spots that have been used and reused since 1999 when the festival started.  </p><p>Then there’s the crowd. It wasn't jam-packed. You could always get food or drink with very little line. You could always see the band, no matter which band you wanted to see. There were tons and tons of families and children and almost no backward-baseball-cap bros. It felt oddly wholesome.</p><p>But perhaps the strongest impression I took away that first weekend was how weirdly, anomalously <em>clean</em> the festival was. One staple of festival life is giant, overflowing trash cans, with food wrappings and disposable cups strewn everywhere. At Pickathon there was none of that. There was virtually no visible trash. Water was free, available at spigots across the grounds.</p><p>It all struck me as so intensely human, so <em>humane</em>, that I fell in love and attended almost every year thereafter. (Here’s a <a target="_blank" href="https://grist.org/living/can-a-music-festival-be-sustainable-pickathon-is-finding-out/">2013 story I did for Grist</a> and a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2017/9/1/16153156/touring-life-14-bands">2017 story I did for Vox</a>, in which I interviewed 20 artists in three days.)</p><p>Pickathon is back this year after a two-year hiatus, so I couldn’t pass up the opportunity to talk with festival founder Zale Schoenborn about how the festival has evolved since 1999, what's next on the sustainability front, and what's new at the festival this year. Even if you don't happen to live in the Pacific Northwest and can't attend, I think you'll enjoy hearing from someone who has put so much thought into into bringing humans together to commune and celebrate in a socially and environmentally sustainable way.</p><p>Alright. Zale Schoenborn of Pickathon, thank you for coming to Volts.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm sure this must be an insanely busy week for you, so thanks for taking the time.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>No problem. It is definitely exciting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So there's a ton to talk about with your music festival, but first, I guess I'd like to just go back and hear a story that I'm sure you have told hundreds of times by now. But Pickathon is remarkably long-running, in the context of the music festival world. It started in 1999, which is just wild. So stretch your mind back, if you can, that far, and tell our listeners the story of just why did you start a music festival? And initially, when you started it, what was kind of the vision? And to what extent is that vision changed or sort of held steady in the, doing math, 24 years? 3? 23 years since?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>24? I don't know. It's all ... you got to count one extra year in there, I think. Great question. Well, going all the way back, something that lasts 24 years, if anyone has the honor of kind of a hobby that grows out of control, that can turn into something, that's the only way you get to what Pickathon is. It's years of making horrible mistakes, and fixing them, and surviving them. So, like, all of the above. But if you rewind all the way back to 1999, it really was pretty humble beginnings. We just thought of, why don't we have kind of a better music party with our friends? And we always had this idea of "genre-based music festivals are really annoying." Like, how come we have to be so isolated in a Bluegrass festival or a Rock festival?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, thank you for saying that. I don't know why that's not a more widespread opinion. "We're having an ice cream festival. Come and eat all ice cream for three days." I mean, I like ice cream.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Exactly. You really get sick of music you love, if that's all you hear. So it was interesting because the response from the pre-program crowds was very negative to that. They did not endorse it. There's like a hardcore following in these kind of genre circuits, and if you were there, they're going to come see the genre that they kind of support. But if you mixed it up, you are off in Never Never Land. And it wasn't until the really big festivals like Bonnaroo and other folks started mixing it up some, that that became a thing. So now it's pretty common, but we stretch it a little farther. And that's kind of like the early days. We were just kind of having a party. Let's potluck party. And we said, "jeez, what can we do with all this energy? Well, let's support our community radio station." So we were just like raising money for KBOO, a local radio station here. And that kind of happened for like six, seven years in that mode.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This was in Portland, though.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>It did start ... we were out in Portland. We've been in three different sites. So the first site we were out at is Horning's Hideout. So in this KBOO phase, we were out in a place a little bit out in the west side of Portland, and beautiful little kind of reserved acreage in the coastal mountains. We didn't survive there because there was just a lot of neighbor turmoil, and we were the little festival. We were having awesome acts. I think we had one of the last Holy Modal Rounders, true performances by them. Kelly Joe Phelps.</p><p>It was awesome, but it was just not ... it takes a while. Pickathon is one of those things that we could tell everyone it was going to be awesome. And we, basically, had to have people come and grow by like 10% a year because that's the only way folks would get it. We just didn't do a lot of what we do now because this site we were at, the Horning's Hideout, had a venue, it had power, it had water. It wasn't like an open farm, it was like a pre-set site. But when we got kicked out of there about six years into that, we kind of found a temporary home for a year down in Pudding River, and then eventually found the Pendarvis Farm. And it's in those years where we really grew up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what year was that? What was the first Pendarvis Farm year?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>I think it was 2006.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So tell listeners, because this is one of the, I think everyone who's been to Pickathon would agree is one of the most striking features of the festival, is the grounds, itself, Pendarvis Farm itself. So tell us a little bit about how you found that because my understanding is that that area, that farm, is not used for other festivals or gatherings. It's a once a year for Pickathon kind of thing. So how did that come about?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Through friends. So we had somebody that had gotten married there, and they said, "well, you should check this place out." And it was a friend that's married. They weren't doing like weddings at that time. They just had kind of a friend's wedding. And I did. I went to, actually went to one of the ceremonies there and checked it out, the little party they had. And I didn't really know the scale of the property because they hadn't really maintained the back, even right behind their farmhouse. So maybe the first two acres, three acres of it, five acres, I could see, but I didn't know went back a half mile</p><p>And right when we figured out the scale of this and met Scott and Sherry Pendarvis, who are definitely special people in the universe, we hit it off, and the energy Scott and Sherry throw out into the universe is kind of both inviting kind of creativity, but also they want their property to have this place for wildlife and fauna. And so not doing something all the time was, kind of like, part of where they were coming from because they weren't looking at it from, "let's just turn this thing in and turn it around every week." They were like, "let's do something special, and then we don't want it to do because we're going to wreck the wilderness."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One event a year, and sort of the rest of the year is like restoration and growing. So I've always wondered, how is there not like a line of people at their door saying, "I love this, I love this area, I love this venue, let us do this too. At least have two festivals a year, or three." It's amazing to me that they've resisted that for all these years.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>It's not a business equation for them. They want to live and be sustainable, but it's different than if you were running a business and trying to maximize it. It's just not where they're coming from. And there's a lot of logistics that you have to run through. You have to get permits with the city. So it's a bit of just like the amount of tension you want to try to fight with, like, "how much, what kind of permit do you want to actually run your events?" There's a lot of overhead in that, and I think just us being so large, so impactful, really kind of felt like the right balance for them. And yeah, it's been great.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what do you do? You find this, I mean, basically, huge wildland. It's like pasture and woodland, and you're looking at it, and you're like, "how do I impose a festival on this?" Like, you have to create every path, every stage, every sort of venue. Like, every little bit of the festival has to be imported onto that site because there's nothing pre-existing there. So when you first looked at it, how did your mind not just short circuit? How do you go from nothing to festival accommodations?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Well, desperation definitely helps. That is the kind of starter pack for willing to take anything because we didn't have a spot, so we didn't know really what we could do there, how big it could be. And you're 100% right. When you went beyond kind of the main field they had their horses in, it was ten feet rolling, four-inch thick blackberries, choking everything. I mean, it was the craziest amount of blackberries, and they just haven't been tended to for a long time. So it was more than just wild. It was just choked.</p><p>And there were a couple of roads. There was like an old, there is a second grove forest that was logged, a couple of times, but they logged in the so that road existed. And Scott and Sherry had a couple of other trails that they had already, kind of, throughout the land. But, yeah, about 80% of those trails, Sherry and Scott kind of rolled up their sleeves, and we made, like, a trail system, and we slowly, surely cleared out the forest over, I would say six ... You've been coming for a long time. So were you there when the "Wood Stage"?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I was trying to figure this out the other day. 2011 was my first year.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Okay. So we might have been kind of fully baked, close to it on the trail side, but we were still probably adding trails when you came. It's been a slow process. There's only so much you can do every year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And this is one of the things, I think, that's really striking about the festival when people get there and see it, is that there's now this network of trails through the woods. And not only a network of trails but these campsites have been used now once a year, every year for whatever, decades now. So it's like a little city. It's like a little city in the woods, of little roads and campsites. There's nothing quite like it anywhere else.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>That is the truth. When it's all assembled together, we like to call it Big Rock Candy Mountain, where you don't see rough edges, and it just kind of feels like magic. But underneath it, yeah, there's power, there's water, there's security, there's fire, there's dishwashing, there's a site maintenance. There's so much. Everything you would need in the city, you're right on task, right on point. And that took a while to kind of build too, a long while. We had epic mistakes that were so hard to deal with in the festival year, we hit them, and then next year, we would try to address them. So the system looks kind of well-oiled, but it's really a series of just major gas, that are probably really custom to the site. You probably wouldn't make sense everywhere else.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. What were some of the biggest mistakes?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>There are so many. I mean, so many. For a while, we just let folks go into the woods and find campsites. And I don't know, actually, if this existed any other festival, but we have this idea now. And the consequences of that was fine when we were small, but as we started to get a little bit more people not familiar with the grounds. There was a situation where people would just go in 100 feet. They wouldn't even try to find a spot that was open, and they'd camp on the side of a hill. And then they tied their tent or something to a tree, and, boy, were they mad. I mean, we just got so many people just having these horrible experiences, or they took them forever to find a spot, and we just felt so bad.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It was a little stressful too. There's an anarchy element to it, when everybody's just sort of heads for the woods. You're like, "oh, my God."</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah. What can you do? What can you do? We came up with this idea, and it's really developed pretty significantly into what we call the "front desk for camping, the camp-host." And now they are a crack crew of firefighters now, pretty much, that are amazing. And their job is to kind of like show you on a dry-erase map, they're talking to the crew out in the field, and they're kind of telling you where there's availability and where you should go look. And if you have too much stuff, or you have some trouble carrying your gear, we have like a gear drop service where we kind of put it in a bin, one through five, and it will show up, and you can exchange a tag and get it out in the woods, right? It's actually delivered to you. And that whole experience of getting everyone in comfortably meant to be like a little thing, but it's a humongously important thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I've lived through it a couple of times, and yeah, it's so, so crucial, and it's so amazing how well it works. The very first time I did it, as we were wandering back into the woods looking for a camp spot, the number one thing I thought was, "my God, there are so many ways this could go wrong."</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There are so many ways you can f**k this up.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah. And people get mad when that's happened. That crew is like well-oiled machines. The first year you do any crew, it's kind of clunky, and it kind of works. And then those people stick around, and didn't hate it and liked it, they kind of create their own community, and all of a sudden, before you know, it's like it's always been there. And it works like a charm. And that's where we're at now with that. Some of the big sustainability stories for us, like having so much plastic, it was just crushing to us. We're like, "this is awful. What are we doing?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, this is great. Well, this was my next question anyway, so this is a perfect segue. So let's jump into this because from the first time I went, the cleanliness, relative to other music festivals I've been to — I think people who go to music festivals at this point are just used to giant, trash cans overflowing with crap everywhere, and like, paper plates, and Styrofoam cups, and just junk everywhere — And this is remarkably absent at Pickathon. But I assume that you didn't start out that way. So I'm sort of wondering, in terms of sustainability, how central was that from the beginning? Or is that something you brought in more over the years?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>We always cared, and so we were always thinking about it, but it was as we started to really grow, you start to lose control of telling your friends, "just bring potluck dishes." At some point, to service that many people, you have to start bringing in pallets of water bottles. And everyone likes to charge for water in our world, which was just abhorrent to us, which is I'm like, "how can you charge basic necessities?" Like charging for the bathroom or something?</p><p>We just kind of grew into it from wanting to do the right thing, but it was just really kind of broke for us in 2009. We're just like, "this is crazy, there's got to be a better way." And there were some festivals in Canada that were trying to do some stuff, like reusable. But we kind of had some very hardcore friends in the recycling world, and we just came up with just a really grand prognosis, "well, what if we do no plastic? Let's do none." And then we're like, "yeah, let's do that."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that why water is free or was water always free?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Water is always free, but you had a lot of it we couldn't service. We found some tanks around that time too. We had water tanks, but we still had to have water bottles a lot, everywhere. Or people brought cans. But it was mainly just the spirit, like just having the sense of, "we're going to have like a quarter million cups that we're going to throw away."</p><p>I think actually in that preceding years, we had this dream of compost, right? So we're compostable cups. We were in there, but Portland being such a sustainable, kind-of-minded, hardcore town, people were calling us out. They're like, "yeah, you guys are not going to compost cups. Nobody wants cups. Yeah, they say they're compostable, but you're going to have to go find a special spot to do that." And we're like, "really?"</p><p>All of that led to that design. Thinking of, "well, let's just get rid of it." And we had some very good friends that were working for Klean Kanteen at the time, and they were kind of into this idea, and we kind of made up this idea of, "well, what if we have a stainless steel cup, and everybody has to hold on to their cup? And what if we make a silicone ring that you could put around the cup, and a carabiner, and you could clip that cup to your belt so it's not such a pain in the booty to walk around all weekend with it."</p><p>And we really thought through it, and we ended up kind of really checking with the health department. And we decided, "yeah, let's do this." And all the advice was "make it optional". And we're like, "oh my God. Well, then what's the point? And nobody's going to like this." And sure enough, we kind of threw it out to our crowd, and they loved it. They're like, "should we get rid of plastic?" And it kind of went early days of going viral, but it went viral.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it was the cups first.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah, that was the big first step. But it worked so well. And it just seemed like, "duh". We were just like kind of like, "of course you should do this. It kind of pays for itself."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know. Well, this is the thing. You go to the festival, and you walk around for three days with your cup attached to your belt, filling up free water from all these faucets around you. And you just cannot ever go back to a normal festival, where every time you get thirsty, you have to find somewhere to pay $8 for a small bottle of water. You're just like, "I could never go back to that." It's absolutely primitive. It's one of the many things that seems so obvious once you do it.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yes. In Portland, we ruined the ability to charge for water. It was such a blowback for years. I remember MusicFest Northwest was charging for water in those years, right after we started giving it away. And there were people just couldn't, were just up in arms. They're like, "what are you doing?" We're like, "we're sorry. I guess we ruined it. We didn't mean to, but we're going to give it away again. Can't help it."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so then comes the food. And of course, everybody who goes to Pickathon is very struck by the food system and ends up talking and talking about it. I remember my first year that I experienced it. I went through, what I'm sure everybody goes through the first time they encounter it, which is sort of initially presented with this idea of like, you have a token, you exchange it for a bowl. When you're done with the bowl, you exchange it back for your token. Sounds a little bit complicated. You do it once or twice, and once again you're like, "holy s**t, how does the whole world not work like this? This makes so much sense."</p><p>So explain kind of the bowl-token system, and who thought of that? And when was the first year that you attempted that?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>So 2010 was when we did cups, and that cut our waste stream down by a third. Just that one thing. And we were like, "yeah", but what we kind of noticed is we still had a ton of single-use dishes, and forks, and all kinds of things that were related to just throwing it away. And you couldn't really compost a lot of that. You could say you're going to compost, but a lot of it ended up going to the trash because these compostable things at the time just are not truly, like, just trash compatible.</p><p>And we just said, "well, God darn it, what can we do? Can we actually go further and have this goal of getting rid of single-use?" And it's still kind of like a North Star because it's almost impossible. But I do believe, from the festival side, we were pretty successful. We said, "you're going to have one bowl, so what is that going to be? And you're going to have one utensil." So we came up with the perfect food bowl being a nine-inch pasta bowl.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, man, I love your freaking bowls. I am not kidding. Me and everyone I know who's been to this festival has at least like a dozen of these bowls, that I've used for years and years. I mean, the bowls that I got the first year I was there are still in my house holding up somehow.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>And the cups. And they're so easy. Going back to your point, these also just pay for themselves. Like, you buy a token, which costs you basically the amount of the bowl. You give that token every time you want to eat to a vendor. They give you food in the bowl. You finish it, you give it to the dishwasher. We wash those dishes all weekend. And then when you're leaving for the weekend, well, you get your token back from the dishwasher. And so you're not carrying your bowl.</p><p>It's not like the cup was. Like we said, "you can carry the cup. It would be a lot more awkward to carry your own bowl and wash your own food." At the same time, we kind of created a do-your-own washing station, in case people didn't want to use ours. But we weren't going to give you any plates, so you have to bring your own or use ours. And almost everybody uses our token system. And then you're carrying around a token. It's really easy. But the cincher, and the way it kind of really works for everyone, is at the end of the weekend, you'd give that token to the dishwash station, and they give you a clean dish to take home, right? That's it, closes the loop.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It also serves as a souvenir, and it's incredibly useful. It is like the Platonic ideal of a dish. It works for everything.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Soup? Salad? Really nothing doesn't work in a nine-inch pasta bowl. It's kind of the spork of dishes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly. So then you eliminated single-use cups in 2010. So maybe 2011, the first year I came, was the first year of the bowl tokens?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah, you experienced the very first year. And I mean, we had a lot of hiccups in that dishwash system. We engineered a very low-flow special dishwasher, that can run off of water that we had from the farm. And there was a ton of engineering, by a local dishwashing company, to figure out how you could do this and do it on a farm at enough volume to keep up. And it was rough, but I think to the most people, it was a great experience. And it was another just, "Aha", we got another third of our waste stream down in just one year. It was incredible. There's just so much being thrown away.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Was there any blowback at all? Was there any complaints at all from the attendees?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Maybe one or two over like ten years, but it really isn't. It's incredible. And that's what's so astonishing to me is, like, we've been trying to, like, give this away to festivals. Like, "look, it doesn't cost you any money. This actually pays for itself. You should just do it. It's so great."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But to your knowledge, like, you've been doing this system now, which has eliminated, or almost eliminated, single-use bowls, and plates, and stuff for over a decade now. Has anyone else picked it up? Has anyone else?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>I think there's some people trying the cups. There are some spin-off, but I don't think anybody's doing it. There's a lot of optional stuff, a lot of, like, "oh, if you want to do it." And that doesn't work, and you can't predict on how many to buy. And it basically feels like a disaster to the festival organizer because they spend money, and nobody did it, and then nobody really actually, you didn't get any benefit. But the only way this works, and we've told it to everyone, is like: you know how many people are coming, you buy that many plates and dishes, it's not optional.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What's left in the physical waste stream bucket that you're going after?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah, there is trying to get all of your vendors to bring kegs of things, right, not to bring packaged goods. So we've pushed wineries to put stuff into kegs, and that's now a very common thing people are doing, and it's cheaper for them. So we've been pushing a lot of the people that want to bring us cases of glass and cases of packaged things, that we want to get these things in bulk from you in reusable containers.</p><p>That took a while to really say "no" to people if they wouldn't do it. They're like, "really, you don't want this free stuff?" We're like, "no, we can get it from somebody else. And we really want to. I think it's good for you too. Like, you can start delivering to bars in this way." And sure enough, Portland, you do see a lot of reusable stuff and things in kegs. And for us, going back to why other festivals aren't doing it, I don't really know. And I think there's a really kind of American sense that you don't want to force people to do something. It would be so inconvenient to have a reusable dish or carry a cup. It's just terrible experience.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But it's crazy, like, the audience loves it. It feels like you're doing something. It feels like you're helping, right? It feels like you're involved in something with other people, where you're out of the ordinary.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>It doesn't feel bad. That doesn't feel weird, does it?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No, it doesn't feel like an imposition. It feels like a fun thing you're doing together. How much physical waste is left?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>There's compost from food mostly. So what we still have is people don't eat all their food, and our vendors have some compost waste in our kitchen. So then I think that most of our waste, though, comes from our campers, as much as we ask them to try to. Like, I would say 80% of our waste is people in the campground, and it's hard to police that. So we talk about it, we get folks to kind of be into it. But we are very generous on people being able to come because a lot of families come. A lot of people need to bring a lot of stuff. And what a pain in the butt if we were just policing every little thing.</p><p>But we've made it so that the festival side, when everybody gets up with a blanket at the end of the night, right, the only thing that's on the ground is blankets that people leave.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I remember. I mean, I don't know. I keep going on about this. My first year there, it took me a couple of days to even pinpoint it. What is different here? Why does this feel ... and it wasn't until the second or third day, I was like, "oh, there's just no trash. There's just no trash everywhere. I'm so used to trash everywhere."</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's really mind-blowing.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's talk about some other sustainability aspects then.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And as you say, one of the other striking things about the festival experience, when you go. is just that it's not mobbed, it's not crowded. Like, you can get food, you can get water, you can see the band. There's never been a band at Pickathon that I've wanted to see that I've not been able to go and get a pretty good view of, just because there's not that many people there. So tell me about sort of, like, the capacity of the space versus the sort of number of people you let in, and kind of what is that calculation, that balance? And how has that evolved over the years?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Well, it goes back to as we were starting to grow, and it wasn't just me supporting it off of my day job. And we really started to need to kind of, like, couldn't be just volunteer. The hardest part of a really dreamy idea, a concept, is probably the first couple of years, right? You're doing it off of just vapors. Your family is involved. Everyone's just willing to work for free. No one's like, "it's a dream." The third or fourth year, it's like, "I can't do that. I can't take off two weeks to work. I'm sorry, I can't do it."</p><p>Things get in the way in life. And so you start to fall back more and more on having to kind of pay for things. And that's usually the place where most of these kind of community events die. Is that kind of hard transition?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? Some professionalization is inevitable.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>And we were hitting it hard. We were hitting it hard. We were like, "what are we going to do?" And we knew from other festivals that our path was going to take us to kind of grow in the capacity. And we just kind of like, deep down, we're like, "god, we don't want to go to that festival." But we didn't have any choice. So we really just threw it out to our audience, and asked them, "we're like, okay, here's what we can do. Do you want us to just keep our ticket prices low and just grow this thing and get it to be like a normal festival you've always been to, or?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's just pause and make a note here. You could, the space, acreage is huge and could accommodate lots more.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>About 5X, yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Five times. So what is the ticket sales capped at now?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>They're capped at $5,000. Just one of our main fields could probably hold 50,000, right? That's how big our main field is. So it's kind of ridiculous, but it's really awesome.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They couldn't all camp, right, though?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>They couldn't all camp. But you could run like a day festival. Lots of things about Pickathon wouldn't — the more people would have really ruined camping, too, in terms of being a universal thing you just get for free. People forget that. Most times you pay for camping. But yeah, that was a conscious choice.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you asked the audience, you said, "our expenses are growing. We can either let in a bunch more people or raise ticket prices." When was the first time you sort of presented that to the audience?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>I think about 2007, somewhere around that Avett Brothers kind of time frame. It was somewhere in that range because we just knew we had to kind of make a choice. We were kind of outgrowing our own infrastructure at the time. The whole farm wasn't there, but we just really needed to know how we were going to do this.</p><p>And we kind of also had the idea of, way too early it turns out, David, that we should scale by being a filmmaker in digital content. That was part of our sustainability plan. We're like, "okay, we're going to stay small, charge a little bit more, but we're going to create this beautiful film. And we're going to export and infect the world, we're going to bend the arc of pop culture in some weird way." And those are all kind of, like, they were all interconnected at the time, those same ideas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you first presented that question to the audience in 2007. The audience responds, "please keep it small. We will pay more."</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>100%. 100%. Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Have you returned to them with that same question, again, since?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>It's kind of new. I mean, we have ... people know that about us. We have to often explain it more to people because at this point we are actually moderately priced. There was a point where we were pretty high priced compared to where festivals were. Now, festivals are pretty expensive, so we have a lot less of those questions. And we didn't grow our ticket prices in the same way, that our major ... we play Coachella on TV, right? We are like 1/200th of the size, but we're in the top ten festivals. But it's only by playing that on TV. We're really like 1/100th of the size, or something goofy, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I wonder the equation there, the sort of balance there. At a certain point, making the tickets more expensive will kind of start to make it feel exclusive, right? It will kind of start to price out some families and stuff. I know this is not a science, but is there a point at which you would consider letting in more people, or sort of how do you think about that balance ongoing?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Well, we definitely think about it on multiple levels. One, is we don't charge for kids under 13, so they're free.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And there are a bunch, I should say. There are lots of kids.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Oh yeah, there's like 1,500 kids under twelve and like 1,500 teenagers under 18. It's a lot, and we kind of made that, "Okay, these guys don't count." And it's hard for families to come. So like if you, yes, the tickets are more expensive, and if you want to come as a family, and you're paying that much for your kid to come, it becomes really proactive. So that was some of the equation. We're like, "okay, we're going to charge for the adults. People can bring families. It feels a little more economical." And I don't know where the balance there is. It's still a tough one for us. We keep our prices as aggressively low as we can, but we think about it every year. We're like, "is this too much? Where are we at in this equation?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is the video stuff? I mean, I assume part of the motivation of getting into video and streaming, and all this kind of stuff was to open up a new revenue stream. Has it brought in much money?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Well, not really. The most money we ever made is ... we did a concert a day with the Recording Academy right after COVID hit, and we raised several hundred thousand dollars for Music Cares. We were right there with the Grateful Dead, raising money. Pretty hilarious. And that was like a great time. But as you might know, being in the business, things like YouTube and stuff just don't pay that much. And monetization has been off and on. In the balance, it's been a positive because that ability for us to scale and kind of reach the world through our content has worked. 100%. People know us. Some early video of Mac DeMarco peaked before he was ever known.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really great video too, I should say. Like, really incredibly, good-looking video.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>We care a lot. Yeah. That crew is like 700 people at Pickathon, believe it or not. It's like a movie set, right? The whole thing. And we still believe in it. I mean, I definitely look at it from a sustainability point of view. I am happy keeping it at this scale. We really do want to figure that out. I think the timing is getting more, right, at some point in the future, there is some way that this is going to be scalable. And we spun off a company named FRQNCY to try to make it better. And we've had some success. That stuff is slow, so slow. But we think of it as a sustainable plank, if this is a good way to kind of scale, versus just trying to ruin the land and do other things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So, final sustainability thing I want to ask you about, and this, I guess, is probably the other big piece of impact for any festival, is just people coming and going to it, driving to and from it. So what were your first, I mean, I assume you wanted to tackle that from early on. So sort of what's the history of your efforts to reduce that? Just the sort of gas, and traffic, and everything else impact of people driving to and from.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Well, a lot of parts of that. So you incentivize it. For us, we knew that people driving to Pickathon was just, "how can we get less cars?" And we've been thinking of this and pushing on it. And for us, where we are kind of now, in 2022, we're like, "okay, it's all about kind of like carbon taxing, right?" Bikes are free. We're committed to that. You don't have to pay a cent ride a bike. It's only 12 miles from Portland. Anybody could ride a bike to Pickathon, like, just do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I should say you organize these sort of bike trains, these bike groups, so people can ride.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>We throw your stuff in a moving van, and we go out together, right? And the average biker is pretty sophisticated in Portland. They have their own system, and they can carry a lot of stuff. And there's over, I don't know, I bet you there's 1,500 bikes at Pickathon. I think that's a huge number. And that's level one. And then take a shuttle, take transportation. The max is 5 miles away. So we kind of price that the next level of cost. Like, it's cheap. You can just jump on back and forth, and you're able to come and go anytime you want.</p><p>And above that ends up being cars. So you want to bring your car for the day or the weekend, you should carpool. We set up carpools. And you just kind of go up the food chain there. Then people want to camp, and there's some car camping, and there's a little bit of RVs. But we just have just a little, and those are kind of like the level of taxing people. We really have been pretty successful at getting folks on bikes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>On a big-picture level, do you feel like your efforts in this area have been as successful as your efforts in, like, the solid waste area? I mean, it's really, talk to any urban planner, anybody, anywhere, like, this is the hardest nut to crack of them all. Are you satisfied with how well you've ... ?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Honestly, I want to push more. We were toying with no cars, but the American psyche, right? Maybe we'd be just fine. We didn't find it so funny, just like you got kind of like the cups and the plates, but people are traveling from far away, and we just know that it is a tough nut. I think you just nailed it. It's not really something that we can just do and make it an easy experience for everyone. Like plates and cups.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>But there is one really big thing we're doing this year, that I don't know if you know about, that is kind of like going to probably have the same level of impact, sustainability-wise, as all the things we've done. We've been talking about. We redesigned the festival in a way that I'm we're really excited about. I don't know if you know much about that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Only what's come out on the emails, and I haven't looked that closely. Just to help listeners, sort of the way it was, and has been for the last decade, is there's sort of these two big fields with big stages, and then there's like a barn and a little shack here. And then there's a stage off in the woods, the "Wood Stage". Just legendary, amazing place. Little sort of stages scattered here and there that have people playing in sort of staggered timing. But before we get to this year, let's just briefly talk about the last few years, which have been difficult for literally everyone in the world, but for you as well.</p><p>So the worst thing was in 2019, Pickathon was very well known for a long time for having these big sails, kind of big pieces of fabric hovering up in the sky, kind of blowing in the wind, sheltering you from the sun. Very visually striking. In 2019, there was an accident. Two people died trying to take those down. And that was traumatic and involved some fines, and some scrutiny. And then the next year got canceled, I think. And then the year after that got canceled because of the pandemic. So it's been a real turbulent last few years.</p><p>Talk a little bit about how you got through that because I, around this sort of 2020 years, was hearing rumors that it might be over that Pickathon might be over, that Pendarvis' farm might not be open to having it anymore. So just, I'm sure you could talk for hours about this.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>You forgot that thousands of houses have moved into our parking lot too, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And development is sort of encroaching on the farm. So give us a sort of capsule summary of the last few years, kind of the turbulence, how you've gotten through it, and how you're feeling about this year being kind of a renewal.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah, it was a lot of grief and trauma. So our accident was kind of, like, it happened in a way that was just really tragic. Total accident. Just one of those things that experienced people with very little, ten minutes left in the last day, and an accident happened, and it was just awful. And basically, we were in a place where we were just rallying around our community, trying to understand how to do grief and trauma. And that was like a very kind of, in a weird way, brought a lot of people together, in a good way, even though we were really just kind of having this moment.</p><p>And it made us think. We didn't know exactly what, we were trying to, kind of thought, "okay, we're going to again eliminate a lot of this risk. We're just not going to build the kind of things that are here." We've been doing this for twelve years, and we kind of felt really good about our systems, and we just decided ... and that was like a pretty major thing for us. But we didn't quite get to the point of being able to execute on it because of COVID. COVID hit. And that just really felt like a gut punch not just to us, but to the entire creative world. And we were just ... "how in the world are we going to survive?"</p><p>And that's when we pivoted to the kind of concert today, helping Music Cares. Because we're like, "okay, we got these people," and then some of the PvP. And then we started doing a lot of advocacy work with NIVA, National Independent Venue Association, and became kind of a really force to be reckoned with. And generally, that lobbying effort to support kind of independent venues was one of the best things that happened out of, in terms of organizing in the pandemic. It saved the entire industry, including us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Were the rumors I was hearing just rumors or was there a time when you seriously had doubt about whether the whole thing would move forward?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>They never really know ... the combination ... We're not in a solid ground because of — not because of the farm. I mean, the farm is great. It's parking, and there's a lot of challenges. The farm is more valuable to become into houses. If it was a normal set of landowners, they would flip this thing, and the whole farm would be mowed down for houses, like every tree. That's what 95% of the universe would do in their situation. Because it totally is ready to go. Shovel ready to be giant, giant development.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's just the Pendarvis' themselves, really, their personage.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's them and us willing to kind of try to adapt. We could also kind of throw in the towel, like, "no way, we are not up for another 'figure it out year'." Because it's like doing it over every time, and you're like, "wow, it's a lot of energy, it's a lot of work." And we knew that in these kind of last several years. If we came back after 2020, it's going to be a lot of work. Okay, "well, let's come back in 2021. It's going to be a lot of work. Okay, I can't do that."</p><p>"Let's go back in 2022." And so here we are. And it's even more work because some of the plans that we built for the parking lots, now they have houses in them, and we have a different lot for parking. And we're surveying it, and mapping it, and doing all kinds of things that are kind of ridiculous for a weekend event. But we're restoring and removing blackberries. Eventually, this whole thing is going to be mowed down and turned into houses. It's the last remnants of a golf course that we're using this year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is this a long-term worry? I mean, are you going to get closed out of parking entirely? Eventually?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>We have some plans, hopefully, for the next three to five years, I think is our hope. That's good news, but I can't promise. I think all we know is we're on this year, and the intention is there. Pickathon, I think is strong enough. It should be able to last. We don't know if our future will be there, but I think there's a path for at least three to five more years. And we're looking to try to come up with something even longer. But it would really be nice, David, if it was just, like, set, and we could just operationally get better.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, it would be nice if the fundamentals weren't constantly shifting.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yes, I had little joke with people. I was like, "man, wouldn't it be great if we just had our businesses just running and not reinventing itself every time?" Maybe it wouldn't be as much fun, but sometimes you just think about that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, all that said, then you're coming back here in 2022, August 5th-7th, approaching this year, you sort of had a little bit of a blank slate because you had a couple of years off. So what's the new thinking this year in terms of kind of the grounds itself, and rearranging, you're rearranging the physical space itself into what you're calling neighborhoods. So a) what does that mean? And b) what does it mean for sustainability? In what way is it more sustainable?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>The big takeaway for us was, "Okay, this 2020 hindsight, here," when we were just sitting around talking with kids, in the music, and thinking about it, you start wandering. You're like, "well, if you were going to redo it, how would you do it?" And so one of the big things you mentioned, you said you really love the "Wood Stage". And that "Wood Stage" was kind of a big part of how we came to an "aha". There's this stage that David mentioned. "Wood Stage" is essentially a permaculture artist town Mark Lakeman built. We harvest sticks from the forest, and we make a sculptural stage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's like a natural amphitheater that it's sitting in. And it looks, to all appearances, like a stage grew out of the woods there.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yes, and we're rebuilding this year in a really very awesome, sculptural way. But yeah, that stage wasn't a big lift for us. We built that every couple of years. We had to clean it up and repair it. But in essence, the other stages we built, which were impressive. I mean, the Mount Hood stage you mentioned, which was one of the larger temporary tension fabric structures in the world. And the "Tree Line Stage", which is a very kind of elaborate project where we try to reuse materials, and they have to go somewhere else. Diversion architecture, we call it. It's a whole nother sustainability part of Pickathon.</p><p>And they're wonderful. But no matter how much placemaking, I call it placemaking, people love the "Wood Stage", no matter how grand, no matter how big it was. And the "aha" was like, "nature kicks your butt, kicks everyone's ass, you just can't beat nature. So like, well, why try? Why don't we go the opposite way, and rethink about this entire property, and say there's so many beautiful places on this farm? Why don't we just think about those beautiful places as settings, and then kind of come in, and vibe, and add things to those places? And what if we go a little bit further? What if we think about times of day and places? What if you, in the daytime, when it's 100 degrees in Oregon, in the summer, what if we're in the woods, and there's not as many people in the morning?"</p><p>So we can be a little more intimate and kind of keep the energy up, and we can migrate back and forth between spaces that are shaded in the woods. And then as the day goes on and the sun starts to set, we can kind of move out into bigger fields. And as it sets a little further, we can move out into the, finally, the biggest fields. And that's what we did. We're like, "oh my God. Aha! This is how you should build a festival." And if you think about it, it's like a bunch of wood stages. That's kind of the vibe we're trying to create this year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There so there are several brand-new stages, areas, places this year</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>This year neighborhoods we're calling them. And they are kind of zones that are natural zones, like they're a bowl or a hill. There's some geographical thing on the farm, and we, basically, are kind of connecting those all together. And the carbon footprint result of that is, we haven't done the math, but it's many, many factors lower because you're now not needing all this incredible heavy equipment. You're not trucking tons and tons of materials across the universe to give them to you. You're not spending all of this energy and gas to kind of build things that have to be quickly torn down. You're just dramatically reducing what it takes to put on something, even at the scale of Pickathon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So some of these new stages are going to be like the wood stage, in that they just stay there?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>No, mostly in the shade side. So, like, when we built the "Tree Line Stage" or the "Main Stage", the "Main Stage", we built a lot of that sales for shade. We don't need shade because we're using nature. We don't need to use giant settings. The way we oriented the "Tree Line Stage", which was a stage that's built by grad students at the Portland state every year, they built it out of pallets, out of concrete tubes, out of 2x4s. And after they were done.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Very visually striking.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah, after the festival, it went back to become 2x4s.</p><p>One year, it was built out of a kit of parts that became a homeless village for veterans in Clackamas County. So pretty cool ideas there, too. But the scale of those kind of settings, we built because behind them, there really wasn't anything to look at. So you're building these kind of places. We're flipping that, and now you're looking at trees like you said, or the farm setting. And I think it's just better. Like nature kicks butt. Like it kicks ass. Like, why, you try to, why fight it? Just lean into it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You got, what, like a week and a half, a week and a half to go? Are neighborhoods in place? Have you had a chance to sort of walk around and experience these yet? Because this will be brand new to the audience.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, there's another whole factor we're doing that's new as part of that because we knew we couldn't pull all this off, so we kind of divided all of these neighborhoods and went out to the community and kind of presented like, "okay, each of these neighborhoods is a design-build challenge." And we went out and tried to recruit kind of a combination of architects, designers, project managers, builders.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>For each one of these teams, and then kind of treat it like their own little Burning Man. Not just because people build these elaborate things in Burning Man, I'm kind of using that. But it's like the PSU idea, where we found a community that could, every year, design and build. And those grad students, it works because it's a class and because those grad students actually get amazing jobs after they do this project because everyone — they've won National Architecture Awards. We're like, "well, we can figure out other sustainable models for communities on why they'd want to do a design-build." And it turns out there are many. So we have like 15 of these incredible collections of design-build teams, and they are all spinning things up that are to die for.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So each neighborhood has a team in charge of it? A team that owns it?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yes. It's going to be incredible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh man, I can't wait to see that.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>I think it'll be awesome. A lot of people have been manufacturing and building, and a lot of this material is going to be reused again somewhere else. So it's very awesome. I know that this approach to kind of doing festivals, and kind of involving community, and kind of creating all these other tie-ins. How can you do this in a way that all these teams, it's a sustainable process, they'll do it year after year? There's a lot to be mine there, and maybe we can talk about on your next podcast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One thing that's striking about this, and all the other things you talk about, is just how bespoke it is, and, thus, how much care and investment it requires. This is not something — this is not something a big company could buy, and scale up, and make lots of money off, right? This is just a high touch ... and that's just not something that makes pure business sense. It just doesn't.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yes, it doesn't. We like to call it — the whole thing is completely irrational. Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But it's commensurately beloved.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, it is that kind of underlying dream sandbox. We often say, like, "the Olympics of what everyone does," come do something at Pickathon. It's probably like, what, "you do what you do, but do the Olympic version of what you do," and that works. And you kind of like, getting folks to kind of have that break in life where they do something very much what they do, whether carpenter or something, but they're doing something in this context where it just has such a big impact. It's just a really rewarding thing for everyone.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and you can see people enjoying it, and using it, and loving it. It's a very direct feedback loop there.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>And in many cases, it furthers their professional life, too. So that's where it all ties back together. Like sometimes they show off, and they're recognized, and their connections are made, and businesses grow. And so we take a small band that ... Pickathon is known for discovery. We are known for kind of taking bands to the next level. And we've been saying that this is great music, and having faith, and you should just book good music, and that's all that matters. It doesn't need to be known.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I will say, and this is not true of many festivals, I have discovered lots of new bands through Pickathon. Like, it's genuinely the "not quite, just about to break" bands, you know what I mean?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>If you lived here, David, we'd be hanging out playing cornhole, and joking, and debating music. I could tell, It's a very open source idea where you just kind of dig into communities of music, and whatever is like the hot red, red hot, like, Elvis kind of movement of that scene, probably isn't well known yet to a lot of people, but the people who really care, this is it. And you listen to those people. Typically, you don't even have to be a fan of that style. You literally put that next to ... When you experience it, you'll be like, "oh my God, that's amazing."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I've had many of those experiences over the years, and I've kept you for too long. But the one final thing to say about the music, too, is I think Pickathon has become somewhat legendary in that bands love it. And you can tell, by the time they play, they've usually been there for a day or two, and they're like, "man". They love the bamboo bowls, and they've just been, like, wandering around, chilling out. It's hard to put into words, but I've been to a lot of music shows, a lot of music festivals. I've seen a lot of live music. And you can tell when a band is, like, relaxed and into it.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>They're on vacation. We get a lot of bands who just know that they're going to come and chill out or be fans of other ones. It's really easy for us now. The music is really easy. We are sought out by musicians and by agents.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm sure in the grind of touring life, like, going to Pickathon for two or three days is like, feels like a vacation from work.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>And, like, again, that sustainable thing. We hope to kind of bend pop culture in a weird way with good music. I mean, artists that play Pickathon, immediately, their lives change. They bump up several places in what they can do. And that's so awesome, right? We can take all this energy that's been focused back to kind of making them not only have a good time but actually their life changed, right after.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so this year, the big, I guess the big two artists, insofar as you'd called them, headliners, are Valerie June and Wet Leg, which I feel like is a good snapshot of kind of.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Oh, and JGZA. Don't forget GZA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. The the diversity involved. Alright, well, I've kept you forever. I mean, it's probably obvious that I'm a fanboy in this.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Are you coming this year, David?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I actually am.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Okay, good. We will continue this conversation in person.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. I'd love to hang out once we get there, but sort of the final question. Obviously, your priority in the years going forward is just to help things survive and fight to preserve a little bit of parking against the incoming development. But in terms of sustainability, in particular, is there a next big item on the list, or is it mostly at this point just about kind of buffing and dialing in the pieces that are in place?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>I can't think past this year. We have to land this ginormous spaceship on a dime. Where we leave ... the ambition we have this year is kind of staggering, in terms of like taking all these teams. So something will go wrong, and then that will be the kind of ... or some things will go really right, and we'll build on them. I don't know. I hope what we are thinking about is, "this is amazing," and I think it is. And it's going to be the first year a lot of teams kind of hit their mark. If you remember way back when, when the PSU started, they had a pretty moderate pallet stage. You remember that stage?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I remember the first one.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>And it grew and grew in ambition. I think if we get this right, all of these teams are going to kind of have that same arc. Whatever they do this year is just a tiny taste of what is to come.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And we should say that for listeners who can't attend the festival, which I assume is probably most of them at this point, that the whole thing is live-streamed.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You can buy a live-stream ticket? How does that work?</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>You can go to FRQNCY.live. There's no vowels in that F-R-Q-N-C-Y-.live, or go to Pickathon, and you'll see a Pickathon livestream. You can basically get access to every show or kind of like a curated broadcast, where we kind of pick and move around different stages. There's a couple of ways you can do it, and it's great that you can kind of see the 700 people working hard in person on the Internet. We take it very seriously. As you know, David, we're big film buffs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. So people can at least, maybe, drop in and see a little bit, see what these neighborhoods look like, even if they can't make it out.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>It'll be a wonderful experience.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome, Zale. Well, thanks for taking all this time, and I will see you in a couple of weeks. Maybe we can play some cornhole.</p><p><strong>Zale Schoenborn</strong></p><p>Okay, take care.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-a-music-festival-that</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:65152852</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 09 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/65152852/26f0064a5046d91c10c280ba39469f23.mp3" length="93954370" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3915</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/65152852/7cfee19be5c4c9ad5556a1d879bcdfc1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: how Biden can address climate change through executive action]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Jean Su and Maya Golden-Krasner, attorneys at the Center of Biological Diversity, discuss which executive actions President Biden could take to aggressively address climate change, and what might happen if he did so.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACIniR6ol6TbgSB8TRwC4MMa/volts22.07.25%28su.golden-krasner%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-how-biden-can-address-climate-change-through-executive-action"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It now seems fairly clear that no climate legislation is going to pass this Congress before the midterm elections. After the midterms, Democrats are highly unlikely to retain control of both houses, so there likely will not be any federal climate legislation in the US for many years to come. This is, obviously, to the country's immense shame.</p><p>That means Biden finds himself in the same situation that Obama ended up in: if he wants anything at all to get done on climate change during his term, he's going to have to do it himself, through executive action. He has already begun announcing some executive orders.</p><p>However, there is a case to be made that the president has the power to do much, much more. Two senior attorneys at the Center for Biological Diversity — Jean Su, director of CBD’s energy justice program, and Maya Golden-Krasner, deputy director of its Climate Law Institute — have been aggressively making that case for the past three years, laying out a broad suite of actions available to a president and accompanying them with arguments rooting those powers in statutory authority.</p><p>They've just released a new report called “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/energy-justice/pdfs/Climate-Emergency-Powers-Report.pdf">The Climate President’s Emergency Powers</a>,” which digs into what it would mean for Biden to declare a state of emergency over climate change and what sort of statutory powers that would grant him. </p><p>In this moment of utter legislative failure, I wanted to talk to Su and Golden-Krasner about the kind of things Biden is capable of doing, which actions he ought to prioritize, how he should think about the hostile Supreme Court, and the political optics of governing so aggressively and unilaterally.</p><p>Alright. Jean Su and Maya Golden-Krasner of the Center for Biological Diversity. Thanks for coming to Volts.</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Thanks for having us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there's a lot to discuss, a lot to discuss here. So I just want to start maybe with this sort of background assumption. Let's just assume, for the sake of our conversation, that Build Back Better does not miraculously rise from the ashes and pass in the next, whatever, however much time we have to pass it a week or two. Let's just assume that it's dead dead. That legislation is dead dead. And that, as all odds are pointing to that, all the prognostications now say that Democrats are almost certainly going to lose at least one House of Congress in the midterms, which will mean legislation is dead for the rest of Biden's term.</p><p>That leaves us with what Biden can do on his own. This has all happened before, and it will all happen again, as they say on Battlestar Galactica. This was exactly the situation Obama found himself in, as we all remember. So it's a little depressing to be back here, but let's make the best of it. So the other thing I wanted to say, just by way of preparation is I think it's fair to say that you all, that the CBD, has what I would characterize as a sort of maximalist interpretation of Biden's executive powers. Extremely sweeping.</p><p>Your 2019 report on the executive powers available to the President. I mean, if you read through that whole thing, I mean, jeez, Biden could just sort of revolutionize all of government, and all of industry, and justice, and there's almost nothing he couldn't do under some legal authority or another. So I might be, throughout this, playing a little bit of devil's advocate, trying to push back a little bit on some of that. So just to let you know. So with all that said, let's start with what seems to be most in the news these days, which is whether or not Biden is going to declare a Climate Emergency.</p><p>There's a lot of talk about this, a lot of hand waving, a lot of sort of ... I don't think it's very well understood what exactly means for him to do that and what it would enable him to do. So let's just start there. Maybe we'll start with you, Jean, maybe you can just tell us what does it mean for Biden to declare a Climate Emergency, what is the legal authority under which he would do that, and then we can get into sort of what it would enable him to do that he couldn't otherwise do.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>So I think you've painted a really bleak picture of where we are right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Look around, Jean.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>And it's very real, and this is exactly where we hope we wouldn't be. But it didn't also take a crystal ball to let us know that we would be here, as well. And so I think on that note, one of the things that we have at the Center have always focused on is the executive branch, and that is an equal branch of the three branches. And we've always have looked at what are the available tools for the president, not to the exclusion of anything else.</p><p>We absolutely need legislation. I pray that your prediction is not true on legislation, and we hope and pray, best wishes, for that legislation because we need prayers. Thoughts and prayers. So I think one of the things, when people have talked about the Climate Emergency in the last few days, is this fear that it is to the exclusion of everything else. And that is absolutely, from our point of view, not true. We would want every single agency, every single executive power within President Biden's quiver to essentially be utilized.</p><p>And this also is not something that we advocate only at this moment in time when legislation is a question mark. It is something that we have always felt every single presidency should begin with, in concert, working as hard as possible because we have truly the emergency of our planet on our hands right now. So every single tool available to us should be at least considered and considered wisely, thoughtfully, with the understanding that we need kind of everything that we can get right now and everything to fight this thing. So giving kind of that overview of our standpoint on all of this. So a Climate Emergency Declaration would have two different uses. On a very broad level, a Climate Emergency Declaration, that's paired with bold actions, would be a clarion call that we need right now for climate leadership.</p><p>I think the picture that you painted is absolutely a picture of despair, and that is where so many people are right now. And I think there is a real need for the president to not only acknowledge that we are in a Climate Emergency, but really to seize that mantle of leadership right now and say, "hey, we're in a Climate Emergency, and I am going to do everything in my power to make sure that, within my administration, we combat this as hard as possible. Because it is unacceptable that there are 100 million people in this country right now on high heat alert, that the world is literally burning with 80 wildfires, and that so many communities in this country are experiencing this not just today, but from the fossil fuel economy violence of the past decades."</p><p>So that, on a leadership, level is so important to unlock and unleash the momentum of everybody, to put out what they can to fight this, whether it is state' local governments, as well as other global leaders. Which is something we can totally talk about from an international standpoint, and that's a lot of what we work on as well. Separately, the Climate Emergency Declaration would potentially unlock emergency powers. Emergency powers are a whole subset of executive powers that are just part of the greater suite of executive powers that we have been advocating for decades, essentially, at the Center.</p><p>But to unpack the subset of emergency powers, Maya and I went through the emergency power statutes, which include four different statutes: the first is a National Emergencies Act, the second would be the Defense Production Act, the third is the Stafford Act, and the fourth is the Public Health and Services Act.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The "declaration of emergency", itself, is the power to do that under one of those particular laws. Like what is the authorizing sort of statute to the declaration, itself?</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think when people say, "declaration of a Climate Emergency," that could be interpreted in different ways, but one of them is the National Emergencies Act. So under the National Emergencies Act, the President would declare an emergency, and that essentially triggers 130 some statutory authorities. But he has to actually pull something specific when he declares the emergency if he wants it to actually have some type of action. So under that framework of 130 so statutory authorities, we've identified some of the most climate-progressive ones that he could potentially think about when he would pull the National Emergencies Act. And so the top ones of that, for us, would be looking at reinstating the Crude Oil Export Ban, that was basically overturned after 40 years in 2015. That would be the equivalent of shuttering 42 coal plants.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To bring in the devil's advocate thing, the sort of traditional, I think, conventional wisdom here is if you cut off crude exports from the US, you're going to suppress US production a little bit, but other countries will just ramp up their production to make it up. And other countries often have dirtier production than we do, so wouldn't that reduction in greenhouse gases be a little bit of an illusion? I mean, wouldn't that just be a reduction of our greenhouse gases but not overall greenhouse gases? How do you address that common argument?</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>Yeah, so that argument has been countered by folks at SEI, Stockholm Economics Institute, and it's not the case. They find that if you do shut down oil production here in the United States, or other parts of the world, it won't necessarily mean that it will pop up somewhere else. And so the analysis that we've seen, with the 42 coal plants analysis, takes that into account, and that's that. So I think the other part of this though is looking at, I think, that gets into greater supply-side arguments, which we can totally go into right now because that is a common break and debate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>A lot of these executive moves you're talking about have to do with ...</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>supply-side work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>supply-side, slowing or cutting off either domestic production or exporting. So might as well get into it now. Why should we think that the US cutting back on production or exporting would have this global effect?</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Well, first of all, as Jean says, there's been significant research that shows that ending production or slowing down production, actually results in a net global reduction of use of fossil fuels. So it's not actually true that for every barrel that we stop producing, we import another barrel from somewhere else, or we need another barrel from somewhere else. That's not actually how it works. Fossil fuel supply actually helps drive demand. So from our perspective, climate policy has to address both. And we've really spent decades trying to reduce fossil demand, and, really, our policies have focused on that critically but not supply.</p><p>And here we are in today's climate crisis, and it's a policy failure that we can avoid by reducing supply and demand at the same time. On top of that, we have enough oil, in our existing leases right now, to meet demand. And at the same time, there's already way more fossil fuels under production and planned, and the fossil fuel industry is planning huge projects going way into the future, that can safely be burned to stay under 1.5 degrees Celsius.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, this is a crucial background fact. I just want to put an exclamation point next to it. I feel like listeners to this podcast probably know this by now, but at this point, it's been analyzed up and down a million ways. If current oil and gas fields produce to their capacity, we're going to shoot past 1.5, never mind exploiting new oil and gas fields, right? So when it comes to oil and gas, there's no margin left, really.</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Exactly. So climate science is showing us that 40% of already producing deposits have to stay in the ground to avoid the catastrophes of 1.5, just as you said. But at the same time, we've got fossil fuel companies who, there's a new study out showing they make $3 billion a day and pure profit. And so they're looking at undeveloped reserves of up to, according to the study, $100 trillion. And so they're not giving up. They're going to push, and push, and push, and push. So we we can't ignore that they've got money to, you know, buy politicians, to file lawsuits. They're constantly pushing and pushing. And so our climate policy can't just focus on renewables, without pushing back on what the fossil fuel industry is doing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But let me toss in here, and we're getting ahead of ourselves again into the international stuff, but it seems notable that there are other sort of analogous wealthy democracies, like Norway or whatever, that are doing a lot on climate change, on the demand-side, but they aren't particularly cutting back on production. Would we be the first to really grab onto this? Or is there an example of another country that is attacking both demand and supply?</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>Yeah, so there's a new — I think you've nailed whatever the expression is. But that is essentially the problem that we face, right? There are hypocritical policies. Saudi Arabia actually exports a ton of their oil because they profiteer more from that and also are electrifying themselves using solar.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You say it's hypocritical, but it's the standard. I mean, that's the standard among oil and gas-producing countries.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And it is the standard that has gotten us to the Climate Emergency and the climate catastrophe that we are here right now. The US has an "exceptionalism" reputation, that it feels and fuels itself with. And I think we have been so furious at urging these movers, and these oil and gas producers, to change their tune. We absolutely have to because that is what science is telling us to do.</p><p>And so, yes. Would the US be one of the first to do it? Absolutely. Would that be a game changer and a signal to the rest of the world? Absolutely. Is that what we need to actually keep our emissions down? Absolutely. And so these are the hard choices that need to be made in a political atmosphere where fossil fuel companies really have such deep, deep influence on every single part of our government in these choices.</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>There's no world in which we are safe, in which the US continues to produce oil, and then it exports it like the other, like Australia. We can't continue to extract fossil fuels and send it away to be burned elsewhere or to be turned into petrochemicals or plastics, which are very toxic processes, themselves, that also pollute the planet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well I mean the conventional wisdom, the conventional approach, is just all the countries of the world join hands and reduce their demand in concert, and that is what ends up reducing supply because there's no demand for the supply. You just don't buy that model.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, we've been going to the Climate Change Negotiations for the last 17 years, and that was the initial idea about the treaty right now. When the Paris Agreement, and all of its predecessors, were crafted, none of them had the word fossil fuels in them, and that is purposeful. It is purposeful that all of those "climate change cops" have been sponsored by fossil fuel companies. It was only last year, for the first time, that we finally got fossil fuels into the decision that came out of last year, and that is after decades of this type of agreement system.</p><p>But one thing I did want to get back to you Dave is that there is a new alliance called the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, and this actually is set up to get first movers on their way. It is led by Costa Rica and Denmark. So small countries, but these are countries actually trying to deal with both supply and demand at the same time. And they are pushing different states, like California, et cetera, to basically get on that same train. And that's the type of leadership that we need right now. And, yes, would it be unprecedented if the American government did that? Absolutely, and that would be the shining star of what we need right now for the climate catastrophe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, well we're going to return to the political economy questions later. I feel like I jumped ahead too much. We had the whole discussion about supply side, but let's return to the power. So the first thing Biden could do, that would be enabled by the emergency declaration, is reimpose the Crude Oil Export Ban. So let's go down the list again. What's number two?</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>So number two, well, it depends on where you want to go, whether you want to go finance or renewables, but let's go for finance because a lot of people are interested in this one. There is another power that is the most frequently invoked NEA power, and that is with the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which we belovedly call IEEPA. And IEEPA is evoked every single year by a president at least once. We've seen it this year already with the ban on Russian imports of oil, by President Biden, and it essentially allows the president to control commerce when it's necessary to deal with a threat, with an outstanding threat.</p><p>So one way that we think that he could use this on fossil fuels, or climate in general, is that he could actually stop the hundreds of billions of dollars every year that leave from the United States private institutions towards fossil fuel projects abroad. And the single analysis that has — basically, this is as much as public organizations have been able to garner, is that in 2020, 16 American financial institutions shipped out $470 billion to fund twelve fossil fuel expansions, that are going to be emitting 175 gigatons of additional CO2, which is actually almost half of our remaining carbon budget.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this would be literally, like, if he did this, that would render those loans, like, literally illegal? I guess I'm wondering about sort of the enforcement or the legal regime around them. If he just declares it a Climate Emergency, declares this, you know, no more financing of international fossil fuel projects. And then, you know, some bank sends a loan somewhere. Like, do you send the police to the to the bank? How does that work?</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>Yes, correct. So they are sanctions. And it has been done on individuals in the United States. It has been done on companies during the Apartheid era in South Africa if anybody was sending finance goods over to South Africa. Yes, if you do that, you will be sought after. That is against the law.</p><p>Right now, it's in place for financing Russian businesses, for example. And it's under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so has there been a case of that being enforced? You have a case of like a company getting dinged for doing that? Or is it mostly obeyed?</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>It is obeyed, and there are sanctions on those who violate it. And when I say this is normal, this is the most normal emergency power that is used every single year. So there are violations, and there's general compliance as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there's an infrastructure set up to enforce it.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>There is a very robust infrastructure with IEEPA to set this up.</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>It's been in place for, also, for transactions with Iran and fossil fuel financing as well. So often it's used for particular countries, but it doesn't necessarily have to be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it fair to say that this would be the most sweeping use of it? Because no financing fossil fuels is pretty big sweeping prohibition. Is this notably more ambitious than those previous uses of it? Or do you think it's sort of in keeping?</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>I think it's in keeping to a certain extent because it's just, in terms of the amount of dollars, I think that we've, for certain countries that are sanctioned, for example, I think there are billions of dollars involved with that. But I do think this is keeping consistent with the Biden administration's own view on finance towards fossil fuels. They themselves, last year at the Climate Change Conference, did a historical pledge to stop putting public finance into fossil fuel. That was laudatory, and that was a great thing that Secretary Kerry has committed to do. So this would be an extension of that principle towards our private financial institutions.</p><p>And I think, given our different discussions that we've had with people on the Hill, this one is also politically savory, and it's definitely pulling finance from fossil fuel projects. Really kind of looking into our own footprint, into the tremendous and dirty emissions that are happening abroad, is just common sense. And so I think that this one, in particular, is a powerful and important tool under the NEA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. Let's turn to boosting domestic production, which you have enabled by the Defense Production Act. So maybe just tell us a little bit, like, what is the Defense Production Act? And I know that Biden has invoked that, he's done some stuff under that act. So maybe just tell us like what he's done and then sort of like the further steps you would like to see.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>So the Defense Production Act is my favorite statute of all time. I have a very sweet spot in my heart for the Defense Production Act.</p><p>So the Defense Production Act. It was made during wartime, during the Korean War. And what it essentially allows it to do is it tells the president, allows the president to identify those materials and goods that we need right now for our national defense. And it allows him to marshal industry, as well as other important stakeholders, bring them to a table and say, "this is what we're missing, this is what we need to produce, can you produce it? And we will buy it from you or figure out other ways for it to basically come to fruition."</p><p>So in a wartime setting, it has been used for, "we need to manufacture tanks, so vehicle makers please start making tanks. We need to manufacture artillery, so hunting gun makers start making that. And we will give you grants, loans, loan guarantees, and/or purchase agreements from the government to make sure that you feel secure as a company to make those types of moves." And the other thing it does is that industry, therefore, is working together, so it shields all of these players from working together, from antitrust laws. So it is really an all-hands-on approach to critical materials.</p><p>And one of the most incredible parts about the Defense Production Act, if you read it from front to end, is that there is a whole section about energy, and there's a particular section about solar, wind, and geothermal as critical materials for our energy security.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No kidding. When was it written?</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>50s.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No kidding. Quite a bit of foresight there.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>There is incredible foresight with this act. The way that we've thought about it through the climate lens is through the "clean energy and electric vehicle" lens. The US does not have the manufacturing base, right now, for those types of technologies. And in fact, we're seeing those technologies be made, in some instances, with Uyghur slave labor and other slave labor around the world. So what the Biden administration did, which was such a sea change in how it is approaching climate change, is that it invoked the Defense Production Act to manufacture clean energy technologies. And these included solar, it includes heat pumps, insulation, and transformers. And these are all critical technologies that we need for our national defense against the Climate Emergency. And we were also particularly heartened to see some justice aspects, that we had outlined in our blueprint, that were also picked up.</p><p>So when we talk about manufacturing, well, the question is where, where should it be manufactured?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>This is a place where the Biden administration can intentionally choose areas that have been economically blighted. They can with economic and environmental justice kind of communities as well, so that they are filling their J40 aspects and really choose — and also with Midterms coming up — choose places that may be helpful in terms of making sure that Democrats stay in power. So where manufacturing occurs actually can have incredible benefits, especially from a justice lens of where it needs to go and generate jobs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there are factories producing solar panels now in response to this and receiving government grants in response? Is this happening?</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Soon, hopefully.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>This was just passed in June, and they are just getting their roundtables together now. It's already the end of July. And so we would say, "Biden administration, please act with more haste, and speed it up." But there is a limiting factor here, and the limiting factor is finance. And there is a DPA fund out there, $10 billion just got injected for COVID purposes for the Defense Production Act to use. So we actually have seen Congress, this Congress actually, like exact Congress give $10 billion to the Defense Production Act when Biden has pulled it for COVID.</p><p>We would obviously are trying to get as much from this Congress, now, for these new clean energy funds. We were successful recently in getting $105 million extra from the House, and that is now being considered by the Senate. But that certainly isn't enough.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So to be clear, so the money that the government would use to incentivize the people doing the manufacturing in response to this has to be appropriated by Congress.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>So, traditionally, it has been appropriated by Congress. There are other ways though, with existing budgets out there in the federal government, that you could actually achieve the same effect. So for example, we have a $650 billion federal procurement fund every year, and the Biden administration has put out an executive order saying, "please buy clean energy when you can." One way that manufacturers can actually feel more secure right now in making this transition, is if we use those federal dollars and say, "hey, we commit to buying your goods as part of these Defense Production Act clean energy orders." That is one way that you compare an existing budgetary amount with these DPA clean energy orders.</p><p>And there are other programs as well like WAP, the Weatherization Assistance Program, the LIHEAP Program. And we would argue there's other kind of interesting ways to also leverage FEMA funds towards buying and purchasing, and deploying renewable energy as well as climate funds. We actually have technical assistance commitments that we've made abroad, where we could actually purchase American-made pieces and ship them abroad as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Intuitively, it seems to me that the amount of money necessary to create a domestic manufacturing industry, or several actually, is just huge. I guess, just intuitively, that's a huge amount of money. And it's hard for me to believe that the government, even if it scrapes together all these piles of money, is really going to have just kind of the brute force cash to do that. Is this more of like a seeding or instigating kind of thing, like trying to channel private funds?</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>Absolutely. So the Defense Production Act is just a jump-starter. We cannot afford to pay for every single solar panel out there. Absolutely. So what we're looking for with the Defense Production Act is just that amount of investment that is enough to make manufacturers change, expand their factories, and actually start on new pieces of technology that are necessary. We already have fledgling pieces of this all over the country, and right now, it's just about boosting it and making them understand that this market is burgeoning. And so we're not looking for the full. I mean, we can't even get what we need for BBBA. So we just need that seed funding and that investment funding. And it doesn't have to just come from the federal government.</p><p>We have state government surpluses. My gosh, California government is as a huge surplus right now. We have state governments, we have private companies, first movers like Apple and Google, et cetera, who also may be interested in putting their private capital and committing to purchasing non-Uyghur labor clean energy goods. So there's a lot of potential in what the DPA can do, and we're really heartened to see that in the clean energy orders. He can also further expand that to other technologies that we would need. For example, in the transportation sector with electric vehicles, E-buses, and charging stations.</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>One of the other helpful things, too, is that it can bring together industry all along the supply chain. So if there are supply chain disruptions or things that are also blocking the ability of companies to manufacture things here, it's a way to bring everybody together to figure out, "how can we coordinate, how can we unblock that issue too?" And there's also other financing mechanisms, like Jean was saying, and there's like public-private partnerships and loan programs through various departments of the federal government, too. So it's just really a great way to coordinate and be creative, in terms of coming up with funding.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so far we have halting crude oil exports, cutting off private funding for international fossil fuel projects. We have marshalling domestic manufacturing industries for clean energy technologies. Maya, is there a number four that you want to get in a mention of here.</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Well, we can get into some of the production side issues. So, for example, we can suspend production on fossil fuel leases in our oceans, especially the Gulf and the Arctic under OCSLA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Under which now?</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>It's the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Exactly. And so that's kind of a major one for fossil fuel production.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You mean that would stop all — what does that mean? How big of a piece is that? How much on the Outer Continental Shelf is going on now? And how much would be cut off by that?</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Well, there's a significant amount that is going on, especially in the Gulf, and they're trying to open up more in Alaska. So the idea would be to suspend that production, probably, while they come up with a plan for kind of a managed decline of all production in our federal waters and our public land. So our Emergency Report is actually a companion piece, as Jean was mentioning at the beginning, to an original report from 2019 that was about Biden's ordinary executive powers. So the idea would be to suspend the leases offshore, and then come up with a plan for a kind of managed, thoughtful, intentional ramp down of our production and public lands and waters.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But didn't Biden just recently, notably, not do that?</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>He did recently, notably, not do that, which has been really frustrating because one of the reasons that we'd like to see him do this Climate Emergency Declaration is to really focus his policy. So he came into office saying, "no new leases, no new leases." And then Russia invaded Ukraine, and gas prices went up. He's like, "oh wait, whoops, maybe I'll do some leases. Maybe we should probably start doing this."</p><p>First of all, offering new leases for production is not going to affect gas prices. Oil companies right now are sitting on huge numbers of leases and not producing anything on those. So they don't actually need new leases. And secondly, we just need him to really focus on the Climate Emergency at hand and phase out production.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's this sort of generic argument about supply-side versus demand-side policy. But then there's also a more specific argument, which is right now, specifically, there's this situation with Russia invading Ukraine. Russia is cutting off gas supply to some people, and there's this crisis, like, Europe is supposedly heading for shortages, and natural gas prices are spiking. So what about the argument that cutting back US production at this particular moment, while the crisis of Russian gas is going on, is just going to make that crisis worse, make those gas prices even higher, make European shortages even worse? Like, how do all these supply-side things you're talking about interact, in your mind, with the Russia situation?</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>So, first of all, I think it's important to note that we're not saying end all production tomorrow. What we're saying is, first of all, you don't need new leases. You have plenty of land, you have plenty of production going on right now. We're asking for an intentional, managed decline while we ramp up renewable energy at the same time. And secondly, the oil industry is always going to have price spikes, economic pain, and price gouging. As we said, they are making huge profits right now, $3 billion a day, and that's expected to be even higher this year while gas prices are up, while people are hurting.</p><p>So the solution to both the climate crisis and gas prices is really just to get off of oil and transition as fast as possible to renewables, creating jobs in the process. The other thing for, domestically, oil prices are controlled by refineries too, that also manipulate the market to keep prices high. So you'd see that the price of a barrel of oil went down long before gas prices went down, here, because the refiners were artificially manipulating how much they want to manufacture in order to maximize their profits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm not sure people appreciate that when Biden goes to oil companies and says, "please produce more, so that we can lower the price of your product." Companies don't generally want to reduce the price of their product. Companies generally like when the price of their product is high. It's serving the oil industry quite well for these sort of temporary shortages to be jacking prices up. They're not super incentivized to ramp up production.</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Biden really doesn't have any leverage there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>So much of the inflation issues that we're seeing right now is purposeful price gouging by oil and gas companies. Mayor Pete was talking about this the other day, and his explainer of all of this, and how he doesn't understand why oil prices fell a bit, but gas prices are still artificially up there. So I think it is important for us to recognize the very thoughtful and intentional way that oil and gas companies are controlling what is happening right now, and that the supply issues going on, in the long run, for us to really deal with inflation and fossil fuel price volatility. The one way to actually get out of that is to get off of oil and gas, and that is completely antithetical to any new leases. Any new leases that are allowed right now are basically locking us into decades more of that type of dependence. And that is the opposite way we need to go for energy independence.</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>And if you think about it, every dollar that we're spending right now to push fossil fuels is a dollar that is not going to renewable investment. And so we just really need to be pumping everything we can to make that transition as fast as possible. And we're not saying it's going to be painless, but we have no choice at this point.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that power that you're just discussing Maya, is not an emergency power. That's just something the president can do, something that is within presidential authority. The continental shelf thing, or is that an emergency thing?</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>So in order to suspend production on leases in our oceans, that's an emergency power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about on public lands?</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>On public lands. So what he can do is every time they kind of update their resource management plans — which are sort of their overarching plans on what lands are going to be open for leasing, where they're going to be production — they can say, "these lands are not going to be open for leasing. We're not going to lease these anymore," for example. So that's from ordinary powers, the Department of Interior can also withdraw leases if they were issued illegally or as a result of fraud. And there's an argument there that the oil companies have been operating on the fraudulent basis for years and have been deceiving.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because of hiding their knowledge of climate change? Because of that or something?</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Yeah. And as I said, areas that haven't been leased yet can be withdrawn from consideration under ordinary powers, under OCSLA, or through the resource management plans for public lands. And then for places that are legally producing right now, they wouldn't be shut down tomorrow, but they would be sort of thoughtfully ramped down. And actually, whenever oil companies sign leases, in their leases, they come with clear language that says that the leases are subject to restrictions, including the possibility of lease suspensions or limitations on rate production. So they've already signed that they understand that that sort of comes with the deal of having a leasing our public resources.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. Alright. We've covered quite a bit of power that Biden has, although I should emphasize here to a listener that we have barely scratched the surface. I would encourage him to go check out your 2019 report. It is capacious, in its detailing of sort of his powers to do various things on the supply and on the demand side.</p><p>But before we use up all our time, I want to get to a couple of, I guess, political questions, what you call political questions. To begin with, the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is cartoonishly bad at the moment and looks to be bad, jeez, for the rest of our lifetimes. So to what extent is Biden executive action constrained by the Supreme Court? Like, my assumption is anything he does, somebody's going to sue, and it may or may not end up at the Supreme Court. So I guess my question is, how confident are we in the legal case for these things? And are you nervous about the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over this stuff?</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Being nervous about it, I guess, isn't really the issue, because it is what it is. So all of the actions that we recommend are solidly grounded in existing law. We want Biden's actions to be upheld in court, and we crafted the recommendations, we think, to achieve that. But that said, the unfortunate current reality is that the fossil fuel industry and red states are going to sue over anything that Biden does. Like you said, it could be minor and incremental. And unfortunately, a lot of the times, we're seeing the outcome of the cases decided not on the strength of the legal claim, but the identity of the judge who decides it, including at the Supreme Court.</p><p>Some setbacks are inevitable, but there's going to be some cases that are brought before fair judges who are going to uphold them. And so we don't see the Supreme Court as a reason for inaction, but more as a reason for Biden to act even more urgently. I think one example of what you're saying, that they're going to challenge anything, is that when Obama's EPA first adopted the Clean Power Plan. It and some big environmental groups said, "Okay, this is the way to go, not a bolder move under the Clean Air Act," because it saw it as this small, incremental step that the Supreme Court would definitely uphold. And look what happened.</p><p>We think that it's important to take emergency actions that are going to save lives, make the world a better place, and just have Biden enact them. And if the Supreme Court strikes it down, then Biden should get up and use his bully pulpit to explain why it's such a problem, explain what's so important about enacting bold climate measures.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Also in the Supreme Court, I mean, you could see them ruling against this or that specific executive order for this or that specific technical legal reason. But is there anything, like when it comes to the EPA case, there's this major questions doctrine which, depending on what side of the bed John Roberts gets up on, could theoretically cripple the EPA's ability to do almost anything. It's so vague, you could use it for almost any reason. You could take away a huge swath of the EPA's power. Is there something similarly sort of legally radical that the Supreme Court could do to constrain the executive powers of the presidency in general? Or is this more of a battle-by-battle kind of thing?</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>I mean, I think it's a battle by battle thing. The Supreme Court is going to strike down whatever they feel like striking down. For example, "I don't want abortion anymore. I'm striking this down. I'll make up a reason based on what people in the 15th century thought about abortion, that's fine. I'll just make it that," you know. And so our hope is that if Biden takes these really bold actions, and and people see that they're life-saving, and they kind of start down the path, they're going to be harder to reverse. So that's one hope.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>And I would say many of, Maya had said this, but the powers that we have elucidated, especially for the emergency powers, those are actually quite straightforward powers. Literally. The Crude Oil Export Ban says, "if the president declares a national emergency, he can reinstate the Cude Oil Export Ban." There's not much interpretation there. The interpretation there that people are arguing now, that you see a little bit in the news, is this question about emergency. What is an emergency? And that can have be debated about. That in fact, was litigated on during the Border Wall Case, which I personally litigated.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting because Trump declared an emergency. Right. How did that go?</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>He did. Yeah, really heartbreakingly. That border wall has been built, and that case, and the litany of cases — there were cases brought in three different jurisdictions across the country to challenge this. The lower courts actually found really good things. They found that his total Trumping of Congress's bid to, "say you are not allowed to get over 1.2 billion," but he went around their backs anyway to do it. They found that was illegal. That was great. They also found that the way he was using the particular emergency power that he invoked, which is redirecting military funds towards military purposes, was also statutorily not correct because the border wall has nothing to do with the military.</p><p>So those, those were good findings under, you know, in the district courts. It eventually trickled up to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court vacated everything, and the Biden administration mooted it out. But in our case, in the DC district, one very good thing actually came out of that decision, and it was the fact that the term "emergency" is a political question, and that courts cannot ... yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting. I was going to ask about that.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The president's ability to decide what is and isn't an emergency, that's not within the Court's. Like the Court can't come in and say, "we disagree that this is an emergency."</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>Well, the District Court, at the very least on this set of cases, said, "that's a political question." And in fact, that is a political question. The way that the National Emergencies Act was written is that it does not define the term "emergency". It purposefully did not define that because it gives the president discretion to do that. In statutory language, what that means is that we rely on what is a common understanding, what is the dictionary definition of emergency. And so there are going to be arguments about whether a Climate Emergency is an emergency. I think for, I don't know how you feel, but with the world burning, literally burning right now, I actually think that it does qualify as an emergency that one should act on.</p><p>And so we're going to have those types of cases, I believe, if this comes up, and it's up to the courts to figure out whether the Climate Emergency is indeed an emergency. And so those are the types of cases I think that will come up.</p><p>But one of the things that's really important from all of this is, "should you not try then just because it's going to be litigated?" And I think that is a common retort to many types of proposed new ideas and actions. "Well, it's going to be litigated. Well, if this was a Republican administration" — I was litigating every day against Trump. Absolutely, these things are going to be litigated, but that is not the excuse to not try. And the other kind of thing about it is, "oh well, it's going to be reversed by the other side." And that's an argument.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That was my next question because we lived through this, right? We lived through Obama having legislation taken away, basically resorting to executive action, and then just having either courts or the subsequent administration, shoot down almost all of it.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>And we also have seen gains at the same time. The things that we are asking for, with respect to climate, are jump-starting things, that can actually start transforming the market. We can actually use as much time as possible to get these actions jump-started. And at that point, if and when they do get strucken down, there will be movement that would have been made. There will be less barrels of oil being extracted and poisoning communities. And for every day that we can stop a child, right now, who is suffering from the climate crisis because of that fossil fuel pollution, otherwise, if we can just have a few more days at that, that works.</p><p>And that helps. And I think perversely, we have seen the border wall. The border wall was challenged. It was eventually mooted. But guess what? That border wall is still there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, facts on the ground, as they.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>Say, that is in the ground. That is an executive action that was essentially mooted out. But it is there, and it is a monstrosity, and it is still in its destructive mode. If we think about it that way, in a perverse way, executive action actually does a lot, and even if it gets reversed later, it will have impacts. And hopefully, on the pieces we are talking about, good impacts that will last and trigger something much greater for the transition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also, if Biden doesn't have Congress, what else is he going to spend his time doing?</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>He has things that he should have been doing since day one, not even emergency powers. I mean, he really could have been doing a lot of these things starting from the moment he took office. But he chose to wait Joe Manchin out and look where that's gotten us. And so now we're even further behind.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>And Dave, I think the point here is that this is not an either/or decision. Absolutely, we need legislation, and absolutely, we need an executive action. I think that bifurcation is just false. We need both/and, and we have needed that from day one. From day one, he could have stopped all new oil and gas leases. He actually went in the wrong direction. From day one, he actually could have started producing less and less oil from existing leases. He could have also increased the standards of our car emissions, which he has not raised, to even back to what the Obama administration had.</p><p>So these are pieces in his pocket that he has had. And if he declares a Climate Emergency, I would hope that, at the very least, it gets rid of these inconsistencies, and it puts the fire under every single agency to really look at every single power that they have and go for it, because we just don't have time to diddle-daddle anymore.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, as a final question then, let's talk about politics. Because I think it's fair to say that Biden himself is probably sort of small "C" conservative, institutionalist, doesn't like to .. ...</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>He's a senator.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>... radical. Yes, he was a senator for whatever, 107 years. So that's very deeply in his, in his bones. And I think the administration, probably as a whole, if you, if you look at it, is pretty small "C" conservative, has not really been willing to do things radical. I mean, one of the reasons, as you mentioned, is they're scared. Anything they do that's sort of bold, or out of the ordinary, or that goes against fossil fuels is going to, absolutely, put the final stake in the heart of any chance of legislation.</p><p>But as I think we've discussed, it looks like that ship is basically sailed at this point. But let's just talk about the politics of it because it's not clear at all, to me, that this would be good politics for Biden. I mean, it would look like — and it would be characterized by the right, and probably a bunch of jerks in the mainstream media — as, basically, Biden couldn't get legislation, he couldn't get people together to sign off on legislation. So now he's being a dictator, and he's just ramming through the far left agenda, and he's going to cut off our energy production that makes America great, and he's going to raise energy prices.</p><p>And you don't have to guess at the kind of attacks that this would bring. And like Biden doing a bunch of stuff that's unpopular, and then Democrats losing in 2024, and Republicans gaining a trifecta would be worse than anything you could imagine. So aren't you all a little nervous, at least about counseling this kind of thing? Do you think about the political implications? Do you worry about the political implications? Do you think I'm wrong about the political implications?</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Well, there's a recent poll that shows that 58% of Americans actually say they would support a Climate Emergency Declaration if BBBA doesn't pass, which it looks like it's not going to. And 80% of Americans think the government should be doing more to support climate. And we're seeing huge percentages, 100 million Americans under a heat warning. We have fires raging across the country, across Europe. I'm in the South in California. People in the Southwest were, basically, facing a permanent humongous drought right now. And so I think huge percentages of Americans are feeling the Climate Emergency in these palpable ways, and it's getting to a breaking point for people calling for change and urgency of transformation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But it sure seems like freaking out about gas prices ... they're like, "oh, we're very concerned about climate change. Whoa, what gas prices? Never mind all that. Never mind all that. Bring my gas prices down." I'm not sure that the support for climate has the endurance, or the depth, that just the general American aversion to taxes and high prices has.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>To answer that question, yes, we think a lot about politics, and how this would affect people, and what they're thinking. I think a National Climate Emergency and the powers that he chooses to pull from there, have to be extremely intentional. At the end of the day here, we're trying to protect the American public, and what they need to know right now is that they will have some safety in the face of the burning wildfires and heatwaves that they have right now, as well as the hole that's being burned in their budget because of this inflation. So there has to be absolutely an intentional plan for phasing out existing fossil fuels.</p><p>That's not something that is particularly controversial in any way. It's just we need to get off this. And at the same time, we are seeing so many people in the public really put those two together, that climate, and everything that's happening, and vulnerability to oil and gas really means getting off of it. We are seeing better understanding that solar, and clean energy, and E-vehicles, if they can actually be penetrated down to low-income communities, that people are very excited to get it. We work with communities on the ground. I think there's this polling out there, and elites sitting in their desks and doing that.</p><p>We get to talk to people on the ground who are suffering every day from this. And they're not big "d"s, little "d"s, whatever. They're just normal, everyday people, who are really so scared about what is going to happen. And they know that the only way to get it out of this issue is to stop fossil fuels. And so whatever the president does, it's about getting to that end but doing it in a way that is safe and that, essentially, protects our most vulnerable communities first. And I think there are absolutely ways that we can do that by using the many different executive powers that he has, to map out that plan super intentionally.</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Maybe he should just call the plan "Making America Great Again". Maybe that'll work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this has been super illuminating. There's been so much vague talk about executive action lately. It's really nice to get some concretes and some specifics, and hash through them. So, Jean Su and Maya Golden-Krasner, thank you so much for coming and spending all this time.</p><p><strong>Maya Golden-Krasner</strong></p><p>Thank you. It's been fun.</p><p><strong>Jean Su</strong></p><p>Thank you, Dave. It's been an honor and pleasure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-how-biden-can-address</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:65111241</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 09 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/65111241/54e2ae459058182b4c74e66b05bb4b2e.mp3" length="84900748" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3538</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/65111241/e26a9b43f546462e900d95b267cf3f3c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: David Wallace-Wells on the ravages of air pollution]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, journalist David Wallace-Wells raises the alarm about how incredibly unsafe our air is, the impact it’s having on human welfare, and why it doesn’t get as much attention as it should.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACz2uQYRangMfiUMXpvX_w4a/volts22.07.18%28david.wallace-wells%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-david-wallace-wells-on-the-ravages-of-air-pollution"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Back in 2020, I wrote <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/8/12/21361498/climate-change-air-pollution-us-india-china-deaths">an article</a> about some eye-popping new research on air pollution which found that the damage it is doing to human health is roughly twice as bad as previously thought, and moreover, that the economic benefits of pollution reduction vastly outweigh the costs of transitioning to clean energy.</p><p>It seemed to me then that the findings should have gotten more attention in the press, and I wasn't the only person who thought so. Journalist David Wallace-Wells, who made a splash a few years ago with his terrifying book on climate change, <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3O1zoe8"><em>The Uninhabitable Earth</em></a>, also dove in to new air pollution research and produced a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v43/n23/david-wallace-wells/ten-million-a-year?te=1&#38;nl=david-wallace-wells&#38;emc=edit_dww_20220711">magisterial overview for the </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v43/n23/david-wallace-wells/ten-million-a-year?te=1&#38;nl=david-wallace-wells&#38;emc=edit_dww_20220711"><em>London Review of Books</em></a> last year. Recently he <a target="_blank" href="https://messaging-custom-newsletters.nytimes.com/template/oakv2?campaign_id=253&#38;emc=edit_dww_20220708&#38;instance_id=66189&#38;nl=david-wallace-wells&#38;productCode=DWW&#38;regi_id=77958647&#38;segment_id=98030&#38;te=1&#38;uri=nyt%3A%2F%2Fnewsletter%2Fbc3574a9-a14c-530a-a3af-3348fb949b0c&#38;user_id=f84e5ac04f021896598d9107641bfee0">revisited the subject for his </a><a target="_blank" href="https://messaging-custom-newsletters.nytimes.com/template/oakv2?campaign_id=253&#38;emc=edit_dww_20220708&#38;instance_id=66189&#38;nl=david-wallace-wells&#38;productCode=DWW&#38;regi_id=77958647&#38;segment_id=98030&#38;te=1&#38;uri=nyt%3A%2F%2Fnewsletter%2Fbc3574a9-a14c-530a-a3af-3348fb949b0c&#38;user_id=f84e5ac04f021896598d9107641bfee0"><em>New York Times</em></a><a target="_blank" href="https://messaging-custom-newsletters.nytimes.com/template/oakv2?campaign_id=253&#38;emc=edit_dww_20220708&#38;instance_id=66189&#38;nl=david-wallace-wells&#38;productCode=DWW&#38;regi_id=77958647&#38;segment_id=98030&#38;te=1&#38;uri=nyt%3A%2F%2Fnewsletter%2Fbc3574a9-a14c-530a-a3af-3348fb949b0c&#38;user_id=f84e5ac04f021896598d9107641bfee0"> newsletter</a>, asking why social mobilization against climate change, which promises millions of deaths in decades, is so much greater than mobilization against air pollution, which kills 10 million a year today.</p><p>It's a challenging question, and I'm not certain I have a great answer, so I wanted to talk to David about it — what the new research says about the mind-boggling scope and scale of air pollution’s damage to human welfare, how we ought to think about it relative to climate change, and what scares him most about the process of normalization that allows us to live with 10 million deaths a year.</p><p>David Wallace-Wells, welcome to Volts. Thanks so much for coming on.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Oh, my pleasure. It's great to talk. Really good to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you made a big splash, several years ago, with your article on climate change and the subsequent book, but in the last year or so, year two, you have been writing more and more about just good old-fashioned air pollution. And it seems like you're kind of getting sucked in, like it keeps pulling you in. So tell me kind of the story of how you first interacted with the story and why you keep coming back to it.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Well, on some level, it's the same answer I give when people ask me how I got worried about climate change, which is just to say I was seeing scientific research that was really quite alarming. And the more that I looked at it, the bigger the story seemed and the more it seemed to demand of me as someone who wrote on anything close to these issues. The slightly more personal version of it is, like, I wrote my book, I spent a lot of time talking about it, talking about climate change, and I found myself again and again in describing the scale of the impact, citing a small handful of data points or projections that I found really useful to communicate what I saw as to scary it all was.</p><p>And one of those was this data point that at two degrees of warming, we should expect 153 million additional deaths from air pollution produced from the burning of fossil fuels. And I would always caveat that and say, "no, that's not exactly climate change, but it's caused by the same things that cause climate change." And the more I said it and the more that I thought about it, I was like, "wait, hang on a second. If the most dramatic data point that I can come up with to explain how scary the world that we're going to be living in is ... is not actually about temperature rise, maybe I should spend some time thinking about what that means and how it might change my own perspective on warming and what that's likely to be like."</p><p>And so I wrote a piece. It actually was a very slow burn piece, and it was actually, even though it totally contradicts what I just said, was a story that was proposed to me by the LRB. I wrote a piece for the London Review of Books that was published last fall, but which they had actually invited me to write before the pandemic began. And over the course of those couple of years, I was just collecting more and more material. And as I sort of had done with climate, it just felt like the more I looked, the more I saw, the darker the picture got.</p><p>Now, there are some really important distinctions, and it's not an easy parallel. We could talk about some of the contrasts, but in general the sort of emotional experience of it, for me, was the same, which is just to say I had my eyes opened out of some amount of horror or fear, and the deeper that I looked into the subject, the bleaker it seemed to get.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, well, I want to talk about some of those parallels in a minute, but first let's just dwell on the research for a minute because I feel like there's sort of a popular conception of air pollution in the US, insofar as people think about it anymore. It's like the river used to burn. Then we got the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act and more or less tackled that problem and now it's just a problem for overseas. I think that's kind of the folk story of air pollution. But the recent research, it's almost qualitative difference.</p><p>I wrote about this for Vox a few years ago, just looking at this new research that's basically like, "it turns out the effects are about double what we thought they were." I'm like, "damn." It seemed like it should have been bigger news then, I kind of wrote a little table-pounding story about it. So just talk about kind of what scientists have concluded in these last few years about air pollution and its effects.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Well, there's sort of two stories running in parallel, or maybe parallel isn't even the right word. They're kind of running in opposite directions at once. And one is the story that you've summarized as the folk history, which is to say, "in the richer parts of the world, air pollution is getting better."</p><p>That is true. If people remember 20, 30, 50, 70 years ago, the air in the US and in Europe was a lot worse than it is now. And it is better in part because of policy, but in part because of activism, and for a variety of reasons, but it is better. And the health impacts are significantly smaller today in the US than they used to be. But at the same time, we're learning that the health impacts generally are way worse than we thought than they were. So I touched on this in the story I went for the Times recently about it, but I think this is one of the complications in processing this new data, is that we see things getting better even as the science is giving us a darker and darker picture.</p><p>What that science says is, "every time we lower the threshold that we want to consider safe for air pollution, we discover that in fact, that new level of air pollution that we thought was safe was not safe."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, and that's and that story is unbroken. The ratchet never goes in the other direction, as far as I can tell.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Totally. And it's it's very much the parallel there is there with lead, where just every few years there's a new standard. And then researchers are like, "actually, let's make it even lower." So the WHO just released last fall a new global standard, in which they said that anything higher than five micrograms per cubic meter of particulate matter is dangerous to your health. The previous level had been ten. In the US, the official standard of safety is twelve, still to this day.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's battled over and battled over. What was Obama trying to make it like? What were we trying to ...?</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>I actually don't know those details. Maybe you'd know them better than I do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I want to say ten or eight.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>I mean, it would make sense that they were just trying to pull it into line with the WHO standard, which had been ten so that probably makes sense.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And have failed repeatedly.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>And I don't want to overstate what this means for people in the US who are breathing unhealthy air, which is to say, if the who standard is five and we're at, as a country, nine or whatever, or you're in a particular locality where it's seven or eleven, it's not like you're going to be dealing with the same level of health impacts as people living in Delhi, for instance, are. There's a spectrum, and the more of it there is, the worse off you are.</p><p>But one of the things that's been most interesting to me, at a sort of conceptual level in thinking about all of this, is also that while the effects on an individual life can be relatively small or even invisible, when you unroll the impact or the menace over a large population, the totals really add up. So a big study that came out of Harvard, about a year and a half ago, and the headline there was that 8.7 million people around the world died, and I think it was 2019, just due to the air pollution from the burning of fossil fuel. So 8.7 million a year, globally, just from the burning of fossil fuels. Putting aside all other causes of air pollution, they found that just within the US, the total was 350,000, a year, which is roughly as many Americans as died in the first year of COVID officially.</p><p>So we are, even here, breathing our relatively clean air and telling ourselves that things are getting better on the pollution front. Even here, 350,000 lives, or so, are being cut short every year due to these impacts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's a parallel, I think, to the climate discussion, in that you can say climate causes X deaths, but deaths never present themselves as from climate, right? What climate is doing is raising the odds of other bad things happening. And in a sense, it seems like, kind of, conceptually, air pollution is the same way. Like air pollution is not on your death certificate, right? Air pollution just raises the odds of this immense range of other bad things happening.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah. It basically makes everything about the human body and the human brain worse. And that means that across a large population, there's a much greater mortality risk than there would have been without it. And it's important to keep that in mind. It's not like we're talking about someone dropping a bomb on a city when we say, "10 million people die a year, globally, from air pollution.' The causes are more diffuse, the impacts are more diffuse, and the way that we experience those impacts are also more diffuse in the sense that yeah, like the person, you know, who might have died, given the world as it is, but wouldn't have died in a world without air pollution, you probably attribute their death to cancer, or respiratory disease, or heart disease. But those rates are just much higher in the presence of this environmental contamination.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And people think about, I think, air pollution as exacerbating, you know, like asthma and stuff like that, stuff with your lungs, maybe even cancer. But, you know, you cite research that ties air pollution to a wild array of outcomes like health, psychological, social crime, like name it. Just tell us about some of the sort of craziest things you found in those studies.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>I'll say the crazier stuff in a minute, but I think the most important thing is just, like, it's just everything. So it makes everything worse. So that's — the things that may seem familiar, it's just important to sort of reiterate respiratory disease, pulmonary disease, cancer. Then there's all stuff about cognitive performance, and you can look at like surgeons perform worse when there's more air pollution in the air, umpires and baseball games make worse calls, when there's more air pollution in the air. Crime goes up, domestic violence goes up. And there are these pretty striking findings about mental health, and depression, suicide, self-harm.</p><p>It really goes, like, all down the list of absolutely everything that you could sort of define as a standard of human flourishing is made worse, at the population level, when there's more of this stuff floating around in the air. And the way that that rolls out, or folds out, or plays out, in a place like the US, is one kind of scale of effect. But in places where there's just a mass amount of pollution, it's really dramatic. So in the US, the estimate is that as a country, even though we're losing 350,000 people a year, on the whole, that only adds up to a loss of about 0.2 years of life expectancy, which is that like a few months on average for every person. But it doesn't change the shape of your life in a truly profound way. In Delhi, it is ten years, which means that — this is a city of 20 million people. They are, on average, losing ten years of life.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's wild. And losing, in some sense, before they're even born, like, that's some of the most kind of depressing research we cite.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah, the research it's been, like, sort of a second active research for me has been the effect on fetal health, and maternal health, newborn health, which is growing a little bit, but it just also happens to be something I've been focusing on more lately. And I was writing this piece for the Times in the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court's decisions on Dobbs in West Virginia versus EPA. And it felt like, "well, God, if only we could show there was some connection between air pollution and the well-being of newborns." So, yeah, globally, 500,000 newborns die every year in ways that are attributable to air pollution.</p><p>So in South Asia alone, there are 350,000 stillbirths and miscarriages every year attributable to air pollution. And the effects are not just whether fetus lives, or dies, or survives. The pregnancy emerges intact. It's also it affects premature birth, low birth weight, which are strongly correlated with a lot of measures of human well-being later in life. So, again, it's really, no matter where you look, no matter what standard you're trying to apply, or what question you're trying to ask about whether people are flourishing in this world, air pollution is almost certain to give a darker picture than we'd be able to give, or have, or live through without it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk a little bit about kind of what to do about it, where it comes from. People think mostly about burning fossil fuels, which I think is probably the bulk of the problem. But you point out that there are other sources as well, big, large remaining sources, even if you tackle fossil fuels.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, I would say actually there has been a bit of a shift towards an understanding of the predominance of fossil fuels as the cause over the last few years. I think, you know, rewind five or ten years and people probably would have guessed that a lot of it had to do with bad indoor cooking in the developing world and agricultural burning. And those play a role too. But yeah, at least according to this Harvard study, we're talking about the large bulk of air pollution deaths being attributable to fossil fuels, and that's in particular coal plants and cars.</p><p>But the natural world produces a fair amount of particulate matter too. We have dust pollution. And so in the piece I mentioned one study, that I actually think this may be slightly pessimistic, but they said that if we entirely eliminated all anthropogenic activity, half of the world would still be breathing unsafe pollution levels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No kidding. Because of dust, or fire, or what?</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah, a combination of dust and fire. And then there's just some other stuff that, like vegetation, just gives off some particular matter, which I didn't even know about before looking at this work. So there's some stuff that we can do to somewhat take control of that. Dust is a problem that can be, to some degree, controlled through agricultural practices, and ecosystem restoration, and that kind of thing. But probably we're going to be living with some amount of this gunk floating around in our air forever, and that's in certain ways dispiriting and despairing. But to bring it back to something I said a few minutes ago, it really is different if you're like, at ten micrograms per cubic meter versus 40.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>And we should be able to bring a lot of those really dangerous levels of pollution down if we take control of the things that we are doing as humans. Which is to say, burning stuff. In the LRB piece, I had like a line that was, "everything we burn, we breathe.' And I think that's a pretty good rule for thinking about how to combat air pollution. Anytime you're lighting a match to something, it'd be better if we didn't do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We light fewer matches. What do you say — I remember this kind of old-school conservative thing, kind of before climate change took over everything when air pollution used to be kind of a bigger thing. I remember kind of the conservative take on it being based on this Kuznets Curve, based on this idea that "the more prosperous a society gets, the less it burns things," basically. And so the solution to this is just to make those developing nations as rich as possible, as fast as possible, rather than focusing on the air pollution itself. What do you make of that argument?</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>I think it's a relatively accurate description of the path of development that most countries in the world have taken to this point. But I find it pretty disingenuous as a guide, or rule, to the way that we should be thinking about the present tense or the future, in the sense that, especially, acknowledging how large a role fossil fuel burning is playing in these issues. If we believe, as the IEA and many other analysts tell us, that solar power is the cheapest electricity in history, and 90% of the world lives in places where renewables are cheaper than dirty energy. There is no longer this trade-off, where living greener and breathing cleaner air is going to come at the cost of economic growth.</p><p>It's now the case that all else being equal and of course, there are complications, but all else being equal, if we're drawing development trajectories for anybody anywhere in the world at the moment, we would be rapidly downgrading, downsizing, our dependence on fossil fuel in those places and rapidly embracing renewable power, which is going to produce many, many fewer of these impacts. So I think going forward, and thinking about policy, and culture, and economic activity going forward, I think that that old rule is a little bit foolish and, essentially, council's complacency, when, in fact, the landscape as we understand it should push us in the other direction, to move much more quickly to get off these sources.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It seems like even if you just take the same cost-benefit analysis, the same equation, and just plug the new information we have about pollution into it, just out of that, you would get counsel for much more aggressive pollution reduction, right?</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, this is something that you've written about too when you wrote about the testimony that Drew Chandell gave, and I can't remember if it was Congress or the Senate, during the pandemic, but where he said that "the cost of the green transition in the US would be entirely paid for and then some, just through the public health benefits of the cleaner air that that transition would bring about." So we don't have to worry. You don't even have to put into the equation all the jobs we're going to get. You don't even have to put into the equation the climate benefits we're going to get. You just have to think about the cleaner air, and that immediately pays for the whole project.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, it would pay for everything. And also, now that we know more about the damaged pollution side, it's the same story with lead, right? As you said before, ever since we stopped using it, or even before we stopped using it, we've just been learning, "oh, it's worse, and worse, and worse, and worse, and worse than we thought." And we've traced crime waves, tons and tons of stuff to lead, basically, lead in the water. It's amazing how much you can attribute to it.</p><p>And now the same thing is happening with particulates in air pollution, which means when you look back, a. that the pollution we have had in this country, decades ago, actually did more damage than we knew. And b. something like the Clean Air Act — they keep doing these cost-benefit analyses on it, and every time you get new information about pollution, the overwhelming benefit of the Clean Air Act just grows, and grows, and grows. To the point now, that it's sort of like if it were popularly appreciated, what a wildly successful piece of legislation that was, there would be so much more outrage about what the Supreme Court is doing, right? Like, in retrospect, we know it was even more successful than anyone dared hoped, even until just very recently.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah. I want to go back to something you said just a minute ago because I think it's really, really important, which is we can talk about the public health impacts. We have talked about a lot of them. But I think it's also important to understand just how much these forces shape our social, and political, and cultural lives through their public health impacts. So when we think about lead, there's a quite plausible account that lead pollution, which was concentrated in poorer, browner, blacker communities in the US.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Always.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Drove the US crime wave of the 60s and 70s, or at least powered it, gave it some extra push. As a result, we can say that that crime wave was more racialized because of the racialized effects of lead. And the result of that was "white flight" out of American cities, the growth of quasi-reactionary, quote — unquote, "centrist suburban politics" in this country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Reaganism in the 80s. I mean, you could spin it out.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>The whole story of America over the last 50 years, and especially, the American politics of the last decade or so. You can actually quite neatly draw that line from lead pollution, which is to say, to an environmental contaminant which we knew was bad for you a century and a half ago, and we chose not to worry too much about it because we didn't really appreciate the scale. And there were other reasons not to take action. And so we let the paint companies put lead in their paint, and we let the gasoline companies put lead in their fuel.</p><p>And that whole time we knew. And the effect wasn't just corrosive to the public health, particularly, of Black and Brown Americans, poor Black and Brown Americans in the middle of the century. But it is one of the driving forces in our entire national narrative over the last five decades. And when you think about air pollution in the same context, again, the impacts are not as dramatic in the US as they are elsewhere, but the whole picture that we have of early-stage industrial development in the late 20th, early 21st century in the Global South, so much of that is tied up in the toxicity of the pollutants that are produced there.</p><p>And if we could wind back the clock and run those development patterns differently, the whole picture of the future, as it was perceived in places like North India, would be really, really different. And our perspective on those places, looking at it from the Global North, would be really different, too. We wouldn't regard life in the slums of the Global South as nearly as dark and grim as they are, beyond which those, at least implementing what we know now about the economic benefits of clean energy, they may well be moving up the economic ladder much faster than they are today, if they hadn't gone down that path. So all of these stories from the incredibly local, individual lives lost up through the geopolitical and the sort of mythic level that we operate on often in our national politics, all of those are affected by these forces.</p><p>And that's not to say that, like, "if you walk down the street in Delhi, you're going to peel over and die", although I have walked down the street in Delhi, and it can be hard to breathe. But it's just to say, that when we put even a small-scale effect on a population of 20 million, or in the case of India as a whole, 1.4 billion people, those effects really, really add up. And we are just beginning, I think, to appreciate how much those stories of environmental contamination are shaping all of these bigger narratives that we've treated for so long as, if not quite neatly, "great men theories of history", then stories about national character or whatever.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And you look back, and it also makes every bit of sort of corporate lobbying, like in the lead story, every bit of corporate lobbying, every backroom deal that let it go on a little bit longer. Those now, knowing what we know about the sort of first, and second, and third-order effects that spun out from that, those just look like monstrous crimes. Like, the amount of human suffering attributable to those decisions, looks enormous now, with the full scope of history, to look at it, and it sort of makes you think now, like, "here we are arguing again in our politics right now over air pollution."</p><p>Like, do we think we're going to find out in the future? Again, we should be learning prospectively now, from the past, that these are very big decisions, and the benefits of reducing them are so much larger, once you've taken the full picture than anyone imagined like it ought to be transforming politics.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it's interesting because I come at this from a pretty unusual position. I write about climate, I write about the environment, but I'm such an urban person who does not think about the rights of nature and the bounty of the planet that needs to be protected. Those are not my emotional impulses. My emotional impulses are to think about human suffering, but the more that we learn about not just air pollution, but the effects of pollution of all kinds. Yeah, I think you're exactly right. The more that we bring ourselves back into line with what was that sort of old-timey seeming environmentalist impulse, which is just to say, "we should be protecting natural world at all costs." I wouldn't quite go as far as to say at all costs, but we know so little now about what all these microplastics are going to do to us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I know, but we've had enough experience to guess.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>It's not going to be good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which direction the results are going to go, right? That's the thing. At some point it seems like you need to start learning from these things, looking forward, right? And not making the same damn mistakes over and over again.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I wonder, I mean, I don't know exactly how you'd put those odds, but it does feel like we're more in a position of making the same mistakes all over again than we are really.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, yes, we are in an age of making mistakes all over again. I think that is our era. Well, let's get into maybe what might be kind of a slightly awkward or controversial subject, I guess, depending on how we want to put it. But I'll just put it this way. Knowing what we now know, the current global effects of air pollution are as bad as anything climate models project in terms of deaths and illnesses, even decades in the future, from climate change. Do you think that's fair?</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Well, I would say that that's my understanding of the science. There are some climate models that are already tallying deaths in the millions, but I tend to think of them as sort of outlier assessments. Now, they may prove to be more prescient, in the same way that alarmist assessments of air pollution have proven to be prescient, too. So I think it's, at a baseline, very safe to say that there are more people dying, as we understand it today, from air pollution. In 2022, and 2023, and 2024, there are going to be more people dying from air pollution than are dying from the whole range of climate impacts.</p><p>And that, to get to a point where climate death ever overtakes these numbers that we have today, which is to say 10 million people a year, which is 100 million in a decade. To get to that point with climate, would require, perhaps, both a real unraveling of the global climate system, that would require some of the higher-end possibilities to come true, and also probably a much more robust accounting measure beyond that which we have devised, to this point, to tabulate those impacts. Most of the sort of alarming comprehensive assessments of climate mortality suggests that, in this climate scenarios that we can sort of expect in the next 50 to 75 years, we will never reach this level of death on an annual basis from climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And that's just like striking. I really want to put an exclamation point on it, like, the world is mobilizing against climate change. Obviously, not to the degree anybody wants or that is sufficient, but there's immense social upheaval, and mobilization, and political mobilization against a possible future danger that is not as deadly as ones we are living through right now, which are not causing anything like the same mobilization. How do we explain that? What story do we tell ourselves about that? And what story should climate people be telling themselves about it? Like, do you think it makes sense to, just on a utilitarian level, turn your activist attention, and your advocacy attention, away from climate to air pollution?</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>There are a lot of different questions embedded in there, and, actually, I'd be really curious to know how you think about it. I would say a few things. To begin with, I've never written two big pieces on air pollution, and I actually underwent something of a perspective shift in the interim. Which is to say, when I wrote the first piece, which was just last fall, I put forward the line that activism against air pollution might be, at the very least, useful to include in a more significant way in our climate advocacy.</p><p>These things are really correlated. If we solve one, we solve the other. And talking about air pollution really makes the cost of inaction really, really clear, in a way that talking about climate change independent of air pollution doesn't make quite so clear.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And much more localizable, right? Much more sort of like traceable to particular communities, right?</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>And immediate. So if you cut emissions today, the effect on global temperatures may not be so visible, but the effect on air pollution from your local coal plant will be immediately visible. It's also, like, there's a visual that's really powerful, literally like the ugly gunk in the sky and in the waters, like all that stuff. It lends itself to advocacy and has in the past pushed people, in countries like ours, to take action, in a way that climate has proven a little harder to gain that sort of traction right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And is mobilizing people in China and India now, I think, in a way that maybe climate isn't.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Actually, it's an interesting comparison to make. The most dramatic reductions in air pollution over the last decade or two have come in China. India has taken some steps, and there is some advocacy growing, but they haven't meaningfully reduced their pollution levels. In China, they really have. They've cut their pollution by, I think, something like 40% in seven years, and it was from a very high level. I think, one estimate I cited in this piece was that 30 million Chinese people died between 2000 and 2016. 30 million people in a single country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That was the coal binge, right? I mean, that coal binge had so many effects on so many things, but like among them, the mortality of the Chinese.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>And they took large scale policies, they made large scale policy, made a large scale response and to deal with that. They move the coal plants, to begin with. They've also started moving off of coal. They keep building the plants, but they're running them at much lower levels of capacity, as I'm sure all your listeners know. But the question of what produced that, I think, is a complicated one and not — I don't personally feel like I know the answer clearly because everything we know about Chinese environmental policy comes to us through so many layers of ... I don't know exactly what to call it. It's just hard to know the real story there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>My understanding is that there has there has been some amount of grassroots activism, and people were upset about the air pollution, in the middle of the last decade. But I also think that there's a pretty strong role being played here from the top-down powers as well, who are looking at the mortality data and are just like, "well, why would we want these people to die if we can not have them die?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it seems like the whole point was, "we're going to use coal to grow the economy, bring a bunch of people out of poverty, and then we're going to pivot and start addressing the problems of coal," right? You hate to say that they accepted all those deaths from air pollution on purpose, but they kind of did in exchange for the extraordinary number of people brought out of poverty during that same period, right?</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah. Again, it's another thing I'm not sure that I can attribute that logic to Xi or his advisors. That is the operational revealed logic of their path. For sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>So for all those reasons, I thought like, "yes, making a bigger deal out of pollute," and it poles way better also. Literally, every American you ask is like, "yeah, we should be taking measures to keep our air."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It wasn't like everybody switched to climate because climate poles so much better than air pollution.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Right. The opposite. And relatedly, it is much less tied up in culture war b******t.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Than climate is. And theoretically, if the climate movement made air pollution a much bigger deal, maybe that would change, maybe it would become polarized in the same way. But at the moment, it's in a very happy place where basically everybody's excited to sign up for most measures that promise to reduce pollution. Although there are some issues about — it's still the poorest, Brownest, and Blackest communities that are hit hardest, and it's not always the case that other people want to help them. But at the national level, people want to deal with pollution. They want their air to be cleaner.</p><p>So for all those reasons, I thought this is a strategic win. We've probably left something on the table by focusing on climate, as opposed to pollution. And we don't have to talk about the future, we can focus on the present. We can see it all very clearly. It motivates people. We have a track record of success here.</p><p>But I've started to think much more that the story of air pollution is less about, yeah, mobilization and more about normalization. We have been living with these impacts in certain parts of the world, really quite dramatic levels, for a very long time. And while there are some success stories — the US Clean Air Act, the equivalent in Europe, and now it's happened in China — it's also the case, as you point out, that there just isn't a global movement around this. And in fact, we've come to regard, I think, in places like the US and Europe at least, we've come to regard the pollution levels that people are dealing with in South Asia, and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and to some degree, East Asia, and China as just like normal. And that's the flip side of the Kuznets Curve story that you told.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's what I was going to say. That kind of falls out of that, right? If you believe that story, then you look at that pollution and say, "well, ah, that's the phase they're in."</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>"And it'll solve itself."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>"And what are you going to do?"</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Totally. That's really what worries me about climate these days, too. You know, I used to think that if people saw the story clearly, they would take action. And even at the time, I sort of knew that that was, to some degree, naive.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We were such a sweet summer children back then, a few years ago.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>And now I think, "oh, most of the stuff that people like you and I have been warning about for a while is probably going to come true." There is going to be a lot more suffering and a lot more disruption. It may not be quite as bad as maybe me in particular has warned, but it'll still be like quite large-scale negative impact on all forms of global flourishing, to have climate change of two and a half degrees, maybe even three degrees of warming. But the response there, I come to think, more and more, is going to be dominated not by, you know, mitigation, to be sure, not by, you know, adaptation and resilience, but just by normalization. We're just going to find ways to treat.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not by a global uprising of spontaneous grassroots energy.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah. Or even technocratic like, "oh, we're going to build a sea wall here, and we're going to regrow the mangroves here, and we're going to ... " Even that kind of thing is, I think, a smaller form, is a smaller part of our sort of adaptation toolkit than normalization whereby we were —— like people living in California. They talk about the fires, they talk about the smoke, but here we are. I don't know exactly. Depending on how you want to count, like, we've quintupled the amount of acreage that is routinely burned in California from wildfire, and everybody's just like, "yeah, it's a little worse."</p><p>And that coping mechanism, I think, is really quite deep and is the way that we adjust.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If we had been talking about this five years ago, it'd be one thing, but now we've seen this illustrated in so many forms now. Basically, people's ability to take what once would have seemed crazy, or out of bounds, or too far, or too bad on board, as long as it's incremental. And it turns out we can normalize things really quickly. Like, we got used to, I mean, COVID is still going on, right? Hundreds of thousands of people are still dying, but we got used to that so fast. As I look back now, the climate idea that climate campaigners had, especially in like the early 2000s or whatever, like, "once it gets really bad, people will mobilize," just seems so wildly naive now. It takes so much to get people to mobilize. And anything that's incremental, even something as fast as, like, democracy falling apart around us, look at what we've taken on board as normal in the last five years, in terms of democracy and the rule of law.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>And that's in the domestic context, which is also something that would have surprised me. It's one thing to say Americans don't care about dictators in the developing world, it's another thing to come to terms with what we've seen here. I totally agree. I think the pandemic, we could have a whole second conversation about the lessons of the pandemic on these questions. I think that normalization has been a huge and underappreciated part of the story.</p><p>I'm working on a piece now about the sort of the "endgame" that we have apparently, according to the people who really know this stuff, somewhat settled into here, which is to say 100,000 to 250,000 deaths annually from this disease. And I'm now working at the New York Times. When we hit 100,000 deaths in the US from COVID, they put a huge banner headline on the front page, which used the phrase "an incalculable loss". Well, how do you calculate ten times that loss, or having that loss every year, forever after, going forward?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It so quickly becomes abstract.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>But there's another lesson on the climate, and I have a dog in this fight, just to, like, declare it up front that I think is really interesting from the pandemic, which is to say — the moment of most intense interest and greatest capacity for large scale behavioral and political change, in response to this threat, was at the very beginning, when people were most scared. Now, saying it that way suggests a slightly neater case study version of what we've gone through than I really want to suggest. But it is, I think, important to keep in mind that, actually, the capacity for change was quite dramatic at the beginning of the pandemic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And the corollary of what you're saying, which is that it's going to get more and more difficult to address as it gets worse and worse, right? Not easier to address, not the spontaneous global mobilization. It's going to be harder and harder. I mean, this is what we know about chaos, and just general disorder, like, it does not make people more far-seeing, and more concerned about the next generation, and more open to cooperation with other people, right. All the things you need in place for a global solution to this, get more difficult the more climate does that threat multiplication thing it does.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Well, I think there are those who might say, "it's a little more complicated than that." I mean, Rebecca Solnit has written a lot about the way in which disorder and disarray can call forward are better impulses. I think the truth is that we can't count on any single narrative pattern emerging and holding in any one direction, through the series of climate disruptions that we're likely to see over the next few decades. And I do think that there is probably some amount of response that will be called forth, more dramatic response. I mean, we've seen it already. The world is moving faster than it was five years ago, even though climate impacts are getting worse.</p><p>But I also don't think that we can just say that, "well, that's going to take care of things." There are a lot of ugly impulses out there. We need to do what we can to make sure that the responses are targeted and guided towards prosocial, productive goals, rather than zero-sum, competitive scrambling over what we perceive to be limited resources. I think it's just a big mess. That's not to say that no progress is possible in that mess, but the landscape itself is a mess.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Once you abandon the idea that accumulated, empirical information is going to spark social change, then you're sort of at sea, right? What will? What does? The one thing your air pollution story illustrates really well, which is something that's been demonstrated to us over, and over, and over again these past few years — which is that humans are terrible at assessing risk. We don't treat all deaths the same. We don't treat all risks the same. Our individual and collective response to risk is not totally disconnected from the scale of the risk, but, you know, 90% disconnected from the true nature and scale of the risk.</p><p>So it seems like we need something like a study of what does break through? What does cause social mobilization? What does make a threat, in addition to the empirical information that demonstrates it's a threat? What makes it socially sticky and catchy? Do we know anything about that?</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Well, you might know better than I do, but when I look at the last few years and think about this question on a few different fronts, not just climate, the thing that strikes me is not the question, "does anything work?" It's, "is there anything that can work in an ongoing way, sufficient to really disrupt the established structures of power and authority?"</p><p>So when I think about climate, I think, "oh wait, we did have an incredible global mobilization around climate change." We had millions of people all around the world marching in the street, mostly young people. We had more aggressive climate activism in the form of, to some degree, Sunrise, certainly XR.</p><p>And the sum total of those movements, I do believe, really did change the discourse around climate change among the world's most powerful people, both in the private and public sectors. And so you see a lot of this lip service now being paid by presidents and prime ministers, but also by CEOs, and our sainted billionaire class. Nobody is a climate denier anymore. And they all say, they even say when you're to get to net zero by 2050, basically, if you ask them, and many of them make a big deal out of that. But we actually haven't gotten on that track at all.</p><p>So we've just sort of to the extent that we've forced anything, we've forced a rhetorical shift in people who are interested in making progress, but not interested in making progress quickly enough. And I think that maybe it's the pandemic, maybe it's other political forces, but I look at the climate movement as somewhat exhausted now compared to where it was a few years ago.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>And then I think about, okay, so thinking about in the domestic context, the response to Dobbs and the reversal of Roe, and I feel this and I see it among many, you know, like-minded liberal Americans, there's just this sort of exhausted, almost acquiescence. When you compare the response to that decision to the Women's March, which came out of the election of Donald Trump, you can argue about what impact the Women's March had and whether it was sustainable, etc. But you saw over the course of whatever the ... that is like six weeks, between eight weeks, between maybe it's ten weeks, but between the election and the Women's March, the building of a "from scratch" protest infrastructure, which at the very least signal to other Americans, we as a mass are outraged.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it just didn't seem like there was the institutional, you know like somebody needs to pick up that ball and run with it on the right. If there's a spark of social uprising, like there's billionaires ready to heap money on it, and bus them around, and put them on TV all day, every day. But it just didn't seem like there's any infrastructure to pick that energy up and carry with it. So it just seemed like it kind of dispersed.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that that's definitely part of it and that we would be better off with some more effective, large-scale organizing infrastructure on the Left. I also, although, I've read some things recently about the way in which the Bloomberg gun philanthropy has sort of like hoovered up what was, essentially, grassroots movement into a corporate environment, in ways that may not be all that helpful. But I also just think about, I sort of go back to what we were talking about a few minutes ago about the response to the pandemic and the way in which an initial burst of outrage and commitment can just dissipate on its own. And I worry that we sort of mobilized on the Center-Left and Left against Trump because we understood that to be such a profound threat to a lot of things that we assumed or wanted to assume about the nature of the American Democratic experiment and the public at large — I just worry we sort of spent that energy for a generation, and that we may now be depleted.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it's kind of the nature ... I mean, I returned again and again. This is a little bit of a cliche, but I return again and again to sort of psychology of abusive relationships, and that's part of how they work, is you can only deal with so many crises at once. The financialization of the economy is a crisis. Like inequality is a crisis. Climate is a crisis. Now, here you are telling me air pollution is also a crisis. Like democracy falling apart. It's a crisis. Any of those I could justify spending my entire energy and passion towards.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>But are you familiar with the term "polycrisis" or "permacrisis"?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And people just can't process it or focus at a certain point. Your phrase is exactly right. Exhausted acquiescence. It just, that seems to be sort of the energy these days, which is disastrous. But I don't know what to what to do about it.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Well, on the Dobbs and Roe point, I mean, I do really believe that there is some real failing here on the part of Democratic leadership.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, better leadership would help.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>It just seems, like, I don't know, it's a tough hand to play, but people are really furious. They're really outraged, and playing the long game just isn't the right message to give them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And it's not even clear they're doing that. It's not clear that if they had a long-term plan, that'd be one thing. They just don't seem to have a plan at all other than sort of this instinctive move to the center attempt, the sort of twitch at this point that establishment Dems have. It's like the only reaction they have left.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>I don't remember who in the White House said it, but just a couple of the last couple of days, somebody said basically like, "we're not here to appease the activist wing of the Democratic party."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The activist, which is like 80 %, 90% of the freaking party.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Absolutely. Like, it's the whole party. Like, what are you talking about?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's nuts.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>But I also think that you know ... I also think that there's a failure on the part of the public here, which is to say the protests have been pretty small and uninspiring, and every woman I know, and a lot of men, are really, really upset about it, but it's not actually translating into the same level of public, you know — we're not projecting that outrage, in a visible way, that makes the decision seem untenable. We're just sort of crying privately, and that's ... it's just not ... I mean, you know, we're coming off a pandemic. We've been, as you say, there's one crisis after another.</p><p>On a personal level, I understand someone being like, "I'm not about to organize a march on this myself to some degree," but when you add up that exhaustion, you're just like, "well, then who's leading the way?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. My dark story is the exhausted acquiescence after the theft of the 2000 presidential election, basically, was the starting gun, for a century thus far, of exhausted acquiescence to incremental ratcheting up of these authoritarian impulses and the reactionary backlash, just that was where to draw the line, right? And ever since then, it's just been retreat, pulling the lines back, back, and like, look where we are now. There was a freaking coup, and we can barely act collectively like it was a bad thing, much less hold people accountable, or whatever.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, the perspective on the Left, on the hearings is almost like, this is good TV.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, God.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Which I don't mean to, it is good TV. They've been much better at it than previous people doing previous versions of the same thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I feel like we should have learned by now that nobody involved cares about being outed, or shamed, or scolded, or exposed. Like, none of that matters. Consequences matter, and that's it. And there just haven't been any.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah. I would say I think that the hearings have damaged Trump's chances of the nomination.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, they have helped DeSantis quite a bit, I think.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>But they haven't hurt Trumpism.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay. We've wandered so far afield, David, I'm going to bring it back. I'm going to bring it back for the final question then, which is related to this, which is, do you think that ... this air pollution story that you're telling, that you're sort of over there pounding on your table, telling which trying to break through, is very striking, and I think new to people.</p><p>And so I wonder, and as you say, addressing it and addressing climate change are basically the same damn thing. You're trying to stop burning fossil fuels, right. So do you think that the sort of global climate community, a. ought to or b. can use this new air pollution story as an accelerant in the effort on climate? Or do you think that normalization is such that it's just like the shock pads on the dead body, you just can't get any more juice out of anything? Do you think it's going to help or work?</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>I think it's already helping. I think that global political leaders have a growing understanding that burning fossil fuels has really terrible health effects that are concentrated in their own countries, which is to say, that they can control those effects in the way that they can't control the global climate change dynamics. I think that the climate movement could bring out this imperative a little more clearly, and I think to some more effect. But I also wonder, really, how much more the curve can be bent. The way I see the changing climate dynamics is that we may be moving relatively, already relatively close to a kind of best-case decarbonization pathway.</p><p>And that's not to say that I think disastrous climate change will be averted. It's just to say that when we start imagining even faster paths of decarbonization that have already been promised, I start to worry and wonder whether those are even technologically feasible. Like, getting the whole world to net zero at 2050, or 2060, is a really gargantuan task. I think it's beyond our capacity. And so one version of the question is like, "if we're already committed to those incredibly fast pathways, what difference does it make to be yelling about air pollution a bit more?" Another version of the answer, though, is to say, "well, the problem is not the commitments we've made, it's how fast we're moving to fulfill them."</p><p>And I do think that on that point, in some of the ways that we've been talking about, the localness of the effect, localness of the control, and the sort of immediacy that most people feel about like choking on bad air as opposed to breathing clean air. I do think that there there can be some difference made there. I do think that especially people lobbying to close down local coal plants, for instance, can make a difference through appeals from air pollution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Any context in which cost-benefit analysis is involved, this swamps it, right? Like, once you bring this new air pollution data in, you're like, you win all those arguments, right? It's ridiculous.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, you know, the US government officially sets the value of human life at something like $7 million, which means that, like, if we have 350,000 lives lost every year, that's a lot of money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I can't do that math on the flight deck. I was going to see if you could do it.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>It's a couple of trillion dollars a year that should be, in theory, should be spent to clean this up.</p><p>But I would say in the big picture, it's also, just one little last point on that decarbonization stuff, is like there's a huge difference that's going to be made through EV adoption and electric bikes in other parts of the world too. And we're going to pick up a lot of those gains that way, which is a story that's unfolding. It could be accelerated by policy. But it also seems to be, to me at least, to be unfolding, almost independent of policy pressure, at least in the US right now. And I think that's also useful to keep in mind, that whether or not the climate movement can weaponize air pollution to accelerate the green transition, whether or not they can do that, the air will be cleaner 30, 50 years from now than it is now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The benefits will happen.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Some benefits, like we can get there faster, we can get farther along. But to the extent that it can feel oppressive to contemplate the climate future and think that all we're doing is choosing between degrees of disaster, the air pollution story tells us slightly different and more optimistic story, which is to say, it is probably now worse than it will ever be in the future. And in that sense, not to sound too much of a cliche, but there's something we can look forward to there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, that's a delightfully optimistic place to wrap it up. Thanks for coming on, and thanks for your work bringing attention to this. I feel like it should be talked about a lot more than it is.</p><p><strong>David Wallace-Wells</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me to talk about it's. Great to schmooze.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Alright. See you, David.</p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-david-wallace-wells</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:63822236</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 05 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/63822236/49402da51b48a5bf11d1d7e4306b6dc7.mp3" length="80893982" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3371</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/63822236/a009fda72720242b31f0a5deace27764.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Lori Lodes on climate activism and the path forward]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Lori Lodes of Climate Power discusses how climate activists can maintain momentum when federal action feels entirely out of reach.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AABsy9h-DaMxBHWh7409Kp6Aa/volts22.07.06%28lori.lodes%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-lori-lodes-on-climate-activism-and-the-path-forward"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It is a dark time for climate activists. The immense hope they felt at the introduction of the original Build Back Better bill has curdled. It is still possible that some kind of deal might emerge from the Senate in this final month, but if it does it will be a pale shadow of what it once was.</p><p>Meanwhile, the Republican-dominated Supreme Court has just taken away one of the EPA's principal tools for addressing greenhouse gases. And that is, of course, only one tiny sliver of the damage that the court has done and is continuing to do. A Supreme Court that is hostile to climate action seems fated to be a fact of life for at least a generation.</p><p>It is not clear what climate activists could have done differently to avert these grim outcomes. And it is not at all clear how they should proceed from here. They have no way of encouraging West Virginia Democrat Joe Manchin to be a decent human being and once the reconciliation bill is done, the midterms will be upon us, and all signs point toward disastrous Democratic losses that will take legislation off the table entirely.</p><p>What should climate activists be doing right now? How should they be maintaining hope and momentum?</p><p>To discuss these difficult questions, I contacted Lori Lodes, the head of the nonprofit advocacy organization <a target="_blank" href="https://climatepower.us/">Climate Power</a>, which was created by John Podesta and others in the run-up to the 2020 election to ensure that climate had a place on the Democratic agenda. Lodes is a veteran of several difficult Democratic fights going back to Obamacare and is a self-proclaimed lover of political combat, so I was eager to hear from her on what climate activists should be doing, how they should feel about whatever emerges from the Build Back Better negotiations, and how they should move forward in a world where federal action has become all but impossible.</p><p>Without further ado, Lori Lodes of Climate Power. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Thank you for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We are meeting here, I guess, what you'd say, under inclement circumstances of a variety of kinds. Among them, I'm on the downside of a piece of COVID which is why I'm coughing and sound hoarse. So bear with me. I want to talk about what's going on and what's coming next. Lori, but just to start with, you were chosen by John Podesta to run this new climate organization in the run up to the 2020 elections.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Talk a little bit about what your experience prior to that. And I know you played a big role in fighting for Obamacare and then fighting to protect Obamacare afterwards. And we're on the Hillary campaign, the ill-fated 2016 Hillary campaign. So maybe just talk a little bit about your pre-climate work and the sort of things you picked up from it about Democrats, and their problems, and how they can win.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Big question, I mean ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a lot.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>I got my start in politics. Like a lot of people, I just cared deeply and was a complete idealist. I read the newspaper every day with my family. But the big thing for me was saying, "I like big fights," and I have a complete belief or ideology that we can do better, that we can form a more perfect union, but it takes a lot of hard work. And so I've been on one side of the battle or the other, fighting to expand health care, to get as many people health insurance as humanly possible with certain limitations, with certain political limitations that we have from trying to pass minimum wage laws, from trying to prevent Justice Kavanaugh from getting on the bench.</p><p>And now I've started Climate Power with Podesta to really do everything that we can to win the politics of climate. And that's really at the heart of so much of these big political battles. The policy is smart policy, right? If this was just about the policy, we would have passed climate laws to take care of climate change a decade, two decades, three decades ago.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If this were a battle of white papers, we would have won an overwhelming victory long ago.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Yes, right. And as progressives who care about policy and who think a lot, our side has a lot of those white papers, a lot of them, what we haven't been able to do is change the political calculation. It's getting a lot better, right. If you look back to 2016, when Hillary Clinton ran for president, she really wasn't talking about climate change very much, right? Bernie Sanders really wasn't talking about climate change very much. It came up in very specific instances, but they weren't running on it. And that's really why we started Climate Power in 2020, was how do we make sure that whoever the presidential nominee was going up against Trump was going to fight on climate?</p><p>Because the politics of climate we believe, and I still believe this, have changed demonstrably. But it's not enough to say that you have to prove it to elected officials every single day, and prove to elected officials that you have their back, that there is a political benefit for talking about climate, for running on climate, and then for governing on climate. And that's where we are today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to ask about that. It does seem like one clear victory of the climate movement between, let's say, 2016 and 2020 and today is that it really does seem like elected Democratic officials have put climate at the center of their agenda for whatever that counts as victory. That does seem like a clear-cut victory, like something activists did, right. It really does seem like the party establishment has swung around behind this full square.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Incredibly so, right. This was not a long time ago an issue that people, elected officials, didn't want to talk about except when they had to. And now you have climate being the singular issue that completely united the Democratic Party in Build Back Better, right. When you look at the vote for Build Back Better in the House, and I'm just going to put the Senate aside, I clearly did a little bit of gymnastics to get around Manchin, but if you look at the vote in the House, there was one Democrat who voted against Build Back Better, and, you know, this was the House version of it.</p><p>So it was big and there was a lot of great policy pieces in it, and that was Jared Golden up in Maine. If you flash back to 2009 when the House passed Waxman-Markey, there were 44, I think, somewhere around there of Democrats who voted against it. And that did not happen by accident. There has been a concerted strategy over the last ten years to really, "how do we move the ball forward, how do we get more people involved?" And a lot of credit where it is due to young people, in particular Sunrise, for really galvanizing, mobilizing people in a new and better way and really giving a voice to young people where candidates felt like they could no longer ignore it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let me offer one of the contrarian takes somewhat against that point. There's a certain critique that says, "yes, Democrat elites, democratic elites, democratic politicians and funders are definitely now on board with climate. That's very, very visible. But in some sense they are out ahead of the public in that score. In other words, the public will say, yes, we care about climate, but when they rank issues, it rarely rises to the top of the pile." So what do you say about the critique that in some sense this is more of an elite phenomenon than it is a grassroots phenomenon?</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>I don't believe it. I think yes and right. Yes. It is obviously something that the "elite", the donors, and policy experts, and think tanks, and activists care deeply about and have pushed hard on. At the same time, one in three Americans last year experienced an extreme weather disaster. That tracks with how many people? The Yale communications folks who do their like polling every year?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The Six Americas.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Yeah, the Six Americas, right. Alarmed people who are convinced climate change is happening, that it's human caused, and it's an urgent threat. One out of three are alarmed, and this was in the end of 2021. Compare that, so the one out of three, compare that to just four years ago, and it was one out of five. That is a huge dramatic difference, and I think that is what has changed, in part, like, so put the activism aside, put the work we're doing aside. It is people are living and having their lives at risk, having their livelihoods at risk in a way that they weren't even just a few years ago.</p><p>Or at the same scale that's happening now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let's then talk about how that is or isn't translating to actual political power. So, you know, the polls all said, in 2020, I'm giving myself nightmare flashbacks. No, but the polls all said that Biden was going to come in with a relatively substantial Senate majority. They were talking 52, 53, 54. Didn't turn out that way. And so in the end, the entire fight to pass this grandiose agenda that Biden ran on came down to the 50th vote, i.e. our old friend Joe Manchin. And so I just wonder, from the perspective of climate activists, I mean, one of the notable things about climate activism in the run up to 2020 is that the activist community seemed to very consciously try to get out of its silo, and become more intersectional with other parts of the Left, and to speak up more about police violence, and all this kind of stuff.</p><p>And we can discuss whether that was the right kind of strategy. But long story short, it's very clear that climate activists now are on the Left. So my question is just basically, in retrospect, this all came down to Manchin and what he was willing to accept. Two questions. One, was there anything that climate activists could have ever done to reach Joe Manchin, or change his mind, or affect the outcome here?</p><p>Because it's literally just a binary. It's either Manchin says yes or no. Was there ever anything activists could have done to shift that one way or the other? And then secondarily, was there ever anything that Chuck Schumer or Joe Biden could have done?</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Those are two very different questions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Very different questions. Go with the activist one first.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>The problem in any sort of negotiation is when one side does not care, and the likelihood is that the party who does not care will win in some way or another, right? They have nothing to lose. They don't care.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You think Manchin from the beginning was perfectly willing to let all of this blow up and nothing pass?</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Absolutely. Including infrastructure. And I think that's the problem. Like, if you look back at, go in the wayback machine, of what we could have done differently, should we have really been pressuring progressives to stand strong to the nine so-called centrist who were demanding that the bipartisan infrastructure law be voted on before we voted on the Build Back Better law?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Sure. But would it have changed where we are? And I'm not sure the answer is yes. I mentally believe that there is nothing we could have done. And I hate to say this, right, it's all about an after action plan. What could we have done differently? And I just I do not know what would need to have changed for Joe Manchin to have cared more, right? Like his approval rating in 2021 was 40% in the first quarter of 2021, right. Joe Biden comes into office 40%. His approval rating a year later was 57%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a bitter pill. But if you're looking at it through narrow, lizard brain, self-interested in politics, he did the right thing. That's how you win in West Virginia is by theatrically humiliating your own party and its leaders. But I guess it just comes down to, like, how much did you think Manchin might be something other or more than just a lizard brain, self-interested politician? And it turns out it was zero more than that.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>I do not think that anything that we could have done, and we the "big we", we on the outside, we the climate community that was going to outweigh his own priorities and his own interest.</p><p>Yeah.</p><p>Right? My job over the past 18 months has been doing everything possible to make the politics as favorable for passing a big, bold piece of climate legislation. And I will be honest, my priority was not on getting Joe Manchin to vote, because that was not going to happen from anything we did. We couldn't spend money in West Virginia, like Climate Power going in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>He would love that.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Right, exactly. It worked to his benefit to have us really blowing up at him. Now the real question is what should Schumer or Biden, President Biden, done differently?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The hot question of Democratic politics right now, was there anything they could have done?</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>I mean, honestly, I want to go back to like February 2021, right, when the decision was made to break off the American Rescue Plan, and to separate it, and to do it by itself because we — understandably COVID bad, need to get money out to states quickly. But the decision was made to split it up, right. That we'll do COVID separately, and then we'll do everything else that the president ran on and that are definitely — I believe President Biden when he says that climate is his next central threat. I believe him. I know it to be true that this is a top priority for him, but I think one of the biggest lessons from health care is that we went too slow.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, my God.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>We let the Republican shenanigans, despite the fact that we had 60 Democratic votes at one point, which is just still rattles my brain.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>And we took time and that's what it's always been against us. Now we're at the beginning of July, and we are still squeezing to get anything we can just so we can act.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, one of the most frustrating things is all the Democrats, I mean, the whole party came into Joe Biden's first term saying, "we've learned our lesson. We all know what happened last time. We did too little, we did too slow. We need to go big, we need to go fast, we need to not get stuck getting drawn out and extended negotiations, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera," and then just drifted into more or less the exact same friggin dynamic as last time.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Exactly. And there's always a reason why, right? There's a justification for why this time is different, and why we have to do big rescue package first, and then we'll do it, and we're going to do it immediately, right? I mean, it's like going back to 2009. I was at Service Employees International Union, and we had this unity table, right, with all of the progressive groups, and we were going to pass the four major priorities in the first 100 days of the president's term in office. And it was cap-and-trade, it was healthcare, it was immigration.</p><p>And, I come from labor, Employee Free Choice Act, right. 100 days, we're going to do it all. And I think this time we still fell into that of like, "okay, they're going to do the American Rescue Plan. But you know what? Before Memorial Day, we'll be able to get this started and moving in, like, pass it by 4 July at the latest. At the latest." Here we are a year later, and I still have a shred of optimism that we will actually get something done.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But you think splitting Build Back Better off from the COVID recovery package that lowered the chances of it passing?</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then splitting infrastructure off from the rest of Build Back Better also lowered the chances of it passing? In some sense, it was the same calculation both times. Like, is there advantage? Is there a moral obligation to get something done quickly? And on the COVID recovery, you can see the argument for speed. Like, it's very clear. But on infrastructure, it's so ridiculous. You had some of these Democratic moderates saying, like, we've got to pass it immediately. And you have democratic "moderates" still complaining about the small delay progressives inserted into that process, as though the exact timing of a giant infrastructure bill is politically relevant.</p><p>It was also ridiculous, but, okay, now we've split off infrastructure. Now we've got the Build Back Better, and Manchin is chopping away at it, and chopping away at it, and chopping away at it. So now here we are, July 1st, midterm train headed our way. I'll ask sort of another version of the same question. From where we're sitting right now, is there anything activists can do or should be doing right now to raise the chances of something passing out of this process before the midterms? Is there anything, I mean, it really seems like a super-inside game now.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Well, it is absolutely a super-inside game. When things sort of, there was this moment earlier this year when things sort of hit pause in the White House was very clear. It hasn't worked for us to talk about this publicly. We tried. It didn't work. Everyone sort of needed some cooling off time. Remember that this was coming off of the democracy reform fight of how can we change the filibuster, and Manchin and Sinema we're in those crosshairs as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Biden committed the apparently unforgivable sin of simply mentioning Joe Manchin's name in the context of explaining why this thing wasn't passing, just that. And Joe Manchin got his butt up on his shoulders about that. Such a tantrum his he fit. Good Lord.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>That, I think is the perfect example of why this has been such a challenging process right. And why it is so impossible to surmise what we should be doing now, right. What activists can be doing when the president who — the thing that I have held on to, and I will say that it's been shaken a little bit, but the thing that I have held on to is that Senator Manchin may not like us climate activists. He may not like the Democratic Party in many respects.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>He really doesn't seem to like his own party at all.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>And it's fine. He may not like the folks in the White House, except for one person. I do believe that he has great affinity for Joe Biden. And so that is what I've held on to, like that Biden will be able to get Manchin over the line. And I think there have been extremely productive conversations between Schumer and Manchin. So I think we are on the precipice of well, either way, we are on the precipice of knowing one way or another.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Finally.</p><p>I know, and I'm just like, well, thank God, right? I really think by August 4th, August 4th is when the Senate goes home on August recess, or is scheduled to go home on August recess, I should say.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>And that's really also when the elections start in full gear. Nothing else matters. Elections.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But if it's true that Manchin has some fondness for Biden, how then do you explain the fact that it looks like, if you look at his behavior over the last two years, it looks like from all appearances, like he has deliberately not just blocked Biden's agenda, but dragged it out and humiliated Biden repeatedly. Like Biden told progressives, I mean, straight out, "I'm in good with Manchin. If you split these two bills up, I promise we're going to vote on them together. I've got Manchin," and then Manchin just very publicly let him say that and then walked out afterwards. It was like, " Blllt, no, he doesn't."</p><p>It just seems like he could have accomplished his narrow political goals without humiliating Biden so much. There seems like an element of just kind of bullying to it. So what's going on there? If he likes Biden, why is he humiliating Biden? Like kicking sand in his face on a beach or something?</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>I'm just shaking my head. You can't see that I was shaking my head throughout every word of you said. I was about to say that I wish I could get into Joe Manchin's mind, but I'm pretty sure that I don't want to be there. And the simple answer is, like, I don't know. Again, I think at the end of the day he's acting in his own interest, and I think for whatever reason, he has decided that it's been okay to publicly challenge the president of the United States. I'm honestly at a loss.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the 49 other members ...</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>49 fellows ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of his caucus just like zero ...</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Zero respect for them, zero concern for their political fate. I don't know. I guess the big question at the beginning of all this was how awful is Joe Manchin? And he turned out to be more awful than anyone predicted, which to me remains under-explained. But you're right, none of us are in his head or particularly want to be. So maybe he'll write a freaking memoir or something these days. So here's a slightly more forward looking question. If in the next month this sad, battered process limps over the finish line and something gets passed, I think we can probably expect it not to be the grandiose $550 billion climate package that was going to be in the original Build Back Better.</p><p>No one, I assume, not you, not anyone outside the room knows what might survive. But I think we can expect an extremely diminished, let's say, climate package to be surviving in that. And it will probably be larded up with a lot of fossil fuel giveaways, because that's basically what Manchin wants. So then what is the right, I mean, this is asking you to speculate since we don't know the specifics of what's in it, but assuming, let's say it's a diminished but still better than nothing climate package, what's the right attitude for the climate movement or climate activists to take?</p><p>Because we constantly face this question, right? Do we decry how diminished it is? Do we celebrate because Democrats desperately need a win and they desperately need to not let the country slip into one party autocracy in the next couple of years? Just what's the right posture for activists once something plops out of this?</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>First, I think it's important to sort of take a look at what could be in it. Most likely, and Senator Manchin has said as much publicly, is a lot of what they're talking about has been around the clean energy tax credits, right. To stipulate at the outset, you are correct, this will not be what passed the House. The world has changed a lot, it turns out in the past six to nine months, the war in Ukraine has really shined a light on just the dangers of our dependence on fossil fuels. But for someone like Joe Manchin, it has shined a light on ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>the need for more.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>We need more. And so the politics of the moment have made it even more complicated. And again, going back to what I said, he doesn't care. If you don't care if something fails, then your bargaining hand is pretty high. And so the tax credits. I really think, and you know this much better than I do, but if we are able to get the ten-year clean energy tax credits. It will transform. It has the power to transform depending on, again, we need to see it all. It has the power to completely transform the power sector. It has the power to increase, double the amount of clean electricity that is getting generated in this country.</p><p>And will that be enough? I think we have to see what else will be in it, like what will be included to increase production. But I am of the opinion, and this probably isn't a surprise, considering how hard I fought to pass the Affordable Care Act, that if we can get tax credits for clean electricity, and new technology, and manufacturing that will create jobs, and jump start new businesses, and help lower cost, and put us on a path to doing something about climate change. That's huge. It will be historic. It will be the most historic climate action taken in this country ever, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Such a low bar.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>I mean, it is such a low bar, but that's what I was going to say is I do think it will put us up there with major action that other countries have done and it will get us ... You know, we are a laggard, right? It's like us in Australia, and Australia's, elections just sort of upended everything in a good way. And so I think it redefines what our commitment is to climate, and it will spur a lot of additional actions at the state level in local communities, from corporations, from new businesses, and that will be huge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, how do we avoid, and we talked about this before, the sort of dynamic which bedeviled Waxman-Markey and Obamacare in different ways, which is that there's all this activist momentum going in and that it meets the sort of morass of US politics. And what comes out the other side is a diminished and compromised form of what went in that ends up having sort of no fans, no boosters. And in Waxman-Markey, that resulted in it not passing because it had a bunch of very concerted opponents, and basically, no one loved it. By the end, no one loved it. The Left didn't love it, the center was scared of it, no one but like establishment climate groups, and even then only at the leadership level would even say a good thing about it.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And in a sense that happened to Obamacare too. Like Obamacare got across the finish line, but it was such a sour taste, everybody ended up hating it for different reasons once it passed, and that made it very vulnerable going forward. And it seemed to sap, like for all the work the Democratic Party put into it, got very little political benefit out of it because by the time the thing passed, everyone was sick of the whole thing. So I'm wondering, like, how do we avoid that happening again? How do we avoid some form of diminished form of Build Back Better passing, and everybody in the Democratic base just being like and getting no political boost out of it.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>I mean, it's a real challenge, right. I do want to go back to Obamacare days, because I think it's an important lesson in how we're approaching this moment, is that you captured it, right. The Left was against it. There wasn't a public option. It did not go far enough. All of the things that we know to be true also helped drag it down. When the law passed, I think the approval of the Affordable Care Act was around 46%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it was grim.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>It was grim. And in 2016, the disapproval was near 50%. Today it's back up to 55% approval. Now, the reason why a lot of that happened, yes, it was the Left, but it was also a $450 million campaign spent by the Right over four years, the first four years after it was passed, to define it. And I think the question for us is how are we going to define whatever passes if it does demonstrably bring down emissions, if it puts us on that path to at least have a fighting shot at meeting what we need to do, which is cutting our emissions by half by 2030?</p><p>I think the reason why I did the poll numbers for the ACA is because I think it's really important to remember nothing happened for ten years because of how hated it was. Nothing happened. We do not have ten years on climate to wait.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this gets to a question that I touch on quite a bit in my podcast and writing, and I just did a whole pod about it with Dan Pfeiffer a couple of weeks ago, which is the Right has this giant machine. And if it wants to define something in the eyes of conservatives, it can do so more or less overnight, because it's got the whole conservative base wrapped up in this bubble of Fox and Breitbart, and these shady Facebook pages, and all this kind of stuff. So if they want conservatives to think X, Y, or Z about Build Back Better, they can just transmit that to conservative eyeballs boom immediately in a coordinated way.</p><p>The Democratic Party does not have any such machine, does not have any such media army. We tend to just sort of like, Chuck Schumer wanders out to a press conference and says his talking points to the mainstream media reporters and just hopes. Hopes against experience that those talking points will be conveyed in some sort of relatively accurate way down to Democratic voters. So my point being, even if the Democratic Party wants and needs to define this, whatever comes out of the Build Back Better process in a positive way, do they have the machinery to do that?</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>I think you answered the question already. I mean, the reality is the extreme Right, which now controls the Republican Party, the so called MAGA Republicans, are really good at following what Fox News tells them to think. Like, they have really great followers. One of the things that I pride in being a liberal Democrat is that we have our own ideas, and we're constantly thinking and challenging each other. That's not what the other side does. McConnell can send out a message, McCarthy can send out a message, and all of the members get in line. Their Twitter accounts all say the same thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>sometimes literally the same thing.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Literally the same thing.</p><p>They take that message to Fox News, and they have that echo chamber that we do not have. And by the time — when this passes, knock on wood, in a month, we will not have changed that calculation. And so I think the question is, "what do we do? How do we show up?" We have spent a lot of time over the past year trying to educate elected officials about why it's important to act, why it's important to see this moment as an opportunity to invest in America and the American people in jobs and lowering costs in a more just and equitable society.</p><p>And now we need to start taking that conversation to the American people and having a conversation, however we can, in reaching them where they are about whatever it is that it will be called, what it will mean to their lives, how it will lower the cost of prescription drugs, how it will lower their energy cost, whatever else that will end up in there. And we have to tell that story as loudly as possible. And I think the odds are not in our favor to be able to do that as effectively as probably the campaign to label it another socialist grab.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, my worry about all this, and this worry goes beyond climate is just that we're going to have something like Build Back Better pass, and then we're going to have these big hearings on January 6th. We're going to have all this stuff put to voters, and then for a whole variety of reasons, you know, it just looks like 2022 is going to be terrible. The midterms are going to be terrible. Just historically they're fated to be terrible for Democrats, which is going to look like voters basically rejecting Build Back Better, rejecting the January 6th Commission, affirming the coup attempt, affirming all the obstructionism, do you know what I mean?</p><p>It's just going to look like everything they've done is going to get affirmed in 2022, which is just my ultimate nightmare.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Yes. I mean, everything you said is what keeps wakes me up in the middle of the night, right? And why I have insomnia, it's just like the dread of where we are. I hope that the Supreme Court's overreach power grab that we have seen just over the last week, but really they've been building up to it, right, that it will break through in a way that will change the calculation for November. But that's hard, right? It's hard when you have elected officials like, "well, that's why you just need to vote." And it's like, "but you haven't done anything to earn my vote."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>But the reality is that the elections this November will decide: will abortion rights be ended? Will we ever take climate action and even have a fighting chance to not basically take down the entire planet with us? Will guns be allowed in every community on the streets, wherever you are? And the American people are going to have a chance to vote on it. And while that doesn't necessarily meet the rage that I and others have of being at this moment, it is the tool we have to send a message that, "this is not okay. You cannot take us back."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The way I put it is, "just vote for more Democrats," is both the least exciting and motivating political slogan I can imagine in the universe. But it is also, at the same time, plainly true.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Think about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It can be both at once.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Right? Think about if we did, you were saying it earlier, in 2020, the expectation is that we would have 52, 53 Democrats. Think about if we did, how this all looks different. Manchin would not have been in the driver's seat necessarily.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a good way to torture yourself. Just think if Maine voters hadn't been their quirky selves.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>I mean, I just think about North Carolina more than anything.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's not give ourselves ulcers right here in real time. So I want to ask another question about the future. Pretty grim questions. Say, as odds have it currently that Joe Biden loses one or both houses of Congress in the '22 election. That means, I think you and I can agree that legislatively Dems are done through 2024. They're just not going to let anything else pass. And then if you look at the sort of trend lines, it's probably going to be a good long while before Democrats have a trifecta again, which is the only way that they can pass anything.</p><p>It could be ten years, it could be more, which just seems like in November 2022, the door to federal climate legislation, which was open just briefly these last two years, is going to slam shut, maybe not permanently, but for a long time. So given that, what should the climate activist community do with its time? It just seems like, honestly, getting involved at the federal level is just a waste of time. So I'm just curious, what do you think the movement should do? What should activists do in the event that happens?</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>I think first and foremost, going back 30 seconds ago is before we get to 2022, we've got to do everything we can so that we keep the Senate and the House and the presidency, obviously, because that is the reality. If you look at the Senate map in 2024, if you look at it in 2026 ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's real bad.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>And that's why you said — it is horrible. We will not have power again, at least until probably 2028, 2030.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I think people I just want to insert this too, because I'm not sure it's widely appreciated. It's not just because of which states are coming up for elections. It's also the general bias of the Senate toward rural.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Oh, my goodness.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Areas and rural states is just getting worse and worse and worse. Like the playing field is tilting farther and farther.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. Exactly right. So first, I refuse to give up hope that we can do something about November because I do believe we can. And there's a lot of great candidates out there running, and running on climate. So that is the one thing I would say. It's like don't vote for the Democrats, vote for the people who are going to do something on climate. Look at who is saying what on climate. It just so happens they will all be Democrats because the Republican party refuses to even acknowledge that this is real, let alone doing something about it.</p><p>So putting that aside, you got to it. But I think, especially after the Court decision this week in West Virginia vs EPA that we have to look to the states. I do believe this is our last, best chance at congressional action. And it just so happens we have like four or five weeks, right? Our window is now like rapidly closing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I just want to say I just want to put it on the record here, even though it's pointless and petty, that almost the first post I wrote after the 2020 elections was, "hey, look, we got a two year window, and then it's going to close probably for decades afterwards. Let's not mess around. Let's do what we can while we can."</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Here we are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Shockingly, no one listened to me, and we did this instead.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>But the great thing is that we do see states acting, right? Like just this week, I don't know if Newsom actually signed it into law or not, but they put forward nearly $54 billion in climate. New York is obviously taking action. You have mayors and governors across the country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>New Hampshire, am I making this up or did New Hampshire just pass some super ...</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>New Hampshire just pass something too. And when you think about New Hampshire, and other coastal states, who are going to see a boon in jobs and sort of reworking of their economy because of offshore wind, right? I think that there is so much capacity at the state level, and we are all going to need to lean in and really have those states set examples. They need to act as quickly as possible. I think that's the biggest thing when you think about where we are in 2022, what could happen in 2024, the states need to act quickly, and get as much progress underway, and have it locked in before 2024.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Because this is something else, I think, that doesn't get discussed enough, which is that if, God forbid, if Republicans take a trifecta in 2024, which at least like currently, that's what the sort of models show. They're not just going to sit by and let states do exciting progressive things without pushback. The Republican federal government and the Republican Supreme Court are going to be extremely hostile to state action. So that's going to be a whole new dynamic for Dems to struggle with.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Right. If the federal government wants to stop states from taking real climate progress, we know the Court is captured. That has been proven time and time again. It will be hard to stop. There is a great uplifting statement, but I do think it's why we need the states to move quickly. We need to get creative and aggressive in states filing lawsuits as well, right. Like there was these horrendous comments from Lindsey Graham earlier today, "about 50 years, we had a 50 year plan. We told you what we were going to do, and we won power. So we're doing it."</p><p>And it's like we need to have that same type of deliberate focus of mobilizing on climate. I think we are on a path, but it's going to be hard, and it's why again, going back to your point, yes, it sounds hollow, but the most important thing to do is to make sure that climate champions are the ones who are deciding what our future is going to be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think there are lots of people in the climate movement who have already sort of concluded that pursuing federal action is futile, or even that pursuing sort of going primarily after government is futile. And they're turning their attention to, sort of, other institutions, I think in particular of the activists turning their attention towards financial institutions, banks and things like that. So do you have any thoughts on, I know you're sort of, by experience and inclination, a creature of government battles and politics, but are there extra governmental sort of roots forward for climate activism, do you think?</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Absolutely. But I also want to start out with, like, we cannot give up on the federal government getting involved in doing more. There's a quote that I read coming out of the Australian election which was, "it seems impossible until it isn't."</p><p>Right?</p><p>The Australian Prime Minister lost because he was doing too little on climate in a time where no one thought that was actually going to happen. The fires, the floods, everything changed the conversation. And I don't think that we can afford to take any tool out of our toolbox because the problem is so big and the status quo is so ... not even suboptimal.</p><p>It's just so not enough.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's like the kindest possible words you could put on. But people do have to prioritize, and there's limited money, and there's limited organizational power, there's limited sort of opportunities to communicate with the public. So you do have to make some choices.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And I think what is happening in the financial sector is extremely promising, and a lot is moving. I think that you have seen a concerted pushback, recently, about shareholder activism, the so called ESG platform that corporations use to show that they are taking action, and it shows it's working right. And I think it's something we have to keep an eye on because they really are gunning for taking down ESG. And by "they" I of course mean the oil and gas lobby and their mad Republican allies in Congress, and that is a real opportunity to shape the market if corporations change how they are doing business right.</p><p>And I think that is one of the biggest opportunities we have. Also, you have front-line communities who are on the front lines every single day in dealing with the ravages of climate change, dealing with the legacy of pollution, and they are going after the fossil fuel infrastructure in a way — like the Louisiana bucket brigade — that sort of challenges the way we think about things. So I mean there is no shortage of the work that needs to be done at all. And I really think you said it, it's like, "how do we prioritize? What are we doing at this moment that will have the biggest impact and do the most to set us up, so that we really can meet our climate goals and not just abandon the planet."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Another long running sort of intramural debate on the Democratic side. One of the things that is notable about Republican, the Republican Party especially recently, is its extraordinary level of self-discipline in the sense that if you drift off the path and say the wrong thing, you get taken out by a primary. And that's happened now enough times to enough high profile targets that the entire party apparatus is just absolutely cowed into saying exactly what the MAGA movement wants it to say. Like they have whipped the party into shape. And this is a long running argument on the Democratic side about whether there ought to be a Democratic Left that is equally sort of active and vicious, and whether taking out a few Dems that are wishywashy on climate change is, in your mind, a salutary effort to push the Democratic Party in the right place.</p><p>How do you feel about this sort of taking out Democrats who aren't trying as hard as they should?</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>So I think that there is a very big need for the Democratic Party to have elected officials at every level who are willing to fight for climate change. The issue is just too existential. It's not just an issue. The problem is too existential and we need new, better elected officials who are willing to go to the mat on climate. The question about taking out Dems, like I am all for primaries, right? Like if a better Dem is out there, and takes or defeats an incumbent, and is able to go on and become a member of Congress, outstanding.</p><p>And I think we have seen Sunrise and others wage really formidable challenges. I applaud those efforts, and I think they're very much needed as part of the architecture of how we get our issue to be a top tier issue. At the same time, I am really focused on how do we make sure that people know just how awful the Republican Party is as a whole, right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is also my obsession. Lori, it's weird, I have that same quest.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>There are people who will vote for a Republican even though they care deeply about climate, but the two don't go together. And I think it's an untenable position for the Republicans in the long term. And they know that, they see that. That's why they formed a so called "b******t climate caucus", right? And it's why Rick Scott, who put out his eleven point plan, he has climate in it, Right? After the words, "weather changes all the time. We care deeply about climate change, but we don't want to do any of these hysterics," right? It's just they are not going to be taking it seriously, and we need people in power who understand that climate change is an existential threat, and that we do not have the luxury of time to wait any longer on actually acting and acting boldly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Defining the Republican Party. What a thought.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>I know if you have a billion dollars and you want me to make that brand stick, I am so there for it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I remember, I think it was on an Ezra Klein's podcast. I forget who the guest was. It was a historian. But the point the historian was making, which was sort of mind blowing to Ezra and to people listening, was just that, nominating Obama, lots and lots of voters. That was the first time they ever realized, "oh, the Democrats are the party of diversity and civil rights." That was the first sign, that was the first clue they had. Even though ...</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Which is mind blowing, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Even though there have been decades of experience by that point, which is just to say that people engaged in politics, like us, constantly fail to appreciate how little people know. And I think you're right. Like on climate, even though at this point, to people like us, it's sort of like painfully obvious, the lay of the land. I suspect that we're in a similar position of civil rights when Obama was like to most people, just don't know. They don't put it together. So I agree, just going out and saying things that we think are obvious seems very necessary at this point.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Absolutely. The only path forward is for us to be very clear about who's on what side, right. And I think, and for the Republican Party, it goes well beyond just not believing in climate science and refuting facts. They are beholden to the fossil fuel industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Right. Millions of dollars, more than millions, pour into their coffers so that they will continue doing the oil and gas lobby's business.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It does complicate, somewhat getting that message out when Biden's up leasing new oil and gas leases to oil and gas companies, kind of muddies the who's on what side message.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>It makes it more challenging, for sure, but I do think there is a political reality that we are all dealing with and that elected officials are dealing with acutely, which is people are really struggling with gas prices, right. It's not just people in polling saying that. When I go to the grocery store, I hear about people talking about gas prices because they are so high. And I think we are in a really challenging moment where how does the leadership in this country show that they do understand that people are hurting, they are taking action and at the same time not put us on a path that will just make it worse.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And maybe making a point like, "hey, maybe we shouldn't have spent the last several decades making all our cars bigger, and bigger, and bigger, and bigger, and less and less fuel efficient, and building all our cities so that everyone has to drive everywhere. Maybe this wouldn't be so bad if we hadn't made those awful decisions and started doing something different now."</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Those are the exact questions we should be asking, right. Because the decisions we make now are going to impact people also for the next 30 years, right. We need to take action as soon as humanly possible. We should have taken action a long time ago, but then we also have to think about what is that 30 year trajectory, and what are we doing. My son is four years old, and I'm thinking about it constantly in this work, right? It's like, "what does the world look like when he is my age?" And it's scary. But we have to be thinking about our public policy not only in the short term but in that long term and answering those big questions when we're making our policies happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, well, I suppose there was zero chance we were going to be super optimistic on this pod, but I think we weren't as horrifically depressed as we could have been. For us.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>It could have been worse.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's our mantra. Now every day I wake up, "it could be worse."</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>There's a great children's book I have that I will send you that is all about. "It could be worse."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, well, thanks for coming on, and thanks for talking, and maybe we'll talk again in a couple of years.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Thank you so much, sir.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Alright. Bye, Lori.</p><p><strong>Lori Lodes</strong></p><p>Bye.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-lori-lodes-on-climate</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:62142866</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 03 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/62142866/8d8c14c35ad777a1549dbd04147573db.mp3" length="82579193" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3441</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/62142866/078e9830199d64faa77662c68830e24b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Jay Duffy on the Supreme Court's EPA decision]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, lawyer Jay Duffy, who represented environmental groups in </em>West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency<em>, explains the ins and outs and potential implications of the Supreme Court’s final ruling in the case.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAg2uDT9Qgb18EIUAD-AdLLa/volts22.07.04%28jay.duffy%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-jay-duffy-on-the-supreme-court-s-epa-decision"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>On June 30th, the Supreme Court <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/06/30/us/supreme-court-epa">handed down a ruling</a> in the case of <em>West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency</em>. There was a great deal of dread in the climate community in advance of the ruling, and a great deal of hyperbolic coverage in its wake. But what did it actually say?</p><p>Volts listeners will already be familiar with the case thanks to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-jack-lienke-and-kirti#details">a pod I did on it a few months ago with Jack Lienke and Kirti Datla</a>, and they will recall that it was somewhat bizarre for the court to take this case at all, since it regards a set of regulations that never were and never will be put into effect. Rather, the court seemed eager to pass judgment on the legal justification that it anticipates EPA might use when regulating greenhouse gases under Biden. It was, in other words, an advisory opinion, which the Supreme Court is not supposed to do.</p><p>Nonetheless, it took the case and now it has ruled. The headline is that the majority opinion is not as bad as many anticipated, especially in the wake of the unhinged Dobbs decision that overturned <em>Roe v. Wade</em>. This was a Chief Justice Roberts special, carefully parsed and hedged.</p><p>To get clear on what the ruling does and doesn't actually say, I contacted one of the lawyers on the case, Jay Duffy of the Clean Air Task Force. Duffy was responsible for several of the key briefs and arguments in the case, so I thought he would have a good read, not only on what the Roberts decision says, but what it portends for subsequent cases.</p><p>So, without further ado, Jay Duffy, welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Thanks so much, David. It's a pleasure to be here. Thank you for asking me to come on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's start just really briefly, tell us about your involvement in the case.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Sure. So I represent a number of environmental and public health groups. American Lung Association, American Public Health Association, Appalachian Mountain Club, Cleaner Council, Clean Wisconsin, Conservative ... "Conservative no", Conservation Law Foundation, and Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy. We challenged the ACE rule in the CPP repeal when it came out in the DC Circuit. I argued a portion of that oral argument on a nine hour zoom call. Yeah, I hope this pod won't be as painful as that was. We won below, and then that was, of course, appealed by State Attorney General and coal interest, and I continued to represent the same clients before the Supreme Court.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So at a headline level, everybody saw the Dobbs ruling, which was a Sam Alito special, i.e. completely unbound, and unrestrained, and deranged, and I think were subsequently filled with fear about this ruling. But this is a Roberts decision, not an Alito decision. And it seems to bear the sort of typical characteristics of a Roberts decision, in that it is sort of a little bit of this, a little bit of that, kind of trying to cut it down the middle, not quite dramatic, slightly more technical, slightly more narrow. So am I right in thinking that in the spectrum of outcomes that climate people anticipated or imagined, this is toward the better side?</p><p>Right. This is one of the better outcomes we could have envisioned. Is that roughly right?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>That's roughly right. I think there are two kind of lanes in this decision. There is what is the path forward for regulating greenhouse gases from power plants? And I think there is still a lane there. And we were concerned that we would have a roadblock on the major questions, doctrine expansion, that piece is more troubling and I think we could probably get into that. But I do think, even though the Roberts opinion kind of throws shade on multiple pathways forward, at the end, he says, "this is just a narrow opinion. All we're saying is that the Clean Power Plan and the system underlying the Clean Power Plan is outside of EPA's authority."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? So they didn't nuke Mass vs. EPA. They didn't take away EPA's ability to address CO2. They didn't try to mess with the endangerment finding whereby EPA found that CO2 is a danger. There's a lot of bigger things they could have done that they didn't do. And we'll get into later sort of where we think they're going from here. Let's talk about then what Roberts did say. And when I first was reading about this, I thought that Roberts was focusing on the sort of inside the fence-line versus outside the fence-line question, which for listeners who don't have the background on this, the question is, if you're regulating coal plants, do you have to confine your regulations to the coal plant itself?</p><p>Or in some sense, can you regulate the fleet, or can you do what the Clean Power Plan did, which is regulate the entire electricity fleet, not just coal plants? But that's not quite right. He specifically didn't speak on the inside versus outside the fence-line question. It sounds like all he did is just say whatever regulations you pass on coal plants, they cannot require utilities to shift generation to non-coal plants, i.e. generation shifting. Is that all he said? Is that it?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Well, and he also didn't say that ... The interesting thing about this section 111 of the Clean Air Act, which is what we're under right now, is EPA doesn't actually require any sort of pollution control. What it does is come up with, okay, what's the best system of pollution control out there? Comes up with a standard, and then it's up to the states to then set standards for their individual power plants that they comply with in any way they see fit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>So in this ruling, it does seem like even complying with generation shifting is still on the table, you could have a rule based on cofiring, or CCS, or some other quote unquote inside the fence-line measure. It seems like the pathway forward could still be an individual plant deciding to shift generation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So I think, as I understand it, what he said was when EPA is contemplating output standards for coal plants, it cannot take generation shifting into account when setting the standard.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Right, that's exactly right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It has to set the standard based on inside the fence-line options like cofiring, like CCS, things like that. But in complying with that standard, the state can still use generation shifting. That's right?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>I think so. I mean, there is a lot of ambiguity in this opinion. I think we'll be parsing through it for a while. I mean, as I said at the end, Roberts kind of says, "hey, even though I just said a lot of stuff negative about cap-and-trade, and I've said some other things about fuel switching, et cetera, I'm not ruling on that. This opinion doesn't rule on that. All this opinion is saying, the Clean Power Plan, don't do that again." I think we're going to have to read the tea leaves and find out which pollution controls have been cast more doubt upon in order to think about what the future of these regulations will look like.</p><p>So yeah, it's a mixed bag and what is still on the table is a little unclear. I think the inside the fence approaches are definitely still on the table. Whether or not market mechanisms like trading or other things like that are still on the table, I'm not as clear. As part of basing the standard on those. Could you do a CCS based standard, carbon capture and sequestration based standard in conjunction with trading and set the BSDR and the standard on that? That's unclear in this opinion, to me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, but if you could do it, it would have to be trading among coal plants, right? It would have to be trading among the regulated plants.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Yes. I think thats ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Seems like he's trying to sort of cut non-coal plants out of the picture entirely.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>I think that's exactly right. I think that cannot be the basis of the standard. Shutting down the plant can't be the basis of the standard. We certainly know those are off the table and frankly, we've known that since they stayed the rule in 2016.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So I guess if we're just confining ourselves to this ruling and not trying to sort of contemplate what might come next or what else they might do, it seems to me that the sort of sole implication of this ruling is that standards for coal plant emissions are going to have to be less stringent than they otherwise could have been. That seems, because before you're setting the standard based on this broad set of possibilities, and now he sort of narrowed the set of possibilities, and so a standard based on that narrowed set of possibilities is probably going to be less stringent. Is that fair?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>I think we could reach the same sorts of stringencies as the Clean Power Plan. You and Jack and Kirti talked about this a lot too, is that the Clean Power Plan was met eleven years in advance. So query whether that was all that stringent. The pathways forward of cofiring with natural gas or a carbon capture sequestration based standard, those techniques can, especially CCS, lead to near zero emissions. So I think there's still pollution control technologies out there that can do it, but that's yet to be seen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so to use those as the basis for your standards, say, if the EPA says we're going to set output standards for coal plants based on CCS, EPA has to demonstrate that CCS is what available? And does it have to show anything about the cost? Like, what does it have to demonstrate to allow it to use CCS as the standard?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Sure. So all those factors are listed in the statute. And is it adequately demonstrated? Is it cost reasonable? Does it reduce emissions? Is it the best? Does it take into consideration energy considerations such as reliability? So those are kind of the kind of things that they need to think about. In 2015, when the Obama administration promulgated the Clean Power Plan in it, they said, "we've looked at CCS, we've looked at cofiring, and they meet all the criteria of Section 111, but they're more costly than generation shifting. And we think even if we set a standard based on CCS or cofiring, that the bulk of the compliance would come from generation shifting. So we're just going to go with that."</p><p>So to me, with that taken off, with generation shifting taken off the table, the record is already there for a kind of CCS/cofiring based standard. And right now, if anyone wants to build a new coal plant, that is the standard. Right now, it's based on partial CCS</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. For new plants?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Am I wrong in thinking that the sort of net effect of this might be the coal industry just punching itself in the face because a standard that requires them to use CCS is going to be, it seems to me, way more destructive of the coal fleet than the alternatives.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>I would say it w iill be more costly than generation shifting was, but still within the parameters of cost reasonableness under the Clean Air Act, with a forward looking, kind of technology forcing statute. And we have things like sulfur scrubbers in the 70s, which EPA promulgated rules in order to deal with acid rain. When the standard was imposed, there were only three in operation, these sulphur scrubbers, and there's only one vendor. By the end of the 70s, there were 16 vendors, and the cost of those scrubbers had been cut in half in 20 years. So I think the forward looking nature of the Clean Air Act provides a good pathway to cost declines.</p><p>You know, that's not to say that the you know, obviously EPA has already found that CCS is cost-reasonable when it did so in 2014 and 2015.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, and surely in the subsequent seven years it has come down in cost.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>The cost has come down, and also the climate crisis has gotten worse. So the necessity to reduce these emissions is even higher.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's get back to what EPA should do next here in a little bit. First I want to talk about the ruling a little bit more. So let's talk about then major questions. Doctrine. The doctrine, as I understand it, is just, "if Congress intends agencies to do major things, it will specify so in law and statute. And we don't want agencies sort of interpreting vague statutes such that they are given major powers." Right? I mean, that's sort of the idea. And I think the idea in this case is the ability to regulate CO2 in the US economy is a major thing.</p><p>So it is impermissible for EPA to sort of ring that out of the Clean Air Act because the Clean Air Act does not specifically say that. Is that more or less Robert's reasoning here?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Well, would you mind if I read you something before I hop into his reasoning?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Please.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Okay. "The Court's alarm over global warming may or may not be justified, but it ought not distort the outcome of this litigation. This is a straightforward administrative law case in which Congress has passed a malleable statute giving broad discretion not to us, but to the Executive Agency. No matter how important the underlying policy issue at stake, this court has no business substituting its own desired outcome for the reason judgment of the responsible agency." Who wrote that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Was that Scalia in Chevron?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>That's Scalia in Massachusetts versus EPA, along with his friends Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Hilarious.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>I've been reading it over and over again.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is Chevron, right? This is what's known as Chevron, which is the idea, which has been practice, as far as I know, for quite a while in the Court, which is just giving agencies sort of broad ability to interpret statutes as they see fit and more or less trying to keep judges out of it. This has been standard practice for a long time, right?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>That's right. I mean, this is how Congress works, right? There's not a bunch of scientists and engineers, et cetera, over in Congress trying to figure out what the best pollution controls are and how a power plant works. So what Congress does is they want these laws to last for a long time. They want them to be able to adapt to new problems and new solutions. And so they write these kind of broadly worded statutes like, "Find the best System of Emission Reduction."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act are sort of legendarily designed to be flexible designed to incorporate new information and change and grow over time. That's partially why conservatives hate them so much,</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>right? That's exactly right. There are plenty of guardrails here. There are a lot of factors that Congress confined EPA with in order to find the best system of emission reduction. But up until this point, the "major questions doctrine" to me and to the dissent and what we argued in our briefing was Congress delegated this authority to this agency. And it's okay that it's broad words, but is it acting within its lane, its expertise? And is there anything in the statute or in any other law that kind of really conflicts is a mismatch between what they're trying to do and something else is pushing back on it.</p><p>The interesting shift that happened here is the "major questions doctrine" used to be defined under this utility air case as, "Congress should speak clearly if it wishes to assign an agency decision of vast economic and political significance." And now there is a subtle shift here that does a lot of work in the West Virginia case. And it says to overcome the skepticism of this is a major rule the government has to point to clear congressional authorization to regulate in this manner.</p><p>So it went from, "do you have the right to make the decision? Is this your decision to make?" To, "what decision did you make? What is the how? how you made the decision?" That actual rule needs to be kind of pre-authorized. And to me that subtle shift does a lot of work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it just seems completely counter to the spirit of the Clean Air Act because the whole point of the Clean Air Act is lawmakers in the 60s and 70s saying, "we don't know everything that's in the air that hurts people. So we're just going to say whatever that turns out to be, EPA should regulate it, right. Like whatever science discovers is in the air hurting us, EPA should regulate it." So sort of by definition, it can't specify in that law how EPA should regulate new threats. It doesn't know what the new threats are. That's the whole point.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Right. This section and a lot of these sections apply to a variety of different sources, a variety of different pollutants. So if you regulate X pollutant from a cement plant, can we not figure out what the best system of emission reduction is? We have to go knock on Congress's door and say, "is this too big? Is this a good approach here?" That's not how this is designed. It would really gum up the works.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, it would gum up the works. And I'm sort of obsessive about this, but it just seems like "major questions doctrine" as it's being interpreted on its face, counter to the literal spirit of a bunch of laws that Congress passed. It seems like in and of itself, it's thwarting Congress's intent under the guise of doing the opposite.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Right? That's right. I think Nathan Richardson wrote an article recently called "Anti-Deference".</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>It's not even just Chevron. It's now you've got a thumb on the scale against doing something important, and it's anti-regulatory in nature. As you spoke about with Kirti and Jack, there isn't an issue brought up, there aren't any court rulings out there that say, "oh, you're not doing something important." That's a major question. And you could see that throughout, looking at the factual background as they laid it out, was a lot of focus on the cost to the industry without any description of the benefits to society.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, this is a sort of theme lately. They wrote a gun ruling that had virtually nothing in it about the victims of gun violence. They wrote an abortion ruling that had virtually nothing in it about the impact on women. And now they've written a pollution ruling that says almost nothing about the effects of pollution.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Yeah. The humans who breathe.</p><p>On humans.</p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's striking. And so why ... that quote you read was the pretty standard Chevron reading of agency discretion, why do you think Roberts has shifted? Is it just as simple as because he can and has a giant majority now?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>We can kind of see this thread from Roberts over the course of the past decade or so. He, in a dissent to this case called City of Arlington, said that deferring to agency's broad interpretation of laws isn't quite the very definition of tyranny, but the danger posed by ... don't worry, it's not the very definition, but the ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Tyranny adjacent.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Exactly. But the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, yes, it can. I can dismiss it. Watch me. I just did.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>So at the time in that dissent, justice Scalia actually responded to that dissent and said, you can characterize anything as a major question. You can characterize anything as over jurisdiction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Indeed. Based on vibes.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Exactly. Vibes only, a nod to our friends at the other pod. But he explained that everything could be characterized as a question about agency and authority, and that sort of rule would be an inappropriate transfer of interpretive power from the agencies to the court. I think that's kind of the path we've been on. The interesting kind of detour that Roberts took was in the Affordable Care Act case, he essentially said there, this is a major question. "The treasury shouldn't be making health care decisions. But I'm not going to say that the rule is illegal. I just am going to say that it's the court's decision to make."</p><p>And there he upheld the quote, unquote, major rule. So we've kind of seen a shift just since the Affordable Care Act, and I was hopeful for a more narrower approach to the "major questions doctrine" than what we saw here, knowing that the Roberts opinion in King versus Burwell did actually end up upholding the major rule. It just didn't grant deference to the agency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And now he is thwarting the agency directly. Let's talk about then. Maybe there's no answer to this, but what in the hell is a "major question"? What are the characteristics, what are the sort of metrics or standards by which an agency contemplating a rule sitting around, I'm just picturing them sitting around a conference table contemplating a rule, thinking, "well, but is this major?" How do they know what standards or metrics have been offered by Roberts for other people to judge whether something is major? Or is it literally just feels major to John Roberts?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>He literally said, in the opinion, "does it raise an eyebrow? Does it raise an eyebrow?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Whose eyebrow? John? Who's eyebrow?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>And how high does your eyebrow have to go?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know, raise it a millimeter. 2 millimeter.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>That's the most striking. There are some parameters or factors, although even in Gorsuch's concurrence, he said, this is not an exhaustive list. Come with us. Come to us with further suggestions as to what might make something major.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, God.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>But is it old? Which strikes me saying, as the Constitution is 235 years old, has it not been used a lot? They just kind of use it or lose it idea. Is it an ancillary provision? I saw someone on Twitter earlier today say I love all of my Clean Air Act provisions equally, there are no ancillary provisions. They were all written by Congress, a sort of anti-novelty principle, which I think Jack made a great point on your last pod about, so once a law is enacted, if the agency doesn't go and do something big at the outset, they kind of get locked into what it is, even though here we're dealing with a portion of the statute that deals with an entirely different pollutant and a different source category.</p><p>So of course, the solution is different.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not to pound the table on this, but the whole freaking point of the Clean Air Act is to say we don't know all the pollutants yet. There might be new pollutants. Let's do scientific reviews every few years and see if there are new pollutants. So by definition, if you find a new pollutant that's novel, it it's going to be the first time like this. These are all Catch-22s.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>That's right. And I also think that the interesting thing here is that, it kind of goes back to that Scalia quote, that you can characterize anything as major. And I would characterize the Clean Power Plan as the most cost effective, efficient means of reducing emissions from the power sector based on decades of them doing exactly that, and then they continue to do it such that they reduce their emissions beyond the targets of the Clean Power Plan. But if you read the opinion, that is not what you come away with. You come away with this idea that there was an EPA takeover of the entire electric grid.</p><p>And so that's what's troubling to me is that you can use these kind of squishy factors and characterize things however you see fit, to kind of fit the factors almost</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well this is one of the great ironies, and this is one of the things that makes me laugh about this whole judgment, is the particular provisions being characterized as major here, in this judgment. The targets were met without the regulations ever passing, meaning almost by definition, if they had passed, the targets would have been met at zero cost, since they were going to be met anyway. So if a regulation that would have had almost literally no effect on anyone at all, if that counts as major, what wouldn't count as major? Literally? We know how major this would have been.</p><p>We can now see in historical retrospect how major it would have been. It would have been tiny. It would have been completely marginal. It would have done almost nothing.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Well, there is some interesting back and forth with Justice Alito at the oral argument where he was arguing, "that it's not about what's happening in this actual rule, it's about what could it, what is the most you could do with this new interpretation? That's the stick by which we should be looking at." Yeah, and I don't know how much that played into the thinking here, but you're right. I mean, there was no rule at issue. Justice Roberts essentially admitted that this was an advisory opinion upfront. So the standing here was based on this idea of voluntary secession exemption to mootness, which essentially says, "you EPA have told us that you're not going to bring the CPP back into effect, but you could, couldn't you?"</p><p>And then they could look at the record and said, "no, the state plans were due to the agency in 2018. The targets have already been met." And so then they move on and fairly explicitly say that EPA needed to somehow demonstrate unequivocal abandonment of generation shifting, henceforth.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But how could it demonstrate that? What does it even mean?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Right, well, it's by definition, the concept of generation shifting is not what was before the Court. The Clean Power Plan repeal, not even the Clean Power Plan was what was before the Court.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is the most sort of tortured, obvious effort to insert itself in agency deliberations and just like scrabbling together the most thin justifications for it. It's really striking the deeper you get into it. So I wanted to ask briefly about concurrences. As I said, this seems like a very Roberts-esque ruling as opposed to an Alito-esque ruling. So were the other conservatives on the Court, did they have, as they want to do, crazier things to say in their concurrences?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>As someone who will be litigating before this Court again in the future, I'm sure I will not opine on anyone's craziness, however. So we've all known for a while that Justice Gorsuch is a fan of the non-delegation doctrine, and he provided us with a reading list in his concurrence. Interestingly, Thomas, who has signed on to these sort of concurrences on the non-delegation doctrine, especially on the shadow docket cases about vaccines and eviction moratorium, Thomas didn't sign on to this one, so I'm not quite sure yet what to make of that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's not like Thomas to show any restraint.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Right. Essentially, what Justice Gorsuch, he wanted to get into what the "major question doctrine" does, and I think he sees it as a way to vindicate his concerns about non-delegation, without all the messiness of essentially striking down multiple laws. He says that, "'the major question doctrine' is something that preserves Congress's power to legislate and for the lay people to have their say." But they did. The Clean Air Act was written, and it was supposed to do important things, and I think it discounts what Congress actually did. And there's a lot of public input that goes into these.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's what I wanted to emphasize. They are trying to characterize agency actions as anti-democratic, as though there is this cabal of bureaucrats up there doing things with no care for the common man. But if you look at actual American governance, the EPA, in coming up with one of these rules, arguably takes in a lot more public input and is more responsive to public input than the friggin legislature is. Like, these rulemakings are arguably one of the most democratic things America still does.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right. And they are required under the Administrative Procedure Act to provide public comment. They can't change the rule too much after they provide the public notice of the rule. They need to take into account and respond to the thousands of comments that come in. This is, as you said, kind of more democratic than what we get to do with legislation. So I think it undermines that significantly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, I'm cynical about this, but this idea of non-delegation is basically just Congress shouldn't hand off important things to agencies. It should do the important things itself. Again, what counts is important. Again, why? This is the thing about non-delegation and "major questions doctrine". It's just like, where is this coming from? There's nothing in the Constitution. The word major does not appear. You know what I mean? Like, all these principles are just made up by conservative jurists. Am I wrong about this? Is there textual or constitutional basis for these things? Or are these just like, kind of how these guys feel?</p><p>Like "they shouldn't be doing major stuff, It just feels wrong." What is the basis for these doctrines?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I think the idea is that there's a separation of powers concern that Congress is supposed to be making the major decisions, and that the agencies are just supposed to be there to fill up the details pursuant to them making the major choices. But as we've talked about what constitutes major, and there's plenty of scholarship out there talking about the legislature delegating authority to agencies since the founding.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, the dissent had quite a bit on that, I think.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>That's right.</p><p>There's also a really strange and gratuitous footnote about Woodrow Wilson in the concurrence. It was one of the stranger things I've read in a case in a long time. Gorsuch essentially says that, "Woodrow Wilson was a racist, which I believe is true and didn't like laymen, and that his attitude was that we need more experts making policy." And so the insinuation here is that you need to pick Woodrow Wilson's side or scientists and engineers making technical determinations about complicated pollution controls. Pick a side with Woodrow.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a little bizarre guilt by association there.</p><p>Precisely.</p><p>"This racist liked scientists. Do you like scientists? Sounds racist." The cynical take on non-delegation is just Congress doesn't have the expertise or the time to get into nitty gritty detail about specific decisions that administrative agencies might make. So if you say that all major decisions have to be made by Congress, in effect, you're just radically reducing federal power, right? You're just going to get a lot less law and regulation out of Congress because Congress just doesn't have the capacity to do what it's being asked to do, right?</p><p>I mean, that's Gorsuch's long term goal, right? It's just to shrink the federal government and reduce federal power. Is that too cynical?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Elena Kagan, Justice Kagan says in her dissent that all signs here point to just an animosity toward the administrative state. So the system, the way it works right now is a conservative Court can decide what is major and kick it back to a Congress who isn't working right now in a lot of ways.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, the very conservatives saying, oh, this is the job for Congress are the same conservatives who have spent decades rendering Congress completely useless, and frozen, and unable to do anything. It's almost like they just don't want the government to work at all.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>I'll give them what one ... on our side of the briefs, we did understand and acknowledge that the Clean Power Plan was novel. We believed that the generation-shifting mechanism was fully supportable, and was demonstrated, and cost effective, and the best means of doing this, but we did in our briefing, we understand that creating a formal role for renewables to generate credits is novel and could be envisioned as outside of EPA's authority.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It is a bit of a stretch.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>It's a bit of a stretch, and we admitted that in our briefing. And our hope was that that would create an off ramp within the "major questions doctrine", even, to say that the EPA has overstepped kind of in those same ways that they've overstepped before in the case law. They're looking at, like, treasury looking at healthcare or something like that. EPA kind of bringing in unregulated sources formally into a program. Maybe that was too far. And our hope was that that would lead to the Court being able to give a nod to "major questions doctrine" and sort of, are you staying in your lane the same sort of way as Justice Kagan describes the "major questions doctrine" in her dissent?</p><p>But unfortunately, they decided that they needed to go further and kind of say, "is the rule that you came up with, is that pre-authorized by Congress?" Not just "is this within your lane?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. But it is narrower than it could have been. So they're saying you can't take generation shifting into account. But I thought it was clever of you guys to argue this. In a sense, you gave them that as a sort of modified, limited ruling to sort of forestall them ruling in a much broader way. So the sort of generation-shifting thing is kind of like a sacrificial lamb that you offered up for them to kill. So they didn't kill the whole thing.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Well, not even the generation shifting amongst sources. The hope was that you could then preserve even just shifting between covered sources. What we kind of expressed was novel was including non-Clean Air Act sources in the program.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So shifting amid regulated plants is still on the table.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>I don't know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We'll find out in future lawsuits.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Right. I don't think anyone's chomping at the bit to test that one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>But he did say the way the Clean Power Plan did it exceeded EPA's authority. And there's a lot of language in there that says that just reducing generation at a source is not a system of emission reduction. So I would doubt that that is within anything anyone wants to pursue and may just be precluded by the decision.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I want to talk about what avenues EPA should pursue, but first, let's just talk briefly about my sense, is that what Roberts would have preferred to do on Dobbs and on abortion is shave away at it incrementally, bit by bit, because he kind of scolds the majority in that case for the jolt. This is too big of a jolt, and we're not supposed to jolt people. I want to erode abortion rights bit by bit by bit, like I'm eroding voting rights and money in politics. So we're easing our way into this new reactionary future. That seems to me like what he wanted to do on abortion and was upset that Alito didn't go along with it.</p><p>It seems like that is what he's doing on the Administrative State question. So I'm curious about two things. One, I'm curious since he doesn't really control the majority anymore, right? Like if Alito, and Gorsuch, and Coney Barrett want to get together and go big, he can't really stop them anymore. So I'm curious about two things. One, why you think they signed on to the kind of slower, more incremental strategy this time, and then, secondly, what you think is next, because this is surely not the last word this court is going to have on the Administrative State.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Right. I mean, I think on the power plant side and the paths forward there, I think that was incremental. It's pretty narrow. It takes off just the Clean Power Plan approach. But I do think that the Chief is actually more aligned with the conservative, less incremental side on the administrative state. As I said, it's tyranny adjacent. I think this opinion actually is an opinion that the rest of the conservatives wanted to sign on to. It kind of creates this you don't need to get into Chevron or any sort of deference and it's actually an anti-deference canon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They never mentioned Chevron. It's quite striking.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>No, and the interesting thing too is that the Trump administration, when they repealed the Clean Power Plan, they came in with this Chevron one claim language. Every system that you utilize to control pollution from these plants needs to be to or at an individual source. It was a 65 page Federal Register notice. And, you know, half a page talks about the "major questions doctrine" and they say our plain reading of the Clean Air Act is that you can't, you can't use generation shifting and everything needs to get bolt on control. And we think the "major questions doctrine" confirms that.</p><p>They don't even get into it all that much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's, in a sense, Roberts did not confirm that interpretation, right? The idea that the only permissible regulation here is something that you bolt onto a coal plant, which was sort of the Trump EPA's take. He didn't affirm that and sort of by implication said that's wrong, right? I mean, in some sense this is a ruling against that interpretation as well.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>I think that's right. And I actually think that would have been a more dangerous decision for regulating power plants and for a path forward for power plants. They kind of were narrower on this. What does 111 say? And is it as confined and extreme as the Trump EPA had proposed? They were a little more narrow there, but then used the "major questions doctrine" much more than the Trump administration did in order to do the work of knocking down the Clean Power Plan.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What's next then? Are there other particularly significant cases regarding the administrative state that are on the docket? Or do we know sort of what the next step? I mean, I'm just assuming that Roberts is going to be trying to sort of destroy the administrative state in pieces. Is there any sense of what's coming next?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Well, I work on transportation litigation as well, and we're currently in the DC Circuit Court of Appeals litigating a challenge over light duty vehicle standards. And we have the statement of issues in from the red state attorneys general and there they're saying any reliance on transitioning to zero emitting vehicles ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of course.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Raises the specter of the "major questions doctrine".</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Same basic thing, right? Same idea. You can't make standards based on the idea that fleets could switch to electric right?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>That's right. And the same sort of thing too, where a lot of the automakers, they're fine with the standards that EPA is coming out with. And as we saw in West Virginia, it was the coal interest and the red states. It wasn't the power industry. The power industry was actually arguing for this sort of interpretation because they know that this is the way that the industry has worked for years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I bet they would like to just know what the hell they're supposed to do at this point.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>I know. I mean, that's the real troubling thing going forward is now everyone's guessing as to what's major.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know this whole idea that conservatives care about regulatory certainty is such a freaking joke. They've just inserted very fundamental uncertainty into every agency decision now.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Right. Even thinking about the power plants, I've been on the briefs here. I've argued portions of the case and even I can't quite tell you what is on and off the table. And I've read the opinion ten times already. So I don't know how exactly we figure out on a variety of rules. There's always going to kind of be this looming big brother of major questions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this again is a cynical take on it, but I feel like cynicism is justified these days. It's almost if he had been more specific and clearer, it just seems like Roberts left quite a bit of vagueness in there on purpose. Because the effect of vagueness is that the agencies will start being cautious on their own, right. They're going to start sort of patrolling themselves, policing themselves, being cautious themselves, rather than take chances. So in a sense, it's almost leaving the vagueness out there seems deliberate. It seems like a deliberate play to sort of just signal to agencies, "hey, rein yourselves in," across the board.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Right? I mean, I don't know can't speak to the intentions, of course, but I know that it is going to raise that for all the agencies trying to figure out what the lines are. It also leaves very little guidance and a lot of breadth to lower courts who deal with, you know, the majority of these, these sorts of decisions. Most agency decisions, you know, go to the DC Circuit, and now they kind of have to parse through, you know, what exactly is major here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Knowing that at any time the Supreme Court could just take something away from them, reverse them. Like the way the Supreme Court is treating these lower court rulings. Must be discouraging to be a judge at that level, I would say. Let's conclude then by talking about what EPA should do. So it cannot do what the Clean Power Plan did, which is make output based standards for existing power plants based on a wide array of compliance strategies, including generation shifting. You can't do that. But Roberts didn't specifically preclude a lot of other routes forward. I know you're not in charge of EPA.</p><p>You're not in the administration, but sort of your sense of what EPA is going to take from this and the likely route it's going to try to take forward now addressing greenhouse gases from existing power plants.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Right? I mean, I go back to the 2014 and the 2015 rulemakings where EPA said that cofiring and CCS are available and meet all the criteria of Section 111. To me, that seems like the natural path forward to stringent standards. That's what I anticipate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's just to clarify, EPA is saying, "you have to bolt this thing onto your power plant to bring it down to meet this output standard." You cannot get more straightforwardly legal than that, right? I mean, there's no fuzziness about whether EPA is allowed to do that, is there?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Well, as I said before, EPA can't tell you to do that, but they can base standards on it, and then you can apply however you see fit. But yes, CCS is a carbon scrubber, just like other scrubbers that are bolted onto plants. Cofiring with CCS is at the source just like other things that have been used for decades. I am certain that even in the ... there's currently a case over that 2014 new source performance standards for coal plants, that's based on CCS, that has been stayed for years and years now because the Trump administration said it was going to repeal it, and then it ended up not repealing it.</p><p>And now this EPA is reviewing it. So there are challenges there essentially saying CCS is not adequately demonstrated, and it's too costly. So I'm sure we'll have those arguments, but those are more the sort of like record based, "let's go through a bunch of engineering diagrams and modeling and cost metrics," which is not usually, and I say that with a long pause, the thing that the Supreme Court spends their time on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you think probably that question will be resolved by the DC Circuit Court and the Supreme Court will not mess with it. Is that your guess?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>That is my guess. Based on historically, the types of cases that the Supreme Court takes up because that they don't waste their time kind of like parsing through an administrative record on sort of engineering details.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm just trying to exercise my tragic imagination more these days and imagine what they could do if they woke up grumpy one day. So am I right in saying the reason EPA didn't do that in the first place was because it wanted to make a system that was more flexible, and adaptable, and lower cost? So am I right in saying that by eliminating these novel possibilities of treating the whole electric fleet as one system and requiring you to, more or less, make your standards based on what you can bolt on the coal plant, you're going to end up with a system that is tougher on coal plants, are you not? I mean, this really seems like the coal industry shooting itself in the foot, like you're going to end up with standards that are more difficult to meet and are probably going to lead to more coal plants closing.</p><p>Is that wrong?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>I don't think that's wrong. I think there is a path forward to do it. I think there's a bunch of compliance alternatives, as I said before, with the sulfur scrubbers. I think once a regulation is put into place, it is remarkable how quickly industry can innovate, and learn, and decline costs, and things of that nature. So it could be something that spurs some real action based on the technology forcing nature of the Clean Air Act and what it requires, which is putting on the best system. And those are the best systems right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're all, I guess, just speculating at this point, but so many of these coal plants are just kind of lumbering, half-dead giants anyway because as you say, compliance wise, utilities can comply by shifting generation if they don't want to plow a bunch of money into a half-dead coal plant. So I just sort of anticipate, if the choice comes down, bolt CCS onto this already not particularly competitive coal plant, or just let it die. I'm guessing let it die is going to be the more common route, but we'll see about that. So what's the schedule then?</p><p>Now EPA is in the midst presumably of analyzing this, because they weren't going to use the CPP anyway. So I guess by way of wrapping up, I'm sort of curious like where EPA is on this. Are they starting over now with a new rulemaking or do you think they've got a lot of work done? Sort of like when do you think we can anticipate a new rule out of EPA?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>So EPA has said in it they do a unified regulatory agenda in the spring, and they said that there will be proposals on new and existing power plants for their carbon emissions in March 2023. They have been working, they have been thinking — at Clean Air Task Force, we go in and have meetings with EPA and provide them with our analysis. And we have a whole bunch of engineers, and scientists, and policy folks who do modeling and all sorts of analysis that we go in and provide to EPA to help them form their rules. And we've done that.</p><p>So we know that they've been taking meetings with us and and others to work on on this new set of rules, and my God, the the record for for what you can do on on these fleets. You know, we've been giving them materials since 2012, you know, we've written written the same sort of comments over and over again for a decade now. So they certainly have a lot of information to build on and we're urging them to move as swiftly as possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, just trying to imagine what happens if these rules slip in under the deadline, and then Trump administration comes in and then whoosh, the whole thing. Like, if they pass rules on new power plants and existing power plants, and there are lawsuits, as there will be, and those lawsuits are resolved in the lower courts in EPA's favor, would that mean that a Trump EPA is stuck with these rules, like legally? Or can they just throw them out all over again and start this whole damn thing over again?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>They certainly could.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They would have to have a legal rationale for doing so, though, right?</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Yeah. An agency can change its mind. It depends also on what the DC Circuit ruled. If they said that heat rate improvements alone are insufficient, then that's the law of the land on 111, and they wouldn't be able to do something like that, or even something along those lines. There can be holdings that will bind future administrations, but if it's EPA just using their broad authority to come up with what that agency at that time thinks it's the best system, then in the future, another administration could find that a different system is the best system. It is a bit of a whirlwind.</p><p>It is exhausting. We've been litigating what the meaning of a system is here, for most of my career has been the word system and what it means.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, it never ends. Okay, well, we'll leave it there. We'll leave it there with the modified, limited, hopeful statement that EPA, after this ruling, still has authority over greenhouse gases, still has authority over existing power plants, and still can and will pass regulations forcing existing power plants to reduce their emissions. So that's all happy and positive.</p><p>That is, although the "endangerment finding" was challenged in the DC Circuit last week.</p><p>Surely SCOTUS is not going to take on reanalyzing the "endangerment finding". Just tell me they're not going to do that.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>I know. I actually think that the West Virginia opinion strengthens the "endangerment finding". It makes clear that EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases from power plants. So I think that is a very weak case.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, well, on that extremely limited positive note, let's wrap it up. Thanks so much for coming on at such short notice and for clarifying all those for us. Thanks a lot, Jay.</p><p><strong>Jay Duffy</strong></p><p>Thank you, David. Happy Fourth.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You too. Bye now.</p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-jay-duffy-on-the-supreme</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:62145844</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 03 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/62145844/f130bfdb35cd3de157400d156111a869.mp3" length="81316539" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3388</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/62145844/237732e9d9c00e74a65370795783d1ff.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Charles Marohn on unsustainable suburbs]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Charles Marohn of Strong Towns discusses why urban planning too often creates money-sucking suburbs, what it might look like to build healthy communities, and why there are so many barriers to doing so.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADm7VzYpYu9Iovvjk7pmckRa/volts22.06.29%28chuck.marohn%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-charles-marohn-on-unsustainable-suburbs"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Charles Marohn — “Chuck” to his friends — grew up in a small town in Minnesota and later became an urban planner and traffic engineer in the state. After a few years, he began noticing that the projects he was building were hurting the towns he was putting them in — subtracting more tax value than they added, forcing everyone into cars, breaking apart communities and saddling them with unsustainable long-term liabilities.</p><p>He began recording his observations on a blog called Strong Towns. It quickly caught on, and over the years, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.strongtowns.org">Strong Towns</a> has grown into a full-fledged nonprofit with an educational curriculum, an awards program, and a rich network of local chapters working to improve the towns where they are located.</p><p>Marohn has since written several books, most recently 2021’s <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/39YZ9gZ"><em>Confessions of a Recovering Engineer</em></a> and 2019’s <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3QORVN5"><em>Strong Towns</em></a>. Intellectually, he sits somewhat orthogonally to most of the contemporary urbanist community. He’s an avowed conservative and opposes many of the state and federal solutions to the housing crisis favored by today’s YIMBYs. </p><p>But there is arguably no one alive in America who has done more to get people thinking about what makes for a healthy community and how the US can begin to repair its abysmal late-20th-century land-use choices. I was excited to talk to Marohn about why suburbs are money-losers, the right way to think about NIMBYs and local control, and why the city planning profession is so resistant to reform.</p><p>Okey-doke, without any further ado, Chuck Marohn of Strong Towns. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Hey, thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is really cool. I've been sort of a follower of Strong Towns for many, many years. It's great to finally get you on here. I wish we could be talking under more pleasant circumstances.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Oh yeah. You got to always have some joy and optimism to things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm trying. Before we get into any of that stuff, I am sure this is something you've talked about a million times, but I still don't know that it's sunk into the general public. So let's just summarize real quick right off the bat, the core of the Strong Town's critique of suburbs, the sort of Ponzi scheme critique. Because I think still to this day, it probably comes as a surprise to most average Americans, just the idea that suburbs don't pay for themselves, but I just don't think most people know it. So let's just review that real quick.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>It's astounding though because we've come a long way, because now I see when people bring up what is kind of like an ignorant statement of like, "I pay my taxes, this stuff is paying ..." people are like, "Whoa, hang on, let me show you something." So when I was a young engineer and planner, I have a civil engineering degree, I have a planning degree, I was building all this stuff to make cities really successful. I was putting in roads and streets and pipes and building Walmart parking lots and Arby's drive throughs and ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Every architect's dream as a child.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah, no, this was great stuff. And I believed in my heart that I was making the city that I live in, the city that I grew up in, wealthier and more prosperous. But over and over and over again, I would be exposed to these insane projects. These projects that if you're an engineer, you kind of work in a silo of design. If you're a planner, you kind of work in a silo of regulation. But when you do both, you wind up with this left brain, right brain conflict that makes you ask like weird questions. And that's what I was doing.</p><p>I was asking questions like, "Okay, this is going to cost us a million dollars. How long will it take us to recoup that with the tax base that we get?" And I would run these numbers and it would be insane things like 120 years. It's like, okay, either I'm calculating this wrong, or something's really messed up. And I started just doing this over and over and over again with all these different developments that I had worked on. And in 2008, I started to publish this stuff. I started to write a blog and I share this stuff.</p><p>And quite frankly, I was open to the idea that maybe I was crazy, right? There's got to be something I'm not seeing because there's a lot of smart people doing this work. I can't be the only one asking this question. But turns out, I was the only one really asking this question. Or there were others, but they were disparate voices, either from the past or silent. And we started to build at Strong Towns. Myself and some of my colleagues and friends started to build this body of insight, this body of evidence that at a certain point just became undeniable.</p><p>And the undeniable nature of it is that when you build in the suburban pattern, we call the auto-oriented pattern development because we certainly find this style of development within urban areas too. Right, we tear down stuff and rebuild it in a suburban style. When you see this style of development, what we find is that it generates from a cash flow standpoint, a lot of immediate cash. The quintessential example is we get a developer to come in and put in the pipe and put in the road and put in the sidewalks and build all the infrastructure and then gift it to the city.</p><p>And the city then gets all the tax base, all the revenue, all the money coming in from this without having to spend anything upfront. So from a cash flow standpoint, the city is way ahead, way ahead in year one, way ahead in year two, way ahead in year three. But the problem with this transaction is that the city then agrees to take on the long-term liability. We will go out and maintain that road. We will go out and maintain that pipe. And of course, they do this on behalf of the public, right? So we all collectively together get cash today in exchange for a long-term promise that we have to make good on in the future.</p><p>If you compare those two things, if you add up all the cash, and you compare it to the ultimate amount we have to expend, in this style of the development, the post-war style of development, the style of the first ring, second ring, third ring, exurbs, the style that we've re-developed the internal core of many of our cities around. It's not just functionally insolvent. It's bizarrely insolvent. It creates a dime or two of revenue for every dollar of expense it generates. It literally is a wealth-destroying, kind of, growth machine. And, yeah, I think the difficulty in perception is that we can all see that cities that are growing fast are shiny and new and look better and are doing better than the cities that are stagnant or declining.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>We can all see that. We can all see that those cities have bigger budgets and fancier stuff. And while all of us, hopefully, live multiple generations or multiple decades, keeping track of that slope of decline or ascension over that period of time and coming to grips with it is just not something the human mind is set up to do. So I'm a little bit sympathetic to the culture and why the culture has bought into this. I'm really hard on professionals who have calculators and pencils and notepads.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, you make the point that you have to bring in this new cash to cover the old stuff and then even more cash to cover the old, old stuff. So only as long as you're building new suburbs are you staying ahead of the game.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>You have to grow at accelerating rates.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>And that is ... people objected to my use of the term "Ponzi scheme." Like, early on at Strong Towns. That was a big fight we had. People would come to our site and they'd be like, "How dare you say Ponzi scheme?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, funny.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Because they assumed that anyone who runs a Ponzi scheme is nefarious, is trying to do something evil. And I actually think the psychology of a Ponzi scheme is a lot more human than that, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. There are lots of examples that's just got to grow, got to grow. And if you slow down growing, it all starts to fall apart. I mean, that's a fairly common dynamic.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>I don't blame the people who hate Bernie Madoff for losing all their money. Right, I get that. But I think if you actually look at Bernie Madoff's story, he felt pressured to show earnings, and so he fudged a little bit. And then fudging a little bit one year kind of forced him to fudge a little bit more the next year, and that forced him to fudge a little bit more next year. And all of a sudden, there was never a point where you could reckon with how out of alignment things were. You had to just kind of pretend that this Ponzi scheme would work itself out.</p><p>And when you saw, like, interviews with Madoff, they asked him, like, "How do you feel?" And part of his feeling was, "I feel relief."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not running to stay ahead anymore.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, one of the things ... I mean, it's one thing to point to this style of development and its intrinsic sort of unsustainability and say, "Well, that's bad, but I can understand why some places do it." But the situation in the US seems to be that it has become utterly hegemonic. Utterly! I'm from Tennessee originally, and a few years ago, we had occasion to drive down from DC down through to Tennessee. You know, all these rural highways, and you go to these small towns, you know, that have maybe, like, 10-15, whatever, 20,000 people.</p><p>And even there, you get the four-lane strip with the big box stores surrounded by lifeless, single-family home suburbs. Like, even there, it's the same model. Insider cities, in the exurbs, in the small towns, this bizarre, utterly, sort of, like, unpleasant — it's just not pleasant to be in — style has become utterly hegemonic in the US. And that's just baffling. Seems like it requires some sort of explanation. And you were in that profession. How does that happen? Because what you discovered is not, you know, it doesn't take that much of a cognitive leap to see it.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>No.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And yet here it is hegemonic, and virtually, no one else is objecting to it. And you started objecting to it 20 years ago, and it's still going on. What the hell? What is the source of this grip that it's got?</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a really good question, and it has led me to, actually, over the last decade, spending more time studying human psychology and human behavior than anything. And people are like, "Have you read this planning book?" And I'm like, no, "I haven't read a planning book in a decade. Have you read this new Kahneman book?" Because that's where the answer comes in, right? Let me simplify this down. Why do people smoke? Why do people who are diagnosed as prediabetic continue to eat sugar? Why do people who have a history of heart disease in their family eat fatty foods and things that lead to heart attacks?</p><p>These are questions where I think if you are not participating in that, we all have something like this, right? I mean, that's the great findings of Daniel Kahneman, the cognitive psychologist. Like, humans do irrational things, and we rationalize them and pretend that we're different or we understand why, or we're in control. But the reality is that we have a fast reaction, a gut reaction, an impulse on how we do things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>System one.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>System one, and then system two, rationalizes it after the fact. So I know that I need to eat healthier, but there's a bowl of ice cream that my kid is having, and she offered me one, and I'd be really antisocial if I didn't, so I will eat healthier tomorrow.</p><p>And now it's tomorrow and I'm at work, and there's a pile of donuts, and it's kind of like, I can have one. Like, it's not a big deal. We are really, really good at rationalizing each individual step of our own decline and demise. That's not a commentary on the darkness of humanity. I think that there's good cognitive reasons why humans, as they were evolving out of hunter-gatherer societies, or even go back further, evolving out of chimpanzees and primates and mammals, why this kind of instant gratification gene, in a sense, is embedded in our DNA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Very true for individuals. I think everybody immediately recognizes that as individuals. But you would think one of the reasons we build institutions or one of the reasons we build expertise among groups of people is that we're supposed to be able to watch over one another's shoulders, right, and check one another so that we can check that error collectively. But instead, here we have the entire profession acting basically like the diabetic individual eating cake.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Okay, but here's what you said. We have institutions to, in a sense, check our avarice, right? Check our human behaviors. Totally agree. This is also why we destroy institutions from time to time, because we, as humans, feel constrained by them. We feel as if our avarice or our impulse is being constrained improperly. I tend to be a little bit on the conservative side of things. I mean, I'm a small-town guy from a rural area. I've grown to understand the yin and yang of left and right and really appreciate the dichotomy and the roles that people who are pushing boundaries versus people who are trying to cling to institutions and ways of being.</p><p>Like, I get the tension, and I actually appreciate the tension. But it just, I think, shows that the suburban experiment cannot be understood in any other way than a progressive attempt to reshape the continent around a new set of ideas. It is a destruction of a certain way of life in order to create whole cloth, something that would be better. And it just so happens that in our political framework, the mechanism of doing that became, in a sense, the Republican mechanism, right? Like, we're going to recreate this around a model of big business and big top-down corporations and big top-down institutions.</p><p>So there's something for everybody, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let's talk about, rather than the dysfunctions of the planning and civil engineering professions. Let's just, at least briefly, talk about when you talk about a strong town, the model that's been lost in the car era. Presumably, physical layout has a lot to do with that, but that's not everything. So sort of what are the kind of elements of a strong town that you are trying to recapture through this movement?</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>That's a great question. And I think that when we go back to the early days before I started writing, when I was trying to get my mind around this problem and trying to come up with like, well, what does this problem mean and what do we do? I gravitated to the New Urbanists because the New Urbanism is a collection of people who have, in a sense, gone back and tried to understand why do cities of the past work, and why do cities of today not work? And they do things like go out and measure sidewalks and street width and all this.</p><p>And there was a central argument, and I'm going to caricature the New Urbanism. I love these people. I have a deep respect for them. But I think there have been things that they have evolved on over time. And I think one of the things that has been evolving is this insight that if you just get the design right, everything else will take care of itself. If you just build the human habitat in the right way, the humans will respond. And anyone who's ever been to Baltimore, which is one of the most beautifully designed cities in America, will recognize that that's simply not true.</p><p>There's a deeper interaction there. I think that we have to recognize that at the end of World War II, we were, as a nation, in this very unique position. We had just gone through the Depression. We had just gone through, if you're a bean counter in Washington DC, we got out of the Depression by starting, "you're joining a global war." We were demobilizing millions of troops. We were shutting down industries with millions of jobs. There was a sense that we were just going to go right back into the depths of the Depression.</p><p>And instead, we took these complex, adaptive human habitats that had evolved and shifted and been very bottom-up for thousands of years. And we said, "We're going to take all of this capacity, all this industrial might." We had more oil in Saudi Arabia at this point. We had the world's reserve currency. We had all the gold. We had this culture that was united. We're going to take all of this capacity we have and we're going to direct it into this new project of building a new version of America. And that means we got to build quickly, which means we have to standardize, we got to have standard road sections, standard street sections, standard housing forms, standard zoning classification, standard building styles, and types.</p><p>And we have to repeat this process over and over and over and over again. And if we can do that, it will create enough energy in our economy to not only lift us out of depression and keep us out of depression but make our country powerful and rich and wealthy and build a really strong middle class. And it worked.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As you note, "As long as it's growing, as long as you're ahead of the ..."</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yeah, we learned. That lesson really well, right? And so you even hear economists now today saying, "Well, what should we do, economists?" And they'll say, "Build more infrastructure, because that worked in the 1950s and the 1960s." It is long past diminishing returns. And the economists don't understand that. We always talk about a strong town being more like diet and exercise than it is like being ripped, right? So we can look at like a weightlifter and be like, okay, or someone who does a ton of aerobics and be like, alright, this person is in really great shape. If you look at cities, there's no cities that are ripped.</p><p>There's no cities that are in really great shape, right? We've all been subjected to 70 years of this macroeconomic growth experiment. We're all atrophied, we're all struggling, we're all insolvent, we're all in a mess. So strong towns. The idea is more like diet and exercise. How do you develop good habits and good practices that will allow your city to evolve, adapt, and grow stronger and more prosperous over time? So that's what we focus on. How are you doing your budget? How are you doing your design? How are you doing your layout? How are you investing in transportation?</p><p>What does your approach look like in terms of developing capital projects? These are things we try to help people get a grip on and just think about them differently.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm curious. I want to think that there's a lot of that progress going on beneath the surface, because one of the things that's most striking about all this is that the kind of critiques of car-based suburbia that you are talking about go way, way back. They go way back. And at this point, at least among my cohort, whatever my demographic cohort is, people like me, it's just like conventional wisdom at this point. Of course, it's bad. Of course, if you build more lanes, there's just going to be more traffic. You know, induced demand. Like, of course, if you build around cars, businesses will do worse because, you know, of course, more businesses get more business from pedestrians, just like stuff like that among my crowd has just been accepted. And yet ...</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>You lose every time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The zombie shuffles on still. Still, still, still. So who are these planners who haven't heard the news? Who are these traffic engineers who haven't yet been convinced by the evidence for induced demand? Like, what is the disconnect between this very well-established critique at this point and the zombie that seems unaffected by the critique just decade after decade?</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I can't reconcile those, I guess.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Did the people running Rome not recognize that bread and circuses was a dead end. Of course. Right? Of course, they did. We look back and we're like incredulous, like how would they have done something this stupid? And then we don't recognize that we are human and trapped in the same kind of thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Let me put this point on it. At Strong Towns, we spend a tiny bit of time thinking about macro policy and how to change it and I will take calls from Congressmen from time to time and chat with them. They're very pleasant and all that, but we don't have a program for that level. I don't actually think there's ... we just passed a bipartisan infrastructure bill that was totally a disaster. If I could have written a horrible bill it would not have looked any different than this. This was a bad, bad, bad bill and it was acclaimed. It was acclaimed by both parties.</p><p>It was acclaimed by the national media. It was acclaimed, you know, on Main Street. I still travel around the country and people are talking about the infrastructure bill. You know, not all that much, but like if they're going to say something positive that's they point to that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, the bar for success at the federal level is so low at this point.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>I don't think we should pretend that we are going to end the bread and circuses, right. That's not the project that Strong Towns is trying to undertake. I think at Strong Towns we have to understand that, in a sense, the bread and circuses will end at some point and that's going to be a really, really painful, painful experience. And when that painful experience comes to fruition, we need to have a project that not only is nascent but is actually working in places. We need to have an alternate model that has some credibility, some success, some adherence, some people who have worked out some of the kinks and are figuring out, like, here's a best practice for this, and here's a best practice for that.</p><p>Because the alternative to that is going crazy as a society. And we need something positive that we can do that will keep us from going crazy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a good segue into my next question then because the whole Strong Town thing is to sort of reject grandiose top-down visions from both the right and the left in favor of this sort of bottom-up evolutionary, incremental ...</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Can I push back a tiny bit?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sure.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>And then you continue your question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sure.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>You said "Reject top-down vision" and I guess — "grand vision" — I guess I want to say I feel like I have and I feel like so many people affiliate with Strong Towns have grand visions. What we reject is the grand sweeping action to achieve that vision, right? It's the fact that I have a grand vision of "Here's what my life is going to be." If I go out and borrow a ton of money and just put myself in hawk and achieve for one instant the thing that I was after. That's not really like attaining something, right? I want to build up to what success looks like.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Humble steps,</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Top-down imposed sweeping reforms then, in favor of bottom-up. But the sort of other side of that is, at least in the current urbanist, YIMBY, whatever you call it, community. When I hear bottom-up, my first thought is NIMBYs. My first thought is, insofar as there is community involvement in a lot of these questions, it is almost always on the side of "No, no, no, build nothing, change nothing, keep this crappy system that we built because it's sending my home values through the roof." Or I also think of environmental review and just the bureaucracy, and just when I think local involvement, that's where my mind goes, is sort of wealthy boomers going to town meetings, shouting at people who want to build bike lanes.</p><p>So how do we reconcile that, sort of, like, bottom-up vision of yours with the sort of scourge of NIMBY-ism that seems to be what is actually happening bottom-up in cities?</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yeah, totally. I could not agree with your analysis more. Let me give you a brief history of the 20th century as it goes with public engagement. So we get out of World War II, we start building all this stuff, and we empower engineers and we empower planners and we empower corporations to just build, build, build, build, just keep going. They actually had a plan at one point to use atomic bombs to build a highway through the Rocky Mountains. That's how much power we gave to engineers, right? I'm not joking. Like that was the legit plan that went through.</p><p>Like, okay, we're going to do this. And the next phase was, "Wait a second, this is totally junk. Like we hate this. We don't like this at all." And then you have born out of that all the kind of like environmental renaissance of the baby boomers, right? You get the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act and you get environmental reviews and you get NEPA, you get all this stuff. And what that establishes is a process to go through to accomplish what you want to accomplish. And so in a sense, the baby boomer response to the process dysfunction of building suburbia was to attack it with more top-down process.</p><p>And now you go to kind of the next iteration. And the next iteration is to say, okay, this is all messed up. These processes are resulting in really bad things. We need — and I'm going to put in superficial, I'm going to put in parentheses on the beginning of this — we need a superficial level of public engagement. We need the public to feel involved, feel listened to. And it's almost like the participation trophy, right? For public engagement, we need to have everybody feel like they're heard but again, not results that we really want. We fight these things.</p><p>We battle. But what this has done is it's empowered the NIMBY. The craziest person can show up with two of their friends and shout down the most sanest proposal. And the investiture of time it takes to overcome that is just asymmetrical to what anyone would be willing to do given the limited upside.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And of course legendarily, in a lot of these decisions, the people who will benefit from them don't exist yet, right? Or don't live there yet. That's the whole point. And if you're not there yet, you can't very well show up to a meeting, right?</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Or even look at something simple like, "We're going to put in a new traffic light on this highway because Walmart wants to go here." And you're like, okay, well what that is going to do is it's going to rob about 30 seconds a day from everybody who uses that highway. So 20,000 people who have invested for this highway capacity to get somewhere are now going to have 30 seconds of their day robbed. So over the course of a year, they're going to have 3 hours of their life robbed or whatever that works out to be. And over the course of a decade, they're going to have a day and a half.</p><p>Alright, that is like a small bit of pain. How much time would you spend at a public meeting trying to fight that? You're not going to, right? Collectively when we add up everybody together it's a huge dramatic loss. But for each individual player who's negatively impacted, it's not enough to justify your participation in the system. But for Walmart, the gain is enormous, right? They'll hire teams of attorneys and teams of advocates to go and show up. And say we need to do this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Classic, classic asymmetry here.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Asymmetry. Right. And so you have this in many different realms. Like the NIMBY who doesn't want something built in the house next to theirs can show up with four of their neighbors and shout down something. But the like 20 people who need a place to live, they're out at their job and they're out working and they're trying ... And the amount of time they would have to invest to actually make a difference is so huge and the potential upside so minimal. It's asymmetry. So the answer to this problem is not look back through history. It's not to empower the technical people more.</p><p>That's one option on the table that we just need to get ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Technocratic override.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yep, we need to get the oligarchy of technocrats in here to run things for us because we're incapable. Option number two is that we create more process. This is the baby boomer reaction, like "More process, more process and we'll get better outcomes." Option three, we'll call this the Gen X option. I don't know if it is or not, but I'll claim it as my generation is the idea that if we can have a lot of participation trophies and a lot of theater of public engagement that maybe we'll get some better ideas and people will certainly feel better about things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or a sheen of legitimacy.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Right, the sheen of legitimacy. The answer to it is the ancient practice of subsidiary, the idea that decisions should be made at the level in which they can competently be made and no higher. And the role of every level is to either make the decision that is at their level or assist the levels below them in making a decision. I point often to the chicken problem, backyard chickens. Where should backyard chickens be regulated? Should they be regulated at the regional level, at the state level? There really ... it's a block-level decision. If I'm going to have chickens, that doesn't affect anybody except my neighbors.</p><p>And so that decision should be one that neighbors make together. Now people will say, "Well Chuck, I don't like my neighbors. I don't get along with them. We fight, we disagree." Okay, but you got to work this one out. That's not a decision you can allow other people to make for you. You have to, as a neighborhood, make that decision, or as a block. "Well jeez, we just can't we're at each other's throats."</p><p>To me that's where the role of the city comes in. The city says, "Alright, I can't make this decision for you. I could, but that would be wrong and it would be a dummy standard applied to everybody and we need local nuance. I can't make this decision before you, but what I can do is I can help you as a neighborhood reach a decision together." If we had government that functioned like that, what we would find is that the regional rail project is not going to get derailed by one block of people who are rich enough to hire lawyers and create all kinds of process. That's a regional decision. It should be made by a regional government representing everybody. But the chicken thing is not going to get screwed up. Or contrasting, the big developer is not going to be able to come in, buy off the city council, or mobilize whatever to shove the eight-story condo unit down your throat.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, but I guess I would object to ... well, not object, but my question is it seems slightly question-begging since the whole point of contention here is if the decision is whether to put a bike lane in neighborhood x. Is that like chickens, in that it mainly or only affects neighborhood x and therefore should be made at the level of neighborhood x? Or is it an infrastructure decision that affects the whole city and its transportation flow in which case you make it at the city level? Or, there's a lot of research lately showing that these local NIMBY decisions are creating a housing crisis which is having macroeconomic effects on the entire country, which might suggest that maybe the federal level is the level for some of these decisions.</p><p>So it's not obvious to me what the right level is. And in a sense, that's the whole point of contention, is it not?</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>No. Well, it is in one sense because this is what politicians do, right? They're like, "Well, this thing affects everybody. And so the temperature you set your thermostat has to be decided in Washington DC. Because it's a macro issue." The answer is not to what degree does it affect everyone. The answer is, "At what level can this decision be made?" And it should be made at the lowest level that it can be made. I think one of the problems that we confuse, and one of the things we get up our minds wrapped around, is that we're so used to working at the wrong scale that it's hard to reconcile the idea of subsidiarity with the kind of projects we do today.</p><p>You brought up a bike lane, and a bike lane is like a very popular kind of project amongst a certain group of people because they're like, "We need more biking and walking." I can tell you that almost every bike lane project I see is the wrong project for that community. There are very few where it's like the right project originated in the right way. And let me walk you through that just briefly. We have a thing at Strong Towns that we call the four-step process for public investments. And the core of this process begins with going out and humbly observing where people struggle.</p><p>A lot of times when we're looking at bike projects, they don't originate with a humble understanding of where people are having a difficult time using the city as it has been built. Where they generally start with is either someone at City Hall really likes bike lanes, there's a grant out there for bike lane projects. We have a capital improvements plan, and our complete streets policy says we should put in bike lanes, or some regional authority is like, "We're trying to build a regional bike trail. You guys need to put in a connection." All of those are the wrong place to originate a project.</p><p>When we originate projects based on where people are having a difficult time using the city, what we wind up doing is making projects that are actually scaled to the urgent demands of people on the ground. And those projects are not opposed. They have their own baked-in constituency. And the thing about those kind of projects is there's an endless number of them and the implementation does look a lot more like subsidiary.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't know. When I think about bike lane decisions being made at the neighborhood level, it's hard for me not to think that there would just never again be a bike lane.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yeah, I don't know. I don't know the city you live in, but if we went out here where there's a lot of opposition to bike lanes. I mean, the last big bike lane project we put in went right in front of a Catholic church in town. And I go to the different Catholic church, but I've attended this one. I know the priests, I know the people there. The Catholic church was irate about it, and they were irate about it because it took away the place that they would park for funerals and weddings, right? Like, right out in front, like it took away this place.</p><p>It was a stupid bike lane project. No one ever bikes there. It's not a place where people bike. But what happened was they came up with a master bike lane plan, a master bike plan. They were redoing the street. This is phase one of implementation. And they said, from a very top-down kind of rote approach, "This is where the bike lane goes." And what they did is they generated a ridiculous amount of opposition to bike lanes. My recommendation to them, this is my city now, was, let's go out and see where people are biking right now, and then let's bike with them or follow them or talk to them and find out where you are biking right now is it most difficult? Where are you having the most struggle? I bike all the time. We can go out and do this. We can go out and talk to people. Show, like, crossing this bridge: really dangerous. Crossing the street: really dangerous. What can we do to fix that?</p><p>And the amazing thing about fixing that is that a. there's already people using it, they're just struggling, b. those people are adjacent to other people who would probably use it but for the danger or the struggle. And so, c. when you fix it, you not only have a built-in constituency whose needs you're responding to, but you have a related adjacent constituency that's going to come forth and affirm the thing that you did and the value that it provides.</p><p>That's how you build a culture of biking and walking, and that's how you get bike lanes everywhere.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And can you point to a place? I mean, Strong Town gives these awards, it runs these academies, tries to teach city leaders, tell us a story of a town that is strong, that is doing things like that.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>That is ripped.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not yet ripped, but on a good health plan, let's say.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Well, we have the annual Strongest Town contest, and that is really a celebration of places that are doing this kind of incremental work. Where are the places that are doing the diet and exercise of building a strong town. And none of them are perfect, and we tell them, like, "Don't be ashamed to apply if you're not perfect, because none of these cities are." But we have tended to have this long list of mid-sized towns where they are, and I'm going to generalize here, but I think this is generally true, where they are too poor to be stupid, but just connected enough and coherent enough to grasp the need to work together.</p><p>And those are places that are astounding. I mean, Pensacola, a few years ago. I'm going to Jasper, Indiana here in a couple of weeks. You know, these cities are places where they all have kind of the same problems everybody has but have found unique ways to deal with them. But if you told me like, Chuck — okay, I was in Sacramento last week, and the people who run the Council of Governments in Sacramento, it's this regional governance body, they go around and around to places and talk to people, and they do like these retreats. So they're going as a group to Salt Lake City to learn from the people in Salt Lake City.</p><p>They have in the past gone to Amsterdam to learn from Amsterdam. And they listed these places that they've gone. And then they asked me, "Chuck, where would you go?" And I said, "I'd go to Detroit, I would go to Memphis, I would go to Buffalo, I would go to Shreveport, I would go to Cleveland, Akron." These are places that you see the most innovation, the most entrepreneurial spirit, the most flexibility of thought. These are the places to me that are the most exciting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And get zero national attention.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah, no, they get zero, right. But they're uninhibited by, you know, we went back and talked about that cultural expectation of the bread and circuses and all that. The bread and circuses are done in these places, and so they're uninhibited by that hang-up and they can actually focus on doing great stuff. And these places struggle. I'm not going to pretend that you're going to walk in there and go, "Wow, this place is amazing." But if you scratch the patina a little bit and talk to some people and go to some neighborhoods, you're going to see story after story after story that will blow your mind, that you could do in Sacramento, that you could do in an affluent place and see amazing success.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to get to politics. But there's one thing I wanted to hit before then, and this is given what's going on as we are talking, somewhat thematically appropriate question, but I wanted to ask what makes ... it seems like one of the key features of a good town, a good community, is safety, a certain level of public safety. And I just wonder of all the reforms and things you look for and things Strong Town rewards with its awards and whatnot, what kinds of things create safety? I was reminded recently of a Tweet thread where this woman asked, "What would you do if there was a curfew for men? If they had to be in by ten, what would you do?" And by far the most common answer was, "I would love to go running at night. I've always wanted to go running at night and I just won't now because of safety."</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm sure physical structure and design structure has something to do with that, but also there are other factors, community, sort of. So, in the safety dimension, what makes the community safer?</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>I'll give you the number one thing and it's people, right? People make it dangerous and people make it safe. I was able to spend some time in southern Italy, which is a really amazing place, but also very poor. And there were a lot of places where the crowds and the sheer number of people in these places were conducive to things like pickpockets and that kind of stuff. But not to rape, not to assault, not to the things that you would fear. There's a level of people less than that. The pickpocket part actually goes away, too, because you lose the thickness of the crowd in a sense.</p><p>When we look at places that are great for biking and walking, I think our affluent assumptions is that places that are great for biking and walking have great biking and walking infrastructure. And that's actually not true. The places that are the best for biking and walking have just the most people who bike and walk, regardless of the infrastructure. So if you've got like crappy infrastructure but there's tons of people walking all the time, that place becomes instantly way safer than anything else. Because, and I'm going to say this and people may recoil this, but most people are good, most people are decent.</p><p>We do bad things sometimes, and sometimes we do things that will make you cringe. But the reality is that most culture is actually pretty good. We're pretty good to each other. And when we get people out together, that added security of having more people around you is what will keep you safe. This is a related insight to Jane Jacobs's "Eyes on the Street."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, "Eyes on the Street." I was just thinking.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yeah, but it's even, I think, a step beyond that. "Eyes on the Street" recognizes that people don't want to get caught, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>But I actually think there's a next step to that is that I think people are genuinely inclined to be their most lovely self when they feel like they are in an environment where other people are viewing them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Especially other people who are again going to be viewing them the next day and the next day, right? A community of people.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Let me say it this way, people who matter to them. Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>And I think there's a way to go really dark with that because there's a way to have this be an insider versus outsider kind of thing. Humans are, I think, lovely and beautiful to each other, but a lot of that is a function of in-group versus out-group behavior. And sometimes in out-groups, we are not as lovely to each other. The response to that has often been, "Well, then let's get police out there, and let's regulate that." To me, the response in a healthy place is to just increase your in-group.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Like, expand your in groups.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Social trust. It's the bedrock of everything.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yeah. When you look at ...there's a fascinating book by Tim Carney, conservative writer, and he looked at ... basically, he studied the 2016 presidential primary, and he was trying to make some insights on community. So this was all Republicans, right, places that voted Republican in the general election, so voted for Trump in the general election. But he wanted to know what places in the primary supported Trump and what places didn't. And of course, this can be broke down precinct by precinct. And he created a map around the country of what these places were and what they look like.</p><p>And what he found is that the places that voted for Trump tended to have more crime. They tended to have more social isolation. They tended to have more people who identified as Christian but didn't go to church. There was a bunch of things like that that you were really getting a measurement of what I would just say is like the end result of the suburban experiment, right? Like, complete individual autonomy and social isolation from others.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>God, I think that's so true. And I bring this up and people look at me like I'm crazy. But I really think the suburban model, the end product, is to make people into psychopaths. You make it so that each lives in their individual castle, and the only way they interact with the community is as drivers. And as I'm sure you're well aware, nothing makes you more of an a*****e more quickly than driving a car.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>We've done studies on — not we, Strong Towns — we humans. Psychologists have done studies with rats and with monkeys and with chimpanzees, and we've looked at social isolation and the impacts of it. And it does not take much social isolation to make ... and I would say lower level, not homo sapiens, completely neurotic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>It does not take much social isolation. We have built a development pattern where the marketing brochure is social isolation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Here's how we can help you, facilitate you, being the most antisocial person you can. Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Here's how you can escape other people.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is the thing, the safety thing. I've spent a lot of my life walking around suburbs because I have dogs and I walk them frequently in Seattle, where I live, is chock full of suburbs. And the whole notion that they're safer has always struck me as bizarre. And as you say, it's about the density of people. When you're walking around suburbs, even healthy, wealthy suburbs in the middle of Seattle, you just don't see many people. When you see one, it's like the two of you alone on a block, and there's something creepy about it. There's just something that's always felt unsafe about it, even to me, a sort of stocky, white dude who's probably the safest any human could be.</p><p>It just doesn't feel even safe to me. I've never understood this idea that escaping away from other people makes you safer. I don't know why that's taken hold.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Let me actually make this statement that I think affirms what you're saying. The most dangerous development pattern is the failing suburb. Because there you combine all of the neuroticism of social isolation with all the desperation of poverty.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And we're going to see a lot more of those in coming years.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Oh, my gosh, that's my nightmare. I think that is the thing that is going to define the 21st century is dealing with that problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yikes.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Because you you isolate poor people in inner cities, and it's a despotic thing, but you at least isolate them in coherent neighborhoods. I mean, neighborhoods where they can walk to get food and walk to a job and get on a bus and get somewhere to a doctor or what have you. You isolate the same demographic. You isolate poor people in America's second-ring, third-ring suburbs. And, to me, you're talking "Mad Max."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's very dystopian.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Right. That's very dystopian.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let your mind run. Well, I did want to ask you about this, too, that I had so many things I wanted to talk to you about, and we're running out of time, but let me squeeze this one in, too. I'm sure you've even asked a million times. The puzzle of how to build a good place, I feel like is not solved, but I feel like we're just setting out to build a brand new place. We have a lot of good guidance and know a lot of things to do now. But of course, the big problem in America is all the suburbs already built along this crappy model spread out. It can only get to them by car, and they're there.</p><p>What do we do with them? Have you ever heard, I mean, I've had a lot of sort of urbanist-y kind of people on and ask this question all the time, and if you had to hear a good answer, but what do we do with them? Do you know of ways to rehabilitate or densify or something to help your typical sort of windy, curly Q street exurb? Or is it just lost to us?</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Well, let's pause at this. There are some brilliant people working on this problem. Ellen Dunham-Jones, Galina Tachieva, they've created ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, they're coming on the pod in a few weeks.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Okay, great. They've made beautiful books, and they show brilliant architecturally how we make this transformation. And you look at them and you're like, this is genius work. The problem is that the work is misaligned with the culture, and it doesn't scale to the size of the problem. So I feel like there's insights from those books that we can use and adapt, but as a solution, suburban retrofit is not a solution. Because the reality is when I say we collect ten cents, twenty cents on the dollar of what we need to maintain all this stuff. The implications of that is that a lot of what we built will not be maintained.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yep.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>And so when we look at these places, we have to recognize that the goal of saving them all and retrofitting them all is the ultimate pouring good money after bad. Half of the streets we have today, half of the roads we have today are not going to be here 50 years from now like they just won't. The bridges will not be here. The interchanges will not be here. This is bizarre. People who have trouble getting their mind wrapped around this, yet everybody who has trouble getting their mind wrapped around this can think of what it looked like when we walked away from the core of our cities.</p><p>We just walked away from these places, ordered them up, and said, this is not ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Detroit's right there. We can just go look at it.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>We can go see it. It's not a difficult case study to examine. So you look at this and then what you recognize is that there is no discernible pattern between the neighborhoods that make it and the neighborhoods that fall apart. And so what we need to do as a public project is actually work in this bottom-up, incremental way. And the places that start to coalesce and those will have physical attributes, but they're also going to have cultural attributes of people being willing to work together. The places that start to coalesce into success, those are the places where we make our limited investments.</p><p>Those are the places we triage. So if neighborhood A says, "We're a bunch of NIMBYs and you're not allowed to build an accessory apartment or a duplex in this neighborhood," but neighborhood B says, "Hey, we welcome corner stores and we welcome duplexes and we welcome all kinds of investment," and I'm a city and I can only fix one neighborhood. I got to decide between A or B. I'm going to pick the one that is embracing others. I'm going to pick the one that has upside potential from an investment standpoint. I don't think that's a hard choice to make.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it is going to leave us with ...</p><p>It's going to leave us with a lot of mess.</p><p>Lots of abandoned, crumbling ... I mean, I guess no matter what we do, we're going to end up there. But jeez, if you think that landscape is vast and soulless now, just like, project your mind ahead 50 years and imagine it crumbling and falling apart and largely abandoned.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>If we learn something from Detroit, which I think we should learn a lot of things from Detroit, but if we learn something from Detroit about that transition, there really needs to be an industry of suburban salvage more than anything. Right? Instead of having your house go to nothing. We're going to purchase it and salvage it at some point.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Strip it for parts.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yeah, strip it for parts. It's exactly what we'll do. Strip it for parts. Because that wire has value. Some of the other stuff has value. We'll strip it for parts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Pretty bleak.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>But it is bleak because what we built was stupid, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>I mean, I think a lot of us would like to save ourselves from, like, okay, I didn't go to college. I knocked out my girlfriend when I was 17, I have a drinking problem, and now I'm 45 and I got my life straightened out. That's great, like from that point on, do good things. Right? But it doesn't make up for the fact that you kind of made a series of bad choices for a couple of decades. You got to deal with that. And I feel like as a society, we made two and a half generations of really bad decisions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, America is so good at honest self-reflection and coming to terms with its own mistakes in a mature and clear-sighted way. So that shouldn't be a problem.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Was that Churchill, "We'll always do the right thing after we've tried every other option"?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that quote is starting to sound a little tinny to me, much like Obama's arc of history. I'm like, well, when, though? Yeah, we tried everything bad and we're still trying it. When's that? Anyway, let's talk politics for a minute, you know, or at least were last time I checked, in a self-described conservative. I don't have to sort of belabor the evolution of the right in America in recent decades and of the Republican Party, among many, many, many other things. We have seen it now become basically explicitly pro-suburb. Right? Instead of implicitly, it's now saying, Joe Biden is going to come take your suburbs.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, he wants to kill the suburbs, right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Put his flag down in the exurbs and everything else going on. So I wonder I know that small "c" conservatives like you, sort of, pro-urbanist conservatives exist. I know that the species exists. Where is your political home? What has become of you? What do you make of your own sort of political location at this point in trajectory?</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>There's a really good book that was ... that no one's read by a guy named Blake Pagenkopf, and I interviewed him on my podcast a while back. I can't remember the name of the book, but he only has, like, one or two, and they're both on the same topic. So he helped me understand this because I had long ago, I mean, long ago, like mid-2000s, walked away from the Republican Party and said, "I may have conservative tendencies, but this branch of national politics and local politics being nationalized doesn't make any sense to me."</p><p>I've never embraced the Democratic Party because there's kind of a central flip over the chessboard every now and then kind of individualism to it that I've always kind of struggled with the idea that every problem needs a big top-down solution that reworks everything. And that impulse has always not been something I could see in myself.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is a kind of old-school Burkean conservatism you're talking about, right? Just have some respect for the accumulated ...</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Accumulated wisdom.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wisdom that's written into communities.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Right. Here's the interesting thing. And this is where Blake's book really kind of helped me become comfortable with this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It is, by the way, called "Rebooting our Political Operating System."</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Oh, thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I looked it up.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>What I found is that I could have better conversations that were more productive and more operative with people who were far left of center, but who were very bottom-up than I could have with anybody who was conservative when they were at their core, top-down. The bottom-up person who understands is very environmentally sensitive and understands ecosystems and understands that kind of thing, to me, I find really enlightening. And I've learned a lot from people like that. The person who cares deeply about social justice within the neighborhood that I live in, I have learned to disassociate them with a national social justice campaign run from a top-down to drive votes. And I've learned to listen to them with compassion and empathy because really, quite frankly, they're talking about my neighbors and humans.</p><p>And I do love them and I do care about them. I feel like what Blake's book describes is a political spectrum that doesn't go left-right, it goes more quadrants top-down versus left-right. And when you do that, what you find is that the left and the right have a common cause politically. Democrats and Republicans have common cause in top-down action. And that is the thing they agree on the most, and that's where they can find consensus. And I am ultimately, the other day, a bottom-up person. And I find a lot more to work with on the political left from the bottom-up than I find in the political right, which has become very, very top-down.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The bottom-up left, you're talking about stuff like cooperatives and things like that, citizen councils and all this kind of stuff.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yeah. And let me say it this way. A cooperative is not where my sensitivities lie, right? The people who found cooperatives and work in cooperatives and do other kind of left of center, bottom-up things, they're motivated by things that are different than what I feel like I'm motivated by. But I find their work inspiring. I find their work adjacent to mine, and I find that we can collaborate really, really well. And I respect them and I respect where they're coming from. I am sensitive to other things.</p><p>And when I can ground my sensitivities in a neighborhood level, a bottom-up way in the humans that surround me, my things that I'm sensitive to I can express those in ways that what I find is that people who are left of center really understand and appreciate, and even if they don't agree, they at least respect. When it gets to the big top-down project, we have a hard time having a conversation. And so I have kind of divorced my own reading list, my own sensitivities, my own view of the world from the top-down. I just don't spend a lot of time on it. I let it be. And I put my efforts into this bottom-up project. And we started this conversation with you saying something along the lines of tension and with everything going on in the world.</p><p>And I said, we got to have a lot of hope and joy. The bottom-up gives me a lot of hope and joy, particularly in other people, particularly in people that I'm told I'm not supposed to agree with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this reminds me of ... I don't know if you've been following James Fallows. He's flying around in his little plane, visiting small towns, and coming away with very much the same thing you're saying. Like, if you're looking for a place away from these intractable, maddening national debates where there's actually some consensus and good things happening, you go to these little mid-sized towns that are kind of out of a national spotlight, and there's all kinds of good stuff happening.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>I think that's true. I will also say this. I found the same thing in large cities, New York City. If you talk to a true New Yorker, they will describe New York City as a series of neighborhoods.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>They don't describe it as a top-down system. They describe it as a series of neighborhoods, each with their own culture, each with their own attitude-approach. And to me, I find the same exact kind of interaction with each other in a place like New York City at the block level, at the neighborhood level that I do in in, you know, a city like mine with 14,000 people.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I just wonder, you know, we seem to be moving nationally into a period of conservative dominance, at least for the next few years.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>And you say that, and I would actually say the opposite.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really?</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yeah. No, I was having this conversation with someone today, and I said, "If you are left of center and you are plugged in nationally, you can go a long, long time without hearing an authentically conservative message delivered well, you will only hear caricatures of conservatism. But if you are a right-of-center, unless you want to not listen to the radio, not watch TV, not go to the movies, not go to college, not participate in civic society, you are going to be bombarded continuously with left-of-center messaging. You just will be." And you might say, like, well, the Supreme Court is very right.</p><p>Okay, I get that. It's the way the kind of ping pong balls fell in terms of turnover, and you can complain about political maneuvers, and I get that. I respect those complaints. The reality is that we are culturally top-down, a very left-of-center project.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is the great contradiction, right? As we seem culturally center left, but the Senate is structurally right. The Supreme Court is structurally right. Now through gerrymandering, the House is structurally right. We keep getting conservative presidents that lose.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Lose the popular vote. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So when I say dominance, at the very least, they're very likely to control all three branches of the federal government for at least some period of the next decade. And it seems like it's going to be a very long time before Dem's get a trifecta back. And it doesn't seem to me, given the character of the current GOP, that they're just going to let blue cities merrily do what they want, implement progressive policies. So I wonder if there's any kind of new political coalition to be had based in good city-making.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yeah, that would be my hope. I mean, really, that would be my hope. I will say I have been around long enough now. I'm 49.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Me too.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Oh, okay, good. We have the same, like, timestamp on our culture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>So I've been around long enough where I have experienced the highs and lows of one-party dominance. Like, oh, we won everything, and then, oh, we lost everything. And the reality is we celebrate the New Deal and the 100 days of FDR that's never happened again, and I don't think it can happen. Right. We will have to have a different form of government for the type of hegemonic thing to occur. Republicans had control of everything just a few years ago, and they got zero things done. And they got zero things done because they are the party of organization.</p><p>Right. Like, Democrats fight each other. Republicans line up and vote for things. They still couldn't get anything done. And I think what we've reached is we've reached a point where, at the federal level, there's really not answers to any of our existential problems. The answers have to be evolved out of local conversations and local action. And so you just see, like, is Obamacare a bad bill? Yeah. Is there a replacement you come up with that would be good? No. So what do you do about that? You just complain and try to get people out to vote for you so that you can pretend you're going to do something.</p><p>I know people get frustrated because they want the federal government to work. I think we don't appreciate that the federal government is designed not to work. We are designed to have a very limited federal government with power concentrated in states and really concentrated in neighborhoods of people.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The one thing I would want to throw into that, and I'll get yelled at if I go this whole interview without mentioning it, is climate change. And I guess, do you see bottom-up reform in cities moving fast enough or being dramatic enough to get a handle on greenhouse gas emissions? In other words, I can envision a lot of good things coming out of bottom-up, but it's real hard for me to envision climate change coming under control without some centralized top-down action.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Okay, let me make this a fair question. So we have Option A, which is some type of top-down action to address climate change. We have Option B, which is bottom-up action to address climate change. And Option A and Option B are in a race against each other to see who can get to where we need to be. What I'm going to suggest to you is that Option A has zero chance or near zero chance of getting to the finish line. And people can argue with that and say, "Well if we just got like an overwhelming number of people elected ..." Look, the most dedicated to climate change president that has ever been has just done a gas tax holiday for six months, right?</p><p>We're not at some tipping point where people are serious about it and they're not. The best thing ... people ask me, "What's the number one strategy we can do at the local level to build a strong town?" And I'm like, a. go out and plant trees. Like street trees are the lowest cost, highest returning investment that can be made. The number two, get people walking and biking. Build a culture of biking and a culture of walking. Number three, fill your parking lots with stuff. Get rid of parking lots and fill them with things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Amen.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Now you tell me if your strategy was we need to get the right people elected. They need to have the guts to pass the right package to do the right stuff so that we get some action on climate, so we get electric cars and we get whatever your package of solar panels and what have you is. Or we can make a bottom-up choice to emphasize communities that plant trees, get people walking and get rid of parking. Which one is going to be further along the race a decade from now? I don't even think it's close. The strong town's approach actually can get done and actually scales.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Scale is the question though, right? I mean, all these local fights. One of the things that when I look at this strategy and I think about it scaling that sort of causes me to despair is that each local community is different. The dynamics are somewhat different. It's just battle after battle after battle after battle.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>So at the end of World War II, we didn't have to convince people to move to the suburbs. They didn't have to be like a national program saying, "This is good for you, you should do this. I know you don't want to do this, but you should do it." People did it in mass. They wanted it. And I'm telling you people want walkable neighborhoods. They want corner stores. They want good sidewalks. They want street trees. We're not selling that strong house anything that people don't want. People want us in droves. They'll pay extra money for it. They fight to live in these places.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They go vacation where it exists.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>They go vacation in them, right. We just don't deliver it in the marketplace. And I'm saying make that switch. We will deliver this in spades, and it will scale big time. Because everybody in policy understands, like, this is what people want.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I hope you're right about that. And maybe we'll we'll check in a decade and see whose strategy failed worse.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, I'm I'm not, you know, saying there should be no top-down action, but I'm just saying I feel like what I see happening with the progressive project is 98% of our energy put into trying to win the next top-down election to get the results we want and 2% of the energy put into recycling our Aquafina bottle. And what I would like to see is 2% of our energy put into this chess match of gladiators at the federal level and 98% of our energy put into making places better. Because you do that and it's a revolution. Everything changes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Great. Well, alright, Chuck. Thanks so much for all your work. And thanks for coming on and talking.</p><p><strong>Charles Marohn</strong></p><p>Thanks, friend.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-charles-marohn-on-unsustainable</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:61146763</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 16 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/61146763/81d2b75215556bda56e04ce9314e6562.mp3" length="103582269" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4316</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/61146763/1fb27f62e4fe10496ccaba802bee89e6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Another note to readers]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Readers, I am keenly aware that you subscribed to this newsletter to get articles and podcasts about clean energy, not to hear about my life and travails. And I’ve already sent you <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-note-to-readers#details">one life-and-travails message</a> this year. So I debated with myself a long time about whether to send this one, especially given all the other horrible stuff happening in the world.</p><p>But, in the end, there is an unavoidable intimacy to this format and that is one of the things I like about it. I don’t have any bosses or advertisers or funders to report to — there’s just me, trying to create good content, and (some of) you, paying for it. Given that life events are currently affecting my ability to work, I feel I owe you some explanation.</p><p>Attentive readers may recall that I’m <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-to-do-in-italy">supposed to be in Italy right now</a>, vacationing with my family to celebrate my oldest son’s high school graduation and impending departure to college. </p><p>As fate would have it, that vacation has been canceled. Why? Well, part of it is that, as followers of my tweets may already know, my entire family has Covid at the moment. But the other part, which I haven’t yet shared, is that I also have cancer. </p><p>Specifically, I have a relatively rare cancer called urothelial carcinoma — a 4.5-cm mass in my right kidney cavity. It was identified via a CT scan about a month ago. A few weeks ago, I had a procedure: a right ureteroscopy with biopsy and ureteral stent insertion. They also fired some lasers at the mass, which I found oddly gratifying. </p><p>The good news is that, somewhat to everyone’s surprise, the biopsy indicates that the cancer is low-grade. The bad news is that the mass is so big that it’s got to come out regardless; my surgical options are no different than if it were high-grade. </p><p>Because it has gotten so big, trying to laser it to pieces could take two, three, or even more full surgeries, followed by a lifetime of vigilance, since this type of cancer tends to recur in surrounding tissue via the “<a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Field_cancerization">field effect</a>.” Recurrence in my kidney or ureter would be bad; recurrence in my bladder (which I only have one of) would be worse.</p><p>The other option is just to have my right kidney taken out entirely, which is what I’m scheduled to do next month — what the official documentation refers to as a “nephroureterectomy, robot-assisted,” which I also find oddly gratifying. I like having robots and lasers on my side.</p><p>Having a kidney out is not a small thing — it’s a serious surgery — but there are very good chances of full recovery. People lose or donate kidneys all the time and go on to live long, healthy lives. My colleague at Vox, Dylan Matthews, donated one of his kidneys out of pure altruism and wrote a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/4/11/12716978/kidney-donation-dylan-matthews">detailed account</a>, which has been a great comfort to me. </p><p>To be clear: I’m in no pain. The cancer itself is causing me no symptoms outside of hematuria (bloody urine), which admittedly is no fun, but it was the only way this thing got caught. A tumor in your kidney lining (as opposed to the cavity, where mine is) can grow for a long time and cause no symptoms at all. It’s a good thing my tumor made a ruckus.</p><p>Suffice it to say, in the vast hellscape of possible cancers, I could have done a <em>lot</em> worse. I am, in the grand scheme of things, quite lucky.</p><p>That said, losing the vacation is a real bummer. For one thing, it was all set up: the plane tickets were bought; the lodgings were booked; the train tickets were reserved; the cars were rented; the tours and outings were all lined up. It was going to be magic. But what really hurts my heart is not getting to send my son off with some indelible memories of his final summer with us. I wanted that time with him so badly. </p><p>As a sad, sweet gesture, Mrs. Volts made us reservations at an Italian restaurant in Seattle for last Monday night — the night we were supposed to leave for Italy — but then, over the weekend, the older boy tested positive for Covid. He isolated immediately, but the next day I tested positive and the day after that, Mrs. Volts and the younger boy. </p><p>To summarize: rather than nibbling gelato and sipping espresso at a street-side cafe in Florence, we are at the end of a week spent slumping around our house, coughing and snorting and unable to do much but watch TV. (<a target="_blank" href="https://www.fxnetworks.com/shows/the-old-man">The Old Man</a> is really good.)</p><p>One additional downer: remember a while back I told you about <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-note-to-readers#details">my aching wrists and elbows</a>? Yeah, that’s worse than ever. I can type for short bursts, but holding my hands steady in any position for more than about 30 seconds brings sharp pain. This means I can’t really sustain concentrated work on longer writing. I can basically … tweet. And given that tweeting is already what I do when I’m anxious, I’ve been tweeting a lot lately. It’s not great.</p><p>I tried some voice control and transcription programs, but I found them weirdly enervating. It is exhausting to talk all the time! But I’m going to have another go at them, since this doesn’t seem to be going away and I still can’t think of a practical way to take six months away from a keyboard to let them rest. </p><p>Anyway. I have lived, on balance, an extraordinarily fortunate and privileged life, and I’m still living one, but I tell you — when it rains, it pours. </p><p>I will get my kidney out; Covid will pass; I will figure out how to deal with the tendonitis. Some day soon this will all be behind me and I will get back to full productivity, including writing the long explanatory articles that I desperately miss writing. I want to bring in more guest pieces, do more deep dives, and set up some regular features and themes. </p><p>But in the meantime, while I am navigating this crapstorm, there might be some slow weeks and months around here. I’m going to try to keep up the podcasting, but it may be a bit more sporadic.</p><p>As I said <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-note-to-readers#details">last time</a>, if anyone feels like they’re not getting what they signed up for and wants to unsubscribe, I understand and do not begrudge. Subscriber growth slowed considerably when I shifted from writing to podcasting, as I suspected it might, but it hasn’t yet ever gone down. Y’all have stuck with me and I can not tell you how grateful and humbled I am to have you all here. </p><p>In the meantime, my prognosis is good. My health-care providers are good. My insurance is good. My wife is a superhero. I don’t need or want for anything. I just thought I should let y’all know where I’m at. Volts is one of the things that keeps me going, so thank you for reading and listening and just being out there.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/another-note-to-readers</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:60569517</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 27 Jun 2022 17:00:11 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/60569517/1098c00605731a5860a7900bf6b315ed.mp3" length="12590256" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>525</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/60569517/98781437e3a4a84fa69c13579c2f0f88.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Kimberly Nicholas on the best ways to get cars out of cities]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Kimberly Nicholas discusses her published research on the most effective policies to reduce car use in cities.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACr-q9v3ViL16QF1rsfp3VRa/volts22.06.22%28kimberly.nicholas%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-kimberly-nicholas-on-the-best-ways-to-get-cars-out-of-cities"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In the US, the movement to get cars out of cities is … what’s the nice word? … <em>nascent</em>. But in Europe, where many cities were built before cars and big-box sprawl never completely dominated, there is growing agreement that cars need to be reigned in. It’s partly about fighting climate change, but beyond that it’s about quality of life — living without air and noise pollution, using your legs to get around, and enjoying public spaces.</p><p>More and more European cities are discovering what Copenhagen found when it <a target="_blank" href="https://cyclingsolutions.info/cost-benefit-of-cycling-infrastructure/">studied the problem in earnest</a>: every mile traveled on a bike adds value to a city, whereas every mile traveled in a car subtracts value. </p><p>The pushback against cars in the Europe has been going on for decades now, but there has been little effort to catalogue and rank the various policies and initiatives involved. What works and what doesn’t? What should other cities prioritize?</p><p>Into that breach came a recent <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2213624X22000281">research paper</a> in <em>Case Studies on Transport Policy</em> that dove into the academic literature (surveying 800 papers) to rank the top car-reducing strategies. It was co-authored by Paula Kuss (based on her master’s research) and Kimberly Nicholas of Sweden’s Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies. Nicholas later wrote <a target="_blank" href="https://theconversation.com/12-best-ways-to-get-cars-out-of-cities-ranked-by-new-research-180642">a summary of the research for The Conversation</a> that received an enormous amount of attention. </p><p>As it happens, driving cars out of cities is one of my enduring obsessions, so I eagerly accepted Nicholas’ offer to review the research, discuss the themes evident in the top-performing policies, and ponder whether such policies could ever take hold in the US. Our conversation was enlightening and heartening, despite making me want to move to Europe.</p><p>With no further ado, Kim Nicholas. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Thank you so much. Long-time listener, first-time guest.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to talk about your study, but before we jump in, there's just a couple of kind of background things I want to establish. One point, which you emphasize a couple of times, which I don't feel like is super well understood. I feel like a lot of times, in my experience, when we talk about declining cars, or trying to get rid of cars, or blocking cars, or anything that inhibits cars, it strikes people, I think, intuitively as a punishment to the poor. And the point you make, at the top of your post about your paper, is that this is not in fact, the case.</p><p>In fact, the sort of transportation sector is weighted as it is toward the wealthier. So say just a little bit about that by way of background.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that's so important that people understand that it is overwhelmingly the rich who drive the most, and it's very important to design climate and transport policies that simultaneously tackle the very serious and increasing problem of inequality. But that's fully possible to do. Some of the people who benefit the most from active and public transport are lower-income folks. So our study focused on Europe because Europe actually has a policy to ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Study.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Exactly. The European Union has promised to deliver 100 climate-neutral cities by 2030. And those cities have just been chosen. And in order for that to actually happen, cities have to reduce the number of cars.</p><p>And when we look in Europe, the data show that it's the rich who drive the most, the richest 10%, about 21% of their emissions comes from driving. And they take up so much more space in cities, which is something we often don't think about. But in Berlin, for example, it's three and a half times more public space that goes to car drivers than non-car drivers. So the car really is a tool to increase inequality.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's just parking mostly, right? That public space?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Largely parking. Also roads and other car infrastructure. In Sweden, it's about 100 m², roughly 1000 square feet. That's the size of many apartments in cities, here. So you think, "Okay, what value could we get for that land? That could be public parks, that could be more housing where we need it in cities." And it's just a really inefficient use of space.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you make the point that EU is doing fairly well on some climate metrics, but its transportation sector is actually kind of a little bit of its Achilles' heel. It's not on a good trajectory.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>No. And I think that this is really something that it's important for the world to take a look at because to get down to zero emissions and actually stop climate change, the first thing is to produce a lot of clean energy. And I think listeners to your podcast are well aware of that, and you talk about that a lot. But then you have to electrify everything to run on that clean energy. And transport is the next sort of phase. And you see in some of the earlier leaders at the national level, Sweden is one of them, where emissions have been declining too slowly, but they are on the way down.</p><p>California is a state in the US that's the same, where they're making the transition to produce clean energy, but they're not yet, or they're just really starting to gain traction in electrifying cars to run on that clean energy. And they're not tackling the need to reduce cars and switch to the need for less mobility and sustainable mobility.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What is that case? Because I think a lot of people, a lot of people, especially new to this area, sort of think, "Well, transportation runs on gas, switch it over to run on clean electricity, and you're good." I think that lots of people think that's most of the solution, and I think a lot of people also think that that's faster to do that than to change cities. So what's the case for trying to reduce overall vehicle miles traveled alongside electrification?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Well, the climate case is that we won't meet climate goals unless we do that, and the inequality case is that we'll continue to exacerbate inequality unless we do that. So I think that's a very strong case because if we're serious about these goals, and actually making cities safer and healthier and more fair and nice places to live, we actually need to focus on reducing cars. And a lot of cities are starting to realize that, especially in Europe, but also elsewhere. I mean the US does have a lot of work and activism and research showing the need to actually reduce cars.</p><p>And I think the IPCC, the UN Climate Panel, has started to pick this up, and their latest report focused on this "avoid-shift-improve" model, which I think is really helpful because, for a long time, climate policy has really been focused on just the improve. Take unsustainable tech, replace it with sustainable tech, done. And on a finite planet that's not enough. Because not only do we have a carbon budget, which we need to meet to stay within Paris Agreement limits of warming, we just have a material world that is limited. We have a limited amount of land and water and resources, and we have to use less of them than many of us in wealthy countries do right now in order for everybody to have enough.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And a lot of new drivers on the way, in the next few decades. Or at least a lot of people who will newly have enough money to drive, if that's the option.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>I had a really interesting conversation, actually, on Twitter. Someone from Ghana got in touch with me and was talking about what sustainable mobility looks like there. And I mean, the reality there is that the vast majority of transportation at the moment is on foot. And his argument was that this kind of approach to reduce cars can actually really benefit people in cities in Subsaharan Africa, for example, that are growing fast, that have a lot of transport needs, that are choked by car traffic, and aren't designed and aren't meeting the needs of how people actually get around.</p><p>And those cities have an opportunity to do things right from the beginning rather than do what actually Copenhagen did, which was be designed for cars, and then due to grassroots organizing, kind of re-engineer itself to be a city for people instead of cars. But that's obviously a fight and more expensive and takes more time, than doing it right from the beginning.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, they could leapfrog cars in the jargon. Let's talk about your study then. So you looked across the EU at cities that are trying to reduce vehicle travel and looked at their policies, and tried to sort of compare them and figure out which are the most efficacious. And so my sort of first question is it just seems like, intuitively, that's a lot of very different circumstances, a lot of very different policies, a lot of different areas or sectors. They cover just there's so many apples and oranges. How did you find some sort of data set where you could compare across these?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>It was a struggle. Thank you for recognizing that. As we write for academics and the people doing the research that formed the evidence base for this study, which was led by Paula Kuss for her master's thesis, please use a standard metric and one that can actually be linked to emissions. So if any of you listening are in a position to measure car use, please measure vehicle miles traveled by modal share per day. So how far do people go and what means of transport do they use to travel that distance? Because as you saw, we had to combine different measures, and then make somewhat subjective assessment of "okay, how do we rank these?"</p><p>We can say, "drop in car use by commuters," or "drop in the number of cars in the city center," or "drop in the share of residents who have a car," and make some kind of informed guess about, "well, how many people or what percent does this apply to?" But it's not as good as if we could say miles traveled, but nobody measured that in our study. We screened more than 800 papers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Really? Zero cities are keeping track of that metric?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>They may well be doing it, but it's not ending up in the peer-reviewed literature. And we also checked about half of our database came from reports at the city level. So, I mean, it may well be in PDFs at individual cities, but that weren't part of the European Union databases that we looked at for inclusion. So the data may be out there if you're willing to dig on an individual level. And I guess now that we've identified here are these couple of dozen cities where you should be looking, it might be more feasible to go into their city council websites and so on. But I think that's just prohibitive as a place to start a research project.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's an element of subjectivity here that we think it's directionally correct. So I don't want to go through the whole list since there are quite a few different policies here. But let's talk about the top three, then. Let's go through the top three, what they are, and how effective they are and where, and who's using them.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Sure. So leading the list at the top is a "congestion charge". So London was the first to implement this. Drivers need to pay to enter the city center. And that was, we found the most effective overall.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that spread beyond yet London? I know New York City has beat its head against that wall for quite a while, but has not done it yet, right? Has any other city done it?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>So we only looked in Europe, and in Europe, we found Milan, Stockholm and, Gothenburg are all using a congestion charge as well. London's was the most effective. So city center car traffic in London dropped 33%, which is quite a lot.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wow.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Other cities were not as much. The approach that we took doesn't really let us dive into the details. I think you would need to add some social science research to interview people who were involved and understand, you know, the design and the actors and the coalitions at play. And, you know, why, why exactly did it get this result on the ground?</p><p>But even the ones that didn't see as big of a result, the fact that it's for the entire center city, of 12% to almost 20%, was really substantial.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Could you look closely enough into those policies to see whether the main metric is just price? I mean, sort of like efficacy goes up with price, or is it more complicated than that? Because I know London has increased its charge a couple of times, hasn't it?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yes, it has. I don't have an answer to say, "for every dollar a city charges, it drops by this amount." I mean, London's, I think, partly reflected inflation since it was first put in place in 2003 at £5 per day, and then it's now at £15. So I guess that's faster than inflation. But it probably does need to go up over time to remain effective in reducing car use. But we also know that once people change habits, they get stuck in new habits. So if this drives people, no pun intended, if the congestion charge drives people out of their cars, or to do remote work, or to drive less, or to carpool, or to switch to public transport, those new behaviors can become a habit.</p><p>And maybe the increase in charge is maybe more relevant in affecting the behavior of potential new drivers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And it's also important to mention that revenue goes toward public transportation. Has there been — I'm wondering whether London voters are able to sort of see with their eyeballs a notable improvement in public transport that can be traced to this policy?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>That's a really critical element of policy design, and we found that in the most effective policies, they need to combine carrots and sticks. So you need to have something that explicitly reduces or restricts cars and parking. That's the stick. And you also need to have something that aims to increase and improve and expand the alternative. So public transport, active walking, and biking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>A lot of people on Twitter were looking at my table that lists interventions by a congestion charge or parking and traffic control, and they're like, "you forgot bike lanes." I'm like, "no, look in the carrots column. Bike lanes are there." But just adding bike lanes alone without changing the playing field, that right now really overwhelmingly favors cars and driving, is not enough to shift behavior.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And I imagine that effect is both just in terms of efficacy, but also in terms of political economy. You need to sort of sell some sweet with the sour or whatever, or however it goes.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly. I mean, I think a common theme in getting climate policy enacted is you can expect resistance from a small, probably powerful group of people who benefit from the current status quo. So I wasn't there in London studying this 15 years ago when the first congestion charge was adopted, but I'm sure it was not a completely smooth ride.</p><p>And I think politicians need to get much more bold about defending these climate policies on their social merits of saying, "look, here's the data. In the UK, it's overwhelmingly the richest households that have a car. Almost 40% of the lowest-income households don't have a car. And those are more likely to be BIPOC communities. Those are women and single head-of-household. So if we care about equality, we actually need to have some restrict over consumption as well as increase the standards for people at the lowest end."</p><p>Number two drum roll, please. Thank you. It's parking and traffic control. So that means removing parking spaces.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, my God. Removing parking spaces? What? I just broke out into a sweat.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>I said it. You mean like a fevered fantasy of delight?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, a little both, and terror at the thought of proposing this in the US city.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>It can happen. It can happen, Dave. You can do it. That's the stick, then, in this case. So that's not an economic stick. The first one was an economic stick of a monetary charge, but this one is a public goods and services stick, basically, of reallocating the space in a city, the public space, to be of higher use to people than cars. And so alongside that restriction, and basically the carrot is, you make those spaces really beautiful and usable, and you put bike lanes and walkways in and add car-free streets. And then people use that space and benefit from that space in a different way, and that creates popularity.</p><p>And I know that US cities, as well as many other cities, have done this, for example, with the pop-up bike lanes and bike lane expansions starting during the Pandemic, for example.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I find that whole episode, you address that actually in your post, and we might as well talk about it here because I find it somewhat disheartening. There was a lot of sort of pop-up urbanism during the Pandemic, with a lot of new bike lanes and other walkable streets that excluded cars. And as I look around, I'm not sure how much of it is sticking. It looks like a lot of it is getting rolled back. Do you have a sense of that?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>You're probably right. I haven't seen a study. We know that in the Pandemic, public policy did not seize the moment as it should have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>On a number of levels.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yeah, yes, absolutely. I'm not an expert on the health level, but on the climate level, only 18% globally of the COVID funds were in line with climate goals, basically. So there could have been a huge opportunity there to tackle some of these systemic problems, that was largely missed, unfortunately. But we know that those moments of disruption are an effective moment to change behavior, that habits form in a context, and when the context changes, "so okay, I'm not going into the office anymore." People do develop new routines and habits. So smart city planning would have kind of seized that and capitalized on that more.</p><p>And some cities did do that. So European cities that added bike lanes during the Pandemic increased cycling rates by eleven to 48%. So it was a really big increase. But now, as you said, we are seeing some rollback of those initiatives. I don't have a number overall for how much, but I mean, at least anecdotally some cities are returning. And I guess what this tells us is carrots alone are not enough. You need policy change that actually focuses on the source of the problem. So I mean, if we're talking about fossil fuels, it's production and supply. If we're talking about transport, it's restricting cars and parking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And so then number three is one of my favorites. Let's talk about number three.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Alright. Number three is the "limited traffic zone". So that's excluding cars from parts of the city, with exceptions for residents. And I should say we haven't talked about this yet, but I mean, all of this can and should be designed to make sure that people who need cars, for mobility and social inclusion, have access to them. And that's the really important part of reducing the inequalities, that for disability or other reasons for people who actually need cars, that should be possible. So certainly those folks would get an exception. But in a limited traffic zone, cars are excluded from a certain region.</p><p>And again, the care that's linked to that stick is that violation fines fund public transport.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And is usually the city center, isn't it? I mean, that's usually where these things start.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yes, we just looked at cities again because we wanted to have something that was hopefully useful for this EU mission to deliver these 100 climate-neutral cities. But there are also ways of reducing car use in rural areas. And that wasn't the focus of our study here. But I think that's a really interesting area because, much like the misconception you mentioned that. "wait a minute, the poor are really car-dependent, and we can't punish them. Well, wait a minute, that's not what the data show." Similarly, people have the argument that rural people are more car-dependent, and at least in Sweden, the data show that that's not the case.</p><p>That they may have fewer alternatives for public transit, for example, but they don't drive more on average, or they don't drive further than people in cities or suburbs. So in Sweden, and I think this is repeated elsewhere, it's a small minority of folks who do a really excessive amount of driving. It's 25% of the population here that cause 90% of the car emissions. So it's targeting those folks. And those folks are largely the highest income. And then they're distributed around, geographically, between the countryside and the city pretty evenly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So who are the sort of marquee cities here? London did this, didn't it? And didn't Paris also do this?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Limited traffic zones. The example we talked about was Rome, and they saw a 20% reduction in cars during the hours that this restriction was in place. And even when it wasn't, they saw half of that 10% reduction. So it shows that having policy change does lead to pretty widespread and more lasting behavior and social change, rather than it's not only like a light switch that people just only follow when it's on. It starts to shift norms and create alternatives and do other good things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, seems like a huge piece of this is how to take those changing habits and sort of reinforce them and accelerate them and make sure they don't roll back.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's true. I mean, there you start to get into some of our other policies that we identified as effective, which have to do with, for example, workplaces and schools, because then I think the employers and schools and cities can do a lot to promote new norms. I mean, to make to have the infrastructure to shower at work, for example, or secure bike parking, but also to kind of make it easy and accepted and even expected to cycle to work. And I know that was in the news recently of some dismissive comments about, "oh, people in Denmark are so poor that they have to cycle to work."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it was like the most American thing I've ever seen in my entire life.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yeah, "no, they actually are doing fine financially, and they prefer to cycle." And here's a minister in a suit on a bike, and it's just the best way to get to work, and it's not a hardship.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I think of also all those videos I'm always seeing of bicycle school buses in Barcelona. Are you familiar with this? Just like huge herds of children on bikes that all ride together for sort of safety. And it also seems like the social part of it too is a big part of habit formation. Just having it be socially accepted and having your peers doing it too and being able to do it together.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I mean, my friend David Kroodsma biked from grad school at Stanford to the tip of Tierra del Fuego, the southern tip of South America. And he had an amazing journey. It was raising awareness about climate. He met so many people, and people would invite him to stay in their homes, and he slept in a lot of fire stations. And I mean, he wrote a book, had an amazing time. And he told me that he also did something similar across the US, and he could never meet people because there are never people on the street.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There are just no people on the street. I really don't think Americans realize the lack. Because you kind of have to travel overseas, and you just get used to like, "I'm in a city, of course, there are people around."</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yes. That's so much better for us as humans. And in terms of social cohesion and trust, which is really important for democracy, and knowing a diverse group of people, and getting to know your neighbors, and actually having small interactions with others in the real world. I mean, the cars are so isolating, and David said he would have to go to gas stations or grocery stores, was like the only moment he could grab people out of their cars.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just hang out outside McDonald's. Speaking of trust, one of the themes you sort of pull out of this study is how well-placed local governments are to do this kind of stuff. So talk about that a little bit.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yeah. So we found that the policies that worked did a couple of things. They needed to combine carrots and sticks, as we've been discussing, so that could be economic or city planning as tools to make it more expensive, or difficult to drive cars and park, and make it easier and cheaper to walk and bike and take transit. There's also information campaigns that can be a part of that. And then who is it that can do all these good things? Well, 75% of the measures in our study were led by local governments.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What were the remaining 25%? Where did they come from?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>I mean, most of these interventions had more than one partner involved. A couple of them were led by the transit agencies, sub-NGOs, a couple of businesses, and those kind of players were also usually involved in partnership with the local government.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>But I think what it says to me is that local government can and should be leading these initiatives and should be making the case for them, building the political will that we always talk about. But in really practical ways, saying, "Okay, who can do what, and who do I need on board to do this?" And it's not only politicians and elected officials, but I think civil servants have a huge role to play here. I mean, people who are working in transport, and streets, and planning departments are really important in making cities better for people.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You said you went through 800 studies, so I'm sure you've looked at programs in a lot of different cities. Was there any particular city or any particular program that you had sort of not appreciated before that jumped out of you, that sort of caught your imagination?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>One that kind of surprised me was car sharing. So the two cities that have adopted that and that we found had measured its impact, had good reports. So they found that they replaced 12 to 15 private cars with each shared car. And that was, like, a carrot-only policy. So that's having integrated into neighborhoods, nearby where people live and work, having cars that you can check out with an app, for example, just for an hour or two, as opposed to a more sort of centralized rental system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>But the thing that surprised me there, the question that was raised in other literature, is there is a risk of that seamless and easy use of cars drawing in more people who previously were not driving. So, I mean, it's clearly a win for the space issue, which we were discussing earlier, that cars need a lot of public space to move around and park, and 95% of the time they're sitting still, which is really inefficient. So it helps with some of those issues. But I think the jury is still out on how effective in the real world are they at actually reducing miles traveled and the number of people traveling by car.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And may this is a good time to mention that the other thing people refer to as car sharing, which is sort of car services Uber and Lyft and all that, as far as I can tell, the recent studies I've seen show that they probably increase vehicle miles traveled in cities, all told.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is a bit of a sad trumpet ending for that much-hyped trend.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>It's the same with E-scooters. There was just a study in Switzerland, that there's a lot of hype and probably a lot of very good intentions, I think, in these kind of micro-mobility and shared mobility. But as you said in the US, there was a really comprehensive study that found that Uber and Lyft entering a market, increased vehicle ownership in the city overall and also eroded took away from public transport use for the high-income areas. So it's the opposite of the carrot and the stick. Both things are going in the wrong direction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Bummer.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk a little bit if you have anything to say about it, about how or whether this sort of analysis can be ported to the US. Because I'm looking at your policies and not only just sort of on politically do they seem challenging in a US context, but also a lot of them are sort of premised on shifting people out of cars and into public transit. And a lot of US cities just don't have the public transit to absorb a very large shift. So is there any plans for a similar study like this in the US.</p><p>Or how applicable do you think this is to the US?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Well, I'm not planning to do one at the moment, so if anyone listening wants to, please go for it and feel free to contact me if you want some advice.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You can find enough policies to study.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Well, I think. They're out there. And actually, I will answer your question, but something that doing this study made me realize is that there's a huge research need for really applied research like this, that is not scientifically groundbreaking, to compare apples and oranges and sift through these large number of studies. But it's actually really important that we have this evidence base. And this is one of the studies that I've done that I've gotten the most feedback from citizens, from people, from city planners, actually, around the world, saying, "I can use this in my work."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's a lot of will out there to do this now, I feel like, recently.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yeah, and for a lot of different reasons. We do need people who like to do the work, to make the work accessible. Please measure miles traveled, as I said, and then put it online, I mean, get it out there and share it. And somebody needs to compile it because we need this evidence base to help push forward good climate policy. But okay, that was my hobby horse. Now, I forgot your original question. Oh, "can we do it in the US?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, just how depressed should we be about the US putting any of this into effect?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Well, I know that things are tough in the US right now, but I will say there's so much potential, actually. And I really see cities as leaders in reducing emissions, and actually making a fast and fair transition to a fossil-free world happen, because cities, we have about ten times more cities globally that actually are on track and reducing emissions than we have countries. There's about 20 countries that are reducing emissions, where they're going down, which is the right direction. All of them need to speed up and do much more. But they've started that transition. But we have over 300 cities that are actually decreasing emissions.</p><p>And I think that cities are a really effective place to engage in climate work. And that's good news for citizens as well, because it's easier to get involved as a citizen at the city level, to show up at city council meetings, to organize your neighborhood. I mean, those things actually do really work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. You don't get into politics in the paper, but it strikes me as this just such a straightforward reflection of politics, and the sort of sorting of political tribes into and out of cities. So all the willing people have been sorted into cities, which does make them fertile places to do this. Did you, in the process of looking through all these papers, learn anything about the politics? Because, of course, when you rank things by how effective they are, I'm sure there are policies we could think of that would be way more effective than any of these, but couldn't get past anywhere.</p><p>Was there a political economy sort of aspect to this study or your other work?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Not in this study in particular, but it is something that I think about a lot because the only way for climate policies to reduce emissions is to actually be enacted and enforced. So we have to think about feasibility. My friend and colleague Christian Nielsen is doing some of this work on, basically, including in models and in the way that traditionally the people. For example, in the IPCC, the Climate Panel, have been assembling and ranking policies to start to include not just technical effectiveness, but actual behavioral plasticity. So how willing are people to actually use and adopt these things and the political feasibility? How do we get legitimacy and actually get these policies enacted?</p><p>So I can just say, I know these are very important issues, and I don't have insight, because of the way we did this study, to how did these cities succeed in getting them passed. But that could be a next step to now that we know where these cities are that actually worked. We could contact these folks, we could interview them, and try to scale it up. And I know that some journalists have actually, or at least one journalist contacted me and was planning to do that, to try and find the people in these cities who actually did this work. So now that we know where the bright spots are, we can dive into that further.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One sort of parallel that struck me, as I was thinking about this, is discussions over carbon taxes. I think the conventional wisdom at this point is, "yes, in theory, a carbon tax is the most effective sort of per ton per dollar policy, but it also happens to be the most politically challenging policy." You're going to face the most resistance from the most people if you push it. So in that sense, it's not effective because it's very difficult to pass. And I just wonder about whether congestion charges are a little bit like that. Obviously, efficacious if you can do it, but so difficult to do that it might be worth doing other things instead, or alongside, or, you know what I mean?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. And I think that's smart to think about in a local context. I mean, the other cities that passed congestion charges after London, I actually don't know enough about the process that London went through. Their mayor, I know, was instrumental, but I don't know exactly how that policy got put in place. But the other three that have it had a referendum, so people voted on it. That's obviously a good way in a democracy, to demonstrate legitimacy. This is the will of the people. But I totally agree, if in your context a congestion charge is just the kiss of death, then if you combine workplace parking charges and workplace travel planning with mobility services for university and school travel planning, you could maybe get just as far.</p><p>Yeah, when we did the study. So we ranked these interventions by effectiveness, and then another part of the study was to apply it to the city of Lund, which is where I live and where Paula Kuss was doing her masters. And I have a project trying to help Lund actually reach its climate goals and be climate neutral by 2030. We have a long way to go, but in our case, for example, we didn't recommend the congestion charge to Lund because we did do some of that political feasibility work on the ground here. And from interviewing local experts and civil servants and politicians, it wasn't ranked feasible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>We chose the three that were the most, that combined the best combination of feasibility and effectiveness, and everyone was like, "oh, apps, we should do an app." And we're like, "nope, that's not that effective." So even if it's very feasible, we're not going to suggest that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>People love their apps.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>They really do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I wonder ... this is sort of a random thought, and it's probably not going to be captured in your study because it's about policies that have been in place for a while ... but I wonder how big the working from home trend is. Are you aware of any studies yet on the working from-home effect on reducing cars, and what, and whether there — I've been wondering if there are cities should be embracing that and passing policies to sort of try and reinforce it and keep it in place, or if you have any thoughts on that at all.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yes, I haven't seen a study about exactly that from the Pandemic. But from earlier work, in 2018, Seth Wines led a study where we compiled existing interventions across high-impact domains. So driving, meat consumption, energy use at home. We wanted to do flying at that reduction. At that time, we found zero cities that had even tried to reduce flying, so we couldn't include that. But the ones that we found that reduced the most CO2 were telecommuting. So incentives to do that can be really effective.</p><p>There's a newer study from the UK, I linked to it in that post in The Conversation. That study is called "Do Teleworkers Travel Less?" And that's based in England. And they basically conclude, "you need to work from home three or more days per week to actually reduce your overall driving." That there seems to be some substitution effect of perhaps more leisure travel or people. I think a big risk is people moving further away from work because they don't have to be there so often.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>But we know that most emissions come from long-distance driving. So if you're only driving to work once a week, but it's 100 miles instead of you used to drive every day, 3 miles, that's a worse equation for climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Yeah. And this is another area where it just seems like the difference between the EU and the US is so huge, because working from home if you are living in a city, you have other reasons to go out and mingle with people other than work. But if working from home just means being stranded in your suburb all day, every day, just seems like a different thing in terms of driving and just in terms of life quality.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yeah, I hear you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Final question, and you touched on this earlier, but another thing I think about the US is how car dependent our rural areas are. I think probably considerably more so than in the EU, or in a place like Sweden. My experience of the rural US is highways, two-lane highways with roads branching off them. And even in little, small towns, you pass through, like in the South, where I grew up, even tiny towns are built such that you basically have to drive everywhere, such as to be hostile to walking. So I just wonder whether you've heard about policies for reducing vehicle miles traveled in rural, or even like exurban, suburban and exurban, and rural areas, because in a sense it's easiest to do in a city, I would think.</p><p>But have you heard about efforts to do it in the more far-flung and less dense areas?</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yes, I have and I heard about it from readers who contacted me and discussed on Twitter and in my newsletter. So I think in my newsletter that I wrote about this, which was "We Can Fix It", a couple of months ago, I think I linked to the study that someone brought to my attention. So it was a report from the UK that was specifically about reducing driving and increasing sustainable mobility in villages and rural areas. So there are people thinking about that. And I do think that's really important, both for social inclusion and cohesion. That the dynamic, in many parts of the world, is this urban, rural divide, and people who live in the countryside feel like, "those big city politicians don't understand me, they don't see me, they don't care about me."</p><p>And that's not good for democracy. So I think meeting people's needs where they are is really important. But I guess another thing to say there is that if we go back to this "avoid-shift-improve" model, the most effective way is to avoid the need for mobility in the first place, to have your needs close to hand. So, I mean, there's never going to be a sustainable way to travel 50 or 100 miles between where you live and where you work. That's just too far away. And I used to be one of those people. When I lived in California, I was commuting 70 miles from my home in Sonoma to grad school at Stanford, and it was a nightmare and now feels like completely ridiculous.</p><p>But I did that for many years, so I know there are lots of reasons that people get put in those positions, and those are the things we also need to be thinking about structurally. I mean, how do we make towns attractive places to live that have jobs, so people don't have to commute? Or how do we make it affordable to live where the jobs are? And that was a policy that, I think, got mentioned briefly, that something workplaces can do is actually support policies for affordable housing and encourage people to live near work and incentivize that, rather than giving free parking and incentivizing people to live further away.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is also Interesting, and it strikes me as promising that you got such an enormous amount of feedback about it.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Yeah, thanks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It seems like the iron is hot, or whatever the right metaphor is. Like, People seem geared up to do this now.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>I think so. And that feels really exciting. And I mean, I think we need a lot more work in this direction. Imagine we lived in a world where politicians are ready to implement bold climate policies. What is it they should do? We really need better answers to those questions in specific places and for specific sectors. And "who can do what" is where I'm now shifting my research to because we do have a lot of ideas from many, many years of study of — we know in broad strokes what needs to be done.</p><p>Transition off fossil fuels, have agriculture that feeds people without destroying the planet. Big Picture. We've got all that. We have a lot of technical solutions, but "who can do what" in specific places to actually make that happen in a fast and fair way, we really need more evidence base for. So I think this is the way I'm going in the future, and I hope others will be inspired to contribute, too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Well, thanks for doing the work, and thanks for coming on.</p><p><strong>Kimberly Nicholas</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me, Dave.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-kimberly-nicholas-on</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:59691727</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 30 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/59691727/c5a42096f91349bb4da00b7ed251cdf3.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2553</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/59691727/94524b7d74fb071f9a124db415b77a39.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Dan Pfeiffer on the Democratic Party's megaphone problem]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, political communications expert Dan Pfeiffer speaks to the wide influence of right-wing media, why Democrats keep losing messaging battles, and what they need to do about it.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAHElSPCdrQ2XwbuS5RGGw-a/volts22.06.17%28dan.pfeiffer%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-dan-pfeiffer-on-the-democratic-party-s-megaphone-problem"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You probably know Dan Pfeiffer best as one of the hosts of the wildly successful Pod Save America podcast, part of the growing Crooked Media empire of which he is a co-founder. Or perhaps you know him as the author of the Message Box newsletter, where he dispenses communications advice to left-leaning subscribers. </p><p>But before he was a new media mogul, Pfeiffer was in the thick of politics as a top aide on Obama’s campaign and then in Obama’s White House, where he ran communications and strategy.</p><p>Pfeiffer has seen the media war between the parties play out, and he has seen Democrats lose messaging battles again and again. He has first-hand experience of the growing power of the right-wing media machine to spread disinformation, set the agenda for the rest of the media, and deflect accountability.</p><p>Now he has written a book on the subject: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.twelvebooks.com/titles/dan-pfeiffer/battling-the-big-lie/9781538707975/"><em>Battling the Big Lie</em></a> is an extended examination of the growing imbalance between the conservative movement’s massive media megaphone … and the left’s lack of one. </p><p>Listeners know that I have been obsessed with this imbalance for as long as I’ve been following politics, so I was super geeked to talk with Pfeiffer about how right-wing media grew, how it successfully intimidated both mainstream media and social media companies, and how Democrats can begin building a comparable megaphone of their own, before it’s too late.</p><p>Dan Pfeiffer. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Congratulations on writing a book under extreme time pressure. An extremely stressful time to be alive. I hope the psychological damage has been minimal.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>I think we'll only know how much damage there was many years from now, so the full cost of this endeavor will not be known.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I want to talk about the current situation, but just briefly at the beginning, let's look a little bit at history. So I wonder what you think are sort of the kind of the landmarks on the road to the current situation. So for instance, tell us a little bit about when the press, the mainstream press as the enemy, became a popular thing on the right. That's sort of the first and then the second is like, what are the sort of markers of the growth of their own media apparatus? How did we get here?</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Sure, there had been a bubbling sentiment of conservative anti-press sentiment dating back to the New Deal and FDR and Democrats sort of dominating the conversation. But it became a political strategy, primarily in Barry Goldwater's 1964 campaign. He hammered the press, he hammered Eastern elites. He handed out pins to the press on the press planes, calling them members of the Eastern establishment. The press as enemy became an explanation to the right, themselves and their voters why they kept losing elections. It wasn't that their policies were bad. It wasn't that they were unpopular. It wasn't that their rhetoric wasn't good.</p><p>It was that the press hated them. Nixon took that into hyperdrive because of his own set of insecurities and grievances. And even before Watergate, like in the course of the Nixon administration, there was real thoughts on how you go about destroying the press. Richard Nixon had his enemies list, which included members of the press. He also explored with Roger Ailes and some of his other aides very specific forerunners, the Fox News. In terms of state sponsored propaganda, there was an effort where they explored creating local news pieces created by the White House that would then be under a sort of undercover that would be sent to local news stations.</p><p>There was an effort to fund a pro-Vietnam War documentary to push back against the Pentagon Papers and other efforts out there. And then when the press, in the common "tell all the President's men" telling of what happened, took down Nixon, that became sort of the cause celeb in the right. "The press is out to get us. The press is out to get us." Reagan took that in the 80s. Getting rid of the Fairness Doctrine as a part of it was part of his campaign.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One question about that, about the Fairness Doctrine thing, I'm curious what sort of the public versus private justifications for that were, like, did Reagan and his people consciously do that in order to bolster right wing voices or was there some sincere ideological motivation back there somewhere?</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>I think there was probably some sincere ideological motivation, but the primary driving factor, as I understand the history, was the fact that the Fairness Doctrine was putting downward pressure on efforts to have an emerging right wing radio ecosystem. And that in order to have that, every time they kept trying to move towards local stations, kept trying to move towards sort of the forerunners to Rush Limbaugh, there would be pressure from the FCC for equal time, et cetera. And so ending the Fairness Doctrine basically created the environment by which right-wing radio could thrive. Which created the environment by which Fox News could thrive.</p><p>The idea that the FCC and the Fairness actor and the big government were preventing conservative media was one of the motivating factors among grassroots activists that pushed Reagan to do it. And then there are a couple of moments in time where the idea of aggressive Republican Party adjacent media comes from. And I use that to distinguish between ideological media like Human Events and the Weekly Standard and sort of National Review, of which we have examples in the pre-Trump era on the right and the left, right sort of real magazines. It's pushing the party agenda, left or right, depending.</p><p>And that's obviously Roger Ailes recognizing that the power was in the press and so get partnering with Rupert Murdoch to start Fox News. Fox News becomes very, very powerful over the course of time finds a real market. And then there are two other moments that I think are incredibly significant. One is right after the 2012 election, there was a view pushed primarily by Steve Bannon that the right is losing the messaging wars and they need to double and triple down in the ability to push the political conversation in their direction. Their direction. And his view was cultural wars, immigration, et cetera.</p><p>And that leads to Breitbart, The Daily Caller, Free Beacon with real investment from a new set of, quote unquote, "Rupert Murdochs," like the Mercers who help start Breitbart, or take Breitbart from its previous version to the Steve Bannon pro-Trump version. You have Foster Freeze, who gives money to Tucker Carlson to start The Daily Caller. And then the moment that really sort of takes that, which would be in Supercharges, is Facebook really hits a tipping point in around 2014 where its reach, the news feed and the algorithm all sort of combine with these new right wing digital outlets to move the political conversation powerfully towards right wing extremist messaging. And that takes off and then that sort of ends in Trump, and then Trump takes the whole thing to another level from 2016 on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I remember, even back in the day, it's sort of early, after the emergence of Fox, the situation it created, which persists to this day in mainstream sort of especially like mainstream cable news, is you have this weird form. Of balance now, where the balance is on one side, explicit ideological right wing propaganda media, and then the other side, and I'm air quoting here, is just a couple of mainstream journalists from like the New York Times or whatever. Mainstream journalists who are scrupulously, as always, attempting to appear objective and unbiased. And that's just like a bizarre form of balance, a bizarre way of drawing two sides that always struck me as surreal but now is just absolutely bog standard and no one blinks at it.</p><p>That's what balance basically means now, on like a Sunday show.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. The right has so convinced the media itself that it is left that in order to balance itself, it must seek out a right-wing voice. Like you mentioned the idea of the Sunday shows and that is often the lineup, particularly Meet the Press is a Republican, a Democrat, some journalists and a member of the conservative media. And then Facebook took this to another level when they started putting in trusted news sources in order to, quote unquote, "balance CNN and the New York Times," they had to have Breitbart and Fox or The Daily Caller or whatever it is.</p><p>And it is like this I think this is one of Roger Ailes's great insights because he is someone who came from he was in media, was a political consultant, went back to media as he understood how to exploit the cultures the mores and the insecurities of the press in a way to push conservative messaging. And he knew that they were incredibly self conscious about liberal bias because many of them are personally liberal. They may live in New York or they may live in Los Angeles and then use it simply to bludgeon them into becoming a vehicle for pushing additional right wing messaging. I mean, it must have been Roger Ailes's dream.</p><p>Like, he could not believe how successful his endeavor was that after Barack Obama was elected, the New York Times assigned an editor to monitor Fox for story ideas. That The Washington Post executive ... that is a real thing. The Washington Post executive editor at the time, Marcus Brauchli, said that he wanted his paper to spend more time paying attention to Fox, to learn more. In his wildest dreams, when he started thinking about Fox, in the idea of Fox, in the 70s and 80s, the idea that his hated New York Times would be so cowed by him that they would sign an editor to watch his network in order to hold a Democratic president accountable, it must have been beyond his wildest dreams.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's wild. It's been one of the wildest things about the whole process is the extent to which explicit ideological right wing media has been protected at every stage by the very establishment that it is devoted to destroying. It's so surreal and one of the most infuriating chapters of the last, actually. It's more than a decade ago. I'm revealing my age here, but that you cover in your book is Obama came in, you all came in with Obama. And by that point, I mean, it's pretty obvious from the jump, I think. But certainly by the time Obama took office, it's just super obvious that one of these things is not like the others.</p><p>Right? That Fox is not just another objective news network, that it's very explicitly devoted to taking Obama down, it's devoted to the Republican Party. Seems very obvious, and I'm sure seemed quite obvious to you inside the White House. But then you all consciously decided to push back on it and just reaped a shitstorm not from the right wing media, but from its defenders in the mainstream media. That drives me mad to this day. I can only imagine what it was like from the inside.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>I was one of the people in the White House that were in the book who pushed to go aggressively against Fox. And my mistake, I guess three mistakes. One is misunderstanding the nature of it's, sort of like the NATO defense pack among journalists, that an attack on one is attack on us all. So that's mistake one is that we weren't just fighting, we're going to fight Fox. We're going to end up fighting everyone. And that's not worth our time and energy and not a fight you're going to win. The second, I think, was in sort of in our tactics.</p><p>We made some mistakes, and when we got into their access, that's where the press, I think to some extent understandably comes to everyone's defense because it's not whether we're going to do interviews with them or not. It's not whether we're going to acknowledge them or not. It's whether they get to show up and participate in sort of communal activities which they pay for.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>And then the third was that Fox would see it in their this part we sort of understood, but would see it in their interest too. Right. Obviously our attack on them became proof to their base that they were doing what they said. And now in situations like that, we can both win. Because as painful as that whole battle was, it did have at least I think and then maybe this is just me justifying my own decisions, a moderately moderating impact on how much the press was following Fox. It still obviously was a problem, but there was less like we really were in those first years of the White House would be like Glenn Beck segment.</p><p>Phone call from Politico about Glenn Beck segment. Right. And that people created at least a little bit of more self conscious echoing of Fox before they came to us. But these are small victories.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it still begs the larger question, which is why it was just super clear for me, as an outside observer looking at the media landscape, that Fox is not like other news, other news stations. It's very clear they're doing a different thing. And it just begs the question of why other journalists couldn't acknowledge that or couldn't see it or weren't. And this is what I always wonder, why they weren't pissed off about it. If you're a real journalist and you really care and you're dealing with fact checkers and editors and you're having to confirm things with two sources and et cetera, and then these people come along and just sort of, like, call themselves a news network, even though it's, like, 90% bloviating opinion and it's full of falsehoods and it's full of b******t.</p><p>And they're calling themselves the same thing you're calling yourself. Where's the professional pride? Why are journalists not mad about Fox? Why instead are they defending and welcoming it? Have you ever figured that out?</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think there are a couple reasons for it. Part of it is this sort of self conscious liberal bias where it's like, yeah, we are kind of liberal. Maybe it's not bad if someone balances out in the sense that this view that maybe Fox is a center right journalism entity during the day at least, as opposed to a propaganda operation. The second one is basically, up until 2012 or so, the people that Fox hired to be campaign reporters or White House reporters, they almost operated as intermediaries between the Fox higher ups and the people they were covering.</p><p>And it's a pretty like people who had been at other entities and were well respected by their colleagues, like Major Garrett, Carl Cameron, and we would have conversations, I'm not going to out specific conversations with people. A lot of the people who would cover us, they'd come to you and say, look, we'd sort of kind of know this is b******t, what's your complaint? And they'll try to serve it as intermediary. So I can see in a world in which I'm not defending this, but just understanding sort of the fraternity or culture among journalism, is it's like we respect Major Garrett or we respect Carl Cameron, and he is one of us and worked with one of us.</p><p>And then it began to take a transition with the sorts of people those sorts of people started leaving the network and going to other things and you end up with other people like Ed Henry or Peter Doocy or others who are you had to be all in on the scam or all in the propaganda to be there after a while. So it's like, I think it was a not a deeply naive approach from a lot of the press. It was born of subconscious liberal bias and some complete cockiness in their position in the political firmament that like, yeah, they attack us, but we are the fourth estate. We exist.</p><p>We will forever be trusted and important. And before long that very, very they didn't realize they were. I often sometimes joke that the, you know, Fox and Roger Ailes in the right declared war on the press, and the press covered that war instead of participated in it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's turn to real quickly to Facebook, because one of the more disheartening episodes the last few years so many disheartening episodes, but one of them is I sort of came into political consciousness in the early 2000s and watched as the right wing media sort of chipped away at mainstream media. Just accused it of bias over decades, even before the 2000s, like you say, starting back in the 70s. Just accused it of bias. Banged on it. Banged on it with these critiques, slowly wore it down until it sort of submitted to being polluted and ending up in this bizarre two sides objective versus right wing situation.</p><p>But at least it took a while to bring the media down. Then along comes Facebook. The same exact arguments, the same exact disingenuous arguments, the same accusations of bias, the same whining and grievance, the same right-wing playing the refs thing came out again, except Facebook resisted it for all of like a few months and crumbled in just spectacular total fashion almost immediately. So is the explanation for that that tech-guys are even more naive about the ways of the political world than journalists are? Or is the right interpretation more cynical? Just that these guys just wanted to buddy up to power and never had any pretensions of journalistic integrity in the first place?</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>I don't know that anyone at Facebook had any intentions towards integrity at any point. I don't think. That wasn't the I think I have always understood Mark Zuckerberg to be an entirely amoral person who stumbles into immorality when he's not paying attention. And so I think the answer to your question is both. So in the pre-Trump election, there was a inside Facebook like, deeply, deeply, deeply naive people about how politics works. So the moment that I think is notable in the pre-Trump period that leads to things going really bad in the Trump period is right around the time that Democrats are about to win the election.</p><p>Now, the leadership at Facebook, whether it's Zuckerberg or Sheryl Sandberg, has become relatively they're well connected with Democrats in Washington, either via Nancy Pelosi or through President Obama. I mean, Chris Hughes, who was one of the original founders of Facebook, worked on the Obama campaign in the early days of Facebook. They had plenty of connections among Democrats, as a lot of tech companies would do, from California would do, right? And then right when the Republicans are starting to control the House, they're starting to build up their government affairs operation because now they're a real company, and they're going to start bumping into the regulatory state.</p><p>And Republicans are coming into Congress, and they figure, we have the Democratic side figured up. We can get people on the phone, so we need to hire Republicans. So they hired Joel Kaplan, who was George W. Bush's Chief of Staff, had worked in the Office of Management and Budget. Incredibly well-respected, well-liked, moderate-ish Republican like, not a Tea Party Republican. That was sort of the MAGA version of 2010. They hire him, and he's the only Republican of note in the company. So his word is like, he is the only one who if there's a question about product or marketing, there are lots of people there who have opinions on it.</p><p>No one has an opinion on how to deal with Republicans other than Joel Kaplan.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>He's the Republican whisperer.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yeah, he may be the only one that they even know, right? And so he starts giving them advice, and so they're like giving money to Republicans and doing meetings and all of that. But this first becomes a real issue in 2016 when this fake scandal emerges that suggests that Facebook is biased against conservatives and what they put on their trending news page and other Republicans yell. Then Joel Kaplan sort of puts together a plan that causes them to, even though they essentially did nothing wrong to apologize for it, accommodate these Republicans. Zuckerberg begins his outreach program.</p><p>He dines with Tucker Carlson and all these people and some well meaning conservatives like S.E. Cupp and some other people. It's not all just like proto MAGA types. It's some conservatives in good standing, even if we disagree with them on a lot of issues. And then Trump wins. And this is where I think it takes the transition from sort of self conscious, naive liberal bias to we got to make money. And so there's fear of Trump using the power of the state against them. Republicans control all the levers of power in Congress. They're threatening all sorts of things around overturning Section 230, which gives them legal immunity from things published on their page.</p><p>And the other thing that's important to know about Facebook is the Facebook audience is much more Republican than any other social media company. Twitter is overwhelmingly Democrat. The Facebook audience is older people, trans-Republican. And so they have a challenge. They're setting an inside game of being seen as being able to influence a process and prevent and be able to keep making gobs of money without interference from the Trump administration. And then there is the problem of if Trump turns on them, that would affect their bottom line because people will stop using the platform. They'd already lost a bunch of liberals over Cambridge Analytic and all these other things.</p><p>And so if MAGA fans, Trump fans, started deleting, "hashtag deleting Facebook," that was going to be a real problem. So they were trying to navigate the situation where they were not upsetting. Their customer base was sort of in the old Michael Jordan apocryphal quote, apparently Republicans use Facebook too, or even may use Facebook more. So there was a fear about losing those people. So it is a combination of ignorance and avarice, I think, that got them in this position.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to come back to their sort of unsolvable problem at the end because I think it's kind of the root of everything. But first, let's get to the present day. So one of the most, I think, key points you make in the book, and it's a point I have been trying to make again and again and again for years, to no effect, is that everybody on the left seems convinced that the left has a messaging problem. And what you point out is that the problem is not messaging. The problem is megaphone. The problem is not the words we're saying what we're saying.</p><p>The problem is the left simply does not have the capacity to get its words into its voters ears in a direct way. We don't have the big machine that the right has built that we're just discussing. But nonetheless, you can say that over and over again. And it proves incredibly difficult to dissuade average people on the left from obsessing over words, magic words. One of that you describe in the book being at these high dollar fundraisers in your suit, kind of hiding over in the corner, trying not to talk to anyone, and these rich people who hold the fundraisers finding you and buttonholing you so they can tell you their thoughts about messaging.</p><p>And I have been at those fundraisers and I have talked to those people, and it was so vivid to me that I was getting beads of sweat on my forehead reading about that. I can't tell you how much sympathy I have for you being forced to listen to overconfident old rich white guy telling you how dems should talk, like the phrases that will magically make things work better. And of course, I'm in climate change. The first thing everybody knows about climate change is that environmentalists are talking about it wrong and instead should use this set of magic phrases which would open up the politics.</p><p>It's really hard to dissuade people from that. But one of the points you make, which I thought was good, is if it came down to the quality of messaging and messengers, then how are these people winning? Look at these people on the right. Look at what they're saying. Don't over 3D-chess yourself into thinking that they're brilliant. They are in fact dumb and sound dumb. They're not good at messaging.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>That's right. As I have made this point over the years, and then particularly in the context of this book, some people read my focus on the megaphone problem as an endorsement of every message the Democrats have ever had. And of course, look, I would stipulate our message could always be better, right? Strictly congressional messaging is inherently bad because you need anything that you need 50 Democrats to sign off on. And one of those Democrats is Bernie Sanders and one is Joe Manchin. Of course it's not going to be like super sharp, right? It's lowest common denominator strategizing.</p><p>I worked in Senate leadership for a time. We went through that, though. In my world, it was Bernie Sanders and Ben Nelson. Or my world or Bernie Sanders and Joe Lieberman. And so it was very challenging. And I think Democrats have a little bit of this was described to me once by many, many years ago, back when Bush was president, that Democrats have a slot machine addiction, which is we're just hoping to pull the lever and get lucky on one thing as opposed to actually doing the work. Right. It speaks to our obsession around messaging, which is we can just come up with our bigger government, less smaller government, less taxes or ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Better together.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yeah. Or MAGA. If we could just find one bumper sticker slogan, it would solve all of our problems. Or it also speaks to, and I think this has changed a lot in the last four or five years, our obsession with presidential elections, right? Presidential elections, if you can just they're exciting, they're sexy, they only happen every four years. It's a substitute for the hard work of building bottom up progressive power through candidate recruitment, candidate training, state legislative races, all of those things. And so we're constantly looking for shortcuts. And I think our messaging obsession is a shortcut to thinking if we just figure out this one magic zinger, we will solve all of our problems.</p><p>And that's just simply if we come up with it, no one's going to hear it. And I obviously wrote this book about the megaphone, both their megaphone and our lack of one. You could write another book about the messaging, but I felt like we have a gazillion people working on the words and not enough people working on the megaphone. So I wanted to try to balance the scales in terms of what the focus was on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I can't tell you how many classes of graduate students I've talked to, all of whom are busy-beavering away doing little experiments, trying different combination of words to see how people react in focus groups, looking for the magic combination of words. And I just want to tell them, like, so much of this is wasted effort.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Problem is the friggin' West Wing view of politics, because in West Wing, Bartlett solved every problem by pulling out the magic words, by having the magic speech by persuading people. And that's just like a very, I think, for liberals. Liberals are educated over-educated. Some might say love words. They love the idea of reasoned persuasion. And it's very self-flattering to think that that's what politics runs on, right? Because that's what you're good at and that's what you know. So it's just real easy to think that that's the engine of politics. But of course, as I tell people who come along and say, well, why don't you talk about climate change as a national security problem?</p><p>It's like, do you think no one's ever said that I can send you 500 white papers. Like, people have been saying that until they're blue in the face for years. It just doesn't go anywhere. It doesn't get out anywhere because we don't have the mechanisms. We just shout it out into the mainstream media and hope that it filters down through the mainstream media to people, and that is not what happens. So I want to talk about building this megaphone, but first, just the most depressing realization I ever had about climate change is when the IPCC report came out and said, we got about ten years.</p><p>Not 'til the Earth ends or not 'til it's too late, all this b******t, but we got about ten years to turn the ship around before we cross these thresholds that are going to be devastating. And when you hear it like that, you're like, oh, ten years? Well, if we have to solve it in ten years, that means we got to solve it with these people that we've got now, like, these people and these institutions, which is just like, "wah, wah, wah" So how big of a problem is the fact that democratic leadership, by and large, is old AF and have their, you know, their thoughts on messaging were formed not even by the Internet, but, like, by TV coming along, you know what I mean?</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So do you just work grassroots up around them? Do you persuade them? Have you been able to persuade any of them to get a clue on this? Or like, what do you do about this lump of. Gerontocratic leadership that is on top of the party.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>My theory of politics has been that people's understanding of the media environment is frozen in amber from the time in which they entered national politics. And so that was a huge advantage for Barack Obama in 2008, was he was a person who had campaigned and come up in politics in the age of the internet, right? You sort of can divide the world into time periods. There's the TV period from 1960 on. There's the cable TV period, which starts in the then the Internet really starts in the early two thousand s. And that goes in my mind up until 2014, which I think is the Facebook-Twitter period of campaigning.</p><p>But so we have a bunch of people who are incredibly skilled leaders at certain aspects of their job, like Nancy Pelosi is, I think, without a doubt the greatest legislative leader in American history. She has done incredible work over a very long period of time. And she is in that role because she's the best vote counter, right? Chuck Schumer is in that role because he's a great vote counter. Joe Biden was, I believe, probably the only Democrat who could have won that election. But his skill set is not getting attention for himself. He was a perfect person to run against Trump.</p><p>But in this day and age, what matters more than anything else is can you get people to hear what you're saying? And that means you have to change how you say it, when you say it, whom you say it to, and all of that. And I think that's very challenging for this group of people. The positives of it, I think, are that I really have felt in the larger progressive universe, including the progressive donor community, that in the last two years, since 2020, since I think the closeness of that Trump election of Trump almost winning that race, and then the power of the big lie scared a lot of people into realizing that we have to narrow the media gap.</p><p>And you're seeing more investment from democratic donors into entities that are trying to solve that problem, either media companies or content factories and things like that. So there is some positive and there are among ... there was a group of us, I wasn't the only one, but sort of by far from the only one. There are a group of people after 2016 who were making the round saying this was the challenge. And there were all ... a gazillion meetings after the election between people in politics, old Obama people, silicon — I live out in the Bay Area — Silicon Valley people, like rich people.</p><p>Holy s**t, what happened? How do we fix this problem? And there were massive gaps all across the board in the infrastructure, right? We had a data problem, we had an organizing problem. We didn't have the organizations to capture the huge wave of resistance that was coming in. Who's working on local stuff, all of that and the messaging thing often fell by the wayside for a whole host of reasons that we can talk about that has shifted. And there are even like you have to look for small victories, I think. But I've seen some things. I know the people in the Biden White House, I worked with lots of them at all levels.</p><p>This is certainly not Joe Biden's natural skill set is communicating in this environment. And we knew that going in. We knew that when we nominated him. We knew that when we elected him. The people around him are pushing and working on lots of things and there are some small things that I think are really positive. Like I took note of Biden doing some progressive media interviews. Like with Brian Tyler Cohen and Heather Cox Richardson. There are some efforts happening out there. The DNC just launched a really, I think, potentially game changing program if they can scale it, where people can download an app that gives them content to share to their networks, whether it's what we're trying to do at Crooked Mmedia, whether it's the stuff that you're doing and other people Midas Touch, Demcast, there are more perfect union.</p><p>There are lots of out there. Like we have a long way to go. But I've seen so much more focus and investment on trying to solve this problem in the last couple of years than I have in the full balance of my career in politics before it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the things that struck me as I was reading your book is the media and communications environment has changed so fundamentally in the last ten years that it has basically rendered the skill sets of the Democratic consultant class anachronistic. They just have a bunch of skills now and talents that no longer matter. And this was rendered vivid when James Carville goes on TV or actually was in Vox. He went on Vox and he's complaining about how Democrats are woke, how novel James, and says, we need to get this other message out there, so we need to start calling cable bookers and writing op eds to get this message out there.</p><p>And I just thought, my God, how revealing is that, that when you think about how to get a message out there, your first thought is calling cable bookers and getting op eds placed in regional newspapers. That is just like some grandpa s**t. But that's the skill set that most of the consultant class has. And if you are talking about pivoting to a completely new environment, you are going to render a lot of those people useless and presumably they don't want to be useless. So what's your sense of how much resistance there is from the people who learned the old way, the old way of press management?</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>There definitely is some level of resistance. There has been over the course of my time in politics, mostly the same set of people making television ads for presidential campaigns, and the dominance of broadcast linear television advertising as a communications medium in presidential elections. In particular, the value of an ad, television ad in a highly polarized environment where an election is decided by 40,000 people is probably pretty small. It's like a historically inefficient way to communicate with people. I think it's slightly different in races where the candidates don't have 100% name ID. And I mean, this is getting sort of nerdy, but the way Facebook has changed its political advertising policies, you're sort of being pushed back in some ways to the old world.</p><p>I think there is resistance. There's a sense, I think, that the whole consultant class is corrupt and this is all about making money. And there are certainly some people who on both parties who are not as ethical as everyone else. But for the vast part at least, the consultants I've worked with, they want to win. They want to win because they're Democrats, they care about the country. And also winning elections is better for business than losing elections. And most are pretty open to some new ways of doing things. It is sometimes hard because the candidates are less so because they are from an old world.</p><p>They want their race this way, some of them, just because the way demographics have changed, haven't had a tough race in a very long time and so they're sort of operating in the way they were thinking. If you're looking for positives in this, the number of people with digital organizing and communications experience who are running campaigns, who have the actual campaign manager title and are making budgetary decisions, has gone way up. That's actually what most campaigns that I talk to, that's what they look for first. Someone who is digitally savvy and understands analytics, performance, measurement of communications and all of that.</p><p>So there is some positive stuff there. The hard part is like, and I argue this in the book, is you have to entirely change the apparatus of how campaigns are structured to fully maximize a new way of communicating. And that is a hard thing to get anyone to wrap their mind around. And one of the challenges we had in this presidential election, this past one in 2020, was the old way of doing ... of how you communicate, where 99% of your communications is focused around press management is not a terrible way to win a primary. The Democratic primary electorate is the highest percentage consumer of political media and so maximizing your press coverage and managing your press narratives was a huge part of those campaigns.</p><p>So there wasn't an incentive to radically rebuild the model for the general election. And then when Biden won the nomination, he was probably the person least likely to do it, just given his experience. But he did hire Jen O'Malley Dillon as his campaign manager, someone who has thought as deeply about these issues as anyone I know in the party. And they did a lot of things sort of under the radar in terms of how they communicated strictly towards the end. But making those changes in a pandemic when the headquarters shuts down, whatever it was, seven days after you win the nomination, and the day your new campaign manager arrives at the office makes it very hard under all scenarios.</p><p>And so I think that there are some good things happening, but change is always hard, and change is particularly hard in the White House because of the way it's set up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about, then, the megaphone. You say it in your book. I've said it a million times. It seems so obvious to me that it's baffling, that it needs saying over and over again. But the right has this giant machine whereby they can directly channel their message to their voters and get all their voters on the same page. So, for instance, if the left comes out with a Green New Deal on the left, they introduce the Green New Deal at a press conference and then mainstream reporters write it up. And the left just hopes that the spirit and the details of the thing survive those write ups and make it somehow to left voters.</p><p>Whereas on the right you're like, oh, here's a new thing. What do I think about it? Well, every one of a dozen radio stations and web pages and TV shows are telling you exactly what you think about it and what all the other people on the right think about it. So whether it's AOC debuting on the scene, or the Green New Deal debuting on the scene or what have you, like the left fumbles around with it, but the right swings around in opposition to it immediately and in lockstep because they have this megaphone. So the left needs something like a megaphone.</p><p>But there are issues around that that people on the left struggle with, and I think of two in particular. One is whether it can find an audience. So one of the things you say in your book is that obviously the left's megaphone, the left needs to tell the truth, right, because trust is much more important on the left than it is on the right for a variety of reasons. We need people to trust government for the government to do things. We need to be persuading people who are not our natural ideological allies, people in the mushy Center.</p><p>So we need trust. So we need to tell the truth, and we need to be transparent about where we're coming from and sort of what our priors are. But problem number one here is, I feel like one of the things we've learned from this, our miserable current media environment, is just that calm, honest transparency doesn't necessarily get clicks. It certainly doesn't get as many clicks as being a provocative a*****e. So the first question is just if such a thing happened, if the Democrats created something like this and started calmly explaining their positions in all their sort of truth and nuance.</p><p>Why do we think that anyone would consume it? Do you think there's a demand for that kind of thing?</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>This is maybe a sad statement on the world, but I don't think there is a demand for nuance. Calm nuance is not something if you want calm nuance you can listen to NPR or read the New York Times if that's what you want. The calm nuance market exists and it's doing fine, but it's not necessarily helping Democrats and it's not the job of the people in the calm nuanced market to help us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>So I think a couple of things about this. One is I would say one stipulation is that there are two economic models for media, right? And I use I define media broadly. There is subscription model and I think there are people who've indicated they will pay for calm nuance or in depth reporting or policy analysis. There are people who will pay for that. And then there is digital advertising. And digital advertising is a click-driven model and those clicks often come through Facebook. So you are a prisoner of the Facebook algorithm. Now we know what the Facebook algorithm values, which is on a daily basis.</p><p>It's Candace Owens, Ben Shapiro, and Dan Bongino who dominate Facebook in terms of engagement and posts that perform, right? And so in the media environment which exists, you have to find ways to get attention. You have to be loud. You often have to be oppositional just.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To sort of put a pin or an exclamation point on this. People hating on you and yelling at you counts as engagement. So you can be the most hated post in the world and it could still be incredibly successful.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yes, that is the most important thing for anyone to understand and I write a chapter about this in the book, just is that weaponizing liberal anger is one of the primary right wing media strategies, which is they want like in the sort of and this is a real Steve Bannon project, the Breitbart headlines. There's one I don't remember what's topic, but something like "Birth Control Makes Women Ugly" or something. There is all these horrible things that they say and they're specifically trying to trigger liberals into expressing their anger about the article online because Facebook counts your angry comment, your thumbs down emoji just like it counts a thumbs up emoji and therefore we are inadvertently spreading their content all over the place. So what do progressives do?</p><p>We have to be willing to anger the right. You have to be loud, you have to be clear. You have to be like I named the book "How Fox, Facebook and the MAGA Media are Destroying America" as almost a model for the sort of the very direct, clear language you have to use to get attention. If it had been "How Fox Facebook and the MAGA Media are Undermining Democracy." That is not as clickable, right? That is the world we live in. And you have to be direct in how you do it now. Humor, so there are a couple of things about how this works in a progressive media ecosystem.</p><p>One is being clear, indirect, and authentic and offering some differentiation between just more liberal New York Times, right? It has to feel like authentic. The second is it has to be entertaining and engaging. And that can be funny, that can be provocative, whatever that is. But I talk about this in the book. But it's like I watch these Trump rallies even now, and obviously there's no place in the world I would want to be less than a Trump rally, especially when you see the press going live from the parking lot or whatever. Those people I don't think it's a great statement in America those people are having a blast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, they're very engaged. They look like dead audiences. That's what it reminds me of over and over again.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's all these merchants in the parking lot selling weird, oftentimes racist chuchkis. There are people wearing funny shirts. They're having a blast.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And these are people who have never had a Grateful Dead.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You know what I mean? Or a fish. Like they have never had a sort of cultural occasion to do something like a traveling festival like this. So for lots of them, it's like you can tell it's really life changing for them.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's like the bizarro version of Obama rallies in '08, very similar vibe. People wanted to like if it was in your town, you didn't want to miss it. And we were able to bring a lot and I think Trump succeeded from this as well, bring a lot of people into the process who just wanted to check it out because everyone was talking about it. And I think that that is like as I wrote in the book, we are trying to engage people who don't like to engage in politics. Our math depends on new people or people who've checked out the process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>And so we got to make it fun. Like I tell the story, John Lovett tells the story all the time in my pocket puzzle. America co host that back when he was a speechwriter for Senator, then Senator Hillary Clinton. They had written a big climate change speech that she was going to give. This must have been like in six or seven or something, even before she ran for President. And Lovett had worked on the speech and like they often do with the big speech, they had shared it with President Clinton. And like at two in the morning, love its time, because I think President Clinton was in Vegas.</p><p>He gets a call from the A traveling with Clinton with all of Clinton's notes. And Clinton's big takeaway is, you got to make solving our climate problems seem like an adventure that people want to engage in, that it's going to be huge, joyous, important work that you're going to want to be a part of. And we have to think about politics of it in progressive media is this is going to be something that is fulfilling and even fun and entertaining and you're going to want to be a part of. And if we're just trying to and the Republicans don't have to do it that way.</p><p>Their math means they can just make people angry and get them to turn out. We have to do something a little more complicated, and our media has to reflect that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But you were saying earlier you have to be provocative. You have to have some kind of hook. But it's not just that you have to be provocative on step one. It's that when you're provocative and then you get scolded by the right and probably by some well meaning, goo-goo centrist Democrat, you have to not back down, right? You have to stick with your guns. And this is an intangible that I feel like it just gets undercounted in terms of what makes people want to you're talking about making it seem like a fun adventure, making it seem like a festival, like a cultural event, like something you want to be part of.</p><p>Part of that, I think, is people are attracted to people who have the courage of their convictions, and it's just not I just don't think it's lost on the public that over and over and over again you see dems or people on the left backing down in the face of scolding and blowback and apologizing. I mean, this whole cycle of defund the police is just like a paradigmatic example, right? You got, like, three leftists say, defund the police. The right wing successfully hangs the thing around the entire party. And rather than saying, we believe in our activists this is not the best slogan, but we believe in the policy.</p><p>And moreover, we would like to emphasize again the dire need for police reform. Instead, they just scrambled backwards, apologized, and did a big speech about funding the f*****g police. And that's just a classic example of every time they get smacked on the nose, they back down. How do you I don't even know what you would do, but how do you break that habit? How do you give people on the left some of the sort of bullishness and tenacity to just shake off criticism and double down?</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>I mean, part of this is generational in a lot of ways, and there are always exceptions to every generational critique here because I talk in the book about how largely it is our older Democrats who struggle with this new media environment. But Bernie Sanders is actually pretty good at it, and so is Elizabeth Warren, even though they are also in their 70s. This is somewhat, I think, generational the way to do this Obama always used to say, in situations like these, don't play the game, call out the game. And so the way I have tried to convince people who I've talked to about the defund the police situation is, one, you have to understand what's happening here.</p><p>This is not an on the level discussion of law enforcement and criminal justice policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I can't believe that's so basic.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, this is about race.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We're not having a reasoned policy discussion here.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, it is about dividing people largely along racial lines. It is to scare the s**t out of white people. And you have to understand that in your response. And so simply yelling, we want to fund the police is not a solution to the problem. You have to take their critique of you and turn it back on them. Why are they trying to divide us or to exploit people is because they want to do why? The language that I always push people to is the language that was put forward in the race-class narrative about how the work that was done by Demos and a bunch of other groups is they want to attack you for defund the police.</p><p>You should attack them for attacking you for defund the police and pivoting back onto your core set of issues like why aren't they trying to solve the problem? Why are they trying to exploit the problem? Why are they trying to divide us? Because they want to protect tactics of the law that you can pick your issue that you want to put in there, but is you have to punch back. Right. I kind of hate the idea that you should never apologize because there are times in which you are wrong, and when you are wrong, you should apologize.</p><p>You should never back down in the face of bad faith critiques. Right. If something you say does not generate a backlash from someone, then you probably didn't say something provocative enough to get it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know we need to start training people to view this blowback as a sign of success.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The first problem I raised about a Democratic microphone is how to attract eyeballs and viewers for accurate information. When it seems like lying. It's so much easier to be provocative and to get engagement with lying. The second problem, though, is the nature of the Dem coalition sort of legendarily. The right is much more homogenous than the left. Racially, ideologically, culturally, however you name it. The left has all these different groups, very different cultures, different ages, different whatever class, whatever. So, a. it's very difficult to sort of come up with a message that unites all those people, as you were saying.</p><p>But also one of the problems I've seen is that for any attack on the left by the right, there will be some other faction of the left who also hates that faction of the left. And will join in the right's attack, right? So if the right is attacking AOC, you'll have centrist Dem saying, "Well, they kind of have a point." Whatever. Like whoever you attack on the left, you'll find somebody else on the left who will join in because the left isn't legendarily fractious. So the upshot of that is that every criticism coming from the right ends up looking bipartisan, right?</p><p>Because they'll get somebody on the left to go along with it, right? And if you're too provocative or too left in your megaphone, you'll get wishy-washy mainstream Democrats tut-tutting, you scolding, you telling you to calm down, telling you to not be so provocative. Or as I'm sure you're familiar with, if you're out trying to sort of sell the mainstream Democratic line and sort of help the mainstream Democratic Party, you're going to come under constant attack from the left for being a simp and a sellout and whatever, a mouthpiece, et cetera, et cetera. So it just seems like so many factions on the left are so invested in battling one another.</p><p>That sometimes strikes me as just like an insuperable barrier to anything like the megaphone we're talking about. What's the answer to that? You're not going to get the factions to get along. Is it just multiple megaphones? Is there a solution to that problem? Just from the point of view of messaging and media?</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Probably not. We have always been the Democrat has always been somewhat of a circular firing squad. I mean, Republicans present a more united front via Fox News and all of their other entities than they are in real life. They are trying to destroy Liz Cheney and a whole bunch of other people. Right now they're in these incredibly divisive primaries. Most Republicans actually hate Mitch McConnell. It's one of the few things that gives me hope for America, that Democrats and Republicans both hate Mitch McConnell personally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But I'm not sure normies, I'm not sure political normies are ever even aware of those divisions.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Right. That's because the right is communicating. All that matters is whether your target audience knows about those things. And so this is what happens when this is how journalism works, right? And there's something wrong with this. It's just how it works, which is you say something, they call up someone to criticize to give the other side of whatever it is that you just said to offer it and post a review. And that's always more valuable, particularly in a polarized time from the perspective of journals, if that person is ideologically aligned with you on other issues, right? So Democrat crapping on Democrat is more interesting than Republican who craps on Democrat for waking up in the morning.</p><p>But that is the price we pay for depending on traditional political media to be the primary distributor of our message. If you build up your megaphone. I want to try to find the right balance in this between internal party debate, which I think is largely healthy and should be understood. And I don't mean performative crapping on AOC or even sometimes left attacking Biden for things Biden can't do for the sake of clicks. It happens both ways, right? And some of these fights that happen between one left member and one centrist member are beneficial to both of them individually because the criticism of the other approves their bona fides to their base.</p><p>But it's negative for the party as a whole. But having big debates about what we should do on various things, or pressuring an incumbent president to do something like cancel student debt, those voices should be heard. But when it comes time to focus the mind and win elections and we become more aligned around things, you need media outlets, ways to communicate where the price of that communication is not highlighting disarray within your party, which is, I think, what happens when you if you are relying on the New York Times or CNN as the way to brand your party.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, the way I sort of convey this story, the anecdote I tell to convey this to people is one of my early sort of formative political experiences was tracking the Waxman-Markey Climate Bill back in 2009, 2010. And I naively read the bill and studied the policies involved and was all geared up to have a discussion with someone, anyone, about the policies involved. And what I noticed, and this didn't really become clear to me until kind of it had passed, but you had a left who was invested in crapping on it because it was a sort of mainstream market based policy that didn't go far enough. So you had the whole left apparatus crapping on it.</p><p>You had this whole sort of like goo goo centrist above it all left who crapped on it because it's too complicated and it has too many compromises and a clear, simple carbon tax would be better. It's sort of this virtuous crapping on it from that side. And then of course, you had the right distorting everything about it and crapping on it. And the sort of net effect was the thing a. didn't have any real champions, right? And b. didn't have .... at no point was there a discussion in media about the actual bill itself as opposed to the weird symbol that various factions had made out of it.</p><p>Kind of that's what I saw as missing. I was like, yeah, the left has its little megaphone for bashing stuff and the centrists have their megaphone and the right has their megaphone. But the actual meat and potatoes of mainstream Democratic politics, the bill that's actually on the table and might actually pass, has no megaphone behind it, has no one behind it. And so that's what I sort of struggle to envision when we talk about a megaphone is like, I understand how the left faction thinks they're kind of like cool and rebellious and how they get excited.</p><p>And how the above it all centrists get excited by their priors being confirmed, but it just doesn't seem sexy or exciting or cool at all just to be a Democrat and to defend what Democrats are doing and to try to help Democrats. I don't even know that I can put my finger on it, but just culturally, it seems like there's no cool identity there.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, look, these are very challenging problems. There are incentive structures on all side that push people in various directions. And we used to joke sometimes in the Obama White House that the place where we would always find ourselves was where the left was mad at us and the right was mad at us just in that middle. Because that's oftentimes the correct possible policy solution. Right. It's not as nice as you would do it if you could do whatever you wanted, right? That is Obamacare in a lot of ways.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>If you were starting from scratch and the President could just pick whatever plan he wanted, it would be different than the ACA.</p><p>And no matter what plan you pick, the right was going to s**t on it. And so you often do find yourself in that place. I think there's not an easy answer there. I think a more sophisticated, more advanced, more digital friendly way of communicating from more people in the party could offset some of that would put more throw-weight behind what is happening if you were more aggressively using paid media and organic digital media and leveraging the existing in an expanded progressive media megaphone to just communicate directly with your people. Because that's the problem is the discourse is about the discourse, right?</p><p>What people are hearing is they're hearing that some people are mad about something. Some of those people may be people that you like and therefore you think, maybe I shouldn't like this thing so much. And if you had more direct line of communication for Democratic Party leaders and progressives, I define that broadly progressives to tell their story on their terms, you would be able to it would not just become this is Obamacare problem, left is mad, right is mad. Everyone else throws up their arms and think, this thing must be fucked. And over the course of time, as the Affordable Care Act became so popular, that trying to repeal it cost the Republicans, the House and almost the Senate.</p><p>And so things can change over time, but in the moment, if you can communicate more directly with people, you're going to have a better chance to at least compete with those other voices because there's going to be people. The right has this in some sense, too. Less so when Trump was president. But right wing media is shitting all over Mitch McConnell, right? Just attacking him, attacking him, attacking him, because there is a financial, political, click based incentive to do it. We have a similar thing on our side, but they then have Fox and a bunch of other entities who can balance the scales so that they're telling a more direct story.</p><p>And that's kind of what we have to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's something perverse about the fact that the exact space of kind of political possibility is perfectly located at a spot that nobody loves. It's almost possible because nobody loves it. So that is like an intrinsic communication problem that mostly faces the left, because it's always the left that's trying to do things, trying to advance things and do things. And people will always default back to status quo bias, even if the status quo sucks.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, the political system is biased towards conservatives both in terms of the way that which the Electoral College and the Senate disproportionately value Republican base voters. But also it is a system designed for inaction and that is a problem for the party that wants to do things and it is an advantage for the party that wants to not do things. Where Republicans get in trouble is when they're trying to undo the few things Democrats did accomplish and then they generally fail at those things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, the few things that we can make part of the status quo, then we can finally get status quo bias working in our benefit. But it's so difficult. It's so slow. Well, I've kept you a long time. I just want to wrap up with a final question, which is probably the biggest question at all and the least answerable of all, but I think is ultimately at the root of all this. So what you lament in this book, and what a lot of people have lamented recently, is that there used to be a core media that everybody had to deal with, right, that everybody got their news from, and that if you wanted to get your voice out, you had to go through them.</p><p>This was through scarcity. Before the Internet, we just had a set number of TV stations, a set number of newspapers, and people go on and on about the disadvantages of that, all the biases that were built into that and all the blind spots that were built into that. And that's all very true. But the flip side is that we're all acknowledging now is it's not really good when there's no common source of information or facts, that there's no institution that is trusted across lines in the US. That's what we sort of come back to again and again.</p><p>Like the mainstream media could do all these reforms that you suggest in your book, but ultimately, if it tells the truth consistently, it's going to be unfavorable to the right. So if the right doesn't have to trust it, it won't. And as long as the right has its own media machine, it won't. You see this sort of playing out now and how people talk about Facebook. Now we're talking about wanting Facebook to moderate content, but just step back and think how insane that is. We're asking Facebook to decide in our society, in our culture, what are the bounds, what are the moral bounds on dialogue, what is okay to say and what's not okay to say?</p><p>What's merely controversial versus out of bounds, right? Like these are sort of things that are governed by norms and common understanding. And if those things are gone, if we don't agree about those anymore, why on earth would we think that a board of tech dudes could step in and play that role in our culture? It just seems honestly like I understand the recommendation for Dems for the left to create its own megaphone because the right has one and the left has got to fight back. But then if you're just left with two megaphones and no shared authority, that means in terms of messaging and news, but also more and more in terms of government and literal authority figures, it doesn't seem like the left just having fighting back the way the right is fighting.</p><p>Seems like you just end up spiraling down this sort of partisanship black hole.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it seems like what we need if we want to survive as a society long term is restoring something like some shared authority, something that we can all trust and just. Do you have any thoughts on that? I mean, do you worry if there are just two competing sides and there's nothing above them, there's no transcendent rules or guidelines that we're kind of doomed?</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>I worry deeply about the state of our democracy, the state of a country where there is no shared set of facts. Now, when you say it that way, it makes it sound like republicans don't believe these facts and Democrats don't believe these facts when the fact of the matter is we have a majority in this country. It's a majority that is frankly growing, that has a shared ... is attached to reality. It has a shared set of increasingly progressive, fact-based values and views of the world. Now, that majority, because of our political system and the current demographic world we're in, does not have political power commensurate with its numbers that Joe Biden can win by 7 million votes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>These are not two mirror images, not two equal sides. That's always important to point out.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yes. And I do not believe that anytime in the near future we are going to return to the pre-internet world of media where you had a series of trusted, a small number of trusted, putatively objective arbiters of fact and fiction in this country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>I think there are a few things that can happen. I think there are some and I'm far from an expert in this there are some regulatory moves that can be made that can make it so that there is less disinformation and conspiracy theories flowing on social media. These platforms can be held more accountable. There are some proposals out there this is beyond my expertise, certainly about more transparency and regulation of the algorithm itself. So we take Mark Zuckerberg's individual whack a mole decisions about what to keep on the platform, when to take off out of it.</p><p>I agree that is a losing battle. So that is one thing. I also think that we are also in a very strange period in American history about where the media and how people get information change so fast that we have a particularly vulnerable population to disinformation, right? Where younger people who have come up on Facebook, on social media, are going to be much better at separating conspiracy theory from reality, fact from fiction, genuine good faith arguments from bad faith arguments because they are much more savvy. Most people over the age of 50 were trained to believe, to have presumed to believe as true headlines they read.</p><p>And the right has ruthlessly exploited that. Fox News has exploited it. A bunch of these digital sites have exploited it, and that has put us in this bad position. So I don't think we're going to go back to the old world. I think there is a way in which the new world is better. And one of the reasons why we have to build the Progressive Megaphone and I don't mean to be mercenary about this, is we have to defeat this MAGA extremist faction in this country that is existing at a very very dangerous time because of where we are in our technological evolution, where we are in information ecosystem, and where we are in the demographics of this country that the midwest is turning red before the southwest and southeast are turning blue.</p><p>It puts us in a very, very vulnerable place. And if we can survive this and get to a better place and protect democracy and prevent Trump or Ron DeSantis president, we have a chance to age into a better information environment with more sophisticated information consumers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm old enough to remember now when a vital young man named Barack Obama came into office and everybody thought, we did it. We made it past the boomers, we aged like the young people are finally here. And then, no.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>We went right past the boomers, but we went the other way. We went to the silent generation to be in charge. So we went past the boomers, we just went the other way. And so hopefully we're getting towards some very young Gen X or late stage millennials to be in charge soon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's looking like odds are a big Republican victory in the midterms. Odds are a Republican victory for President in 2024. Obviously, you and millions of other people are going to fight to change that outcome, but at least purely in terms of the statistical odds, that's what looks likely. And I wonder if one of the very small and very few bright points of that might be that if, like, a full on authoritarian movement takes over all three branches of government. If that might not just by force of pressure, cause the media to be more self aware of itself and its own norms and practices and its own health as an independent institution, if it might, in some perverse way, accelerate some of these needed changes in the media outlook?</p><p>Or is that just wild optimism.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>If your optimistic take is that a shift towards an authorian torment government would be good for the media, but I would file that. I would file that under I don't want to find out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's like at the end of Watchmen when you bring in the giant space octopus to unite humanity against it. That's kind of the only thing I can imagine. Making the media be more self conscious about itself as an institution and its own prerogatives.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Obviously not the way you would want that to happen. Anyway, Dan Pfeiffer, your book "Battling the Big Lie" is out now. It's great. I read it. I appreciate the work you do. And thanks for coming on Volts.</p><p><strong>Dan Pfeiffer</strong></p><p>Thanks, man. Thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much. And I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-dan-pfeiffer-on-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:59479348</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 30 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/59479348/06360253188bedbc593e1c16bbe2faf4.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4391</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/59479348/a0e5f3414aa7405900a958d163bce246.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Johannes Ackva on effective climate altruism]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Johannes Ackva of Founders Pledge discusses his thinking on the most effective forms of climate philanthropy.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAC-SoOI4NVVn9nVgmG4XCXha/volts22.06.15%28Johannes.Ackva%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-johannes-ackva-on-effective-climate-altruism"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Say you’re a private individual (or a company, or a foundation) who cares about climate change and has some money to spend on it. What’s the best way to spend that money? How can you ensure the largest possible impact?</p><p>Similar questions about maximizing philanthropic impact have led to an entire field of study and practice known as “effective altruism,” which seeks to apply logical and empirical rigor to do-gooderism. But it is only very recently that effective altruists have turned their attention to climate change. </p><p>One of the leading EA voices on climate is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eaglobal.org/speakers/johannes-ackva/">Johannes Ackva</a>. He’s a researcher at <a target="_blank" href="https://founderspledge.com">Founders Pledge</a>, an organization through which business owners and entrepreneurs donate a portion of their earnings to charity. For years, Ackva has been thinking through the puzzle of how best to channel climate philanthropy, given the <a target="_blank" href="https://founderspledge.com/stories/changing-landscape">structure of the problem</a> and the politics around it. </p><p>If you’re interested in what groups Founders Pledge has chosen for its donations, you can find <a target="_blank" href="https://founderspledge.com/funds/climate-change-fund">a list on the website</a>, but I was more interested in the thinking that led Ackva to those recommendations. Given the enormous spatial and temporal scales involved in climate change, the many social and political complexities, the extensive and irreducible uncertainties, how can a well-meaning donor have any confidence in their choices? </p><p>I found our conversation quite enlightening — a new lens through which to view this familiar problem — it and I think you will too.</p><p>Johannes Ackva, welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p>Johannes Ackva:</p><p>Yeah, thank you, David. Thanks for having me. It's an honor and pleasure to be here.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Let's start a few steps back since I'm not entirely sure that the Volts audience will be familiar with the effective altruism movement, even though it gained quite a bit of press attention recently. So to start with, just tell us briefly, what is effective altruism and what is it trying to do?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>So effective altruism is really a social and intellectual movement that tries to answer the question, “how can we do the most good possible?” And, not only answer that question in a theoretical way, but in a very practical way, actually trying to do as much good as possible. </p><p>There are two components to it. The first one that I would stress is, of course: altruism, which is about trying to be really serious about helping other people and other beings. So, effective altruists usually take a global take, including all humans, also all future humans, also all animals. So, having a really expansive form of altruism. And many effective altruists donate a large part of their income to the global poor or change their careers. So this is the altruism piece of it. </p><p>And then there's this effectiveness piece, which is like thinking really hard and long, and trying to use as much evidence as possible to think about “how can we have the most impact?”, the most positive impact. And one thing about impact here that I think is crucial, because I think it will come up throughout our conversation, is that a lot of what I'm saying on climate is motivated by this notion of counterfactual impact. Given what everyone else is doing, what is the thing that is additional, should be done next? So, not only trying to have impact, but trying to have impact that otherwise would not happen in the world. And I think that's really key to how we think about climate.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>And this is the concept of additionality, doing something that would not otherwise be done?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, doing something that would not otherwise be done. Yes, that's the concept of additionality.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>I won't claim any deep familiarity with the ins and outs of the movement, but my impression over the last few years is that some of the most prominent spokespeople for effective altruism are relatively down on climate change as a target for philanthropic giving. I think the idea is that they're trying to think about all humans today and all humans that will ever be. They're thinking about what might cause the extinction of the human race, and they say climate is unlikely to cause extinction, whereas, you know, a terrible pandemic or an asteroid or an AI that becomes sentient and does a terminator on us are much greater threats of extinction. </p><p>So why, within the context of effective altruism, do you think that climate change is a worthy target for people's giving and attention?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>First, I would say you're broadly right there. And it’s funny, because I was a climate person before I was an effective altruist, before I encountered effective altruism. So, it was the first instance of having to justify myself. Why <em>am</em> I working on climate? Growing up in Germany this was something I never had to justify. So I think that's broadly right, most effective altruists do not focus on climate and I think the reason that you’ve outlined as to why is broadly right. </p><p>Climate is a really big threat, and I think effective altruists acknowledge that there are very serious threats from extreme climate change, so the view is not that climate isn't a serious problem. I think effective altruists take it very seriously. But seeing a broad set of problems of similar magnitude (like nuclear war, advanced artificial intelligence that you mentioned, or bio risk) where many of those issues receive far, far less attention than climate change is the reason that many effective altruists would not first go to climate.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>But you think they're wrong about that, that climate <em>is</em> a worthy target of giving and philanthropy? What is the effective altruism justification for focusing on climate?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, okay, so I think the effective altruism justification for caring about climate has two different aspects. One comes from thinking about humans alive today, or humans alive in the near future. So obviously, I think we know from the literature on climate impacts, that vulnerable populations in the Global South will suffer the most from climate change, and helping them can be quite effective, also because solving climate change is related to solving some other really big problems, in particular air pollution and energy poverty. So, if you think about clean energy abundance as one possible solution for climate change, that would actually solve all of those issues.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right. So you're solving three problems in one when you solve this problem?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, that's the first piece. I think the second piece comes if you think about global catastrophic risk or if you think about the importance of geopolitical stability and good international cooperation. If you think about how climate change can go wrong, how climate change can cause migration, international attention, etc. I think that's another set of reasons to care about climate change, just making the world in general less fragile, more resilient, and trying to reduce geopolitical pressure.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Yeah, because they say climate is a “threat multiplier”, right? That's the term that you use. So in a sense, by decreasing the threat of climate, you are also decreasing all those other risks. </p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>To add one little bit of nuance here, I'm not saying to effective altruists: “do more on climate, do less of these other things”. I just want to be very clear about this. What I gave you is what I see as the strongest case for caring about climate change, but it is true that there are other risks of similar order of magnitude, in terms of risk, that we're spending a 100th or less of the attention on. So I think it's probably right to think about climate not as the most neglected issue, globally speaking.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>So even you would say, from an effective altruism point of view: while climate is worthy of attention, there are other risks worthy of attention that are getting less attention than climate. Is that what you’re saying?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>I think that's what I would say if we only think about the importance and neglectedness of those problems. There is, however, another dimension. And I think that's also really important in making the case for climate. And that dimension is tractability, or the ability to make additional progress, and I think climate looks extraordinarily good on that dimension compared to many of those other problems that I mentioned for a couple of reasons.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Tell us about that then. Tell us why, in terms of tractability (meaning there's progress to be made), there's “low hanging fruit” available, you might say. Why should we think that climate <em>philanthropy</em> in particular can produce results?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, great question. So I think there are essentially three reasons why I would believe that to be true. The first one is that attention to climate overall, like societal attention including policy, economics, etc. is actually really high, and is at an all time high. We're now spending about a trillion or so in the global economy, and climate policy has been a really important part of Biden's agenda, and has been really important in Europe for a long time. So, there's a lot of attention to climate, I think that's the first piece. </p><p>The second piece is that a lot of that attention is not spent optimally, in terms of the ultimate goal (or, what I see as the ultimate goal) of acting on climate, which is reducing climate damage as much as possible. And there are some very predictable biases. For example, the US and Europe maybe represent around 15% of future emissions, so effective climate action should always think about global emissions, but there are lots of political incentives to focus locally. There's lots of ideological issues, there's lots of special interests, so a lot of the attention on climate is not spent optimally. That's the second piece. And the third piece comes if you think about climate philanthropy as a whole and the role that climate philanthropy can play. If you conservatively assume that you can only shift how the public response is improved by something like a 10th of a percent, or something like that, that can still be extraordinarily valuable. So essentially, it’s about leveraging the attention on climate to try and help steer the climate momentum that exists in a way that’s more useful for global decarbonisation.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right. So you’ve sort of got the raw material there, you've got the attention and the will to do something, and you think a little bit of nudging in a better direction could have a big positive effect.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah.</p><p>David Roberts: </p><p>I want to focus in on one of the things you said, and this is a quote from one of your papers: “the goal of high impact climate philanthropy is not to maximize emission reductions, but to minimize climate damage”. It might not be obvious to people what the distinction is there, so explain that a little bit and explain what those two different approaches would imply?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, no, that's not obvious at all, and it wasn't obvious to me for a long time. I only really fully grappled with this last year when I wrote the <a target="_blank" href="http://founderspledge.com/landscape">paper</a>. So, I guess the first intuition when thinking about maximum impact and climate philanthropy would really be: okay, we want to maximize emissions reductions. But, there's something particular about the climate challenge that I think makes this intuition wrong, and that’s the fact that climate damage is highly nonlinear. So, if we think about a 3 degree world, this is much worse than twice as bad as a 1.5 degree world. Again, a 6 degree world is much worse than twice as bad as a 3 degree world. If we think about it in terms of a concept like the social cost of carbon, the social cost of carbon at different levels of temperature is very different. It's much more valuable to avoid an additional tonne of carbon in the 6 degree world than in the 1.5 degree world. And this is standard climate science and I would say this is really one of the most uncontroversial facts about climate. </p><p>But the key thing here is that we actually “know” things that must be true if we're in a 4 degree world compared to a 1 degree world. For example, if we're in a 4 degree world, Zeke Hausfather, the climate scientist, has said “we're not in a 4 degree world and renewables have succeeded beyond all expectations.”</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>This means that in this 4 degree world, there are solutions or hedges which can be extremely valuable. One of them would be, for example, advanced nuclear, which to some degree is a hedge against failure of renewables. It might not play a big role in the best case world, right? Maybe we’re in the best case world where renewables succeed beyond all expectations, but if not, there's an extraordinary hedging value from those kinds of solutions. Maximizing emission reductions will not lead you to this conclusion, whereas minimizing climate damage  leads you to other kinds of conclusions.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right. So if you're trying to maximize emission reductions, you would just go for the cheapest, most obvious reductions available now, which will generally be renewables or something like that. But it sounds like you're describing something more like trying to reduce risk rather than emissions.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yes.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>And risk rises nonlinearly, so you think philanthropy should be hedging against failure, hedging against the failure of mainstream approaches basically. Does that sound right?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Alright, let me answer this in two parts. First, it's not really about time. It's not really about spending now versus long term. It's not about spending on renewables now for the cheapest buckets, it’s more about thinking about what correlates with different climate futures. So for example, if you think about one thing that's often described as very cost effective: forestry, avoiding deforestation. Having agreements between Europe and Brazil to avoid deforestation, that’s very cost effective in the best of worlds where international cooperation and the quality of agreements is stronger than it actually is right now. If we're in that kind of setting we're not going to have a lot of climate damage. So, even though that might maximize emissions reduction in expectation, it wouldn't minimize damage. So it's not about the timing, but what correlates with different kinds of scenarios. </p><p>So, what I'm talking about is always counterfactual impact, and what to do given what everyone else is doing. So I'm absolutely not saying we shouldn't focus on renewables, or we shouldn't focus on natural climate solutions. It's more that given we have a large focus on this now, what should we do next? And then, my argument would always be about the value of hedging against the failure of mainstream solutions, because right now we're in a situation where mainstream solutions get a lot of attention. We can also see the success of that, right? Future emission trajectories have gone down a lot because of the success of renewables, more than I think most people appreciate. So there have been really big successes, and if we think about how things can go wrong (how “s**t can hit the fan”) it’s not because we spent 1% less additional climate philanthropy attention on renewables, it's because something goes wrong there or something goes wrong with another solution. Let's say international climate policy falls apart, which looks more realistic now than a couple of months ago. If something like that happens, this is how we get into those worst worlds, right? And so we want to hedge against those worlds, we want to look at solutions that on the one hand are robust to those worlds, and on the other hand provide explicit hedges and protect against failures that are likely to occur in those worlds.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right, right. And another big piece of this (and this is something I've run into a lot of times when I talk to both individuals who are thinking about what to do with their money, but also foundations and people who have access to big pots of money), is that unlike some altruistic endeavors you could imagine – like buying mosquito nets – this is the cliché example but mosquito nets for children in Africa – you can calculate pretty firmly and clearly exactly how many lives you will save per dollar spent. But when it comes to climate change, the problem is so big and sprawling, it's so long term and it's so unclear what will work and what won't, that this sheer wall of uncertainty is daunting to people and often pushes them toward those climate solutions that are more short term and tangible and measurable. But you're counseling against that approach, so talk a little bit about how climate philanthropists should think about uncertainty, and what uncertainty means for their giving.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, I think that's right. I think the worst thing you can do on climate is try to avoid uncertainty. I sometimes say, “<em>It's much better to probably have a large impact than to certainly have a low impact.”</em> And there’s a tradeoff, if you optimize for certainty there's this huge trade off to be made there. And the reason is, as I think you alluded to, that climate is incredibly complex, right? There are three or four intertwined systems. How much will economies grow? How emissions-intensive will growth be? How will the climate system react to this? How much damage will it cause? So it's a situation of vast, vast uncertainty and not only in the climate response, but also on the solutions side. I mean, you've covered this a lot. If you think about the debates about 100% renewables, if you think about the debates about how far electrification will go, there are a lot of debates where there's really large uncertainty. And those uncertainties will not be resolved in a time frame that is action-relevant, they will be resolved when it's too late… Right? </p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right. </p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>So you have to think of this uncertainty as a fact of the situation. And we need to make decisions under this deep uncertainty, where we don't know anything for sure. So I think the way to deal with this is to think about, first of all, what <em>do </em>we know? What <em>can </em>we conclude from this? And I think there are two or three key facts that guide a lot of my thinking and my grantmaking. If you think about one thing that I mentioned before, the nonlinear climate damage, higher failure at higher warming levels is disproportionately worse. So I think that's really important. The other piece is that there's already a fair amount of attention on some of the mainstream solutions. And then the third piece is, what do we know about those uncertainties and how they might resolve? </p><p>So, if we think about electrification or the success of renewables etc., if all of those things resolve positively (and positively here means “okay, they're resolving in a way that has minimal climate damage”), that's pretty good. In those cases, additional climate philanthropy will not be very valuable. If those solutions resolve negatively, those are the worlds that contain the most risk. So let's say a world with lots of growth in emerging economies, breakdown of international cooperation, and some limitations to getting renewables over 50%. These are the worlds where by far the most risk is, even if those worlds are not very probable, and I would not say those worlds are the majority of my probability mass, but they're the majority of the worlds that I care about because there's so much damage in them. So that's where this comes from, hedging against the worst case and thinking about the structure of how different uncertainties relate to each other. I can talk a bit more about that as well.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>One of the points you make that I think is really good and worth emphasizing is that even if we can't measure, in an absolute sense, what effect particular solutions or particular giving strategies might have, we can draw conclusions about their relative impact. One set of solutions versus another. And those conclusions are what you need to be able to act, right? A prioritization of solutions, not necessarily final answers about what they'll do, but just which are more likely to have positive effects. </p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>That's exactly right. Yeah.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>I want to get back to one of those uncertainties. But first, I want to talk about (to get a little tangible here), one of the things you pointed out. There are some great charts in your reports about, you know, how you say that climate philanthropy is on the rise and there's been quite a bit of money flooding into this space in recent years, but there are two key imbalances in where money is currently being spent. One of those is that most of the money is going to the US and the EU, even though as you say they are together responsible for maybe 15% of future emissions, and the other is that most money is going to clean electricity and natural solutions, i.e. trees and reforestation and the like. And you know, as you say, it's not that those things are bad. But, there are spaces being neglected, and this whole notion of neglectedness plays a huge role in all the effective altruism stuff I've read. So, tell us a little bit about why you think those imbalances are bad, and what spaces –important spaces in particular– you think are most neglected these days?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, just to be clear, I think the case that I want to make about neglectedness is not that we're overspending on renewables and trees. I think that the case is much more that we're underspending on a lot of other sectors. If we think about where the next dollar should go, it should probably go to those other sectors. </p><p>I guess the first piece of this is about the geographical distribution –that about 15% of future emissions at most will come from the US and Europe. And if you think about affectable emissions, that share is probably lower, because in a world where US and European climate policy is above average binding it means that if you reduce an emission, and if you're in a liberal state in the US or if you're in the EU, the additionality of that is rarely 100%. So, the share is actually lower because there's policy already determining this.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Yeah, yeah. I want to pause and put an exclamation point on that because I think it's an important point. If you’re in a place where emission reductions are in statute, it's arguable that your additional reduction thrown into that pot is not going to do anything additional since the reduction is going to happen anyway, by statute. So that's where you fail these additionality tests: when you're operating in a place where the trends in law and regulation are already mandating what you would be trying to do anyway.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, that's exactly right. And that's disproportionately the case in those jurisdictions, I think that's the first piece. Obviously I'm not saying that only 15% of climate philanthropy should be focused on those regions, because if we look at climate attention and if we look at ways to shape future emissions through climate leadership, through innovation, etc., the US and Europe do play a disproportionate role. So it wouldn't be right to say what we should be aiming for is 15% for those regions. </p><p>But, we can still see various systematic effects. I think the reason that there's so much spending on the US is not because someone decided, “<em>okay, this is the impact maximizing solution</em>”. The reason is because most climate philanthropy is from the US, and most people find it much easier to donate to an American focused organization. The reason that is problematic, or the reason that I would say this leaves impact on the table, is because there are dynamics related to future emissions growth (and in particular carbon lock-in) that are dependent on where you are in the world. So, they're not the result of global innovation, they're the result of infrastructure decisions, policy decisions being made right now. </p><p>And, a lot of those 85% of future emissions come from regions that are very strongly growing right now, and are making a lot of infrastructure decisions about how to build grids, how to build new coal plants or not, which will have consequences for decades into the future. So those are really high leverage points for intervention, and there's very little attention paid to these in total. And if there is, it's very focused on a couple of key sectors and key solutions. And then you have situations where (for example, if you look at climate philanthropy targeted at Indonesia, Indonesia is one of the places where coal is growing the most) there's fairly little attention paid to this. You will find that in many of these sectors, there are large parts of future emissions that receive very little attention, and it's probable that if you looked a bit more closely, if you started to do some early philanthropic work, you would find some quite high impact or high leverage points because early engagement is often much more impactful than later engagement.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right. So the first dollar there is probably gonna have more impact than, say, the millionth dollar in the US.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yes, that's exactly right. Crucially, the millionth dollar in the US is easier to fundraise for than the first dollar there….</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right, right. So, in terms of clean electricity, I sometimes think (and I go back and forth on this), that there's almost too much talk about clean electricity being a done deal, that we can move on from it now and focus on other things. But you know, when I hear that, I want to point out that clean electricity is on a positive trajectory, but not anywhere close to the slope it needs to be on or the speed it needs to be on. It's not, by any means, a “done deal”. So what's the justification for turning attention away from clean electricity, which I think you and I agree is probably going to be the bulk of the solution. What's the justification for looking elsewhere in your giving?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>So, at no point would I suggest we turn away attention from clean electricity. It's more like we’re in a space in climate [philanthropy] that is strongly growing, and the question is where to put additional money right now. If you look at those clean electricity numbers (and by the way, of this clean electricity funding, 90% is renewables and I think 90% of that is solar and wind), this philanthropic funding has played a huge role in triggering the policies that led to cost reductions. So, this has been hugely impactful, this was absolutely the right priority to set. But if we think about, for example, super hot rock geothermal or innovations in geothermal which are also renewable, also about clean electricity, they receive a very, very small share of that. I just talked to the Clean Air Task Force yesterday, they have a program on super hot rock geothermal, which is essentially the “geothermal anywhere” solution, right? The solution that will make geothermal available location independent.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Potentially a huge, huge resource.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Potentially a huge, huge resource, yeah. And potentially, exactly attacking this problem that I think is the bottleneck problem in clean electricity, which is firm sources or balancing. Right? So you had Jesse Jenkins on the show. If you think about it, that [advanced geothermal] could have a huge impact on clean electricity, but there's like a 1 million or so philanthropic effort to make it happen, right? And at the same time, we're spending something on the order of 600 to 700 million on clean electricity in general. So, I agree with you that clean electricity is not solved, but the thing that can reduce risk there is not the priority of current clean electricity philanthropic spending, geothermal it’s instead probably a bet of around 1 million philanthropically right now. And if you think about advanced nuclear, or something else, it's probably something like 10 million. So, within these categories, these are what I think of as huge imbalances. </p><p>I think the other part is also, what's the role of philanthropy? The reason I think it was great to invest philanthropically really heavily in wind and solar until maybe 10 or 15 years ago, and that this would have been an absolute priority, is because this really helped unleash the policy change which then led to the technological change, which leads to a trajectory change in emissions and future emissions. But we're not in that moment anymore, right? We're not in the moment where solar and wind are niche industries. At this point, these industries are growing. And, while I think there are really hard problems to overcome there, if I think about philanthropy as catalyzing early change, I don't really see wind and solar failing because the next 10 million of climate philanthropy goes towards other solutions, let me put it that way.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right. So we have some clean technologies that are on a positive trajectory; whether they’re going fast enough or not, at least they’re on a learning curve. And then there's a bunch of other climate technologies that are widely expected to be needed, but are not on those trajectories at all. They're not on the learning curves at all. So to draw an analogy to what you were saying earlier, the first dollar spent on getting one of those technologies on a good trajectory will have more impact than the billionth dollar spent accelerating the wind and solar trajectory.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Exactly, exactly. And I would say tremendously more impact. I would say the differentials here aren’t like two times, my best guess would be more on the order of 100 or 1000 times, because there's essentially nothing happening. Super hot rock geothermal is essentially (I mean quite literally) putting this idea on the map. Building coalitions in government, getting innovation funding for this, connecting the different industries to research labs, connecting it to people who could implement it, etc. So this is very early stuff with a really outsized impact, potentially. </p><p>And I mean, we’ve seen similar things like carbon removal, where it's been clear from the scientific literature that we're definitely going to need carbon removal if we want to get to 1.5 degrees. I think that’s been clear of carbon removal since 2015 or so at the latest, right? And this has taken time to sink into policy discussions. And philanthropy, or NGOs that are philanthropically funded (in this case, I want to mention another grantee of ours, Carbon180) are quite important in early field building, early attention building, etc. and can play a really huge role. And now we have a stimulus in the US, or an infrastructure investment bill, and it makes a real difference. It’s clear there's going to be a huge climate component, but the organizations that are going to be present there are shaping this, so it makes a difference that there is an organization that is really strong on connecting the science to the policy needs for the most neglected technologies, this makes a difference.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>That gets us to innovation. My impression is that one of the things that almost everybody in the effective altruism movement who's thinking about climate agrees on is that innovation is a good target. But the mirror (I don't know if this is the right analogy) image of innovation is carbon lock-in. So we were talking earlier about uncertainties, and one of the key points you make is that not all uncertainties are additive (meaning you just sort of multiply one uncertainty by another by another and just get bigger and bigger and bigger uncertainty bars); some of them are negatively correlated. So talk about how that plays out in terms of innovation and carbon lock-in, those are two key concepts here.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah. When I think about future emissions and what will determine those, I think there are these two really big trajectory-changing dynamics. One of them is innovation, as we've seen with solar, as we're seeing with electric cars. Really radical changes which were early decisions and geographically quite specific decisions, not global decisions, can make a huge dent on global emissions, changing the trajectory for decades to come. So this is the innovation piece.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Just to pause there, because you make this point well in the paper, one of the key players in the early innovation in solar was Germany. And as you say, if Germany had been approaching this problem from a, “how can we maximize emission reductions per dollar” approach, they never would have spent on solar. It was an extremely inefficient way to reduce emissions at the time when they were spending, but it catalyzed this trajectory, and so the indirect effects were huge in terms of emission reductions.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, the short term solution would have been to buy Russian gas, this would have been the much cheaper way. And I think this is really why we shouldn't ever evaluate climate actions by their local short term effects, we should always evaluate them by their global long term effects. So this is the innovation dynamic. And then, there's this countervailing dynamic which is carbon lock-in, which is infrastructure decisions and capital investment decisions into new coal plants, new steel plants, etc., that determine or really strongly influence emissions over decades to come because once this asset is built the decision about how much to produce is much, much lower [in influence] than compared to like, just like “okay we're just gonna have this high emitting asset there”. So if you think about these two dynamics as competing, then you see that on the innovation front, pushing an innovation forward five years is often much more valuable than just five years of reduced emissions because it can act at the lever points, like, before. Let's think about how the world would look if we’d had cheap solar and wind when China started to expand, the world would look very different today. So there's these huge, huge lock-in effects. So of course, there are these two dynamics. </p><p>And again, uncertainty, my friend uncertainty is here. If we think about the ultimate potential of acting on those two mechanisms, on the one hand trying to avoid carbon lock-in and on the other hand trying to accelerate and improve the success of innovation, the relative potential of those two theories of change is negatively correlated. What do I mean by that? So, there's a world where carbon lock-in is relatively benign, let's say it turns out that we can get renewables so cheap that it becomes easy, renewables, storage, and we solve all of the attendant problems, right? Let's say, we're in the very best case world. And in this case, maybe it becomes realistic that we're retiring coal plants early or we're replacing them with something that we're working on is repowering coal, maybe we can replace the heat source and coal plants with geothermal or with advanced nuclear. This is a world where carbon lock-in has relatively less influence because retrofitting is easy and premature retiring becomes possible politically and economically. The maximum impact of innovation will be in this world, a world where avoiding carbon lock-in is relatively less important.</p><p>And this is important, of course, because there's also this other world where it's not true, right? Where we’re maybe going to get all of those innovations, but you know, those innovations will not fully realize their potential because lock-in is really severe. There's a lot of infrastructure, political clout, invested capital,  that leads to a situation where we have new, low carbon solutions but we're not adopting them at scale. So, those two dynamics are negatively correlated which means one of them -- if we're on the more bullish side of innovation, maybe if we now invest in innovation and carbon lock-in and maybe in that case the carbon lock-in investment is less valuable. The other thing goes the other way, right? If carbon lock-in is more severe, then investing in [avoiding] carbon lock-in is more valuable. And if we're in a situation (and I think this is the situation we're in) where we’re really genuinely uncertain about those two theories of change and about the relative value of additional investments, I want to diversify.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Investment in innovation versus investment in avoiding carbon lock-in?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, I'm sorry, I meant philanthropic investment here. </p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right. JASo yeah, I'm genuinely uncertain between those two solutions. But again I think about the nature of climate damage, and I'm reminded of the fact that my goal is not to maximize emission reductions but to minimize climate damage, and now I have these two really big uncertainties that are negatively correlated. So in this situation, investing in both of them can actually be impact maximizing because of this structure: if one succeeds a bit more; the other fails a bit more. That's a more robust investment, given the shape of climate damage and given how much worse it is to fail, if that makes sense.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right. So each is a hedge for the other, in a sense.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yes. And I think something similar applies to investing in accelerating decarbonisation and investing in carbon removal, for example.</p><p>David Roberts: </p><p>One of your conclusions you come to, and this is a quote too, is that “the plausibility space for high impact climate philanthropy primarily contains solutions and approaches that are considered controversial, speculative, or remote”. So this is where your logic takes you, it’s that if you're counseling people where to give their climate philanthropy dollars you're probably counseling them not to give to the sexy, popular solutions that everybody's hyped about, but to some of the more obscure and controversial stuff. Spell that out a little bit.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah. I mean first of all, this quote was written in December, actually November, at the end of last year under the impression that climate philanthropy and climate philanthropy foundations had essentially doubled within a year, with the Bezos Earth Fund playing a huge role. And these dynamics are essentially, to a large degree, reinforcing the existing foci of climate philanthropy: increasing the emphasis on clean electricity on the one hand (particularly renewables); and on the other hand, natural climate solutions.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>As a side note here, do we know where Bezos’s money is going yet? Has it been laid out where his giving is going?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>So it's evolving, but we did include it in our November 2021 <a target="_blank" href="http://founderspledge.com/landscape">analysis</a>. We used the data from ClimateWorks for the 2020 baseline, and then we looked at all of the Bezos grants that were made in 2021 and tried to account for those. And that's what’s included in the comparative charts we have in there. The main takeaway for me was that, by and large, the Bezos commitment (at least the early Bezos commitment) increased spaces that were already relatively well funded. It also increased funding in other spaces, but in absolute terms this was more or less increasing those existing emphases. </p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>So if you were counseling Bezos, or whoever's controlling that pot of money, you are going to tell him to channel his money away from those things, basically?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Again, it’s always about the margin. So it depends on what everyone else is doing, but given what everyone else right now is doing and given how climate philanthropy has been increasing really strongly and over a really short time, it's not that there are a lot of great funding gaps left for popular solutions. I think that's very implausible to say at this point. So yeah, that means I would say: if you're looking for the highest impact opportunities, trying to look at things that are controversial or not on the radar, etc., is probably the way to go. Stuff like super hot rock geothermal, stuff like carbon removal, stuff like advanced nuclear… solutions that are not solar, wind, electric cars, and trees. And not for the reason that those four aren't great parts of the decarbonisation puzzle, they are, but they are the ones that we all know and we all like and that we are all already invested in heavily.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right, we’re back at hedging. So, the strategy you come down on in terms of recommendations is robust diversification. Does that just mean what we’ve been discussing? Sort of, hedging by putting some of your money at the margins outside popular solutions? Or, if not, what do you mean by robust diversification?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, so I think there's a couple more dimensions. The robustness here is robustness to uncertainty. I think as we've mentioned before, there are really large uncertainties that will remain on all relevant timescales, right? Like how far technologies will go, how emissions will evolve, what will happen to the Paris Agreement, etc. Part of it is about choosing a portfolio now, which hedges against the failure of mainstream solutions - based on the  logic I laid out before. Damage is much worse when the mainstream solutions fail, and right now the mainstream solutions are, relatively speaking, much, much better funded than some of the hedgier solutions, and for systematic reasons. So that's part of it. The other part is within your portfolio, trying to diversify in a way that takes into account what I mentioned, the negative correlation of the uncertainties. Because again, you're not trying to maximize emission reductions, you're trying to minimize damage. So you're complimenting your focus. That's what we’re doing with our focus on, say, accelerating decarbonisation, which we do with grantees like Clean Air Task Force, Future Cleantech Architects, TerraPraxis. These are people working on different pieces of that puzzle, then we’re combining this with a focus on carbon removal: Carbon180 would be our recommendation in that space. So, there's this negative correlation there. And right now we're trying to take the next step into looking at different theories of change and diversifying there, always driven by this idea of the importance of robustness against the worst worlds where the majority of damage is concentrated.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>It's not really entirely different than a sort of financial investment strategy. Johannes Ackva: No. David Roberts:It's a portfolio approach for the same reasons.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>It's a portfolio approach for the same reasons, right. Essentially, if you're doing this in financial terms, what you're saying is, the marginal utility of money is decreasing, right? So, you're not trying to maximize your income, you're trying to maximize your well being. If you're a millionaire, getting to 1 versus 2 million is not as valuable. So it's exactly the same logic, yes.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Okay. And one of the things I found really interesting in your work is that you end up really recommending advocacy and public policy. Advocacy, as opposed to, you know…if I'm the Bezos Fund, I could make strategic investments directly in early stage companies, I could make investments directly in research or found a research center or something like that, but you end up pushing for advocacy. In other words, trying to get policy paths, trying to change public policy. Why do you come down there?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah. So first, a clarification. I should be clear about this in my writing, and I'm trying to be clear here. When I say advocacy, what I really mean is trying to attract large scale societal or social mobilization. This can be like changing policy etc., but it can also be changing behavior of large corporate actors. So that's one piece. And this is not only “on the Hill” lobbying, this also does and can include stuff like doing research on new technologies, the viability of new technologies, and putting things on the map (just to clarify this a little bit).</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Advocacy, broadly construed.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Advocacy, broadly construed. Not only Beltway lobbying. So, if we think about why we’re focusing on that, I think there are two or three answers. I think the first one is that even if you take the most expensive sum of climate philanthropy (right now it's on the order of around 10 billion), this is still at most a 100th or so of the overall effort spent on climate.David Roberts:Right, compared to public money. Johannes Ackva: Yeah, compared to public money. So, this is one reason. If you think you only need to have a small multiplier (it’s not like I'm not saying you got a 100x multiplier), it’s still likely that given those numbers, focusing on advocacy can have an outsized impact. There's also literature on that, which shows that this works for other fields. </p><p>I think the other key part of the answer, which I think is the deeper answer, is that ultimately solving climate change is a policy problem, and it requires a huge amount of policy. Technological change is not a garage factory thing, right? Technological change is fundamentally the result of government policy and government incentives being correct, and public investment and innovation, etc. And this is not only true for innovation, right? This is also true for other parts, like for rolling out technologies. So for every garage entrepreneur there's a policy behind that, that usually came before. So in that sense, I think public policy is really crucial for essentially all parts of the climate challenge. And if the policy is set right, the private action, and the research, etc. will follow. So the causal primacy –what I would call the causal primacy – really lies with making sure that political conditions are as good as they can be.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>I'm sort of curious about how philanthropists respond when you pitch this, because we've talked about uncertainty but if I'm Bezos, I'm an executive. I'm used to quantification and results, I want to see numbers. And if I want that from my climate philanthropy, I can spend on a forest and then I can see the forest and I can measure the tonnes from the forest, or whatever. Whereas advocacy, even broadly construed, is so uncertain. What could move politics is so unclear. This is very much the central dilemma of climate change: what can move public policy and what can get things moving? So if you commit to that, you are very much taking on the risk, the possibility, that you could be wasting your money: you could spend a bunch of money on advocacy and it could just not do anything. I think we've seen, unfortunately, in the last year or so, an enormous, enormous amount of really well organized and funded climate advocacy that is starting to look like it is not going to come to anything. And I can imagine if I'm a rich philanthropist, looking at that and saying “screw that, I'm just gonna go get some verifiable tonnes where I can”. So, how do you address that, and how do people react when you pitch this?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, that's a great question, there's lots in there so let me try to answer all of those different aspects. So, the first one is that I'm not making it easy for myself saying that. I talk to a lot of entrepreneurs and executives that have, I think, as you outlined, very different intuitions on that. There are people that want to do impact investing or that want to do stuff that's fast and certain. And me saying “let's invest on this policy thing that's highly uncertain” is not the thing that maximizes the giving I can influence. It's a position I take because I believe it very strongly. And I think that's also an additional reason why we should think it to be, relatively speaking, underprovided.David Roberts:</p><p>Right. It goes against a lot of intuitions.Johannes Ackva: Yeah, and against a lot of intuitions in particular of new climate money. So if we think about new climate money coming into the philanthropy space, a lot of that is coming from people who got rich in tech. They apply their own mental models and their own success stories, so for them it's much more natural to do impact investing, or start their own company, than to say we're going to do this policy advocacy thing. So again, if you think about this, this is once again one of these psychological factors, one of these systematic features that should make you expect that advocacy is underprovided (relatively speaking to its impact). Because, while it's much more uncertain, even if it's highly effective, oftentimes you will not know it. Because the best advocacy is the advocacy where an organization will influence a policymaker, and they will never talk about it publicly, because talking about it publicly would destroy the entire impact. The whole point of it is that the policymaker thinks they came up with it themselves.David Roberts:Right, it's thankless. Johannes Ackva: Yeah, it's thankless work. But that's why it's so crucial to support it. And I think one thing I would disagree with a little bit here is saying there's been this huge effort and nothing came of it. We also invested hugely in the wake of Biden wins here in the US advocacy space, and I wouldn't say nothing came of it. There is the infrastructure bill there, there is the Build Back Better plan. The infrastructure bill is not what we hoped for, it would be much better if Build Back Better had passed as well, but there is a lot of stuff in the infrastructure bill that's helping with relatively nascent solutions. So I don't see that all of our bets there were a failure.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right, well, maybe I was too cynical. And I think you could say, even if Build Back Better ends up not passing, which is very much a possibility at this point, advocacy was successful in causing Biden (and really the Democratic Party in general) to prioritize climate, which is a long term effect. It's not necessarily measurable by just what gets passed these past two years. </p><p>Johannes Ackva:  </p><p>Yeah, absolutely. And also, these philanthropic investments are still small compared to investments in direct technology, or what we're spending overall on climate change. So I think one really shouldn't be too cynical on advocacy at all.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>By way of wrapping up, let’s pull this back to (because I know a lot of listeners ask) a question anybody who writes or talks about climate change in public gets asked a lot. I'm sure you get it a lot, and it’s about individuals who want to do something but don't know what to do. You obviously get a lot more leverage affecting what Bezos wants to do than the average Joe off the street, but nonetheless, it would be nice to have guidance for “normal” people. And I think there are a lot of the same dynamics here in terms of uncertainty in the sense that individuals think, “well, if I buy an EV, there's a measurable impact, it's not huge, but it's certain and I did it”. Whereas tossing money out to an advocacy group can feel a little bit like throwing dollars out into the ocean and then never knowing what came of them. So, is your pitch to individuals more or less the same? Or, to put the question more simply, what should individuals do? If they have climate money to spend, how do they maximize their impact?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah. The first thing I want to say is that I don't think consumption choices or behavior change and giving is an either or. So for myself, I'm a vegetarian, I actually don't have a driving license because of climate reasons. </p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>You also get to live in a country where that’s possible.Johannes Ackva: Yeah. And I do my fair share of lifestyle changes. At the same time, I don't believe (and this is not only because of my professional role, but also just in general because I'm a middle income person in a rich country), this is anywhere close to the maximum impact I could have. And the reason for that is twofold. If you're a typical middle class person in the Western world, in the US let's say, you're emitting something like 11 tonnes or so, something on that order, per year. And again, you can reduce that to zero, but it's really hard to reduce that to zero. Even if you did reduce it to zero, which would take really extreme measures, a lot of that reduction would actually not be additional for the reasons we alluded to before. David Roberts:</p><p>Right, because policy is in place already. Johannes Ackva: Yeah, so I think that's the first thing. And the second part is: reducing emissions by 11 tonnes per year is actually really unambitious if you think about what you can do. It’s kind of like saying your responsibility is only towards your own emissions, not towards the emissions related to the fact that the West got rich on fossil fuels. So, it doesn't really make sense as a benchmark either, even from this perspective. So that's the first part. </p><p>The second part is if you focus on effective philanthropy, you can probably avoid a tonne of carbon for $1 or something. Even if you're 100 times more pessimistic than me, if you're doing lifestyle changes and also donate $1,000, you already have the same impact with your philanthropic investment. And of course, you don't need to stop there, right? There's no natural bound on what you can do philanthropically, while there is a very natural bound to what you can do with your lifestyle changes.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>Right, yeah. One of your charts that really made an impression is where you chart the tonnes of carbon impact of various lifestyle changes. And you grant that in the chart, if you buy an EV and it inspires 10 other people to buy an EV, even if you 10x all your lifestyle choices, you're still not going to have anywhere close to the impact you would have, the direct impact you would have, by giving your money to a climate organization – a climate advocacy organization basically. </p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>Yeah, again, I guess I would add the caveat here: a climate organization that tries to maximize impact at the margin.David Roberts:Right, a good climate organization. Johannes Ackva: But one thing I really want to stress in this case, because I think it's the most common misunderstanding, and the thing that makes people really uneasy, is: I would really not think about this as offsetting. People sometimes ask me, “how much do I have to donate to a charity to reduce my impact,” and this is really the wrong mental frame. The mental frame that I want people to take is really different. It's more about, not offsetting, but acting morally in the world and in accordance with your values and trying to have a positive impact. </p><p>The other thing is that for me, donating is not an offsetting choice, it's a political action. So in the same way as going into the streets, participating in a protest, or calling your representative. It's in that bucket of activities. It's also structurally similar in that these activities will always have more impact because they're addressing the problem. There are multipliers to be had here, and the same kind of multipliers that you can have in your civic engagement apply (probably somewhat stronger), that is, the same kind of logic applies. So if you think that going into the street or calling your representative is higher impact than your lifestyle choices, and I think in almost all cases this will be true, then you should believe the same about philanthropy and you shouldn't see it as offsetting at all. It’s a form of political action.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>The whole focus on offsetting is such a weird artifact of Western individualism. It's such a bizarre way to approach the problem of climate change. Like, “if I can just eliminate my tonnes, I'm good”. It just doesn't, it makes no sense in the context of climate change as a global problem.</p><p>Johannes Ackva: </p><p>No, no, it absolutely makes no sense at all.</p><p>David Roberts:</p><p>In conclusion, let’s say I'm an individual, I'm hearing your message and I'm convinced and I want to give to a good climate organization. Is there somewhere I can go where you lay out which climate organizations you think are good and effective, like a guide to individual giving? Is there somewhere people can go for some help?</p><p>Johannes Ackva: What we, as Founders Pledge, have on this is a <a target="_blank" href="http://founderspledge.com/climate">Climate Fund</a> where we’re trying to make the best commitments – philanthropic commitments –- we think are possible. The logic that lies behind this is explored in our reports, which we publish on our website. For example, one of them that we’ve discussed a lot today is the <a target="_blank" href="http://founderspledge.com/landscape">Changing Landscape report</a> from last November. You can go to <a target="_blank" href="http://founderspledge.com">founderspledge.com</a> and find the report there, and we can also include the links in the show notes. The charities that we’re highlighting right now are: the Clean Air Task Force, with a focus on neglected solutions in decarbonization; Carbon180, with a focus on carbon removal; Future Cleantech Architects in Germany, which is focused on innovation in hard to decarbonize sectors, with a European focus where there’s less attention philanthropically to innovation but a lot of policy action; and then TerraPraxis, which is focused on advanced nuclear.</p><p>David Roberts:What if I’m on the other side of things? I’m in a climate organization, a climate advocacy organization, and I want to get on your list to make the case that I’m a worthy recipient of your funds. Is there any formalized process for that, or do you guys just go out and look, or is there some application thing, how does that process work?Johannes Ackva: So, what we’re trying to do, or what we layed out today and what we lay out in our reports, is that we’re really trying to understand systematic things about the space and then find the organizations that are doing high impact things in the most neglected areas. So we don’t have an application process as such. That being said, I’m happy for people to reach out to me on <a target="_blank" href="mailto:johannes@founderpledge.com">johannes@founderpledge.com</a>, but this is not our usual process. Our usual process is to dive into the field, understand how it's changing, where the margins are, and try to support solutions at the margin that we think of as great bets for counterfactual impact.David Roberts:And I promise this is the final question, it just occurred to me, say you do an analysis and you find a neglected space that you think could be high impact and there is no organization devoted to that space, have you ever thought about trying to spin off or create organizations to fill those spaces? Johannes Ackva: Yeah, that’s absolutely something we’re open to doing. Until now this has been a little bit beyond our capacity, but I think we have been doing a lot (that I also think of as high impact – a high impact solution in general) is to support organizations that are either one or two people strong, because those are the organizations that do not have the bandwidth to apply to large foundations for funding. So this is actually a really important part of our strategy, to support those kinds of organizations. And we’re taking high risk bets, we’re very risk tolerant. We’re not expecting an organization of two people to have the same strategic plan. We’re making bets on people, we’re making bets on working on neglected solutions.</p><p>David Roberts:Yeah, diversification. Alright, well thank you so much Johannes. It’s been really interesting reading your work and watching the logical step-wise process by which you go through the space and think about the shape of the space and the shape of the uncertainties and everything. It’s quite clarifying and interesting, so thanks so much for coming on.Johannes Ackva:  Yeah, thanks so much for having me.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-johannes-ackva-on-effective</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:58756839</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 29 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/58756839/524c5e49e1598aa2f745f925a901b8c3.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3735</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/58756839/c03368f6f658b7427e0e4f519cb5676d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Dr. Ye Tao on a grand scheme to cool the Earth]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Dr. Ye Tao discusses his vision for combatting climate change by using fields of mirrors that reflect solar radiation.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACE6i7lCiUEYqtEnSHq6RGea/volts22.06.08%28ye.tao%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-dr-ye-tao-on-a-grand-scheme-to-cool-the-earth"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Geoengineering — using large-scale engineering projects to directly cool the Earth’s atmosphere — is an intensely controversial topic in climate circles. On one hand, such schemes strike many people as dangerous hubris, interfering with large-scale systems we don’t fully understand, risking catastrophic unintended consequences. On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that even a wildly successful program of decarbonization will not be enough to avoid devastating levels of heat in the atmosphere.</p><p>Dr. Ye Tao was early in his career as a researcher at Harvard’s Rowland Institute, working on nanotechnology, when he became gripped by the problem of climate change. As he dug into the research, he concluded that even rapid decarbonization — especially insofar as it reduces the aerosol pollution that temporarily cools the atmosphere — would leave the Earth roasting in levels of heat hostile to most life forms.</p><p>As he reviewed available options for carbon capture and geoengineering, he realized that none of them were safe or scalable enough to do the necessary cooling work in time. So he came up with a technique of his own: mirrors.</p><p>The <a target="_blank" href="https://www.meer.org">MEER project</a> — Mirrors for Earth’s Energy Rebalancing — is a nonprofit established to advance Tao’s vision, which involves covering some mix of land and ocean with fields of mirrors. The mirrors would reflect solar radiation, and thus heat, back up out of the atmosphere. If 10 to 15 percent of developed agricultural land could be covered with mirrors, Tao has calculated, it would return Earth’s heat to safe preindustrial levels, providing a range of local benefits to agriculture and water in the meantime.</p><p>It’s a brash idea, somewhere between crazy and obvious, and I was excited to hear more from Tao about why he thinks it’s necessary, how it would work, the materials that would be required, and how the MEER framework changes the way we view carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. </p><p>Alright. Ye Tao. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming on.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yeah, thanks for inviting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Ye I have to confess when I first invited you on the pod, I had not yet really done a deep dive into into the MEER Project, and I was just sort of thinking, "Oh, a bunch of mirrors. How novel. That sounds fun. Let's talk about that." But I've spent a while now digging in and listening to more of your presentations and reading more, and there's really a lot going on here. There's a lot going on here. The mirrors are at the end of a sort of chain of reasoning that in many, many ways contradicts conventional wisdom about climate change.</p><p>So I do want to get to the mirrors. I'm excited to talk about the mirrors, but let's do a little background building first. So I want to start with, it seems like the key to understanding your whole framework here is the distinction between CO2 and heat. We sort of conflate carbon and heat. When we talk about climate change, what's the problem? It's more carbon, and carbon causes heat. How do we reduce heat? We reduce the carbon dioxide emissions. We sort of have those coupled in our mind. And you say it's important to decouple them. So talk a little bit about why we need to keep them conceptually distinct, and then also decouple them in terms of the physics of the system.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Okay, yeah, that's a good place to start. It's true that we created this problem by emitting CO2, and it's important to shut it down as quickly as we can manage, practically. And in the Earth system, everything is basically linked. So it's only natural that when you perturb one important component to a very significant extent, such as CO2 concentrations, you should expect some downstream consequences — and the most urgent of which is overheating of the planet. And heat is really the driver of weather patterns and precipitation patterns. So when you have excess thermal energy that's really different from the state Earth was before the CO2 perturbation, that you can expect downstream extreme events and also perturbation to the biochemical cycle.</p><p>And if we look at the responses of different organisms and plants, insects, and mammals, and how they respond to individual perturbations in CO2 versus temperature, universally they really suffer when temperature gets ramped up to a few degrees above their normal temperature niche values. But in terms of CO2, essentially most species, like 90% plus or more, are actually not perturbed really by the current increase in CO2 levels. So basically, we initiate this avalanche by burning CO2. But the real environmental stressor that's really creating havoc are a combination of overheating and the resulting drying of land and moisture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what we talk about as the effects of climate change are the effects of heat, basically, our heat playing its way through the system. And is it safe to say then that we care about CO2 in the atmosphere more or less only as it relates to heat? Only insofar as it brings more heat, right. Because in and of itself, as you say, it's not, I mean, I'm sure there's some level of concentration that's dangerous, but the levels of concentration we're talking about are not dangerous in and of themselves. Is that fair?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Well, we'd have to be a little bit more careful and include a timeline. I would say, like in the near future, next 50 years, assuming that we're emitting and growing economy on current trajectory, then the predominant parameter is heat. That's going to basically shut everything down before we're able to continue. But if we were, somehow, we're able to manage to prolong this fossil fuel economy then by the 2070s, 2080s, ocean acidification would then also become a potentially dangerous environmental stressor for marine ecosystems. But the logic is that it's very highly unlikely for society, or civilization, to really survive to that point on our current emission trajectory.</p><p>Therefore, we really need to focus on both decarbonizing safely and also dealing with heat. So I mentioned that we initially started this heating process by turning up CO2. And that there are many parameters in Earth system are interlinked. But it's logically just not correct to say that the best way is to use this single CO2 knob to address the heat or moisture. There are other knobs that are higher leverage, essentially, for the same input in resources, energy, and time. And we're stressed on all those fronts. There's much better ways to address the most imminent danger of environmental overheating than looking at conventional CO2 or methane mitigation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So CO2 is the knob that turned heat up, but it's not necessarily the ...</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Only knob that we have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or most efficient knob for turning it down. And you go beyond that to say, that even if we switched to 100% renewable energy tomorrow, you think we would still pass heat thresholds, that would be devastating. Explain that a little bit.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>So currently Earth is on a heating trajectory, and when something is heating, that's because there's more thermal power or more heat that's been put into the system than is coming out. So let's say somehow we could selectively just shut down emission of greenhouse gases, while somehow maintaining economy going, the Earth will continue to heat. The reason is if you make a measurement of how much sunlight is coming in, and how much IR radiation is going out, currently, there is a 1.5 watts per meter squared of power net energy input into the Earth system. So essentially the past emission debt, even in the current state has not been fully paid.</p><p>So the Earth will continue to heat up, even if we were to shut down. And I need to explain a little bit what this 1.5 watts per meter squared means. So "watts" is a unit of power, basically how much energy gets passed through per unit of time. And "per meter squared" is an average value that scientists, climate scientists like to use to get some common metric. So basically, you have LED at every square meter of land surface on Earth, that's currently how much heat is coming in continuously.</p><p>So to translate this power into an eventual equilibrium temperature, we have to multiply by a factor that converts this weird unit to a degree unit. And that factor has a value that's roughly one. So it's very convenient. So for every watt per meter squared of radiative forcing or this heating power per square area, we can expect at equilibrium a temperature increase of about one degrees. So therefore, we should expect another 1.5 degrees of temperature increase at equilibrium, if we were to just shut down further damage at this point. So that's point number one.</p><p>But this 1.5 degrees will not realize instantaneously. It's going to take some time, years, decades, to centuries to realize. And there's different components, different part of this 1.5 will manifest itself over different length scales, but overall, we're looking at order one-degree increase.</p><p>So that's assuming that we could somehow selectively shut down CO2 emissions. But when we burn fossil fuel, there are other pollutants that are co-emitted, which includes these aerosols.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I love this. I've been waiting for someone to say something. I've had this question idly in my mind for a long time, and I was so glad that you answered it in your presentation. And it's such a fascinating irony, I guess you'd call it, or paradox or something, and I'm glad to have it measured. So I just want to put a pin in this. So you say if we're burning coal, we're sort of steadily burning coal. And part of what that is doing is putting aerosol pollution in the air, which is blocking some of that solar radiation.</p><p>So to some extent offsetting the heating of the atmosphere. And if we stopped burning coal, those aerosols fall out of the air quickly. Unlike CO2, they quickly fall out. So whatever heating they were blocking would very rapidly make its way in. So I guess what I want to ask is, would that more than offset whatever reduction in heat you get from the reduction of CO2?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>That's an excellent question, and let's go into a little bit of semi-quantitative detail. So I previously mentioned that even overlooking this temporary cooling effect, the Earth is currently experiencing a heating power density of 1.5 watt per meter squared. So this quantity is called the Earth's energy imbalance, basically how much surplus heat we're getting right now. And this value has been fluctuating around 0.7 to maybe 1 watt per meter squared in most of the past 10, 20 years. Except for more recently. In the recent few years, it really went up to maybe 1.3, 1.5, even like last year, based on the most recent measurements.</p><p>So I won't speculate on why recently there has been an increase in this heating power. Okay, let's leave that Earth energy imbalance aside for a moment and address how much additional heating is currently masked by these aerosols. So the latest IPCC, if you really delved into the technical parts, they put the number at about 1.2, 1.3 watts per meter squared. So it's an important number to remember, 1.2 to 1.3. So essentially, let's now assume that in addition to shutting down the CO2, we also shut down all the aerosol emissions, which comes naturally anyways. We would then induce a Earth's energy imbalance, which is no longer 1 or 1.5, but that number plus 1.2 or 1.3, which brings the total energy imbalance to most likely around 2 watts per meter squared, or somewhere slightly above that.</p><p>And if we then translate this heating power to an equilibrium temperature increase, it will be like more like two degrees Celsius.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's on the timescale of the aerosols going away, like by when?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Okay, so the fraction that will be added when aerosols fall out, the 1.2, 1.3 watt per meter squared, that fraction, half of that would be realized very quickly, within a couple of years. So recently, I gave a presentation summarizing a dozen peer-reviewed papers that came out since the first batch of COVID lockdowns. So COVID, despite all the inconvenience it created and all the havoc it created, offered climate science a rare opportunity to really assess and confirm this warming that's hidden by aerosols.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Because we stopped emitting them pretty abruptly.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>That's right. And we know exactly when the measures or rules were put in place. So it's a sort of very controlled experiment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>And there's a lot of most paper, I think all the paper, experimental measurements confirm that, say, in the area of East Asia or China, there was temperature increase over land of about 0.5 degrees just over the very short weeks to months of the 2020 lockdowns.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. That wasn't even a year, right. That was a matter of months. And there was an immediate rise in heat in the area.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yes. So when we talk about this global average temperature increase, you have to average over the oceans and land. But of course, the primary driver in that process will be land, because it's the one that's the lowest heat capacity. And that's a component that also responds most instantaneously to an increase ramping up in heating power. And then, this land temperature increase will then drive atmospheric circulation patterns, which bring the warm air to the oceans and also bring the oceans up to temperature. So it's to be expected that the fastest response component is land surface temperature.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So where does that leave us by 2050? Say we switched to renewables tomorrow and just had the sort of legacy, 1.5 per watts per meter, and then the additional 1.2 that we would get from dropping aerosols out, what temperature, global average temperatures that put us at in, say 2050.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yeah, thank you for bringing me back to answering those questions. But now let's remember that the aerosols are masking 1.3 watts per meters squared So essentially, as we decarbonize, we'll lose that component. And now let's just remind ourselves of how much our annual emissions is adding to this heating power. So I'm quoting some presentations, I had to track down the source, but our annual CO2 emissions at about 0.06 watts per meter squared of heating power. So over 20 years, 0.06 times 20 gives you roughly about 1.2 watts per meter squared, which just happens to be comparable to how much aerosols are masking.</p><p>So in a very simple model of decarbonization, linear decarbonization, from now until 2040 something, we would have avoided creating 1.2 watt of per meter squared of heating, but at the same time, we would have unveiled or unmasked about 1.2. So the two at this point, just magically happens to balance out, which allows us to have very high confidence of the heating trajectory of the Earth system from now until 2040, 2050s. So the two-degree mark will most certainly be surpassed in that decade. And that will happen regardless of what we do on the emissions front. Because of this coincidence of the annual heating contributed by current emissions and how much is currently masked if we continue to have this emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You never gave me a temperature for 2050. Is three possible?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>In my personal opinion, I think that will be quite difficult to reach due to the thermal lag and things in the system. Like for such a gigantic system, things move slowly. And if you just look at, disregard all the underlying mechanisms, just look at the temperature versus time data, the slope of that changes very slowly. So there's polynomial projections generally tend to work pretty well for these massive systems.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But the point is we are definitely going to pass the threshold we have deemed safe, I guess. Is that the tooth threshold anymore? I don't know if safe is the right way to describe under that, but over it certainly unsafe.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yes, we have functionally passed the two-degree threshold that's touted as being safe, and because of this predictable trajectory. And also most people have no understanding of the underlying dynamics and maybe just assume that temperature is proportional to current emissions, then it perhaps enables some very few policymakers who may have a scientific understanding to really perpetuate this, essentially, a lie to the public that we can somehow get temperature under control just based on conventional mitigation. It's not really the case.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so this brings us around to we need to deal with heat in some more direct, faster way than via CO2, certainly than via CO2 reduction in emissions. So one obvious question is what about CO2 removal? What about direct air capture of CO2? This is, sure you're aware, very hot right now.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you think that could accelerate the drawdown of CO2 fast enough to counter this rise in heat?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>No. Before we really start to look at any particular solution, I think we need to really dive and find the core of the challenge, the core of the problem. So the problem is energy imbalance of the Earth system. Meaning there's net power, net heating power coming into our home planet. And we need to be quantitative because this is a very important problem. So quantitatively, the heating power that's heating Earth is roughly 1000 terawatts. A "terawatt" is ten to the twelve watts, which is 1,000 billion. So we have roughly 1 million billion watts heating the Earth system, 1000 terawatts.</p><p>Okay. Now we're humans, and we think we can modify our environment, but to do any modification, we need to use our machinery, our technology. And our machinery and technologies are powered by energy. So let's see how much energy we have available. The whole of humanity in 2020 was using a power of 18 terawatts. Okay, so the problem of overheating is 1000 terawatts. And we have 18 terawatts of mostly fossil fuel combustion heat to deal with the problem. What does that mean? That means we need to have a cooling system that's 1,000 over 18 times 100% efficient, which is roughly 10,000% efficient.</p><p>So just to put things in perspective, for an air conditioning that most people are familiar with, for every unit of electrical energy you feed it, it can move about three or four units of heat from one side of the wall to the other side of the wall. So it's only a coefficient of performance of three or four. But here, to move heat from inside the biosphere, the atmosphere outside into space, we need a coefficient of performance of 100. So that's drastically more efficient than just any typical technology that we are aware of.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So where does that leave us?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>So that basically means, in order to have a chance of stopping global warming, the particular process that you invent needs to have a minimum theoretical efficiency that's much, much larger than 100. Why is that? Because it's not possible to use all of our energy to just tackle climate change, because most of the energy goes into also feeding the population and keeping us warm. So then the question is — this is an unsolved question and I think we're starting just to discuss answers to this question which is — so realistically what fraction or percentage of the 18 terawatts is humanity able to devote to tackle something like climate change?</p><p>So there is no answer to that that I'm aware of. And leading thinkers in these fields have not really been alerted to the importance of finding that number, because the MEER framework is not widely known yet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That wouldn't be a physical limit, though, would it? I mean, the limits on how much of our energy we're willing to devote to that is not. That'll be a social constraint, won't it?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>To a certain extent, with the assumption that somehow social opinions and the societal trajectory could be arbitrarily curved. But there are underlying mechanisms that we are simply not aware of, or we don't fully understand. And there are also physical limits to how much fossil fuel extraction, let's say, if that's the power that used to solve this problem, and how quickly we can build solar panels. There are some kinetic barriers to how much we really can. But of course, these things needs to be investigated in the process of finding how much energy really we are able to devote to this process.</p><p>But just as an analogy, people have calculated what fraction of current power needs to be devoted to renewable infrastructures to fully decarbonize it, become running mostly on renewables by say, 2050. And that figure falls between, say, 0.5% to maybe 5% of current total energy consumption. But even that single-digit percent investment seems to be difficult at this point. And most of the world is not aware of this Earth energy imbalancing problem that will guarantee global warming yet. So it's not even in discussion. So we would be very, very optimistic in thinking that somehow we could manage to put, say, 5% of our energy consumption to tackle this heat problem or global warming at its core.</p><p>So that corresponds to roughly one terawatt of power out of 18 terawatts. And if that's the case, we need what we call a heat rejected on investment or cooling return on investment. We need this ratio to be a couple of 1,000 or 2,000.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? How do you get the most heat out of the system per ...?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Unit input in energy and the materials.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Per energy expenditure.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>But it's easy to measure things, well, it's possible to convert things at least to the energy base on first inspection, before you even consider the material analysis. So we can apply this framework, or this minimum requirement criterion, to analyze, say, the likes of carbon capture, direct air capture, and won't find that such methods are short of what's required by an order of magnitude or more. Which basically means if we were to invest all of our energy consumption, 18 terawatts, into the process, we would barely really just manage to capture, contemporaneous or contemporary emissions.</p><p>And it's obviously not possible. So it's essentially an industry that's created that can turn a profit on small scale, but its capacity is only capable of, in the very optimistic sense, address its own emissions in running the process and creating all the absorbents and all the factories that's needed to make it run. So it's a very ideal exemplification of capitalism, basically creating a need out of nothing and asking consumers to pay for it and branding it in dishonest ways.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, we got to get to the mirrors eventually, so I want to cross a few other things off the list. This is our framework. We have X amount of energy available to tackle this problem. And the way we need to approach it is: how do we get as much heat out of the system as possible per unit of energy we expend? What about these other geoengineering ideas? Like what about sulfur particles in the atmosphere, or cloud seeding, or kelp? Have you gone through the geoengineering catalog and tried to figure out what can and can't reject the most heat?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yes, we have basically done a more or less comprehensive analysis of all the proposals out there. And I'm also part of several discussion groups online that the members of which are basically leaders and principal investigators in different startups and companies, or nonprofits, each fostering different techniques and approaches. For example, Stephen Salter is a professor, retired professor, from University of Edinburgh, that I visited actually in person, studied vetting for two days to really understand the latest thinking and design for marine cloud brightening. So I can say that I have a pretty comprehensive understanding of the limitations and capabilities of different approaches.</p><p>So you asked about solar radiation management, and the only two that's currently being talked about include stratospheric aerosol injection, and there's a marine cloud brightening.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This aerosol injection, which let me just interrupt briefly, the aerosol injection, which would ironically be furiously attempting to replace the aerosols that are falling out of the atmosphere as we're reducing coal burning.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yes, it's an attempt to perform something similar, but there is important distinctions. So the aerosol that we create from coal burning, they don't go very high up in the sky because they are sourced at the ground, and they're transported by atmospheric circulations in the troposphere. So troposphere is the lower part of the atmosphere, up to a height of about 10 km, so roughly 10 miles in some cases, and thinner on the poles, but it's roughly flight altitude, cruising flight altitude, and much above that, it's called the stratosphere. So the two layers don't really mix very well, which means when you inject particles in the lower part, they fall up much easier, so they're less stable.</p><p>But if you put things up high in the stratosphere, they stay up much longer on the order of a couple of years, maybe sometimes more. So one of the thinking about why inject into the stratosphere is because it makes the particles more stable, which means you don't have to inject all day, every day, 24/7 because the next rainstorm or precipitation events would have wiped out all your reflectors. So that's why people are thinking about putting them up in the stratosphere. The problem is that we do not have a full understanding of the chemistry or physical transport or nucleation, cloud nucleation, properties of the different particles that are being proposed.</p><p>We do know that sulfuric acid nanoparticles, or droplets, will contribute to ozone depletion. So that's one known risk. What's not really been studied fully is when these particles eventually fall out. So the way they fall out is they get injected, say, in the tropical latitudes, and they get transported by stratospheric circulation to the poles, and they ring out over the poles. So when they ring out over the poles, they could potentially seed cloud over the poles. So if it's the summer, polar summer, then great. They're promoting some cloud formation, so shielding part of the polar water from being heated up by sunlight.</p><p>But because the residence time is over a couple of years, so they will also potentially fall out during the winter. And when they do seek cloud during the winter, it's like the cloud acts as a blanket. So they prevent freezing. They could potentially prevent freezing of the Arctic during the winter. So clouds, you can conceptualize that basically as a barrier for energy passage. So which way it's impeding the flux of energy depends on the net vector, or where the flux is going. So in the summer, there's more coming down, so they have a cooling effect. In the winter, there's more energy going out by radiation than they would have a keeping warm, warming effect.</p><p>And since we do not have the microphysical understanding fully of cult formation over the Arctic, in the event of a large quantity of aerosols raining down there, we do not really actually know the sign of the impact, local impact, in the Arctic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's, I think, a specific version of a more general point, which you said before, which is just, "We don't understand the risks of these things well enough to be doing them." So this is what sort of sponsored your search for a simpler, more direct version of geoengineering. Which brings us to the mirrors. Your proposal, to put it as simply as possible, is to cover a decent swath of the earth's surface with mirrors, and the mirrors will reflect solar radiation back out into space. And with sufficient mirrors, we could reject enough heat to bring the global average temperature down into a safe range, even if CO2 remains high and even rising.</p><p>Is that a fair summary?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yes. The idea for using mirrors, which is a local light management, or reflector device, is very important because these challenges are interconnected. Shortage in food that's coming down the line and the droughts. And local communities are the one that's bearing the brunt of the impact. If we can not only tackle the global problem, but primarily have a very strong local impact, then it's a process that can be tested on small scale, and that can be potentially implemented out of the volition of the local population communities and in a naturally organically, democratic way in its testing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about then what would I mean, obviously, the global effect of reducing global average temperatures is to everyone's benefit, but what would be the local effects that you could sell a local population on, of creating big fields of mirrors?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Okay, so we have preliminary data from the summer season of 2021 to put some numbers on the expected impact. So in our very small mirror field in New Hampshire, Plymouth, New Hampshire, during the months of July, which happened to be very wet. Despite high soil moisture during the measurement period, we could measure up to ten degree Celsius temperature reduction in the regions underneath a single mirror, that's as small as 2 by 2 feet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If you're talking 2 by 2, the directly shaded area is going to move around all day. So it reduces temperature in the whole area of soil?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>That's right. So the shade, as you mentioned, it swipes over a region which is on the order of five or 10x the surface area of the mirror itself. And over that region, you can have order degrees of cooling at the surface. And a few degrees can really make a huge difference between complete crop failure to an excellent harvest. So, for example, for every day that your crop spent over 30 degrees Celsius, you can expect a drop of about 1% in yield. And studies generally have only analyzed data that's not too many degrees above 30. But this year, for example, in India and Pakistan, people experienced 40, 50-degree days over weeks.</p><p>So these extreme weather events and their impact on crop, we just don't really have enough data to really put a number on it. But most likely it's not going to be linear. So maybe for every degree over 40, it's more like 10% drop or even more. So if you can somehow manage to reduce local field temperature by five degrees to ten degrees, we can more or less locally just delay these devastating impacts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So is the idea that the mirrors are ... tell me what this looks like. Are the mirrors over the land on, like, stilts or something? Or how would you, I mean, if you have a field of crops, where are you putting your mirrors to get this effect?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yeah, so those parameters are currently being investigated in a more extended field experiments in Concord and Plymouth, New Hampshire. So we're looking at the impact on soil temperature and moisture and the local air temperature, as a function of a coverage pattern and the coverage of fraction. So we're looking at between 5% coverage, up to 25%, 30% aerial coverage. And just based on how the Earth rotates, we know that the shadow scans along the East/West axis. So we are looking at configurations where we have columns of mirrors lined along the North/South axis and playing around with parameters of inter-column spacing, and also a bit inter-row spacing, at this moment.</p><p>You can have various designs for field-applied mirrors. You can have each, say, square or rectangular mirror supported by a single rod that's planted into the soil. So that's what we're using for its simplicity in our experimental measurements. But of course, you can also have an array of rods between which you can tie even a flexible polymer based reflectors, which would save how much glass mirror you need. And if different materials become limiting, then you can use ones that are readily available.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Isn't this something that PV people are currently investigating? I mean, agri-PV or whatever the heck they call it. Agrisolar?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yes, agrivoltaics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, agrivoltaics. They're busy investigating these same questions, aren't they? I mean, it's somewhat similar.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yeah, there are similar questions that are being investigated, with the important difference that when you put PV panels, while you can provide local soil cooling and shading, you're actually increasing how much heat is produced inside the atmosphere. Because PV panels are extremely light absorbing and dark, so it would create a higher air temperature. So in regions that are already stressed by air temperature, if the temperature is the main stressor rather than moisture, then it would become a net negative sooner. In the case of mirror, the shading impact is similar, but it also has this air-cooling impact.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And I'm trying to get a sense of scale. I don't know how to put this together in my mind. How much coverage by mirrors are we talking before you have a regional effect? Do you know what I mean? Like, if I'm on the next farm over, do I ever get cooler? Or are these strictly local effects? If we had half our square footage of our town covered in mirrors, would the entire rest of the town get cool?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yeah, there's actually some data, not from this field, but from the field of scientists, engineers trying to address urban heat island effect that provides some hints to the length scale, correlation length scale. And if you have a neighborhood that's significantly brighter than the neighboring one, then the cooling effect extends to, on the word of quarter mile, hundreds of meters around this area. So you can create essentially what are local oases.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>So that's the other interesting idea of mirror of this local solution because it potentially can create these local environments that are still habitable, even if the global average temperature has increased way beyond what's sustainable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>So it's almost like essentially oasis in a desert. And I think it's an open scientific and engineering question as to whether such oases could be created and on what length scale, and eventually, like, what length scale of these habitable islands do you need to enable local biodiversity to persist? So these are interesting, multiscale, interdisciplinary questions that potentially we could answer once the mirror framework becomes mainstream.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you envision mirrors out in fields or on top of buildings or over parking garages, or all the above?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yeah, all of the above and more. So another project we have ongoing this summer is to look at water-saving potential when you float mirrors on top of water bodies, let's say reservoirs. So Deutsche Welle, the DW, German television, just released a video, or documentary, about heat, the recent heat stress in Pakistan and India. And they mentioned that about 60% or 70% of the fresh-water gets lost during a distribution system because they're flown in, like, canals or aqueduct that's open top. So just imagine if we had covered that with mirrors to reduce the evaporative loss and conversion to latent heat, we could potentially significantly alleviate urban water stress.</p><p>And our experiment from last summer already qualitatively demonstrated that water saving impact. And this year, we have added new string age sensors to monitor the weight of the little bins and buckets that we use to simulate a water body to more quantitatively understand how much water we can save in the process. So it's saving water and also cooling the planet at the same time. So it's like multiple benefits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Here's another question I'm sure you get from every audience you talk about this with. I'm trying to imagine a city or just any large swath of land that is close to completely covered in mirrors, and it just seems like flying over that would be dazzling. I mean, I don't know if there would be heat reflecting up or light in people's eyes, or is there any danger at all in covering the ground with mirrors in terms of, like, the airspace above it?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Our experimental site in Plymouth, New Hampshire is right beside the municipal airport. And the administration really looked into the problem and concluded it's not really a problem. Why is that the case? So even in the highest coverage that we would realistically deploy, which is around like say 20% of land surface area, we at most would increase basically ground albedo by about 0.1 or 10%. So what the pilot would actually see is, okay, there is the sun in the sky which is providing say 100% of the downwelling short-wave radiation. And then from this mirror field from below, it would add maybe 10%, 20% percent of what's coming from the top-up.</p><p>And because the mirrors are not going to be precisely controlled in direction up to 0.001-degree precision, the different beams of light from each individual devices will go in every which direction, more or less scrambled. So the pilot will not really see a coherent image or reflection even from the mirror field.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the beams won't come together at any point. So there wouldn't be any heat either, I guess then.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yeah. So there's no concentration of radiation energy in space, so no birds will notice it. So we have watched the birds landing on these mirrors, and also turkeys going through the fields. They are not really concerned because to really get them to point in the same point demands a lot of engineering, and that's the focus of many different companies, just to how to create such focal point reliably.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I've talked with several of them. Well, let's talk about the simplicity, then, because that brings us to the subject of materials, which is a huge piece of this. One of the things you say, one of the sort of premises of the project is, "We need to find a solution that can reject as much heat as we need to reject using materials we have available to us, currently." So that sort of excludes any sort of fancy fabrication or engineering or rare materials or scarce materials. So talk about what mirrors are made of, and how much of that stuff there is.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Okay. So that's a very natural flow of things. So first of all, we have to establish that energy-wise mirrors can provide that leverage. We won't go into details today, but yes, we have established that that's feasible. And next is do we have enough material to construct all of them? So the initial stages of the project we had focused on considering soda lime glass as the main material that goes into both the supporting structure and also the planar reflector, because the technologies already exist, and we essentially buy from commercial suppliers, currently, for our field experiments. And the advantage of glass in this application is that they essentially don't degrade.</p><p>And the ones that we have also even survived minor hailstorms from last year. So we are pretty confident — and also snowstorm. So we're pretty confident that, in most parts of the world, these things can last for decades, at least to centuries.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The glass can last. But isn't the reflective surface somewhat more vulnerable?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Oh, so we just thinking about that problem, we have designed our prototype to be such that the reflector layer is sandwiched between two glass layers, top and down, so that they are protected by impenetrable glass from chemical intrusion. Of course, there's still some work to be done for edge ceiling, but that's a minor engineering material science development that's totally manageable, given enough resources.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you're just talking about "glass" glass, right? Plain old glass. We're not talking about any special bulletproof or industrial or whatever.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>No, we're just relying on solid lime glass, which of course is not as clear or transparent as, say, high-quality, pure fused silica. But for the extra, say, two 3% transmission, you would have to increase your expenditure by orders — that doesn't make sense. For something like this, we just use what's mostly readily available in abundance — so the lime glass.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And there's no conceivable shortage of lime glass?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>No, actually, that's something I need to point out. So our initial thinking was, "Yes, we do have enough reserves in soda lime glass to implement the full project out of glass, and to basically stop further global warming. We can do that. We do have both the energy and the material to do that." The energy consumption for a all-glass framework is 3% of global energy consumption. So which is, again, in the slow single digit, which is optimistically feasible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Annually?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Annually ... well, I mean, it's a power consumption, so it's 3% of annual energy consumption.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you're talking about just manufacturing mirrors.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Manufacturing glass and mirrors, and transporting and implanting them. Because most of the energy is used in the melting process, the rest is basically negligible because the melting process is the most energy-intensive step. So the bottleneck for a all-glass solution is not in the reserves for making the material, or in the energy needed to power its manufacturing, it's actually in the speed at which we can make glass. So it turns out that we need slightly more than an order of magnitude higher annual glass output than currently exists, in order to do this. So that's a huge problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>So that's why we started recently to think, "okay, we cannot really expect humans to really coordinate to such an extent that we just decide to ramp up one particular industry by ten times. What — can we do something in the meantime to still keep the project going and also keep it readily scalable?" That's when we start to consider replacing the planar reflector part, using reflectors based on PET, polyethylene terracethalate, thin film plastic. The advantage of this material is that you can make thin films that are very thin but still tensile, quite stable over multi feet length scales, and they're stable even down to thicknesses of a few microns.</p><p>So when there are a few ten of microns, they are already very robust. So even though the energy intensity for making these polymers is roughly one or two orders of ... higher than making glass for the same volume, but because you can really make the polymer film is much, much thinner than you can make glass. Glass needs to be a few millimeters in thickness to be stable, whereas these can be 100x thinner and still be stable. So the energy penalty, by a factor of ten, is more than compensated for, by using less material of the polymer.</p><p>And these polymers, they degrade mostly via oxidation and weathering due to UV radiation and the photo-activated processes in the atmosphere. But if we can protect the underlayer using the reflector layer, that should largely attenuate the process. So there is the possibility, but enough research to make these films much more environmentally stable. And if they can last for more than five years, based on our calculations, the system would be able to deliver the energy rejected or cooling return on investment ratio of 1,000 or 2,000 that's required for the process to be viable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I would think if we globally decided we suddenly needed to be manufacturing enormous quantities of reflective surfaces, I would imagine there's lots of innovation to be had there, just in terms of materials, in terms of scale and processes and everything. If it ever got going on that scale, I'm sure there would be ways to bring down material costs.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm sure. So we need to mostly just alert people to this seemingly simple but actually quite versatile framework. And we certainly have enough pet for the process. So we have been looking into how much goes into landfills, and it turns out that what's currently going into landfills, which is roughly 20 megaton per year of PT plastic, that amount is more than sufficient to implement the whole project. And how much aluminum cans that are going to landfills is 7x more than what's needed to implement the mirror framework. Right now. The only remaining puzzle is still this glass part, because it's still our understanding that the part that interfaces with the soil needs to be made of glass for chemical durability and zero-emission requirements, and currently rejected or buried glass bottles, wine bottles, champagne bottles, and container bottles is at 150 megaton per year. And that's only sufficient for about 10% of mirror needs.</p><p>So finding a sustainable material, for making this support for the reflectors, is a current challenge. So we're looking at other systems, like, maybe pressure-treated bamboo that's more durable, or some sort of composite that combines recycled, upgraded, reused materials. So that part is an ongoing research, but we're getting very close to being able to finance the mere framework in terms of energy material, using what's currently discarded, the resources in landfills.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And you mentioned too, moving manufacturing over to being — because currently, I guess, glass manufacturing is mostly fossil fuel. You've talked about trying to drive that with solar.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yeah, that would be quite ideal, and it's certainly feasible. So it's already been demonstrated in 2018 by research group Paul Schur Institute PSI, close to Zurich in Switzerland. But the solar program there got shut down like a couple of years ago for reasons that I don't understand. But it's certainly possible, and if we can harness that — but anyways, I don't think energy is anything of a concern. What's needed is really policy and understanding. Like methane emissions, fugitive methane emissions from landfills, more or less, is sufficient just, if properly channeled for furnaces to make glass for the mirrors.</p><p>That alone is sufficient for the process. So it's a combination of if we can solve several problems at the same time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One thing that I wanted to ask, sort of straightforwardly, is it seems like one of the implications of this research is that it is better to put up a mirror than to put up a PV panel. And it is better, as a matter of fact, to manufacture and put up mirrors than it is to manufacture and put up renewable energy. And you could even say that if we rejected enough heat with mirrors, CO2 would not be nearly as urgent a problem, and transitioning from fossil fuels to renewables, would not be nearly as urgent of a problem. Is that all fair?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>No, that's not correct. I think the conceptual distinction to make is that energy provisioning and global warming are two separate challenges. Energy provisioning is try to make the 18 terawatts that we're currently using carbon neutral. Global warming management is how to get rid of the 1000 terawatt of heat. So they're on completely different scales of challenge. In a sense, the renewable energy challenge is even easier, I guess, because it's also like at the more advanced stage of discussion compared to the global warming excess heat management problem. Again, here there's a natural tendency to link the two problems because energy provisioning created the problem, therefore, we have to solve the global warming problem by addressing energy provisioning. But that's not conceptually correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I guess what I'm wondering is if we have this knob, this relatively cheap knob that we can turn to turn down heat, why do we care if our energy provisioning is carbon intensive?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, there is some limit, eventually, of physiological intolerance to CO2 that we know. So yes, it's a few decades down the line, but we know that the fossil fuel industry has been successful in the past decade. So who is to say that they won't continue to be successful, if we don't counter them with as much determination as we have shown, at least in the activist and academic fields. So we certainly need to decarbonize that. There's no question about that. So these are two separate problems.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. And so as a final question, and thank you for sharing so much of your time. I guess I'd like to know — all this right now is really early. I mean, most of it is just sort of noodling and thinking about it and conceiving and trying to model it and work out the math. How do you envision, or do you envision, it starting to translate into reality, and then I guess, secondarily, how big would it have to, I mean, how much surface area are we talking about before we start feeling global temperature effects from it?</p><p>In other words, like how big of a head of a steam does it have to get before we start getting global payback from it?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>To more or less keep the climate at current levels, we need to implement these refactors over maybe 15% of currently used agricultural land.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a lot.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>And it doesn't have to be just land that's currently cultivated. Yes, it's a lot. However, we remember that when you put them into the land you most likely will actually increase per area yield. Then it feels more manageable. And because these agricultural fields are already snatched surface that's highly engineered, there is a little concern for biodiversity impact. And if you can provide also local cooling shade and more moisture, it might actually foster some local rebound of insect population and the soil microbes. And it's also entirely possible that at high enough coverage, one could expand arable land into currently area that's currently too hostile for agricultural work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like de-desertification? Wait, there's got to be a better way to say that.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Well, yes, it would contribute because water is usually the limiting resource. So in some borderline regions, where if you just had a few on average half a millimeter per day of net water accumulation, which could be afforded by the demure rays, then you could convert some of these areas into new habitable zones. And there's evidence for that in megaprojects taking place in China, both under the concentrating solar power plants and also their large-scale PV fields. That previously barren land is now producing grass and becoming grassland, that sheep herders are leveraging and duck herders are leveraging to produce protein for the local population.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about the economics? We should mention that MEER is a non-profit and run by volunteers, and it's all open source, and this is all — nobody's going to make money from all this. But at the same time, it's hard to imagine something spreading over the entire globe unless it makes money. So is the effect on, if I'm a farmer, is the effect on my crop yield sufficient to pay for the mirror? Do you know what I mean? Would it be an economic transaction for me, or is there an element of government needed, or is it philanthropic in the end, or is there an economy to be made here?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>So we have not done the economics assessment for that problem. But it's something that we have thought about and will performing in the future, mainly because we have not fully obtained the full impact of the parameter space of moisture and temperature and air temperature perturbations. It's only when we have those figures can we then look at the growth functions of different crops and their light requirement, moisture requirement, to start performing that analysis. So our ongoing experiment this year and next year in the field to get those very basic radiation perturbation temperature moisture data is quite necessary to enable that assessment.</p><p>But we do have precedents that's already in the field. Many people use, or farmers, use shades or like sort of greenhouse, but really structures covered by partially transparent white plastic in order to reduce how much light arrived at our crops. Because in some most lower latitudes, below 40, solar noon is basically too intense for most plants to survive, really, especially single canopy crop field. So naturally, there's a need to reduce how much light comes down. And farmers have been willing to buy these plastic-based sheeting to cover their crops, and we don't expect the mirrored version to be much more significantly, more expensive.</p><p>So, for example, if you look at PET sheeting on Alibaba before and after metalization, metalization is the process of putting on thin layer of metal to make it like a mirror. The prices differ by maybe 10%, 20%, because most of the cost comes from the polymer production and the film manufacturing, by process of thermal and blowing them and cutting them and rolling them. So it seems like just at a qualitative level, changing the current partially transparent white shading to a reflective film, maybe with different ways to put them up, shouldn't be a huge change in what some farmers are already spending to keep their land arable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you can imagine a market, and I guess also it's obvious, but worth pointing out, that heat solutions, solutions to heat are going to be much more in demand in coming years than they are now. So I imagine the problem of shading crops will become more acute as time goes on as well.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And people will be looking for solutions.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yeah, and also not only heat protection for crops but also for humans. And one of our projects is a humanitarian project trying to deliver these affordable mirrored sheets, or mirrored tiles, for implementing on roofs to help people in Pakistan and India, and parts of Africa, so that they can actually survive during these extreme heat events.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. I would imagine it would do an enormous amount to just keep a single structure cool. I mean, that's like life or death difference.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Yes, a couple of degrees. Sometimes it just said one extra degree. That's really the last straw that crushed the camel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Alright, well, thanks for coming on and talking about this. It's fascinating. So what's the next step? You guys are doing some early research. Is there next big milestone?</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Next milestone is, basically, include getting more concrete and precise data in the field and also demonstrating or testing cooling in urban heat island settings, and more or less just an educational effort. Because even among people working in this domain of climate mitigation, only a very minor minority are really scientifically trained, and engineering trained, in a multidiscipline fashion that they are able to think from this more top-down perspective. So sometimes people are really excited about their own projects, for example, carbon capture, that they know all details about how the sorbent works, the kinetics of those processes, but they have not had the chance to really zoom out and see, "whoops, even if everything were to work 100%, as I expect, it's still not enough to really tackle the Earth energy imbalance."</p><p>So really teaching people about what's the core problem, we're trying to confront, is one of the future focus over the next year. So we'll be updating our websites with these educational texts. So a lot of time is actually spent trying to translate university-level basic science writing into 8th-grade compatible writing material. And sometimes it's creating more time sync than we like to spend.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know that struggle. Alright, well, thanks so much. Thanks for taking the time, and I'll be following the project.</p><p><strong>Ye Tao</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-dr-ye-tao-on-a-grand</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:57908794</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 28 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/57908794/9de9743e7ea37aa0c859a533a12978b1.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3850</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/57908794/341f93d47f130308782a9d7501cf5c55.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Chris Hayes on how his politics have changed since 2015]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Chris Hayes of MSNBC discusses how American politics and society changed after the Obama years, where things might head in the future, and how his own views have shifted along the way.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAD8kbr4EhUg1hsMKB0HhkhPa/volts22.06.03%28chris.hayes%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-chris-hayes-on-how-his-politics-have-changed-since-2015"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I often reflect on a particular moment in the summer of 2015. It was not long after the Supreme Court made gay marriage legal across the nation in Obergefell v. Hodges. And America was in the middle of one of its regular fights over Confederate monuments and flags, which were being pulled down by progressives across the country.</p><p>One afternoon I ran across a cartoon — I think it was on Facebook? — showing a Confederate flag being lowered and the LGBTQ flag being raised in its stead.</p><p>Hot damn, I thought. Maybe we really do get it right eventually.</p><p>I now think back on that moment as the peak of my belief in what you might call the Obama creed, which the nation's first black president repeated in one way or another in virtually every speech: that the essence of America is its continuous struggle toward the egalitarian ideals of its founding. Again and again it delays and falls short and takes two steps back, but it never stops striving, improving, bit by hard-fought bit. The arc of history is long, but it bends toward justice.</p><p>To a first approximation, everything that has happened since then has sucked. We fell into the ugly 2016 Democratic nomination fight, followed by the ugly presidential election, then four years of daily insults to dignity and compassion by Trump, then a plague that we bungled in countless ways and that has killed more than a million of us, and now, the Supreme Court is systematically dismantling the pillars of the modern administrative state while Biden and the Democrats fumble their way through a slow-motion catastrophe, setting up an openly seditious Republican Party to seize near-total power in the coming two elections.</p><p>To put it mildly, these developments have been rough on the Obama creed, at least for me and many people I know. Much of what Obama himself did was crushed or reversed by Trump, and Biden has barely begun rebuilding from the wreckage. More than that, America's reactionary minority seems ascendent. And its intentions are clear: to follow Viktor Orban's lead in Hungary. To whittle democracy down until it's entirely hollow, one-party rule in all but name. It finds echoes in similar reactionary backlashes currently rising in nations across the globe.</p><p>Is America redeemable? Is white Christian patriarchy ready and willing to destroy the country before it gives up power? Is the arc of history bending, or is it merely flailing back and forth, with no larger purpose or pattern? Is modern multi-racial, multi-cultural democracy still a viable long-term project?</p><p>To help ponder these weighty questions, I've turned to the inimitable Chris Hayes, who, as they say, needs no introduction. You've seen his shows on MSNBC, you've listened to his podcast, you've read his essays and books, you know that he is one of the leading liberal voices of our time. He’s also a friend. We are part of the same generation of journalists, living through the same dumpster fires, seeing the same patterns, and our paths have crossed regularly over the years. I’ve also been on several of his shows! We go way back.</p><p>I’ve always felt that Chris and I share similar political and intellectual instincts  — one of the few people at the commanding heights of US journalism and punditry about whom I can say that — so I’m curious to hear how his political outlook has changed since 2015, whether he still believes in the Obama creed, and what he thinks is coming in America’s near future. </p><p>So with that portentous wind-up, let's bring him into the conversation.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>That was great. I love that. I found that very moving.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, great. Alright, well, thanks for coming on Volts.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>I should say I'm a Volts reader, too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you. Thank you. I appreciate it. We're talking during a very dark time. Dark. I mean, it's all shades of dark these days. It's particularly dark in the wake of the latest ...</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Child murder?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Child murder. Yes, child mass murder. That we're all going through the motions as we always do, until that fades and something else horrible comes up in the news. But let's pull the lens back. I want to do some big picture talking, and then a little bit more close in, like proximate, what's our proximate future talk? But let's start with the big picture. So I just want to start by asking you in the most general possible terms, if you think back to 2015, which I mark as sort of the last normal year, how has your political outlook changed?</p><p>I think of you as basically sort of a Left liberal, Scandinavian, welfare-state kind of guy. Has any of that fundamentally changed? Or if not, have you changed your mind about any big things? How have you evolved since then?</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think my basic orientation, which is like, a Social Democrat, a Rawlsian liberal, a mixed economy, freedom plus groceries, adherent — freedom plus groceries, a great quote from a New Deal congressman describing the New Deal, which has never been improved upon for basically Social Democratic, mixed economy, rule of law. Broadly, I'm a liberal, and I'll talk about that in a second because I actually think that I'm more that in a specific philosophical sense than I ever was before, actually. But, yeah, that hasn't really changed. But things have changed. So one, I do think I'm a little less, I don't know what I feel about progress.</p><p>What I do feel with age, and with now going through having been a sort of professional working journalist for 20 years now, just like that, there are reformist moments and reactionary moments, and they kind of alternate and being able to recognize when you're in one almost the way that an athlete can recognize a defense. It's like, "Oh, yeah, no, right now we're in a reactionary moment." I just know what a reactionary moment feels like because I've been through a bunch of them. And in some ways there's a little bit of some comfort, I find, in that, because there's a little of "this too shall pass" about the nature of reactionary moments.</p><p>First sort of reformist moments, radical moments, even. I mean, I think there were moments in the Trump administration where we're almost sort of revolutionary in some ways, a level of sort of radical thirst for and exuberant enthusiasm for taking on Patriarchy and White Supremacy that I'd never seen before in my life. I mean, the the sort of both "Me Too" and the Women's March and then the George Floyd protests. So I think I've gotten more, just like a little, again, I think a little wisened or sanguine about the fact that you go through different periods in the life of a society, in a democracy.</p><p>I also think things are more tangibly perilous than they've ever been. I think that's informed by actual hard facts. And it really is the case that January 6th hadn't ever happened before. It really is the case that one of the two parties is openly seditious, or contains a faction that's openly seditious. It really is the case that we've pissed away 20 years that we could have been doing stuff on carbon, and now have a much tougher road ahead. It really is the case that, whatever you want to call it, populist ethnonationalism, 21st-century sort of authoritarian models are on the rise, and there's and there's democratic retreat in a lot of places in the world.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>My experience since 2015 has been sort of comprehensive, 360-degree, sort of disillusionment. It's one of those things like when you do yoga for years, you're like, "Oh, I didn't even know there were ... I had muscles there." I still had illusions.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yet they're falling. But one of the things I want to talk about is history because it's odd. I'm not sure why the timing worked out this way, but it seems like one of the things that's happened since then is a lot of people on sort of the broad Left have been getting a little bit more interested in reconstruction and looking more closely into that period of American history right after the Civil War, which is not taught very well in schools. I did not learn, I did not get the full picture in small-town Tennessee, in the 1980s when I was learning history.</p><p>But through the lens of that, and then looking more at American history, it's sort of come to me that it seems like American history is not so much reactionary moments followed by reformist moments, as very brief reformist moments followed by long swaths of reactionary moments. Like, if you throw a dart at a timeline, the odds are you're going to hit a period of horrible, reactionary backlash. Most of it is horrible, reactionary backlash. What we learned about in school are these brief periods where the reactionary backlash somehow gets out over its skis or goes too far, or causes some rupture, and then there's this sort of reformist burst.</p><p>But really, most of it is dark. So in that light, one of the things you often hear, there's a sort of like, "everybody calm down" faction in the punditry. I know you're familiar with them. And one of the things people like that often say is, "Oh, you know, like, think about the '60s and '70s there were bombings in the cities, and leaders being assassinated, and blah, blah, blah." Or think back to like, you know, the 1910s, or think back to the 1890s, citing these periods of American history which were genuinely awful, in which things genuinely did seem to be falling apart.</p><p>But you say, flat out, it's as bad as it's ever been. So how do you think about those historical comparisons?</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>That's a great question. So, yeah, I would agree, probably in terms of sheer years on the dartboard, you're probably right. I think I started reading, getting really into Reconstruction right after Trump's election, and spent several years reading a ton, including the Du Bois classic on it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's so infuriating. It's impossible to exaggerate how infuriating it is. The deeper you get into the details.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>It's also like one of those things ... sometimes you read, like, you encounter some text and you're like, "It just feels like it could have been written yesterday." There's just aspects of that that you're just like, "Holy crap, like, wow. This doesn't feel like the Dead Sea Scrolls. This does not feel like this got cracked out of some vault."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This feels the dynamics, change the rhetoric a little bit, the dynamics are so similar.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I think the reason that's useful, I think the reason I got into Reconstruction, I think it's useful is just because it got covered up, because it is so inimical to the view of progress, right? Because we had a huge amount of progress and then this enormous backlash, right? So things move backwards. I always describe it as like the lost city of Atlantis, of American multi-racial democracy, where there was a civilization that got built, and then just flooded, and then completely like, everyone just floats on the surface and it's like, "Wait a second."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, lost to history.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>"Wait a second. There was a majority Black state legislature in South Carolina in 1869. Wait, what?" never been replicated before. Like, we've never had a majority Black legislature in any state since then. So I think, yes, I think that the reason a lot of people have gone to that. I think precisely because when you feel like history is being wrenched backward, or reactionary forces are ascended, that's a real touchstone. And I think also your point about ... I have some sympathy to the Just Countdown Caucus insofar as there was tumultuous stuff going on in the 1960s and 70s, and think the way that I square the circle.</p><p>And this comes back around, in some ways, to answering the first question, which is that the biggest change is appreciating the difficulty and preciousness of liberal democracy. That I just took it for granted. There's the old David Foster Wallace, who has a very famous graduation speech he gives called "This is Water", which opens with him citing the old joke about the big fish that swims by the two younger fish and says to them, "beautiful day, boys. Enjoy the water." And the big fish swims away, and one the little fish says, the other, "What's the water?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right?</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>And democracy is the water for us. It's just like, "Oh, right, yeah. That's how we have a liberal democracy." And there's, like, a court system. There's a rule of law. There's inalienable rights. There are means of redressing grievance through nonviolent adjudication of grievance and accountability.</p><p>There is ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Peaceful transition of power.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Peaceful transition of power. Like, all this stuff is just like, "That's the water." And then all of a sudden, it's not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>And that is the big thing for me, the understanding the preciousness and the vulnerability of it and the real profound recency of it as a project, which is to say actual, genuine multi-racial democracy. I mean, 1965, basically, when we get the Voting Rights Act, is like when you can really plausibly start the clock on it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, younger than many living Americans.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Younger than many living Americans, and I mean, younger than, like, my parents. And that's also true around the world. I mean, you know, India starts the clock in in '48, and, you know, Brazil, you know, starts the clock probably earlier, but then has multiple military dictatorships, and sort of its modern incarnation of, like, a durable liberal democracy is, what, 40 years old, probably.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Think about Franco in Spain. That wasn't that long ago.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>No, not at all. And I think that also the other connection that that gives me. The other thing I think about is thinking about the generation that survived fascism, and saw fascism and also Stalinism and authoritarianism in different stripes, and the appreciation that gave them of how thin it was, how fragile, and also that they had watched it collapse in on itself. I mean, that's the other thing I think that ... that experience, which is, like, the fascists came to power in environments of, quote-unquote "liberal democracy and elections".</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, talking about hearing echoes. Go back and read about people living through that, and the sort of like, it's the conservative moderates that didn't step in and restrain the extremists. It's those center Leftists who were too comfortable and didn't worry when they went after this group and that group. I mean, it's just all ...</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>It's the Leftists who said after Hitler, "Us, the worse, the better." There's a lot of blame to go around.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But it's all happening again. It's all like mirror image happening again right now. And this is part of my despair, is like, yes, we had not just a generation of Americans who sort of lived through this kind of thing happening, but all of modern history is full of this kind of thing happening. And full of people like Hannah Arendt, and on and on, sort of doing these incredibly, erudite, deep dives into the mentality of it and the psychology of it and the sociology of it, and really, forensically laying out, like, here's what happens with, presumably thinking as they were doing so, "if we make it so super clear how this works, we'll recognize it next time." And yet we seem to be walking through the script, beat by beat, and knowing that we're living through the script doesn't seem to be helping at all, doesn't seem to be slowing down.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>And I wonder if that's partly, I do think that's a little bit of lived memory. I do think there's a relationship between the generation of people who experienced it firsthand dying out and what we're seeing. I had a conversation with Francis Fukuyama recently about this, and he definitely thinks that. And we talked about that a little bit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's disappointing that one generation is all it takes though, right? I mean, one generation is all it takes to forget this. Totally forget.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>But don't you also feel I mean, to me again, it comes back to like — if I take a step back and I say it is a miracle for a society to self-organize and self-govern, and it's a miracle to do it at the kind of scale that the US does it, or Brazil, or India, right? These are all massive, multi-racial, complicated democracies with incredibly fraught politics. Like if I take a step back and say, "That's a kind of marvel and precious and worth fighting for," then the fact that it is easy for it to come undone feels in a sort of almost biblical sense or a religious sense. It's like Moses with the tablets and the golden calf.</p><p>It's like it's just easier to worship an icon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It is pushing against a lot of normal human instincts and habits.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yes. Now, this is, I think, a little bit of intention with some other ideas that other people have that actually what we want to be is free and self-organizing. And I just read the David Graeber & Wengrow book — basically makes an argument that hierarchy and these social systems and these forms of sort of complex politics of domination are actually these kind of, aren't necessary for complex systems. And people have organized themselves in all kinds of fascinatingly, free and equitable ways, which I found really a wonderful provocation and really interesting. So I don't want to overly subscribe to this view that's about the human nature that's really born of a fairly small experience of politics.</p><p>But that said, it does strike me that it's hard. It's always going to be hard, and that if you appreciate that, then it feels less surprising that there's people constantly pulling on the threads, threatening to undo it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I would even pull that point out a bit and make it slightly broader. Like, I only in retrospect, realize now that I sort of took democracy as the baseline, but also sort of took basic rationality, basic sort of empirically informed argument, basic decency, the basic baseline of moral equality among people. Obviously, I know we fail on all those things again and again, but I guess I just sort of assume that we all agree that those are the baselines, that's what we want, that's the standard, and we err when we drift away from them. But now, as you say, I've sort of flipped around to viewing all those things, especially rationality, especially any sort of collective rationality, as miraculous exceptions to the rule.</p><p>Things that we can sometimes have achieved if everything goes just right, but not by any means the default.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>I mean, to me, the ultimate example of this, right, was like the COVID experience, where it was like the combination of, like, we made this vaccine in twelve months, and then people didn't want to take it, which was just like the most perfect combination of ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yin and Yang right there.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. It's like, wow, we are really, what an amazing thing we are as humans.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then also like, wow.</p><p>Idiots. So let's talk about Trump. And I'm just curious, did you think Trump would win? And looking back on him winning, I'm talking about 2016, looking back on him winning, is the story you tell about him winning a story of large, structural forces that made something like him inevitable? Sort of the 2008 financial crisis, the implications of that, and offshoring of manufacturing. All these stories we're familiar with, the sort of sorting, the big sorting by education level. There's lots of structural factors you could point to. Or is the story you tell about him winning just like a bunch of random contingent s**t happened to all line-up and fall the wrong way, and it was just more or less an accident of history?</p><p>I go back and forth, both about which I believe and about which is more frightening.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which one do you favor?</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Well, I was always, and I think the record would reflect this in our program. I mean, people would always ask me, I remember people that summer asking me after he'd sort of sealed up the nomination, "Can he win?" And I would say, "Anyone in this country who wins a major party nomination. And I mean, like, you the person I'm talking to, anyone starts at about 42% of the vote. 43% of the vote. So, yeah, it's a coin flip, basically. I think he's got a 50/50-ish chance of winning, maybe a little less. But yes, of course, he can win. The major party nominee for president absolutely can win." So it always seemed real to me, and possible in a way that I always felt a little frustrated. That was not ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Did you think he'd win the nomination, though? Like, where was your level of credulity about that?</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yes, I did. I did. It was in after a little while, but when I sort of understood how the math was going to work, I did think he was going to win the nomination. Not in the beginning. I definitely did not in the beginning think. I definitely was not like, "Oh, he came down the escalator like this." No, absolutely not. In terms of how I explain him, I mean, look, one thing I like to say is that the definition of a catastrophe is that a lot of things have to go wrong to make it a catastrophe.</p><p>So if you read the Challenger launch decision book, which is a sort of autopsy of that right, it's like there's a bunch of stuff concatenated together that produces it, and that's just necessarily the case for a catastrophe. It's true of World War I, right? And so I think of Trump as a catastrophe, and I think in the stuff that went wrong, there's two categories: which is the accidents and then the bigger structural driving forces, like the sort of alienation of downwardly mobile, White, rural folks, who felt increasingly removed from forms of sort of coastal, liberal, multi-ethnic, multi-racial culture. The material basis for that, the fact that these social misery index of addiction and suicide.</p><p>So all of that stuff that people talk about when they talk about the kind of hillbilly, elegy, Chris Arnade stuff, I think there's real stuff there. And I think the sort of backlash to multi-racial democracy, as embodied by the first Black president, it's obviously an enormous part of it. I mean, I love the, like, the Michael Tesler research on this, who basically...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is like, he's the "dying of Whiteness" guy?</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>No, that's Jonathan Metzer. Michael Tesler is ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You had him on your pod, though, didn't you? Michael Tesler, I remember being very struck by that episode.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>He does research on race and Obama, and basically, he goes back, he had a panel survey, and basically what he's able to find was that people with high levels of racial animus ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I remember now</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>In his previous panel research were the best predictors of White voters that flip to Trump, basically.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>He's the guy that showed, "Grab any thread, pull it long enough, and you end up back in race," basically.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Right. And so you could basically predict people's ACA views based on their racial animus score. But one of the things that he, one of the amazing findings of his research, really one of the major takeaways is that people are real checked out of politics and that tens of millions of people didn't know which party was, quote, "on the side of Black people," basically, until Barack Obama was elected.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Truly the mind blower.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>That like, that, basically, was like, "Oh, wait a second." And for decades, it's not been like an apparent piece of knowledge that a lot of White voters were walking around with and that Barack Obama just is like, "oh, okay, whoa, now, okay, I understand."</p><p>And obviously, when I say on the side of Black people, I'm like, that's a tongue-in-cheek reduction of the two-party system. But I just mean like that, obviously, Black voters vote for Democratic candidates up and down the ballot in the 80%, 90% range, but also sort of in the sort of demographic cleavage of the two main coalitions, that Black folks were in one of the two predominantly, and that there was a responsiveness to their interests represented in that coalition, was just not a known fact to a lot of White voters.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I feel like another trend of the last few years, at least for me, is coming to appreciate more how much political analysis mine and others has been confounded by and continues to be confounded by underestimating the near-total ignorance of most voters. You have written about this very eloquently, and it's something that you can sort of learn, but you have to just relearn it over and over again. You know what I mean? You got pounded into your head. They literally didn't know that, most people didn't know that Democrats were basically the party of Civil Rights.</p><p>That's just, like, hard to absorb for someone like us. So let me ask you a related question. Similarly broad, and probably the answers are somewhat related, but this, I feel like, is the sort of central bafflement of our time, at least for liberals. So there's sort of two stories you can tell about kind of American politics since 2015. On one hand, you have the sort of political scientists saying despite all the theatrics and the human cry and the sort of social media heat and et cetera, et cetera, basically, things are going roughly how you would predict they would go, based on the fundamentals, right.</p><p>Trump's victory, and his approval rating, and all that were more or less what you'd expect from a generic Republican president in the same circumstances, and vice versa. And you would sort of predict his loss in 2020, and he did lose. And then the fundamentals would predict that Joe Biden would be unpopular based on inflation and everything else. So on one sense, you could just tell a story the last five or six years of American politics that are like, there's this, it's producing a lot more heat and insanity and social media hand-wringing, but basically, things are more or less unfolding normally, as you would expect.</p><p>And then the other story is that the Republican Party is going crazy, just very visibly crazy, right in front of us, progressively, as time goes on.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Literally. It's like watching someone degenerate in front of you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And I feel like I'm losing my mind. Like, how can this continue to go on and not matter? What level of it would matter? On the one hand, you're like the fundamentals. Yes. Predictable, normal. On the other hand, why are things still normal when one party is so clearly invisibly going off the deep end, accelerating off the deep end? How do we reconcile these two?</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>I mean, I was just having this thought today because I was watching Herschel Walker, who basically is, he's now the nominee for Republican Senate seat in Georgia because he was anointed by Trump. He doesn't live in Georgia. He went to the University of Georgia, quite famously, where he was an incredible running back and went on to have a very good pro career. But he lives in Dallas. And people have been talking for a while about, the whispers, you know, the Republicans, he's not a very good candidate. But he hasn't done much media, and I thought the reason for that was like, he pointed a loaded gun at an ex-wife and said he's going to blow her f*****g brains out.</p><p>There are multiple accusations of domestic violence that he has acknowledged. I don't think he denies them. He says he's sort of a changed man and found God, et cetera, but I didn't quite like I just listened to an interview with him, and I was just like, "Is this a bit?" Like, very obviously this person should not be a US Senator. And, I mean, I feel that way about, like, Tommy Tuberville, too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Literally, if you were a middle manager at a shoe dealership, you would not hire them.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>I don't know if you've heard Tommy Tuberville, but it's like ludicrous. It's like an SNL joke. And there's other people I don't feel that way around. I don't feel that way about Tim Scott. I don't feel that way about Mike Lee. There's people it's like, yeah, I don't like that person. I don't like their politics. And the reason I bring this up is because it's a perfect test case right now, of this battle between what I call normal politics and abnormal politics. I'm always talking about this show, the two tracks, right? Because we have the track of normal politics, which is like, Democrats control both houses of Congress and the White House. Inflation is 8%. They're going to get their butts kicked.</p><p>And again, that's democracy. I don't like it. It's bad. But that is normal politics. Republicans holding a grandstanding press conference to be like, "The price of milk is too high." Any democracy on Earth, that is what the out-of-power party is going to do. When inflation is 8%, that's the most bread and butter normal thing in the world. Meanwhile, there's an ex-president stalking around, like, trying to get pro-coup insurrectionists, including a guy who bussed people to January 6th, who is now the Republican Nominee in Pennsylvania.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Running on a promise to send his state's votes to Trump no matter what.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly. To never let a Democrat win the electors of the state of Pennsylvania. And it's like. So I totally feel the same way about the weird, and I think the, what it comes down to is this: voters don't actually — again, we talk voters we're talking about 100 million people. We're talking about people with all kinds of different things they're thinking about and dealing with. There is no within, and this is, I think, the thing that Hannah Arendt and the generation that saw the rise of fascism learned, and we have to relearn — there is no penalty in normal democratic politics for anti-democratic forces.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Which is to say you cannot win elections by saying, "Those people are authoritarian fascists," because people will vote on the price of milk. And that underscores how precious and dangerous this stuff is, precisely because within the confines of the battle over people's votes, there is very little penalty for being essentially illiberal, authoritarian, or fascist.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Another way of saying that is you probably couldn't get the Bill of Rights through a popular referendum. You probably couldn't get democracy itself through a popular referendum. People want their team to win, basically, much more than they feel any fealty toward these sort of abstract third-party rules that are supposed to govern everybody.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yes. And again, keep in mind that the only reason we have, the second founding of this country and the key to the democracy we have now, which is essentially the 14th Amendment, came at the point of a gun. It was over the bodies of 600,000 dead Americans. And because the South's representatives weren't seated in Congress. Like, we only have it because they were under literal military occupation and didn't get votes and had to ratify it to get readmitted to the Union. And the 14th amendment is, basically, the linchpin of what modern liberal democracy in America looks like.</p><p>The 14th amendment, which incorporates the Bill of Rights into state governments, which hadn't happened before, which has the Equal Protection Clause, all of the stuff that we think of as being like in a free society, which is really at a real level, protected by the 14th amendment, much more than the Bill of Rights, which, again, is only Congress, right? Congress shall make no law. Congress will make a law right. That itself didn't come about in any democratic way. It came about through mass violence.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But it's not just anti-democratic stuff. There's book banning, and book burning, and then just a general sort of ugliness. And if I'm being honest with myself, I'm a classic coastal liberal. Like, I'm all the stereotypes.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>I've been telling you this forever. You got to play up your Tennessee bona fides.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know. I got to drop that.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>You got to constantly just be like, "look, I'm just a simple gun over from Tennessee."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As a small business owner...</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>You're a small business ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Who is originally from Tennessee.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>You're a White man from Tennessee who's a small business owner, basically a MAGA dude.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know, what's wrong with me? But I will say personally, it's not just that I find all this stuff, the violence, and the obvious love of violence, and the very theatrical sort of to me, almost like parodic sort of sweatiness about masculinity. And all of it is not just morally repugnant to me, but aesthetically repellent on almost every conceivable metric. You've said before, everything's lining up into these one big side versus one big other side, and everything I hate and loathe and find repulsive on both aesthetic and moral grounds, is all coming together in one. Which leaves me, again and again, thinking, "Why is my repugnance at this," — which I find so fundamental and like preconscious, more than I could explain. I couldn't even explain it. I couldn't even argue for it. It's preconscious. "Why is that so rare? Why are the rest of Americans not repulsed by this?" I know it's a naive question, but I can't get around it. It keeps coming.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>I would say a few things on it. One is they do pay a penalty for being nuts. Like Donald Trump lost the national vote to Hillary Clinton, lost it by 5 million votes. He was an incumbent one-term. There aren't a lot of one-term presidents. They normally win reelection. They do pay a penalty for it. They could have had a Republican president who is 20% less repellent and weird and corrupt and probably won reelection. They've lost, count the Senate seats that they have lost over the last from like Sue Lowden to Todd Akin to Christine O'Donnell, I mean Herschel Walker, like that should be a walk.</p><p>They should win that in a walk. It's going to be a tough race. I just watched that interview with Herschel Walker and was like, "Oh no, no no no." And there's a lot of voters who are going to feel that way. So they do pay a penalty, it's just not that big, but it's at the margin, and it gets back to this like 45% problem. The other thing to think about is they are playing on a tilted playing field because of the way that a. that states have been gerrymandered and the electoral college and the Senate, such that they can lose the total national popular vote and win the House.</p><p>They can lose the total national popular vote and win a big part of the Senate. They can lose the total national popular vote and win. So when you combine those things, they have an advantage already, and they're already like pissing away some of that with the insanity. But fundamentally, the structural factors are what produced 90% of the outcomes, and then the last 10% is everything else, that they can go very far with that 90% even if they give away the 10%. And then the final thing I would just say is that, you're sort of somewhat tongue-in-cheek when you talk about the repellents, but it's like there are, there's aspects of liberal culture that I find aesthetically repellent. and there's lots of cringy, "in this house, we believe."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There are aspects of virtually every other human being.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Totally. And I think a lot of people feel that way about preachy, cosmopolitan liberals. There are times where I could subjectively access. There are certain things it's funny, there really are differences. Like, there are certain issues that I can access subjectively, and some I can't.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Project yourself imaginatively into the position of the person who believes it.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Right. But I agree that fundamentally, the penalty they are paying for being as wild as they are is really insufficient. And I also think there's another aspect of this. And if people have watched my show, or I've talked about this may be like, and again, this makes me feel a little like, "Am I doing that thing that people do as they age? Or like, when I was younger?" But I feel like when you would call someone, if you would use the adjective, like, "he's very political" or "he's like a politician" or even "diplomatic", right, it all had a pretty similar cluster of meaning, which is: a person who's just trying to be inoffensive and, like, liked by as many people as possible. Because the basic math of either diplomacy or politics is to not offend and turn people off. And it's very bizarre that the personality of a shock jock, which is the opposite, which is like, "the troll who tries to strip controversy," is now the personality of a lot of politicians.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everything else has fallen away on the Right.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>It's weird.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is the only route.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Performing being an a*****e to people. It's like Rob. Just the difference between Rob Portman and J. D. Vance, a perfect example. Rob Portman is just like a bloodless, inoffensive White dude, who has terrible politics but is not, like, going out his way to offend people. And J. D. Vance is like, "Alec Baldwin just shot and killed someone." Like, "Jack, you got to let Trump back on Twitter." And it's like, what are you doing?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or Marjorie Taylor Greene. Let's just take another example. Literally, the only thing there is about her to recommend her to even Republican voters is that she will say the grossest, nastiest, most offensive thing. That's it. There's no record, there's no policy proposals. There's nothing else but that. That is the sole desideratum now, on that side. It's wild.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I think, again, I think that, like, well, that relates to something that I'm writing a book about, but I I do think that there's — the attentional incentives have gone pretty haywire and have have wreaked havoc with our politics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, let me ask about that, because the natural follow-up here, is if you're talking about the sort of gap between the sort of theatrically repugnant behavior of Republicans and the weird normalcy of public reaction and public opinion, you have to look at the media. I think that's what comes up, is the media. And we could easily do a whole podcast about media, and what's happened to it, and how much it is to blame for all this. But sort of, this is another thing that has changed markedly, I think, since we started out.</p><p>My distinct memory of the George W. Bush years was there's this sort of normal political world and normal political media. And then over here on the periphery, kind of like a weird, buzzing horsefly, is this Right-wing swamp media, with its crazy conspiracy theories. And they were just as crazy back then, over there on their margins. You remember the Jade Helm, like Obama is going to take over the US and declare martial law, just endless, one after the other. And I sort of ended up kind of taking that as my baseline model. Like you've got media, and then you've got this weird peripheral thing, and just very, very steadily, step by step, piece by piece, as we've watched over the years, that peripheral crazy has eaten the Right-wing media entirely.</p><p>And so now the media and that machine has grown, and has been measurably strengthened by social media too, of course. So now we have this weird situation where the sort of 800-pound gorilla in the media room is explicit Right-wing propaganda, and then this husk of the mainstream media, if it's left, which seems entirely defensive, entirely not up to the task of pushing back. So how much do you blame the fucked up media situation for our state of affairs?</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>I will say, that I do think that what happened in the wake of 9/11, and what we saw happen in the Bush years, was the beginning of the Right-wing media swallowing, like moving towards this, like infiltrating the mainstream and dominating the things that we talked about. I don't know, I feel really, I don't have a simple answer here. Here are two things I think. One is that everyone in the media underestimates how much power they have over people's attention. Everyone in the media thinks they're just chasing, and everyone outside the media overestimates how much power they have. I think part of what produced Trump, and part of what has produced our current situation, is balkanization and attentional changes to the institutions of attention and the markets for attention.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. This is your book, right? This is what you're writing a book about?</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yeah, this is what I'm writing a book about. But I also think, again, let's go back for what, 500 or 600 years? All they did on the European continent was murder each other over there, whether trans-substantiation was happening or not. The joke I always make about disinformation is like they didn't have Facebook during the Salem witch trials. Like, it turns out humans are perfectly capable of passing false information, dangerous false information in circles.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>False information is the baseline and good ...</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>... fact-based media is another one of these ...</p><p>Rare.</p><p>... Effinescent miracles that sometimes shimmers into view but can easily vanish, if not actively tended.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Right. So I have a million critiques. I do think that, here is the one thing that I think is true. A thing that people don't understand about the media, and media consumption in this country, is that there's basically two large political coalitions. One of them, the center Left, make up the audience for all of the media. So everything that's out there, from small-lifting magazines, podcasts, blah, blah, that's all the center Left.</p><p>And then the other half of the country, it's like Fox, Fox, Right-wing talk radio, and some Right-wing podcasts, but they don't read The Washington Post. They don't read the New York Times. Increasingly, they don't watch the network evening news. That whole universe that we call the media is basically, and even when we have these debates about cancel culture and what the media got wrong about the Lab Leak theory, those are all intracoalitional debates amongst one of the two major coalitions of people. And the other coalition really does just get propaganda.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They've been setting it up. They've been working for that goal for decades.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>And I cannot stress this enough, how much it's propaganda. And I know this because I'm a practitioner. I know what it would look like for me to do propaganda, and I choose not to. So there is this really crazy thing that happens. And then to get back to — now, here's the most fascinating, complicating part of this about how much the media is at fault. Here's the real black pill. Okay. After the election, this is an amazing moment, after the election, by and large, in the weeks after the position of Fox was that Trump had lost the election.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Famously called it. Who was it calling Fox trying to get him to take it back? But they called it that night. It was a very pivotal moment.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Exactly. Yes. They called Arizona before anyone else. But what I'm saying is that even after that, they did not go fully in on the ghost of Hugo Chavez hacked the Pennsylvania machines.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or the Chinese ... what was it?</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>The Chinese? The bamboo paper. Yeah. You got to get the UV lights so you could see the Chinese bamboo. Okay. And here's what happened. Fox's ratings tanked worse than they ever have, and for the first time ever, OAN started getting audience, and they even beat them for 1 hour. And I see the ratings every day. I don't look at them every day like I used to, but it was wild, and you could just see it was direct. It was like people were just like, "Click. I don't want to hear you telling me Trump lost. I'm going to go to this place where they tell me that he won."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And, yeah, they've been trained. The audience has been trained.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>And then Fox realized what was happening, and got much more ... now, they never quite went fully because they have a legal department. They can't just openly lie for people. But they started doing a lot more of big lie stuff and flirting with it, and they got those people back. But that moment was, like, that's where you see the dark agency of the audience.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And there's no firebreak on that. There's no force or constituency left on the Right with the power or the inclination to thrust itself into that process and try to even slow it down. It's less and less friction.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Perfect example. This is like the career trajectory of David French, who is a completely doctrinaire conservative, pro-life, religious, Christian, low taxes, low regulation, whatever, name the issue. He also believes in liberal democracy, that the election was not stolen, and that Donald Trump is like a moral monster as a person. These are just like all, like just to me, completely obvious.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Seems like they are obvious. Seems like it.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>And David French now writes for The Atlantic because that's a place, that's the ecosystem in which we can have debates about this stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No one can predict the future. But I don't see anything on the horizon that would disrupt this basic dynamic. And I just wonder how far ... it's gone so much farther, so much faster than I predicted, even though I, like many netroots types from the early 2000s, came online b******g about the media. That's what I was doing from the second I started commenting on politics. All the same patterns, all the same dynamics. But even as a longtime media critic, I think I underestimated just how far and how fast it's going, and it's just accelerating. So where does that end up?</p><p>I mean, this is sort of a cliche at this point, but you can't really have a self-governing democracy without shared trusted sources of information, and we don't have them. So is that it?</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, the key-word there, and this is the thing that I think everything comes down to. So there's two, basically, I think there's two themes when you get down to the fundamentals of this. And I'm writing a book about one of them. And then the other one is what my first book about. But I'm writing a book about attention, because I think attention is the most important resource of the 21st century, and the way that people marshal it, attain it, achieve it, mine it from our minds, determines fortunes and empires and everything, okay.</p><p>But the other is trust. And fundamentally, you can't run a low-trust democracy. This is really what it comes down to: you can't run a low-trust democracy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it seems so much easier to degrade trust than it is to build it. So it just seems like on that front, democracy is constantly an uphill climb.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>And I think that's part of the reason that it's such an uphill climb. But I also think, like, we really got to think the trust problem. I mean, we really saw it .... there's all sorts of ways that you can measure this across countries, right? Like, "Do you think most people can be trusted most of the time?" And you can ask it in a bunch of different languages, and you can rank just how people feel about other people in their society. And we're a very low-trust society. We're like, near Russia. Russia is like a famously low-trust society.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I read an article, one of these sort of research roundups on this question of social trust. And the sort of conclusion, as far as I can tell from the sociology world, is a. social trust is the coin of the realm without which nothing else is possible. Nothing. No good media, no good politics, no good policing. Name your thing. Without social trust, it's all impossible. And b. what creates social trust? How do you preserve it? How do you revive it when it's flagging? No one knows. Like, no one has a f*****g clue. It's like the mystery juice that makes everything run, but no one knows really how it works or how to create it, or how to stop it from leeching away, which is what seems to be happening.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>You see a theory of it amongst the Democratic Party leadership institutionalists, which Barack Obama was, Joe Biden, which is basically like, just keep willing the institutions to try to work.</p><p>I'm serious. That's the only way to soldier on and to recreate the social trust that's lost, is you got to just put your shoulder to the wheel and work through it. And it's like, again, I don't want to dunk on it because I don't necessarily have a better alternative.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. Well, I will say, though, the one perhaps, maybe not alternative to that, but a different strain that I found more hopeful was Warren's sort of approach during the 2016 primaries, which is to say, the problem is lack of social trust. And the way to create social trust is to create a government that works. So pay attention to whose staffing agencies, pay attention to how agencies work, and who they report to. Like, the procedural mechanisms of building an administrative state, as boring as they are, that's the nuts and bolts of what will create trust is the thing working, right?</p><p>And yet she couldn't get like, the supposed Pragmatists of the center Left didn't care. They have their catechism about austerity and all the rest. They don't actually care about Pragmatism. And then on the far Left, they just want the beautiful results of socialism, right? The Medicare for all and everything else. No one cares about the mechanisms.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>The meetings, lots of meetings.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Meetings are where you live or die.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Bureaucracy, there's paperwork, there's spreadsheets. All of that stuff is like, what? Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And again, she was the champion of that, and it got her nowhere.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I think that's partly because that, again, is a hard thing to win on. But again, I guess here's what I would say to conclude this about where my politics are, I have never been more acutely aware and convinced that things are truly, genuinely perilous and never less clear on the solution. And I don't mean the solutions in a like, "You get to wave your wand and pass the agenda you want to." Because I think those solutions are actually, like, I think we should have single-payer health care, and I think we should massively boost up our investment in clean energy.</p><p>And we should probably put a price on carbon. That's not going to be enough. And there's a million different crash programs we should be doing. There's a bunch of stuff that if you said, "Okay, you have a supermajority in both parties and just you control it." I don't mean that. I mean getting from where we are to something has never been less clear to me, like, what that answer to. And I find myself very frustrated with every single faction of the coalition, from the most doctrinal Marxist to the most milquetoast Centrist.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, everybody just seems to be reinforcing their priors. And I'm like, "Things sure seem different now."</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>That's part of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think there's something notably different, like some fresh thinking.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>That's it.</p><p>That's part of it. It always feels everyone is giving a "now more than ever" argument. It's like, "Wait a second, a lot of s**t has happened. Have we changed our mind on anything? Really now more than ever?" About all the things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I know. And just imagine when Democrats get beat up in the midterms, which seems inevitable for a thousand different reasons, there is going to be a festival.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Everyone's going to get to say, yeah, exactly. It was too far Left, not Left enough.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We're running short on time. So I'm going to combine my last few questions into one mega question. And it's probably unanswerable, but I'm sort of curious about, in terms of our proximate situation, your outlook on the 2022 and 2024 elections. Things sure look bad to me, but maybe you see something else.</p><p>And then sort of the second part of that question is if, as seems statistically likely at this point, Republicans romp in the midterms and then take the presidency in 2024 and thereby control all three branches of government and are thereby unleashed to pass all the voter restrictions they want and make it much more difficult for Democrats to ever get back into power. Well, a. how fatalistic are you about the upcoming two elections? And if you are as fatalistic as I am, how fatalistic are you about 2025 and forward, I guess, at this point, do you have an optimistic story?</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>I'm not fatalistic about 2024. I just don't think about it. It just seems too far and too much craziness. I don't know. We had a Pandemic. We had the land war broke out in Europe, the largest one since World War II. Who knows? I don't know. That's a long time away. I am really a Serenity Prayer kind of person, even though I'm not sober, but what I can control, what I can't, the wisdom to know the difference. So I think Democrats are likely to get walloped in 2022. 1946 is a really interesting analog because I'm trying to think of a year that's similar.</p><p>And it's funny you think of 1946, you'd think, like, people must have been pretty psyched like the war was over. Like the boys come home and get to meet little Billy, the son he's never met, and they're kissing the nurse in the Times Square. We defeated fascism. But 1946 was like a brutally dyspeptic year in American life. Inflation was through the roof. There wasn't enough housing for everyone that was returning. There was huge disruptions. There was massive racial strife as, like, basically the Black people who had gone into the factories to work were kicked out. And there was, like, factories that had been kind of like integrated under basically the wartime exigency being recently.</p><p>What there was in 1946 was the end of this era actually produced its own set of disruptions because normalcy did not snap back. And a new era had to be born. And the way it showed up is that the Democrats got annihilated at the polls in the worst midterm loss in years. And it was functionally the end of the New Deal. And in fact, the first thing they did was they passed Taft-Hartley over the veto of Truman, which rolled back the NLRB and was the first reactionary blow against social democracy that had been achieved on the New Deal was to a frontal attack of the unions.</p><p>But all that said, like, Truman improbably wins in '48. Of course. Famously. Right? you think you won, and he ekes it out. A lot can change. So I'm not there yet on the fatalism of 2024, or what comes after. I think this election is going to be bad.</p><p>I do think the abortion matters. I do think they have an untenable position on abortion. I do think they have a problem with their own activists who are going to push for wildly unpopular s**t. And I do think that the vast majority of Americans think that forcing a 15-year-old to give birth to her rapist child is insane and that abortion illegal after six weeks is insane, under any circumstances. That hunting down doctors for possible criminalization, or banning Plan B imports, or whatever crazy s**t they're going to come up with between June and November is nuts and bad and will hurt them, and really will hurt them.</p><p>And particularly in these gubernatorial races like as Josh Shapiro, the AG in Pennsylvania, who's the Democratic nominee, said to me, the Republican legislator of Pennsylvania will pass a total abortion ban that will come to the governor's desk and it will either be vetoed by Josh Shapiro or signed by Doug Mastriano. It is not an abstract, like women of Pennsylvania. That's going to be what's going to happen.</p><p>So I do think that actually has a tremendous amount of salience, and I also think it kind of reminds people who are cross-pressured or in the middle some of the things they like the least about the Republican Party. That said, there's also, like, the human tragedy of it. So I don't want to, like I'm just focusing on the midterms here, but I don't want anyone to come away thinking I think that's the most important thing. The most important thing is, like, women's bodily autonomy and their control of their own bodies and reproductive health care.</p><p>So I don't know, but I think it's going to be bad. And I think the broader thing I would say, is that the problem we have now is it's not tenable. You can't run a democracy in which you have to win every election, otherwise, the other party, when they get in power, is going to ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Destroy democracy.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Destroy democracy. We can't play this as an iterative game. And that's why I do think, I honestly do think from a harm reduction standpoint, I think that if you say that that is the most important thing, and to me, it is now, I mean, climate is, but I don't think I would choose a climate-friendly dictator over a democracy or don't, although it's an interesting choice.</p><p>Then you got to be serious about, like for me, it's like Brad Raffensperger's primary win was a big deal. The Idaho governor beating his lieutenant governor, Brad Little beating Janice McGeachin, that was a big deal. I think I will very much root for Ron DeSantis over Donald Trump in that primary.</p><p>Really?</p><p>Who I think is like really an odious, vile person, but I think is like several degrees closer to believing in the basic fundamental, liberal, democratic order than Donald Trump.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's so grim. Well, just finally, then, to really conclude, when I try to not be depressive and fatalistic, which is rare these days, but when I try not to, I can think of little things like that. But when I try to think of, if it's just sort of like a politically disengaged, low-information normie, who's just living their life and just seeing these dire headlines occasionally and comes to me and says, "it seems like things are falling apart," what is the long-term story you tell about how America pulls out of what feels like a nosedive? I no longer ...</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yeah, I don't have the story.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I start hand waving and talking philosophically, right, about the arc of history because I don't have a story.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>I don't got it. I agree with you on that, and I really don't have it. And that's what I mean. Again, I could give you ten bills to pass day one, you know what I mean? But the story from here to there is ... I do believe it's unwritten, and I do have hope and faith in it being unwritten and us being able to will it into being. But what the steps of it are, are really, really unclear to me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All that I can sort of see at this point, the only optimistic story I see is the reactionary backlash overextending itself into some sort of flailing, massive harm that we then ... you know what I mean? Sort of like things fall apart, and then something's born out of the wreckage, in some way. That's the best I can do for optimism. I don't see how you get around the falling apart stage from where I stand now.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yeah, I don't know. I really don't know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is not a great place to conclude our podcast.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>No, but here, let me end on this note. Let me just say this. There's lots of things that I was certain of that didn't happen in other directions, which is, like, I was quite sure they were going to repeal the ACA. Like, I really was. I was also quite sure that, like, Roy Moore was going to be an elected US Senator. And I was actually really skeptical the Democrats will win those Georgia seats. I mean, really, really skeptical.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Me too.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>So politics does have the ability to surprise, and they have paid a price. Again, it's not enough of one, but they have. Like, it turns out, nominating Roy Moore in Alabama is a bridge too far, even for Alabama. Now, Tommy Tuberville is just a ludicrous figure. Just the right amount of bridge, the perfect amount of bridge. So I guess I would say if there's anything, the thing that I just come back to is like, I just have no certainty about the future and what will happen. And often that means that things far worse than I could have imagined happen. Like a million people dying from an infectious disease.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's the way things surprise us, most often lately.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>But sometimes they are surprising the other direction. And like, who knows, really? Who knows?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, this was I wrote a column about when I was leaving Grist. I was writing these sort of valedictory columns, and one of the columns I wrote was about hope. Because anybody who writes about climate, everybody's constantly asking, "Like, are we screwed? Is there any hope?" And I sort of said, I came down basically exactly where you just did, which is, "Sure, if you look at any particular event or trend, it seems super bad. But then again, life is chaos."</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>"And anything could happen. And so that means good things could happen too." It felt so utterly inadequate, but it really is. That's about all I got.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, thank you for coming on. I mean, we could ... it's difficult to step back under what feels like constant incoming fire. So this was fun.</p><p><strong>Chris Hayes</strong></p><p>I enjoyed that. Yeah, it was great.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's do it again sometime. Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-chris-hayes-on-how</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:56470308</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 20 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/56470308/a775ba349fded2ad53e203379e1f6a2a.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3801</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/56470308/10c3e4b1d0575b3695c6e7af94db9c2b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Danny Cullenward on California's shaky climate plans]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, policy analyst Danny Cullenward of CarbonPlan talks about the disconnect between California’s  ambitious climate goals and its actual practical plans for achieving them.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AACAWojexNQ8p6CxqeZIUJ2Ta/volts22.06.01%28danny.cullenward%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-danny-cullenward-on-california-s-shaky-climate-plans"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>California has long been known, nationally and internationally, as a leader on climate policy. The sheer scale of its economy and the stringency of its emissions targets have made it a model for other states with climate ambitions. As a role model, its successes (and failures) reverberate far beyond its borders.</p><p>So it matters a great deal whether California has a practical plan to meet its aspirations. This year offers something of an answer, and … it’s not great. </p><p><p>Volts is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></p><p>Every five years, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) issues a “scoping plan,” laying out how it intends to meet the state’s targets. </p><p>The last one, in 2017, raised serious questions about whether the state’s cap-and-trade system could do the emission-reduction work that the state planned to require of it through 2030. This year’s draft scoping plan (there’s still time for public comment) answers none of those questions, and instead, looking out to 2045, raises new questions about whether <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-nan-ransohoff-on-how?s=w#details">carbon-dioxide removal</a> (CDR) can do the work the state plans to require of it.</p><p>That’s a lot of questions. To hash through them, and get a sense of just how prepared California is to meet its climate targets, I called up Danny Cullenward, a long-time policy analyst in the state. (Volts fans will remember him from one of the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-carbon-pricing-will-never-be?s=w">very first Volts posts</a>.) He is currently policy director at the nonprofit <a target="_blank" href="https://carbonplan.org/">CarbonPlan</a> and a research fellow at American University’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.american.edu/sis/centers/carbon-removal/">Institute for Carbon Removal Law & Policy</a>. </p><p>Cullenward and I discussed what policies have worked to reduce emissions in California, whether the cap-and-trade program can do what’s asked of it, why the current scoping plan leans so heavily on CDR, and whether there’s still time to improve the plan before it’s locked in for five years.</p><p>Without any further ado, Danny Cullenward. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me on, Dave.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Danny, you were the first interview I ever did for Volts a couple of years ago. And as far as I know, now you're the first return guest.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And the first to pivot to audio. This is fun.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, the first to pivot to audio. I'm sure this is the kind of accomplishment you used to dream about as a young man.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>If I were still an academic, it would be going on my CV.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Alright, so the purpose of our conversation here today is to get a handle on California and climate, sort of where it's been, where it says it's going, and whether it is in fact prepared to go where it says it's going. Before we get there, though, let's do just a little sort of scene setting, a little background. I think everybody hears about laws coming out of California all the time. California is doing this, doing that, and it becomes a little bit of a blur. So let's just sort of clarify what are the targets to which California is committed by statute, and sort of what are its other targets which are less statutory.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>I think that's the formal legal definition. That's great.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Semi statutory.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Well, so there's a reason people talk about California and also why people, I think, sometimes get confused about exactly what's going on. And the reason that it matters is California was one of the first states to move forward on some of the macro climate policy issues, and many states are either copying or learning from its experience. So what it does turns out to matter a lot to sort of what other people start to do. I think the story begins in earnest in climate policy with the passage of AB 32. Our famous climate law back in 2006.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Under Arnold.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Under Arnold Schwarzenegger, and a progressive Democratic legislature came together, found common ground on this bill, did a couple of things.</p><p>It set a target to reduce emissions back down to 1990 emissions, by the year 2020. And it empowered the climate regulator, the California Air Resources Board, with the authority to undertake new regulations, including a cap-and-trade program, as well as to coordinate with other agencies, like our clean energy regulators that had already been pushing on renewables in the past. And that sort of set up the meta-framework and delegated the planning exercise to this regulator. So that's target number one. Target number two is about a decade later. In fact, one of the same principal legislators, then-Senator Fran Pavley, led a bill called SB 32, which codified a target of 40% below 1990 levels by the year 2030.</p><p>So both of those are statutory targets. They're legally binding. The regulator is obligated to plan to and meet those targets. And then in 2018, we had the passage of SB 100, our zero-carbon grid bill. That was much celebrated. At the signing ceremony for that bill, Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order that said, let's go carbon neutral by the year 2045 on a statewide basis as well. And it's under the auspices of that executive order, and some more recent executive order and direction activity from the current governor, Gavin Newsom, that the state of California is thinking about its long-term climate goals.</p><p>So we have statutory target for 2030, and we have non-binding aspirational executive orders for the post-2030 period.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, just to be clear, those executive orders are hotatory. Is that the word? They're meant to inspire action, but they have no legal force, there's no penalty.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>That's right. You can't create new policies or programs from those executive orders that aren't separately authorized by existing law. And it's really easy to say, "That that's dumb. It means they're nothing." On the other hand, the statutory targets we have followed from earlier executive orders, so there's a history in this state, and in many other jurisdictions, you set the aspirational goal and you codify the parts of it you can, you sort of push ahead and you iterate in ratchet. So I don't want to discount the importance of that. But the practical takeaway is that nothing can be done to implement those targets other than talking and using existing authorities.</p><p>You can't create new law with an executive order.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, so the legislature will have to follow up on that. So the first target you mentioned was by 2020, that was returned to 1990 levels. Did California hit that?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Not only hit it, hit it a few years early. So it's a good story. And getting down to 1990 levels, maybe two things to say for your listeners. 1990 is a baseline that was really common to talk about 15, 20 years ago. We now talk about baselines like 2005, that's just sort of an artifact of when people locked into all of this. It doesn't sound like a particularly impressive target, in some respects, that's true, but at the time it was set, we were looking at emissions going ever up, and the idea that they would flatline and come back down a little bit was actually really ambitious at the time.</p><p>And the state met it a couple of years early, which is great. Could talk about why. We got a little lucky. We also worked really hard, and we got there a couple of years early.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's briefly talk about it. So I'd like to get a sense of sort of — there's these two families of policies in California that have been passed in pursuit of these targets. There is the cap-and-trade system that was set up, as you say, by the Arnold Bill. And then alongside that, there's this sort of more sector-specific rules and regulations and investments, sort of, I guess what you would group under "industrial policy". So you have this sort of price-based mechanism on one hand, and then these sort of more old-fashioned regulatory tools on the other hand.</p><p>So what has worked to put California ahead of schedule for its 2020 goal?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Maybe the other thing to mention here is for these macro state targets, like the 2020 target and the 2030 target, AB 32, that original climate law asked the regulator to come up with what's called a "Scoping Plan". So every five years, the regulator is supposed to put together an official strategy. We're in the middle of a process for updating that strategy. And so you can look to those strategy documents to answer your question. And the first such document that was put together, basically, said that the expectation was that about 80% of the work to get to our 2020 target would be done by regulations and what today we now call things like industrial policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That was in what year the first Scoping Plan came out?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>It should have been December of 2008, end of 2008.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And the state said 80% regs 20% cap-and-trade. And that's a combination of policies that I think reflects the historical role that traditional sector-specific regulations and industrial policy have played in cutting emissions. Think renewable portfolio standard, think CARB's leadership on mobile source emissions, trying to set rules for cleaner cars. Those are the kinds of efforts that have historically delivered the tons. And the initial plan was about 80% in that traditional route and put on top of that an economy-wide carbon price that would do some of the lifting, but maybe not the lion's share.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And did that prediction, I guess, in 2008, turn out to more or less accurately reflect what happened through 2020?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>That's a place where I think there's a little bit of nuance. So if you look at the data in terms of how we actually got to our target early, it turns out that there was a substantial boost from the financial crisis, right? So, like, the world economy collapsed, and people stopped driving. We didn't have like a boom time, and that exogenously pushed emissions lower. When you look at the sectors where the work has been done, it turns out that we struggled to keep pace in the transportation sector, struggled to keep pace in the industrial sector, but our electricity sector decarbonized much more quickly than even the optimistic plans in the original Scoping Plan suggested.</p><p>And that's a combination of the fact that renewables and efficiency have performed in some respects better than we thought and moved faster than we hoped. It's also a reflection of the fact that at the time the plans were set, California was importing a lot of coal power. And it's a long story, but they eventually created a process by which the utilities in the state stopped importing that coal power. So we shed that liability from our books, and it's that electricity sector transition, moving off coal and starting to move on to clean energy, which is just beginning to really show up in the inventory.</p><p>That's where the real progress has come. The rest of the sectors have struggled and electricity is most of the work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Got it. And so you hit the 2020 target early. The 2030 target is 40% below 1990 levels by 2030. Is California on track to hit that target?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>I don't think there's a case to be made that we're anything close to it right now. I think it's entirely feasible and doable, but I don't think we're on that track right now. And part of the reason why reflects a pretty big shift in the state's official strategy for its climate policy. So I told you that the first Scoping Plan in 2008 said 80% regulations, 20% markets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>To make a long story short, there was a crisis in the cap-and-trade program starting in about 2016. The program was only authorized through the end of 2020. There was a crisis about the state of supply and demand in the program, the upcoming expiration of its clear legal authority, and that was ultimately resolved with a bill that passed in 2017 to extend the cap-and-trade program to 2030. So now we have the authority for cap-and-trade aligned to our state goal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. I remember that fight. That was Brown, wasn't it? Who?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>That was right. And I think it's fair to say Governor Brown had a singular role in that bill and that approach. So the bill passes and extends the authority it requires for state constitutional reasons. It needed a two-thirds vote, which is extraordinarily difficult to pull off anywhere.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Even in California.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Even in — anywhere.</p><p>And it led to a number of concessions to industry. So it shut down the ability of our local air pollution regulators to regulate CO2. It shut down the ability, at least temporarily, of the state climate regulator to regulate CO2 emissions from the oil and gas sector, including refining and production, other than through existing policies and the cap-and-trade program. And it led to a compromise in the implementation of the cap-and-trade program that made it a not particularly strict policy. Now, if you want to make a plan that's 80% regs and 20% cap-and-trade, a "not particularly strict policy" can maybe deliver that right.</p><p>But that's not what the climate regulator decided to do. So they decided in 2017, in their most recent Scoping Plan.</p><p>Like just in the wake of the program being renewed through 2030, right?</p><p>That's right. So the cap-and-trade legislation said, "You got to finish your Scoping Plan, and here's some of the constraints on that planning process." And in that plan, the regulator adopted a set of policies, or a set of strategies, that would put that emphasis much closer to 50/50 for the year 2030. So it was a pretty big departure. And if you ask an economist that sounds like a good thing. If you ask a political scientist, or somebody in the policy scene, "What's going on?" There's a lot more questions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. This is a classic real-world running of this sort of experiment, this long-running sort of dispute. I'm sure listeners are probably familiar with the basic outlines, but then you sort of have economists who are like, "Pricing is the most efficient way, über alles. Absolutely. The cheapest way to do this, and most effective." And then you have sort of people from the political realm, you might say a political scientist, who point to, "Well, in the past, what has worked? And in the past what has worked are these more blunt weapons, these sort of regulations and mandates and investments," and things like that.</p><p>So it's interesting that California is really running a real-time experiment. So now in 2017, for its Scoping Plan, it says, we're going to put these on more or less 50/50 basis.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Let me pause you right there. Yes. And then, here's maybe the most interesting part of this. So the plan is settled at the end of 2017, the rulemaking to implement the program doesn't finish till 2018. So ask me in 2017 what I think about this. I say, "I might have some concerns about the balance. I don't know if that's the wisest approach, but you can absolutely design a program to deliver in that way if that's what you want to do."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And we can come back to this, to the extent this is interesting, but the design of the program in 2018 was a pretty universal sort of shift in a direction of not really addressing the supply-demand balance in the program very explicitly. And I think it's fair to say some decisions were made that led to consequences, and these consequences were warned about. A bunch of us in the either academic or nonprofit world raised concerns about there being too many allowances in the program to get to our goal. My colleague Chris Bush and Justin Gillis even had an op-ed in the New York Times, like, for you to get an op-ed in the New York Times about cap-and-trade minutiae.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Allowance numbers.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>It's a pretty rarefied thing. Make a long story short, the critics who raised concerns about this said, "Wow, we've modeled the program. We think it's going to end up with too many allowances."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so just wait, just pause there. Just to spell that out a little bit for listeners, you need an allowance to emit a ton of carbon. And the idea is, if you get too many allowances in the system, they just become cheap. You can start buying them up and hoarding them. Basically, if there are too many allowances flooding the system, it removes what incentive there is to reduce emissions. And instead, you can just start buying and hoarding cheap allowances to protect yourself, and because, to steal a little bit of your thunder here, but because California allows banking, which is buying allowances and saving them for later, this opens the possibility that regulated entities in California can take advantage of these super cheap, oversupplied allowances.</p><p>Buy a bunch, create a big reserve of them, and then when or if prices ever go up, they're just going to have these giant stores of cheap allowances. So even if the price goes up, they'll still be sort of insulated from having to take action. That's the worry about too many allowances.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah, and I like to analogize it. I don't want to in any way cast aspersions on making these programs work right. Which, again, I think is something that is a nice idea, and I work on every day, despite writing a book about why it's unlikely to work. But think about it as a cap-and-trade game, as a game of musical chairs. And so the players that's the pollution, the chairs, that's the number of allowances in the program. And players can exit the game if regulations are successful or technology improves. And the question is, how many chairs should you have in the game?</p><p>And if the regulator guesses wrong or gets the number wrong, for whatever reason, you can end up with too many chairs. And the basic rule of a cap-and-trade program is a player's got to have a chair at the end of every period. You got to have the right number of allowances to match your emissions. And if you don't, you're out. You got to figure out a way to close that circle. So it's really hard, turns out, to estimate how many emissions you think are going to need to be covered in a cap-and-trade program.</p><p>You have to guess at the future of the economy. You have to guess at the performance of each sector. You got to guess at macroeconomic conditions. You got to guess how fast you think the grid is going to decarbonize. It's hard to do right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's pause here to make a note that the original economic attraction of cap-and-trade, and of pricing carbon generally, is supposed to be that you don't have to guess those things, that the price will do the work for you, that the price will sort of reflect our aggregated information about those things if it's just allowed to run. But it turns out, as you point out in your book, and as many other people have pointed out, if you've got a big system that covers the energy sector, you're not going to take chances. In practice, you're not going to let it do whatever the market does to it, right?</p><p>It's energy. It's too core to the economy to leave it up to that. So what ends up happening is regulators end up fiddling and fiddling and messing and shaping and capping, and they end up designing it to the point that it just becomes a sort of backdoor command and control mechanism, which was the whole point was to get away from that. So it's like you end up with the worst of both worlds somehow.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah, I want to tell you a positive story about how to fix it and all that at some point, but it is ridiculously complex. And I think the main insight is that when you ask an economist about this, they say, "Well, you don't have to worry about this." The reason is they're thinking as though you had this policy in isolation, in an idealized setting, and in the real world, you only ever see these instruments evolve alongside strong complementary policies. That's the label we use. We call the things that do most of our work "complementary policies" reflecting the sort of economist worldview on that.</p><p>But good economists have been thinking about this for a while. I mean, there's many to reference, but Severin Borenstein at UC Berkeley and his colleagues wrote a really great paper looking at the California program and saying, "Wow, I mean, there's so many policies that directly affect emissions subject to the program." There's only a small piece of the puzzle that is responsive to these prices, and you end up trading, as we say in the book, you end up trading the residual, and there's more volatility the more work these other policies are doing. There's also more political stability the more you rely on these other policies.</p><p>So everything kind of points into a direction where the program looks bigger than it is and is also really complicated to manage empirically and effectively. So I'm trying to be sympathetic here. Like, it's hard to do it right. I'm not saying, "Oh, everybody screws it up if they just listen to the smart people." It's actually really hard to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Because you have all these other complementary policies that are reducing emissions, but every little bit that they reduce emissions has an implicit effect on the pricing in the cap-and-trade system. So you sort of have these two symbiotic things, one of which you're directly controlling and one of which you're sort of obliquely controlling. Yeah. And you end up having to — it just seems like, and you're right, we're perhaps being too negative too early here, but it just seems like ...</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Save it, Dave.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>... A giant Rube Goldberg mechanism created just so you can say you did something market-like. The final product bears virtually no resemblance to any market or market mechanisms. But it's just like the symbolic value of saying, "We did a market thing," has prompted all this work and complexity just to make this thing appear to be playing a big role.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Okay, I got to push back on you. That is both too cynical and not cynical enough. Here's the optimistic case for this. You actually want markets to work, if you want to deliver some cost-effective reductions. There's value in having markets discover cost-effective reductions. And in the real world, if you manage this carefully, given all of these constraints and all these concerns, there's actually value in that secondary supporting role. So you sort of articulated case, "Oh, this is all smoke and mirrors." It actually could be important to do this right, admittedly at a lesser scale than the textbook econ solution suggests more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Explicitly as a "sopping up the remainder" policy rather than a sort of "main workhorse" policy.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah. And if politics improve over time, if industry wants to come to the table to talk about cost-effective ways to get things done, it becomes a venue where you could have that conversation and have that conversation potentially be real. The more cynical take, and this is something I expect we'll come back to, is that the presence of a market-based program that can be described as an idealized outcome also becomes a shield against reform.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And people will point to it, and they say, "You already have this economically efficient program that's designed to do all the work, so you don't need that next industrial policy. You don't need that higher ambition. Why would you remove allowances from the market and raise consumer prices when it's already designed perfectly?" It becomes a very dangerous thing when the idealized case is made, and that's typically made by industry and by regulators when they're sympathetic to either the concerns of industry or the challenges of reform that I think are practical and real.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So if you have in place this system that you are claiming is an economically efficient way of mopping up emissions, and then you propose some further sector-specific industrial policy, it's very easy for industry to come along and say, "No, you don't need that. We already have — look, you already said you have this perfectly economically efficient plan in place. Why would you need to do anything else if you truly have this plan in place?"</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And just for a second, if they're right, if that program was designed perfectly and you're not worried about long-term dynamics, you just assume a relatively simple econ framework here, they might have a point. And the problem is the programs are rarely designed that sufficiently, and you also have all sorts of other market failures that sector-specific policies might want to address. But they do make a point which, again, is really compelling to lots of people and is worth paying attention to. If you did this right, it would take away some of the rationale for some of the sector-specific work.</p><p>And I think it's a mistake to say, "Oh, that's not a legitimate argument." From a certain point of view, it can make sense. The tell is that we've rarely designed programs that are strict enough to deliver on that outcome.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, this is the key. I think you can imagineer a program that does all these things they say it does, but it doesn't seem like a coincidence that no one's been able to implement a program like that in the real world. In the real world, these programs are always compromised and oversupplied with allowances with all these blind spots. This is the whole sort of political economy point, right?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah. And just again, not to put too fine a point on it, but that's okay if you work with it and you understand it and you put it in the right size box and you say, this is the classic example, is, "would you rather California have a $30 price on carbon or a zero dollar price on carbon?" And I will take the 30, please. But I don't want to pretend that 30 gets me to net zero, and I want to hold both of those ideas in my head at the same time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, okay. So this brings us to the present. California is, in 2017, sort of shifted its emphasis to a sort of half-and-half industrial policy and cap-and-trade program road to the 2030 target. It is not currently on track to that target because of some of the large and still unaddressed problems in the cap-and-trade side of things. That's where we stand now. So then into this situation enters the current Scoping Plan, which was just released. I guess they do it every five years. They did 2017. So the 2022 Scoping Plan was just released.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Just to clarify, it's the draft that's been released, so this is the only opportunity for public comment. It's not locked in, but we'll talk about what's going on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. That's important later. The draft Scoping Plan for 2022 has been released. Now, you might think, given what we've discussed so far, that the 2022 Scoping Plan would be singularly obsessed with whether the cap-and-trade program can in fact, do 50% of the work, can in fact, do what they want it to do. Given that a. there's a lot of long-standing, very loud, persistent critiques of that program. And two, that it doesn't seem to be working currently because they're not on track, you would think that the Scoping Plan would be preoccupied with "how can we tighten up cabin trade, so that it really, does this work we say it's going to do?"</p><p>That turns out not to be what the Scoping Plan does at all. In fact, the Scoping Plan, as you pointed out in a piece you just wrote last week, devotes all of six pages to the 2030 goal, which is currently not on track to be met. And as far as I can tell, does nothing to revise the basic shape of the cap-and-trade program and doesn't really, as far as I can tell, address any of the long-standing critiques of the cap-and-trade program.</p><p>In other words, this Scoping Plan tells us very little about how California is going to go from "not on track" to meeting 2030 to "on track". Is that fair?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yes, that's fair. So this is over 200-page planning document. There are six pages that address cap-and-trade and the 2030 target.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's wild. That's wild. It's only eight years away, Danny.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah, I know. They don't even discuss, you reference the concerns and criticisms. Let me just give you just a couple of statistics. So if you look at the official greenhouse gas inventory by which we measure progress towards our various targets, the most recent pace of reductions is about 4.5 million tons per year we're reducing. And that's good, it's something to celebrate, but we need to increase that by almost a fourfold rate to get on track for 2030, to get to our existing statutory target.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So what, like 16? What's the target number?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>The target number, we're in the low 400s, 400 million tons CO2 equivalent per year. And we need to get down to about 259 million per year by 2030. We need to be falling at a rate, like, if you take our 2021 provisional estimate, we need to be falling at about 16.7 million tons per year, and we're falling sort of four to 5 million tons per year. So there's a gap there. That is absolutely in the technical world, that's an achievable. We can do that. We know how to do that if we really want to do that.</p><p>But there's a gap. Second thing I want to introduce is we actually have a lot of evidence. We talked about back when the cap-and-trade regulations were finalized in 2018, there was a big debate, and there was some criticism. So the people who wrote their numbers down in public documents who said, "Here's how many extra allowances we expect to see at the end of the third compliance period." We just got data six months ago on that. And based on those allowances, those extra allowances, we have concerns that the program maybe can't get us to 2030 on track with our goals.</p><p>So the people who did that, it turns out they got pretty much exactly right, and we saw the surplus allowances at those levels. So I'm the vice chair of the Advisory and Oversight Committee for this program, and speaking just in my personal capacity today with you, we in our annual report for the advisory report, looked at the number of extra allowances, and there are about 321 million that came into the post-2020 market. In the 2017 Scoping Plan, which did this first analysis of how to get to 2030 and how big the cap-and-trade needed to be to get there, they estimated around 236 million tons of reductions would need to come from cap-and-trade.</p><p>So we've banked more allowances, that is to say, private parties bought and are holding on to more allowances than the entire cumulative reductions expected from this program in the last plan. So when I tell you that only six pages sort of hint at this stuff, and they don't even reference the advisory reports, the data, the documents, the public peer-reviewed papers, that should really strike you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So just to put a fine point on that, regulated entities could get all the way through 2030 using nothing but already banked allowances, not making any further reductions at all. Is that fair?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>That's a possible outcome. I don't want to say that's the most likely outcome. It depends on sort of your view about both the number of players in the game. We know the number of chairs and the regulations if we're thinking about this as the musical chairs game, and that is possible. And so my colleague Dallas Burtraw, who's the chair of the advisory committee, was quoted several times in the press saying, "That's a possibility." It's wickedly complicated to try and model it all, but basically, we're talking about a surplus of 321 million when you're looking at creating kind of a deficit of 236 million.</p><p>So it's the wrong direction for sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And even if they only do half the emission reductions needed, that's still super bad. I mean, ideally, you'd have few to none excess allowances floating around in your system, right?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>If you wanted emissions to fall roughly in line with program caps, you wouldn't expect to see very large banks emerge or at least you'd want to have some long-term continuity in the program. I want to flag the cap-and-trade program is only authorized through the end of 2030.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>We'll get to this like what's going on in Washington. Washington has authority to do both climate and cap-and-trade way out farther into the distance. And so there's some really interesting issues that come up. You might look at our market and say, "If we're just trying to solve for 2030, we have way too many allowances."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>You could also look at our market and say, "Well, if we were trying to solve for also 2045 or 2050, maybe it's appropriate to be in the kinds of conditions we're in." The problem with that statement is that we don't have the legal authority to do that, and we can talk about this, but it proved impossible to get a simple majority vote on just a climate target last year, and you need a two-thirds vote to make the cap-and-trade program also follow.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And given the sort of harrowing concessions Brown had to make to get that first two-thirds vote, one can only imagine what would be required to get it past 2030.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah, and it's tough because again, if you're a proponent of these systems — and again, I want to support, like using them well and right, that's a good thing. But you're probably also pretty challenged by what's increasingly sounding like double speak about this from the regulators. Because think of it this way, if this conversation gets deferred a couple of years, and we're having a conversation about what a two-thirds vote looks like in 2024 or 2025, that's going to be an even harder conversation. If there's a big bank of allowances and relatively low prices, and you say, "Well, what if we extended the program and massively increased prices?"</p><p>It's not like that challenge gets easier by putting it off.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, this is sort of another aspect of the political economy of these programs, is they need to be able to get more expensive. That needs to at least be an open option. They're not working correctly unless they occasionally get more expensive. But no politician wants to go out and propose a reform explicitly to raise prices on people.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And that is also why when people declare victory on the backs of the idealized perception of these programs, it becomes even harder to advance climate progress. Because now you're not only stuck trying to convince a reformer to make that argument, but you have often the government, and usually major industries saying, "Actually, it's fine the way it is."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>So the number of people who are sort of against the climate reform trajectory increases, including political stakeholders who are just trying to think about staying in office or managing competitiveness, it's tough.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so tell us also ... you found a discrepancy about how the sort of baseline emissions scenario is calculated, that also looks like it's padding the results slightly. Can you explain that real quick?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah, so if you want to model the role of the cap-and-trade program, and I told you that it was expected to require almost half of the work from cap-and-trade in the previous 2017 Scoping Plan, you need to model what you think business as usual emissions are going to be, given all of the other non-cap-and-trade policies. So what's the clean electricity policy, the vehicles policy? When you add that all up before you think about the effect of cap-and-trade, what does that all look like?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So in other words, what is the remainder that cap-and-trade has to wipe up?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>If you just pretended we didn't have cap-and-trade, and you had a good model that could give you a crystal ball outlook for the emissions trajectory without cap-and-trade, these Scoping Plans, they say, "cap-and-trade will close the gap." You basically want to model what you've got without cap-and-trade, and whatever else you need to do, that's the role that's implicitly assigned to cap-and-trade. So if you model that, we can have a conversation about how big this needs to be. And so in the six pages, there's some discussion about, well, we've got a new scenario, a new version of that line for emissions, and it's lower, so we're not going to need as much from cap-and-trade.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's saying we're going to get more out of these conventional industrial policy policies than we thought.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yes. And to be clear, it's not like there's a bunch of new policies. There's a couple of things that have come online in the last few years, but it's not like they're proposing a bunch of new policies. They're sort of saying, "Since the last time we checked in, we have a few more policies, and the outlook looks pretty good." So that sounds like good news. And if it's true, it is. Vis-à-vis reducing the reliance on cap-and-trade. I want to flag, that does not fix the problem of having a lot of allowances when you want the program to cut emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But the less work you're asking it to do ...</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>The more manageable the problem becomes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>So that sounds great. And so I decided, I download the spreadsheets because that's the kind of person I am. And I started looking at the spreadsheets, and I was like, "Something's not right here." And I pulled the inventory data, again, from the climate regulator. They say, "What's the pollution look like in our state from the climate side?" And the scenario that is being offered as evidence for we're doing better, our emissions are going to be lower, and so we're going to rely less on cap-and-trade. Don't worry.</p><p>That scenario is like 12, 15 all the way up to potentially 27 million tons per year lower than the actual inventory data where we have it. So the story is completely inconsistent with the regulator's own data, and it's worse. I dug into the sector-specific totals because you could imagine that the outlook for transportation is different post-pandemic. I work from home now, I didn't use it. No, the difference is in the building sector, which does not change, and the industrial sector.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is the one that's hardest to get at and slowest to change and has least policy aimed at it.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>So all the modeling in this plan is done with a proprietary analysis through consultants. There's not a lot of documentation, and on this scenario in particular, there's really nothing to clue us into what happened. So all I can do is sort of hold up a mirror and say that "the numbers are off." And the delta between the story and the inventory numbers is bigger than the purported improvement in 2030 that should make us comfortable that we don't have to worry about the cap-and-trade program anymore.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. The upshot of which is just that California is proposing to rely on cap-and-trade even more than it says it is, by a big chunk.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>I would summarize it slightly differently. We don't really know what's going on. Nothing has really changed in terms of the policy portfolio, and no one's proposing to make any changes now. The regulator, to their credit, they've said, "Hey, we're willing to have a conversation about the cap-and-trade program, we just like to have it next year." And so there's nothing here, and nobody's affirmatively changing. And it's not like the role is bigger, or something like that. It might be smaller, but we're still not having a conversation about "how do we more than triple our emission reductions, given a plan that relied about half on this program, and evidence that this program is not designed to perform in that way right now."</p><p>And again, for proponents, if you're somebody who wants to see this program play a bigger role and do a bigger job, you also know you got to think about a two-thirds vote in the legislature to extend it past 2030, which would fundamentally change the way you would answer those questions, right? If you're planning for 2030 versus for 2045 or 2050.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In retrospect, just making it ten years at a time was not great, was not smart, which Washington learned from. Before we move on to the other parts of the Scoping Plane, let's briefly talk about Washington, because Volts listeners will know that Washington has recently passed a whole raft of great clean energy and climate policies, a bunch of sector-specific stuff. But alongside that, Washington is proposing to create a cap-and-trade system more or less mirroring California's and to connect it to California's, to become part of California's market, which some folks might remember way back in the day when California was first setting up its market. This was always kind of the thought that it was going to be a big West Coast thing, that there were going to be all these players attached to California's market, but they sort of like dropped off one at a time, leaving California and Quebec now?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>That's right. Ontario later joined for a brief period</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Very random, but then Ontario bailed too.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>But they're not there anymore. Yeah.</p><p>Right. So now it's California and Quebec, but Washington is proposing to join. So from my hometown point of view, the dysfunctions of California's cap-and-trade system very much matter for Washington. So spell that out a little bit. Like, what is the danger that Washington faces here?</p><p>There's a couple of things. So one thing to say is, again, there are a few sources of climate policy and climate institutional leadership at the subnational level in the United States. And California is one of the really big players in that space. And so even when people set out to do their own things, they often borrow or learn from and adapt various things we've done. So it's always important to think about what we're up to, not because we're the center of the universe, but because a lot of what's happening is either following or learning from things we're doing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the reasons that smaller jurisdictions that come along and want to do something good on climate will copy California's work is that California, sort of legendarily, has a robust administrative capacity. One of our favorite subjects here at Volts, and specifically CARB is sort of unique. So maybe just say a quick word about why California ... ? What is it about California's system that enables it to put together these things out of scratch, such that other people sort of come along behind and want to copy it?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>I think that's exactly it. So we have large and reasonably well-sophisticated regulatory bodies in a number of spheres. And in fact, one of our problems is we have so many that coordination can be an important challenge. We'll come back to this actually because part of the flavor here is California — there was a debate when AB 32 was being set up in 2006. "Should we give one agency the quarterbacking role, the lead in all of this, or should we distribute it across agencies?" California went with the sort of quarterbacking model, where the Air Resources Board is primarily in charge of this, although, as we mentioned, a lot of the progress has been made in electricity. And you should be looking at our utilities regulator for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, but it is worth saying that CARB is huge and powerful relative to virtually anything you find in almost any other state.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Almost anywhere else. Right, exactly. And so there's scientists, there's engineers, there's lawyers, there's a big administrative capacity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which, like, Washington does not have, just doesn't have the size and money to replicate that.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And that's exactly right. And so what's so interesting right now about subnational American politics is I think we're seeing much higher climate ambitions become popular at different times, and so you're seeing sort of higher watermarks for the level of policy goals and integrity. But many of the states, like Washington, where I would describe frankly, your current goals as better than California's, but you all don't have a regulator that has the same capacity. And so it's not just that people are looking for inspiration. Let me contrast this really quickly. California says, "Let's have a zero carbon electricity grid, a renewable portfolio standard with a technology-neutral back end. Let's amp that stuff up on steroids."</p><p>Many states have utility regulators that are capable and sophisticated enough to emulate those policies if they want so that policy can diffuse without worrying too much about institutional capacity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Not so with a cap-and-trade program, which is phenomenally complex. And I mean no disrespect to the regulators in Washington state, but there's just far fewer per capita in total. So the significance of this is that you literally need essentially hegemonic, regulatory actors to govern these systems. And this is the opposite — you and I've talked a little bit about the East Coast states and their cap-and-trade program called RGGi, where they're fairly egalitarian, and everybody sort of cooperates on an equal basis. This is really a centralized infrastructure that California is the biggest market by far.</p><p>The size of your emissions footprint is less than a 6th of our market. So you are a smaller player in economic terms. And that means both the capacity difference between the two states and the relative economic importance of our decisions and situation have enormous influence over whatever you all decide you want to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Washington doesn't have the administrative capacity to cook up a system like this from scratch. But does it have the administrative capacity even to manage a mirror of California's?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>I don't want to comment directly on that because I don't think there's any reason to doubt it. And I also personally couldn't run one of these by myself, so I don't want to sort of stick myself in their shoes. Look, copying the DNA of the structure of the market should be feasible. The system is called the Western Climate Initiative, and there's actually a private corporation called WCI Inc that runs a lot of the things, like the auction platform, the various mechanics and pieces of this. Those are services that can be contracted for reasonable costs.</p><p>So I think there's a case to be made that a lot of this can be done. The question is, do people want to design around a common program? Do they want to design around similar programs that are managed separately? And there's a lot of politics that go into that. I don't think that administrative capacity is necessarily the biggest problem. I would not say it would be fair to say out of whole cloth, with no example to learn from, could the relatively small Washington Department of Ecology stand up a program completely on their own? In a vacuum, that would be a much bigger lift. But the question of what might they design, given the example, experience, text and operating experience of all of the different players, including California, that have worked with these systems, I think is very different.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So then let's get back to the substance, which is if California's program is flooded, is oversupplied with allowances such that it has this incredible slack in it, what is the danger for Washington if it hooks up with that program?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>So the danger is that there are potentially too many allowances here, such that — if Washington were to design a strict standalone cap-and-trade program, it would be a more robust program. It would almost certainly have higher prices. And so if you're a regulated industry in Washington, you're probably pretty pro-market link because that means you can hook into our market and try and buy some of those surplus allowances which will tend to raise our prices, but will tend to depress the prices up in Washington, so it'd have the political benefit of reducing prices. It would have the environmental consequence of potentially our excess allowances, rendering your program unable to meet your own goals, depending on how carefully those issues are balanced.</p><p>And that's why this link issue, which I want to be very careful not to prejudge, it's so complicated because the design questions all interact with the decision around, "do you link to California, and does California either reform or extend its program or not?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And is the size of Washington's market enough to materially impact that level of oversupply, or are we kind of a drop in the bucket there?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>It's a great question. I've seen some initial efforts to start to model the program, but I haven't seen anybody directly grapple with that question. So given several hundred million surplus allowances and statewide emissions on the neighborhood of 60 million tons per year up there, what kinds of deltas and credit flows would lead to consistent outcomes or inconsistent outcomes? I get the sense people are studying that privately, but I haven't seen a lot of good public-facing analysis on that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the danger here is just Washington replicates California's system, and then thereby inadvertently replicates California's inability to hit its target because of the weak cap-and-trade system.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yes. So that's the climate nightmare. And then the super cynical, scary version of this is, "Isn't this better than nothing?" And I think the answer to that question is still, "Yes." So where in that spectrum of better than nothing and actually on track with what we're all trying to do, can we land this thing?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's where the whole climate space lives, isn't it? That delta between what we ought to do and what we can do.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What's better than nothing versus what's needed?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And I think what's so complicated about this is, like, we've probably lost two-thirds of your listeners just talking about cap-and-trade. And here you actually have to get this far. We're almost to the point you're going to have a conversation about what your opinion should be about this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And that's really different than, like, I would like 100% clean electricity or zero-emission vehicles. Where putting aside the fact we've had a lot of problems trying to actually do that well and robustly and in a big tent fashion, it's a lot easier to tell a regular person who's motivated to fix climate what direction they should be pushing in here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Or just more EVs?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Like EV good, clean energy, good.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. These sectoral policies are very sellable or explicable in a way that cap-and-trade is not.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah, and again, I think if we were orienting this conversation around, trying to have a more honest conversation about what are the options and the consequences, it might be easier to do some of that. And part of what we're dealing with right now is just the complete inability to just speak plainly about what's going on, which only makes it harder to have the sort of pro-climate conversation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So now that we've lost two-thirds of listeners, let's leave behind cap-and-trade momentarily and talk about the rest of this Scoping Plan. Returning to the Scoping Plan, so there's 200 pages of it. Six of those pages deal with the looming 2030 deadline, for which the state is not on track. So then there's all the rest of it. So a lot of the rest of the Scoping Plan turns to this aspirational 2045 target of carbon neutrality. And it proposes to get to carbon neutrality not exclusively, but a big chunk of getting to carbon neutrality in 2045 it proposes to do via carbon dioxide removal, CDR.</p><p>So tell us a little bit about the scale of CDR that is being sort of proposed here in this Scoping Plan.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>So carbon dioxide removal is a very scary monster that is coming to take your children away, and you should — I'm joking because it's this ... I've been working on carbon dioxide removal pretty hard for the last couple of years and people say, "why are you wasting your time on that? We need to cut emissions and deploy solar and wind and efficiency and storage and EVs and build the national grid." Those things are all true. But one of the reasons I focus on it is because it's like this perfect prism for refracting all of climate politics into its factional squabbles.</p><p>And I want to again say two things that are almost the polar opposite of one another and both true. There's almost nothing that exists today that's real, that's permanent, that's delivering carbon storage that is even remotely comparable to the atmospheric and oceanic consequences of burning fossil fuels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And we're also going to need way more than, I think, easily a gigaton per year globally by mid-century. We can spend too much time fighting about those numbers. But it needs to get very big very quickly from approximately zero, which applies a very big scaling. And so you can look at any long-term net zero plan and say, "There's none of this, it can't possibly be real to rely on any of these carbon removal technologies," which I think is a huge overreach. And you can also look at these kinds of plans and say, "Wow, you're relying so heavily on an idea."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, theoretical future technology.</p><p>Why are you not making equally heroic assumptions about cutting emissions and doing other things right?</p><p>Or about the falling prices of solar or the falling prices of batteries? Like, if you want to get your heroic assumptions in there, why not make heroic assumptions about the stuff that's actually reducing emissions?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>So if I told you that somebody and a big important player had put out a plan that relies, pretty substantially, for almost a quarter of its net zero goal, on a sort of speculative set of technologies with no detail on what they are, how to deploy them, and was taking no near=term action and deferring this conversation on the basis of some incomplete modeling, you'd say, "that sounds like an oil company." And it also sounds like, I want to be really clear, I want this to be better, but it's also a perfectly fair description of the draft Scoping Plan. So we have here, these are numbers that I think are meaningless to people who aren't in net zero land, but we've got some pretty massive reliance on carbon removal, maybe up to 100 million tons per year assumed by 2045.</p><p>That equates to something on the order of a 75%/25% split. We're about 75% reductions in emissions and about 25% carbon removal to get us to net zero. Just to compare this, when people talk about net zero, the state of New York has codified a 2050 climate goal that says at least 85% reduction, so higher than our 75%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it also proposing to mop-up the remainder with CDR? Like, is there a little bit of CDR mop up in all these state ambitions?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah. And this is part of I mean, again, if you think about this from a physical climate science perspective, we don't know how to get everything to zero.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, right.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And even just N2O emissions from the agricultural sector, that alone is reason enough to think about carbon removal. So yes, there's always going to be some, and we need to rip that band-aid off and stop being scared of it. We also need to be able to say that and say when is way too much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? You want a goldilocks amount of CDR in your long-term plan? Not none, but not too much. So New York has very little, it's going 85% reductions at least in 15% remainder by 2050.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>The California legislation that tried to codify our 2045 net-zero goal would have said at least 90%, 9-0. And your state, Washington, has a codification of at least 95%. So compare that to the approximately 75%, 76% that's in the preferred scenario. And that should give you some sense. Like this is not aiming for the moon. In fact, this is airing pretty heavily on not cleaning up the mess first.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So ironically, Washington and New York have more ambitious emission reduction goals, long term-emission reduction goals than California. California's is commensurately lower emission reductions and commensurately much higher reliance on CDR.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>At least in this draft plan. Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I guess I just want to know why. Because if Washington's setting this goal and New York setting this goal and all these states are coming along setting these goals, I mean, they feel confident that the technology will be there for those things, or at least see a pathway to those technologies. Why is California ending up the most cautious in its long-term plan? Just like, what explains that?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>So I don't want to over-index on the outcome because I think, first of all, it's hard. And I think anybody who's closer to putting pen to paper, and where the rubber meets the road, is going to run into challenges that these bills, which are just sort of codifying targets, haven't had to fully address. So I want to, on the one hand, defend the challenge here, and on the other hand, the reason that the number comes out so much different in California is that the California regulator literally did not include a scenario that resembles any of those others. So they didn't even look at, like, "Well, what if we tried to get to where Washington wants to go or New York wants to go?" And they could say, "Oh, we looked at it, and here's why it's not so good."</p><p>And we could have a conversation there. But just sort of like reforming the cap-and-trade program, they didn't talk about about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So there's no sort of numerical or analytical explanation for why they didn't do this. There's no modeling of an alternative scenario where there are higher emission reductions.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>There are four scenarios that are studied, alternatives one through four. The first two alternatives look at a 2035 net zero target, which is we can get into this if you want, but is so aggressive. It's, I think, not a realistic conversation. And I worry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's a little weird. That they like why they do that.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Well, I worry that this is kind of the cynical versions of your Goldilocks story because they picked a scenario that's right in the middle, by choosing a couple of scenarios that realistically nobody was going to implement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You choose your ends and you can determine what your middle looks like, right.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And Alternative 4, the one, they didn't pick, they picked Alternative 3 in the draft. Alternative 4 has even more carbon dioxide removal and even fewer emission reductions at the end. So they didn't study a 2045 target that resembles the New York, the Washington, or even the proposed legislative California version. So they just literally didn't look. And that's an area where, again, I should mention that the posture of this document this is drafted by staff after a series of public engagement opportunities. It will go before the board of the Air Resources Board, which is the politically appointed decision makers who oversee the staff.</p><p>And it's one of the things the board could say is "Hey, why don't you include a new alternative or modify one of your alternatives, so that it looks like one of the other climate leaders that's out there?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So California has released a Scoping Plan that says very little about the 2030 target, despite the fact that there are extremely well-documented concerns, about whether that 2030 target is in reach or whether current policy can get there. Says virtually nothing about that. Then says about the 2045 target kind of this other magic asterisk, like, we'll get 75% of the way there, and then CDR will do the rest. When we talked earlier, you sort of made this point that, in a sense, CDR is playing the same role for the 2045 target that the cap-and-trade program is playing for the 2030 target, i.e. it's just sort of like hand waving away the remainder without a very close look at how it's supposed to happen.</p><p>So it seems like this is not a solid basis upon which California can launch its extremely ambitious coming years, crucial coming years. It seems like this needs revising. It seems like what you'd want is a beefed-up consideration of 2030, and at least an effort to model greater emission reductions, through 2045, rather than so much CDR. So let's just talk a little bit then about the sort of mechanics here. This is a draft Scoping Plan. There's going to be a public review comment process, and then what happens?</p><p>In other words, if Californians of goodwill want this to be revised and improved, what should they do, and what is the hope, and who has the power to cause it to be revised? How would it all work?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>I think I'm supposed to say vote in November. Isn't that the standard answer to all?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Get out and vote!</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Get out and vote.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh my God.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, if you're concerned about these issues, there is a public comment period open. You can quickly Google the California Air Resources Board 2022 Scoping Plan. You should find information about that pretty quickly. But the process here is that for the next several weeks into sometime in mid, late June, the comment period will be open. And then at that point the board will hear the program, they'll hear from the staff about what's in the proposal, they'll start to review feedback, and a number of things could happen. So the staff have indicated that they want to see a vote on this program by the end of the year, to clear this up and move on to the next priorities.</p><p>In theory, the board could say, "Hey, we've heard some concerns here. We think some of these concerns are well founded. We'd like you to go back," and, for example, include a scenario that talks about deeper emission reductions by 2045, or include more than six pages on 2030. Or align your planning, say, of the electricity sector to some really great work that's ongoing joint between CARB and the Public Utilities Commissioner and the Energy Commission, where they're trying to grapple, I think, in much more technical detail, with how to actually develop a clean grid that builds out the energy needs we need as we electrify everything.</p><p>So maybe instead of assuming we should expand our gas capacity, which is what the draft plan proposes, maybe we should think about the more careful modeling to figure out what likely gas prices are going to be in a world that has a war with Ukraine. And does it make sense to build that out right now or not? So the board could provide direction to the staff to revisit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the board has the power to say to CARB staff, "Go take another whack at this with these specific things in mind." It has the authority to do that.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yes, they have the authority to do that, that's for sure. And the plan doesn't become final until the board votes on it. And so I think the board's reaction to what happens in the next several weeks, month or two, is going to be really important as to whether this thing gets kind of rubber stamped or there's a chance to align it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And if you were God King of the CARB board, are those the two specific things you would tell them? a. tell me something about 2030. Please reassure me about 2030. And then second, model more emission reductions through 2040. Are those the two big things, or are there other things you would instruct them to do?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>I think those are two of the really important things. The third, I might add, is the one I mentioned about let's really plug into the detailed modeling work that's trying to ask what that zero carbon grid should look like, because that may be more robust than what we're doing. That may be a way to help us get to the lower emission scenario. But I think those are two or three concrete actions that, they don't require you to invent a new plan out of whole cloth, but I think they'd be really constructive. I'll be honest, the 2030 question is so hard because we spent five years not talking about it.</p><p>And that was frankly, one of the lowest moments for me as a professional is realizing when that deal was done, we were going to lose five years because the technical people could see the consequences, and it would take a long time before they manifest, and now the problem has gotten harder, not easier. So I don't know how to solve that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And if you complain back then, you're supposed to let it play out. And like you said earlier, industry can just come in and say, "No we settled this." Right? Like if you're going in and pushing for reforms during those five years, industry just comes in and says, "no we settled this. We got the cap-and-trade thing in place, we don't need any more of this stuff." So it not only sort of you not only go quiet about cap-and-trade, you end up suppressing discussion of other stuff too.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And this is why it's really important for other people to pay attention because — I'm glad we still have a cap-and-trade program. I'm going to try and upset everybody here, like, it's good we have one, it's better than nothing. We can make it stronger. It can play an important role. I don't think it can ever play the idealized role that some academics think it should and industry proponents cynically use to manipulate to their political advantage. But I also think the sort of emerging Leftist critique that all markets are bad and everything is evil is not particularly helpful on this either.</p><p>Although I also want to recognize, like when I talk to my friends in the environmental justice community, they are the ones who bear the brunt of people saying, "cap-and-trade solve this problem."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And that's real.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Because those refineries that the local air pollution authorities are now no longer allowed to regulate because of cap-and-trade are located in those communities.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah, when it comes to CO2, they can no longer regulate them. That's right. So we've shifted so much attention away from air quality to climate, which is good for climate and if we could use climate policy to solve both problems it'd be a win for everybody. But the practical reality on the ground is when we say cap-and-trade will do more than it's capable of doing politically, we sacrifice both the climate impacts and the political priorities of disempowered communities, who basically don't get the airtime and nobody's talking about the local pollution permitting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>California has a large and robust environmental justice movement. Are they losing their minds in response to the Scoping Plan? Because it really seems like their nightmare for CDR to be given this giant role and for cap-and-trade to be utterly unreformed. It just seems like, are they on the war-path about this?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>So I want to let the environmental justice community speak for itself on this. But I think talking to them I learned something a long time ago. You might remember the first time we worked together was when you were covering some of my research on how these electricity imports, letting our coal imports out of the cap-and-trade program, sort of shedding liability. It was called resource shuffling. And it was kind of an inside deal to make it easier to meet our targets and potentially lose some outcomes. And I went from being somebody who was fairly welcome on the inside of these policy conversations to being told to take a hike.</p><p>And I looked around and I realized it was me and the EJ folks. And I stopped for a minute and I listened. And I don't mean that I'm like some woke, White climate guy who gets all this, but I mean, I actually listened to what are they saying. And it has been striking for all of the criticism that EJ groups get about being technically unsophisticated about issues X, Y, or Z. There's no question if you compare a community group against the world's leading chemical engineer, that the chemical engineer will have more particular things to say about carbon removal.</p><p>But time and time again, they're noticing process flaws that are designed to shunt the conversation to particular political outcomes. And they were the first people in the early part of the Scoping Plan process to say, "We can't get anybody to disclose the modeling assumptions. We don't have the capacity to review them or the time. They've given us three weeks to respond to basically the draft technical analysis, and we can't discourage the assumptions."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, if there's any community in the US that has good reason to be alert to procedural shenanigans, retrofitted to achieve particular political ends, it's them.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>But I think we've ignored that in this broader conversation. And I'm doing my part to listen, including when they say things that are totally counterintuitive because sometimes it turns out they figured it all out. And I'm just really struck by that. I mean, I worked — very recently, there was a story that came out yesterday on the role of dairy digesters and the low-carbon fuel standard that Jessica Foo wrote for Grist. And it was this phenomenally complex piece of reporting. She brought me all these moving parts, and I read u,p and I was trying to follow her at every twist and turn.</p><p>And it turns out, the EJ groups had fully documented it in comment letters weeks before I had come to it. And the number of times that happens, and it's not, like, visible in the elite, technocratic circles, is really striking. And I think, I think that's something to reflect on, and also to let the EJ groups speak for themselves. They have an advisory committee that has public positions they're developing on this, and we should take a listen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it'll be interesting when they come out with something. I can only imagine. So what do we know about the, in terms of what you can say maybe publicly, but what do we know about the CARB board and its political sort of orientation? Is there appetite for reform of the kinds you're talking about on the board?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>I'm hopeful. You know, that's ultimately a question for for the board members to decide for themselves. But but I think what's been kind of interesting is that you know that the previous chair of the Air Resources Board, Mary Nichols, is is a singular figure in climate policy history. And I think it's fair to say, during her second tour of duty as board chair under Governor Schwarzenegger and Brown, she had a fairly clear sense of what she wanted to do. And the agency moved ... there was a very clear sense of cohesion around that. And in some respects, the staff are many of the same individuals from that era.</p><p>But there's a different board, there's a different board chair, and a number of the newer board members have a strong either progressive climate or environmental justice orientation. So they need to decide what it is they want to do and why. And it's not for me to speak for them, but I do think there are different board members now than there were five or ten years ago, and that tension is there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If there were a time to sort of try to insert into the process and change the course CARB is on, the sort of Nichols path-dependent course it's on, it would be now, right? I mean, this would be the time to do it.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>I don't want to make it into it like a personality issue. I think the main point I was trying to suggest is that for an outside observer to talk about CARB as a fairly singular entity. That was a sensible description of seven years ago. And I do think that there are important voices that are emerging on the board that may be different sometimes than what staff want and potentially more aligned with other stakeholder groups on the outside. I think that's a good thing as it relates to the possibility to improve the outcome here and not simply set up ...</p><p>My big worry is we'll have a non-binding plan for net zero, that will sort of socialize a very heavy reliance on carbon removal, that will socialize not cutting as many emission reductions as we want, and declares, sort of in passing, that 2030 is solved. And now, does it matter if there's a non-binding plan to that effect? You could say, "Oh, it's just a non=binding plan." Well, what happens when somebody brings that to the utility regulator and says, "Why are you guys pushing this hard? Here's this plan to do even more than you're doing? Says we're fine."</p><p>And I just worry that people underestimate the impact for those sorts of things, and I worry it will underestimate our credibility for doing real actions. And I just want to highlight maybe a couple of things that are going on in the state since we've been really critical.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But let me just jump in here. Yes, this is my final wrap-up question, and you've touched on it in a number of ways running up to now, but sort of as you said at the very beginning, as we both said, California is kind of the 800-pound gorilla in the state climate game. And anyone who's paying attention to national politics knows that, once again, here we are saying, "Oh, we're going to go to the States. The federal government is going to be lost to us. There's going to be no progress at the federal level. We're going to have to do this at the States."</p><p>Just real deja vu of this conversation. So if that's true, California is the big state actor, the one with sort of historically the most ambitions, with the most administrative capacity to make plans and form policies. So just talk a little bit about the implications here of California's success or failure on this larger kind of go-back-to-the-states strategy.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>So obviously we need to push at all levels. So I don't want to say, "Oh, the states are going to take care of it," because it's not enough, and nothing's ever enough. But we've got the best of times and the worst of times. I think you can point to some things that are really not working, and I do that a lot because when they get copied, it screws up other things as well. We're also doing a bunch of things that are working, and I think it's important to think about those. I think the potential to go deep on individual sector policies. CARB continues to be, that the Air Resources Board continues to be one of the most important vehicle regulators in the world, and we need to be really thoughtful about that as an important focus.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Enormously influential, right? I mean, whatever, a dozen states follow along?</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>More than that, I think, yeah, it's the only state that can set stricter emission standards for mobile sources than the federal government. And, of course, the Right-wing legal machine will attack that, and we will have to defend that. But that continues to be an important area. We really did launch the first large-scale, 100% clean electricity policy, our SB 100 bill, that many states have now copied, and that's been profoundly beneficial. And we have many sector-specific policies, whether it's trying to organize offshore wind, trying to think about the buildout of clean electricity and accelerate the pace of grid deployment and clean energy deployment.</p><p>There's a lot of efforts to push that further in the legislature and in the administrative branches. And we have right now a massive budget surplus, a good chunk of which the governor is very intentionally directing, and explicitly directing around climate priorities, many of which are great. So you can see everything when you look at us. And the thing that worries me is we have sold the story that we figured it all out, rather than we're one of the places that is doing the most to figure it out. And we will have some wins and some losses, and people who copy us uncritically will miss that.</p><p>NGOs, who promote simplistic tales of what we've done, will sell the wrong story to other people and will also miss the opportunities to move forward in this state. So I'm actually pretty hopeful that there's a lot of great things going on. But as always, fixing the cap-and-trade program is one of the hardest ones, and I still continue to try and do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And the flip side of cap-and-trade maybe being weaker or more flawed, than is understood outside the state, or even understood within the state. The flip side of that is just the extraordinary success and power of these sectoral policies. And this is sort of conventional wisdom, maybe more so a couple of decades ago, but the sort of conventional wisdom in US policy circles is that, "oh, we're trying to move away from command and control," overly intrusive this and that to market-based policies that are less smaller government hand. All this very conventional wisdom. I just feel like it's so important for people who are following the actual unfolding of policy and the unfolding of emission reductions in the US to just say aloud, again and again, it is these old-fashioned sectoral policies that are the workhorses, that are working, that have proven track records at this point.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah. I mean, if you're an industry that's, that's trying to get started, like, we, many of us want to start the offshore wind industry in California, that's a very good thing. You need typically legislation, you need regulatory coordination. You see that the interest in geothermal development and lithium mining down in the Salton Sea area. It's not a surprise that you see new industries that are trying to create themselves, and create the infrastructure around themselves, working directly with the government to figure that out. And of course it's going to take a lot of private capital and a private sector interest to do that.</p><p>But it is not a surprise that there's a coordinating role for the government in that work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And there's more to it than just turning up the carbon price dial and hoping for the best.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yeah. And again, I'm not here to say don't do any of that stuff. It's better to have one than to not have one. And the key thing is to realize that it's really hard to turn that dial, and there's reasons not to, especially around affordability, rely on it too much. So tell me where you want that price to be and design a program to get you there. It could be a tax, it could be a cap-and-trade program that's well designed to get you to a particular set of outcomes, and then rely on it for that boost, for the revenue it brings in, for the little kick it gives to all the sectors it covers.</p><p>If you rely on it to be this magical thing that will deliver at low cost whatever you need, no matter when you need it, you won't get it. Just like if you assume carbon removal will mop up all of your problems, it will fail.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>You need to build it to be the thing that you want it to be and not rely on it as a crutch. So, again, I'm not here to say, "get rid of it, or Washington shouldn't have a cap-and-trade program." What I'm saying is Washington is proposing to adopt California's forest offset protocols into its cap-and-trade program. So all of the widely documented problems in our protocols are planning to be replicated. Why?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So just a more discerning eye in terms of picking apart what's working and what's not working. Okay, well, this is super educational.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Eat your veggies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Eat your veggies. And I think it's helpful, I think, to get it out there, because things tend to descend into sloganeering. So I think it's good to get it out there that California is both kicking ass and falling short, like, both doing a lot and really not prepared to accomplish all it says it want to accomplish. We can hold both those thoughts in our heads.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Yes. And let's not forget, it's really hard to do any of this, and you need experts to do it. And we got to remember, some institutions are really good at some things, and some things are challenging to some institutions, and we can't lose sight of that administrative capacity issue.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>It's at the heart of all of this. You can't just say, "oh, industrial policy, but I don't actually have a public sector," that doesn't work. Right. You can't say, "cap-and-trade, and I have a monstrous team that's ready to — oh, I don't have a monstrous team. I have a very small team that's going to need to be a taker on a lot of the details." Those are very different strategic considerations.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Alright, well, thank you so much for this. This is really clarifying, and maybe we'll do it again in five years when the 2027 Scoping Plan comes out.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>And we talk about — yeah, yeah. That'd be fun. Thanks for having me back on. I really appreciate it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Awesome. Thanks, Danny.</p><p><strong>Danny Cullenward</strong></p><p>Cheers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-danny-cullenward-on</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:55893021</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 19 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/55893021/7ac02b6bd56f457e86085ddea7f81d2d.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4568</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/55893021/d8b70f6aa1f36596c44b9630d38a6428.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Abigail Hopper on the trade case that is crushing the US solar industry]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Abigail Hopper of the Solar Energy Industries Association discusses the trade complaint that has cast a pall over the US solar industry, why she believes it should be dismissed, and the complexities of tariff policy.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAA0zAP7SxvTe0_PWJRgnglVa/volts22.05.25%28abby.hopper%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-abigail-hopper-on-the-trade-case-that-is-crushing-the-us-solar-industry"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Back in 2012, the Obama administration <a target="_blank" href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/03/20/feds-to-impose-tariffs-on-chinese-solar-goods/?sh=6e0f4500b3f6">levied tariffs</a> on solar panels from China, to punish the country for unfairly subsidizing its panels in an attempt to corner the market. In the ensuing years, US imports from China fell off sharply and imports from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam rose just as quickly.</p><p>Early this year, a tiny California-based solar manufacturer, Auxin, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/solar/will-the-biden-administration-let-one-company-kill-us-solar">filed a trade complaint</a> with the US Department of Commerce, alleging that China is effectively laundering its solar supply chain through third-party countries, thereby illegally circumventing tariffs. It asked Commerce to apply commensurate tariffs on imports from those countries. (Canary Media has <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/auxin-solar-trade-case-a-series">extremely thorough coverage of the case</a>, if you want to catch up.)</p><p>Commerce is investigating. Meanwhile, the industry has been thrown for a loop — imports have fallen off, projects are being cancelled, and projections of growth are being revised radically downward. The tariffs could be anywhere from 30 to 250 percent, which would radically change the economics of big solar projects, and if applied, will be retrospective over the past two years, which means even existing contracts are in jeopardy. The uncertainty has <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/05/07/auxin-solar-projects-frozen/">cast a pall over the entire sector</a>.</p><p>The Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) has been advocating against tariffs from the beginning and is calling on Commerce to dismiss the complaint. I contacted Abigail Hopper, the head of SEIA, to talk about the merits of the case, whether building a domestic solar supply chain is a good goal, whether tariffs work, and what other policies might be preferable. </p><p>With no further ado, Abigail Hopper of SEIA. I'm not going to say the whole thing. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me. I'm glad to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So this is a knotty and complicated issue we're going to get in here.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Is that the K-N-O-T-T-Y naughty?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Okay, just checking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Also, perhaps naughty, we'll see at the end. So I want to kind of go through it piece by piece, before we get to the tariff dispute, the tariff case that's at issue here, let's go back a little bit and just talk about the tariffs. These date back to Obama, the Obama era. So why don't maybe you just tell us sort of what tariffs are in place, and what is the rationale for tariffs, like when Obama put these in place in 2012? What is the sort of stated rationale? What are they meant to accomplish?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Sure. And you already have displayed more knowledge than the average person around the multiple layers of tariffs that the solar industry is dealing with. So, yes, these go back to 2012. And at that time, there was an allegation and then a finding, that China was dumping its product into United States. That meant that the Chinese government was unfairly subsidizing production of solar cells and solar modules and then selling them into the United States below cost. So if it cost $10 to make it, they would sell it in for $5, and the Chinese government would suck up the other $5.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And presumably this is not just, like, unfair or unsporting. This violates some law or treaty.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yes, it violates the trade laws, and therefore the tariffs were put in place to address that unfair practice.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then there were more under Trump. What did he add?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>So the ones we just talked about, people refer to usually as the ADCBD, Anti-Dumping Countervailing Duties cases, and those are from 2012, and those apply to products coming out of China. In 2017, a case was initiated, and then in 2018, President Trump imposed tariffs. And those are the Section 201. That's the section of the statute it applies to. And those were placed on cells and modules coming from any country in the world. There were a couple of specific exceptions, but generally, any country in the world, these tariffs applied and they started at 30% and stepped down.</p><p>There's a whole drama around the bifacial modules and that exclusion, I'm happy to talk about. But those were additive to whatever ADCBD tariffs that were already in place.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So specifically, then, imports from China would face both of these tariffs added together.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, the rationale for the first set makes sense. If China is doing something illegal under trade law, that makes sense. But what is the rationale for just slapping tariffs on all imports? That can't be that all importers are breaking trade laws. What's the rationale there?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a totally different theory of the case. It is not a claim based on fault or anyone being nefarious or violating laws. Rather, the finding is, the allegation and the finding is that the US domestic market has been harmed by competition, and they basically need a pause. They need a pause. They need a break. "Give me a second. I got to get it together." And so the best way that one of my trade lawyers explained it to me, as I was not well versed in trade law when I started this gig.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Little did you know you were going to get a PhD.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Little did I know, right. He explained it as basically putting an umbrella over the United States.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>So there's this protection, right. And the goal of those Section 201 tariffs is to provide an opportunity for the US solar domestic manufacturing base to recover and to build back.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sure. But what I don't get is that seems like the mirror image of Chinese subsidies. In other words, that seems like giving the US domestic market an unfair advantage. It seems like that would also be illegal under trade law for the same reasons.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>So it's not illegal under US trade laws, right. It's certainly, I think a lot of people think smacks of protectionism of US industry. There were complaints taken to the World Trade Organization, right, to allege, that the imposition of the Section 201 tariffs violates World Trade Organization rules, or I don't know what they're called there, actually. Whatever, they're not allowed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It literally is just a subsidy to US manufacturers, just like China is subsidizing its own manufacturers.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>I think that's a very fair argument to make. I think what we saw, which I think is important, is it didn't actually have the same impact, though, right? Like, there were definitely a couple of facilities that were built in the United States after the 201 tariffs were announced, but it certainly wasn't enough to supply the US market, right. It did not create a robust domestic manufacturing base. And so round two of the Section 201 tariffs just took place in 2021. And in early 2022, President Biden extended the Section 201 tariffs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I don't think I'm alone here, don't get that. It seems like I mean, you know, we can talk later about the question of a domestic supply chain. I want to get into that. But it seems like a crude and not particularly effective tool. And I had thought that sort of the conventional wisdom was that this is a sort of slightly crazy thing Trump did. So what on earth, what reason did the Biden administration give for continuing these tariffs?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>So the Biden administration gave a couple of reasons. One was that the US manufacturing industry had not recovered sufficiently, and they said, partly, that was due to COVID, right. That as the entire economy kind of was jolted for a year, year and a half, that they too were. And so they sort of lost out on this time of protection.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So they need a break. They just need a little longer break. They're not quite refreshed and ready yet.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Exactly. I mean, I know that feeling.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I know. I'm very relatable.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>I just don't usually get government assistance with it. They did do two important things, though, in the February 2022 decision. One was to exclude from Section 201 bifacial modules that were being imported. That was a significant development.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Tell us what bifacial panels are and why that's significant.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>So bifacial panels are solar panels used primarily, almost exclusively, in the utility scale sector that have the ability to reflect light and create energy from both sides of the panel. So there's material on the back of the panel that allows it to create more energy, and therefore be more efficient and produce more electrons, obviously changing the economics of energy production.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And that's the bulk. I mean, that's utility scale. So that's like the bulk sort of by number, by weight, but that's the bulk of imports. So then what's the rationale there for slapping a tariff on everything except the main import? Like, I'm losing track of what substantive goal is served here.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Well, so the bifacial exclusion was originally requested shortly after the imposition of the 2018 201 tariffs. And at that time, bifacial modules did not represent a large portion of the US market, the import markets. It really was a newer technology that was more in the R&D phase. And so if you think about kind of the theory of the case, the theory of the case is to allow the domestic market the opportunity to really recover and continue to develop. No one in the US was producing bifacial modules. And so allowing bifacial exclusion made sense because it wasn't competing with the US marketplace.</p><p>And that's still primarily the case. There really aren't manufacturers of bifacial modules, certainly not at scale in the United States.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the original tariffs, the Obama tariffs, the rationale there is that, "China is breaking trade laws." The rationale for Trump's tariffs is, "we want to make room for the domestic manufacturing, domestic solar manufacturing industry to grow a little and get more robust." So before we get into the rest of it, I guess the question here, I have sort of a twofold question. One is, is it the case that once these tariffs were put in place, domestic solar manufacturing grew and flourished as intended? The larger question there is the reason, I think everybody at this point sort of gets this, the reason there's a huge solar manufacturing sector in China is not just because the government subsidizes it, although it does, but it's got cheap materials, and it's got cheap labor. It just has advantages, all the same advantages that got manufacturing offshore in the first place. Is a tariff, of the size being discussed here, enough to close that gap between the sort of costs of manufacturing abroad and the costs of manufacturing in the US?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>No.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's not big enough to close the gap.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>No. The simple answer is that the tariffs alone did not incent the kind of investment that the proponents of those tariffs articulated it would, right. There were certainly a couple of companies that made the decision to invest in the United States, and that's great, but it did not bring the scale of investment that would support our entire marketplace. And so I'm excited about the conversation about what would it take to develop at that scale. But tariffs, I agree with you wholeheartedly that they are a crude and inefficient tool to create domestic manufacturing in the United States.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Alright, well, we're going to return to that later, but sort of sticking with the tariffs. So the Obama tariffs are in place. The Trump tariffs are in place. Biden extends the Trump tariffs, and then we get this case. This US solar manufacturer, Auxin, files a complaint, basically saying, as I understand it, that China is circumventing these tariffs. It's basically just exporting its materials to nearby countries and then manufacturing the stuff there. And we're importing from those countries. But in all but name, we're still importing from China. Basically, China is using Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam to launder its solar cells and panels, and thereby dodging the tariffs.</p><p>This is the case Auxin is making. I think there's been a lot of focus on Auxin. And this is, if people care, it's a pretty tiny company, as these things go, does not appear to be particularly robust or growing. There's been a lot of focus on Auxin. But I'd rather just skip all that and talk about the case itself. So I guess where I'd like to start is, just on the merits of the case, is this true? Is China guilty of circumventing tariffs by laundering its materials through these other countries?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>No, it's not, and I can tell you why. So there is a statute, right? There's a statute on point that they have alleged that China has violated. And I think the evidence will show that they have not. And the key piece of that statute says that in order for it to qualify the actions you're described, you described well, to qualify a circumvention, the manufacturing or the processing in the third party country, the third country. So the Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam has to be minor and insignificant. Like, those are terms that are in the statute.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So, in other words, those countries would just be taking the material and cranking it out and not really doing, not really adding value?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Right. Like, in my mind, it's sort of like it all gets there, they slap a sticker on the back, and then it's like, boom, now it's from Vietnam and not from China. But that's not what's happening. I do not claim to be a supply chain expert, but I certainly have a lot of them that are consulting for us, as you could imagine. And certainly cell manufacturing, the manufacturing of solar cells is far from minor and insignificant, right. It is a very complex, very technologically advanced process that adds a ton of value to the product. The United States Department of Commerce has determined in four different cases already that the country of origin is where the cell is manufactured.</p><p>But as they have looked at other cases and considered other claims, they have made that determination, because, "where do you apply the tariff? Oh, you apply it where the cell is manufactured, okay." So the cell is manufactured in these four countries. And so, no, I do not think, and our council certainly doesn't think, that the requirements needed to demonstrate Circumvention have been met in this case.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But another way of looking at this, sort of intuitive way of looking at this, is you got these Chinese companies that are receiving all these subsidies from the Chinese government, which is the whole sort of issue here. And then they open subsidiaries in Cambodia, et cetera, and manufacture there. So in a sense, they're not manufacturing in China, but in another sense, they are still subsidized in the way that caused the original tariffs, right? Do you see what I'm saying? Like, the sort of unfair subsidies still seem to apply, even if a Chinese company opens a satellite company in Cambodia, it's still getting the subsidies.</p><p>Do you know what I mean?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>I understand the point that you are making. I don't agree with it wholeheartedly. I think two points. One is that some of the companies that we're talking about that are impacted by this Circumvention Petition are not Chinese-owned companies. They're other companies, like from different countries. And so that's sort of the reality. And then secondly, the petitioners chose to use a specific statute, and they didn't meet the requirements of the statute. If they want to go back and choose a different statute, then we can have a different conversation about whether there is sort of unfair dumping of some sort.</p><p>But that's not the issue before us today. Like, I get your sort of theoretical point, but we're fighting a battle. And as we have heard a quasijudicial proceeding, we've heard that term so often, and so I'm going to stay focused on the proceeding in front of me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. The case itself.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So if there are a bunch of companies involved in these countries that are not Chinese subsidiaries, then the substance of the case is just that they're sort of conduits for Chinese parts and materials?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yeah. That some of the raw materials are coming from China, even if the ultimate manufacturer of the seller of the module is not Chinese-owned.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the substance of your side of the case is to say, "it's not true that the manufacturing taking place in these countries is small and trivial. They are adding value, and thus it's not just laundered Chinese stuff." That's the substance here.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Given that Commerce, the Commerce Department, which is the one doing these investigations, and I guess you'd call them the quasi-judge and these quasijudicial proceedings, has found this in previous cases, is it your sense that when they get around to ruling on this, they're going to find that again and rule in your favor? Obviously, you probably don't want to handicap this and make guesses and everything, but are you confident enough in the merits of your case that you think you have a pretty good chance of getting a good ruling at the end of all this?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>I do. I think that the statute is clear about what the petitioner has to show. The petitioner has actually testified in other proceedings back to those Section 201 cases we talked about. The petitioner has testified under oath that cell manufacturing is a complex and technical and highly value producing process. And so there's not really anyone that's disputing that. So I think we're pretty confident on the merits. Obviously, one of the things we've also been focused is on the timeliness of a decision.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're going to get into that. The situation is that there's this case in front of now, Commerce Department. The schedule is that Commerce is going to issue some sort of preliminary results, or preliminary findings, in August, and then is supposed to issue a decision in January of 2023. Although, as I understand it, they can, if they want to apply for like a 65-day extension, which could push it out into early to mid-2023. So this situation, if they don't accelerate things, like you're asking them to, this situation is going to linger for a while, potentially for a full year.</p><p>So let's then talk about what are the effects of this case lingering out there. Because one of the key pieces, and I don't know if this is popularly understood, is that if Commerce finds in Auxin's favor, it's not just that tariffs are going to get slapped on imports from these four countries, but that tariffs are going to be retroactively slapped on imports from those four countries for the past two years. Which seems, honestly, to me, crazy like that seems to violate some very core principles of ...</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Ex post facto?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of actual judicial proceedings as opposed to the quasi kind. Like in an actual court, you sort of legendarily cannot retroactively punish someone for something that was not clearly illegal at the time. So anyway, point being, it's not just that future imports from these countries will be slapped with a tariff if this succeeds, but that there's going to be a big retroactive penalty on imports. So what effect is this having on the industry at the moment? And it's just the uncertainty, right? I mean, it's just the uncertainty that's screwing everything up.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yeah, there are so many layers of uncertainty.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Truer words.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Well, let me clarify one thing. So that you are 1000% right about the retroactivity of these tariffs. There were new regulations that went into place November 1, I believe, November 1 of 2021. And so that's sort of the outside date by which the retroactivity could apply. My understanding is it could apply from the date of initiation, April 1 of 2022. So you can just — that's one uncertainty, right? We know they will be retroactive. How far back the Department of Commerce chooses to go is one unknown. Obviously, what the tariff will be, will be another unknown.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, so that's not a fixed thing?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>No, that's not a fixed thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's not some standard tariff here. It's a case-by-case thing.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>It is usually a company-by-company thing. And if a company does not have a tariff rate, then there's a countrywide rate. And that's why you've heard anything from 50% to 250%. That's why when Secretary Raimondo, the Secretary of Commerce, last week testified that if there were tariffs, there might be 10% to 12%. That's why I, in particular, was very outspoken, that that was just wrong. That's not factually accurate. If there are tariffs and a company does not have a countrywide rate, then it will be 250%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we don't know how retroactive it will be, and the tariff will be somewhere between 30% and 250%, which also seems extremely large dollop of uncertainty there.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Very large dollop, right. I think those are the two biggest uncertainties, right. Then, once manufacturer — so your question to me was, "How is this impacting the market?", right. And we are in mad consensus that the uncertainty is really what is roiling the market, and how that is playing out is that manufacturers are just telling their customers here in the US, "You know what, we're not going to sell you modules. There is way too much risk, way too much uncertainty. We're going to go sell our modules to Europe, or we're going to sell them to Brazil, or we're going to sell them to another country where there's not this crazy policy uncertainty."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So spell it out for me. What could happen? Like, if they sell to someone in the US for X price, and then the tariff is imposed retroactively, the customer then has to pay more?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I literally don't understand how that works. If you complete a transaction under the current circumstances, and then the tariff is passed, and it's retroactive, do you then have to sort of reopen all those transactions and redo them?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>So the way that it works is that the importer of record is liable for the payment of the tariff. So Manufacturer A, they may sell their product to a customer for whatever the cost is, but under the terms of their importation agreements, like with the US government, right, their right to import into the US, they're obviously liable for additional duties. And if there were additional tariffs imposed, then the manufacturer will be liable for that additional money. They are going to contract that risk with their customer, right. They're going to say, "Hey, there's a risk here," right. "And so either you, customer, take the risk. It could be 20%, it could be 200%, could be 250%. We're happily bringing you some modules, if you want to take that risk." Obviously, the customer is going to say, "No way, I'm not going to take that risk."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How do you even price risk when it's, like, as we're saying, the range of possible outcomes, the uncertainties are so broad, like I wouldn't even know how to put a number on that risk.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Well, I think that's what we're seeing, is that you are not alone in being unable to price that risk. And so the alternative is they're just not shipping here. Every conversation I have had with a customer, a developer, a residential installer, a CNI company, their number one challenge is they cannot get modules. They cannot find modules. It's not a question of "the modules are too expensive," right, because that at least you could make a determination of whether the project can bear additional cost.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>It is literally like, "I can't find them."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Actual prices do help the operation of markets, I've found, like, having a numerical price does ease market transactions.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Right. Did you have to go to special school for that to figure that one out?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then imports have dried up? Projects aren't being built? We're only sort of a few months into this. What's happened so far?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Honestly, I think the entire solar market is a bit in shock at how quickly this has happened, but yes, the answer is yes. Modules are not being imported into the United States. So even if you had a purchase order, it's not necessarily being honored. Domestic module suppliers, obviously, everyone wants to buy from them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. They must be kind of enjoying this, right? I mean, they must be maxed out.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>So I will tell you what I'm hearing, which is that they are definitely maxed out and, perhaps, some are not honoring contracts, are renegotiating contracts because demand has gone up so much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I'm sure they can get a premium.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>And a higher price, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Actually, I want to take a little factoid timeout.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's get, just as a marker here, so listeners can get a sense — how robust is the domestic US solar manufacturing industry? In other words, what percentage of the demand for cells and panels and modules in the US could be satisfied by the existing domestic manufacturing sector?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>So it's currently about 25%. So if you think about last year, 2021, we had about seven and a half gigawatts of domestic production in the United States. That includes all technologies. So first, solar technology as well as PV technology that's covered by these tariffs. We installed about 23, 24 gigawatts last year, so roughly 25%. The majority of US production serves the residential market, the distributed market, and so it is not 25% of the utility scale market and 25% of the resi market. I don't actually know off the top of my head what percentage is by market class, but it is a much lower percentage for the utility scale because that's not what is here in the US.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So if you're cutting off imports from these four countries in question, you're, even best case scenario, if the US domestic solar manufacturing industry is humming along at peak capacity, you're whacking off 75% of your supply, which can only result, I would imagine, in prices from domestic manufacturers going through the roof. Like they could ask, if this keeps going on, they could basically get whatever price they ask, couldn't they?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>I mean, they could until the market can't bear it anymore, right? And then those projects won't get built either. I think at some point there'll be a cap. But you are right, it distorts the laws of supply and demand because it's just such extreme pressure on demand. Obviously, there's lots of companies that are looking at supplier module manufacturers outside of those four countries, right, and trying to track back their supply chain.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How robust is that? How concentrated is manufacturing in those four countries? Is there a robust manufacturing capacity outside those four countries that are not subject to tariffs?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>So the majority of US imports come from those four countries. There are other places that have manufacturing. Because the US doesn't have kind of — they've not been the majority of our imports. There's not the same kind of quality assurance or kind of bankability or comfort level with performance. And so there's a lot of that kind of work happening right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I bet they're scrambling too. Like solar manufacturers in whatever other country must be excited about this. So projects aren't being built, things are not being imported. Consequently, US coal burning is on the rise for the first time in years. Super exciting. There was an Indiana utility that announced that it's going to keep its coal plants open several years longer than planned because the possible spike in solar prices. It's going to screw up a lot of utility plans, like a lot of utilities are planning big shifts to solar, and this could potentially throw a wrench in all those plans.</p><p>But let me ask this. The effects we're seeing now, as you're saying, are largely a result of uncertainty, just because no one knows how this is going to go, and there's such a wide array of possible outcomes. So let me ask this. If the case doesn't go your way, if Commerce finds in favor of Auxin, and these tariffs are slapped on imports from these four countries, presumably that would be damaging to the industry, but probably not as damaging as this current fog of uncertainty. So in other words, I'm asking, is the level of damage that's happening right now, that will diminish somewhat just when there's some certainty, right?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>It obviously depends a little bit on what happens. And if Commerce — a 10% tariff versus a 200% tariff, obviously, is a very different outcome.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>The situation in Indiana, though, is really compelling for a number of reasons. Because not only, obviously, is it troubling that a carbon emitting facility is going to continue to emit longer than was anticipated. But as you think about other utilities that we're building, they put out IRPs, and they put out a whole plan, and then they did RFPs to find lease cost resources, and those were solar and storage usually combined. Now we're impacting reliability, right? We're clearly talking about carbon, which is critical, we're also talking about reliability, and we're talking about rates to customers. And so the beauty of the growth of solar is that we can impact the market.</p><p>And the challenging part is that we're going to impact the market. If you take this fuel source out, or make it uneconomic, it's going to have an impact on ratepayers and reliability. And that thread, I think, is something that hasn't gotten quite as much attention, right? People think, "Oh well, half-built solar projects in the middle of the desert, well that's not ideal." No, that's not ideal. But so is like new generation not showing up when it's supposed to, right?</p><p>Think about what's happening in South Carolina. That nuke is not showing up when it was supposed to. And that's impacting rates, well, that's a whole different reason, and impacting supply. And similarly, if you take solar and storage, if you either take. It off or push it out two, three, four years, what are we going to use? How are we going to keep the lights on? What's the plan? We had the Senior Vice President of SPP at an event two weeks ago, and he and I were having this conversation, right? As they look at their resource planning from the RTO perspective, and they think about their queue, and then they think, "well, 30%, 40%, 70% of what's in the queue might drop out," because it can't show up, because it's not getting built. That's a problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Maybe 20% of it, maybe 80% to 90% of it.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Again, this is not a small uncertainty band that we're dealing with.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>It's not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think when normal people hear about this, there's a number — I don't know if there are any normal people listening to my podcast. I think when normal people hear about this, they're baffled by a number of things, one of which is Biden's allegedly got this whole of government push for clean energy. It's one of his sort of signature things. There's all these things he's doing to advance clean energy, and then there's this one thing that his administration is doing which could sort of almost single handedly just chop the knees out from under the clean energy push.</p><p>And it just seems like that's bizarre. Why do that? But it's worth noting here that there are legal like — well, let me ask this, because I've been wondering about this — Once Auxin filed the case, was Commerce sort of obliged to take it up, or did they have discretion on that front?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Obviously, they felt they didn't have discretion. They felt like once the case was filed, they had to initiate. We have a very different view of that, but it's water under the bridge at this point. We are where we are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, but you think they could have elected just to what, just ignore it?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Not ignore it, but just find that an investigation wasn't necessary. The regs clearly indicate this, they also have the authority and could have exercised it to initiate a case and then issue a preliminary determination at the same time. They could say, "You know what, we will investigate, and we're going to issue a preliminary negative determination." Like, we don't think, based on this petition, there's anything here. We'll continue to take a look, right, through the rest of the investigative process. But they obviously chose not to do that either.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, they chose not to do that. And it's, like, the effects of this, the effects of them taking it on and leaving this uncertainty open are very predictable. So, again, I return to being baffled. I guess, who has control over this? Could Biden do anything? Is there anyone who can do anything other than the people at the Commerce Department? And who are they, and what would you like them to do?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, first of all, I share the bafflement of the regular people, or normal people, or whatever phrase you used. I don't consider myself either regular or normal, but I certainly am very baffled. In all seriousness, it is without a doubt the most frustrating and maddening thing I've experienced in a long time in my professional career, right. Just this juxtaposition of rhetoric on the one hand and action on the other. And it is enough to sort of put our hands up in agony, but yet we fight on another day. But it is mind-numbing. I can tell you what certainly should happen based on the statute.</p><p>If you can't tell, I'm a lawyer, so I'm super focused on sort of what the statute allows. Obviously, this decision process is bounded by statute and being governed by people who are very attuned to what the statute allows and doesn't allow. And what the statute provides is that the Secretary of Commerce, so to answer your question, "Who's in charge," the Secretary of Commerce will make a determination about whether this Circumvention Petition is meritorious. And there's five things for her to consider. I talked about one of them, which was whether the processing was minor and insignificant. Even if you were to determine, "Yes, all of these elements have been met and there is circumvention," there's a fifth factor, which is, "Is the imposition of tariffs appropriate?", right? And appropriate is one of those words that lawyers love.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. You can sneak a lot through that door.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yeah. I think it's — like Congress wrote this statute, right. And they know what the word appropriate means and sort of the discretion it conveys and it gives the Secretary of Commerce. And so I think, as the Secretary of Commerce is thinking about what is appropriate, reflecting on what the President, as you said, what the President's signature policy platforms are, how critical addressing climate is to all of us as humans. Obviously, the economic impact that this has, there's a number of things that we think she should be considering as she determines the appropriate remedy for any finding if she were to make one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So in theory, she could look at this and say, "Yes, there's some circumvention happening, but slapping a giant tariff on it would screw up this administration's, one of this administration's central goals, so we're just not gonna." She theoretically has the discretion to say that.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yes, she does. The statute allows her to say that. We don't think she'll get to that point because we don't think the first factors are met, but even if she were to get to that point, she still has the discretion to determine it's not appropriate. Your second question about can Biden kind of, I don't know if you use the word overrule, but ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, can he do anything?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Not really. I mean, I think the President kind of always has ability to overrule his cabinet secretaries, but no one is expecting that he would do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Like legally, he's supposed to allow Commerce to be independent on this, right? I mean, that's the sort of idea.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's the idea. That's the idea.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's moments like this when I think back to the Trump administration, and I think, "I wonder if Trump would be restrained in interfering with such decisions by norms and precedent." So what do — you have asked Commerce to basically accelerate this process and basically issue an early decision saying, "we're tossing this out." Commerce, as far as we can tell thus far, is not taking you up on that. So at this point, are we just sort of locked into a process where we get this preliminary decision in August and then a final decision in January? Is that schedule fixed at this point? Or do you think there is still any open possibility that they might push it up or accelerate it?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yeah, so I don't characterize it personally as an early determination, right. I think the statute allows them to take up to 150 days.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>But there's nothing that says they can't act sooner. And in fact, as I said, the regulations allow them to issue a preliminary determination on day one. So all we're asking is that they look at the precedent of their own department, right? They look at what they have decided in prior cases and use that information in a timely manner to get to a more rapid decision. So, so far, I'm sure, you know, there's been an opportunity for people to comment on the investigation, there's 30-day period, and now there's been an opportunity for Auxin to respond and rebut those comments.</p><p>And we've actually asked the Department of Commerce to take those 60 days, 30 days, 15 days, and another two weeks to review everything and act by the end of May. So what is it? It's May 19 today. I'm looking at my computer. So no, it's certainly not fixed in stone. We do not think that we should all just resign and wait until August. We're going to keep up the pressure because as we talked about, it's having such a huge impact on the market, that a decision earlier, rather than later, would be extremely helpful.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so let's turn now to the sort of substantive question, or kind of the philosophical question. Does SEIA agree with the basic idea that it would be good for the US to have its own freestanding, more or less, independent domestic supply chain for solar technology?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>100%. Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But, I shouldn't get diverted on this, but I wonder about that. Everyone seems to agree on that. And I just wonder why though. I mean, I understand that there's this larger issue of, like, manufacturing got offshored from the US, and our manufacturing sector is hollowed out, and we want to build it back up. But why solar specifically? The world is full of products where the supply chains are concentrated in particular countries, and we just don't worry about it. It's just part of sort of like specialization. It's part of the sort of advantage of capitalism is specialization, and we get the cheaper products out of it.</p><p>And we don't worry that, when it comes to toasters or whatever, that we're vulnerable because our supplier of toasters, because toaster manufacturing is concentrated, might cut us off from toasters. They could, but they probably won't because they depend on our toaster money. That's what trade is. We're not vulnerable to suppliers. Suppliers are also vulnerable to customers. It's a two-way relationship. So I guess I just wonder, why do we need a domestic solar manufacturing supply chain?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a totally fair question. I think I feel strongly that we need a domestic manufacturing supply chain for the following reasons, and I should not have said 100% quite so quickly. I think you characterize it as — I don't think we need exclusively 100% domestic supply chain. I think we're always going to have a global supply chain. But I do think it makes sense to bring back more domestic manufacturing to the United States. And I think that for a couple of reasons. I think one, certainly the last two plus years, the challenges that COVID has brought with supply chain, the increasing price of transportation, sort of the vagrancies of workforce in other countries as things are happening, we all saw, solar included, how depending on supply from a particular part of the world or a particular country, it's a risk.</p><p>It is a risk that perhaps we hadn't fully realized or fully experienced before this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And just tossing this in there too. There's the whole slave labor question.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yeah, that was going to be number two.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Sorry to cut you off, but I was like, "Oh, God, I don't want to forget to, I don't want to forget to mention that." I'm doing devil's advocate a little bit, but obviously this is a counter consideration.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>But if you think about it, certainly, obviously slave labor and forced labor has zero place in the solar supply chain. And I think we've done a number of things which I'd be happy to talk about. But if you think even a little bit more generally, the integrity of the supply chain, the carbon intensity of a supply chain, kind of all of these different attributes that customers are caring about more deeply than perhaps they did five years ago or ten years ago, I think that really lends itself to a more transparent and onshored domestic supply chain. So I think there's that.</p><p>And then I think third, it does go to customers, right? Customers do want Us manufactured product, and if we can invest at scale, like the at scale part is really important, I think we can continue to get the price down, right, even for those customers. Customers say they want US manufactured products until sometimes they see the price, and then they think, "Oh, maybe I don't need it." But scale, scale, scale, scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This gets to, like, I guess the broadest take on this issue, which is just that it seems like there are two kind of incommensurate impulses we have here. On the one hand, we don't want slave labor. We don't want exploited labor. We don't want people cheating in international trade. We want domestic jobs. We want domestic supply chain and all this. But on the other hand, it's just inarguably true that the US's progress, thus far, on clean energy has depended on inexpensive solar from abroad, where it's manufacture cheaper with cheaper labor. And of course, that's great for solar installers in the solar industry and everything, but it's also great for climate.</p><p>We want the transition to clean energy. So it just seems like those two are in tension here. And I hear people arguing from both sides, and either side seems to sort of find ways of dismissing or talking around the other side. But it seems like there's just no way around it. Like there's no way to solve that equation. Like, you're either going to have a more robust domestic manufacturing and more US made panels, that are more expensive, or you're going to continue basically taking advantage of cheap manufacturing, and cheap labor abroad, to more rapidly install solar.</p><p>It just doesn't seem like there's a neat way of resolving that basic tension. Am I wrong?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>I think you might be wrong.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I hope I'm wrong.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>I just don't think that, sort of past this prologue, is really applicable here. If you think about how our industry is going, I mean, I really believe it's going to grow exponentially over the next decade and the next two decades. And so things that seemed uneconomic and not scalable in 2015 are going to be very doable in 2022 and 2025, right. So there's just this change in norms. I think one of the things we've really been focused on is trying to figure out what the US does really well in the manufacturing space and harnessing our energy and our time and our resources on those things.</p><p>And then there are things that other countries do really well. We don't have to recreate every wheel here, but we should figure out what's the most efficient.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, yeah, this is one of the things, even if it turns out US manufacturers are really good at, say, manufacturing panels, the raw materials are almost all coming from China, right? Like, the rare minerals, all the early processing steps.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Currently they are, but we have a lot of capacity to produce polysilicon here in the United States.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But do we want to? Like, a lot of that sort of basic mineral mining and processing business is really gross, and, like, China is doing it for cheap. So even if we develop a robust panel manufacturing industry, which would be great, we'd still, if you choose to look at it this way, would be dependent on China for the raw materials. Unless we also move that over here. But it's just not clear that these sort of low rungs of the manufacturing chain are some great prize. Do we want that in the US?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Well, I think you have either intentionally or unintentionally stumbled upon sort of the bigger question about the clean energy transition, right. And like, yes, we all want solar panels and wind turbines and batteries, but are we ready for the mining and the manufacturing and all the other pieces that go along with it? Same with EVs and all that stuff? I think there's a real question about whether — I am on "camp yes," just for the record. Like, yes, we do want that stuff, and we need to be cognizant of the entire supply chain, but sort of embrace the fact that if we want to have solar panels, we're going to have to use polysilicon, and that means we're going to have to mine for metallurgical grade silicon.</p><p>Right. Like, these things don't just happen by Fiat, they are actually manufactured and mined.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Somebody has to do them, and we want them done well, and we want them done equitably, and we don't want them to be done in a way that exploits workers. But it seems like one thing we could do is, since we're a large market, we could just do things like buying standards. Like we'll only buy raw materials from mines and processors that can demonstrate that they pass some basic standards, stuff like that.That would take care of the sort of moral concern, and it still wouldn't require standing up a mining and processing industry in the US.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Right? Yes. We're actually working on a whole standard setting certification at SEIA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So say you do want to, as you do, and I think most people do want to, enhance the US domestic solar manufacturing industry. Why are tariffs — I mean, that's basically, despite what the sort of technical justifications are generally, politically, that's the motivation for tariffs, I think, the reason they get away with them — why are tariffs the wrong tool to do that?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>We have a decade of experience to show that it just doesn't work, right? Like, if it worked, that would be a different conversation. But we have been tariffing product coming into the United States, and it has not resulted in domestic manufacturing. We have not talked, but we certainly could talk about the domestic manufacturing incentives that are in the Reconciliation Bill, right. The pieces that pass out of the House of Representatives.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is where I want to conclude the conversation, then. So if we agree that we want domestic manufacturing, and tariffs don't work, which I think is ... I had thought that was sort of conventional wisdom, kind of common knowledge, but as I've been reading about this, sort of like, I keep seeing tariff defenders popping up out of the woodwork. But if we think tariffs are not the right instrument to make that happen, what is the right instrument? Because I just want to make a quick point here, which is that when we talk about this, I feel like people are a little glib about this, and I think people underestimate the distance between where we are now and a robust domestic solar manufacturing chain is not a small thing.</p><p>The idea that just like boosting the price of imports alone, it's a little bit like the carbon tax discussion, right? Just making fossil fuels a little more expensive on the margins is not going to have the motive effect of building an industry, right? Like, if you want to build an industry, you got to build an industry. It's a very big thing to do and requires big policy to do it. And people who say they want it, I'm not sure everybody's fully reckoned with the size of the task.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Right. Yeah. I agree with what you just said. I think that if we really want to bring domestic manufacturing to the United States, then we do need to embrace those big, bold ideas. And our thinking, and obviously, having spoken to lots of manufacturers, is that they need some certainty, right? It's not rocket science. If you're going to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in a manufacturing facility in the United States, you're going to want some market certainty.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. That's not a small unit of investment.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>No. Sometimes I share your frustration. Most folks doing this work are rational, economic actors, right? And they're making kind of risk-reward calculations. Anyway, they need some certainty. And there's nothing particular about solar that needs certainty, right. If we were talking about pencil manufacturers, right, they need certainty. But looking at what passed out of the House of Representatives and what we worked on really closely with them, it really is a long-term demand driver, right. So long-term extensions of the investment tax credit, so you know the customer base will be there. It is an investment tax credit for the actual investment in the facility and then a production tax credit.</p><p>And it's not just modules and cells, but also things like trackers inverters, so covering more of the real high-value pieces of the manufacturing base of production tax credit. It's also woven into the ITC regime requirements for domestic manufacturing to keep your refundability, your direct pay, as the years go on, and then an adder for domestic content. And so that, in my mind, is the whole of government, or at least the whole of the tax code, perhaps, approach.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What's Ossoff's thing that deserves a mention in here? That's law now, right? That passed? Or it's in the BBB?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Yes, it is in the BBB. It is what I just described. The investment tax credit for manufacturing investment and the production tax credit for the production. That's Ossoff's bill. So it's passed out of the House. It's sitting in front of the Senate waiting a vote, as you know. That's not where you wanted to land.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, avoid the Senate if at all possible, but apparently it's not very possible.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>No, I don't think that's ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you think, or does SEIA think, that what is in the House version of the Build Back Better Act is to scale with the goal of building a domestic manufacturing industry?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>I do. I think when you ... yes. And when you then add that to some of the assets of the department of energy, things like the loan guarantee program, things like the R&D spending at Cedo and other offices, and the advanced manufacturing initiatives, that — all of those tools that we have at our disposal, plus the national labs, right, plus universities. As you said, this is an ecosystem that we need to build. This is not just like, "Oh, someone goes stick a factory and fill in the state." It is a thoughtful and strategic ecosystem that needs to become sustainable and self-reliant at some point.</p><p>And so, yeah, I think that what is contained in the House provisions of Build Back Better, including Senator Ossoff's SEMA, is going to be significant. We put out a press release a couple of weeks ago about the manufacturers that have articulated ... once that passes, they'll be making announcements and breaking ground on manufacturing facilities. So it's not just kind of theoretical. It's companies that have capital at the ready and are looking to the US government to signal a long-term policy certainty, so they can make those investments.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you have any I mean, getting into wild speculation here, but if Commerce finds in Auxin's favor and slaps these tariffs on these four countries, and we get something like the Build Back Better Act, or something like, whatever we get, if those things limp across the finish line, any idea how that would balance out?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Again, it depends on the level of the tariffs, but I think it would be sort of classic, like one step forward, one or two steps backwards, right. It would be just an incredibly lost opportunity if we were able to get provisions passed, and then handicap ourselves with tariffs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the most unanswerable question of all: what the hell is going on in the Senate? And are you, I assume, SEIA is up there lobbying or whatever. Do you have any insight into Senate dysfunction that anyone else doesn't have? Do you have any handicapping of the possibilities here? What the hell is going on? No one knows what's going on. Do you know what's going on?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>I know that myself and my team are up on the Hill lobbying literally every single day, and having conversations with all of the names that you read in the newspaper on a daily basis around what's happening. After that, I don't have a lot more insight than we're all reading in the news clips. They're keeping this pretty close. The people that are negotiating on what is going to happen, either on the clean energy side, specifically, or generally on a reconciliation package. I think they learned some really painful lessons at the end of last year, that, perhaps, negotiating through the press was not a particularly effective mechanism.</p><p>And so things are close, and I choose to take that as a good sign, right. If there's enough at stake that we're not going to talk about it until there's something to announce, I'm going to choose to view that hopefully.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you're just reading the tea leaves. What color is the smoke coming out of the window?</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, thank you so much for coming on. This is such ... in an era of screwed up things happening, it's just like, "Do we need this one more screwed up thing happening, really, on top of everything else?" So thanks for coming on and untangling it a little bit for us. And maybe once something happens, who knows what that might be, we can have you on to talk about the aftereffects.</p><p><strong>Abigail Hopper</strong></p><p>I love that. Thank you for your time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-abigail-hopper-on-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:55725738</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Jun 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/55725738/f8646bb482c04dfcbc8be38f43b44ce1.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3883</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/55725738/474497142c242150169a834fb55042f2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Lauren Melodia and Kristina Karlsson on energy inflation and how to tame it]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Lauren Melodia and Kristina Karlsson of the Roosevelt Institute explain why it’s counter-productive to increase domestic oil and gas production when energy prices rise, and how building out clean-energy infrastructure is the actual best way to address the price volatility of fossil fuels.</em> </p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADhCftEK-Fpkn_pGnlwmn1sa/volts22.05.23%28melodia.karlsson%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-lauren-melodia-and-kristina-karlsson-on-energy-inflation-and-how-to-tame-it"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Americans are struggling with two related problems: one, there’s general inflation, which means pretty much everything is expensive; two, there’s energy price inflation, which means that energy in particular (specifically, oil and gas) is expensive.</p><p>This has led some politicians, mainly Republicans-and-Joe-Manchin, to propose a dual solution: cut back on government spending (to tame inflation) and increase domestic oil and gas production (to tame energy prices). </p><p>This approach is wrong-headed and counter-productive on both counts. The reasons why are laid out in a <a target="_blank" href="https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/energy-price-stability/">new issue brief</a> from the Roosevelt Institute, the first in a series called “<a target="_blank" href="https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/all-economic-policy-is-climate-policy/">All Economic Policy Is Climate Policy</a>” (which, hell yes).</p><p>Lauren Melodia, deputy director of macroeconomic analysis at the Roosevelt Institute, and Kristina Karlsson, the institute’s program manager for climate and economic transformation, argue that fossil fuel prices are inherently volatile, and that volatility has serious macroeconomic effects; on the flip side, electricity prices — specifically renewable electricity prices — tend to be far more stable and manageable.</p><p>It follows that government spending to build out clean-energy infrastructure is itself anti-inflationary; it removes a source of price instability and replaces it with stability. </p><p>This argument is my favorite kind — it put words to something that’s been rattling around in my head for years — so I was excited to talk to Melodia and Karlsson about the volatility of fossil fuels, why we’ve come to accept it as an inevitable fact of life, and why it is, in fact, a choice that we could make differently. </p><p>With no further ado, Lauren Melodia and Kristina Karlsson from the Roosevelt Institute. Welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Thanks for having us.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Thanks so much for having us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You have written this report about energy and inflation. It's one of my favorite kinds of reports, in that, after I read it, I was like, "Oh, well, duh, of course that's true." But it's like it hadn't occurred to me before. It's one of those things where just hearing it stated clearly, I think is very eye-opening. So let's walk through a little bit, the pieces of it, and then we'll get into what it means for policy. So to start with, something I found interesting and didn't really know, which is that these traditional measures of inflation, which are gently sort of like bundles of products through which inflation is measured and tested, exclude energy.</p><p>Typically, energy is not included in them because energy is sort of inherently volatile and is swinging up and down all the time. And so the idea, I think, is if we include that, it's going to sort of obscure what we're trying to look at. So we'll set that aside and look at another bundle of products, and if they are going up, then it's real inflation. This is sort of how things are typically done. But as you say, this can be somewhat misleading since energy price volatility plays a huge role in inflation, and, specifically, is playing a huge role in current inflation.</p><p>So explain briefly sort of the role of energy prices in the inflation we are currently experiencing.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Sure, absolutely. I mean, I think that there's two ways that they're at play, despite the fact that the Fed or certain macro analysts might not want to think about energy prices in the overall inflation rate. One is simply that people spend a lot of money on energy. And so even if the core CPI, Consumer Price Index, or other indicators show that there's price stability, people are experiencing rising gasoline prices. And we've seen over the past year, that really fuel the conversation around inflation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Consumers definitely don't hold energy as some separate category, right. Like they experience it as inflation when prices rise.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Exactly. So if we're talking about rising prices in society and trying to ground that conversation and connect with consumers, people who are consuming the media, your constituents, these are the prices that people are going to be talking about. The other way that they really do influence kind of the overall economy is that these energy price volatility, the changes in energy prices, actually do have a huge impact on our economy overall even if we don't want to be thinking about them when it comes to inflation. And that simply is because energy is foundational to business operations and household consumption.</p><p>If there's a spike in gasoline prices or other energy prices, it is something that people just have to deal with. You can't delay consuming energy, you have to pay the higher price, and it means that you're going to have less money to spend in other parts of the economy. So we've seen actually, historically, that ten out of the last twelve economic recessions in the United States were actually preceded by a spike in crude oil prices. Meaning that you've got this rise in prices there, people have to pay it, they can't pay for other things in the economy, and it leads to kind of a slowdown of economic growth.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to sort of put an exclamation point on this because I feel like it's super important to understanding the rest of it is. It's not like cars or bread or something, where if the prices rise you can buy less of it or switch to an alternate product. Energy is a non-negotiable. You have to heat your house, you have to run your business. So rises in energy prices just mean you're spending more on energy, which automatically means you're spending less on other consumer categories.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. One of the concepts we try to really highlight here is the concept of energy insecurity. When the price of energy rises and people just have to pay it, it means that they can't pay for other basic necessities, not to mention other things that fuel economic growth and productivity. Those other things where we've got people out there working, making those things to produce and sell to consumers who have disposable income to spend.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And can you quantify sort of how big a role energy volatility is playing in the current inflation relative to ... we've seen all these other consumer goods rising in prices, too. So is there some way sort of dividing the responsibility?</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, people are aware of gasoline prices rising a dollar or two in their communities. The way that inflation is calculated is based on the change in price of an item, but it's weighted based on how much people spend on that item. So energy prices are one of the biggest ticket items for the average household. The average household is spending roughly 11% of their annual budget on energy consumption. And so that gets weighted in the calculation of what inflation is. So inflation, the number that we hear monthly when the numbers come out is rather abstract.</p><p>Like last month it came in at 8.3% over the past year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>But we can attribute 2.1% of that to energy prices alone, and largely gasoline price increases.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, you said in the report, gasoline price increases specifically responsible for 75% of energy inflation. So gasoline is the big ticket here. And just, aside from the economics of inflation, gasoline is also probably the single consumer price of which US consumers are most aware, most hyper aware. They see it advertised to them every day. So insofar as part of inflation is sort of the psychology of it, the consumer psychology of it, that is also a big piece.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>For sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you say, you lay out a couple of reasons why fossil fuels are not accidentally volatile, but sort of intrinsically volatile. Could you lay those out insofar as this is not like a solvable problem? So explain why fossil fuel — what is it about fossil fuels that make their price fluctuations kind of out of our hands?</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I think you started that question with the exact takeaway. This problem is not solvable, so long as we are continually reliant on fossil fuels. And that comes from a few things. I mean, the most obvious place to start is that these are hard to find hydrocarbons buried deep underground. They require significant investment in production up front, and they also happen to be located in different places around the world that sort of tie us into a default geopolitical web. And as we can see right now, with Russia's invasion of the Ukraine, geopolitical conflict has a huge impact on our domestic oil prices.</p><p>And that has been the case for a very long time, not just in current situations. And I think that's very well exemplified in that graph that we share, where we show that ten of the past twelve economic recessions are preceded by an oil spike. A lot of those oil spikes come from geopolitical conflict. And beyond that, I mean, beyond just the fact that there's conflict in this international market, the fact that it is international, and that we are one player in a much bigger market than we would be for other types of goods that we consume, is another part of this volatility.</p><p>I mean, when we are faced with situations like we are in now, where international conflict is driving changes in our domestic prices, we have very little ability to mitigate those supply chain blockages by boosting our own domestic production.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I wanted to ask about that specifically. This, I think, is a lot of people's initial instinct or intuition, and not just a lot of random people, but a lot of members of Congress in both parties. This idea is, like, if this international volatility, these international problems are causing oil prices to go up, it makes intuitive sense to people, I think, that if we just produce more of our own oil and gas, we will to some degree protect ourselves from that volatility. And that just turns out to be...</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Not the case.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>... very straightforwardly wrong. Explain why.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think there's two things, I think, one, even if we increase our domestic supply, the way that — especially crude oil — is priced is through an international sort of price cartel, which is OPEC. They have a strong price setting power, and any changes that the US makes will still be influenced by the prices that are coming from that organization.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And if they want, they want to set prices, and if the US boosts its production, such as to lower prices more than OPEC wants them lowered, OPEC is perfectly capable of dialing back production in other places ...</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>... to get the price they want.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>We can't beat them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Exactly. Theoretically, there's some limit. If we were a big enough producer, if we had like 50% of the world's, or 80% of the world's oil, or something like that, there's some size we could reach where we could have a bigger influence.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>But we don't want that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But a. we don't have it and b. probably couldn't get it even if we sort of maxed out.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Exactly. I mean, and the second reason, which is even in this imaginary world where the US becomes the mega producer of crude oil, it's not going to help domestic consumers, because our current domestic producers are very heavy exporters at the moment. Most of our domestic production is actually being exported, even in times of elevated demand at home, even when we're having price crises at the pump in the US, we can't make oil companies choose to sell their product domestically, especially if there's a profit incentive for selling abroad. And that's exactly the case.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Like taking care of like "Oh, our people, our domestic people are suffering. Let's divert some of our oil and take care of them." It's just not really a thought process that like your Exxon execs ...</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>They get a lot of undue patriotism put on them because, in these moments, when this is really hitting the fan, we can see where their priorities are. And this ties to the nature of fossil fuels again, which I think will contrast with renewables later on, is that these energy products are transportable overseas. The reason that they are exported so much is because we can. And early on, when natural gas came online in the US it was supposed to be the solution to US energy independence. That was all well and good until liquefied natural gas happened.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. I want to lay this out a little bit because the conventional wisdom, and I think probably a lot of people still have this in their heads, I think, insofar as they're paying attention to energy, the conventional wisdom is: yes, oil is this sort of perfectly fungible international market, and the domestic supply is almost irrelevant to the prices. But natural gas is different. It's harder to transport, it's harder to send overseas. So insofar as we're boosting domestic production, we are satisfying domestic demand. But as you say in the report, the sort of growth of the liquid natural gas technology and industry means that more and more natural gas is starting to sort of mirror oil.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>In being international, an international market.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Right. I think, we can observe sort of similar skyrocketing trends in exports around the same time between liquefied natural gas and crude oil, which is when the crude oil export ban was lifted and during the time that liquefied natural gas technology was really coming online. And now we're at the point where we are the number one liquefied natural gas exporter in the world, and we are actually exporting faster than domestic production at the moment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, wow.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Which is very concerning.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we're exporting more than we're producing.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Yeah, we have reserves, but we are exporting at a pace that is higher than our domestic production, and that is actually causing us to draw down inventories, at this moment, when we are really struggling, to maintain our export commitments.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So then this idea, because there's a lot of congresspeople who are real hot on the idea that building more LNG terminals is the way ... like, that's how we can get our "freedom gas" to Europe, so they can stop using the "autocrat gas" and start using the "freedom gas." But that, again, fundamentally mistakes how international markets work. Like the market is fluid. Once the LNG is out there circulating in the natural gas market, it's just part of the gas market. It's not marked. You don't have a little "F" on the "freedom gas," and a little "A" on the "autocrat gas," it just all becomes gas that you buy on an open market.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Exactly. I mean, it's important to remind ourselves also when we play out these potential scenarios, if we invest further in our own fossil fuel dependence, even if the sake is to export "freedom gas," we are now further entrenching ourselves to our vulnerability to price fluctuations from gasoline, which are still not going anywhere, is just further and further entrenched. The more infrastructure we bring online, the more we are tied to international dynamics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And there's no getting through that, right? There's no level of domestic production at which you outrun that effect.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Right. And even if we had the capacity for that level of domestic production, the oil and gas companies in the US would not give it to ourselves. That's the key part.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Much like OPEC, they would fiddle with their production based on prices and profits, right. I mean, that's sort of how they work.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And say a little bit, in terms ... this gets it at some of why sort of fossil fuels are intrinsically volatile. But there are two other pieces. One is say a little bit about speculators. I don't think I had really fully understood this until I read your helpful summary.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, I think it's important to understand that speculators basically are betting on price changes and making money off of those bets, in the most simple of terms. So it makes sense that speculators love volatile prices because there's a lot to bet on. And oil and gas or commodity futures market is extremely big and powerful. And especially starting in 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act started to really open the floodgates on this. And it was a direct affront to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which is tasked with keeping a handle on this. And since then, it's been a huge part of how energy prices are determined.</p><p>Dodd-Frank tried to reel this in some. But the great thing about it being an international market, is if commodity traders want to continue to do business, they can start private commodity trading desks housed in other places. And that's exactly what happened after Dodd-Frank. And during the past year, the top three or five of these private commodity trading houses, many of them almost doubled their profits in 2021, during a time when people's energy burdens were as high as they could be, when people are tipping into energy insecurity. And they're particularly effective during times of like crisis when energy demand is at its highest.</p><p>And we talk about the Texas storm example, where people's energy bills were at $15,000. Part of that comes from the energy companies, themselves, price gouging. But another part of that is that these speculators, on top of that, are taking advantage of these times of desperate need.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And whatever you might say about energy prices being tied to sort of foreign events or foreign conflicts or economic fluctuations in other countries, we can't control that, but at least it's legible. Whereas once they start being dependent on speculators, then they're just volatile with no rhyme or reason, which is even worse.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Right, exactly. And speculators can make money if the price is going down or up. That's another thing. So it expands the volatility, and I will say and the other part is that it's vulnerable to climate events.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>So the ironic thing about burning fossil fuels, maybe it's not ironic, maybe it's obvious, is that burning fossil fuels is terrible for climate change. In fact, it drives it. And then we have extreme weather events, we have extreme temperatures, and those weather events and those extreme temperatures jeopardize fossil fuel infrastructure, which means that fossil fuel companies are paying to fix pipelines that have frozen or they're limiting their supply for two months while there are wildfires going on. And the fact is that we're just burning our way into our own demise in this way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, we're exacerbating the natural volatility, you might say. So as you conclude, and here I'm quoting, "effectively managing energy price inflation, while retaining a fossil fuel based economy, is nearly impossible." And this, I think, again seems obvious once you say it out loud. Of course we can't control fluctuations in the prices of international commodities, the bulk of which come from other places and are traded on an international market. Like, we are subject to that market, and there is no recourse, there's no secret weapon, there's no increasing domestic production ... doesn't get you out of this. Releasing oil from the strategic petroleum reserve.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Like the secret space.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, we tried that, and it was like a blip.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>The tool that we typically turn to when it comes to managing inflation ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I meant to ask about this. I'm so glad you remembered that. Why won't just the conventional response to inflation, which we're seeing play out now is just for the Fed to boost interest rates, why won't that get at this?</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Well, I think there's two layers. I think one, that is a very blunt tool that's meant to basically slow down the productive capacity of the entire economy, because it's running too hot, or our demand is too high. So it's already a pretty blunt tool, and I would argue that probably it isn't the right tool for the moment period, but it's not able to deal with specific supply chain issues already. We know this. But the fossil fuel supply chain, especially, is out of the hand of our domestic government to deal with because of all of the reasons that I just stated.</p><p>So it's already the wrong tool for dealing with supply chain blockages. And then supply chain blockages in the fossil fuel markets are even more so out of our reach.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So just to sort of put a pin in this part, insofar as your economy is dependent on fossil fuels, you are stuck with a level of volatility that has real macroeconomic effects. Yes, some of which we're living through now, in part. So let's pivot then to my favorite subject, electricity. One of the initial points you make, and this is even sort of, in here we're just sort of bracketing renewables, we're just talking about electricity in general. You make the point that electricity prices historically have been much less volatile for two big reasons. So tell us why historically electricity prices have been more stable.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a great question. I mean, there's two main reasons that we point to in this report, acknowledging that the electricity industry is super complicated. The production and transmission of electricity, also, beyond the scope of what we can really outline here. But all that said, the first thing is that the electricity grid draws on a variety of sources. So whereas most cars run on one type of gasoline that you can buy at a gas station, or your home furnace can be powered by one type of oil or gas — when you use electricity, you're plugging into a grid that is drawing on power generated from a wide variety of sources.</p><p>And so it has built in these mechanisms to kind of balance the desire for consumers to have electricity whenever they want it and all of these different sources generated in all of these different places. So it's just structurally set up to kind of deal with giving people — drawing on a lot of options, not getting stuck in dependence on one fuel source.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So if coal, for whatever reason shot up, you can shift to natural gas, or vice versa, like, you can move around what you're drawing on in order to keep prices stable.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Exactly. Yeah. The other big reason, that we bring up in the paper, is just that the electricity industry is much more regulated than the gasoline industry or utility gas industry. I think part of this is because of the uniqueness of how electricity is generated and transmitted. I mean, I think very early on, as it was being developed into this product for consumers, it was clear that we needed the government to be involved in setting what the prices were going to be, because otherwise the cost of entry into the market is so big that undoubtedly there was going to be one company locally that kind of had a monopoly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, a natural monopoly.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Exactly. Yeah. And so this is something that utilities in general, very early on, as they were being developed, were understood to be a natural monopoly. So we needed there to be government regulation to protect consumers and make sure that they had just and reasonable prices and equal access.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And for all the complaints electricity heads have about electricity sector regulation, which are many, it has, sort of at the macro level, kept certain parameters on the whole thing, kept a certain degree of stability around the whole thing.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Absolutely. I mean, our electricity sector today, it's not running exclusively on renewables, like we argue in the report. It should be. It is drawing 60% of power generated through fossil fuels. And yet, even given that you look at volatility, the average price change in electricity compared to utility gas or gasoline over time, and the prices go up and down far less, and they don't swing as widely or as often.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's a very striking graph in the report, if listeners want to go track it down, showing the volatility of oil versus gas versus electricity. And electricity looks practically like a straight line relative to the other two, which fly up and down, all over the place.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So electricity manages to stay relatively stable, even drawing on fossil fuels, which, as we discussed, are volatile, it has this sort of effect of suppressing that volatility and creating stability. So sort of the next piece of the argument is that even beyond that sun and wind, solar and wind power, specifically, are less volatile.</p><p>So explain a little bit about that.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, Kris really got into kind of the nitty-gritty of the extraction and the conflict around pulling fossil fuels out of the earth and producing energy sources with them. But wind and solar look almost the opposite to that. They're commonly available everywhere. Sure, there are some areas that might have more sun, more wind, but we're not dealing with geopolitical situation, where there's a handful of countries that have access to this resource that the rest of the world relies on. Now of course, we know there's been a lot of discussion about the minerals needed to produce the technology to access the sun and the wind, but we believe it's possible to figure out how to fairly and justly distribute those minerals.</p><p>We're hopeful that we can produce that technology globally and in cooperation. And therefore, once it's set up, you have common, unlimited access to solar and wind. So the thing about the fossil fuel industry is that there's this fuel that constantly needs to be extracted and transported all over the world. And with sun and wind, once you have the technology to capture it, it's just commonly available. You don't have to be transporting it around the globe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And free.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Yes, absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I want to dwell just for a second on this supply chain question, because this is a common argument made on behalf of sun and wind. There's no fuel costs. It's all raining down on us for free. You don't have to dig it up. And so once you build the technology, the costs are all technology, not fuel. And so once you build the technology to harvest it, you have basically an eternal, reliable source of free fuel. But there are supply chain issues around the technology. So as you say, there are minerals and metals involved in terms of the sort of chips involved.</p><p>China has almost all the rare mineral processing. So in terms of the supply chains for getting that technology, there are currently at least geographical concentrations. There are sort of players that are sitting in a similarly sort of cat-bird seat, as people who are sitting on top of oil and gas. But as you say, that's a solvable problem, right? The fossil fuel volatility is not solvable. Supply chain volatility is, in theory, solvable, right? Like we've built diverse, international supply chains for lots of things in the past and could do so, again, with this.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Absolutely, I mean I think that the dependence on fossil fuels sets you up to have a permanent need to be negotiating global production and distribution, whereas with renewables, there's an upfront investment. I think that there's a lot of government and international coordination that needs to take place but it's not to the same degree that we have with the fossil fuel industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. More like a constricted passage that we're trying to get through, but there is an other side.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>There's no other side with fossil fuels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And worth mentioning, because we mentioned it about fossil fuels, is that insofar as you can prevent climate change, which sun and wind do, you prevent more volatility in your supply chains in that sense, too. Those are both, I guess, long term effects, but worth noting. And also another in terms of mirror, like you talked about how oil price spikes precede recessions because of this — energy is not something you can choose not to buy, so everybody's stuck with the price rises. But you have sort of the mirror effect with renewables, in that they are constantly reducing household energy expenditures, which free up more money to spend on other things, right?</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. I mean we don't have the best ... we have a lot of historical data when it comes to fossil fuels, both the production and on the consumer end. We have a lot less of that with renewables. But there are a lot of studies that other people have done, that we highlight here, really looking at, "What does it cost to produce renewables now? What's the impact on it on your electricity bill today?" Really trying to parse those details out. And again and again we see that renewables are trending downward in terms of the cost of producing them.</p><p>So that is something ... there's a long-term trend in them going down, whereas with natural gas we see it trending up. So that's something that can be passed on to consumers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so I wonder if you think, and this is, I guess, somewhat speculative, but as we become more of a renewables based economy, do you think that will reduce the number of recessions? I mean, do you think that will have the effect of mitigating some recessions?</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>I think that there's a lot of potential there. I mean, I think that with the recessions we've seen now that have been preceded by oil price spikes, a lot of that has to do with it being produced elsewhere, and so prices go up, and we're paying for gas that is being captured by producers abroad. But the renewable energy landscape is its domestic production, so everyone can produce it technically. Some countries more than others. Some will have an easier time ramping up. The United States, obviously, one of them. But the idea here is that it's something that doesn't have to be transported because it's commonly available everywhere, and so it's going to be domestically produced largely. Which means that even if there is a price increase, the producers of it are getting that price here in this economy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. It's still in the economy.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>So it has less of a kind of domino effect, in the sense that it's not just a bunch of money getting sucked out of the US economy to oil producers abroad, but it might be getting sucked out of consumers pockets into their local energy production companies. But those companies, the people that work there and own the business, also live in the United States, and they'll be putting that money back into the economy here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. You're having money circulating the economy, whereas every one of these price spikes of fossil fuels, and I just don't know that people really sort of fully have internalized this, but every single price spike in fossil fuels just has the effect of draining shitloads of money out of the US economy and might as well be lighting it on fire, right? These are just rents we're paying. We're not getting more for our money. We're just getting the same thing for our money. So it's just being drained of blood.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>I think the other thing that comes into this is, like, Kris was talking about the speculation kind of betting on prices going up and down. Renewable prices, electricity prices are much more stable. And so you can plan your life around that. You can't have, like, "Oh, the price of gasoline went up. We don't know why. We don't have any control over it." There's a lot less of that dynamic at play. So when you have stable energy prices, it's something that you can plan for. It's not something that's going to catch you off guard, and then you can't pay your rent. You can have long-term contracts, consumers can have that.</p><p>There can be much more education and awareness about what to expect.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Right. And we do argue also that for those in our economy that are the closest to being energy insecure, or who are lower-income — and we found more so Black and Latinx — the volatility from fossil fuels can really put you over the edge, and you can't plan for that. And so we say that this transition could also have the potential to be an improvement in energy equity at least. Obviously, we make some stipulations about how the policy design would have to make sure that those consumers had access to renewables. But if we do this in a public-investment-led way, if we move away from tax credits and more towards subsidies, if we make sure that renters who don't have control over what their landlord does in their building, for example, are able to have access to renewables, then this sort of price stability will have an even greater impact on those who spend the majority of their household budget on energy, not the majority of their whole budget, but who spend more so than other groups of consumers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So you can enhance the equity effects. But I think it's worth, I think, emphasizing what you said at the beginning, which is insofar as vulnerable populations suffer more from price volatility, they will disproportionately benefit from price stability, right. So there's an inherent equity effect in all this, in shifting from volatile to non-volatile sources of energy. You're going to have a large equity effect, even bracketing everything else.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So let's then talk about what to do with these insights. So the conventional wisdom is that inflation comes from overheated demand running out ahead of supply, and thus, that government spending, like the initial Recovery Bill that Biden and Congress passed, insofar as it accelerates consumer demand, is just going to exacerbate inflation. Sort of the conventional wisdom is that Biden and Democrats are sort of partially responsible for this because of the big spending they did when they first came in. And I think Jeff Bezos sort of expressed the conventional wisdom the other day, when he said that Manchin saved the Democrats from themselves by preventing them from spending even more.</p><p>He literally used the phrase, "Manchin saved them from themselves." It haunts me.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>He cannot pivot into being a pundit now. I cannot take that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can just one billionaire not. Just don't.</p><p>But the conventionalism is that in times of inflation, the proper government response is austerity — to spend less until supply catches up with demand.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But to operationalize what y'all are saying, would require spending a bunch of government money, like accelerating the transition from fossil fuels to renewables. You can just sit back and wait for the market to do it. But if you want it to happen in time to have the effects we want, short-term effects, that is going to require a big, new public spending. So how do we reconcile this intuition that public spending will drive inflation with this counterintuition that the energy transition will suppress inflation?</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Well, I think you picked up on one of the main goals of this paper. This is one of the issues that we're really trying to confront, which is that climate scientists, climate activists, so many people have been calling for a big, public investment in this transition and are being sort of bombarded with inflation hawkery, saying that "We can't afford it right now, it'll drive us over the edge." I mean, I think conventional wisdom is misapplied in this current moment for a few reasons. I think we've already mentioned that the inflation that we're dealing with is coming from several supply chains.</p><p>And as we said, our tools for dealing with that type of inflation, instead of overall overheating inflation, are different. But two, it's not just government spending, all inflationary. I think you have to really understand what you're spending your money on. And that's the big argument of this paper is that if you spend your money on building infrastructure that will stabilize energy prices, which as we can see, are a huge driver of the inflation we're seeing right now, then you are actually eliminating a major source of inflation. And the amount of spending that we do in the time period that it would require will be much shorter than the amount of time that we've actually been dealing with fossil fuel-driven inflation and fossil fuel-driven volatility.</p><p>So I think our argument is, "Of course it's worth it, and the stabilizing effects of switching to renewables will be able to, I don't even want to say offset, because I don't want to cosign the idea that this will lead to additional inflation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So a. we have the stabilizing effect of moving off fossil fuels onto renewables, but you don't even think that government spending equals more inflation is true to begin with?</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>I'm saying in this current context. I don't know that the conventional wisdom is properly applied to the context we're in right now. There's a lot of debate over whether or not we are truly overheating, or if we're really just dealing with some supply chain blockages that come from recovering from the Pandemic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think that if you're studying kind of what's driving inflation, a lot of economists are in agreement: that right now the inflation we're experiencing is much more on the supply side, and therefore, we don't see signs of overheating in the economy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so it makes sense that spending on the supply side would ease that, right? I mean, that spending on the supply side would ease rather than exacerbate them.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Yeah, I think you could think of a clean-energy spending bill as a supply smoothing policy in our energy supply chain.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This all makes intuitive sense, but do we have ... it's one thing to have an intuition, and it's another thing to have some numbers in your back pocket. I'm just wondering how well we're able to model these kind of things. And I wonder to what extent is sort of some of the conventional wisdom, that you guys are disputing, kind of embedded in the models. Do you know what I mean? So, like, modeling itself is misleading us. Do you feel confident enough to be throwing numbers around to policymakers if they ask, like, "How much would this ease inflation?" Do you know?</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Well, one of the studies that we highlight in this paper, this is not our own modeling, but looked at what a rapid transition to renewable energy production would look like on overall costs to consumers, not a change in the rate of inflation. And they found that a rapid transition to wind and solar today, along with the technological advancements in subsequent years and the economies of scale of really bringing that online, would save consumers about $2 trillion a year on the price of energy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That seems like a large number.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>So that's not really about inflation per se. It's really just "what are people paying?" But I think it drives home the point that you make this investment now, we have to make this investment now. It is a government-led investment. It is totally different than the idea of just like throwing dollar bills out into the world to get spent in different ways. This is a very coordinated, planned utility grade investment. Switching to solar, switching to wind, building out the EV charging infrastructure, public transportation, relying on electricity. All of that kind of coordinated investment could save consumers $2 trillion a year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which they would probably enjoy whether or not there was inflation.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>I mean, I would argue also that predicting inflation ten years from now in a renewable universe is probably not the right way to prove this quantifiably. In my opinion. I think we're talking about energy inflation. The inflation that we're likely to see over that year, over the next ten years could come from many different sources. I think, if we wanted to say, "Inflation stemming from energy prices will be reduced," the best way to get at that answer is by displaying stable prices, because inflation shows you the change in prices. So I think by talking about the stability of renewables and the stability of energy prices, we're also really getting at the fact that energy inflation, which tracks price volatility from energy, will be reduced.</p><p>I think guaranteeing policymakers that we are going to be in a 2% inflation universe, if we switch to renewables, is probably not the best way to get there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But I mean, insofar as energy volatility has played a big role in inflation in the past, I mean, like, something close to half of current inflation. If you could promise to take that chunk off the table ...</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>We can do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's not a small thing. To wrap up, this makes total sense to me. Looking out, in terms of long-term economic strategy. It's interesting. It's sort of one example of a thing you see a lot in energy discussions around fossil fuels, which is it's only now that alternatives are available, that we're able to sort of turn and clearly see what the choice of fossil fuels is doing to us, right. Because if there's no alternative to fossil fuels, then fossil fuel price volatility is just a feature of the universe, right. It's just a background condition, which is sort of how we've been treating it. As you note, we leave it out of these inflation measures because we've just sort of ...</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Made our peace.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Made our peace with it, right. Like accepted. Like, "This is how it is, we're stuck on this freaking roller coaster, and we have no control over it. Oh well, let's bracket that and look at everything else." But now that fossil fuels are increasingly a choice, we can see, "Oh, like wow, that has really sucked to be stuck on that roller coaster for decades."</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>With no seatbelt.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>"That's been unpleasant. Let's, let's get off that." So, so anyway, long term, like strategically long term, this makes all the sense in the world to me. But of course, there's strategic long term, and then there's, like, the midterms. So I wonder whether you think that some bold move ... I guess, what I'm asking you is, do you think that a big public spending program on renewable energy would have effects fast enough to materially affect current politics? Or is this kind of a mid- and long-term thing we're talking about?</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Well, I think there's a couple of ways to think about that. I mean, on some level, nothing that happens with managing inflation today is going to, overnight, change price volatility between now and the midterms. But what we do have is a really active climate movement that's been demanding change, because we absolutely need it. And they're not getting action, and they're being told it's because there's inflation in the economy. And it's our job, it's our point with this paper to arm activists with the information they need to push past that argument. Because I think one of the ways that we really can affect the political climate, is to see action on this issue in particular, which is so popular.</p><p>We want to see change. We have a plan. We're organized. We know what we need. We know how to get there. And inflation is not the excuse to delay it. It is the reason to act now.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Absolutely. And I think, politically, progressives need to show that we're going to do the thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's not typically been our strong suit.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>I'm hopeful that now would be a good time, and I don't think there should be any tabling this for a little bit later or after the midterms for the sake of political wins, because I think that might actually be harmful. I think pushing on climate investment as soon as possible is probably a political good, also.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Absolutely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. I just wonder ... the case, as you lay it out, makes sense, but I wonder about the Democrats ability to sell it, or to tell that story in a way that is meaningful to the public, especially with one of their most prominent members out spewing the dumbest of conventional wisdom on this subject.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Yeah, they might have a hard time doing what they need to do, but it doesn't mean that we shouldn't stop fighting for it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so it goes. Well, thank you so much for coming on. And like I said, this is, like, on some level, I feel like I knew this, on some vague level, but it's so nice to just have it put out. And to me, this is, I just think, one of the great underutilized arguments in favor of the energy transition, which is just that being tied to fossil fuels sucks. It's unpleasant.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>We made your hunch citable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, a citable hunch. This is why I'm in the business, is to have my priors reinforced by experts. Alright, so thanks for doing the report, and thanks for coming on today.</p><p><strong>Lauren Melodia</strong></p><p>Thank you so much.</p><p><strong>Kristina Karlsson</strong></p><p>Thanks so much. Bye.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value you conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-lauren-melodia-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:55372080</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Jun 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/55372080/3b2da3fb2bc04acf40a75ad4d0d0d945.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3073</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/55372080/1eaa9875be3871a871529c4c9f5d9a4f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Jesse Morris on building an operating system for distributed energy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Jesse Morris of international nonprofit Energy Web discusses his group’s work toward building a transparent and trusted “operating system” for distributed energy resources, with an end goal of enabling a more sophisticated and resilient energy grid.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAA7BfloiNdXXTtX2lePaEOya/volts22.05.18%28jesse.morris%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-jesse-morris-on-building-an-operating-system-for-distributed-energy"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Recent years have seen an explosive rise in distributed energy resources (DERs) — energy devices that are located “behind the meter,” on the customer side, like solar panels, batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), and smart appliances.</p><p>Distributed energy has the potential to change the grid for the better, making it cleaner and more resilient, but as things stand, there’s a problem.</p><p>Consider an EV. The customer has a relationship to it, a way to see its capacity and behavior; it wants to operate the EV in a way that best serves their own transportation needs. The aggregator — an entity that gathers DERs and treats them as a single entity, to sell their services — has a different relationship with the EV; it wants to operate the EV to meet contractual requirements. The distribution utility has a different relationship; it wants to operate the EV to maintain grid stability. And the market manager (ISO) has yet a different relationship; it wants to operate the EV in the way that best serves the market.</p><p>All these entities want different things from the EV, but they’ve all built bespoke systems to track it — systems that do not communicate with one another. Consequently, most DERs are wildly underutilized. </p><p>This can not last. Confusion and crossed wires will only grow with distributed energy. What the world needs is a common, transparent, trusted way to track DERs, their capacity and interaction with the grid. </p><p>That is what <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energyweb.org">Energy Web</a>, an international nonprofit, aims to provide: “an operating system for DERs” that will assign each DER a record on the blockchain (yes, the blockchain), allowing all interested entities to have a common source of information and tracking.</p><p>I am a bit of a skeptic of toward blockchain hype, but this seems like an excellent use of it, which could unlock a much more sophisticated and resilient grid. I’m eager to talk to Energy Web CEO Jesse Morris about what the product is, how it can help DERs, and where we might see it adopted next.</p><p>Alright, then. With no further ado, Jesse Morris of Energy Web. Thanks for coming to Volts.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Thank you for having me. Looking forward to the conversation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You know, I want to get into the nuts and bolts of Energy Web, but I feel like we should do a little background, a little scene setting, a little contexting. So let's start, then, because Energy Web is, I think, primarily a way of solving the problems, some of the problems posed by distributed energy. And so I don't want to assume too much background knowledge on the part of listeners. So why don't you just really quickly sort of tell us what qualifies as distributed energy? What's the sort of technical definition of distributed energy? What is it? How much of it is there? How much is coming on board? And what challenge does it pose to the grid?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>So I think that is a very accurate statement, in terms of our primary focus at Energy Web and the problems we're trying to solve. For us, distributed energy, and I'll add the additional word on here, distributed energy resources. What are we talking about there, at least in kind of Energy Web's world? So we're really talking about any kind of electricity using, storing, or generating device. So that could range from a battery in a home, a battery in a commercial and industrial building, an electric vehicle, a charge point, a heat pump, any kind of load that can be flexed over time.</p><p>So our definition of distributed energy resources, at least in terms of the work that we're doing, is actually quite broad. And if I think about the challenges and opportunities there, these are things that anyone working kind of under the broad umbrella of the energy transition, especially you, David, would be super familiar with. We know that in many grids around the world, we're undergoing one of the biggest shifts in the 100+ year history of the grid. More and more customers are adopting these distributed energy resources. Again, I'm sitting here in California, massive amounts of rooftop solar coming online.</p><p>The model three is the fastest selling and the best selling automobile in the state. So all of these distributed energy resources, in some places, are presenting problems. We do a lot of work in Australia, where they have too much solar at specific times of the day. It's literally backfeeding into the transmission system. It's unbelievable. But then we also are in places where those same resources can provide immense value to the grid. My electric vehicle can help reduce congestion at certain times of the day to prevent our overhead lines from overheating and starting more wildfires. So a little bit of the context about what we're focused on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As I've thought about distributed resources over the years, I think, in the beginning, most people are, I think intuitively, most people still just think solar panels, and kind of batteries, sort of the generating and storing of energy. But as you note, any energy consuming device in the house that can be controlled, really counts as an energy resource, as a distributed energy resource. So, like your water heater. Very sort of banal household appliances, we're kind of starting to think about them now as energy resources, which is really a new way of looking at things. But the one piece about distributed energy that I think is worth adding is that all these devices that you're talking about are what's called "behind the meter", which means from the utility's point of view, the utility comes and reads your meter, and that's how much energy you use.</p><p>So it does not know what is going on behind the meter. I think a key part of this is just that these distributed energy resources are operating largely out of sight of utilities.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Exactly. That is the problem that we're trying to solve at Energy Web. We are trying to make it possible for all of these devices to be seen and be able to communicate by these utilities. And maybe a little context there. My background. I worked at RMI, or Rocky Mountain Institute, for about ten years. And my tenure there, I can't tell you how many times I walked into a boardroom or with some executives at a utility or another energy company, and we had these beautiful charts and models showing how much money different companies could make by taking all of these distributed energy resources and bidding them into wholesale markets, and eventually, with regulations changing, bidding them into local, I'd call them "distribution markets" for electricity run by local utilities.</p><p>And the charts were beautiful, the performers are beautiful, but you had to make two pretty fundamental assumptions. One, that regulations would continue to evolve, which as you know, is ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not always something you can bet on.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Exactly. But the second thing, and this is why I spun Energy Web, myself and several other colleagues at RMI spun Energy Web out, is it was very clear to pull off any of these business models we were talking about, software was going to be needed. And these utilities, it's not an innovative place necessarily. Building software means using Zoom in a lot of cases. So that's really where this came from. We said, "Well, wait a minute, can we start a new organization to build open source software to crack this problem of giving grid operators visibility into these assets that sit behind the meter?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And one more thing to add, maybe, you're referring to the many potential benefits that could come, if these things are seen and coordinated in some rational way. But I just want to emphasize one last time before we move on, that from the utilities point of view now, not being able to see them, it's not just that they're leaving benefits on the table, it's causing them severe problems because utilities turn power plants on and off to meet demand. And demand traditionally, as you know, has been pretty predictable, right? It goes up and down. It goes up when everybody gets home from work and then down at night.</p><p>And it's relatively predictable for utilities how much power they're going to need. But if you've got like a solar panel generating behind the meter, from the utilities side of the meter, that just looks like demand going down, right? Demand from that household going down. Only now, because you've got all these thousands and thousands of DERs, of distributed energy resources, behind all these meters, suddenly demand is just becoming less predictable for the utilities, right? Because you got things generating and storing and timing their consumption behind the meter, you can't see any of it. So all of a sudden your sort of very predictable demand curves, that you're used to sort of orienting around, are starting to look wonky and weird.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Exactly. And I'd say I'd push it even further. Two examples come to mind for me. So another one in Australia, there's so much solar being exported at the distribution network that grid operators there, today, need a tool to be able to communicate directly with smart inverters and shut off those solar systems. Most cases they don't have that.</p><p>If I spin around the world to Europe, so far we've been talking about customer-owned resources that sit behind the meter, they actually have this problem with their own equipment in some places. A lot of sensors that are used and a lot of automation equipment on distribution networks. They're actually using relatively analog technology to kind of track where those assets are and communicate with them. And so, even there, you might have some industrial sensors that you're using some old school technology to actually collect data from them, instead of having a nice dashboard to show you the temperature of your distribution network in different places. So it's not just customer-owned resources that are operating a little bit with kind of old school methodologies and technologies. It's also some utility-owned ones.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a little wild, and I won't do all this, but many people have remarked how amazing it is that the grid works at all.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Shocking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You can't store electricity, at least you couldn't until very recently, at least very well. So you have to be generating exactly in concert with demand at all times, 24 hours of the day. And they've been doing this for a century without clear visibility into the things that are at the end of the lines, right, the edge of the grid. It's just amazing that it's been pulled off as long as it has. But the idea that, "oh, we should have some real time awareness of what's going on out there on the grid that we're trying to manage," it just seems so obvious. It's crazy that it's only just now coming along.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>I continue to be surprised. I mean, I can't tell you how many times I've been sitting with a grid operator and made an assumption, being a millennial in their mid-30s and has a supercomputer in their pocket. "Wait a minute, you're telling me you haven't thought about sending me a digital communication to maybe not use electricity at a certain time? And you're talking about, let's make sure we send Jesse a flyer to engage in a demand response problem." I mean, that's a real conversation I just had.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I love it. I love it. Direct mail. They're still in the direct mail phase of things. It's crazy how primitive some of the pieces of it are. So there have been some efforts to try to address this, and to try to sort of make use of distributed energy in a more coherent way, but it hasn't really taken off much. So, like, for instance, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC, issued this Order 2222. I'm not sure what's the right industry way to say that. Is there some slang?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>I think you got it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>22-22? I don't know.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Meant to sort of authorize DERs to bid into wholesale energy markets, so that all the energy that's generated that isn't self consumed by the consumer doesn't just go to waste. And there have been sort of efforts in this direction in the EU, but your sort of take is that they have fallen short. Nothing's really gotten along. So what are the efforts so far? And why haven't they done much good?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Unfortunately, I kind of said there's two things you need to believe for these DERs to be being fully utilized, right. One is these regulatory barriers need to be overcome, and the second is you need technology to go out and get them. We're really focused on number two, in particular, and one of the reasons we're focused on number two is because one of the reasons, that are at least put forth by key people in some of these utilities, especially in the US, is that a grid largely relying on DERs to help balance the grid, instead of centralized thermal plants, just isn't reliable enough.</p><p>And our approach there is, say "No, no, no, let's prove that wrong. Let's show that we can give grid operators near real-time visibility and, potentially, control, if a customer allows it, into exactly when, for example, an electric vehicle is charged and with how many amps." So we're really focused on the technology side, but if we want to talk, I can offer a couple of, at least, observations on the regulatory front. I'm lucky enough to be able to have conversations with every time zone on the planet pretty much every day. We're really active in Western Europe. We have some projects in Turkey. If we spin all the way around the globe, we're very active in Australia, then here in the US we've got a lot going on.</p><p>So if you look globally, I mean there are opportunities for DERs to make money via either bidding into the wholesale market under some limited programs. So California is probably the best example of that. And then these local programs managed by, for lack of a better term, distribution utilities. So the companies that are running the distribution networks, and there's your traditional virtual power plant demand response programs. You hit the nail on the head though. If we're trying to generalize around the world, very few places can distributed energy resources have unfettered access to the wholesale energy market or to these, what I like to call, "distribution level markets", even though they don't really exist yet.</p><p>And David, you know better than me why that's going on. I mean, you should, perhaps, offer that synthesis.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, there's a bunch of reasons. I assume you're referring to the fact that utilities traditionally make money off building big infrastructure, and to the extent, consumers or customers are building that infrastructure for them, basically, which is what you're doing when you put solar panels on your roof and a battery in your garage. You're building a little piece of grid infrastructure. To the extent customers build it, utilities don't make any money off the building of it. The same problem that faces DERs and efficiency and anything else that might trim consumption of central thermal plants.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly. And there are other issues too. In Europe it's a little bit more nuanced. I would say the conversation in Europe about DER provision of services locally, and at the wholesale level, is a little bit more advanced than here in the US. I think more and more market participants are recognizing that there needs to be a way for them to be compensated. So there's a lot of really interesting work going on on these energy communities. There's a lot of different ways for some of these devices to be able to participate in the market. In Australia, there has emerged what I would call rough consensus on kind of what the market is going to look like as it relates to DERs.</p><p>Most of the 25 or so distribution utilities in the country are going to start offering more full-blown virtual power plant demand response programs. We call them "local service exchanges." So it's not just capacity shaving from DER, but it's, "Hey, I need X, Y or Z service at this time. What DERs can help?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Well, I want to get into some market structures later, but first, we've been sort of dancing around the topic, but now let's talk about it. You say, in one of the papers that you guys wrote, that, in some sense, these arguments over, "how to aggregate them, and how to get them into wholesale markets," are a little putting the cart before the horse. It's like, I think the analogy used, "It's like arguing whether Gmail or Hotmail is better before you have established an email protocol via which you can exchange emails." So with that said, sort of tell us what Energy Web is trying to do with all these DERs.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>So our ultimate vision here is to make it as frictionless, as easy and as cheap as possible, for any DER to be either rolled off the manufacturing line at a manufacturing plant, or plugged in at a customer's house, or activated by an energy aggregator or retailer. Our vision is to make it just completely frictionless for that DER to be energized, and immediately digitally connected, and trusted by every grid operator that has a relationship with that device.</p><p>So I give a very specific example. I'm sitting in Northern California. My utilities, I have three: I have a community choice aggregator, I have my distribution utility, and then I have the California ISO that's managing the whole network. All three of those entities can extract value from my DER, assuming that regulatory piece is solved with at some point, but they are blind to that device right now. In this case, I'm talking an electric car.</p><p>So that's our vision. "How can we make it possible for my car to be automatically integrated to all of these different markets and programs, and so that these utilities can see it and interact with it?" And to just paint a picture of how acute this problem is right now, my colleagues and I recently counted in California, there are at least eight different programs for DER to provide some level of service to local utilities and regional.</p><p>Now get this. How many of those programs do you think are coordinated, as it relates to an underlying protocol or technology?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I'm guessing they're all bespoke?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>You got it. Zero. So that is recognizing that we still have a lot of evolution that needs to happen on the regulatory side to unlock the value proposition of these DERs. We are saying, "let's just focus on the underlying technology to make it as easy as possible for all of these different assets to be trusted and able to communicate with each other."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the idea here is you make every DER transparent, basically, its capacity, its capabilities, what it's currently doing, what DER programs it's currently enrolled in, like who's getting what value out of it. All these things about the DER are just going to be accessible to all these different utility parties.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Exactly. Able to be trusted and to be able to transact and participate in these different ... we have to protect customer identity information. We have to protect person identifiable information. But no, you're right. It's all about making those DERs usable in these different markets and programs, and making that process as seamless and low cost as possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And so, related to this, there's something called a narrow waist protocol. And I'm wondering if I need to know what that means.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>That's definitely an Andreessen Horowitz Silicon Valley term for technology. It might be useful. And this is where, if we want to go there, there is the whole blockchain Web3 of it all, if that's what you're trying to get at.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I do want to know how that relates, but I think sort of, again, to go back to the email analogy, I think most people, most listeners, even not particularly tech savvy, will know that there is a sort of protocol — it's called SMTP — that structures all emails. And that's why any email can be read by any email program. And so you're basically trying to do that for DERs, right? Create a protocol that is universally acknowledged and universally accessible and readable.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah, so the way the technology works, it's pretty simple to describe. Basically, we use these things called "digital identities" for every person, every DER, and every organization in our ecosystem. So basically every one of these DERs gets an identity. Those identities might sit in another aggregation of identities. And then every aggregator gets an identity, every utility gets an identity. So we basically construct these digital identities for every object in any grid where we're working. And then starting from those identities, which you could almost think of, like passports, we then enrich them with additional information about them: "Who installed them? Do we trust it to participate in this market or that market? What are the different characteristics about it?"</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Sorry to interrupt, but once you've got the identity, is there any limit to the kinds of information you could add to it? I mean, I'm presumably you've started with basic stuff, but is there any technical limitation to how much information you can stuff in there?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>The main thing is about latency. So if you have one of those identities, and you need to send very granular information at high frequency between identities ... let's think about frequency regulation in these wholesale markets, right. You can run into some very challenging engineering things where, "oh, my gosh, I now have 100 million DERs in California. 100 million of those things need to send some data every 2 seconds to the California ISO." You start to run into some scalability things. But then again, look, I'm an energy and climate guy. I think, David, on a podcast, I heard you talk the other day. You said, "Hey, everybody, the nerds have come to the energy transition." Well, if we unleash the nerds, so the incredibly talented software engineers and all those folks on that problem, it too can be solved.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, I'm sure some of them can be solved, but it's interesting to sort of contemplate it. In a sense, electricity works at the speed of light, so in some sense, you're trying to move information around to get ahead of something that's moving at the speed of light. I can see how there could probably be some irresolvable problems at some point.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Definitely. And right now, most of the time-sensitive applications that we're building against is really more on the 5 to 15 minutes interval, of data being shared.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Which is plenty, we should note. You can get plenty out of that.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Definitely. But those identities, again, not to oversimplify how we work, but that's basically our technology stack works. You establish these identities, and there's a number of ways to do that. With some partners in Europe, we're actually working with SIM card manufacturers. So the cards that are in our phones, and they put those SIM cards into different devices, be they smart meters, or electric vehicles, or what have you. And then with those identities in the asset, you can literally trust it the moment it rolls off the manufacturing line, which is super interesting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, this feels like a dumb question, but is this a chip that needs to be attached in or onto all these devices? What does it look like? What's the actual ...</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>That's just one path. So if you talk about the SIM card, SIM cards can take a lot of different form factors. Literally, if you look at some of your credit card., you have a little chip in there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>In many cases, that's a SIM card. And that can come in a variety of form factors. It could be in our car, it could be in your phone, it can be in a home energy gateway device, what have you. But that's not the only way, right? Because if we have to go around the world in retrofitting every IoT device, we haven't done this right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. I have in mind my humble water heater. And I'm just wondering, like, if I want my water heater to get an identity and play in these markets, what do I do? Do I stick something onto it?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>If we are in a situation where you, or me, or our parents have to do anything to get paid a few bucks a day for your assets to provide services to the grid, we have failed. Let's just put that out there. So that's why the SIM card thing is interesting for long term, because we could maybe get these devices to be ready to rock from the beginning. But right now, most of our business is very closely focused on working with OEMs — so Volkswagen is an example of a company we work with — or aggregators. We basically conduct an integration with those companies.</p><p>So those companies are running their own servers, and those servers are having communications with all the different assets that they manage. And so we can actually conduct these kinds of integrations with those aggregators, with those manufacturers, to begin establishing these identities. Now, it's not as ideal from a kind of utopian and even a cybersecurity perspective. If you could go all the way to the edge of the grid directly, with every single asset, and have that, what's called in technology land a "root of trust", right, in every toaster, in every electric vehicle, that would be ideal. But that's going to take a really long time to get there, and climate change isn't waiting for us.</p><p>So our focus is, "Let's just move quickly." And that's why we work very closely with aggregators and OEMs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So aggregators have an individual relationship with my hot water heater. How are they doing it? Like, are they communicating with my hot water heater somehow? I don't know why I'm obsessed with my hot water heater.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>No, it's a good example. Have you had any aggregators on the pod?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No, I haven't. I should actually. I've been meaning to.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>I think it'd be a super interesting conversation because I've had a very bipolar experience with the aggregators that we work with. Some of them are going crazy on technology and are using all sorts of tech to do what you described, which is to have a really tight digital relationship between their server and your water heater, so that they can control it and optimize it for bidding into these different markets. Other aggregators are still sending text messages, like, just to be clear. That's what's going on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Text message, like, "turn your water heater down" and ...</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh my god.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>So it's really a broad spectrum, and I say that not even to throw them under the bus. They're performing an incredibly important mission, I think, which is enrolling these customers, so that their DERs can eventually make money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We should actually pause here. I don't want to assume too much on listeners parts, but just to make it clear, an aggregator is an entity that goes and makes deals with hundreds or thousands of DERs and gains the ability to control them. And thus the sort of aggregation of DERs, in sum, acts like a big battery, or a big power plant. Basically, you can treat it as one entity, once you have it all coordinated, more or less, you can. I imagine if you're sending text messages, your sort of ability to be nimble is limited, but to some extent, right, that's what aggregators are. I just want to make sure everybody knew what we're talking about. So I say with some trepidation, tell me what the blockchain has to do with all of this.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>I share the trepidation and you should hit me with a ... we can have a whole other part of this conversation on blockchain and Web3 and what's going on. I'm happy to offer my candid take on all that. For what we've described so far, it's actually pretty simple, and maybe a little bit of context is useful. When we started Energy Web, we had a strong hypothesis that blockchain could actually help us do some of the stuff that we've been talking about, thus far on this conversation. But we didn't know exactly what. We knew that some of the high level principles about what blockchains could be capable of sounded really interesting, and let's experiment with them.</p><p>And since we started Energy Web in 2017, coming all the way now to 2022, I'd say we found 200 ways to not use a blockchain in the energy transition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The entire world is currently sifting through ways not to use blockchain, I think.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Yes. And we found a couple of ways that we think make pretty good sense. And so the way that we use it, in the applications that I've talked through here, is they act as an anchor for those identities. So if we're talking about any of these use cases that we've talked about, you've got those identities, and you've got some metadata associated with them, that needs to be seen and trusted by a lot of different companies. And each of those companies, they have their own It systems, right? So we can't get them to come in and use a single gigantic centralized piece of software. That has a number of problems, a number of challenges.</p><p>It's also incredibly cyber insecure. I mean, just look at all of these things that have happened with different centralized databases being compromised and hacked. So the way we use blockchain is each one of those identities I've talked about are anchored onto that blockchain, which doesn't mean that all of the data is sitting on a blockchain somewhere, but almost like a digital thumbprint of that identity sits on the blockchain, which makes it very easy for these different market participants, at the end of the day, to trust that that DER is what it says it is, and to verify that it has the credentials that it claims to have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that what a token is? I'm waiting ... so rapidly past my background knowledge.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Not quite. So I'd separate cryptocurrency and tokens from how these blockchains are constructed. So if you have an address, which is like a wallet on one of these blockchains, and I have a wallet, which is almost like a bank account on one of these blockchains, we can send tokens to one another. But these identities, that doesn't have to do with the tokens at all. It's almost like every one of these identities has one or multiple addresses on the blockchain that is associated with it. And so that's how the verification and check happens. Now, we still do use tokens, and there are other ways to use multiple tokens in blockchain.</p><p>But for us, the primary, most important thing here is using blockchain to act as this universal anchor for identity. And I should say, we're not the only ones doing this. Microsoft has a very interesting project about creating digital identities for college students and anchoring them onto blockchain, so they have an entire business around that. It's really interesting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So we don't lose track of our college students. The whole thing about the blockchain, too, is that it's not sitting in some central database. There are basically copies of it all over the place. So there's no sort of way to get at — you can't corrupt it.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Correct. It becomes much more challenging to corrupt it. It becomes much more challenging to attack it. And I don't want to, actually, maybe I'm being a bit too harsh on the Web3 and blockchain folks. We're also experimenting with using it in very innovative ways. So if I put my energy hat back on for a second. Let's pretend that we're with a couple of utilities, and we're in a situation where there's a demand response program, and there's a wholesale energy market, and you have aggregators bidding DER into both of those markets at the same time. Well, somebody's got to run a solver.</p><p>Somebody has to decide, "Okay, given the constraints of the distribution utility and the bids and offers going to the wholesale market, we need to make sure there's no double counting going on, and we need to make sure that those services are going to the right places." That's a pretty complicated kind of solve. And most of the companies offering that to the market today, it's kind of done in a black box, which is, "hey, trust us, this works." So one of the blockchain concepts we're building, as we speak, is, "let's decentralize that function. Let's make it so that that matching algorithm, and that solved function, is actually being performed by a decentralized network of computers who are all competing to output the best result."</p><p>So that's bringing kind of how blockchains work into the energy sector and that's where these technologies can unlock an immense amount of value. So when I see the Metaverse, NFTs, it's very frustrating for me, and frankly our whole organization, to say, "look, we're actually proving how this technology can unlock real world value and help fight climate change." But sorry, I digress.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's hard to distinguish yourself from that large swamp right now. I'm sure over time that stuff will shake out, it won't all be lumped together. So here we are then. We got a bunch of DERs, thousands of DERs, each of whom now have an individual digital identity, which is anchored on the blockchain so that any utility, my distribution utility, my market manager, my aggregator, whatever can look at that identity and see what that device is doing, what it's committed to, like its capacity, et cetera. So that information becomes secure and transparent to everyone involved.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>That's right. And at the end of the day, what we're just trying to enable is so that those devices can provide full value to the distribution network and full value to the transmission network, all with one plus one equaling two, as it relates to what that device is actually doing for the network.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Not double counting. Alright, so we have this system now we're tracking DERs. So tell me then, give me an example of where is this being used in the world? And how is it being used thus far?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>So I think that the real tip of the spear example, as with so many things in the energy transition, when we talk about the grid, has got to be in Australia. I mean, we have massive amounts of rooftop solar. I think half of homes now have rooftop solar in the country. You have these wild events with just an immense amount of backfeeding happening from the distribution networks because there is so much solar on the grid. You have more and more customers adopting batteries, and now electric vehicles are just starting to kind of really take market share against combustion-fueled cars.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Again, totally screwing up the demand curve that the utility sees. Like now, once you have a battery, a home battery, and an EV and panels interacting with your consumption of energy, your demand profile just becomes completely opaque and unpredictable, unless they have some visibility into these devices.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>So unpredictable that the CEO of AEMO, the Australian Energy Market Operator, which basically manages the wholesale market there. The CEO recently said, and I'm not directly quoting here, but, "We need to be able to manage a regularly 100% renewable by 2025," right? So this isn't something that's coming in the future. This isn't, "let's hem and haw about regulations." No. "Let's go." Right? So in Australia, what we're doing is using this technology approach we've talked about, we're building for them. It's a distributed energy resource data exchange that does exactly what we've talked about. We're partnered with some of the distribution utilities.</p><p>We have four aggregators on board and we're working directly with AEMO, Australian Energy Market Operator — they manage the wholesale grid, again — to do what we've talked about. So basically to make it really easy for distributed energy resources to participate in what's called a "local service exchange" — so that's a market for services from DER managed by the distribution utilities — and doing it in such a way that those aggregators can also bid their assets into the wholesale market, without those two programs kind of tripping over each other. So that's what we're bringing to market. And it's more interesting for other reasons too.</p><p>Distribution utilities need a way to communicate with solar systems, so they can shut them off, which we talked about earlier. They need a way just to know what the heck is on their system. I mean, that in and of itself is valuable, right? So that's what we're building for them. And we're also doing another version of it in Western Australia for the market participants on that part of the country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I want to draw one thing out. I mean, you mentioned that, obviously, part of this is preventing DERs from inadvertently doing damage by backfeeding, or things like that. But also you say this is about fully utilizing them. So just explain a little bit like why, in the current regime, they're not being fully utilized and what this sort of transparent information about them would enable.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Right now, in most places around the world, batteries in particular — if we just take batteries as an example of a DER — they are paperweights, to be blunt. When I was still at RMI, we did some analysis about these large batteries in commercial and industrial buildings that were bought to pull down peak electric demand, so that you could avoid demand charges in some of these different markets. A lot of our analysis showed that those very expensive, very slick, state of the art batteries were sitting unused for 95% of the year. And one of the primary reasons for that is because, well, there just weren't other ways to make money with that battery.</p><p>You weren't allowed to participate in the market. So in places like Australia, where now the grid operators are moving to a point where there are multiple products and markets that those assets can participate in, that's where we come in with the tech, that's where we come in with that protocol, to make sure that those assets can seamlessly participate in those different markets and programs that are now coming online.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So intuitively, when I think about Australia with these thousands, tens of thousands, I guess millions, depending on how expansive your definition is, millions of DERs in Australia that heretofore were being underutilized in some cases, as you say, dramatically underutilized, paperweight 95% of the time — that just seems like an enormous resource, a huge resource of basically power — it's like a new power source that we are discovering, that's just sitting there, that requires almost nothing but information and coordination to exploit. So point being, have they been doing this long enough to get results? What do we know about how this is working so far?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>It's an immense resource, and it's growing so fast in different markets. Look in Australia we're not even talking about electric vehicles, because they're just coming online. So if we just look at California, how many electric cars are in the state right now? I mean if those things are networked together and charging or not charging at the right time in the right places, we have the world's biggest, most beautiful distributed battery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And I think it's just worth emphasizing, in case listeners don't appreciate this, but the batteries in EVs are, cumulatively, going to absolutely dwarf any other kind of battery, commercial or home batteries or anything else. Like the amount of capacity in the global EV fleet is eventually going to be just galactically larger than anything we're dealing with now. So the size of the resource is mind-boggling.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Exactly. How far are we ... and I'm not even going to just say Energy Web here. I mean let's just zoom out and say there are dozens of really innovative companies looking at bringing the full power of DERs to bear. I don't think any of us are happy with where we are right now. We know that these devices are technically capable of providing these services. There are some technical challenges. Part of the work we're doing, making sure all these things can talk to each other, they're integrated with utility systems.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That honestly seems like step one. I can't believe it's ... it's a little weird that it wasn't the first thing everybody sort of went after. Like you need to know where these things are and what they're doing before anything else is possible.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>There was recently a new program announced in California called the Emergency Load Relief Program, which is a new demand response program to try and help bring some of the peak generation off of the mix in the state, when we have these congestion events. In the bottom of the order, and I hope that they address this, it said, "it is our hope that this program will coordinate with other efforts to orchestrate DER in the state."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that an official hope? Or did the governor sign off on that hope?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's very much cart before the horse. FERC 2222 that you mentioned, I mean, there was very little thought given. Most of the negotiation and process work, based on my experience and our contributions to those proceedings, is very much legal and regulatory. There's such little discussion of the technology, which I find really disappointing because, again, when you can show otherwise hesitant stakeholders and regulators what these DERs are capable of, how we can use software to trust them, it does defray some of those second or third order questions that they have about the future we're moving towards.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wait, but let's get back to "Have we been doing this in Australia long enough to learn from it?" What have we learned?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Not no ... so this is relatively fresh off the press. I mean they have been running demand response and virtual power programs for several years. Interestingly, batteries have been able to bid into the wholesale market to some of these ancillary products for some time. So things like the equivalent of frequency regulation here. And what's really interesting is that's been very successful. So much so that the value of those services in Australia are not that high.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's cratered, right. I mean, this is the thing that all the energy nerds say, is these ancillary service markets are very shallow, and it's going to take like twelve batteries basically to exhaust that market.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Right, So I think with this new construct that I described, this is very new. Some kind of a system to coordinate across the transmission and distribution interface that is all open source and uses this decentralized approach. I mean, they haven't had any technology filling this gap to date. So it's being deployed as we speak. There's an entire kind of second work stream, where some management consultancies are doing a super detailed cost-benefit analysis. But then we're pushing as hard as we can for this to go to kind of the standard way of doing business in 2023.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean, maybe I'm being naive, but it seems like something like this is just inevitable. There's no solving the problem without a shared, trusted system of tracking, right? I mean it's got to be this, it's got to be something, or else we're all just flailing in the dark.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Oh man, if only everybody saw it that way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I'm telling everybody, get on board. We've got to have this.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>At the end of the day, I'm with you. I don't even care if it's us. But this has to be there. If we're in a situation where there are hundreds of bespoke, centralized information technology setups to basically perform the same function in every energy market around the world, wow, we have missed a huge opportunity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is it fair to say then, that just, that the Energy Web is new enough that we don't have a good real world example yet to point to. We don't have any track record yet.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>We have track record because we've done this project in Australia. We've rolled out an enterprise solution in California. So there's an entire system in California, where we're using these identities now for the Flex Alert system, which is their voluntary demand response program. We have active solutions running in the market in Western Europe that's focused on helping electric vehicles directly participate in these programs. And we haven't even talked about it, but we've got a bunch of different solutions running in the wild today, actually using this same approach to facilitate creation and tracking of just RECs, so like renewable energy certificates, which is a much, much easier use case.</p><p>We have the solutions out there, and they're running. Do we have five years of historical data of them running in an enterprise environment? No. And that's because Energy Web or not, this layer of the grid simply doesn't exist today, right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. I just have such high hopes because one of the things about distributed energy is unlike big centralized thermal power plants, which are, there's a small number, they come in large units. Distributed energy, sort of by definition, is a swarm type of thing, and that's what tends to produce, I think, emergent effects that you can't always predict in advance. So I just feel like once you have a handle on where all these things are, I feel like a bunch of stuff is going to fall out of that, that no one could have predicted in advance.</p><p>Is that too utopian?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>That's the hope. I mean, who knows what kind of startups can emerge if you have all of these devices? How much easier can an aggregator's life become, if all of these devices are already out there? I mean, look at the competition we have in the Telco networks now, especially in places like Europe where it's more deregulated. I mean, you have dozens of different, effectively, retailers fighting for your mindshare and walletshare, for your cell phone use. And that's because every SIM card can be trusted, every customer can be trusted. Imagine if we had that kind of landscape for DERs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. So this is an open source protocol, meaning, I guess, that anybody, it's like Linux, I guess, anybody can just grab it and use it if they want to. So how do you make money or do you?</p><p>We try to. So our business model as an organization is very close to, if you're familiar with, Red Hat, that got bought by IBM recently.</p><p>Oh, vaguely.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Okay, so I mean, I'm not an expert in enterprise IT or software either, but effectively the way that works is open source software is great. It's sitting there, there's repositories, which are web pages online with a bunch of code. But typically, you need some people, either within these utilities or outside of them, to make that code usable and to run that software on some servers somewhere. And so what businesses like Red Hat did was all the code is open source, so that it can be reused in different places around the world, but they basically offer services around it.</p><p>So we have teams that ... we have a membership program where companies pay us, and we basically teach them how to use this software. We actually have teams sitting with these different utilities around the world, building this software and running it and deploying it. We're actually structured as an international nonprofit, which is pretty cool because we don't have any shareholders. I have a board, that is managed by folks who, themselves, sit on a mix of different nonprofits and then other active companies in the energy transition. And the only thing I have to prove is, "Jesse, are you covering your costs as an organization? And what kind of impact are you driving?</p><p>Because we're completely focused on the energy transition and climate.</p><p>And so, as you say, once this thing is in place, or if it ever gets fully in place and all the DERs are on the blockchain and available to anyone who wants to access that, I can imagine that opening up a huge competitive market. Who knows what the future nerds could do with this? I just imagine this is like as a creation of an entirely new market sector almost.</p><p>That would be amazing. That would be amazing. Look at all the innovation that happens in these other sectors, whether it's social media applications or whatever. All of those startups that have gotten just tens to hundreds of billions of this Silicon Valley money, it's because data is readily accessible, and in the energy transition, that is just not the case right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, as you say, most of your work is devoted to, the way your website puts it is "to building an operating system for electrical utilities that can accommodate all these DERs," which, of course, is huge. But you're also tracking other things, as you mentioned before. So tell us about this. I think most listeners are familiar with RECs, with renewable energy certificates. So if you're a company, you want to offset your energy use with renewable energy, you can go buy renewable energy certificates, which allegedly represent a unit of carbon-free energy. And, of course, the sort of problems around those markets are very well-documented, and a lot of them have to do with this sort of traceability and trustability and information. And just like does this REC actually trace back to a specific ton? Or is there fuzziness and double counting going on here, et cetera, et cetera.</p><p>So tell us a little bit about what you're trying to do in that market.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Using the same kind of technology approach for all the grid stuff, we also just help provide deep levels of traceability to any supply chain having to do with the energy transition. So RECs are one, right? "How can we give just more visibility and bring more by volume to certificates?" But there's many others. We're doing a bunch of work on sustainable aviation fuel. We're looking at green hydrogen and basically every other kind of hard to decarbonize sector. I mean green steel, renewable heat, the list goes on. "How can we actually use this to improve the trust in voluntary carbon markets?"</p><p>So before I talk about RECs in particular, again, from our perspective, using this technology approach, we can just bring very detailed levels of visibility into stuff that happens to do with the energy transition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So anything that needs tracking and tracing and trusting that's traded around or sent around in the energy world, you want to try to get in on that.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah. And if we zoom in just on electricity, I think what's really interesting right now is, and I know you've covered and talked about this in the past, David, there's a lot of work in electricity being focused on this 24/7 concept, but then there's also this other set of work around carbonality or emissionality, right. And what's really cool is we're actually using our technology to support both concepts, because, I don't know about you, I don't know which one is going to win out in the long term.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, again, being able to know for certain what you're accomplishing is a necessary precondition for either of those, right.</p><p>I mean, to get back to the theme, it's amazing how much has been going on without us really knowing concretely what we're talking about, right, without us having a clear view into what we're talking about. So just being able to track those attributes in a verifiable and trustable way alone, will, I think, have an effect on those markets.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Definitely. And we're also looking at more advanced ways to use this technology to frankly push the renewables sector harder. And one example that might be interesting of that is what we're trying to do with Bitcoin miners right now. So Bitcoin miners look, frankly, a lot like data center operators, if you're a utility. You've got a bunch of servers sitting somewhere, they use a bunch of electricity. Right now, you can go ahead and be a data center operator or a Bitcoin miner, you can have loads somewhere, and then you can go buy a bunch of RECs that are totally unbundled from your actual power consumption.</p><p>So I can have a data center in California, and I can buy RECs in any number of other geographies in the US. And I can then claim that I'm 100% renewable for my electricity consumption.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You just buy some cheap wind from the Midwest. And I keep hearing Bitcoin people going out and trying to brag about environmental credentials. Is that what most of them are referring to? Is that what most of them are doing now? Are they just buying RECs?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Some are buying RECs, unfortunately, some are just buying carbon offsets, so not even buying RECs. People are pretty harsh on the Bitcoin crowd for some of this stuff. And look, I get it. I'll just say from personal experience, a number of them, these are not companies that understand how to buy renewable energy buying. Let's step back for a minute. Let's go back to like 2010 when these initial power purchase agreements were coming out from Google and Microsoft. They had huge teams that were figuring out how to structure those deals and how to decarbonize. The Bitcoin miners are at the front end of that curve. And so they're trying, some of them are trying.</p><p>And so what we're trying to do with this kind of work is say, "Well, look, if you're going to buy certificates, how can we structure some sort of a certification to get you to buy them in the most impactful way possible?" So what we're doing with our technology stack is basically asking a series of questions that they have to answer, and then we verify them about, "Okay, where is your load, and how clean or not is that grid? What kinds of renewables are you buying? Are you directly investing in them? Are you buying unbundled certificates? Are you in a green tariff? And then finally, if you're buying certificates, where are you buying them from? Are you buying them from a new solar system in Kentucky, which would have a great carbon impact?" Or are you buying, as you said, "unbundled certificates from the middle of the country?"</p><p>So with that kind of an environment, where you bring more transparency into what kinds of renewables these companies are buying, it's our hope that we can sort of push a new sector of renewable energy buyers into buying more impactful renewables.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And also, well, a big part of the 24/7 push is this notion of hourly RECs, a REC just for a particular hour, so you can know exactly how much carbon was displaced in that particular hour, et cetera, et cetera. And when I was researching those, I kept wondering over and over again about the tracking and trustability of those hourly RECs. Have you gotten into that at all yet?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Big time, yes. So we have an entire 24/7 solution that we've put out there. We're working with a couple of different market participants in different geographies to do it. You know what's interesting, is, and I see the same news announcements you do about these different corporates doing these 24/7 deals — the big thing that is very not transparent is the matching. So you've got the data coming in about the load, you've got data coming in somewhere about the renewables, and then, typically, you have a nice dashboard, hosted by one of these corporates, that says, "Don't worry, it's 24/7 matched," right?</p><p>So that's what we're trying to make more transparent is to say, "let's make that visible. Let's actually open up and decentralize the matching algorithm for those different solutions." So that's what we're trying to do there is just bring dramatic transparency to these 24/7 claims that companies are making.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Interesting. Alright, well, we're coming up on time, so I just had sort of two final related questions. One is just: what's next for Energy Web? I assume you're talking with other grid operators? Or what's the next big thing on your list?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>The big, primary focus is getting as many of these kinds of rollouts, that we talked about in Australia, happening with every ISO in the US and every TSO in Western Europe and beyond. That's our primary focus, is just trying to replicate that architecture in as many markets as possible. And the really cool thing about working in open source is as we get other markets on board of this platform, we learn and advances that we make in PJM territory, who we're also working with, we bring to Australia and vice versa. So you start to create this network effect that really knows no boundaries.</p><p>So that's what's next for us is our team is just relentlessly pounding the pavement and trying to do everything we can to get senior decision makers at, frankly, all of the regulated ISOs and RTOs in the US, and then most in Europe, to come on board with this architecture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is there a US ISO that's taken some steps?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>California.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Of course. California.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Yeah, of course. Right. So we work directly in partnership with the California ISO. As I mentioned, we've rolled out our technology stack to enhance that Flex Alert program. And now the next step is, again, just trying to make the case to the load serving entities in California, the Public Utility Commission, and all of the, frankly, morass of political agents that work in California that, "hey, we can really solve some problems in the state, if we all come onto one technology stack." So that's more of a political effort, than anything right now. But I'm hopeful.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I wanted to ask about this earlier, but I'm just going to squeeze it in here at the end. One of the things ... when I think about grid architecture, and I think about the profusion of DERs, and then I think about these big wholesale markets opening up to DERs. These wholesale markets traditionally are used to dealing with dozens, let's say, of participants bidding in and bidding out in real time. And I've just been wondering, over and over again, even if you can persuade them to open up those wholesale markets to DERs, it just seems like pretty rapidly you're going to run into just computational issues, right?</p><p>Like these institutions, that were meant to track a couple of dozen participants, are going to be tracking tens of thousands, and quickly millions. And I always took that as sort of evidence that we're eventually going to have to devolve responsibility for markets down to a lower level, to the distribution level. And this is getting into a whole different topic, which we don't have to get into. But the idea is that you could have, at the distribution level, a distribution market operator that's sort of like a mini version of the ISO, that's running a local market and sort of managing the profusion of local DERs and then just reporting up to the wholesale market kind of a single number like.</p><p>This is our remainder after we've dealt with all our local market stuff. These are called DSOs. There's a lot of talk about them. But I wonder, in relation to Energy Web, do you think that by kind of solving the information problem, by getting the information problem all trusted and out in the open, do you think you're going to enable wholesale markets to be able to handle these millions and millions and millions of DERs? Or do you also think that we're eventually going to have to move to something like a DSO model?</p><p>This is super abstruse. If anybody's listened this long ... they asked for it.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>I'm a deep, deep grid architecture geek. And your pieces, David, in Vox, where you had these beautiful animated charts with the TSO at the top.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>I cannot tell you how many presentations I've used that in. So thank you very much. I think it's an incredibly important topic. Typical answer for me is: our tech can support both pathways. It really doesn't matter to us. I think you do run into some computational, not necessarily in the piping and the infrastructure part, but in the solver. You're going to run into some challenges, if you literally have hundreds of millions of DER bidding direct into the wholesale market, and we don't really work on that intelligence that is needed to perform that function. But I do think there are some potential challenges there.</p><p>And just having worked with these different market participants around the world, seeing the direction Europe going, seeing the direction Australia is going, that local market operator model, to me, intuitively, as somebody who's worked on this kind of stuff for about twelve years now, it feels like it is a better fit for the direction that the grid is evolving for a variety of reasons. But I don't pretend to have a crystal ball to say what direction it's going. From our perspective, we can solve both architectures.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, the utility sector, especially in the US is so sclerotic and kind of constipated. It's difficult to imagine such a fundamental reform these days. But I agree, that the technology and the markets are kind of pushing in that direction. Either way, having good information is good. So I asked you what the next step is. Now, by way of wrapping up, I wonder if you could just indulge, maybe, in a little utopian dreaming, a little utopian speculation about what kinds of things you think might be unlocked or possible, if the world's DERs, I guess then you're probably getting into trillions ... if the world's DERs are all on the blockchain, all have identities, all tracked. We know the capacity, and the capability, and the behavior, and the market commitments of every one of those DERs in the world. What kinds of things might we be able to do in that future utopia?</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>I worked directly with Amory Lovins for a long time, when I was at RMI, and he had this beautiful way of going zooming into the micro and then going to the macro. So maybe I'll try and answer it with that kind of framing. At the micro level, to start simple, Iwant for you, me, my parents, eventually my kids, when they have buildings that they're working in or living in and all these devices, I want companies blasting them via text, via email, knocking on their door, saying, "sign here to make a few bucks a day in order for your stuff to help decarbonize the grid."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And beyond signing, you don't have to do anything.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Exactly. It just happens, right? And you get no sacrifice. Your beers are still cold. You can take hot showers when you want. So at the micro level, I think that's really important, because if we haven't constructed that, I just don't think it's going to happen. If we zoom out to the macro level. What happens in aggregate if we can do that? I don't have the specific numbers, but I think something, like, we should be able to shave 20% to 25% off of these peak moments, so that here in California, we don't have these rolling blackouts in the most advanced economy in the world.</p><p>If we have that happening, we should be able to network together some of the biggest batteries in the world through all these different electric vehicles, in order to make optimum use of these increasingly low-carbon grids, so that we don't have to have dramatically oversized wind and solar systems all over the place.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, also, I'm not sure ordinary folks necessarily understand that there are lots and lots and lots of power plants out there that were built just to provide those peaks. That's a disproportionate amount of capacity, fossil capacity you're taking offline, when you shave those peaks.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Yes. So if we could use all of these beautifully networked together DERs in every country, you could effectively eliminate the need for these thermal power plants to provide that peaking capacity, which would go a real long way towards cleaning up the grid and, frankly, make us all more resilient. I think this gets buried sometimes, but if we are able to move to an electric system that has these local sources of flexibility, instead of having these central points of failure in the system with these large thermal plants that just happen to turn off at the moments you need them most, we're all going to be happier.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think everybody can understand intuitively, that if you're operating a system with ten units, that your ability to take things off and on is limited. But if you're working with millions or billions, that gives you such fine-grained control, right? It gives you such fine-grained, you're not working in big chunks anymore, you're working in exactly as much as we need, like real time, exactly as much as we need kind of levels. And that's just going to trim an immense amount of waste too, it seems like.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>And hopefully it won't be a utopia, at least in some places, right? I do think in the next decade, we're going to see some of this happen, certainly before 2030. And I'm watching Australia really closely. They're close to 100% renewables several days a year. They have the pressures to do it. Their energy prices are going up. There's an election about to come up, where some more liberal leaning politicians may come into power. So I'm crossing my fingers because ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>As Saul Griffith is fond of saying, "it's cheaper to buy power from your own rooftop panels than it is just to transport power from a power plant," right? Even if the power plant power were free, just the cost of getting it to your house exceeds the cost of your home solar, which is just so mind-blowing. It shows what's possible here, if we would quit messing around.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Indeed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Truly final question, and I'm not lying this time, and this is asking you to descend into wild, hand-wavy speculation, but there's a big sort of meta argument about distributed versus centralized power that's been going on a long time. The Amory Lovins soft path is more distributed, and then there's been pushback to that, saying that to really provide modern levels of convenience and to run a city with factories in it, et cetera, et cetera, requires big, centralized, concentrated power.</p><p>And I'm sure you're very familiar with this argument. It goes back forever, it's endless and generally tedious. But it does seem like once you're tracking all the DERs, and you are fully exploiting all the DERs, then you're kind of going to be able to answer that question finally. You're going to finally be able to answer the question of, "how far can distributed energy get? And how much do we still need big centralized power plants?" And again, I return to the question of car batteries. People say there's just not enough distributed energy, but that's a shitload. The distributed fleet of car batteries is a ton that is not being exploited now.</p><p>So I guess I wonder whether you have an opinion on how far we can get with distributed. and maybe, like, what the sort of final balance is going to be between distributed and central.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Well, I have a very strong opinion on it, which is that I think that regulators should be forcing utilities when they submit these IRPs, before they even do an integrated resource plan, they need to say, "what is your plan for getting your stuff together to go out there and figure out what is actually on your network?" Because they should be starting from the bottom up. They should be tasked with saying, "you need to figure out how many DERs are on your network. what are they capable of providing?"</p><p>And let's not even have the distributed versus centralized argument. Let's just start from fact, and then we can get the nerds to run the models to figure out what the perfect mix is. So I would just start there, and say we absolutely should be starting with that "start from fact", which we just don't do today. If I had a magic wand to wave it and sort of look at this centralized versus distributed split, I think it's going to be intensely regional.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Right? I think it's really impossible to make a generic statement on that, especially ... I'm just putting on my hat where I work a lot internationally, there are definitely grids in Europe where there is much lower load. They've got a solution for heating, because they're doing district heating, and it's just different. So it's very challenging, I think, to make a generic statement on that. And I think it's going to be intensely regional.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I guess, it's sort of one of my articles of faith. I think, just that distributed is going to surprise us. It's going to continually surprise us. It's unexpected. I think it's capable of surprising us in a way that giant thermal plants are not.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>I share your optimism.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Alright, well, thank you so much for coming on. This is, in addition to everything else, like the first coherent and sensible use of blockchain I've heard about. So congrats on that, and I look forward to tracking your progress.</p><p><strong>Jesse Morris</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me, David. Keep up the good work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf, so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-jesse-morris-on-building</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:54551125</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Jun 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/54551125/855958eaf1638093a036dd05de9f5ffe.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4238</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/54551125/f1de4ea74163c48e04279569a6e2dcda.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Doug Thompson defends the deep state]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Doug Thompson, associate professor of political science at the University of South Carolina, sings the praises of bureaucracy and its essential role in the fight against climate change.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAC_Kb8INNBsANERnQFym9q1a/volts22.05.13%28doug.thompson%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-doug-thompson-defends-the-deep-state"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It’s well-understood that the modern US conservative movement is a mix of two primary forces, fiscal and social conservatism. (See: <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fusionism">fusionism</a>.) Put more crudely: it’s the oligarchs and the evangelical white nationalists. </p><p>The left’s pushback to social conservatism — anti-racism and civil rights more broadly — is well-developed and richly articulated. But what about the oligarchs and their stated mission to, in Steve Bannon’s words, “deconstruct the administrative state”? Where is the left’s defense of the administrative state, or as it’s less fondly known, the bureaucracy, or even less fondly, the “deep state”? Who will speak up for the deep state?</p><p>The left has an ambivalent relationship with bureaucracy (which, after all, only overlapped with democracy for the last century or so) and has largely failed to articulate a coherent defense, even as Biden’s administration scrambles to rebuild the agencies Trump decimated. </p><p>The right has told a clear, consistent story: government bureaucracies are corrupt, inefficient, incompetent, and expensive. It has been repeated to the point that it is folk wisdom. To this day, the left does not have a similarly clear and consistent counter-story about the merits of bureaucracy, or, to use a less loaded term, <em>administrative capacity</em>.</p><p>State administrative capacity may not be well-theorized on the left, but it is nonetheless a necessary condition of virtually all progressives’ solutions to contemporary problems, climate change chief among them. The wealthy can not be taxed, corporations can not be forced to follow the rules, and wealth can not be transferred to those in need without a robust, competent administrative state. </p><p>My guest today, <a target="_blank" href="https://sc.edu/study/colleges_schools/artsandsciences/political_science/our_people/directory/thompson_douglas.php">Doug Thompson</a>, an associate professor of political science at the University of South Carolina, has been thinking and writing about bureaucracy lately, as part of a larger book project on authoritarianism in America. He wondered why aspiring autocrats invariably degrade administrative capacity the second they are able — what they know about it that small-d democrats don’t seem to — which led him to an investigation of bureacracy that traced through Tocqueville and du Bois.</p><p>Anyway, I’m excited to geek out with Thompson about the intense oligarchic hatred of the administrative state, America’s rich and somewhat surprising history with bureaucracy, and the kinds of positive arguments that can be made on behalf of administrative capacity as such.</p><p>Without further ado, Doug Thompson, welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson: </strong> </p><p>Thank you very much for having me. It's a pleasure to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>We're going to talk about bureaucracy, which many people mistakenly think is a boring subject; we're going to set them straight. One of the points you make in your writing is that bureaucracy and democracy have somewhat separate histories and only really intertwined recently. As a consequence, our ways of thinking and talking about democracy were shaped in a pre-bureaucratic age and we don't have a robust language to defend democratic bureaucracy as such. Tell us a little bit about that history and how it’s shaped political science and political views.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson: </strong> </p><p>Sure. Bureaucracy has been around for thousands of years. The first unified Chinese Empire was founded and established by putting together all of these little statelets that had been at war with each other for a few hundred years. All of these states, over the course of their development, had acquired pretty significant administrative capacity. They had a dedicated, somewhat professionalized bureaucracy that was able to levy taxes and measure the population and measure land and take all that information down to help the first Chinese emperors rule. This set China on this path that it continues to be on to this day, of the rise and fall of dynasties but the constant reconstruction of those dynasties on the basis of a pretty significantly powerful and centralized bureaucratic state. </p><p>Of course, those are autocratic societies. On the other hand, democratic societies typically developed not only <em>in</em> the absence of bureaucracy, but in many cases <em>because</em> of the absence of bureaucracy. If you're a ruler and you want to demand your people pay some taxes, you can't just yell it from the treetops and expect them to pay up. If you don't have a dedicated administrative system to collect that kind of revenue – the kind of policy that nobody likes; no one wants to pay taxes – then you have to go to other elites in your society, or perhaps even a broad swath of the population if it's a relatively democratic place, and you have to consult with them and convince them to pay up and why it's in their interests. </p><p>We see the development of early democratic institutions that way, because of the absence of bureaucracy. You have these two separate trajectories. It's really not until very recently, 19th but certainly in the 20th centuries, when you have large-scale democracies, like the United States, where a huge swath of the population that's able to vote is tied to pretty significant bureaucratic institutions for the first time.</p><p>The founding of the US is a great example of demand for democracy because of the absence of bureaucracy. In the 1600s, if the folks running those English colonies on that stolen land (let's call it what it is) want to build a schoolhouse or a road, or irrigate their fields, or whatever it is they want to do, there's no administrative system there that can carry out those policies. They have to come together, consult with each other, debate with each other, then all vote together what to do. You can picture in early America how the absence of bureaucracy made democracy necessary.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>As you say, in the political science literature and also in folk wisdom, a lot of times bureaucracy is framed as counter to the spirit of democracy. That's probably a consequence also of bureaucracy coming late to the game.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>I think that's right. There's also another issue that comes up. The earliest development of modern democracies in the 19th and 20th century are larger-scale, more inclusive democracies where people vote for representatives, rather than small councils of elites debating amongst themselves, like in Athens. This time where bureaucracies begin to develop in these democratic societies happens to also coincide with probably the greatest humanitarian crimes in human history.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>Very notably bureaucratized crimes.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>Yes. Bureaucracy gets a bad name in many ways because of that. We think of the Nazi regime and its horribly bureaucratized system of mass murder, personified in Adolf Eichmann in Hannah Arendt’s book. We also think of the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union, which also kills millions and is known to have a centralized bureaucratic state. In the American case, Robert McNamara’s Pentagon during the Vietnam War was also a heavily bureaucratized system with all kinds of weird benchmarks, body counts and horrible stuff that also rationalized murder; Americans killed 2 million Vietnamese people. There are reasons why bureaucracy got a bad name as it was being attached to democracies, because it was put to, frankly, anti-democratic uses as well during that period.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Clearly bureaucracy is a tool that can be used for good or bad, but it's no coincidence that aspiring authoritarians always go after bureaucracy. You sent me a paper a while back on the “authoritarian dilemma”: that any democracy is born out of something else, and the ruling class in whatever else that was is not going to like transferring to democracy; and is still going to be there in the democracy, probably willfully trying to destroy it; yet the democracy, being a democracy, has to extend equal rights to those people. </p><p>I've been thinking about that recently, for obvious reasons. We have our own aristocracy that never accepted the onset of real democracy. Say a little bit about why we see this regularity throughout modern history, that autocrats always want to degrade the state.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson: </strong> </p><p>We can see this in a number of periods of American history and American political development. A great example is the antebellum South. The slave states of the South are not democracies by any stretch of the imagination; the internal politics of the states, especially in the Deep South, are dominated by massively wealthy landowning families that have huge estates, enslave hundreds of people, and make tremendous amounts of money, through the value of humans (since humans are given a financial value during this period), their land, and selling cotton like gangbusters on international markets. </p><p>They're in charge of everything in those states. When you need to build a road there, if you want to take care of any kind of policy, usually it's done through highly personalized influence networks and clientelistic networks, and those at the top are at the top of those networks. So the imposition of authority from outside – like the federal government coming in and handing over the administration of roads, of schools, of tax collection, of land use and land distribution, and the monitoring and defense of people's rights – is going to look like a huge imposition and a giant loss of power that these elites enjoyed in the prior, pre-democratic era. It's not just a loss of their money and their prestige; it's a loss of their identity, too. These guys are the lords of this area. They stand to lose everything by federalization and bureaucratization, so they're going to push back against it. </p><p>You do get some bureaucratization. During the Reconstruction period you have the Freedmen's Bureau, which is dedicated to implementing the policies put in place after the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments are passed. There are all kinds of problems with the Freedmen's Bureau – it's understaffed and underfunded, but it is a federal bureaucratic system that is enforced by military force; the Army is still occupying the South in the decade or so after the war. And there's a violent insurrection against that system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>If you're on top of one of those local power structures – you're the son of the guy who owns all the car dealerships or whatever – even if it's only subconscious, you know that to the extent the playing field is made more level, you're not going to come out on top where you were. Insofar as there is a hint of meritocracy introduced, you're in trouble; you know that your reign is not justified or warranted by talent. That's why they've all put so much energy into the mythologies that justify their rule, because they're insecure about it on some level. They know.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson: </strong> </p><p>This is not really a bureaucratic question, although it can be in many cases, but think of the inclusion of women in elite parts of the workforce and the labor markets, and the incredible pushback on that. If 50 percent of the population that had been relatively forcibly excluded from the best jobs – the neurosurgeon, the high-end lawyer – now is competition, the idiot third son of your local car dealership owner who was going to get into law school now might not, because now he’s got to put up with all this competition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>All the aristocracies are terrified on some level that if the people they treat like s**t gain some power, they’ll treat them like s**t. It's clear that the autocrats know that centralized bureaucracy works against them. </p><p>Let's flip over and make the positive case for bureaucracy. If you ask 10 random lefties on the street “how do you feel about bureaucracy?” I’m not sure that they would feel positively at all, much less be able to articulate why bureaucracies are good. </p><p>Let's tick through some of the reasons. One of the most interesting, and something you argue in your writing that political science has overlooked, is that centralized bureaucracies often do not only reflect the desires of voters, they also affect the way voters see things and the way voters view politics, and in some sense can create constituencies for further change. You wrote about how the Freedmen's Bureau worked that way. Say a little bit about that.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson: </strong> </p><p>There's an excellent literature on this in political science. It goes by the name of “policy feedback” – how policies, when they’re implemented, affect the process. </p><p>There are a few ways that people could frame positive effects of bureaucracy; the one you mentioned is probably the most complicated, so I may get to that one last. It’ll tie your brain in knots if you think about it closely, but we'll get to it.</p><p>One of the things that we can say about bureaucracy that is intuitively appealing is that it gives democratic citizens a freedom and power that they wouldn't have otherwise had. When majorities of citizens vote for representatives because those representatives promise to put in place certain policies, if there's no administrative capacity to actually carry out those policies, then it doesn't matter if you vote for them or not, because they'll never happen. </p><p>If Congress puts in a law that says “I command companies not to dump toxins into the air or the water,” it's like shouting for taxes from the treetops in the year 1200. Nobody's going to comply with this. You need to have a dedicated staff with a budget and a bunch of experts who can monitor the air and water quality on a day-to-day basis and make sure that the compliance is going on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>I talked with an expert in Chinese environmentalism recently, and one of the things he said was that the central bureaucracy in China has some ambitions about clean air and clean water and climate change, but frequently it is shouting those commands down to local parochial rulers who have other counter-incentives about making money or fast economic growth and who can just ignore it. The Chinese central party views the EPA and the system of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act with envy, precisely because it enables us to do these things that we want to do, which are not trivial.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>The Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act are policies with huge majority support. In an abstract way, if you say “the EPA is shutting down small businesses and we all hate environmentalists telling you what to do,” you can tell a story that will get people to hate the EPA. But when you ask people “do you want your kids to have horrible asthma or get terrible cancers because of poisons in the air?” everybody says no to that question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>The problem is the next step you want them to take, which is that the only way to do that is our big, professionalized bureaucracy. We've built a giant, complicated, very professional, very well-functioning machine that enables you to have those preferences. If we didn't have the machine, you could, as my granddad used to say, have the preferences in one hand and pee in the other and see which one fills up first. Preferences without capacity are futile.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>Absolutely. That's one of the intuitive stories that we can tell and broadcast publicly. Even Republicans will say they want to have clean air. Republican voters often agree with Democratic voters about specific policies; depends on how you word it, of course. You're free to express your desires in your vote and have it turn into a reality because of that administrative capacity. </p><p>We can also make a case for individual bodily freedom that Americans find very appealing. Are you really free to move around where you live? In your metropolitan area, are you really free to commute if you have terrible roads and minimal transportation options? If the transportation infrastructure in your area is awful, your freedom to move around and your choices are reduced. </p><p>I used to live in Chicago, and when I would go to work I had two bus routes, two different train routes, and I could drive or bike or walk if I wanted to. I had multiple options for going to work because there's a (crumbling sometimes but decent) public transportation system. I live in South Carolina now and there's very little transportation infrastructure in the South. My individual choices are greatly reduced. I have to drive my car, I have no choice.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Most Americans have no idea how much their freedom is restricted by car dependence under the illusion of freedom. The whole thing is sold under the banner of freedom, but nothing more restricts our abilities and capacities and choices than car dependence.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>It’s a forced choice too. It's a piece of administrative capacity that's lacking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>We're getting at the distinction between negative and positive freedoms. Negative freedom being, people leave you alone, but positive freedoms being, what is your array of choices? Bureaucracy and good public administration and administrative capacity enlarges the choice landscape, so increases positive freedoms.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>One hundred percent. Both on an individual level, in terms of stuff you can do in your area, but also in a larger collective democratic sense. We the people have more choices about what we can ask for and demand from our governments because they're able to deliver those things that we want, such as clean air, clean water, and good infrastructure. </p><p>But the one that you asked about initially is the tricky one, and has to do with that policy feedback literature in political science that I was talking about. The way that administrative programs are designed can often have profound mobilizing effects on voting constituencies, and really creative effects in producing new voting constituencies through which we the people can express ourselves. But if designed poorly or maliciously, which often is the case, they can also be profoundly demobilizing. </p><p>For example, Social Security was intentionally designed to be very mobilizing. If you're working, you pay into Social Security while you're working, so you're highly conscious of the fact that you are participating in Social Security throughout all of your working life. If politicians come in and say “let's privatize Social Security and expose you to the vagaries of the market,” or “let's try to get rid of it altogether,” as a lot of donors to the Republican Party at present would like to do, you have this already mobilizable constituency that’s ready to say “wait a minute, we actually have an implicit right in this society not to die of old age in poverty and penury and starvation, so I'm going to defend that right.” </p><p>The way it's designed makes it obvious to you that you're a recipient and a participant in this your whole life, even if you're not near retirement yet. Even if you're 35 but you've been paying into it for a while, you know you’re paying into it, and you're going to defend it. We saw that in action after the 2004 election, the only election since 1988 in which a Republican candidate managed to win the popular vote majority.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>If there's one thing the US has successfully done, it is mobilize old people as a political constituency. </p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>We mobilized old people in a number of different ways. Medicare is another example of that. People are very well aware that they’re recipients of that program, and huge supermajorities of Americans like those programs. When polled, majorities of Republicans say that they like Medicare; poll Democrats, it's a massive majority.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>You see that finding notoriously over and over again: Americans will tell you they hate bureaucracy and hate government, but almost every individual result of bureaucracy and government, they love. Part of making a case for bureaucracy has to be not always getting sucked up into abstractions and talking more about concrete things.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>Although we can get too bogged down in thinking about the individual programs and thinking “well, we're policy wonks, so therefore let me talk about this or that program,” one of the things we've failed to do is to come up with a coherent, concise, unifying narrative about why all of these administrative departments and programs are more than the sum of their parts, but actually are an inherent part of a modern democracy and making a free people and the kind of life that we as modern people want to live. Those institutions are essential to that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Getting back to this example of creating constituencies and feedback loops, one of the few clean energy policies that have actually been successful and resilient is the federal tax credits. There's this whole machinery now of federal tax credits around renewable energy, and probably that policy has done more than anything else to make those constituencies conscious of themselves as constituencies and politically mobilized.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>You're absolutely right. Even tax breaks can be profoundly mobilizing. For example, mortgage tax breaks (which can fuel inequality because of course renters don't get that, which doesn't make sense).</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>That's another thing the US has done really well – mobilize homeowners against future homes.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>These mobilizing effects can be very negative if they're focused on entrenching people who are already benefiting from the system and shutting out other people – as you say, with blocking out new homebuilding. But in the case of clean energy, whether it's a tax incentive for solar panels, or buying a new battery, or a new electric car, that also can be mobilizing, in good ways. </p><p>We could also say something about public transportation. If you suddenly told New Yorkers that you're going to take away the subway system and we're all driving cars now, people would explode. You couldn't do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Another thing that you note in favor of administrative capacity is that it's the first and only way we’ve figured out how to sustain a broad middle class in a democracy, which is also a relatively new thing in the world.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>It really is. When the US was founded, by random chance, it was a relatively equal society – amongst free, white, landowning men, which is not a universal group by any stretch of the imagination. But if you look at the economic data from the time, the US was a more equal society economically than England or other countries in Western Europe or elsewhere at the time. </p><p>Then inequality rose over the course of the 19th century. There was this sweet spot period of relative income equality and a relatively much more equal society (not perfect equality by any means) in the few decades after World War II. There was enough of an equal distribution of wealth to build a large middle class for the first time in American history; one of the first times in world history, really, that you have this large, modern, urban, middle class. </p><p>Part of that was undergirded by a huge array of administrative programs that intentionally were produced to build a middle class. Billions of dollars of public money were put into middle class suburban housing development. A lot of that was administered on a racially exclusive basis; a lot of those policies were explicitly only for white homeowners at the federal, state, and local levels. But those policies did build a larger middle class than had lived there before. </p><p>You can see this also with Social Security and the administration of collective bargaining rights, which was tremendously important for building a large middle class.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>if you want to redistribute wealth (which is a demonized phrase these days but clearly is what we and every other democracy are doing), if you want to keep income inequality from getting out of control and you want to systematically lift up the working classes, you need a big machine to redistribute all that money. It's a job fraught with the temptation for corruption and inside dealing; the only way you get around that is to create an administrative culture that has its own values and practices and has integrity aside from the interests of the people it's dealing with. You need an administrative culture of quality and competence, especially in that area.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>This is one of the reasons why the IRS has been intentionally attacked and defunded and understaffed over the last several decades. The US has become a much more unequal society over the last four decades as the gains of economic growth have gone to the people at the very top; the very wealthy have gotten much wealthier, we all know the story. Incomes have stagnated for 90 percent of Americans, while health care costs, secondary education costs, and housing costs have gone up and up and up. </p><p>The middle class has shrunk, and taxing wealthy people who can pay for it to fund infrastructure and education that will help ordinary people get ahead – without destroying wealthy people; no one's talking about revolution, at least in mainstream politics – is a pretty popular program. If you ask people “should very wealthy people pay a little bit more in taxes since they've been benefiting way more than everybody else over the last 40 years?” people say yes to that at large majority rates.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>This is what I was getting at before. You can get people to say yes to that, but how do you get them to take the next step – to not just love taxing rich people, but to love the IRS without which you could not do it? The IRS has a terrible reputation.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>And by design. The very intentional counter-strategy to that has been to pour billions of dollars of lobbying money into Congress, to have Congress, when writing tax law, write in all kinds of exceptions and complications. The US tax code is tens of thousands of pages long, when other countries’ tax codes are often shorter.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>And we force normal people to fill out their own tax returns. I don't know if most Americans are aware of this, but in other civilized countries, the government will generally just fill out your forms for you and send them to you to sign. We don't do that, because TurboTax has a lock on Congress. </p><p>If you need large bureaucracies to do things and you erode away your administrative capacity, what comes to fill that is corporate capacity, which is not better and not necessarily more efficient, despite all the market myths. I feel like neoliberalism should have taught us that it's not automatically better to have private actors fill that space.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson: </strong> </p><p>This is often the contemporary equivalent of old, feudal, personal influence networks. Private owners will take care of all these services for you in ways that obviously are going to benefit them primarily, and they’re going to feed the wealth that they accrue from capturing these services back into the political process to bend the rules more in their favor. </p><p>The complicated tax law is a great example of that. The IRS can easily get ahold of all of <em>my</em> records; all of my income comes from working. But it's easy to hide money if you have enough money to pay for the kinds of financial services that know how to do that. And the huge, very powerful financial services firms that cater to the wealthiest clients have way more legal firepower than the IRS has, by design, because those firms lobby Congress to defund and diminish the personnel in the IRS. That then feeds back onto the public where people say, “I hate the IRS, it's such a pain to fill out those forms and then I get audited. I'm just a small business owner, why am I being audited?” When, as we've seen, very wealthy Americans are paying close to nothing in taxes these days.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>They somehow rallied to defang and degrade the IRS, and (to get back to the larger theme of the conversation) there isn't language laying around with which to defend a big bureaucracy. We don't have that vocabulary or conceptual structure, despite the fact that the US has this mythology of individualism – yeoman farmers and independence and all this. But the US has actually been a pioneer in bureaucracy at several points, and not just in the modern era. Tell us about that.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>One of the issues we have in talking about bureaucracy is that so much of our language for talking about politics comes from early modern and ancient Europe, where strong centralized bureaucratic states were notably absent. A lot of our language is based around ideas that are in many cases wonderful and worth defending, but don't tell us much about bureaucratic institutions. </p><p>This was an issue in the 19th century as the first centralized bureaucratic institutions were developing. One of the earliest examples would be the Post Office Department, which had thousands of employees and a centralized administrator overseeing it that actually was a cabinet position by the 1820s. It covered thousands of miles of roads and was the principal source of information dispersal that was able to create a new, national, modern democracy in the United States.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Getting back to our point about the feedbacks, the ability to send information to and fro anywhere in this territory in a large way made it into a country and created Americans as a constituency.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>Exactly. As de Tocqueville puts it in <em>Democracy in America</em>, although I don't know exactly what words he used, it took this abstract idea of a national community and lodged it in people's habits; no longer just concepts, but actual habits. You felt like a member not just of Virginia or Massachusetts or whatever but of this “we the people” that was just words on paper a couple decades ago. The building of a national culture was produced through the rise of administrative capacity in the US.</p><p>Nineteenth century Americans often didn't recognize this. They thought of the US government only in terms of the separation of the three powers and Bill of Rights and that sort of thing. Throughout the 19th century, Americans did not describe those kinds of institutions as administrative or bureaucratic institutions. They didn't have a concept for it, because it wasn't yet part of the national culture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>In the 20th century, weirdly under Nixon, there's a flourishing of administrative capacity in ways that are notably successful. It's not part of our folklore about American successes, but the flourishing of administrative capacity in those years has redounded to our benefit in so many ways.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>Absolutely. The Clean Air Act is an example of an innovative program where the US is a first adopter. You can say something similar about New Deal programs from the 30s and 40s, some of which have lasted to the present, such as Social Security. And think of the huge gains made by middle class people in the United States due to collective bargaining rights that were monitored and implemented through the National Labor Relations Board and other agencies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>There's a well-known phenomenon in the environmental sphere called green drift. Once the Reagan Revolution happened, it became practically impossible to pass substantial new environmental legislation, but the administrative capacity set up by those pivotal 60s and 70s laws (the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, etc.) was designed to evolve, and it just kept evolving and moving forward and taking care of new threats and expanding its remit. It was built to evolve, and that's the main reason the oligarchs hate it, because it works so well.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>They have funneled billions of dollars into think tanks to develop theories as to why the mission creep of those bureaucratic institutions is fundamentally against American principles, and that it amounts to (and they’ve been saying this since the 30s) a form of socialism, in some cases even communism, and is a road to destruction, a road to serfdom.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I feel like there are two contrasting instincts or impulses that ordinary people, including me, have about bureaucracy. One is the traditional conservative instinct, which is that the farther away from the local level you move administration and the more you centralize it, the more you create bureaucracies that are distant from the people they're supposed to serve, and they become inefficient and issue burdensome rules because they're not in touch enough with the people on the ground. This whole idea that centralizing moves away from democracy is a very common small-c conservative story, and it’s sunk in even to ordinary people.</p><p>But then there's the counter-intuition, which I have very strongly these days, which is that the closer the locus of political administration gets to the local level, the more likely it is to recreate and be taken over by those local power hierarchies and used to their benefit. I think of the example of California NIMBYs. They have this theoretically extremely democratic process of housing in California, but what that mainly amounts to is that locals control everything, and they use it to cement their power and their money, which derives from housing scarcity. So in that case it's very intuitive – to be more fair and to pursue more public benefits, you need to be moving the administration up, away from the local level. </p><p>Everybody has versions of these two instincts. Is there something we can say about what marks a good and legitimate bureaucracy from the many, many bad ones we have examples of? Are there rules or guidelines about what's the best bureaucracy and what's the right level of administrative control?</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>That's a great question. The answer is always incredibly complicated, unfortunately. There are some things we can say clearly, though. We have seen in American history how dangerous it is to leave the administration of policies that touch upon people's fundamental rights as people and also as citizens – for example, voting rights – up to the local level.</p><p>Maybe there are different policies that are more appropriate for administration at a local or state or regional level, but for policies that touch upon fundamental rights, it's not enough to leave them up to the states because it's too dangerous that those laws will be captured by local elites and that people's rights will be taken away from them. We’re seeing this as a real possibility in the current moment with reproductive rights. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>It seems we disagree about what's a basic right. We're having that argument under cover of this weird procedural argument about which level of government we're going to do it at. It’s a little silly.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>This is an aside, but I think a lot of the elites and ordinary citizens who say they want to get rid of those rights have not thought through the horribly authoritarian consequences that are to follow as soon as Roe goes down. Speaking of administrative capacity, how do you police that rule if all of a sudden abortion is murder in one state but it's not murder in the state right next door? How are you going to police that without intense surveillance, discipline, and horrible threats?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Conservatives love law enforcement administrative capacity. They love the need for that. Look at the knee-jerk response to 9/11 and the years following; a lot of that was just a bureaucratization of paranoia and permanent war footing. You need a coherent critique of bureaucracy in those cases that also makes room for good bureaucracy. </p><p>So as you say, the more fundamental the rights involved, it seems the less should be left in local hands. You also mention public feedback, some way for the administrative process to not be the opposite of democracy but to involve democratic participation.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>Yes. A way we can measure or think about whether something is a good, democratic, public power-enhancing, public freedom-enhancing administrative system is whether it mobilizes or demobilizes people. </p><p>Take Medicaid, which is administered by states. Because it deals with poorer people, states will often fragment the implementation within the state and intentionally put up several administrative burdens, like all kinds of paperwork about whether you're working, how much you're working, how many hours a week you're looking for work. This makes it very difficult for people to access those programs, but it also is profoundly demobilizing, because you've fragmented groups of citizens; you've branded them as less than the rest of the population, which is a horrible thing to do; and you've given them all of this administrative work that they have to do so they don't have time for anything else. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I think some earnest, center-left, moderate Dems don't get this. They hear about means testing, and they're just thinking about it in the abstract quantitative, like how it affects the top line budget numbers. But the conservatives pushing stuff like that instinctively get that the real effect of means testing is demobilization, and that the demobilizing effect matters even more than a budget effect.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>Very clearly. They learned this from their successful anti-labor politics from the 80s onward, going after and successfully gutting private sector labor unions that were a major source of mobilization for the Democratic Party. (There's no reason why Republicans couldn't also appeal to those unions; they obviously just didn't want to.) That mobilization was terrifying for anti-labor Republicans and huge business owners who don't want to pay higher wages and certainly don't want to pay for any social programs through taxation. That was an intentional strategy to shut down unions, not just because they don't want the union to bother them about higher wages, but also because they saw that political mobilization power that unions give to ordinary workers. This is also why, more recently, they've gone after public sector unions, such as in the case of Wisconsin under Scott Walker.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Not to get all socialist on you, but the last thing capital wants is for workers to be mobilized and to think of themselves as a constituency. Legendarily, this is what racism has always in part been about in the US: preventing the formation of a cross-racial, self-identified constituency of workers.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>And it’s one of the most successful strategies. Again, when polled with “do you want to have clean water and clean air?” people say “absolutely.” If you poll most Americans and ask “would you like to have government introduce a better public health care system that will reduce your costs and provide better outcomes to more people?” – which we know is possible, because other countries do it – most people will say “actually, yes, I would like that kind of administrative system to be established and strengthened and well-funded so that I get better medical services.” Because the private health care system in the United States is a total catastrophe. It's awful. People hate it and are aware of the fact that they hate it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>This is why the “get your government hands off my Medicare” sign is so telling. It speaks to this split brain. The effect of the bureaucracy, the results of the administrative capacity, are valued. Yet somehow, at the same time, in the same mind, the origin of that administrative capacity is bad. The capacity itself is bad, even though the results are good.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>The Republican Party and the massive wealthy donor organizations that basically have taken over the party at this point have been effective at repeating over and over again a very simple narrative that those institutions amount to socialism and tyranny. Especially, they have been very effective, through dog whistles and sometimes through overt appeals, to paint administrative institutions, especially social insurance and other forms of regulation, as racial transfers from hard-working white Americans to “those people” who don't want to work – which is of course nonsense, but has been very effective. </p><p>You can get people to vote against people who are promising the stuff that they actually want if you can activate that feeling of identity threat – “they try to take stuff from people like me.” In fact, most of those voters would benefit and, when asked separately from that messaging, <em>know</em> that they would benefit. </p><p>The question is, what is the elite counter-messaging that can activate those voters otherwise? I don't know. That's a tough question. And some of them may be gone for a while.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I've been thinking about the love affair that American lefties have with the Scandinavian government, but missing from that is specifically an appreciation of their very competent, professionalized administrative capacity. They are good at government, and that is what enables the whole thing to happen. </p><p>In the 2016 Democratic primary, you have a variety of messages on offer. You have traditional, moderate, Dem wishy-washiness. You have Sanders on the left, offering all the socialist goodies. Then you have Warren, and a big part of her message and public record is about administrative capacity. She gets that it's incredibly important what agencies you have, who is staffing the agencies, what the rules are; she gets that it's the mechanics and architecture behind the scenes that are really shaping results. And she tries to build a campaign at least in part around “I've got a plan for that, I'm going to make the administrative state better. I've got plans to fix the bureaucracies and make them more high-functioning.”</p><p>To me, that's singing my heart song. But the moderate Dems, the self-identified pragmatists – they don't seem to care about it. They just care about their same old boring, watered-down, austerity stuff. The lefties, the Sanderites, don’t seem to care about it either. So Warren doesn’t take off. </p><p>There's obviously a lot going on in and around all that, but one of the lessons to me is that it is super difficult to mobilize people in a democratic polity around good bureaucracy, even though good bureaucracy is the very fundament of everything they want and care about. Is that just the way of things and we're stuck with it? Or do you see any prospect of making a defense of administrative capacity a real significant plank in anyone's politics? </p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>It's time for Democrats and others who want to defend democracy against its very dangerous assault at the moment to lean in to the actual benefits that we receive – and I don't mean financial benefits from particular programs, but the stability, the capacity for wealth generation if you want to look at it in those terms, the capacity to make choices in your life, to vote for stuff that you want to vote for, to have clean air that your kids can enjoy, and a future that is bright for all of us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I'm sure you've read Michael Lewis’ <em>The Fifth Risk</em>; that's a great book that's exactly about this. There's administration stuff going on all around you all the time, keeping you safe, that you don't even know about.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>People take a pay cut to do those jobs; you can make more money in industry and they choose not to because they love that stuff. </p><p>It's time for us to lean into that narrative. One of the pitfalls we can fall into (and I'm not saying necessarily that Warren did) is to focus only on the fragmented array of various administrative programs and why they're individually good. We can’t only say “I have a plan for that and for that and for that” but not stitch that together into a coherent narrative about your freedom to vote, your freedom to have the policies that you want, your freedom to have a possibility of a middle class life and an affordable house to live in, and roads that work, and schools that you really want, and a stable climate, and a rational program for when areas are going to degrowth because the Colorado River isn't flowing anymore. Do you want your children and grandchildren to be free to have those things? Or do you want to have those things taken away from you because Steve Bannon and massively wealthy billionaires are working 24 hours a day with laser focus to destroy those administrative systems on which your freedom depends?</p><p>You can have a more rousing language for this and not get bogged down in the details. Of course you're going to have policy stuff on your website that's going to talk about those details of how you're going to fund it, how you're going to implement it, and why this design is mobilizing to constituencies and why this one is bad. Absolutely, get in the weeds. But there is a passionate story to be told about bureaucracy and democracy in America, and I hope that people might be ready to hear it. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I’m trying to envision how that might play out in coming elections.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:</strong></p><p>Who knows? I might be overly optimistic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Maybe in 10 years when the war's over and Reconstruction has begun. </p><p>Well, this is fascinating. I was excited to find someone trying to rehab bureaucracy in the eyes of political science. Thanks so much for coming on.</p><p><strong>Doug Thompson:  </strong></p><p>Thank you very much for having me. I enjoyed it.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-doug-thompson-defends</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:54246181</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Jun 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/54246181/0ed7763621f2da49b044941ccbc76167.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/54246181/553a15f8e564a8aa8b532bb43c3ac1ef.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Andy Frank on how to sell whole-home retrofits to skeptical consumers]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Andy Frank, president and co-founder of Sealed, discusses his company’s pay-for-performance model for home electrification.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAC7QLTAnXaIV8agS9oGnk2ka/volts22.05.09%28andy.frank%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-andy-frank-on-how-to-sell-whole-home-retrofits-to-skeptical-consumers"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of the greatest riddles of the decarbonization effort is the residential sector, responsible for about 20 percent of US energy-related carbon emissions. There are about <a target="_blank" href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/240267/number-of-housing-units-in-the-united-states/">142 million housing units</a> in the US, around <a target="_blank" href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/187576/housing-units-occupied-by-owner-in-the-us-since-1975/">83 million</a> of which are “owner-occupied.” Substantially changing them involves dealing with 83 million separate owners, each with their own circumstances and preferences.</p><p>Residential decarbonization seems incredibly difficult to scale up, and attempts to date have not been particularly successful. At the rate we are going, it will take hundreds of years to decarbonize America’s housing stock. </p><p>The crew at New York-based climate tech company <a target="_blank" href="https://sealed.com">Sealed</a> is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/energy-efficiency/from-home-improvement-to-securitization-the-virtuous-cycle-to-supercharge-residential-energy-efficiency">trying something new</a>, imported from the commercial efficiency market. Rather than trying to persuade homeowners to buy and install things with their own scarce resources, Sealed covers all the upfront costs and coordinates the work with trusted contractors. Homeowners pay the retrofit back out of energy savings, which means Sealed <em>only</em> gets paid if there are, in fact, measurable energy savings. </p><p>This kind of pay-for-performance arrangement is called an energy services agreement (ESA). Listeners of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-rob-harmon-on-how-to">my pod with Rob Harmon</a> will recognize the concept: customers are paying for <em>metered energy efficiency</em>, in the same way they would pay for energy. </p><p>Sealed started small but is growing quickly, so I’m excited to talk to its president and co-founder Andy Frank about the frustrations and failures of residential energy efficiency to date, what he’s learned about homeowner preferences, and what kind of benefits come along with having a fully electrified home. </p><p>Without further ado, Andy Frank of Sealed, welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Andy Frank: </strong> </p><p>Thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Where do residential emissions and energy use sit in the larger picture? How big of a piece of the climate puzzle are they?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>They’re a pretty big piece of the puzzle. Home energy use represents about 20 percent of US carbon emissions. It's a big enough piece where we're really not going to be able to meet our climate goals without nailing residential efficiency and electrification. It is a large opportunity, but also one that has historically been very frustrating to make progress on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>The arguments for home energy efficiency stand regardless of climate change; it makes sense to save money and use less energy to do so. We've talked for decades about weatherization and nation-wide retrofits, etc., but nothing ever seems to get off the ground. Why has this been such a tough nut to crack and why have previous efforts not cracked it?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>There have been many more ambitious goals than there have been success stories. There's essentially been what I'd call 50 years of failure. The first efforts to really promote energy efficiency – they mostly called it conservation back then – were around 1973, with the first oil embargo, the first big energy crisis. Fast forward to today, we're still not in a great place. At the current pace of retrofits, it's going to take us more than 500 years to retrofit every single home. We don't have 50 years, much less 500, so we definitely need to do something.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>What have we been trying and why hasn't it been working? </p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>We've tried a lot of things; not a lot of them have worked. A lot of people associate the early days of energy efficiency with Jimmy Carter asking Americans to wear a sweater. But actually, President Nixon, a Republican, was the first one to push for conservation in the early 70s – to turn down thermostats and take shorter showers and change your behavior. </p><p>Obviously, we're American, we don't like conservation, we don't like having to sacrifice. So the next wave, which was through the late 70s and 80s, was led by legends of this field: Amory Lovins, who was a big inspiration to me, and Art Rosenfeld, and folks saying hey, this isn't about sacrificing; this is about producing more with less, a better quality of life. The old line “people don't want kilowatt hours, they want cold beer and hot showers” – that was the next wave, and that, of course, makes sense and has always made sense. </p><p>One of the original sins of the energy efficiency industry, at least in my mind, is it was created by government for government, and through the utilities and local contractors. What that meant was you were essentially pushing largely home energy audits, very technocratic solutions, on the populace. </p><p>I loved <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-elizabeth-popp-berman#details">your pod recently</a> talking about the economic style of thinking; that was very en vogue with energy efficiency. The idea was, if only we could educate people and give them exactly the right amount of information about what they're doing with home energy use and how much energy they can save, of course they would spend thousands of dollars to make their home efficient.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>They are rational interest maximizers, so why wouldn't they?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>Exactly. The value prop of residential efficiency essentially evolved to assume that homeowners are all classical PhD economists and have a Masters in building science.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>And are willing to balance short-term investment with long-term payback and can calculate those things for themselves.</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>Perfectly rational.</p><p>The sales pitch has historically been horrible. The way that energy efficiency has been sold for pretty much the last 50 years is, “Would you like to save money on your energy bills? Great, get an energy audit!” You have to schedule it, you have to take a half day off of work or at least be in your home and aware of it, and someone who you don't know trucks around your house for three hours, goes into all of the most private parts of your home – I won't even speak to all the stuff that we saw when we were doing energy audits. </p><p>At the end of the day, if you're lucky, they will sit down with you and say, “This is what we found, here's how much energy we think you're wasting, here's what you can do about it, and by the way, that's going to cost you thousands of dollars to do” – to potentially save what you, as a homeowner and consumer, largely see as fake money. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Homeowners are not carrying the one; they're not calculating their energy costs down to the penny. What are their thought processes? When they do go forward with a retrofit or something, what motivates them to do so?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>The great news here is there's actually a lot that motivates people to move forward with these efficiency and electrification retrofit projects. But it's not energy, and it's usually not saving money on energy bills. It’s comfort, it’s health, it’s safety, it’s quality of life. </p><p>For anyone who's seen the now classic movie <em>Fight Club</em>, the first rule of fight club is you don't talk about fight club. At Sealed, the first rule of selling energy efficiency is you don't talk about energy or efficiency. These are not things that generally resonate with real people. What you talk about is getting rid of drafty rooms and cold floors and upstairs rooms that feel like a sauna. You solve people's comfort and their quality-of-life issues, and the energy savings are a way to make it affordable to install those solutions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>How much of this is anecdotal and how much is nailed down by research? What's the balance? Are <em>any</em> homeowners talking about energy and saving money?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>There has obviously been a lot of research over the years, largely through surveys that ask people what motivates them to adopt energy efficiency measures. They're normally set up, though, in a way that doesn't actually give you great information. If I ask you “would you like to save money on your energy bills?” you'd be an idiot to tell me no. But if I then ask you “would you like to spend $10,000 to save $100 a month?” your answer is probably, “Not sure about that. Tell me a little bit more.”</p><p>Part of this is around mistaking people's general desire to save money – which, if you watch any number of commercials on TV, is of course a motivation for people – with their desire to not invest money to save money. </p><p>The other big problem is that the industry generally assumes, including in the research that they do, that most people actually believe in the energy savings. If you look at the data – not just in residential, but across sectors – energy efficiency is by far the biggest and most powerful energy and carbon-reduction resource we've had over the last seven years; but at the same time, it's invisible. It's the lack of something. I analogize it to dark matter – the most powerful energy resource we have, but we literally can't see and feel it. </p><p>That's always been the challenge, both at the macro level in all of the fights over the years with measurement and verification, but also at the micro level with a homeowner. Very early on at Sealed we did a survey asking people, “If somebody did an energy audit in your home and projected that you would save $100 a month, how much do you think you would actually save?” The answer across the US was less than $25. In other words, people are discounting 25 cents or less on the dollar from what you tell them. So the money's not real. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Another barrier has always been that even if you sell people on the fact that they could get a lot of energy efficiency, it's still a huge project to do so and to know what to do. Was the original vision for Sealed just to make that project easy? Is that the whole point? If I call Sealed to my house, what are you offering me that overcomes that dread of dealing with things, which I feel so acutely?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>Sealed is a climate tech company on a mission to stop home energy waste and electrify all homes. That's what we're trying to do when we approach each home.  </p><p>First off, I consider myself a lazy environmentalist. I want to use as little energy as possible and reduce my carbon footprint, but I'm not a do-it-yourselfer. As my wife will probably tell you, I'm not Mr. Fix-it in the home. I need help. </p><p>I actually recently got my own home sealed. After working in this space for a while and building up Sealed, I can finally, as they say in the startup industry, eat my own dog food.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>So how did you find the experience with yourself?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>I'm a very biased source, but it was great. </p><p>Basically, we design, manage, and finance home weatherization and electrification projects, and we aim to make it both easy and affordable for people to be comfortable while using less energy. </p><p>We focused initially on the affordability piece, trying to make it as affordable as possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Did you go in with the conventional assumption that this is mostly about money and saving money? Did you share that misapprehension at first?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>Oh, yeah. I went into this believing all of the “best practices” and all of the received wisdom in the space. I was essentially classically trained in neoliberalism in college and took courses from all of the very smart and wonderful professors who believe in things like the preeminence of the Kyoto Protocol. So I came in with a very technocratic view. </p><p>Obviously, being in the field and spending time with our contractors and with homeowners really shaped my view of how we needed to change things. Early on, my co-founders and I would go to train stations to talk to people to find out what they thought about their energy or comfort. I interviewed every single homeowner that I could in my network to really understand how people think about this; shadowed lots of energy audits; did a lot of grounding research to understand what this looks like; and came to the conclusion – which again, is not rocket science – that people are motivated to do things that improve their quality of life and make it easy and affordable to do.</p><p>We have a pretty simple framework for creating value that we like to reference sometimes, which is “GAF is greater than LAF.” This is a family podcast so I won't do the full translation of that, but – everyone  is greedy. We want things. We're Americans. We want to live well, but we're also a little bit lazy. Like I said, I consider myself a lazy environmentalist.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Some of your research found that people will often say that they're looking to save money, but once the time comes, they don't actually act that way. In some sense, survey results talking about saving money are about people's identity, their image of themselves, which does not always play out in practice.</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>We focus a lot on finding the pain of people. In my case, we moved into this wonderful house, we love it, but it was not sealed. The floors were cold all the time; my wife had to literally decide when to use different bathrooms depending on what the weather was like outside because it was too cold to go into some. We were wearing slippers all the time, at least two layers at all times, including while in bed; it was just not a comfortable place to be. Of course we want to save money, we want to reduce our bills here and there, but that's not really the primary motivation. </p><p>One of the things that's interesting about the space is that for the past 50 years, the industry has trained people to think about saving money on their energy bills as the equivalent of energy efficiency. A lot of times the challenge that we have with our marketing messages and our sales conversations is that we need to separate that out when we're talking to people. Most people that we talk to, of course they want to save money generally, but they also have very real comfort and quality of life problems. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>How many people even know that greater comfort is among the product offerings when they think about energy efficiency and retrofits? </p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>That's a great question. We spend a lot of our marketing education investments on making that explicit. We focus a lot on explaining – through gifs, live action video, text, articles, whatever it is – the connection between people’s comfort problems and energy efficiency. Because, to your point, a lot of people don't know that. </p><p>I can't tell you the number of conversations we have with customers where they call up and say, “You don't need to talk to me anymore. I know what my problem is. It's my windows.” And 90 percent of the time it's not their windows, because of what’s called in building science the stack effect. You think it's your windows, because that's what feels cold, but it's actually your lack of insulation or lack of balanced heating and cooling in your home.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>So Sealed comes to me, the homeowner, and what is the value proposition? What are the steps I go through?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank: </strong> </p><p>You click on an ad on Instagram, YouTube, wherever you find us. The first step is that you give us a bunch of information about yourself, what your comfort problems are, what things you want to solve, as much information about your home as you know and can share, and your energy usage history. Then our team takes that information, pairs it with third-party information and tools, and puts together a proposal for you. Without ever going to your home, without having to roll a truck, without ever having to send a contractor to you, we can say “this is what we think is going to make sense for your home and is going to solve your problem.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>You can get pretty close without a site visit?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>Yeah. I remember several years ago, I was on an energy audit with one of our contractor partners. We pulled up to the house and he looked at me and said, “Andy, I'm going to crush this house. This is going to be $10,000. We're going to reduce their heating usage by 30 percent, I'm going to do this amount of insulation here, there's probably two knee walls there that I’m going to do, we'll do some rim joists and we're done.” </p><p>I said, “Great, that's awesome. So why are we doing the energy audit?”</p><p>And he said, “Well, we have to go through the program. We have to show the customer that we did a whole bunch of work and that we did the blower door test and we did X, Y, and Z.”</p><p>I wish I could say the next day we shifted to this remote audit model, but it took us a little while. Credit to Ali Adler, our VP of marketing, and Dan Hochman, who was our head of sales for a long time and is now at SolarEdge; we really found out that you can do most of the work remotely, especially with today's tools. Obviously with Covid that's only accelerated, as people get more and more comfortable with having these kinds of conversations remotely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So what is the proposal?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>We essentially say, here's the project that we think makes sense – this tonnage heat pump, these number of heads, this amount of weatherization, this amount of air sealing. And this is what the market value is if you were to pay cash; if you want to finance with us, we will cover the upfront costs and these are the terms in which you would pay that back to us based on the amount of energy that's actually saved. </p><p>One thing that's very unique about Sealed is that we put up the upfront cost to pay for these projects. You, as a Sealed customer, would not have to pay anything. The only payment to us is based on the actual amount of energy reduced. If we don't cut energy waste, we don't get paid, so we're very accountable for the performance and aligned with the project working.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>That model – paying for actually produced, measured energy efficiency as though it were energy – has been around in some form or another in commercial buildings for a while. I had <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-rob-harmon-on-how-to#details">Rob Harmon on the pod</a> a few weeks ago talking about his model. Are you, as far as you know, the first to bring this to the residential space?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>As far as we know, yes. This has always been the holy grail of the residential space: can you bring this performance financing model, this ESCO model, from commercial and government to residential? That's really what we think we've cracked.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>You're not doing the work, you're coordinating with local contractors, right? Do you have binders full of good contractors?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>Normally it’s spreadsheets, but yes. We get the customer to the point where they know what project they want to do, the pricing comes from the negotiations that we have with contractors in their area, and once they sign an agreement, we say “great, we're now going to connect you with the best local contractors to confirm the project and then install it.”</p><p>This is important because, especially with bigger home weatherization and electrification projects like mine, I had three different contractors. Normally, if you want to get your home weatherized and replace your fossil system with a heat pump system, which more and more people want to do, you essentially have to be your own GC and coordinate a bunch of different contractors. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I went through a similar process nine years ago and I used one of these “we'll coordinate it all” type of service companies. As long as I was talking to the coordinate-it-all service company, they were super great and attentive and had all the right answers to my questions. But then I’d get passed off to a contractor, and in my experience, it was not a guarantee that the contractor would know exactly what was going on, or have any good answers, or be as accountable as I was led to believe by the great customer service I got from the coordinating company. I assume you're putting a lot of work into making sure these contractors are as attentive to customer service as you are?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>That's a big focus for us. It's not just important for the work itself to be done well – because if the work isn't done well and the customer’s not saving energy, we're losing money – but also, we have a long-term relationship with the customer. When we talk about managing your project, that's from beginning to end. That's from when you first click on a Sealed ad and fill out some information until up to 20 years after your project is complete. So the level of service and the experience that you have is super important for us. </p><p>We spend a lot of time working closely with our contractor partners to make sure that people are going to be on time, and that the right protocols are going to occur with keeping the site clean, and any number of small details. It's residential construction; things don't always go perfectly. But we're motivated to make sure that they go as well as possible, because our relationship is not done with the customer when the project ends.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>So as a customer, some insulation contractors show up and do their thing and leave. Then a heat pump contractor shows up, does their thing, and they leave. What is Sealed’s ongoing relationship with me?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>We only pay the contractors after receiving photo verification as well as written verification from the customer that the project was performed to spec. First, we’re verifying that the project was done well and the customer is happy. </p><p>After that, you're enrolled in Sealed’s platform, where we're literally tracking the performance of your project. We're doing this for two reasons. One, of course, we want you to understand how much energy you’re actually saving. That's also how we bill you – you are only paying Sealed based on the actual energy reduction that you receive. We look at your energy usage before the project, we adjust for weather, and that's your baseline. We measure that against your actual usage after the project and you're only paying Sealed based on that delta. It’s direct-to-consumer metered efficiency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>The customer, then, in the years following this project, is seeing on a monthly basis how much energy they saved and how much is going to Sealed out of that. Your business model relies on there being enough energy savings in the house to pay for these projects. Do you ever get contacted by someone and hear their story and say, we can't really squeeze enough juice out of your apple to make it worth it? Or can every house be improved enough to make the numbers work?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>I would say most houses. We will sometimes get overzealous energy nerds who have done everything – have insulated their halls, have heat pumps, and want to see what they can do. We tell them, “Looks like you've done a good job, I don't want you spending money that you don't need to spend to marginally improve your home.” </p><p>For most homeowners, this makes a lot of sense. But we do one thing differently compared to most of the rest of the industry, which has generally had a Maginot Line of bill neutrality – God forbid that I improve my comfort and quality of life if it's going to mean that I spent one penny more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>In theory, the customer’s total energy bill going forward could be lower; they could be saving enough energy to pay Sealed and take a cut. But Sealed is not guaranteeing that the customer’s total costs will decline.</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:</strong>  </p><p>Frankly, in most cases, their total energy budget including what they're paying to Sealed goes up. We've found this is more honest and very powerful with the customer, because we're telling them that they are going to pay a certain amount of money to live in a better home. Just like you would pay for remodeling your bathroom or retiling your floors, you're paying to have a more comfortable and healthier home. </p><p>Now, you're only paying if the project actually performs, unlike most home improvements, where you're paying for the sight unseen. That's a big difference. But we're not trying to pretend like you're only going to pay for things that are going to lower your overall energy budget, because that creates a lot of weirdness in how you scope projects and ultimately ___.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Let’s say my house was built in 1954, a normal suburban house. I've got a natural gas furnace, I've got half-ass insulation like most houses do. What is the merit order of improvements? Is there a baseline thing that you do first for almost every house? How bespoke is it from house to house?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>Right now we offer two plans. The first is our comfort plan, which is focused on weatherization. For your house, that would likely be looking in the attic; in any knee walls; see if you have any exposed rim joists in your basement; trying to essentially keep the outside out, seal all the places, and put in the right amount of insulation. We’ll give you a smart thermostat as well to make sure that you're modulating everything in the right way. </p><p>Typically we'll do the attic, and the basement if it's unfinished. Usually homes have something else that we're doing too. In my case, it was what we call a FROG, or “freezing room over the garage.” My bedroom is right above the garage and the garage ceiling was not insulated, so the company that came in and did the weatherization for my home, Dr. Energy Saver, basically drilled some holes in the ceiling of my garage, blew insulation in there, and now my bedroom is a lot more comfortable.</p><p>Other people have overhangs; sometimes people get their walls insulated as well. It depends on the home.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>The comfort proposition of insulation is very clear. What are people's motivations on heat pumps? How do you sell heat pumps?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank: </strong> </p><p>Heat pumps are part of what we call our climate control plan. Typically, if someone's home is not weatherized, we will include a weatherization component of that plan. We will not install heat pumps into an un-weatherized home because they're not going to perform and we won’t make money.</p><p>The motivation for heat pumps is really strong. It depends a little bit on circumstances, but you're essentially getting a new modern heating and cooling system that is more comfortable, healthier, quieter, safer, just better. </p><p>When we were doing research and putting together the plan, we did a survey around the things that people were most excited about when it came to heat pumps. Ali, our VP of marketing, was insistent that we put in a question around the fact that it does both heating and cooling, that it's a two-for-one deal. I thought, “Who cares about whether it's two for one? This is going to be a wasted question, we should ask something else.” But she was very dogged, and put it in. </p><p>Of course, out the other side, the number one thing that people were attracted to with heat pumps was the fact that they did both heating and cooling together. People just love the idea that it's two for one, you can save space, it's this modern type thing. So that was interesting. And of course Ali has not let me forget that I was against including the question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>From your experience, how big of a deal is indoor air health related to natural gas? I'm curious whether that knowledge has started penetrating the wider public yet.</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>It’s definitely started. The talking point here – and this is mostly with gas stoves, but it's even worse if you have other appliances – is that from an indoor air quality perspective, the health effects of having a gas stove are basically the same as having a smoker inside the home. There are more articles coming out and we're hearing that more and more from our customers. </p><p>There are also a lot of other health implications of heat pumps that people think less about. When we were doing our research to put together this plan, we talked to a lot of people who had considered or gotten heat pumps for health reasons because of the need to have constant temperatures at all times. There are a lot of people with health conditions where you can't have temperatures that get too hot or too cold; you need to stay at a certain rate. Heat pumps give a constant temperature at all times, vs. traditional fossil systems that turn on and off.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>People are paying Sealed back out of their energy savings. How long are people typically taking to pay you fully back?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank: </strong> </p><p>We have a standard term of 20 years, which is very similar to a solar lease or a PPA. We like to do it as long as we can, given the conservative view of the life of the measures, because we want to keep the monthly payments as low as possible for the customers and make it as affordable as possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>What happens when the house is sold? Is your arrangement somehow tied to the house, or does it go with the homeowner? </p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>We don't have a lien on the house. Unlike something like PACE or home refinancing, we can't take your home if you don't repay us. It's ultimately an unsecured product. We still have some leverage over you; knock on wood, we have not had any defaults to date. But it's not something where we can take your home. </p><p>The options that you have when you move are to transfer your agreement to the next homeowner (who needs to qualify and accept the Sealed terms); or to exercise an early payment option. In everyone's contract there's a schedule that goes down over time in terms of how much money they can pay us to buy out of the agreement. So you can leverage that. </p><p>One thing that's really great about the investments that we're making in the home is that it's increasing the home value. There's more great data around this coming out all the time, but these types of energy efficiency and electrification improvements are increasingly things that people are looking for when they buy their home. So you can essentially pay us back for whatever is remaining in the agreement out of your increase in home value.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>This is about making a market for home comfort or home sealing, but there are social benefits too; you’re reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and there are ways in which it helps utilities that aren't necessarily captured in a private transaction. Is your vision and hope that the market will take over and mainly drive this, or do you think even given a market, there still is an argument for some form of public subsidy and public policy to help?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>We think policy is very important. I'm a recovering political junkie and policy nerd, and we think there's a huge role to play for policy, in particular around appliance performance standards, which have been neglected. A lot of the big gains we've made in energy efficiency are because of appliance standards, not fancy programs. It was simply saying “now your refrigerators need to be this more efficient, go do it.” </p><p>There are ways to be more aggressive than even what the Biden administration is doing today when it comes to performance standards; being able to go beyond 100 percent efficiency, because heat pumps and other electrification devices are more than 100 percent efficient. I'm not in the policy world full time, so may be a little naive, but you talk to a lot of folks in the space and they'll say some version of “well, we don't want to go that far because we could get sued.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Well, you're always going to get sued. It's just part of the process now. When's the last time one of these things was not sued over?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>I'm preaching to the choir here. </p><p>So we're very pro-policy levers, in particular performance standards, but we also see a huge value driver from the utility and societal value of energy efficiency. You can either meet your energy needs by increasing supply or by reducing demand or some combination thereof, and historically, despite a lot of efforts, energy efficiency has not been valued in the way that it should by the utilities, by the grid operators, from a carbon perspective, etc. </p><p>What we believe needs to be done is that the utilities and government and the policy space need to provide a simple and performance-based market incentive to companies like Sealed and many others.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I hear critiques all the time about traditional weatherization programs as they’re run now through utilities. Do you think it would be better to scrap those and move over to something like a market incentive to try to bring private capital in, or do you think there's still a role for those old weatherization programs?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>I very much think that the shift needs to happen. We've talked to folks in a number of states that I won't name, and private capital is not always welcomed in a lot of places in this market. It's, let's just throw ratepayer or taxpayer money at it. That's great, but eventually you run out, and the private capital markets are so much bigger than what we've historically thrown at the problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>This seems like a classic case where a small-c conservative critique can apply, in that you create these government programs and they become, at a certain point, partially dedicated to their own ongoing survival. You get interests on the policy side, on the utility side, that are very accustomed to this way of doing things and have their hands on big pots of money and don't necessarily want the apple cart upended.</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>My co-founder, Lauren, is both a small-c and big-C conservative, and whenever we run into this dynamic we joke that I'm moving a little bit to the right today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Regulatory capture is a real thing. There's no sense pretending it's not. </p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>It’s a real thing. Though the good news is that we're seeing more progressive points of view on this in the last few years. We work with a number of utility partners, in New York in particular and a few other states, and one thing we've been talking with a lot of them about is moving from this very command-and-control program structure – it's as close to Soviet-style planning as we have in the US – toward what we call a performance playbook, or basically a market-aligned model for doing things.</p><p>There are essentially three steps to make that happen. The first is access. To even participate in most of these programs, you largely need to be one kind of company; in normal times, you need to be a contractor. Sealed a lot of times doesn’t qualify for programs, even though we are spending lots of money in customer acquisition, financing, coordination, and all these different things, because we don't actually install the project. </p><p>You're asking contractors to basically do all this coordination in addition to being great at construction management and scoping and all this stuff; it's not really fair to them. These are hard businesses to run, especially at scale, so you need to expand who can qualify for these incentives. You can create a much greater innovation ecosystem. A lot of times, the thing that's not captured in all of the models is the innovation tax that you have by putting out a hundred-page RFP. I've been in the trenches filling those out; those will kill innovation really quickly. You need to make it accessible, easy for lots of different kinds of real market actors. </p><p>The way I define “real market actors” is if you make money based on a customer, like a homeowner or business paying you money. That's important a lot of times to distinguish in this space, and we need to have more of those that are able to participate at scale in these incentive programs. </p><p>The second thing is around sustainability. A lot of states and utilities will jack up downstream rebates or customer-facing rebates to get people to say yes. Denver just put out some crazy rebate program that's probably going to run out in a couple of weeks if it hasn't already. It’s basically giving a sugar crash to the market, telling all the people “do this when it's really cheap, when there's huge rebates.” They’re not going to do it any more after that, because they’re expecting the next round, which may or may not happen. You create bad incentives for the market and you're ultimately making it not sustainable. </p><p>Even with large incentives, which are great, we want as much ratepayer money invested in these projects as possible. You do those through midstream incentives: you have the money go through the actual market actors, and then those market actors can figure out the best way to use those dollars to increase adoption, whether it's through customer-facing incentives, investing more in (God forbid) sales and marketing, which is how markets actually grow, or building the infrastructure to grow even further. </p><p>The third thing is performance-based. A lot of these programs give incentives or rebates based on how much the project costs, which obviously creates horrible incentives. You get what you pay for. So you really need to have a performance mindset in terms of pay for performance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>I talked about this with Rob Harmon, too, that measuring energy efficiency with enough precision to make it into a saleable market product is relatively new. A lot of market and policy structures that were built before that was possible are lumbering to move to take account of it, but it's a new and exciting thing that you can now commodify energy efficiency like this.</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>You hit the nail on the head. That's something that's really changed in the market, and it’s certainly made a business like Sealed possible. We're not the first one to think about or try to do something like performance financing for residential, but what we did that was different was, instead of trying to solve essentially an engineering problem and try to calculate the energy savings based on any number of crazy DOE energy models, we threw that out and said “I don’t know if that's an impossible problem, but it's a stupid problem to solve. Let's solve a very possible problem, which is actually measuring this from a statistical basis.”</p><p>We leverage machine learning, specifically predictive analytics, to look at how actual homes use and save energy based on different home characteristics and different project types. So we can be very confident in a portfolio of homes that a certain amount of energy is going to be saved, to the extent that we can go to an insurance company, Hartford Steam Boiler, which we have a reinsurance policy with, and say “here's the math, here's what we're investing in” and they’re actually going to lend us money, or reinsure this portfolio of homes based on the accuracy of our predictions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Where is Sealed currently operating? You just got some new funding; where are you looking to expand next? And long term, more speculatively, I'd love to hear blue-sky dreaming about what could be the next step in making things even easier for customers, being even more thorough in what you do in a house. Where's the next frontier in the residential space?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>To give you context, Sealed has raised more than $60 million, including $29.5 million in our last round, which was a Series B extension with Fifth Wall, Keyframe Capital, and Footprint Capital, which has Robert Downey, Jr. as an investor. So we’ve got some great investors.</p><p>My co-founder, Lauren, who's our CEO, led that round and did a great job; as far as I know, it's one of the largest venture investments in home energy retrofits in many years. We're in a great position to be able to expand our model and be able to grow. As you can imagine, with that kind of funding, we've been growing fast and plan to continue to grow fast in the future. </p><p>To give you some perspective, over the last year or so we have seen revenue growth of about 4.5x year over year, we grew headcount about 2.5x, and we grew from one state, New York, where we've been based and built our business for many years, to now five states: New York, New Jersey, Connecticut (where I live now), Pennsylvania, and we recently launched in Illinois (which is where I'm from originally, so it was very heartening for me to be able to see that). We dramatically grew our heat pump sales as part of that as well. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Still mostly Northeast, then. Which way are you marching? South, or are you going to come west?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>Our wonderful market expansion team is taking a look at different markets that we're going to go to. We do want to start to experiment with markets that are warmer than what we've seen so far.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>Intuitively, my guess is that the colder the place, the easier it is for you to make business.</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>Well, we're not sure about that. We're a very sick business – we like pain. We want it really hot or really cold, ideally both in the same year. I know in your climate, and in other climates, unfortunately due to global warming it's getting warmer and warmer in the summer. So we're taking a look at the different market dynamics in different places. We have not made a decision on some of the next markets we're going to go to yet, but you should be seeing us in many more states over the next year or so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Are there competitors yet? Anyone else doing what you're doing? Do you expect other people to start doing what you're doing soon?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>We'll see. I will say, the things you have to put together to create a business like Sealed are varied and a little bit weird, so it's definitely a natural competitive advantage there. But the space of home electrification is generally starting to explode on a few different fronts, so we certainly expect competition. </p><p>This is a model that's working, we're expanding, and part of the reason why what we're doing is possible now is because of the proliferation of digital tools. We don't have to open up a physical office, where we're storing insulation and trucks. When companies in the past, like Next Step Living or Mark Group, wanted to expand, they had to make big capital bets and move from one place to another. We can be a lot more agile in terms of how we do that, and that makes a big difference. </p><p>As we grow and invest in the future, I'm excited about what we're going to be able to do in terms of creating a digital experience for buying home weatherization and electrification and other clean home improvements. We recently hired a new VP of product, Paul Zeckser, who came to us from HomeAdvisor. We're really excited about what he and his team are going to be able to build. </p><p>We've recently also brought on a new chief revenue officer, Sarah Pierce, who comes from Better.com, from the mortgage industry. Seeing high-volume sales, being able to create digital experiences that allow people to buy in a way that is a great experience for the customer, also makes it easier for our team to be able to service them. So that's a big part of what we're investing in. </p><p>At the end of the day, our North Star is making it easier and more valuable for people to buy clean home improvements – to buy a heat pump instead of a new boiler furnace.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>You could imagine getting into stoves, into water heaters and all kinds of appliances; getting into smart home load coordination; getting into EVs, even, because they are a piece of the electrified home. How comprehensive a take on the electrified home do you want to do?</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>Well, I'm not going to commit my product team to anything specific on the podcast, but I can tell you from going through my own home weatherization and electrification journey that there's a lot of great technology out there. Another reason why this kind of business is growing so fast right now is because the hardware is there, the technology is there. We've got smart everything. I recently bought a smart washer (and my smart dryer is backlogged a little but should get here soon). It's much more efficient than my old washer. I just put in a canister of laundry detergent, and then I never have to think about pouring out laundry detergent. I throw the clothes in the washer and press go, and it's done. </p><p>This is one of the great things about the technology that's out there now, but also why we need companies like Sealed spreading the message and talking about this. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>The average homeowner can't possibly be keeping track of all these technology loans in all these different areas. They need someone to paint a big picture for them.</p><p><strong>Andy Frank:  </strong></p><p>Exactly. We're excited to help, and ultimately our goal is to take homes off of fossil fuel. When we are able to weatherize and electrify a home and pair that with renewable energy, we're taking homes fully off of fossil fuel. We're hitting the big stuff first, heating and cooling and your water heater – we do offer heat pump water heaters, I've got one myself now, works great. That's where you want to start. But to your point, where we want to be able to get people to is taking them off of fossil fuel and having a completely clean home.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>That sounds like a great place to conclude, with a nation full of fossil-free homes. Thanks so much for coming on and sharing. </p><p><strong>Andy Frank:</strong></p><p>Thank you for having me.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-andy-frank-on-how-to</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:53275636</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 30 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/53275636/4f8339735f69d809d521328f3cab79d9.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3602</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/53275636/ef3b8a65fbaaa0f431d5f8c66457536b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Fran Moore on how to represent social change in climate models]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, UC Davis assistant professor Fran Moore discusses her research team’s effort to construct a climate model that includes (instead of ignores) effects from the interplay of social conditions and policy change.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAAz8ITwcNhVwK6RKZYc2cRIa/volts22.05.04%28fran.moore%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-fran-moore-on-how-to-represent-social-change-in-climate-models"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>One of my long-time gripes about the climate-economic models that outfits like the IPCC produce is that they ignore politics. More broadly, they ignore social change and the way it can both drive and be driven by technology and climate impacts. </p><p>This isn’t difficult to explain — unlike technology costs, biophysical feedbacks, and other easily quantifiable variables, the dynamics of social change seem fuzzy and qualitative, too soft and poorly understood to include in a quantitative model. Consequently, those dynamics have been treated as “exogenous” to models. Modelers simply determine those values, feed in a set level of policy change, and the models react. Parameters internal to the model can not affect policy and be affected by it in turn; models do not capture socio-physical and socio-economic feedback loops.</p><p>But we know those feedback loops exist. We know that falling costs of technology can shift public sentiment which can lead to policy which can further reduce the costs of technology. All kinds of loops like that exist, among and between climate, technology, and human social variables. Leaving them out entirely can produce misleading results. </p><p>At long last, a new research paper has tackled this problem head-on. Fran Moore, an assistant professor at UC Davis working at the intersection of climate science and economics, took a stab at it in a recent <em>Nature</em> paper, “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-04423-8">Determinants of emissions pathways in the coupled climate–social system</a>.” Moore, along with several co-authors, attempted to construct a climate model that includes social feedback loops, to help determine what kinds of social conditions produce policy change and how policy change helps change social conditions.</p><p>I am fascinated by this effort and by the larger questions of how to integrate social-science dynamics into climate analysis, so I was eager to talk to Moore about how she constructed her model, what kinds of data she drew on, and how she views the dangers and opportunities of quantifying social variables. </p><p>Without further ado, Fran Moore, welcome to Volts. Thanks so much for coming.</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>Thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>In climate modeling, we put in values for what we think is going to happen to the price and then watch the model play out. I've been looking at climate modeling my whole career, and I've always thought that what's actually going to determine the outcomes are our social and political processes, which are not in the model. So really, the models amount to a wild guess, we're all wallowing in uncertainty, and we just have to live with it. </p><p>You confronted the same situation, and being a much more stalwart and ambitious person than I, said, “I'm going to try to get the social and political stuff into the model to make the model better.” </p><p>In conventional climate modeling, these sociopolitical variables are treated as exogenous. What does it mean for them to be exogenous to the model?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>Exogenous means that they come in from outside, so as the researcher using the model, you have to specify that. In particular, when we're thinking about climate change, those really important exogenous variables are the ambition of climate policy, whether that be in terms of trajectories of carbon prices, or target for temperature, or target for emissions levels. Typically, those are things that you set and they appear exogenously in two ways.</p><p>One is, in climate modeling, you take some radiative forcing trajectory, or some greenhouse gas concentration, and you ask, what does the climate system do in response to that? But it also comes up in other types of modeling, like energy modeling, where these policies appear exogenously as constraints on the model. So you're asking an energy model to tell you what's the least cost pathway for getting to a 2° temperature target, or to a certain carbon concentration limit in the atmosphere. Those are both versions of exogenous inputs of policy into climate-relevant modeling.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>The upshot is that the modeler is basically specifying the trajectory of policy and then asking the model: given that, what will happen? What it means to make it endogenous, then, is allowing social and political factors to be affected by other variables and to affect them in return inside the model. What does it look like for something like this to be endogenous? What does that mean to us?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>The way it works in our model is that climate policy becomes endogenous. We don't specify what it does; it arises from modeling of more fundamental social-political processes that we think are going to drive or enable climate policy as it might play out over the future. By taking that step back we see this policy not just as something that we're going to specify and ask what happens, but actually something that emerges from the system itself, that comes out of a model’s structure and parameterization.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>On one hand, that seems like exactly what we want: let’s specify some initial conditions, then ask the model what people will do on policy later. On the other hand, intuitively, it sounds impossible, like trying to predict the future. </p><p>When I think about social and political forces and variables, there are an infinite number of ways to conceive of them. Of all the social and political forces you could imagine, how do you narrow down to something manageable? Which variables are you choosing?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>Let me take a minute to say that it's actually not obvious that this is what you want to do. A lot of climate modeling has taken the view that the goal of this is to inform policy, and the goal of the modeling is to say to policymakers “if you do X then Y will happen and if you do Z then W will happen.” If that is the goal of your modeling exercise, then you don't want policy to emerge endogenously; you want to be able to specify some possible counterfactuals so you can take the results of your model and tell policymakers about just how bad climate change will be under these different cases. </p><p>I see two main reasons why that is unsatisfactory as the only approach. One, scientifically, it seems unsatisfying, in that human decisions are the single most important determinant of how the climate system is going to evolve and if we just exclude them from our modeling, we don't really understand the system as a whole. </p><p>But there's also a practical application, in that we're not just here trying to inform mitigation decisions. Increasingly, we're trying to help adaptation. And not being able to tell adaptation decision-makers about the probabilities of different emission trajectories when your single largest uncertainty is between different emissions pathways – that's really unsatisfying and not what we need for adaptation. We want to be able to put probability bounds over there in order to support much better adaptation decision-making. That was part of the motivation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>When you're choosing these variables, these feedback loops that you're trying to include in the model, where do you start? Where do you look? Is there existing literature or existing loops you can adapt and put in, or are you just starting with a blank piece of paper?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>It was definitely a process. One of the starting points was the observation that we do want to be focused on feedback loops. This is a certain style of modeling, sometimes called system dynamics modeling, where you're focused on the coupling between different feedback loops because they tend to be really important in driving the dynamics of the system over long time periods. If you have reinforcing feedbacks, particularly if they're coupled to each other, you can get very complex, nonlinear behavior emerging from the model. We wanted to make sure that we were allowing for that, so we did have a focus on trying to identify the feedback loops. </p><p>Essentially, an interdisciplinary team of people started brainstorming, based on our knowledge, what theories around psychology, social psychology, sociology, and political science might be relevant here. Then we did a literature review across different potential feedback loops, looking for evidence within a really diverse range of literatures about dynamics that might be relevant to the system, that we could take and incorporate into this model.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Give us an example of how a change in one thing might trigger a change in another thing that might trigger a change in policy.</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>One that we incorporate into our emissions or energy component is learning-by-doing feedback; it’s represented in a lot of energy-system models these days. This is a phenomenon where new technologies tend to be really expensive, but you tend to get cost reductions with increased deployment, so your technology gets cheaper, so it gets deployed more, so it gets cheaper, so it gets deployed more. That's a reinforcing feedback where there's quite a lot of evidence across different energy technologies about how large that effect tends to be. </p><p>Some of the ones where the evidence is more qualitative or perhaps more debatable would be things like, we have a feedback from policy change to public opinion. This is the idea of the normative force of law or expressive force of law, which is described in some legal literature. It's the idea that policy change itself can signal to people what is desirable behavior or desirable outcomes, so you can get this reinforcing feedback where you get some change in the law that later drives public opinion in that direction because it's signaling something. That's the kind of feedback that we allow for in the model.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>The learning curves are a socioeconomic process, but there's tons of data on them; they’re very well-understood and well-modeled and quantified. I can imagine getting those in the model relatively smoothly. But something like the extent to which passing a policy serves as a social proof that then shifts public opinion, which then makes the next policy slightly more likely – I can conceptualize that loop easily, I understand what it means on a qualitative level, but how do you begin to quantify that? What are the data sources that would even feed into that?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>This is an issue that we ran into in designing the model, is that a lot of the evidence here is coming from more qualitative disciplines like legal literature and political science literature. That doesn't mean it's not evidence; in some cases, we have quite rich case studies showing some of these feedbacks in operation. But it does make it challenging when you're trying to take that and put an equation on it.</p><p>One thing is that we allowed for a lot of uncertainty. In our final set of runs, we sample over a lot of uncertain parameters in the model and we try and say, given the fact that we don't know a lot about this particular parameter that describes the strength of the feedback, or even the existence of this feedback, what can we say probabilistically about where emissions might go?</p><p>The other thing that we do is a hind-cost exercise to jointly constrain these parameters. Even though we don't have data that is allowing us to say “this feedback in particular,” we can take a subset of the model – in this case, I think it was our opinion, policy, adoption, and cognition modules – and we can start it in the past. I think 2010 was when we first had data for distribution of public opinion as well as carbon pricing. Then we can run the model forward using, again, sampling over a very large set of the parameter space, and look at how well that evolution of opinion and that evolution of policy actually matched what happened over 10 years. Based on the match under different parameter combinations, we can probabilistically say “this set of parameter combinations is more likely true than this set of parameter combinations” just because it seems like it generates a better match in the model over the last 10 years. </p><p>We do two versions of that for different parts of the model, these hind-cost parameter-constraint exercises, and that's primarily how our empirical evidence comes into the model. It would be great if we could use other data from other fields to constrain some of these parameters more precisely, but for some of these ideas, that doesn't exist at the moment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>One of the things that's done with climate physical models to test them out is, as you say, backcast – meaning if we went back in time and used this model, would it accurately predict what actually happened? Do you think a model like this, with social features, some of which are fuzzier than others, could ever accurately backcast? What did you find when you backcasted? Are you comfortable that you have a set of feedback loops now that at least accurately captured the last 10 years?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>It is tricky in that some of the feedback loops play out. Ideally, we would have much better historical data on some of these social measures that allow us to go back much further. Because we only have data over about 10 years, and it might even be less than that, we're able to say that over this relatively short time period, the model seems like it’s not going completely crazy. But part of the goal of incorporating feedback is so that you have the potential for things like tipping points and things like that, so you don't want to over-constrain.</p><p>Sometimes you see critiques of energy models that they over-constrain in order to precisely match historically what's happened; but if some of those constraints can change in the future, and we're projecting out a long way here, then you want to allow for that to happen too. So it's a balance between those: what do we have evidence for, in a broad sense of the word, in terms of the structure of the feedback; as well as, can we use the evidence as we have it to constrain it? </p><p>There's uncertainty, and we can get a wide range of behavior, but more or less it can track this gradual expansion of support for climate policy in OECD countries, which is our focus, as well as relatively slow increase in average carbon price, which is our measure of policy. Between those two things, they can constrain some of the parameters in the model, but not all of them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>When it comes to social and political stuff regarding climate change, by definition, there aren’t data sets going back a long way, because the issue itself is relatively new to society and politics – a couple of decades, which in modeling terms is a relatively short period of time. So what data <em>do</em> we have? Of all the kajillions of social and political factors you might imagine trying to get in here, do some have data available and some don't? Do you end up biasing yourself toward factors where there is data available just because there is data, and overlooking things that might be important because there is no data? </p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>On that latter question, because we built into the model the potential for the feedback loops where we don't necessarily have strong quantitative data, we're deliberately trying to avoid that problem. We're allowing those feedback loops to operate in probabilistically. We can't constrain them directly with data, we recognize that; there are only limited model outputs and parameters that we can actually match to stuff that’s measurable in a defensible way. But that doesn't mean that we don't include them in our model. We still allow for those effects to operate, because they're potentially really important in driving the dynamics, and just because we don't measure them super well doesn't mean that they shouldn't be in there. </p><p>In terms of the exact data, what's important is to have repeated data on repeated measures over time because that helps you constrain these dynamic systems. That is tough, because you have opinion surveys that’ll be for one country in one year and a different country in a different year, or the question changes. </p><p>The Yale Program on Climate Change Communication has something for the US, so originally we used that. Then we wanted to be representative of more countries, so we used a Pew question that has been asked repeatedly across about nine OECD countries since about 2010. I don't think they do it every year, but it gives us a time series of how opinion is shifting on average across these countries. </p><p>We have two other measures. One is on policy, so that measures carbon pricing. That’s fairly straightforward – well, it’s kind of straightforward.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>I was going to ask about it, because explicit carbon pricing policies are a very small fraction of total climate policy. Are you taking all those other climate policies and trying to translate them into an implicit carbon price, or are you just looking at explicit carbon pricing?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>That is exactly the caveat I was about to add. Ideally, we would like to do exactly what you said, which is take all these climate policies around the world that have some associated shadow cost and that can be quantified in terms of effective carbon price at the margin, and add it all up. We just can't do it. That has not been done by other people. So instead, we use just explicit carbon pricing: cap-and-trade systems and carbon taxes, essentially. Those are pretty well-documented.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Don't you worry that you're only capturing a fraction of policy? How do you compensate for that?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>The important question is, do we get the change right? We're not able to say more than that. We can say we seem like we're matching the rate of change of explicit carbon pricing. </p><p>How that matches up to other measures that would include things like renewable portfolio standards and so on is not clear, but those get complicated too, because there’s a bunch of reasons why you might do them. It's not just carbon – things like CAFE standards have a climate component, but they've also got air pollution and fuel economy and saving people money at the gas tank and all those things. It'd be great if someone else wanted to come up with the shadow cost of all these different regulations; we would definitely use it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>One of the significant types of findings that might come out of a model like this is, given the current social-political trajectory, when might we see some sort of tipping point when the gradual build flops over into sudden action? Even physical tipping points are incredibly hard to pin down because of emergent effects that are difficult to predict from initial circumstances; my intuition is that social tipping points would be even more difficult to predict. Do you get any firm predictions about tipping points out of this model, and how confident are you?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>Part of the reason we built a model like this was this idea that you can get these tipping-like, nonlinear behaviors in the social, political, and technical systems that produce emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>If you look back on history, most progress comes out of something like that punctuated equilibrium model – things were the same for a while, then whoosh, a bunch of stuff changes. Actual policy history does not do these gently, upwardly sloping lines that you see in models so often.</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>The first step in trying to understand that is to actually have a model that can generate those. Our model can definitely do that. To some extent, it was designed to do that; we went around looking for these feedback loops and we coupled them all together, and that's inherently going to be a system that under certain conditions is going to give you this tipping-style behavior. </p><p>The reason why some modeling communities don't like this type of modeling is exactly that reason, that you allow for this complex, rapidly changing, accelerating behavior under certain conditions. It’s not necessarily super well constrained what the future looks like, because you're allowing for rapid changes in ways that are going to produce futures that maybe we can't really imagine right now. When we look out we tend to extrapolate from the trajectory we're on, rather than accounting for the accelerating feedbacks that we're capturing here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>We don't necessarily know what public opinion will do in response to literally unprecedented conditions.</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>Yeah. So the goal is to try and draw on the theory that we have already in the social and political sciences and put them together.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Your paper mentions trying to learn from past episodes of rapid social change, previous tipping points. Can you pull durable lessons out of those past examples?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>There are other strategies that might do a case study example of past social change. Here we're trying to abstract from that a little further and say, what are the underlying dynamics and more fundamental prophecies that revolve around things like social networks and information and political institutions and power? </p><p>If you recognize the uncertainty, and that's what we're doing with our 100,000 runs, then the other thing you can do is query the model – to say, what combinations of parameters put us in a world where we get positive rapid transformation and what sets of parameters put us in a world that we don't? You can start to ask those types of questions. </p><p>These models with tipping points are not necessarily fully predictive; that's not necessarily what they're trying to do, in the sense of “we're going to have a tipping point in 2042.” But they're still informative about the system, and they're still potentially informative to management of that system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>You're just constraining the field of possible outcomes. You don't have to get to a single prediction to be helpful.</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>That's really important. People are nervous of this style of models sometimes, because you can get rapid changes that maybe make us a little uncomfortable about making predictions like that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Right, you don't want to bet on those things.</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>But we're actually able to constrain the set of, say, 2100 temperatures compared to looking at the range of representative concentration pathways and saying “well, it could be 8.5 and it could be 2.6 and we just can't put probabilities over those.” That is a huge range. We can really say “both those ends are pretty unlikely, and probably we’re somewhere in the middle.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>The balance of your model runs that try to capture sociopolitical processes end up with lower emissions than business as usual, which I take to mean that on balance, these social-political feedback loops are moving us in a positive direction. How do we know there won't be loops pushing in the other direction? One of the big things people are talking about these days is the looming possibility of eco-fascism, where climate impacts cause people to get into a lifeboat mentality and build walls and hoard the rest of their fossil fuels. You can imagine feedback loops pushing us in the wrong direction. How do you think about the possibility of negative loops?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>If I was going to expand the model further, we would maybe pay more attention to those types of potential negative feedback loops, or balancing feedback loops. It’s fair to say we built a model to be tippy because we were looking for tipping points and we wanted to make sure we had the potential to capture them, and we definitely do. But thinking a bit more about what some of these balancing effects might be and how they might slow down that tippiness is a way we would want to expand the model.</p><p>The one you talked about is definitely one we thought about, this idea that with mitigation, you're trying to provide a global public good, and that’s difficult at the best of times. Maybe as things get worse or are perceived to be getting worse, it becomes more and more difficult to provide global public goods, and instead, maybe we would focus on much more local public goods, or no public goods at all, and switch more into an adaptation focus. That's definitely a dynamic that you could imagine playing out, and that could potentially have some effects on the model, depending exactly how it was parameterized.</p><p>The other important balancing feedback that we don't have in there at the moment is reaction against carbon pricing. That probably is important given that you can have higher energy prices, but you cannot have them quickly. If you're raising carbon prices very, very quickly, you're probably going to get negative reactions to that and public opinion that will slow that down. We could definitely incorporate more of that into the model.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>It's on my mind these days, because I look around the world and it seems like reactionary backlash against progressive movement is very real.</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>We're clearly also no longer in a business-as-usual world. We have carbon policies in many countries, and we have accelerating reductions in the cost of energy technologies. What this model gets is spillover effects where you can drive down reduction in cost with just a little bit of policy. So if you do have reinforcing feedback loops, you don't necessarily need really fast climate policy to get some big reductions, potentially. </p><p>By acknowledging that you can have accelerations in directions you're not necessarily focused on, it can show where there are positive places; and clearly, things are stuck in some places as well at the moment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>The social cost of carbon is an attempt to put a number on the total economic damages wrought by a ton of carbon emissions. It’s useful, for example, if you're going to make climate policy; you need to know on some level how much it hurts to emit a ton of carbon so you can calibrate your cost-benefit analysis and whatever else. In trying to capture all the damages, you are inevitably getting into difficult-to-quantify areas like the worth of a species, the value of intact ecosystems, the value of a human life. The decisions you make on these fuzzy variables have practical real-world effects insofar as they show up in the social cost of carbon, so it matters quite a bit how you quantify these things. </p><p>There's been a lot of critique of the social cost of carbon lately on a couple of measures. One is that by the time you make all these value judgments, by the end, it's faux precision. The other general line of critique is that because certain things are so much easier to quantify than others, those are more likely to be incorporated in the social cost of carbon, and the things that are difficult to quantify tend to be on the damage side, so by restricting your vision to what you can quantify, you are undercounting the damages. </p><p>I'd love to hear you talk a little bit about the social cost of carbon and how you balance this.</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>Your point about undercounting is definitely true. There are effects of climate change that probably we are always going to be unable to put dollar values on: things like effects on conflict risk, loss of cultural heritage, migration. </p><p>In my head, it's always helpful to distinguish between the social cost of carbon – the number that we come up with that is legally defensible and can survive as it’s dragged through the courts, which is done as soon as the US government comes out with whatever number it's coming out with; we need to be able to go into court, to show defensively that this number came from sound scientific and economic processes that were transparent and other people can agree with them – and then the actual costs of climate change that are potentially and probably unboundedly large above that. </p><p>Those two things are not the same thing. But we can do the best job we can at the former, getting it as comprehensive and up-to-date and with as sound science as we can. Why wouldn't we do that? We spend an awful lot of time and money documenting climate change impacts, and the only formal way in which those get into considerations of climate policy and US regulatory analysis is via something like the social cost of carbon. It seems somewhat crazy to me that we would do a lot of this work on documenting what climate change impacts are and not make that final step of actually trying to incorporate it into regulatory analysis, as and when we can.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Even given all the uncertainties and fuzziness, it's better to have a number than not have a number.</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>Everyone is very willing to give you numbers on how costly climate policy is going to be, and how many jobs it’s going to cost, and how much it’s going to raise energy prices. It seems pretty important to have on the other side of that some well-done accounting on what we’re getting for this. Those numbers don't have to just be in dollar terms, which is what the social cost of carbon does. But that is the language in which a lot of policy operates. You're fighting from a losing position if you're not able to provide that measure of the benefits of these kinds of policies.</p><p>As a legitimate critique of exactly how this modeling has been done over the last 30 or so years, it's definitely fair to say these models got stuck at a certain place, in particular in terms of representing what we know about climate change damages. They were really not where we needed them to be to have real confidence that they're telling us about what we know about climate change damages. </p><p>But there's been a lot of work to fix that, some of which I've contributed to over the last 10 years. The US government is in the process of updating this number, and I think you'll see a lot of those benefits being reflected in the revised versions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Every critique I've ever heard of it from climate scientists says it's too low. It makes me think that there might be some danger in having this too-low figure getting stuck in practice.</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>It's good to recognize that it misses stuff. But also, if we had a global carbon tax of $50 per ton, which is what the current number is, we would be in a totally different place than we are right now. Maybe it's low, but even if we just took what we're currently counting seriously as a guide to policy, we'd be in a really different place. </p><p>It is not the fault of these models that we're not in that place. The models have been saying for a long time that the costs of climate change are real and are positive in the sense that we should be doing something about climate change. Then we get into debates around “is it high enough to justify 2°” or whatever, but that's not the place we're in right now in the policy sphere. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Another critique is that a lot of the key variables that produce the social cost of carbon are, at root, value questions. The famous example here is discount rates – how much do we value future costs and benefits relative to present day costs and benefits? There's a long literature of people arguing over what the right discount rate is, and in the end, there's no empirical way to resolve that argument. Ultimately, you are making a value judgment about how much we value the future. And what you decide that figure is absolutely shapes, in a very fundamental way, the values that you end up with. </p><p>Do you ever worry that we ought to be having that debate over values out in the open? In terms of values, do you worry that putting a precise number on it obscures the fact that there's a values debate at all?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>As you might have gathered, I tend to take a more practical view of the matter rather than get into philosophical debates. When people say “my personal value judgment is this” that's fine, and you can plug that into the FTC models and calculate what that does to the FCC, but as an input into regulatory analysis, the way in which we carry out these values debates is through government, through political engagement. When the EPA and the interagency working group come up with the social cost of carbon, they are applying these discount rates, which do represent something about how we're going to value the future under various different epistemic arguments, and that's part of our democratic decision-making process. It’s not divorced from that. Just because there are values involved doesn't mean that it's not something that belongs in policy, because policy is a representation of our values. So I don't really see the tension there, in terms of how it's actually applied.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>You wrote a recent comment in <em>Nature</em> with Zeke Hausfather that comes from a very different direction than your paper about the social determinants of climate change, but arrives at a very similar destination. Can you explain what that comment was about and the research it was describing?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>This was an accompanying comment on a recent paper by Malte Meinshausen, which looked at what countries have pledged for their net zero commitments. In that paper, they add them all up, estimate what that does in terms of emissions, and show that if fully realized, these long-term pledges get us really close to that 2° Paris Agreement target.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>That's a very big deal. It doesn’t seem like that news has really gotten out yet. </p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>I agree. When I give talks, I try to make sure to say that we're making progress. We're bending things. One thing economists often think about is that expectations are important; if businesses and investors and planners expect things to be going in a certain direction, then the capital allocations will flow accordingly. They bring themselves into actuality in some ways, although not fully, obviously. </p><p>What we did in our comment on this paper, and I have to give Zeke the vast majority of the credit for this, was to pull together not just the current Meinshausen study but also a number of other papers, including my paper that we've been talking about, that have also tried to look at probabilities of temperature outcomes under different emission scenarios by 2100. </p><p>There are a number of different approaches: some of those might just look at the effects of current policy; some might look at 2030 pledges; some are more fully probabilistic, like there's a recent study out of Resources for the Future that does some various expert elicitations combined with statistical modeling work to look at distributions of emissions and temperatures. Collectively, they do provide a much tighter temperature bound than if you were to just look at the range of, say, RCP scenarios.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>When you gather all these models up and average them out, what range of temperature can we reasonably say we are headed toward now?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>We find, and it matches what the other studies have found using very different methods, that we put a lot of probability math in this range between 2° and 3°. That can definitely go up, particularly on the high end, based on uncertainties in the climate system – so if we're more unlucky on carbon cycle feedbacks, or on what the climate sensitivity looks like, we could definitely be above 3°, even getting toward 4°. But the probability math right now is 2°-ish on the low end – maybe below that, depending on what happens with carbon capture, say – and then between 2° and 3°, essentially.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Ten or 20 years ago, 4° or 5° or 6°, even 8° were on the table. I don't know if there's common agreement on this, but I think once you're getting up above 4°, that's where you get into “does advanced human civilization persist?” type of questions, whereas between 2° and 3° is bad, but potentially non-catastrophic. </p><p>There was an IPCC paper that talked about the difference between 1.5° and 2° in very helpful, clear terms; I feel like we need that same thing for the gradations between 2° and 3°, because that now looks like where we're going. How are we supposed to feel about this, Fran? Are we supposed to be optimistic? happy? still filled with dread? What does “between 2° and 3°” <em>mean</em>?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>I think you have an appropriately nuanced and mixed set of feelings about this. The impacts we've seen so far, the extreme events – heat extremes, rainfall intensity extremes – that have even taken climate scientists by surprise are certainly enough, I think, to worry about at this range of 2° to 3°. But obviously, there would be an awful lot more to worry about if we saw we were getting up to 4° and 5° of warming by 2100. The fact that we can, with increasing confidence, start to rule out the really extreme rates of temperature increase is definitely good news. But there's plenty to worry about at this more moderate range of warming as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>It’s such a complicated thing to explain to a public.</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>That's why things like the social cost of carbon can be really helpful. It's designed to think about the margin – for that additional ton of carbon dioxide, how bad is it? You don't have to say “climate change is a disaster” or “it’s solved” – we're always going to be at this margin of “should we do more?” The social cost of carbon can help you balance that, recognizing that it's uncertain and there's a lot missing from it. In those real-world cases, where we’re in the middle somewhere and we should probably do more – but how much more? – it does help you. </p><p>The other point is that, given this increasing sense from various directions in the literature that we can narrow down this range of warming, that should be informing what our climate modeling looks like and what these climate impact studies are doing. We have a lot that look at RCP 8.5, which we think is probably quite unlikely now; we have a lot that look at lower levels of warming; and we need something more in-between if we're going to start providing serious advice to planners and governments about adaptation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>One of the big debates in climate science is how to treat what are called “tail risks” – ends of the spectrum where you have low probability but extremely high-impact possibilities. Martin Weitzman's work famously made the case that we’re misleading ourselves when we make policy based on the middle of the bell curve; we need to be making policy based on foreclosing these risks, because even if it's a small risk, the catastrophe would be so complete that in a sense, it’s worth almost anything to avoid it. </p><p>In the context of that argument, it looks like our modeling is reducing those tails, at the very least. So how should we think about tail risks? Is the possibility of 4° or higher low enough at this point that I, as an average citizen, should breathe a sigh of relief? Or is it still high enough that it activates these Weitzman-y do-anything-to-avoid-it reactions? </p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>When I think about Weitzman’s writing on things like fat tails and the more catastrophic end of climate damages, the importance there is on the distribution of damages. That is both about emissions and what the climate system does, but in my looking at these systems and what drives damages and models like the social cost of carbon, what's even more important is, what does temperature do to human society and the things we care about? The tails on that, I think, are really large. That is not super well-constrained. You can get quite heavy probability mass at some quite large damages at moderate levels of warming under plausible scenarios of just how sensitive human systems are to changes in climate. </p><p>Even if we think we're narrowing in the temperature range, that’s not giving us a huge amount of confidence in that we’re not necessarily narrowing in on constraining the damages, because the uncertainty bounds on those are still really enormous – for some people. These are not distributed equitably. There are going to be catastrophic consequences of this level of warming for some communities, perhaps many communities. So when we look at that distribution, we don't treat it as just a central estimate. We do look at a full uncertainty and that uncertainty is large. That right tail does pull out the mean. </p><p>The question of how exactly that translates into policy is, again, a values question. How much you weight these unlikely but very bad outcomes is essentially a question of risk aversion and preferences over risk, in the same way that the discount rate is about preferences over time. That's something that can operate through the political system as well. Just trying to keep that uncertainty and that full distribution in the regulatory analysis as far as possible is good, although those processes do tend to be relatively adverse to uncertainty.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>To summarize: the work we've done so far to address climate change and the work we’ve done so far in climate modeling has somewhat narrowed the possible range of outcomes, so there's some comfort to take in that; but on the flip side, the remaining uncertainty about damages to society and at least the possibility of truly large and catastrophic damage to society are still very much there, so there's no reason to reduce our sense of urgency about policy. Is that fair?</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>Yes, I think that's true. If you look at even just the social cost of carbon we have right now, we're so far short of it. Even that by itself, you don't even need to get to a fat tail; we should definitely be doing more than we're doing right now on a purely cost-benefit basis. We're definitely in a place where we're going to get benefits by doing more. Once we do a lot more, we can argue about that margin, but right now, the net benefits are definitely in terms of more ambition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Well, that seems like a great place to close. Thanks so much for coming on. And thanks for all your research.</p><p><strong>Fran Moore:</strong></p><p>Thanks so much for the great questions.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-fran-moore-on-how-to</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:53079351</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 30 May 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/53079351/1ad1057bcc12484c84c5b549ab519ea6.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3735</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/53079351/2aa0ac539aea059ebd0802fd49ae2b8f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Nan Ransohoff on how (and why) Stripe is kick-starting the carbon-removal market]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Nan Ransohoff, head of carbon at Stripe, discusses the company's new spinoff, Frontier, which will pool money from partners and make it available to early contenders in the carbon dioxide removal (CDR) market. We chat about that market, the technologies that show promise in it, in the role of private industry in accelerating it.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-nan-ransohoff-on-how</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:52859477</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 28 Nov 2022 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/52859477/bd22d364a7c8b7bc48e7f3a91329e026.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2582</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/52859477/17e0e897cf8514a722437290b0a0db72.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Michael Terrell on Google's pursuit of 24/7 clean energy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Google’s director of energy, Michael Terrell, explains the company's new goal of supplying all of its facilities with clean energy 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. We discuss how its going, what kinds of new technologies will be needed, and what new policies could help move things along.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-michael-terrell-on</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:52653850</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 28 Nov 2022 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/52653850/b9927296ca072daa69fa4cfffe802501.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3123</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/52653850/59cb25b4d95b1d0e651bcd3acdf24d95.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Horace Luke on decarbonizing the world's two-wheelers]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, I discussed swappable, rechargeable batteries in two-wheeled electric scooters with Horace Luke, the CEO of Gogoro. Luke’s company is selling subscriptions to batteries in bustling emerging-market cities like Taiwan. We talked about consumer requirements for swappable batteries, the other kinds of technologies that might use them, and his plans for expansion.</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Horace Luke, April 22, 2022</p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/7b5gf2w519ovelz/volts22.04.22%28horace.luke%29.pdf?dl=0">PDF version</a>)</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Electric vehicles are all the rage these days, but at least here in the western world, most of the attention has focused on four-wheeled passenger vehicles, first Tesla and then all the companies trying to catch up with Tesla. However, across the globe, more than 50 percent of commute miles are undertaken on two-wheelers — scooters, mopeds, and the like. China, India, and Indonesia alone contain more than 500 million two-wheelers; anyone who has visited big cities in those countries has seen the vehicles swarming the streets.</p><p>And they are dirty as hell. Their two-stroke motors emit as much as five times the pollutants of the average new car in the US. Millions of people have died from two-wheeler pollution, to say nothing of the climate impacts.</p><p>But two-wheelers are difficult to electrify. Their owners tend not to have extra cash; theft is a constant danger; and urban density makes plugging in, especially in a place sheltered from the elements, difficult.</p><p>Today’s guest, Horace Luke, set out to solve this problem with his company Gogoro, founded in 2011. The idea was simple: consumers would own the scooters, but Gogoro would own the batteries, which would be made available in stations across the urban fabric, such that riders could easily find one to swap. Consumers would subscribe to the service, effectively ensuring that they would always have a charged battery available. </p><p>The company took a different course than he expected — Gogoro ended up building its own scooters, stations, and batteries, doing far more hardware than the software-minded Luke had originally envisioned — but his persistence won out and the model is taking off, preparing to expand from Taiwan (where it started) to a range of other burgeoning megacities in emerging economies. </p><p>It’s a clever model, a mental shift that opens up all kinds of new possibilities, so I was excited to chat with Luke about the problem of two-wheelers, the consumer experience of subscribing to Gogoro, and the other kinds of things, outside of transportation, that cities might be able to do with thousands of distributed, swappable batteries. </p><p>So without further ado, welcome, Horace Luke, to Volts. Thanks for coming. </p><p><strong>Horace Luke:</strong></p><p>Thanks, David. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I'm so taken by this whole idea. Tell us a little bit about the problem of two-wheelers: where they are, how dirty they are, and how big a part of the climate problem they are.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Most of the people in the audience probably don't realize that more than 50 percent of all commute miles done globally every day are done on two-wheelers.</p><p>While we in the United States look at it as more of a recreational or very short-distance commute, in the East – Vietnam, Thailand, China, India, Indonesia – you can't cross the street without being hit by one if you’re not careful. They're just everywhere. In China, India, and Indonesia alone, there are more than 500 million two-wheelers roaming around every day – taking people to school, to work, to the market. They are the absolute utility dependency vehicle that people look for when they're moving around town, and people on average ride somewhere between 300-700 miles a month. </p><p>Unfortunately, because of the economics of it, the chance of them being clean is not very high. When compared to a gasoline vehicle in, let’s say, California, there are five times more pollutants coming out of the tailpipe per kilometer, easily. On top of that, you have people not using premium fuel and other carelessness that makes owning a two-wheel vehicle extremely polluting. </p><p>On top of that, they're usually being used in densely populated cities where thousands of people are living on top of each other. If you're walking down the street, you can definitely smell them, you can feel the heat from them. It is a central problem that we need to solve.</p><p>I grew up on the west coast of the United States. I worked for Microsoft, where I was one of the original founders of Xbox, then eventually was fortunate enough to lead the Windows XP user experience and product experience side of the business. Eventually I moved to Taiwan, where I worked for a company called High Tech Computer (now HTC). I created some of the world’s first Android phones – the T-Mobile myTouch, the Verizon Droid – and was pretty successful there. </p><p>At age 40 I was traveling around Asia, thinking, “I made that company number one in the world, shipping 43 million phones a year – now what? As the world is moving to 5G and then to 6G and beyond, is that really the end game? Is human computing to make humans more efficient and more productive really the way of the future, or is sustainability?” </p><p>So I picked sustainability. I think that this is the decade of sustainability. Mobility plays a huge role within that, and trying to figure out how to get the eastern hemisphere to adopt electric was the essential problem that we needed to solve. With Gogoro, we did that. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So cities are choked with these two-wheelers, which have some of the dirtiest engines possible, and you're trying to think about how to solve this problem. One way would just be to go electric, the same thing we've been doing with cars. Why isn't that the intuitive solution, to make electric versions of these scooters?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>In most areas of the world where two-wheelers are massively adopted, people live in stacked apartment buildings. Thousands and thousands of people live on top of each other, and these vehicles are being parked on the side of the road in a very ad hoc kind of way. You've got nowhere to park, so you really don't have a solution for nighttime charging. </p><p>During the daytime commute, some technologies are emerging for fast charging – something like 10-15 minutes for about a 50 percent charge. Maybe that's doable, but in a two-wheeler, you don't have the comfort of a sofa, you don't have a stereo system, you don't have an environment where you're protected against the natural elements. If you're in line in front of me and somebody else is in front of you, we're talking 30-45 minutes exposed to rain, to heat, to sun. That just makes it almost impossible. </p><p>Plus there’s the economics of it. You've got batteries, you've got a fast charger – now you're trying to figure out how much the vehicle actually costs. By removing the battery from that purchase equation, we help the user adopt the electric solution much quicker. Instead of buying the battery and charging it yourself, you stop by one of our GoStation battery swapping stations and just swap out the battery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Back in 2011 when you first started Gogoro, did this vision – that you take the battery out of the scooter and make the batteries interchangeable, a quick swap rather than having the consumer own the battery – just come to you in a flash? Is that what the company has always been about? </p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>The company has always been about that. We started the company with 27 desks; we were thinking that we were a software company helping to create the algorithm and efficiency of swapping and managing these batteries. One thing we knew was that how and when you charge the batteries is very important to managing their lifespan. If you're starting a company thinking about sustainability, it's not about greenwashing or riding the electric hype – it’s about how you take the resources and minerals that are out of the ground today and extend the lifetime of use for as long as possible. </p><p>That's the thesis from which we started. Then we were looking for people to build the vehicle, build the motor, build the station, etc. To be honest, it sounds like a broken record – a lot of companies start very small and eventually find out “hey, that's something nobody can do, so let's go do that.”</p><p>Now we're fully stacked, we build our own smart batteries. We took the technology that we did with smartphones and we turned it upside down. Think of our battery as a smartphone that doesn't have a big screen on it. We took the ability to update and wirelessly connect and created perhaps the world's most powerful little battery that can power two- and three-wheelers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So you eventually got into making the scooters, the batteries, and the battery banks that the batteries are stored in, just because you couldn't find anybody else to do it any better.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Absolutely. I have this policy in our company where you ask twice, and if you ask three times, that means that you should have done it yourself. The first time you ask somebody “hey, can you help me with this?” and they're like “no, that's kind of impossible,” then you go to the second guy. And if they say, “you’re crazy, you can’t make that happen, that energy density is not something we can do” – if our science and our math work out that you could, we try and do it ourselves. </p><p>So we built the world's most powerful and dense small, compact motor for mobility today, a tiny little motor that powers about 7 kilowatts, about 10 horsepower. It's a replacement of the popular 125cc or so. </p><p>We've got our own batteries, we've got our own station, we even design our own charger. We subcontract out the bidirectional inverter that's in our station today. We even geek out on tires; a lot of energy is lost on tires. I sit down with the team to look at the compound of the tread pattern, the profile of the tire, so that we can save energy on tires to go as far as we can go. </p><p>We're a curious bunch that just want to make electric mobility a possibility in these big cities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>If I'm a citizen of Taiwan and I need a scooter for my business or my personal life, what is the consumer experience like? What do I do, where do I go, what do I sign up for, what do I buy?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>By the way, in Taiwan, there are 14 million two-wheelers on the ground for a population of slightly more than 22 million people. If you don't count old and young people, you literally have a vehicle per person.</p><p>Before 2015, when we launched our first vehicle, electric solutions were less than 1 percent of the overall sold in Taiwan. (In comparison, Tesla in the United States is about 3-4 percent.) We ended last year with about 26 percent in Taipei; in the overall market, we're somewhere between 12-13 percent. </p><p>What's amazing is that our battery-swapping system accounts for 90-95 percent of all the electric vehicles. So we not only grew the market ten times, but at the same time we became the de facto standard when it comes to people adopting electric. That’s because we partner people not only with our own brand vehicle, but also with Yamaha, Suzuki Taiwan, Aeon, and PGO.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So if I'm going to replace my vehicle with an electric and I want to use the Gogoro battery system, I have different brands of scooters to choose from that can all accommodate your battery.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, not only brand but design and functionality. Think of us as the Android of EV, or the Windows and Intel of computing. We're 47 different models across 10 different brands, so lots of shops around town.</p><p>You choose the horsepower and design you like, you choose the form factor, you choose the brand, because at the end of the day each has different performance and different affinity to the brand. You buy the vehicle, and then you subscribe to our battery swapping system. </p><p>The subscription is kind of like a mobile operator plan, for those of us who are old enough to remember those. You used to have fixed minutes and fixed messaging; you buy the bundle pack up front and the more you buy, the less you pay for overage per minute or per message. Same thing with us. We have plans ranging from all-you-can-ride, where you pay and you can go crazy and ride all you want. Or you can buy a little bit, start with something like $10 and about 60 miles, and then anything more than that you pay per kilometer on overage. The more you pay up front per month, the more you get. We even have carryover miles, just like you had carryover minutes. We apply the mobile operator model to battery swapping usability.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>If you translate it into American dollars, what is an average monthly fee?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>The average monthly fee starts from about $10. You get about 60 miles, or 100 kilometers, and for every kilometer (or 0.6 mile) overage, you pay about three pennies or so. Then you find yourself snapping to the next plan, which is about $16-$17, and for that, you get a little more kilometers on a pre-bundle. And you just keep going up on the mileage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So I've got the subscription, I'm riding around with one of your batteries, I'm getting low, I look for a battery bank – what do these things look like? What's the user experience of swapping a battery? How long does it take? And how common are these battery banks, how easy are they to find?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>In Taiwan, we've been going at this for almost seven years, and we are now at about 2,200 locations. In the metropolitan area, we're more dense than gas stations. By the end of this year, we will definitely have more locations than there are gas stations across the island. </p><p>We have slightly more than 11,000 cabinets. Think of them as ATM machines or vending machines. We put them in places like convenience stores, cafes, universities, train stations, bus stations, supermarkets. Instead of gas stations, where you need a huge plot of land with a safe circumference around it, we can place them underneath your apartment building, wherever is most convenient for people.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>They're common enough that if I'm running low, there's probably one close by.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Literally, you're within a quarter mile from each one. The average distance that our consumer rides is about 40-50 miles, so they swap maybe every 3.5 days or so. Range-wise, we’re about 60-70 percent of gasoline vehicles, but with a lot more convenience than the gasoline vehicle. </p><p>We can swap out batteries in less than a couple of seconds. But when we do that, people think our system is broken, that we didn't do the bill right or we spit out the wrong battery.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>So I lift up the seat, I pull out the battery, and I put it in one of the empty holes in the bank. When I put it in, does the system know it's me somehow? How is it tied to my account?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>We wanted to make that user experience as seamless as possible. One of the things that we absolutely needed to do is to make it so much better than gasoline from a user experience perspective, so that people would want to switch over. </p><p>So no credit card, no phone, nothing needed. You put your battery in, and because our battery has NFC on it, it carries your credentials – who you are, how many kilometers you’ve ridden. You put your battery in and it calculates whether you paid your bill, how much is needed for this time, how you rode and how much energy you used, then picks the right battery and spits a new one out for you that is fully charged. </p><p>That battery is then programmed for you. So if I stole your battery from your vehicle and I put it in my vehicle, it won't work. The security system is tied to you. Essentially, you can feel confident having these expensive batteries in your vehicle; it won't be stolen because it just simply doesn't work. A stolen good is no good if you can’t resell or reuse it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>You're cutting out theft at a stroke there.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>You're cutting out theft on the battery; you’re also cutting out theft on vehicles. If I go to your desk and steal your key and ride your vehicle away, you just call our customer center and say, “Somebody stole my bike, can you put an alert on your network?” We put an alert on the network, so when the guy that stole your bike puts a battery in to swap, that battery is locked. Your vehicle handle lock is locked, so all you can do is push the vehicle in circles. And we know exactly where it is, so we can send a guy out to pick up the bike. There literally has been no theft on our network, because you can't steal it. Even if you steal it and you don't swap, you're talking about a circumference of no more than 60 miles. </p><p>When a consumer takes a loan out from the bank, the bank gives a low rate because the system can be locked. If the guy doesn't pay his bill, we know exactly how to lock the battery or slow down the vehicle. If you don't pay your bill on time, we don't lock your vehicle right away; we make it go really slow first, so you can go to the bank. </p><p>There are a lot of interesting bits that we've been able to do with the system, and it's just a bunch of us sitting around the table adding feature upon feature. Think of it as a smartphone, except with wheels on it, that’s electric. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>These batteries you make are modular, so you could theoretically have a vehicle that requires two or three or four or more. You can imagine a lot of different vehicle form factors. What are the varieties that are out there now using your batteries? </p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>We're working with Yadea in China to ship low-cost e-bikes that use a single battery, but the speed is not great. It’s like 17-18 miles per hour top speed; that's a regulation in China. That battery can go pretty much forever, a really long distance.</p><p>In Taiwan we have one that is about 50cc, a single battery. But the most popular vehicle in Taiwan, or across Asia, is 100-125cc, and that requires two batteries. We also have three-wheelers that we ship now with two vehicle makers; one is more just a quick last-mile delivery vehicle – think of it as Pizza Hut or Domino’s – and that's a three-wheeler with two batteries. We also have a vehicle maker that’s building a wet market big utility three-wheeler that uses four batteries. </p><p>We recently announced the world's first solid-state battery prototype for swappable batteries. That added about 40 percent energy density into our battery pack. As energy density increases, form factor variety can increase. To swap batteries on a four-wheeler today, you might have to swap out eight of them, and that’s kind of exhausting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I imagine once you get up to four you're spending a lot of time swapping.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Anything more than a six-pack is a little troubling. As energy density gets up to, let’s say, 3 kilowatt hours, now we're talking about ability to create a variety of different form factors. </p><p>Our system is also interoperable, so our battery can be placed into a Yamaha vehicle, and the one that's shipped with the Yamaha can be placed into the Gogoro vehicle and the Suzuki Taiwan vehicle. </p><p>We've had three generations of batteries, three generations of stations, refining, working out all that needs to work out in the system. But the very first vehicle can use the latest battery, and vice versa – the very latest vehicle, that literally just shipped yesterday, can use the very first battery. And we've now manufactured 1 million batteries, so it's really a scale in numbers. As we get more and more vehicles and batteries out in the network, the more efficient it gets. </p><p>If you go on our website, you'll see our vehicles are fun, colorful, and very eye-catching. The reason why we made them eye-catching is because, unlike a smartphone that you put in your pocket, every vehicle in the intersection is an advertisement. We wanted people to realize “hey, that guy's using something new, that guy is adopting electric, that's pretty cool.” We wanted to build that momentum as we built up the population of vehicles on the ground.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>You've recently had a few experiments using the batteries in other urban things that need low, constant power, like parking meters. Is that a big direction you want to go, or just a side benefit at this point?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Again going back to the word “sustainability,” it’s about taking whatever you need out of the earth. It's not about wearing nothing, eating nothing, sitting there with nothing. It's about the world becoming modernized, safer, smarter, and more efficient, attracting people coming into the cities of tomorrow. </p><p>Our batteries are great for their first life, which is you and me grabbing onto each other and zipping a bike up a mountain, going out for a ride. At some point in the future, the battery can no longer propel such a heavy vehicle with the energy demand that a vehicle needs. Instead of retiring those batteries and recycling them, we find a second use for them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>In cars I know that's once you degrade it down to about 80 percent of original capacity. Is that roughly the same for two-wheelers?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Roughly the same. The energy demand of the battery on a two-wheeler is actually much higher than that of a four-wheeler. It's just the sheer amount of energy you have in your car. Your vehicle is probably 70-80 kilowatt hours; we have literally 3.4 kilowatt hours to propel you and your friends up a hill. It’s called a C-rate; the discharge rate coming out of a little battery is much higher. The draw on the battery is much more demanding. </p><p>Now, that said, once it retires at 80 percent, what are we going to do with these batteries to extend the life instead of recycling them? One of the things it’s great for is portable swappable power. You mentioned the smart parking pole. We're doing a couple thousand smart parking poles in Taiwan this year as a pilot. Just like we piloted our battery swapping system for scooters back in 2015, we're piloting a swappable battery system for smart poles. </p><p>A city like Taipei is not very orderly. In order to create parking poles, to get organized, it's not like you just paint on the ground and say “you park here.” You have to try and find ways to penalize and also charge people money for it. So we are putting our batteries into the smart parking pole that does not require you to dig up the ground and draw power from the ground; you just use the battery and we swap it out every 27 days or so. In a matter of hours, a non-monitored street can become a smart street. </p><p>As we think about all these batteries, there is going to be a lot of opportunity to not only turn smart devices to be powered on in cities, but also, as we most recently announced, a power backup. In a place like Taipei or other cities across India and in Southeast Asia, rolling blackouts are common, and the most dangerous part about rolling blackouts is an intersection. We're working to develop a system where we use our battery to back up the streetlights for three hours. Again, swappable power – coming up to three hours, we go and swap those batteries out so it continues to operate the intersection safely. </p><p>Everything from crosswalks to red, yellow, green lights, we're able to help cities become smarter and safer. Those are the extended uses that can continue the lifespan of that battery for another half a decade to a decade, easy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So you can use them all the way up before you recycle them.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>To give you a philosophy of how we think, the other day we were sitting around a table going “okay, now we got second life figured out – what's third life? What do we do with it before recycling?” Wouldn't it be great to power education in places like the slums of Mumbai, where the family is not able to access energy for cooking and it results in wood stove burning or garbage burning in order to cook? Imagine these batteries are now fully exhausted when it comes to depreciation, when it comes to the cost of these batteries. If we can do that before we recycle, that would just light me up. That's something that we want to do to further humanity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>One of the really interesting aspects of this network to me is that you're not primarily putting the computing power and intelligence and tracking in the scooters; you're putting them in the batteries. The batteries are the smart part of this. With batteries going in and out of all these different scooters and banks, you're gathering an immense amount of information. What is the intelligence making the batteries smart? What does that allow you to learn about what your customers are doing, and what does it allow you to offer in terms of features?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Think of the battery as really a smartphone. It can collect as well as it can dispatch. </p><p>You're absolutely right, there's an immense amount of effort that we pay attention to when it comes to machine learning and AI and control systems on the backend side. When we want to upgrade a swapping station, we literally do a FOTA (firmware-over-the-air update) to all our stations, and from there we can update the battery; the battery can carry a package and update the vehicle. </p><p>With consumer consent, we can add features. A couple of months ago we rolled out “rain mode” for our consumers. By looking at the weather report in the area that you happen to be at with your phone, it will say “hey, it looks like it's raining outside, do you want to turn your vehicle on with rain mode today instead of the regular high-power mode?”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Rain mode is just a little slower and safer?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>It’s basically less torque, less jerk when it comes to the rear wheel so you don't slip when you accelerate. That feature wasn't available on the first day, but over time, we continue to add features to the vehicle. All consumers have to do is say “I want it” and all of a sudden the vehicle is updated with the battery pack.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Those come with a subscription price? You get those updates as long as you're a subscriber? </p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>We try to get the consumer as many updates as possible. It puts a smile on their face.</p><p>That vehicle will sing “Happy Birthday” to you on your birthday. If I bought a vehicle secondhand from you, David, the second I registered, my server knows that I now own the vehicle and my birthday is in May instead of your birthday, and it’ll sing “Happy Birthday” to me on the right day. Little delights that you put in there because it’s a connected system. </p><p>The vehicle data is also collected by the battery and in turn, taken back to the swap station and fed back to the cloud. We know how you use the vehicle, how much you deplete the battery, how often you swap. Those are all data that we use to make your experience better so that you can predict when you're going to go to the next station, how much energy you're going to bring back, and what's most likely your preference of battery – do you care about durability, or do you care about high performance and thrust?  </p><p>On top of that, recently we launched our usage-based insurance. The first step is through mileage, but eventually what we want to work toward is, if you are a safe rider – you turn on your blinkers all the time before you make a turn, you don't hard brake on your vehicle – we would like to know that data so that we can collect it and give it to the insurance company on your behalf so you can save on your insurance premium. Those are things that a connected system can do that other people cannot.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>This seems like an immense amount of data exposure. Can customers opt out entirely? How do you safeguard privacy?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Absolutely.  We don’t take your GPS location of where you park your vehicle unless you grant us access to it. We all came from working on smartphones, so you can only imagine the scrutiny that my team and I are well aware of and practice every day. We only do it with the consumer’s consent. Everything from subscribing to the battery to letting us know where you swap or letting us know where you park is with user permission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Is this the kind of thing, though, that's buried somewhere in a long agreement that I just click “yes” to in the process of subscribing? Or is there something more granular and in your face? </p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Take a look at the insurance one. Without you granting us permission to work with the insurance company specifically on that feature, we do not do it. We do not take your data and share it anywhere else. </p><p>That said, though, we do look at whether or not your vehicle tipped. For example, if your vehicle crashed or you dropped it on the left side, our gyro sensor inside the vehicle registers. That's not for the insurance company, but for our workshop. By the time it can come in and the guy takes your wireless key – or our latest vehicle uses an NFC card so you don't even need a user key – we swipe the NFC card, your log comes up in the service center and sees that you tipped your vehicle on the left side and the mechanic needs to pay more attention to the left side of the vehicle to make sure that the brake lever has not been bent, make sure that everything is in tip-top shape on the left side of the vehicle. It's for customer safety, but within a confined use. Not really related to privacy, but related to safety and servicing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>We've become familiar in the tech space with platforms, networks, and the way that the first mover company can get these network effects that make it very difficult for competitors to come in. Facebook is the classic example of this. If I'm imagining all these different vehicles from all these different brands, but everyone's using your batteries connected to your central banks and with your information, that looks a little bit like a monopoly. How do you not abuse that power? Is it possible for other networks to come in and compete?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Oh, absolutely. You ask a really good question. The first thing we need to do is make sure that we practice with fairness and with the consumer’s interest first and foremost. To be honest with you, the company today is EBITA positive, but at the same time, we are still losing money to build out the technology and build out the investment it needs for the network. We're 95 percent market share because of how fast we've built it out and how much we've built out in Taiwan alone. </p><p>That said, though, we have to make sure that the consumer always has a pricing grandfather ability. When you buy a vehicle, if you don't change your plan, your cost of owning that vehicle remains the same until the end of that vehicle's life. We maintain that to make sure that the consumer feels like they're not being strung along in any sense. That's the first thing that we need to make sure we do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>You don't raise subscription rates on individual consumers in the middle of their subscription.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke: </strong> </p><p>Exactly. We raise it, however, because our cost does go up – electricity costs go up, or recently with electronics components, everybody's well aware of the inflation that's happening globally. Prices do go up on components and costs of us running the network, so we grandfather the existing customer, but we raise it for new customers instead. As a consumer comes in, they can feel confident that what they signed up for is what they get. That's really important.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>That is great that you do that. But if you have 95 percent market share, maybe someday you retire and a less benevolent CEO takes over – what would stop them from changing that policy, once you've got everybody locked into the network? That’s the whole problem with a monopoly. </p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Will I retire one day? Probably in the distant future.</p><p>We enable a plan on our network called the Flex Plan. When you're looking on your phone for a charge station, we have an app that shows you all the stations and, more importantly, shows you which stations are stressed and which stations have extra energy that is ready to be distributed, and for that we’ll give you a discount. We will continue to invest in things that allow the consumer to have flexibility, to in some way game the system so that they can get it even cheaper if they want. </p><p>Our company is about 2,000 people at the moment, about 100-200 in the management team and the back office, and the engineers make up about another 400 or so. The culture is so strong. We have a slogan that says “do good, do well, and have fun doing.” </p><p>So “do good” is the first thing we need to do. Not just about sustainability, but we need to do good as far as building something that's fair, something that's great for the consumer to have. Brand credibility is all we’ve got. The second that people say “hey, you know what, this guy has me strong-armed,” the escape cost of getting out of that vehicle is only a couple hundred bucks. It's the residual value on the vehicle. So it's not hard for a consumer to get out. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I could get out of your network, but are there competing networks? Are there other companies even trying to do this? Is there another swappable two-wheeler battery that I could go to if I for whatever reason wanted to leave Gogoro?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>In Taiwan there is another company, created by the largest gas vehicle maker in Taiwan, that has built up their network. They continue to do promotions to attract consumers to go over to their side, to the point where they were offering free rides. Literally you can swap batteries for free. You just buy the vehicle and only have to pay a dollar for subscription. </p><p>You mentioned network effect; network effect is both from a business perspective and also from a convenience and user experience perspective. We have so many batteries in so many stations on the ground today that although the other guys are cheaper and more aggressive when it comes to throwing dollars at it, at the end of the day, it's not just about how much you're charging the consumer; it’s about the value the consumer gets.</p><p>That's an important part that people need to understand – we're not competing dollar for dollar. Giving something away only lasts so long, but we have to create a user experience that is so unique, that is so much a game changer when it comes to owning a mobility solution that you can say, “I want that.” “Want” doesn’t mean it's a dollar amount; “want” is something that is more emotional. It’s heartstrings that we are plucking in Taiwan, and it’s definitely worked very well so far. </p><p>In addition to that, we also created probably one of the most efficient ridesharing networks, called GoShare, on our system. So our platform not only allows for that user experience when you own the vehicle, but we have about 6,000 vehicles rolling around Taiwan today that allow the consumers to use an app, kind of like Bird and Lime, short term rental. But the difference is there is no range anxiety, because we have so many swapping stations in the network that the consumer just picks up a vehicle and at the beginning of the ride or mid-ride, they can swap out a battery. We've had people take a vehicle for two days and ride around the island of Taiwan. </p><p>More than 70 percent of refueling on our ridesharing network is swapped by the consumer. Think of it as a hotel room that cleans itself. The maintenance cost is really low, the OPEX cost is really low, and it allows the consumer the identical user experience as the vehicle they own. Maybe this time they're hanging out with friends to go drinking, so they don't want to ride their own vehicle; they ride one of our GoShares to the bar, and on the way back ride a taxi or hail an Uber instead. It allows for a lot of flexibility when it comes to what we call a platform to enable a number of solutions on the market.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>So ridesharing is built into the whole model, in addition to ownership.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Exactly. We have an overlap of consumers. People that buy our vehicles love riding a Gogoro, love swapping batteries as a means of refueling, and then they just sign up to GoShare and off they go. Same user experience, same type of vehicle, except sometimes you ride your own, sometimes you rideshare when there's one on the street next to you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>An EV fleet is an enormous amount of distributed energy storage, and in the US there’s a lot of talk about trying to hook those batteries up to the grid such that they could, in addition to serving their primary purpose, also be relied on for grid stability – store excess energy in them when you need to, take energy from them when you have a shortage. </p><p>It occurs to me that these battery banks that you have all over Taiwan are all themselves big batteries, so you are building yourself a giant distributed storage network. Are you talking to grid operators, trying to hook those things up to the grid such that they could serve this ancillary purpose of grid stability? It seems like it would be incredibly useful for the grid, in theory.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>That's something that we've been working on and prototyping with a grid provider here in Taiwan. The stations that you see on our website are bidirectional ready. Today in our network we have close to about 200 megawatt hours of batteries on the grid at any time.</p><p>Whatever EV you’re talking about – a Tesla, a Porsche, a Bolt – it’s a battery that is not owned by the provider and doesn't come home often. It's the consumer's choice. The difference is, we actually have that battery back on the rack every couple of days. At any time we have close to about 200 megawatt hours of batteries literally on the rack. </p><p>We're working on things like being bidirectional, so when the grid needs it, we can push that energy back to the provider, _____ charging of energy. We’re also working with Enel X, the world's largest virtual power plant provider, to do demand response. So the grid performance is at about 65 Hertz; all of a sudden, we see a surge coming, people need to stop. Whoever can stop gets paid, and our stations can instantaneously swap the stop, all of them. We're able to then participate in that model. </p><p>Extra revenue from that today is not very meaningful; we're still developing the technology. But one day it could be. As we become the de facto standard and massively deploy the batteries that we're talking about, that revenue stream can become very meaningful.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>With EVs, like you say, with every consumer owning their own battery, the big challenge to vehicle-to-grid coordination is the coordination itself, those soft costs of trying to network everyone together and coordinate and talk with everyone about what they're willing to do. But you have that problem solved out of the box – all your batteries are already connected, you're already in communication with all of them, so it's primed and ready to hook up to the grid.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>Also, for example, about a month and a half ago Taiwan had a huge blackout; 40 percent of all households experienced a power outage. During that time, most of our stations, except the very early ones, can back up energy anywhere from 48 to 64 hours. Even if there's no power, it can still swap out a battery. </p><p>Battery-to-battery charging is something that we're working on, so that eventually somebody can say “hey, you don't have extra energy, I'm going to put it back on the station so that somebody else gets to have enough energy to go pick up their kids and go home.”</p><p>I always say to my team that energy is at the center of all human innovation. The fact that you and I are talking to each other on a podcast, the fact that we get to record it, the fact that I have earbuds on, it all has to do with energy. If we think of what Gogoro is making as portable, distributed, connected, smart energy units, and mobility being just one part of it, and smart cities being another, the limit is on the imagination on what we can do with it. </p><p>It sounds weird, but everything you mentioned, I'm working on. It really is just a matter of focus and getting it done. Stations that have batteries can do demand response to the grid, can do battery-to-battery charging that can take two half-charged batteries and provide one fully charged one. We can also have stations and ___ charging that energy back to the grid. </p><p>In Taiwan today, ___ charging doesn't make a lot of money, but if you ever deploy in Brazil, ___charging can be as much as 30:1. I can buy energy at $1 and at the right time sell it back up to $30 for a kilowatt hour. There's a huge amount of opportunity for us to do good and provide a modern, safe, connected energy system that powers mobility; at the same time, the business needs to be sustainable. If we can create a sustainable business that actually does sustainability, everything then makes sense. </p><p>Too many times I find companies that are trying to do greenwashing or riding on the sustainability trend, but when you look at the mathematics, it just doesn't work. Unit economics on a business, it has to fundamentally work, and if you look at what Gogoro is today, every individual that comes on the network is contribution margin positive on our battery swapping network.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Also, every increment of cost decline you get in batteries, you're not just doing the things batteries were doing more cheaply, you are opening up new applications, new ways to use them. I've been waiting a long time for both solar generation and energy storage to get so small and modular and cheap and ubiquitous that they're infused throughout the city. Then, like you said, you could let your imagination run. What can you do with a city that has energy storage infused throughout?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>That's exactly what we're working on. Having these stations placed almost at a frequency of ATM stations across town, and being able to have these energy stores accessible literally within seconds by the consumer, makes turning over to smart, connected electric a lot easier than if you are demanding somebody to charge and have to sit out there in the rain and wait for it.</p><p>I own an electric vehicle, too, a four-wheeler, as well as several Gogoros. Charging and sitting inside a car is easy because you can plug it in and you can do email, you can listen to music, I even watch a movie sometimes. But that luxury or that privilege cannot be had with the masses. </p><p>I still remember, when I was growing up, I had a poster of the Lamborghini Countach, my dream car. Today, what the next generation has on the wall is the Tesla Roadster or the Porsche Taycan. How many people can actually own a Lamborghini Countach? Not many. And how many people in emerging countries can own the Tesla Roadster or the Porsche Taycan? Again, probably, not very many. But definitely the trend of electric is here to stay. </p><p>As you think about us pivoting to this decade or two decades of electric mobility and sustainability, these young folks now in their teens are going to grow up to be the decisionmakers of tomorrow. If they can access these vehicles that are even cooler than a plug-in charging two-wheeler, a four-wheeler, wouldn't that be cool? That is the market that we're going after, a market that has half a billion installed in Asia, getting ready to pivot to electric. </p><p>In Taiwan, for example, where there are 14 million vehicles on the road, government a couple of weeks ago made an announcement that by 2040, no gasoline vehicles can be sold, so that by 2050, all vehicles on the road will be electric. And there are milestones to that: in 2030, 35 percent; 2035, 70 percent; 2040, 100 percent of what’s sold has to be electric.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Speaking of the future, you recently announced a prototype solid-state battery, which is much more energy dense; you can fit a lot more energy into your battery. Everything we've been talking about that you could do with this distributed energy storage would be ramped up and accelerated if you got a 30-50 percent bump in your energy density. How close is that to reality?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke:  </strong></p><p>When it comes to solid-state batteries, you see ideas coming out of a lab, or startups creating a membrane of film that allows solid state to happen in a small package. We’re the first in the world to package it into a battery pack that actually is functional.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>It looks and is shaped like your other batteries.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke: </strong> </p><p>Identical, but with energy density that we're targeting in several years to be 40 percent higher.  We're commercializing probably in the later half of this decade.</p><p>Is it feasible? That's the next question – can we get to a system where you see a shift to complete solid state? I think it's going to take time, just like hard drives and solid-state drives. In the middle, you’ll probably see some sort of hybrid system – guys that are using solid state but for very premium cases, and then hard drives continuing to have the density that rotational batteries have. </p><p>We are definitely staying ahead. As a company, we always look at new technology and always look at the application of such new technology to make sure that we're looking out for the best interests of the consumer. Because if you can provide that for the consumer at an earlier time, that will only translate to a happy consumer, and that translates to a happy Gogoro. </p><p>To give you a short answer, you’ll see some momentum in the solid-state battery space in the second half of this decade, but is it fully feasible and commercializable in the masses? I think it's going to be a tad longer than that, just because of how much capacity is built up in lithium ion. Our suppliers – LG, SDI, Panasonic – have built up a tremendous amount of capacity in the US, Europe, and in Asia. It takes time for that capacity to ramp down, and the cost economics are going to get better and better because of the amount of capacity they are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>You require a certain amount of urban density for the network to work. Where are you now? Where are you going? And is there a single city in the US that is dense enough that you think you could pull this off here?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke: </strong> </p><p>A lot of my friends are from the US. I grew up in the US, the early part of my career was in the US. Lots of people raise their hand and say “I want this in my city.” </p><p>One of the most essential things that we have to do as a company is to focus on the biggest challenge and opportunity ahead; with every challenge comes a great opportunity. We're now, in China, the world's largest two-wheel market with the number one electric vehicle maker Yadea and partnering with the number one gasoline vehicle maker in China, ____. We’re also working on the second largest market in India, looking to deploy end of this year or early next year. We're also working with Indonesia.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>At this moment, how many cities are you operating in?</p><p><strong>Horace Luke: </strong> </p><p>All the cities in Taiwan. We're in China, in Hangzhou, Wuxi, Kunming, and several more to come very soon. We are in Seoul, Korea, mainly for food delivery. We're in Japan, with tourism rentals of two-wheelers. We are also in Germany with a ridesharing service, providing our vehicle and swapping solution. We have a pilot in Jakarta with GoTo and Gojek; GoTo has about 2 million riders on a network that's looking to turn electric through battery swapping probably by the end of this decade. </p><p>So a lot of conversation, a lot of pilots, and a lot of expansion. We just listed on the NASDAQ under the ticker GGR. The reason we got listed on the NASDAQ is to get ready for expansion. We needed the capital, we needed the transparency, we needed to grow the team. Going on the NASDAQ and getting to be a publicly traded company enables us to now go very fast into those regions. </p><p>We dabble in energy storage; we are wholly focused on battery swapping for mobility; we've got portable energy for smart cities solutions, and smart parking poles, and safety. We've got ride sharing, we’ve got rental, we’ve got food delivery. So Gogoro goes back to the thesis that energy is at the center of all human innovation. We can take what we're doing and enable different businesses to enable what they care about to become real now, because of our platform.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I didn't hear any US cities on your list.</p><p><strong>Horace Luke: </strong> </p><p>We're working on it. I would not say never. We’ve looked at places like Austin, Seattle (where traffic is terrible), San Francisco. We continue to see them, but it's a question of resources. We're 2,000 people, we're about to attack three of the largest markets in the world with several of the largest partners, and focus is really important for us.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Thank you for coming on and taking all this time. It's fascinating. The whole world of two-wheelers is something I don't have a lot of occasion to think about. </p><p><strong>Horace Luke: </strong> </p><p>If you ever come to the east side of the hemisphere, you'll see that most people travel on two wheels. In India, 80 percent of all commute miles done every day are done on two-wheelers, and 60 percent of all gasoline that is spent every year is on two-wheelers. That's how big the market is, but most people don't realize that in the West. </p><p>We live on one blue ball, right? If Europe becomes better, if the US becomes better, Canada is good, but what about everything else? If everything else is not good, then that would eventually creep over to the West, and that is a problem that a lot of us moved to the East to solve. That's something that we're adamant about – we have to make the planet a better planet so that our next generation can have one.</p><p>We are now at this critical point where innovators and business leaders have to put their resources and their time on sustainability, not just because it makes good business sense, but it’s essential for humanity. That's something that we as a team are so passionate about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Thanks so much and good luck with all your expansions. </p><p><strong>Horace Luke:</strong></p><p>Thank you, David.</p><p></p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-horace-luke-on-decarbonizing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:52309259</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 28 Nov 2022 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/52309259/6bf305b49d679ebaf1d89b80af4ea5f5.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3919</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/52309259/553d30c110f8f34aa0a5bebea244827d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[At long last, I have an EV]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>For years now, I’ve been dithering about getting an electric vehicle (EV). Much of that dithering has been done in public, on Twitter and for various sites I’ve worked for — just a few weeks ago I subjected you to my <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-lovely-ford-mustang-mach-e-and?s=w">handwringing about an EV test drive</a> — so I figured I might as well document how the journey finally ended.</p><p>Long story short, we bought a used 2017 Chevy Bolt. That is about the least sexy sentence one can write about EVs in the year of our lord 2022, but there you have it. </p><p>We thought about leasing or buying one of the fancy new EVs, the Kia EV6 or the Ford Mustang or a Tesla. But we’re pretty cheap and didn’t want to pay that much. And we felt slightly guilty about buying a new car. And those cars feel like statements. As Mrs. Volts put it, “I just don’t want to say that much with my car.” </p><p>The Bolt (along with the Nissan Leaf) is the closest thing to an econo-box option in the EV market, and that’s more our speed. We paid $25K — considerably more than we would have paid for the same car 12 months ago, thanks to lingering supply issues, but less than half of a tricked-out, new version of any of the fancier models. </p><p>In terms of value, though, there’s a twist — the “cheat code” of the current EV market. As you probably know, there has been a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.chevrolet.com/electric/bolt-recall">massive recall of Bolt batteries</a>. Every battery in every Bolt from 2017 to 2022 will be replaced, at no charge, by Chevrolet. </p><p>That means, at some point in the next year (my local Chevy dealer estimates seven months from now), they’ll call me, I’ll drop the car off at the dealership, they’ll put in a brand new, 260-mile-range battery, and I’ll get it back the next day. Given that the rest of the car is in good shape (~57K miles on the odometer), this will effectively be like getting a new EV for the cost of a used one. Score.</p><p>The econo-box of EVs</p><p>The car itself is somewhat spartan, if comfortable. It has the “premier” trim, so I got my beloved heated steering wheel, Mrs. Volts her beloved heated seats. It has one-pedal driving and lane assist and parking assist and all-around cameras and Android Auto. The only fancy-pants feature I notice missing is wireless phone charging (which I got used to <em>real</em> quick in the Mustang). </p><p>As for acceleration, even if it isn’t the insane road-rocket the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-lovely-ford-mustang-mach-e-and?s=w">Mustang was</a>, it is considerably zippier than either of our aged current vehicles, more than zippy enough to make it fun getting around the city. (It has a “sport” mode, with higher torque and lower range, but I haven’t had occasion to use it yet.)</p><p>The interface is lower end, which means it involves more physical buttons and knobs and less screen real estate than newer EVs, but to be honest I like that much better. There’s less occasion and temptation to look at the screen. I can find most stuff I really need with my fingers. </p><p>There’s not enough console space and the Bluetooth interface with phones is somewhat janky — listening to music on my phone involves a lot more button-poking than I’d like — but it’s tolerable. </p><p>As for accessories, I bought a back-seat cover (for the dogs) and a level-two charger (we had a 220-volt outlet already installed). I can’t think of much else we need. We are now driving (semi-)guilt-free. </p><p>Getting an EV is easier than ever</p><p>One final note: early in this process I was contacted by a company called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.drivewith.link">Link</a> that is devoted to making it easy for people to get EVs. You can use their site to shop for the EV you want — they offer an advisory service — and then they’ll arrange the lease or purchase for you.</p><p>After wasting way too much time shopping around, I told Link I wanted a used Bolt. For a few weeks, they sent me notices of Bolts (that had been inspected) as they came on the market. When we saw one we liked, they did all the purchasing and transferring of titles. They mailed me the paperwork (including detailed inspection reports), I signed and mailed it back, and then the car was dropped off in my driveway. I never had to haggle or talk to a salesperson. All I had to do is register it at the DMV and let the Chevy dealership know I had it. It could not have been easier. </p><p>Link is mostly operating on the West Coast for now, but if you have been dithering about an EV like I was, I can’t recommend it enough. (I know other services like this are springing up — it’s a big and eager market, I would think.)</p><p>Anyway, that’s the story of how I finally got an EV. You’ll hear no more dithering from me. Instead I’ll to go back to daydreaming about living somewhere where I don’t need a car at all.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/at-long-last-i-have-an-ev</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:52311105</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 18 Apr 2022 16:00:38 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/52311105/1d4a04d786f72754b81b4e97a7174bcd.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>356</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/52311105/d034eba357941686c472f8a8f138f27d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Elizabeth Popp Berman on the "economic style of thinking" that consumed US policy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, sociologist Elizabeth Popp Berman discusses her new book, <em>Thinking Like an Economist</em>, about the “economic style of thinking” and how it took over in US policy circles in the post-war period. It remains embedded there to this day, but alternatives are beginning to emerge.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-elizabeth-popp-berman</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:51762459</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 02 Oct 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/51762459/d010d52829aeb002809f4a0c4b512e00.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3770</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/51762459/729fb3333a7395ed9db253d7f7c63ab8.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Paulina Jaramillo on the IPCC's new climate-solutions report]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Carnegie Mellon professor Paulina Jaramillo discusses the IPCC&apos;s  working group 3 report, “mitigation of climate change,” of which she was a co-author. It&apos;s the most comprehensive look to date at the economic sectors that emit greenhouse gases, the strategies and technologies that can reduce emissions, and the state of play in climate policy around the world.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-paulina-jaramillo-on</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:51764505</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 02 Oct 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/51764505/9cebd4a0b1e5235fef78dba3987ac825.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/51764505/818b1dfb637c3ca1694569ca3f0fa97f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Me, on the Some More News podcast]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this year, I stumbled on the news videos from the team at <a target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCvlj0IzjSnNoduQF0l3VGng">Some More News</a>. They are like <em>The Daily Show</em>, but longer, smarter, more in-depth, more profane, and free of Jon Stewart’s unfortunate navel-gazing centrism. But still funny as hell!</p><p>In other words: they might as well be targeted directly at me. I’ve been gorging on them for months. (You could start with <a target="_blank" href="https://youtu.be/UZhW1k_m7OY">this one on critical race theory</a>.) </p><p>Anyway, imagine my delight when I discovered that Some More News also has a podcast, Even More News, and they wanted me to come on it! </p><p>So that’s what today’s episode of Volts is: an episode of Even More News that the team has graciously allowed me to send to you on the Volts channel. We talk about IPCC stuff briefly, but I also got to let loose on Joe Manchin, lament Dems’ general media fecklessness, and heap scorn on Elon Musk’s Twitter moves. It was fun to get away from the wonky stuff for a while and just riff. It’s a different side of Dr. Volts! You can decide for yourself whether it’s better or worse. </p><p>You should definitely <a target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCvlj0IzjSnNoduQF0l3VGng">subscribe to Some More News</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.patreon.com/SomeMoreNews">support the team via Patreon</a>. The left needs much more of this kind of thing — new ways of reaching people where they are. </p><p>Also! Last week <a target="_blank" href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/un-climate-report-warns-governments-are-falling-short-on-lowering-planets-temperature">I was on PBS Newshour</a> to discuss the new IPCC report and the state of clean-energy technology. You can watch here:</p><p>I always underestimate the reach of PBS — it’s wild how many people saw this and contacted me! And how many saw it and contacted my parents. Love you, PBS. </p><p>Back later this week with some nerdy pods of my own!</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/me-on-the-some-more-news-podcast</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:51974716</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 11 Apr 2022 16:00:48 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/51974716/cc97dbbb474288bf5b232a55f2980c27.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3426</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/51974716/ea702274e67ffabd00b3fdc1daab2e1f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Me, interviewed by Noah Smith]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Economist Noah Smith runs the excellent substack <a target="_blank" href="https://noahpinion.substack.com">Noahpinion</a>, where he writes and podcasts about … pretty much everything. Economics. Politics. The war. Housing. Technology. On and on. The guy is ludicrously productive. </p><p>This week, he interviewed me! We talked about the new IPCC reports, the state of technology, some dumb tweets of mine, and NIMBYs, among other things. It was a fun and wide-ranging conversation. Check it out! (And <a target="_blank" href="https://noahpinion.substack.com/subscribe">subscribe to Noahpinion</a>.)</p><p>The video is below. The audio is posted as a podcast above.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/me-interviewed-by-noah-smith</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:51834252</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 08 Apr 2022 14:00:49 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/51834252/e4a8f17de653226548a83b3ea12fed27.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4636</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/51834252/d23cd2bc3a0970e3a6be662aa1e66c86.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Matthew Metz & Janelle London on gasoline superusers & smarter EV subsidies]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, activists Matthew Metz and Janelle London discuss their new report on gasoline “superusers” — the subset of drivers who drive long distances each year — and the policy recommendations around EV subsidies that it contains. It&apos;s a clever idea I haven&apos;t been able to stop thinking about.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-matthew-metz-and-janelle</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:51153080</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/51153080/de8468c2d1bf641741bec70d41cd7dec.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1991</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/51153080/9ad556a10b75e1199da15f1e33ad47a6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Audrey Schulman and Zeyneb Magavi on how to replace natural gas with renewable heat]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, activists and entrepreneurs Audrey Schulman and Zeyneb Magavi discuss their audacious plan to replace the nation&apos;s natural gas distribution infrastructure with a series of networked geothermal heat pumps. Basically, neighborhoods would be heated by warm water rather than natural gas. It would be the most efficient collective heating option available in the world.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-audrey-schulman-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:50795134</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/50795134/896cbd6656f50299aa8e13fff68c317b.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3967</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/50795134/5f34a0c1ff2f4c9aa96a40f3ec1ba159.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Rob Harmon on how to scale up energy efficiency]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, entrepreneur Rob Harmon discusses his new method for tracking and monetizing energy efficiency in commercial buildings. Traditionally, efficiency policy has consisted in subsidizing equipment up front. Harmon explains how to get reliable numbers about actual performance and begin to build a market around them. Surprisingly fascinating.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-rob-harmon-on-how-to</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:50789825</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/50789825/511eedef2c4a11a3ea4b12bafede299d.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4490</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/50789825/bf8659cfb7ef845253935d5db8894b27.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: David Hsu on the grassroots policy that lets communities control own energy supply]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, MIT Professor David Hsu discusses a paper he wrote that charts the history, evolution, and current fortunes of community choice aggregation, a tool whereby a community can take ownership over its own energy procurement. It is the rare example of energy democracy breaking out in America&apos;s monopoly-dominated system — a good news story in an era of bad vibes.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-david-hsu-on-the-grassroots</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:50191621</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Sep 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/50191621/855ff4bc4a5c12cc7016a61a49e753d0.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3744</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/50191621/7af2eefefd68f35e587764fba5b5a43b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The lovely Ford Mustang Mach-E and the danger of electric cars]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>(Hey y’all — I’m attempting to dictate this post <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-note-to-readers?s=w">rather than type it</a>, so please forgive any sins of grammar or structure.)</p><p>My family and I own two extremely old cars, a 2001 Honda Odyssey minivan and a 2009 Toyota Prius hybrid. The van is literally falling apart, so we have been looking around lately for a new vehicle. Obviously, we would prefer an EV.</p><p>A representative from Ford saw me musing about it on Twitter, contacted me, and offered to loan me a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ford.com/suvs/mach-e/">Ford Mustang Mach-E electric vehicle</a> for a week. I've been driving it for a few days and I thought I would report my early impressions, along with some larger reservations.</p><p>Holy s*** EVs are fun to drive</p><p>I should note up top that I’m not a car guy. I don’t know much about them, don’t much like them, and don’t much like driving them. I never learned to drive a stick shift or change the oil. I don’t drool over muscle cars or know what “hemi” means. Truth be told, I kind of hate car culture.</p><p>I should also note that I have only ever driven two EVs in my life. The first was the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.kia.com/us/en/ev6">Kia EV6</a>, which I test-drove last week. The second is this Ford. I can say very little about the fine differences in EV driving experience.</p><p>In short, I am the least qualified car reviewer on the planet.</p><p>As I said, both of my current cars are extremely old, so I am easily impressed by modern vehicular technology. I still get a kick out of remote key fobs. With this car, when you approach, it lights up, unlocks, and projects a picture of a Mustang on the ground next to the vehicle.</p><p>There are heated seats, a heated steering wheel, a wireless phone-charging pad, and a giant touch screen with about 50 menus. It all feels like a spaceship to me.</p><p>The first thing anyone notices when they drive an EV for the first time is the acceleration. With either of my gasoline vehicles — even the Prius when it’s driving in electric mode — there is a lag between pressing the accelerator and speeding up. You are always thinking a second or two ahead, about what speed you'll need to be going, and trying to anticipate. With the EV, acceleration is instant. You are going the speed you want to go the second you want to go it. It is wild.</p><p>And when you use one-pedal driving mode, when you let off on the accelerator, you immediately slow. It’s difficult to put in words, but it adds up to a sense of much more precise control.</p><p>I was driving home from a restaurant on Tuesday evening and fiddling with the Spotify menu when I drifted slightly onto the middle line between lanes. With a tiny little push — boomp — the car nudged me back into my lane, as though it were semi-sentient. I hadn’t even thought about the driver-assist features before that, but my one experience with them so far was reassuring, albeit faintly creepy.</p><p>I’m one of those old guys who resists getting a Tesla because I don’t want to be forced to do every-dang-thing with a touch screen. Give me something physical, with feedback that goes beyond a haptic buzz. I like knobs! Ford’s screen has one giant knob toward the bottom, for volume — it’s better than nothing.  </p><p>In general, Ford has done a pretty good job with its screens and interface. Crucially, unlike in the Tesla, there’s a second screen just under eye level with key information like speed and range. On the bigger center screen, finding the basic stuff is painless. And there are some cool things if you poke around — you can save different profiles (mirror and seat positions, music playlists) that attach to different key fobs. Or you can use your phone as a key fob. </p><p>I haven’t used any of these features enough to know how they’ll age, but it’s all pretty dazzling. </p><p>The ride is smooth and quiet, the stereo system kicks ass, and that heated steering wheel … I mean, I’ve found nothing to complain about. And I’m pretty good at complaining. <em>Car & Driver</em> named the Ford Mach-E its <a target="_blank" href="https://www.caranddriver.com/ev-of-the-year/#:~:text=Jul%207%2C%202021%20Presenting%20Car%20and%20Driver%27s%202021,Mustang%20Mach-E%20is%20our%20EV%20of%20the%20Year.">EV of the year</a> in 2021 and far be it from me to disagree.</p><p>It’s not clear Americans can handle this kind of power</p><p>However! As I was driving home, hands blissfully warm, thinking I might take the long way so I could drive more, I started feeling some reservations. I started thinking about what it would mean for EVs to become dominant, the default choice, with most people driving them.</p><p>For one thing, they make driving much more <em>fun</em>, even for someone like me who has a deep-seated antipathy toward cars and has never enjoyed driving. All the electric gizmos and screens and features, combined with the unbelievable torque and acceleration, make driving feel like a game in which you’ve just leveled up. </p><p>It's difficult to believe that if driving is more fun … people won't do it more. And electric or not, less driving is better.</p><p>The other thing is, the acceleration puts an <em>enormous</em> amount of power in your hands. For someone like me, who drives fairly carefully and pays attention, it can feel more precise and controlled, and thus safer. But it's not difficult to see how this kind of power could be misused. These cars can <em>leap</em> across intersections, going from standing still to 20 or 30 miles an hour in a second or two. If drivers aren't paying attention, it's a lot easier for an idle mistake to grow more consequential, involving more speed. And the constantly available torque is an invitation to try crazy passing maneuvers on the highway. </p><p>The US already has notoriously pedestrian-hostile infrastructure. If that stays the same, if nothing else changes, more torque and power in everyone's hands is going to lead to more collisions.</p><p>Driver-assist features might offset this somewhat. I do feel safer knowing that my car will keep me in my lane in normal driving conditions. But there's only so much software can do in the face of bad infrastructure. Lacking much data, we are all going on our guesses and impressions and priors, but my gut feeling is that putting tons more power in drivers’ hands without changing anything else is going to lead to an even more hostile environment for everyone not driving.</p><p>Ultimately, my fondest wish is that I lived somewhere where I didn't want or need a car at all. I hate cars. I hate driving. I really hate other people's driving, and other people's cars. EVs are such an enormous leap forward in environmental terms that it feels somewhat perverse to question them, but nonetheless, despite all the hype, despite all the fun, it's worth remembering that the top priority — not just for climate hawks but for humanists of all sorts — should be reducing the need for, and number of, cars.</p><p>The top priority should be making land use and planning choices that encourage walkable communities, with amenities mixed in, so people can get out of cars and get onto their feet or bicycles. </p><p>EVs are fun to drive. But no kind of driving is better than walking in the fresh air, getting exercise and mixing with your neighbors. I hope EVs don't pull our attention away from that fact. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-lovely-ford-mustang-mach-e-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:49988947</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 14 Mar 2022 16:00:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/49988947/648e6e3f5fe6fefa487861778e5c230f.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>530</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/49988947/02b1faf0a13d02ed38c6a53192ac06d9.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Jack Lienke & Kirti Datla on the ridiculous (but extremely important) EPA case before the Supreme Court]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, two Clean Air Act experts — Jack Lienke, regulatory policy director at the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Kirti Datla, director of strategic legal advocacy at Earthjustice — discuss the recent Supreme Court decision in the case of West Virginia v. EPA, which would dramatically curtail EPA&apos;s powers based on legal justifications that are, charitably, underbaked.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-jack-lienke-and-kirti</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:49757609</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Sep 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/49757609/b74001d366fa1c69ca2eb9dcd764c8bf.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4947</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/49757609/897bbe486838b03f8ec7e86a76c1da31.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Erin Mayfield on the massive consequences of Build Back Better]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Dartmouth professor Erin Mayfield discusses some new modeling on the Build Back Better Act, showing how and where it would reduce emissions in the US economy, how it would affect inflation, and how many jobs it would produce.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-erin-mayfield-on-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:49815880</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Sep 2022 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/49815880/96c510edb7c63a70465eafd3f1f0b411.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/49815880/a7e86086ea27c6f463db35cef3519202.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A note to readers ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Hey, y’all, just a short note to catch you up on my current situation and my plans for the coming weeks.</p><p>Long story short: I have tendonitis in both arms. I’ve had problems with pain in my forearms for years, but it always faded or went away after a while and was manageable. A few months after quarantine started, in 2020, it started getting worse, to the point I had to give up playing bass guitar — my one non-computer hobby. Then, a few months ago, it started getting a <em>lot</em> worse, quickly. </p><p>I have been to see two physical therapists, done stretches and exercises, received regular therapeutic massage, bought a <a target="_blank" href="https://kinesis-ergo.com/shop/freestyle2-mac/">split keyboard</a> and a <a target="_blank" href="https://evoluent.com/products/vm4l/">vertical mouse</a>, worn compression sleeves during the day and braces at night, iced both arms every day, taken a bunch of goofball supplements (hoping for some placebo effect at least), and even ordered <a target="_blank" href="https://armaid.com/products/armaid-1">one of these widgets</a>. </p><p>Nothing has worked, at least not yet; it’s just gotten worse and worse. It feels like a boulder rolling downhill. Nothing slows its momentum. (And don’t bother suggesting resentment and self-pity — I’ve tried those too.)</p><p>One result is that typing has become a chore. I can get through about a paragraph before my wrists and forearms start to ache and I have to take a break. What’s worse, it has messed up my thinking. Over many years of writing, the act of laying my hands on a keyboard has become a somatic cue that triggers my thinking; I can not write without it. But now it involves pain, and the pain is clouding the thinking. </p><p>This has made it difficult to write the next piece in my <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-minerals-used-by-clean-energy?r=cvjrr">minerals series</a>. It’s made it difficult to write anything. Just contemplating writing makes my arms ache. </p><p>Of all the advice I’ve gotten, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.painscience.com/articles/repetitive-strain-injuries.php">one bit seems reliably true</a>: the only thing that fixes this problem is <em>rest</em>. I’ve got to stop doing the repetitive motions that damaged the tissues. In my case, that means I need to cut way back on holding my phone and typing. I’m told these things take from four to six months to heal.</p><p>Four to six months of no typing obviously presents something of a challenge for someone who makes his living with a newsletter. Quite a challenge indeed. [eye twitches]</p><p>So, just to be fully transparent about it, here’s my plan:</p><p>Next week, I’m taking the week off. It’s winter break and my 16-year-old and I are heading down to Bend, Oregon, to see friends and do some snowboarding/skiing on Mt. Bachelor (where it hasn’t snowed in weeks, sigh). I’m going to endeavor to get through the week with a minimum of screens.</p><p>After that, I am going to shift — at least temporarily — to doing more podcasting and less writing. This pains me. As much as I make writing a misery for myself, I love it. But working my way into a permanent state of diminished capacity is not something I’m ready for at the tender young age of almost 50. Six months of no typing sounds bad; 20 years of no typing (and no bass playing) sounds way worse. </p><p>I’m also going to have a go at dictation software; if I can’t type, I can always speak. I admit this fills me with horror. I hate Siri. I hate Alexa. I hate talking to computers. It’s … demeaning. This has been one of my stalwart Dad Things for years; it’s a running joke in my house. But I’m going to bite the bullet. (By the way, Dragon <a target="_blank" href="https://tidbits.com/2019/01/21/nuance-has-abandoned-mac-speech-recognition-will-apple-fill-the-void/">no longer makes</a> dictation software for Mac and apparently nothing else is as good. Let me know if you’ve heard of alternatives. I’m aware that Mac has built-in dictation, but trust me, it sucks.)</p><p>I’m also going to start doing hot yoga again. I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2015/5/8/8568967/6-reasons-im-addicted-to-hot-yoga">did it regularly for years</a> and it was a blessing. It cured my lifelong back pain and generally warded off the decay of my aging body. I stopped doing it early in the pandemic, and it feels like, in the last year or so, all that aging I held off for those many years has found me at once.</p><p>Hopefully I can recapture some of the magic. Or at least keep from puking or passing out in my first class back. </p><p>So, that’s what I’m thinking, at least for now. I don’t know how this will ultimately impact Volts and I’m somewhat reluctant to make any promises at this point — this thing could get worse or it could get better. I need to put my health first. If any of this, now or going forward, affects anyone’s subscription decisions, no worries, I get it. We here at Volts management apologize for any inconvenience.</p><p>With that said, I’m going to sign off, pack for my trip, and try to forget about my arms for a while. I hope you have a pleasant week and that when I return, the climate parts of Build Back Better will have passed.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-note-to-readers</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:48902321</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 18 Feb 2022 19:00:35 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/48902321/176ace4caec68735471168ae7fd355ee.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/48902321/0b0924af556d23941cfde46eea3fdeac.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Gerald Butts and Catherine McKenna on Canada's carbon tax]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Gerald Butts and Catherine McKenna discuss their experiences passing a carbon tax in Canada, as advisor to prime minister Justin Trudeau and minister of the environment respectively. In particular, we focus on a key feature of the Canadian tax: all the revenue collected goes back to the province from which it was collected, mostly as per-capita dividends. Butts and McKenna believe that feature was central to selling the public on the policy.</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Gerald Butts and Catherine McKenna, February 16, 2022</p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/uwhdr9ti5coe5t0/volts22.02.16%28butts.mckenna%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF version</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>In 2015, after nearly a decade of conservative rule, Justin Trudeau and his Liberal Party won a majority of seats in the Canadian parliament and control of the federal government. Part of Trudeau’s election platform was a carbon tax.</p><p>The proposed tax had a few key features. First, it would only be imposed on provinces that did not have their own pricing system that met a few minimum requirements. And second, all the money collected from a province would be returned to that province as carbon dividends.</p><p>After years of vigorous advocacy and negotiations, Trudeau’s liberals got the tax passed through parliament. It was implemented in early 2019, just before another federal election that became widely seen as a national referendum on the tax.</p><p>Liberals won again. The carbon tax was affirmed. It’s going to stick — and rise to a whopping $170 a ton by 2030. </p><p>This is a startling success story for climate policy that was largely overlooked in the US. We, uh, had some other stuff going on. But it’s worth taking a closer look at how Canada pulled it off.</p><p>Two people at the core of the tax pitch were Gerald Butts, who was principal secretary to the prime minister from 2015 to 2019 and Trudeau’s closest personal advisor, and Catherine McKenna, who was the minister of environment and climate change during the same period.</p><p>Butts and McKenna were in the trenches and they have the scars to show for it. Both of them noticed <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/do-dividends-make-carbon-taxes-more">the piece I published on Volts in January on carbon tax refunds</a> — and they objected to the conclusion that dividends did not make the carbon tax more popular in Canada.</p><p>So I had them on the pod! We talked about how the carbon tax was conceived, what enabled it to secure majority support (yes, they say, refunds were important), and where the politics of carbon pricing stand as we move into the 2020s. Not only were my spirits lifted — it’s nice to know there’s a sane country out there somewhere — I learned an enormous amount. I think you will too. </p><p>Without further ado, Catherine McKenna and Gerald Butts, welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:</strong></p><p>Very happy to be on.</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>It's great to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>When Justin Trudeau announced his candidacy [for prime minister of Canada] in 2015, the carbon tax was part of his initial pitch. How far back does the carbon tax idea go? Who got it in Trudeau’s ear? How long had it been bouncing around up there before it made its debut on the national stage? </p><p><strong>Gerald Butts: </strong> </p><p>The first time it was a real issue in Canada was during the federal election campaign in 2008. Important for the context of the story, for reasons I'll go into later, is that the Liberal Party proposed something called the Green Shift, which was an elaborate take on a carbon tax, under the leadership of Stéphane Dion. But it was easily caricatured as a regional wealth redistribution program, because the revenue from the tax was paid into the consolidated revenue fund at the federal government, and it was redistributed by the federal government to programs of its own choosing, not all of which were environmentally related. </p><p>To me, there were a lot of reasons beyond the Green Shift that the Liberal Party lost the election in 2008, but that was the fundamental flaw in the policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>The idea is that you're just taking wealth from carbon-intensive provinces and redistributing it elsewhere.</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts: </strong> </p><p>Absolutely. That, of course, has a history in this country that goes back to when the current Prime Minister Trudeau’s father was prime minister and he created the National Energy Program. </p><p>The conservative government in 2008, under Stephen Harper — which, to be diplomatic, was not inclined to climate action — easily caricatured this as the second coming of the National Energy Program in Western Canada in particular, and made it out to be that the Liberal Party was after Western money to pay for Eastern programs, which is always death in politics in Canada. </p><p>When we designed our program, there were lots of people within the party who thought we should stay a million miles away from it, because they were convinced that they lost the election in 2008 because of carbon taxes. We were very careful to make sure that any of the revenue collected went back to the province from which it originated. That, I think, was what unlocked the political constituency for carbon pricing in Canada.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So that design — money goes back to the province from which it is gathered — was there from the very beginning, as you were working it out. </p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:  </strong></p><p>I came in as first minister of climate change and was given this mandate, and it was very clear that was going to be the hardest thing to land as part of our climate plan. For the first time ever, we went to Paris, we worked really hard to get an ambitious Paris agreement, but then we had to go home and do the work. </p><p>I was stuck with the unenviable task of meeting with provinces and territories all the time and going through interminable discussion on carbon pricing. There was not a lot of appetite, and everyone would bring all the reasons not to do it. We needed to think hard about how we were going to land it. </p><p>It's important to know there were some provinces that had pricing. At that time, Alberta had a progressive government that had brought in a price on pollution. Quebec was in a cap-and-trade system with California, as was Ontario, and BC had a direct price carbon tax. </p><p>So we came to the table with that. Gerry and I spent a lot of time talking about the design. There were a lot of people who at first shied away, didn't want to do it, but when they decided maybe we could do it, they still thought it was okay to take the money and distribute it as the government saw fit. And I knew I couldn't land it, I knew there was no way. As liberals, as progressives, people believe the worst — that you're going to take this money and you're going to have your special things you want to do, which might be really dumb in the perspective of others. </p><p>It was pretty clear, but it was a fight internally, too. Saying all the money was going to go back in a transparent way was just critically important to me. I knew I couldn't land it otherwise. It was still very hard, we had to do good comms, but it was critically important that we could talk to people and say, “you're going to get more money back.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>How did it play in the 2015 election, Trudeau’s big triumph? I'm curious how central the carbon tax was in his campaign and in the election generally.</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts: </strong> </p><p>There were bigger forces in 2015, to be brutally honest. The cornerpiece of our 2015 election campaign was something called the Canada child benefit, which was a progressive benefit given according to family income to people directly in cash. That's what we ran on in 2015: the middle class has been screwed by 25 years of supply-side economics and we're going to do something about it because we know you're hurting. Everything else built out from there. </p><p>In 2015, climate helped us consolidate a progressive community behind the Liberal Party. This is an important piece of the context in Canada. There are a variety of options on the left, one of which is the center left, one of which is the Green Party, which has diminished its political viability over time as the Liberal Party has absorbed progressive environmental policy. </p><p>Everybody wanted to get rid of Stephen Harper in 2015, and there was a debate over whether it was going to be us or the NDP. We put a more progressive policy platform together than they had, and climate was a huge part of that. I have no doubt that it helped consolidate the progressive community and has kept it there through some difficult times. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>The Canadian carbon tax is designed as a backstop, which means provinces with their own carbon pricing systems that meet certain minimum thresholds are left alone, and only provinces that don't have a sufficient price have this imposed on them. Was that structure also part of it from the very beginning?</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>Definitely. There are two things that Americans can be forgiven for not thinking deeply about when it comes to Canadian politics — probably more than two, but for the purposes of this discussion, there are two. </p><p>One of them is, all of the revenue collected from the carbon price in Canada goes back to the provinces. None of it is spent on federal programming. There were lots of provincial governments who opposed it on ideological grounds but said they were in favor of it in public. But that's that's what we did, and some people, as Catherine said, were not in favor of it. That's the first thing. </p><p>The second thing is, we were coming into power at a time when the four largest provinces already had carbon pricing schemes in place. They were acting in the absence of federal leadership during the Harper years. Had there been no carbon pricing anywhere in Canada, it would have been easy to put a uniform system in place. But we had to create this concept of equivalency, because we didn't want to punish the governments that had led on climate action at the subnational level in Canada. </p><p>Those two things are really important contextual pieces of the Canadian politics of the time to understand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Was there a lot of debate over what the backstop levels are? Because what you choose as your bottom line effectively chooses which provinces are going to get overridden. What was that process like? What are the minimums?</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>Catherine could speak to that better than I can. But from my perspective, conceptually, this is why a carbon price was important in the first place, because there would have been nothing to use as a benchmark and nothing to uniformly compare across the country as equivalency. When we say equivalency, what we really mean is an equivalent carbon price through some mix of policy measures at the provincial level.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Catherine, how was that hashed out? If you're putting together a baseline that provinces have to meet, you can imagine a baseline being quite elaborate and complicated, or you can imagine a very simple one. Was that done in dialogue with the provinces?</p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:  </strong></p><p>At the end of the day, hard things are hard. I sat in so many meetings and we went nowhere. We didn't know where the four provinces that had a price were at. Cabinet ultimately decided we're going to start at $10, because that meant the system that existed would be acceptable for the four provinces. </p><p>Now, two of those provinces changed governments, so we lost the pricing that they had, but it showed resilience. This is the way we decided it made sense. </p><p>It was a lot of design work. This is an across-the-board carbon price with all these different jurisdictions, and then we have an output-based pricing system for major emitters as the backstop, and also there's a benchmark on that. Environmentalists would probably love us to go into details. I won't go into details of the design, but in the end, one day, you have to just announce it. You have to do it. </p><p>The provinces were trying to delay. This was in 2016. In 2015, Paris Agreement; 2016, we have some major challenges with you folks, and we're trying to land carbon pricing, but it was clear it wasn't going to happen. Gerry and I had a conversation and I said, “I can't land this on my own. I need the prime minister to be totally with me on this.” </p><p>I was at a meeting of my provincial and territorial counterparts. It was quite a useless discussion, going around the table again, people restating their positions like they do,  negotiations are maybe going backwards. And I said, “you know what, it's been a great discussion, you might want to tune in to the House of Commons because the prime minister is just announcing now that there's going to be a price across the country and it’s starting at $10 and going to $50 in 2022.” (Obviously, I'd talked to some of the key provinces to reassure them that their system was going to be acceptable as long as they continued to go up. Stringency is really important.)</p><p>A number of people stormed off. All hell broke loose at the table. It was quite a lot of drama. But that's when it got real. We had many discussions, but suddenly, front page of newspapers: “there's going to be a carbon tax across Canada.” </p><p>That’s the interesting part of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/do-dividends-make-carbon-taxes-more#details">this article</a>, which suggests that even giving all the money back can't save a carbon tax. We've been through two elections, and it's held. In the last election, the Conservative Party, which has been extremely difficult, even brought in a weird system that was a fig leaf, maybe, of a carbon tax. In 2019, the majority of Canadians supported a party that had a price on pollution. </p><p>So we were able to land it, but there was a lot of drama between 2016, when it was announced, and getting it done in 2019. There was talk about “technocratic dreams” and “policies can't transcend politics” — but what's missing in that is people. Actually, people are reasonable. We have a prime minister who said this, Jean Chrétien: “Canadians are reasonable, so be reasonable.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>The structure of the tax is that 90 percent of the revenue goes straight back to households in the province from which the tax was collected. What about the other 10 percent?</p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:  </strong></p><p>That goes to business, indigenous communities, and other organizations, but in a transparent way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>For those of us who are not up on Canadian politics, what does it take to pass a law in Canada? Presumably Trudeau can't just stand up and say, “we're doing this now.” It has to be an act of the legislature. Is that just a single majority vote in parliament, or is there more to it than that?</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts: </strong></p><p>The situation is much more straightforward if you have a majority government, which we did. We’re a parliamentary democracy, derivative of the British parliamentary system. If there's a majority party in the House of Commons that forms the government, generally they can rely upon passing their own legislation. Our Senate is not elected and therefore doesn't have the democratic authority to question the central purpose of any legislation — so essentially, if it passes through Parliament, it makes it. </p><p>The big caveat is, anybody can litigate any piece of legislation that goes through Parliament in the courts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Just to be clear: not a <em>supermajority</em> in the parliament — you just have more votes for than votes against, and the law passes. Any American listening will be incredulous.</p><p>Was there ever a realistic chance that enough members of parliament from your own coalition would rebel against this? Was there ever real doubt that if Trudeau put up a real bill it would pass?</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>No. There was doubt that we could manage the politics internally to get a real bill tabled, and that had to do with the federal-provincial dynamics at the time. But it also had to do with the internal management of caucus and cabinet — generally, the disagreements are behind the scenes. People were jumpy. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I bet they weren't making arguments against their own party in the <em>Wall Street Journal</em>, though. </p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>No, they were not. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>The reason I emphasize this is that, in terms of setting a political context, something that is a fait accompli, definitely going to happen, brings out a different dynamic than something that you might be able to block. </p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>Once it's tabled, David. This is a really important distinction. Canada is not this lovely, magical land of unicorns where everything is easy and progressive. That's not the way it works up here. A lot of hard work was done behind the scenes. </p><p>Remember the context: we had come from third place, in an almost extinction-level event for the Liberal Party of Canada, and gone on to form a government for the first time in the country's history. It had never happened before. There were lots of people in that caucus who were veterans of the 2008 election, and members of staff in senior roles who were like, “do we really have to do this?”</p><p>Frankly, it was Catherine's leadership, along with the finance minister at the time, Bill Morneau. Finance tends to be the place where people gather to make things not happen; it's like our own Congress within the federal government. Bill was clear from the get-go that he 100 percent stood behind what Catherine wanted to do, and we were going to make it happen come hell or high water. </p><p>Of course, it goes without saying the prime minister was behind it too. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>If you go to a provincial official and say, “all the tax we collect from your province will be returned directly to the people of your province, and most of them will come out ahead financially,” that sounds like a political home run to a sensible person. So what was all the jumpiness? What were the objections and counter-arguments?</p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna: </strong> </p><p>I should make a distinction. Caucus was jumpy; provinces were <em>angry</em>. They were just … conservatives. </p><p>It was the weirdest thing, because I designed — with the support of Gerry, Bill Morneau, the Finance Committee, and a bunch of officials — the most small-c conservative policy you could do. I remember meeting George Shultz, and that came up; there are obviously Republicans who supported fee and dividend. </p><p>I wanted to get the politics right, so I gave these folks an opportunity. I said, “go fill your boots, design your own policy.” To be clear, if the provinces that didn't already have a pricing system designed their own, they could keep the revenues. They didn't even have to give it back to the people. They could decide they were going to take the money and put it to their pet projects, that wasn't going to be our problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>If you're going to reject that, you're going to reject any carbon price. You can't get more flexible than that.</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>You put your finger right on it. That was precisely our objective. Political context at the time: there were a bunch of conservatives running around Canada saying, “we believe that climate change is happening and it's a bad thing and we should do something about it … but not a tax.” </p><p>Our objective was to take all of the objections that have been leveled against previous attempts — be it regional redistribution, tax grab by the government, some nefarious global plot sponsored by the left and George Soros, whatever nutbar theory people wanted to level at it — and say, “no, this is a simple thing. We're going to collect the revenue, and we're going to give it back. If you're against that, you're against everything.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>To my question, then, what were their purported objections to this seemingly very reasonable policy?</p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna: </strong> </p><p>Well, they just lied. It's not a very nice thing to say, but they did. They were so opposed to liberals that they just said it was a cash grab. </p><p>I looked at <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/do-dividends-make-carbon-taxes-more#details">your article</a> and I said, “this is not the narrative.” It was so important to deal with the lies, to spend a lot of time selling that all the money was going back. </p><p>Take Ontario — very important province politically, it's the largest province by population. To be able to say, “this is the amount of money that the average family's going to get back, which is more than you're going to pay” was super important. It was decisive. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>In terms of public opinion, you mean?</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>Part of my objection to the article is the definition of public opinion. If you ask someone their views on something in a poll, and it's a theoretical prospect, they're going to have one opinion of it. But when they go to decide which political tribe they belong to at the ballot box, that's where the rubber hits the road. </p><p>I never like to have fights with environmentalists, especially in public, but this is a really important thing — the authors of the study were looking at publicly available data. I can tell you from what we were doing internally, within the government, that there was a 25-point difference among voters in support for a carbon tax and a carbon tax with a rebate. Twenty-five points. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Let me back up one second. These conservatives are saying in public, “it's a cash grab, it's going to hurt families, blah blah blah,” all the predictable things conservatives say. But presumably, they're not dumb, they knew what you were telling them, that they're going to get all the money back. So what are they saying to you in private? </p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:  </strong></p><p>They're saying the same things. I couldn’t even believe it. </p><p>I would say that to them and then they immediately go to a microphone and they're like, “I just told the minister that this is a cash grab.” It was not super fun, because it was a fight a minute. It ended up becoming a real security issue for me, because people hear things from politicians, and you can inflame people if they think you're going to take money and people are just trying to pay the bills. So I'd have to rush to the mic, too, because they didn't care. </p><p>I remember, in a conservative province where they have a provincial sales tax and generally people don't like taxes, I got someone to do the math for the premier. I said, “you could get rid of your provincial sales tax; you can bring this in. Here's your sales pitch!” And he was still against it.</p><p>This is why it's so important, us telling this side of the story. They thought it was a winner to rile people up and lie, saying “you're going to pay more money and you can't understand this anyway.” They would have ministers go fill up their tank and take a picture of them at the gas station, then say, “this is going to cost an average family this much by 2022,” but they wouldn't talk about how you're going to get more money back. It literally was a comms war. We would be on the airwaves, I had to be out getting pounded.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>You became the face of the whole thing for a while. I imagine that was unpleasant.</p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:  </strong></p><p>I'm Irish, I’m a competitive swimmer, I can take it. I didn't love it, that's for sure, but I believed in it. I believed that we needed to take serious climate action, and I felt like I could not lose it. I felt personal responsibility, which was a heavy weight, and I was very worried.</p><p>We had this output-based pricing system, which is very complex, because you have to look at particular sectors — cement, aluminum — and design in a way that you're not sending these companies offshore. It took a while; we literally brought it in in 2019, which is the year of the election. </p><p>The reality is, to paraphrase David Axelrod, hard things are hard, and you're always going to take flak, so go do the really hard things that matter. We could have done a crappy, wimpier version, and they didn't care — these guys were going to be out there. (And by the way, it was all guys, a bunch of guys calling themselves the resistance to Justin Trudeau. And Catherine McKenna, I suppose.)</p><p>It was a fight worth fighting, but we had to enlist people, and not just environmentalists. (I will give a shout out to our good friend Kat. We all are big fans of Katharine Hayhoe.) Of course we had environmentalists putting out the message. But we got young people, and it was good because at that time you had Greta, and young people marching in the streets. We got doctors, there was a whole campaign of doctors to support us. I got Arnold Schwarzenegger to do a video — as a Republican, he brought this in in a bipartisan way. </p><p>We were just doing whatever we could so that Canadians could hear the message. There was some emphasis on how Canadians didn't know exactly how much money they're getting back. That doesn't matter. Like Gerry said, the fact that you asked them, “do you know exactly how much money you got back?” — that wasn't the thing. In the end, we were able to make carbon pricing a necessary part of a serious climate plan where it wasn't the exact amount you got back that mattered. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>One thing I really despair about in the States is our abysmal media situation. Basically, our right wing has captured a large portion of the population and facts don't penetrate at all. I know you have some terrible Murdoch-sponsored media up there, too, but do you feel like when you put a coordinated effort into it you were able to get over the heads of that media machine and reach the public?</p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna: </strong> </p><p>We have media that fought this the whole time, but it actually goes to our broader strategy. We had to get to real people. As many op-eds as you put in the papers, how many people are reading them? We did them, but I didn't wake up every day thinking about op-eds. I spent a lot of time looking for clips for social media. In the election, the Liberal Party did a lot of social media to reach regular people. </p><p>A really interesting thing happened that was surprising to me, but important. I had pushed to have a check back every month. I wanted someone to arrive at your door and hand you a big fat check. That would be the best, but we couldn't do it. </p><p>But helpfully, we got a lot of free advertising from accountants, because at tax time they would literally advertise “come get your climate action incentive.” (We put a lot of effort into “climate action incentive,” what we wanted to call this thing you’re getting back. It had to be about climate, it definitely couldn't say tax rebate!) </p><p>So you had all of these accountants and accounting firms saying, “We’ll do your taxes, get your climate action incentive, you're going to get this much back in the province.” I would go there and do events, we had local members of parliament doing events to promote it. At tax time people like money back. So that's the good news. </p><p>I spent all my time trying to think about who I could get to sell it.</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts: </strong> </p><p>Again, we are not the land of unicorns up here. Two-thirds of our daily newspapers are owned by an American hedge fund, the same one that owns American media, i.e. the National Enquirer. They had no shame in how they opposed the carbon price — they printed lie after lie after lie about it. </p><p>But it didn't work, because one thing we do have going for us in this country, at least so far, is that we're not tribal when it comes to our partisan affiliation. Most Canadians have voted for different parties at different points in their lives. Some people even vote for different parties at different orders of government simultaneously. I think that's a good thing. Partisan adhesion is not as sticky in Canada as it is in many places.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Do you explain that just by reference to the fact that it's a parliamentary system and there are multiple parties, so there's not this constant binary forced on everything?</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>No. It's part of it, for sure. What explains it more is that we have more or less built and maintained an excellent public education system that 93 percent of Canadians send their kids to. You're looking for the secret sauce in Canadian policy and why everything from immigration to climate action is possible here? It's because of that basic fact that everybody goes to school together.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Carbon pricing was run on in 2015, passed in 2018, and then elections in 2019, so there was no getting around this being at the heart of the election. I was just reading an account of the 2019 election which basically said the big winner was the carbon tax. Two-thirds of voters voted for a party that supported the carbon tax. </p><p>If you’re a liberal and a fan of the carbon tax and involved in doing it, you have incentive to play up the extent to which the election was a referendum on the carbon tax, but was it really? Were there other bigger forces, or was it really mainly about the tax this time?</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts: </strong> </p><p>It was the showdown at the OK Corral about climate in Canada, for sure. There were other things, some of which it's still too soon for me to remember. You may remember a certain story that came out about the prime minister in the middle of the campaign — that took over the news cycle for a few days. </p><p>The conservatives had been elected in major provinces (not that there are any minor provinces, coming from Nova Scotia) — they had the governments of Ontario, Alberta, more or less Quebec. And everybody, including of course the leadership of the Conservative Party federally, was saying “we are going to scrap the tax.” There were probably two or three things that decided the 2019 election, but there's no doubt in my mind that that was number one.</p><p>Greta Thunberg drew I can't remember how many hundreds of thousands of people to the streets in the middle of Montreal, literally in the middle of the campaign. The prime minister marched in the rally. </p><p>And more importantly for this discussion, there's no way we win that fight without the rebate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So the fact that the money goes back to citizens did play a big role in the debate.</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts: </strong> </p><p>It was decisive.</p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:  </strong></p><p>It was key. You could call it out. It was a reasonable policy. They could just say it was a tax grab, and the response had to be, “it's not, and by the way, this is what you get back.” In a way it's kind of good in elections when you have one issue — it doesn't feel good, at the time I was very nervous — but it was good, it focused the mind. </p><p>Carbon pricing also became, like, do you want to act on climate? Because the conservatives were so against it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>To what extent was public support about the details of this policy, and to what extent did it just become a proxy battle of, “we care about climate change and they don't?”</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts: </strong> </p><p>It's a great question, David, because this wasn't a <em>detail</em> of the policy — this <em>was</em> the policy, the price and rebate. The difference of one side saying “it's a tax grab” and the other side having to say, “well, look at all the things we're going to spend the money on,” and one side saying “it's a tax grab,” and the other side saying “they're lying to you” — when it's a live-action, kinetic political battle, one of those arguments is winnable, and the other one is not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>I feel the need to insert here, just to make myself feel better: not that there's anything wrong with the federal government taxing people and spending money on public purposes.</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>Absolutely. Our universal public healthcare system and the public education system that I just alluded to would be impossible without those things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>So you win in 2019 on the carbon tax. Is the feeling in Canadian politics now that the main issue is settled, we're just arguing over the details? Or are your right wingers like our right wingers here in the US, that never give up? Are they still after it, or is this a settled question in Canadian politics? </p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:  </strong></p><p>I think the Canadian public bought into a price on pollution — that's what we call it, not the carbon tax. But the conservatives apparently are going to kill themselves over this again. It's kind of funny, the number of stories that have been written about the conservatives tying themselves in knots over this, and conservatives themselves, the more reasonable ones who want to get elected, saying “you do this again, you're going to lose again, can you learn some lessons?” </p><p>It's going to happen, but I don't think that means it's a lost policy. I think that the conservatives are a lost cause. </p><p>Having said that, you always have to be vigilant. You can’t take it for granted. As the price goes up, you have to continuously emphasize you're getting more money back, but you also need to do the other things: make sure that your economy is growing and you're creating jobs and you're showing that you're taking real climate action. It's part of a bigger piece. </p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, I don't think it's settled. I had hoped it would be settled in the last election. The conservatives had a weird policy that nobody believed they would ever really implement, that they would go to a first ministers’ meeting and say, ”hey, we tried, and now we're going to get rid of the old plan.” I don't think they ever had any intention of implementing it. It was, by my view as someone who has spent a lot of time in government in this country, unimplementable. But that's for them to answer. </p><p>You mentioned the forces of the right wing in the United States — they're the same forces. Catherine and I are both phoning into this lovely discussion from Ottawa where we have MAGA flags and Confederate flags flying on Parliament Hill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I want to hit on the Supreme Court case. Several provinces sued over the tax; the substance of the lawsuit was that this is an unconstitutional power grab by the federal government over things that ought to be provincial, and the Supreme Court ruled in March of last year that, no, it's constitutional. Pretty much settled that. How nervous were you about that? Was that case a big deal, or was it a frivolous lawsuit? </p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>It was a pretty huge deal.</p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:  </strong></p><p>We definitely needed to win or else it was going to be really bad. </p><p>We are a federation, so we had to demonstrate the reasonableness that the environment is joint jurisdiction between the federal government and the provinces. By saying, “you can do a direct price or you can do cap and trade and design it how you want but you have to meet the benchmark,” we knew that was going to be important, legally. We didn't just say, “okay everyone, too bad, whatever your system is, we're getting rid of it” or “you have to design it just like this.” We were reasonable. That was important. </p><p>But also, the Supreme Court said climate change is a threat of the highest order to the country and indeed to the world. That was critically important, because it was going to be ridiculous at the most basic level if the federal government couldn't attack greenhouse gas emissions within the country. How are you going to have a climate plan? We couldn't comply with the Paris Agreement! If you have a target and you can’t actually reduce emissions because provinces get to do whatever they want and they can continue to slowly [increase emissions], that was going to be a huge problem. </p><p>But the Supreme Court was very reasonable and they actually recognized that pollution doesn't know any borders. We had tailored it in a way that it was narrow, and that was important because they did look at, is the federal government going to come in? This was some of the arguments by conservative provinces, that we're going to regulate everything. We'd have these conservative premiers saying, “they're going to regulate how often you can drive your car.” We had to be careful. </p><p>It was also a very important decision because it does now make it clear that the federal government can take action to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in potentially broader areas where it's in the national interest. I didn't really think we had a chance of losing. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>You were pretty confident in the case and in the court itself. What's the situation with partisanship on the Supreme Court in Canada? </p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:  </strong></p><p>It's not a thing. Stephen Harper probably tried to put people that might have been conservative. But the legal profession is different here. How we appoint judges is different. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>And the court is trusted by the public as a neutral arbiter. That must be nice.</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>As the prime minister said many, many moons ago when he kicked off his leadership campaign in 2012, this country did not happen by accident, and it will not continue without effort. It is a constant struggle, David.</p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:  </strong></p><p>The Supreme Court — I wouldn't overstate it. Which sounds like a funny thing to say, it was obviously critically important that it be found constitutional. But at the end of the day, a new government can always change policy. </p><p>That’s why you can't get distracted in some ways by some things. That was really important, because otherwise, you'd have to go back to the drawing table, or win a majority, or get new legislation. But end of the day, you have to convince regular people. </p><p>Maybe 2019 was unusual, because it was such a significant issue, though fought on a variety of different fronts. But I actually think Canadians have come a long way, not just on carbon pricing, but on climate. The town of Lytton literally exploded, it just burned down. We're seeing massive floods, forest fires, droughts, our Arctic is thawing. That doesn't mean that a particular policy will be resilient, but if you talk about it as a reasonable person, and it is well designed — it has to be well-designed policy, you can’t sell something that sucks to the regular person — but we are in a different place from where Canadians were at in 2015.</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>And we're at a different place than where Canadians were in 2011. Canada did not look much different on climate change; in fact, in some ways, the Obama administration looked way better than the Harper administration did on climate change. </p><p>I guess that's the point, David, of this whole discussion, and why it raised our Canadian version of Irish when we read this study. People can change things in democracies. Sometimes the cards are stacked against you, and sometimes it feels like nothing good can ever happen, but if people put their whole heart and soul into it, they can make change happen. That is possible. It's still possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Well, we’ll have to agree to disagree about that. When people talk about the difference between the US and Canada on this issue, there's a lot of hand-waving about public opinion and who's sensible and who’s not, but to me, in the end, it all comes back to structures and procedures. You [Canadians] can have a majority that wants a policy, and that will result in the policy passing. We [Americans] have a majority that wants a policy, and we have a situation where 30 percent of the population can elect senators that can go literally block anything. So I think it's less the intangible stuff and more prosaic: we have really stupid rules, and kind of a stupid Constitution. </p><p>I don't know how you get around that. We've done the work trying to change public opinion, it has changed, and we've come up with good policies — we did all the things we’re supposed to do, and now we're facing a situation where one dude from West Virginia, who partly owns coal plants, is literally deciding what and whether we do anything at all on climate change. It’s absolutely absurd.</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>That, to me, is one of the central differences between the Canadian and American political systems: the centrality of money. It's insane to me how much money — I remember David Axelrod asked me how much money we were going to spend in the 2015 campaign, and I said “it's probably going to be around $35-40 million.” It ended up being $42 million, in the longest election campaign in modern Canadian history. David said, “I spent more than that in the Democratic primary in Florida.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>One of the things that fee and dividend proponents are constantly saying is that it's very important that the rebates be visible, that people know they're getting them. They all are advocating this idea of sending the big Ed McMahon check to the door every month. </p><p>But Canada went with a tax rebate that, unless you're pretty on the ball, would be very easy to not notice. That's the research that was written up in that paper — lots of people just aren't noticing it. </p><p>So why bury it in tax rebates? What prompted the decision to shift this summer to mailing checks? Do you anticipate mailing checks to make a big difference?</p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:  </strong></p><p>I don’t know why we weren't allowed to. I actually said, “I'll deliver it. I'll go to every Canadian and bring it.” For whatever reason, the bureaucratic system could not do these mailed-out checks. We weren't able to win that. We’ve won it now, in the sense that we recognize that this is important.</p><p>Some of it was that people didn't know how much they got. Half of the people didn't know they got a check. To the extent people cared, they would be able to hear the conservatives say, “it's a tax grab,” and then they'd hear me and others saying “actually you’re going to get more money back.” It was very important, I can't emphasize enough. We could not have won if we had said, “actually, you know what, we put it into general revenue and we're going to do this green thing where we're going to give it to green stuff in different places, and I don't know what your provinces get.” That's not sellable. </p><p>I don't want to be too depressed about the situation in the United States because we did live under Donald Trump — being the environment minister, it was hard for us. I actually went to Miami and Houston and hung out with the mayors there and did videos for Canadians to say, “but look, these guys are doing stuff on climate!” You’ll always have the states and cities and businesses that are acting. </p><p>You’ve got to be crafty. We could have done the easy thing. It didn't really occur to me, because I wasn't going to back down on it, but people did want us to not do this, including internally. Some people will just wait out the clock. But we were crafty. </p><p>I know it's much harder in the United States. Comms matters, designing things in a way that can uphold a constitutional challenge matters. I get your Supreme Court, you have challenges, working with states, litigating everything and knowing that it's going to be in place while it's litigated. You have to be crafty, too. I'm hopeful that the US is able to land things.</p><p>I'm going to be at Columbia with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-jason-bordoff-and-meghan">Jason Bordoff</a>, working on carbon pricing and border carbon adjustments. Maybe the enticement of border carbon adjustments will help on the pricing. The IMF is working on a minimum price floor. So there's action. I'm a realistic optimist or an optimistic realist some days, but I don't want to give up on you guys doing things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>One of the things that's not publicly appreciated in these discussions about carbon taxes, because they're so big politically, is that, especially at the level that they're being talked about, they're macroeconomically not that big a deal. If you look at macroeconomic assessments, it's like 1 percent GDP one way or the other, with a lot of uncertainty.</p><p>I can understand completely why dividends serve as a great political argument, and also that people in practice maybe aren't that aware of them, because the amount you're paying in tax is not yet very big and the amount you're getting back is not yet very big. The actual amount of money, as opposed to the political symbolism of it all, is relatively modest. </p><p>That said, the tax is about to go way up, to the point that we’ll pretty soon be at levels that Canadians will start noticing the costs, and maybe start noticing the checks back, too. The amounts on both ends are going to get bigger. Is there a next test of the tax?</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>I think there’s going to be an annual test. You're right that people are going to feel $170 a ton a lot more than they feel $50. There's no way you'd maintain a political consensus for it if that money weren't being rebated to people, because while you're right at even $170 a ton, at the maybe $3 trillion the Canadian economy will be at the time, it is not that much. But for individual families, it is a lot. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Are you pretty confident that the checks will increase the salience of the dividends? Has there been any testing or polling on that, or is it just gut common sense?</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>I can't speak to that, because that policy was announced after I joined the private sector, but I suspect that was the reasoning. There's no reason to believe it won't be the case, but it's going to require a continuous commitment to communication. Of course, 2030 is sooner than it used to be. But it's still a couple of election cycles away, and anything can happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Well, thank you guys so much for doing this thing in the first place, which, despite your admonitions, still has unicorn vibes to me. Catherine, I wish you all the best in joining the fight down here in the US; we could use some new energy and optimism. Thanks to you both for coming on today. It was really fun. </p><p><strong>Catherine McKenna:</strong></p><p>It was great.</p><p><strong>Gerald Butts:  </strong></p><p>It was  a real pleasure.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-gerald-butts-and-catherine</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:48676780</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 16 Feb 2022 17:45:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/48676780/3baab4355901be8198cc9e5cb64a2f30.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3900</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/48676780/2c6d45f27b331524ed6314eb4fe28545.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Rebecca Dell on decarbonizing heavy industry]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Rebecca Dell, who runs the industry program at the ClimateWorks Foundation, offers a comprehensive overview of the problems of industrial decarbonization, the most promising technological solutions in steel, cement, and chemicals, and the kinds of policies that could accelerate progress. Incredibly informative.</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Rebecca Dell, February 11, 2022</p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/p7v73dxcv2x6qk1/volts22.02.11%28rebecca.dell%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF version</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>For most of the carbon-intensive sectors of the economy — electricity, transportation, buildings — we have a pretty good sense of how to eliminate carbon emissions. None of those sectors will be <em>easy</em> to decarbonize. Every one is an enormous practical challenge. But in each case, the basic path to zero is clear, and it mostly involves switching out fossil-fueled machines with machines that generate or run on clean electricity. </p><p>Then there’s that other wedge on the pie chart, the one that gets less attention: industry. Manufacturing, mining, construction, and waste processing are responsible for about a third of global carbon emissions (about a quarter of US emissions).</p><p>The path to zero emissions in heavy industry is much murkier than it is for other sectors. Low-carbon alternatives are early in development and commercialization; in some cases, there are no alternatives except to capture and bury the carbon when it’s emitted.</p><p>In future pods, I might get deeper into some specific industries (like steel). But for this one, I wanted to attempt a broad overview: What You Need to Know About Decarbonizing Industry.</p><p>Nobody knows the sector and its challenges better than <a target="_blank" href="https://www.climateworks.org/people/rebecca-dell/">Rebecca Dell</a>, who runs <a target="_blank" href="https://www.climateworks.org/programs/industry/">the industry program at the ClimateWorks Foundation</a>. Dell previously worked at the Department of Energy, where she helped coordinate Obama’s climate action plan, and before that was a research scientist at Scripps Institution of Oceanography. She’s a researcher, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.climateworks.org/report/build-clean-industrial-policy-for-climate-and-justice/">author</a>, and, as more attention turns to industry, an increasingly frequent podcast guest. (She was <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/podcasts/catalyst-with-shayle-kann/catalyst-podcast-why-the-chemicals-industry-is-one-of-the-toughest-to-decarbonize">on Canary’s </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/podcasts/catalyst-with-shayle-kann/catalyst-podcast-why-the-chemicals-industry-is-one-of-the-toughest-to-decarbonize"><em>Catalyst</em></a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/podcasts/catalyst-with-shayle-kann/catalyst-podcast-why-the-chemicals-industry-is-one-of-the-toughest-to-decarbonize"> pod last month</a>.) </p><p>It takes a while — okay, almost two hours — but Dell and I manage to cover all the big industrial sectors, why they emit so much, prospects for reducing emissions, and the policies that could make it happen. If you’re looking for a one-stop-shopping primer on industry and climate, this is for you. </p><p>Without further ado, Rebecca Dell, welcome to Volts.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>Thanks so much for having me. I'm really happy to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I'm excited for this. We are going to attempt to cover a lot of ground. I want to try to give a 30,000-foot overview of industry and decarbonization; obviously any of the subtopics could be podcasts of their own. </p><p>Among the Volts audience, people are probably basically familiar with the famous Energy Information Administration pie chart of where US greenhouse gases come from. There are wedges for transportation, electricity, buildings, agriculture — I think people mostly have their heads around how to decarbonize those. </p><p>Then there's that big wedge that just says “industry.” My sense is that, to a lot of people, that is a bit of a black box — it’s not clear what's in it or how to approach decarbonizing it. Historically, that has been the neglected stepchild of the decarbonization conversation. But am I right in saying that attention on that little wedge has rapidly increased in recent years?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>Yes, and for people who work on this area, it's been exciting to see how much new interest has come in the last year or two. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Do you have an explanation for why?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:</strong></p><p>The phenomenon that is more in need of explanation is why so few people were looking at this area until the last year or so, considering that the industrial sector globally, under the most parsimonious accounting, is responsible for a quarter of all greenhouse gas emissions, and under a broader definition, it's responsible for more than a third.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Does that roughly echo the US pie chart? Or is the US different because we have deindustrialized a little bit?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>The US is a little lower in terms of the portion of our emissions that come from the industrial sector. But if you add back in the greenhouse gas emissions that come from manufacturing products in other countries that will be consumed in the United States — you can think of those as our imported emissions — then you get back to something pretty close to the global average.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So let's say about a third — that's a lot of emissions to neglect for this long. When we say industry, what do we mean by that? What does that category inclue? What are the boundaries? And what, in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, are the top line items?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>That's a really important question, because when we talk about “industry” in the climate community, it’s a piece of stealth jargon. It’s the worst kind of jargon: it's a word that sounds like a normal word, but it actually is a jargon word. </p><p>Basically, what we're talking about when we talk about industry is everything that's not agriculture or energy, which is to say, it's the material economy. It’s mining, manufacturing, construction, waste processing. It's physical stuff, as opposed to energy. </p><p>As you might imagine, there are a lot of fields of human endeavor that are included in that very broad set of activities. It's a very heterogeneous sector. But for all of the millions of different types of activities that are included in the industrial sector, there's an astonishingly short list that are responsible for the overwhelming majority of the greenhouse gas emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>That's very useful for our podcast purposes.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>It is. It allows one to simplify one's focus considerably. There are three real standouts here: steel, cement, and commodity chemicals. </p><p>The chemical industry itself is, again, varied and heterogeneous; they produce a lot of different products. But there are about 10 chemicals that are basically the precursors for two products — plastic and fertilizer — that dominate those emissions. You can think of this in four product categories: cement, steel, plastic, and fertilizer. Just making those materials is responsible for two-thirds of all the greenhouse gas emissions from the entire industrial sector.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>Insofar as you figure out how to decarbonize those, will those lessons be transferable to all those other varied applications? Or are they so heterogenous that you have to do it one by one?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>The sources of greenhouse gas emissions are different in other areas. For example, a lot of the emissions in the waste processing area are what's called landfill gas: anaerobic digestion of poorly sorted solid waste trash leads to methane emissions. So that's in the one-third that's not accounted for. </p><p>But a lot of it is manufacturing. It’s from lighter manufacturing activities: lower temperature processes, electric drive processes, cooling, motors, that sort of thing. A lot of that will be taken care of as the grid gets cleaner and as things that are relatively easy to electrify become more electrified.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>If tomorrow, by magic, all electricity became clean, how much of that one-third of emissions would vanish?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>That's pretty much the difference between the one-quarter and the one-third numbers that I cited. For the one-quarter, the more parsimonious definition is “we are only looking at greenhouse gases that are coming out of smokestacks at factories,” what are called <em>direct emissions</em>. If you add in the greenhouse gas emissions from generating electricity that is consumed at industrial facilities, that gets you from a quarter up to over a third.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>In terms of that quarter, how much of industry is devoted to fossil fuels themselves: mining, drilling, processing, transporting, refining, etc.? If we shift away from fossil fuels over time, how much of a chunk does that take out of the industry pie?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>None. </p><p>The numbers I cited to you, the quarter and the third, those are global numbers. Here in the United States, we have a very unusual convention of including the fossil-fuel extraction industries as industrial activities. In the whole rest of the world, when people are doing their greenhouse gas inventories, they don't count that as an industrial activity; they count that as an energy transformation activity, so they lump those emissions in with power generation. </p><p>If you look at that pie chart from EIA, or EPA — if you look at a strictly US source — that will include your refining and fossil-fuel extraction emissions, but global numbers don't include any.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>That seems like a complication in comparing across countries, doesn't it? It's kind of a big chunk to have misfiled in one place or the other.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, but we're America, and we like to do things our way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Why do steel, cement, plastic, and fertilizer produce so many GHGs? </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>First, because we make them in larger quantities than we make anything else. These are the materials that we make other things out of. We make steel and cement in increments of billions of tons per year. We make commodity chemicals in increments of hundreds of millions of tons per year. These are the only products that we make in those volumes, so of course these are the products that have the biggest greenhouse gas impact. </p><p>Second, all of these industries are a variation on the following theme: you dig something out of the ground and the first thing you do with it transforms a raw material into a useful molecule; everything that's downstream of that in your supply chain is arranging your useful molecules in different combinations and sizes and ratios. But all of that rearranging takes a lot less energy and emits a lot less greenhouse gas than making the useful molecule in the first place.</p><p>All of these industries are what we call primary commodity processing industries. In fact, if the big three that we talked about — steel, cement, chemicals — are the highest emitting industries, four through seven or eight are also primary commodity processing, just smaller ones. They're things like aluminum.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Let's look at those four: steel, cement, plastic, and fertilizer. Why does making steel specifically produce so much greenhouse gas? What is the traditional steel-making process?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>Steel emissions are so big because we make 2 billion tons of it per year. That's the best part of a thousand pounds of steel for every human being on Earth, every year. It sounds insane until you look at a suspension bridge, or a runway, or anything in our built environment. Then you have to think, oh yeah, I guess we do use an incredibly large amount of steel. We make everything out of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>What is the raw material, and what is the processing that sends off so much greenhouse gas?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>With steel, we start with iron ore. Iron ore is iron oxide — iron atoms chemically bonded to oxygen atoms. Your audience may be more familiar with iron oxide by its common name, which is rust. </p><p>Everybody knows that rust does not have the valuable material properties that steel has, so what we're doing when we make steel is stripping off those oxygen atoms and turning it into metallic iron, with a little bit of other elements mixed in to improve its properties. Steel is almost all iron by weight.</p><p>The main way we do that chemical reaction today is to use coal. We combine the iron ore and the coal together in a reactor called a blast furnace. We use metallurgical coal, which is also called coking coal. It's a special kind of coal, but it's still a lump of carbon. </p><p>In the blast furnace, part of the coal gets burned for thermal energy to help the reaction go faster. All of those carbon atoms are a more attractive place for the oxygen atoms to go, so the oxygen atoms move from the iron oxide over to the carbon, and we get carbon dioxide. So we're getting carbon dioxide from two different sources. </p><p>This is another theme that we'll see throughout the industrial sector: you have the energy emissions — the coal that you burn to get your reactor hot to make the chemical reaction go — but you also have a set of chemical reactions that are going on in there that are not combustion reactions. They're a different kind of chemical reaction that's also producing greenhouse gases. That’s what we call <em>process emissions</em>: any greenhouse gas emission that comes from doing anything except combustion.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>My intuition tells me that energy emissions are going to be the easier ones to eliminate, because we have alternative sources of energy that don't emit greenhouse gases. Is that accurate?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>In many cases, yes.</p><p>It would be useful at this point to give a typology of solutions that applies across industries. There are a few buckets of decarbonization pathways that we can use across all of these industries. </p><p>Bucket number one is <em>material efficiency</em>. We can just use less of this material in order to make the products and deliver the services that we want. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Traditionally that's the cheapest, right? It's just changing your behavior, changing your processes, changing design.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a big one. The barriers there are typically not technical. They're barriers that have to do with incentives and social systems and cultural norms. That's very important, and we should definitely do it. </p><p>Bucket number two, <em>carbon capture and storage</em>. You keep doing pretty much what you're doing now, but you figure out a way to collect all the carbon dioxide and put it underground. You don't have to like it, but you have to acknowledge that it exists and is a possibility.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>I'm very familiar with capturing carbon dioxide off of combustion; that's the standard CCS model. Is capturing the carbon dioxide off of process emissions notably different or more difficult?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>There's a dumb version of carbon capture where you just take your flue gases at the end of the pipe and put them through some scrubbers and then put them through some amine sorbents, and you can do that on any flue gas. You could imagine doing that on the end of almost any pipe, but each industry has its own version of smarter carbon capture that is engineered to optimize for this industrial process. That varies a lot. </p><p>Bucket three is <em>hydrogen</em>. As your <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-panama-bartholomy-on#details">recent guest Panama Bartholomy</a> said, it is the answer to every question in energy before it has even been asked. </p><p>Bucket number four is <em>direct electrification</em>. </p><p>Bucket number five is <em>bioenergy</em>. </p><p>Those are your five buckets across all of these industries.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Is there significance to the order you put them in?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>No. Well, I suppose I put bioenergy last because bioenergy cannot ever be more than a small part of the solution. There’s no way to provide enough biomass to do a large portion of the decarbonization in these industries. The IEA estimates that our current total biomass available for energy use on Earth is something like 55 or 60 exajoules of energy. The chemical industry today uses almost 50 exajoules of energy. The steel industry uses another 30 exajoules of energy. There’s just not enough to go around. Bioenergy might show up here or there, but it can't be the bulk solution, because there just aren’t enough joules there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Bucket number one, material efficiency, applied to steel: I can imagine us using less steel. </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>One point on that: in the United States and in other high-income countries, we already use less steel. As countries get richer, their demand for steel tends to tail off. </p><p>The reason for that is that as you become a middle-income country, that's when you build out an electric transmission and distribution system that actually gets to every house; you move your entire population into modern housing; people start having private vehicles for the first time in significant numbers; you build sanitation systems and aqueducts that bring clean water and public health to people. Once you've done that, your demand for steel is largely a function of population growth and replacing things as they wear out. </p><p>We in high-income countries might have a lot of opportunities to reduce our demand for steel in order to be more material-efficient in our use of it, but there's this huge latent demand for more steel that is represented by the couple billion people on Earth who are still in poverty and have an entirely legitimate desire to have modern housing and sanitation and all of those things.</p><p>The other thing about steel, though, is that it's quite recyclable. As you have a lot of stuff for a long time, you develop a stock of steel that you can recycle. If current trends continue, all of the additional demand for steel that's going to come from countries emerging out of poverty can probably be met with recycled steel. The current volume of new steel production probably doesn't have to go up in order to continue to meet global needs, but it probably doesn't have to go down either.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>Are we currently on a trajectory to hold it steady?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>If current trends continue. But I don't think I've actually said out loud yet in this interview how much greenhouse gas is emitted by the global steel industry. It’s 3.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year. It's more greenhouse gases than are emitted by any entire nation except the United States and China. Even if we're just holding current production constant, that's still an enormous problem to solve.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>By the same token, if you reduce it by even a small fraction, you are reducing a lot of tons.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>What does smart carbon capture look like in steel? </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:</strong></p><p>Frankly, there's not a lot of interest in steel CCS around the world right now. I'm happy to explain how it might work and why it would be hard. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>My attitude toward CCS is, don't do it unless you have to. If you're telling me you don't have to, I'm happy to put it out of my mind. </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>I think we can confidently walk past. Let’s move on to hydrogen. Hydrogen is where a lot of the excitement in the steel industry is right now. In my mind, the best argument for hydrogen is that making steel using hydrogen is the smallest increment of technology that we need to get to zero-greenhouse-gas steel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Can you just substitute hydrogen into existing refining processes, or there's more to it than that?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>No. Today, more than 90 percent of what we call primary steel — steel that's made from iron ore, not recycled — is made with a blast furnace using coal. There's not a lot you can do about the blast furnace on the hydrogen front. </p><p>But about 7 percent is made with an alternative process called direct reduction that uses methane instead of coal. We think that the hydrogen process might be quite similar to direct reduction and use quite similar equipment, so we don't have to start from zero. </p><p>This direct reduction process is only 7 percent of global production, but that still makes this a fully commercial, mature technology. You can call up the Midrex Corporation and say, “hello, I would like to buy a shaft furnace,” and they will make you one. </p><p>Basically what we're talking about is reengineering this existing technology of the shaft furnace to use only hydrogen instead of what it currently uses, which is a mixture of hydrogen and carbon monoxide. If we're going to do that as our main route, we're going to have to build a lot more shaft furnaces. </p><p>So the next option — direct electrification.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>My favorite.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>There are a few different ways to do this. The one that's most advanced is something called molten oxide electrolysis, which is pretty much what it sounds like. You take your oxide (iron ore), you heat it up enough to melt it, you put a giant electric field across it, and the electric field is strong enough that it pulls apart the iron and the oxygen. </p><p>This is pretty similar to how we currently make aluminum, so it's not crazy. It's a thing that should be able to be made to work. It's a pre-commercial technology, though — it's not ready for primetime yet. There are some companies that are working on it, it might be ready soon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Are we to a demonstration project yet? Is it happening somewhere?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>Give it a year and there may be something exciting to announce.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Is that the cheapest form of direct electrification, or the most practical?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>That’s the one that’s closest to being ready to do. People are also thinking about low-temperature forms of electrolysis that you can do without having to melt the iron oxide first, but the one that I just described is the most mature. </p><p>The biggest advantage of the hydrogen route is that it is the smallest increment of technology to get us to truly green steel. The biggest advantage of the direct electrification route is that it will require the least energy. If you are using green hydrogen — taking electricity and converting that into hydrogen — and then using that hydrogen to convert your iron ore into iron, you lose a lot of energy in that extra conversion. If you can just use the electricity directly, you get to keep another third of the energy.</p><p>The amount of energy that's involved is enormous. This industry uses a similar amount of global energy to its portion of global greenhouse gases, which is 7 or 8 percent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>None of these, except for carbon capture, seem to address existing blast furnace steel production facilities.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>Yeah, and this is incredibly important for the politics. In the steel industry, as in a lot of these industries, the reason why the facilities that we have today were built in the places that they were built is because they had the best access to raw materials and energy. Why did we put the steel mill there? Because we could get metallurgical coal to that place really cheaply. </p><p>Also like a lot of these industries, most of the production is done at a relatively small number of very large facilities. I've visited a lot of steel mills over the years, and it's not unusual for a steel mill to have 10,000 employees. The biggest one I ever went to had 48,000 employees at one facility. It's the size of a city. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So these are not things that you can move around easily. Switching geographies is not practical.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>It creates a lot of problems and a lot of social dislocation. The steel industry might not be a huge part of the total US economy today, but for the communities and even the states that are hosting these facilities, one facility is a really important part of your employment. People will fight really hard to keep these facilities, because they're so concentrated and the local community is so dependent on them. If you're moving from a coal-based process to an electricity-based process, frankly, the places that have the best access to metallurgical coal are not typically the same as the places that have the best access to cheap electricity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>So CCS is something you can offer these communities and these facilities to say, “you don't have to change anything fundamental, you don't have to move, you can continue to exist here and just bolt this thing onto your facility.”</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:</strong>  </p><p>You can potentially maintain existing industrial economies, but it's not easy. </p><p>One of the reasons why CCS is tough in the steel industry is that at what are called integrated steel mills, the traditional type of steel mills that have blast furnaces at them, typically you'll have three or four really big carbon dioxide sources — your blast furnace, some other major process furnaces, and things like that. Together, you have a lot of carbon dioxide coming out in one place, so you can see how it could be cost-effective to collect it all. </p><p>But all of that together is often only half or maybe 60 percent of the carbon dioxide that's coming out of the facility overall. The rest of it is all these small sources — little process heaters here and there — that are distributed by the dozens all over a facility that's the size of a town. Thinking about how you would collect all of the carbon dioxide from all those distributed sources and do that cost effectively is really hard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>I came into this interview riding on a wave of green-steel hype, and nothing I'm hearing you say is justifying any of it.  What is all the excitement around steel? It sounds to me like we have no good options. </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>I didn't say anything nasty about hydrogen, did I?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>I mean, it's going to substitute for that 7 percent with a special kind of furnace, right? Which is not nothing, but blast furnaces are most of the furnaces. </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>All of them are going to have to be retired.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>That sounds like a brutal social and political process.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>I'm not going to claim that it will be straightforward, but we do have 30 years. Industrial equipment doesn't typically last longer than that. We don't have to do this all at once. But I have never seen a good idea for how we have a climate-safe blast furnace. </p><p>We are in a process of closing most, if not all, of the coal-fired electricity stations around the world, and we all accept that this type of industrial equipment, this particular coal-fired type of furnace, is just not consistent with a climate-safe future. That is also true of blast furnaces.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>So insofar as there's an elevator-pitch answer in steel, it is shutting down blast furnaces and building new facilities that either can work with hydrogen shaft furnaces or are some directly electrified process that we don't quite have worked out yet.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>We're getting close, though. That's probably how it's going to go. </p><p>There are some interesting reports that came out in the last few months looking at pathways to steel decarbonization. Several different organizations have done this kind of analysis over the course of the last year, with different methodologies and approaches, and all of them basically come to the same conclusion: no new blast furnaces, and we're going to have to start shutting down the existing blast furnaces in pretty short order.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I'm guessing these new, less standardized and commodified processes are more expensive. What kind of delta are we talking about?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>This is a great question, and there are two answers. </p><p>First, yes, we do expect that green steel and other green commodities will be more expensive than existing dirty means of producing them. Depending on who you ask, and depending on exactly which process you're talking about, those price premiums range from 20 percent up to 200 percent. </p><p>That's okay — we pay for environmental performance all the time. Cars with catalytic converters are more expensive than cars without catalytic converters; we still think it's a good idea to put catalytic converters in our cars.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>But if you're telling a country that's emerging out of poverty that it's going to be 200 percent more expensive for them to do so, that's not nothing.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>This leads me to the second point, which is that these industries — steel, cement, commodity chemicals — are incredibly valuable. The whole rest of the economy relies on the material that these industries produce. </p><p>However, from an economic perspective, they are extremely low-value-added industries. They have very tight margins. These are your classic commodity industries. The cost of these materials represents a very small part of the cost of the finished goods that are made out of them. </p><p>From the perspective of the guy who owns the steel mill or chemical plant or cement kiln — sometimes it’s a girl, but usually a guy — he's like, “I have commodity-sized margins here. There is no room in my margin to pay for any kind of decarbonization.”</p><p>I would encourage you, however, to look at this through the other end of the telescope. Don't look from the perspective of the guy who owns the steel mill; look at it from the perspective of the person who's buying a car made out of steel. Even at a relatively high additional cost for decarbonization, that's only going to add a couple hundred bucks to the cost of your car. The average new car in the United States costs $37,000; $37,200 looks a lot more manageable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>This must have political economy consequences, too, right? If the steel mill owners can't get the car buyers on their side to rebel against this, how much power do they have on their own to politically resist these sorts of things? </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>The real political and economic problem here is not, “how do we afford to pay for decarbonization?” We can 100 percent afford to pay for decarbonization of steel and all of these other industries. The problem is, how do we pass the costs efficiently through the supply chain so that the place they land, the final consumer, is the person in the supply chain who can actually afford to pay.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>They’re more dispersed the more you pass them down the chain too; less concentrated on any one constituency that might rebel against it.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>Yes. The policy challenge here is about how you pass those costs through. Ways that you can do that are things like product standards. Why do we have catalytic converters in our cars? In a practical sense, it's because you're not allowed to buy a car that doesn't have one. If you want to make sure that the costs of decarbonization get passed all the way through the supply chain, one way to do that is to have standards that require that products use clean materials.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Of course government procurement is always a huge piece of this too. Government can start that process. </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>Yes, the government can start by applying the standards to itself.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>That's basically end users voluntarily taking on the cost, right? </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>I don’t think there's anything voluntary about my catalytic converter.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Well, policymakers deliberately choosing to put the costs on the final user so that it's less concentrated. The steel mill owners are all equally affected; none of them are being priced out relative to the others.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>To be philosophical for a second, there are only two pots of money in society: consumer dollars and taxpayer dollars. The question is, what ratio of consumer dollars to taxpayer dollars do we wish to use? That is going to change depending on circumstances, but that's the question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>This helps me have a more realistic view on steel, although it’s slightly dimmed my enthusiasm.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>I don't want to give you the impression that nothing's happening on steel. The Swedes have a project called HYBRIT, a hydrogen reduction steel project, which is the most advanced in the world. They recently announced that they made one of their mining vehicles entirely out of green steel — the first vehicle in the history of the world to be made out of green steel. </p><p>It’s only one vehicle, but the distance between one vehicle and two vehicles is a lot smaller than the distance between zero vehicles and one vehicle, and that distance keeps getting smaller over time. We're making real progress. We're not there yet — it's definitely at an earlier stage than our colleagues who are working on power or transportation — but we're making progress.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Let’s move on to cement. What is the raw material and what is the basic processing?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>The raw material is the main constituent of limestone. Limestone is a very common kind of rock; you can find it pretty much in any country. The main constituent of limestone is something called calcium carbonate. The main ingredient in cement is something called calcium oxide. You can hear right in the words — there is carbon in the limestone, there is no carbon in the cement. </p><p>You dig up the rocks and cook them at 1,500℃, roughly 2,600℉. About 40 percent of your greenhouse gas emissions come from burning fuel to get your rocks that hot, and the other 60 percent, on average, is from burning off the carbon that was in the rock. The carbon coming out of the rock is your process emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Once again, it's fairly easy to imagine the energy coming from a different low-carbon source, but the problem comes down to process emissions. When the carbon comes off the limestone and is released, is there some way of capturing it? Is there some way of doing this without releasing the carbon? What are the green cement options?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>Even if we decide that we don't want to use CCS in any other part of our economy, the place that we are most likely to end up relying on CCS as our primary decarbonization pathway is in the cement industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Are the emission sources more concentrated in cement than they are in steel?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>A cement kiln is a much simpler place than a steel mill. We were talking about steel mills with thousands of employees; if you go to a cement kiln, the typical number of guys on shift is maybe 25. You just have one big pipe in a cement kiln, so CCS is a lot more straightforward there. </p><p>People do have ideas for alternative raw materials or alternative cement chemistries that might be able to address this process emissions problem without CCS, but it's probably going to be CCS. Part of that is my assessment of what the technical alternatives are, but an even more important reason is that cement and the thing we like to make out of it, concrete, are foundational to our buildings. It is literally the thing we make foundations out of. Almost every structure in our society relies on concrete, and the type of cement that we use, which is called ordinary portland cement, was first patented in 1824. We're coming up on its 200-year anniversary.</p><p>This is a material we feel very comfortable with. We know its material properties really well. And for obvious reasons, the construction industry is incredibly risk-averse about the structural properties of the things that it's building. Even if you have great ideas for alternative cement chemistries, the likelihood that the global construction industry would feel comfortable wholesale shifting over to them in 30 years time is a pretty tall order.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I can't imagine the process you would have to go through to demonstrate that your concrete would hold up buildings in every conceivable situation. </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>We do have performance-based standards for concretes and ways that we test different types. I don't want to say that there's nothing to be done here. </p><p>The main ingredient in cement is something called clinker, and we already use a big range of different clinker factor — that's the percentage of clinker — in different cements around the world. Almost all the carbon dioxide comes from making the clinker. A lot of cement is 95 percent clinker, but it's also very common to use 65 percent clinker cements. You can cut 30 percent off your greenhouse gas emissions by using low-clinker cements, and those things are already technically mature and well-demonstrated — there are big structures made out of them that you can go and visit around the world. </p><p>So there’s an opportunity to make at least 30 percent greenhouse gas emissions reductions, on average, just by going to the lowest clinker factor that's appropriate for whatever you're using. There's no technical barrier. It usually is cheaper. We should do it tomorrow — there's no reason not to. But a 30 percent emissions reduction still leaves you with 70 percent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>What about bucket one, using less? Is there a practical way to use a lot less cement? </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>Oh my god, we are so wasteful in the way that we use concrete. </p><p>People have gone out to actual commercial and multifamily residential buildings and looked at how much structural material, primarily concrete, these buildings are using compared to how much structural material would be needed to support all the loads. They typically find that there is something in the neighborhood of twice as much structural material as is needed to comply with the very safety-protective building codes. </p><p>Almost all of the studies that I've seen have been in Europe or the United States, so it's mostly in high-income countries that these numbers come from. We think the situation is probably even worse in developing countries. </p><p>I live in the San Francisco Bay area. For a commercial or multifamily construction site in this area, certainly it's more expensive here than in other parts of the country, but it's not radically different. Depending on the size of the building, the typical payroll for one of these construction sites might be $5,000-$10,000 an hour. To get one of those mixer trucks full of concrete delivered to your construction site — we're not talking about fancy concrete here, just normal commodity concrete — that's about $1,000. So if you can save five or 10 minutes of time on your job site by wasting a truck full of concrete, you just saved money. </p><p>This goes back to what I was saying about looking through the other end of the telescope. Why would you use materials efficiently when they are so cheap? For private construction here in the United States, the average amount of a construction project that is represented by the cost of the cement is less than 0.5 percent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So cement is so cheap that people overuse it to save time, to save soft costs …</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>To save anything. Everything is more expensive than cement. If you take an 18-wheeler and you fill it up to the statutory maximum weight for driving on an interstate highway in the United States, it will have approximately $2,600 worth of cement in it. It will have a one nice laptop worth of cement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>This does seem like an area where markets could work well. You want to put a higher price signal on it and then trust people to figure out how to eliminate some of it. Is that right?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>It's a good news / bad news situation. Because cement and all of these materials are so cheap, it is very hard to persuade people to use them efficiently. It is very hard to persuade people to value them in terms of the actual value that they provide to their lives. It's a little bit like water or electricity that way. </p><p>However, because they're so cheap, the good news is that even if the green version is a little bit more expensive, or even a lot more expensive, than the dirty version, that doesn't actually make the products that these materials are made out of more expensive.</p><p>If we go back to this commercial building I was talking about, 0.5 percent of its costs are cement. Let's say we mandate dumb end-of-pipe CCS, the most expensive, worst engineering option that we can think of, for our cement decarbonization. We involve only lazy engineers in our project. </p><p>Even under that circumstance, maybe we'll double the cost of the cement — that only adds 0.5 percent to the cost of the building. In fact, it adds less than 0.5 percent to the cost of the building, because all of the construction costs that I've been citing don't include the cost of the land, which is often the most expensive thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So I was precisely wrong — it's probably going to be difficult to put a pure price signal high enough to make the market work. But you can get away with mandates, because it's not going to affect consumers much.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>Yes. This is part of what I was saying earlier — these industries are incredibly valuable, but because they're low-value-added, compared to the prices that consumers actually face, these materials are not typically an important line item.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Let's talk about chemicals. I know it's a varied category. Are there simple things to say about why chemical processing produces so much greenhouse gas, or does it vary a lot also?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>The chemical industry is very diverse. I remember talking to a colleague who was a senior sustainability person at BASF, the German chemical giant, and she told me that BASF has an 80/20 problem when it comes to their greenhouse gases. BASF makes approximately 100,000 products. Eighty percent of their greenhouse gases come from not 20 <em>percent</em> of their products, but from 20 <em>products</em>. </p><p>Again, these are the basic materials that are the ingredients for all their other products — mostly fertilizer and plastic. </p><p>For fertilizer, primarily we're talking about nitrogen fertilizer, so making that cleanly is mostly about making hydrogen cleanly. People do have some ideas for how to make nitrogen fertilizer that's not made out of ammonia, but the main idea is, if you want to make clean ammonia, you just need to start with clean hydrogen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>If you solve the green hydrogen problem, you solve the fertilizer problem downstream?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>Yep. There's not a whole lot to making fertilizer besides making hydrogen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>That's convenient. Plastics, I assume, are more difficult.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>Yes. With plastics, you have the same buckets of solutions we were talking about earlier. We could use less, and definitely we should. </p><p>Plastics are interesting, because they’re carbon-based molecules; they're made out of a carbon-based material. When we make plastics out of fossil fuels, some of the fossil fuels are burned to provide energy, but for more than half of the fossil fuels that we use in plastics production, we're actually taking the carbon atoms and the hydrogen atoms that are in the fossil fuels and we're putting them into the plastic product. We're making the product out of the fossil fuels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>So every piece of plastic is, in some sense, carbon sequestration.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>You know, Shell says that all the time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I take it back. Does it release the carbon when it breaks down?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>There is a scenario in which, if you collected all the plastic at the end of its life, and you made sure that it was clean and dry and well-segregated, and you put it in a nicely lined hole in the ground, it would be inert in that hole for a very long time and technically you could call that carbon storage. </p><p>But that's not actually what we do with plastic at the end of its life, and the way that we <em>actually</em> treat plastic at the end of its life leads to a lot of greenhouse gas emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>What do we do? Do we burn it?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>Some of it we burn. That's like burning fossil fuels directly, and that's a very popular option around the world. </p><p>Here in the United States we mostly put it into mixed garbage. When you have plastic and organic material mixed together in your garbage, the organic material, food waste, will decompose anaerobically. All the carbon atoms that were in that organic material will then leak out as methane instead of as carbon dioxide. </p><p>Methane, depending on the timeline you're looking at, is somewhere between 30 and 85 times more potent of a greenhouse gas than the carbon dioxide that you would get if you properly composted your organics. </p><p>So even if the carbon atoms in the plastic are not decomposing quickly and turning into carbon dioxide, they are leading to methane emissions from trash, which are an important source of overall greenhouse gas emissions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>It seems like here, bucket one is the lowest-hanging fruit by far. We're so wasteful. Plastic is so gross and overused.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>In the United States, the EPA estimates that only 8 or 9 percent of plastic is even collected for recycling, and of that, only about half is actually recycled in any form at all. Almost always, the recycling process is that you have a wide variety of mixed plastic, you melt it down, and when you lump all of these different materials together you get very, very low-quality plastic, radically downcycling. </p><p>Most of the plastics we use are, in theory, infinitely recyclable. If you have a high-purity waste stream, you can melt it down and get new, first-quality products that are just like the old ones. But we don't do that. </p><p>We need to use less plastic, but we also need to have tight regulations on exactly what types of plastic can be used, so that there are only a few types out there and all plastic packaging is the same couple of types, so they can be easily segregated and meaningfully recycled. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>We can change the way we design plastic products and the types of plastic we make to encourage more recycling, but obviously you're never going to get to zero that way. Is there a way to avoid, bucket two, or are we stuck with CCS here? Are there real alternatives on the horizon to carbon plastic?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>Bioplastics are real. I occasionally will encounter a PLA fork or something like that. They're not a meaningful portion of current plastic production. And as we were talking about before, there's just not enough biomass to go around to make large quantities of plastic out of biomass, so that's going to be a niche item forever. </p><p>We can take carbon atoms out of carbon dioxide and turn them into plastic; it requires an eye-watering amount of energy. This is important for carbon-utilization conversations generally: imagine we started with these big, exciting, highly energy-dense fossil fuel molecules; we had a combustion reaction, where we took out all of the energy that was stored in those molecules; and what we were left with was carbon dioxide, which was a combustion product. It's what's left over after you take out all of the energy. </p><p>If you want to turn it back into one of these big exciting molecules, you have to put more energy back in than you got out in the first place from burning it. The chemicals industry is the most energy-consuming industry of any industry in the world. It's only the third-most greenhouse gas emitting, because a lot of that energy is stored in the product and doesn't go directly into carbon dioxide.</p><p>A couple of years back, the big pan-European chemicals industry trade association published this fantastic report where they said, “okay, you guys want us to decarbonize, let's get serious about what that actually would be. Let's go through one process at a time and talk about the energy and feedstock requirements for the green alternatives in every case.” </p><p>What they found was that to produce the basket of chemicals that they were currently producing and to do it using carbon dioxide as their primary source of carbon would require something like 1,900 terawatt-hours per year of clean electricity. The IEA estimates that in their Paris compliance scenario in 2050, the total amount of electricity that is generated and used for all purposes on the continent of Europe is only about 3,400 terawatt hours per year. </p><p>More than half of all the electricity would have to go to the chemicals industry if you wanted to make all of your carbon-based chemicals out of carbon dioxide. </p><p>So, it can be done, but we are <em>really</em> in too-cheap-to-meter territory with our electricity if we're doing that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>None of those sound like good options. What's your favorite for plastics? </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>It's got to be using less, material efficiency. I have seen no scenarios where you can get 1.5℃ or even 2℃-consistent reductions in emissions from the chemicals industry without dramatically reducing the amount of plastic that we use and dramatically increasing the quantity and quality of recycled plastic.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>With steel, you mentioned that when you're developing as a country there are a lot of big one-time uses and then your usage tails off. Is there an arc for plastics?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>Not that we’ve been able to find. It’s just up and up and up. Since 2015, the rate at which total global plastic production is increasing has stopped accelerating.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I guess that's good news?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>The problem is not getting worse faster. It's just getting worse at the same very rapid rate that it was previously getting worse at. That's the nicest thing I can say about the trend for plastic production volumes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I do want to touch on some policy options. It sounds like if we're looking big picture, at industry decarbonizing by 2030, the most difficult area is plastics. Is that roughly accurate, or they're all difficult?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>I don't like to think of any of them as difficult. I find that framing both unhelpful and inaccurate, because people just started noticing the importance of the industrial sector about a year ago. I often tell people that where we are in our decarbonization progress in these sectors is similar to maybe where the power sector was in the late 90s. </p><p>I don't know, I was a kid then, but I'm assuming that in the 90s the concept of completely decarbonizing the power sector probably felt pretty hard to people who were out there trying to get solar panels installed and being called silly hippies. We have 20 or 25 years of progress that we've made since then. </p><p>It's not going to be easy, it's not going to happen by itself, but we have a line of sight to where we're going. We see how it's going to happen.</p><p>The situation in the industrial sector is not that it's somehow inherently harder. We're just at a much earlier stage in our decarbonization journey.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>We waited a long time to get started, though. We do have to go faster in it than we did in electricity, arguably.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>That is true. We did take our sweet time to get started.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>You're closely in touch with political and policy angles on this — do you see urgency around this commensurate with the scale and speed necessary to do it? </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>I mean, obviously not. Even the parts of the climate challenge that we're doing the best at we're not on track, and this is not one of the parts that we are doing the best at.</p><p>It is very clear to me that what we need to do to decarbonize these industries is entirely within our capacities here in the United States and also globally. Please don't interpret what I'm saying as any disrespect to the efforts of the Biden administration. The people who are doing this work in the Biden administration are very, very clear about what the scale of the challenge is, and they are attempting to move as fast as they possibly can. But they would probably be the first people to tell you, “what we're doing is not enough.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Let's look at what we are doing, then. We had executive actions early on, we had the Recovery Act, then we got the Bipartisan Infrastructure Act. Are there big pieces of good policy on this that have already been passed? Secondly, are there good pieces of policy on this in Build Back Better that we, like everyone else, are sitting around waiting forever for action on? </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>The biggest thing that was in the bipartisan infrastructure law is a serious pile of money for commercializing and demonstrating clean industrial technologies. Most of that is going through the Department of Energy, and the way that the money was allocated is pretty flexible. The DOE currently has a lot of discretion about exactly how they spend that money, and there are a few different pots of it, so it's hard for me to give you a dollar amount that will go to the industrial sector, but it will be somewhere between half a billion and a few billion dollars. That's a serious amount of money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>It does sound like in some of these markets or sub-markets we are at that point where a visibly successful demonstration project could be triggering, could unleash things.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>It’s a thing we need really badly, and it's a thing that absolutely requires public money. There's a certain amount of technology risk that the private sector in these industries, in particular, is simply not going to pay for. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>What about Build Back Better? Is there some pot of gold at the end of that?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>It’s a much larger pot of money in Build Back Better. We go from a minimum amount of industrial decarbonization demonstration projects of $0.5 billion currently up to a minimum amount of $4 billion if Build Back Better gets passed. Then the upper limit, depending on how you count it, goes up commensurately. </p><p>The other important thing is that Biden issued an executive order last month on federal sustainability which included for the first time direct instructions for the federal government to buy low-greenhouse gas building materials — read: steel and cement — when it builds stuff with federal money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>That’s not a small thing. That's a very big customer, right? </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>We call the family of policies where the government buys low-greenhouse gas building materials “Buy Clean.” If you look across all levels of government — federal, state, and local — almost half of all the cement in the United States is purchased with taxpayer dollars.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>In other words, Buy Clean government policy could do a lot.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>If it's well-structured and aggressively implemented, it could make a huge difference. Build Back Better, in addition to demonstration, has a bunch of money in it to facilitate the implementation of Buy Clean.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Just at the federal level, or helping states or cities too? Presumably, government at any level could do a little bit of this.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:</strong>  </p><p>There are a lot of spillover benefits. If the federal government says, “we're going to do this,” that makes it much cheaper and easier for state and local governments to do it, even without direct federal subsidies. </p><p>For example, the federal government has to put in place the measuring and reporting frameworks for the greenhouse gas intensity of different products; they have to make sure that the low-carbon products are available wherever federal construction is happening. All of the fixed costs of getting the system up and running can be accepted by the federal government.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>All of which makes it easier for the next person to do it.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>There's also a lot of exciting stuff happening at the state level. California was the first state to pass a Buy Clean law, but since then, five other states have passed Buy Clean laws of one type or another.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Mostly cement and steel?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>The specific set of materials that's covered varies from state to state. Some states it's cement only; some states have steel, cement, and other things; in California, unfortunately, it's everything except cement. The cement industry had good lobbyists.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Is this the sort of thing where if enough states get in on this, they're eventually going to force a sea change?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>These are concepts that need to be proved out. If you can have a state policy that leads to widespread use of comparatively very low-greenhouse gas building materials, it becomes a lot easier for the EPA to start regulating related issues. The goal here is to create a virtuous circle of greenhouse gas ambition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>On one side you have investment for demonstration projects and setting up these systems; on the other side, for demand-pull, you have Buy Clean. Are there other big-ticket policy items that have not yet been tackled?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>There are a lot of different ways to structure the investment side. You can do credit subsidies; you can do direct subsidies; you can also do direct federal investment, which we have done a lot of in years past and in fact, the Defense Production Act allows us to do an almost unlimited amount of, if we wanted to. There are a lot of good arguments to be made for direct federal investment in clean production. All of those things are really important. </p><p>There are also some important governance issues. A lot of these industries and markets have had pretty poor enforcement of existing regulations, both around non-greenhouse gas pollution and around labor standards. We have some pretty good rules on the books that are very poorly enforced. If we want the energy transition and the clean transition across the economy to be sustainable politically, we have to be showing people real, direct benefits in their lives and their family's health. That has to be an important part of this conversation. </p><p>Also in the governance bucket, the United States is very bad at industrial policy. It was not always true, but for the last 40 years or so, we've had this weird fantasy that we don't do industrial policy. We definitely do industrial policy, but it's incoherent and easy to be captured by the covered industries because we’re pretending that we're not doing it. </p><p>One of the consequences of this is that we have entirely hollowed out the expertise and the governance infrastructure of industrial policy, particularly at the federal level. There's hardly anybody whose job it is to think about these things in the federal government, compared to other countries whose manufacturing sectors we would like to emulate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>Look at Germany. It's all very explicit. It's right up front. They're very clear about what they want to do and how they're going to do it. It's so much more sensible.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>And they spend a lot of money on it. The main applied R&D in the manufacturing sector that's from the German government is a system of things called the Fraunhofer Institutes. They spend almost 3 billion euros a year on the Fraunhofer Institutes.</p><p>The analogous thing in the US government is the Advanced Manufacturing Office, which has an annual budget of $400 million. Our economy is five times larger than Germany's, so compared to the overall size of our economy, we are spending less than 5 percent of what they are spending on applied R&D. And that's the piece of industrial policy that we feel most comfortable with!</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>That cuts across every sector, right? We constantly talk about goals and targets, but the capacity to do things on purpose with our economy has been hollowed out. </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell:  </strong></p><p>This is particularly true in the manufacturing sectors.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Is that largely because we exported so much of it? </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>I might make the causal relationship go in the other direction. One of the reasons why we had a lot of deindustrialization was that we didn't have a concerted effort to maintain a vibrant industrial economy. For example, Germany still has most of its steel mills.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>If anything, we deliberately accelerated the reverse process with trade deals and things like that. That seems like a long-term project, reversing that process. </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>And an important part of that is rebuilding our governance capacity. It blows my mind that the highest-ranking person in the federal government whose job it is to think about the future of the US manufacturing sector — the head of the Advanced Manufacturing Office at DOE — has the rank of Office Director. </p><p>There isn't a single Assistant Secretary anywhere, in any department, on this beat. That is wild. There are 20 million Americans employed in this sector.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>The final piece I want to look at is international trade. Presumably either we or other countries are going to start using trade deals as an instrument of decarbonization in industry. Is that something we're trying to do, or that people are talking about?</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>It is. You may recall that Donald Trump, when he was president, put tariffs on steel and aluminum, just because he felt like it. Late last year, around the same time as the big climate meeting that happened in Scotland, the US and EU made an announcement about how they are working together on a deal to transform those tariffs into something that is mutual and linked to greenhouse gases. </p><p>There's definitely a lot of work happening in this space. We have not yet settled on what the best policy tools are to promote decarbonization. For solar panels, some people say “we should have free trade in solar panels so that there are cheap solar panels and everybody can have the cheapest possible clean electricity.” Other people say “no, if we want to decarbonize we should have high tariffs on solar panels so that countries can have employment and manufacturing and broader social benefits, which will make the whole country more supportive of solar power.”</p><p>We still have a lot of work to do to figure out what a truly climate-safe vision for trade policy is. There's a relatively narrow set of policies that are traditional trade policies. In most cases, for things like tariffs, that's often less important than, what are the international reverberations? What are the trade consequences of purely domestic policies like subsidies and procurement policies? </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>In terms of stimulating global movement toward industrial decarbonization, our biggest tools are probably still domestic. Doing it as fast as we can and making those products cheaper, rationalizing the industry, etc., is probably going to be a bigger deal than any tariffs we put on.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>Our goal is usually not that the trade policy itself will promote decarbonization, but that we can put in place trade policies that will prevent international trade from undermining our purely domestic policies, so different countries can push their industries to decarbonize faster without having to worry that dirty production from overseas will flood into the market.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>How do you prevent industry from just moving, or shifting production? </p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>This is one of the reasons why things like procurement policy are so fantastic, because when the regulation is on the product, not on the facility, there's no incentive to move the facility. The market-creation policies allow you to sidestep some of these difficult questions. </p><p>People talk a lot about how businesses hate regulations. Businesses don't hate regulations; businesses hate regulations that they have to comply with, but their competitors don't. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Well, I can not thank you enough. I know 10 times more about this now than I did when we started, so I really appreciate you taking all the time. Maybe someday we'll drill down a little deeper into one of these many, many rabbit holes that we tripped so lightly over in this conversation.</p><p><strong>Rebecca Dell: </strong> </p><p>I would be more than happy to talk in greater detail in the future. As you can probably tell, talking about this is one of my favorite things to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>It's so fun. Thanks so much, Rebecca.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-rebecca-dell-on-decarbonizing</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:48253656</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 11 Feb 2022 17:00:49 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/48253656/e03e7482d779e9d1e84183c4bd475db3.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5531</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/48253656/df9d40afece1da83bc983a622462cd9c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The minerals used by clean-energy technologies]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/minerals-and-the-clean-energy-transition">previous post</a>, I offered a broad overview of the problems related to minerals needed for the clean-energy transition. To recap: </p><p>* clean-energy technologies are more minerals-intensive to build than their fossil-fuel counterparts; </p><p>* the growth of clean energy will rapidly raise demand for a set of key minerals;</p><p>* mining and processing of those minerals is geographically concentrated, often in countries with weak labor and environmental protections;</p><p>* mineral mines and processing facilities often pollute water, scar landscapes, and impoverish communities;</p><p>* production may not be able to expand fast enough to keep up with demand, which could cause supply constrictions and price fluctuations and slow the transition away from fossil fuels.</p><p>That’s the big picture. </p><p>In today’s post, I want to take a take a closer look at some of the biggest clean-energy technologies and the minerals required to build them. Specifically, I’ll cover batteries, solar PV, wind, geothermal, concentrated solar, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). I’m not going to get <em>too</em> deep into any one of these — just a quick tour.</p><p>I’ll be drawing heavily on a 2020 <a target="_blank" href="https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/961711588875536384/Minerals-for-Climate-Action-The-Mineral-Intensity-of-the-Clean-Energy-Transition.pdf">World Bank report</a> that projects demand for key minerals under rapid decarbonization scenarios from the International Energy Agency (IEA) — specifically the RTS (reference technology scenario, or current policy), 2DS (2-degree scenario), and B2DS (beyond 2-degree scenario, aiming for 1.5). (The World Bank and IEA use the word <em>minerals</em> to refer to the mineral and metal value chain, and I do the same in this post.)</p><p>This tour will reveal which minerals are expected to be most in demand — which ones are certain to be needed and which depend on the direction taken by particular technologies. It will help focus attention on possible supply stress points. </p><p>It will also reveal that there is enormous uncertainty about the pace and scale of demand growth for specific minerals and minerals generally. Much depends on unpredictable developments in technology, policy, and politics. Epistemic humility is called for, along with policy focused on resilience. (More on policy in the next post.)</p><p>One fact that is certain: the more ambitious the world’s decarbonization efforts, the higher mineral demand will rise. </p><p>Here’s an overview table of energy sources and technologies and the key minerals they use:</p><p>Let’s start the tour with the 800-pound gorilla of minerals demand: batteries.</p><p>Batteries are the biggest growth sector for minerals demand</p><p>Of all the clean-energy technologies set to boom in coming decades, none will put a strain on minerals supply like batteries, shown as energy storage in the chart above. They account for about half of the projected growth in minerals demand over the next two decades in a rapid decarbonization scenario.</p><p>In large part, this has to do with the expected rise in battery-powered electric vehicles (EVs), which represent 90 percent of battery demand growth; the other 10 percent will come from growth in stationary storage, used to balance out wind and solar on the grid. </p><p>If the world targets 2°, minerals demand from energy storage will double from the baseline scenario; if the world targets 1.5°, it will more than double again.</p><p>Batteries, readers of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/battery-week-everything-in-one-place">my battery series</a> will recall, are composed of two electrodes, a cathode and an anode, and an electrolyte through which they exchange ions. (The outlier is redox flow batteries, which pump a liquid electrolyte past electrodes.)</p><p>Depending on what those three parts are made of, batteries require different minerals. Many EVs still use lead-acid batteries, which use lead and sulfuric acid, but lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) are expected to rapidly take over the market, so demand for lead-acid batteries won’t grow much.</p><p>As for LIBs, most use graphite as the anode, which means graphite will be the most sought-after mineral in energy storage. Cathodes vary more widely. The most common use nickel, with various mixes of cobalt, lithium, and manganese also common. (It should be noted that lithium is used across all LIBs, not just for the cathode.)</p><p>It should be noted that these projections out to 2050 are to a large extent guesses, just an extension of the “average” LIB into the future. In fact, LIB technology could evolve a number of different ways, and other storage technologies could play bigger roles in subsequent decades. </p><p>“The assumption that Li-ion batteries dominate both the mobile and stationary market for the next decade is conservative,” the World Bank writes. “Post-2030, the scale of uncertainty is much greater, with a wide range of options in both markets.”</p><p>Consider the options for LIBs. For cathodes, NMC111 batteries use one part nickel, one part manganese, and one part cobalt, while newer NMC811 batteries use much more nickel and less cobalt. Tesla and other automakers are trying to eventually eliminate cobalt from their batteries; it’s too early to say how far they’ll get.</p><p>Right now, almost all anodes are graphite (a market dominated by China) but there is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/battery-week-competitors-to-lithium">active development</a> of zinc-air batteries that use air as the anode, sodium-ion batteries that use hard carbon as a anode, and solid-state batteries (which replace a liquid electrolyte with a solid one) that use lithium as an anode. What mix of technologies will triumph is still an open question, which means the precise trajectory of graphite demand is tough to predict.</p><p>If manufacturers seek to minimize cobalt, demand for nickel will rise. If solid-state batteries catch on, they could reduce demand for graphite. If zinc-air batteries catch on, they could dent demand for lithium, graphite, nickel, and manganese.</p><p>Post-2030, other storage technologies like flow batteries or a wide array of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/long-duration-storage-can-help-clean">long-duration storage techs</a> could become competitive. It depends on the evolution of policy and the electricity mix. Also worth noting: the practice of using <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/energy-storage/used-ev-batteries-are-storing-solar-power-at-grid-scale-and-making-money-at-it">second-life EV batteries</a> as a form of grid storage could take off, which would trim total demand for new batteries.)</p><p>Finally, LIBs have made substantial advances in materials efficiency and those will likely continue, which could effect how sharply demand rises. (Read <a target="_blank" href="https://rmi.org/insight/breakthrough-batteries/">this RMI report</a> for a bullish take on improvements in LIBs’ energy density.)</p><p>In terms of how geopolitically concentrated and environmentally destructive they are, the big minerals to watch here are graphite, nickel, lithium, and cobalt, but it’s impossible to know their precise mix in advance.</p><p>Solar voltaics love aluminum and copper</p><p>Solar is another technology that we are confident is going to grow like mad in coming decades, but it’s difficult to predict the exact trajectory of minerals demand. </p><p>The World Bank paper looks at four common PV technologies: crystalline silicon (crystal Si), which makes up about 85 percent of the current market, and three different “thin film” technologies that can be printed on flat sheets: copper indium gallium selenide (CIGS), cadmium telluride (CdTe), and amorphous silicon (amorphous Si). </p><p>All four are made primarily with aluminum, copper, and silver, with different additional minerals contributing to different technologies. In terms of overall size, aluminum and copper are the biggies:</p><p>In the comparison below, the World Bank includes two scenarios from the International Renewable Energy Agency, which tends to be more bullish on PV and batteries than IEA — a renewable energy roadmap (rapid decarbonization) scenario and a reference scenario. In IRENA’s roadmap scenario, demand for both minerals rises <em>350 percent</em> from baseline through 2050. </p><p>Depending on which scenario you favor, demand for aluminum and copper from PV is either going to grow a boatload or a mega-boatload.</p><p>Aluminum — not itself a raw mineral, but a product of bauxite reduction that produces alumina, which is then smelted — plays a role in almost all energy technologies, but solar is the biggest source of demand in the energy sector, by far. </p><p>When it comes to copper, clean-energy technologies — batteries and solar, but also transmission and distribution systems — are the fastest growing source of demand. In a 2-degree scenario, clean energy’s share of total copper demand will rise from today’s 24 percent to 45 percent. It’s going to drive a lot of new copper mining. </p><p>Demand for aluminum and copper will likely be robust no matter which way solar PV evolves, but for some minerals, the direction the technology takes has bigger consequences. For example, almost all (97 percent) of the indium used in the energy sector is for solar PV — specifically, thin-film solar PV. </p><p>“The current literature expects this subtechnology to grow, and in the model, the three thin film subtechnologies — CIGS, CdTe, and amorphous silicon — are assumed to grow from 20 percent to 50 percent of solar panels,” writes the World Bank. If that doesn’t happen, if old-fashioned crystal-Si panels continue to get ludicrously cheaper and crush all competition, it could cut energy sector demand for indium to very little. </p><p>Other minerals like silicon, gallium, and tellurium are also sensitive to the direction of PV markets. </p><p>Anyway, in PV, aluminum and copper are the biggies, but several rare earth elements are in play too, depending on future technology choices.</p><p>Wind turbines are big on steel </p><p>Wind turbines are made mostly of steel for the turbines (the manufacture of which, depending on the details, can involve nickel, molybdenum, titanium, manganese, vanadium, or cobalt), with lots of copper for cabling and iron for other parts. </p><p>Most of those materials are common in other clean-energy technologies. The one mineral for which wind is the primary demand is zinc; wind would boost demand at least 80 percent in a 2-degree scenario. </p><p>Most onshore wind farms use geared turbines, which “use a gearbox to convert the relatively low rotational speed of the turbine rotor (12–18 rpm) to a much higher speed (1,500 rpm) for input to a generator,” the World Bank writes. Around 80 percent of current global wind capacity is geared turbines, attached to generators that use lots of iron and copper. </p><p>In direct-drive turbines, the generator is affixed to the rotor and turns at the same speed. These are more common in offshore installations, due to their lower maintenance requirements. They often use permanent magnets with rare earth elements.</p><p>Some minerals will be greatly affected by the ultimate balance of onshore and offshore turbines, like neodymium, a rare earth element used only in permanent magnet direct-drive turbines. A 2-degree scenario in which offshore wind grows faster than expected could spike demand for neodymium almost 50 percent relative to the base case; if onshore grows faster, it could sink neodymium demand by almost 70 percent. </p><p>(Read <a target="_blank" href="https://www.windsystemsmag.com/applications-of-magnets-in-wind-turbines/">this piece</a> for the bullish case on direct-drive turbines. Another big unknown is the possible penetration of “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.linquip.com/blog/switched-reluctance-motor/">switched reluctance motors</a>,” which are both cheaper than current induction and synchronous motors and don’t need a gearbox <em>or</em> rare earth elements for a magnet. See <a target="_blank" href="https://www.linquip.com/blog/switched-reluctance-motor/">here</a> for more on that.) </p><p>So for wind: lots more steel, zinc, iron, copper, and, depending on the evolution of turbine technology, a few rare earth elements. </p><p>Geothermal, concentrated solar, and CCS are small mineral players</p><p><a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/10/21/21515461/renewable-energy-geothermal-egs-ags-supercritical">Geothermal power</a> is a relatively tiny portion of global electricity capacity and is likely to remain so even under optimistic growth scenarios. </p><p>As it grows, it will demand special steel alloys designed to resist heat and corrosion, which involve several rare earth elements. It also requires nickel, chromium, copper molybdenum, manganese, and titanium.</p><p>The only mineral for which geothermal is likely to be a significant chunk of demand is titanium; it is the main user in the energy sector. In a 2-degree scenario, demand for titanium for geothermal will rise 80 percent or more.</p><p>Concentrated solar power remains a fairly niche technology — more expensive and geography-dependent than PV — and is expected to grow, but not much. The only minerals of note that it uses are copper and silver, and it is not likely to represent a substantial portion of demand for either. </p><p>Carbon capture and storage uses chromium, cobalt, copper, manganese, molybdenum, and nickel, but no one is sure which CCS technology will win out or how much will be built, so it’s anybody’s guess how much.</p><p>The big picture</p><p>The World Bank’s figures “demonstrate an overall increase in demand for as many as 11 minerals used across a variety of energy technologies, with iron and aluminum showing the highest absolute increase, followed by copper and zinc.”</p><p>Here’s a graphic that shows relative increase in demand for a variety of minerals (on the left) and absolute increase in demand on the right.</p><p>As you can see, graphite grows by the largest percentage and by the second largest total amount — as a key component of batteries, it is key to the transition.</p><p>For some minerals, though demand does not increase a huge amount in absolute terms, they are starting from a small base and markets will grow by close to 500 percent, including lithium and cobalt, or around 200 percent, like indium and vanadium. Those could be stress points. </p><p>Some minerals will grow substantially in absolute terms, but relatively little in percentage terms, like copper and zinc, which are used widely outside the energy sector. (Although note: the World Bank analysis does not include copper for transmission lines, which could be a big source of growth.)</p><p>And then there’s nickel, somewhere in the middle.</p><p>To try to get all this information in one place, the World Bank created a risk matrix for minerals under a 2-degree scenario. Importantly, the matrix doesn’t capture risks related to environmental dangers or possible supply constraints. It only captures demand dynamics.</p><p>The horizontal axis — “weighted coverage-concentration index” — measures how cross-cutting a mineral is. To the left are minerals used in fewer energy technologies, whose fates are tied closely to the fate of those technologies; to the right are minerals common to many technologies, for which demand is likely to rise no matter which technologies win out. </p><p>The vertical axis — “2018-2050 production-demand index” — is a weighted measure combining relative and absolute demand growth. It captures, roughly, how much demand for the mineral is expected to grow. On the top are minerals that will experience large demand growth; on bottom, less growth. </p><p>The four quadrants of this matrix provide a way of categorizing minerals and their demand risks.  </p><p>Quadrant one contains medium-impact minerals. They are used in a small number of clean-energy technologies and their overall growth will be modest. These include zinc, silver, titanium, and several rare earth elements. </p><p>Quadrant two contains high-impact minerals. They are only used in a handful of technologies (principally batteries), but demand is expected to increase rapidly and substantially. These are graphite, lithium, and cobalt — which are among the most environmentally nasty of the bunch in terms of mining and processing.</p><p>Quadrant three contains the highest-impact minerals, which are both crucial to a wide array of technologies and expected to grow quickly. For now, that only describes aluminum. It comes from bauxite mines, which are not great (no mines are really great), but it is one of the most recyclable and recycled materials in existence. Almost 75 percent of the aluminum made in history is still in use.</p><p>Quadrant four contains cross-cutting minerals, which won’t see dramatically rising demand like quadrants two and three but are vital to a broad array of technologies, which means growth in demand is quite certain and predictable. Copper is the big one here, used in pretty much every clean-energy technology, but nickel is going to grow even more. Lead, chromium, molybdenum, and manganese also qualify. </p><p>So that’s the risk matrix. It points to which minerals will be most in demand.</p><p>It turns out, as we saw in the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/minerals-and-the-clean-energy-transition">previous post</a>, that some of the most important minerals to the clean energy future are geographically concentrated and mined under socially and environmentally dubious circumstances. Processing is almost entirely dominated by China. </p><p>What should we do about that? More on that in the next post.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-minerals-used-by-clean-energy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:47236387</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 07 Feb 2022 17:45:55 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/47236387/de27ac1a034956d999cba62ce5979793.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1126</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/47236387/d4911e4180d7d9749d093820ed0917a0.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: using DOE loan guarantees to accelerate clean energy, with Jigar Shah]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Jigar Shah, the recently appointed head of the Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office (LPO), discusses how he and his team have reformed the office and pulled into into the modern age, the kinds of help LPO is offering entrepreneurs, and the frontier technologies that have him most excited.</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Jigar Shah, February 2, 2022</p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/lm6qkmi1xfqzv3k/volts22.02.02%28jigar.shah%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF version</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Back in 2010, the Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office (LPO) briefly became what kids these days call the <em>main character</em>, the focus of a storm of controversy and media attention, thanks to the bankruptcy of Solyndra, a solar company that received the very first loan guarantee under Obama’s Recovery Act and then promptly gone bankrupt. </p><p>Despite that <a target="_blank" href="https://grist.org/politics/one-year-in-gop-solyndra-investigation-remains-a-gigantic-nothingburger/">wildly overhyped controversy</a>, the LPO did reasonably well under Obama. It ultimately <a target="_blank" href="https://www.npr.org/2014/11/13/363572151/after-solyndra-loss-u-s-energy-loan-program-turning-a-profit">turned a profit</a> for the government and was arguably crucial to the explosive subsequent growth in markets for <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy.gov/articles/5-big-wins-clean-energy-loan-programs-office">utility-scale solar and wind</a>. </p><p>Under Trump, the LPO basically went dormant, doing little beyond shoveling money into the <a target="_blank" href="https://insideclimatenews.org/news/21012022/georgia-power-vogtle-nuclear/">ill-fated Vogtle nuclear plant in Georgia</a>. Now the LPO is being revived, reformed, and reinvigorated by new director Jigar Shah. </p><p>Shah has a long history on the business side of clean energy — he was the co-founder and president of <a target="_blank" href="https://generatecapital.com">Generate Capital</a> and before that founded “no money down” solar pioneer SunEdison — but he’s perhaps best known to energy nerds as the co-host of the late, lamented podcast The Energy Gang. (The team behind The Energy Gang now has a new show: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/podcasts/the-carbon-copy">The Carbon Copy</a>.)</p><p>He wants to streamline the process of getting loan guarantees from LPO and rethink how the office approaches risk. And he’s got about $40 billion to work with, more if Build Back Better passes. (For the best account of Shah’s new approach, read these two Canary pieces — <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/climatetech-finance/jigar-shah-has-a-new-strategy-to-boost-climatetech-through-doe-loans">one</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/policy-regulation/jigar-shahs-big-idea-for-getting-rooftop-solar-and-smart-appliances-to-low-income-americans">two</a> — from Jeff St. John.) </p><p>Under Shah’s leadership, the LPO has been doing due diligence on the hundreds of applications that have flooded in since the office reopened for business. In December, it issued its <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/open-business-lpo-issues-new-conditional-commitment-loan-guarantee">first new conditional commitment for a loan guarantee</a>, to a plant in Nebraska that will transform methane into hydrogen and carbon black. Many more loan guarantees are in the pipeline.</p><p>I’ve been looking forward to chatting with Shah about how the office is reforming under Biden, how to think about risk and communicate it to the public, and the kinds of clean-energy technologies that have him excited these days. </p><p>Without further ado, Jigar Shah, welcome to Volts.</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah: </strong> </p><p>Thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I'm a longtime fan of your career and your many podcasts, so it's great to finally get you on here.</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah: </strong> </p><p>Well, the feeling's mutual.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Give us the elevator pitch: What is the Loan Programs Office, what does it do, and what is it meant to accomplish?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah: </strong> </p><p>The Loan Programs Office was originally conceived of by Senator Pete Domenici in the 2005 Energy Act. It was first funded in 2009 during the Obama stimulus. </p><p>The main rationale for its existence is that the Department of Energy does so much great work on basic fundamental research; it gets all these technologies to what they call Technology Readiness Level 7, which means that you can actually verify that the technology works; but then they leave them there waiting for the private sector to pick them up and take them the rest of the way. And the private sector is saying, “we're happy to do it, but we can't get any debt for these technologies because the commercial banks are saying, ‘we don't want to spend the effort to understand all the nuances of this and get all the expertise lined up for one project, so until there are 100 projects to do, we’re not in.’”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>This is the famous “valley of death”?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah: </strong> </p><p>That's right. In this case, it's a valley of death that focuses on debt. The vast majority of valley-of-death conversations focus on equity: raising venture capital or raising private equity. In this case, you're talking about debt. </p><p>When you talk about solving climate change, you're generally talking about trillion-dollar scale, and trillion-dollar scale only exists in infrastructure. In venture capital, we had a banner year last year; it was about $60 billion. That's not trillion-dollar scale. </p><p>What does it take for the trillion-dollar-scale people to get comfortable with a technology? That's a commercial debt conversation. </p><p>How do we underwrite a deal for commercial debt? I talked to most of the money center Wall Street banks last year and they said, “Jigar, one thing we will confirm is that the due diligence that comes out of your office is of such high quality that we know that a technology is ready if it gets through your office.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>That's one thing that maybe average people don't understand: you're not just handing companies money. The whole process of assessing the company and its technology is a long and labor-intensive process. The bulk of the service you're providing the industry is not even so much the money as the due diligence itself, so they don't have to do it, right?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>That's exactly right. The government process that we take companies through is a lot more efficient and a lot shorter than it used to be, so we've made a lot of strides there, but no one would subject themselves to it if they could walk through the front door of one of these big banks and just get a standard commercial loan. They're going through that process and subjecting themselves to the detailed diligence and the 10,000 expert scientists and engineers we have with the national labs because they know that this is the best way for them to get a loan. An average loan size for us is $500 million.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Backing up a little bit: the loan office has been, let's call it “dormant,” for the last four years.</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>That’s certainly what the Secretary of Energy called it during her confirmation hearing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Dumping money down the giant Georgia nuclear plant was the only thing it did, I think. </p><p>Before that there was the whole stupid Solyndra controversy. But as I understand it, the Loan Programs Office under Obama did well overall — ended up revenue-positive, spurred a lot of new industries. I’m curious what you take from that experience, and in what ways you're trying to improve. What needs to change to make it more modern and more suited to current circumstances?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah: </strong> </p><p>There’s a series of questions implied there, so let me take them one by one.</p><p>First, Solyndra was one of the first loans that we issued out of the office. The office was very young when we did that loan, and since then, the office has matured greatly. We're up to 170 people from probably 20 people at that time, and we have a lot of processes and procedures. Solyndra wouldn't pass the office in the same way that it did in the past. The office has improved its processes tremendously. </p><p>Even with the Solyndra losses included, we did about $35 billion worth of deals; we've had roughly $1.02 billion of losses, inclusive of Solyndra. That track record is something you would put up against any commercial bank in the space, let alone one that focuses on hard-to-finance deals. There are a lot of people who suggest we're not taking <em>enough</em> risk. </p><p>In terms of what we're doing differently now: in the Obama era, we had a financial crisis, so we actually had a lack of access to commercial debt. When you look at Elon’s famous story of Tesla, he also had a problem getting equity. The money wasn't flowing like it is today with SPACs and etc. </p><p>Fast forward to today: if you have a rock-solid 20-year power purchase agreement with a utility company, you're generally not going to come to the Loan Programs Office, unless you've got some weird long-duration storage technology or something else that has never been commercialized. </p><p>We have to do a lot of things differently. The type of deals we see are far more diverse than just electricity. We see deals in the industrial decarb space, in the broader transportation space. The markets are less formed. For instance, people sign power purchase agreements in the electricity space; remember a lot of that came from PURPA, which is what all the coal plants were based on. But when you look at transportation fuels, for instance, people don't generally sign a 20-year fixed-price contract for aviation fuel. </p><p>We have to change the way that we underwrite deals to figure out how we support those kinds of projects as well as the merchant market. When you look at the Low Carbon Fuel Standard credit program in California, which is driving a lot of projects, the price that gets set for those credits changes every month. </p><p>So we have to come up with a new way of evaluating those projects and figuring out how we support them. The Loan Programs Office has gotten far more sophisticated about how it underwrites risk than it was forced to be, frankly — not that they were not capable of it in 2010, they just didn't have to do it in 2010.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Is that reflective of changes in technology, or of a change in approach at the LPO to take a broader look at technology, or both?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>All the above. In general, LPO could get away with doing standard, easy-to-finance deals in 2009-2010 because you had a historic credit crunch, and people needed our money. Today, those standard, easy-to-finance deals aren't coming in to the office, so we have to evolve to be relevant. </p><p>But second of all, there were historic amounts of money invested during the Steven Chu era and Moniz era around new technologies, and a lot of those technologies are now mature enough to be able to come to our office. They made a lot of investments in industrial decarb. We had a lot of high-profile failures in carbon sequestration and storage in that era, but the new approaches are being built upon the success stories that we had. One of the success stories that came out of that era was the ADM Class VI wells, which continue to bury 1 million tons of carbon dioxide a year in Illinois.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>The topic of risk is interesting, especially when it comes to an arm of government. The right-wing critique of the office was, “it's taking too many risks and it's losing money.” But the more educated energy-expert critique was, “it didn't lose enough money. The whole point is to take risks; that's why the thing exists, to take risks that private capital or banks won't take.” </p><p>Talk a little bit about how you think about risk. Is there a percentage of losses that you're targeting? How do you target the right level of risk?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>It's a great question. As a government appointee, your ability to take risk is defined by the amount of support that you're getting. The secretary mentioned the Loan Programs Office in her confirmation hearing and has been talking about it ever since, so we're clearly getting a lot of support. That means the world to all of us, and it gives us the freedom to make the decisions that we think are right for the country and not just right for the political moment. That's valuable. </p><p>We don't view risk on a portfolio basis like that, although it does turn out that we check it that way. We view it on a deal-by-deal basis. </p><p>Everybody in the office gets the same interest rate, which is Treasury’s plus three-eighths of a point, so that's 1.8 percent. Then we add a risk-based charge on top of it, based on the percentage chance that it loses money. The vast majority of our projects are not investment-grade. When you look at the other lending institutions within the government — whether it's the USDA programs, or TIFIA, or some of the other ones — they generally do investment-grade credits. These are people that have triple B or better credit ratings. </p><p>Our average credit rating in the office for new projects is double B or single B, because it's by definition misunderstood; otherwise, it wouldn't be coming to our office. Those projects generally have a risk of failure of 15 to 20 percent, depending on all the variables. </p><p>We then add an interest rate adder to the interest rate to be able to compensate the government for that risk of loss. Let's say we'll add another four percentage points to the interest rate, so now it's not 1.8 percent, it's 5.8 percent. That extra money goes into the US Treasury Department. </p><p>Then we do view our performance on a portfolio-wide basis. Today, the program adds about $500 million of interest payments per year to the US Treasury — so we make money for the government. There's a separate component to that: on a portfolio basis, you charge interest rates above the US’s cost of borrowing, to figure out whether we're earning enough “excess” interest to be able to cover any losses we have. </p><p>Then, separately, Congress sometimes appropriates loss capital to us; it's called a credit subsidy. For ATVM, the Advanced Technology Vehicle Manufacturing program, the Congress has determined that some of these projects are clearly going to be risky, because you’re taking an “if you build it they will come” risk; even if they make a great car, it could be that it's a terrible design and nobody wants to buy it. In that case, they actually allocate cash from the Congress to our program, and we pay that credit subsidy on behalf of those applicants. That basically forms a loan loss reserve in the US Treasury Department for those projects. </p><p>To summarize all that, on balance, we’ve reserved almost $6 billion in loan loss reserves at the US Treasury, and have had a total of $1.02 billion in losses, and we don't expect very much more loss out of the existing $30 billion portfolio.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>That's the operational way to view risk; the semi-separate question about how to <em>communicate</em> risk and loss and the chances you're taking is … maybe not your job, maybe that's the job of the secretary. But do you feel like the office itself, or the Democratic government culture in general, has learned anything about how to communicate risk? As we saw with Solyndra, it’s so easy to demagogue, and it takes some time to explain why risk is actually a good thing. Have you given that any thought?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>On the political risk side of it, clearly sometimes political arguments move away from logic, and then you end up in a place that's — whatever it is. </p><p>Sticking to the logic side of things, where I'm more comfortable, the way that we've talked about risk is we've talked about opportunity. Think about the sea change that has occurred in the thinking of automakers. Ford Motor Company stock has gone up tremendously in the last year, simply through the firm announcement that they're moving to electric vehicles. That all comes from the risk that we took in 2009 and the opportunities that it has created for millions of Americans as a result. </p><p>The way that the president and the secretary have been talking about it is that this is the single largest wealth-creation opportunity America has in front of it. If we do it correctly, not only do we get to use our technology that we have ourselves invented through our dollars that we put in out of DOE, and we manufacture the products here, and we create the jobs here — but we also help hundreds of countries around the world decarbonize through the export markets for our technology companies. I mean, Tesla is the single largest exporter in California, which itself is the fifth-largest economy in the world.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Tesla serves so many contradictory symbolic roles at once. But one of them is definitely: you give Big Money (or Big Debt) permission to come into these markets and that spirals out globally. It's difficult to trace all the consequences from that. </p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>Absolutely. The same thing is true for utility-scale solar and wind, which of course is a more boring story. At the time, Europe had a feed-in tariff, which meant it had a guaranteed payment from the government, although it used the utility to pay it. That was not the case in the United States. We had some power purchase agreements, but in general, the whole concept of a feed-in tariff really there. There was a tax equity portion with tax credits. </p><p>When we offered our loan guarantees for solar to SunPower and others — who will tell you that they were essential to be able to build those plants — Bank of America and Citibank and all those banks had not yet gotten their arms around how to support solar and wind, even though Germany and Spain and everybody else had had these big years in 2007-2008. You were sitting in 2012 with $1.5 billion projects such that those companies were forced to sell those projects to Warren Buffett and MidAmerican. And Warren Buffett and MidAmerican always make money. </p><p>It wasn't until 2014 that there was a modicum of a competitive market, that SunEdison had created with the REIT that they created with TerraForm. Then in 2016, you got a lot more liquidity in the market. It wasn't until 2019 that you had full acceptance by all institutional investors such that the interest rates went down to 2.5 percent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>There's a certain amount of money set aside in the LPO for fossil fuel technologies like carbon capture. There's a certain amount of money set aside for nuclear. Then everything else competes for the remainder, which is smaller than the amounts set aside for fossil fuel and nuclear. What is the logic of that setup?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:</strong> <strong> </strong></p><p>Unfortunately, the truth is that we just used up the renewable energy money. All of our allocations were received in 2009; there was a little bit of reshuffling since then, but most of it's 2009. We had $20+ billion of renewable energy and efficiency money; that money was largely used. We never issued a fossil fuel loan, so that money is all unused. The nuclear part was bigger too — but then of course we had the Vogtle nuclear plant that’s used up a lot of the money — so that money is still there as well. </p><p>What I would say without getting into trouble is that Congress is very supportive of what we're doing. They basically said, “there's a lot of support for the loan program on both sides of the aisle, so get the thing working again. Show us that it's actually working before we allocate more money to that bucket.”</p><p>I don't think that's as controversial as it appears, and we are getting it working. We've got 170 hardworking men and women and they've done a great job of fixing the foundation of the program. It resulted in one conditional commitment in 2021, and we'll have a lot more this year. But that belies how much fixing that we did in 2021 so that the foundation was strong enough to have a big year in 2022.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Speaking of politics and money, what did the bipartisan infrastructure bill do for the LPO? Secondarily, what's in the as-yet-unpassed Build Back Better bill that relates to the LPO?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>The bipartisan infrastructure legislation has a number of provisions in it that broaden our authority. It took the ATVM program and said, you now can do heavy trucks, light duty trucks, airplanes, battery chargers, locomotives. Somebody even included Hyperloop, which I thought was interesting, but it is what it is. I haven't seen any good Hyperloop applications coming in. </p><p>We also got a broader level of authorities around carbon dioxide pipelines. A lot of the work that we're doing, for instance, is on these industrial hubs, where you're taking some of the places that have the most pollution in the United States, like the LA basin or the coast around Texas or Louisiana, and decarbonizing those. </p><p>The hydrogen hubs, which are also in the bipartisan infrastructure legislation, marry with the carbon dioxide pipeline authority that we have to be able to help decarbonize all that heavy industry. </p><p>There's also one other provision which was little noticed in the legislation that says that if a state entity supports the applicant, it actually moves away from the innovation requirements of our office. That's an interesting nugget that we're trying to figure out exactly what it means. Senator Murkowski had a big role in putting that in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>But no new money in the bipartisan bill.</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. The new authorities were put into the bipartisan infrastructure legislation, and then the additional money comes into the House Build Back Better bill. Obviously the Senate's working on it. </p><p>Because we make money for the federal government, the Congressional Budget Office has largely determined that new authority that goes into Title 17, in particular, only costs 1 percent in deficit spending of the loan amount we receive. So if we wanted to do an extra $100 billion of loans, it would cost $1 billion of deficit spending.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So it wouldn't take very much additional appropriation to vastly increase the amount of capital you have to work with.</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>That's right. Again, that's tied up in folks saying, “guys, prove to us that the office is working. Get some conditional commitments out the door and get some of the companies that are in our districts to tell us that you really are open for business. I understand that you're telling me you're open for business, and I see this big graphic that says you're open for business, but I'd like to hear confirmation from our constituents.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Say Build Back Better passes or Congress got excited about this and dumps a bunch of money on you: are there capacity constraints for how much you can get out the door? How much could you possibly deploy before January 2025?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>We've spent a lot of time on that in the office the last five months. The office initially was extraordinarily optimistic about what it thought it could accomplish, which frankly is amazing to see that level of risk-taking from the federal government staff that we have. It's really inspiring to see. But we've been a little more realistic about it in the delivery phase in January. </p><p>We've got about 77 applications that have come in as of December 31, representing roughly $60 billion of requests. I do think that we can get a third of those applications through the system, mainly because the applicants are sophisticated and competent enough to go through all of our stage gates efficiently. Then half of the ones that can't do that quickly will also get through our office, it'll just take them an extra period of time to cure the defaults in their applications. </p><p>We can actually move quite a bit of volume through the process. Note that if we obligated $30 billion of capital, which is a big number, that would make us the single largest provider of this kind of capital in the world. It's not like JPMorgan Chase or some of these other companies are chomping at the bit to do first-of-a-kind deployments; they're coming later in the process. </p><p>It really is significant. When you think about the numbers in relation to each other, the venture capital community put $60 billion to work last year into companies; those companies need to put first-of-a-kind projects out the door. They would take $30 billion from us, they would match it with probably $30 billion of their venture capital as equity, and we put in let's say 50 percent debt. That would be $60 billion of first-of-a-kind projects. </p><p>That would then cascade into second through fifth projects, EPC excellence, learning curve, the six cumulative doublings of experience. And a lot of that learning curve actually comes from a mixture of state and federal policy. The federal government generally likes to give them tax credits and maybe some demonstration dollars, which we have in the new Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations; then the state is the one that does more of the mandates. For instance, you're seeing California, New York, and New Jersey right now looking at green cement mandates, which then allows us to fund green cement manufacturing facilities.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Let's talk about some of the technology areas where you are focusing. When you are choosing technology areas, are you choosing purely based on an analysis of what you think is going to be needed? Or is it mostly, what among that set of technologies that will be needed are facing this first-mover problem and specifically need us? Big Solar and Big Wind, I presume, have now grown past the need for you. So what are the on-the-verge-but-not-quite-first-big-demonstration-yet technologies that you're looking around on? </p><p><strong>Jigar Shah: </strong> </p><p>For our process, we looked at all of the different sectors where we thought that the technology itself was actually mature and commercialization was the problem, so we needed to lean in. These are things like low-impact hydro; advanced geothermal; some of the battery chemistries that have been around for some time, you’ve seen them SPAC; hydrogen; carbon sequestration storage in some forms; sustainable aviation fuel; small modular reactors. </p><p>All these sectors we tapped down, went across DOE and said, what's ready for primetime? Then I went to all the trade associations for those groups and said “get me all your CEOs on the phone, hold a meeting, invite me to speak, and let's talk about it.”</p><p>Some of them were ready. We’ve gotten $10 billion worth of applications from the sustainable aviation fuel and biofuel space; roughly $10 billion of applications from the advanced nuclear space; $5 billion of applications in from the carbon sequestration side; several billion dollars of applications in from transmission, etc. </p><p>There are some places where they weren't ready. I've gotten almost no applications in for geothermal or for hydro.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>“Ready” means “have their s**t together enough to be able to go through the due diligence properly?”</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah: </strong> </p><p>No, they actually are prepared to go through the office, but they don't have projects ready to go. You can't come in and say, “I have this dream.” You have to say, “I have a utility, I've received the allocation from the Bureau of Land Management for this land, I've got this, I've got that.” Therefore you have something to evaluate. </p><p>Some of the sectors we don't have projects in not because the technology is not mature, but the developer community has not yet developed the projects for us to evaluate. We haven't given up on those sectors; we continue to educate them and make sure that the trade associations and others know what services we offer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Do you think geothermal will come along and be ready for you at some point? Do you have a capsule assessment of that?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>The California RFP for 1,000 megawatts of geothermal is useful. Anyone who wins that RFP will probably come to our office. </p><p>In general, the biggest problem with geothermal — and you see this across all the flexible-baseload technologies, it comes out of the UC Berkeley study or the Princeton study — is that in general, all of them need 7 cents a kilowatt hour. That 7 cents a kilowatt hour is completely justified. So when you look at the modeling, to build more solar and wind at 1.8 cents or whatever it is, you have to build more transmission to transport it from where it blows to where it's needed. That transmission is hard, and if you want to move hard to fast then you have to pay extra for it, so you pay double the cost of the transmission. </p><p>The alternative is you pay for technologies that have more like a 60+ percent capacity factor on existing transmission, and then that's 7 cents. But when you look at the decarbonization strategies that are finally starting to emerge from these utilities who have determined that they're going to be net zero or whatever it is by X date, they have now determined that there is some mix of variable renewable energy and flexible baseload that they need, and that they actually can afford to pay 7 cents for part of their portfolio. </p><p>That has led California to put out this RFP, and you're seeing Nevada and a few other places go “wait a second, we should actually be putting in some of these flexible baseload technologies, because the alternative is we put in natural gas, and then natural gas prices almost doubled, and we're stuck.”</p><p>Part of this is not that the technology is not mature but the markets haven't been mature, and LPO does play a big role in that. We've hired people on our platform that have engaged with the utilities in their Integrated Resource Plan process and their other processes and said to them “hey, you should be looking at these types of resources, because otherwise, you're just not going to get there.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Right, unless you build an absolute boatload of transmission, which is more politically and regulatorily difficult in some ways than any of these new technologies.</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah: </strong> </p><p>More expensive, not more difficult. I'll give you an example. When we came into office, the Department of Transportation announced that they were going to let federal highways be used for right-of-ways for transmission. I said, “huh, what would that cost?” And people are like, “I don't know.” So we hired NREL to figure that out. </p><p>They'll come up with a paper or something on this, but they showed me their preliminary results. They mapped every single highway and they said, “these highways have very limited obstruction, so it may only be 1.2 times the cost of normal transmission” — which, of course, “normal” transmission doesn't exist, because it's hard to build — “and these highways have tons of four-leaf clovers and tons of issues so you have to underground under all those; you can't go over. That's going to cost more like 1.9 times normal.”</p><p>Now I have a number, I actually know what it costs. Someone could say “that's too expensive, I don't want to pay for it.” But you can't say that it's impossible to build. You can just say “we can't afford to pay that.” Now you can actually do real trade-off analysis.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>The model here is a big, capital-intensive project like the one that got your first loan guarantee: the Monolith pyrolysis carbon black / hydrogen project. But of course, one of the trends in energy these days is distributed energy; thousands and thousands of small-scale projects. Intuitively, it doesn't seem like that matches your mission or your capacity that well, but you are trying to figure out how to get some LPO money behind distributed energy. Say a little bit about conceptually how that works.</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>Let me give you a little history. In 2009, when we did the rulemaking, these distributed projects were not really contemplated. The rulemaking and the solicitation around this program didn’t cover these kinds of projects. </p><p>Then in 2015 we had a substantial residential solar company come in and try to use the office, so a lot of thinking was done there on the legal side around how to shoehorn — it was very Apollo 13, “here's what we have, figure out a way to make this work,” which was great. There were other folks too, like there was a FIT RAM program in California, so one of the companies came in to do distributed CNI (commercial and industrial) solar. When I came in, I said, “we're going to get a lot of applications that look like this; let's start revving that back up and figuring it out.” </p><p>The harsh reality of the situation is that the government doesn't do things in a vacuum very well, so we had to convince some people to apply to the office. We luckily got a couple of people to apply, and I warned them, “you are going to be a guinea pig here, so it's going to take a while to process your loan.” </p><p>As a result of them applying, we were able to get the nitty-gritty details around what they needed and where they ran afoul of our existing rules. Then we were able to review those existing rules and see whether those were in the statute, meaning they came from Congress, or whether they were self-imposed restrictions. It turns out that the vast majority of them were self-imposed restrictions. </p><p>We have gone through a long process to rewrite the solicitation and to broaden and update it for modern times. It hasn't been substantially updated since 2009. That then allows us to do a lot more of these. </p><p>We still have an innovation mandate, so you can imagine I can't just do standard solar and wind projects that are distributed in nature, or whatever it is. It's the applicants’ responsibility to prove to us what innovation is; we can't make it up for them. But what they have pitched us, which has been very fascinating and very relevant, is DERs, DERMS – distributed energy resources, demand flexibility work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>The people applying presumably are aggregators of large numbers of small projects?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>Sure. We've said to them that they have to be innovative, and the innovation that they pitched us is this participation in the FERC Order 2222 markets, which allows for demand flexibility to get equal standing in the wholesale power markets as natural gas peaker plants. </p><p>Then a lot of utility companies have also offered these demand flexibility programs; California, New York has used them to save the grid multiple times. You see companies who’ve SPAC’d that specialize in this; EnerNOC in the old days, Voltus recently, and others. You're starting to see a lot of investor interest as well in these companies. </p><p>So they've come into the office and said, “the underlying technology might be solar plus battery storage and a thermostat and water heater and bidirectional charging using wallbox — but if we're aggregating all these assets up and opting them into a DER framework, which then provides a huge amount of extra reliability to the grid at one-tenth the cost of today's natural gas peakers, does that qualify? And we’re like, “huh, I guess it does.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>None of those pieces are particularly innovative. All of those technologies exist now. It's the aggregation and playing in the market that's the innovation.</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>The underlying hardware is not innovative, but the software continues to innovate. </p><p>I was one of the first investors in battery storage behind the meter in my previous role, and that software has dramatically changed every year, such that some owners of batteries have hired a new platform to operate their batteries every year, because the software is changing so quickly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>It seems like those markets for distributed energy aggregators depend so much on politics and regulation. This is not a free-market situation; you can do that where regulation has permitted you to do it. In a sense, the market is limited by things that you can't really affect. You can help them succeed under those circumstances, but you can't bust the market out of those circumstances. It requires regulatory changes.</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah: </strong> </p><p>You're right, and that's true for everything, right? The advanced geothermal market isn't going to work unless someone pays 7 cents a kilowatt hour with a dedicated RFP. </p><p>But we do have the ability to nudge in ways that are quite influential. For instance, in this case, the vast majority of the repayment obligation comes from FICO score, not from markets. People are agreeing to pay a fixed price for their new water heater or bidirectional EV charger. Even though they are now registered to operate in these demand flexibility markets, they're agreeing to pay a fixed $20 a month in loan payments to pay us back. </p><p>We can, on the one hand, get a reasonable prospect of repayment without the regulatory changes. On the other hand, the companies that borrow the money from us go to the regulator and say, “I'm adding 20 megawatts a week of load that I control now, you guys should put that into the regulation.” So there's some circularity to this, and someone's got to go first. Clearly, the DOE Loan Programs Office should be the one that goes first.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>One of the big problems facing clean energy expansion is the availability of minerals. Their production is concentrated in certain countries, which are not necessarily great; processing is concentrated in China, which is not necessarily great. So there's a big focus on finding them, mining them better, refining them better, moving those domestic supply chains, and recycling. Are any of those on your radar?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah: </strong> </p><p>They're all on our radar. The one big initiative that was added during the Trump administration was a focus on critical minerals. We have improved a lot of the legal justifications in others. </p><p>We've mapped out every single opportunity in the country that we believe to be commercially ready. A lot of people have mapped out where the minerals are in the United States; we've overlaid that with people who are actively getting the permits and doing all the work to start it. I would say every one of those folks is in our pipeline, and we've already received about $3 or $4 billion worth of loan requests in the critical minerals and battery recycling space.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>How excited should I be about battery recycling? Is there cool stuff going on in the recycling space, generally?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>Recycling is a big deal, and it's one thing that the US has, frankly, done a terrible job of over the decades. Even in the steel market, or the copper market, we send gargantuan amounts of raw materials to China by accident because we don't want to recycle it here. We just stick it in a shipping container to Malaysia, Malaysia recycles it, and it happens to go to China. </p><p>Why are we doing that? We should do that here. Steel, for instance: we have a huge amount of steel that we could actually melt using an electric arc furnace. For brand new steel, you need pig iron and you need the HYBRIT process and all that, but we could substantially increase the amount of recycled steel we use in this country. We just haven't invested in the infrastructure to do so. </p><p>The same thing is true with battery recycling, copper, heavy metals, cell phone recycling — there's lots we can do here. And that's all eligible within the Loan Programs Office.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Looking back now on the performance of the LPO during the Obama years, we can trace pretty clearly that it played a big role in the explosion of a couple of key markets: utility-scale solar, onshore wind, arguably batteries. If I'm in 2032, looking back on the LPO’s performance under Biden, what two or three markets could you envision exploding in the same way due to your work?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah: </strong> </p><p>It's a great question and one that I will partially answer and then leave you wanting more for our next podcast session. </p><p>In general, what I have said to my colleagues at DOE is that we actually know how to do this. We have written a lot of white papers out of the Loan Programs Office that have been shared widely across government around what we think the formula is on how to do it. If we agree with the way in which we do it, that forms the new approach to American commercialization. </p><p>Instead of being jealous of Canada or Germany or other countries, we should actually admit that we're really damn good at this, and we should stop self-hating and start owning what we do. It's a combination of tax credits, Loan Programs Office, state regulation; and we should do it in a way that's more methodical than what we perceive to be haphazard, but isn't haphazard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>This is uniquely American, I feel like, the way we think about industrial policy — which every country does, and always has, but we're vaguely embarrassed about it, so we don't look directly at it, do it behind our backs. I agree, that's silly.</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, but not anymore. </p><p>If you look at the big pots of money in the bipartisan infrastructure legislation: you've got hydrogen, we will make that work. Instead of hemming and hawing around green and blue and pink and whatever, what we should be focused on is that we use 10 million tons of hydrogen a year; all 10 million tons of that will be turned into low-carbon hydrogen. We have a pathway to do that, the secretary has laid it out, and with all the applications I've already received in the office, I'm fairly confident that we have a pretty clear pathway of doing it. </p><p>The same thing is true in direct air capture and CCUS, even though a lot of people love to hate it. The Class VI wells that we have in Illinois, which are being replicated in Wyoming, North Dakota, and other places, do work for industrial emissions. I am not going to say that I know how to capture carbon dioxide from power plants and put them into Class VI wells, but from ethanol plants or chemical plants, we know how to do that really well. </p><p>Direct air capture, too. It's like $500 a ton, but we know how to get that down to $200 a ton, and the secretary has announced the Carbon Negative Earthshot which gets it to $100, and there are several people who are telling me that they think they can get it done before 2030. So we're pretty on track there as well. </p><p>One other area that I'm super proud of is the virtual power plant / DER / DERM area. There are millions of Americans who've been left out of this revolution and we are going to get them in, and it's going to be pretty damn cool to watch.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>You mean lower-income people having access to DERs?</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>Lower-income people, people in multifamily housing; a lot of people control loads that they can contribute into these virtual power plants and get paid to do so. Ten percent of our entire electricity bill is used to pay for these reliability / resiliency balancing services. Why pay the natural gas peaker plants for this when you can pay people to have flexible demand for this?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>You think that's going to overcome all of its many logistical, regulatory, financial obstacles? It's such a tangle.</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>It's 90 percent cheaper than what we're doing now, so it literally makes no sense for anyone to ignore it. Why would you not pay the money to individual ratepayers as opposed to paying it to the owners of natural gas peaker plants?</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Well, Jigar, thank you for coming on, and thank you for taking the reins of this thing and whipping it into shape. I'm super excited to see what happens over the next few years.</p><p><strong>Jigar Shah:  </strong></p><p>My pleasure. I’m in the luxurious position to evaluate other people's work and not have to do it myself. I appreciate all the hard work that the entrepreneurs are actually doing. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Thanks again, Jigar. We'll talk again soon. </p><p><strong>Jigar Shah: </strong></p><p>Thanks, Dave. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-using-doe-loan-guarantees</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:47835079</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 02 Feb 2022 17:00:49 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/47835079/88036f1d1345d531b44af30aad9aa535.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3005</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/47835079/a15024c4b7f06d9eebddde334aecfd4d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Panama Bartholomy on decarbonizing America's buildings]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Panama Bartholomy, head of the Building Decarbonization Coalition, discusses the need to decarbonize buildings, the many challenges facing the effort, and the cities and states that are making progress. You better believe we get way into heat pumps and induction stoves. </em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Panama Bartholomy, January 28, 2022</p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/rwguhad8zejhy7u/volts22.01.28%28panama.bartholomy%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF version</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Fossil-fuel combustion in buildings — mostly natural gas for space and water heating — is responsible for around 10 percent of US greenhouse gas emissions. Getting to net-zero will require heating, cooling, and powering all those buildings with carbon-free energy.</p><p>It’s an enormous challenge — or rather, a huge thicket of challenges. There are technical issues, political issues, public-opinion issues, and policy issues, all of which decompose into dozens of discrete issues of their own. </p><p>To help me wrap my head around all of it, I’m eager to talk to Panama Bartholomy, who is, I promise, a real person and not a Dr. Seuss character. </p><p>Bartholomy has been wrestling with building decarbonization for decades, at (in reverse chronological order): the Investor Confidence Project, the California legislature, the California Energy Commission, the California State Architect, and the California Conservation Corps. He’s served on a variety of boards, collaborated with various expert organizations, worked on climate issues in over 30 countries, and all kinds of other stuff, but if I tried to include it all I would never get to the conversation.</p><p>Bartholomy is currently running the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.buildingdecarb.org">Building Decarbonization Coalition</a>, a multi-sector alliance of companies, nonprofits, and government agencies working on buildings, so he’s up to date on where progress is being made (think New York and California), the biggest political impediments (think the natural gas industry), and whether heat pumps really work in cold climates (think yes, they do).</p><p>Without further ado, Panama Bartholomy, welcome to Voltscast.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Thanks, Dave. Good to be here. Long-time listener, first-time caller.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Let's talk about buildings. There's so much to get into here, but I want to start with a few broad scene-setting questions. Just to orient us, tell us where buildings fall on the climate policy hierarchy of needs. What portion of the problem are our buildings?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Maslow's hierarchy of needs for buildings and climate, I love it. </p><p>We — by which I mean the building sector — come in right about 25 to 30 percent of overall emissions nationally, and about the same globally. Depending on the state you're in and the grid mix of your electricity, it may be a little higher or lower, but we’re right about in that sweet spot of 20 to 30 percent. </p><p>One of the challenges is that in this sector, unlike industry or the electricity sector or even the transportation sector, you have millions if not billions of little machines that have a lot of consumer choice. You can't just shut down a coal plant and all of a sudden get a lot of benefit. You have to involve a lot of players in this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Yes, this seems like the decarbonization sector that involves the most logistics and the most high-touch human interaction. You have to think about sociology and psychology. It's a tangle.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>It is, and that's why I appreciate you spending some time in our funny little corner of the climate world. We need a lot more attention to it. Every time somebody buys a new furnace or a gas water heater or stove, they're locking in 20 or 25 years of carbon emissions from there. So attention is one of the key things that we need on this issue.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>In recent years there's been something of a consensus forming in carbon circles that electrification is the premier decarbonization strategy. When we look at buildings, is electrifying them the whole game? How far will electrification get us and how big is the remainder once you're done electrifying?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>We haven't seen a lot of good alternatives at this point. When you think about electrifying buildings, you’re talking about space heating, water heating, cooking, and probably clothes drying. You do have some arguments with people about their gas fireplaces and their pool pumps, but that's a pretty small amount, all in all. </p><p>When you look at the alternatives, are we going to pump incredibly expensive renewable natural gas through pipes to power those? Are we going to replace the entire gas system with a new hydrogen system to do that? I don't think so. These are pretty low-level technologies, when it comes down to it, in the use of energy, and using expensive fuels just doesn't make sense either from an economic perspective or a climate solutions perspective. </p><p>So electricity is the path we need to go down on buildings. They're making cold-weather heat pumps that can operate well down to -15 degrees, so here in 2022, we have much if not all the technology we're going to need for electrification of buildings. It gets down to an issue of scale and deployment, and how are we going to do it fast enough to meet our climate goals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Here’s a philosophical question: If we are going to electrify all the buildings and then we're going to supply that electricity with zero-carbon renewables or other clean energy, then why do we need efficiency? Why do we need to use less energy in buildings if the energy we're using is clean?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>Because even if we're using clean electricity, we don't want to use a ton of it. I consistently look forward to a Star Trek future when we don't have to have conversations about appliances and energy and where it comes from. But the reality is that electricity does cost money here in our reality, and if you're running even a highly efficient heat pump off of a very clean grid in a very cold climate, you just want to use less energy to heat your house. In particular in the colder climates, it's to save money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>So we could imagine your Star Trek future where renewable energy has gotten so cheap that we no longer feel the need to ration it. In that theoretical future, will efficiency just fade out, or is there some intrinsic worth to efficiency beyond saving a scarce resource? </p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>I was raised in California and then Hawaii, so I have a primal fear of being even slightly cold. My wife did her undergraduate work in Minnesota, so whenever I complain about being cold, she mocks me, and I say, just because you were colder at one point in your life doesn't invalidate my feelings and discomfort right now. </p><p>The benefit is going to be one of comfort moving forward. When you talk to the leaders in the energy efficiency community that actually sell efficiencies successfully — and there's only two — they'll say that that's usually what sells efficiency: it’s comfort, it’s air quality, it's a better quality of life, rather than the marginal savings you get from it. </p><p>In the colder and the hotter climes, efficiency is always going to have a role to play, but increasingly people are recognizing that it's less important in the timeframes that we're talking about for addressing climate change than getting off of fossil fuels. We can't just be using less fossil fuels, we need to stop using fossil fuels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I want to talk about the impediments to building decarbonization in three different areas. First, putting aside politics and regulation, what is the biggest <em>technical</em> barrier to building decarbonization? Are there still practical and engineering and technological problems to solve? Or is this all about policy and investment?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>What you have is a situation of the technology itself and then market awareness or market familiarity with the technology. </p><p>When you look at low-rise commercial buildings, low-rise multifamily residential buildings, the technology is there. As I mentioned, we have incredibly performing cold-climate heat pumps, and a heat pump is just an air conditioner that runs in reverse, so anybody that installs an air conditioner knows how to install a heat pump. Heat-pump water heater — it's not crazy Vulcan technology. The technology is there for that, and there's enough familiarity with it that if we can put in place the right market signals and the right policies, it'll be an easy shift for the industry. </p><p>For the high-rise, we have a few more challenges. You have the “starchitects” and the good engineering firms that are familiar with doing central hot water heating systems with heat pumps. But by and large, that's one technology where — even though it exists, it's being deployed in countries all over the world — particularly here in America, there's less awareness and history of designers doing central heat-pump water heaters. So that's one area where we still have to come up to speed. </p><p>Then the biggest barrier on the technical side right now is just home wiring and home electrical panels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Upgrading to prepare for electrification, that kind of thing? </p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Exactly: undersized electrical panels. If you're adding four new appliances and maybe an electric vehicle, you're going to have to upgrade your electrical panel. Which isn't bad in itself, and for a lot of homes there’s a safety benefit to it as well. The challenge is that in our world, what usually brings that about is a failed furnace or a failed water heater, so it’s an emergency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So these decisions are made under duress, usually.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>What about the biggest political impediment? Is it consumer ignorance or consumer sentiment? Or is it, as I tend to suspect, opposition from the natural gas industry? </p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>The biggest political barrier right now is fear. It's the fear of politicians to set out agendas in line with their stated climate goals. Even leadership states like California and New York that have strong climate goals — you think of all the different sectors that are emitting, and well, pretty soon here, we’ve got to stop burning fossil fuels in buildings. </p><p>Yet you see a hesitancy of leadership to set out that vision, and that results in market confusion. You have the manufacturers, the installers, the builders all saying, “well on one hand, it's pretty obvious what you're going to have to do to us through regulation if you're going to meet your climate goals, but on the other hand, you're still allowing new buildings to hook up to the gas system; you're still providing energy-efficiency incentives for gas appliances; you're still putting out billions of taxpayer dollars into affordable housing and school construction and you have no alignment of those policies with your climate policies.” So right now it's fear to step up and set bold policies for buildings that is holding it back. </p><p>You mentioned where that fear may be coming from, and largely it is gas utilities, who don't see themselves in a low-carbon future; in particular, the unions that work within those companies and lay those pipes, or unions that lay pipe in buildings. What we are seeing in both New York and California right now is organized labor starting to come to the table. They use the same language every time we sit down at the table with them: they say, “we see the writing on the wall; we know where this is going, and so we're coming to the table to begin to negotiate what a just transition actually looks like beyond just a slogan.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>What is the biggest financial impediment? Is it just a lack of government money, or is there a lack of financing and funding models?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>I've spent about 20 years in energy-efficiency policy; I'm a recovering bureaucrat, spent about 15 years in state government in California. Part of the beauty of working in our space is that we are working with technologies that are not a choice for consumers. A lot of people think about building electrification, they draw parallels with the solar industry or the electric vehicle industry or lessons learned from energy efficiency. And while there is stuff to learn from that, the reality is: you don't need to have solar panels in order to stay warm in your house. You don't need an electric vehicle in order to be able to provide hot water for your family. </p><p>So we're dealing with technologies that people fundamentally have a lot of urgency around when they break. The beauty is, they break, and absent any of our electrification goals or our climate goals, that person was going to spend anywhere from $7,000 to $15,000 on a new furnace and air conditioning system. </p><p>They were already going to have to spend money, think through what financing options are available to them, etc. So what we need to do in this space is figure out how to add just enough money and just enough access to financing to be able to shift that decision around to the technologies we want. We don't need to pay for the entire water heater; what we need to do is pay a few hundred to a thousand-and-a-half for that water heater in order to help consumers choose a heat-pump water heater rather than going back to another gas water heater. </p><p>We need some incentives, particularly over the next decade, to be able to make it so that the electric choice is the cheaper choice. For low-income and moderate households, we need to be focused on accessible financing models for communities that have historically been left out of capital markets. We've done a big report about what that could look like: how to use tariffed on-bill financing in an effective way to both protect consumers but allow far more people, lower-income and renters, to be able to take advantage of financing to make these upgrades.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>When I talk about building decarbonization, one of the first questions that always comes up is about renters: unless my landlord has good intentions and is excited about this, there's not much I can do. Is there agency for renters? What should they do? How do you get to landlords?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>There's water heating and space heating, and then there's cooking. Water heating and space heating, landlords are generally looking for the cheapest option; something breaks, they need to replace it. What I mentioned in the last answer about making the electric choice the cheapest choice and having good financing for high-efficiency electric appliances: that's what's going to help landlords make the better choice, that they're able to save money up front on these technologies. The same incentive programs and financing that help homeowners are also going to help landlords help renters with that. </p><p>Now, key to that is that we also have in place policies that protect renters so that landlords don't install this technology and then try to raise the rent on them. It’s a key conversation happening right now. </p><p>But I wanted to pull apart cooking, because cooking may be an area where there is more agency than what we've historically expressed, because of the air-quality impacts of cooking with gas. There's now a good 40 years of research showing that there are potentially significant air-quality impacts of burning gas in your home and around your family, and there are laws in this country around habitability that landlords have to follow. They need to provide good environments. </p><p>So if a landlord is providing an environment that does not have good venting over a stove and/or has a stove that you can test and show is emitting dangerous levels of pollution, we are now starting to work with a number of groups across the country about, how do you then turn that into policy? How can you empower local governments to include that in their habitability requirements, which would compel landlords to then make the shift to either a different kind of stove and/or venting?</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Is that about passing new policies upgrading the habitability standards? Or is there some way to interpret or use existing habitability standards to get at stoves? Are the tools there already?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>We believe that the tools are already there, that the habitability standards cover this, and it's a matter of somebody stepping up and testing it. We're engaged with a number of groups doing air-quality testing over a period of time, working with tenant groups, and working with local governments to be able to say, look, this is the data right here. We're potentially having higher pollution coming from stoves in people's homes than the highways or ports next to them; as much as we need to address those, we also need to be addressing this. </p><p>We haven't yet had the first city go ahead and adopt it, but we're in conversation with a number of them and I hope in the near future to be able to talk to you about that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>When we talk about building decarb, minds go to the operational emissions: you're running your furnace, you're heating your house, etc. But the other half of the equation is what's called <em>embodied emissions</em> — the emissions represented by the manufacture and transport of the materials used in the building. This seems like something that consumers have very little control over. Who needs to understand embodied emissions, and where's the right lever to take action on that?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>The Carbon Leadership Forum, out of your area of Washington, has been the leading voice on the issue of embodied emissions. They've done a ton of good work on this. It's a combination of factors, and it gets down to individual theories of change about how we're going to address climate change. For me, I think we need to be doing as much as we can in the 2020s to invest and incentivize and educate. Then we're looking at a series of regulations in the 2030s that bring along everybody that wasn't incentivized or didn't fall to our education. </p><p>On embodied carbon, it's going to be the same thing. Right now, a lot of the focus on embodied carbon is on the design and construction community: how do we get the specifiers in all these firms, largely on the commercial and multifamily and institutional side, to start to specify different materials? You have leadership systems like LEED and the Living Building Challenge incorporating greater transparency to product design and product development.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>If you're a big builder, I'm guessing your primary sentiment about this is that you just don't want to waste a bunch of time on it. You don't want to have to do the research on the materials yourself. Is there an easy way for a builder to say to suppliers, “you must meet X standard?” Is there a standard out there yet that they can pin their supply on?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Absolutely. LEED and the Institute for Living Futures have been the two leading groups on this, enforcing through their rating systems a system for manufacturers to be able to report on the environmental impacts of their products. We're getting beyond just recycled content or emissions, we're now getting into a lifecycle analysis of the product. They're providing the model right now for products to be measured against. </p><p>The other place we're seeing it is at the local and state level, but they haven't been able to get much beyond cement, to be honest with you. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Well, that's a big one.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>It is. But we need to be getting into steel. There are a number of different large systems. California a couple years ago passed a Buy Clean California bill that required state government to start to reduce the embodied carbon of steel, glass, and a couple other products that they purchase for their own buildings. At the local level, we're seeing local governments pass embodied carbon ordinances that are mostly focused on cement and using low-carbon cement in both public and private buildings. </p><p>But it is nascent and we haven't seen anywhere near the attention on embodied carbon that we've seen on operational emissions of buildings. Folks like Ed Mazria out of Architecture 2030 make a compelling point that the bigger carbon problem is the embodied carbon than the operational.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Looking down the road at our imaginary future: if you reduce your operational greenhouse gases to nothing through clean electrification and sealing and all that, and then you secure low-carbon materials, you can imagine buildings not just zeroing out their emissions — you can imagine buildings becoming carbon sinks, carbon stores, negative carbon. Is that something people are thinking about, or is it a 2050 type of thing?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>No, people are talking about it. It sounds like you are hanging out with some of those starchitects I mentioned earlier. It's not enough to be net-zero anymore, you need to be a carbon-positive community. </p><p>The science is there. You sequester carbon in certain materials that you use in a project, and if you use enough of it, and you zero out your operational, you should be able to do it. </p><p>Again, we need to get it beyond the starchitect buildings to the mainstream, and that's where I fundamentally feel that government has to play a role. The most important thing they can do in 2022 is say to the market, where are we going? How are we going to help create the market to allow the regulations to work when they come into effect?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>The pandemic has brought a lot of attention to the fact that air quality and ventilation are fairly abysmal in many existing buildings. Now this is becoming a public health issue. Are good ventilation and filtering and air quality in tension with efficiency? Are those necessarily going to mean more energy? How do you see those fitting together?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>They're necessary. For 40 years out here in California we've tightened up the building envelope; I say that the folks over at the California Energy Commission belong to the the church of the envelope because of their dedication to it. When you do that, you necessarily start to trap any emissions in your home: all your aerosols, all the furniture you bring into your house, and then microplastics — I think I'm probably one-quarter microplastic at this point because I have two young kids. </p><p>For our world, it's really the pollution that comes from the stove, so potentially dangerous levels of nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, and formaldehyde coming out. If you don't have venting, and you have a tight envelope, and you're cooking in winterm and you don't want to open the windows, you have a potentially dangerous situation there for your lung health, and, with carbon monoxide, for your overall life. </p><p>So it's a critical piece of energy efficiency, and we're starting to have a pretty brutal conversation in the energy-efficiency community particularly around some of our low-income weatherization programs. What is the morality behind tightening up some of these homes and providing comfort and saving money without addressing some of the pollutants inside those very homes?</p><p>It's absolutely critical that we deal with ventilation and removing sources of pollution. We know that stoves are a critical source of pollution, and we know that we have much better technology that just blows the doors off of gas stoves to replace it with.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Does this just come down to building in ventilation and airflow standards into our regulations? Is that the long and short of it?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>On new construction, yes. Last year, the Energy Commission in California adopted its new building code that'll go into effect in two years, and it's the first time in the world we've seen a building code that's differentiating the ventilation standard it requires based on the type of fuel you're using to cook food. They're saying if you have a gas stove and you’re new construction, under this code you're going to have to have a higher ventilation standard, and therefore a more expensive ventilation system, than an electric one. It's the first time we've recognized in a code the inherent health benefits of cooking without gas. </p><p>For existing buildings, whether you're talking about waste or water treatment, source control is always your best bet, the most affordable way. You just want to find a way to get the gas stove out of the kitchen and get an electric one in there. You're still going to have some emissions from just cooking and, depending on how good a cook you are, from burning. So you do want some ventilation for that, but at least you don't have what are known criteria pollutants from the EPA being emitted into your kitchen in that case. </p><p>I say that because in some situations, these homes are just built in a way that is going to make ventilation systems very hard to retrofit in, and landlords unwilling to do something about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>So you create an incentive for builders or retrofitters: get rid of the gas stove and thereby save money on ventilation spending.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Exactly. The Energy Commission's done that small step; they didn't say “no more gas stoves,” but they said “we recognize gas stoves are dangerous, and therefore you're going to have to deal with it.” So yes, it is a regulatory incentive.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I think we can agree that nothing like the scale of action we'd like to see is happening, but there are places that are taking big steps. In New York, the governor laid out some big talk; I'm curious what she said and what authority it carries. What else needs to happen to make it move forward?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, very impressive first State of the State from Governor Hochul on the environment. I think Politico called her a political juggernaut. </p><p>Unfortunately, her hometown bills couldn't quite get over the hump last weekend. But she put out some big goals for buildings, and it matches well with what's happening in the state right now, which is the beginning of a public process for their big climate scoping plan that's been under development for years, about how they're going to meet their climate leadership legislation. </p><p>What the governor announced is a laundry list; I could take up the rest of the podcast to go through it, so I'll just be brief. She released a comprehensive package of proposals in the State of the State: some that can be carried out through her Public Service Commission, some that will need legislation, and some that will be addressed in the budget.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>And she has a supportive legislature?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>She does. She hasn't really had to test it yet. But what we've seen from the last governor, whose name shall not be spoken, is that he was able to “work well” or bully legislature into carrying out the agenda. We'll see if this governor has a similar success rate with the legislature. But it seems like it. There's been three great pieces of legislation immediately introduced around building electrification, so I think there's a lot of action on it. </p><p>But to your original question, the governor proposed how to bring about 2 million climate-friendly homes by 2030, with at least 1 million of those being all-electric and 1 million being electric-ready, pre-wired so next time any of your gas appliances break, you're ready to go with electric appliances.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Does “climate-friendly” have a concrete definition?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>I've never seen “climate-friendly” in law yet. I think it was a turn of phrase that her media folks developed for this one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>It can mean a lot of different things in practice. </p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Yes, indeed. I'm sure the gas companies have a lot to say about “climate-friendly.” </p><p>She called for all new construction in the state to be zero emission no later than 2027, which is in line with what New York City just adopted for all buildings being built in New York City at the end of last year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>That's operational, not embodied, emissions?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:</strong></p><p>Correct, that's operational emissions. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>So does that mean the resulting building will not produce carbon on an ongoing basis, or the construction process itself is somehow zero carbon?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>The resulting building. We'll see how it all gets played out. It's a lot of platitudes and speeches for the State of the State address. There's a piece of legislation currently working through the legislature that actually sets 2024 as a zero-emission date for construction. If that one passes, there's a series of definitions in there, but that is from operational emissions rather than embodied or construction emissions. </p><p>She also put up a green electrification fund to electrify low-income homes, about $25 billion for a five-year plan, which is far more visionary than we've seen from anybody else. </p><p>There's a certain law called “obligation to serve”: utilities that provide gas, usually monopolies, are obliged to provide that gas or electricity to ratepayers if requested. If you're far out in the country, you may need to pay for some of that infrastructure, but the utility is obliged to provide it to you. It's a real barrier when you're looking about starting to trim the gas network. So the governor in her address actually proposed to end the “obligation to serve” for existing customers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Just to be clear about this, say you are trying to eliminate part of your gas network and electrify everything in that area; all it would take is one citizen to say to the natural gas company, “I would like to be served by gas” and then basically you can't get rid of it? Is that the legal situation right now?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Yeah. We're seeing it out here in California. Pacific Gas & Electric, largest utility in the country, fourth-largest distributor of natural gas, they are trying to go through figuring out how you can operationalize electrification. They've been doing some pilot programs around going to whole neighborhoods where they have old pipe that's coming up for replacement. It’s going to be millions of dollars in replacement, they've done the analysis, and they said, “okay, if instead we just electrify all the homes on this pipe extension, it's going to be cheaper for us and for ratepayers.” So they go to every single one of those homes and they ask each homeowner, “hey, would you like a free all-electric home?”</p><p>We've seen two case studies they've done on this. One of them, it worked. They saved $400,000 on the project compared to the gas pipeline replacement, and it was great. On the other one, out of 150 homes, two people didn't want to give up their gas stoves. PG&E had to go ahead and spend millions to replace pipes that are going to have a 60- to 80-year lifespan, that if we're going to meet our climate goals, we're going to have to early retire, and who's going to pay for that? It's going to be ratepayers paying for that early retirement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So this would be a law to get rid of that obligation.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>This would be a law. A piece of legislation has now been introduced in New York legislature to remove that obligation to serve. </p><p>She also has called on the PSC to take a look at the whole approach to pipeline maintenance in New York: how we grade it, how we decide whether or not to replace pipe or look for non-pipe alternatives to it, such as electrification — completely changing our approach to just assuming that we're going to replace old pipe with new pipe. </p><p>I could go on and on. She has a bunch of stuff for training programs for New Yorkers to get a lot more people in. One of the two exciting areas I'll bring up is, she's talked about needing to convene private capital markets. No better place than New York to be doing some of that convening, to be able to bring them in to figure out how they can support this. </p><p>Lastly, she's proposed 1,000 clean, green schools. This is an opportunity to clearly be able to get organized labor more to the table, to be supporting building electrification as well as providing better ventilation and air quality in schools.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I always thought that was political gold, just waiting for someone to pick it up. The respiratory health of kids, what's more on people's minds right now?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>Exactly. I live in fire country out here in California — we used to call it wine country — and increasingly, our schools and our public facilities are being used as resilience centers in heat waves and firestorms. Getting these schools with solar, batteries, all electric, with great ventilation systems, is unfortunately going to be a critical need as we deal with and potentially adapt to climate change.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>We could stay on New York forever; it's amazing what's going on there. But what about California? That's the other big state that's come up recently. California is going to just spend a bunch of money on it?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>Yep, that's the proposal at this point. Sadly, probably nowhere near as much as we need to, but it's a good start. </p><p>What I would say about the difference between what we're seeing in New York and in California is that in New York, you're seeing some high-level leadership coming directly out of the governor's office. In California, the leadership is bottom-up. </p><p>We have 54 cities across the state that have adopted local gas bans or local building codes that discourage gas. We have agencies like the Air Board and the Energy Commission and the Public Utilities Commission adopting piecemeal policies that are all building toward the direction of requiring electrification and incentivizing it and building the market. But until January 10 of this year, we didn't see anything coming from the governor's office about, “we need to start electrifying, we need to start getting off of fossil fuels.”</p><p>On January 10, the governor released his proposed budget for the year and he proposed just over a billion dollars for building electrification, with two-thirds of that going toward existing building low-income housing retrofits. We're starting to see some significant investment, more so than we've seen in the past. </p><p>But at this point, I’ve got to say, I think if you put a UFC championship belt on any governor right now, it's Governor Hochul. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>New York and California are the leaders on so much carbon and climate stuff. Are they the leaders in this respect too, on buildings? Or is there anyone else that's taking comparable action?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>There are. I mentioned local governments, and that's a theme we've seen in addressing climate change for decades now: the locals are the ones that are the most exposed to voters, and yet across the world they have been taking the biggest swings on climate change. They see both the benefits and the risks of climate change more directly than state or federal levels. </p><p>Other states, I would say that Massachusetts, Illinois, and Colorado are stepping up. I'll throw Washington in there as well. Massachusetts is just about to vote on the next three years of their energy-efficiency program, and they have nearly completely shifted the focus of the energy-efficiency program to make it much more electrification-focused.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>This is a big thing, right? Because efficiency conventionally conceived is not necessarily aligned with electrification or cleaning up sources. Often in tension. I feel like this is something not a lot of people are aware of outside the space.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>It very much is, and I think a lot of it is because the energy-efficiency mindset came out of the oil crisis of the 70s — it's just about saving more energy, it's not about ending emissions. The shift to climate-is-existential, I think it's been hard for folks that have been working in this space for 30 years or so. So that'll be great in Massachusetts. </p><p>Colorado and Illinois both passed overall climate legislation last year that had buildings as a specific part of it, and in implementation they're going to be developing comprehensive roadmaps for how to deal with buildings. In Washington they're actually adopting a new building code, and for commercial and multifamily buildings they're proposing electrification mandates within that building code. So your home state up there is one of the leaders. The odd thing is, they're backing off on single-family homes, where it's the easiest to do it, and it's largely because of stoves.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>It's easier to electrify residential. Big buildings and commercial buildings, industrial buildings, that's doable, it's just more expensive? Or the incentives are wrong? What's the status of bigger buildings? Is this something we know how to do?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>It's very much doable, it's being done. I can point you to buildings in Seattle that are all-electric tall towers. One of the leading consulting firms, Ecotope, is out of the Seattle area. It is very possible and being done all over the world. </p><p>The key thing there, though, is awareness. We haven't asked our bread-and-butter design and construction community to care this deeply about climate change before, so they've been focused on efficiency and not on these central heat-pump water heating systems. The HVAC systems — again, heat pumps are basically air conditioners that can run in reverse, so it's not complicated to design that, but there are some differences in a boiler-based water heating system versus a central heat-pump water heating system. It's nothing crazy; it's not Star Wars technology. It's just familiarity with it and being able to design around it. Unfortunately, I think we're going to do a ton of education and incentivizing in the 2020s and then have to require it in the 2030s. </p><p>It's very doable. It's being done. For the folks that know how to do this, we're not seeing a price premium for building all-electric versus building with gas. In fact, Point Energy out of San Francisco did a big study for the University of California system, which has adopted a carbon neutrality by 2025 target, about what it costs to build and operate a building with gas and electric versus just electric. They looked at residential towers, office buildings, and labs, and found that the electric buildings cost the same or cheaper to build and operate than the gas buildings across all three of those building types.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Is this one of those things where it's more capital-intensive up front but then you save on operations over the long term? I used to be very taken by that story, but then I realized that, as nice as that thought is, it’s not really what motivates a lot of behavior in markets. People overweight those upfront capital costs. Is that still the situation?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Not in this space. You never want to make generalizations about construction. Every project is different; every time you interact with a supply chain is different than another time interacting with the supply chain. But by and large, our members, who are design and construction folks in this space, that know how to do this, say they don't see a cost premium for the construction of these projects for large, commercial, institutional.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>There are a lot of states now that are, let's say, pushing the other direction. One of the ways they're doing that is by passing laws that preempt cities from passing gas bans; it's popped up in a lot of red states. Is there anything to say about that other than, “they should stop doing that, that's bad, we should elect somebody who won't do that”? If you're a city who's in one of those states, are there ways around it? Are there other things you can do? How should they deal with that?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>That's a great question. What it fundamentally comes down to is taking away local governments’ choice about how to address climate change.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>By the party that champions local government. Weird.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>Yes, weird times, almost like it's disingenuous. </p><p>When you look at what cities can do on climate change, usually transportation and buildings are the largest emissions; it just depends how much infrastructure or industry they have in their boundaries. Transportation emissions are tough; a lot of it is consumer choice. Your land-use choices take a long time to have a big impact. Public transportation is tough and expensive. </p><p>So buildings are one of the key areas where local governments can actually do anything. When you take that tool away, you're really crippling local government's ability to do anything on climate change. </p><p>What we're seeing right now is some creative ways to look around it. Some of the states that have adopted this have focused in on building codes, so you have some cities looking at planning law, health and safety law, instead of our building code law, which has now been preempted by state government. You are seeing some cities trying to look for creative ways around this. </p><p>Ultimately, you know, I love all of our 50 states equally. But when you look at the top 10 states by gas demand, only Texas and Ohio have adopted these bans. The other eight states are climate leaders. They all have climate laws, they have climate targets, and they collectively represent over half the gas demand in the United States in buildings. I think what you're going to see is a coalition of those states changing the marketplace. Smaller states with smaller gas demand are just going to have to deal with the implications of those market changes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>A little bit like fuel economy, right? You get enough big states going in the right direction, they end up dragging the market with them. </p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:</strong></p><p>Very much so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I know Biden has done an executive order on federal buildings, and I know there's some money in the infrastructure bill. Are you excited by what's happened so far federally on buildings? Are there particular pieces we should be aware of?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>There's more than we've ever seen. And that's great.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>That's always such a low bar in these conversations.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>When you work in climate, you have to be an optimist. Maybe not if you report on climate, but if you work in climate, you have to be an optimist. The numbers are just too stark. </p><p>The fact that we appointed somebody in the White House, Mark Chambers, formerly from New York City, to be the lead on building emissions for the Council on Environmental Quality is amazing. The fact that you have Secretary Granholm going around giving big press events around cold-climate heat pumps and people yelling from behind her, “heat pump nation!” is absolutely incredible. DOE is moving forward on regulations that manufacturers of heating equipment say are going to be pushing the market to electrification. We're seeing a lot of what we need to see. </p><p>It's our fundamental belief that you don't see significant federal action until you see a lot of state action. Federal is the bank, and then the caboose on regulations. We need significant investment from the federal government, and then that investment will help locals and states be able to adopt regulations that will transform the market enough that actors of all colors will come back to Washington and say, “listen, this is too haphazard and patchwork, we need some level of consistency across the country.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>If any of us need to feel additional anxiety about Build Back Better, is there anything big on buildings in Build Back Better that you are hoping makes it through this twisted process?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>There is, much of it thanks to former guests on this podcast who have done great work in this area, particularly Saul and the folks over at Rewiring America. </p><p>There's $17 billion in there for federal buildings, which I have a hard time getting too excited about when I think about taxpayers looking at it. “Great, so you're going to do a bunch of stuff that you should have been doing the whole time, and now we're supposed to get excited about this? What about the $17 billion to help me with my water heater?”</p><p>But there's $12 billion for residential electrification, and that'll be split: about $6 billion coming out of the Department of Energy to provide direct rebates for the whole suite of electrification technologies (water heating, space heating, cooking, and clothes drying); then there's $6 billion that'll be implemented through state energy offices. That'll be focused on what is one of the biggest movements in energy efficiency right now: performance-based energy-efficiency measures.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Can you give the capsule summary of what that means?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Historically, we've had widget-based or “deemed” savings for energy efficiency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>You just incentivize them to buy the equipment. </p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Exactly. And even worse, we give installers money just because they installed the equipment — not necessarily the quality of the installation, the performance of it. How does it perform on the grid when we have grids that have very different greenhouse gas profiles depending on the time of day that the power is being drawn? </p><p>A performance-based energy-efficiency program gives some money up front for an incentive, but the majority of the incentive is paid out based on the actual operations and performance of those systems. How efficient? How much energy did it save? How much carbon did it displace? How many emissions did it avoid? </p><p>There's $6 billion currently in the Build Back Better bill that would go toward supporting states to set up those programs, and that would be run out of the state energy offices in each of the states.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>And technologically we have what we need to be able to track performance in a way that you can bank on it?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>We do. It's amazing some of the technologies out there. Leading firms like Recurve are providing  fantastic tools for utilities to be able to pull apart the dynamics around a kilowatt hour saved, and why that kilowatt hour, normalizing for weather, normalizing for occupancy. It's incredible what computers can do nowadays. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I want to take a minute just to talk about heat pumps. They have gone from nowhere to people chanting, “heat pump nation!” It's a thrill. But when I bring them up and talk about them, immediately I hear, “I installed one 10 years ago and my house is always cold,” or “I can't afford to install one because I'd have to get fossil-fuel backup with it.” </p><p>This actually happened to me. Seven or eight years ago, we were going to replace our original oil furnace in our house, which had been there since 1954: big, giant, peach-colored. We wanted to get rid of it. I would have loved to get a heat pump, but the contractors were baffled and resistant, and assured us, if you get a heat pump, you have to get a natural gas furnace to back up the heat pump, and all told it would have been an additional $8,000. So I ended up, to my great and ongoing regret, installing a natural gas furnace. </p><p>I feel like that's a pretty representative experience in terms of a) people not knowing b) contractors not knowing what the hell they're doing, and c) this question of whether heat pumps can do the job, and in what climates. Can we get some clarity on that? How good are heat pumps these days?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Heat pumps are great these days! We have, through the leadership of the Northeast Energy Efficiency Partnership, or NEEP, a whole database of cold-climate heat pumps. They pioneered a cold-climate heat pump specification years ago and have been working with manufacturers since then to make sure there's a suite of different cold-climate heat pumps available. </p><p>These are heat pumps where the heat pump part of the heat pump can operate down to 14 degrees below zero before electric resistance kicks in, or if you have a gas backup, before that gas backup kicks in. </p><p>The technology is there. What you're talking about is your interaction with the contractor, and that's going to be one of the hardest things about this transition. Try to call up a plumber or an HVAC installer right now: people are just flat busy. They were flat busy before the pandemic, and now we're in the pandemic, everybody wants to renovate their home, which is now their home office, and they're busier than ever. There's no reason contractors should change what they're doing if they're selling and they're booked months out in advance. </p><p>It's going to be up to us who are concerned about climate to give them a reason. It's not going to work to require it right now, because of the shock to the system that'll create for this workforce. It's going to have to be incentives, and then regulation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Let me pause on the shock. Are there just not enough people trained to do it? Or is it about heat-pump manufacturers not being ready to ramp up quickly? Or logistics? What would be the shock if you tried to push it too fast right now?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>It's a great question, because there's this fallacy out there that we don't have enough trained workers. The reality is, again, we're not installing crazy alien technology here. A heat pump is an air conditioner that can run in reverse. A heat-pump water heater is a tank of water with a heat pump on top. This is not complicated stuff. Electricians know how to electrician; they know how to run wires. </p><p>It's not an issue of a lack of workforce, it's an issue of incentivizing the workforce in the right way. Right now, the major thing that installers want to avoid is callbacks. They want to be able to go in, put in something, and then not be called back out, which will prevent them from doing another job. If you historically have not cared about the performance of the HVAC system or water heating system that you're installing, it can be a change to all of a sudden now have to care about that performance. </p><p>What we're seeing is a gradual transition of this workforce over to electric installations, but until we send some clear market signals, there's no reason for them to make that shift. You have all the myths that you ran into, like “they can't operate in even Seattle's mildly cold climate; you need gas backup; these things just don't work.” </p><p>One of the other things is, we're just going to have to accept the difficulty of living in the first wave of addressing climate change, and that things are going to be better next decade. Things are going to have a lot of friction and be pretty hard this decade as we help to transition this industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>When I hear pushback against electrification, this is the main thing I hear in terms of substantive objections: If you go to cold climates like the Upper Midwest, and you replace all their oil and natural gas furnaces with electric heat pumps, then in the winter you’re going to get enormous electricity demand that's brand new. You have these electricity systems built for summer peaks suddenly having enormous winter peaks, three times bigger than their historic peaks. </p><p>Some people argue we're simply not going to be able to radically upgrade the entire electricity infrastructure in all these places fast enough; we're going to need, in some places, some alternative to electrification, which usually amounts to some zero-carbon liquid fuel, some hydrogen variant or biomethane, whatever it is. </p><p>Basically, we are going to need to keep combustion in some areas because we just don't have the capacity to handle that much winter electricity demand. What do you make of that?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>God, I wish that was a real problem. If we were installing so many electric appliances that we were actually causing grid disruption anywhere in the next decade — man, I could go home, that's it, retire, done, we succeeded. </p><p>The reality is, we're not going to stop maintaining the distribution and transmission grids. We're not going to stop building generation in any part of this country. We're not going to have mass-scale electrification at the speed we need in the near-term. We're going to have some time to adjust. </p><p>The people who think electrification is going to happen in a silo have not seen how electricity systems have worked for the whole history of electricity systems. It is an integrated planning effort, and demand is forecasted and then supplied. Now, at some point we can talk about rolling blackouts and weather events, but on the normal, this should be something that grid managers can absolutely handle with the rate of electrification that we could see, even if we had significantly more electrification.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Do you think it's fair to say, though, that if you're in one of those cold-weather climates and you see electrification on the horizon, you need to start bulking up your electricity system now? Those things are not fast to accomplish.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, if you are committing to electrification, you should be incorporating that into your demand models and looking at generation. And, getting back to the beginning of our conversation, you should be thinking about how to incorporate energy efficiency into those projects as well, to limit some of that new demand and ease building electrification into this high winter peak. </p><p>To be honest with you, I think our bigger challenge is going to be electric vehicles — the doubling and tripling.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>They're additive, right? You get a bunch of electric vehicles in a cold-weather climate alongside a bunch of electrification of heat and cooling, then you're talking about a lot of electricity.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>It is. But with cars, average car ownership is about seven years, water heaters about 15 years, furnaces about 20 years. We're going to have quicker turnover of the vehicle fleet than we are of the water heater and furnace fleet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Do you feel confident saying that, in the end, nowhere in the United States will need liquid fuels for heat? You think electrification is going to do it everywhere?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>I'd say that for buildings, not necessarily for industrial, or transport. That is a hard decision that we need to make immediately: if you look at trash gas, or cow-crap gas, the rainbow of hydrogens — these are all precious, and they're all expensive. Is the highest and best use of that gas in my moderately efficient water heater in my basement? Or should we be spending it in those areas where it is going to be hard to electrify for the foreseeable future, such as industrial purposes, freight, aviation? That's just a better use for it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>So you wouldn't even be into some blending or mixing as an interim measure, to reduce emissions while we wait for electrification?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>The challenge there is the expense to ratepayers. You're maintaining two infrastructure systems moving forward, and ratepayers are paying for it. Instead of making some of these decisions and clipping off the branches of the gas system and relieving ratepayers of that, you are just paying and upgrading it — and these upgrades to gas systems, as I said, 60- to 80-year lives for the materials that are used. These are long-term investments, and even if the whole neighborhood is only using gas for cooking, you still have to maintain that gas system to a high level of safety. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>It’s interesting to think about the gas system as binary: you either have it or you don't. And if you have a single gas appliance, you have the whole gas infrastructure. It's a sticky dilemma. </p><p>Speaking of that, let's talk for a minute about stoves. Where are we on education? I'm seeing it talked about more. I'm seeing a lot of concerted pushback — natural gas utilities and natural gas businesses out propagandizing all over the place, hiring advertising agencies and Instagram influencers to cook on gas stoves. Where do you see the battle for hearts and minds on stoves?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>It's no accident that the gas company is choosing stoves. What's interesting is, it's probably their area of greatest vulnerability.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>In the grand scheme of things, stoves are not a huge source of demand for natural gas, are they?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>Nope — 3 to 5 percent of the average home’s natural gas demand. It's not big, but every mixed-fuel utility that provides both electricity and gas will tell us that their nightmare is that they have to run a gas system just because people aren't willing to give up their gas stove, and charge everybody $180 a month just to cook with gas. </p><p>It's no accident that they're focusing on this. We've been part of a number of studies that have looked at people's attachment to different appliances, and unsurprisingly, those appliances that you interact with the most are the ones you have the greatest attachment to. Water heaters: pretty low level of emotional response. Stoves: really high. And people have had some bad experiences with electric resistance, the coil stoves of the past.</p><p>Generally, the two things home or professional cooks care about the most are power and control, which are usually at the heart of all bad relationships. The good news is that we have an alternative that beats gas on both of those things. But we have this impression that gas is better, and you have these things coming from consumers, saying things like, “I deserve a gas stove. I finally saved up enough money, I can finally get a gas stove.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>It's definitely seen as a luxury, as an achievement, still.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>Very much so. Part of this movement is going to have to be exposing some of the inherent dangers of gas stoves: the air-quality dangers, the safety dangers, whether you have a small child or older relatives in the house, and then just the dangers of piping gas around all of our communities. </p><p>Like electric vehicles, the good news is that we have the high-powered electric vehicles of the kitchen as an alternative. It'd be a bummer if we were like, “no, come back to this coil stove.” That's not going to work. I can’t wait to see the marketing campaign around that.</p><p>But gas stoves, because of the air-quality impacts, are also one of the gas company's greatest vulnerabilities. As you start to see more and more attention paid to that, more groups speak out about it, governments begin to address it, their last gasp from a marketing perspective could turn into the final dagger. </p><p>With induction stoves, it's fantastic that we have a product that, once you test drive it, people's hair gets blown back. It's incredible. It's three times as powerful as the best-in-class gas stove, twice as good a control on it, incredibly easy to clean.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>When I talk to people, that's the first thing I mention. I'm lazy, and I’m the person who cleans the kitchen. We were in a rental for a few months recently and it had a gas stove — god it was a pain in the ass. I was like, how do people live with this? There's so many nooks and crannies; it gets gross so quickly. Induction is this perfectly smooth surface. It really made me appreciate my stove.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, you just wipe it. We have all these pictures of my two-year-old cooking on the induction stove, putting his hand right next to the pan and cooking eggs. It's fantastic technology. </p><p>So the good news is that we have a technology that's better. It's a matter of getting people out there to test drive these things, and getting it in the Home Depots and appliance stores, getting little pop-ups at farmers markets to begin this transition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>It doesn't quite carry the air of fanciness of a gas stove, though. We bought a commodity-level, relatively cheap induction stove; there's no fanciness to it. I don't know what you can do about that. You can't really make a high-end one, either, because magnets are magnets; they're all doing the same thing. Even the lowest-end induction stove basically has exactly the power and control. There's a lot of consumer psychology at work here that's difficult to puzzle through.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>We need the Ford F-150 commercials for induction stoves. Big man turning big dials! Big power, lightning bolts shooting into the pan!</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>But you don't get any flame. Flame is so darn manly, magnets don't quite do it. </p><p>Where's the industry on this? Do they have a preference what kind of stoves they make?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>At this point, they don't. At this point, they have been happy to sell whatever stove a consumer wants to get. They are standing up and taking notice when you have 54 cities in California, most of the Bay Area, basically say, “you're not allowed to build with gas anymore.” Denver, Seattle, for certain building types in New York City now. That's making them take notice. </p><p>It's been interesting to watch, because this is an appliance area that hasn't had to deal with efficiency and energy and environmental regulations a lot. The HVAC and water heater folks, this has been bread and butter for them for 40 years. But the stove folks, they're just like, “whoa, we're a target? Where did this come from?” Just out of nowhere.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>One of the most outrageous things about this — and I don't know if a lot of people appreciate this —  is that in a lot of cases, it is natural gas utilities running these propaganda campaigns, and they are paying for those propaganda campaigns with ratepayer money. In a lot of cases, if you have natural gas, you're paying for that anti-electrification propaganda. Are there legal remedies for that, or what's the right way to deal with that?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:</strong>  </p><p>There are if your local PUC, PSC, BPU has a spine. The area where we've seen that be expressed the farthest is out here in California, where you've had groups like Earthjustice bring forward motions against companies like Southern California Gas Company around using ratepayer dollars to both lobby against electrification as well as run consumer campaigns against electrification. And you've had, after months and months of delay, mealy-mouthed responses from the Public Utilities Commission that at worst, slap them with a small “don't do it again” penalty, or at best say, “well, technically, under current law, there's nothing that we can do about this.” </p><p>The good news is that you're starting to see a change in leadership at the gas companies. In October, Southern California Gas Company, the largest distributor of gas in the country, released a new report called their <a target="_blank" href="https://www.socalgas.com/sustainability/clean-fuels">Clean Fuels report</a>, and it said that widespread electrification of buildings is the future of California. It's the first time we've seen a gas utility anywhere make these sorts of statements. They think that by 2040, up to 90 percent of all of the space and water heating will be electric in California. </p><p>Then, at the end of the year, they joined PG&E in a filing to the Public Utilities Commission that is on a proceeding that would take away incentives to extend gas lines from gas mains to buildings. They’re called line extension allowances; basically, we use ratepayer dollars to give money to builders to pay for some of the costs of extending gas from the gas main in the middle of the street to a house or a new commercial building. It's a perverse incentive from a climate perspective; we're using ratepayer dollars to put into place infrastructure that’ll make it harder for us to meet our climate goals. </p><p>So the PUC in California has opened up a proceeding to recommend doing away with those, and PG&E and Southern California Gas Company came in and said, for residential buildings, we agree that we should stop incentivizing this. First time in the country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>I can understand how an electric and gas utility could come around to the light on this. But if you're a natural gas utility, it's pretty much existential, isn't it? If there's no natural gas, there's no reason for you to exist. Is there a big political difference on those kinds of utilities?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>What is the answer to every question in energy right now, before it's asked? Hydrogen! </p><p>If you read through the Clean Fuels report, and you read through most any clean fuels report from a gas company in America right now, they're betting big on hydrogen. It's very much a “don't look behind the curtain” type of scenario, because you don't want to talk about the fact that you're going to have to replace the entire gas system to be able to pipe hydrogen, or how expensive the hydrogen is going to be to produce and use. But what Southern California Gas Company has said is, we need to start refocusing on supplying industrial and commercial clients with cleaner gaseous fuels. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong> </p><p>Interesting. That's not crazy.  </p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Not crazy. Residential makes up 30 percent of their revenue, so it'll be a big cut.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>They're inevitably going to be smaller, if they survive at all.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, but hydrogen is the hope. It’s the hopium of our time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>The most common question I hear about all this is: I'm a homeowner, I'm confused and overwhelmed, what's my priority list? If I'm making an electrification checklist, what do I do first? </p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>It's going to depend on the age of your appliances. You're looking at your four major appliances: water heater, furnace, stove, and dryer. If you use gas, you want to look at how old those systems are, and you want to replace the oldest one first, if you're looking at it purely from a climate perspective. </p><p>If you're looking at it from a health and safety perspective, you probably want to go with your stove first, because your stove is likely emitting levels of nitrogen oxides, formaldehyde, and carbon monoxide that would be considered illegal if they were found outdoors.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>What if I'm weighing appliance replacement against efficiency upgrades on my envelope, or solar panels on my roof? Are the appliances job one?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>It's going to depend a lot on your climate zone. If you're living up in Upper Minnesota, I highly recommend you do some envelope work along with your heat pump. But it's just going to depend on the life expectancy, how much longer you think that furnace or water heater is going to be kicking.</p><p>This stuff can be confusing for people. The good news is that we've recognized that consumer education is a critical part of this, and with about 15 other sponsors, we’ve partnered on a campaign. It’s called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.switchison.org/">The Switch Is On campaign</a>. It's just in California as of now. It provides all the basic information you as a consumer need, like, what is a heat pump? What would it cost to put it in? It has all of the rebates available to you based on your zip code, utility, government, etc. We pre-screened hundreds of contractors that know what they're doing on electrification and won't talk the Daves of the world out of putting in a heat pump.</p><p>There's about seven other states that are standing up campaigns like this. We also are talking to folks in British Columbia and Australia with similar campaigns. It's a recognized need, and we're trying to provide some of the early resources that consumers need. So yeah, visit the website if you want to see what version one of the electrification consumer education looks like.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>If you're a city policymaker, mayor or town council, same thing. What's your priority list? What are you going after first? What's the big fish?</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>There's three things, and in order, but they're interrelated. </p><p>Number one, we need to stop digging the hole. We should not be building any new buildings with gas connections. Every new one you're building is just creating a problem for your community down the road.</p><p>We need to deal with existing buildings. So the second thing is, you need to set a date for when you're no longer going to allow gas appliances to be sold in your jurisdiction or in your state.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>You're going after the supply side.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy:  </strong></p><p>Exactly. And there are lots of arguments: is it building performance standards, is it time-of-sale requirement. We believe that with a set of complementary policies around it, to build the market and protect people, that appliance bans are the solution we need across the board. </p><p>The key thing is the third thing: we need to build the market so that you can support a ban. We've built up enough of an educated workforce, we've switched electricity rates around, and we’ve brought the cost down so it's comparable or cheaper than gas, etc., to be able to make a mandate work when it goes into effect. </p><p>Those are the three for us: stopping new construction with gas, setting a date for the phaseout of sales of appliances that use gas, and then building the marketplace for electrification. They're all interrelated to each other.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Awesome. Well, this is fascinating, I'm sure we could go on for another hour, but I don't want to test my listeners’ already legendary patience. Thanks so much for coming on, and thanks for all your work on this.</p><p><strong>Panama Bartholomy: </strong> </p><p>Absolutely. Thanks for coming to our funny little corner of the clean energy world, Dave.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-panama-bartholomy-on</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:47773923</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 28 Jan 2022 17:45:41 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/47773923/6165391642ded0bae4b019e9c73ec07c.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4941</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/47773923/ce70930583ee9aefd282c5a37e06394b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Do dividends make carbon taxes more popular? Apparently not.]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Arguments over carbon taxes go back as far as discussions of climate change itself. Economists have long insisted that pricing carbon is the most efficient way to reduce greenhouse gases. For years, they hijacked the climate discourse, with untold money and effort put behind proposals for various increasingly baroque pricing schemes, to very little effect.</p><p>Over time, political experience with carbon taxes has highlighted a truth that should have been obvious long ago: carbon taxes are taxes, and people don’t like taxes. People don’t like paying more money for stuff. </p><p>More broadly, carbon taxes are an almost perfectly terrible policy from the perspective of political economy. They make costs visible to everyone, while the benefits are diffuse and indirect. They create many enemies, but have almost no support outside the climate movement itself. All the political intensity is with opponents. (More <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-carbon-pricing-will-never-be">here</a>.)</p><p>One response to this critique that has grown increasingly popular in recent years is the notion of refunding the tax revenue — giving the money back to voters. Various ways to do this have been proposed, the simplest being an equal dividend to each taxpayer. Some proposals have all the tax revenue refunded; some have a limited portion refunded. </p><p>The idea is that the tax would discourage carbon-intensive activities, while the dividend would mute political opposition. In most of the proposed schemes, the lower half of the income scale comes out ahead — dividends are larger than tax burdens — and in some cases, up to 80 percent of taxpayers come out ahead. A refunded carbon tax is basically large-scale wealth redistribution from the biggest fossil fuel users to middle- and working-class citizens. </p><p>This kind of “fee and dividend” framework is endorsed by the <a target="_blank" href="https://clcouncil.org/our-solution/">Climate Leadership Council</a> (centrist/bipartisan elites), the <a target="_blank" href="https://citizensclimatelobby.org/basics-carbon-fee-dividend/">Citizens’ Climate Lobby</a> (left-leaning grassroots campaigners), and one-time presidential candidate Andrew Yang, though they differ on important details.</p><p>The logic of the policy is compelling to proponents — and to many people who first hear about it — and they feel deeply confident that it will compel the public too. The evidence, however, is mixed. </p><p>Do refunds increase the popularity of carbon taxes? At last, some field research.</p><p>There are numerous studies showing that, in a polling or focus-group setting, the inclusion of refunds increases public support for a hypothetical carbon tax — see <a target="_blank" href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aax3323">here</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ab92c3">here</a>, among others. But that kind of polling has not translated into victories in, for example, Washington state, where a fee-and-dividend policy <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/10/18/13012394/i-732-carbon-tax-washington">lost badly in a public referendum</a> in 2016.</p><p>More to the point, because there have been so few fee-and-dividend policies implemented in the real world, there’s been very little field testing of the public’s actual response to it.</p><p>That brings us to a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-021-01268-3">new paper in the journal </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-021-01268-3"><em>Nature Climate Change</em></a> by political scientists Matto Mildenberger (UC-Santa Barbara), Erick Lachapelle (University of Montreal), Kathryn Harrison (University of British Columbia), and Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen (University of Bern). They do something novel: look at public opinion in the places where carbon fee-and-dividend policies have been implemented. </p><p>It turns out there are only two. </p><p>Switzerland established a rebate program in 2008. The carbon tax reached 96 Swiss francs (about $105) per tonne in 2018; about two-thirds of the revenue is rebated on a per-capita basis, with everyone (including children) receiving an equal share. </p><p>Canada established a rebate program in 2019 as part of its national carbon-pricing strategy. So far, the scheme covers four of 10 provinces, with more than half of the national population. The price was initially set at 20 Canadian dollars (about $16 U.S.) a tonne, rising to CA$50 by 2022; recently the government released a new schedule that would target CA$170 by 2030. </p><p>The refund, or Climate Action Incentive Payment, is based on the number of adults and children in the household, with a 10 percent boost for rural households. It is highly progressive; 80 percent of households get more back than they pay.</p><p>The <em>Nature Climate Change</em> paper looks at public opinion in both countries. In Canada, it draws on a longitudinal study, which surveyed the same residents — “from five provinces, two subject to the federal carbon tax (Saskatchewan and Ontario), one with provincial emissions trading (Quebec), and two with provincial carbon taxes (British Columbia and Alberta)” — five times from February 2019 through May 2020, during which time the scheme was proposed, debated, passed, and implemented. </p><p>In Switzerland, the paper draws on a survey of 1,050 Swiss residents in December 2019.</p><p>So what do these surveys tell us? It’s not great.</p><p>Refunds don’t change opinions much; many recipients don’t know they exist </p><p>In Canada, throughout the period in which the refund was hotly debated, passed, and implemented, public approval … didn’t change much. </p><p>What’s more, opinions on the policy were divided primarily not by who got a refund and who didn’t, or who got a bigger refund. They were divided by (say it with me) partisanship:</p><p>By wave 5 [of the survey], 75% and 81% of Liberal supporters in Ontario and Saskatchewan respectively supported carbon pricing, compared to 32% and 13% of Conservatives in these same provinces.</p><p>Perhaps more importantly, Canadians remain confused and in many cases ignorant about carbon refunds. When asked whether they got one at all, “many Canadians did not know, including 17% in rebate provinces and between 33% and 36% in non-rebate provinces.”</p><p>When asked how big their carbon refund was, many in non-rebate provinces reported positive amounts, while those who did receive one underestimated it by as much as 40 percent on average. “Only 24% of Ontario respondents and 19% of Saskatchewan respondents estimated a rebate amount falling within the correct $100 dollar range of their true rebate.” (Perhaps unsurprisingly, Conservatives underestimated their rebate more than Liberals.) </p><p>You might think, well, Canada’s program is new. What about Switzerland, where they’ve been receiving rebates for over a decade?</p><p>It’s … even worse. Only 12 percent of Swiss respondents know that part of the carbon revenue is refunded; 85 percent did not know they’d gotten a refund at all. D’oh! </p><p>Additional information about refunds often doesn’t help</p><p>You might think, well, the problem is <em>how</em> these countries administer their refunds. In Canada, it’s a line on your tax return. In Switzerland, it’s a discount on your health insurance premiums. Both are clearly marked, but lots of people don’t exactly scrutinize those documents and keep track of every line item. Surely support would rise if people are <em>made aware</em> of the refund they are receiving, yes?</p><p>Er, no. </p><p>In both countries, a portion of survey respondents were given individualized rebate information — that is to say, they were shown, on the documents in question, exactly how much they had received in annual carbon refunds. </p><p>In Canada, this treatment did not raise support for carbon pricing at all. In fact, respondents who were shown what they received were <em>less</em> likely to believe that they had been made whole (this trend was also more pronounced among Conservatives). </p><p>“Canadians who learned the true value of their rebates,” the paper reports, “were significantly more likely to perceive themselves as net losers, even though most Canadians are net beneficiaries.” D’oh!</p><p>Maybe Switzerland? There, information about rebates mildly increased support for the current policy (“around one fifth of a standard deviation”) but it did not increase support for an increase in the tax at all. And in fact, in a June 2021 referendum, <a target="_blank" href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/swiss-vote-hike-taxes-fight-climate-change-78249142">the Swiss voted against an increase in the tax</a> and the rebates. </p><p>In short, the available evidence suggests that carbon refunds don’t do much to reshape public opinion on carbon taxes, even among voters with accurate information about the refund they receive. </p><p>Caveats</p><p>Perhaps support for these policies will increase over time. Perhaps it would increase if voters didn’t receive just one-time information about refunds, but consistent, repeated information. Perhaps it would increase if the rebates were sent via check rather than buried in bureaucratic documents. (We’ll find out about this — Canada is switching to a checks-by-mail system this summer and researchers are planning more surveys.) Perhaps support would grow if the rebates substantially increased in size.</p><p>We can’t know what would happen in these counterfactuals; anything is possible. We can’t know whether some sort of carbon refund scheme might catch on and grow popular at some point. But the current evidence is fairly discouraging for the thesis that rebates will <em>ipso facto</em> increase support for carbon pricing. </p><p>The lessons of this research</p><p>There was a popular theory among pundits (myself included) when the Democrats took control of the federal government in 2020: the one thing you can’t propagandize voters on is their own lives. If Democrats could improve voters’ social and economic circumstances in tangible ways, it would cut through the disinformation haze and increase public support.</p><p>In retrospect, I think that was naive. You <em>can</em> propagandize voters about their own lives. Or, to put it more academically, all of our experiences, even our experiences of our own life circumstances, are mediated. We interpret them through schema and worldviews shaped by our tribes and the stories they tell. These days, we get that stuff through electronic media, with which the world is saturated.</p><p>Most people are not aware of exactly how much they pay in gas or carbon taxes a year. Most people do not closely scrutinize their tax returns or health insurance forms. And above all, most people are unaware that they already receive a variety of government benefits, which are often buried in the tax code or otherwise hidden from view. (The best book on this is Suzanne Mettler’s <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/35fOn3n"><em>The Submerged State: How Invisible Government Policies Undermine American Democracy</em></a>.)</p><p>Outside of a focus group, out in the real world, people’s assessments of a carbon refund are less likely to be informed by careful economic cost-benefit analysis than they are to be mediated by identity affiliation. And these days, identity has been subsumed by partisanship. </p><p>“[I]n the two federal-tax provinces, supporters of the Liberal Party of Canada were 3 to 8 times more likely to support the carbon tax than Conservative Party supporters,” the paper reports. “Similarly, in Switzerland, left-leaning voters were 48% more likely to support rebates relative to right-leaning voters.”</p><p>People’s assessments of a policy tend to echo their tribe’s assessment, which they absorb through media and peers, not through an accounting spreadsheet. The amounts of money generally being discussed in carbon refund policies are not large enough to be life-changing for voters. The signal is not big enough to break through the noise of partisanship. </p><p>Mildenberger summed it up for me over email:</p><p>The entire [carbon refund] logic requires that large parts of the public understand that they make more money from their cheque than they are paying in taxes. But this is not what we see in Canada. And it's no surprise. As long as one group of actors spends its time sensationalizing and dramatizing the costs of carbon taxes, then many people will think they are not being made whole. Why should we expect — in an American society where even basic facts are politicized and vast portions of the public accept outright misinformation — that carbon taxes will be immune to this? <strong>What matters is not the actual material reality of people's circumstances, but their perceptions of those circumstances.</strong><em> </em>(my emphasis)</p><p>That last line squarely identifies something that Democrats have long been loath to accept. In a sense, carbon refunds are the latest expression of a long-time technocratic dream: that a policy can be so sensible, such a net benefit for so many people, that it will transcend politics. It will argue for itself and its logic will be irrefutable.</p><p>But if we’ve learned anything in these past few years (and I fear we haven’t), it’s that nothing transcends politics. Nothing is experienced directly by voters, not even money showing up in their bank account. Everything is mediated.</p><p>Politics in the US has been nationalized and fully subsumed by the culture war. No policy, no matter how cleverly designed, can get around that. In our present partisan and information environment, the measurable effect of a carbon refund on voter finances may carry less weight than advocates hope.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/do-dividends-make-carbon-taxes-more</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:47559047</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 24 Jan 2022 17:00:49 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/47559047/9bc2f480f39499d02c9b0e76e698ccd3.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>961</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/47559047/9e52711d1e9dfeb406835eb747bb8b97.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Minerals and the clean-energy transition: the basics]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Recently, there’s been a lot of talk in the energy world about the minerals needed by clean-energy technologies and whether mineral supply problems might pose a threat to the clean-energy transition. </p><p>To hold warming beneath 1.5°C over pre-industrial levels, the world must cut greenhouse gas emissions in half by 2030 and reach net zero by 2050. To do that, it must radically ramp up production of solar panels, wind turbines, batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), electrolyzers for hydrogen, and power lines.  </p><p>Those technologies are far more mineral-intensive than equivalent fossil fuel technologies. “A typical electric car requires six times the mineral inputs of a conventional car,” <a target="_blank" href="https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions">writes the International Energy Agency</a> (IEA), “and an onshore wind plant requires nine times more mineral resources than a gas-fired plant of the same capacity.” (The IEA report uses the word <em>minerals</em> to refer to the entire mineral and metal value chain from mining to processing operations, and I do the same here.)</p><p>Power transmission and distribution require aluminum and copper. Batteries and EVs require cobalt, lithium, and nickel. Wind turbines require rare earth elements. And so on.</p><p>In its encyclopedic <a target="_blank" href="https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions">2021 report on the subject</a>, IEA estimates that “a concerted effort to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement would mean a quadrupling of mineral requirements for clean energy technologies by 2040. An even faster transition, to hit net-zero <em>globally</em> by 2050, would require six times more mineral inputs in 2040 than today.”</p><p>Some individual minerals will see particularly sharp jumps. The <a target="_blank" href="https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/961711588875536384/Minerals-for-Climate-Action-The-Mineral-Intensity-of-the-Clean-Energy-Transition.pdf">World Bank says</a>, “graphite and lithium demand are so high that current production would need to ramp up by nearly 500 percent by 2050 under a [2 degree scenario] just to meet demand.”</p><p>A clean-energy transition sufficient to hit 1.5° will mean an enormous rise in demand for these minerals.</p><p>This fact has been seized on by a variety of people to raise questions about the speed and sustainability of the clean-energy transition. Are we just trading one resource curse for another?</p><p>So I looked into it. It’s a complicated subject — each of these minerals poses its own specific challenges, with its own specific suppliers, supply lines, customers, and possible pain points. There’s no neat single story here.</p><p>Nonetheless, I’ll try to summarize what I found, starting at the end, with what I think are the key big-picture lessons. In the next post, we’ll get into specific technologies and minerals.</p><p>The clean-energy transition will be an environmental boon</p><p>Yes, it is true that demand for minerals will rise and that several of those minerals are currently produced in environmentally and socially problematic ways. This is a real problem — or rather, a whole nest of problems, which warrant concern and concerted action.</p><p>That being said, it’s important to keep in mind that, even under the grimmest environmental prognostications, the transition to clean energy will be a boon for humans and ecosystems alike.</p><p>It will certainly involve lower greenhouse gas emissions. The World Bank says that, under a 2 degree scenario, through 2050, renewable energy and storage would contribute approximately 16 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) greenhouse gases, “compared with almost 160 GtCO2e from coal and approximately 96 GtCO2e from gas.”</p><p>If the concern is material intensity, energy researcher <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/more-of-me-talking-and-interviewing">Saul Griffith</a> has done some back-of-the-envelope calculations that put the transition in perspective. Here’s what he told me:</p><p>Assigning all 328 million Americans equal share of our fossil fuel use, every American burns 1.6 tons of coal, 1.5 tons of natural gas, and 3.1 tons of oil every year. That becomes around 17 tons of carbon dioxide, none of which is captured. It is all tossed like trash into the atmosphere. </p><p>The same US lifestyle could be achieved with around 110 pounds each of wind turbines, solar modules, and batteries per person per year, except that all of those are quite recyclable (and getting more recyclable all the time) so there is reason to believe it will amount to only 50-100 pounds per year of stuff that winds up as trash. </p><p>That is a huge difference: 34,000 pounds of waste for our lifestyles the old way versus 100 pounds the new, electrified way.  </p><p>These are only illustrative figures, but they show that the scale of resource extraction in a decarbonized world will be vastly, vastly smaller than what’s required to sustain a fossil-fueled society. Close to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/nishandegnarain/2020/09/25/loud-calls-for-global-shipping-to-ditch-fossil-fuels-and-meet-climate-goals/?sh=660f69622aaf">40 percent of all global shipping</a> is devoted to moving fossil fuels around, a gargantuan source of emissions (and strain on the ocean) that clean energy will almost wipe out. In a net-zero economy, there will be, on net, less digging, less transporting, less burning, less polluting.</p><p>The fact is, fossil fuels are a wildly destructive and inefficient way to power a society. Two thirds of the energy embedded in them ends up wasted.</p><p>That inefficiency has been rendered invisible by fossil fuels’ ubiquity and the lack of alternatives. Now that alternatives are coming into view, it’s clear that <em>any</em> shift away from mining, drilling, transporting, and combusting fossil fuels will dramatically ease human pressure on the biosphere and the atmosphere. </p><p>Again — I can not emphasize enough — this is no reason to ignore or gloss over the very real environmental impacts of mineral mining, processing, and transport. Though overall environmental pressure will ease in a clean-energy world, it will be concentrated in new places, among people who may not necessarily enjoy the benefits of the transition. </p><p>There are ugly and cruel ways to go about an energy transition, and there are sustainable and equitable ways to go about it. I’m strongly in favor of the latter and encourage everyone to do what they can to bring that about.</p><p>Nonetheless, either way, the broader cause is environmentally righteous.</p><p>These minerals are not rare and there’s no shortage of them</p><p>Another common misconception is that the clean-energy transition could fall short because there simply isn’t enough of certain minerals — this especially comes up around the somewhat misleadingly named rare earth elements (REEs). </p><p>It’s not true. Known reserves of all these minerals, including REEs, are much higher than demand, and “despite continued production growth over the past decades, economically viable reserves have been increasing for many energy transition minerals,” IEA writes. Reserves will rise further with new exploration and detection methods. </p><p>Currently, demand is forecast to grow much faster than supply. As that happens, there are bound to be chokepoints and price fluctuations. </p><p>But those stresses will be temporary, especially if policymakers anticipate and prepare for them. New caches of minerals will be found and recycling will increase in scope and effectiveness. There will be supply problems, but there is no Supply Problem, no global scarcity of any mineral that will put a hard limit on the transition. </p><p>Minerals do pose risks to the transition</p><p>Temporary minerals shortages or disruptions could result in “more expensive, delayed, or less efficient [energy] transitions,” IEA says. Here’s how it summarizes the risks to the transition posed by minerals supply:</p><p>(i) higher geographical concentration of production, </p><p>(ii) a mismatch between the pace of change in demand and the typical project development timeline, </p><p>(iii) the effects of declining resource quality, </p><p>(iv) growing scrutiny of environmental and social performance of production, and </p><p>(v) higher exposure to climate risk such as water stress, among others.</p><p>None of these risks is prohibitive, but if they are not managed, they could slow the transition. Let’s go through them one at a time.</p><p>Geographical concentration</p><p>Production of the minerals needed by clean energy technologies is currently more geographically concentrated than oil and gas production.</p><p>No single producer dominates in oil and gas markets the way the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) dominates cobalt, China dominates graphite and REEs, and Australia dominates lithium. </p><p>Similarly, processing of these minerals — refining and preparing them for industrial applications — is highly concentrated, but mostly in one place: China, which processes around 40 percent of copper and nickel, around 60 percent of lithium and cobalt, and around 85 percent of REEs.</p><p>The US, like most developed countries, has become highly import-dependent in minerals. According to a <a target="_blank" href="https://payneinstitute.mines.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/149/2021/03/The-material-foundations-of-a-low-carbon-economy.pdf">recent commentary</a> from scholars at the Colorado School of Mines’ Payne Institute for Public Policy, “of the 35 critical minerals identified by the US today, 14 had a 100% net import reliance in 2020, and 14 additional minerals have a net import reliance of greater than 50%.” </p><p>The risk of this concentration is not so much that any one country will try to pull some kind of Bond-villain crippling of the world economy, but simply that the fewer producers or processors involved, the more it matters when any one of them runs into regulatory changes, trade restrictions, or political instability. When there’s a robust ecosystem of producers, one country’s bumps can be absorbed. But when there’s only a handful, any bump ripples out as rapid fluctuations in price. </p><p>These markets are relatively small, but will grow quickly under decarbonization, so more and more countries will be vulnerable to price fluctuations. In the oil and gas world, there are energy-security measures in place, including strategic stockpiles of some fuels, but there’s not much of that in place for minerals, at least not yet. And markets for minerals are in many cases much more opaque than markets for oil and gas, lacking a shared set of metrics and transparent pricing. </p><p>At least through 2025, IEA does not expect the level of concentration to change much.</p><p>Aggressive investment in alternative supplies can decrease concentration eventually, but in the short term, solutions will involve drawing producers into more transparent market frameworks, pressuring them to improve social and environmental performance, and developing some buffer reserves of critical minerals.</p><p>Timing mismatch</p><p>Demand for minerals is already rising and will accelerate rapidly in coming years. Unfortunately, exploration, discovery, and exploitation of new mineral resources are marked by substantial lead times, in some cases over 15 years.</p><p>“These long lead times raise questions about the ability of supply to ramp up output if demand were to pick up rapidly,” IEA writes. “If companies wait for deficits to emerge before committing to new projects, this could lead to a prolonged period of market tightness and price volatility.”</p><p>To keep up with demand, investors need to think ahead. And lead times need to decline, which will involve substantial investment and governance help from wealthy consumer nations to poorer producing nations. </p><p>Declining resource quality</p><p>In recent years, two trends have driven down the average resource quality of many minerals: first, the known high-quality deposits have been mined, and two, technological advances have allowed the mining of ever-lower-quality resources. </p><p>“For example,” IEA writes, “the average copper ore grade in Chile has decreased by 30% over the last 15 years.”</p><p>As resource quality declines, the emissions intensity of mining rises, as does the amount of waste. Concerted action and investment will be needed to counteract this trend.</p><p>ESG scrutiny</p><p>A growing chorus of consumers and investors is calling on the mining sector to take action on its labor and environmental standards and rising carbon intensity. They want companies to disclose concrete plans on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues. </p><p>This is a big deal in the sector, as the majority of production of many key minerals now takes place in countries with low governance scores and/or high emissions intensity. </p><p>This is something clean energy advocates have been loath to talk about, but given the coming boom in minerals, silence is no longer an option. The Payne commentary says, “reports have found as many as 255,000 artisanal cobalt miners in the [Democratic Republic of Congo], 35,000 of whom are children working in exceedingly harsh and hazardous conditions to produce the materials many people use in their $100,000 electric vehicles (EVs) and other ‘clean’ technologies.” </p><p>Lithium, cadmium, and REEs are all produced in ways that damage soil and water and release hazardous chemicals that threaten miners and surrounding communities. ESG pressure from governments and the private sector could have a salutary effect on social and environmental performance, but it could also place upward pressure on prices and additional burdens on small-scale artisanal miners, which could pose political problems in some countries.</p><p>Exposure to climate extremes</p><p>Production of clean-energy minerals is increasingly exposed to climate extremes. </p><p>Lithium and copper are perhaps the two most important minerals in an electrified world. Over half the world’s lithium production takes place in areas under high water stress. In Chile, 80 percent of copper output comes from arid or water-stressed regions. </p><p>Other producing regions like Africa, Australia, and China have seen increased extreme heat and flooding. Expanding demand could push production into even more vulnerable areas. </p><p>Anyway, those are the risks. In a later post, I’ll get into strategies and policies that can help address those risks. </p><p>Minerals are the new geopolitics: like oil & gas, but not</p><p>Right now, clean energy is a fairly small source of demand for the minerals discussed above, but its share is projected to grow rapidly under a Paris-compliant scenario, to well over half of global demand for lithium, cobalt, and nickel by 2040.</p><p>Just as clean energy will be more important to minerals markets in coming years, so too will minerals be more important to clean energy. The rapid deployment of technologies crucial to decarbonization is going to depend on supply chains that are in many cases dominated by one or a handful of countries, fed by mines with low labor and environmental standards, exposed to rising climate extremes, and vulnerable to political and economic disruptions. All of those risks could slow the transition.</p><p>The race for minerals courts some of the same dangers that came with oil and gas. Minerals will become crucial to the global energy system and their distribution — both production and consumption — will shape geopolitics. Unplanned supply disruptions could have global consequences, just as with oil and gas. </p><p>But it’s also important to remember that minerals are different from oil and gas in crucial respects. The most important is that fossil fuel technologies require continuous fuel input. If there’s a disruption in oil markets, it is experienced by every driver as an ongoing increase in gas and diesel prices. </p><p>Minerals are only essential to building of clean energy technologies, not to operating them. They are a materials input, not a fuel input. Supply disruptions or price fluctuations will affect markets for the technologies, but they will not affect existing users of those technologies. Solar energy from existing panels will not get more expensive just because copper does. This insulates minerals somewhat from the volatile consumer politics of fossil fuels.</p><p>Secondly, every country in the world has an established relationship to oil and gas — it’s a producer or it’s not — but minerals and mineral markets are much more varied and dispersed. Countries could consciously decide to become producers by exploiting new reserves; they could invest in processing or manufacturing; supply chains will shift and morph. “Individual countries may have very different positions in the value chain for each of the minerals,” IEA writes. This makes the geopolitics of minerals more <em>complicated</em> than fossil fuel geopolitics.</p><p>As we’ll see in the next post, the exact course of minerals markets is difficult to predict in advance, because there is rapid development and innovation going on in clean energy. Exactly what minerals will constitute the final balance in a clean-energy world is unknowable at this stage. </p><p>But there are predictable stresses ahead and policymakers should strive above all not to do what they’ve so often done with oil and gas — namely, stumble blindly into crises that end up having terrible economic and political consequences. The speed and success of the clean-energy transition depend on a thoughtful and cooperative approach to minerals supply.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/minerals-and-the-clean-energy-transition</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:45392343</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 21 Jan 2022 17:00:44 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/45392343/e07aebbcf01d17d7cedf6695eba86ad7.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1178</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/45392343/b973ac1f597f3818002e656c03710b0a.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: me and Adam McKay in an exciting podcast crossover event]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Hey Volties! As you know, last week I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-dont-look-up-director">interviewed </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-dont-look-up-director"><em>Don’t Look Up</em></a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-dont-look-up-director"> director Adam McKay</a> for the podcast. </p><p>Then the talented folks at Canary Media’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/podcasts/the-carbon-copy">Carbon Copy podcast</a> (which you should subscribe to) interviewed me — about the movie, climate change in art, and McKay — and interweaved bits of that interview with bits of my interview with McKay.</p><p>The result is the first-ever Volts/Carbon Copy crossover episode! They did an amazing job. Even if you’ve already listened to my interview with McKay, I think you’ll get something out of it. If you didn’t have time to listen to that 90-minute conversation and would prefer the 30-minute highlight reel … here it is!</p><p>Let me know what you think and if you’d like to see more crossover episodes in the future. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-me-and-adam-mckay-in</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:47439820</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 20 Jan 2022 18:35:45 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/47439820/531d208e3952fcee56c456c0faba8c93.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1990</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/47439820/331eb21adb39730d4599ba583bc0bb64.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Jason Bordoff & Meghan O’Sullivan on the geopolitics of clean energy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, international scholars Jason Bordoff and Meghan O’Sullivan discuss the geopolitical tensions that could be caused or exacerbated by the clean-energy transition, including supply constrictions in oil and gas and the geographical concentration of key clean-energy minerals. This episode is a great antidote to the notion that clean energy is going to make for smooth sailing in geopolitics.</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Jason Bordoff and Meghan O’Sullivan, January 19, 2022</p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/vdn8mkb3r2dl89e/volts22.01.19%28bordoff.osullivan%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF version</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>When one contemplates the thorny geopolitics of oil and gas — with its century-long string of crises, conflicts, and moral compromises — it’s easy to think that the transition away from fossil fuels to clean energy will usher in a saner and more peaceful world. </p><p>And that may happen, in the long term, once the transition is complete. But the road from here to there, over the course of the next few decades, is likely to be bumpy. Policymakers need to start planning for the predictable disruptions headed our way.</p><p>That is the message of a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-11-30/geopolitics-energy-green-upheaval">recent essay in </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-11-30/geopolitics-energy-green-upheaval"><em>Foreign Affairs</em></a> by Jason Bordoff, director of the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, and Meghan O’Sullivan, longtime foreign policy operative and professor of international affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. </p><p>Bordoff and O’Sullivan outline a number of risks the world faces in the short- to mid-term as it endeavors to ramp up clean energy and ramp down fossil fuels. </p><p>Investment in fossil fuels could decline faster than demand, which would perversely strengthen the position of Gulf states sitting on the cheapest oil. Production of the minerals needed to build clean-energy technologies is highly concentrated, often in countries with unstable politics and poor or no labor standards, like the Democratic Republic of Congo. </p><p>Processing of almost all clean-energy minerals is heavily concentrated in China, giving it enormous leverage and exposing world markets to economic or political upheavals there. Trade sanctions or tariffs could slow the spread of innovations. The US’s inability to get its act together could sour relations with the EU, which is moving ahead with ambitious, coordinated policy. </p><p>And so on. Clean energy will eventually diminish the sway of fossil fuel geopolitics, but the transition will create its own geopolitics, its own tensions, disputes, and chokepoints. I’m eager to talk to Bordoff and O’Sullivan about some of those risks and what might be done to prepare for them. </p><p>Jason Bordoff and Meghan O'Sullivan, welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff:  </strong></p><p>Great to be with you. Thanks for inviting us.</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>Thank you, Dave.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I want to begin by quoting your great piece in <em>Foreign Affairs</em>. You say: “Talk of a smooth transition to clean energy is fanciful. There is no way that the world can avoid major upheavals as it remakes the entire energy system, which is the lifeblood of the global economy, and underpins the geopolitical order.” </p><p>In a sense, the whole piece is addressed at a naive view of what the clean energy transition is going to involve. A lot of people think there's all this messy, nasty geopolitics around oil and gas, and if we just subtract that, then you have a world that's running smoothly and at peace. Can you, at a high level, describe why people have that naive view and why you think it's wrong?</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff: </strong> </p><p>You describe the motivation for the piece very accurately. I recall sitting a few years ago at a round table at the Munich Security Conference, talking about Nord Stream 2, a pipeline very much in the news these days as the US and Russia try to see if we can prevent conflict in Europe. There was a comment that I remember: “Why are we spending so much time on this? It won't matter soon anyway, because the geopolitics of oil and gas is simply going to fade.”</p><p>That struck me — and Meghan as well, because we've talked a huge amount about it — as simplistic. The geopolitics of energy since at least the Arab oil embargo in the early 1970s, probably much longer, has largely been about oil and gas, whether it's the concerns about OPEC’s control over oil markets, or Russia's gas supply into Europe, or anything else. So it's a hopeful vision to say, when we decarbonize and move away from oil and gas, those geopolitical risks will become a thing of the past. </p><p>We were making two points in the piece. One is that, that end state of beyond oil and gas is pretty far away. There's a multi-decade period when you have the new geopolitics of clean energy layered on top of the old geopolitics of oil and gas — and even a net-zero world is not zero oil and gas, necessarily. </p><p>But also, there will be new risks created by the emergence of clean energy, from critical minerals, to trade conflicts, to new zero-carbon fuels like hydrogen and ammonia that might move around by ship — a range of new issues that we want to make sure people are thinking about, because our concern is that those geopolitical and national security risks, if we're not addressing them, might actually undermine our ability to move as quickly as we need to to decarbonize.</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>Intellectually, in the foreign policy and climate communities, when we first started talking about geopolitics, there was this focus on “what does success look like” — imagining a world, say it's 2050, where the global economy is fully decarbonized. I was part of that effort, along with some of Jason's colleagues from Columbia, and focused on painting that picture. Jason and I both agree that it's feasible, when the world is fully decarbonized, that maybe the geopolitics of energy will be more copacetic. </p><p>But what the piece does, and the focus of Jason’s and my work these days, is to say, that almost feels theoretical. What matters for the short and medium term — not discounting the long term — is what is going to happen in between. Here we're going to have, not the geopolitics of oil and gas gradually and incrementally giving way to the geopolitics of new energies, we're going to have them, as Jason said, layered on top of each other. </p><p>November/December was a great example of this, where you have the COP, and all the enthusiasm and energy around faster decarbonization and how important it is for the world, at the same time where you had an energy crisis unfolding in Europe, where Russia was playing the same old cards in the old geopolitics of natural gas. This is going to be the screenplay of the next couple of decades, where both of these things happen simultaneously.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>One of the risks you bring up is that, due to social pressure in the developed world and changing social mores, there's a lot of pressure to shut down [fossil fuel] production in some countries. There's a risk that production could decline before demand declines, which will have the effect of empowering those countries that are still producing. Say a little bit about what that might look like in the short term.</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff:</strong>  </p><p>We're seeing it right now. There is a lot of concern that in the next several years we're going to go through a supercycle of commodity prices — in part because of underinvestment, not entirely because of the energy transition and social pressures, but that's certainly part of it. Also, the pandemic and how quickly you can ramp up investment and supply chains and all the rest. </p><p>We had the IEA tell us very clearly in their landmark <a target="_blank" href="https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050">Net Zero report</a> that if we were on a pathway for net zero by 2050 — which sadly, we're not, but if we were — we would not need investment in new oil and gas supply. Those broad messages, along with social pressures and divestment pressures and everything else, have some impact, along with the uncertainty over, what is the outlook for oil demand? When is it going to peak and start to decline? That pulls back capital, or maybe raises the cost of capital. </p><p>But oil demand is still going up each and every year. Natural gas demand is still going up each and every year. If you look at the data, the last two years we have been investing as much in oil and gas as we should be if we were on track for net zero by 2050. The problem is, if we were on track for net zero by 2050, we should be investing more than three times as much in clean energy as we are. So we are not investing enough in energy to meet demand. </p><p>Ideally, we would do that not by dramatically ramping up oil and gas spending, but by dramatically ramping up clean energy spending. But it's hard to scale it that quickly, especially if the policy support is not there. So there is a risk that underinvestment could lead to energy crunches and price spikes. </p><p>Again, you see the political response in Europe where there's an energy crisis this winter, in high gasoline prices in the US and the need for the administration to feel it has to release the SPR in response to oil prices that weren't even that high, $80 a barrel. That kind of public concern about higher energy prices risks undermining support for stronger climate policy, I fear.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Not just passively undermining. We're seeing this today: every time there's one of these fluctuations or disruptions or price spikes, there are a lot of people out there who want to blame it on the clean energy transition.</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>I’ll add something to Jason's response about the real problem of underinvestment and how this could create some of these imbalances. Your question was about empowering old producers. The underinvestment story is the big story there, but there's also a wrinkle that doesn't get as much attention.</p><p>When we look at the scenarios, including the IEA’s net-zero 2050 scenario, they all acknowledge that there will still be some role for oil and gas, even in a fully decarbonized global economy — those carbon emissions should be taken care of by carbon removal or some other technologies that still need to be developed. But that's generally part of the picture. </p><p>So the reality is that there are going to still be some oil producers — a smaller number, collectively producing a smaller amount of oil — in the future. Who are those producers going to be? It's likely going to be those producers that have the lowest-cost production; the oil that has the lowest carbon footprint. Those tend to be the big producers in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, maybe even Iraq. </p><p>So even in a fully decarbonized world, those countries are still probably going to have some geopolitical influence, because they're going to be producing a larger share of a much smaller pie.</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff: </strong> </p><p>You made an important point, Dave: you're right that often people do point to dislocations and energy crises and attribute everything to the clean energy transition, and that's not right. The Texas energy crisis was blamed on wind, and we know with post hoc analysis it was mostly about failed natural gas production and infrastructure. Some of that's true in Europe as well. </p><p>But I do think there's a broader harbinger of risks that may be to come. A point we make in the piece is that it's hard to imagine why we think it should be smooth to take the global energy system, which is something at massive scale, and turn it on its head almost overnight. Vaclav Smil's work and everything else tells us a quarter century to get to a net-zero economy is <em>really</em> fast by standards and energy history. </p><p>We're going to make missteps. We're going to get policy shifts — we go from Obama, to Trump, to Biden. We're going to get certain technologies wrong. There's not a master planner, so we have individual decisions by individual utilities, individual investors; we build parts of the grid, and then maybe we retire parts before the system's ready to handle it. </p><p>We have to think about how to build more tools in to smooth volatility, because we're going to get some things wrong in this transition. To the extent we get them wrong and that leads to price spikes or geopolitical risks, again, that's going to undermine our climate ambition.</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>To underscore the point that Jason just made, one of our concerns is that the geopolitical impacts are not sufficiently understood and that there is risk that these geopolitical impacts end up being the greatest risk to a successful transition. People thinking that high oil prices are because of the clean energy transition haven’t been very accurate thus far, but the perceptions often shape the policy. </p><p>We think about how trade became such an incredibly divisive political issue here in the United States. A lot of the job displacement was actually because of technology and automation — but that doesn't really matter. When we're looking at transition, that's going to be dominantly driven by policy. We want to try to make sure that doesn't happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Let's pause for a moment and talk about Russia. I can imagine the role the rest of the world plays in the clean energy transition and a happy ending for them at the end of that story. But with Russia, they're totally dependent on gas for their geopolitical power and influence. They're already actively involved in trying to undermine the Western democratic order. As this transition proceeds, it seems like it's going to get pretty existential for Russia. There's a lot of potential for bad things to come out of that: a new Cold War, or for Russia to redouble its efforts at undermining other countries. I can almost figure out how to handle any other country, but what do you do about Russia?</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan: </strong> </p><p>This is a good point, and it's particularly apropos today, when we have the US and Russia meeting about geopolitical tensions. If you ask anyone who is likely to be a loser in the energy transition, Russia is always at the top of that list, and there's good reasons for that. </p><p>As you mentioned, the dominance of oil and gas in Russia's economy has only grown since Putin became president. It's been pretty stark, and there is very little indication that the Russian leadership, Putin and the oligarchs around him, have any aptitude for doing the tough reforms that would be required to accommodate Russia to the new energy reality. The power structure now has a lot to do with oil and gas, and that's likely to continue. </p><p>But I'd say there are two important caveats. The first is, as we just discussed, that in the long run this looks pretty bad for Russia — there are a lot of things that we might want to plan for in terms of contingencies — but in the short-to-medium term, it's not necessarily looking so bad, because of the continued need for natural gas and because of Russia's ability to supply that gas at cheap prices. </p><p>The second is that Russia is not like some other countries that we might talk about. It does have areas where it could become quite important and influential in the energy transition and have it be lucrative and also have it be geopolitically influential. The two that come to mind are, first, hydrogen. Russia could become a hydrogen power; it would require a lot of strategy and investment. </p><p>The second is nuclear, where Russia already plays an outsized role in global development. Clearly, if the energy transition is going to be successful, there's going to have to be greater use of nuclear power around the world. Russia could find that to be economically useful, and also geopolitically useful. </p><p>To answer “what do we do” directly: the base case that I would plan for if I were still a policymaker would be to game out and prepare for Russia being a spoiler of the energy transition going forward. We saw that when we were looking at the shale gas unconventional boom in the US and the interest in Europe in recreating it there — Russia deployed a lot of tools to undermine the chances of countries in the EU developing their own shale gas. I imagine that, seeing this as existential, Russia would go to even greater lengths.</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff: </strong> </p><p>I agree with what Meghan said about nuclear power. I wrote a column in <em>Foreign Policy</em> just a few days ago about why nuclear may finally be having its moment. Part of that is we need all zero-carbon tools on deck, and even then, it's going to be incredibly hard to get where we need to get to. </p><p>But also a foreign policy consideration, which is that if the US doesn't exert more leadership in nuclear power, China and Russia are building the world's nuclear power plants, and that is a national security risk. Meghan’s point that Russia stands to be a loser and therefore will perhaps try to stand in the way of the transition is borne out by history and how it's participated in international climate negotiations and COPs in the past. </p><p>The only thing I'll add is oil. Russia gets more revenue from the sale of oil than it does from the sale of natural gas. We wrote in the piece about why the potential for underinvestment — if that underinvestment in supply gets ahead of demand, you could see more price volatility, more price spikes — could mean we may need OPEC more before we need it less, to manage the energy price spikes that are harmful economically and politically. </p><p>One of the interesting developments in the last several years has been Russia's stepping into a leadership role, where Saudi Arabia and Russia are now positioned as the head of the so-called OPEC Plus alliance — OPEC and a bunch of new member countries. That means if we want OPEC to help at certain points put more oil in the market, which is what the Biden administration has called for in the last year when energy prices went high, you're not only calling Riyadh; what happens in Moscow matters too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>This is almost the scariest possible answer: that Russia will be empowered in the short-term and mid-term and fearful of the long-term. That's a recipe for trouble. </p><p>That's a good segue to the next broad topic. One of the things you write about is that the transition to clean energy is going to create new energy powers on several metrics. The first one you mention is one that people maybe don't think about very often, which is the power to set standards for the clean energy economy. Say a little bit about what this means and why standard-setting is a form of power.</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan: </strong> </p><p>This is an area where the Chinese have been very forward-looking and active. The United States only recently came to appreciate the power that comes in setting the standards, which is somewhat ironic, because the US has set so many of the standards globally. Maybe it just took it for granted that it could stay in that position. </p><p>Setting the standards in the clean energy revolution has to do with compatibility, safety, materials — there are all kinds of examples we could use. But if we think about electricity and transmission grids and connectivity: around the world, there are many places like the United States that are going to have to revamp their energy architecture, but there are many countries that are going to be building energy infrastructure for the first time. In doing so, depending on what country or what body is governing that infrastructure buildout, and who is most influential in the setting of those standards, you could see how one country may get a competitive leg up. </p><p>This could be a commercial advantage, but it could end up having political advantages as well, if it puts a country — say China, being potentially the most obvious — in a position of denying that country certain inputs that it needs for its energy infrastructure. It could go so far as cyber connectivity and allowing one country to harvest the data of another country. When we think about the clean-energy transition, we obviously are thinking about societies that are even more electrified than the societies we live in today.</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff:  </strong></p><p>We highlight one place where it's particularly important; it’s part of the reason we would be concerned about Russia and China building the world's nuclear power plants, setting the norms for nuclear nonproliferation, setting the operational and safety standards. So that matters a lot. </p><p>We know that in the clean-energy transition we're going to have a much more digitalized economy, a range of digital tools that help optimize the electric grid; we're going to need more demand-response tools. There could be commercial advantages if certain firms develop the standards and others have to play catch-up. There's also, of course, a host of cybersecurity implications as we see a much more interconnected grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>The second form of power in the clean-energy economy is minerals and materials supply chains. Right now, countries who happen to be sitting on a lot of oil and natural gas get a lot of geopolitical power out of that. But when we transition to clean energy, we're going to need a few key minerals and materials: lithium, cobalt, copper, etc. </p><p>Currently, supply chains for those minerals are highly concentrated; I think 80 percent of cobalt comes out of the Congo. China dominates the supply chain for lots of minerals, but also dominates the early processing of minerals; 80-plus percent of processing of all those minerals takes place in China. </p><p>What's the danger? What do we worry those countries could do with that power?</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff:  </strong></p><p>It's not just clean energy, of course; those critical minerals are essential in lots of technology and electronics applications. We've seen this with semiconductors before. China's embargo on the export of critical minerals to Japan in 2010 tells us what could happen. </p><p>Global trading of critical minerals is going to skyrocket. In IEA’s scenario of what net-zero 2050 looks like, global trade in critical minerals goes from about 10 percent of all energy-related trade to about 50 percent. We're going to need a lot more of all those minerals you just talked about, and they're much more concentrated, so that's important to keep in mind. </p><p>As much as we worry about the role of Saudi Arabia or Russia in the oil market, the top three oil producers — the US, Saudi Arabia, and Russia — each produce about 10 percent of the world's supply. When it comes to lithium and cobalt and rare earths, the top producer in each of those produces more than 50 percent of the world's supply. And as you said, the refining and processing is even more concentrated, namely in China. </p><p>So in that sense, you worry about what that kind of dominance of a necessary input to clean-energy technologies could do if there was a conflict. We’re worried about what China might do in Taiwan in the years to come — if there was a conflict of that sort, if they were to cut off that supply, what implications it would have for the global supply chain. It's a real worry. We acknowledge it. </p><p>It is different from oil, however, in a few important respects. One is that these critical minerals are not the daily flow of fuel without which the heat in your house turns off and you freeze in the cold, or your car doesn't work; it's an input to a finished good. So if we didn't have a supply of lithium, it would cause the market for new electric car sales to slow, it would be bottlenecks in the supply chain and everything else; it wouldn't affect your ability to get around today. It's not the electricity your EV needs, it's something that building the next EV needs. So you don't derive the same geopolitical influence from that. </p><p>Also, whereas oil is to be found in certain places, geologically, there are a lot of these critical minerals around the world. It does take time, it's not easy. It's a 10- or 15-year process to develop new mines. But over time, you can diversify the supply chains, build refining capacity elsewhere, the technology to do recycling is getting much better. </p><p>My engineering school colleagues at Columbia and elsewhere are pretty optimistic that the technology is going to improve where you can use much more plentiful minerals to develop batteries. So maybe our dependence on these things will decline over time as well. But if we get on track for net zero or anything close to it, the amount of clean energy that we have to deploy is so massive that we're going to need a lot more of these minerals and materials to come.</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>What we've written about, and the answer that Jason just provided, should bring down people's blood pressure about this in the medium- to long-run. I would underscore in the short- to medium-term, China does have a pretty significant advantage in terms of its dominance of supply chains of these minerals. I do think that is something that is rightly getting the attention of policymakers; it’s going to be a tougher challenge before it becomes an easier challenge. </p><p>The one thing I sometimes hear that we can probably discount a bit is this idea that there's going to be an OPEC, a cartel of these countries that have these kinds of resources. There may be market conditions which could allow for that, but a cartel is also underpinned by common political objectives. So if you think about lithium, what do Bolivia and Australia have in common in terms of, what are they going to bound together on and hold the global economy hostage? It's hard to imagine exactly. </p><p>Secondly, it's interesting to think about countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which produces more than 70 percent of the cobalt in the world today. I don’t imagine the Congo is going to challenge the United States directly, but it probably will be able to use that reality to shine a light on some of its needs and problems, to up its priority in terms of where resources from the rest of the world go when they go to Africa, the attention given to the conflict there. Those things are likely to happen. </p><p>So they are going to influence foreign policy, but maybe not in the hostage-taking kind of way that our instinctive reflection back to 1973 makes us think about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>When you think about the history of oil and gas, the history of colonialism is highly related. We've seen poorer countries who discover oil or gas basically become resource colonies for the West — they get terrible governance and poverty and we get the resources. If you look at something like Democratic Republic of Congo with 70 percent of the cobalt … seems like a pretty good prediction that we're just going to create a new set of resource colonies. Are there ways in advance to head that off?</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>That is a legitimate concern. I don't have the numbers on the tip of my tongue, but I seem to recall that from what we can discern, the terms of the contracts of the Chinese investment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the cobalt there are really, really unfavorable to the people living in the DRC. So there's legitimate concern for that.</p><p>There's another thing that warrants even more concern and it's directly related, and that is this whole idea of the resource curse. Some of the resource-curse material has to do with foreign powers coming in and taking advantage of countries that are less well positioned to negotiate on behalf of themselves. But it turned out that, over time, the resource curse experience and literature focused a lot more on the huge influx of foreign currency that comes suddenly to a country, and their inability to be able to absorb it. Just because of the nature of foreign exchange into many of these economies, which don't have very developed industrial sectors, it creates all kinds of havoc in the economy. </p><p>A lot of it is exacerbated when the country has a large population working in agriculture, or there's a history of conflict, all of these things that many of these countries actually do have. This phenomenon is called the <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_disease">Dutch disease</a>. It's possible that a lot of these countries will be unable to handle that. </p><p>To answer your question about what we might be able to do about that, I would say in the last 20 or 30 years, there's a lot more awareness of the fact that it doesn't have to be a resource curse, that there are a whole series of policies that a government can adopt to mitigate these negative effects. The problem is that it comes back to governance, and a lot of these countries don't have sufficiently well-developed institutions, governments that are willing to create constraints on their own behavior. That's what is needed in order to ensure that these kinds of economic dislocations don't happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>The influx of a bunch of money also reduces domestic pressure to build a more diversified and stable economic base.</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff:  </strong></p><p>It's the risk a lot of petrostates face now, trying to think about what a world where they can rely less on petrodollars will look like. They're trying to diversify their economies and as we're seeing, that's hard to do — the resource curse issues, the human rights issues. </p><p>You can hopefully develop global standards. Maybe the best example of this is the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.kimberleyprocess.com">Kimberley Process</a> for diamonds. If you have standards and some oversight — that's hard to do — we can avoid some of those issues. </p><p>The other piece of critical minerals is not just the human rights and colonialism concerns, but also the environmental impacts. This is mining, and it does have environmental impacts, and we have to do it at such a larger scale. When you look at how much lithium we need, it is hard to do that level of extraction without environmental impacts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Another source of possible concentration of power is the manufacturing of the components of the clean energy economy. You say in the piece that this is a less-firm sort of power, since manufacturing can and often does spread out, and lots of countries are pursuing their own domestic manufacturing right now. </p><p>But it made me wonder whether we know any historical precedent about this. Is it going to be a natural process for the manufacturing of these clean energy components to spread out and become a diverse global market? Or do you think there will in the end be manufacturing superpowers that have some geopolitical power as a result of having a lock on manufacturing?</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:</strong>  </p><p>There are a couple of interesting and important aspects to this. If we thought of a world where it was just about competitive edge and what was going to advance the energy transition the most quickly, you probably would have countries that would emerge — I don't know if you would call them manufacturing superpowers, but I think the best example is solar panels and China's dominance of that market. </p><p>Now, if we didn't care about politics and we didn't even care about economics, we just cared about the energy transition, that wouldn't necessarily be such a problem. But there are going to be — we're already starting to see them — political efforts to try to ensure that countries are not reliant on one producer or one manufacturer of particularly critical inputs or elements of the clean energy technologies. </p><p>A pertinent example of that is India. Starting this year, India is putting high tariffs on anything solar that comes from China. The purpose of this is twofold. One, India is incredibly sensitive about its geopolitical relationship with China, particularly after the hot war that threatened to erupt on their border in the last year or so. Secondly, India also wants to build a manufacturing base. It wants the jobs that it perceives will go along with that. </p><p>So what we'll have is maybe more manufacturers, but it'll be less efficient and more expensive and will likely make the energy transition slower than it would otherwise be. Again, it's balancing these two things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>The one other source of power you mention, which I thought was intriguing, is that everyone anticipates a huge explosion in the market for zero-carbon fuels derived from hydrogen. You anticipate the emergence of “electrostates” that dominate the production of hydrogen fuels. </p><p>What everybody wants to see is a transition to green hydrogen, which is hydrogen derived from renewable energy. So you might look to states with copious renewable energy to get into that. But the easier and cheaper route into hydrogen is through so-called blue hydrogen, which is made from natural gas, with the emissions allegedly captured and buried. </p><p>I worry about countries with copious natural gas getting into the blue hydrogen game, making plentiful, cheap, blue hydrogen, and then having both economic and political incentive to delay the transition to green hydrogen. How do you see all that playing out?</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff:  </strong></p><p>I find this particular dynamic interesting, because you do have to bend your mind a little bit to think about the world, not today, but in the future. Hydrogen is a topic <em>du jour</em>; you couldn't walk five feet at the COP in Glasgow without tripping over a hydrogen display or a new hydrogen company. Because we know that we have to electrify a lot of things, but some things are going to be hard to electrify: steel and shipping, maybe some other things like heavy duty trucks, we'll see if batteries win there. </p><p>Again, I'll just refer to the IEA net-zero scenario, which finds global energy-related trade in hydrogen ammonia going from almost zero today to about a third. We need a lot more. We need fuel — molecules as opposed to electrons — but then we need those fuels to be zero-carbon. That's where you talk about hydrogen and ammonia, both blue and green. </p><p>A big part of what we were trying to do in this piece is deconstruct how an end state of net zero might look vs. the pathway to get there, and how it could be different and how it could be rocky. In zero-carbon fuels, it comes into play in at least two ways. </p><p>One is, you're talking about the emergence and development of a fairly nascent market. The analogy we gave — and it's not perfect, it bears some resemblance — is the early days of the liquefied natural gas market in the 1960s and 70s. When it was just getting off the ground, you had a few dominant producers, a few dominant buyers, and there was a lot more leverage than you have today in a much more integrated and flexible market. There’s a lot of suppliers, a lot of buyers; if someone threatens to cut off your supply, you go buy it somewhere else. </p><p>In the early days, Japan has said it's going to be a big buyer of green ammonia; well, what if Saudi Arabia or Chile or just one or two countries supply that? If your entire steel sector depends on shipments from that country, that's a lot of leverage, and we could see some geopolitical risk there. </p><p>The second is the one you raise, which is the focus on blue hydrogen today. Of course, if we're going to do that — natural gas combined with carbon capture — you have to make sure the oversight is strict, the capture rates are high, the methane leaks are low. You have some states, Qatar and others, that we could see focus on gas as a way to create hydrogen and then either move that fuel around as the fuel, like ammonia, or maybe just build the production facilities to turn the gas into hydrogen ammonia — in which case you still might have a lot of global trade in gas, you're just doing different things with it, you're turning it into a fuel as opposed to putting it in your power sector. </p><p>I do think over time green hydrogen is going to end up winning, just because the costs will come down dramatically. You're right that states may try to stand in the way. To make green hydrogen work, you need a lot of improvements in electrolyzer costs, improvements in efficiency, and then you need really, really cheap renewable energy, and you need a lot of it. You need a <em>lot</em> of electricity. There are only certain places in the world where you have that much cheap renewable electricity, and those could become some of the dominant states producing low-carbon fuels in the years to come.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Those could be not your usual suspects, right? Like Chile or countries in Africa. They have a lot of sunlight down there.</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>We would be looking at different countries emerging as potentially big actors on this side. Chile is certainly one of them. You need the things that Jason mentioned in terms of having a lot of cheap, renewable energy, but you also need water. Not every place on the earth has those two things in great abundance.</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff: </strong> </p><p>We talked about the resource curse. We do talk in the piece about tensions between developed and developing economies, which were on full display at the COP in Glasgow and I think will be next year at the one in Egypt. When you talk to African leaders, who are worried about the impacts of climate and about not getting the support from developed economies they need to transition — some would like to develop their own hydrocarbon resources and monetize them. So what are the sources of revenue that could come from zero carbon rather than oil and gas? You're identifying one, obviously: lots of good renewable energy resources to produce their own energy, which hopefully will grow as they become wealthier. But it's hard to export electricity as electrons; maybe you can export it as fuels. </p><p>The other thing that's interesting is, we just saw this <a target="_blank" href="https://climeworks.com/roadmap/orca">Climeworks project in Iceland</a>, the carbon-removal project. Why Iceland? They have cheap, zero-carbon energy in geothermal, and they have good geologic storage capability. A lot of African countries have that too. </p><p>I was wondering whether you could imagine a source of revenue for some of the developing economies in the world where they are basically building the manufacturing capacity to pull carbon dioxide out of the air. The largest emitters, who are responsible for this problem historically, are sending revenue to those countries — a wealth transfer from rich to poor countries, in part to remove carbon dioxide.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>When most people think about the future, they imagine increasing globalization of trade in these resources. But there's also a section of your piece about trends and forces working <em>against</em> further globalization in the clean-energy space. One of them is, as you just mentioned, electricity.</p><p>The energy game is going to turn to electricity, mostly; electrification is going to be the primary tool against climate change. Every country is going to be trying to electrify, and thereby using more electricity, and therefore electricity is going to be a bigger part of this energy picture. </p><p>As you note, electricity is not really a globally traded commodity. Very little electricity crosses country lines. I've been thinking about that a lot: as more and more of your energy processes are internal to your country, does that reduce the prominence of geopolitics? How do you see that playing out? There are some other trends working against globalization too, if you want to mention them.</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan: </strong> </p><p>We can imagine the 2050 world, the fully decarbonized world, being one where a lot of forces favor globalization, because of the need for robust trade in energy technologies and clean energy inputs. But in the interim, and to some extent looking even beyond that, there are several factors that are going to pull away from globalization. Electrification, as you mentioned, is one of the greatest ones. </p><p>We have two statistics in the piece that underscore the point you made. In 2018, less than 3 percent of global electricity was traded across borders. That's compared to two-thirds of oil supplies in 2014. So there's this huge discrepancy. The reasons are simply that it's hard to transport electricity; it's hard to store it and it's hard to ship it.</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff:  </strong></p><p>And it’s a much greater security risk, too. You can store oil in salt caverns, you can buy oil from a different supplier. If you depend on your neighboring country to send you electricity to keep the lights on, that country has a lot of power over you.</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>Right. But on the question about to what extent this is going to change things, I think there is going to be an element that's going to be more inward-looking. So if a country is providing more of its own energy sources from within its own borders, it won't have to be accounting for those shipments of oil and gas coming from afar. </p><p>However, it does create some other new concerns. Those have a lot to do with cyber security and the manipulation of electricity grids. Some of these electricity grids will be all contained within countries, but others will cross borders — not in a global sense, but in a sense that may foster more regionalization. </p><p>So if you think about the Northeast of the United States, we get a lot of our electricity from hydro sources in Canada. You can imagine small countries — think about some countries in Latin America — that if they're going to build electricity grids that are reliant on renewable energy, it probably makes sense for these grids to be large enough to serve more than one country. So suddenly, the politics of your neighbors and your relationship with your neighbors are going to be potentially even more important than they were in a world where you were getting your energy sources from halfway around the world. </p><p>There will be a lot of effects like that. The other factors that we mentioned have to do with the protectionism that we've started to see go hand-in-hand with some clean-energy technologies. I gave the Indian example, but there are others. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>It's worth noting: lots of protectionism in the Build Back Better Act, right? The Biden administration is actively pursuing that.</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>Exactly. </p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff: </strong> </p><p>One other striking statistic, to the original question you framed: we were talking about some of the ways global energy-related trade shifts in the IEA net-zero scenario away from oil and gas to critical minerals or hydrogen. But the other finding is that <em>total</em> energy-related trade in a net-zero world is only 38 percent, a little more than a third, of what it would be if the world were to stay at its current trajectory.</p><p>It's not surprising, but it is striking that you have much more localized energy. The geopolitics of energy will wane in the long term for some reasons. There'll be new risks created too, but part of that is just electricity is inherently more local and less globally traded across borders. That's just going to reduce the importance of energy as a factor in geopolitics.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Let's talk about China. So vexing. </p><p>On the surface, one of the conclusions of your piece is that some countries are well-positioned to benefit from the clean energy transition and others are not, and two of the countries that are positioned to be winners are the US and China. You might think the US and China then have enormous incentive, being the two biggest economies in the world and the two potential winners here, to cooperate on accelerating this transition. There's a pot of gold at the end of the rainbow for both of them. Yet an outbreak of cooperation is not what we seem to be witnessing. </p><p>China is such a black box to a lot of Americans, including me. What do you see as their posture on this? Why aren't they going faster? Why aren't they cooperating more? Why isn't it in their interest to go gangbusters after this?</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff:</strong></p><p>I do think that China takes climate change seriously; there are not a lot of climate deniers in the Chinese government. At the same time, when climate ambition or environmental concerns generally — it's not just climate, it's local air pollution throughout China, which in some major cities has been getting better, partly because of less coal, partly because they've shifted coal to other parts of the country where there are fewer people, which doesn't help the climate — but when that comes into tension with economic growth, economic growth usually wins. </p><p>So there is this dynamic playing out within China about how quickly they're going to move and what technologies they're going to use. Of course, they use half the world’s coal, so there's no solution without China to dealing with climate. It was encouraging to see their announcement about not financing coal plants overseas — hopefully that will prove to be true. </p><p>One of the reasons for the difficulty in US-China cooperation on climate — even though there are many reasons; this is the ultimate tragedy-of-the-commons problem, it doesn't matter where a ton of carbon dioxide comes from; if one country does this, it's not going to matter if we don't work together — is whether you can segment the issue of climate from the rest of the US-China relationship, which is incredibly contentious and at its lowest point in many decades. </p><p>That was the hope, and that was what John Kerry as climate envoy said the goal would be. It's unclear whether China wants to segment climate, whether it says, well, if we're going to act on climate, we have these other concerns with Taiwan, or human rights, or intellectual property, or anything else. </p><p>It was encouraging to see at the 11th hour an agreement at the COP in Glasgow that the US and China would commit to work together. But the last year would have been better if they'd actually been working together and had something to show for it. Hopefully that will change moving forward. </p><p>The other factor in this is, if some countries are not moving as quickly as one might hope — and by the way, the US may be in that category; we'll see what happens in Washington in the coming weeks and months — increasingly you are going to see certain countries or groups of countries like the European Union either encourage or try to compel other countries to do the same. </p><p>The starting point for that, of course, is the European Union saying it's going to put carbon border adjustments in place. But it's easy to imagine those extending beyond a tool to level the playing field on imports of carbon-intensive products to your country, and turning into coercive measures not that dissimilar from sanctions. If you roll the clock forward and say where could this go, those could be applied against China or, if we don't get our act together, maybe against the US one day.</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>On the point about the bilateral relationship, I do think that the Biden administration, with the appointment of John Kerry, came to this issue thinking: it's so important, we're going to be able to deal with it separately. And the Chinese have resisted that pretty firmly — you're not going to be able to be aggressive on issues like Taiwan, the South China Seas, the Uyghurs, and then expect a kumbaya relationship on climate. </p><p>That's been a disappointment to lots of us, in the sense we hoped that climate would be this island of cooperation in the otherwise contentious relationship, and also because many of us struggle to imagine how the world is going to successfully transition to a zero-carbon economy if there isn't cooperation between the US and China. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Do you interpret that posture of China’s as a rational way for them to balance climate against their other interests? Or do you think that the rational course for China would be to cooperate on climate where there's cooperation available and segment these other issues? In other words, are they angry and that anger is extending to climate? Or are they, do you think, being rational on a bigger scale? </p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>I think it’s twofold. First, China's looking at this relationship and thinking, “where do we have leverage in this relationship?” One of the areas is in climate. The US is really, really keen for China to decarbonize, and even moreso in a Biden administration, because we all know if China doesn't do it, it doesn't really matter who else does it. </p><p>So it would seem to def realist strategic thinking to say, “we're going to separate this area where we know we have a lot of leverage from all these other issues which we see as more existential.” They see Taiwan and other things as more existential to the survival of the Communist Party; climate is important, but not the same as Taiwan. So that is probably what has been going on.</p><p>I'm sure there are people within the Chinese government arguing that they need this cooperation as a strategic leveling point in the relationship. This has always been one of the reasons I've thought cooperation is important, even apart from what it means for the climate. If there's one area where two rivals can work together, it is helpful for all kinds of reasons for the rest of their relationship. </p><p>Now we're all faced with the reality that we need to envision a successful global transition and not assume that US-China cooperation is going to underpin it. That doesn't mean there can't be some areas of cooperation — the efforts that produced what was produced in Glasgow were are all worth it — but the reality is, this is going to be an area of intense competition, like many other areas of competition between the US and China. </p><p>Trying to figure out how we can compete our way to success rather than compete our way to stalemate is the challenge going forward. That competition is going to be in technology and talent, inputs and markets and standards, it's going to be across the board. Maybe it can be a force for a quicker transition. I certainly hope so.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>With a lot of these dynamics you're talking about, we're framing the long-term promise of a clean energy-based global energy economy vs. the short- to mid-term bumps and difficulties and frictions getting there. On that note, I have been thinking a lot about what it's going to look like if Trump and the Republicans take power again in 2024. </p><p>We know enough now to have a pretty good sense of what their global posture is going to be. Trump loves Russia, loves autocrats, loves fossil fuels, and has a view of the energy transition which basically says those of us who still have oil and gas should exploit the hell out of it. </p><p>It seems to me, in terms of solving the climate problem and the clean energy transition, Trump and Republicans taking power would result in the US basically being a rogue nation, an impediment on almost every front. I wonder if either of you have had the stomach to think about what that might look like and how to avoid the worst of it.</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff:  </strong></p><p>I'm sure we've all thought about what the consequences of that would be. The overall future of the republic and our democratic institutions is perhaps even more concerning to me than what it would mean for climate change. But you're right, it would certainly be a massive setback for the United States on the global stage and put us in the category of countries that would be the target of these sorts of coercive measures. Others would reap many of the economic benefits of leading in clean-energy technology, trying to do the right thing by climate change. </p><p>I don't want to sound Pollyanna-ish or naive, but I'm hopeful that increasingly you do see more on the Republican side of the aisle — and I wouldn't put Trump in this category, but others — who recognize this is a real problem, or recognize that climate change is real and are trying to talk about what the solutions might be, even if those solutions are certainly not at the scale of what they should be.</p><p>I guess I'll put it this way. Even in that scenario you talk about, the impacts of climate are going to continue to play out in years to come. I work with students every day on a campus, so does Meghan; I know how passionate they are about these issues, I know how much higher it is on their priority list in terms of what they care about when they go to the ballot box — even if elected leaders for periods of time don't demonstrate that. </p><p>We have this huge gap now between ambition and reality when it comes to climate change. The ambition is getting stronger, not weaker — 2 degrees, well below 2, 1.5, driven by the science — but the reality is not changing: emissions are going up each and every year, pandemic aside. </p><p>So that gap between ambition and reality has to reach a breaking point. One of the two has to give. Either we're going to wake up one day and say, “this was just too hard, we thought we could do it, but guess we'll just be fine with 3 degrees” or whatever it happens to be — I find that hard to believe, given what we are seeing every day and what we know we're going to see in the years to come, and that sense of urgency that particularly the younger generation has. </p><p>Then the reality has to change. The longer you wait to get started, the more disruptive it has to be. That's why we try to talk about some of the economic and geopolitical implications of that disruption — we have to manage them, or you're going to lose support for moving as quickly as we need to.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Is there a power out there that could realistically step in if the US basically gives up its leadership role entirely? Does the EU have the geopolitical clout to be the center of leadership on the transition in the way that you would hope the US would be?</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff:  </strong></p><p>The EU has been leading in many respects, and it's a pretty sizable amount of global emissions. So if it works collectively, it can do that. I think other countries, like perhaps China or others, might step in as well. </p><p>I do want to say that even in the scenario you describe — which is in many respects a worst-case scenario, from my standpoint at least, for US politics and climate ambition — even if that does not happen, we're still pretty far behind the ball. </p><p>If we pass Build Back Better in DC, which is uncertain right now, that will help a lot; it certainly doesn't get us all the way to being on a pathway to meet our NDCs. We saw just in the last couple of days, the <a target="_blank" href="https://rhg.com/research/preliminary-us-emissions-2021/">Rhodium Group analysis</a> and some others, emissions and how much they went up last year. So even if it’s not a Trump 2024 scenario, but a Republican more in a traditional model or a Democrat were to win, we're still not doing what we need to do. That has to be addressed too. That's going to catch up to us as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>This is extraordinarily difficult to answer, but: in the long term, if you are viewing the clean energy transition from a purely foreign policy realist perspective — that is to say, you don’t care at all about global welfare, the interests of the US are your top concern — do you think the US is going to benefit from the clean-energy transition? It's pretty well-positioned in a fossil fuel world: it's a giant producer, it's got a giant military, it's got long-term relationships in the Middle East. If you're just trying to talk to a foreign policy realist, do you think the US will be better or worse off in the world in a clean-energy future?</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>As you said, it's a very hard question to answer, because it depends how many things we're going to set aside. But my impulse is that the US is better in a clean-energy future. </p><p>I'm assuming, but you can tell me otherwise, that the counterfactual to your counterfactual would be a world where there is extreme climate change, and that in itself, as we already know, is going to produce all kinds of national security ramifications. <a target="_blank" href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/03/19/climate-change-could-force-over-140-million-to-migrate-within-countries-by-2050-world-bank-report">One estimate by the World Bank</a>, which is actually a couple of years old so I imagine the estimate has only gotten larger, is that in 2050, there'll be 143 million climate refugees. That is compared to the world today, where there's something like 25 million refugees. </p><p>So we're talking about this exponential increase in just that one area, which is obviously consequential, but that would have huge implications for the US, its security, its borders, its well-being, its global relationships, all of those things. So I definitely think  a world where America has been a leader in climate change is good in terms of peace and security if we're talking about imagining 2050 or beyond. </p><p>But I also think, domestically, that it can be good for the United States. There is a piece which we started with, which maybe some people find an inconvenient truth, but in a clean-energy future, there's still some role for oil and gas. So position it in a way that this isn't necessarily a fossil fuel world vs. a clean energy world, that it's a world against carbon emissions. When we frame it like that, there's a lot more scope for people to be contributors to a solution rather than detractors. So there are lots of good reasons why this is in the interest of the United States.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I can definitely see why it's in our absolute interest; solving climate change alone is enough. I guess my question was more about our position and power relative to the rest of the world.</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff:  </strong></p><p>Meghan made the most important point; it's hard to disconnect your question from a world that suffers the worst impacts of climate change. Would there be people who lose more than the US in the Global South? Yes, but it's going to be pretty painful for everyone, including the US. </p><p>To the extent there's been discussion of national security and climate, it has to date often been about the national security impacts of <em>not</em> doing something about climate change, suffering the impacts of climate change, and then the view is, “if we get our act together and have a successful clean energy transition, geopolitics of energy will be a thing of the past.” That's what we were trying to address: actually, it could be rockier than you think. But certainly the consequences of inaction would be much worse. </p><p>You're right, the US is one of the largest oil and gas producers in the world, it derives a lot of economic benefits from that in states like Texas and others. But it has good resources to lead in a clean-energy economy too. There's no reason the Gulf Coast can't be a leader in global supply of hydrogen and ammonia. We have some of the best capabilities for innovation and new technologies here in the US; there are going to be lots more companies at the scale of Tesla and much bigger. We talked about nuclear as another technology. I think the US is well-positioned in many.</p><p>Again, in our piece, we talked about the fact that part of dominance in clean energy is not going to come from the geologic trove you happen to have in the ground like oil and gas, but what you can manufacture cheaply, like a solar panel. There are countries that can manufacture things more cheaply than the US, but nonetheless, the US has a lot of assets, a lot of attributes, with good renewable energy resources, manufacturing resources, ports, geologic storage capability for carbon dioxide capture, that could position it to lead in a clean-energy economy too.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>It might also be nice for the US to resume a pro-social leadership role in the world; that might also redound to our benefit in terms of gratitude and better relationships. </p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff:  </strong></p><p>I wrote <a target="_blank" href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/15/biden-climate-energy-transition-green-new-deal-industrial-policy/">a piece on that in </a><a target="_blank" href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/15/biden-climate-energy-transition-green-new-deal-industrial-policy/"><em>Foreign Policy</em></a> a year or so ago, about the case for green industrial policy. Part of that was some of the economic benefits you could derive at home by leading early in these technologies, like bringing down the cost of green steel, things that have a high green premium today. </p><p>But it is also a form of climate leadership, because it's just not reasonable to expect some of the poorer parts of the world that are growing their emissions at the fastest rate, like Southeast Asia, eventually Latin America, Africa, to pay three times as much for the concrete and steel they need to build cities. If we can build those industries here and we can help drive the cost down because we're investing early, then that also makes that technology more affordable to others. </p><p>I do want to say, though, that again, we shouldn't be Pollyanna-ish about this. We should recognize that there are losers to the transition: not just nation-states, but workers and states and certain industries. We do need a just transition. That phrase means a lot of things, but included in that is, we do need to think about people who work in the oil and gas sector in the US, not to mention countries that are dependent on these revenues, making sure that there are public policies in place to help those communities transition and capture some of the benefits of the kind of economy we could grow in the future. That's really important. We don't take that seriously enough sometimes.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Well, thank you two so much for taking all this time. I really appreciate it. I have a feeling this topic will only get more and more prominent and of interest in coming years, so maybe we'll talk again in a few years and see how things are shaping up.</p><p><strong>Meghan O'Sullivan:  </strong></p><p>Excellent. Thank you very much, Dave. It's great to be on your show.</p><p><strong>Jason Bordoff: </strong> </p><p>Yes, I love listening to it, so it's great to be on. Thank you.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-jason-bordoff-and-meghan</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:47154097</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 19 Jan 2022 17:00:41 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/47154097/10708028540650fe0a70c6b13515d0a4.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3918</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/47154097/9beb2c9da4c9c57f2fb11e72ccd049d2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: "Don't Look Up" director Adam McKay on the challenges of making movies about climate change]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, writer and director Adam McKay reflects on the critical and audience reaction to his movie </em>Don’t Look Up<em>. We also talk about making an emotional connection to climate change, some of the other climate-related projects he’s working on (or at least thinking about), and why he ended the movie the way he did.</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Adam McKay, January 12, 2022</p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/cb764zvx9wjlxit/volts22.01.12%28adam.mckay%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF version</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>The film <a target="_blank" href="https://www.netflix.com/title/81252357"><em>Don’t Look Up</em></a>,  available on Netflix as of late last month, has become something of a phenomenon. It has drawn wildly varying, often quite personal and intense, critical responses. Its critics’ score on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/dont_look_up_2021">Rotten Tomatoes</a> is just 55 percent.</p><p>But climate scientists <a target="_blank" href="https://www.yahoo.com/news/scientists-praise-dont-look-up-as-evocative-climate-change-parable-211326557.html">loved it</a>. I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/dont-look-up-the-first-good-movie">loved it</a>. And the public loved it. Its audience score is 78 percent. In the week of December 27, it broke a Netflix record, with more than 152 million hours of streaming. As of this week, it the second biggest movie ever on the streaming service (just behind <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/11/30/entertainment/red-notice-the-rock-netflix-most-watched-film-in-history/index.html"><em>Red Notice</em></a>, just ahead of <em>Bird Box</em>).</p><p>Audiences have ignored critics and embraced the film, which is not something you’d necessarily predict for a thinly veiled climate change allegory about the difficulty of grappling with bad news in today’s information environment, especially one with such a (spoiler alert) bleak ending. </p><p>It’s not the first successful curveball thrown by its writer and director, Adam McKay. McKay first made a name for himself as head writer on <em>Saturday Night Live</em>. In the early 2000s, he formed a production company with partner Will Ferrell and wrote and directed a string of beloved comedies, from 2004’s <em>Anchorman</em> through 2010’s <em>The Other Guys</em>. </p><p>But in 2015, he took a turn, writing and directing an adaptation of Michael Lewis’s book <em>The Big Short</em>, about the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis. It, too, was an unexpected hit, scoring McKay an Academy Award for adapted screenplay. His 2018 film <em>Vice</em>, about Dick Cheney, scored Oscar nominations for picture, director, and original screenplay.</p><p>He has demonstrated that, despite what the chattering class often seems to believe, audiences are hungry to confront real issues. All along, he has wanted to find a way to make a movie about climate change. With <em>Don’t Look Up</em>, he finally figured out how. </p><p>I’m delighted to get a chance to talk to him, to hear about what he makes of the movie’s critical reception, what his other ideas for climate movies are, and how he navigates the politics of speaking out on serious issues from inside Hollywood. </p><p>Welcome, Adam McKay, to Volts.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>Thank you, Mr. Roberts, for having me. I've been an admirer of your work for a long time, an avid reader of your writing, and it is a pleasure to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Thanks, I'm an avid watcher of your movies. So we have a mutual fan club here.</p><p>[<em>Don’t Look Up</em>] has been out on Netflix for a couple of weeks, so we've had enough time now for you to gather some feedback. Let's start with the fact that this movie has gotten more streams than anything in Netflix history. Did I read that right? </p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>It's a bit crazy. I was shocked by the response from audiences. Netflix uses viewing hours now as their metric — they used to use accounts that signed on, but viewing hours is a more accurate number — and we had the most amount of viewing hours in any single week of any release Netflix has ever put out. </p><p>I understand we're about to pass <em>Bird Box</em> as the number two all-time movie [on Netflix], and we've got a chance to be number one, who knows. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Who's number one?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:</strong></p><p>It's a movie called <em>Red Notice</em> that just came out. It stars The Rock, Ryan Reynolds, and Gal Gadot. If you had told me that our ridiculous-slash-dark climate satire would be contending with Ryan Reynolds, The Rock, and Gal Gadot in an action film, I would have said, “you're nuts.” So it's pretty fantastic. </p><p>More importantly, the moment-to-moment online responses have been incredible — just seeing people excited by it, laughing, a lot of people moved by the ending of the movie, talking about crying, having emotional moments with it. So that's the thing that's been really exciting is seeing this worldwide response to this movie, and a lot of people having the response of, “oh my god, I'm not crazy.” Really cool.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Or at least, “we're crazy together.”</p><p>On the other hand, there's the critical response, which has been … all over the place. I don't know what I expected, but it's been such a bizarre range. What do you make so far of the critical response?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>I've never experienced anything like it. We test these movies, we screen them for audiences, and the last three screenings we had played great — people were laughing the whole way through, at the end there was great discussion. </p><p>Then I saw those critical responses … and in fairness to the critics, I don't expect them to mirror a test audience. They look at it with different eyes. So with all due respect, but some of the reviews were so extreme and angry, and I was like, “whoa, what's going on here?” </p><p>But once again, they're critics; they’ve got to do what they’ve got to do. But it really took me back. I just didn't see it coming. You make movies, you get hit with bad reviews, so we were just like, “all right, I guess that's that.” </p><p>Then when the movie came out, the responses were more like what we had experienced. We were like, “oh, good, we're not crazy.” </p><p>So it was strange. I've never experienced that kind of disconnect from the screening, watching the movie with people, to the critical response. It definitely was the most surprising I've seen. Once again, nothing but respect for critics. But yeah, it was very surprising and unusual, no question about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I'm sure you're a self-aware, neurotic guy; you probably have some self-criticisms about the movie. Did any of the criticisms strike home? </p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>When you make a comedy, right away you subtract 20 points. It's just the way it goes with comedy. So I wasn't expecting us to be lifted on the critics’ shoulders and ticker tape to come down, because I've made plenty of comedies and that's just the way it goes. Which was fine, because we made a direct choice to have this be a comedy. </p><p>I think the ones that surprised me — there weren't a lot, but there were about a dozen that were really angry, and accused the movie of being smug, and said, definitively, “this movie will not relate to people.” “It's too smug, it's too liberal.” “It's not liberal enough.” “It's playing to a small crowd.” Those were odd, because we hadn't experienced that at <em>all</em> with this movie, in any of the screenings we had done — that was never the slightest response we ever had. </p><p>With something like our previous movie, <em>Vice</em>, we knew that was tricky. We knew that was not a fun story. So you know, I read reviews, and some of them were like, “yeah, you're not wrong.” But in this case, I was surprised by the timbre of the reviews, the anger of some of them — once again: not all, some. I have to say that over and over again. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Some of them seemed like, “you think you're so smart. You're not so smart.” A lot of critical reviews struck me as, “here are the ways that I am smarter than this guy who tried to make this movie.” It was a weird critical response.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>It was strange, but I think what it points to, now that I've had some time to digest it, is a couple of basic things. Regardless if someone didn't like the movie or liked the movie, there's no question we're living in an incredibly strange time right now. We're looking at a straight shot to American democracy collapsing. The Democrats have face-planted and I don't see much standing in the way of a takeover from the extreme right. </p><p>So that's going on, while this absolutely catastrophic, giant story of the collapse of the livable atmosphere, that is so mammoth it’s hard for even some scientists to fully get their head around, is happening at exactly the same time. It doesn't surprise me that people would be …</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Don't forget the global pandemic. Toss that in there too.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>Oh my god. And by the way, towering, epic income inequality mixed right in. </p><p>So we have all this stuff going on, and the idea that people would have passionate responses to “how do you tell these stories?” makes sense. The idea that a lot of people would be on different wavelengths of awareness, or no awareness, or somewhat awareness on those stories we're talking about makes sense. </p><p>By the way, once again, I respect that. I'm not saying that if someone didn't like the movie, it means they don't believe in climate change. Somehow, through the social media lens, it became that I somehow had said that, whereas I never said that. People were piling on — which by the way seems like something directly out of the movie, of course. So I think it makes sense. </p><p>The reason we made the movie is there are varying degrees of relationships with the idea of the climate crisis, and that's one of the problems we're confronting. So now that I have a little distance from it, part of me is like, “why did I think our movie would be any different?” </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I could have told you what would happen. From my perspective, as somebody who's been in this game for a long time: you have this huge problem on your mind, you’re yelling and yelling, and no one else is paying attention but other climate people. So you just end up talking to other climate people. You end up arguing with other climate people, and forming teams and factions within the climate movement, because no one else is paying attention. I think that's become part of the culture of the climate movement: your number one priority is to shoot down this new climate advocate who thinks he's smart. I don't fully get it.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>When you see Chuck Schumer or some politician talk about the climate crisis, you can just tell from the way they're talking about it: oh, they don't get it. They don't really feel it in their bones. Someone hasn't communicated to them the depth and the urgency of this. </p><p>Even when something happens like those crazy fires in Colorado, where there weren't even trees nearby, the wind blew the embers into the neighborhoods, and the videos are so upsetting; or Kentucky, where it looked like the devil had landed on earth with that massive tornado; Alaska breaking a heat record by 20 degrees; and on and on and on. You see these stories, and then you hear certain people in charge, or even in the media, talk about it, and you're like, “you're not feeling that in your bones.” </p><p>But when you have a movie, you can't say that, because it sounds like you're saying, “you don't get the movie, so you don't care enough about the cause.” I'm like, “hey, I don't f*****g care about the movie. Hate the movie. I don't give a s**t.” We're not posturing like, “Oh, look how important we are.” We actually think this is a giant thing! All these actors came together — there are easier projects we could have done. You think when we're saying this is a big deal we're positioning ourselves for awards season? </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>If you're pulling a money grab, maybe climate change is not your go-to. </p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>I think that's me splitting hairs, though, because the bigger picture here is the crazy appetite of literally hundreds of millions of people, having this very visceral response, and it's fantastic. </p><p>The other joy of the movie was seeing a lot of climate scientists say, “oh my god, I feel seen.” Peter Kalmus wrote a great piece where he's like, “oh, that's it. That's what I've been going through.” George Monbiot wrote a beautiful piece about the emotions he's been carrying. </p><p>So the overwhelming story here is, we're overjoyed with the response. We're overjoyed with the release. </p><p>At the same time … I already had sympathy for people like yourself, but now I think I get it in a much more personal way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Also, sympathy for politicians trying to broach this. You get all these weird, intense, super-specific responses, I'm sure any politician who says these words publicly gets that same weird range of blowback. So I have some sympathy for them, too … though less.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>A little bit less. We did it in the movie. For years I've been like, “why isn't a senator or congressman going to a podium and crying or yelling?” George Monbiot did that, he cried on a show — there's clips all over the place of climate people getting emotional on shows. </p><p>It's funny, because we wrote that in the movie, you’d think I would know that, but the response taught me how deep it is. The challenge of the communication of this is so titanic. How you break through the people framing it as self-interest. “Well, of course, Dave, you have a podcast you do, and you have your own news source, Volts, so of course you think it's a big deal.” It's like, no.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Let's go back in time a little bit. You've said in previous interviews that it was an IPCC report that originally grabbed you and shook you by the lapels and got you freaked out about this. That was 2015 or 2016? </p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>It's a longer road than that. The Al Gore documentary <em>An Inconvenient Truth</em> was the first time where I was like, “oh, wait a minute, that's no joke.” The famous moment where he shows the graph skyrocketing definitely hit me. I started talking about it, wondering what was going on. </p><p>But, in <a target="_blank" href="https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/about/projects/global-warmings-six-americas/">those polling categories they use</a>, where I went from the “somewhat concerned” range to the “very, very concerned” range was the IPCC report and several other reports that came out, culminating in me eventually not being able to sleep and my wife being like, “what's going on?” I'm like, ”this is bad. This is really, really, really bad.” </p><p>I went through a little period where people around me were like, “hey, relax.” I was like, “no, it's really, really bad.” I was late to this incredibly un-fun party. I think you showed up with some onion dip around 2004, but I came in around there, and then every year since it's just been escalating. </p><p>Reading David Wallace-Wells’ <em>The Uninhabitable Earth</em> — that's definitely what led me to the onramp of, “I’ve got to do a movie about this.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>One of the things I'm fascinated by, and one of the things I wrote about in my review, is the difficulty of making art about climate change, the difficulty of telling compelling stories about it in a way that will appeal to a mass audience. Presumably, once you got freaked out about it, you being a movie maker, you started thinking, “how can I get this into a movie?” You've talked about this a little bit, that you had a few ideas or premises come and go. I'm curious what some of your early thoughts were for how you could cram climate into a movie. Did you have other ideas that were developed at all? </p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>Well, some of them I'm still going to do. I'm actually working on a show with HBO Max called <em>Uninhabitable Earth</em>. It's a <em>Black Mirror</em>-style show, anthology, hour-long episodes, dealing with the climate crisis.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>But fictional, like <em>Black Mirror</em>? </p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>A hundred percent, yeah. Each one will be an hour long, we'll have different directors and writers come in. I already have the first episode outlined. I'm behind — I was supposed to have the script written a month ago. So we're doing that. </p><p>But I can tell you a couple of the ideas. The first idea I had — and who knows, I may still do it — was inspired by the movie <em>Greystoke: The Legend of Tarzan, Lord of the Apes</em> that came out in the 80s. I had read that Robert Towne’s initial draft of that script didn't have one single word spoken in it; it was all Tarzan with the apes. Then, of course, the studio made him add all this stuff where he went to England. I actually met Robert Towne about four years ago and I brought that up right away, because I found it really intriguing. </p><p>The idea I had was that it’s 300, 400 years from now, and it's an area on Earth where the climate crisis has fully blossomed — we've gone to 3.5 to 4, sea increase, most of civilization is gone, but there are little outcroppings of people that have hung on. </p><p>We focus on one group that lives between a storm and a desert zone. They're in between an area where there's constant tornadoes and hurricanes and another area that's completely arid — let's say it used to be Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada. They're on a runoff area from the storm zone where water flows, and it's created a deep crevasse, and they live in little Anasazi-style cliff dwellings on the side of the crevasse. Because of the water, they have a little civilization of 600 or 700 people. You see the detritus from the former civilization: pieces, scraps of our old civilization that they've used in different ways. </p><p>Then one day the water stops. We don't say it, but you see from the drawings and the songs that this happens occasionally. They’ve discovered that the person who can handle going through the river of water to find what clogged it, it's best if it's a 17-year-old boy, because they're a little more fearless, they're at peak physical health. </p><p>So they pick their 17-year-old boy, but there’s a girl who’s in love with him. He leaves to go on the mission, they give him a couple of tools, and she secrets away and follows him. </p><p>We basically follow these two teenagers as they go through the storm zone, and we have different encounters with different pieces of our old civilization. One scene was where they have to get across this massive lake, and in the middle of the lake — I thought it was a cool image — you see a giant white pole sticking out. The boy goes under the water and you just see the city of Chicago there. It's the Sears Tower antenna sticking up. And they have to swim across this lake. </p><p>So it's a lot of different episodic encounters. I don't want to give them away in case I ever do this … which, now that I'm telling you, it was pretty cool actually. It was a big 2 hour 40 minute, no-spoken-dialogue, epic film. That was the one I was going to go after. </p><p>Then I started doing the thing, which I know you probably think about a lot, where I'm like, “well, how is this going to play? How are people going to relate to this?” I kept thinking, “it's a little bit like a lot of dystopic sci-fi movies; there have been a lot of those made. Is it too easy to categorize it as that? Is the impact of it lost because it doesn't relate to our world now?”</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>In all those movies, the apocalypse has already happened, so you frequently don't learn much about it. They're rarely about the apocalypse itself.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>I had another idea that was about the carbon wars. Twenty years from now, most of the planet knows we have to shut down the carbon release, but there are holdouts. There are rogue nations, and corporations that are basically like nations, that are like, no. So there's a full-on war going on. I had a bunch of cool stuff for that. </p><p>Then I had another idea that was more like a <em>Twilight Zone</em> episode about submarines from different nations fighting over claiming new land underneath the Arctic Circle that they can drill for oil in. One of the subs gets sunk and then frozen in the deep bottom underneath the Arctic. We go to 200 years later, and it's rescued, and some of the people are able to be defrosted using advanced tech. It's about them living in the future utopia that has solved these problems, which I thought was kind of cool. </p><p>Yeah, I may still do that. These are all ideas that are still on the table. I don't think I'm giving away too much. But with each one, I just felt like, man, I don't know. </p><p>When I talked to David Sirota, and he made the joke about how it's like a movie where an asteroid’s going to hit, like an <em>Armageddon</em>, except no one gives a s**t, I just laughed, and I like that. I thought: laughter, it’s the best. It does a couple of things. It lets people have a common experience. In order to get a crowd laughing, you have to have a shared, agreed-upon reality. You can't really get 300, 400 people laughing without that agreed-upon reality. </p><p>So I just thought, even my family members who are very right wing and friends of mine who are very progressive, everyone can agree we are living in absolutely unhinged times right now. I thought, maybe that's a good purchase point with this idea. So I ended up doing <em>Don’t Look Up</em>.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Did you just hear this joke, or this idea, of Sirota’s and go off completely on that? How much was he involved in the story writing? Or was he just the political consultant guy?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>With any idea, you like the idea to not leave you alone. So he said that, I was like, “oh my god, that's perfect, that's exactly what's going on,” and we laughed, and we kicked it around for a second and then I just moved on. I wasn't going to write it. It was a couple weeks later that I was like, wow, that idea keeps coming back to me – why? So I called Sirota and I was like, “Sirota, I think that's the idea.” </p><p>I liked that it was simple. I liked that it wasn't too-clever clever, that it was a big enough entryway for a lot of people to get into it. I've described it as a Clark Kent-level disguise for climate; it's not really trying that hard, and I like that about it. It was big, and I'm a big fan of execution-based ideas. I don't always love big, clever premises. I like where they're kind of simple. </p><p>So then I started banging it out, and I would check in with David. He was involved. I would run it by him, what the outline was. He came up with the idea for the movie within the movie, <em>Total Devastation</em>. He and I kicked around the idea of profitizing the comet and aborting the mission; that's when I knew we had a movie. I would show him each draft. David's a very funny, creative guy. He's a firebrand, but he also has a good pop sense, and he's written some scripts in the past. So he was pretty involved, actually, from the get-go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Is it obvious it’s about climate change? Have you gotten a sense from the viewing public? Because I genuinely don't know. I'm so immersed in climate that of course I see everything through that lens. But if you just walk in as a normie with no background information on the movie, are people thinking “climate change” from this? Do you have any way of knowing?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>One thing I love to do is go on Twitter when the movie opens. You see the second-by-second tweeting. Granted, that's a skewed lens, because it's Twitter, it’s social media. But that, coupled with the testing process we do, the screening process, gives me a pretty good idea of how people are seeing it. </p><p>What I'm seeing, and what we learned in the screening process, is about 60 to 65 percent right away think <em>climate crisis</em>. Another 25, 35 percent — there's crossover between the two — think Covid, even though the script was written before Covid. </p><p>But the great news is, everyone gets the idea of a society that's broken, corrupted, careerist, distracted, self-interested, all the different layers. I always say it’s David Simon's <em>The Wire</em> grab bag of societal dysfunctions. We tried to touch all those bases. </p><p>Everyone gets that. The way we did the movie was, we tried to find the universal dysfunctions across the political spectrum and not dial into the red vs. blue too much, although you can't avoid it. When you talk about the comet denial in the movie, clearly that's hitting the right wing. </p><p>Overall, the people responding to it as a climate crisis allegory, I've been very happy. Someone tweeted the other day that she started watching it with her kids and within 10 minutes the kids were, “oh, this is like the climate.” I have a 20-year-old and a 16-year-old daughter, all of their friends — none of those people read interviews with me, none of those people read the reviews, and they all immediately were like, oh, climate, Covid, science being run over by capitalism and power. </p><p>I've been very, very happy with the way that's translated.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I think that’s part of the power of it: if you don't watch it through the climate lens, it works broadly as well. I was thinking yesterday that someone looking back 20 years from now at this movie might think, oh, this was about the coup. This was about the authoritarian takeover of America, which people were yelling about, and other people were ignoring them. It works eerily well for that as well. </p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>To me, there are three giant, hard-to-emotionally-comprehend realities. (Intellectually, we get it.) The climate crisis is the big one. Then you have the coup, the impending collapse of American democracy. Then the third one, for me, is income inequality at a scale we just never talk about, that is breathtaking, worldwide. </p><p>As far as size goes, income inequality is like Venus and the impending collapse of American democracy is like Mars. Then the climate crisis is like Jupiter plus Saturn plus maybe the Sun. There are five or six other ones too. There's the opioid epidemic, which we do nothing about. There's the gun death epidemic, which we do nothing about. </p><p>Someone had said, “hey, relax on calling it a climate crisis, it's really just a snapshot of this time.” I thought, that's a fair point, because the movie is about our reaction to these very fixable crises. As complicated as the climate crisis is, we could deal with it if we wanted to. That's what's so incredibly frustrating. What makes the climate crisis so horrifying is that we do have technologies, we do have strategies that could seriously curb the horror show we're headed toward. </p><p>So I think it's fair to say that the movie is more about this particular screwed-up moment that we're living in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>I've seen a lot of climate change documentaries and shows and art, and they're generally pretty bad. I went into this with very low expectations, terrified that you were going to get into albedo effect and biodiversity. I was braced. But it's much more about trying to communicate than it is about the details of the crisis itself. I thought the best part of the movie is the way it shows how the newsertainment blob has this capacity to digest everything and let nothing change it. No matter how loud you yell, it just absorbs it. </p><p>You see it absorb Dr. Mindy, as he becomes unwittingly caught up in it. It just rejects Kate entirely. It has this ability to adapt and absorb and neuter everything. That's to me the most maddening, not just about the climate crisis, but about everything these days: everything is at the same pitch; everything is at the same volume. Everything is the same blur. It's impossible to make anything stick out, to stop or pause on anything or think about anything.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>The moment where DiCaprio as Dr. Mindy says on the TV show, “why does everything have to be so clever or likable? Sometimes we just need to be able to say things to each other.” That's it. It's an emotional movie. It's not a narratively complex movie, it's just the emotion of that. </p><p>That's exactly it: these formats, these shows, will not let you just say things. It always gets twisted and given a certain color or shading. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>It's sitting right there alongside the celebrity love affair — the same tone and same visuals — and the two blur together. I thought another clever part of the movie was that, it's not like Dr. Mindy or any of the protagonists are innocent of this. </p><p>One of my favorite moments is when Oglethorpe, the head of NASA — who, by the way, Rob Morgan is amazing; he's such an ace up your sleeve in this movie — is talking about Sting. It had nothing to do with the rest of the movie, but I loved that moment so much.</p><p>But at one point, the head of NASA sitting there watching and getting caught up in this celebrity relationship. He finds himself really hoping they'll stay together. He's not immune to it either. It absorbs you no matter what disposition you come to it with.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>It's impossible to resist. This is the one thing I've been saying throughout a lot of the press: the movie is not over anyone. I'm in the movie. I eat Taco Bell. I was way into Kyrie Irving returning to the Nets the other day. I'm rooting for Jennifer Lopez and Ben Affleck to an unhealthy level. </p><p>I mean, this stuff is all focus-grouped. It's algorithmically structured. It's like they took the science of slot machines and they've applied it to social media, advertising, the way we consume information. It's irresistible, and we're all part of it. </p><p>But I think it's important to give ourselves a break to some degree on it. It’s going to get us. Life doesn't operate like an action movie where every waking second you're pointed toward the climate crisis, or gun violence, or income inequality, or the collapse of American democracy. There are moments where you're going to obsess about, why did the general charge you for snacks? That's why we have it in there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I loved that bit too, by the way. It spoke to me.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>I love the reaction to it. People are trying to figure out why he did charge for the snacks. There are these theories that he represents the military industrial complex, he represents government. So people ask me, and I'm like, “I don't know.” They’re like, “yeah, but you wrote it.” I'm like, “no, I wrote it as that thing that sticks in your head that distracts you.” </p><p>Comedy — the idea that we can laugh, we can be a little silly — took a lot of the edge off of it and opened it up. It's been cool. Once again, not everyone's going to laugh at the same thing. The funny thing with comedy is, everyone thinks their sense of humor is the gold standard. Which, by the way, I wouldn't change that. That's what's incredible about comedy. But it's funny when, some people love the comedy, some people are like “it's dumb,” and they're definitive about it. </p><p>That's fine. That's how comedy goes. But it's been really cool: at Netflix, they do crazy amounts of data — pretty sure they know, statistically, within 96 percent, how I'm going to die — and they said that they've never seen a comedy play across this many countries. I think the movie was number one in 87 countries and top 10 in 90. For people that care about the climate and care about the state of the world, I think that's a very hopeful thing, that this current moment in the world is that universal. I've never experienced that before.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Some of the stuff in the movie seems pretty US-specific. The media stuff, at least; I guess I don't really know what media is like in Turkey or whatever, but it felt very America-specific. </p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>Turns out, it's a lot like it is here. We're doing an adaptation of Bong Joon Ho’s movie <em>Parasite</em> as a miniseries, and he was saying that to me. He said, “I think you're going to be surprised by how well this plays around the world.” I was like, “really? You think so?” and he was like, “oh, yeah. The problems you have in the movie are everywhere.” And he was right. It's landed in a global way that I'd never anticipated.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>For me as a moviegoer, this is the first time I've seen these particular dysfunctions put to fiction. They're very specific to our present moment and I've never seen anybody else take them on. I think that's why you're getting these moments of people saying, “oh my god, I feel seen,” because a lot of people are experiencing this. I just haven't seen it portrayed in another movie in quite the same way. </p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>The models I used for this movie tend to be pretty small. One of my favorite movies of the last 20 years is <em>The Death of Stalin</em>, which I've seen seven times, but that played to a very particular crowd. It's brilliant. We weren't trying to emulate that; our movie is made for a much bigger audience, very consciously. But there's that. There's <em>Thank You for Smoking</em>, which once again, very small audience, brilliant movie, love it. Then you have to really go back to the 60s and 70s, back when movies like this would play big.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p><em>Network</em> is the obvious predecessor, right? <em>Network</em> is all over this movie.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>That's probably my all-time favorite movie. There's movies to die for: the Buck Henry movie, which I love; <em>Wag the Dog</em>; <em>Ace in the Hole</em>; <em>Dr. Strangelove</em> is another obvious one. For anyone who wants to jump all over me, I'm not saying our movie’s as good as <em>Dr. Strangelove</em>, but as far as the style and sensibility of it, people forget how slapstick-y <em>Dr. Strangelove</em> was. So I think that's one to look at. </p><p>But we haven't lived in a time where … I guess Mike Judge would be the guy: <em>Office</em> <em>Space</em> I worship, <em>Idiocracy</em> is brilliant. But neither one of those movies were even remotely commercially successful. They were found after they bombed in their release. </p><p>So it was definitely something we were going for on this larger scale. With all these actors, we were hoping to bring in a larger audience. It's been very cool seeing Ariana Grande fans watch this movie and respond to it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>I want to ask about the casting and about the crew. It’s A-listers all over the screen, constantly. To what extent did you present this to people as “hey, we want to make a socially conscious climate movie?” Was that part of the motivation of the actors joining up? </p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>I never framed it like that. I always described the world we're living in right now — it's fun, every time I say it I try and use a different analogy, so what I've been saying lately is, “it's like a bouncy castle full of hyenas and long stem wine glasses.” That's what it's like to be alive right now. </p><p>So my pitch to all the actors was, “we're going to try and make a movie that's about this time that's never existed, that's crazy, and we want to try and make it funny, but we also want to make it emotionally moving as well. And yeah, it's about the climate crisis” — everyone knew that, they got that — “but hopefully it's going to have a big feeling to it for people.”</p><p>With our casting director, Francine Maisler, we hit a point where we had a bunch of big-name actors, and I remember Francine and I talked about it and she said, “isn't the point of this movie that you kind of go all the way? That the movie is a comment on what's going on, and the movie should have a breadth?” I said, “Yeah, I totally agree.” So usually we would have stopped, because you don't want the movie to be overwhelmed with stars and be distracting, but in this case, we felt like oh, no, that's kind of the point of the movie. </p><p>That's when we got Timothée Chalamet to play the part of Yule, and Ariana Grande came in, and, I'm trying to remember the order, Cate Blanchett, Kid Cudi came on at that point. Normally we wouldn't have filled those roles with recognizable actors, but in this case we just said, let's drive straight through the locked gates.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>The density of A-listers is so high that it does feel almost like a comment in and of itself. It feels like you're making a point. </p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>We were joking in the edit, with my editor Hank Corwin, I was saying, “this movie is like a combination of <em>It's a Mad Mad Mad Mad World</em> and Lars von Trier's <em>Melancholia</em>.” That was another part of the movie, too, was the style of how we cut it and put it together. We wanted it to feel kind of jumpy and assaultive, keeping you off balance — sort of like the world feels now, too. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>I love the editing. To me, most of the big laughs were from the editing. </p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>Hank Corwin is one of the great editors of all time. He edited on <em>JFK</em>, he's edited Terrence Malick movies. The guy is a legend. It came from <em>Big Short</em> and <em>Vice</em>: even though those movies had funny things in them, they weren't full-on comedies. I kept telling Hank, “I think your style would work. I think this cut-in-the-middle-of-the-line, this breaking the rhythm of traditional editing, would work really well for comedy.” He's a funny, kind of sheepish, neurotic guy, and he's like, “I don't know. I've never cut a comedy,” and I'm like, “no, Hank, I think it's going to work.” But it's another element of the movie. For some people, they are thrown off by the style. I've seen people complain about it. Some people think it's sloppy unintentionally. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>No, every one of them is absolutely perfectly timed. It really gets at the feeling too —  you get swept up in these super-intense, crazy moments and then it cuts to this quiet moment where they're trying to digest it afterwards, and you feel the same thing. You're like, “whoa, what was that? Why was I just so worked up?” It's that same whipsaw feeling of modern media.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>That was what we were going for, those montages and slices and images. Hank had the brilliant idea to play the natural world as a character in the movie. It's funny how in the process of making a movie you can actually learn things about the climate. That was something; like, oh, yeah, the natural world is a character in the story of the climate right now. It was amazing how well it fit with the movie, and that was all credit to Hank Corwin. That was his breakthrough idea.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>There are these cuts of nature scenes, but they're not the conventional climate-documentary nature scenes of pastoral beauty; some of them are just weird. It's not necessarily natural beauty, it's “look at this weird fucked-up natural world.”</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>The one that got me — he just cut this in, I didn't have it in the script — was the shot toward the end of the movie of the bee. Every time we would screen the movie, I would see that bee, I would get teary-eyed. It was like a punch in the gut to me, because the bee is so beautiful-looking, and perfectly constructed, and delicate. Frickin Hank, man, you got me with that bee shot.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Let's talk about the ending because this, I'm sure, is controversial. I guess we're doing spoilers. </p><p><strong>Adam McKay:</strong>  </p><p>Yeah, we should warn people, if you haven't seen it. Part of the impact of the movie is, most people do not know that ending is coming. Some people do, but most people don't imagine that we would ever end that way. So yep, big spoiler alert.</p><p><strong>SPOILER ALERT</strong></p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>You watch a Hollywood movie, especially a big Hollywood movie with a bunch of stars, you are trained by a lifetime of movie viewing to expect the white horse at the end, to expect the good guys to pull it off. It inches right up to the ending and you're like, oh, well, I guess not! </p><p>This might be perverse, but I was delighted when I finally realized, “oh, he's not going to do it. Sweet. He's just going to let it play out.” How much did you think about that ending? How early did that come in? What do you think is the larger significance of the ending? What are you trying to say?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>I was just kicking around this idea — and part of it came from reading <em>Sapiens </em>by Yuval Harari — I thought the big idea of that book was when he posed that our ability to create myths and story is what separated <em>Homo sapiens</em> from Neanderthals and Cro-Magnons. It’s a legitimately big idea. I know some people knock Yuval Harari, but that is a heavyweight idea. </p><p>That got me thinking about what that means, that stories are that important. Obviously, we've talked about stories, and what they mean, and narratives, for years and years and years. The idea was, we've watched 10,000 movies — whether it's Marvel, James Bond, an action movie, <em>Fast and The Furious</em>, the comedies, the stuff I've done — and it's always a happy ending. You just know it's coming. You know Hollywood's going to give it to you. In some ways I started wondering, are we sitting back and watching the climate and expecting a happy ending? </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I really think that’s part of it. “Someone, somewhere, has got this. That's how things work, right?”</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>DiCaprio told me a story where Elon Musk was at some conference and DiCaprio implored him, “dude, come on, you've got news sources” and Elon Musk is like, “the technology will solve it.” That is terrifying. I hear this from a lot of people: “They're going to figure it out. Don’t worry. They'll get it.” No, we're not. We're now at the point where we're definitively not. So I thought, there's a simple power to going straight down the chute with this ending and not having the white horse ride over the horizon line. </p><p>I have never been more nervous for a screening in my entire life than the first time I screened this movie. There was a break in the pandemic, it was after the vaccine, and they said if everyone's vaccinated and they wear masks, we safely could do a screening. You have to remember, this is a big movie. It's Netflix, they're a big company, you have these big stars in the movie, and we're going to go to Orange County and we're going to test screen this movie that ends with — once again, spoiler alert — the entire planet dying. I was telling my wife and Hank, my editor, who during the period of putting the movie together I spent equal amounts of time with: “I've never been this nervous for a screening. This feels like we may have screwed up in a profound way.” </p><p>They test it from zero to 100. The test is not a sciencep you use it as a loose guide rail. But in general, if you get like a 35, that's really bad. You want to be in the zone of high 50s to low 80s. Mike Judge actually told me that <em>Idiocracy</em>, the first time he screened it, he got a 20. A 20! I've never heard of that in my life. He told me how then the studio felt like they were protecting Judge and that's why they buried the movie. I was like, “oh really, that's what happened.” Maybe Spielberg and Scorsese are two people that could score a 20 on a movie and say, “I don't care, put it in 3,000 theaters anyway.” No one else on the planet has the clout to tell a studio, “I know we got a 20 but go with it.” There's just no one. </p><p>So I'm driving to the screening and I'm like, “oh, s**t, oh, s**t.” But I love the ending. We've been watching it, we've screened it for ourselves, I think it's beautiful. We screen it … and it's the audience's favorite part of the movie. Universally. Unequivocally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>How does the whole test screening thing work? Do people write responses? </p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>Everyone fills out a card. There's the 1-10 stuff, but then there's handwritten stuff. You do a focus group with 20 people afterward, they ask in-depth questions. Universally, no question about it, favorite part of the movie: the ending.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Did people say why it was so satisfying to them? Could they articulate it?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>Oh, yeah. The person who leads the focus group is an incredible woman who ran the focus group in <em>Vice</em>. (True story: they ran focus groups on the Iraq War.) She actually runs our focus groups, and she asked them, and they were very clear about it. They said, “we're sick of the b******t endings.” It was an incredible moment where you realize, oh, of course, the audience is way smarter than we give them credit for. They're totally tuned in to what's going on in the world. They all expressed it. They talked about the climate crisis, about Covid, about all the s**t going on in the world. They're fully in line with it. They're sick of constantly getting served fake happy endings.</p><p>Even though I've done silly comedies, I'm a big fan of never underestimating your audience. <em>The Simpsons</em> is an example of how you can be brilliantly stupid. Even when you're doing silly stuff, try and be top-of-your-intelligence silly. So I've always believed audiences (and voting blocs, and the population at large) can go way further than people think. They're way smarter than they get credit from the media, from the savvy crowd, the gatekeepers. But this even surprised me. Number one part of the movie, unequivocally, no doubt about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>The whole movie is about us b**********g each other. It would have been a unique sort of betrayal to have a happy ending to this particular movie.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>There was never one moment where I was going to do it. I just wanted to make sure to balance at the end — that it is a comedy, even though it's this very emotional ending — so I did shoot the joke that we have in the movie that's in the middle of the credits, and then we have a joke at the very end of the credits. I did think that was important too, because some people were really in tears. We had some very emotional responses to the ending. My wife went into her car and cried for 10 minutes after she saw it. Another agent saw the movie when we were first screening it and she was so emotional, she backed her car into a pole when she was leaving the screening. We've seen it in the online responses, a lot of people moved to serious tears. </p><p>So I did think it was important that you don't want to be traumatized. You want to still be able to laugh, yet have those feelings. That was more the alchemy of the ending, how we were going to balance that. But there was never any chance that was ending any other way.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>It’s sad in the context of the movie itself, but I also think part of what's hitting people is that it gives them permission to imagine that in the real world, there's no white horse. Sad endings are perfectly possible in the real world, and once you really start to think about that in the climate context … it's big. It's overwhelming. </p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>I think it's essential to understanding the climate right now. I think you have to realize this could end poorly and in fact is on track right now to end poorly. That's hard for some people, and that's okay. I'm not saying they're wrong or their reaction to the movie is wrong. But I do think it's hard, and I think you have to realize that what we're seeing right now, it's not going well. It’s not going well at all.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Can you talk about the other ending, the mid-credits scene? Since we're spoiling things: the rich people escape the disaster on a spaceship, find another planet, and then are immediately consumed by the planet's denizens. I couldn't fully tell whether that was just a gag to prevent people from going home and hanging themselves, or if there was more significance, a point freighted in there. What's your take on that? </p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>It started as the rich people just get away. The original scripted ending was that they land on that planet, and it's beautiful, and they're like, this is going to work out great. And I just ended it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>That's kind of what I hoped it would be. That's what I was rooting for, to be honest. </p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>Well, we ended up improvising this beat. Meryl’s a great improviser, and she kept saying, “I want to know how I'm going to die.” So she put it in the scene. Then Mark Rylance and I said, well, maybe she gets eaten by a creature on a planet, and he's like, “oh, yeah, we don't know what it means.” We did it, and then it started making us laugh, that maybe we do see her get eaten by a Brontaroc, which was just a name we made up on the day. </p><p>I was hoping it did both, because you see the pods of the rich people, and they're from oil companies and lobbying firms, and it's got this sting. They walk out and there's this beautiful planet, and then we have this joke, which some people are going to like, some people aren't. Judd Apatow was like, “oh my god, that's my favorite joke ever.” DiCaprio was a little bit like, “I don't know if I love that joke.” So once again, it's comedy. My wife was like, “can’t you just end with the world ending?” and I was like, “we actually tried it one time, and it was tough.” </p><p>I like the idea of, you get the ending of the world ending, you get that beautiful Bon Iver song, you get to see the Earth undone, and that's an ending. Then we go for a little while longer and there's another little thing that happens, where the rich people get away with it, but then there's the big joke. I actually am a big fan of, you can have an ending and then have another ending, and whichever one you need, you can choose to lean into. Apatow was telling me he leaned in heavily to the president being eaten by the Brontaroc, he needed that. You didn't as much. My wife didn't, DiCaprio didn't.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>The whole world ending has one sort of emotional tone; the world ending but all the rich f*****s who made it happen escaping untouched has a very different emotional complexion. I just thought that was an interesting move. If you find out the rich people die, then …</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>… it’s a little happy. Yeah. There was another ending I had where the rich people then started saying, “let's get my house built,” and someone's like, “no, the pod with all the workers in it crashed, they're all dead,” and then the rich people started going, “I'll pay anyone a billion dollars who’ll build me a house,” and then another guy went, “I'll pay 5 billion,” someone else goes, “10 billion,” and we just pulled out on that. My friend Tom Scharpling liked that ending. </p><p>As I'm talking to you I realize, you know what we could have done on Netflix, we could have done three different endings. Some cuts could have had the rich people with no one to work for them, another one could have had the Brontaroc, another one could have just had the rich people get away with it and that’s it. I wish I had thought of this: we could have told Netflix, “every third screening has this ending.” That would have been really cool, actually.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>It makes a difference in the context of the movie, but it also makes a big difference in how you think climate change is going to play out, if rich people can survive it.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:</strong>  </p><p>They're not going to get away. No way. This idea that they're going to go in bunkers or go to another planet, it’s ludicrous. You saw it when we had the fires here in LA, I think one of Murdoch's homes partially burnt down. They aren’t getting away from this. If we imagine the climate crisis going to its worst degree, maybe you could see some people clinging to the poles to survive. It's debatable if it's an extinction-level event, but it is <em>possible</em> that it’s an extinction-level event. But if people do survive, it's going to be grim. I think the money can help for the first couple of waves.</p><p>This is me, by the way, just completely theorizing. There's no basis to what I'm saying, let me be very clear about that. I don’t know. But we can kind of guess, right? We know that the whole center of the earth becomes totally uninhabitable from extreme heat and wet bulb events. We know that there'll probably be perpetual giant fires where hundreds of thousands of people die from smoke inhalation, drought, famine, mass migrations, wars, even the poles are going to be nasty. They'll just have to come up with different categories for hurricanes. There'll be Category 10 hurricanes. I was talking to someone online who was saying it is possible we could have a perpetual storm on Earth if this thing really does hit 3-4 degrees Celsius increase.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>My even more dystopic possibility is that we half solve it, so it gets bad but not apocalyptic, and bad-but-not-apocalyptic will probably just mean exacerbating existing inequalities. It'll mean an exaggerated, even more grim version of global oligarchy.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>Oh, that's bad. You might be right. We talk about this nonstop, my group of friends who are equally as freaked out as I am and that can talk about it, and one of the things I always say is, the saving grace may be that our civilization collapses, meaning we don't produce more carbon dioxide; that actually, civilization collapsing stops a lot of the emissions. </p><p>That's a hellish proposition, because that's closer to what you're talking about; we’re at 1.5 to 2 degrees Celsius increase, and we start to see systemic collapse around the planet, wars, refugees, fire, all that kind of stuff, but a billion people have survived and the inequality is more like <em>The Road Warrior</em>. I'm not being flip with that comparison. Literally, that could happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Related to this point, one of the critical responses to the movie has been that it’s not an accurate analogy for climate change. Climate’s not a succeed or fail, one or the other proposition: there are all these degrees in between, we're going to land somewhere in the middle. There's an emotional satisfaction to a comet, that either hits or doesn't, that we're never going to get out of climate change. A) Do you agree with that, and b) do you think that's relevant to the quality of the movie? Did you feel like you were trying to do an exact analogy to climate change? </p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>God, no. Allegories are a sleight of hand. The prodigal son coming back doesn't exactly match the massive emotional bandwidth of loving forgiveness. “Well, the brother was kind of a dick, whereas loving forgiveness knows no bounds and judgment, so I don't know if the prodigal son was the exact allegory.” No allegory is a perfect fit. </p><p>So yeah, there's a little cheat that we did: we took away the hyper-object of global warming, which is so vast and timeless and slow-moving, and we put in a very concrete event, a comet. So no, it's not a precise match at all. The real story of the movie is that the hyper-object, the hard-to-categorize force, is our reaction to the comet. I would say that's the important story when it comes to the climate crisis. It's about our reaction to the climate crisis, which is pretty horrific to this point, and kind of a disaster.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>You’ve said in previous interviews that lately you've gotten a little bit more optimistic about the science and tech side of this, and I think that's for good reason. I feel the same way. The leaps and bounds being made now in clean technologies are amazing; if clean energy just keeps getting cheaper as fast as it's going now, it's going to be dirt cheap in five to 10 years, and utopia awaits. </p><p>But then you look at this other track of American democracy falling apart, income inequality, etc. … you could tell completely different narratives about where we are in history and where we're going. </p><p>How do you reconcile the two: the positive tech story about climate change and the total flaming-bag-of-s**t-dysfunction political story? If you wanted to make a movie about 10 or 15 or 20 years from now, what does it look like? Do you have the slightest f*****g clue?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>Stuff can change so fast. The example I always use, and it's a common one, is that I remember being with my kids when they were young, in the car, and they were like, “Dad, why is gay marriage illegal?” because they had friends at school who had same-sex parents. I was like, “you know, it's weird. Some people are hung up on it. I don't know why they care.” </p><p>“Is it ever going to be legal?” </p><p>“You know, it doesn't look great politically.” </p><p>Then three months later, it was legal, and my kids were like, “you said!” and I was like, “I'm as shocked as you. I don't know what happened. Joe Biden misspoke and then … Obama couldn’t back off? I think that's what just made gay marriage. And it turns out, people were way cooler with it than most people thought.” So I mean, that was a crazy rate of change. </p><p>I'm working with a group out of UCLA that's got some pretty serious breakthroughs on removing carbon dioxide from the ocean, and it's exciting stuff. They're nowhere near the scale to do it, they'll need like a trillion dollars to really make a dent. But is it possible? Technology doesn't advance in a linear way, and a lot of times happens in spurts. So it's very possible you and I could be talking in a year or two and we could be like, “holy s**t, those guys from Carnegie Mellon, what do you know, they had that breakthrough, and there was someone in the Pentagon who was smart enough to go, ‘hey, let's move $100 billion from this B-52 bomber thing and do this,’ and we're actually rolling back some carbon dioxide.” </p><p>That could happen. But if I had to bet, the will and action and awareness part of it is such a train wreck right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Sure. What if that happens and Donald Trump is president and Republicans are in charge of both houses of Congress? Would it even make a difference if there was a tech breakthrough in the woods and no one heard?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>One hundred percent. The US just suddenly becomes not a player in solving the climate crisis. All eyes go to Europe and China, and the US is just out of the picture; we're the bad guys. I'm happy with what's happening down in Brazil and with Chile, that we're starting to see some progressive leaders step in down there, so hopefully, they could be a part of it, too. And is it okay if some other countries get on the stick? The Chinese are not dumb. They know what's coming. Europe clearly knows what's coming. </p><p>But you're right, if the Republicans take over, which it looks like they're going to, because the Democrats have just completely face-planted — in three years, if the Democrats haven't done anything and the Republicans stroll in, they're not giving power back. We know what they're doing, and that may be all she wrote for the US.</p><p>But then you may see some private industry. So that's the part that I'm optimistic about. I also am just a big believer in pain. Pain got me to lose 40 pounds. I had a very minor heart attack. Pain got me to stop smoking regularly; I have to confess I still cheat and have one or two on occasion. But that was pain, and I do think there's some pain coming our way with this stuff. There are fires we can't even imagine, storms we can't even imagine. That could shock us into waking up very quickly, in like a three-week period of time. </p><p>So I guess I just, in a really long-winded way, told you I have no idea.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>It's never been easy to predict the future, but it feels so incredibly opaque now. I don't even know the basic valence. Dystopia or utopia or somewhere in between, I couldn’t begin.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>I like your guess of somewhere in between. Man, if we solve some of this and it becomes just crazy robber baron 3.0, like an 1880s Gilded Age, I'm going to be frickin’ pissed. That's just the grossest outcome, and you're probably right, they're going to try and swing it that way. I don't think you're wrong. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I feel like this is the history of America: when things get so bad that the working class is about to revolt or go communist, they'll give a little; they'll do a New Deal or whatever, just enough to keep the basic system in place. That's what I could envision happening on a large scale here.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>I think that's a good guess. Do you remember the Arab Spring, when those revolutions were spreading? There's a story as part of that that not enough people talk about, that Saudi Arabia just cut checks for 25 grand for everyone in their country and handed them out, and people were like, cool, and they didn't have a revolution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Is it that far off from what we did with the Covid relief bill?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>No. I just wish goddamn Biden would do it with student debt. It's the only button he's got left to push, and they just won't do it. They will not do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I want them to get the comet’s-hitting-in-2024 mindset. We need to spend all the money we can, as fast as possible. </p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>All of DC is designed not to let that mindset happen. Every restaurant hallway, every bit of muzak playing is like, “don't let anyone have that mindset.” But we'll see.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Let me ask you about Hollywood. I'm sure poor Leo DiCaprio probably has answered this question 4 zillion times — it's obligatory, you're asked every time you are interviewed at this point — but there will be some people who say, “the last thing I want is a bunch of rich, Hollywood, carbon-intensive-lifestyle, private-plane-flying, etc. trying to act like they care about climate change. If they cared, they would sell their yacht or whatever.” How do you process all of that? How do you think about that general critique?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>People think of Hollywood as some bizarre foreign country. I wake up every morning, I swim in my pool with my three dolphins, I get in my helicopter, I fly to my solid glass pyramid office. </p><p>No. I would say this: if it's a good faith argument, yeah, give us s**t. I know Leo doesn't fly private anymore. We all are as green as we can possibly be, making as much noise as we can. I'm trying to do a bunch of different things; I'm not going to list them because that just sounds pathetic. </p><p>If someone's saying that to just avoid the subject, then f**k that. That's b******t. But if someone's really saying, “hey, you hypocrites, what about this? What about this?” I'm here for it. Give us s**t. Is there something we can be doing better? Is there something we can be more aware of? I think we have to get used to that being a part of how we talk to each other, without being defensive. If you told me right now, “hey, you guys never have done this with your movie shoots, but you could do X, Y, and Z,” I think I've got to be like, “oh, s**t, I never thought of that. You're totally right.” </p><p>So I think it's good when it's done in good faith. When it's done in bad faith as a way to just shuck off the whole discussion, then I roll my eyes at it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I think it's the latter most of the time, but who knows? </p><p><strong>Adam McKay:</strong>  </p><p>I'm playing a little bit dumb because I do go on social media and 90 percent of the time, it's the latter. No question about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>In terms of climate’s presence in your own life, do you talk to your kids about it? I have an 18-year-old and a 16-year-old. All my life I've been talking about 2030, 2040, 2050, this or that has to happen. They're going to be alive during those years, in the prime of their friggin’ lives. I have gone back and forth about how to think about that a million times. How do you think about that? Do you talk to your daughters about it? How do they process it?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>Yeah, we do. They saw the movie, obviously. My older daughter was very emotional about it. Younger daughter loved it. It was emotional. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>If I made a work of art that my 18-year-old showed open emotion in response to, I’d be parading around the f*****g streets like a king.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>I don't think they've ever had a reaction to anything I've done like this. Going through the years, they’ve mostly tolerated what I've done. Though they discovered the early comedies, their friends like the early comedies, so they love <em>Stepbrothers</em> and <em>Anchorman</em> and stuff.</p><p>But the way I talk to them is mostly the way we're talking right now. What I say is, “this is very, very serious. It's the biggest issue of our lifetime. It's huge. It's no joke. It's not like a normal issue, it's a 1,000-times issue. However, we have technology and science, and people can do amazing stuff when they have the will and the direction. So don't get hopeless about it.” </p><p>During the pandemic, we couldn't go in our backyard because it was filled with smoke from the Pasadena fires. Their aunt lived up in Oregon, she had to evacuate her house because the AQI was around 550. So they've already encountered this stuff. It's already part of their life. I just tell them, “you don't have to solve it all by yourself. Just find a couple little things you can do. Make sure to talk about it, make sure to feel it in your bones, and you'll find your way you can pitch in, and we're going to do what we can do.” </p><p>I think the trick is not to freak out. Even though many times I am fully freaking out, my mantra is just, we can only do what we can do. So if I ever get too freaked out, I remind them, or remind myself, we can only do what we can do. That instantly calms me down. </p><p>I make movies, so we made a movie. We have probably more money than we should, because our society is broken and screwed up, so I'm going to try and use some of that money to do some other stuff. We'll make little personal choices. We'll talk about it. That's what we can do. A lot of it's about emotional tone and providing the right perspective and sense of the moment. But it's tricky, no question about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>When you pivoted and did <em>The Big Short, </em>you out of nowhere went from comedies that are dumb in a smart way to something that's smart in a smart way and about an issue of substance. I think you baffled people; a lot of people thought that was going to fall on its face, and it didn't, and you've kept at it, and you've kept succeeding at it. </p><p>So I'm just wondering, what's the temperature among your peers in Hollywood about making more of an effort to engage with social issues? It's so fraught, for all the reasons we've discussed, but you're making a go of it and succeeding. Is anybody going to follow along? Have you talked to other filmmakers about this?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>One of the coolest things I heard as a reaction to this was that a couple of other filmmakers were like, “hey, can I talk to you about an idea that I have?” I actually did get some of that. I think they saw, if I can take the right crosses that came with those reviews and the savaging I took online and then in the end have the movie find an audience like it did, I think they're like, “s**t, if he can do that, we can do that.” </p><p><em>Vice</em>, when all is said and done, will probably break even, but <em>Big Short</em> made a nice chunk of change. <em>Succession</em> — obviously very different, because Jesse Armstrong writes that, but still a show I direct the pilot, produce on — that's a very different tone. We did <em>Q: Into the Storm</em>, the docuseries which was very successful, got very high ratings for HBO. </p><p>So I think what people are starting to see is, you can make money doing this. It's not some altruistic thing. Audiences want to hear what's going on, and it's a good thing — you can talk to people about the real stuff that's happening and they're excited by it. So it doesn't have to be altruistic, it doesn't have to be pure business, there is this nice middle ground. </p><p>Yeah, for the first time, three people actively reached out to me that want to talk about ideas. I think it's bound to happen. You can't live in the world we're living in right now and pretend it's not going on. I think you're going to see more and more people going for it, whether it's in a subtle way, an overt way, a funny way, a horror movie. There are a thousand different ways to tell the story of right now, and I think we're going to see more of it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I hope we don't end up in five years thinking, “oh, man, I wish we hadn't told all those filmmakers to talk about the social issues. What were we thinking?” I often think that when people start talking about climate change: “oh, man, I miss when people weren't talking about climate change.”</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>Weren’t those good days? The year I always say is 1997. Do you remember 1997? It just felt like no one gave a s**t about anything. I know Clinton kind of sucked, there was stuff on the horizon, the Republicans were starting to get a little crazy, there was bad s**t, but oh my god, it felt like my seventh birthday party, 1997. Oh, I miss it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Final question, and I'm 75 percent serious about this: Have you thought about making a movie about a reactionary movement that takes hold in a democracy and grows and exploits weaknesses in media and institutions to eventually take over and institute a one-party autocratic state? Just spitballing here.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>I have my idea for my next movie, and it's not that, but it's a close neighbor of what you just said. It's about two blocks up and one block over. I will tell you this: from doing this movie and from doing <em>Vice</em>, <em>The Big Short</em>, <em>Succession</em>, and <em>Q: Into the Storm</em>, it does seem to always come back to big loads of dirty money clogging up our system. If <em>Don't Look Up</em>, <em>Vice</em>, and <em>The Big Short</em> were about heart attacks, dirty money is the plaque. It's what's blocking the arteries. </p><p>I think I have an idea that's kind of funny and interesting; I haven't started writing yet, but I'm interested in it. As far as the autocratic rule, we have a bunch of projects at our company that are in development that circle around and get near that. We're constantly looking for ways to play with that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>My other topic I want somebody to take on, that I have also been thinking is un-fictionalize-able: A lot of the problems in our country now are because the electoral college is fucked up, and Senate representation is skewed, and gerrymandering; all these very boring, procedural, structural, institutional issues are playing a huge role in this minority being able to basically control the country. How on earth do you get the American movie public excited about filibusters? </p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>We're doing a movie called <em>Rat Fucked</em>, starring Paul Dano, that's about how they gerrymandered America — the story of who came up with the idea. We've sold that, that's happening at Hulu. Another idea I'm thinking of gets into a lot of that procedural stuff, and I think I’ve found a way to wrap it in a fun bow. That stuff is wildly interesting. I think it's just how it’s told to the public; it's presented as boring. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>What you need is Margot Robbie in a bath talking about filibusters.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay: </strong> </p><p>We need the “Margot Robbie in a bubble bath” channel where all the news is read. But yeah, we are working on one about gerrymandering that's actually already sold and set up, and then this other one gets into a lot of that procedural stuff. That's exactly why we started this company, Hyperobject Industries. I believe that stuff is interesting, and that there is a way to do it. We have a lot of projects circling around exactly what you're talking about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Awesome. Well, I will look forward to those. It’s a good time for geeks in the movie world.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>Absolutely. We've always been pretty comfortable in the movie world. Movie world’s always been kind to geeks.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Yes, but usually geeks trying to appeal to the vaguely imagined jocks of their youth. Now they're just straightforwardly appealing to one another.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>I do have to tell you, full disclosure, I've been lifting weights this entire interview. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Are you getting swole?</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:</strong></p><p>I'm so swole. I'm all swoled up, bro.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>It's time to go in front of the camera.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>Well, man, thanks for having me on. This was a pleasure. I can't believe this is the first time. Like I said, I've been reading your stuff and following you for a long time. Thank you for everything you do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Well, likewise, thanks for making this movie. Wow, did it stir things up. You achieved that.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:  </strong></p><p>It did. I hope it continues to. </p><p>Honest to god, that was maybe the most enjoyable conversation I've had during the entire press run of this. I'm not kidding. I needed that badly. My soul needed that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I'm sure you've been going through it. Good luck enduring the rest of it.</p><p><strong>Adam McKay:</strong>  </p><p>Absolutely, man. Be well.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-dont-look-up-director</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:46829658</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 12 Jan 2022 17:10:35 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/46829658/413a422c346457fc722abc31e92de5cc.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5124</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/46829658/2d299a0f28836f223d887f6b0ca332b5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Climate legislation and Congress: the current state of play]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>My last substantial post of last year was a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-year-in-federal-climate-politics">summary of where things stand with Congress and climate</a>. I ended by reiterating my confidence that Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV), who has been such an impediment throughout the process, would find his way to supporting some form of the Build Back Better Act, the Democrats’ <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/crunch-time-this-is-americas-last">last and only hope</a> of taking substantial action on climate change. </p><p>Mere days later, Manchin <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2021/12/19/22845122/manchin-build-back-better-psaki">threw up his hands</a> and said, “I can’t get there — this is a No on this legislation.” So much for that prediction. </p><p>However! As we head into 2022, there are signs that Manchin’s tantrum was less apocalyptic than it appeared. </p><p>His objection to BBB — which, to be fair, was his objection for months; the Democrats just thought they could eventually get through to him — is that the bill contains a bunch of new programs that are only funded for a year, or a few years, and since they will inevitably be renewed (according to Manchin), the bill’s price tag is deceptive. He wants to include only programs that are funded for the full 10-year term of the bill, under the artificial budget cap he himself imposed. </p><p>That would mean stripping a number of popular programs out of the bill. The process blew up because the other Democrats refused to believe that he was serious about doing so much damage to the legislation. However, as <a target="_blank" href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/12/how-the-white-house-lost-joe-manchin.html">Eric Levitz writes</a> in New York magazine, as anachronistic, stupid, and cruel as Manchin’s views are, he’s not willing to move on them. For any bill to pass, it will have to conform.  </p><p>Insofar as there’s any good news in this young year, it is that Manchin seems positively disposed toward the climate portions of the bill. “The climate thing is one that we probably can come to an agreement much easier than anything else,” he <a target="_blank" href="https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/588180-manchin-expresses-openness-to-climate-action-amid-spending-bill?utm_campaign=Carbon+Brief+Daily+Briefing&#38;utm_content=20220105&#38;utm_medium=email&#38;utm_source=Revue+Daily&#38;rl=1">told reporters</a> on Tuesday. Other Democrats have <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-energy/2022/01/04/climate-confident-799646">expressed confidence</a> that the climate portion of the bill will survive in some form. </p><p>This is in part because Manchin already stripped the bill of any sticks, anything that might penalize fossil fuels (most notably the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-sen-tina-smith-on-the">Clean Electricity Performance Program</a>). What’s left are $555 billion worth of carrots: grants, tax breaks, and other money showered on every form of clean energy, from R&D through demonstration projects through commercialization — very much including <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/carbon-capture/us-government-squandered-hundreds-of-millions-on-clean-coal-pipedream">carbon capture at fossil fuel power plants</a>, a Manchin fave. “There’s a lot of good things in there,” he said.</p><p>Somewhat oddly, Manchin also supports some of the reforms to federal oil and gas leasing that are in the House version of the BBB. </p><p>All of this seems to at least imply that he’s still open to some kind of bill. What he <a target="_blank" href="https://www.axios.com/scoop-manchin-new-play-2cb59ff0-1577-44bf-81a4-a0d72b7e9be2.html">appears to want</a> is a version of the BBB that, at a minimum, strips out the Child Tax Credit — which can not possibly fit under his cap on spending ($1.75 trillion), at least not when funded for 10 years, at least not if the bill is to contain anything else. </p><p>The Child Tax Credit <a target="_blank" href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5743308460b5e922a25a6dc7/t/612014f2e6deed08adb03e18/1629492468260/Monthly-Poverty-with-CTC-July-CPSP-2021.pdf">kept millions of children out of poverty last year</a> and could potentially cut child poverty by almost half. It ran out at the end of the year, and now <a target="_blank" href="https://wvpolicy.org/50000-west-virginia-children-at-risk-of-slipping-into-poverty-if-enhanced-child-tax-credit-provisions-expire/">at least 50,000 children in West Virginia stand to slip back into poverty</a>. Manchin is choosing to allow millions of children to suffer a little more based on vague and ill-founded worries about inflation. It’s ghoulish and unforgivable.</p><p>Nonetheless, <a target="_blank" href="https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/586680-democrats-face-tough-choices-on-biden-plan-after-manchin-setback">it is what it is</a>, so Democrats will need to put together a diminished form of the BBB that protects the climate provisions. They still need to try; the stakes are too high not to. “If they can’t pull this off, then we failed,” John Podesta <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/04/climate/biden-climate-change.html">told The New York Times</a>. “The country has failed the climate test.”</p><p>There are no signs of any such efforts thus far. “There is no negotiation going on at this time,” Manchin <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/04/manchin-biden-spending-bill-negotiation-526486?mkt_tok=ODUwLVRBQS01MTEAAAGByWnbFehG1lmZQwTvxcBbjKXNOt3Fil1Zjae8DpyMP1ZJufCQYEzzsGmRsPfgM_9SnViM0DX6GRiOhUKDrB35OMwDfSNOGbI7NXPbS876sGmJ">said on Tuesday</a>, the same day Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) said, “I've talked to Sen. Manchin numerous times during the break.” Oof. </p><p>Still, also on Tuesday, a group of senators <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/minutes/congress/01-4-2022/taking-the-on-climate/">expressed renewed determination</a> to get the climate portions of the bill over the finish line. "We're going to get this done, come hell or high water,” said Sen. Brian Schatz (D-HI), “and right now, we have both hell and high water."</p><p>"Frustration isn't a strategy,” said Sen. Tina Smith (D-MN), in what I can only interpret as a direct attack on yours truly. “We have to get it done." </p><p><p>Volts is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></p><p>The senators even made a point of noting that Sen. Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ), who has been such a problem on other parts of the bill, is “nothing but supportive of the climate provisions here," as Schatz put it. </p><p>Schumer, as usual, seems determined to press on. He said, “I intend to hold a vote in the Senate on BBB, and we’ll keep voting until we get a bill passed.” Good, I guess?</p><p>Meanwhile, what Senate Dems are <a target="_blank" href="https://news.yahoo.com/schumer-ramps-filibuster-fight-ahead-110025971.html">actually moving forward on</a> is some kind of filibuster reform or exemption intended to enable them to pass a voting rights bill without Republicans. In a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dear%20Colleague%201.3.22.pdf">letter to colleagues</a>, Schumer said:</p><p>Over the coming weeks, the Senate will once again consider how to perfect this union and confront the historic challenges facing our democracy. We hope our Republican colleagues change course and work with us. But if they do not, the Senate will debate and consider changes to Senate rules on or before January 17, Martin Luther King Jr. Day.</p><p>Here, again, Schumer seems confident he can move Manchin and Sinema, despite no sign from either that they are willing to budge. "Anytime there's a carve out, you eat the whole turkey,” <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/minutes/congress/01-4-2022/manchins-rules/">said Manchin</a>. He said he would rather exhaust his ability to negotiate with Republicans, and from all indications, his capacity to negotiate with Republicans is infinite. </p><p>Meanwhile, there’s been no word about any of this from Sinema, who was last on record opposing any changes to the filibuster. </p><p>At least for now, there’s no reason to think that this isn’t just wheel-spinning symbolism, which is going to delay moving forward on BBB. </p><p>On the other hand, the fate of the republic is at stake, so maybe a little symbolism is warranted. If Manchin and Sinema think the filibuster is more important than the right of every American to vote, let them say so affirmatively and publicly, on the record. </p><p>On the other other hand, the fate of the atmosphere is also at stake, and if Democrats dump all over Manchin for blocking filibuster reform, it might piss him off and make him even more recalcitrant on BBB. </p><p>In the coming weeks and months, there will be votes on both these bills and we will have a much better sense of where things stand. The path to (some measure of) success, on climate or much of anything else, is narrow and getting narrower, but it isn’t closed off yet.</p><p>In the meantime, we begin the year where we ended the last one: in deep uncertainty and anxiety, as matters of unfathomable significance are decided by a small handful of vain old white guys. So much fun.</p><p>Anyway, I apologize to the political obsessives on the list — I suspect there are quite a few of you — if you knew all this stuff already. I thought it would be worth getting everyone on the same page, with a clear view of the stakes. </p><p>I’ll be back next week with some wonkery and a very fun podcast guest.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/climate-legislation-and-congress</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:46677207</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 07 Jan 2022 17:46:56 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/46677207/fc0fb940641c189ea50c6257ed016284.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>547</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/46677207/f817c8bf79b527337a0442ee8bcb8803.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: how the left can suck less at messaging, with Anat Shenker-Osorio]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, messaging expert Anat Shenker-Osorio — a researcher, campaigner, author, and speaker — discusses the elements of an effective message, what’s required to spread messages, and the right way to test whether they’re working. We also get into the best way to craft climate messages and the current debate over “popularism.”</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Anat Shenker-Osorio, December 20, 2021</p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/psccu5l7pt79rlr/volts21.12.20%28anat.shenker-osorio%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF version</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>People involved with politics are obsessed with messaging: what to say, and how to say it, to sway voters or politicians to their side. </p><p>Everyone has strong opinions about messaging, but almost everyone’s opinions are drawn from their personal experiences, preferences, and priors, which are rarely reliable guides to what works in practice. </p><p>There are, however, people down in the trenches doing real message testing in the field, as part of real grassroots campaigns, like Anat Shenker-Osorio, head of ASO Communications and author of the book <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/33GsmKg"><em>Don't Buy It: The Trouble with Talking Nonsense about the Economy</em></a>. She helps campaigns communicate for a living, and she discusses the lessons learned from successful campaigns on her podcast <a target="_blank" href="https://wordstowinby-pod.com">Words to Win By</a>. </p><p>Shenker-Osorio is a co-founder of the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.demos.org/campaign/race-class-narrative-project">Race-Class Narrative project</a>, which is developing a coherent response to America’s familiar racial dog-whistle politics. She has advised several environmental campaigns and done a lot of thinking about the right way to message around climate change, as well as its place in the race-class narrative. </p><p>As long-time readers know, I have a love-hate relationship with the subject of messaging, so I’m happy to dig in with Anat to figure out what we really know about good and bad message testing, the elements of a good message, how to actually get messages to voters, and how to talk about climate change in a compelling way. </p><p>Without further ado, welcome, Anat, to Volts. Thanks for coming on.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio: </strong> </p><p>Thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I'm excited to talk about messaging. I want to start with a distinction. The side of messaging that people think about most often is word selection: choosing your words, slogans, catchphrases, and verbiage for your ads. But the other side of messaging is about the infrastructure that allows you to get the messages you've developed to voters: the spokespeople, institutions, media outlets, social media pages, civic groups, all the mechanisms that allow those messages to reach their intended audience. </p><p>It's always seemed to me that it is on this latter side of messaging where the left is really getting its ass kicked. It seems like the right has a robust ecosystem that's very coordinated and capable. If they have a new message — you know, “Critical race theory is taking over schools” — they can get that to the ears and eyes of every single conservative in the country basically at will. The left, it seems to me, lacks that ability. What does it need to do to build that kind of infrastructure? </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>There are so many ways into this question. </p><p>First, of course, I agree with you. That's something that I have remarked upon myself, frequently: A message nobody hears is, by definition, not persuasive. It doesn't matter how fancy your survey or RCT or field test, everything that you did to create that thing: If nobody hears it, it didn't persuade them. </p><p>I think it is too simple a distinction to put those things in two buckets, and here's why. Part of the problem we have is, if your base won't carry the message, then the middle isn't going to hear it. </p><p>Yes, it would be amazing to have an actual functional media that would properly do its job. Yes, it would be amazing to have a left-wing specialized media infrastructure of the size and capability of Fox News and OAN and conservative talk radio and all the rest of it. Yes, those would all be great things to have, and we would be much, much better off. </p><p>But we do have the knowledge that a message is like a baton that needs to be passed from person to person to person, and if it gets dropped anywhere along the way, it is, by definition, not persuasive. </p><p>Why was it possible for the left to spread the message “love is love” and “love makes a family” and with it shift culture, shift perception of gay and lesbian unions (what used to be called gay marriage and is now properly called marriage equality)? Why was it possible in city after city and then state after state to spread a message of Fight for $15? </p><p>Why was it possible in the post-election for us to create content, with a crackerjack team of designers and artists, that said Count Every Vote? Those memes were viewed more than a billion times, and that's just a domestic US audience. There are times when we have broken a signal through the noise, despite all of the disadvantages that you point to — and those have been the times when we have properly attended to that wording question. </p><p>So again, I don't disagree with your diagnosis, I just think that the way that we resolve this issue actually has to do with the messages that we're putting out, at least partially.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Let's talk about how we figure those messages out, then. Another one of my longstanding beefs with the endless messaging talk that I hear — and I'm mostly coming from a climate perspective — is: I frequently read studies and survey groups telling me how people react to messages when they see them in isolation, one at a time, in the calm of a focus group, or assembled by an academic. Then they take the different ways that people react to these messages in that context and vastly over-interpret them regarding what kind of messages work out in the world. </p><p>It's pointing out the obvious, but the way people encounter messages in the wild bears no resemblance to that whatsoever. When people encounter messages in the wild, it's in the midst of the noise and chaos of our modern information system. They get partial messages, and the messages are surrounded, often, by counter-messages from the other side. So the way people encounter and absorb messages in the real world seems to me so distant and different from the way these focus groups are done that there's just not a lot to learn from the latter about the former. </p><p>So how do you messaging experts, or testers, figure out how a message will perform not just in isolation, but in the scrum of an actual political fight in the actual world?</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>I feel like you are an audience plant for me, raising up all of my core beefs and things I yell and scream and write and tweet and bang my head against the wall about. </p><p>Yes, you're absolutely right. In-channel testing is any kind of empirical test where you are providing stimuli to the respondents and asking for their feedback about that stimuli in the same moment at which they are receiving it. So that's a telephone survey, that’s an online dial test; even more sophisticated processes like using a randomized control trial (RCT) and not a sequential survey is still in-channel testing. Same with focus groups. </p><p>First of all, you are literally paying them for their attention. That is what you are doing: providing them a financial incentive to listen to your thing, watch your thing, and tell you about your thing. You have their undivided attention — or at least you have their somewhat undivided attention, because remember, a lot of this testing is happening digitally, which means that, like in the way when people are on Zoom calls, they also have seven tabs open. So you're still getting some level of distraction, because people are not just listening to you. The same goes for when they're taking a phone survey; they're also making dinner and yelling at the kids or whatever's going on. </p><p>But yes, it is what you say. So how do we deal with that? </p><p>We understand that each tool is useful for its purpose and not for another. Things like in-channel testing — qualitative and, more importantly, quantitative — can be used in order to understand whether one frame is more effective than another, or whether one frame is more comprehensible, logical, clear than another. </p><p>What it can't be used to do is determine effect size. You can't see an effect size in an in-channel test, say, “This moved people 8 percentage points,” and believe that that's actually what's going to happen in the field. That's not true, for the reasons that you say.</p><p>Number two, you can design those tests to be closer to the real world by making them legitimate combat tests, having people in the survey exposed to more opposition messaging than our own — which, of course, is what is happening in the real world — and testing our messages against what the other side is saying. This is one of my 5,700 beefs with a lot of academic research, that they do this test-tube experiment where they don't expose folks to opposition messages. </p><p>Next thing you can do, you can be a lot smarter about what you are rating the message to do. That's when we're doing message testing, which, by the way, is not what's happening most of the time. What's happening most of the time is that people are doing polling; they are doing research to take the temperature, not doing research to change the temperature (metaphorically speaking). </p><p>That, of course, is the way that the right wing approaches all of this testing. They don't say, “let's figure out where people already are on our issue.” Something that I say frequently is that it's not the job of a good message to say what is popular, it is the job of a good message to make popular what we need said. </p><p>So apropos the example that you offered, they started their critical race theory attack, and even today, most people don't know what critical race theory is. They have no idea about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>They certainly didn't start by polling and finding out that Virginia parents were natively concerned about critical race theory. </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>Because they weren't. They were like, what is that? Is that the name of a coffee shop? A new kind of NASCAR race? What is that? </p><p>They decide where it is they want to take people, and then they use message testing to figure out the articulation that is going to be most effective of the path that they have already decided to walk. They do message testing to try to change the temperature; they don't do testing to take it. </p><p>When we're doing message testing, it means not asking for facile self-reported ratings like, “did you like this message? Did you find it convincing?” That is asking people to have a conscious response about something that is happening unconsciously.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Right. This is one of my beefs about polls and surveys too: People are not necessarily the best judges of what's going on inside their own heads. </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>They are definitively not. People only tell you what they think that they think. Because most of thought is unconscious, so we don't actually know why it is that something moves us or doesn't. </p><p>So what does it mean to structure a better test? It means, for example, to structure a test in which you ask people a pre-question like, “would this make you want to convert the entire electricity grid to solar, even if it meant you had to pay this much more in taxes?” Why do we ask that that way? Because we don't want it to be a unicorns and rainbows question where people are like, sure, whatever.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Do you like good things? So many poll questions are like that: Do you like positive things? People say yes, and then they send out the press release: People love this thing!</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio: </strong> </p><p>Right. So you ask a higher-bar-ask kind of question, and then you expose people in different treatment groups, relative to a control that doesn't get any message, to a single message, and then you ask them a post-question. Or, you don't ask, you do a control, and you just ask the hard question after, so that you can attribute a difference between the control group that got no ad or message or slogan to the treatment group. Then you can say, “the people in treatment group C, who got message C, they had this however-many-point shift.” You can just do better research. </p><p>Then finally, the gold star is to do in-field testing, to use in-channel testing to get the lay of the land, understand what is probably best, and then do much better research — if you can afford it, because in-field testing is expensive. Instead of asking for people's self-reporting, you do something like send 100,000 postcard A to voters in this block, and send 100,000 postcard B, and then you actually measure the voter file. You're not asking people, you're checking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>That seems much more likely to give you good information.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>Yeah. People who know what they're doing do a combination of all of those things.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Good segue to my next question, and I guess we can use the critical race theory example to get at this question too. </p><p>It seems to me one of the reasons that they were able to start from nothing — parents having no idea what critical race theory is — to parents freaked out about critical race theory in an incredibly short period of time is that they were not starting from nothing. </p><p>The background presumptions of the critical race theory message — Blacks are getting unfair advantage, whites are constantly criticized, whites are the most discriminated-against group in America today, they're trying to program your kids to be socialists at school — that foundation has already been laid through 40 to 50 years of repetition, of having institutions and politicians and media outlets say that over and over and over again. </p><p>So when you come along with this new example, most of the persuasion job is already done. The parents who have been hearing your stuff all those years are primed to believe this new example. </p><p>Similarly, I think back to the cap-and-trade debate in 2009-2010: All the right had to do was say, “oh, this is a tax,” and that got them 95 percent of the way they needed to go, because the foundation was already in place. Everybody's been told for 50 years now: taxes are bad, they're unfair, government’s incompetent. All of that’s already in place, so it's pretty easy to just apply it to the next thing. </p><p>In contrast, the left has <em>not</em> spent the last several decades laying that kind of foundation. There are, as far as I know, no left think tanks or organizations devoted exclusively to telling Americans that government works, government is good, lots of the things we have in our society are traceable to government. So because that foundation isn't laid, they're just starting from scratch every time, with every new messaging battle. </p><p>In the cap-and-trade example, the other side is saying “tax!” and then the left is saying, “well, no, you see, we set the emissions at x level, and then you divide it up into permits, and you can trade the permits, but over time the cap on the permits … blah, blah, blah …” People tuned out a long time ago. Total asymmetry there. </p><p>The right has been doing messaging about its foundational worldview, repetitively, over and over again, through multiple channels, over decades, and the left just isn't doing that. It approaches every new issue or every new piece of legislation or every new fight from scratch, and it's constantly on the back foot. </p><p>So my question is a) do you agree with that diagnosis, and b) if so, how can that be remedied? Whose job is it to be laying that basic foundation, the basic left worldview, beneath all the more specific points?</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>I definitely agree that that is an exact characterization of what the right has done successfully — that they basically have one message, or very, very few messages. What you're describing is essentially the oldest political trick in the book: divide in order to conquer. The right-wing use of dog whistles, of racially coded speech … not just in this country. I just came home from Brazil: it's Bolsonaro; it’s Duterte; it's Orban in Hungary; it's Brexit, Boris Johnson; I lived in Australia, it's the discourse of the right wing there. There's nothing new under the sun. </p><p>Basically, there is one storyline they have, and it is to pick some Other to vilify and tell aggrieved white people, white men in particular: this is the source of your pain and problem, and here, we are going to alleviate it for you. We are going to deliver to you this wonderful vision of a world in which we “Make America Great Again.” We will take you back to a time when you were on top of the pecking order: women knew their place, and Black people did too, and so on and so forth. </p><p>They accomplish all this magically, through the use of this racially coded speech, without actually explicitly naming race, thereby maintaining some measure of plausible deniability, and acting affronted that we dare to say that they've somehow made racist remarks. They say, “I never mentioned race. I just talked about illegals,” when, of course, when they talk about “illegal immigrants,” what comes to mind is not the Swedish backpacker who has overstayed their visa. </p><p>This is exactly what they've done. It's why critical race theory fits so seamlessly; they just keep remixing the exact same story. That is why it is so effective. And it is absolutely true the rest of what you say, that the left: we are very smart, and we're very creative, and we like to make a brand new thing for each thing. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>We are so clever — way too independent-minded to ever just go around repeating what other people say, goodness no.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>There is an entire thing I call “not-invented-here syndrome,” and partly, that is structural. Look at anything that used to be a mass movement — the labor movement, the women's movement, civil rights — that has gone through the maturation process all of these things go through and become professional organizations. </p><p>I don't want to use any one example, because it sounds like I'm impugning that sector, when this is just part and parcel of the architecture. If you're going to be a Sierra Club, a World Wildlife Foundation, a National Resources Defense Council; if you're going to be a Planned Parenthood, a NARAL, a National Women’s Law Center: you need to have your own message, your own branding, your own campaign. Otherwise, what are you showing to your funders to say, “look what we did! This is what we did this year” or “this is what we did this quarter. This is why you should give us more money.” </p><p>Responsible nonprofit executives want to pay their employees’ salaries. That is not a bad thing to want to do; you should want to be able to pay the people that work at your institution. </p><p>So the incentive is against having an echo chamber. There is a financial incentive on the left toward this cacophony of differentiated messaging, which is completely and totally anathema to persuasion and mobilization. It is a visible contrast to how things used to be when we didn't have professionalized organizations: we had a women's movement in which undifferentiated people were in the streets all chanting a similar thing, just to take one for instance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>The right has professional organizations, but does not seem to have this problem. What is the difference between our billionaires and their billionaires?</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>Their billionaires cut checks for general operating. The end. It is a nested set of ironies that they believe in this highly competitive, highly individualistic, highly unconnected worldview, and yet the way that they operate in political space is through an incredibly clustered, pro-social, collective endeavor. </p><p>The way that organizations, think tanks, spokespeople, etc., are funded on the right is that they are given money to just do their thing and are not required to produce justifications. I have 7 billion critiques, and one of them is of progressive philanthropy. Philanthropy is, at its core: If you're giving people money, that is supposed to be about the redistribution of power; otherwise, it is meaningless. If you give people money and you are still saying to them, “well, how did you spend my money? What did you do? What was the outcome? What was the output? What were you planning? What was this accounted for?” That's no different than me giving you a sweater for your birthday and every time I see you, being like, “why aren't you wearing my sweater? My sweater is so much better than what you're wearing! Why are you wearing that thing?” </p><p>That's not a gift, if I am asking you endless questions. You're either giving away your money and therefore your power, or you are simply pretending and still wanting to retain your power by asking endless questions and not allowing the work to get done. So that is my giant diatribe. </p><p>To your actual question — who is doing this on the left, who is responsible for this — obviously, I am not objective, but there are examples. There are campaigns where we have successfully done this. Let me just start with one. In 2018, after having done a giant body of research that we call the Race-Class Narrative (RCN) — which was created in part and in partnership with a legal scholar named Ian Haney López, who wrote the book <em>Dog Whistle Politics</em> and is one of the originators of this idea — we did this giant messaging project, which we have since implemented in many places, starting most robustly with Minnesota in 2018, with a campaign that we named Greater Than Fear. </p><p>As part of Greater Than Fear, we had scripts about taxes, public education, driver's licenses for undocumented immigrants, solar panels, etc. What that meant was that not only did we have Greater Than Fear posters and memes and social media channels and ads, organizers who were going door-to-door during that midterm campaign were echoing each other. It was successful enough that the politicians in the state — Tim Walz, who was running for governor and now is governor, the two senators who were running, folks at the state level — they adopted that messaging. Several of them had a closing get-out-the-vote tour which they named their Greater Than Fear Get Out the Vote. So there are times we've done that. </p><p>We've done that with Fight for $15. We've done that with “love is love” and “love makes a family.” We've done it with Red for Ed, the educator strikes that swept in a wave in 2018. There are times we have done this; it's not that we never have. When we have done it, it has been because organizations — unions, civil society, candidates, parties (to the extent that it is legally permissible, obviously not across the firewall) — have pre-agreed that the most important thing is that we need to be able to break a signal through the noise. They have suspended ego. They have gotten funders to recognize that this is incredibly important. </p><p>We did the same thing in the post-election. The message was “count every vote, count every vote, count every vote, count every vote” — instead of saying “let's call it a coup” or “let's talk about Trump” or “let's talk about authoritarianism.” Then the message shifted to “voters decided.” That seems like an facile and simple thing; it was actually incredibly well-structured, well-coordinated, and well-executed, and that message got across.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>It seems like a sane movement, or let's say a sane billionaire, would be seeking such successes and then trying to fund the organizations behind them so that they can build on those successes in the future and repeat those same narratives in other contexts to the point that those basic narratives become very familiar. That just doesn't seem to be happening.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:</strong>  </p><p>I agree with you, although you might want to rethink the phrase “sane billionaire,” because I don't know if that's a thing. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Ours have a different kind of insanity than theirs, I guess. Ours are the wrong kind of insane. </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>But also, how does one become a billionaire, which is an entire separate conversation. There is no innocence in capitalism. </p><p>That aside, I only know what I know, and what I've done, and what I'm fighting to do more of, and it's the reason why I emphasize campaigns we have won and how we have won them. It is doing exactly what you have described: having a simple, coherent message that recognizes that politics isn't solitaire and that messages don't land in a vacuum. People are hearing relentlessly from the opposition. If we're not attending to what they're saying, then our message isn't going to work. The message has to be engaging to the base. </p><p>But the answer, at least from my vantage point, about why people aren’t doing this, is because there is still a live debate, unfortunately, going on in left and left-of-center parties — again, not just in the US, but I also work abroad — around what it is that works. There is a level of fear, people clinging with their fingernails to what little we have, what little gains we've made. When people are acting from a place of fear, their behavior is never that great. People are terrified to try new things. </p><p>The truth of the matter is that a lot of what passes for polling and message testing on the left is the world's most expensive form of copy editing. People are essentially testing ecru against offwhite against eggshell. They're testing a series of messages which are largely the same argument but with tiny wordsmithing details. Then it's a garbage in, garbage out problem; message D or message E or message whatever is marginally better, but it's not that distinct from the other ones, because people are not considering the range of ways we could make that argument. </p><p>The reason for that, which you already know, is because the kinds of solutions that you advocate, that I advocate — the kind of world that we know that we need — is not the kind of world that a lot of people who are in charge presently actually want. So it is challenging to do projects, to do testing, to develop messaging that makes an impassioned, interesting, engaging, humorous, base-mobilizing case for true economic prosperity, for a livable planet, for an end to poisoning ourselves voluntarily in order to make a handful of billionaires richer. People don't want to do that. </p><p>The basic truth of the left is that we have to beg the master for money to buy tools to take down his house.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>That is very well put. In the spirit of thinking through these foundational left messages that can undergird more specific case-by-case messages, you refer to the race-class narrative. That's become a big thing in recent years. Can you explain what the basic building blocks of the race-class narrative are and talk a little bit about how it can be applied to climate change?</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>The race-class narrative is a messaging architecture. It is a way of talking that has a very deliberate order and structure, and that order and structure is built off of years of testing what is more and less persuasive. So first, let me talk through the structure, and then I’ll give you an illustration of what it sounds like in language. </p><p>You begin the first sentence with a shared value that explicitly names race, or explicitly names any kind of difference that the right wing has been exploiting in order to divide us and impede our progress. So you start off with: say what you're for, say what you're for, say what you're for — in contrast to a standard leftist message, which is almost always either, “boy, have I got a problem for you,” “this is the Titanic,” or “we’re the losing team, we lost recently, so you should join us.” So far we have not seen a lot of efficacy out of those three hellos that the left is keen on. </p><p>So it begins with a shared value. It then moves from value to villain. It names the problem that we're confronting second, not first, and it does so identifying a clear cause, as opposed to saying things like “homes were lost,” “the gap between rich and poor is growing,” “children of color are experiencing the least qualified teachers,” or, to get into your area, climate change has now in our language become personified to a degree that, “climate change is raising sea levels. Climate change is making the weather weird. Climate change is creating these deadly storms. Climate change is this and climate change is that.” </p><p>The issue with that sentence structure is that you can't actually pass a law on climate change any more than you can pass a law to make it be high tide at 10:30 a.m. You can pass laws about human behavior. </p><p>So what we find is that climate change itself has become this frozen phrase which is unhelpfully meaningless and seems to be a causal agent, instead of talking about what actually matters to people, which is air you can breathe, water you can drink, and a statement that at least implies causation, like “damage to the climate.” </p><p>Damage to the climate suggests that someone is actually doing the damaging, as opposed to “this thing is occurring.” As opposed to, it is some sort of self-inflicted wound, or climate change itself is an agent. </p><p>It's a little bit like talking about “systems and structures.” There's no f*****g “system and structure,” there are people making decisions, and those people have addresses. Unless you talk about it in those terms, you don't have an organizing model. Are people supposed to mass mobilize at systems and structures’ house? Are they supposed to do a Twitter storm at systemic inequality? There's no organizing to be done around that kind of problem definition. So step two is that it names the problem with a clear villain. </p><p>Then step three, it resolves the cognitive dissonance intentionally created in that contrast between the shared value opening and the villain problem statement second, and that closing vision statement is one of cross-racial solidarity toward the kinds of outcomes that almost every single one of us desires. </p><p>What does that actually sound like? For example: “No matter what we look like, or where we come from, most of us want to care for our air, land, and water and leave things better off for those to come.” Second sentence: “But today, a handful of politicians and the fossil fuel CEOs that fund them are trying to divide us from each other, hoping that if they can distract us from the fact that they are profiting off of poisoning, our families will look the other way, while they put the clean energy solutions we know work out of our reach. By rejecting their lies and joining together across race, across origin, across ZIP code, we can make this a place that we're proud to leave our kids for generations to come.” </p><p>Something like that. I mean, I would wordsmith it and make it shorter, but that's basically it in a nutshell. In the middle, you have to call out what the other side is doing and ascribe motivation to it. Otherwise, you are not guarding against the efficacy of their lies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>And what they're doing is always some version of dividing us so that they can screw us.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>Pretty much. If they can convince you that Juan is taking your job, when Juan is in fact sitting in front of Home Depot trying to get some day labor — and, by the way, does not possess the means to make public policy, because he's denied even the ability to vote in the country in which he lives and works and contributes — if they can convince you that Juan is taking your job, then you will not notice that, in fact, Jeff Bezos took your job. There's nothing new under the sun. </p><p>If they can freak you out about “law and order” or crime, or if they can make you believe that the problem is “those people who just don't want to work” or “those people who just don't come in the right way” or “those people who just won't teach their children the right thing,” then you can be made to hate and resent government and to be against collective solutions, because your understanding of government is as an evil force that takes away from “hardworking people,” who are coded as white, and gives it away to “profligate people,” who are coded as black and brown. </p><p>Then you resent them, and you don't like the government, and you're willing to vote against it. Everything is some big government socialist program that is evil and taking away your freedom.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>It's sort of hilarious that they've been at this anti-government thing for so long now that government spending is self-evidently bad in their world, government regulation is self-evidently bad in their world – and that's what governments do. That pretty much covers the waterfront. So governments doing what governments do now is self-evident evidence that something nefarious is afoot, on the right.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>Completely, and that government acting, having collective action, is somehow an abrogation of your freedom. In point of fact, I don't know about you, but when I go to a restaurant, I'm not really keen to be on the hook for deciding whether or not the kitchen is full of salmonella. I don't know much about that. I would like when I enter a building for the roof to be load-bearing; I know absolutely nothing about how you check that, I just like to have it happen. When I flush the toilet, I'd like the stuff to go away. </p><p>So partly, it's been on us. One of the other messaging mistakes I point out frequently is that we like to sell the recipe instead of the brownie. We like to have our policies be our message, and that is a very bad idea. People like paid family leave, don't mistake me, but you know what they like even better? When we say, “you're there the first time your newborn smiles.” They like clean energy, but you know what they like even better? “You can feel great about the water you drink and the air you breathe.” We have to sell things in terms of the payoff, in language that gets at the lived experience of being inside that better policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Let's talk a little bit more about some of your work you've done on climate messaging. One of the things I found interesting is what you found out about the Green New Deal. Tell us what results popped up when you tested that.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio: </strong> </p><p>I say this gingerly because of the point that I made earlier, which is, again: it's not the job of a good message to say what's popular, it's the job of a good message to make popular what we need said. So to the extent that the left could make the Green New Deal a thing, it's important to have an undergirding, galvanizing slogan that is central and so on. </p><p>That said, what we have seen in the research is that, at least the last time we tested it, “Green New Deal” is not a particularly effective thing to say. Just the name of it, without knowing other details — which most people do not and never will because most people do not have the bandwidth to be paying attention to that degree — it signals not that ambitious, not that much. A deal is a bargain. It doesn't tell people “your life is going to be better,” as a phrase.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>It's hard not to draw the comparison here to critical race theory again. “Critical race theory,” to most people, was an empty phrase, and they introduced it with the explicit goal of filling in that phrase with everything that made parents nervous or anxious. The emptiness of it at the beginning was almost part of the point, because they could just paint whatever they wanted into it. </p><p>You could imagine the same thing happening with Green New Deal: We introduce this empty phrase, and then the entire left mobilizes to fill it in with everything good that people associate with clean water and all the rest of it. But instead, we introduced this phrase, and instead of filling it in, the right filled it in, and the left poll-tested it and found that it was already filled in, so they retreated from it. So the right did the “critical race theory” thing to it, too. </p><p>I always thought the Green New Deal was incredibly powerful because it was mostly empty at the beginning and it could have been associated with all the positive things we want to put in this new world — but we just didn't have the wherewithal, the institutions, the mentality. It's such a telling contrast, those two cases.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>You were just making a more succinct articulation of what I was trying to say, which is that if you have a vessel and there's some utility to that vessel, then yes, it should be your job to fill in that vessel for people. I was simply reporting to you people’s present evaluation of the vessel. That was not, “do this, don't do that.” I was delivering information.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Yes. It's not filled in yet. Or filled in mostly negative. </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>So the choices are: Do you say, this is enough of a vessel, there is enough agreement among organizations, institutions, politicians, etc. on the left that this is our boat and we're in it, so we better make it the nicest possible boat? In which case, yeah, let's do it, and let's be very clear and good about instead of selling the recipe, selling the brownie; instead of selling the names of policies, actually selling the outcomes, which is a big part of the problem in the way that the Green New Deal has been described. It's been very much taking your policy out in public, which is unseemly, should not be done. </p><p>Or you can say, no, we need a vessel that is more clearly positive, which — just to give you a shot in the dark, out there illustration — would be something like the Freedom to Thrive Act, which at least suggests to people, oh, that sounds like a thing I want. I like thriving, I like freedom. </p><p>Freedom is a value that's closely associated with the US. That is true across demographic groups. When you ask respondents, “what value do you most closely associate with the US?” across the board, without exception, the number one thing named is freedom. That is a value that the right wing has claimed as their own for a long time, when in point of fact, it is a deeply contested concept. Core to marriage equality, the freedom to marry; core to the civil rights movement; core to the women's movement. There's a lot in freedom that is very much a progressive idea. </p><p>And not for nothing: the renamed bill is Freedom to Vote. That was a very deliberate choice.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Getting back to these core narratives, one of the elements of the right’s core narrative is negative liberty: freedom means people will leave you alone. Freedom means fewer rules, fewer restraints. There’s this other way of looking at freedom, which is by taking collective action and structuring markets or societies in certain ways, we enable people to have things they otherwise wouldn't have been able to have. So they have the freedom to get a good education; a good education provides you a certain kind of freedom, but it's a positive freedom. It's a freedom of new opportunities, not just people leaving you alone.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>In fact, in this project that we just wrapped up, looking at how to make a full-throated positive case for public education, soup to nuts, in the era of this anti-CRT nonsense, the name of our messaging guide is Freedom to Learn. Because one of the things that popped up as most potent and effective, besides saying most of us believe that our children should be taught the truth of our history, the good and bad, so they can reckon with the mistakes of our past and understand our present …</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Do most of us believe that? </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, in fact around 80 percent of people do. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I guess the other percent are loud. </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>That's exactly what's going on. But what I was going to say is that Freedom to Learn, this idea that our kids deserve the freedom to learn who they are, where they're going, where they've come from, is very powerful, and an effective rejoinder to this CRT thing. </p><p>What the right does so incredibly well is avail themselves of one of arguably the most persuasive things that anyone has in their arsenal, which is social proof. So it looks to the average person who is not paying attention to political details when they turn on their local news and see a bunch of parents yelling and screaming at a school board: “Huh, I guess people who look like me, who have kids that are like mine, think this way.” When in point of fact, both in our polling and in all of the publicly released polling, 80 percent, 83 percent, 85 percent of parents (it depends which poll), when you ask them, want kids to be taught the truth, the good and bad of history. They don't want books censored. They don't support these things. It is not a popular position. </p><p>But the right doesn’t care what is popular. They understand that the job of the message is to keep their base engaged and enraged. Because as long as that base — even if it is only 15 percent, 12 percent, 20 percent, depends on the issue — is yelling and screaming, that is what is persuasive to the middle. The middle is reading social cues to understand what is common sense and how the world works. Meanwhile, parents on the left, the vast majority of whom actually do support a clear, honest, race-forward, inclusive public education curriculum, they're not out there saying anything.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Yes, this is such an important point. I feel like the left, especially Democratic leadership, doesn't get this. A lot of people don't know that if you look at polls from the early 1960s, you find that most people were fine with equality, most people thought racism was bad, most people were ready for the Civil Rights Act. In terms of mass opinion, it was in the right place. But everybody thought that everybody else was still racist. Everybody thought that they were the exception or the minority. </p><p>So how do they find out that they're not? How do they find out that they actually have the majority? It requires someone standing up and yelling. So this will on the right to suppress the people who actually are in the majority from standing up and yelling and signaling to one another, they can keep minority opinions in place. </p><p>You can see that happening now, too. I bet it's the same on climate change. If you get people in isolation and ask them, “Should we go for it? Should we clean everything up?” most people will say yes, but that's just not who they see yelling when they turn on their TV. I think that's so important. </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio: </strong> </p><p>It’s absolutely the case that we are not just creatures driven by emotion, we are creatures driven deeply in our political beliefs by our <em>identity</em>, and our desire to preserve, protect, and maintain identity. So we are constantly reading in our environment social cues that tell us, what does my kind of person think? </p><p>Take a very specific case. It is common and frequent for folks on the left to do a lot of hand wringing and to verbalize, “oh, XYZ demographic group aren’t voting: young people aren't voting, Latinos aren't voting, African-American turnout is down.” We can see through experimentation — this is not self-reporting — that when you send the message to demographic groups, “your demographic group isn't voting,” <em>it lowers voting</em>. Similarly, talking about vaccine refusal increases vaccine refusal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>That's like the thumb trap: the harder you try to get out of the trap, the more you're in it. If you watch what consumes political dialogue on a day-to-day level, it's constantly the right acting, accusing, establishing things, and constantly the left talking about what the right is saying: fact checking it, refuting it, but talking about it, constantly. So it's what gets talked about.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>My standard joke is that if the left had written the story of David, it would be a biography of Goliath. We talk about our opposition all f*****g day and then we're like, “oh, why don't people want to be motivated?” Because the truth of the matter is, the thing that we see in test after test, is that believe it or not, our opposition is actually not the opposition. It's cynicism. It's not that people don't think our ideas are right, it's that they don't think our ideas are possible. So why bother even trying, when we speak relentlessly about our opposition? Talking about Trump in 2016 is how we got Trump.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>What a nightmarish thought that is. We conjured him into the presidency through our fear.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>When you take your kid to a pool and your kid is running, a competent lifeguard will yell, “walk!” because if you yell “don't run!” at a kid, they will run, either out of defiance or because you literally just yelled “run” at them. </p><p>The core messaging lesson when I do presentations is, “forget everything else that happened today, I just want you to remember one thing: Say what you're for. Say what you're for. Say what you’re for.” You have to tell people what we want them to do, and stop telling them what we don't want them to do. We have to yell “walk!” not yell “don't run!” </p><p>In the climate space, I know, for example, from my work in Australia, the percentage of jobs in the coal industry is something like 0.1 percent. But when the average Australian is asked to take a guess what proportion of jobs are in coal, people guess anywhere from 5 to 20 percent. I would guess if you asked Americans, it would be the same. They wildly overestimate how many jobs in our economy are in the coal industry. Why is that? It's because we talk about coal all the f*****g time. We talk about coal every goddamn day. So it is no wonder that people routinely overestimate its centrality, importance, size, contribution, and number of jobs.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>One of the big things that lefties in the climate space who view themselves as virtuous talk about a lot is a just transition for coal workers. They think, by making that a common point of discussion, they are signaling their good intentions and their virtue, that it's safe for coal workers to embrace this, blah, blah, blah. But I worry that we're having the effect you're describing, which is vastly overstating the significance and number of coal workers in the world and making the transition more difficult. Now you’ve got everybody thinking about this beleaguered group that's going to get ground up by the transition and overestimating their size, etc. How do you navigate that?</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>The way you navigate that is by having more of an overarching message. I'm wordsmithing it on the fly, so forgive me, it's not going to be copy edited, but it would be something like: “Whether we're Black or white, rural or urban, young or old, we all want to be able to care for our families and do work that we're proud of that leaves things better for those to come. But today, a handful of politicians and the fossil fuel CEOs that fund them want to keep people tied to a wage they can't live on and a job that is hurting their families, our air, and our water. By joining together to demand both clean, reliable energy that's homegrown, made from the wind and the sun, and jobs for people coming from any industry, we can make this a place …” </p><p>You just do it like that, more broad strokes, instead of zeroing in on, “we're going to specifically rescue you from the coal mine,” which does reinforce this idea that we're talking about several million people, and we're not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I want to get to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/08/opinion/democrats-david-shor-education-polarization.html">popularism</a> before we're done. The idea behind popularism is that the commanding heights of the Democratic Party have been overtaken by young, educated, urban liberals, but the majority of Democratic voters are still non-college-educated white men. The idea is that all these effete urban liberals are pushing organizations to message and talk in a way that flatters their worldviews and their sensibilities. They cite “defund the police” and all these policies that only resonate among that crowd, but do not resonate among the non-college-educated white men that Dems still need to win. </p><p>The idea, I think, is Dems need to readjust their messaging to appeal to the great, not particularly progressive, non-college-educated white masses, the way that used to be very en vogue. That was Bill Clinton's whole thing. Obama, to some extent — this is an argument popularists make that has some merit — really did go overboard in almost every case to at least rhetorically check that box, to acknowledge the worldview and fears and sensibilities of non-college-educated white people, even as he was pushing for liberal progress. </p><p>All the messaging organs have been taken over by these educated liberals, and they're out of touch with the masses, and that's why the masses are turning to Trump or tuning out. So we're going to end up with an entirely urban, educated demographic, which, because of the various distortions of the American constitution and governmental system, are clustered in cities and cannot form majorities. Basically: the left is screwing itself. </p><p>You want to be tuning your message to the sensibilities of the bulk of your audience, and we're not doing that right now, and we should do that, say the popularists. What's your take on all that?</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>Oh, boy. First of all, have you ever taken The New York Times “guess my political ideology” quiz?</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>No, not yet. </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>You take that quiz. The first question it asks you is your race, and if you tell the quiz that you're white, the second question that it asks you — do you want to guess what it is? It's trying to figure out political ideology. It's taking you through essentially a decision tree; what's the second question you think it asks?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I would think it would be about education.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>But you'd be wrong. Because in point of fact, education is not the strongest predictor of political ideology. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Wait, second guess: the population density where you live. Do you live in a city or a suburb or rural area?</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:</strong>  </p><p>Good guess, but it’s religion. It’s religiosity.</p><p>If we want to operate in a simplified world where we only look at people as two variables, or we only look at white people as one variable — which is a silly thing to do — the most determinative single variable is not education level, it's religion. </p><p>So first of all, this idea of education polarization as the most meaningful data point is demonstrably false. There's some veracity to it, obviously, we're talking about tendencies, etc. But if you're trying to reduce a massive population, which is white men, then the way to cut through it, if you're only making one cut, is whether or not they're evangelical. That's the first thing. </p><p>The second thing is that, what the popularists fail to understand is what we spoke about earlier: that politics is not solitaire. If we choose to be silent about race, about police, about immigration, about all of these things that are purportedly anathema for us to talk about, that doesn't mean those conversations go away. It means that the only thing our voters hear is the unrelenting race-baiting of the other side, which means our economic promises cannot cut through. </p><p>We've seen this over and over again, when we go to our voters and say, “I'm going to increase your wages, you're going to have better working conditions,” the voter has just been canvassed two hours earlier by some right wingers saying, “Juan is taking your job” or “you can't even drive into the city because it's too dangerous and you're going to be murdered and there's crime.” Our economic promises have no ability to break through and penetrate because the right wing is engaged in this unrelenting scapegoating and fearmongering, and if our messages are not attending to that, they don't work. </p><p>Number three: Let's take Obama as an example. Let's take, more specifically, his attempts to appease frightened, anxious white people, these non-college white people, by deporting more people than any previous president and using the discourse of getting tough on the border and cracking down and deporting and deporting and deporting. </p><p>I'm just stating facts. That is what occurred. It’s not a message, that is what happened. </p><p>Republicans <em>still</em> said he was for open borders, <em>still</em> said he was creating this entire ethos and era. Obama himself said that he had to be tough on the border, he had to crack down, he had to deport. Same with Clinton cracking down on welfare — this idea that you have to genuflect at the altar of the terms the right puts on you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>And worse, that policy is the right way to respond. As though policy will change the rhetoric, as though policy will change the discussion. One of the first political posts I ever wrote in my entire life was yelling at Obama about this. You can change policy all you want, but people's political opinions are only tenuously connected to policy realities, if at all. That's just not the lever. If you want to change politics, you don't pull the policy lever, you pull the politics lever. You do politics.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio: </strong> </p><p>How else do you explain that the former senator from MasterCard, who is now our president, is a “socialist?” How do you explain that Chuck Schumer reportedly wants to defund the police? The point is that regardless of what Democrats actually say and do, people's opinion of Democrats is not made out of what Democrats say; it is made largely out of what Republicans pillory them with. </p><p>How would it possibly be the case that public opinion about what someone stands for and does would actually just be made out of what they said? That would be great, but that is not the reality. So the entire idea is a house of cards. It exists only inside of the rarefied environment, like you said earlier, of a survey; it doesn't stand up to the real world. </p><p>I forgot what point I'm on because I could make 67 other points. This is just so deeply absurd. It really is as facile as your financial advisor saying to you, “you know, you should make more money and spend less money.” How is this a theory? “You should do popular things.” That is very “Deep Thoughts with Jack Handey.” </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>It seems to me it involves the implicit admission that Democrats are powerless to change what is popular.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>And that somehow people's opinion of Democrats is made out of what Democrats say and do, which, again, it isn't. </p><p>And then number … whatever number I'm on: again, going back to our earlier conversation, if your words don't spread, they don't work. The fact of the matter is that the Democratic base is largely people of color, and if we are not attending to issues of racial justice, climate, women's rights, immigrant rights, etc., we have a mobilization problem. We have people not turning out. </p><p>Something people do not realize is that Biden won 2016 voters by around a 1.5 to 2 percent margin; he won 2020 first-time voters by 12 points. It matters to turn out new people. Those voters that turned out in 2018 and 2020, in those unprecedented turnout elections, I call them vital voters.</p><p>That’s it. If we are going to hold on in ‘22, our only hope is to engage in what I call “re-turnout” — get those people back. The way that we get those people back is speaking authentically and full-throatedly to the things that they care about in their daily life. For a Democratic base, that means that they should be able to wander through their neighborhood and make it home without worrying whether or not the police are going to kill them. If we are not standing for people's basic human rights, why would they turn out to vote for us?</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>I am trying to imagine the paradigmatic non-college-educated, white, exurban man who was going to vote against Democrats, but then Joe Biden says something implicitly racist, and the white guy says, “hey, well, he seems like a guy like me, I'm gonna vote for him instead.” I am having trouble envisioning this swingable group of voters in the middle that are going to respond to signals like this relative to how they respond to economic conditions or other big forces. I have trouble seeing these messaging tweaks having the large-scale effects that the popularists seem to think they will.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>Completely. Again, they're testing these things inside of this fake environment where you're paying people for their attention. They're not actually attending to the fact that you have to get your base to carry that message. </p><p>Let's take a concrete example. For years and years, there was this advice that we should talk about raising wages in terms of, “we should raise wages because we have a consumer-driven economy and people need money so they can be customers in our stores.” Or, “hard work should be rewarded; we can't survive on $7.25.” </p><p>The issue with both of those narratives is that they eclipse from view the fact that the money to pay people comes from their work. It doesn't come from the magical money pants of the “job creators,” which is a term that was deliberately selected in order to mirror that biblical creator who may or may not reside in the sky. </p><p>So this language that “we should pay people more so they can be customers in our stores,” which is language that was created in order to make us seem like the reasonable people in the room, the adults in the room who get things done and are practical and are not asking for outlandish things — I don't know about you, but I don't wake up in the morning like, “I'm going to check on the GDP, I'm just really passionate about economic growth. I'm super excited to go take to the streets to march for the GDP.” People aren't going to go and act on behalf of that. </p><p>Instead, in the Fight for $15, the message swapped to, “people who work for a living ought to earn a living,” which is a fairness frame. It's a moral high ground. People would go strike and march on behalf of that. They would not march and strike on behalf of, “this will increase GDP growth.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>This better approach to messaging, with better research and a more proactive, aggressive mindset: Is that catching on with young activists? Because if there's one thing we've learned over the last few years, it’s that existing Democratic leadership, whose average age is 137, seem completely at sea in the modern information environment. Is there a young vanguard coming up that's better at this?</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio: </strong> </p><p>Yes, absolutely. You see them on your TV; they're called the Squad. There are definitely folks who are much better and who are making an impassioned, full-throated case for legitimate multiracial democracy, a livable future, everything else, the whole list. But I self-identify as pathologically optimistic. I can not do my job unless I'm optimistic; I have no choice, I have to believe that something else is possible.</p><p>I am also in a dark place, mostly because what the GOP learned from 2020 was that it was far too easy for people of color to vote and far too hard for them to cheat, so they've set about fixing both of those “problems,” and Democrats seem to be pearl-clutching and finger-wagging in response.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Can you be a deer in headlights for four solid years? Apparently, yes.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>Unless we can still have elections in which everyone could potentially vote and all of those votes could potentially be counted, I'm not really sure how we do everything else. </p><p>That said, yes, there are people who are doing much better. There is greater sophistication. There are people who are being more thoughtful and deliberate about engaging the base, understanding that that is, in fact, the way that you persuade the middle. </p><p>Even if your only aim was to get white people in Midwestern diners to flip, still the way that you would do it would be to engage the base, because in point of fact, social proof is real. We know that what moves white people in Midwestern diners is seeing other white people out marching, for example, during the summer of protests after George Floyd's death. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>The Women's March was so powerful in that respect. </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>People's minds change when they're like, “oh, people who look like me think this. Okay, I guess I think this. Cool.” But the main thing is these vital voters of the surge in ‘18 and ‘20. That is what distinguishes 2022 from every previous time that we've been in a midterm, in which (spoiler alert) the incumbent pretty much without exception gets a shellacking. </p><p>But this time around, what is different is that we have just come off of two cycles in which we mobilized an enormous number of new people and got them to the polls. So it is an arguably easier lift, because it is not turnout, it is re-turnout. We have a lot of hard evidence of what did it, so we simply need to recreate it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>You see a debate now in Democratic circles. One side is saying, “our election messaging in 2022 and beyond needs to be about the concrete changes that Democrats have made to make your life better — our ‘kitchen table’ issues.” (I'm so sick of hearing about the kitchen table.) “What we do for you,” not, “why they’re bad.”</p><p>The other side says, “the fact that the other side is explicitly, right out in the open, planning to steal the f*****g election seems relevant. That is something we ought to convey to voters, because for the vast majority of them, they don't know, even though it's happening right out in the open.” </p><p>It's social proof again. I can understand the average voter looking out and saying, “they seem to be openly talking about putting election officials in place that are willing to steal the thing for Trump; it seems bad, but I don't see other people freaking out, so I guess I'm not supposed to freak out.” </p><p>So the other side of the messaging fight would be: people need the social proof that yes, this is a freaky, bad, apocalyptic thing coming down on us. They need to see that it's okay to freak out about it. </p><p>This is the quintessential messaging debate of ‘22, and ‘24, I expect. Where do you come down on that?</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>It definitely is. </p><p>First of all, I think it's just — real talk — going to be very, very hard to sell a topline message which is, “Democrats delivered for you. Aren't Democrats lovely?”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Reality does constrain your message somewhat. </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>That's tough. Unless we come back in ‘22 and we're in a completely different reality, which, hey, I would take. I would love that. Maybe they have some deep thoughts and reflection over the new year and they come back and actually pass things. That'd be cool. </p><p>Yes, I'm aware of the filibuster, and yes, I'm aware of the 60 vote threshold. I know all of the things, so I'm preemptively striking against that. Whatever. People view Democrats as being in the majority, and that is the level of detail that they understand, the end. </p><p>So first, it's very hard to sell the “Democrats delivered for you” message. Right now what we are seeing in nightly focus groups — like weekly testing, we're testing stuff all the time — is basically “a plague on both your houses.” “All of them are useless.”  “There's no good here.” Or, “politics, I’m just going to look away from it.” </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>And guess who that serves? </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio: </strong></p><p>Yeah. So the message is a little bit of both, and this is the distinction that I want to draw: first of all, it can't make Democrats the protagonist. It has to make voters the protagonists. Always, you want to talk to people about what you want them to do, not about the candidate or the party or whatever. </p><p>So, “in ‘18 and ‘20, you turned out as vital voters to defend our democracy and move us forward together.” And yeah, you can do a shout-out: “And that means we lifted blah-blah-blah kids out of poverty, and we delivered these stimulus acts, and we did blah-blah-blah” — whatever you can lift up — but make it the accomplishment of the voter, the audience that you're targeting, and say, “now you are going to do it again.” </p><p>The message that they used, for example, in the Georgia runoff — hot off the heels of Georgia swinging in 2020, they had a runoff in January — they said, “Our work is not done yet.” That is what they said to their voters. “Our work is not done yet. You did this historic thing. You're the reason. You delivered, and you're going to do it again.” </p><p>Obviously, it was also about Warnock, and Ossoff, and “Mitch better have my money,” but even “Mitch better have my money” is a voter agency message. It's saying, “you have the power here, and you're going to make this happen.” So first of all, voter as the protagonist. </p><p>Then, with respect to the shitty, terrible things that we say about these shitty, terrible people, is inspiring defiance instead of fear. That's the distinction I want to draw on the negative side: It's really, really important that we not give in to fear-based messaging, but rather have the negative emotion that we evoke be anger and defiance. </p><p>Fear is an inhibiting emotion in most people. It evokes fight or freeze, but for the majority of people, it's freeze, not fight, and it only evokes fight in people who are already activists, not in people who need to engage. </p><p>So what is the difference between fear and defiance? That's the difference between saying, “if Republicans are in power, it's going to unleash a new wave of Covid, you're going to get sick, you're going to die. F**k. Holy s**t.” Or, “Republicans are going to create these armed insurrections and they're going to come with militias.” Fear, fear, fear. </p><p>Instead, a message that says, “if Republicans think they're going to silence our voices and block our votes, they’ve got another think coming.” “We showed up and we showed out in 2020, and we're going to do it again.” “Not on our watch, not in our state, not in our country, back the f**k up.” That's the distinction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Well, your lips to their ears, let's hope. Thank you so much for coming on and taking all this time. This is so incredibly relevant right now. Communicating well is always important in politics, but we are at a juncture where it's so vital and being done so poorly in so many places. So thank you, and good luck with your work, and we will probably chat again sometime; maybe we'll reconnect in a year or two and see how we can message about the wreckage. </p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio: </strong></p><p>Wow.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I mean, the surprise victory.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio: </strong> </p><p>Exactly. You have to manifest.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Positive thinking. All right. Thanks so much, Anat.</p><p><strong>Anat Shenker-Osorio:  </strong></p><p>Thank you. Have a wonderful holiday.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-how-the-left-can-suck</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:45658839</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 20 Dec 2021 17:00:47 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/45658839/723f5a79ad1226ca798d09637691d8e3.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5042</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/45658839/91a1724845c705b388daa09263ada2ba.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The year in federal climate politics and what lies ahead]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>The year is coming to a close, which means us bloggers are obliged to do a year-end post, looking back on the year’s events and looking ahead to what’s next. I’ll be honest, I had second thoughts about whether to publish this post at all — my outlook is pretty gloomy and I don’t want to be a spreader of gloom — but I figure you pay me for the straight scoop. So here it is.</p><p>The broad story is that, as bad as it sometimes felt going through it, we are coming to the end of the most productive year of federal climate politics that any of us are likely to experience for a long, long time. I’m not sure it ever really sank in with most people, including Democrats in Congress, but this was the last big shot. After the Build Back Better Act passes (<em>if</em> it passes), that will be it for federal climate legislation. </p><p>After that, those of us hoping for climate progress will have to forget about first-best solutions and begin thinking in terms of guerrilla actions, in states, cities, and the private sector. That’s a very different mindset than the push for a centralized solution.</p><p>Let’s begin with a quick review of the events of the last year.</p><p>Democrats’ inevitably disappointing legislation limps toward the finish line</p><p>Joe Biden entered his first term as president in an impossible situation. </p><p>He was swept into office on a wave of high hopes, given total Democratic control over the federal government, in the wake of an election marked by expansive policy promises and record voter turnout. </p><p>At the same time, his majority in the Senate — salvaged by the two miraculous Democratic wins in Georgia — is razor-thin. Given the effectively automatic use of the filibuster by Republicans these days, absent filibuster reform, Democrats simply can’t pass bills under regular order. They can only pass bills through <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/5/28/18636759/climate-change-budget-reconciliation-democrats">budget reconciliation</a>, and even on that, they need the votes of every single one of their senators to do anything. </p><p>Given that basic structure, disappointment was inevitable. </p><p>Biden and the Democrats started strong out of the gate. Congress delivered the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/22310269/third-stimulus-update-2021-package">Covid relief bill</a>. Biden issued a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/biden-is-blitzing">flurry of executive orders</a>. Vaccination rates began <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/02/covid-vaccine-us-reaches-bidens-70percent-goal-for-adults-a-month-behind.html">rising</a>. As long as Democrats were doing stuff, taking action, controlling the news cycle, Biden’s approval rating held up.</p><p>Around July-August, two things happened. First, Biden withdrew US troops from Afghanistan, after which the Taliban quickly took control, sparking an extended wave of <a target="_blank" href="https://newrepublic.com/article/163357/media-coverage-afghanistan-withdrawal-failure">hysterically negative mainstream press coverage</a>. (Coverage of Biden in right-wing media was, of course, hysterically negative on day one and has been ever since.)</p><p>Second, legislative action ground to a halt and segued into months of frustrating negotiations, which continue to this day.</p><p>They split their big bill in two, allowing a bipartisan group of senators to hash out a roads-and-bridges infrastructure bill (the bipartisan infrastructure framework, or BIF) while leaving everything else to a second bill. The idea was to give Sens. Joe Manchin (D-WV) and Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ) their bipartisan achievement, but to require that they pass it alongside a Dems-only reconciliation bill, the Build Back Better Act (BBB). </p><p>At the time, Democrats from Biden and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) on down pledged that the BIF would not pass without the BBB. The bills were a single package, they all emphasized. “It's going to be either both or nothing,” Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/manchin-open-biden-s-human-infrastructure-plans-undoing-some-trump-n1272057">said</a>.</p><p>What happened instead is that the bipartisan group put together a relatively bare-bones bill and got it passed through the Senate. That put immense pressure on the House to follow suit, despite everyone’s pledges. The progressive caucus, led by Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), held together and refused to pass the BIF for as long as it could, but in November, it relented and the House <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/05/us/politics/house-infrastructure-reconciliation.html">passed the bill</a>.  </p><p>Progressives voted for the BIF based on a promise from Biden that he could secure Manchin’s vote for the BBB in something close to its present form. By all appearances thus far, that promise was worth very little. Manchin showed no sign at the time, and has showed no sign since, that he’s willing to vote for BBB as it stands. </p><p>In fact, before and after the BIF passed, he has done nothing but talk down the BBB, set arbitrary limits on its total size, and demand that elements be eliminated (like the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-sen-tina-smith-on-the">Clean Electricity Payment Program</a>) or radically pared back (like paid leave).</p><p>Sinema has been frustrating throughout the process, but at least for now, it looks like she got what she wanted — protecting Pharma from price competition and corporations from higher taxes — and is now ready to vote the bill through.</p><p>Manchin, on the other hand, has been nothing but a jerk, from the very beginning and at every stage. He’s been more of a jerk than is explicable even given the red lean of his state, even given his <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/12/13/manchin-blind-trust-enersystems-stock-climate-change/">outlandishly corrupt conflicts of interest</a>. He’s been a vain, inconstant, ill-informed font of conservative economic gibberish, theatrically sticking his thumb in the eyes of the other 49 members of his caucus. </p><p>He’s still being a jerk, calling for a “<a target="_blank" href="https://apnews.com/article/business-933207cd2af1b1d0969be55aaf3b778a">strategic pause</a>” on the bill and citing inflation as a justification. (Economists say that the <a target="_blank" href="https://investinamericaproject.com/economists-build-back-better-acts-cost-cutting-measures-will-alleviate-strain-of-inflation-on-families/">BBB will alleviate inflation</a>.) He’s out peddling <a target="_blank" href="https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/lindsey-graham-offers-case-study-how-not-have-policy-debate-n1285760">a fake Congressional Budget Office report</a> from Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), using it to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.axios.com/manchin-senate-spending-biden-87a445c2-cfdf-4bba-bc20-dd62db2a613a.html">go after the child tax credit</a>, which is just about the most ignorant and malicious thing he could conceivably be doing.</p><p>Schumer keeps setting deadlines to vote on the BBB, but they keep blowing past with no agreement and no repercussions. Last week he was saying Christmas; now they’re talking about <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/15/build-back-better-act-democrats-unlikely-to-pass-biden-social-spending-plan.html">some time early next year</a>.</p><p>As Biden’s approval rating continues struggling — the negative coverage that began with Afghanistan <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/12/03/biden-media-coverage-worse-trump-favorable/">never ceased</a> — and inflation drags on, Manchin is more and more empowered. He loves where he is right now: at the center of attention, the man in the middle, the Democrat who screws over other Democrats. He’ll stay in that spotlight as long as he can.</p><p>And that brings us up to date on the big picture. What about climate policy?</p><p>Build Back Better is still good climate policy</p><p>On climate, it’s been a roller coaster. Heading into the election, Dems across the party seemed united around an <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21252892/climate-change-democrats-joe-biden-renewable-energy-unions-environmental-justice">ambitious policy vision</a>. The climate plans of the leading candidates <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2019/9/10/20851109/2020-democrats-climate-change-plan-president">reflected it</a>, including, eventually, Biden’s.</p><p>When elected, rather than retreating from that agenda, Biden embraced it. He brought climate activists into the fold to help shape policy. He hired superstars for key energy-related positions. He said all the right things.</p><p>When the Covid relief bill was passed and attention turned to the BBB agenda, Sanders led with a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/us/politics/democrats-infrastructure-deal-congress.html">$6 trillion proposal</a> that was, among other things, a climate policy buffet. That was in June. Ever since then, Democratic climate plans have diminished. </p><p>The $6 trillion proposal became <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/09/us/politics/senate-budget.html">a $3.5 trillion proposal</a>. Before the election, Manchin <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/joe-manchin-trillion-infrastructure-spending-congress-stimulus-2021-1">was saying he would support $4 trillion just on infrastructure</a>, but in his new role as Jerk-in-Chief, he decided he would only support $1.5 trillion. </p><p>Of course, even after Dems cut down the bill to please him, he kept whacking. He took out the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-close-look-at-the-clean-energy">Clean Electricity Payment Program</a>, the one energy policy in the bill that had some financial penalties alongside its rewards. He’s currently <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/11/11/manchin-objects-federal-tax-credit-union-made-electric-vehicles-provision-bidens-social-spending-package/">trying to kill the EV tax credit bonus for union-made vehicles</a> (the Toyota plant in West Virginia <a target="_blank" href="https://electrek.co/2021/11/11/sen-manchin-whose-state-was-built-by-unions-joins-toyota-to-oppose-union-made-ev-credit/">isn’t unionized</a>). He’s jacked up the size of the carbon-capture tax credits. </p><p>Who knows what else he’ll do. But it is notable that, when the $3.5 trillion bill was cut to a $1.75 trillion bill and then a $1.5 trillion bill, the overall size of climate spending, around $555 billion, remained almost the same. Clearly Democrats are prioritizing climate. </p><p>Despite all the frustrations along the way, it remains true that if the BBB passes in something like its present form, it will represent the biggest investment in carbon mitigation in US history. </p><p>As with all climate policy, how you rate it depends on what baseline you choose to measure against. It’s obviously much more than would have happened if Trump had won, or if Democrats had lost in Georgia. That is to say: it’s more than nothing. </p><p>It’s much more than the US has ever done before, including in Obama’s 2009 stimulus bill, which prompted enormous growth in clean energy. It’s more than I would have predicted the day after the Georgia elections.</p><p>Equally obviously, it’s far short of what’s needed, which is in the tens of trillions over the next several decades. It is unbalanced policy, consisting entirely of carrots (tax breaks and subsidies) with no sticks (regulations or fines) whatsoever. And it’s much worse off, its effects less certain, after Manchin got done with it. </p><p>Princeton did <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/JesseJenkins/status/1459245283666137088">some modeling</a> using the House version of the bill and found that, while the BIF alone would yield almost no emission reductions, and BBB + BIF + CEPP would reduce emissions enough to hit the US 2030 emissions target, BBB + BIF would … fall somewhat short, but be a hell of a lot better than BIF alone.  </p><p>The three big lessons to draw from the modeling are a) the BIF alone is, from a climate perspective, basically worthless, and b) Manchin did serious damage to climate policy by removing the CEPP, however c) BBB remains remains America’s only real hope of staying even close to a safe climate trajectory. It desperately needs to pass. </p><p>What’s gonna happen?</p><p>My guess is, Manchin will continue being a jerk, whittling down the BBB well into spring, generating more stories about Dems in Disarray, frustrating and demotivating Democratic activists, driving down Biden’s approval rating, and rendering final passage of the bill (I do think something will ultimately pass) a sour affair about which no one will feel particularly excited. </p><p>Democrats will celebrate and tout the bill. At least some BBB money will begin reaching voters relatively quickly. But that alone will not be nearly enough to overcome the enormous headwinds facing Dems as they head into the midterms. </p><p>One of the only reforms that could make a real dent is the <a target="_blank" href="https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/573116-voting-bill-seeks-to-crack-down-on-gerrymandering">Freedom to Vote Act</a>, which would give judges the power to reject overtly imbalanced redistricting. Without that reform, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2021/nov/12/gerrymander-redistricting-map-republicans-democrats-visual">extreme recent Republican gerrymandering</a> will remain in effect for a decade. It alone will <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jun/28/republicans-gerrymandering-congress-elections">guarantee the GOP the House in 2022</a>, even if every voter votes the same as 2020. </p><p>But voting reform requires filibuster reform, and despite some <a target="_blank" href="https://newrepublic.com/article/164735/manchin-filibuster-carve-out-senate">recent buzz</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/12/15/sinema-democrats-filibuster-changes-524809">Sinema appears immovable</a> on the subject. Between her and Manchin, filibuster reform seems unlikely, which means voting reform is unlikely, which means Democrats are probably heading for a crushing defeat in the midterms. They stand to lose dozens of seats and control of the House. </p><p>Whether they lose the Senate depends on the size of the wave, which depends somewhat on events over the next year, particularly what happens with gas prices. If things go just right, Dems could hang on to the Senate. If things go poorly, they could lose it.</p><p>Either way, without the House, there will be no more federal legislating for Democrats — not in the last two years of Biden’s administration, likely not in the next 10 years, if not longer. </p><p>If they keep the Senate in 2022, Dems can stave off an impeachment (at least a successful one), install more good judges, and allow Biden space to pursue his executive agenda. If they lose it, some kind of impeachment effort becomes likely (Republicans will make something up). Certainly the final two years of Biden’s presidency will be defensive.</p><p>Controlling the House will allow Republicans to launch endless bogus investigations and subpoena Democratic lawmakers in retribution for the Jan. 6 panel. It will allow them even greater control over the news cycle. But most importantly, it will allow them to throw the 2024 election to Trump, no matter how many votes he receives.</p><p>As the Jan. 6 investigation has made extremely clear, Trump and his allies tried their best to steal the 2020 election. They were stopped by a few key Republican officials and (oddly) Vice President Mike Pence. They have been <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/01/january-6-insurrection-trump-coup-2024-election/620843/">busy ever since clearing those obstructions</a>, stocking key state election offices and legislatures with loyalists, gerrymandering safe districts in the House, and passing <a target="_blank" href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-july-2021">voter suppression laws across the country</a>. They intend to accuse Democrats of cheating and steal the 2024 presidential election — they aren’t even particularly hiding it. </p><p>In short, US democracy is lurching toward one-party authoritarianism and I don’t see forces on the horizon capable of stopping it.</p><p>That’s a grim place to conclude our year in review, I realize. I don’t want to bum everyone out. Obviously, everyone should do everything in their power to prevent this outcome. Nothing is written in advance; there is always a chance the tide can be beat back. But at the same time, it’s worth thinking through how Biden and Democrats can maximize the coming year to minimize the damage.</p><p>And it’s worth beginning to think about how, if the federal government is taken off the board, climate progress can be made through subnational governments and the private sector.</p><p>I’ll have more to say soon on the positive story unfolding outside the federal government. And more to say about what four more years of Trump and Republicans could mean for the climate effort. But for now, I’ll just conclude by saying: the BBB must pass, no matter what. Everything depends on it.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-year-in-federal-climate-politics</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:45454198</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 17 Dec 2021 19:15:23 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/45454198/a3624f6e8ff0e2e3a6ea70e83881ac35.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1019</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/45454198/1a5571e6c0a7a94f2019c926c4209000.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Discussing disinformation and media with Matt Sheffield]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, right-wing media critic Matt Sheffield and I discuss the disinformation crisis and the climate change crisis, and how they are deeply intertwined.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AAC2MFnM4gaA07whx9ISc0bSa/volts23.08.25%28matt.sheffield%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/discussing-disinformation-and-media-with-matt-sheffield"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p><a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/16/technology/a-former-right-wing-media-creator-on-how-a-different-reality-became-so-prominent.html">Matt Sheffield</a> started his first conservative media website, bashing news anchor Dan Rather for liberal bias, way back in 2000, and in subsequent years became a key figure in right-wing media criticism. </p><p>But the rise of Trump left him disillusioned and he has since become a prominent critic of right-wing media. He now runs a site called <a target="_blank" href="https://flux.community">Flux</a> dedicated to accurate, inclusive journalism.</p><p>Last week, Matt and I got together on one of these live Twitter Spaces things — a glorified conference call, basically, to which people can tune in and ask questions — and had a wide-ranging conversation about the disinformation crisis, how it manifested in climate change, and what can be done about it. </p><p>The audio was archived, available exclusively to Flux and Volts subscribers. I hope you enjoy it.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>We're doing a space tonight to discuss climate change and the birth of the disinformation economy. And David has been a longtime climate change correspondent and environmental columnist for a while, and he's also the proprietor and publisher, writer, et cetera, of Volts, a newsletter, which he started one year ago today, which he was just recounting that for our previous space, which I accidentally ended somehow. So your experience overall has been pretty good, you were saying? And I think I ended the space inadvertently right after you said you work better alone.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes —</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>I inadvertently proved your point, I think.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. This is why I don't talk to people. Yeah, it's been going great. I have found that readers are excited to go deeper and wonkier and share my obsessions. I'm sure different writers have different opinions about this, but I much prefer it over writing for a general interest publication.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>And you wrote a retrospective on your site today that — one of the things you said is that you appreciated not having to reintroduce topics over and over again in terms of — you assume that your current readers actually know who you are and something about the material, I guess.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, yes. It's the famed return to blogging. It is a persistent audience who will follow me over time and thus who I don't have to explain that climate change is bad in every post anymore.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I guess it's a way of trying to have a continued conversation rather than one that starts over de novo every time. Right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. And it's explicitly I mean, I did it knowing that I would be writing for a much smaller audience. It's not a mass audience play. It's very much for a self-selecting group of people who are more than average interested in my subject matter. So I think it can still have influence because I think the people who do read it are sprinkled throughout the world, the energy world, in high places. But I've basically transitioned away from mass writing, I guess is what I'd say.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>So now, before you were doing just for those again who hadn't seen what you were doing before you were working at Vox and then before that you were working at Grist, which is a website that's still out there doing climate coverage. How is it different now compared to your Grist days would you say?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh goodness. Well for one thing I didn't know what the hell I was doing back in my Grist days. I was hired at Grist as an editorial assistant in I think like 2004 with no background in journalism and no real background in environmentalism which is what Grist was supposedly about and knowing nothing at all about climate change or anything really. So the ten years I spent at Grist were in retrospect it's something I think journalists don't really get anymore these days, which was it was a place where I could labor in obscurity while I learned what the hell I was doing.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I think that's an interesting observation you make there because that is one of the things that's definitely very different about media now is that you and I are both Gen Xers in our forties and in the old days, the media industry was very sort of anti young people in terms of letting them have public facing work to a large degree. And so basically they had people work as research assistants or as publicists or something like that —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or come up through local papers. I'm old enough to remember when the way you came up through the reporting game is through local papers. And it's interesting if you go through that route you're taught a certain set of skills and rules and norms but I wasn't taught those at all. I had never had any experience in that world at all. So all I was reacting to and sort of shaping myself around was what do readers like? What is helpful to readers? And if you just follow that string you don't end up in the model of the inverted pyramid, daily objective third voice — information is relevant.</p><p>You know what I mean? There's no spine to your research. You don't know what you're looking for. And this is the sort of feeling I get from reading lots of objective news stories. It's like a grab bag of facts. It's like a grab bag of true things. They're all true. But how do they hang together? What do they all mean? That's what's missing. And once you approach it that way, what is sort of my narrative here? What kinds of things am I researching? What kinds of arguments am I trying to make that helps you know where to dig and doing that over time informs you more fully I think, than you get informed doing objective style reporting.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Traditional training with journalism has also it made it to the point of the topic today about climate change and disinformation. It made them very basically totally unprepared to understand how a gaslighting campaign was being built right in front of their eyes. They couldn't even see it happening. And you could argue that this was something that probably was first done by the tobacco industry in the 1950s and 60s when they did research that figured out that smoking causes cancer and how do we keep the public from knowing that? But basically that information, understanding how that happened and why it happened, it never really filtered down into elite journalism, I would say.</p><p>And climate change was kind of the next area where this —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It happens again and again and it happens — these critiques of the flaws of this style of journalism are things people have been saying for decades now. When I first started in this whole game in the early 2000s, it was sort of the rise of the net roots and the sort of famous like, oh, the bastions of the mainstream media are being stormed by these outsiders, all this blah blah, all this sort of utopian talk. But all these critiques of media that we're talking about here were around then the both sides saying, the sort of fetishizing of moderate being whatever happens to be wherever the two is between, where the two parties are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All this kind of stuff has been around so long now that I've come to find it very difficult to believe that the people involved don't understand these critiques or don't know what's happening. They get it yelled — if nothing else, every time they go out on Twitter, that people yell it at them. So they've definitely heard it. The thing is, you have know, economists annoy me in a lot of ways, but one thing I sort of have picked up from economists is, it's helpful — one helpful lens on any situation is what is the incentive structure? What are people incentivized, what are people rewarded and punished for?</p><p>And you can do that sort of brain-dead, both sides, journalism forever. And there's never a penalty, there's never a downside. Like, you might have people like me yelling at you on Twitter, but in the world of media professionals, that will never count against you. Whereas if you betray an opinion or know, like we saw it during the Trump years, like, sometimes journalists would get really worked up and they'd be like, "I think taking kids from their parents at the border when they're seeking asylum and holding them in cages without telling them where their parents are is bad" and you know, the whole right would just jump on it.</p><p>They'd be like, "Oh, there's a biased anti-Trump reporter." And then of course, that would cause the editors and everyone to retreat, duly retreat, like they do every time. And just that cycle over and over again, over time means as a professional reporter in DC, as a professional politics reporter, doing the brain-dead objective, both sides, horse race, blah blah, blah, is without downsides. You can get ahead doing that. There's no risk to it. So unless they're sort of like gripped by a civic spirit or whatever, why would they stop?</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, I think that's right. And then besides, from what you're calling effectively market incentives, there —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There are social and reputational incentives too.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah. No, I agree. And the other thing is that just in terms of how being a journalist works in the print business for a long time, there was this term that people use that "I have to fill the news hole." That was how they thought about making their product. But in retrospect, when you think about that phrasing, it's just basically you're going to fill it with what? By shoveling s**t down the hole?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, imagine there being any space without news already in it anymore. Show me a news hole in the universe.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, that's fair. And yeah, like a lot of this stuff though. Yeah, you're right that those critiques have always been there, and I'd say they're still certainly relevant. I mean, just yesterday, Politico ran an article in which they criticized Vice President Kamala Harris for being Bluetooth phobic. Because she was concerned that Bluetooth has some security risks as a wireless technology. It actually does.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is the nonsense things about that. You could go on forever. But just one note, like note that the whole critique from people like us of the mainstream political media in 2006 can be boiled down to two words: Her emails. Right. They spent an absurd amount of time on that ridiculous non-story, and that has become shorthand for the whole critique of mainstream media. So for them to go after Kamala Harris for information security specifically, not for breaching it, but for being too concerned about it, it's hard to interpret that as anything but a deliberate "F**k you" to every media critic of the last five years.</p><p>Right? I mean, it's not just any shallow, stupid story. It's very specifically a shallow, stupid story that is the opposite they attacked the last woman for just as though to say as though to flag, "Yes, hell yes, we're going to do this again. Hell yes, we are."</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, and it's the opposite. Her behavior is the literal opposite of Trump because when Trump was the president, he had a standard issue iPhone that he was tweeting on and his Twitter account had I think the password was "Make America Great Again." So his Twitter account got hacked twice while he was the president.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The whole four years was among all the other things, it was one long series of sort of horrendous information security stories, leaks and breaches and like emails being Cc'd here and there and emails from illegal accounts. The media didn't give a s**t because they never gave a s**t about infosecurity. That's never what it was about. It was always retrofit from the narrative they wanted to tell.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, and I think the other thing is that there's this sort of desperate, rote idea of making — our job is to hold public officials accountable. And so they think, obviously that is a journalist job. But on the other hand, that shouldn't be the number one principle because otherwise you just end up with these ridiculous stories. So in other words, like the Harris Bluetooth story, basically our vice president is taking too much security. That makes no sense in any possible world except under the rubric of, well, our job is to criticize public officials.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this is what accountability has become, right? It's shrunk to this ridiculous sort of brain-dead version of itself where these reporters just feel like I need to write negative stories about the administration. That's what tough journalism is. That's what real journalism is, just negative stories. And notice if you're not allowed to have any opinions about policy, or about whether it's good to jail children or about morality or about anything, you're not allowed to make any moral or ethical judgments. That means you can't hold a president or vice president responsible in those terms. Right? So the only terms you have to quote, unquote, hold them responsible are just these sort of shallow, like "Yesterday you said one thing and today you said something that sounds slightly different" or like "Oh, in the campaign you said you were going to unite people, but oh, look, people are still fighting" just the most sort of goofy, brain-dead versions of accountability you could imagine. To truly hold the president accountable means you got to care about something and understand something and desire one outcome over another, you know what I mean? And they're just not allowed to do any of that. So what there is of accountability ends up just being these sort of shallow gotcha gimmicky stories.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, exactly. And it is a very big contributor to how we got to this present situation where you have one party that has basically decided that if we lose elections, then we will end democracy. That's our belief now. And if moderation is simply splitting the difference between the two parties, well, then I guess that means ending democracy isn't good. But maybe just trimming it around the edges and curtailing it is okay.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Some Democrats say that democracy is good, critics argue otherwise.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, what I've seen happen is, and we saw this forecast a long time ago in the climate change space, is the thinking is basically what is good for us, our tribe, which is white Christian, rural and ex-urban conservatives, basically the Republican party has become quite monolithic in that respect. So what's good for our tribe? That determines not only what's politically good, that determines what's true. So everything else becomes subordinate to that. Including facts, including democracy, including truth. Everything has become subordinate to what it is in the immediate interests of our tribe. That's what I think you see reaching its sort of absurd reductio ad absurdum results before us now is right-wing media is just "What is true, is what is good for us." So what is good for us? That's what we're going to write. The whole notion of any metric of truth or even any conception of truth, that transcends tribe, that transcends partisanship has just completely fallen out of the picture now. It's just like, what do we need to believe? That is what we shall believe. It's frictionless.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>And as somebody who worked in that world for a number of years, all Republican operatives pretty much have this idea that everything is debatable, everything is subject to opinion. It's just a matter of opinion. And so when I was working at NewsBusters and places like that, the demand that we made to journalists was, well, you have to quote what the Republicans said about a thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>And then also not specify whether what Republicans said was true or correct or not. At the same time, one of the things that sort of began my disaffection with right-wing politics was that while I was fine making that demand of people who were claiming to have no views or no opinions, I also felt like that, well, conservatives ought to try to have a mainstream media that reports things fairly and reports progressive opinions as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's what Tucker wanted to do when he first started. Remember, he gave that whole speech. That was his original purpose, was it not?</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Oh, it was, yeah. And actually, I haven't mentioned this publicly, but I actually interviewed to be the managing editor, the first managing editor.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, you're lucky. Go on, I guess, because those original intentions got nuked upon first contact with the audience.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, no, and that's basically what happened with him, is that he tried doing some reporting on negative reporting about Republicans. And basically American right-wing epistemology is such that if you're a Republican, the only thing you can criticize another Republican for is not being right-wing enough. That's it. Every other criticism is unfair and illegitimate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, but over time this is what happened. Over time, it went from being unfair to therefore it is false. Right. You could say it's unfair and then you could actually go out and do some investigation and try to determine separately whether it's false. But nowadays it's just "That's bad for us, therefore it's b******t." There's no middle step where they're like, "Oh, should we go find out?" It's just what they need to believe is what's true.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah. And it did manifest in regard to the climate debate, because if you look at public opinion polls before the oil and gas industry began trying to manipulate public opinion through ideological groups and PR firms, Republicans actually were more concerned about protecting the environment than Democrats were, believe it or not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We're talking about the media. Science in general is very widely trusted, especially used to be very widely trusted in the US. And environmentalism used to be a relatively bipartisan thing. They had to deliberately code it partisan. It did not enter that way. It's not intrinsically that.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>I mean, like Theodore Roosevelt, for instance, Republican president was the guy who created the National Park system. That was a very big tradition even in conservatism and certainly within the Republican Party. And so, like, actually weirdly enough, some of the right-wing anti-immigration groups actually grew out of conservative environmentalism because people were concerned that they were going to be overpopulating the United States. Immigrants were, and so we needed to keep them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Give one thing I give Republicans credit for even like Inhofe early on, I think on some level, on some sort of brainstem level, conservatives like Inhofe appreciated the implications of climate change more fully than climate advocates did. Like, I think he recognized pretty early on, "Oh, this isn't going to be like traditional environmentalism." This is not a traditional conservation issue. If this is real, if this is true, then this means revolution. The facts here carry you to radicalism. If you accept these facts, you are carried inexorably to radicalism. So you have to refuse the facts. I think Inhofe was smarter in recognizing the end of that road than a lot of quote unquote moderates like McCain.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>That's an interesting observation. I think. yeah, he realized that there were a lot of implications for industry and Oklahoma being a big oil producing state. Yeah, he realized what that would mean.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Pull the string any direction you want. It means fossil fuel businesses and centers of the economy will be diminished and reduced in power. It means the whole world will have to cooperate if you want to solve it. It means you need stronger international agreements and maybe even some kind of international governance. You know what I mean? It leads away from nationalism and parochialism toward something like humanities get together and cooperate as one. And that's a very basic brainstem difference between conservatives and other people. And I just think Inhofe got wind of that early on. The people who paid more attention to climate change on the right were the ones, I think, to turn against it most sort of vigorously because they, I think, were smarter about where it would lead.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>And to that end, I guess early, relatively early on in some of the right-wing pushback against understanding climate science and acting in response to it, there was this scandal that it seems very quaint now that they cooked up a fake scandal that they called Climategate. Can you review what that was for people who weren't paying attention or don't remember that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's funny because there's a much more recent model that's very similar that will be fresh in people's heads. So basically, somebody we never, I don't think ever found out exactly who, though. One just has to assume it was some sort of right-wing operator of some kind stole a bunch of emails from the scientists who work at the Tyndall Center, I think it was, or I forget, some center of Climate research. I think it was the Tyndall Center for Climate Research. And they stole thousands — in the UK. Thousands and thousands of thousands of emails.</p><p>Basically scoured through those emails to find not just points, but to find individual sentences and phrases that could, if you lift them out of context and give them a sinister interpretation, could make it look like the scientists were up to something shaky. And so you're right, it's sort of like it was a template for many, many right-wing faux scandals to come in that the right-wing media did a blitz on it. Questions raised, doubts, like this phrase, what do they mean by this trick? What do they mean they're going to run a trick on the data?</p><p>And the right-wing blitzed, media blitzed enough that the mainstream media had to sort of pick it up. Like, oh, everybody's talking about it now. You have to talk about this thing if everybody's talking about it. And so the mainstream media did its sort of "Scientists involved say this is all a bunch of horseshit, but critics say blah, blah, blah." And then eventually after the story had passed from the mainstream media and most people had forgotten about it, all the inquiries and investigations that were set up to put it to rest — and I think in the end there were something like seven or eight separate inquiries — all found that it was b******t, all found that it was nothing, all found that you just get any database of thousands of emails and scour through it and you can find something that you can twist to look bad. But there was no —</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, and just to reference what the supposed malfeasance was, it was basically they were accusing people of having manipulated data and climate records and temperature data, basically. But as you said, yeah —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is important to emphasize because I think it also says something about right-wing scandals lately. It's not that there was a germ or a seed of wrongdoing that they found that they then blew up or enhanced or exaggerated. There was no seed. There was nothing there. The whole thing was spun up like cotton candy out of nothing. And that's sort of like — it demonstrated at the time. It demonstrated that they could do that. They're like, "Oh, we don't need to wait for a real scandal. We can just spin one up out of nothing anytime we want to."</p><p>And they've done it over and over and over again ever since. They did the same thing with the Democrats e-mails when that Russian hacker in his bedroom stole all the DNC emails. It's the same thing. You go through thousands of emails, you're going to find stuff you can spin to look bad, and by the time investigators or fact-checkers or whoever the hell show up, everybody's moved on and it goes down forever. Like Climategate is gospel on the right. It is in their holy books forever. The truth of all of that will never reach the right-wing base, and the middle doesn't care about it.</p><p>So it's like only the people who care on the left are ever going to even know that it was all b******t.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Well, and then, of course, that same playbook is being replayed right now with critical race theory. And that's why it's important for people who are journalists, mainstream journalists, to understand that you exist in a hostile environment and one in which your product is being attacked and you are being subjected to a manipulation campaign. And they don't even now seem to understand that because you're right that basically the goal of these strategies is to use biased right-wing media to create a story out of nothing or very little and then whip it up into such a fever pitch that mainstream journalists feel like they have to talk about it because, well, Republican elected officials are talking about it, so therefore, we have to talk about it.</p><p>And then they do, but they never put it in the correct context, which is, this is a public relations strategy and designed to manipulate the public. They never do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And there's a very strong bias, human cognitive bias, that is sort of summarized by where there's smoke, there's fire. We have a very strong bias to thinking, if everyone's talking about this, there must be something there. We have trouble not thinking that way even on the left, even after we've seen one after the other after the other, after the other of these b******t things come up, even after we've seen QAnon and we've seen whatever, when Obama was going to launch a military assault from Texas. What was that one?</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>The operation Jade Helm, I believe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Jade Helm, you know, Sharia Law, you see them over and over again. But even now, just there's some part of your mind when you see a bunch of different stories on a subject, you almost can't help thinking there's something there. That's how they manage to associate Hillary Clinton with every human flaw, even diametrically opposed flaws, because if you just do it enough, even people who have no sort of primary opinion on the matter will just sort of absorb by osmosis. "Oh, I wouldn't be reading that she's shrill this often if there was something to that, or that she's weak or that she's tyrannical. She must be all the things."</p><p>Like people don't have a coherent, rational view of these things in their head. They just absorb ambiently from the media, what's everybody talking about, and this is what right-wing media hacked. And what they realize is now that the sort of grip of the gatekeepers is broken, right? There's no more scarcity in news, there's no more scarcity in information, so there's nobody gatekeeping anymore. Anything can make it into the public realm. And thus, if you want to create smoke and give people the suggestion that there's fire somewhere. You can do it just at will, right.</p><p>You don't need anything to build on. And they just do it over and over again. And this is what I think the media denies its responsibility for and culpability for and just its involvement in is like even if your story on subject X is totally factual, just by putting another story about subject X out there, you are in some way or another telling your news audience that it is significant. More significant than other things that receive less coverage. You're contributing to the sort of atmosphere, the ambient atmosphere of information. And that alone is expressing a judgment.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah. In a lot of ways, I think you could argue that we're kind of in a modern-day reincarnation of the time of the era of yellow journalism. And it's weird how when people are learning about that in history, or they're discussing it in some journalistic context today, that people are like, "Oh, I can't believe they were so dumb. It fell for all these ridiculous stories." But that's literally what's happening today. Just to review it, for those not familiar with that idea in the beginnings of mass print publications. So mass print newspapers in the late 19th century, you had this proliferation of newspapers, and anybody with somewhat large enough an amount of money could start one.</p><p>And so you had pretty much every local political party had a newspaper, and you had lots of local vanity newspapers as well, of eccentric, crank millionaires, and they were just churning out whatever the f**k they wanted. And it was this environment where there were no holds barred in terms of information, in terms of what you could say, and newspapers would routinely make up stuff and insert it into their copy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>People will believe anything. It's not sort of like, I think, polite to say this in these conversations, but your average schmo is just not going to go into media consumption with all these defenses up and sort of scrutinizing everything and double-checking everything. That's just not how people work. People will believe what they're told, basically from trusted sources, and they'll trust the wrong people. It's interesting. I was listening to a pod about McCarthy and the Red Scare and it was really interesting to me because that got going through what we would now think of as right-wing media, sort of pamphlets and obscure sort of crank radio shows and stuff like that.</p><p>And that fanned the flames and that sort of pushed it into the mainstream. And as we all know, it went incredibly far and hurt a lot of people's lives. But in the end, it was still possible for the mainstream gatekeepers to say, "Have you left, sir, no sense of decency?" And to shut the thing down, politicians and mainstream media outlets could basically agree to say, "This is too far. We're shutting this down." And that's how it came to an end. And today I ask you, like, if there was a comparable Red Scare, there's no one who has the power anymore to shut it down.</p><p>You could prove the charges wrong to any sort of empirical standard you wanted. You could get accurate information out there all you wanted, but you just can't stop anything anymore. There's no way to stop half the media universe from just churning it forever if they want to. So, I think we're going to see if we get Republican control of government again and Trump in office again, we're going to see something like that. And there will be no trusted institutions left that can step in and say, enough's enough.</p><p>There's no Walter Cronkite anymore who can step in and say, Vietnam's gone on long enough and crystallize the change in public opinion. There's no trusted institutions or people that are trusted across borders or across barriers anymore. So, something like the Red Scare today, I just think there'd be zero check on it. There would just be no way to ever stop it. It could go on forever.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>It would be probably the Antifa Scare, arguably.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>It never stopped, in a sense. Couldn't you say —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, they never gave it up, right? They never dropped anything. They never dropped anything. But there was a time they could be held to the periphery somewhat, or at least banished back to the periphery somewhat. There was still a mainstream.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>I think, unfortunately. I'm sorry, I've not introduced myself to anyone, but I'm Anna Tarkov. I'm an associate editor at Flux. Hi, David. Thank you for joining us. By the way, I'm sorry I wasn't here earlier. They can't put that genie back in the bottle, as you say. We have to think forward about ways that we can mitigate these types of things. And we've had people that have written things for our side, and we've hosted other types of spaces like this where we are trying to wrestle with this problem, as are, of course, many other of our colleagues and other people who are concerned about these types of things.</p><p>And yeah, I don't sadly, no easy answers, but I know that we often have talked about that maybe there could be some broad teaching of critical thinking somehow that a lot of people do come back to that type of thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I think that's so wrong. I don't know if you want to have this out here, but I just think that's the wrong direction to look. You're never going to create a society filled with rational people who assess with all these good cognitive habits. It's very difficult to do that, even for yourself, even to be that way for yourself. When you make a conscious effort, conscious constantly, it's never going to be. You can't look to the individual, I guess, is what I would say. This is a social phenomenon to me. All the questions about truth are downstream of questions about trust.</p><p>This is all about social trust. The great mass of people have never been scientific thinkers or rational or gone around gathering evidence and weighing the evidence before they draw their conclusions. Most people, most of the time, then and now, just believe what the people and institutions they trust. We need trustworthy institutions.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>I do agree with you. I think that we need actually, I would say a multifaceted approach, ideally. And I think that where I agree with you 100% in a way. I also come back to thinking that we're not going to get back to a Walter Cronkite reality, right, ever. So people have to of course, we're not going to turn everybody into a critical thinker and everybody into a brilliant parser of information or even the majority of people. That is impossible. I 100% agree with you. I think that what we can do, though, is in the people that are concerned about these matters as the minority though they may be, that if you can have people learn and exercise these skills, they can have influence on other people who are not brilliant critical thinkers or are able to.</p><p>I don't know if that can scale, but on a personal level, I've seen this work in terms of personal relationships, I'm a person who is, I'd like to believe, a good critical thinker, et cetera, and I can affect people in my life and people I come in contact with. And if we can have a again, it's a multifaceted approach that we have to take. One of the problems, of course, is the vast ecosystem of media and other types of actors who are committed to disinformation for various ends. That is a whole other area that —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If you look at the research on like if you look at the research on conspiracy theorists, like Q types, cult members, what you find over and over again from this research, from the disinformation research is it's super hard once someone has been sort of led down this path to get them back. Like, it's high touch, super emotionally intensive. It's a real one on one thing, and really the best you can do is cut off the supply. It's always a supply issue. There's a lot of poison that once it's out there, is just going to do a lot of damage no matter how much you're trying to inoculate people against it.</p><p>There's got to be some supply — there's got to be some control over supply.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Yeah, a 100% a 100% —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>This is a complicated question: Who do we trust to be that? And it's like the right-wing media spent decades very deliberately attempting like, I remember Rush Limbaugh saying this back in the early 2000s. He's like, academia, journalism, politics, and I forget what the fourth one was. These are the four pillars of deception, which basically means all the institutions are taken over by liberals and you can only trust us. And they've been saying that over and over for 40 or 50 years now. So the question is what institution gets to play the gatekeeper role anymore. Like, we don't trust mainstream media.</p><p>We don't trust science anymore. We're going to trust, like, we're trying to get Facebook to do know, we're trying to browbeat Facebook and Twitter into doing it, but do we really want them to be the hand on the supply side? You know what I mean? So there's just no way around the problem of trust. You have to have social trust if you want to have a shared reality that you're all inhabiting.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>No, you're right. One of the big issues is religion in regards to fundamentalism. We've talked about several instances of right-wing propaganda operations, such as lying about smoking or lying about the Iraq War, the first one, George W. Bush's Iraq War, and climate change. But I think if you go back even further, you could say that trying to cast doubt on belief in human evolution, that creationism is the original alternative fact. And so because of that, you've got this idea that a lot of people who are Christian fundamentalists in America, they feel like that they know deep down that — they believe the Bible is literally 100% true.</p><p>But they know that that's not provable. And they know that, in fact, there are a lot of things that disprove their ideas. And so it puts them in 100% tension with everyone else.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, and also who is convincing within that world. If you have two guys telling you that Jesus spoke to them and told them to start a church and you should join it, which one are you going to believe? You're going to believe the one who's most charismatic. That's what the sort of coin of the realm is in fundamentalism, is charisma, because, like you say, there are no empirical and there's no outside empirical standards you can use. So it all comes down to charisma. And you see this now basically on right-wing media and in right-wing what's left, I guess, of right-wing intellectual circles is it's just performance.</p><p>It's just who's a good performer? That's what Ben Shapiro is. He performs argument, you know what I mean? Or performs investigation more than he actually does it. It's all who's most charismatic. I was thinking about that when I was listening to this podcast about Mars Hill. The Mars Hill Church super charismatic guy started it and ended up, you know, being an abusive dick. And I was thinking, that's like, who do you think are the charismatic people who talk loud and a lot and draw a lot of attention to like, those are scam artists. That's why there's so many scam artists on the right constantly.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Well, and that's why I do think that progressive Christians actually are going to be integral to overcoming some of this disinformation, because progressive Christianity in the beginning of the 20th century and some even in the 19th century at the end, figured out that, well, the Bible doesn't appear to be literally true. It appears that there are multiple gods that were in the Hebrew Bible that were squished together and created a single one and that God had a wife and that these gods were members of a pantheon. So that's something — then they basically said, well, okay, that means it's not literally true, but that doesn't mean we have to not believe in God anymore.</p><p>It just means that this is a book that was created by flawed humans and we can still get things that we agree with out of it. And there's nothing wrong with believing in some of the ideas and rejecting ones that we don't like. And so that's a much healthier epistemology, and it's one that Judaism had come by a lot earlier than Christianity had. And so that's going to be a big part of helping people overcome some of their intellectual nihilism.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>These are kinds of people who want this certainty and want this lack of ambiguity. That's what they're after. How do you convince them to be more cognitively flexible when the reason they came to fundamentalist Christian theology in the first place is that it's easy, very simple, easy answers and a hierarchy that puts them on the top. That's what they want?</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, no, that's true. The certitude is very comforting for people who want that. Ultimately, there's probably always going to be people who have that psychological need for certitude. But overall, though, for people who don't have that need, there has to be a better awareness of standing up for uncertainty, for standing up for pluralism, and understanding that these are things that they don't exist by themselves, that people had to fight for them and that you have to fight for them. These are not things that exist because, again, the story of humanity over and over in societies, over and over, is that the rule of the strong oppressing those who cannot resist them, that's the human story over and over.</p><p>And so having pluralism, having markets of some kind, these are all creations, artificial creations of governance and of democracy. And so you can have your beefs with it, but ultimately the other systems just don't work as well. But you have to fight for what you have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Although I would say, and this harkens back to something I said earlier about Inhofe sniffing out the implications of climate change before other people, I sort of think it's a little bit similar with empiricism, and it's a little bit similar with capitalism. If you really let capitalism run, it is utterly destructive to local cultures. It famously sort of standardizes everything. Wipes out and workers move, and it breaks up these communities. This is something I think you're seeing, like Rubio and Hawley get a little sort of hint at these days. Like unrestrained capitalism is totally toxic to any parochial culture.</p><p>And it's true also of empiricism. Like, if you follow that string, any parochial belief or superstition you have is going to eventually go down. I can understand why some people are just like, "No, I'm not going to take step one. I'm not going to take step one down that road because I see where it goes."</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>There is perhaps some positive, though, in terms of focusing on educational initiatives that if you look at younger Republicans in office at the national level, obviously a lot of them are pro QAnon and whatnot, but there actually are some of them, like Matt Gaetz even, who actually believe that climate change is real, believe it or not. And their ideas of how to respond to that don't necessarily make sense, but they are different and this is something that more conventional older Republicans regard them with suspicion because of that. I don't know if you've seen Gaetz talk about climate change at all, have you?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I've been keenly following this sort of nascent Republican attempt to claim to have an answer to climate change. But from what I can tell, Gaetz's thinking and the thinking of that whole caucus is almost purely 100% political i.e. it's not good for Republicans anymore for the division to be Democrats want to do something about this and Republicans don't. That has come to be viewed unfavorably. So they need to pull yet another scam on the mainstream media. They need to offer up something that looks like another side so that they can change the story from Dems want to do something Republicans don't to Dems and Republicans disagree on exactly what should be done about climate change. Which is the kind of story that they can ride forever, like they can delay climate action forever under cover of that story. Pure denialism has come to be kind of a PR disaster. But the two side story, as they're well aware, you can get away with that infinitely.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, is that progress, though, do you think?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I almost think I go back and forth on this, but I almost would have told you 10 or 15 years ago, I mean, I was saying this a long time ago, that denialism is stupid. They caught the denialism tiger by the tail and suffered for it. They should have pivoted to b******t faux solutions a long time ago because that would have served to — they only became the bad guy in this debate because of the denialism. If they could have just smoothed it out with both sides nonsense from a much earlier point, they could have gotten away with delaying substantial action forever without as much political flak.</p><p>I think this was always the smart pivot on their part. They should have done it a long time ago. I don't know if it's progress because once again, what media that people read or see on cable news is going to tell the American people these solutions that they are putting forward are horseshit — they will not do anything and they will not solve the problem, this is not a good faith policy proposal. Who will say that that's the truth? But who will say that such that any of the sort of casually interested Americans will ever hear that?</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>That's the sort of thing that we need people to say on these cable news shows and whatnot where they routinely create these false equivalences or set up these panels. And a lot of times the guests may not even know very much about the topic that they're being asked to talk about. And so I've seen many times where you have some far-right activist who's got a complete set of answers just that they don't make sense logically or with the facts, but they at least are short enough to be able to fit into the sound bites. And these debate segments, they're not accomplishing anything and in fact, I'd say they're harmful.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It gets back to the performance. As I was saying earlier, who wins those is who's the most sort of charismatic shouter. And so to get back to incentives, that whole ecosystem, the incentives in that genre are for bullshitters.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, and then I guess the other sort of unfortunate dynamic is that if you look at the — and I stopped watching them a long time ago — but the political Sunday morning shows where they've got this fetish for, this obsession with trying to find the reasonable Republican. They're continually putting Chris Christie on the air, or they've been trying to turn Asa Hutchinson from Arkansas lately, but they don't know how to talk to them. And so while they might be not a raving anti-vax lunatic, they're perfectly willing to enable the raving anti-vax lunatics. And these people like Chuck Todd and these other hosts, they have no idea how to speak to them.</p><p>They seem to think that their only mechanism is seemingly trying to attack people for hypocrisy and that's it. Or trying to get just asking the same dumb question, well, was the election stolen? What do you gain by asking that question every time? If you know what they're going to say, then don't invite them on the program because you are not going to persuade them of anything.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The only thing that should be asked is what would it — like, this wasn't enough, this wasn't enough, this wasn't enough. What would be enough for Trump and his base to do? Is there something they could do that you would decry or denounce? Just in theory, let's try to set a bar beforehand this time, right. Let's set a few markers in the sand beforehand this time, so that when all these collaborators travel past them, at least they're on record saying they wouldn't.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah. Instead of asking about 2020, you should ask them, is overriding the votes of a state wrong? Having a state legislator override the vote of the voters wrong? That's what they need to be asking.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Or if you're a member of the House of Representatives, would you vote to take the decision out of the hands of a state and just give the electors to Trump, which of course the House of Representatives absolutely can lawfully do and we have every reason to expect will do in 2024.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah. And then at the same time, while they could do better in terms of how they speak to far-right people and their enablers, the press hasn't really communicated the urgency of the upcoming 2022 and 2024 election. And that was a huge thing with this whole critical race theory panic. Is that just like the Climategate emails or just like the Hillary Clinton emails that — they're designed to sort of make everyone else throw their hands up and just be disgusted or confused and then also rev up the raving lunacy base. And so if you look at polling of Democratic voters and independents or moderates, they're very disengaged right now and that's by design on the part of the radical right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I keep reading about the Republicans looking for more Youngkins right, just sort of like how to be —</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Respectable Trump</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>yes, how to be a Trump in the sheets but then sort of a moderate in the streets. But the problem is that takes like and I guarantee you here's a prediction, the next Youngkin, whoever it is, part of how they will attempt to signal their moderation to the middle, to the media, will be to say reasonable sounding things about climate. That will be one of the sort of flags that they can wave at the middle while winking at the base. The next Youngkin will be, quote unquote, good on climate. That's my prediction.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Yeah. And I think that it's important to note that not only does it not fill me with hope that people like Matt Gaetz believe the climate change is real, and I think the reason for that is very important to remember that they're quite organized, worldwide, extreme right fascist movement. And we are going to have, and already are having climate refugees from the Global South. And I think that believing — I read this article once where it was like what happens when the right starts to believe in climate change? And a lot of the things are quite bad.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's going to be super ugly and that's coming soon too. I don't think that's very far away. I mean, if you think about it, if you try to put yourself in the mind of a reactionary and you find out that there's this global problem, the way to solve it is either to sort of cooperate with people across the world in a sort of global governance where you make present day sacrifices for future generations. Which doesn't sound like them. Or you could just build walls, pull up your borders, hoard the remaining oil and natural gas under the ground and try to basically lifeboat it.</p><p>And that will be the conservative response to climate change. It'll be what they call ecofascism, it'll be border restrictions and it will be marginalized communities being forced to again pay the price for it.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Exactly. There's a book what is it called, Tropic of Chaos? I have not read it yet. Yeah, it was recommended to me by a journalist friend who said that this is already — we're seeing this type of thing across the world already, where there are all these opportunists who are taking advantage of already, these, again, disadvantaged and mostly communities of color all across the world. And it's only going to get worse, as you say. And already again, we are seeing that already in the US. It's not an accident that we've already had this type of rhetoric about walls and locking countries down to immigration and that sort of thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Look at how COVID played out too. It's a perfect — Look if you are just assessing COVID logically, empirically, you immediately come to the need for communal activity, right? You have to act together, you have to make sacrifices for one another like you have to act with solidarity. That's the only way to solve it. But is that how people reacted? Like, was that people's natural instinctive reaction? Basically, when people get stressed out and uncertain and anxious, they don't get more progressive. That doesn't make them into cosmopolitans. The more stressed and anxious and uncertain and frightened people get, the more small c conservative they get and the more open they are to those kinds of arguments. That's what I fear.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>It has gone both ways, I would say. Of course, I'd say definitely much more on the side of the people who are, as you were talking about. But there was a moment I don't know if we're past it. I really hope we're not past it. But in the spaces I'm in and I know a lot of organizers and a lot of people who are really on the front lines of working for various types of social change, including climate change. And I think that we have seen the other side of the coin, so to speak, where people have pulled together in a lot of places.</p><p>There have been all these flourishing at one point of mutual aid efforts and all these types of things and that sort of thing. Unfortunately, it's an open question whether it's going to persist or not. As we've been saying, there's a lot of people who are very apathetic right now, especially people who are more moderate or less politically engaged, whatever you want to call it. I want to just again bring in something you were saying before too, about how unfortunately the march of capitalism that must ever continue is a big hindrance to all of this. Because people who are, I have a friend who calls it "s**t life syndrome," is her term for people who — because in our society, it is so hard for many people that — it is so hard for them just to make it to put food on the table, to put a roof over their heads, to pay for things that you don't have time to participate fully in democracy and you have no inclination to do so when you are trying to figure out how you're going to pay your rent or etc.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, and if politics does nothing for you, you're much more likely to. When someone comes along and says, "Hey, f**k all these people, I'm going to blow it up," you're like, "Yeah, whatever."</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Yeah, that sounds good. And I don't do anything for me because why would I? They've never done anything for me and they've not helped me.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Michael Moore in 2016, he predicted that Donald Trump was going to win on the idea that a lot of people just feel like they have no control over their lives and they just want to blow the system up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, that's one of the many frustrating self-reinforcing cycles that it's so easy for conservatives to launch. Right? Like they can make you feel anxious and then you become more conservative and then they pass crappy policy that makes you even more anxious. It seems like everything they start ends up working to their favor and it's so difficult to start the opposite kind of — it's so difficult to start a self-reinforcing positive cycle where people build on something together and it's reaffirmed and they benefit from it and so they have more trust and so they build more together.</p><p>It's very hard to get that kind of thing going, especially when you have basically half the media and one half of your entire society trying its best to make everyone feel shitty and anxious.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely. And I think that there's a lot of at least I'd see some possible promise or a good idea in the sense that there are people that talk about for example, everyone has like a different lens that they view a lot of these issues from where people, of course, will look at multiple viewpoints. But a lot of time people have one that they focus in on more than others, depending on the person, the commentator, the journalist, whoever. And I do think that there's a lot of validity to the types of people that say that one of the ways to get out of a lot of these problems is that we need to have a culture of accountability for people in positions of power which we have not had for I don't know how long.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That is the central characteristic of American public life from the time I have been old enough to be aware of it is: Shitty people doing shitty things and facing zero accountability. I mean, over and over and over and over and over again. I can't imagine, like, people born after me, younger people, have never literally never seen anything but that in American public life of just like the shittier you are, the more you benefit, the more you get ahead. And that's just incredibly toxic for trust, like I said, for social trust.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Yeah. And the troublesome thing is that not only some people respond to that with, of course, apathy, as we've said. They look around and they say, "Well, nobody faces consequences. There's nothing I can do. Certainly my vote doesn't count as much as someone who can hire wealthy lobbyists, etc. Why bother?" Which I can understand how people can get to that point very easily. And then the other thing is that there are people who then they valorize and want to emulate these types of people because getting rich, etc.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>F**k. Yeah. Well, and what else is whiteness but the promise to middle and lower class people that they can get a little taste of that, a little taste of what it's like to be on top and to not be accountable and to be able to do whatever you want and no one can stop you. Whiteness is just like you can have this version of it. Yes, exactly.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>That's right. And that's why people hold on to that. Above — people are always so mystified why these people are voting against their economic self-interest. Well, it's not that hard to figure out, really.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah. And then also they have other interests as well. So if you feel like you can never exist in the market, you just resolve that well, yeah, I'll just always be whatever my current job is. Then you can seek different incentives. So maintaining white supremacy or Christian supremacy, those can become things that are valuable to you and will provide a psychic fulfillment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The thing about the reactionary mind is based in hierarchy. Everything's about hierarchy. Every relationship is one of dominance and submission. So in every relationship, you're either on top or on the bottom. So all whiteness is, and to a certain extent maleness too, right, is a guarantee that no matter how low you are in society or in the economy, you're still above black people, you're still above your wife and kids, you still are the king of a little kingdom of your own. And that's in your interests. I mean, they're not wrong about that being in their interest.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>It's true. But just going back to the climate topic here for a bit. So, I think one of the developments there have been a number of recent developments in terms of bringing the costs of renewable energy, particularly solar, down, and China has really doubled down on a lot of manufacture of that and trying to deploy it. Do you think that those developments might move towards some more positive outcomes for the environment?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, yes. I think what we're going to see is China responding somewhat rationally to economic incentives, which just mean everybody looks at sort of like, what's China's latest proclamation? And we judge them by that. But if you look over the last ten or 15 or 20, 30 years, their level of ambition on clean energy and on climate just keeps going up and up and up. It's never as fast as people want, but it's only moving in one direction. And that's because all the prices for clean energy are moving in one direction. And it's suddenly known whoever gets there first in terms of the materials and the manufacturing of these components of a clean energy future is going to economically benefit. China is racing — this whole thing in the conservative circles are like, "China's not doing anything. Why should we?"</p><p>It's so dumb. China is investing trillions of dollars to try to capture these markets. These markets and solar panels and wind turbines and everything. Like, China's going as fast as it thinks it can, literally. And while still maintaining social stability, it's racing.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>And to understand that this is infrastructure, manufacturing, supply chain. Like, again, that's their supposed obsession with that now. But the reality is if you actually care about supply chain issues, then you need to be militating for massive investments in green energy.</p><p>Yes, which is what Democrats are trying to f*****g do with the Build Back Better bill as we speak, there are literally provisions in that bill specifically designed to stand up domestic supply chains for EVs and turbines and solar panels. And it's going to dump billions of dollars in there. And then someday those facilities are going to benefit red states, and there are going to be red governors taking credit for them. You'll see that in a few years.</p><p>Yeah. Well, ultimately it's possible that some right-wing billionaire might find the light might finally go off in his head, "Oh, I can make a ton of money off of green energy." And in fact, there was somebody, Boone Pickens, who had invested lots and lots of money in wind and natural gas, but then he died. And nobody kind of stepped into that space after he was deceased.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Or if you're a right-winger, you can take some comfort in the fact that it seems to be in America, if you become a billionaire, you become a right-winger sort of automatically, which is what happened to Elon Musk, you know, who came in talking about saving humanity from climate change and now has become a f*****g deficit scold. So don't worry. Right-wingers like money brings people in your direction.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>I mean, I strongly believe that someone can't be a billionaire without being some sort of an a*****e. But structurally, in order to amass billions of dollars, I don't think that it's possible to do that while being a completely ethical and moral person. It's just not —</p><p>The real chicken and egg question. They seem to both, like — they get grosser the richer they get and the richer they get, the more it makes them gross. Who knows where it starts.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>All right, well, this has been a great discussion. We're going to open it up in just a little bit here to audience questions. If anybody has a question, feel free to use the raise your hand option as we get toward the end here. So I'm just going to go back and I'll put a link in the show notes to the piece that and I mentioned it earlier on Twitter, but I'll mention it again after we're done here. So David wrote a piece in 2017 about Donald Trump and tribal epistemology and just kind of closing the loop a little bit on some of what you were saying that in this essay.</p><p>I'm curious what you think of it now that you were talking about the problem of disinformation to some degree at the time, you were talking about has to be solved on the demand side. But you did say, and I'll quote from you because I'm sure you don't have it memorized, you said, "If it is solved, it will not be, in my view, on the demand side," you said, "but rather to do it to change the incentives of disinformation." What do you mean by changing the incentives to produce disinformation? What does that mean?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, just to put in the most basic possible terms, you should feel like it is a risk to lie about something in public. You should feel like if you are exposed as lying in public, whether you're in the media, whether you're a politician or whatever, you will receive disapprobation for that social disapprobation. Your reputation will be hurt, it will affect your subsequent life opportunities. It feels really dumb and simple to say that, but we've somehow constructed a system now where there is zero downside for lying. There's literally nothing that happens to you. Your lie might not get believed, it might not work, but you don't ever suffer for it.</p><p>This is what Trump demonstrated. Just make up one thing after another. Some of them will hit, some of them won't, but why not just keep trying? You can do some of that with economic incentives. You can do some of that, I think, with government regulation. But ultimately that kind of has to be like a social thing. Like you need to just restore respect for truth as a social norm, as a shared social baseline.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>How do you do that, though?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>F**k if I know, I was worried you might ask.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>I will quote from the last headline, sub headline in your piece. Your headline was "The answer is: ha ha, just kidding."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? Because I don't know the answer. I mean, if you read my sort of gloomy outlook, I try to think about is there historical precedent for a culture, a society or culture that has become this cleaved in two with one side against another inhabiting different realities, wanting different having different visions of the good and of a good society and just having different beliefs about what is real and what isn't. Like what exists and what doesn't healing itself in some way other than collapse and violence.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>That's a very a good question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Never mind, like, an unlikely answer. I don't even have a candidate answer at all. I don't even know what it would look like. I don't know how you would go about doing that. It looks very gloomy to me, especially in light of social media, et cetera, et cetera, because if you had your hand on, like I said before, if you had your hand on the supply, if you had some effect over what could get into the public square, then at least you'd have a place to focus your efforts. But nobody's got their hand on that anymore.</p><p>Everything's flooding in. There's no way to keep anything out.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Yeah, again, like I said before, I think it has to be a multifaceted approach, right? There's no, like, silver bullet, sadly. If we knew what it was, someone would have done it by now. But what I mean by a multifaceted approach, it's like you're saying, I think there are a lot of different factors, a lot of different things that can be done and that haven't yet been done or tried, or at least not — for example, I mean, there are groups that advocate for tougher regulation by the FCC, for example, in terms of somebody not being able to buy up 500 radio stations and TV stations and etc., and broadcast the same message on all of them, that's like a pretty big thing that could potentially be done.</p><p>That was, again, it requires the will. It requires somebody to take the lead on actually doing something like that. As far as on the individual population level, where, as you said, I'm somewhat pessimistic in the sense that I don't think we're going to solve it either. We can teach people critical thinking, we can do this, we can do that, we can try to have people that are trusted, that check facts, etc., but I don't think we're going to ever get back to a point where we once were. But I think that on the political side of things that then what has to happen is that there has to be a recognition of the fact that there are these — as you said, there are people who live in these alternate realities.</p><p>And maybe the only thing we can realistically do is to keep people who are not living in the real reality out of power as much as humanly possible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, you're getting at the biggest central challenge here, which is in practice, anything that attempted to restore accuracy or that tried to enforce accuracy would in practice, mostly be aimed at conservatives. In practice would mostly be shutting down conservative voices or blocking conservatives from being on Twitter or whatever. Because it's conservatives that are doing most of the lying and it's no coincidence. So it's like the fear of being partisan, the fear of seeming like you're on one side or the other, has paralyzed every institution that could do anything about it to the point of uselessness. And I don't know the way out of that.</p><p>You just saw them run the whole scam on Facebook again, just like they did on mainstream media, like browbeating Facebook, claiming to be discriminated against, demanding to be represented on any sort of council or panel or whatever, and they've absolutely run the scam on Facebook and now are allowed to say whatever they want on Facebook. And Facebook has put hardcore right-wing propagandists on their sort of truth committee or whatever it was. What institution can escape that bind?</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, although, I mean, to be fair to the other social network, Facebook from the very beginning was proto-fascist with Peter Thiel on the board.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I don't think they had very far to travel.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Well, I mean, no, you're right, a lot of this it has to be a combination effort. And this is something because the disinformation economy is very distributed. It can't be attacked in a head-on fashion and successfully. And I would say so before I started Flux, I worked at the Hill doing polling for them. And one of the things that we always polled on was Donald Trump's approval rating. And it was very different from other presidents in that he had this strong floor of support that seemed very consistent, but to a large degree, that floor of support —</p><p>we asked people, do you strongly approve somewhat disapprove or strongly disapprove of Trump? And there definitely were a substantial number of people who strongly approved of Trump, but there also were for a long time, people who only somewhat approved of him. And those people figuring out what makes them do what they do and what motivates them may be the key to overcoming a lot of the social impasses that we have. And that's why I mentioned progressive Christianity.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Well, on the one hand, yes. And on the other hand, isn't it partially a pandering to those people that has caused the media to take this approach where we have to prove that we're not partisan?</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah. Understanding and — understanding them, but not pandering to them. Yes, good point there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To again and again, if you look at the sort of academic research on public opinion, and what you find over and over again is that people basically take their cues from elites, they basically take their cues from people they trust that are in leadership positions in what they consider their tribe. And that's sort of one of the most basic features of public opinion. It's one of the most basic features of human thinking. Which leads me again and again to the conclusion that there's just no way to solve this from outside the conservative movement. It's got to reform itself from within somehow, because it's completely sealed everyone else out.</p><p>Like, what else can anybody do? No one else is trusted inside it. And when will that happen? And what reason would they have to reform? They're winning. It's working. They change what they're doing.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>That's a great point. But ultimately they are damaging the things that they suppose that they're trying to protect. So, like, for instance, if you look at belief in Christianity in the United States, it's gone down as right-wing Christianity came to the fore on the Republican Party. Belief in the Bible has gone down. And even like Orthodox Judaism is losing members now compared to Reform or Conservative or actually Conservatives lost as well. Reform is the only type of Judaism that's growing in. And that's also true with regard to Christianity is that there are a lot of people out there, these fundamentalist right-wing Christianity sects, they're losing members as well.</p><p>So like Jehovah's Witnesses or Mormons or Southern Baptists, they're all losing members in western countries. I think that understanding — that's why I said understanding what motivates me and then trying to have the people who are concerned, rather than leaving and becoming Democrats, just try to stay and fight for reason within their own party. And that's a hard ask, I understand.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It is. I mean, if you look at the dynamics of fundamentalist movements or fascist movements, they all have a kind of arc, right? They all start with a broad appeal, usually as a backlash against some regime or elite or some bloated, whatever, and then it's just the mentality. They have to get more and more extreme, build clearer and clearer walls around them, and they shrink, right? I mean, this is what happens. They shrink and get more extreme and shrink and get more extreme and then end up imploding and bringing some substantial chunk of society down with them.</p><p>That's sort of the arc I think you would expect this to have is more and more people get shut out, you know, like you see, like Liz Cheney, what happened to Liz Cheney. Like more and more people will get sort of declared apostates and booted until the thing shrinks down, until it can't really but that will be an ugly, ugly, ugly process. And maybe you could reverse it. Maybe Republicans of goodwill could throw themselves on the tracks and try to stop that process from happening. But I don't have a lot of hope.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>I often come back to the fact that while you can't necessarily get people to think critically, I think that it's more achievable to get people to work — deep canvassing, have you heard of that? Where you go and you talk to people not about a specific issue or a specific candidate or a specific policy, but you try to reframe their thinking about various things. For example, I know of, and this has been empirically studied and it seems to work. So it's something that unfortunately, I don't think is employed as often because a political campaign isn't going to; they're going to go and talk about their candidate.</p><p>A political party typically is not going to engage in that sort of thing either because they want their candidates to win, et cetera, or to promote their policies or whatever the case may be, or their brand. This is what Democrats stand for. This is what Republicans stand for. And so I think things like that show a lot of promise. It's just a matter of them being employed more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, and think about it when you leave that house. I believe that this is what I mean by sort of high touch intensive interaction or intervention. I believe if you can get in the house with people and talk with them over time and establish a human connection, you can invoke different frames. You can get them to think about things in a different way.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But then you leave the house and you're gone. And Fox is still there, and Fox is there all the time, 24 hours a day, day and night, leading them back the other direction. So we can't go deep canvas everybody. We've got to get a voice of reason inside the house.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>You have to work all the different sides.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Matt, do we want to do questions? Let's do it.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>All right. We're going to open it up to the audience here real quick.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>If you haven't used spaces before, you have to request.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, okay. And actually, it looks like we have a request here. I mentioned this at the beginning, but if you weren't there at the beginning, this is a recorded Twitter space. So if you don't want your voice to be recorded, then you may not want to ask your question. But I did want to disclose that to everybody. Henry Elsewhere real quick. I have added you as a speaker. Go ahead.</p><p><strong>Henry Elsewhere</strong></p><p>Hey, how's it going? I'm curious, have you seen I believe it was in China, this kind of like, might actually be the carbon capture technology we're looking for. I just want to know if you'd seen it and if you had any thoughts on it. I heard there's a bunch of VCs that are super stoked on it because they're like "Oh, we only need like a 25 x 25 miles area with these carbon capture plants set up and they basically turn it into fertilizer." I don't know if you're familiar with this or not, but kind of interesting if it works.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I can say a few things. I don't know what specific technology you're talking about, but this is a super active area of research and there are a bunch of different interesting directions people are pursuing. There's mineralization, which might be what you're talking about, where you absorb the carbon into minerals, which basically render it stable and then just throw them down on the ocean floor or bury them or mix them in with fertilizer because they're a good fertilizer. There's a bunch of different carbon capture machines. All I would say is that carbon capture is going to be a marginal contributor.</p><p>Even if you take the sort of International Energy Agency as gospel, it predicts a lot of carbon capture, but still, carbon capture is going to be dwarfed by solar and wind and batteries and all the normal stuff. So I feel like the tech community and the VC community have gotten themselves sort of geeked up in kind of a Star Trek way about this because they love the idea of advanced super technology that no one's invented yet and can magically solve things. But the fact is, we have the stuff we mostly need and it's mostly political and social resistance that's stopping it. And it would be nice if some of those tech and VC people got in the arena and advocated for policies that got the first 80% of reductions done before we start worrying about these technologies, we need to do the last 20%. That's what I would say generally about carbon capture.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Okay. All right, thanks for that. All right, Nelson looks like he got his Internet connection resolved. So go ahead, Nelson.</p><p><strong>Nelson</strong></p><p>Yeah, sorry about that. We were talking earlier about one way for people to become more interested in the truth or more interested in the left and its policies is for the truth to help them. For the left and its policies to help them, right. And it seems to me that there's a lot of things like the Green New Deal, et cetera, that have the potential to directly aid people in their lives. But I think a problem is taking credit for it, right. If it is not reported on as actually helping the people's lives, or if the effects are downplayed or accredited to Republicans, for instance, then it seems to me that you will not get the desired effect of people becoming invested in the truth or progressive policies.</p><p>So I guess I was wondering if you had any thoughts on how to, supposing that we do succeed in improving people's lives, getting credit for that and using that to move progressive policies forward further, right? It seems like, can we get more progressive media? Can we yank the current media, give more credit where it's due? What do we do?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a fantastic question, which I could go on about at length, but I'll try to be concise. First, I would just say, didn't the poll just come out not very long ago that a substantial number of people who got the childcare tax credit checks think they came from Trump? Something like 30 ish 40 ish percent of people in the country? So you're right that there is no this sort of naive version of this notion that Dems have that like, oh, if we change material circumstances in a positive way, it will redound to our political benefit.</p><p>That is naive because as you are sort of indicating here, even people's experience of their direct own lives and circumstances is mediated in some sense. Like they don't bring meaning to these things inherently. They find out from the voices and media around them what these things mean, what's the context for them, like who's responsible for them, all these kind of questions. So there's nothing unmediated. You can't just change material circumstances and expect that to do the political work for you. I think Obama found that out, he lowered most people's taxes, and yet to this day, most people believe he raised their taxes.</p><p>So, I would say two things. One is, when you think about interventions that can improve people's material circumstances, think not only in economic terms like Obama did, but also in social terms. What is a change in their circumstances that's so big and obvious that they can't miss it? You know what? And Trump grasped this in his little lizard brain, which is why he held up the checks until he could sign them. Do you guys remember that? He didn't send out relief checks until he could sign, but he got that. So, you need to do things, one that are big and dumb and clear and unambiguous enough that they're easy — if you do talk about them, you can cut through the fog a little bit and just make it clear.</p><p>And things, I think, like EV tax credits. If we're going to give people $3,500 back on the purchase of an EV, that $3,500 check should come with, like, Joe Biden's smiling face on it saying, "Thanks to the Build Back Better Act, here is your $3,500." That kind of thing. Like, Dems need to think more crudely almost about public policy and quit this technocratic fiddling with tax write-offs and tax deductions and capped tested tax benefits, all this s**t. No one knows. No one ever finds out about any of that stuff, even if it does help. So, do some big, dumb things is step number one.</p><p>And then step number two is just talking about it a lot. And that involves two things. One, some message discipline on the left. Which, how do you do that? I don't know. Two, it involves what is the information infrastructure that gets those messages to the ears and eyes of voters? And that is the biggest question in my mind facing the left today, is that they don't have one of those, right? You have a right-wing media dedicated 24 hours a day, all year long to making them look like s**t no matter what they do. And then you have a mainstream media who, as we were discussing earlier, views its role as, quote, unquote, adversarial, hold people accountable, which in their translation means just writing negative stories over and over and over again.</p><p>So when you have a Democrat in office, the entire media landscape is dedicated to writing negative stories about them and making them look bad. And that's why that explains so much of what we see around us now. So, what is the left's machine to push back against that? Is it a cable channel? Is it a radio station? Should we send hip-looking young people out on TikTok to do — I'm half joking, but I saw a handsome young man on TikTok the other day with an incredibly articulate little presentation about zoning, about upzoning and its climate benefits. I was like, s**t, yes. If they're out there watching TikTok. Let's send some people onto TikTok. I don't care where it is. But Dems have got to stop relying on the mainstream media to carry their messages to voters. It just doesn't work. It's a game of telephone, but that never reaches the voters. So, I wish I had a better answer on the latter half of that question because it is everything. That's everything. How to build that machine, but I don't really know.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Well, I think no, that's a great point, David. And that's actually one of the things that we're trying to do with Flux is to A, get people on the political left aware that this needs to happen and then B, build it up to whatever degree that we can. And the reality is that it shouldn't be one thing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Progressive philanthropy has this obsession with, well, we need to have only just one thing. That's just this massive thing. And the reality is that's not what you're up against and that's not what you should do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Guerrilla warfare that's out on the streets, right? Corner to corner in all the places.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah. You need to be helping people, help you get the word out. Progressive philanthropy, there's a lot of problems with it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>If I had to trace the problem to one factor above all, it's our shitty billionaires. Right-wing billionaires are legendarily patient with their capital and generous and will just like — if you want to get on that gravy train, you can and live on it for the rest of your life just doing nothing but being a hack, going out on TV and saying the message over and over and over and over or writing it over and over and over again. And the left's billionaires are terrible. Terrible. They do these one-off campaigns. They do these deliverables.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah. Or they make for-profit investments in media. I mean, if you look at so many left-of-center media outlets in the United States, they're for-profit, and that makes no sense at all. If you actually believe in your ideas, you can't put pressure on them to be commercially viable. That's just —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And this is a good way of framing this that I ask people a lot of times. So the public has this mistaken belief that the federal budget is like your kitchen table budget. Right. This is long-standing —</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Huge problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, it's a huge problem, and it's been a problem forever because it really makes the public fundamentally misunderstand what the federal government does, like, what the federal government is for. It's a very terrible misunderstanding that hurts progressive policy. But anytime you bring that up and I've brought it up to numerous Democratic politicians and sort of like pollsters and advisors and whatever, and they all say the same thing, which is, "Oh, well, that's very old and deeply rooted and we're in the middle of a campaign and we don't have time to re-educate people about the basics like that. We just have to work around their misunderstanding. We have to do the best we can do in light of their misunderstanding" and that's true on a bunch of different issues. And so then I come to the question whose job is it to change the public's view about that like that and many other things but just choose that? Whose f*****g job is that? Is it think tanks? Is it some kind of media? Is it some kind of paid PR? I don't know what it is but, like —</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>It's certainly not going to happen by itself.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's not going to happen by itself. And the right has numerous organs devoted full time to convincing people that government sucks and it can't do anything right. Who does the left have devoted to convincing people that government can work and that it's responsible for most of the good things we have in our life in America and etc., etc. Who's out there educating them on basic true facts about the world and no one can give me an answer.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a know we try to explore a lot at Flux. So for people who are not following us on Twitter, I invite you to do that. And flux.community is our website address as well. And yeah, right now we don't have anybody raising their we actually do we have a profile name here so go ahead and you can take your turn unmute yourself.</p><p><strong>Diana</strong></p><p>Hi. This is actually Diana. Thank you. I just want to say thank you. Your conversation here has been awesome and I really appreciate learning so much from you guys. I'm trying to be one of those people that is having those one-on-ones with people in my community a little bit. I have an EV and I know it's not perfect for the environment of course, but it's progress. However, from my neighbors, I've had comments I really didn't expect things like, "Hey, it'll take too much for the grid to handle and we can't have everybody driving an EV."</p><p>And comments like the debate about the post-use pollution of the vehicle and the battery and then they go to I say, "Well it's better than the pollution." So then they turn around and talk about the mining process for the battery and it seems like I just can't win. So I'm just wondering somehow they win the argument. I don't know where to go with it. And I was wondering if people are hearing that and it's been the same different people, but it's always the same exact lines. Are they getting this from somebody or are they all coming up with that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The thing, they're all getting it from the same that's why they all sound the same is because they're all getting it from the same places. All these same arguments. Like I can mark as someone who is, let's say, too online, extremely online and involved in these particular subjects, I can sort of tell when a new talking point goes out. A talking point like "The grid can't handle all the EVs at once." That was nowhere, and then all of a sudden it was everywhere. I don't know the mechanism like what Alec or what think tank guy dreamed it up or how these things start, but clearly the word went out and I was getting Twitter randos yelling at me, using almost identical language one to the next.</p><p>So the answer to are they all getting in the same place? Is yes. And the other thing is, I can tell you from a history of arguing about climate change in very similar ways, with very similar people who were getting their information from very similar outlets, is that there is no winning, there is no end to it. Because they weren't arguing against climate change, because they had any genuine spontaneous feelings or thoughts about climate change. They just knew it was a lib thing. They knew — and you're supposed to own libs, and people like us, conservatives, don't believe that b******t.</p><p>And so they would try this argument and you shoot it down and they try that argument and you shoot it down, and then they'd go back to the first argument and you're like, wait, I shot that down. And then they drift off to some third argument and eventually you realize — in my case it took like ten friggin years — eventually you realize this is not a good faith exchange. We are not on a journey together to try to find the truth together. That's not what's happening here. They view their jobs as pissing me off and wasting my time.</p><p>Them changing their mind based on evidence is not in the cards. It is not a possible outcome here. And so a lot of times you just have to choose not to engage or disengage. I don't know exactly if there's a rule to tell the difference between what's good faith and what's not, but like a lot of these, you're going to run into a lot of this about electric cars. Now that they're threatened by electric cars, the coming global growth of electric vehicles is the number one thing that is going to diminish oil demand in the near term and is going to f**k the industry all up.</p><p>They're officially scared now, so you're seeing these Anti-EV arguments roll out and the fact is, yes, if every car converted to EV tomorrow, it would overwhelm the grid. Luckily, that's not going to happen and it's impossible. What's actually going to happen is the grids are going to be getting greener and being bulked up while electrification is happening. They're going to proceed in parallel and nobody is going to — no grid operator, like there's no forecast for the sale of EVs that has them rising so fast that they overwhelm grids in a way that we can't anticipate and deal with.</p><p>So that's just like disingenuous. It's disingenuous. It's just one of these made up arguments that's made to waste time. And it's the same with you here. Like, oh, you're just charging off the grid and the grid is coal. So really you're just emitting just as much elsewhere. Well, first of all, no, it's not just as much. Even on a coal intensive grid, an EV is better by pollution in pollution terms. And as I said, we're greening the grid as we speak. The US grid is getting cleaner and cleaner and cleaner, which means if you buy an EV and you're charging off a grid that's getting cleaner, in environmental terms, your EV is getting cleaner every day.</p><p>Right. Like an internal combustion engine you buy is as dirty as it is forever. But an EV literally gets cleaner every day as the grid gets cleaner. So it rises with the grid. There are answers to these things if you go out and look for them. I'm just skeptical about whether the kinds of people you're interacting with are ever going to care if you can shoot down their latest —</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Yeah, I want to underscore that for anyone else listening because this is a common theme that comes up not just in talking about climate, but every other progressive issue, right. Is where people believe that they can argue on the facts and give people statistics and studies and information that they view as empirically sound or scientific and that this is going to change their mind. Unfortunately, that's not how human psychology works. That's not how people's political beliefs are formed or how they work typically.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There's a great fact I like to share, which is that several studies and surveys now have found the same thing, which is that the most hardcore climate deniers, like old school "climate is not happening deniers" are the ones who know the most about climate science. They're not dumb, they're not ignorant like that. I think that's really important to understand. They often know more about climate science than your sort of average person off the street who just accepts what the scientists tell them, you know what I mean? They learn more about it in order to debunk it.</p><p>Right. It's not a matter of ignorance. It's all about ideology and motivation.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Yeah. And that's why you have to parse whether someone is talking to you in good faith or not. And it can be hard to do it's easier in person than online, for sure, I will say.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>But it definitely is true. It definitely is true that some people are sincere in their question asking. As somebody who was a conservative for most of my life. People, I was able to change my mind so I can say that. All right, well, so we're going to do — give people two more chances to speak. So Gene, we tried to bring you in earlier but I don't know if you were hearing us or not. So we're going to let you have a chance and then if you're not able to speak, then we'll move to Kent.</p><p><strong>Gene</strong></p><p>I actually hit that by mistake. Sorry.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Okay. All right. I'll remove you from the speaker then. Okay.</p><p>All right, so Kent, you can go ahead then. This is the last question here.</p><p><strong>Kent</strong></p><p>Okay. Yeah, there's a point here that — I live in a rural area. I'm a blue-collar infrastructure worker, retired. I worked on dams and all kinds of projects. But anyway, there's a point here where we need to decide, are we going to save the environment and the planet, or are we going to change the minds of the people that are fighting us? And I live here, and you ain't going to change these people's minds until they realize that there's money to be made and even the small-time farmers — I just sent a link to a couple of you about Sherman County, Oregon.</p><p>It went for Trump by 52 points, went from the poorest county in Oregon to one of the richest in less than 20 years by embracing wind energy. And the turbines are on farmers' land, and there's one farmer up there that gets $82,500 a year off her wind generators, which provides her money for next season's seed and maybe a new tractor that needs to be replaced that kind of thing. Dead Trumpers. But there's a point where if what we need to do, like here in Oregon, I can't put solar panels up. I've got five acres. I can't put up any more solar panels than I use for electricity.</p><p>So I can't actually produce electricity and get a wholesale price for it of whatever excess I make. And that would at least add to the grid. And the people that are fighting this really embrace that kind of thing. And so it's just a point where we got to decide, how are we going to do this? I mean, there's a big black cloud out there that we're charging towards, and we're all preaching to the choir, and that includes me. And so when I go out and I'm talking to my friends around here, they used to tell me that the Green New Deal wouldn't let them grow their cows.</p><p>They couldn't make hay. They couldn't drive their trucks to go get their cows. Beef was going to be outlawed. I mean, it was just insane. So I carry a couple of copies of the Green New Deal in my pickup, and I've got them all highlighted and marked up with all the pertinent things. It's only 14 pages. I'm sure everybody here has read it. And I go through it with them and say, look, here's what it says. There's a lot of good points in here. And then I talk to them about Sherman County. They just put in a large, huge, about a square mile solar farm here.</p><p>I can see it from my front yard. And people at first fought it and fought it, and now they're going, wow, that's pretty cool. There are some good things happening out there. It isn't all doom and gloom. We stopped the Pembina gas pipeline that was supposed to go through Oregon from Malin all the way to Coos Bay. They've completely abandoned that project. So that was just the people here. And you know what? It was all Republicans who stopped it because it was going to go through their land. It was a NIMBY thing. I know it seems really hard and it seems like all of these things are immovable, including us, but there is a way to get around this, maybe just at least as part of the energy part of it.</p><p>It's kind of like Tom Sawyer when he talked. We've all read that when he talked to all of his neighborhood friends to paint his aunt's fence instead of him because it was so much fun.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>That's a great point, Kent. Let's give David a chance.</p><p><strong>Kent</strong></p><p>Sure, not a problem. I just wanted to say there are some things out there that are happening that aren't just bad.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, thanks. Thanks for that.</p><p>It's a really great question and a bunch of good points. Here's one thing I would say. If you can try to project yourself back to before you heard anything about the Green New Deal and empty your mind about it and think about what was the spirit of the Green New Deal as offered by the people who came up with it. And I mean in the contemporary context, the sort of contemporary left that came up with it, the whole point and motivation behind it, well, part of the motivation behind it is we got to address climate change.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's one thing. But the other thing is this transition is going to happen because of economics. And we specifically want to make sure that we don't discard communities, particular communities or that particular communities don't get ground up in the wheels while we're changing as has happened during previous energy transitions. So specifically we have all this stuff in here for farmers, like all this stuff in here for agriculture, all this stuff in here to transition and help coal workers and natural gas workers that are left behind. One of the whole motivating spirits of the Green New Deal was a rural, friendly, working-class, friendly transition.</p><p>That was the damn point. And of course, if you could get out to those rural people and the farmers and the ranchers and get them away from Fox and talk to them for a while and show them what's in it, you could talk them around to that. But the fact is, after the Green New Deal — and I wrote about this study — after the Green New Deal was introduced by AOC and her cohort, in the following six months, Fox mentioned the Green New Deal more than all the other networks combined, like twice as much as the other three big cable networks combined. Why?</p><p>Because they recognized it had potential symbolic potential. Like they recognized you could make it into a symbol of something different than previous environmentalism, something more worker-friendly, more justice-oriented than previous transitions. They recognized the threat and they went right after it to destroy it. They very deliberately mounted a campaign to lie to their listeners about it and tell them it bans beef and bans — yes, they on purpose killed it. And I come back to the question I come back to over and over, which I've come back to a bunch on this call. Whose job is it to mount a similarly comprehensive, loud, repetitive, ubiquitous campaign on behalf of the Green New Deal, to support it, to lend it positive, symbolic connotations and —</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>On non-ideological grounds?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. So the left isn't unified to do it. We don't have a machine on Fox or talk radio. So what AOC does is give a press conference to the friggin mainstream media and then just is dependent on them to convey it to their listeners, which they don't. So naturally now public opinion is against the Green New Deal because one side went after it and one side didn't support it. And that's true for everything. There's nothing that's intrinsically going to appeal to farmers or rural people. It's all got to be somehow delivered to them and conveyed to them.</p><p>And the only people they listen to are Fox and right-wing radio who's lying to them actively about it. So basically, all problems on the left and all problems in the climate, left too, come back to this. Like we just don't have any control over the information atmosphere. And Fox can pollute anything it wants. It can turn those rural people against anything it wants. Right now, just as a funny example, Democrats are saying let's bulk up the IRS enforcement a little bit so that we can make rich people pay the taxes they owe. You would think that would be the most obvious, non-controversial, you're like, who could be against that?</p><p>Literally, who could be against that? And somehow right-wing media has got such a lock on their audience that they've figured out a way to convince these poor people that giving the IRS more enforcement power is just going to somehow hurt them. Even people who don't pay tax because they're so poor now believe they're against IRS reform. Which just goes to show there's nothing so obviously good that Fox can't pollute it.</p><p><strong>Anna Tarkov</strong></p><p>Well, David, the IRS is the government. The government's bad.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And why is that? Because they've spent 40 years saying that half their messages are already baked in. Everyone's already pre-convinced. I mean, I remember when the cap and trade bill came out in 2009 and the pro-climate people are like, well you see, there's these permits and then you trade the permits and then you can trade them in for an auctioned value. And then the right comes in with Fox and says "tax". Boom. Debate was over. Bill was dead because they had already everybody on their side already knows what a tax is, right? They know exactly how to fight that.</p><p>They know exactly how to think about it. They know exactly what they're doing with that.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>I'm sorry. They also have made the infrastructure. In real estate the number one rule of real estate, commercial real estate, is location, location, location. But the number one rule of persuasion is presence, presence, presence, presence. If you are there and if you're there, you don't even have to have good arguments, just the fact that you exist and are there and people can see that you're there on the cable. Like a ton of people came to watch Fox News just because they were flipping the TV. They didn't, you know, actively seek it out. They had never even heard of.</p><p>So, you know, just being out there all the time and that's something positive that we can think of as well as we come to the end here. That being out there on the regular, it is persuasive. If people encounter — some people will never change their minds, but other people, if they encounter ideas enough in enough different places from different people, eventually they can rub off in some fashion. And that's something that happened in a good way with the fight for same-sex marriage. And generally speaking, there's been a greater acceptance for LGBT rights and existence. So good things can still happen even in a system in which the deck is stacked.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, the thing is, the left does have enormous cultural power. The right is not wrong about that. They're not wrong when they freak out that the left owns Hollywood, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So if everyone on the left decides at once, like they seem to about gay marriage, then that will seep through culture, right? It'll come out through sitcoms, you know what I mean? Like in movies, it becomes ambient in culture. If the left really is gripped by something, it can make it ambient in culture and change minds about it. The question is just like, how do you do that on purpose?</p><p>How do you herd those cats on purpose? And no one knows?</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, well, it begins with enough people having the will to do it. And that only begins by conversations like this and writings like everybody here today that getting people to understand that this has to be done and we have to move toward a more change-oriented politics. Really, I appreciate you joining us today, David. And just to recap for everybody, so the conversation today, this was a recorded Twitter space. So patrons of David's and patrons of Flux, it will be available to you after this is over if you weren't able to make it. So I encourage you to subscribe to David's site or to join Flux on Patreon.</p><p>And David, did you have any concluding remarks you wanted to say?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>No, other than everyone should subscribe to Volts.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>And your website address is impossible to forget. So go ahead.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is volts.wtf.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Yeah, you can't forget that one. That will be seared into everyone's mind today, hopefully. All right, David. Well, thanks for being here, everyone, and we'll see you next Tuesday at 03:00 P.M. Pacific, 06:00 P.M. Eastern Time. So thanks, everyone.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right. Thank you, bye.</p><p><strong>Matt Sheffield</strong></p><p>Bye.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversations like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at volts.wtf. Yes, that's volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/discussing-disinformation-and-media</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:45359061</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 30 Aug 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/45359061/d26755269a3d4b82f03b66f8cf10cc08.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>7268</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/45359061/3048e4e7349010951c0ac1322331e498.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Don't Look Up: the first good movie about climate change]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>One of the most devilish aspects of climate change is that it resists good art. But Adam McKay, director first of comedies like <em>Anchorman</em> and later of more serious fare like <em>The Big Short,</em> has cracked the code. <em>Don’t Look Up</em> (in theaters today; coming to Netflix on Dec. 24) is the first climate movie — the first work of art about climate change of any kind — to hold my rapt attention from start to finish. It is fantastic.</p><p>One reason it’s so good is that it isn’t really about climate change at all. It’s about a pair of scientists, played by Leo DiCaprio and Jennifer Lawrence, who discover that a large comet is heading directly toward Earth and will strike, and wipe out all life on the planet, in just over six months. They try to tell people. It does not go well.  </p><p><em>Don’t Look Up</em> attempts to capture, not so much climate change itself, but one of the most vertiginously weird aspects of understanding climate change: you know this terrible thing is coming and yet … no one’s acting like it. You end up feeling like the ranting guy on the street corner waving a sign about how the end is nigh. </p><p>The movie is about having knowledge but being unable to make the knowledge <em>matter</em>, being unable to make anyone hear or act on it. By compressing the timeline to six months and making the threat a singular force, visible in the sky, it brings the absurdity of the situation to the surface. It’s hilarious, and if you’ve spent years banging your head against a wall trying to get people to pay attention to climate change, you will find a great deal of catharsis in the laughter. </p><p>Before we get to the movie, a word on climate and art.</p><p>Climate change makes for bad art</p><p>By its very nature, climate change is abstract, the sum of millions of observations and long chains of reasoning. It unfolds slowly, over the course of decades and centuries. Its effects are felt incrementally, across the globe, in disparate ways. </p><p>In short, climate change isn’t a good villain. It has no plans or intentions. It’s not even a singular force, it is simply the descriptor we apply to the panoply of changes happening around us. </p><p>The magic trick of good art is that it uses specificity — particular people, places, and relationships — to evoke universal human feelings. We have been designed by evolution to feel most intensely about things that are close to us, within spatial and temporal boundaries that are legible to us. We’re not designed to feel anything about a projected 50-year change in global average temperature.</p><p>We can know and understand that forecast in an intellectual way, but to really <em>feel</em> it, to integrate it into one’s basic narratives and worldview, requires conscious cultivation. It does not come naturally; it is not universal.</p><p>That makes climate change a lousy subject for art. Over the years that I have been writing about it I have been exposed to many, many songs, poems, documentaries, short stories, and novels about it. They are all like vegan food: the intentions are commendable, the spirit is good, it even looks on the outside like normal food, but the taste … let’s just say, it feels like I’m supposed to be eating it, and if I weren’t supposed to, I’d be eating something else that tastes better.</p><p>(Vegans: I love you. Please do not write me angry emails.) </p><p>So too with climate art. It runs into one or more of four main dangers. </p><p>One, it can be treacly. This is most climate documentaries: swelling orchestral music beneath shot after shot of Natural Beauty Under Threat. </p><p>Two, in order to compress climate change into something dramatic on a human time scale, it can mangle the science, as in 2004’s <em>The Day After Tomorrow</em>, wherein a key scene finds our heroes fleeing from an oncoming wall of, uh, freezing. It’s not that I’m a stickler for strict scientific accuracy in art, but once you make climate change into a disaster fit for a disaster movie, you’ve changed all the structural features that make the climate crisis what it is. You’re not illuminating anything about the reality.</p><p>Three, it can be overly oblique, a metaphor for climate change that is so generic — “nature is good” (<em>Avatar</em>); “dystopia is bad” (<em>Snowpiercer</em>) — as to say nothing about climate change in particular. </p><p>Fourth, it can end up being didactic or educational. Though it is by all accounts informed and magisterial, I could could not get through Kim Stanley Robinson’s <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3y7Dbjr"><em>The Ministry for the Future</em></a>. After an intense first chapter, it became a series of white papers teaching me stuff I already know. If I wanted to read PDFs I’d just read PDFs. </p><p>Climate is perilous territory for art. That brings us to <em>Don’t Look Up</em>.</p><p><em>Don’t Look Up</em> defies the trend</p><p>I went into this film with extremely low expectations. I’ve seen the subject of climate change humble too many eager artists and storytellers to have much faith that anyone in Hollywood would get it right. </p><p>When I heard the basic setup — an analogy that everyone in the climate world has pondered at some point — my expectations did not rise. There are so many ways a story like that could go wrong. It could be broad or ham-handed; it could be overly clever; it could be didactic and preachy. </p><p>But somehow it’s great. I suppose that’s what happens when you get this idea in the hands of smart writers (politics’ own David Sirota helped with the story; McKay wrote the screenplay) and an unbelievably <a target="_blank" href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt11286314/fullcredits">stacked cast</a>.  </p><p>DiCaprio and Lawerence convincingly shrink into nebbishy scientists, he with a middle-aged gut, she with unfortunate bangs. The MAGA president and the boozy cable news host could easily have been caricatures, but Meryl Streep and Cate Blanchett are incapable of a false note. Every role down to the most incidental is played by marquee performers who fill their screen time with thoughtful choices. Every performance lands, keeping the proceedings grounded even as they grow more ridiculous. </p><p>It’s extremely funny, but not with rat-a-tat jokes. These are recognizably human characters, not broad types, stuck in absurd situations; the laughs arise out of the structure. There’s an editing technique used again and again: just as a scene is in the midst of its manic peak, there will be a hard cut to a new, quiet scene, often characters trying to process what happened. It made me laugh every time. (Credit to the venerable <a target="_blank" href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0181650/">Hank Corwin</a> for editing.) </p><p>Though it flirts with it at times, it never descends into farce. It’s just that everyone finds themselves lost in the same disorienting information environment, unable to connect. </p><p>Also? About two-thirds of the way through the movie, Timothée Chalamet wanders in as a character with no obvious connection to the plot and no clear reason to be there, but who is nonetheless an absolute delight for every second he’s on screen. </p><p>The film manages to be funny and allegorical and human all at once. But I think long-time climate hawks will take special pleasure in it.</p><p>So many climate feels, captured for the first time</p><p>I have no idea how normal people — people who haven’t spent most of their adult lives immersed in the subject of climate change — will process this movie. Will they see the climate analogy at all? It could just as easily be read as an analogy for Covid, or biodiversity loss, or nuclear war.</p><p>But if you’re a climate hawk, there’s no mistaking it: McKay has clearly been involved in this subject for a while. He captures a whole series of feelings and experiences that are painfully familiar.</p><p>There’s the feeling of telling the government about a threat and having it shrugged off. There’s the feeling of telling the press about the threat and having it subsumed and lost in the flattening stream of 24-hour content. There’s the feeling of being mocked and memed for being alarmed. There’s the feeling of needing to prove people wrong on the internet. </p><p>There’s the feeling of watching a body of science become the target of wild conspiracy theories and a partisan culture war. There’s the feeling of seeing the most obvious solutions to the problem delayed and deferred over corporate profits. There’s the feeling of seeing people jump straight from denial to nihilism, without any being-helpful stage in the middle. There’s the sinking feeling of watching people who have accepted the threat turning to glittery promises of future high-tech solutions.</p><p>There’s the feeling — which DiCaprio captures in a mid-movie rant that I, at least, found incredibly emotional — of hoping against hope that someone in charge, despite all the appearance of venality and stupidity, knows what they’re doing, has a handle on this thing. </p><p>And perhaps most acute of all, there’s the feeling that we simply can’t communicate any more, that there’s no way to establish a shared reality or shared priorities. Everything is absorbed by the information/media/entertainment machine, blasted out at the same volume as dozens of other daily clickbait outrages, and soon forgotten, like all the rest. Nothing lands, nothing sticks. There’s no way to cut through the noise.</p><p>“If we can’t all agree at the bare minimum that a giant comet the size of Mt. Everest hurtling its way toward planet Earth is <em>not a f*****g good thing</em>,” DiCaprio cries, his voice cracking, “then what the hell happened to us? I mean, my God, how do we even talk to each other? What have we done to ourselves? How do we fix it?”</p><p>The movie does not offer answers to these questions. Without any spoilers, I can say it’s a pretty pessimistic take on our capacity for collective action. But I found it incredibly cathartic just to see my specific brand of anguish portrayed with such insight, more than I ever expected from a big-budget Hollywood movie. </p><p>Back here in the real world, climate remains stubbornly uncathartic. It has no six-month deadline; it will play out slowly over our whole lives and beyond. There will be no final moment of recognition and no clear line between success and failure. The result will be an unsatisfying muddle at every stage, with more suffering than there should have been but less than there could have been.</p><p>Still, we know that, in some sense, the comet has already begun striking. We’ve already lost some stability, some biodiversity, some lands and lives, and we will lose more, no matter what we do. It’s baked in at this point. We are living in the most stable climate we will ever experience. Every decade from now on will get warmer — more of the comet will strike. We can only control the scale of the damage.</p><p>After I watched <em>Don’t Look Up</em> (thank you Netflix), as I was eating dinner with my family, I couldn’t stop thinking about DiCaprio’s final words in the movie, as he is surrounded at the dinner table by family and friends: “We really did have everything, didn’t we?” </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/dont-look-up-the-first-good-movie</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:45155295</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 10 Dec 2021 17:00:46 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/45155295/a1fe31e3b98572cfc673dcd5f6b17c79.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>741</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/45155295/2d9852f969a6048c241806d92c136917.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts one-year anniversary: a letter to readers]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>On Dec. 7, 2020, one year ago, I sent out <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/welcome-to-volts">the first Volts post</a>. At the time, I was extremely nervous. I had left behind a stable job at Vox and had no idea if a newsletter dedicated to clean energy and politics would find any readers, much less readers who would pay. </p><p>Over the last year I dug into <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-carbon-pricing-will-never-be">carbon markets</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-everything-in">transmission systems</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/battery-week-everything-in-one-place">lithium-ion batteries</a>, and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/247-carbon-free-energy-everything">24/7 carbon-free energy</a>. I profiled new clean-energy legislation in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/washington-state-now-has-the-nations">Washington</a> state, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-will-toor-on-colorados">Colorado</a>, and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/illinois-brilliant-new-climate-jobs">Illinois</a>. There was a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-i-am-a-progressive">little philosophy</a> and a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/crunch-time-this-is-americas-last">lot</a> of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/west-virginia-needs-the-biden-energy">politics</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-close-look-at-the-clean-energy">policy</a>. For the podcast, I talked to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/energy-modeling-net-zero-grids-and">researchers</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-the-good-news-about">analysts</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-20-years-of-solar-advocacy">activists</a>, and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-sen-tina-smith-on-the">politicians</a>. </p><p>I have reason to believe Volts has reached the corridors of power, though Joe Manchin has by all accounts remained immune to its charms. </p><p>I have a long list of topics for next year: clean-energy materials and recycling, embodied carbon, hydropower, hydrogen, and the possibilities for political progress under a dysfunctional (and possibly soon fascist) national government.</p><p>Anyway, one year in is probably too soon to draw any definitive conclusions, but from what I can tell, it’s working. I am absurdly grateful. </p><p>I try not to indulge in too much navel-gazing — mostly I keep that stuff confined to my neurotic inner monologue — but in this post I want to reflect a little bit on why I started Volts and what to expect from it in the coming year. </p><p>And I want to ask you, if you haven’t already, to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe">sign up for a paid subscription</a> — or, if you have a subscription already, to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?gift=true">purchase one for someone else</a>, perhaps as a holiday gift.</p><p> So: why did I start Volts? Two basic reasons.</p><p>Writing for my people …</p><p>One, although Vox gave me tons of latitude, there are limits to what you can do at a general-interest, ad-supported publication. You have to aim wide, to try to snare as many people as possible. Readers are likely to encounter your headline floating on Twitter or in their Facebook news feeds — you can not assume they know anything about you, your past work, or your subject matter. </p><p>So every new piece has to be an introduction. You can’t use any allusions to your previous work. You can’t reference any inside jokes. You can’t take anything for granted. (I can’t count how any times I had to explain that renewable energy is good because it reduces carbon emissions, which is good because it slows climate change, which is bad.) </p><p>And you can’t be too weird or idiosyncratic. Ultimately, though it is much more flexible than many publications, Vox needs every piece to be, at a basic level, a Vox piece. It has to represent the brand. That’s true for any publication or institution.</p><p>There’s nothing wrong with that — Vox has a great brand! If you visit, as I regularly do, you’re guaranteed to find a bunch of good Voxy pieces. </p><p>But I got tired of writing for everyone and no one in particular. I was ready to write for <em>my people</em>, to gather them up and take them with me so that we could learn together, follow ongoing themes and narratives, develop some in jokes, and shower the appropriate amount of love and attention on my dogs.</p><p>I’m well aware that I reached more people at Vox than I ever will at Volts. My gamble was simply that there would be <em>enough</em> of my people, and that they would be generous enough, that I could make a living writing for them — just them, not any “average reader” or editor or boss or publication. </p><p>I wanted to strip everything else away — the pressure to please higher-ups, the imperatives of attention-hunting in modern mass media — and focus purely on adding value, being of use.</p><p>… rather than The Man</p><p>The second reason I started Volts is that I am, at heart, a child of Gen X: I don’t want to work for The Man. I don’t want to make money for <a target="_blank" href="https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2015/08/comcast-owned-nbc-buys-part-of-vox-media-and-its-stable-of-news-sites/">Comcast</a>, or any giant media company, or any company at all, really. I don’t want to feel beholden to any advertiser or sponsor. I don’t want to be a representative of any faction or institution.</p><p>At Volts, I have only one incentive: to provide a service that you, my readers, find valuable enough to pay for. There’s no one here but you and me. </p><p>That feels like an honest living. It feels like something solid I can hang on to in increasingly turbulent times. </p><p>Volts survives entirely through subscriptions</p><p>I am editor-at-large for <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com">Canary Media</a>, a relationship that allows my posts to be reprinted and reach more readers. But I live or die through paid subscriptions to Volts. </p><p>There are certain things I could do to boost my revenue that I’m not willing to do. I don’t want to put content behind a paywall — I want to be as useful as possible to as many readers as possible, even those who can’t afford a paid subscription. And I don’t want to hassle my mailing list with reminders and special offers and fundraising drives and bonus content. That stuff feels squicky to me.</p><p>But I do need to make enough money to live. And I’d like to make enough to be able to expand Volts and bring on new features and guest writers. </p><p>So I’m asking you, if you value what I do here and are in a financial position to do so, to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe">sign up for a paid subscription</a> or <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?gift=true">buy one for someone else</a>. </p><p>For a year, you’ll pay about what you’d pay for one solo night out at a decent restaurant. You will get the ability to comment on posts and discussion threads, to be a part of the growing (and incredibly sharp and helpful) Volts community, but more than that, you will make it possible for me to keep doing this, to continue being of use.</p><p><p>Volts is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></p><p>I’ll do this as long as I can survive doing it. I hope it’s of service to you and you’ll support it.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-one-year-anniversary-a-letter</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:44869604</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 07 Dec 2021 17:00:34 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/44869604/e919d0c299ccbfa79d15462e93b4c194.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>448</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/44869604/265d16f056da589139533f582049895b.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[24/7 carbon-free energy: everything in one place]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>When I first started looking into 24/7 carbon-free energy (CFE) — a company or city matching its electricity consumption with clean electricity production on an hourly basis, throughout the year — I intended to write a single post on it. That worked out about as well as usual.</p><p>Below are summaries of and links to each of the 24/7 CFE posts. Above is a 24/7 CFE mega-pod, with the last three pods strung together into one podcast. </p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/an-introduction-to-energys-hottest">An introduction to energy's hottest new trend: 24/7 carbon-free electricity</a>What it would mean to supply a company or city with clean energy for every hour of its electricity consumption, every day of the year; why a company or city would want to do that; what kind of technology could do it; what market reforms are required to enable it.</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/is-247-carbon-free-energy-the-right">Is 24/7 carbon-free energy the right goal?</a>Critics say that companies would be better off focusing solely on reductions in carbon emissions — after all, from the atmosphere’s perspective, no company’s emissions are more significant than any other’s. But proponents say 24/7 CFE accomplishes things beyond reducing carbon emissions.</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-long-term-promise-of-247-carbon">The long-term promise of 24/7 carbon-free electricity</a>Some new modeling of 24/7 procurement out of Princeton reveals what it will do to carbon emissions, how much more it will cost, and the innovation and development it could spark in clean energy. </p><p>Volts is free of ads or sponsorships; it runs entirely on reader subscriptions. If you value this kind of explanatory journalism, please consider <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe">becoming a paid subscriber to Volts</a>, or giving someone you know a subscription as a gift. I appreciate you all.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/247-carbon-free-energy-everything</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:44641601</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 29 Nov 2021 17:20:42 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/44641601/a370e20efb4f84220a6d7434ab1633a0.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3970</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/44641601/71b9932be7881d5a6190269746b4e7cd.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The long-term promise of 24/7 carbon-free electricity]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Over the course of the last few days … [checks calendar] … er, month, I’ve been digging into the new trend in voluntary climate action: procuring 24/7 carbon-free electricity (CFE), matching consumption with production every hour of every day.</p><p>In my <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/an-introduction-to-energys-hottest">first post</a>, I introduced the idea and explained what motivates it and what it entails. In my <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/is-247-carbon-free-energy-the-right">second</a>, I puzzled through the biggest controversy around it, which is about whether it’s the right goal at all — whether companies and cities ought instead to focus solely on reducing emissions (with no regard to who produced them, or where). </p><p>This post will make a great deal more sense to you if you’ve read those.</p><p>Today, in the final post in this series (promise), we’re going to look at some <a target="_blank" href="https://acee.princeton.edu/24-7">new modeling of 24/7 procurement from Princeton’s ZERO Lab</a> and see if it can shed some light on the trade-offs among different procurement strategies. Then we’ll wrap up with some provisional conclusions.</p><p>The model</p><p>ZERO Lab models three scenarios for voluntary corporate clean-energy procurement, with 10 percent participation from the commercial and industrial (C&I) sector: no procurement (as a baseline), procuring for 100 percent annual match on a volumetric basis, and procuring for 24/7 match. </p><p>Each scenario is run in two separate markets, California and the PJM Interconnection (an electricity balancing area that covers 13 Northeastern states and DC). Modeling in two markets helps tease out how 24/7 could unfold differently depending on how clean a grid is to begin with — high penetration of variable renewables in California vs. a relatively dirty grid in the Northeast.</p><p>The model is premised on the idea that participating C&I customers aggregate their demand and pool their purchasing power, effectively acting as a miniature <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27152">balancing authority</a>. This may or may not be how things play out in the real world. Customers could act on their own, disaggregated and uncoordinated. The lab’s going to model that kind of scenario soon.</p><p>Note: The lab did <em>not</em> model a procurement strategy optimized to reduce maximum carbon emissions. (<a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscast-jesse-jenkins-on-energy">Jesse Jenkins</a>, who leads the lab, refuses to use the word “emissionality.” He insists on “carbon-optimized procurement.” Don’t worry, he’ll crack like the rest of us.) Modeling carbon-optimized procurement would have been a lot of extra work and the funder of the research, Google, did not ask or pay them to do it, so if you’re a wealthy corporate or philanthropy out there reading this, pay the lab to model it!</p><p>Let’s look at a few of the findings.</p><p>24/7 procurement reduces the carbon intensity of a company’s energy portfolio</p><p>As companies push their CFE scores higher — meaning, as they match more and more of their hourly consumption with hourly production of CFE — they reduce the carbon intensity of their portfolio. At a certain level of CFE, they reduce it beyond what they would accomplish with 100 percent annual matching.</p><p>Take California. It already has a fairly clean grid — every company starts with a minimum CFE score of 64 percent, just by being located there. If a company procures the cheapest clean energy to match 100 percent of its annual consumption, its CFE score gets to 75 percent. There are still 25 percent of hours in which it is drawing on at least some fossil energy. </p><p>As a company’s CFE scores rise beyond 75 percent, the emissions rate of its portfolio falls further, steadily to zero at a CFE score of 100 percent.</p><p>(Another note here: “Current technologies” means wind, solar, batteries, and, at least in California, conventional geothermal. “Advanced technologies, no combustion” includes advanced geothermal and nuclear, along with long-duration energy storage.  “Advanced technologies, full portfolio” includes all of the above, plus natural gas with carbon capture and sequestration [CCS] and combustion turbines running on zero-carbon hydrogen fuels. The reason the green bar never fully reaches a zero emissions rate is that there are residual emissions associated with natural gas and CCS.)</p><p>PJM is a different story. It’s pretty dirty — participants there start with a baseline CFE score of just 22 percent. So a simple strategy of 100 percent annual matching results in a huge drop in emissions rate, though it only gets participants to a CFE score of 62 percent. Once again, as participants raise their CFE scores beyond that, the emission rate declines to zero. </p><p>However, 24/7 procurement does not just reduce participants’ own emissions rates.</p><p>24/7 procurement drives more system-level carbon reductions </p><p>In California, if 10 percent of the C&I sector participates, 24/7 procurement would reduce more <em>system</em>-level (as opposed to participant-level) emissions than a 100 percent annual matching strategy, starting at a collective CFE score of 88 percent. </p><p>There are two explanations for this. The first is a <em>volume</em> effect — participants doing 24/7 matching simply have to buy more CFE, and with more CFE, more fossil generation is displaced. The second is a <em>timing</em> effect — participants doing 24/7 matching procure resources that better match demand patterns, thus displacing more fossil generation. </p><p>Here’s PJM:</p><p>PJM starts out with much less solar and wind. That means that, while the volume effect does advantage 24/7 once CFE scores reach 90 percent, the timing effect isn’t very pronounced (the marginal generator is basically always fossil), and the net difference doesn’t amount to much. </p><p>So 24/7 procurement reduces more system-level emissions than 100 percent annual matching, but only at relatively high CFE scores and not by a <em>huge</em> amount. </p><p>24/7 procurement comes at a relatively steep cost premium</p><p>There’s no two ways about it: 24/7 procurement costs more. And the costs rise as CFE scores get closer to 100 percent, especially if only current technologies are available. </p><p>Here’s California.</p><p>Note that covering that last 10 percent, getting from 90 to 100 percent CFE, sees costs rapidly escalate, <em>especially</em> for the last 2 percent. </p><p>If only commercially available technologies are put to use, 24/7 CFE is 64 percent more expensive than 100 percent annual matching. If a full portfolio of technologies is available, it’s only 39 percent more expensive.</p><p>The current technology costs are easy to explain: it’s extremely expensive to cover the last 10 percent of consumption with only wind, solar, batteries, and conventional geothermal. But why is the green line so much lower than the blue line?</p><p>The difference between blue and green comes down to which clean-firm sources are available. The “no combustion” set — long-duration energy storage, advanced geothermal, and advanced nuclear — has high fixed costs (labor and construction) and low variable costs (operation and maintenance). </p><p>But the “full portfolio” set includes combustion-based sources like natural gas with CCS and turbines running hydrogen fuels, which have lower fixed costs but higher variable costs, and that turns out to be much cheaper when the sources are run at low utilization rates, as these will be. </p><p>In PJM, the cost differential is even greater:</p><p>With only currently available technologies — which, remember, do not include geothermal in PJM — the cost of 24/7 procurement is 139 percent higher than the cost of 100 percent annual matching. Yikes. </p><p>But with the full portfolio, 24/7 is only 54 percent more expensive. In PJM, “procuring clean firm generation or long duration energy storage technologies can significantly lower marginal abatement costs, particularly at higher CFE scores.” It really helps, on a dirty grid, to have some clean-firm sources that cover the last few percent.</p><p>OK, let’s pause here and assess what we’ve learned. We know that 24/7 procurement can reduce and eventually zero out the carbon intensity of a participant’s own portfolio, though of course, from a climate perspective, that’s basically irrelevant. In system terms, 24/7 procurement reduces emissions more than 100 percent annual matching, but only a modest amount — and that modest amount comes at a substantial cost premium.</p><p>Here the emissionality perspective taps us on the shoulder. It points out that, in either case (100 percent annual or 24/7) companies could reduce more emissions with the same amount of money by directing that money to <em>dirtier grids</em>. Companies are spending extra money to reduce “their own” emissions when the atmosphere doesn’t care whose emissions are whose. </p><p>Emissionaries (ha ha, another new word!) might ask, what’s so great about 24/7 over and above 100 percent annual matching? Why are the companies procuring for 24/7 willing to spend so much more money for so little additional emission reduction? Why don’t they spend that money on dirty grids where it will reduce more emissions?</p><p>The main answer from proponents is that 24/7 procurement will do more to prepare the way for, and reduce the cost of, full grid decarbonization. It is playing the long game. </p><p>24/7 procurement drives early deployment of clean-firm sources</p><p>While procuring for 100 percent annual matching generally means buying only wind and solar, procuring for 24/7 matching will necessarily include, depending on local prices and technology availability, not only batteries but “conventional and advanced geothermal, advanced nuclear, natural gas power plants with CCS, gas plants using zero-carbon fuels, and/or long duration energy storage.”</p><p>Here’s 24/7 procurement in California with 10 percent C&I participation in 2030 with current tech, advanced tech with no combustion, and the full portfolio:</p><p>In the first and second cases, the story is about solar, geothermal, and batteries. But with the full portfolio, geothermal drops out almost entirely, replaced by natural gas with CCS (and a few zero-carbon-fuel turbines), which will be considerably cheaper. </p><p>This is not likely to be a popular result — I can’t say I like it — but it looks like, on grids with high penetration of variable renewables that need some low-utilization clean-firm generation to fill the gaps, natural gas with CCS may be the cheapest option.</p><p>Here’s PJM:</p><p>In the current-technologies case, it’s all about solar and batteries — and as we saw above, it’s expensive AF. In the advanced-tech-no-combustion case, advanced nuclear steps in and vastly reduces the total amount of CFE required, thus shaving off a big chunk of the cost. </p><p>In the full-portfolio case, natural gas with CCS once again replaces most other clean-firm generation, including nuclear, reducing costs further. </p><p>Summing up: “If 10% of C&I customers participate and reach 100% CFE, 1.9-2.3 GW of clean firm generation and long-duration storage capacity is deployed in California and 5.9-7.1 GW in PJM by 2030.”</p><p>That’s a lot! Enough to kickstart those markets. </p><p>“Just as 100% annual matching helped transform wind and solar PV from expensive ‘alternative energy sources’ to mainstream, affordable options for the world,” the report says, “24/7 procurement is likely to have similar transformative impacts on clean firm resources.”</p><p>Here’s a chart of what different procurement strategies can accomplish:</p><p>What’s the right time horizon for voluntary climate policy?</p><p>So where does this leave us on the debate between 24/7 and emissionality? Should companies reduce their own hour-to-hour emissions or should they just reduce the most emissions they can, regardless of location and timing? </p><p>Of course, there’s no real reason to pit them against one another. Companies can do one or the other or a mix, depending on their particular values. Nonetheless, it’s an intriguing question, and I admit to remaining torn. </p><p>I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/on-climate-policy-theres-one-main">frequently argue</a> that post-2030 decarbonization is, if anything, drawing <em>too much</em> attention from policymakers, corporates, and tech types, at least relative to the prime directive of climate policy: rapidly reducing emissions in the coming decade by driving fossil fuel power plants off the grid with cheap wind and solar. </p><p>That core task is by no means accomplished. Most grids in the US remain much dirtier than California’s, with plenty of room for more wind and solar. Before they get too excited about advanced nuclear and CCS, everyone needs to make sure that wind and solar are growing fast enough to mostly decarbonize the grid by 2030. </p><p>I worry that 24/7 procurement is part of this trend: turning our eyes to the 2040-2050 horizon, the last 10 to 20 percent of grid decarbonization, before we have the first 80 percent locked in.</p><p>That said, I don’t worry about that <em>too</em> much. Getting to 24/7 CFE will involve buying plenty of wind and solar along the way. Long-term power purchase agreements will remain the gold standard; hourly trading of renewable energy certificates will be used to fill in the gaps with balancing resources. And all the companies pursuing 24/7 procurement will be invested in their local grids building more wind and solar — it raises their CFE baseline.</p><p>What’s more, I think the socio-technological process of stimulating innovation and development in these gap-filling clean-energy technologies is going to turn over all kinds of rocks and uncover all kinds of insights. We’re still somewhat guessing about which technologies will best play the clean-firm role. Reality could surprise us. The sooner we run that investigation, the sooner we’ll have a better grasp of exactly what we need and how to craft policy around it.</p><p>So for now, I remain excited about 24/7 CFE and I can’t wait to see more companies and cities jump on the bandwagon. People are beginning to think about full decarbonization now. The engineers and accountants are running the numbers. We’re going to see some really cool stuff happen soon.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-long-term-promise-of-247-carbon</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:44216543</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 24 Nov 2021 17:00:40 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/44216543/6b9b73fc74f22e6e9bd328f971300e96.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1067</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/44216543/5c7c9f53008ea5a15ff1f393b6bfde74.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Is 24/7 carbon-free energy the right goal?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Last week, I wrote an introduction to the hot new trend in energy: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/an-introduction-to-energys-hottest">24/7 carbon-free energy</a> (CFE), i.e., matching a company or city’s power consumption with production of clean electricity throughout the day, every hour of every day. If you haven’t read it yet, you’ll want to check it out before reading this post.</p><p>Today, I want to talk about a big debate around 24/7 CFE, regarding whether it’s the right goal for companies and cities to adopt at all. Exploring that debate will help us get our heads around what 24/7 CFE can and can’t accomplish.</p><p>But first, a quick refresher. </p><p>Here’s the idea: right now, in addition to generating electricity, renewable energy projects generate renewable energy certificates (RECs), one for each megawatt-hour. They can sell the RECs to any entity looking to buy renewable energy. For instance, a company or city that wants to go “100 percent renewable” can simply buy enough RECs to cover its yearly electricity consumption.</p><p>At least two changes would be required to make 24/7 CFE possible. First, “renewable energy” would expand to “carbon-free energy.” Any generator putting out electrons without carbon emissions, including nuclear or natural gas with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), would qualify. </p><p>And second, RECs, rather than coming in month- or year-long chunks, would be issued in time-stamped increments of an hour, so that buyers could target procurement at the particular hours of the day when they need CFE. Eventually, each hourly REC would contain information about avoided carbon emissions, so buyers could tally up the carbon impact of their purchases. </p><p>That’s the vision.</p><p>In this post, I’m going to discuss an objection to 24/7 and some counter-arguments to the objection. Then, in my next post (yes, this is turning into 24/7 Month), I’ll look at some <a target="_blank" href="https://acee.princeton.edu/24-7/">new modeling</a> of the impact of 24/7 procurement and try to draw some conclusions. We’re going to have a good time.</p><p>Measuring carbon is mostly doable</p><p>An intrinsic part of the 24/7 CFE vision is that each hourly REC will be tagged with a certain amount of avoided carbon. This will allow buyers to make procurement decisions that take emissions into account.</p><p>There are some issues and controversies around calculating avoided carbon, though they’re not the ones I’m going to focus on today. Some carbon counters have proprietary formulas (like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.watttime.org/">WattTime</a>) and some are trying to develop open-source methods (like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energytag.org/">EnergyTag</a>). </p><p>The numbers they produce are not <em>radically</em> different, but they do differ. They vary in how they calculate the marginal (most expensive) energy source on the grid at a given moment — the marginal generator is the one that will spin down to make room when the CFE is produced. They differ in how to draw the geographic boundary of analysis, which can affect results. And other stuff like that. </p><p>“To go from the generation data to the local carbon emissions data is not trivial,” says Toby Ferenczi, founder of EnergyTag, “because you're trying to model the flow of electrons. Until you can track a single electron through the system, there will always be different types of approximations.” </p><p>There’s also the question of how distributed energy resources (DERs) are treated. Right now, grid operators tend to have little visibility into or control over DERs; energy generated locally, on a distribution grid, is viewed by grid operators as reduced demand on that grid. Bringing DERs more fully into the picture as deployable resources is an important long-term challenge.</p><p>There are data issues too. If you look at <a target="_blank" href="https://app.electricitymap.org/map">electricityMap</a>, which seeks to track the carbon intensity of every grid in the world, at every hour, you will see that there are still big holes, areas where utilities have not made the data public. New regulations and laws requiring grid operators to make these numbers available is another priority.</p><p>Anyway, I’m not going to dig into these technical issues. I have faith that, if an hourly REC market gets going, these kinds of questions will be ironed out. The general sentiment is that it is more important to have a common set of numbers than it is for those numbers to be accurate down to the decimal. </p><p>Instead, let’s turn to the more fundamental challenge to 24/7 CFE.</p><p>24/7 vs. emissionality</p><p>Unlike air pollution, which concentrates where it is emitted, carbon dioxide diffuses completely into the atmosphere. It doesn’t matter <em>where</em> it is emitted; all tons are the same, from a climate perspective. One company or city’s emissions are no different than any others. There’s nothing about your hourly emissions that make them special.</p><p>It follows that, if you’re a company that wants to reduce carbon emissions, the thing to do is buy clean energy on the dirtiest grid possible, wherever it will displace the most carbon-intensive energy and thus prevent the most emissions.  If you take an international perspective, that will probably be somewhere overseas, in Asia or Africa; if you take a US perspective, it will be in states like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1133295/electric-sector-carbon-dioxide-emission-rate-by-state-united-states/">West Virginia, Wyoming, and Kentucky</a>.</p><p>The best way to do this is with bundled RECS — RECs purchased together with the energy that produced them, through long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) — because that’s the approach most likely to actually lead to new clean energy projects being built. But “most organizations are not in a position to sign long term PPAs,” says Ferenczi. “All they know is: I want to buy good electricity, not bad electricity.” For them, unbundled RECs are the only option.</p><p>Either way, if you want to reduce emissions with your CFE procurement, it must be guided not only by what’s most likely to lead to new projects (“additionality”), but also by what will reduce the most emissions (“emissionality”). </p><p>This word <em>emissionality</em> is a terrible neologism — the latest of many out of the energy world — but I’m living with it, because it’s a helpful way to refer to the quantification of carbon emission reductions.</p><p>Now, take note: <em>optimizing your clean-energy procurement for emissionality is different from optimizing it for your own 24/7 consumption</em>. </p><p>The former strategy maximizes emission reductions. The latter does not. In some cases, optimizing around your own consumption could fail to reduce emissions or even increase net emissions, despite increasing your share of CFE. </p><p>One simple example: imagine one company has signed a bunch of solar PPAs and thus has more hourly RECs during the day than it needs to cover its consumption, but it has a shortage at night; another company has signed a bunch of wind PPAs and thus has excess hourly RECs at night, but a shortage during the day. The companies can simply trade hourly RECs. Each has increased its CFE score, but no new clean energy was built and no carbon emissions were reduced. </p><p>Another example is how companies choose to deploy batteries. Mark Dyson, an energy analyst at RMI, explained it to me this way:</p><p>A battery optimized for 24/7 would charge when a buyer has procured “excess” renewable energy in a particular hour, but in most grids, for the foreseeable future, a fossil generator will usually be the marginal unit at the system level — so charging storage increases carbon emissions in that hour. </p><p>Discharging the battery later would offset generation from another fossil generator and reduce emissions, but there’s no guarantee the difference in efficiency of those power plants is greater than the round-trip-efficiency penalty of using the battery, and thus total emissions can actually increase.</p><p>In other words, optimizing battery deployment to cover 24/7 consumption will be different from, in some cases contrary to, deploying them to optimize emission reductions. </p><p>Nobody has yet modeled exactly how much these two strategies would diverge, or how frequent cases like the ones above might be, but no one disputes that they would diverge. A strategy built around emissionality would, by definition, reduce more emissions than any alternative strategy built around any other goal.</p><p>And this is the critique of 24/7 CFE: emissions are emissions. Reducing any one company’s emissions is of no particular benefit to the climate. Just reduce emissions wherever you can — that’s the climate imperative.</p><p>This same debate expresses itself in several different forms. One way to think of the distinction is between <a target="_blank" href="https://ghginstitute.org/2021/04/21/the-most-important-ghg-accounting-concept-you-may-not-have-heard-of-the-attributional-consequential-distinction/">“attributional” and “consequential” carbon accounting</a>. Critics (see, e.g., <a target="_blank" href="https://www.watttime.org/news/white-paper-to-drive-more-authentic-impact-faster-look-at-the-consequences-of-your-choices-and-actions/">this paper from WattTime</a>) say attributional accounting — purchasing energy with a REC attached — is fine for statutory or voluntary clean-energy requirements. But when it comes to reducing carbon emissions, companies should use consequential accounting, i.e., purchasing energy that has the most short-term emission-reduction impact. </p><p>The same debate crops up again between “hourly average” and “marginal” carbon measurement. One can either assess a unit of CFE based on its effect on the hourly average emissions on the grid in the hour it is produced or based on the carbon intensity of the marginal generator it displaces. Hourly averages are, for a variety of reasons, easier to determine, and can be used to boost your own CFE score, but a marginal approach (measuring “nodal marginal emissions”) will tell you which energy purchase will maximize short-term emission reductions.</p><p>All these debates are forms of the same question: why not focus on carbon emissions? As Henry Richardson of WattTime put it to me, “measure emissions, not megawatt hours.”</p><p>The emissionality critique — that emissions, not any company’s <em>particular</em> emissions, are the proper target for procurement strategies — is worth taking seriously. Everyone in the space has wrestled with it. Let’s run through a few possible responses and counter-arguments.</p><p><p>Volts is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></p><p>Industrial policy vs. carbon policy</p><p>When I talked to Princeton energy modeler Jesse Jenkins — who contributed to the modeling of 24/7 CFE we’ll look at in the next post — he suggested a helpful analogy to the debate between emissionality and 24/7: the debate between a carbon tax and more sector-specific standards and investments, i.e., industrial policy.</p><p>A carbon tax is the most economically efficient way to reduce emissions — it will go after the cheapest emissions first. But by doing so, it will leave untouched many sectors of the economy that we will eventually need to decarbonize to get to 100 percent net-zero.</p><p>If we leave them untouched for too long, we’ll run into a wall. “We need to be thinking about the total solution,” says Melissa Lott, research director at the Center on Global Energy Policy. “Otherwise we're going to get halfway down the road, have to take a hard left, and it's going to be painful and expensive.”</p><p>The emissionality vs. 24/7 debate takes the same form. An emissionality approach would reduce emissions at a lower per-ton cost — it would go after the cheapest reductions first, usually by adding wind and solar to dirty grids. </p><p>But a 24/7 approach will direct investment toward technologies that fill the gaps left by wind and solar. “And there are gaps,” says Lott. “These gaps aren't eight or even 100 hours, which can be solved with different battery technologies. They're eight to 14 days.”</p><p>To cover those gaps will require “clean firm” generation, many sources of which are still in nascent forms of development. The pursuit of 24/7 CFE will stimulate innovation and growth in the entire suite of technologies needed to smooth out variable renewables — sources all grids will eventually need and many already do. (California power providers are already <a target="_blank" href="https://www.peninsulacleanenergy.com/california-community-power-releases-request-for-offers-seeking-200-mw-of-firm-clean-resources/">putting out solicitations</a> for clean-firm projects.) </p><p>In fact, says Brian Janous, Microsoft’s director of energy and renewables, even the early talk of 24/7 CFE has gotten people thinking about solutions. “We're seeing more and more utilities, and more and more energy service providers, come to us and say, hey, we think we can solve this problem for you,” he says.</p><p>Companies pursuing 24/7 CFE are undertaking voluntary industrial policy, channeling attention and investment to gaps in current clean-energy technology, bringing down the costs so that other companies can use them more easily. That could have impacts well beyond their own emissions. </p><p>Here’s how Jenkins put it to me:</p><p>The heart of 24/7 carbon-free procurement is the pursuit of transformative impact on electricity systems via accelerated innovation. Think about the indirect emissions impacts from helping accelerate the time to maturity (or enable in the first place) one or more clean firm technologies or long-duration energy storage technologies that can go on to widespread adoption and make reaching 100 percent carbon-free electricity easier for the world. </p><p>Leadership isn't just about doing one's part. It is about making it easier for others to follow. For a company, even one as large as Google, this impact is likely to far outpace any direct emissions reductions they achieve via procurement.</p><p>24/7 CFE needs to be seen in its full context</p><p>None of the entities pursuing 24/7 CFE today see their own achievement of 24/7 CFE as the ultimate end goal. The goal is grid decarbonization.</p><p>“We break it into three pillars,” says Michael Terrell, Google’s director of energy. “First is transacting,” i.e., contracting with developers to ensure Google’s own 24/7 supply of CFE. “Second is advancing technology, both on the demand side and the supply side,” i.e., the industrial-policy piece. “Lastly is policy and grid decarbonization,” i.e., advocating for clean-energy policies before state public utility commissions (PUCs) and legislatures, to hasten decarbonization of the grids in which it operates.</p><p>“For us, it's not a win if the only way we get to 24/7 in each place is by transacting,” he says. “We want to get the grids moving in that direction, too.”</p><p>When it comes to the standard way of getting to “100 percent clean energy,” companies can just buy cheap RECs from distant grids. They don’t need to get involved beyond that. “That was a concern of ours,” Terrell says. “Companies were getting to 100 percent without having to consider the future of the grids where they were operating or do any policy.” </p><p>In contrast, if a company is trying to cobble together a 24/7 supply of CFE on its local grid, it becomes much more invested in the state of that grid. The more CFE is on the grid, the higher the baseline from which it begins transacting for its own CFE. That will get companies involved in pushing utilities to make clean-energy commitments, pushing PUCs to clear away anachronistic regulations, and pushing legislatures to pass clean-energy policy.</p><p>“We are trying to drive massive system change well beyond Google,” says Terrell. “The idea behind 24/7 is, you want corporates to have a stake in every grid where they operate. You want them to be banging the table, driving system change on these grids, getting these grids to carbon-free as fast as possible.”</p><p>Janous says that Microsoft also wrestled with the 24/7 vs. emissionality debate as it determined its next steps. “Ultimately, we determined that local influence is still important,” he says. “Our ability to influence PUCs and local utilities, and do that worldwide across dozens and dozens of different markets, was more important than taking a pure-play emissionality approach in one market.”</p><p>Time will tell how strong that local influence proves to be. What happens if progress on local grids is slow? Lott thinks the pursuit of 24/7 will move forward some tough calls. Entities pursuing 24/7 “are going to have to make a decision here in the next few years,” she says. “Do we keep our data center in this location where we don't see a clear path to [24/7], or do we move it? Do we shift investment somewhere else? This is going to be an interesting tension that will play out around 2025, ‘26.”</p><p>This is an aspect I think critics of 24/7 CFE tend to miss: the social dynamics. If it becomes the new standard for climate-conscious companies and cities, there will be dozens, maybe hundreds of them doing it, spread out across all of America’s many balkanized grids. Each will have reason to serve as a local clean-energy emissary. Each will be invested in the others’ success — one company’s PPA boosts the grid mix for every other company on that grid. </p><p>Companies will be incentivized to pool their resources for greater impact, as many are already doing through the <a target="_blank" href="https://cebuyers.org">Clean Energy Buyers Association</a> (CEBA), which organizes and accelerates voluntary clean energy procurement. (A telling tidbit: until quite recently, CEBA was REBA, but “renewables” have given way to “clean.”)</p><p>In short, the movement to 24/7 has the potential to drive social and political change in a way that traditional REC markets never could and arguably a pure emissionality approach couldn’t either.</p><p>Emissionality can inform a hybrid approach</p><p>The choice between 24/7 and emissionality does not have to be a stark either/or. It is possible to use both perspectives for different jobs, or to blend them.</p><p>Take the hourly-average vs. marginal debate. “All of these accounting systems have their advantages,” says Terrell. If you’re thinking about offsetting the consumption of a large facility, “you want to be looking long term, at the 10-to-15-year roadmap of that grid, and average emissions is fine for that,” he says. </p><p>On the other hand, if you’re thinking about offsetting the emissions of product supply chains and product use — which are spread out across the country — there are no local consumption concentrations to target, so you might take a marginal approach to seek the cheapest, fastest emission reductions. </p><p>Put another way: you can use hourly averages to offset your scope 2 emissions and marginal to offset your scope 3 emissions.</p><p>Microsoft, Janous says, takes emissionality very seriously:</p><p>The way I think about it is, there are three stages of impact. The first one is <em>attribution</em> — it's just buying RECS. Then, five years in, we moved to we would call <em>additionality</em> —  it's not good enough for me to have this attribute, I need to have an attribute tied to something that I actually did. </p><p>We're now getting into this third era, which is what I would deem <em>consequential</em> — not only do I need to say that I caused it, I need to be able to demonstrate that I'm materially changing the makeup of carbon on the grid.</p><p>With that in mind, he says, Microsoft has developed a “hybrid form.” </p><p>By pursuing 24/7, “we are going to look at each grid where we operate and we're going solve for that,” he says. “If we can achieve 100 percent decarbonization of our energy supply across our portfolio, we've demonstrated that you can do it just about anywhere.”</p><p>“By virtue of taking that grid-level approach, we are not going to have perfect optimization for emissionality,” he says, “but we're going to apply [emissionality] within that grid context.” In other words, <em>within</em> the grids containing Microsoft’s local loads, Microsoft will purchase the CFE that reduces the maximum emissions.</p><p>In this hybrid approach, neither 24/7 CFE nor emissionality is perfectly optimized, but both are pushed forward together.</p><p>“We feel like the principle [of emissionality] is still extraordinarily valuable,” Janous says, “even when you do it in this hybrid way.”</p><p>Other values could supplement 24/7 as well</p><p>Janous, Terrell, and pretty much everyone else I spoke to emphasized that there are other values beyond emission reduction that are important to integrate into procurement decisions as well, most notably environmental justice.</p><p>Last year, Salesforce released a white paper, “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/qkgyi0r6wofkajh/sustainability-more-than-megawatt.pdf?dl=0">More Than a Megawatt</a>,” explaining its evolving view on large-scale corporate procurement. It wants to go beyond emissionality to assess potential clean-energy projects based on a whole range of criteria, from equity to land use to impacts on wildlife. </p><p>There are always trade-offs among these metrics, so Salesforce has developed a “<a target="_blank" href="https://quip.com/GsCbAJ7wgEB3#OYNACARX6LD">procurement matrix</a>” that will help weigh all these factors and determine which projects best optimize for multiple values. (A <a target="_blank" href="https://www.leveltenenergy.com/post/purpose-led-procurement-development">similar whitepaper</a> was recently released by LevelTen Energy, a renewable energy procurement platform.)</p><p>Notice that the more of these values enter your procurement matrix, the farther you are from a pure 24/7 play. Instead of optimizing for any single value, you are — as in life generally — trying to balance multiple competing values under time and resource constraints.</p><p>That can be complicated. It will help if big players like Salesforce create some standardized tools and metrics that make it easier for mid-sized companies to follow suit. Individual companies and cities can decide for themselves how much weight they want to give to 24/7 CFE relative to other values. </p><p>Anyway! This post, like the last one, has gotten way too long. If you’ve stayed with me this long, you are definitely a Volts reader and should purchase a subscription!</p><p>In my next post, we’ll have a close look at some new modeling of 24/7 procurement from Princeton’s Zero Lab and then see, based on that and all that has come before, whether we can draw some provisional conclusions about 24/7 CFE.</p><p>Notice that the more of these values enter your procurement matrix, the farther you are from a pure 24/7 play. Instead of optimizing for any single value, you are — as in life generally — trying to balance multiple competing values under time and resource constraints.</p><p>That can be complicated. It will help if big players like Salesforce create some standardized tools and metrics that make it easier for mid-sized companies to follow suit. Individual companies and cities can decide for themselves how much weight they want to give to 24/7 CFE relative to other values. </p><p>Anyway! This post, like the last one, has gotten way too long. If you’ve stayed with me this long, you are definitely a Volts reader and should <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe">purchase a subscription</a>!</p><p>In my next post, we’ll have a close look at some <a target="_blank" href="https://acee.princeton.edu/24-7">new modeling of 24/7 procurement</a> from Princeton’s Zero Lab and then see, based on that and all that has come before, whether we can draw some provisional conclusions about 24/7 CFE.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/is-247-carbon-free-energy-the-right</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:43928450</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 19 Nov 2021 17:00:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/43928450/426488429ede73348297d2ec049ed412.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1480</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/43928450/2bb8d31ab1eaec5600cae16f64a691ee.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Don't get too bummed out about COP26]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Hey y’all, just a quick thing today (as I work on my follow-up to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/an-introduction-to-energys-hottest">Friday’s post</a>).</p><p>I was <a target="_blank" href="https://crooked.com/podcast/josh-hawleys-masculinity-press-tour/">on </a><a target="_blank" href="https://crooked.com/podcast/josh-hawleys-masculinity-press-tour/"><em>Pod Save America</em></a> last week:</p><p>One of the things I talked about is the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow, Scotland, which wrapped up last week with a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/11/13/cop26-glasgow-climate-deal/">final agreement</a> that … say it with me … represented real progress but fell short of what’s needed. Just like all the other COP agreements.</p><p>I had a pretty deflationary take on the whole thing on the pod. Given the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/14/betrayal-of-people-planet-world-reacts-to-cop26-climate-pact">melodramatic rhetoric</a> around COP26 — the same rhetoric that attends every international climate summit — I thought I’d briefly explain why I don’t think COP26 is worth getting down about. </p><p>By way of background, remember that there were effectively two climate events at the COP, as there always are. One was the COP itself, the business of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The other was a kind of climate festival-cum-trade-show, featuring governments, nonprofits, and private-sector actors announcing all kinds of new campaigns and initiatives alongside the UNFCCC process — and protestors marching outside.</p><p>First event first. </p><p>The Paris Agreement continues to play out</p><p>The actual business of COP26 mostly involved negotiators from various countries in cramped conference rooms hashing out technical details of elements of the Paris Agreement — about monitoring and verification, about who is contributing how much to the climate fund for poorer countries, about how often countries will report new targets, and so forth. </p><p>None of that stuff was particularly dramatic; it was all the usual incremental, too-slow movement forward. There was some drama at the last minute when India — which had started COP26 with a bang, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-59125143">promising</a> to hit net-zero emissions by 2070 — <a target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/india-proposes-new-wording-phasing-coal-down-not-out-2021-11-13/">demanded</a> that a provision on a global coal “phase-out” be rewritten to say “phase-down.” (This was disappointing, but keep in mind this is the first time fossil fuels have been specifically mentioned in a COP agreement at all.)</p><p>Much was made of this and other shortcomings of the final agreement, but there’s a weird kind of disconnect around this commentary. What people seem to forget is that the UNFCCC has no real power to enforce anything and there isn’t the unity needed among participating countries to create a binding target with real consequences. </p><p>This was <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2015/12/15/10172238/paris-climate-treaty-conceptual-breakthrough">the origin of the Paris Agreement</a>: the realization that the best the UNFCCC could do is structure and publicize voluntary national goals and commitments. The idea was to do with transparency and peer pressure what decades of adversarial negotiations couldn’t: steadily increase ambition.</p><p>A shorter way of saying this is that a COP agreement can’t make a country do anything. Whether and how fast India phases out coal has nothing at all to do with what its diplomat says in Glasgow and everything to do with domestic Indian politics, which have their own logic and are only faintly affected by international politics. </p><p>The utility of the Paris process is that every few years it provides the equivalent of a giant camera flash, revealing where everyone stands. That is useful. International transparency and peer pressure can sometimes move national governments. But it is a mistake to invest any particular hopes for change in the UNFCCC process — it can’t really <em>do</em> anything. It can only illuminate what is being done.</p><p>What is being done</p><p>The good news is, we’re making progress. A decade ago, we were on track for 4° to 6° Celsius average warming by the end of the century, which would have been species-threatening.</p><p>As <a target="_blank" href="https://climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/">this report from Climate Action Tracker</a> shows, thanks to actions taken by national governments since then, we have “bent the curve” on climate change, as it were, and brought the average expected warming down to 2.7°C. </p><p>That would still be devastating. But we’re not going to stop there. Progress is only accelerating. If every country that has submitted a 2030 carbon target in the Paris process — an NDC, or nationally determined contribution — hits that target, average warming will be 2.4°C.</p><p>If all short- and long-term targets submitted thus far are achieved, it’s down to 2.1°C. In CAT’s “optimistic scenario” — in which all targets announced by anyone anywhere are met — the average is 1.8°C. </p><p>As the CAT report emphasizes, that’s still short of the Paris goal. There’s still a credibility gap between what countries say they want to achieve and what they are willing to offer. There’s certainly no reason for complacency. </p><p>But the trajectory is in the right direction. There’s still plenty of reason to fear where we are currently headed, but at the same time, there’s no reason to think that five years from now, at the next major Paris “stocktake,” we’ll still be headed there. </p><p>We’re bending the curve and lots of forces and institutions are lining up behind the effort. Speaking of which …</p><p>Climate Woodstock</p><p>Alongside every official COP is a kind of international festival where everyone who’s doing anything on climate goes to talk about it. Bi- and multi-lateral coalitions, states, cities, nonprofits, corporations — everyone gravitates to the moment when media attention will be most intense. </p><p>There was a bit of a sour taste at the festival this year, given that fossil fuels were <a target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-59199484">abundantly represented</a> and the poorest and most vulnerable were, thanks to Covid, <a target="_blank" href="https://heated.world/p/the-rich-injustice-of-cop26">unusually under-represented</a>. </p><p>Nonetheless, amidst the unsavory optics came all kinds of heartening news. There was a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-59137828">global treaty on methane</a>, brokered by the US and the UK, which has been signed by more than 100 countries. A group of renewable energy players created the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.un.org/en/energy-compacts/page/compact-247-carbon-free-energy">24/7 Carbon-free Energy Compact</a> in partnership with Sustainable Energy for All and UN Energy (see <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/an-introduction-to-energys-hottest">my explainer on 24/7 clean energy</a>).</p><p>A group of governments and private funders <a target="_blank" href="https://www.fordfoundation.org/the-latest/news/governments-and-private-funders-announce-historic-us-17-billion-pledge-at-cop26-in-support-of-indigenous-peoples-and-local-communities/">pledged</a> to spend a total of $1.7 billion on Indigenous peoples and local communities (IPLCs) protecting local biodiversity. Over 100 countries <a target="_blank" href="https://ukcop26.org/glasgow-leaders-declaration-on-forests-and-land-use/">pledged</a> to stop deforestation by 2030. </p><p>A group of philanthropic and development organizations and governments called the Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet (GEAPP) <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/03/world/europe/global-energy-alliance-fund-cop26.html">pledged</a> $10.5 billion toward helping emerging economies transition from fossil fuels. Similarly, the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) <a target="_blank" href="https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/cop26-glasgow-climate-announcements/">pledged</a> over $130 trillion of private capital to the energy transition. </p><p>And so on. What this shows is an immense amount of will in the world to address this problem, struggling to organize. There’s so much going on.</p><p>Another thing I said on <em>Pod Save America</em> is that national governments are often going to be in the caboose of this train — civic groups, the private sector, and subnational governments are leading the way. That’s distributed all over the world, less easy to see and sum up, but it shows that the caution and intransigence of national governments are not the whole story.</p><p>COP26 was a snapshot of a world — agonizingly slowly but with gathering speed — moving to address a crisis. There’s no reason for anyone to stop pushing, but there’s also nothing wrong with acknowledging and celebrating the progress that’s been achieved by all the pushing so far. </p><p>Things are moving! </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/dont-get-too-bummed-out-about-cop26</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:44049196</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 15 Nov 2021 18:30:30 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/44049196/2fb4457b441f93fee031fde032dfeb7c.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>541</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/44049196/6d8edf95cd87414797112c49c1e307a8.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[An introduction to energy's hottest new trend: 24/7 carbon-free electricity]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>When a company or city claims to be “100 percent powered by clean energy,” what it typically means is that it has tallied up its electricity consumption, purchased an equal amount of carbon-free energy (CFE), and called it even.</p><p>That’s fine, as far as it goes. But now, the next horizon of voluntary climate action has come into view: a brave few companies and cities aspire, not just to offset their consumption with CFE on a yearly basis, but to match their consumption with CFE production every hour of every day, all year long. Running on clean energy 24/7 — that’s new hotness. </p><p>The list of entities in the US that have committed to 24/7 CFE is short: Peninsula Clean Energy (a community choice aggregator in California) has committed to it by 2025; Google, Microsoft, and the Sacramento Municipal Utility District have targeted 2030; the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power and, somewhat anomalously for this California-heavy list, the city of Des Moines, Iowa, have targeted 2035. Ithaca, New York, is rumored to be contemplating something similar.</p><p>That’s it for now. But the idea is catching on quickly and drawing tons of attention. In September, a broad international group of more than 40 energy suppliers, buyers, and governments launched the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.un.org/en/energy-compacts/page/compact-247-carbon-free-energy">24/7 Carbon-free Energy Compact</a>, “a set of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/principles_-_updated.pdf">principles</a> and actions that stakeholders across the energy ecosystem can commit to in order to drive systemic change.” </p><p>Biden’s original American Jobs Plan <a target="_blank" href="https://grist.org/energy/can-the-federal-government-run-on-24-7-clean-energy-biden-wants-to-try/">contained a promise</a> to pursue “24/7 clean power for federal buildings.” That language has fallen out of the Build Back Better budget reconciliation bill in Congress, but rumor has it Biden may issue an executive order on the subject soon.</p><p>There are already efforts afoot to standardize hourly tracking of clean energy and build it into markets, as well as numerous active discussions about how to update markets and policy to accommodate it. </p><p>Anyway, it’s getting to be a big deal. It’s time to wrap our heads around what’s going on. Happily, it turns out to be a fascinating story with all kinds of twists and turns. Let’s dive in!</p><p>A history of “powered by clean energy”</p><p>To understand what “100 percent powered by clean electricity” has meant to date, you have to understand at least the basics of renewable energy certificates, or <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energysage.com/other-clean-options/renewable-energy-credits-recs/">RECs</a>.</p><p>Originally, RECs were a mechanism that utilities used to comply with statutory requirements for deploying renewable energy. A wind or solar farm that generated 1 megawatt-hour of renewable energy also generated 1 REC, which was submitted to regulators as proof of compliance. </p><p>Then voluntary REC markets came along. In a voluntary REC market, a power generator can “unbundle” its REC from the megawatt-hour of energy it generates and sell it into a market where it could be traded numerous times before being retired, or taken off the market. (For accounting purposes, whoever retires the REC gets to claim the environmental benefits.) Corporate, institutional, and government entities could purchase, trade, and retire RECS. </p><p>The idea was that the ability to sell RECs as a second income stream would induce developers to build more clean energy projects. And it worked for a while, as long as solar and wind came at a cost premium and RECS were relatively expensive.</p><p>But then, wind and solar started getting super-cheap: the cost of an unbundled REC went from $5 in 2008 to under $1 in 2010 (where it stayed through 2019, though it has risen back up to $3-$5 in the last couple years). Voluntary REC markets became quite robust but it became clear at a certain point that all these unbundled RECs were not actually driving many new renewable energy projects. A 2013 <a target="_blank" href="https://agris.fao.org/agris-search/search.do?recordID=US201600066150">study</a> found that “the investment decisions of wind power project developers in the United States are unlikely to have been altered by the voluntary REC market.” </p><p>To their credit, corporate and industrial (C&I) buyers took notice. In 2014, Walmart stated that it would no longer offset its energy use with unbundled RECs, and many other buyers followed suit. The market began to trend toward long-term contracts —  power purchase agreements (PPAs) — through which a buyer pledged to buy both the energy and the RECs (“bundled” RECs) from a prospective project for 10 to 25 years. </p><p>That gave developers more confidence and has prompted a surge of building of clean energy projects. In 2020 alone, C&I buyers in the US procured 10.6 gigawatts of renewable energy, which represents a third of all renewables capacity added in the country. Voluntary procurement by the C&I sector has become a major driver of the energy transition.</p><p>There are still plenty of entities buying cheap unbundled RECs and claiming carbon neutrality, but the leaders in the space are generally bundling them under PPAs. </p><p>But there is still a problem with RECs, even the good ones.</p><p><p>Volts is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.</p></p><p>The problem with RECS</p><p>When a C&I buyer purchases a REC, whether bundled or unbundled, it knows how much renewable energy was generated (a megawatt-hour), but not <em>when</em> it was generated. But it turns out that, when it comes to energy sources that come and go with the weather like wind and solar, the timing of generation matters quite a bit. </p><p>If participants in voluntary REC markets continue to buy the cheapest wind and solar RECs, sooner or later, the grid will become imbalanced. During periods of high sunlight or heavy wind, there will be too much renewable energy, pushing prices down. </p><p>But in periods when the sun is down or the wind flags, there isn’t <em>enough</em> renewable energy, so demand must be covered by expensive natural gas peaker plants. Prices and supplies swing wildly. Markets don’t like it. And more wind and solar only exacerbate the effect.</p><p>What’s needed is CFE that’s available when sun and wind fall short. A megawatt-hour of additional CFE is <em>much more valuable</em> during those times than it is during times of high solar and wind output. The timing matters.</p><p>But right now, RECs contain no information about the time of generation. It is impossible for buyers to know if any particular generator covered or will cover any particular hour of consumption. Buyers have no way of buying CFE specifically in the hours that they most need it. </p><p>Think of a monthly REC as an extremely low-resolution image of renewable energy production. In temporal terms, it’s one giant month-sized pixel. C&I buyers purchase these low-resolution images, overlay them on their consumption, and hope for the best.</p><p>But when you look at a higher resolution image of renewable energy production, one with hour-sized pixels, you see that it does not overlap perfectly with consumption. Not even close. </p><p>The mismatch between “100% CFE” and “100% CFE 24/7”</p><p>Google broke ground in this area with a 2018 white paper called “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.blog.google/outreach-initiatives/sustainability/internet-24x7-carbon-free-energy-should-be-too/">The Internet is 24x7. Carbon-free energy should be too.</a>” (See also <a target="_blank" href="https://www.gstatic.com/gumdrop/sustainability/247-carbon-free-energy.pdf">this 2020 white paper</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://blog.google/outreach-initiatives/sustainability/new-progress-toward-our-247-carbon-free-energy-goal/">this April blog post</a> from Google CEO Sundar Pichai.) It has produced some visuals that allow us to clearly see the mismatch between renewable energy supply and demand.</p><p>Google has dozens of data centers. It tracks energy supply and demand by the hour and gives each data center a CFE score: how many hours of its operations were powered, in real time, by renewable energy. </p><p>A quick word about how the CFE score is calculated. For each hour, the baseline CFE score is the grid mix. So if the data center is drawing on a grid with 20 percent CFE (wind, solar, nuclear, whatever) and 80 percent fossil, it begins with a CFE score of 20 percent for that hour. </p><p>Google then adds any energy being produced during that hour by projects with which it has signed PPAs on the same grid. That can push the CFE score up, theoretically to 100 percent.   </p><p>Anyway, with that in mind, let’s check out some data centers and their CFE scores. The first is from the company’s data center in Iowa. </p><p>Google buys more than enough wind power in Iowa to offset the data center’s consumption in volumetric terms. But is the data center actually running on wind power, from hour to hour? Not entirely. To be precise, 74 percent of its demand was matched, on an hourly basis, by CFE. It has a CFE score of 74. </p><p>Below is a stripe representing the data center’s consumption for every hour of the year. Each column is a day (there are 365). Each row is an hour, beginning with midnight at the top. The shade of the square represents the amount of CFE powering it during that hour.</p><p>In most hours, there’s enough Google-contracted wind power coming onto the Iowa grid to cover the data center’s consumption. However, for a period in late summer, wind speeds decline, wind power drops, and fossil fuels step in to provide the power. </p><p>How can Google get this data center’s CFE score up to 100 percent? </p><p>The first thing to note is that it can not simply buy more Iowa wind power. It is already getting all it can get out of wind. It doesn’t matter how many wind farms it has contracted with if the wind isn’t blowing in a given hour. In Iowa, Google is going to have to procure <em>something else</em> — something that can fill in the gaps left by wind.</p><p>One way to do that is by buying both wind and solar, which tend to have complementary profiles. Below is a similar stripe representing Google’s Netherlands data center. On July 1, a bunch of new Google-contracted solar came online; from that point on, the middle of the stripe — daytime — is much greener. Solar fills in some of the gaps left by wind. </p><p>Unfortunately, solar leaves gaps too. It doesn’t matter how many solar farms you’ve contracted with if the sun is behind clouds or, you know, down. In the Netherlands, Google is going to have to procure <em>something else</em> — something to fill the remaining gaps left by solar and wind. </p><p>In some sense, these are nice problems to have. Here’s the Taiwan data center:</p><p>Oof. What little CFE there is on Taiwan’s grid comes from nuclear power plants — when they go out, it’s all fossils.</p><p>Google has given all of its data centers CFE scores (which was no mean feat, since in many cases this data was not easily available). Here they are:</p><p>These graphics help illustrate Google’s 24/7 CFE challenge, which isn’t just one challenge but a slightly different challenge in each of the dozens of grids in which it operates. </p><p>At each of those data centers (except maybe Oklahoma and Oregon) it needs to buy a bunch more wind and solar. But it will also need to buy <em>something else</em> — something to fill the gaps.</p><p>What might that something else be? </p><p>The technology needed to fill the gaps</p><p>Part of the great promise of the movement to 24/7 CFE is it will draw attention and investment to all those things needed to balance out cheap wind and solar. </p><p>For big consumers like Google, there are, roughly speaking, three ways to smooth out the fluctuations in wind and solar and maintain a steady hourly supply of CFE. They are, from least to most expensive: demand management, energy storage, and clean-firm generation. </p><p>Demand management</p><p>Demand management begins with load reduction through efficiency. Google has aggressively pursued energy efficiency at its data centers, with dramatic results: “Compared with five years ago,” the company said in 2018, “we now deliver more than 3.5 times as much computing power with the same amount of electrical power.”</p><p>After load reduction comes load shaping — managing daily operations to push more consumption into high-CFE hours — and load shifting, which refers to moving consumption around in smaller increments, responding to hour-to-hour fluctuations in CFE. </p><p>“We got our start by looking out over a 24-hour period, getting a forecast of what the grid CFE would be, and then shifting compute loads back in time during that period, things like feature upgrades or backups,” Michael Terrell, Google’s director of energy (and the author of the 2018 white paper), told me. “Now what we started doing is shifting loads spatially, from one data center to the other. Theoretically you could envision compute following the sun [around the globe], if you took it all the way.”</p><p>Adapting demand to supply rather than vice versa — load reduction, shaping, and shifting — is almost always the least expensive way of accommodating variable renewables. There is still a ton of innovation to come in this area. “It's a space where we haven't even really gotten started,” Terrell says. </p><p>Energy storage</p><p>Storage, currently dominated by <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/battery-week-everything-in-one-place">lithium-ion batteries</a>, is great for smoothing out the day-to-day supply curve, taking some excess wind from windy hours and saving it for lulls, or saving excess solar from the daytime for nighttime. </p><p>However, while batteries are a good balance for renewables’ variability, their hour-to-hour fluctuations, they aren’t as good for balancing its intermittency, the occasional days, weeks, months, even years of unusually low wind or sunlight. Germans call a period like this a <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunkelflaute"><em>Dunkelflaute</em></a>. It is extremely difficult and expensive to cover one with only batteries to supplement wind and solar. </p><p>Clean-firm generation</p><p>The third option is “clean firm” generation, i.e., energy sources that can be turned on at will and run for days or weeks on end, but emit no carbon. The two big conventional examples here are hydro and nuclear power, but there isn’t a ton of new hydro available to most buyers and new nuclear (at least in the absence of next-gen nuclear tech) is prohibitively expensive.</p><p>There’s also geothermal, which (as I wrote <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/10/21/21515461/renewable-energy-geothermal-egs-ags-supercritical">here</a>) is getting a lot of interest and active development. The first bit of clean-firm that Google plans to acquire is <a target="_blank" href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/infrastructure/google-fervo-geothermal-project-creates-carbon-free-energy">geothermal, from a company called Fervo</a>. For now, affordable geothermal is only available in certain areas of the country, but technological advances are close to changing that.</p><p>Other clean-firm sources include:</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/long-duration-storage-can-help-clean">long-duration energy storage</a>, which is technically a form of storage, but competes directly with other clean-firm sources;</p><p>* advanced nuclear, which has been just over the horizon for years but might finally be getting close;</p><p>* biomass, some versions of which may qualify as zero-carbon; </p><p>* power plants running on hydrogen (or hydrogen-based fuels), which are currently being tested in the UK and elsewhere; and</p><p>* natural gas plants with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), which are currently both nonexistent and wildly expensive, but may (with the help of a boosted 45Q tax rebate in the Build Back Better bill) become more cost-effective soon. </p><p>One reason energy nerds are excited about the 24/7 trend is that it’s going to pull forward in time a bunch of questions (and investment decisions) that were going to face grids trying to reach 100 percent CFE anyway. Perhaps the biggest and most important of those questions is: how far will we be able to get with demand response and batteries? How much clean-firm will we need in the end? </p><p>With a bunch of companies and cities competing to reach 24/7 CFE, we’ll find out sooner than we otherwise would have. And the clean-firm sources that are necessary will receive much-needed investment, bringing their costs down and benefiting other decarbonizing grids across the world.</p><p>The market products needed to fill the gaps</p><p>If companies and cities want to fill in their hourly gaps, they need access to time-stamped CFE. As previously mentioned, current RECs only come in low-resolution form, in chunks of a month or year. They aren’t precise enough to target specific hours. </p><p>The answer — simple to propose but devilishly difficult in practice — is to supplement and eventually replace current RECs with some kind of hourly RECs. As it happens, there’s a bunch of work going on to figure out how that would work. If you’re interested, the place to begin exploring is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.mrets.org/hourlydata">this white paper</a> from M-RETS, a nonprofit organization devoted to the tracking and trading of renewable energy.</p><p>Working with Google, M-RETS is <a target="_blank" href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/sustainability/t-eacs-offer-new-approach-to-certifying-clean-energy">pioneering and testing a product called Time-based Energy Attribute Certificates (T-EACs)</a>, which are effectively hourly RECs. One monthly REC would be replaced (for a 31-day month) with 744 T-EACs, each representing one hour of the month, each encoding exactly how much CFE was generated in that hour. </p><p>For now, in the Midwest, T-EACs are being offered alongside RECs and Google is buying and retiring them. But there’s a long way to go between that test and a fundamental restructuring of REC markets. <a target="_blank" href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/sustainability/t-eacs-offer-new-approach-to-certifying-clean-energy">Says Google</a>:</p><p>For T-EACs to be adopted worldwide, we’ll need to standardize the certificates and integrate them into existing tracking systems and carbon accounting programs. Also, grid operators will need to enable customers to access and understand their hourly energy data. That’s why we support policies that mandate publication of grid data, and why we serve on the Advisory Board for <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energytag.org/">EnergyTag</a>, an independent non-profit pioneering a global tracking standard for T-EACs.</p><p>This is a big task, which amounts to rebuilding a rather large plane (REC markets) while it is in flight. But the information necessary to do it exists. </p><p>That’s phase one of M-RETS’ plan: make hourly RECS available and reliable. Phase two is a little trickier.</p><p>Measuring the carbon impact of renewable energy procurement is vexed but vital</p><p>Phase two is to integrate carbon information and accounting into T-EACs, to reveal precisely how much carbon was avoided by the clean energy. This information can help buyers prioritize the T-EACs likely to displace the most emissions. It can also allow companies to more precisely track their scope 2 emissions. </p><p>For those who don’t remember this bit of jargon: scope 1 emissions are from direct, on-site combustion of fossil fuels; scope 2 are the off-site emissions represented by on-site consumption of electricity; scope 3 (a much broader category) are all the emissions caused by a company’s supply chain and products. </p><p>To date, companies have been able to offset their scope 2 emissions with REC purchases. But as we’ve seen, RECs are almost always mismatched to actual hourly consumption, and a company that relies on RECs to offset its scope 2 emissions is likely <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cell.com/joule/fulltext/S2542-4351(19)30214-4">exaggerating its actual reductions</a>. </p><p>Hourly carbon-emissions data attached to T-EACs would allow a company to precisely measure the amount of emissions it reduces through its contracts and thus precisely offset its scope 2 emissions. </p><p>There are technical issues around how to properly measure avoided carbon, but we’re going to pass those by for now. There’s a ton of work going on in this area: for companies trying to provide reliable hourly emissions data, see <a target="_blank" href="https://carbonara.energy">Singularity Energy</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://api.electricitymap.org">electricityMap</a> (formerly <a target="_blank" href="https://www.tmrow.com">Tomorrow</a>), <a target="_blank" href="https://www.watttime.org">WattTime</a>, and <a target="_blank" href="https://kevala.com">Kevala</a>. In partnership with several energy companies, Kevala recently released a <a target="_blank" href="https://kevala.com/total-carbon-accounting/">white paper</a> proposing “a methodology for measuring carbon intensity on the electric grid.”</p><p>In addition, there are organizations working to develop standards and common definitions, including the aforementioned <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energytag.org">EnergyTag</a>, “an independent, non-profit, industry-led initiative to define and build a market for hourly electricity certificates that enables energy users to verify the source of their electricity and carbon emissions in real-time,” and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.lfenergy.org">LF Energy</a> (the energy division of the Linux Foundation). </p><p>The ultimate vision: electricity markets in which each hour of CFE is available as a discrete product, with reliable carbon data attached to it. Within such markets, any buyer — a building, a data center, a city — would be able to know precisely what its real-world carbon footprint is and exactly how much progress it has made in reducing it.</p><p>Is 24/7 CFE the next step in carbon commitments … or a distraction? </p><p>Let’s be honest: governments ought to be doing this, through policy. The federal government should pass a clean energy standard (or, ahem, a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/can-the-us-reach-bidens-climate-goal">CEPP</a>) targeting a net-zero electricity sector by 2035, like Biden wanted. On some level, all of this voluntary stuff is a suboptimal response to government failure. </p><p>Nonetheless, the C&I sector deserves credit for pushing things forward even when governments won’t. It is responsible for enormous amounts of new renewable energy on the grid over the last decade.</p><p>Now it is trying to focus attention on filling the gaps left by wind and solar, to achieve full, around-the-clock clean energy. This is a challenge every decarbonizing grid will face eventually. Google et al. are effectively volunteering to explore and chart it in advance. </p><p>Nevertheless, there are real <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/corporate-procurement/should-google-and-microsoft-focus-on-sourcing-their-own-100-clean-power-or-cleaning-up-the-dirtiest-grids">questions</a> about whether this is the best climate strategy. A company procuring CFE to raise its own 24/7 CFE score is not necessarily going to procure in a way that maximizes carbon reductions; those two goals rarely overlap perfectly. Critics of the 24/7 trend say that companies ought to be focused on reducing the most carbon possible as quickly as possible, and that hourly T-EACs are in some ways a return to unbundled RECs, with all the same risks that accounting gimmicks will substitute for real emission reductions. </p><p>These are complicated disputes that are worth spending some time on. And this post has already gone on for too long! So for now, I will leave it here, with the introduction I promised. </p><p>In my next post, I’ll get into the questions around whether 24/7 is the right goal and how it might actually affect emissions. It only gets nerdier from here on out, y’all!</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/an-introduction-to-energys-hottest</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:43708361</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 12 Nov 2021 17:30:47 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/43708361/73217b9066821d875e7de81862ea1c14.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1573</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/43708361/7cc3ff8b31480473740b03a5f39459c3.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Amy Westervelt on disinformation and propaganda]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, journalist and researcher Amy Westervelt discusses the history of the public relations industry in the US and the ubiquitous, if largely unacknowledged, role it has played, and still plays, in shaping how Americans think about the environment. Amy has tons of great stories!</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Amy Westervelt, October 27, 2021 </p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/616bn96y3hfjqus/volts21.10.27%28amy.westervelt%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF version</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>In recent years, there’s been a lot of talk about America’s polluted information environment — the ubiquity of disinformation — driven by social media and “fake news.” What is less discussed is that purposefully crafted disinformation designed to shape public opinion to the benefit of the wealthy and powerful is nothing new. In fact, it’s almost as old as the country itself. </p><p>Amy Westervelt, a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.amywestervelt.com">long-time, award-winning environmental journalist</a>, has spent her career uncovering disinformation and exposing the methods of those who generate and spread it.</p><p>She’s perhaps best known as the host of <a target="_blank" href="https://drillednews.com/podcast-2/">Drilled</a>, a “true-crime podcast about climate change” that has spent six seasons (so far) exposing the propaganda generated and spread by the fossil fuel industry. And she’s editor-in-chief of the <a target="_blank" href="https://drillednews.com/">Drilled News</a> site.</p><p>She’s also the founder of <a target="_blank" href="https://criticalfrequency.org">Critical Frequency</a>, a woman-run podcast network, as well as the co-host of the climate podcast <a target="_blank" href="https://www.hottakepod.com">Hot Take</a> with climate essayist Mary Annaïse Heglar (it’s currently on hiatus; returning next year), the co-host or producer of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.amywestervelt.com/podcasts">several other podcasts</a> (including <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sceneonradio.org/the-repair/">Scene on Radio</a> and Crooked Media’s <a target="_blank" href="https://crooked.com/podcast-series/this-land/">This Land</a>), and the author of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.amywestervelt.com/book"><em>Forget Having It All</em></a>, a 2018 book on the challenges of motherhood in the US. </p><p>Now Westervelt has a new project, launching today: <a target="_blank" href="https://rigged.ghost.io//">Rigged</a>. </p><p>The foundation of the site is a <a target="_blank" href="https://rigged.ghost.io/documents/">treasure trove of original documents</a>, some dating back more than a century, about the founding and growth of the modern public relations industry and its development of tools of mass persuasion.</p><p>Atop that database is a series of pieces charting the landscape, offering a <a target="_blank" href="https://rigged.ghost.io/techniques/">glossary of disinformation techniques</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://rigged.ghost.io/spinmasters/">profiles of the (anti-)heroes of the business</a>, and <a target="_blank" href="https://rigged.ghost.io/industries/">stories</a> on various inglorious chapters in disinformation history, from chemicals to railroads to tobacco to fossil fuels. </p><p>It is equal parts fascinating and horrifying — fascinating that the tools of disinformation are so well and publicly documented; horrifying that they are still working so effectively. </p><p>Here’s just one fun fact: Edward Bernays, one of the pioneers of early 20th century opinion shaping, coined the term “public relations” because the Germans, he said, had “given the word <em>propaganda</em> a bad name.” You can also thank Bernays, Sigmund Freud’s nephew, for men wearing wristwatches, women smoking, and bacon being a standard part of American breakfast. These stories are wild.</p><p>I’ve been admiring Westervelt’s work from afar for years, so I was psyched to talk to her about Rigged, the long history of disinformation, the many ways the fossil fuel industry has shaped public opinion, and why the US left seems so incapable of dealing effectively with disinformation to this day.</p><p>Amy Westervelt, welcome to Volts.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>Hi, thanks for having me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Glad you could squeeze me in between your dozens of projects. Let's start with the newest one. Tell me about Rigged: How did you come to be doing this, why are you doing it, and what would you like it to accomplish?</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>A little more than a year ago now I did a season of my other podcast, Drilled, looking at the history of fossil fuel propaganda. When I first started Drilled, I was just going to do one six-part season about the origins of climate denial. Then, in the course of doing that, I started thinking, climate denial is such a dumb tactic; why did it work? It's dumb to just be like, “Nuh-uh.” It's not a genius strategy. Of course, it's telling people what they want to hear, like this problem might not be that bad and maybe we don't need to do anything drastic. But I also felt like there must be more to it. </p><p>So I started to look at what the industry was doing before; it's not like they just started doing PR when global warming was researched. The more I dug into that, the more I realized that they really spent a lot of time and thought to shape how people view the world in general, and especially how people view environmental issues, for a really long time, before anyone was talking about climate change. </p><p>That has a lot to do with, once this issue appears, how we actually process and deal with it. But in the course of doing that, I also found all this stuff about what the PR firms and the PR people who were working for Big Oil were doing for all these other industries at the same time, and it seemed important to me for people to understand that this is a longstanding system and set of strategies that really was created to circumvent democracy. </p><p>The modern PR industry comes about when you have journalists criticizing America's captains of industry for the first time, you have the vote expanding beyond just land-owning white men; this is the late 1800s and early 1900s, the dawn of the 20th century. The US government passes its very first regulation on business in 1887. So there are all these reasons that industry across the board is saying, “Oh, wow, we really need a way to get a handle on this thing that's getting away from us.” I call it “creeping democracy.”</p><p>A lot of these early PR guys are working for coal and rail and oil and tobacco all at the same time, and then quickly, chemicals joins that list, too. So the reason that we see these strategies replicated in multiple industries is not that an oil executive is studying the moves of a tobacco executive; it's that they're using the same PR firms. </p><p>In the case of oil and tobacco, John W. Hill was working for the American Petroleum Institute and all the tobacco companies at the same time, and he encouraged them to talk to each other. He got the tobacco guys to join the API. The oil companies were co-defendants of the tobacco companies during the tobacco litigation, because they helped to create the cigarette filter. That was all brokered by their PR and spokespeople. </p><p>I felt like all this documentation sitting on my desk wasn’t doing anyone any good there. I started to digitize a lot of it, and I thought, DocumentCloud is kind of hard to navigate, so I should put this on a website that guides people through it. Then I thought, there's a significant number of people who, even if they believe we should act on climate, will never listen to a climate podcast, because they have a certain idea in their minds of what that means; so I'm going to do a companion podcast that looks at how disinformation is created and how it became an industry in and of itself in the US, a long time before we started talking about Facebook and Twitter, or climate change and climate denial.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>When this industry and approach was first coming together, what were some of the early victories that helped put the template in place for what these guys could do for an industry?</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>This is fascinating to me, because they're all these things that people take at face value as just a cultural shift that happened in America. It's really nuts. </p><p>One of my favorite examples of this is Freud's nephew, Edward Bernays, who integrated a lot of Freud's theories into his work in the 1920s. He lived to be more than 100, so he was working from the 20s through the 70s. He had a watchmaker come to him who was concerned about the fact that, apparently, it was considered feminine to wear a wristwatch, so men were not wearing wristwatches. Real men had pocket watches. </p><p>So Bernays starts to think about who are the manliest of men, and he lands on soldiers. Bernays was a frequent user of commissioning an expert to do a study; whether or not that study was valid or not is very suspect, but at the time, it was considered an expert study. So he commissioned a study to look at how many soldiers were killed while lighting a match to look at their pocket watch. Then he goes to the Army and says, “you could have a 25 percent reduction in the number of men being killed if you just made wristwatches standard issue.” So they did. He got the Army to make wristwatches standard issue, and that effectively broke this taboo about it being feminine to wear a wristwatch.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Clever. He did a reverse thing with women in smoking, which I also found fascinatingly devilish.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>Yes. In the case of smoking, American Tobacco came to him with a similar kind of gender taboo: it was considered uncouth for women to smoke. So he had this idea to call up some of his friends’ young socialite daughters and have them stage a protest, walking up and down Fifth Avenue smoking, and say that it was a women's empowerment thing. Then he called all of the newspapers and told them about the protest, and they all covered it. It was in all the national papers. He called cigarettes “torches of freedom.” </p><p>He also really tapped into Freudian stuff about women and penis envy and etc. He was quite a dude. Within six months or so, this taboo had been totally broken down and the tobacco industry had doubled its customer base. I'm sure most people at the time just thought that it was a women's empowerment thing, but it was all manufactured.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Another thing that people think of as a modern phenomenon is attacking the media as biased or fake news, or trying to bully the media into doing a both-sides approach of what ought to be a clear issue. Turns out that goes way back too; that's not an invention of modern Republicans.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>No, it is not. Bernays did a bit of that. Even Ivy Lee, who was the very first modern publicist who worked for Standard Oil, did that. Then in the 60s and 70s, my favorite, Herb Schmertz, the VP of public affairs for Mobil Oil, really hammered that home. He was famous for bullying journalists and threatening them with pulling ads if they didn't cover Mobil’s point of view on things, which he did actually do with the <em>Wall Street Journal</em> for a significant number of years. He even went one step further and refused to give them access to things like quarterly earnings reports.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>In one of the interesting stories I read on Rigged, someone successfully bullied a journalist into saying “changes” rather than “reforms.” It's amazing how vulnerable to this journalists are and have been.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>That was Ivy Lee; he shifted the language around railroad labor requirements. Back in the late 1800s, they were wanting to require trains to have additional staff, because they were very negligent and having massive crashes and killing lots of people. They were told, “you guys are understaffing these trains, they need to be properly staffed.” Ivy Lee shifted the language around from it being a <em>minimum</em> number of staff to <em>additional</em> staff, which is a really key thing when you think about it. </p><p>I was just thinking about that today, with how the oil industry talks about methane. Everything is a methane “leak,” which sounds accidental: oopsie! But you guys are letting it rip constantly, sometimes just because you want to burn off gas. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>“We've been having this accident happen consistently every day.”</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>Industries of all kinds spend an enormous amount of time and money choosing the exact right wording. They've been doing that forever. A guy named Earl Newsom, who worked for Standard Oil from the late ‘20s to the late ‘60s or ‘70s — also worked for Campbell's Soup, and GM, and Ford, and all the big American companies — was using Elmo Roper to do early polling, in the ‘20s, and then using that to inform his PR plan. I found all of the invoicing documents in his archives and some of these companies were spending millions of dollars on PR in the late ‘20s, already.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>It seems like, early in the game, when these things were new and no one had any defense mechanisms, they were wildly successful. That's an incredible payoff for a little bit of investment.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>The very first press release, which Ivy Lee created and sent out to <em>The New York Times</em>, ended up getting printed word for word, because they were so caught off guard by the fact that the company was disclosing all this information.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>It's easy to condemn the corporate side of that move, but the response of journalists is a little bit more muddy. You can see why it’s effective on journalists, because they do want to be fair. Objectivity has become a parody of itself, but the impulse is real; I understand why, as journalists, we're subject to this.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>Totally. It effectively weaponized good intentions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>How can we harness a basically good impulse to horrible effect?</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>It was very smart. In the early days, part of what they were organizing against was the muckraking journalism that Ida Tarbell and Ida B. Wells and Upton Sinclair and all those folks were doing. Part of the strategy was to paint this picture that those journalists are really activists — they're biased, they have an agenda. You don't want to be that type of journalist. Which I still see today, constantly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>One of the most useful things on Rigged is this glossary of techniques that have come into use since the late 1800s. It's a bounded set of techniques that they come to again and again and again. I thought we could look at a couple of them through the lens of fossil fuel companies, because that's my personal obsession. </p><p>Some of them I think people understand already, like astroturfing: the making of fake grassroots groups. Most people get making up of fake experts, or starting your own think tank, or buying a friggin’ academic department and having them crank out studies for you. But some of these are less obvious. </p><p>One of the things I found amazing is how involved the fossil fuel companies have been in school curriculum, going way, way back.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>They started that. They did that before any other industry. </p><p>Standard Oil put out the very first corporate-sponsored curriculum for schools in 1928. They did these pressed albums that they sent to schools; it was called the Standard School Broadcast. It seemed on the face of it like it had nothing to do with oil. That's the genius thing; they are very good at doing this in a subtle way. This program was music appreciation and history. So on the face of it, seems fine.</p><p>I actually went on a little bit of a spending spree buying up old vinyl from the Standard School Broadcast. I have one that's all about the Industrial Revolution. It's classic. They do these radio vignette-style stories in between the music, and there's one where they have this very shrill-voiced woman being the consumer protection person. They give her some name that sounds annoying, like Ms. Snap. It’s setting up this whole thing of, well, do you want to give up your car and live like the aboriginals do? </p><p>This one that I'm referencing in particular came out in the ‘40s. So they've been setting up this idea that anyone who suggests government intervention that would interfere with profits in the name of public safety or the environment or anything like that — that is a backwards thing, it's not sensible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Something the corporates do better than the good guys is, they don't just go in and say “oil is great.” It’s much deeper: corporate capitalism is the nature of the world. It’s propaganda on a deeper level than just their interests. They're trying to convey a worldview.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>Yes, very much, and when you put that worldview in a classroom or in the mouth of a teacher that young children are taught to trust and believe, that is an insidious form of propaganda that is very hard to shake. </p><p>It’s wild. I spent the last several months looking at the school stuff, because we did a series with Earther on school curriculum. What I wanted to focus on was the non-science part. We've gotten to this point where everyone thinks the problem with climate is political will, not lack of understanding of the science — but we haven't really looked at where that problem with political will has come from, and just how far back it goes. These guys were investing in shaping a very specific worldview.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>And making you feel like, if you object to part of it, you are basically standing up against industrialized modern life.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>Yeah, that you're backwards, you're a communist, you're not American. It's tied to all of that. It's insane to me how much you see that messaging today. In all the coverage of Manchin and the Build Back Better stuff, I'm seeing this pitting of the environment against the economy, or environmentalists as some sort of special interest group that just cares about trees. That is still so prevalent now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>If you get those narratives in people's heads when they're young, they don't think of them as narratives; they just think it's how the world works. It becomes so deeply rooted that any amount of contrary facts just bounce off the narrative. Those narratives are so much stronger than evidence.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>This is why science denial was such a slam dunk, because it reinforced the narrative that people had already been brainwashed with for decades.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Some of the older school tactics are, to our modern eyes, quite crude; presumably now school administrators would not be handing out Shell comic books about how oil is great. But fossil fuels are still at it in schools, so what's the modern version?</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>When we did this series with Earther, Dharna Noor and I worked on it together, and Dharna found a guy in Cambridge, Massachusetts, at a Montessori school — so not a red state, or a red area — whose kid had come home with a bunch of coloring and activity books from a natural gas company, all about how natural gas is great and it’s your invisible friend. It was suggesting that kids go and talk to their family members about how they use natural gas. </p><p>The other persistent thing, which is so effective, is just reminding people how much they use this stuff, how complicit they are. Look at all the ways you use natural gas in your home, all of the things it delivers to you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>The more tied up it is with your identity, the more resistant you are to the idea that it's bad, because then you're bad, right? They want to link you to it. I don't feel like the left does this very well. </p><p>When people think about fossil fuel influence, their minds go to lobbying and money. But actually — and I feel like these early stories help make this very clear — they've been laying the groundwork in culture for decades. It's fertile soil on which they can plant a lobbying campaign; the ground has been prepared.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>For a century. That's not hyperbole. It's actually slightly more than a century.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Are there things you found out that fossil fuel companies are doing or have done that shocked or surprised you, that you think most people aren't aware of?</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>The thing that blew my mind the most was in the Earl Newsom archive. So he, again, was a publicist for Standard Oil. </p><p>I should mention, in respect to him and all of these folks: They make a very clear delineation between what they do and what they would call “press agents” do, which is get media coverage and things like that. When they say public relations, they mean being the intermediary, mediating the relationship between the company or the industry and the general public, but also multiple other publics: legislators, moms, students, whatever. </p><p>Earl Newsom in particular saw himself as sort of a consigliere to CEOs. In some of his files, he's weighing in on whether or not they should accept a particular award, what connotation that would have. It’s to a level I don't think the left even understands, never mind knows how to do. </p><p>In his files, I found one box from the Standard Oil archive that was confidential, and there were all these plans in there around free enterprise. This was in 1944, as World War II is coming to an end. This guy is meeting with his big clients, not just Standard Oil, but also GM and Campbell Soup and all of them. </p><p>He's like, “We have a big problem coming down the pipeline here, and it's not war. It's not even the fact that the government's not going to be buying stuff from you anymore. Americans have gotten very comfortable with the government running things; the government has done a good job, and Americans are starting to like it a little too much. So we really run the risk here of Americans turning away from the free market approach that we have come to rely upon in this country. This is a huge problem for business. We need to coordinate a campaign that reminds them of why free enterprise is actually the best thing for them. We cannot use the words ‘free enterprise.’ We cannot coordinate this through the US Chamber or the National Association of Manufacturers, because everyone knows they're just shills for business.” </p><p>This is in the 1940s. They're already saying this. “We have to coordinate but it can't look coordinated. We need a full court press here. We need ads that are focused on cool gadgets that we're coming up with in our research and development departments. We need to be talking about the high wages that we're paying. We need to invest in universities.” </p><p>This is when they start going really big on investing in universities, because they want educated people to be coming out of universities with a fixed idea about how important free enterprise is to the country. It is <em>comprehensive</em>. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>That post-war era is so interesting to me. When you learn about it in history, you learn about these big structural forces: the war was ending, there was a war surplus, all this economic vitality, and then out of that grew roads and giant corporations — as though it was just an unfolding of history. But right in that post-war era was such a flurry, a concentration of people trying to take hold and direct the US in particular directions. It was propaganda flourishing. </p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>It really was. The thing that made my head explode was that shortly after that, I found stuff in the Bernays archive where he had been giving almost the exact same speech to his clients, at the same time. </p><p>Between the two of them, Earl Newsom and Edward Bernays were working for the top 100 companies in the country at that point, and if they were sounding the alarm about this and getting their clients to coordinate, that would have been a pretty effective campaign. </p><p>I grew up with this idea of the war surplus, and we have all this infrastructure that we need to use, and all these people that we need to put to work, and also, Americans are just so grateful that the war is over that they're just in the mood to buy. But really, these guys have been trying to sell us on the idea that convenience and “modernity” are the most important things for forever.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Another section of the site profiles some of the people of the propaganda movement. Let's talk about Richard Berman. It’s fascinating how effective he's been and all the things he's invented, but I also just find him fascinating as a person; I have an unhealthy fascination with awful people. What was his signature achievement?</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>He is supposedly the person that the main character in the movie <em>Thank You for Smoking</em> is based on. He worked for Philip Morris for a long time, trying to work the public and legislators during the ‘90s tobacco litigation. They gave him a bunch of money to start a PR firm. </p><p>With that, he created this incredible web of front groups: The Center for Consumer Freedom. The Center for Responsible Science.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>My favorite was, when the Center for Consumer Freedom somehow became well-known as a front group, he changed the name to the most spectacularly generic name. I literally can't remember it, because it’s just a bunch of buzzwords. </p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>The acronym is CORE: the Center for Organizational Research and Education.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I love it. That could be anything. </p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>He was an early mover on astroturfing and these front groups, and he also figured out that he could very easily hide the funding behind them. I think the Center for Consumer Freedom is technically a nonprofit, the sort of nonprofit that doesn't have to disclose much, so their main payment outgoing every year is to Rick Berman.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>If any of these groups come in for any sort of legal or any other kind of trouble, it's equally easy just to scrap them. </p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>He just scraps them and makes a new one. He's got five or six that are all about unions. The thing I find the most entertaining about him is that he was given the nickname Dr. Evil by “60 Minutes” in the early 2000s, and he was so delighted by it that he actually includes it in his requests for funding now, as a proof of how successful he is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>He loves being called Dr. Evil. This guy, and these other guys, too: Are they evil, and they know they're evil, and they don't care, and they like being evil? Or do you think on some level, they have a story that they tell themselves about themselves where they're the good guys, fighting on the right side of things? How conscious is the evil?</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>This is what fascinates me about them. What makes these people tick? </p><p>A lot of people think it's just money. I think that's true for some, but in my experience, people can only do something just for money for so long before they have to create a narrative for themselves. In Berman's case, and in a lot of these guys’ cases, I think they have completely drunk the Kool-Aid on how important it is to protect capitalism as part and parcel of freedom. I think they just 100 percent believe that if you don't have capitalism, you don't have freedom, and anything that erodes capitalism erodes freedom.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>But the funny thing is, if you read the theoretical foundations of capitalism — why it's supposed to work and why it's supposed to be so virtuous — part of the theory is transparency. Part of the theory is people knowing what other people are doing, and what things really cost, and everyone having the same information. That’s central to the theory. So it's bizarre what capitalism has become in the heads of some of these guys.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>Rick Berman fascinates me too because his tactics are so crude. They're so dumb.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>He's an early version of what we all ran into with Trump: wait a minute, you don't have to be smart. You don't have to really be clever. Your tactics don't have to be subtle. You can just be big dumb, and it works.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>It totally works. There was this tape that was leaked of Berman to <em>The New York Times</em> in 2014 or 2015, when anti-fracking was starting to grow. He got brought in to give a talk to the Western States Petroleum Association. He said, “You don't have to convince people to like fracking. You don't even have to convince them that it's not bad. You just have to get a tie. All you need is a tie. A tie is a win for you.”</p><p>It’s so true. That's the big problem, right? If your client is the status quo, it's much easier to get that. If you're trying to push for change, you actually do need a win. You need to get people to a point where they're willing to act.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Yes. Which is not just neutral; it's way beyond neutral. You have to build a lot of energy to do anything good or constructive, and it's so easy just to sap a little bit of that energy.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>It's so much easier to sell complacency than change.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Why is there no Dr. Good? Where are the climate left’s Machiavellian operators who are doing PR and propaganda? </p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>I find this very puzzling. One, I think that the left gets into this trap of thinking that this stuff is dumb and silly and doesn't work. Which is not true. Then there's this whole false sense of nobility: “They go low, we go high.” Well, or are you just bringing a spoon to a knife fight? </p><p>The left, at least on climate, is outspent ten to one on PR and lobbying. So there's way less money, but it's not because it doesn't exist. There are people with money on the left. There's been a choice made not to invest in this for some reason. I've talked to a few of the folks who are experts in the climate psychology realm, and they say, “I know that my counterpart on the right is being hired by every PR firm in the country.” So, I don't know why.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I have somewhat of a theory. The intellectual vanguard, the left's talkers and thinkers and spokespeople, are hyper-educated; they go to nice schools; they love words. They love the idea that public life is determined by dialogue and persuasion and who's got the best argument. (I’m talking to myself here.) And doing this PR and lobbying is an acknowledgment that in fact, people are irrational, and public opinion is shaped. It involves admitting a lot of things about the world that are disturbing to people who have been trained in words.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>I think that's very true. There's this sense that appealing to people's lizard brain is talking down to them, or is beneath me as an educated person. We've seen this in the climate movement; up until maybe the last five years, it was never okay to include any kind of emotion or exaggeration in any kind of climate appeal. But the right isn’t doing that. </p><p>You're trying to combat the most primitive poking of the fear button with f*****g charts and graphs. It’s not going to work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I used to get into arguments with people: I'd say, so you agree that climate is an existential issue, species on the line, literally nothing could be more important, but … you won't lie? You won’t get mad about it? You won't use emotionally manipulative language — <em>that's</em> too far? Just how seriously are you taking climate change, if your intellectual virtue comes first? It's an argument I have with myself. </p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>That is a big part of it, and that is what scares the s**t out of oil companies about the youth climate movement. I got leaked this report maybe two years ago that was internal VP marketing strategy about the emotional authenticity of the youth climate movement and how they have not figured out how to deal with that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>In addition to the story the Youth Climate movement is telling, which is about emotion and Earth and protecting youth, there's this other story we could also be telling from the tech community: Look at all these cool gizmos that are being suppressed and denied to you by these lazy incumbents who are politically entrenched. You could be living a cool whizbang life, with your solar panels, your EV, your cool electrical panel that's smart and has f*****g 5G, but you're being held back in primitive technology by incumbents.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>That's a great message. That's exactly what the oil industry messaged in the 50s. We should absolutely do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Another thing I wanted to ask about is the development of social media. We've all heard these critiques by now: what works on social media is negative emotions, it's outrage, it's anger. That just says to me that social media, even more than traditional media, is practically built for misinformation. It's so fruitful and helpful for these guys. </p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>That's absolutely true. I interviewed this woman a while ago who was talking about how the rapid corporatization of social media companies was driven by industry's fear of the early freeform internet. They thought, “If there's this giant, open public messaging machine where people are just sharing stories and ideas, we don't get to control it.” That is the origin story of the social media industry as we know it. It’s very much about giving that control back to the people who've always had power in this country.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>We have all these early internet pioneers out in public saying, “We had such big dreams. What happened? It just went the wrong way.” It didn't just go the wrong way, dude. They made it go that way.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>There's this pendulum all throughout history. The muckrakers said, “I'm going to just tell the truth and we're going to get these guys,” and they very quickly mobilize and come up with PR to stop that. In the 60s, you have the social justice movements rising up, and they very quickly mobilize with new PR techniques to stop that. Then you have the internet — in its very first stages, perhaps the most democratic thing we ever had — no, that's not going to stand, they aren't going to let it. </p><p>It's important for people to understand this, so that they know why it's important to fight for genuinely free press. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Is there any positive story to tell about social media? </p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>The complicated problem right now is that social media needs to be regulated. That's the reality. It's not going to happen with self-imposed fact checking processes or whatever the f**k they're using. It’s never going to work. What's happened is that social media has been allowed to behave like media, but without any of the same regulations on it. </p><p>Actually, podcasts fall into this too. I looked into this last year, because I was hearing all of these over-the-top ads from Exxon in podcasts about the amazing potential of carbon capture; they were vastly overstating it, like, “We're going to capture 90 percent of the emissions from factories.” </p><p>I was hearing it on the Science Friday podcast, or Invisibilia, all these NPR science podcasts. So I reached out to the folks at NPR to ask them, because NPR has extremely strict standards about what kinds of ads they allow on broadcast. I said, “Why is this so not in line with what you would allow on the radio?” And they said, “Because it doesn't fall under FCC requirements.” I said, “Don't you just have the same guidelines?” And they said, “No, it's not governed by the FCC.” I said, “So just to be clear, your ethics policy is ‘anything that's not illegal goes?’”</p><p>That's where we're at, with social media and podcasts and a lot of websites. They're under the Federal Trade Commission, not the FCC. There are technically guidelines that you're supposed to follow, but they're not enforced. Even just to file an FTC complaint is a giant pain in the ass, and then it could go nowhere. </p><p>There's no reason why, if you're going to basically become a publisher, you shouldn't follow the same rules as an actual publisher.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>You suggest two solutions to this problem of misinformation, and I have to admit that I have low hopes on both. </p><p>One is media literacy, people being trained to recognize these things. With the tide of information and BS that is crashing over every single human head right now, teaching everybody, individually, to be out there in this jungle and survive on their own seems too huge and daunting, like nothing you could ever accomplish. </p><p>The other is regulation of social media. But someone needs to be making the judgments about what's okay and what's not, what's true and what's not. I don't know that I want social media companies making those judgments, but then, is it government? Because right now, if it's a Republican government, Democrats don't care; if it's a Democratic government, Republicans don't care. We’ve lost any brokers or institutions that are widely trusted, and without that you're screwed. </p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>I don't think you're wrong. We haven't even talked about the fact that, sadly, I think a lot of the regular media has been worked by this too. How many stories come straight from a press release? Let's think about that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Even subtler, little narrative things. Kyrsten Sinema is tanking her president and her party's agenda to keep taxes on rich people low, and in every story about her, she's called a moderate — “moderate,” like she's in-between the parties. One of our normal human heuristics is that medium, in between the two extremes, is good.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>Yes. It's gone on for so long that the media self-censors in this weird way. I was working as a stringer for the Washington Post for a while, and because I live in California, I would get sent to cover wildfires all the time. </p><p>For one of the stories, I had talked to the California fire chief, and he gave me this very succinct explanation of exactly how climate change makes wildfire worse. He said, “I've been fighting fires for 30 years in California. This is climate change. What's making this so much worse is that we're not getting the increased humidity and the cold temperatures at night. Nighttime used to be when we would get on top of a fire, and now we're not getting that, so it's just burning at the same intensity 24 hours. That makes the fire worse, but it also burns out our crew.” </p><p>He’s not a flaming liberal by any stretch — 30-year firefighter from Redwood City or whatever. </p><p>My editor at the time wanted to remove the mention of climate change, because he said, “This is a disaster story, not a climate story.” This was not that long ago, maybe seven or eight years ago. But because I had the background that I had, I said, “That's a total fossil fuel framing. We don't need to be scared of letting a fire chief mention climate change for fear of it turning into a policy story.” </p><p>He very quickly said, “Okay, no, you're right, that makes sense.” But he didn't get a call from a PR guy at Mobil about it; it’s internalized. Everybody has internalized this “liberal media” trope — which is, if you look at who actually owns the media, completely not true.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>The analogy I sometimes draw is to the filibuster. We've gone from the right filibustering everything, to now, all McConnell has to do is send a memo saying, “We're probably going to filibuster this.” They don't force the confrontation anymore. It's the same with media; all the corporations have to do is say, “We're going to make climate change a partisan thing,” and editors immediately say, “Got it, I will use scrupulously neutral language.” </p><p>They don't even have to be browbeat into it anymore. The whole machine is already built.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>One of the solutions I've seen is more people like yourself, like myself, saying, “I'm out. I want to be able to report this accurately, and it's hard to do that in the confines of the media.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>One of the best things about going independent is that I no longer have to muddle through these metaphysical questions. What is journalism? What is and isn’t fair? Now I can just say what seems to me to be the truth — which it seems like more people ought to be able to do. </p><p>You've been a climate journalist for quite a while now. What do you think climate journalism is not doing or needs to do more? What is your critique of climate journalism specifically?</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>I wish that people would get beyond science denial being the only thing that the fossil fuel industry pushes. In being so focused on that, I feel like they're missing, and actually perpetuating, all these other frames that also come from the fossil fuel industry. They think if it's not science denial, it's not a talking point. </p><p>The other thing, at the other end of the spectrum, is buying every climate solution hook, line, and sinker, regurgitating what's been told to you. Also the idea that activists have agendas, but CEOs don't. That needs to go. Diversifying source lists. </p><p>And I hope this doesn't sound like I'm just being a whiny freelancer, but I thought by this point I would not be having to do Climate 101 for every editor I work with. I'm surprised at how many times I hear from someone saying, “I'm the new editor of this climate vertical, but I don't have any background in climate.” </p><p>I wish that the powers-that-be in media would actually start taking climate as seriously as they've been saying they're going to take it for a long time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Part of me wonders if the public is a little bit ahead of the editorial class at this point. Editors still think long stuff is boring, people don't care about wonky science, you’ve got to do the inverted triangles, all these myths and habits of journalism that don't seem applicable and don't seem to reach the intended audience anymore.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>I think that's true. I wish more people would interrogate where the information they're getting is coming from, journalists included. I went to this podcast conference a few years ago, and there was a speech that was done by Chenjerai Kumanyika and Sandhya Dirks, who are both really great podcasters; Sandhya is a reporter, Chenjerai is a professor at Rutgers. </p><p>The subject of the talk was, “Every story is about power.” It was so good! I wanted to make every journalist I know listen to this. They did such a good job of showing how it shows up in even the dumbest stories. They did a story about Dunkin Donuts bringing back a favorite donut, which you wouldn't think was a massive investigation of class structure, but it totally was. </p><p>So yes, just thinking about it in that way: who's sending me this information, and for what reason, and who does it benefit? </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Like you say, the right spent a long time trying to shape the way science was presented in media, but I think now they're spending more effort trying to shape how the solution sets are presented. I think they've given up the ghost on denialism; they know what's happening, they know we're going to do something about it. </p><p>Now they want to take control of how we react, and what our assumptions are about the parameters of a response — what we can and can't do, what's allowed and what's not allowed.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>The reason it’s so effective now is, that's what they've been doing all along. They started narrowing the parameters of how we're allowed to think about environmental issues 50 years before climate change came on the scene. So they're just going back to that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I used to say this around the Waxman-Markey fight all the time: Here's Democrats saying “We're going to issue these certificates, and then you can trade them, but the total amount of certificates” … already 99 percent of people are tuned out. And what's the right do? “Tax. It's a tax. Boom!” The whole ideological infrastructure is already built. It's there. You only have to invoke it. </p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>You see it in the Manchin stuff now. SEP, 4 percent, blah, blah, blah; all the right has to do is say, “It's expensive, though. Oh, $3 trillion. A lot of money.” That’s it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Yes. “It will raise your costs.” Literally, I can list a dozen studies and models showing very specifically that doing this will reduce consumer energy costs, and it just doesn't matter, because “it will raise your costs” has transcended to a realm where it's true regardless of the details. It’s written in the heavens.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>That one killed me, because if the Democrats had led with that before the right could even say anything about the price tag, how much better would that have been than “infrastructure, but we're also going to do climate”? Come <em>on</em>.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Yes. How about, “We have designed a bill here to reduce your energy costs. If you want to know the details we can get into them. But mostly, that's what's going to happen.”</p><p>I'm curious whether you think the fuckery of industry, and PR, and propaganda, and the public's unknowing acceptance of it, are worse in the US? If so, why?</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>Actually, that's been studied. Definitively, yes. </p><p>One of the researchers I go back to again and again is a woman named Melissa Aronczyk at Rutgers — she's Canadian. She looked at the difference between how the media and PR industry evolved in the US vs. in Canada and some other places. Her take is that the entire way that Americans understand the environment is shaped by PR, so it becomes impossible to disentangle Americans’ thinking on environmental issues from PR. </p><p>In the early days of the US, Teddy Roosevelt had two advisors on natural resources: John Muir and Gifford Pinchot. They had very different ideas. Pinchot’s whole thing was that natural resources are basically an economic resource to be managed for the benefit of the economy — and he totally won out. He created the whole US Forestry Service. All of the initial thinking on environmental stuff comes from him. He wrote textbooks, too. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>“The world is literally composed of resources for us.” I think about that in the same way I think about racism: We've made enough progress that you can't really say that out in the open in public anymore, but if you scratch just a little bit, especially on the right, it's just beneath the surface. I've had people say it to me on Twitter before; whenever I write about species loss, I get at least one right winger responding, “So what? We don't need them.” </p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>Right. If it’s not benefiting us, and we don't need them, it doesn't matter. It's interesting to me in the context of climate, too, because I feel like one of the big missteps of the climate movement for a really long time was to leave people out entirely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>But on the other hand, given what you were saying earlier, it could be that a lot of people talked about people, and then some people talked about polar bears, and because the environment archetype in the US imagination is so strongly associated with “that stuff out there” … that’s what people heard. It’s less about what you say than what people are capable of hearing. I think about this in climate narratives. People say we should talk about it in terms of caring for God's creation, or national defense, or economic opportunity; people have been talking about that a lot, for years now, and it just doesn't get picked up.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>The military one drives me nuts. I know that we've been talking about that for a long time, because I remember getting assigned stories on that 20 years ago.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Every editor thinks, oh, this is a novel thing. It's really going to catch people's ear. And it just doesn’t, because they don't have that archetype. They don't have those stories.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>That frame is so rigid in people's minds. We actually found a presentation that this guy had been giving to various industry groups about why it was important to get involved in school curricula, and one of the things that he really hammered home was, you need to consistently restate this framing of environment vs. economy, and environmentalists as a special interest group that only cares about pristine nature. It’s so present today, still.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Yes, and another thing that all the word-drunk liberals think they're better than is repeating themselves over and over and over again, which is the <em>sine qua non</em> of effective PR.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>And across multiple organizations. This is where I feel like the right really has the left beat: when you look at these networks of interconnected foundations. You’ve got the Bradleys and the Kochs and whatever else; the messaging is so consistent; they are military about it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>The capital is so patient. They just set these organizations up and let them run in the background, churning this stuff out. I can list 10 think tanks that are specifically devoted to the wonders of free markets. Is there, on the left, an organization that is devoted exclusively to propounding the benefits of government? No. They all have their own specific little thing that they want government to do, but who's out there defending democratic self-governance through the mechanisms of government? Nobody is telling that story.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>It makes me think of this push as World War II is ending to make sure that Americans embraced free enterprise. Where's the counter to that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Final question: Not only do you do three different podcasts, you also are executive producing a bunch of others, you’re running this podcast network, you’re a parent and wrote a book about how ridiculously difficult we've made parenting in the modern world. Now you're doing this new project … and some other new project. I literally was losing count. </p><p>Can you share your drug cocktail or meditation techniques? How do you do this?</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>Two things. One, only in the last five years did I realize this is not how everybody reads, but I have that thing where I just look at a page and absorb all the information on it at once. Very handy. The other thing is, I feel like everything I'm working on right now connects to the other. So it seems like it's ten different things, but it's mostly one: disinformation and power.</p><p>I've been really obsessed for a long time with why America is so uniquely bad on all these fronts, and going back to how American individualism was conceptualized, and all of the underpinnings of that, is just fascinating to me. So I feel like I would totally be nerding out on a lot of this stuff whether it was my job or not. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Well, thank you so much for all that you do and for taking so much time today. It's been a delight.</p><p><strong>Amy Westervelt: </strong></p><p>It was great to talk to you. Thank you.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-amy-westervelt-on-disinformation</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:42943156</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 27 Oct 2021 16:00:04 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/42943156/d7fb6966b9ff6f397cfff3d4ebe88a77.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4495</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/42943156/61b831c75cd854ff49f41da698a99986.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Can the US reach Biden’s climate goal without the CEPP?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Last week, Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV) finally stopped playing games and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/15/climate/biden-clean-energy-manchin.html">said</a> that he will not vote for a budget reconciliation bill that contains the Clean Electricity Performance Program (CEPP).</p><p>You can read my <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-sen-tina-smith-on-the">interview with Sen. Tina Smith (D-MN)</a> for more on the CEPP and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/on-climate-policy-theres-one-main">this post</a> to understand why it is so centrally important to serious climate policy. I won’t get into all those arguments again. Suffice it to say, it’s a good policy and losing it is bummer.</p><p>Insofar as Manchin has offered any reason for killing the CEPP, it is an <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/15/climate/biden-clean-energy-manchin.html">alleged concern</a> over “using taxpayer dollars to pay private companies to do things they’re already doing.”</p><p>But that is just incorrect. </p><p>Utilities are not “already doing” what the CEPP requires, i.e., increasing their share of clean energy 4 percentage points year-on-year, every year. Only <a target="_blank" href="https://www.evergreenaction.com/policy-hub/CEPPWillDriveanAchievableAffordableandReliableTransitiontoMoreCleanElectricity.pdf">a tiny handful of the nation’s thousands of utilities</a> are on that trajectory.</p><p>The sector as a whole is slowly decarbonizing, but the whole point of the policy is to accelerate the process to meet US carbon targets. </p><p>Manchin knows that. It’s precisely what he’s trying to prevent. He <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/19/politics/climate-change-manchin-what-matters/index.html">told CNN</a> flat out, “I'm not going to sit back and let anyone accelerate whatever the market's changes are doing.”</p><p>Why not? Well, he wants to keep fossil fuel power plants open, which is incompatible with  Biden’s publicly stated goal of 50 to 52 percent carbon reductions from 2005 levels by 2030. </p><p>Manchin is standing up for local fossil fuel interests (<a target="_blank" href="https://theintercept.com/2021/09/03/joe-manchin-coal-fossil-fuels-pollution/">including his own</a>) against the president, 49 of his colleagues in the Democratic caucus, a majority of legislators in the House, a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2021/9/30/voters-support-the-clean-electricity-performance-program">majority of voters</a>, and even a majority of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.dataforprogress.org/memos/wv-voters-support-ces"><em>West Virginia voters</em></a>.</p><p>He also wants to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.yahoo.com/now/manchin-draws-red-lines-child-220803209.html">slash the child tax credit</a>. He’s just a jerk. It is what it is.</p><p>At this point, it’s unclear what will and won’t survive into the final Build Back Better Act (or whether there will be a final bill at all). Reports are that <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/10/16/white-house-climate-manchin/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&#38;utm_medium=email&#38;utm_source=newsletter&#38;wpisrc=nl_most&#38;carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F34ffcc7%2F616af4de9d2fda9d411302dc%2F5fc72243ade4e2428bc8383c%2F22%2F72%2F616af4de9d2fda9d411302dc">staffers are scrambling</a> to find ways to make up the lost emission reductions through other policies.</p><p>The question is, how big of a hole are they trying to fill? How big a hit is it to lose the CEPP?</p><p>A few analyses released in the past week are helpful in getting our heads around this.</p><p>Energy Innovation says the loss of CEPP could cost the bill up to 35% of its emission reductions</p><p>The first is <a target="_blank" href="https://energyinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Modeling-The-Infrastructure-Bills-Using-The-Energy-Policy-Simulator.pdf">from research firm Energy Innovation</a>, which uses its Energy Policy Simulator to determine how much emissions would be reduced by <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-close-look-at-the-clean-energy">the policies</a> in the House Democrats’ version of the Build Back Better Act and the bipartisan infrastructure bill that was passed by the Senate over the summer. </p><p>Obviously, predicting circumstances a decade hence is a fraught undertaking. Energy Innovation ran four scenarios: a business-as-usual scenario, with only existing policies, and low, moderate, and high emission-reduction scenarios based on different assumptions about the price of energy and the efficacy of various provisions in the bills. </p><p>They didn’t model all the policies in the bills, just the ones that are relatively easy to quantify. Some emission reductions have gone uncounted, so the estimates Energy Innovation produced are almost certainly a lower bound. </p><p>Here are the topline results:</p><p>In the high scenario, clean energy reaches an 85 percent share of US electricity by 2030; in the moderate scenario, it’s 80 percent; in the low scenario, about 70 percent.  </p><p>As you can see in the moderate scenario below, by far the biggest tranche of emission reductions (about half) would come from the combination of the CEPP and clean-energy tax credits:</p><p>The good news is that passing both bills could, “with supporting state and regulatory policy,” at the high end of the high emission reduction scenario, just barely get the US to its 2030 target. That’s if everything is included in the bills. </p><p>The question now is, what do those numbers look like without the CEPP? </p><p>Luckily, Energy Innovation ran a couple of variations of its moderate scenario with no CEPP (a high one, which assumes tax credits are maximally effective, and a low one, with lower take-up of tax credits).</p><p>Long story short, “emissions are likely to be 250 to 700 MMT higher per year in 2030” than they would be with the CEPP, “which could eliminate more than a third of the total emissions reductions under the Infrastructure Bills.”</p><p>As the scenarios show, a great deal depends on factors that can’t be precisely predicted: the price of fossil fuels, the cost curves of clean technologies, and the efficacy and impact of the clean-energy tax credits and other BBB policies. The loss of the CEPP could reduce the emissions impact of the bill anywhere from 20 to 35 percent.  </p><p>Resources For the Future agrees but says a carbon fee could make up for it</p><p>Energy Innovations’ findings jibe with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rff.org/publications/issue-briefs/cost-analysis-and-emissions-projections-under-power-sector-proposals-in-reconciliation/?stream=top">the second analysis, from Resources for the Future</a> (RFF). RFF modeled three policies, in various combinations: </p><p>* the clean-energy tax credits, which it calls CEAA for the “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2021/06/11/500429/clean-energy-tax-incentives-will-help-fight-climate-crisis/">Clean Energy for America Act</a>,” a bill from Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) that is largely included in the BBB Act;</p><p>* the Clean Electricity Performance Program (CEPP); and </p><p>* a carbon tax (er, fee) — the “central” carbon fee “starts at 15 $/metric ton and increases gradually to 30 $/metric ton by 2028, followed by a $10 annual increase through the end of the modeling period (2045).”</p><p>The CEAA tax credits alone, without the CEPP, gets the electricity sector to a 69 percent clean energy share by 2030. That is roughly in line with Energy Innovations’ high-end estimation of the tax credits’ impact.</p><p>The CEAA plus the CEPP gets the sector to 78 percent clean energy — a 9 point bump. </p><p>The CEAA, CEPP, and the central carbon fee together get to 91 percent. </p><p>RFF’s model, like Energy Innovations’, shows that the tax credits are doing the bulk of the work. From a baseline (no policy) scenario, the tax credits take the clean-energy share in 2030 from 46 to 69 percent (+23); with the CEPP, it goes from 69 to 78 percent (+9). </p><p>Notably, in RFF’s modeling, the tax credits plus a central carbon fee get the number to 79 percent — in other words, a carbon fee pretty neatly substitutes for the CEPP, emissions-wise. </p><p>Nonetheless, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/16/climate/democrats-carbon-tax-climate.html">despite some recent chatter</a>, Manchin has already put the kibosh on the prospect of a carbon fee as well.</p><p>Rhodium Group says the US climate target is still within reach </p><p>Can the US get on track to its 2030 target without the CEPP? For some insight on that we turn to the other <a target="_blank" href="https://rhg.com/research/us-climate-policy-2030/">recently released analysis, from the research firm Rhodium Group</a>. </p><p>It sets out to determine whether the US can hit its target (again, 50 to 52 percent reductions from 2005 levels by 2030) with what it calls a “joint action scenario,” which includes “actions by all key actors in the US federal system, including legislation under construction in Congress, regulations and other actions that can be taken by the Biden administration and key departments, as well as actions by climate-leading states and corporations.”</p><p>Importantly, though it is capacious, the joint action scenario is deliberately conservative about policy out of Congress, given Manchin’s well-known Manchinness: “We include tax credit extensions, clean energy grant programs, and spending on agricultural programs, <strong>but do not include a carbon or methane fee or the CEPP</strong> [my emphasis].”</p><p>The good news is that the CEPP-less joint action scenario gets the US to its goal, or at least close to it.  </p><p>Even without the CEPP, it is the electricity sector that provides most of the reductions:</p><p>One reason there are so many reductions in the electricity sector — and this brings us to what I suppose is the bad news — is that the joint action scenario includes a <em>lot</em> of policies, including standards on new and existing power plants from EPA. Getting to the US target requires all levels of government and the private sector to act with immediate ambition. </p><p>This is the action required by Congress: </p><p>This is the action required by the executive branch:</p><p>And this is what’s required of “subnational groups,” i.e., states, cities, and companies:</p><p>If all of that comes together, then the US can hit its 2030 climate target without the CEPP. </p><p>Rhodium stresses that the joint action scenario is not the only path to that goal — the final section of its analysis suggests a range of other policies that could also help — but any path to the goal involves coordinated action taken on numerous fronts at once … and a lot of luck.</p><p>Where does this leave us? </p><p>For years now, it’s been one of the climate world’s great rituals: after every new setback, delay, or disappointment, there’s a rush of articles and models showing, “We can still do it! It’s not impossible yet!”</p><p>I suppose this is another one of those posts. Even without the CEPP, the two infrastructure bills passed together would reduce emissions considerably. The loss of the CEPP would take a big chunk out of those emission reductions — more than a third, if things go poorly — but there’s a chance some of that can be made up with other policies. </p><p>This is assuming the BBB bill doesn’t get <em>worse</em>. Manchin may not be done screwing it up yet. The top priority now should be protecting the full range of clean-energy tax credits and ensuring that a) they extend at least 10 years and b) they are <a target="_blank" href="https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2020/05/28/485411/renewable-energy-tax-credits-case-refundability/">fully refundable</a>. </p><p>And other policies must be protected as well. Here, according to Energy Innovation, are the next most effective policies after the CEPP + tax credits. </p><p>The second strongest provision is the fee on oil and gas methane emissions, which contributes about 12 percent of total reductions, or 165 MMT in 2030. Incentives for electric vehicles (EVs) and charging equipment are next, at 115 MMT in 2030, or 9 percent of total reductions.</p><p>I tend to doubt Congressional staffers will be able to find anything new that’s big enough to compensate for the loss of the CEPP, but Biden can also gain back some of those reductions through aggressive use of the EPA and other agencies. We’ll see if he has the moxie to do that.</p><p>The US doesn’t need to worry that hitting its target is unaffordable. All three analyses show that decarbonizing the electricity sector will <em>reduce</em> consumer energy costs, and that’s not even including the enormous benefits of reduced air pollution, which themselves would <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/8/12/21361498/climate-change-air-pollution-us-india-china-deaths">easily pay for the transition</a>. </p><p>Nonetheless, rapid decarbonization is a huge, wrenching socioeconomic transformation. Hitting our target would be a heroic feat. The fastest the US has ever reduced emissions, outside of a recession, is 4.1 percent in 2012. To get to 50 percent reductions by 2030, Rhodium says, “requires a 5.2-5.6 percent year-on-year cut in emissions every year.” We have to go faster than we’ve ever gone, every year from now through 2030. </p><p>And that’s only the first, and arguably easiest, step. The first 50 percent of reductions will be easier than the last 50 percent, which we need to eliminate by 2050. That will require new policies, technologies, and industries.</p><p>In the grand scheme of things, the loss of the CEPP is not the end of the world, as irritating and indefensible as it is. As long as Manchin doesn’t do any more damage, as long as staffers scrabble together a few compensatory policies, as long as Biden uses executive agencies aggressively, as long as states, cities, and businesses continue acting ambitiously … well, as long as all of that happens, we still have a shot.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/can-the-us-reach-bidens-climate-goal</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:42700384</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 20 Oct 2021 16:00:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/42700384/1f3985c01af28cbc177fea4802e18e63.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>930</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/42700384/3957f2780967e410b7bbc4b5c2ee6e89.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: the good news about clean energy, with Kingsmill Bond]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, longtime carbon market analyst and strategist </em><a target="_blank" href="https://carbontracker.org/about/team/kingsmill-bond/"><em>Kingsmill Bond</em></a><em> explains why he is so optimistic about the future of renewable energy. Though it remains a small portion of total global energy, its rate of growth and declining costs indicate that it is on the precipice of enormous, rapid expansion. Markets and geopolitics will be transformed by it. (There is also an abridged version of our conversation </em><a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/clean-energy/the-unstoppably-good-news-about-clean-energy"><em>available on Canary</em></a><em>.) </em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Kingsmill Bond, October 11, 2021</p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/b712hdrqjcob81p/volts21.10.11%28kingsmill.bond%29.pdf?dl=0">PDF version</a>)</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>It seems like good news is difficult to come by in the US these days, what with democracy on the verge of crumbling and the last big chance to address climate change held in the fickle and ill-informed hands of the Senate’s most conservative Democrat, who <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/joe-manchin-boat/2021/08/05/a3575508-f5e7-11eb-a49b-d96f2dac0942_story.html">lives on a yacht</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://theintercept.com/2021/09/03/joe-manchin-coal-fossil-fuels-pollution/">literally makes money off of coal plants</a>. </p><p>As it happens, I have a stash of good news I’ve holding in reserve — a guest I’ve been meaning to talk to forever, but have been treating like a break-glass-in-case-of-emergency thing. I felt grim enough this week that I finally called him up.</p><p>His name is Bond. Kingsmill Bond. (Sorry, had to do it.) He’s an energy strategist at the think tank <a target="_blank" href="https://carbontracker.org/">Carbon Tracker</a>, where he arrived after decades of doing market analysis and strategy for big financial institutions like Deutsche Bank and Citibank. </p><p>Bond’s experience and research have led him to the conclusion that the shift to clean energy has become unstoppable and that it will be the dominant force shaping financial markets and geopolitics in the 21st century. He argues that we are on the front end of a massive, precipitous wave of change to rival the industrial revolution — one that will unfold even if policy support is weak and erratic, purely on the strengths of economics and innovation.</p><p>We need to update our mental model of climate mitigation, he says. It’s not about pain, about how to distribute extra costs and who will be the most altruistic. It’s about <a target="_blank" href="https://carbontracker.org/gain-not-pain-why-cop-must-move-the-narrative-forward/"><em>gain</em></a>, about which countries will benefit most and fastest from the tapping of almost limitless new markets and opportunities for growth. </p><p>There are no fundamental limits to the spread of zero-carbon energy. There’s more than enough renewable energy, accessible with today’s technology, to supply the world’s energy needs. Not only do we know how to get there, it is where we are headed, based on current market and technology trends. The key to succeeding on climate change is simply accelerating what is already underway, pushing a rolling boulder a little faster. </p><p>Like I said, I’m in need of good news like this, so I was excited to talk to Bond about the cost of renewable energy, the peak in fossil fuel demand, and the inevitability of a 100 percent clean-energy system.</p><p>Without further ado, Kingsmill Bond, welcome to Volts.</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>Thank you for having me on the show, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Kingsmill, I've been following you for years and you've been a reliable source of good news. You recently published <a target="_blank" href="https://carbontracker.org/gain-not-pain-why-cop-must-move-the-narrative-forward/">an article</a> arguing that we need to flip our story on climate change mitigation: It's not one of pain, about distributing costs and sacrifice and who's going to be more altruistic; it's about gain, about who's going to claim the giant rewards that are waiting. So before we dive into the specifics, give me the elevator-pitch version of why people confronting the daunting task of addressing climate change should feel better than they generally do.</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>Well, thanks very much for putting it in those terms. The point here simply is that we have got this new, enormous, cheap energy resource in solar and wind that we've unlocked with technology, and we're just starting to be able to apply it. </p><p>As we apply it, it gets cheaper, because it's on learning curves. Therefore, we've unlocked an enormous cheap source of energy that can be used to provide all of our current energy demands and, indeed, the energy demands of those who have very limited amounts of energy. It's an exciting opportunity and moment to do that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>The center of that story is the learning curves for renewable energy. You single out four different technologies on steep learning curves that, if we project them continuing, bear all kinds of good news. Tell us what those technologies are and what the curves look like right now.</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond: </strong> </p><p>The four most clear technologies which are on established learning curves are solar PV for producing electricity; wind for producing electricity; batteries for storage; and electrolyzers to convert that electricity into hydrogen. All four of them have been the subject of a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.inet.ox.ac.uk/files/energy_transition_paper-INET-working-paper.pdf">recent paper by Oxford University</a> looking at their learning curves, that is to say, the amount that their costs drop for every doubling in deployment. All of their learning curves are between 16 and 34 percent, which was already fairly well known. </p><p>But the additional point that's being made by this paper is that when technologies get onto learning curves, they tend to stay on them for very long periods. When you're trying to project future costs of these technologies, the most logical assumption is that those learning curves will continue. This is extremely significant, because we all know that they are growing very quickly, and if you assume that that growth continues — and there's no reason why it shouldn't — these technologies will get incredibly cheap. </p><p>This is kind of an academic debate, because you're already getting solar PV being produced between $10 and $20 per megawatt hour in certain favored locations, so it is, in fact, already incredibly cheap. That cheap energy source is a) going to get cheaper, b) going to spread globally, and then c) be followed up by these other technologies, also on learning curves, which will then provide us with the energy that we need at much lower cost.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>The electrolyzers seem like the newest of those four technologies. Solar and wind and batteries are pretty established, but electrolyzers have just recently come in for a lot of innovation. How confident are we in that particular learning curve? What's the state of our knowledge there?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>In the paper that the Oxford team did, they looked at about 500 or 600 different technologies over long periods and they noted that, actually, very <em>few</em> of them get onto learning curves. As you say, the electrolyzer data set is shorter, but it still goes back a couple of decades, I believe. This is, from their analysis, another technology also on learning curves, and it seems to be already exhibiting the same learning characteristics that we've witnessed in solar, wind, and batteries. </p><p>First of all, in order to make green hydrogen, you need solar or wind electricity, so half the story is already on learning curves. Then the question simply is, can you get the electrolyzer itself onto learning curves? </p><p>What's special about this technology is that it's also what they call granular and discrete. That is to say, you can have very small pieces of equipment, they're easily replicated, and they can be built at any size. Many people can innovate, and that's indeed what they're now doing, as we now see huge amounts of capital flowing into hydrogen strategies across the world, from Chile to China to Morocco to the United States. It seems extremely reasonable to imagine that the costs of electrolyzers will also continue to fall.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>As a snapshot of the present, where is clean energy relative to fossil fuels? Is it still too glib to say clean energy is cheaper than fossil fuels? How nuanced is that story right now?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond: </strong> </p><p>The debate goes like this: Advocates of clean energy such as myself say, look, it's incredibly cheap, its price is down to $10 or $20 per megawatt hour; the global average, depending how you calculate, is between $40 and $50. This is the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/08/f25/LCOE.pdf">LCOE</a> we're talking about. And this is a great story. </p><p>The counterargument is, people say, well, you're only talking about the LCOE, you’re not thinking about intermittency. OK, it's cheap in certain locations, but there are other locations, most notably parts of sub-Saharan Africa, where it remains extremely expensive, because the cost of capital is high. Therefore it's not a fair comparison and it's not a substitute for fossil fuels. </p><p>The way to reconcile those two perspectives, I would suggest, is this point about learning curves. As the costs get lower and lower, this debate kind of fades away. It is fair to say that LCOE is not necessarily the best way to calculate costs, and there are other issues to account for in intermittency, but when costs get incredibly low and you can overbuild, then that debate becomes much less significant. </p><p>Furthermore, as this Oxford paper points out, the country on the 10th percentile of cost today — that is to say, the most expensive countries today — will have the same price solar and wind electricity as the cheapest countries today in 10 years, because they're on these learning curves. So I would suggest that these learning curves solve the problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>They brute force it, in other words. It gets so cheap that you can start being profligate with it.</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond: </strong> </p><p>You can be profligate with it, but in fairness, there are also other solutions. There are certain countries and regions which today have penetration of variable renewables of over 50 percent — most notably Denmark, South Australia, and northern Germany — and are aspiring, as in the case of California, to 100 percent renewable energy-based systems. </p><p>What's been notable throughout this debate, for the last 20 years, is that the ceiling of the possible is constantly rising. </p><p>If you go back to how the debate was being held about 20 years ago, you'll see these very fancy letters from the Irish and German grid operators saying that variable renewables could never be more than 2 percent of the system, for a whole series of technical reasons which are beyond me. But what's happened continuously is that people have come up with new solutions, be they demand-side management, supply-side management, bigger grids, batteries, interconnectors, better software, digitalization, smart meters, so on and so forth. There have been a whole series of different solutions. The point we really want to make is that that ceiling is a rising ceiling.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Intermittency is the number one mental block people have about this, in my experience. So you're right: one obvious point is that the amount we're allegedly going to be able to integrate onto the grid keeps rising. People set these very confident limits, and the limits get busted through. But looking out, the conventional wisdom is that the closer you get to variable energy providing the majority of your energy, the higher the cost of that variability, and the more difficult it is to address. How confident are you that that gap from 80 to 100 percent is bridgeable at reasonable cost?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>There are two answers to this. The first is that this is an absolutely academic debate, because today, solar and wind are 10 percent of the global electricity supply. To worry in 2021 about how we go from 80 percent to 100 percent is completely academic. </p><p>I often use the analogy that it's like sending my daughter to kindergarten, aged five, and worrying about how she's going to pass her university maths finals. Sure, she's going to have to get there eventually, but there's an awfully long way between now and then. History suggests that we will keep on coming up with ways of solving this. So I think the first answer is, it's not a fair question. </p><p>The second point is that, if you assume these learning curves continue and we do get incredibly cheap sources of renewable electricity, then it's absolutely inevitable that we will find ways of using it. </p><p>Perhaps I can step back for a second. It's often worthwhile going back a century and asking yourself: Had you been trying to think about the future in 1921, when we were on the cusp of a quadrupling of global population and a 10-fold increase in energy development and so on and so forth, could you ever have predicted all of the new technology innovation that was going to come? People sit in darkened rooms in Paris in 2021 and seriously think they can forecast the innovation genius.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>But in fairness, we're a lot farther away from 1920 than 2050 is from us. We definitely need to compress the amount of time in which we have to do this. You might say that the solutions ought to at least be visible by now. </p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>Actually, that’s the point: the solutions are visible. You do have detailed plans being made in Australia and California, in Northern Europe, for electricity systems based on 100 percent renewable electricity. You also have work done by people like the great Mark Jacobson: he's basically tried to figure out the solution for every single country in the world. </p><p>So it's not like there are no solutions ahead of us; there are plenty of solutions, at different levels of granularity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>This story depends on the cost curves continuing, as you’ve said. On the one hand, you can look at history and say, cost curves tend to continue once they start. But you can come up with all kinds of stories about things that might impede or slow these cost curves: materials shortages, lithium becoming problematic, mining becoming more problematic, supply chain problems (maybe even caused by climate change), space constraints, NIMBYs who want to stop construction. </p><p>How confident are you that none of those will gain enough purchase to slow things on a macro level?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>I always smile when people talk to me about limits to growth, because renewable energies are essentially, by definition, limitless, absolutely enormous. The real limits to growth are to the fossil fuel system, which is constrained in terms of the amount that we have, and incredibly constrained in terms of our capacity to burn it. </p><p>So it's worth standing back for a moment and recognizing that the real limits to growth are with the current system, not with the new system. </p><p>The second question is, well, are there limits that are insurmountable, that the talent and capital of the world cannot handle? I think the answer to that one is absolutely, obviously <em>no</em>, because we have continuously solved each of these problems as we have encountered them. </p><p>Then, if I can answer this very specific question about mineral shortage: it's an absolutely bogus problem. You need, for example, 200 kilograms extra of minerals in order to have an electric vehicle, which is more than an ICE car. That sounds quite scary until you think, well actually, an average ICE car uses 15,000 kilograms of oil over its lifetime. Those 200 kilograms extra that you require of minerals by definition can be recycled, whilst fossil fuels, obviously, you burn them once and you never use them again. </p><p>Let me give you a couple more stats. There is enough lithium, for example, in known reserves today to be able to satisfy more than a century of current demand. There's enough cobalt in the world for 1,000 million cars. If the answer is, that's really scary because we might need 2,000 million cars, then again, it’s an absolutely fake debate. First of all, we can and are engineering technologies to reduce cobalt, as Elon Musk is doing. But even if we weren't, we build the mines as demand increases. Prices go up a bit and people build new mines and reserves increase. These are absolutely fake problems.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Are there no social or moral aspects to this, though, in expansion of mining?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond: </strong> </p><p>Undoubtedly. This is why people are saying, I think quite rightly, that we shouldn't make the same mistakes this time as we made last time. In our expansion of these mines to build out the new renewables world, we shouldn't be trashing nature with impunity the way we have done in the past. We should be recycling this stuff in order to minimize our impact on the planet. </p><p>But let me just come back to the main point, which is that it's a question of degree, right? If you require 100 — or in the case of coal-fired generation versus a solar panel, 1000 — times less stuff in order to generate your electricity, by definition, you're going to be having a dramatically lower impact on the planet.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>In your discussion of S curves, you mention something about a 5 percent “salience threshold.” When a product reaches 5 percent market penetration, certain dynamics take hold. Can you say more about that?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>This is actually quite an intuitive observation. We see it, all of us, in our own lives. If you think back to when you got your first smartphone, or the internet, or your first mobile phone, what happens is that, as new technologies get adopted, they move up these S curves. </p><p>It takes a long time to get the technology good enough for people to adopt it, so to go from 0 percent penetration to around 5 percent takes a long time. But then, when it gets good enough, everyone wants it, demand goes through the roof, learning curves start driving costs down further, it goes very, very quickly from about 5 percent market share to about 80 percent market share. That's the nature of S curves. </p><p>This is something that is very well documented for many technologies over the course of a century or more. It goes all the way back to cars and electricity in the United States in the early 20th century, and then all the great stuff we've had since then: microwaves and toasters and TVs and now the internet. It's a well-appreciated observation that stuff moves very, very quickly from low penetration to high penetration — when it's cheap enough and when it's good enough. Therein lies the debate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>So where is renewable energy? Do you think it's crossed that threshold? You think we're on that S curve now?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>If you look at the history of deployment of, for example, solar panels, what you will see if you chart it is exponential growth taking place: high growth of between 25 percent and 40 percent growth per annum over the last two decades. </p><p>There are many other people, including the great Ray Kurzweil, who pointed this out: solar deployment’s been doubling every two years roughly for the last couple of decades, and that's an exponential growth curve. Just empirically, that's exactly what is happening. </p><p>What's also notable is that some experts who try to forecast future solar deployment get it completely wrong, the way the IEA famously has done for the last 20 years. They imagine it's linear growth. If you go back 10 years, demand growth was at 10 gigawatts a year and the IEA was projecting forward growth of 10 gigawatts a year for the next 20 years. Then the next year it's 14 and the year after it’s 20, because we're on this exponential growth curve. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>This is a subject of some fascination to me. Is this new Oxford paper really the first model that projected cost curves simply continuing in the shape that they currently exhibit? It's remarkable to me and everybody I know that the modelers have gotten these cost projections so wrong in such a consistent way over and over again for 20 years now. What are we to make of this? What's going on there?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond: </strong></p><p>You're right. It’s absolutely shocking, and it's not just the IEA, it's almost all modeling of the future. It's interesting: I ask people about why they don’t do this. There’s a series of answers, but the first answer basically is well, it's too complicated. We can't put these learning curves into our models because it’s too complicated. OK, fine, why don’t you just get a bit more computing power, surely it can be done. But anyway, that seems to be one answer. </p><p>The second answer, linked to that, is that these models are incredibly complex. If you're trying to forecast kerosene demand in Madagascar in 2070, you have to think a lot about that, and you're not necessarily thinking about what's possibly a little bit more important, which is the learning curve of the technology. So, they overcomplicate it. This is why, for me as a strategist, it’s second nature to simplify. That's what the Oxford paper’s done: they've got to the kernel of what's driving change, and it’s those learning curves.</p><p>Then the third reason why incumbent models have been so reluctant to incorporate these learning curves is that so many of them are, in fact, made by fossil fuel incumbents, and turkeys don't vote for Christmas. That is to say, if you're working for Exxon or Shell or whoever it is, there's very little incentive for you to say, you know what, those battery costs might fall a little bit faster than we think, and EVs’ growth might be a lot faster than we think, and oil demand might be a lot lower than we think, and therefore, I might not have a job. People don't forecast that stuff. </p><p>The final point is that — and I'd like to come back to this, because it's a completely fake argument — people say, “We want to be conservative. Solar costs have dropped 20 percent a year for the last 20 years, but in the future, we don't want to be too aggressive. We can't forecast the detailed solution, so we're going to be conservative and we're going to say they're going to fall at 2 percent a year.” This is just intellectually incoherent, because why would it suddenly stop falling? Just because you can't see in detail, why would you suddenly forecast a drop in cost declines? </p><p>The other reason why it's intellectually incoherent is because, as a result of the failure to recognize reality in these fast-growing technologies, people have to make their models balance. They go, “Well, in order to make my model balance to 2050 net zero, I'm going to pop in CCS and BECCS, and Martians coming from space to take away our carbon” and other completely idiotic ideas, which have absolutely no basis in empirical fact. That's the point: You've got to try and rely as closely as you can on the facts.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>It seems like, intellectually speaking, the most conservative thing you could do is assume that things are going to continue happening the way they're happening. That's almost by definition Occam’s Razor. And if the learning curves continue the way they're going, then all these forecasts are going to get blown away. It’s a bizarre situation. </p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, it is. Sorry to lean so heavily on Doyne Farmer and his Oxford paper, but it’s great work, and they make exactly this point. They say, look, mathematically, the future is unknown. There's a whole continuum of options between basically no change and incredibly fast change. But the business-as-usual scenario, which is central to so much current thinking, is mathematically a complete outlier. It might happen, but it's incredibly unlikely. We might suddenly stop innovating, costs might stop falling, deployment might stop happening, governments might give up, people and companies and the financial markets might stop trying to do anything, we might decide that we want to go over the cliff of catastrophic global warming — maybe we will, but that's pretty unlikely.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>The other area that people tend to cite as a limit, or worry, or outstanding problem is these so-called difficult-to-abate sectors — heavy transportation, industrial processes, steel, concrete. Is the story there the same, that clean energy is going to get so cheap it's just going to bulldoze through those problems? What do you see happening in those sectors?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>The hard-to-abate sectors have been a very loud debate for the last three years. The argument people make is, “Well, you can't get renewable energy into airplanes and cement and steel and shipping, and therefore there will be no energy transition.” </p><p>There are two problems with this argument. The first one is the point I made earlier, which is that this is the final area that needs to be solved. Today, if we look at the entire energy system in terms of primary energy supply, solar and wind — these variable energy sources on these very fast growth rates — are only providing around 4-5 percent of global supply. </p><p>These hard-to-solve sectors are about a quarter of global primary energy demand. So this is a very long-term problem which we will need to solve, but it's quite a long way in the future before we actually have to solve it. </p><p>Then the second point — and this is an argument that we and many other people have been making for four or five years, actually a much more practical observation — is that solutions are already starting to materialize for these hard-to-solve sectors. You have organizations like the brilliant <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy-transitions.org">Energy Transitions Commission</a> that identify prospective solutions for every single one of these hard-to-solve sectors. </p><p>For example, the steel sector three years ago seemed to be a completely impossible-to-abate sector. Now you already have people like Andrew Forrest in Australia talking about taking his iron ore, putting up solar panels and wind turbines in the Australian desert, using that to create hydrogen, using the hydrogen to make steel out of the iron ore, and then shipping that steel all around the world. There are now lots of other companies talking about hydrogen-based steel in the same way. In the shipping industry, we have Maersk now talking about using ammonia as a shipping fuel, which is basically a hydrogen-based solution. </p><p>This is why we're so excited about electrolyzers being on cost curves. Ultimately, the way that we, humanity, are going to solve this problem is we're going to decarbonize electricity. We have solutions for that. We're going to electrify whatever we can, and new solutions materialize every day. </p><p>Then the stuff that we can't, we'll use some variant of hydrogen. That very clearly is becoming the answer. So when hydrogen also gets onto cost curves, and people are starting to think about how to put hydrogen into steel and shipping and indeed airlines and so on and so forth, you can see the contours of the new world that will emerge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Let's shift to another source of good news. I'm not talking about national and international politics, which both seem dismal at the moment. But states and cities and corporations and financial institutions and other subnational entities seem to really be taking the lead in a way that gets more and more glaring every year. So let's talk about some of the things that you see happening at that level that give you hope. </p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>I think the wider point is that we have to realize that politics follows technology. That is to say, as new technology solutions materialize, politicians use them. The best example of this, famously, is Boris Johnson in the UK, who 20 years ago was laughing at all this green technology and was extremely skeptical about it. Now that you can buy an EV in the UK for more or less the same price as a conventional car, he's already put into place the prospect of bans of the sale of conventional cars. He keeps on bringing forward the date by which, in the electricity sector, we're going to have a renewable system. So politicians will use the technologies that materialize. </p><p>It's great that it's happening on a local level first, but it also does need to happen on a national level. This is the absolutely key point. When I attend conferences and talk to developers in the field, they don't talk about a lack of capital, they don't talk about technological problems — what they do talk about, all the time, is the fact that the policies are tooled up for the fossil fuel system, not for the renewable system. </p><p>This is the key point that needs to get through to policymakers: Can they please stop fiddling around, talking about these wonderful strategic visions, and actually do their job, which is detailed amendment of policies, and detailed changes to support regimes for renewables? It's really hard, difficult stuff, and it's not happening. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>One of the other perpetual debates in this area is how big the policy lever is, how necessary it is, and how much of the transition has a momentum of its own, just from economic development and technology innovation. I think you have claimed that this transition is inevitable, no matter what governments do at this point, so how big of a space is there for policy? How much can policy do to slow or speed it down? How much does it have a life of its own at this point?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>We recently put out a report which tries to encapsulate this in a very simple framing. The first observation is that everywhere is different, and every sector and technology is a little bit different, right? To state the obvious. Then, secondly, you need different policies at different stages in the life cycle of change. </p><p>At the start, you do need technological innovation, and government's very good at that. Then, after that, as costs start to fall, you do need government support to these growing industries, as the Germans very kindly did the solar industry 15 years ago. But then, as the costs start to fall towards price parity with the fossil fuel system, the role of government actually changes very significantly. Rather than, as it were, trying to push water uphill, they need to remove the blockages to allow it to fall downhill. </p><p>That's, I think, where we've now got to, certainly in the electricity sector, and to a degree in the transportation sector: the role of government now is to remove the blockages which are stopping change. </p><p>I'll give you a good example. I was talking to an incredibly frustrated wind developer in northern England a couple of months ago, and he was saying, I've got a huge offshore wind project I want to bring to bear but I can't do it, because there's one landowner who won't allow my cable onshore, and it's lasted for two years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>A very familiar story all across the world. </p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond: </strong> </p><p>I mean, this is ridiculous. Are we really going to allow our future to be mortgaged for the sake of people who want to block it for whatever bizarre reason? That's exactly now the role of government. Before you accuse me of trying to trample over people's rights, it actually goes deep into the heart of many systems. For example, there was an extraordinary report written by the Institute of Fiscal Studies in the U two weeks ago about how the government taxes electricity at, I think, effective cost of about 100 pounds a ton of CO2, but subsidizes gas use to the tune of 20 pounds per ton. This is just idiotic. Why is it that we give $500 billion a year of subsidies to the fossil fuel industry? There's an awful lot of very detailed work that governments now need to do to remove these barriers to change, and I would suggest that's actually the cutting edge. That's what now needs to happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>There's a lot of talk these days about financial institutions and the Fed pushing for more pricing of carbon risk, etc. How big of an influence do you think that's having, the discussion that's moved into the financial world?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>The financial world somewhat belatedly is waking up to the systemic risk of carbon, and they should, because we did this study which suggests that about a quarter of equity markets and half of bond markets are in sectors which are either fossil fuel producers, or heavy fossil fuel users. So it's incredibly deeply ingrained inside financial markets. As change happens, as new technologies materialize, you're going to get disruption; you're already getting disruption right across these sectors, and that creates financial risk. So it's quite right, I would suggest, for financial market regulators and participants to look at this risk. </p><p>What somewhat disappoints us thus far is that, like the IEA modeling we talked about earlier, they’re still fiddling around at the margin, they're not really getting to the heart of the risk. A good example is from the banks. If you talk to most global banks today, and we talked to a few, they will say, “We've got this covered, we totally believe in all this green stuff, we've decarbonized our head office, and we're getting renewable electricity — and furthermore, we continue to lend tens of billions to the coal center and the oil center for their expansion. But don't worry, we've got it covered, because our risk models tell us that there's no risk from this stuff.” </p><p>You then probe a little bit and it turns out that they've got risk models built up over 40 years of ever-rising fossil fuel demand. So they're doing bad modeling. They don't understand where the risk is, they're not taking account of it. Ceres, for example, has analyzed the U.S. financial sector and figured out that half of the syndicated loans are to fossil fuel linked sectors. They figured out that actually, the banking capital of the US banking system would be wiped out in the event of a disruptive energy transition. So there's a lot of risk which is not necessarily being accounted for. </p><p>It's great financial markets are starting to wake up to this, starting to think about pricing it in. But let's be clear, there's a very long way to go. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>The world knows how to accommodate the rapid growth of a new industry, but it almost seems like the decline of fossil fuels is going to be more disruptive in a lot of ways. You talk about fossil fuel demand peaking in various places already and approaching peaks other places. Tell us a little bit about that: Where have you seen it? Where do you expect to see it? What can we expect those peaks to look like over the mid-term?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>This looks like a very mad argument on our part. Here we are with fossil fuel demand booming, a shortage of coal in China, record high gas prices and coal prices, and so on and so forth. But I will nevertheless stick to my guns because, at the end of the day, this is just maths. </p><p>What's happening is, you have an energy system which is growing and dominated by fossil fuels. Then you have this new kid on the block of these fast-growing renewable energy technologies. They're moving up the S curves, and, just mathematically, at some stage it will be conceded that the demand for the incumbent technology with 80 percent market share in a low-growth system inevitably must peak. As you get this fast-growing new challenger coming into the market, it must peak and then decline. Mathematically, it will and must happen. </p><p>The question then is, well, how does this play out? We still argue that you got to peak fossil fuel demand for coal and oil and gas in 2019, and COVID has damaged them so significantly that by the time demand comes back, it won't go significantly beyond that 2019 peak. That's the overall argument. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>You’re talking about global fossil fuel demand? You think it peaked in 2019?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>We think it peaked in 2019. The reason why this is a credible argument: If you imagine a global energy system, growing at 1 percent a year, and the challenger of renewables is 5 percent of that system, growing at 20 percent a year — 5 percent times 20 percent is 1 percent. So the moment that solar and wind get to a 5 percent market share in a 1 percent growth system, they will take all of the growth. That's the moment for the peaking of the fossil fuel system. </p><p>COVID basically brought that moment forward. We had forecast that moment for the mid-2020s; COVID brought it forward basically to 2019. So in 2021, in certain areas, you might get back close to where you were back in 2019. In 2022, 2023, two or three years of bouncing along the top; but as this stuff keeps on growing, you do inevitably get a peak and a decline. </p><p>To put the current state of affairs into that context, you’ve got a crash, you’ve got a bounceback, and you’ve got lots of bottlenecks and this demand for stuff that people didn't buy that are suddenly twice as much, so you’re inevitably going to get spikes. We had exactly the same thing, famously, back in 2010. But that shouldn't detract from the wider observation that continued growth of this stuff is going to drive a peak. </p><p>To try and make this more apparent as an argument, it's worth thinking about two mountains. So you've got the Matterhorn, which famously is a V-shaped peak; the Matterhorn’s what happens to discrete individual goods like mobile phones. Nokia's sales can fall off a cliff like the Matterhorn. However, when you think about systems, where you've got embedded demand in a billion cars, then your peaking is going to look a little bit more like Mount Fuji — that is to say, you've got a long, slow slope up; a plateau at the top, for, let's say, five to 10 years, depends a little bit on the detail; then you've got a long slope downwards. </p><p>That roughly is the pattern for what you see in other technology shifts. If you go back to what data we have for the UK for the shift from coal to gas in heating, or the shift from steam to electricity in power generation back at the start of the 19th century, you see these plateaus. They last for a bit, because it takes time for the new technology to get big enough to really kill the old one. But that's nevertheless the pattern.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>So you think we're on the bumpy plateau right now? </p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>I think we're on the plateau at the top of Mount Fuji. (Although of course, having climbed it myself, I know perfectly well that it is in fact a volcano and you go down again, but let's not go into that.) It is a plateau at the top. The point to me is that people should not mistake a little hillock at the top of the plateau for another mountain ahead. That would be the error right now, to do that. This is one of the reasons why Carbon Tracker talks so much about stranded assets, because the fossil fuel system and its loyal attack dogs persist in seeing continuous growth, then build for that growth, and as the growth fails to materialize, they get stranded assets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Along those lines, you make the point that you don't have to take substantial market share away from the incumbent to start hurting the incumbent. You just have to stop their growth, then that peak triggers all sorts of other market dynamics. So what happens once the peak sinks in and it's more widely realized what's happening?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>Once you reach that peak, you kickstart a series of positive feedback loops for the challengers and negative feedback loops for the incumbents. We put out this <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ssga.com/library-content/pdfs/insights/inst-spiraling-disruption-the-feedback-loops.pdf">paper</a> where we run through seven areas and then delve into a couple of them in a bit more detail. So you see it happening in costs, technology, expectations, financial markets, society, politics, and geopolitics. Those are the seven. </p><p>To focus on the first one, think about this. If you are making cars today, go back five years ago. You were sitting pretty. There's 1,000 million cars in the world, sales are $100 billion a year, you're expecting ever-rising growth, and what could possibly disturb that? </p><p>What disturbs it is Elon Musk and Tesla. They come in and they don't have to replace the 1,000 million; they don't even have to replace the 100 million, because what's happening is that 100 million is growing at, let's say, 2 percent a year. So when Musk and the EV sector take that 2 million a year, you as a car manufacturer suddenly realize that your growth is over in the old system. </p><p>You then look at the cost curves of the new stuff, and you realize that you're going to have to change. You have to reallocate your capital out of ICE cars and into electric vehicles. Meanwhile, you figure out that you've got continuous decline now coming for your ICE car sales, so suddenly, your ICE factory is a liability, not an asset. Furthermore, as your sales of ICE cars start to drop, you've got to allocate the same fixed-cost structure over a smaller number of cars, and your cost per unit increases. This is economics 101. </p><p>That's what happens to the old people. What then happens to the new people, Tesla and BYD and the EV makers, is, as they produce more cars, the costs of the batteries fall because of these learning curves. As costs fall, demand increases, and as demand increases, they're taking more market share, and they can then go to the second feedback loop, which is the financial markets. </p><p>Tesla can go to the financial markets and in an afternoon they can raise several billion dollars and build a new factory in Berlin, which increases their capacity to build at the same time the fossil fuel sector is finding it very difficult to raise capital, and is obliged by investors to change their strategic direction — as we saw, famously, with <a target="_blank" href="https://engine1.com">Engine No. 1</a>.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>When this dynamic is underway — when the large incumbent fossil fuel or car companies are dragging around this giant legacy system which can pretty rapidly become a liability — what can we learn from history about the chances that they successfully pivot vs. flame out? </p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>We don't have to do any original thinking here. It's extremely well-documented analysis over decades. There's even a famous book about it by Christensen, <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3vRUF2d"><em>The Innovator’s Dilemma</em></a>, which says that incumbents struggle with disruptive change and few of them make it. </p><p>There's another book that I often like to refer people to, by a very respectable financial analyst called Sandy Nairn, called<em> </em><a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3GsQJtK"><em>Engines That Move Markets</em></a><em> —</em> recently re-released, but it's quite an old book. He looks back at technology shifts and what incumbents did. </p><p>The answer is, incumbents, first of all, try and resist change. Then they struggle to put capital into these new technologies, because they're not sufficiently profitable. You saw lots of examples of the oil center saying that over the last decade: we're not going to put our money into solar and wind because we can get a 20 percent IRR on oil against a 5 percent IRR on solar. Why would we? The problem, then, is that by the time this stuff does get profitable and starts to eat into their old business, it's too late, and other people have moved into this area. That's exactly what's happening now in the energy system. </p><p>It's the risk, of course. It's not just a question of solar, wind, and so on challenging the current enormous coal, gas, and oil system. It's also all of their users, don't forget. So we talked about the car companies, but it's the steel companies, the shipping companies, the airlines — they are going to get disrupted by new people coming in with new technology and new ways of doing stuff. They struggle because, precisely as you say, they have this enormous tail of legacy assets. But it's also a problem, as Christensen points out, of legacy thinking. When you've spent your entire life digging holes in the ground to hoik out stuff, you find it very difficult to do something new.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Mostly I'm pretty optimistic about the electricity sector, but one of the reasons I worry about it is that … car companies can flame out and EV companies can replace them; fossil fuel companies can flame out, clean energy companies can replace them; but in electricity, we’ve got these utilities that are basically stuck there by law and regulation that can't just flame out and go out of business. Any business that thought as slowly and conservatively as utilities would probably go out of business, but they can't. So it's hard to see how those dynamics bite as much in that sector.</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>I agree with you in theory, but what has been notable is that it's actually been the electricity sector which got disrupted first, most notably and famously in Europe. My former boss Martin Lewis tells a story about how he was working for one of these electricity companies in Europe back in the early 2000s, and they talked the talk and they put turbines on their annual reports, but in private they dismissed this as a threat. </p><p>Lo and behold, you have the combination of the crisis and politicians putting increasing pressure on them and this new stuff materializing, driven by new players — then they found that they were indeed completely stuck with the old technologies and had to write down, famously, 150 billion euros of assets in the 2010s. So, somewhat to my surprise, it can happen and it is happening. </p><p>What it does need is political push. Why would a politician push a conservative electricity company to change, and why would they change? The only reason why is if you have incredibly cheap alternatives, and your neighbors are deploying them, and you're starting to get rumblings from the people that not merely do they have polluted air and electricity outages, but they're also having to pay 25, 30 cents per kilowatt hour for their electricity, and their mate in the neighboring country’s getting it for 10. That's what forces change.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>Let's talk about geopolitics. I think the line in international negotiations used to be between developing and developed countries, as they used to be called, but you draw this line between fossil fuel producers and consumers, and you say, per geopolitics, those are the two relevant groups. What's happening that's creating that divide?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>When it comes to fossil fuels, you've basically got two groups of countries: 80 percent of the world lives in countries that import their fossil fuels, and 20 percent of the world lives in countries that export fossil fuels. It's actually even more concentrated than that — basically 10 percent of the world lives in countries that are very highly fossil fuel dependent. So the Middle East, Russia, Australia, which have got very large fossil fuel exports. </p><p>It's a really, really small group of people, 10 percent of the world, living in these fossil fuel dependent countries. Then there's the rest of us who have to import the stuff. </p><p>Furthermore, the geopolitical environment at the moment confers a lot of power upon the owners of the fossil fuel. There's this very significant geopolitical power conferred upon Russia and the Middle East as a result of their fossil fuel reserves. They’re generating these very large rents of roughly 2 percent of global GDP every year, and they're failing to pay for the externality cost of, call it $3 trillion a year that has been picked up by the poorest in society. So the current system we have is very unfair, and massively favors the fossil fuel producers.</p><p>Lo and behold, the fossil fuel users — 80 percent of the world, and it’s all of the areas of growth: China and India, most of Southeast Asia, large chunks of Africa are major importers of fossil fuels — are almost all of the expected growth in demand over the next 40 years. </p><p>They now suddenly have got their own domestic, eternal, clean resource, and it's cheap, so of course they're going to use it. They're going to be very delighted to use their own homegrown source, because what you're ultimately doing is trading rents paid to oligarchs and foreigners for local jobs. Of course they're going to do that. </p><p>There are many other people writing about the geopolitics of this energy transition, but if you stand back for a second, it's pretty clear that it's going to benefit the big fossil fuel importers and damage the big fossil fuel exporters. The question then is, well, where does the power lie? </p><p>Right now, in October 2021, the power clearly lies with the fossil fuel exporters, because not enough of this stuff has yet been built. Give it another five years, and the power is going to shift. That's, of course, another reason why people need to get on with building this new energy world, because otherwise, they're going to continue to be subject to the whims of the fossil fuel exporters.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Why do I hear all of this hand-wringing about a new wave of coal plants in China and Vietnam and in developing countries? I feel like I read this headline every few years: despite climate promises, there's a surge of coal plants. How real is that?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>Don't worry too much. First of all — not to belittle the problem, because it is a bit of an issue — it's not as dramatic as it sounds in the headlines. In fact, in spite of these new coal plants which have been built, global coal demand peaked in 2013. So people have been building them and they haven't actually been using them. Global coal utilization rates have now fallen to about 50 percent. So the thing to focus on is not the new capex going on. </p><p>The second point is that, thanks to the incredibly hard work of millions of people, this tail of new coal plants is constantly being reduced. It used to be hundreds of gigawatts, and now it's being reduced to dozens. So it has fallen a long way and it continues to fall. </p><p>When it comes specifically to Vietnam, there are things changing literally as we speak, because of the incredible success of their deployment of solar and wind. They're already now canceling their coal plants and stopping their plans for expansion of coal. </p><p>When it comes specifically to China, the rumor is at COP we might see a bringing forward of that 2030 peaking fossil fuel demand date, but the point nevertheless remains that China is very close to peak demand for fossil fuels. I hesitate to say it right now, but it is incredibly close. </p><p>To give you a stat, Chinese demand for electricity today, per capita, is the same as Europe. So that incredible ramp of moving from very low demand to develop level demand, that's happened — that's not going to happen again. China is the world's largest producer of solar and wind and all these other new energy technologies, and they're still growing at 20 percent a year. You play with the maths a bit and it's clear that we're very, very close to peak fossil fuel demand in electricity generation in China. </p><p>When I look at the rest of the world — we recently did a report on this — in 99 percent of developed markets, we've already seen peak coal demand in electricity. Interesting enough, in 63 percent of emerging markets, like China, we've seen peak demand for fossil fuels for electricity. It's not surprising, because there's a new opportunity in town. </p><p>We have a lot of legacy problems, and we have some inertia, and we have systems which are tooled up for the past, not the future, and so on and so forth — I understand all of that. But as the financial analyst, you need to look forward and look at what's most likely. What’s most likely now, increasingly, is that people will be deploying these new technologies.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>You describe the dynamic in financial markets where once you shave off the growth of an industry, it sets all these dynamics in motion. I wonder if there's an analogy in geopolitics. You think of Russia's power and African countries’ lack of power: How much would global energy have to shift away from Russia's natural gas to this plentiful solar that Africa has to set off these feedback loops in terms of geopolitical power and influence?</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>Therein lies a question beyond my level of expertise, but it certainly is worth noting that the year of the peak of the British Empire was just after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, just before it collapsed. Things always look great at the top, and you don't need actually that much; what you need is people to realize that the future is different, and that they can get their own energy. </p><p>I should have mentioned, incidentally, that one of the reasons we’re so enthusiastic about this story is that if you look at the technical potential of solar and wind, which has been a lot in the last five years, it's 100 times our global energy demand today. Africa, as you just mentioned, is an incredible renewable superpower; they've got 1,000 times as much supply from solar and wind as their current energy demand. </p><p>When countries are looking for new development tools, rather than reaching to the old playbook of “we must have coal and gas and oil in order to get development,” it’s considerably simpler now. You've got this wonderful distribution system called the sun, which will get you this energy anywhere in the country, and you can harness it pretty cheaply. That, then, becomes the development tool. </p><p>For me, this is another aspect of the incredibly powerful <em>justice</em> which is driving this energy transition: people who haven't had a lot of energy in the past now can have it and can harness it. That eventually will change the geopolitical calculus. </p><p>But as I said earlier, we're at the top of Mount Fuji; we're bouncing around, the old is still powerful. The new is yet to be born in sufficient size to really challenge it. But we can't be long.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Biden's goal is to decarbonize electricity by 2035, and for the US to be net zero carbon by 2050. Do you think those are within reach given the amount of policy that's likely to be devoted to them? </p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>If they're not achieved, the US will be buried by China. If the US wants to continue to be a serious player in the modern world, wants to remain a superpower, then it has to embrace superior, cheaper technologies. It's as simple as that. </p><p>What's really shocking and embarrassing for me as a fellow Westerner is that for the last decade, China has leapt ahead and is dominating all of these new technologies. How can that be when the US has got all of that incredible industrial, intellectual base? </p><p>It's pretty simple. If the country wishes to remain serious, then it has to do it. If not, then like the UK before it, it will descend into irrelevance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>How much of that is baked in? Are you willing to put any kind of numbers on how much you think is already inevitable, or how much requires more policy from Biden? I need faux precision here.</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>OK, I'll give you faux precision. It’s absolutely achievable. Again, as this Oxford paper points out, the more you do, the cheaper it gets. From their calculations, the cost of the transition, just in purely financial terms, is cheaper than the cost of business as usual. As they and many others have pointed out, technically all of this stuff is completely feasible, but you do need very powerful political action to break through the logjams of the incumbents and the inertia of the current system. </p><p>I salute Biden and his team, because that seems to be exactly what they're now trying to do. You do need very powerful policy, because this ultimately will happen by 2100, but by 2100, it may well be too late. So in order to drive it faster, and for that to be cheaper and fairer and better distributed, you need to get on with it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>All right. That sounds like a great place to wrap up. Thanks for taking all this time, and for cheering me up.</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>Well, thanks, David. I hope I didn't overstate my brief there — it just seems pretty clear to me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Well, you're making bold short-term predictions. Maybe in a decade, we can do another podcast and check your numbers.</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>It's funny because we put out this note in 2018, in a little conference room in San Francisco, talking about peaking fossil fuel demand coming in the 2020s. It got fairly well picked up, but it was one of those completely out-there ideas. Then lo and behold, you get COVID and it's starting to look like actually what is happening, notwithstanding what's happening right now. So, we'll see.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So far, so good. All right. Thanks so much for coming on.</p><p><strong>Kingsmill Bond:  </strong></p><p>Thanks so much for the call and for the opportunity. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>All right. Bye now. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-the-good-news-about</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:42280152</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 11 Oct 2021 16:00:39 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/42280152/7381ca689b308f90fa2bc02aa2dfbb83.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3801</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/42280152/1a3daadd76719f09bb9f06f72fca16c2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A rant about economist pundits, and other things, but mostly economist pundits]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Over the years, readers, I have had numerous occasions to be irritated with economists, particularly economists acting as political pundits. I thought today I would explain why. </p><p>There are those in climate circles who lay most of the blame for the failure of climate action to date at the feet of economists. I’m not one of those people. I just lay … <em>some</em> of the blame at their feet. The fact is, rapidly transforming the entire industrial base of every country on earth was always going to be difficult — lots of extremely powerful interests stand to lose a great deal of money and power — and was probably going to go slowly no matter what economists did.</p><p>Nonetheless, I think there’s a good argument to be made that, when it comes to the interface of economics and politics, climate economics and climate economists have blown it pretty comprehensively — and have not necessarily learned all the lessons they should have learned. </p><p>I’ll start by recounting a notable episode and then contemplate two sorts of lessons that might be learned from it, one of which seems like it’s sinking in and and one of which … less so.</p><p>The case of carbon pricing</p><p>This is a familiar story, so I’ll keep it short.</p><p>The theoretical benefits of carbon pricing, as explored <em>ad nauseam</em> by economics over the last several decades, are well-understood. If you have all the stocks and flows of an economy in a giant spreadsheet, and you tweak the “price of carbon” variable, changes cascade throughout the spreadsheet. Every column in which carbon plays a part (which is almost every part of the US economy) adjusts.</p><p>Modern neoliberal economics tends to seek the optimally efficient policy, and on that score — maximum results from minimum intervention in the economy — a price on carbon is the winner. It’s one variable you can adjust to optimize your whole spreadsheet. </p><p>These arguments on behalf of carbon pricing are, I hasten to emphasize, valid. In a spreadsheet economy, turning the carbon-price knob is the most efficient way to reduce carbon emissions.</p><p>But the economy isn’t a spreadsheet and carbon pricing isn’t just another knob on some policy console. </p><p>Carbon pricing faces <em>political</em>-economy problems that are, at this point, almost as well-understood (at least by those who have been paying attention) as its theoretical merits. In fact, the closer a carbon price gets to the economist’s ideal — pegged to the social cost of carbon, equal across sectors, covering the whole economy — the more political-economy problems it faces. Its efficiency varies in inverse proportion to its feasibility.</p><p>The more sectors are roped in under the carbon price, the more simultaneous enemies the policy makes. Different industries have different levels of power and influence and need to be compensated in different ways for their political acquiescence, but a carbon price applies to all industries equally, so it can not compensate any of them in particular. Thus, it has no friends (except economists).</p><p>Carbon pricing policies can be and have been tweaked to overcome these difficulties, but with every tweak, optimal efficiency recedes in the rearview mirror. For one thing, pretty much every extant carbon price is the world is too low, well beneath the social cost of carbon. In the real world, other sector-specific industrial policies that are more politically manageable, like feed-in tariffs and renewable energy standards, have prevented far more emissions.</p><p>Anyway, I won’t rehearse all these arguments again. If you want to read up, start with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/4/26/11470804/carbon-tax-political-constraints">this piece I did for Vox</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/research/publications/why-carbon-pricing-falls-short-and-what-to-do-about-it/#:~:text=2016">this piece from Jesse Jenkins</a>, or <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-carbon-pricing-will-never-be">this three-part interview</a> I did with David Victor and Danny Cullenward, who wrote a <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3a9Il3k">whole book on the subject</a>. </p><p>For years, economists acted like serious grappling with political-economy constraints was beneath them, and they bullied big environmental groups into becoming economist wannabes, preaching their “market-friendly” gospel. The entire decade of the 2000s was spent preparing for a national climate-pricing push in 2008 that ended up producing precisely nothing. </p><p>It wasn’t until 2020 that another shot came around at the federal level — thankfully, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21252892/climate-change-democrats-joe-biden-renewable-energy-unions-environmental-justice">Dems aren’t repeating their mistake</a> (at least that mistake).</p><p>The capture of the climate policy debate by carbon-price-obsessed economists in the late 20th century helped send national and international climate policy down a multi-decade cul-de-sac in which very little was accomplished and much precious time was wasted. </p><p>So what can be learned from that experience? I think there are two broad lessons, the first about the substance of climate economics and the second about the political behavior of economists. </p><p>Conventional economics has mostly gotten climate change wrong</p><p>Part of what prompted me to write this post in the first place is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/what-climate-change-requires-of-economics-by-daron-acemoglu-2021-09">this piece by economist Daron Acemoglu</a> about the failures of economics on climate change and some longstanding assumptions that need to be updated. It’s a smart, approachable distillation of some critiques that will be familiar to policy nerds:</p><p>* Economists have dramatically underestimated the cost of climate damages.</p><p>* They have treated technology as an exogenous variable, something external that just happens, applied to models at a set rate; models with “<a target="_blank" href="https://economics.mit.edu/files/8076">endogenous and directed technological change</a>,” which reflects our ability to shape and focus technology development through policy, reveal that much more dramatic emission cuts are affordable.  </p><p>* They have used “<a target="_blank" href="https://grist.org/article/discount-rates-a-boring-thing-you-should-know-about-with-otters/">discount rates</a>” familiar in short-term market contexts to calculate the value of inter-generational goods. </p><p>* They have failed to account properly for risk and uncertainty, especially for “long-tail risks,” i.e., <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/economists-have-quantified-the-economic">low-probability but disastrous outcomes</a>. </p><p>* They have assessed the costs and benefits of wholesale sociotechnical transformation using utility functions designed to model changes at the margins of existing systems. </p><p>* They have obsessed over optimally efficient policy in a way that ignores other values and trade-offs. </p><p>(See <a target="_blank" href="https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/why-has-climate-economics-failed">Noah Smith</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/neoclassical-economics-fails-with-climate-change-by-tom-brookes-and-gernot-wagner-2021-06?barrier=accesspaylog">Tom Brookes and Gernot Wagner</a> for other recent fulsome critiques of climate economics.) </p><p>All these mistakes point in the same basic direction: economists have dramatically underestimated the scale and speed of action needed to address climate change.</p><p>It’s worth pointing out that, ahem, Not All Economists. There are critiques of climate economics along these same lines that go back decades, from within basic confines of the mainstream — and other critiques from ecological economists and feminist economists and development economists and so on and so forth. </p><p>Economics is not a monolith. It’s not all or even necessarily most economists that have made these mistakes and arguably the rising vanguard of the profession is busy correcting them.</p><p>Nonetheless, bad climate economics has reigned for quite a while, long enough that it has developed into a kind of folk wisdom among the US chattering classes, who are convinced that climate change is a problem, but don’t understand how vast the costs of inaction are compared to the costs of action. It will take time to root out all the lingering fallacies and myths in the body politic, and for that, economists share some blame. </p><p>These failures of economics have created a deficit of trust among climate hawks. Advocates have spent years pushing <em>against</em> economists in pursuit of ambitious industrial policy. That trust deficit is relevant as we contemplate how economists approach current political debates. </p><p>Policies aren’t abstractions, they are embedded in contexts </p><p>The other lesson to learn from the carbon pricing experience is that in the unending struggle among rival interests that is politics, optimal efficiency is only one of many valid considerations. One might also hope for a policy to build resiliency and redundancy into important systems, or to be politically durable, or to channel benefits to marginalized communities, or to fit well with the enforcement capabilities of existing institutions.</p><p>Most of all, in the political realm, the “best” policy is <em>feasible</em>, given the current array of interests — businesses, nonprofit groups, political factions, and others. There are sometimes reasons to push policies that are impossible under the current regime, if only as aspirational targets, but not at the expense of policies that are feasible, certainly not in those rare moments when policy is actually being made.  </p><p>Of course, feasibility is not a binary, it’s a fuzzy judgment, a complex calculation. But for just that reason, to know what the optimum policy is for a particular polity in a particular time and place, one must understand the sociopolitical dynamics of that particular context. Policies are not free-floating conceptual structures that can be compared and ranked in the abstract; they are embedded in social, institutional, and economic relationships among actual, situated people with particular cultures, histories, and habits. </p><p>A <a target="_blank" href="https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/cjel/article/view/8401/4300">recent paper</a> by UCLA law professor William Boyd, published in the <em>Columbia Journal of Environmental Law,</em> discusses the “instrument choice debate” in Western economics and how it took shape. The paper describes a kind of technocratic turn in economics in the last quarter of the 20th century, during which economists abstracted further and further away from lived examples and histories, increasingly conceiving of policy as a choice of instruments, policy tools, which were characterized according to their abstract design and theoretical merits. </p><p>It is as though policymakers are surgeons, scrubbed into a cleanroom, choosing which sterilized tool best suits their needs. Viewing the policy space this way has “constrained our conceptions of the regulatory state and its capacity for climate action in jurisdictions around the world,” Boyd writes, and “led to a sharply diminished view of public engagement and government problem solving.”</p><p>The truth is, policies are not discrete tools in a toolbox, equally at hand. To choose a policy is not to execute an equation in a spreadsheet, it is to invoke a whole skein of institutions, habits, norms, economic interests and counter-interests, and social narratives. We are not in a cleanroom; we are in the opposite. </p><p>Doing politics, advancing the public welfare, is ultimately a utilitarian game. You are trying to maximize outcomes, to achieve the strongest and most effective policy results possible within a particular set of social and political constraints.  </p><p>In that context, a policy that maximizes spreadsheet results but can not get past the constraints is not “better” than a more limited policy that can pass. The best policy is not the economically optimal policy, it’s the most effective policy that can be implemented and enforced. </p><p>No specialist expertise can substitute for wisdom</p><p>In my experience, climate policy debates frequently find people with technical expertise in a particular area — the hard sciences, say, or engineering, or most often of all, economics — confidently making policy recommendations based on their narrow expertise.</p><p>When challenged on the political economy of particular policies, they retreat to their credentials: “I’m no expert on politics, I’m just a scientist/engineer/economist.” </p><p>But here’s the thing. If you’re calculating the optimally efficient policy, you’re an economist; once you go out in public and argue, “legislators should pass this policy,” you’re no longer acting purely as an economist, you’re acting as a <em>citizen</em>, an advocate. </p><p>You’re no longer merely saying, “this is the optimally efficient policy on paper,” you’re saying, “this is the right policy to push, all things considered.” Economist pundits spent years conflating those two in climate policy, and they’ve inspired a lot of other people to conflate them as well. </p><p>When you enter the realm of politics and make political arguments and recommendations, you ought to be cognizant of, not merely the likely economic effects of a policy if it is passed and enforced, but the political dynamics that determine its feasibility, the likelihood that it will stay in place if passed, the state’s ability to enforce it, what social and economic interests will gain and lose from it, how equitable its distribution of costs and benefits may be, and how all of it might shape the space of political possibilities in the future. </p><p>You ought to be cognizant of and feel responsible for the political effects of your intervention — what interests and factions you are strengthening and which you are weakening, where your argument weighs in the current moment, how your words are likely to be used, and by whom. </p><p>Those are all difficult things to know! And the truth is difficult to glean from the ungainly morass of political journalism and commentary. Unlike disciplines with some academic or professional standards of rigor, political punditry and advocacy are a veritable festival of gut instincts, guesses, bad logic, bad faith, and confirmation bias. Pundits rarely offer empirical evidence; they rarely assess the accuracy of their prior predictions; they rarely change their minds. </p><p>It drives scientists, economists, and, uh, ex-philosophy students out of their heads. It is tempting to try to claim some authority, to claim that a background in economics (or some other technical field) confers the status of referee, making the final calls on the merits of various policies. </p><p>But it doesn’t. There are no real “experts” in politics, despite many claims to the contrary. The best we can hope for is to develop a few empirically informed heuristics (including those from economics), to remain open and alive to new evidence, to find trustworthy guides to the current political economy, and to strive toward, for lack of a better word, wisdom. </p><p>Technical training and specialist knowledge are valuable. Those involved in political analysis and advocacy ought to pull in more from economics, political science, sociology, and ecology, among other disciplines. </p><p>But those who have technical training should never mistake it for wisdom. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-rant-about-economist-pundits-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:42191121</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 08 Oct 2021 16:30:01 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/42191121/aab99cd82a7b8194af5283e527e1ff4c.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>960</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/42191121/85d003fff0d2055bfc618d66f62eedb1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: all about methane, with Sarah Smith of the Clean Air Task Force]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, I talk with Sarah Smith of the Clean Air Task Force about methane, the greenhouse gas that falls out of the atmosphere more quickly than carbon dioxide but trap a lot more heat while it’s there. We discuss sources of methane pollution, opportunities for reduction, and recent policy developments.</em> </p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Sarah Smith, September 29, 2021</p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/xn09u4ubl7ujjrb/volts21.09.29%28sarah.smith%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF version</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Methane is having a moment. </p><p>Methane — chemical name CH4 — is a fuel. It is the primary ingredient in natural gas, which generates about 40 percent of US electricity and heats about half of US homes. It is also an air pollutant, a precursor to ground-level ozone, which is toxic to humans. And it is also a greenhouse gas, much shorter lived in the atmosphere than CO2, but <a target="_blank" href="https://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2021/09/the-definitive-co2-ch4-comparison-post/#.YUgGsRR1Pnc.twitter">much more potent while it is there</a>. </p><p>Methane in the atmosphere comes from leaks along oil and gas infrastructure, from agriculture (primarily cow burps and manure), and from landfills. Rising concern over methane pollution has culminated in the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/18/joint-us-eu-press-release-on-the-global-methane-pledge/">Global Methane Pledge</a>, announced by President Joe Biden’s White House last week, which would have participating countries (which include the EU, the UK, and Mexico) reduce methane emissions at least 30 percent by 2030. </p><p>This followed the United Nations Environment Program’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-methane-assessment-benefits-and-costs-mitigating-methane-emissions">Global Methane Assessment</a> in May, which found that substantially and rapidly reducing methane is the only way to meet the international goal of keeping warming under 1.5°C. </p><p>Clearly, for those of us who haven’t been paying as close attention as we should, it’s time to tune into the methane debate. </p><p>The Clean Air Task Force has been <a target="_blank" href="https://www.catf.us/educational/comat-catfs-country-methane-abatement-tool/">tracking methane pollution</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.catf.us/resource/oil-gas-methane-mapping-the-path-to-a-65-reduction/">advocating for reductions</a> for years. So I was eager to talk to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.catf.us/experts/sarah-smith/">Sarah Smith</a>, the head of CATF’s Super Pollutants program, about the basics of methane: where it comes from, how it can be reduced, and the battles over it in US methane policy. (See also: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/fossil-fuels/the-u-s-oil-patch-is-the-wild-west-we-need-regulation-to-control-the-sectors-methane-emissions">Smith’s op-ed in Canary</a>.)</p><p>Without further ado, Sarah Smith, welcome to Volts. Thanks for coming.</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong> </p><p>Thank you so much for having me, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>For those of us who have not been tracking the details of methane as closely as they might: what exactly is methane? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong>   </p><p>Methane is an invisible, odorless gas that is commonly known as the main constituent of natural gas. It has flown under the radar for far too long. It's currently contributing to about half the warming that we're experiencing today.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Methane is a greenhouse gas that traps more heat in the atmosphere than CO2, but for a shorter period of time. What is the climate change potential of methane, and how does it differ from CO2?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>Every pound of methane heats the climate more than 80 times as much as a pound of CO2. But methane only lasts for about a decade in the atmosphere, which is a big opportunity, because quickly reducing the amount of methane in the atmosphere would very quickly slow warming, whereas carbon dioxide is slowly building up over time and takes much longer to reduce.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>I’ve seen it compared to stock vs. flow. With CO2, if you stock it up in the atmosphere it stays, so you have to worry about the total amount. Methane is a flow problem; it's constantly coming out of the atmosphere. Is it fair to say that if we reduced the addition of methane into the atmosphere to the rate at which it was coming out of the atmosphere, we would basically stabilize its temperature effect? In other words, theoretically, there is some level of methane emissions at which you're not making things warmer.</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>Exactly, and that's the goal: to get back to those pre-industrial concentrations of methane by ensuring that less methane is being added than removed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>It is startling that methane has caused half of historical climate warming thus far. How was that discovered, and how did we not know it for so long?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>I ask myself that question all the time. The latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change finally shone a bright light on methane; you saw the CO2 bar next to the methane bar and clearly, methane was causing a substantial amount of the warming, about half as much as CO2. Subsequently, the attention is growing, as it should, and as it has been for years, but finally, we're really reaching a crescendo here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>What are the implications for policy? What does this allow us to do if we grab hold of the methane lever?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong> </p><p>A powerful lever it is. We don't have a lot of time left — perhaps 10 to 15 years, maybe less — to bend the warming curve in order to stave off irreversible changes to our climate, including self-reinforcing feedbacks where the world warms itself, like the loss of the remaining reflective sea ice, which would add the equivalent of a trillion tons of CO2 to what's already been added. </p><p>There's also the Amazon tipping point, where the Amazon could be canceled out as a carbon sink. And many others. So we're in this race now to slow warming, and the biggest lever we can pull, by far, is cutting methane. We have the technology to quickly cut methane by at least 45 percent by 2030, and that would deliver an astonishing 0.3 degrees Celsius of reduced warming, along with a host of other benefits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>When you say reduced warming, you mean relative to baseline, right? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>Exactly. Bending the curve down, reducing the rate of warming. We could reduce this 0.3 degrees C by the early 2040s through reducing methane.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>This is the key thing about methane. You could cut CO2 almost to zero tomorrow and the warming set in motion by the CO2 that's in the atmosphere would continue. Whereas cutting methane gives us this lever where we can promise visible results within a reasonable lifetime.</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong>  </p><p>Decarbonization is critical for slowing long-term warming, but it doesn't provide any reduction in warming for 20 to 30 years, and we simply can't wait. We have to address methane.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong> </p><p>Lately, there's been global attention to reducing aerosols and their negative environmental effects. But one of the things aerosols did, perversely, was thicken the atmosphere and shelter us from some warming. There's worry that reducing aerosols globally, while it will have immediate positive environmental effects on ozone, etc., will actually boost short-term warming. So this brings us back to the need to have a short-term tool to fight that effect.</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong>  </p><p>That's an important insight and one that this latest report from the IPCC finally highlighted in clear terms.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Notoriously, there's been a big spike in methane emissions in the last few decades, and it's something of a mystery, as I understand it. Do we know where that methane is coming from? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong> </p><p>We're certain about the spike. But there is a lot of uncertainty around what's driving the spike.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>   </p><p>Do we have a list of culprits? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>We think fossil is a significant part of the search, but probably not the only contributing factor.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>In terms of knowing how much methane is in the atmosphere, we've historically relied on self-reporting by companies and countries that maybe can't be fully trusted to do transparent self-reporting. Now, we have satellites that can allegedly detect methane. What are the satellites revealing, and what will they reveal when there are more of them?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>The satellite technology is improving, and it's exciting that several are planned for launch in the next few years. That will give us a much more detailed view from the sky of the emissions all around the world; in the case of the Carbon Mapper satellite constellation, near real-time data for the whole planet. That will revolutionize the policymaking landscape and industry, which will suddenly be on the hook to take this on.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong> </p><p>Tell me a little bit more about the satellite network.</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>There's one called Carbon Mapper that will be a constellation, as I understand it, of more than 20 satellites, circling the globe, and providing data every few days. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Is there a third-grade explanation of the science behind how, from space, you can detect a colorless odorless gas being emitted on the ground? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>Sadly, I'm not a satellite expert. But scientists in NASA's Jet Propulsion Lab have been involved in developing this technology, so I am confident in its ability to work.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>It's like the entire world having a curtain pulled away: every single source of methane will be exposed. Do you have any guesses about what that's going to show? Are there going to be big surprises? What might we find out that we don't know?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>Already, some of the satellites in the sky today — which aren’t as good as what's coming, but give us some early clues — have shown massive plumes of methane coming from oil and gas infrastructure, including pipelines, and have already resulted in some cleanup efforts. So I'm excited about the surprises, and hopeful the big sources will be caught more quickly. </p><p>What satellites won't be able to do is pinpoint every tiny leak, and we need to try to address those too. But satellites will be able to show us where the bigger emissions are coming from.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong> </p><p>We keep hearing about giant methane deposits in the Siberian permafrost, in bogs and swamps. There's this constant worry about a tipping point that unleashes giant methane deposits from permafrost. What's the state of science on that? How worried should we be?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>Right now, more than half of methane is coming from human-caused sources. We should address that as quickly as we possibly can, in part to help prevent a rise in methane from these “natural” sources, the leading one being wetlands. Right now, permafrost is not a huge source compared to others globally, but as temperature rises, it could bit by bit become a bigger source. But I don't think people should lose sleep over a one-day sudden surge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>You think the chances of a big dramatic release are relatively low?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>Yes, that's what the science seems to be saying.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I guess we can take some relief in that.</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>We still have a lot of work to do, but that's one bright spot.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>What are the biggest human-caused sources of methane emission, both globally and in the US?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>Overall, they're fairly similar, with about a third of the emissions coming from the fossil sector, including oil and gas and coal mines; about a third, maybe a little bit more, coming from agriculture, with the main sources being livestock, manure, and rice cultivation; and then the final amount coming from waste, including landfills.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I think we have a pretty good understanding of how methane builds up in coal mines and releases. But where in the oil and gas process are these leaks happening?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>The sad thing is that they're happening throughout the whole supply chain, from the well pad, where the gas or oil is being pumped out of the ground, where there are leaks; unloading of liquids along with gas from wells; pneumatic devices, compressors, storage tanks, dehydrators. All through the supply chain, many of these devices also exist: the pneumatics, the compressors, the tanks. Then, of course, you have the pipelines. All the way from the production through processing, transmission and storage, and even distribution portion of the industry.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>So there's not one big spot to focus on; that's a little disheartening. Are there no junctures or concentrations we could target first, if we're trying to prioritize?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>You're pointing out a big reason why this emission problem still exists. It is dispersed. We are talking about millions of sources that can and must be cleaned up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>There has been a long ongoing argument in the climate world over the perennial question of how clean natural gas electricity is compared to coal electricity. Some say that there's so much leakage of methane in the supply chain before you get natural gas electricity that it wipes out any advantage natural gas has over coal; other estimates say no, the leakage rate is low enough that it still has an advantage. How confident are we that we know the leakage rate in this process?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>The leakage of potent methane substantially erodes the climate benefit of gas over coal, and depending on where that gas is produced, how far it's transported, and how it’s transported, the upstream emissions can vary widely. All of that needs to be factored in.</p><p>But I think comparison to coal is letting us off too easy. It's not the ambitious benchmark that we need, which is near-zero methane emissions. Flaring needs to end, venting needs to end, these super-emitter plumes and leaks have to be found and fixed, and that antiquated equipment that vents methane to the atmosphere as part of its normal operation should be phased out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Can you explain flaring and venting? When I tell people about flaring, they have trouble believing that I'm telling the truth. </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>I experience that, too. It is remarkable that billions of dollars worth of gas gets lit on fire every year as a disposal mechanism. It turns out that burning it is better than just releasing it straight into the air, which is venting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Natural gas is valuable, used in a lot of different ways, and we go out to mine it and search for it, but oil wells are throwing tons of it away. What's going on there? Why throw away a valuable resource?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong>   </p><p>The oil producers have not yet been forced to capture and utilize or sell the gas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Couldn’t they make money? Why would they have to be forced if they could make money?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>Certainly money could be made. The question is, could more money be made in other ways? That short-term profit is what they’re after.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>What would be involved in not venting or flaring, but capturing and transporting the gas? Is it additional infrastructure?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>A lot of times it comes down to planning in advance and making sure that before the well is drilled, there's capacity to use or get rid of the gas. There are a wide range of solutions, from using the excess gas to make power on site, or making sure there’s a pipeline and a compressor there to get it to market. But companies aren't doing that without being required to.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Liquid natural gas is another big source of controversy. There are people advocating for liquid natural gas export terminals in the US; China is supposedly going to start importing a lot more liquid natural gas. Is liquid natural gas, in terms of the methane leakage in the process of making it, worse than normal natural gas?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>There is energy that needs to be used to compress the gas into LNG and transport it. We're also concerned about emissions during that transportation process: boil-off of gas, leaks, even super-emitter events. We have an optical gas imaging camera that can be used to see the emissions that are normally invisible, and we've taken it to some LNG sites in Europe and seen the pollution. We know it exists, and we're concerned about it. It's an area where little study has been done so far, but all of these emissions do need to be factored in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>The US fracking industry is likely to collapse soon, and there are thousands upon thousands of wells all over the place, many of which get abandoned because our laws about holding fossil fuel companies responsible for them are rather weak. Are they a source of methane? How big of a problem are abandoned wells? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>They are another source of methane, and we're especially worried about the ones where there is no longer a clear owner. Unfortunately, the government needs to step up with the resources and cap these pollution sources. Long term, we have to make sure that oil and gas companies are responsible for their wells.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>What does that policy look like when they're responsible for their wells? Is it just a matter of bonding some extra money upfront?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>I do think that's key, yes; making sure that enough money is actually bonded upfront that the well can be capped and properly maintained.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>When we say capping a well, are we literally just talking about going and putting a cap on something? Is it just a concrete plug in a tube, or is there something more complicated involved?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>Generally, this is plumbing, not rocket science, but it can be costly to properly plug these wells and then ensure that they're checked for leaks over time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>What's involved in stopping methane leaks in LNG production?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>Step one, find the leaks: if it's with a camera, or a flyover, or, increasingly, satellite technology. Continuous monitoring sensors are also becoming more popular and lower cost. So detecting the emissions and then fixing the problem, which can be as simple as closing a hatch that's been left open, reigniting a flare that's been snuffed out, or fixing a hole in a pipeline or a tank.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>It doesn't sound like it's a difficult technical problem or an intellectual challenge.</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>We have the technology today. In fact, the International Energy Agency says that half of the emissions could be cut from oil and gas at no cost, and 75 percent could be done at low cost with existing technologies. So there's a lot of potential here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>How can it be costless?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>In enough of the places, the pollutant is the product too. That’s how the minimal costs associated with finding and fixing these leaks and updating the equipment can be recouped.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>The second big source of methane that you listed is agriculture. This is cow burps and cow poop? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>Those are two of the top ones, indeed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>What can be done about those?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>On the cow burps, also known as enteric fermentation, there is no silver bullet, but there are solutions that should be pursued, including feed changes and selective breeding. Whenever we improve productivity and animal health and fertility, that's going to reduce methane emissions associated with the products from that animal. So those are good solutions. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Breeding cows that burp less?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>Selective breeding to improve productivity. This is an area that New Zealand has pioneered, and the reductions in emissions aren't staggering — they see a 10 percent reduction, often — but if we could extend that over more of the world, that would start to make a real impact.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>What can be done with the poop? As I understand it, the poop right now goes into giant lagoons and sits there off-gassing. Is that right?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>A lot of that does occur, yes. Some farms have started to adopt these biogas digesters, which require maintenance but can be an important solution. And again, that gas can be utilized, so that's one solution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Is that the main poop solution, capturing the gas and using it? Or are there other methods?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>There are some other actions that can be taken, like decreasing the amount of time it’s stored before it's used, covering it better. There are some emerging technologies, like powdered additives that can be added to the slurry to reduce the emissions. But more study is needed to understand the effectiveness of some of these newer approaches, and more study should be undertaken, because the ag sector as a whole is a huge source of methane that we absolutely need to rein in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>A growing source, right, because more and more people are eating more and more meat?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>That's right — projected to continue in that direction as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>It seems to me that one of the obvious solutions in agriculture is just to eat less meat and raise fewer animals. That would be the most straightforward way to reduce this, wouldn't it?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>That would certainly help. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>It's funny that we have so much more faith in all the technological solutions than we do in the idea of persuading people to eat less meat.</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>That's a challenging case to make, yes, even if it's in their own self-interest and would improve health.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Is it safe to say that the reductions in agriculture are a bit more difficult, less thorough, and less fully understood than in oil and gas?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>Yes, that's true. There are steps that we could and should take today, but we won't get to zero overnight.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>The third big one, then, is waste and landfills. As I understand it, the reason they're off-gassing methane is that they contain a lot of organic material. Do we have any large-scale solutions for landfills?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>No, unfortunately, not really. We could take a substantial bite out of the emissions through existing technologies, like header capping, capturing the gas from landfills and using it, or, if there's no way to use it, at least burning it off so that it doesn't vent directly to the atmosphere. As you said, the methane is a result of organic material decomposing in the landfill, so reducing the amount of organic waste that's winding up in landfills is also a important piece of the solution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Which would be primarily food waste, right?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>Right. Food waste is important to consider and important to try to reduce overall.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Landfills are huge. What does it look like to capture the gas coming off of a landfill? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>In order to capture the gas, the landfill has to be covered, and the gas essentially rises and gets captured at the centralized points. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>So that costs more. For your average landfill, can you make enough off the gas to pay for the process of capturing it? What are the economics there?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>The upfront cost can be a barrier. That's where we need to scale up financing and make sure that municipalities and government jurisdictions that are charged with solid waste handling have the resources to invest in better facilities and facilities that pollute less.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Food waste seems like a difficult problem. Are there technological solutions to food waste, or is this mostly a behavior issue that we need to educate people about? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>One of the groups that works on this is called ReFED; I spoke with their executive director a couple of years ago, and he was telling me that there are policy changes that can help, like shifting dates on packaging to ensure that there's maximal time to use the food while safe, improvements in packaging, technology, and so forth. That can all help, but I'm not an expert in food waste.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Tell us about the global methane pledge that President Biden just announced. Is it ambitious enough? Do we think that countries signing the pledge will actually do what they're saying they will do?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>EU president Ursula von der Leyen and President Biden together announced this pledge recently. They called on countries around the world to join them in a collective effort to reduce global methane from all sectors by at least 30 percent below 2020 levels by 2030, and, importantly, also to take comprehensive domestic action to achieve this target. So this is a great step in the right direction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>So you think 30 percent by 2030 is a good target?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>I do, especially when compared to the 2020 baseline. This would be a big step toward keeping a 1.5 degree C of warming future in reach.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Is this styled like the Paris Agreement, where countries are proclaiming they'll do this and we're trusting them based on their goodwill? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>This is a voluntary pledge, yes. I think of it as the launchpad for deep work in every one of these countries, to ensure that policies are put into place and actions are taken on the ground to get these tons of methane out of the air and try to stave off irreversible changes to the climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Is it fair to say that there's no way to stop short of 1.5 degrees without getting ahold of methane?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>Yes. We cannot keep 1.5 degrees in reach without wringing all of the methane that we can out of the system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Catch us up on US methane policy. What policies do we have in place, especially with oil and gas? What are the big fights going on right now?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>Fortunately, the US is poised to lead by example on this issue, through new rules from the US Environmental Protection Agency and through action by Congress this year that could put us on strong footing going into the COP and bring more countries onto this pledge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>This fight has been going on for a long time. Obama’s EPA put some standards in place, didn’t it?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong> </p><p>Yes. President Obama's EPA developed standards for new and modified oil and gas sources, but left on the table emissions from the vast network of existing polluting oil and gas equipment all across the country. That is something that EPA Administrator Regan under the Biden administration has committed to addressing in forthcoming standards that should be out publicly in the next month.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>So there are no federal standards on existing wells and mines?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>That's right. They are allowed to release unlimited methane right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Are Obama's standards on new and modified sources still in place, or did Trump mess with those?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>He certainly tried. They were off the books briefly, but Congress took action through the Congressional Review Act and undid the Trump rollback so that the Obama rules are largely back in place. But they need to be updated, because we've learned a heck of a lot about methane reduction since 2015 and 2016, when those rules were written. We now know emissions could be cut in the US by 65 percent at least, using currently available, low-cost technologies.</p><p>We know more about how to solve the problem from states that have stepped up and taken leadership on this issue, including Colorado, which has gone through several rounds of rulemakings on this, and even the state of New Mexico, which recently took on flaring. Both Colorado and New Mexico now have finalized phase-outs for flaring of associated gas. Producers are going to have to stop routine flaring and capture the gas, except in emergency situations.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Has Colorado shown success? Are methane emissions in Colorado declining? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>The latest data I've seen does show a declining leak rate in Colorado, and I expect that trend to continue with the state continuing to take leadership on this issue.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>I’ve read that the Democrats’ reconciliation bill is meant to include a methane fee. What can you tell me about that?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>This is a modest fee proposal that would reinforce the specific regulatory requirements that EPA is working on. It would raise revenue, much of which would go to EPA and could help the agency implement the provisions of the rules, improve reporting and monitoring, and even fund environmental restoration projects, including in communities that have been most impacted by air pollution from industry and climate change.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Is it intended mostly as a revenue raiser? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>That’s the main thrust, but it's important to note that it would also help reduce emissions quickly and provide an incentive for companies to go above and beyond the regulations that get promulgated under the Clean Air Act.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>What is the oil and gas industry's current posture toward these upcoming rules? Are they still dug in in opposition? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>I would be hesitant to put the whole industry into one bucket on this. The seas are shifting. Some companies, over the course of the past couple of years, have started to support methane regulation. Even API, the industry trade association, has changed their messaging on this to be much more supportive. I think they see the writing on the wall.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>I know they're protesting the fee. They say it's duplicative or it's on top of the rules, it's confusing. Do you put any credence in those kind of objections?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>No, I really don’t. This is an industry that could so easily minimize its pollution, has had a chance to do that, and hasn't acted quickly enough. So it's time for the hammer to come down.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>It seems like it would be a political and public relations boon for an oil and gas company to say, “we're going to be a different kind of oil and gas company, we're going to be responsible and clean up our methane emissions.” They could do it at low cost and reap such a PR bonanza. Why have none of them done this, not even a single outlier? Do you have any theories about this?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>I wish I could sit each one of the CEOs down with you, David, because that's exactly right. I think it's a case of short-sightedness, and, in some cases, prioritizing short-term gains over long-term gains.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Globally speaking, where are the other big methane sources? What other countries are particularly bad on this? Are there other countries taking action like the US? </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:</strong></p><p>Sadly, there are methane emissions coming from every continent, every country. Because they're so dispersed, we need global action on this global problem. Many of the big economies are the bigger sources right now, but not exclusively. </p><p>In terms of where we're seeing action, it’s exciting to see the US stepping up, and I'll be curious and hopeful to see strong rules coming out this year and finalized next year. The European Commission has a methane strategy that cuts across a range of sectors; they're starting out with some legislation later this year on the oil and gas sector that will, we hope, take action on venting and flaring, leaks, monitoring, reporting, and the topics that we've discussed today. This would be across the EU.</p><p>Hopefully the EU will also establish import standards for all of the gas it's purchasing. It's currently the number one importer of gas in the world, so that will put pressure on Russia and Algeria and Qatar and some of these other countries that are supplying fuel into the EU to implement these common-sense best practices.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I think of Russia as a huge source of natural gas. Is Russia taking action?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>President Putin spoke about the need to reduce methane and called for global action on the topic during the leaders summit that President Biden organized on climate earlier this year, so it'll be interesting to see how that unfolds. Ultimately, we need certification and monitoring to ensure that the practices are actually being implemented on the ground, and the emissions are being prevented. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>This radical global transparency on methane emissions seems like it's going to be fascinating to watch from an international politics point of view.</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith:  </strong></p><p>It will be. We're going to know a lot more about methane sources and a lot more about carbon dioxide sources, too. I hope both can be tackled simultaneously — they absolutely must be to have a chance of maintaining a safe climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Do you think there will be substantial developments on methane in the upcoming COP?</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>I am hopeful that methane could be a bright spot out of this upcoming COP, and that this global methane pledge, when formally launched, will bring together many more countries to rein in the pollution.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>It sounds like there's more and easier potential action on methane than on CO2, in some ways.</p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>It is the low-hanging fruit that has been hiding just out of sight for a long time, and I'm hoping that it will start getting plucked.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>It would be truly embarrassing if humanity destroyed itself with a pollutant that it could have reduced at no cost. That would be a terrible epitaph. Thank you, Sarah, for coming on and taking the time. It's very clarifying. </p><p><strong>Sarah Smith: </strong></p><p>It was fun to speak with you.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-all-about-methane-with</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:41853325</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 29 Sep 2021 16:00:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/41853325/8af81dd25cafa9b883573e6587882110.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3275</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/41853325/d537b89a6b85cfa0346e941077c623c7.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Taking an Uber or Lyft just makes everything worse]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Here’s a question: is it better to drive somewhere or to take a ride-hailing service like Uber or Lyft? </p><p>I don’t mean better for you personally — faster or cheaper. I mean better for the world, for society, for the air and atmosphere … better, all things considered. </p><p>A clever new study from researchers at Carnegie Mellon University attempts to answer that question.</p><p>Ride-hailing services carry more external costs than private vehicles</p><p>In <a target="_blank" href="https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.1c01641">the paper</a>, Jacob Ward, Jeremy Michalek, and Constantine Samaras attempt to tally up the relative costs to the environment and society of taking a trip via a privately owned vehicle vs. taking the same trip in what they call a transportation network company (TNC) like Uber or Lyft, in six of the companies’ biggest markets.</p><p>This involves two steps in each market. First, they add up how many miles the respective vehicles travel per trip. Then, they add up the total externalities — in vehicle emissions, congestion, crashes, and noise — represented by each mile traveled. (These externalities, notoriously, are not priced into transportation decisions; thus the name.)</p><p>To understand the results, you have to understand one key fact: <em>TNC vehicles travel more miles per trip</em>. They have to drive between where they drop off one fare and pick up another, which sometimes involves quite a bit of just wandering around. This time spent with no passenger is called “deadheading,” and those miles must be added to their trip miles.</p><p>Here’s a clear visual representation:</p><p>Those dotted black lines on the bottom half? That’s deadheading. </p><p>Those extra miles traveled represent more externalities — more cost to the environment and society. On average, a TNC trip carries 32 to 37 cents more in external costs than a private vehicle trip. (See also <a target="_blank" href="https://news.mit.edu/2021/ride-sharing-intensifies-urban-road-congestion-0423">this recent MIT study</a>, which found that TNC vehicles increase urban road congestion.)</p><p>There are three countervailing factors, but only the third is big enough to flip the equation enough to give TNCs the advantage in some limited circumstances.</p><p>Ride-hailing services reduce air pollution</p><p>First, though additional miles lead to more greenhouse gas emissions, congestion, crashes, and noise, somewhat counterintuitively, they lead to <em>less</em> air pollution. The secret here is that the bulk of particulate air pollution is generated from “cold starts,” i.e., engines turning over to start up. By contrast, TNC vehicles arrive “hot.” Their engines are already running, so they don’t do cold starts. In addition, TNC vehicles are, on average, newer, and thus cleaner.</p><p>On average, TNC trips represent a 50 to 60 percent decline (9–13¢ per trip) in air pollutants like NOx, PM2.5, and VOCs.</p><p>If TNC vehicles electrify faster than private vehicles, that advantage will grow, because EVs generate no tailpipe pollution. But if private vehicles electrify equally fast, the comparative advantage will stay the same.</p><p>Regardless, the difference is not enough to overcome the other externalities. TNC trips represent a 20 percent increase in costs from greenhouse gas emissions and a 60 percent increase in costs from congestion, crashes, and noise (all told, about 45¢ more per trip). </p><p>Overall, a 9–13¢ decrease and a 45¢ increase add up to 32 to 37 cents more per trip, on average.</p><p>Electric ride-hailing vehicles … are still mostly worse than private vehicles</p><p>The second countervailing factor is vehicle electrification. Doesn’t that reduce externalities? What the researchers found is that a) if the TNC car is electric, while b) the private vehicle alternative is an internal combustion engine car, and c) the TNC car charges entirely with zero-carbon electricity, <em>then</em> the overall environmental and social costs of a TNC trip and a personal vehicle trip are … about the same. </p><p>Of course, those conditions are rarely met. On real-world grids, which are still powered overwhelmingly by fossil fuels, electrification of TNCs reduces the relative advantage of personal vehicle trips by about 16 or 17 percent. It does not eliminate the advantage. And of course, that advantage will shrink as the private vehicle fleet electrifies. </p><p>So what, then, is the third countervailing factor, the one that can actually make a TNC trip <em>better</em> than a personal vehicle trip? </p><p>Shared ride-hailing vehicles are better than private vehicles</p><p>Maybe you’ve already guessed the answer: it’s ride-sharing. Put two people in the TNC car — i.e., have one TNC trip substitute for two personal vehicle trips — and <em>voilà</em>, you flip the script and your TNC trip is a net positive for the world. “When a TNC trip is known to be pooled,” the paper says, “shifting travel from a private vehicle reduces net external costs by a mean value of $0.60/trip.”</p><p>Wow, if you pooled three people you could save even more. Or four people. You could even pool dozens of people on large vehicles that travel on fixed routes and timetables. You could reduce all kinds of externalities! I wonder if anyone has tried that. </p><p>Speaking of which, what if the TNC trip displaced a trip on public transit, where the marginal cost in externalities of an additional passenger is effectively zero? What if it displaced a trip done via walking or biking, where the marginal externalities are, again, zero?</p><p>The study looked at that too: “When TNCs displace transit, walking, or biking, rather than personal vehicles, the increase in externalities is about three times larger (+$1.20/trip).”</p><p>What about avoided vehicle purchases?</p><p>You might think that, with the easy availability of TNCs, it might be possible for fewer people to buy cars, which would count on the positive side of the ledger. </p><p>However, there’s no such comfort. I asked the authors about this and it turns out they did <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cell.com/iscience/fulltext/S2589-0042(20)31130-5">another study</a> (out on Jan. 6, d’oh) which found that the arrival of Uber and Lyft to a market tends to be correlated with a small <em>increase</em> in car ownership, especially in places where car ownership is already high and there’s not much population growth. </p><p>Via email, Michalek adds:</p><p>Even if Uber/Lyft do cause a reduction in vehicle ownership in some cities, I don’t think that alone would change our analysis about the costs and benefits of ridesourcing to society very much, because vehicle production emissions are a small part of overall lifecycle costs. The main costs come from driving.</p><p>What <em>could</em> change our results is if Uber/Lyft <em>enable</em> travelers to walk and use transit more than they would have otherwise. This could be, for example, (1) because Uber/Lyft enable a traveler to get to a transit line (providing a first mile / last mile solution); (2) because Uber/Lyft can fill in gaps in transit services, allowing travelers to take the train out to a nightlife area and take an Uber home after the trains stop running; or (3) because not owning a vehicle forces the traveler to walk, carpool, and use transit more often than they would if they had a convenient personal car option.</p><p>Unfortunately, there’s not a ton of evidence for TNCs enabling more transit trips either. Reviewing the studies done to date on the impact of TNCs on transit, the paper concludes: </p><p>We also find no statistically significant average effect of TNC entry on fuel economy or transit use, but find evidence of heterogeneity in these effects across urban areas, including larger transit ridership reductions after TNC entry in areas with higher income and more childless households.</p><p>There’s no way to avoid the conclusion: in most places, in current circumstances, all things considered, it’s worse to take a TNC ride than to drive a private vehicle.</p><p>What all of this means</p><p>I hope the implications of this research are obvious: ban cars.</p><p>Ha ha, I’m kidding. Kind of. But Uber and Lyft aren’t helping anything. They’re making most things worse. Even if they electrify, they’re still mostly making things worse. </p><p>The most notable finding in this latest study is something we already knew: moving people out of private vehicles (whether they’re driving or not) into walking, biking, and public transit sharply reduces overall costs to society and the environment. The difference that shift makes swamps any differences between the types of private vehicles we choose. </p><p>The basic problem with cars — whether they’re private, TNCs, taxis, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/technology/2017/4/20/15367806/flying-cars-survey">flying cars</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperloop">underground cars</a>, or autonomous <a target="_blank" href="https://www.pal-v.com/en/">Personal Air Land Vehicles</a> (PAL-Vs) with 5G and lasers — is a simple matter of geometry: they take up lots of space. </p><p>You can not have thousands of people living close together, each with their own two-ton vehicle, without congestion, sprawl, noise, crashes, air pollution, climate change, and all the rest of the horrors cars bring. That’s true of big cities, but it’s also true of small towns. If everyone has their own vehicle, there’s going to be traffic congestion or sprawl or both.</p><p>The only way to tackle all of these externalities at once is to get people out of cars. Out of their own cars, out of the Ubers. </p><p>That means prioritizing multimodal transportation in infrastructure and spending decisions. Creating protected walking and biking corridors that connect across town. Reclaiming lanes and whole streets from cars and turning them over to transit or simply to neighborhood walking and gathering. Upzoning and increasing density, especially around transit stops. Subsidizing electric bikes. (Basically, doing what <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/4/9/18300797/barcelona-spain-superblocks-urban-plan">Barcelona</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://archive.curbed.com/2020/1/15/21065343/bike-paris-cycling-anne-hidalgo">Paris</a> are doing.) </p><p>Electrifying vehicles will help on climate change, especially as the grid gets cleaner, but it’s not a solution to cars. Fancy new kinds of cars, even if they fly or go through tunnels or run on unicorn farts, are not a solution. Apps are not a solution. </p><p>The only solution to the problem of cars is fewer cars. That should be the goal of policy — not just transportation policy, but land-use policy and urban policy and economic policy and climate policy. For those who care about the public good, Uber and Lyft are a distraction.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/taking-an-uber-or-lyft-just-makes</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:41691843</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 27 Sep 2021 16:00:45 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/41691843/a8b935835be2808477896176963c6b9f.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>791</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/41691843/d227280a3e12c0998433afce44835d1d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Illinois' brilliant new climate, jobs, and justice bill]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In 2016, Illinois <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2016/12/8/13852856/illinois-energy-bill">passed a decent enough energy bill</a>. It shored up the state’s (relatively modest) renewable energy standard and kept its existing nuclear power plants open. It was a compromise among varied interests, signed into law by a Democratic legislature and a Republican governor. At the time, I figured it was the best any state in the coal-heavy Midwest was likely to do.</p><p>Well, that will teach me to go around figuring. Just five years later, Illinois has raised the bar, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-illinois-senate-energy-bill-20210913-f73pa3ccorhx7iddnlctcle6sq-story.html">passing</a> one of the most environmentally ambitious, worker-friendly, justice-focused energy bills of any state in the country: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=2408&#38;GAID=16&#38;GA=102&#38;DocTypeID=SB&#38;LegID=135062&#38;SessionID=110">The Climate and Equitable Jobs Act</a>. </p><p>Illinois is now the first state in the Midwest to commit to net-zero carbon emissions, joining <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cesa.org/projects/100-clean-energy-collaborative/guide/table-of-100-clean-energy-states/">over a dozen other states</a> across the country. It is also a model for how diverse stakeholders can reach consensus. </p><p>What’s changed in Illinois</p><p>A great deal has changed since that 2016 bill was passed.</p><p>First and foremost, in 2018, Democrats gained a trifecta in state government, increasing their lead in both houses of the Illinois General Assembly and putting Democrat J.B. Pritzker in the governor’s office. As I have <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/5/15/18624294/renewable-energy-policy-cities-states">emphasized numerous times now</a>, Democratic control is a necessary (if not sufficient) condition for ambitious state energy policy.</p><p>Soon after the 2018 election, negotiations over a new energy bill began in earnest. </p><p>The state’s labor community was sensitive to the fact that it had largely been left out of the 2016 bill; the legislation contained no labor standards, and recent years have seen Illinois renewable energy projects importing cheaper out-of-state workforces. Labor didn’t want to get left behind in the state’s energy transition, so it organized a coalition of groups under the banner <a target="_blank" href="https://climatejobsillinois.org/">Climate Jobs Illinois</a> and set about playing an active role in negotiations. </p><p>Renewable energy developers — cognizant of the fact that Illinois is falling short of its renewable energy goals (it’s at 9 percent; it’s supposed to be at 21) and state funding has dried up for new renewable energy projects — organized as <a target="_blank" href="https://www.pathto100.net/">Path to 100</a>. </p><p>Environmental and climate-justice groups organized as the <a target="_blank" href="https://ilcleanjobs.org/">Illinois Clean Jobs Coalition</a>.</p><p>All the groups introduced energy bills of their own. And then they spent years banging their heads together.</p><p>But there was another key difference: this time around, utilities were not at the table. </p><p>Exelon subsidiary ComEd had been caught up in a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wbez.org/stories/the-comed-scandal-shows-every-illinoisan-the-true-cost-of-taxpayer-funded-corruption/b0994134-3d0a-4a06-84d8-31ebdbfb2a0a">bribery scandal</a> that left it disempowered and weak, under a deferred prosecution agreement. The scandal also led to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-michael-madigan-speaker-corruption-probe-20210122-wnbvkhrvbnd35krh2ue2vgl4h4-story.html">House Speaker Michael Madigan</a>, a reliable utility ally, being removed from his position. </p><p>Utilities were, to put it crudely, on the s**t list, allowing political leadership to restrain their historic (and largely counterproductive) influence.</p><p>Nonetheless, by all accounts, negotiations were difficult; the bill was declared dead several times. Senate President Don Harmon (D) said several times that it is the single most complex piece of legislation he’d ever worked on. There were uncertainties and impasses right up through the final week. </p><p>But they got it done! It passed with bipartisan supermajorities: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/votehistory/102/house/10200SB2408_09092021_005000T.pdf">83-33</a> in the House and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/votehistory/102/senate/10200SB2408ham001_09132021_005000C.pdf">37-17</a> in the Senate. Pritzker signed it on September 15.</p><p>One crucial piece of the puzzle was new political leadership, from Pritzker on down. Harmon, who became Senate president in 2018, is a longtime champion of renewable energy. In January 2021, Rep. Chris Welch, a widely respected deal-maker, replaced Madigan as House Speaker. Welch pursued what his office calls “distributed, collective leadership” — key members of the House Democratic leadership took responsibility for acting as liaisons to the legislature’s Black caucus, the environmental community, and coal communities.</p><p>By all accounts, everyone performed their roles ably, holding an unwieldy coalition together through choppy waters. Illinois politics reporter Rich Miller has a <a target="_blank" href="https://chicago.suntimes.com/columnists/2021/9/10/22667625/illinois-house-climate-energy-bill-chris-welch-jaclyn-driscoll-column-rich-miller">nice rundown of the final passage</a>, which he calls “a spectacular victory.”</p><p>From the beginning, everyone involved was more or less aligned around rapid growth of renewable energy and full decarbonization of the electricity sector by 2045. </p><p>The most contentious issue proved to be the <em>schedule</em> for decarbonization. The environmentalists in the Clean Jobs Coalition wanted steady 20 percent reductions every five years, starting in 2026. The labor groups in Climate Jobs Illinois were worried that shutting down fossil fuel plants that fast would lead to the state being forced to import fossil fuel power from out of state, sacrificing jobs to no environmental gain.</p><p>Particularly thorny was a municipally owned coal plant, <a target="_blank" href="https://energynews.us/2021/09/03/prairie-state-coal-plant-at-center-of-high-stakes-illinois-energy-debate/">the 10-year-old Prairie State Energy Campus</a> in southwestern Illinois, which is the state’s biggest greenhouse gas emitter and a <a target="_blank" href="https://ieefa.org/category/subject/prairie-state-energy-campus/">horrendous financial boondoggle</a> that <a target="_blank" href="https://rmi.org/insight/transition-opportunities-for-prairie-state-energy-campus/">costs more to run than its power is worth</a>. </p><p>Part of the problem is that the plant, owned by a consortium of nine public power agencies, was largely <a target="_blank" href="https://energynews.us/2021/03/17/illinois-legislation-could-free-towns-from-dirty-power-but-not-the-payments/">funded by municipal bonds</a> from the communities meant to receive its power; those communities were worried they’d get stiffed if the plant retired early. (Enviros claimed they could close the plant, use the savings to pay off the bonds, and still come out ahead, but that was met with some skepticism.) </p><p>To make a long story short: first Pritzker wanted the plant’s retirement date at 2035. Then he agree to 2045. Then Senate Democrats voted through a plan that would have let the plant pump out 100 percent of its current emissions through 2045. That was unacceptable to environmentalists and Pritzker, who wanted interim reduction targets. That <a target="_blank" href="https://chicago.suntimes.com/columnists/2021/9/3/22656441/even-as-coal-ash-wafted-over-springfield-dems-couldnt-agree-on-a-green-friendly-energy-bill">flummoxed the process</a> for a bit, but in the end, labor agreed to it. </p><p>Even after that, there was some <a target="_blank" href="https://capitolfax.com/2021/09/01/house-will-not-take-up-climateenergy-bill-tonight/">last-minute drama</a> from the governor’s office, leading to a stalemate with Harmon; finally, they agreed to kick the bill over the House, where Welch dragged it over the finish line.</p><p>Anyway, that’s probably more process drama than you wanted. Let’s look at what’s in the bill. </p><p>Clean energy and good wages, justly distributed: the Illinois energy bill</p><p>I’m not going to cover the entire 900-page bill. We’ll just hit the highlights.</p><p>Emission reductions and clean electricity</p><p>Today, Illinois gets about 40 percent of its electricity from nuclear power and less than 10 percent from renewable energy. The new renewable portfolio standard (RPS) will raise renewables’ share to 40 percent by 2030 and 50 percent by 2040, with the goal of a zero-carbon electricity sector by 2045 — and beyond that, a net-zero-carbon state economy by 2050. This is <em>extremely</em> ambitious and a new benchmark for the Midwest. </p><p>Subsidies to renewable energy will roughly double, to around $580 million per year. An additional $317 million the big utilities had previously collected will be spent on clean-energy projects rather than refunded to customers as scheduled. (It’s a long story.)</p><p>The popular <a target="_blank" href="https://www.illinoissfa.com">Illinois Solar for All</a> program, which helps get rooftop solar power to low-income renters and homeowners (as well as public buildings and nonprofits serving environmental justice communities), will have its funding increased from $10 million to $50 million a year. </p><p>Obviously, Illinois will have much more trouble hitting its decarbonization targets if its nuclear power plants shut down, so the bill provides the Byron, Dresden, and Braidwood plants with about $700 million in subsidies over the next five years. (The size of the subsidy, considerably less than the $5 billion Exelon wanted, was informed by an <a target="_blank" href="https://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Exelon_Illinois_Nuclear_Fleet_Audit_Report_REDACTED_21-002.pdf">independent analysis</a> commissioned by the governor’s office.)</p><p>All private coal- and oil-fired power plants must get to zero emissions (i.e., retire) by 2030. Municipally owned coal plants — Prairie State and Dallman Station — must reduce emissions 45 percent by 2035 (which will mean shutting down one of two boilers) and 100 percent by 2045. </p><p>All private natural gas plants must reach zero emissions — either by retiring or by switching over to hydrogen — by 2045. Until then, their emissions in a given year can not exceed the average of the previous three years, i.e., can not rise. (Plants can stay open if a government assessment finds that they are necessary for grid reliability.)</p><p>Importantly: fossil fuel plants will be shut down according to their proximity to low-income and marginalized communities, not necessarily according to greenhouse gases or economics. </p><p>Every five years starting in 2025, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, the Illinois Power Agency, and the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) must produce a report on the state’s progress toward its renewable energy goals. </p><p>The ICC will also begin developing a renewables access plan to increase electricity transmission throughout the state. </p><p>For the record: a recent <a target="_blank" href="https://d7006b7e-66f0-4300-9af7-c93334dc1418.filesusr.com/ugd/61ae1d_0306895b06894917867dac7f92b3696a.pdf">study</a> led by former Illinois Power Agency Director Mark Pruitt found that getting to 40 percent renewable energy by 2030 “would deliver over $1.2 billion in lower total electricity costs for Illinois.” </p><p>Transportation decarbonization</p><p>The bill establishes the goal of getting a million electric vehicles on Illinois roads by 2030. In part, that will be achieved through a $4,000-per-vehicle rebate for EV customers (which, added to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-close-look-at-the-clean-energy">the EV credit in the current federal bill</a>, would mean a combined rebate of $16,500). Electric utilities will be required to submit clean-electrification plans to the ICC, showing how they plan to drive EV adoption.</p><p>The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency will rebate up to 80 percent of the cost of EV infrastructure projects that pay prevailing wages. Forty-five percent of those rebates will be channeled to projects in low-income and marginalized communities. </p><p>Labor and equity standards</p><p>All utility-scale renewable energy projects that qualify under the state’s RPS must use project-labor agreements; all non-residential clean-energy projects must pay prevailing wages. All projects must demonstrate through diversity hiring reports that they have recruited qualified BIPOC candidates and apprentices. </p><p>As far as I know, this gives Illinois the most stringent labor and equity requirements of any state clean energy program. Similar policies tying renewable energy projects to labor standards have passed in <a target="_blank" href="https://patch.com/connecticut/hamden/rights-renewable-energy-workers-passes">Connecticut</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.windsystemsmag.com/new-york-passes-renewable-energy-wage-standards/">New York</a>, and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/washington-state-now-has-the-nations">Washington</a>, but no other state’s energy policy has as comprehensive a package of labor, diversity, and equity standards.</p><p>Workforce development and transition assistance</p><p>The bill will create an $80 million-a-year Clean Jobs Workforce Network Hubs Program, which will create 13 hubs around the state to deliver workforce-development programs to low-income and underserved populations. Resources will be put toward outreach, recruitment, training, and placement. </p><p>The Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity and the Illinois Department of Employment Security will work together to develop a “displaced worker bill of rights,” with $40 million a year to go toward transition assistance for areas dependent on fossil fuel production or generation. </p><p>There will be two green bank–style programs. The Clean Energy Jobs and Justice Fund will provide financing and low-interest lending to clean-energy projects in low-income and marginalized communities. The Illinois Finance Authority Climate Bank, more like a conventional green bank, will provide seed funding and develop public-private partnerships to draw more private capital to clean energy projects. </p><p>A clean energy incubator program will offer support and low-interest capital to small energy businesses and contractors, to the tune of over $35 million a year. There will be a program to train and place soon-to-be-released incarcerated people in clean-energy fields. And there will be a program meant to encourage the development of solar and storage on the site of closed fossil-fuel plants, to help employ laid-off workers.</p><p>An Energy Transition Workforce Commission will report on the workforce needs of a decarbonizing economy and recommend further changes to workforce policies. </p><p>The Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity will create a program to reduce energy transition barriers, a grant program to promote economic development in transitioning communities, and a scholarship fund for children in families of laid-off workers. </p><p>Notably, companies intending to shut down fossil fuel plants will be required to give affected communities two years’ notice, so that such communities can be identified and receive transition assistance.</p><p>Consumer protections</p><p>For low-income ratepayers, the bill eliminates deposit requirements and late fees; it eliminates online payment fees for all ratepayers.</p><p>Utilities will be required to report their monthly shutoffs and reconnections to the ICC, and the ICC will conduct a comprehensive study of the level and design of low-income rates to ensure that they are working effectively. </p><p>Utilities will be required to fund the participation of nonprofit representatives in ICC proceedings, to increase community participation. </p><p>Finally, munis and co-ops will be prohibited from charging discriminatory fees to ratepayers that self-generate solar electricity (as investor-owned utilities already are).</p><p>Utility ethics and rate reforms</p><p>Some of these details get technical, but the gist is that the bill contains a range of specific ethics reforms — for example, public officials must declare if any of their relatives work for utilities — and creates a Public Utility Ethics and Compliance Monitor to make sure utilities are implementing those reforms. In addition, each utility must appoint a Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer who reports to the ICC. </p><p>ComEd is prohibited from forcing ratepayers to pay any criminal penalties or fines associated with its ongoing federal corruption probe.</p><p>Excitingly for us utility nerds, the bill will end “formula ratemaking” — an opaque process whereby rates are automatically increased based on how much utilities are spending, with no need for approval from regulators — in favor of “performance-based ratemaking,” which ties utility compensation to a series of performance metrics such as “reliability and resiliency, peak load reductions attributable to demand response programs, supplier diversity expansion, affordability, interconnection response time, and customer service performance.” This is good stuff.</p><p>An independent auditor will assess the state of the Illinois grid and the money spent on it over the last decade. </p><p>Utilities will be required to file a Multi-Year Integrated Grid Plan that supports the state’s renewable energy targets. They will undergo yearly performance evaluations to track how well they are meeting their planning goals. </p><p>Finally, and intriguingly, ICC will create a Division of Integrated Distribution Planning, meant to increase public input in local distribution grid decisions.</p><p>Illinois is showing how democracy should work</p><p>Over the last three years, climate hawks, environmental justice advocates, renewable energy developers, and labor gathered around a table and worked through their differences about the future of Illinois’ energy system, freed from the usual odious influence of utilities. </p><p>It was an anxious, fractious, and often white-knuckle process, right up until the very end. No constituency got everything it wanted; each made sacrifices. I expect there’s still quite a bit of residual frustration and some fresh bruises that will take a while to heal. </p><p>But to my outside eye, representatives from each of these groups can return to their constituents with heads held high. The bill is a model of non-zero-sum cooperation: every group gave a little to get a lot. </p><p>A special shout-out goes to the environmental-justice community in Illinois, which used three years of relentless grassroots organizing to build an incredible political force, without which the bill couldn’t have passed and wouldn’t have been as equity-focused.</p><p>For all the disputes at the margins, the resulting bill is momentous, a historic inflection point for Illinois. The state is now a national leader — and a challenge to the rest of the Midwest — in how to transition to clean energy while creating good jobs and lifting up those often left behind. </p><p>An aggressive transition to clean energy can be good for the economy, good for workers, good for historically marginalized communities, good for the air, and good for the atmosphere. We can have nice things. More and more states are figuring that out. </p><p>Congratulations to Illinois, particularly to its new generation of political leaders, for figuring it out with such populist flair.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/illinois-brilliant-new-climate-jobs</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:41440937</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 22 Sep 2021 16:00:33 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/41440937/eb56cf06964c25afcfde05c2b959fdc1.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1184</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/41440937/d6facc105a6bfaced96c32c158cb8428.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: 20 years of solar advocacy, with Adam Browning of Vote Solar]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, veteran solar advocate Adam Browning reflects on 20 years of running campaigns as the founder and leader of Vote Solar, one of the scrappiest and most successful solar advocacy organizations in the US. Browning, who is stepping down from leadership this year, helped grow the group from four people to 40, and along the way he’s learned a few things about how nonprofit campaigns can succeed against better funded opponents.   </em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Adam Browning, September 17, 2021</p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/5oi2vj01qr0u2bt/volts21.09.17%28adam.browning%29.pdf?dl=0">PDF version</a>)</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>There aren't a lot of positive, hopeful stories competing for attention in the US these days, but one ray of light — if you'll pardon the pun — comes in the form of solar power. During the 21st century it has plunged in price, to the point that it is the cheapest available source of power in most big energy markets. Though it provides just 3 percent of US electricity today, analysts say it could provide close to half by mid-century. </p><p>Adam Browning has lived through every stage of this extraordinary ongoing story. He co-founded <a target="_blank" href="https://votesolar.org/">Vote Solar</a>, a nonprofit that advocates for solar energy at the state level, in 2002, to push for solar on public buildings in San Francisco. </p><p>Since then, he has helped build a team of 40 people that operates across the country and has led numerous campaigns for state policy and regulatory changes. For as long as I’ve been doing energy journalism, I’ve known Adam and Vote Solar to be reliable sources — smart, practical, and results-oriented. I read all their emails, which regular listeners will know is high praise.</p><p>Now, after 20 years, Browning is <a target="_blank" href="https://votesolar.org/adam-browning-onward/">stepping back</a>, shifting to an advisory role and handing off day-to-day leadership of Vote Solar. Given his long experience, I thought it would be interesting to talk to him about what he has learned, how much things have changed for solar, and where solar and climate advocacy need to go next. </p><p>Adam Browning, welcome to Volts.</p><p><strong>Adam Browning: </strong> </p><p>Thanks, really pleased to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>You’ve been at this for 20 years now. Tell me the Adam Browning origin story. How did you gravitate to this particular field? It must have been relatively soon after you were out of college; it must have been one of the first things you did and stuck with it. Tell us how you got into all of this.</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>You're too kind. My youthful demeanor — I’ll have to tell my stylist. It wasn't quite right out of college. I've never had a plan that I put into place; I've always moved from the thing that seemed really interesting to me at the time, and then was open to that next opportunity. </p><p>After college, I did Peace Corps in West Africa, which was in many ways an incredibly formative experience, a moveable feast that I continue to look back on and think about, and that experience continues to nourish. After that, I joined EPA in San Francisco, the Region 9 office, and worked there for about eight years. The origin story — not of Adam Browning, but really Vote Solar, which is probably more to the point here — was really born out of spending a good chunk of time with the federal government doing environmental protection. I was doing a lot of enforcement and inspecting smokestacks, and fines were exceeding limits in some ways.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>This would have been during the Clinton years, yes? </p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>Yes, and then a little bit of the Bush years. So that experience was a wonderful introduction to how environmental protection works and doesn't work in this country. </p><p>When I was nearly 30, I had a beer with a college buddy, and he was working for then-San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown. This friend, David Hochschild, is now a California energy commissioner, the chair of the Commission. He had just put solar on his roof at home. At the time, solar was really expensive, and there wasn't much of it; it was very much a hippie pipe dream. But he put it on his house and was enthralled by it. And he was like, “Hey man, we should try to put this on City Hall. We need to have governments take the lead.” </p><p>Through that beer and subsequent napkin diagramming, we came up with the idea of a revenue bond to put solar and energy efficiency on public buildings in San Francisco and then use the avoided energy costs, the energy payments, to pay down the bonds, so you have long-term, low-interest capital. It all penciled out. That turned into first a campaign to get it on the ballot as a ballot initiative, and then a citywide campaign to pass this ballot initiative. That was Prop B. This is back in 2001. </p><p>That experience was really galvanizing, transformative for me in a couple of different ways. One: this idea of solar as an emission-free technology. I’d been spending all this time trying to control smokestacks; how about if we just didn't have any at all? That really dropped for me. </p><p>Secondly, we had this campaign where you could actually do solar — then, again, really expensive — but we could do it cost effectively, the way that we'd had this scoped out. That just gripped the imagination. We had legions of volunteers throughout the city; people were really excited to be a part of something larger than themselves. That ballot initiative passed by 73 percent of the vote, which was really high in those days. </p><p>Then we started getting calls from around the country — how can we do this in our city? — which was when we decided to quit our jobs and take this grassroots campaign to a much larger campaign. We had this theory, we had analyses that showed that the way to get cheap solar was through economies of scale: you needed to buy a lot of expensive solar, you needed to show a long-term market for this technology, in order to induce the manufacturers and would-be manufacturers to invest their capital into scaling up factories and the whole supply chain.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Solar has changed so fast: the technology, the prices, the social mores around it, how it's viewed. So take us back to 2002: Was anybody even thinking about solar? Was it viewed as just a hippie affectation? How much did it cost? What was the world of solar like in 2002? </p><p><strong>Adam Browning: </strong> </p><p>So back then, solar was about $9 a watt.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>We're closing in on $1 a watt now, is that right? </p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>For the actual panels themselves, you're looking at 25 cents a watt. Utility-scale installations are well under $1. So essentially, nearly an order of magnitude less expensive right now. </p><p>There was 163 megawatts total installed in the US. So, yeah, back in them old days, people knew of solar; I think it was understood as something that had some degree of promise, but again, the cost put it out of reach for being taken seriously as a long-term, significant portion of our energy resource.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So were people planning for it? Like DOE, when they did their projections at the time — were people saying it was going to grow into something big? Or was it viewed as a niche thing for the century? </p><p><strong>Adam Browning: </strong> </p><p>I would compare it to the algae that you see Exxon always advertising. It was ARCO and Mobil that had these investments in solar; Shell did as well. There were many really wonderful, well-meaning people involved in that, so I don't mean to diminish the seriousness of their efforts. There were a lot of oil majors that were investing in it. DOE was putting money into serious research and development. But it all seemed very far off. It was this thing that did not yet exist, and we all hoped that someday it would. </p><p>Solar then suffered from the start-stop-start-stop of market incentives. Particularly in the California Central Valley, there were installations around with the large parabolic troughs, SEGS plants that had seemed promising, and as soon as everybody scaled up to respond to the incentives, they were then pulled. You never could take advantage of that momentum. </p><p>So the early history of solar, again: a lot of research and development, not a lot of smart, long-term market support to bring it to scale. </p><p>In early years, that underestimation of solar's potential really helped in many ways. Like when you scored the federal investment tax credit, no one thought it would really take off, so it scored really low, and that was actually helpful for it to go through.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>So you have wildly expensive solar that you can make cost-effective in certain limited applications. You have cheap, patient capital and entities willing to wait for it. I'm sure it was just a series of short-term campaigns at first, but at what point did you have a long-term plan? In retrospect, was your plan as optimistic as reality turned out to be?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>I would say no, the plan was not as optimistic as reality turned out to be, although it was very specific and accurate as to what would happen. There are often times when you have policy that promises an outcome and fails to deliver on it; here was something that absolutely, bullseye. </p><p>We had analyses of comparable technologies. Solar is basically a semiconductor; you had examples of integrated circuits that were developed and funded by the military, who was willing to pay an enormous premium in order to have a technology that was much lighter than the capacitors it replaced, and through that investment really brought down the cost through economies of scale. So we had examples of other technologies. </p><p>We had this report from KPMG Netherlands that Greenpeace had paid them to analyze; it said, in essence, that if you brought about a global market that could support a factory that would deliver 500 megawatts a year of solar panels, you would be at grid parity. That was directionally accurate, but we now have factories that are much, much larger than that, of course. </p><p>So the cost drop of solar exceeded expectations, though it was definitely bumpy. Even though we had predicted this effect by virtue of what these policies would do, this whole long-term market demand, at the same time, we didn't really anticipate that we would be passing legislation this quickly that would require 100 percent clean energy. </p><p>Yesterday, the Illinois House passed, finally, a bill that will require 100 percent clean energy. It's expected to pass through the Senate on Monday. That makes the tenth state; well over 35 percent of the people who live in this country now live in a state where carbon-based electricity is illegal, will be legally mandated to phase out by a certain date. That's on the basis of having this scale availability of cheap, zero-emission power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>It was not that long ago that the idea that any governmental entity of any size would target 100 percent clean energy was absolutely out of the universe. Early in my career, I remember projections that solar would catch up around 2070; coal was still expected to dominate well past 2050. The scale of the changes is really hard to cram in your head. </p><p>But now the energy wonk community has developed a pretty good sense of how you scale up a technology and make it cheaper. There's a more formalized understanding of that; solar is the model now of how you go about doing it. But of course, back in 2002, you didn't know that. </p><p>So I'm curious, when you were thinking about advocacy, what was your plan? What was your instinct about what kind of policies would be both politically possible and efficacious at scaling this up?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>That's a great question. In the beginning, when we first launched, we were like, OK, we’ll do a bunch more of these city-led initiatives: the power of energy democracy to drive choice in energy supply. Solar was this perfect technology because it circumvented the decisionmakers; you could put it on your own roof, you didn't have to wait for the utility to make the right decision. You could take that power and do it yourself. </p><p>So we initially said, we're going to do a bunch more of these city-led efforts. We got our grant from the Energy Foundation, $50,000, our first grant, and we started looking at some of these other cities, and it was like, oh, wait a minute. Actually, there is state-level policy infrastructure that enables people to be able to install solar upon their own roof and generate their own energy, and those were the preconditions for being able to do a city-led initiative. So that caused us to reevaluate our strategy and really focus on the state-level policy infrastructure. </p><p>When you're looking at a solar market, you're only as strong as your weakest link. It's never the one thing; it is the four or five things that you have to link together. So one of the key insights that we had early on was that the solution was really at the state level; that was where most energy decisions are made, and you're much closer to democracy there. I don't know how to pass anything through the federal government. I don't know that anybody does. But at the state level, on the legislative side, you are much closer to being able to actually influence the outcome of legislative battles. </p><p>The other large piece of this, of course, is regulatory, through the public utilities commissions. Our first effort was the California Solar Initiative. This was something that a wonderful advocate, Bernadette Del Chiaro, who headed Environment California then, had been working through the legislature for many years, and it kept not being able to pass. </p><p>We then, in collaboration with others, worked really hard to get it through the California Public Utilities Commission. So you had then-Governor Schwarzenegger, who really stood out as a strong leader for this, establish a goal for a million solar roofs. It was an ability to get it through the public utilities commission to implement that — that ended up being about a $3 billion effort to incentivize rooftop solar with a really elegant market design through these declining incentives that got you down to grid parity, when you wouldn't need any incentives at all afterwards. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>When did that pass? What year was that?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning: </strong> </p><p>It was around 2004, 2005, that we finally got those through. That was then also passed through the legislature afterwards and confirmed, which was quite helpful. </p><p>But that was a really big eye-opener for policymakers and for energy nerds everywhere. That was a large chunk of money, designed to last over 10 years; that was this signal to the manufacturers of the world, to the installers of the state, that this industry, this market is going to be around. There is a commitment to it, time to scale up, go big. </p><p>Then once you have the fifth-largest economy in the world commit to it, it no longer seems so esoteric. Both Japan and Germany then also were really strong leaders as well, so it was definitely a global effort. But California really helped catalyze that in the early 2000s with this type of campaign.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>After California — which in terms of progressive policy, is the low-hanging fruit — did you continue on trying to expand in California, or did you move on to other states? What was the plan of attack?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning: </strong> </p><p>A little bit of both. There's a story of how you actually run and grow a nonprofit advocacy organization. So you are fundraising; philanthropy is the lifeblood of your efforts, and you have to be able to fundraise in order to feed your ambitions on this. For many years, we were two people, three people, four people. We were very small. It wasn't until 2008 that we were able to open an east coast office.</p><p>So I would say, over the course of Vote Solar's history, we had a 70/30 split. The majority of our efforts were in places where we thought we could get traction, that there was a political appetite, that we could have a real line of sight to success. Then we spent a non-trivial part of our time in lonely places where there wasn't much going on, but if we didn't help catalyze, if we didn't plant the early seeds, it wasn't going to happen. Somebody needed to do it. We always wanted to be an organization where we weren't just, me too; we wanted to be involved in fights that weren't going to be won but for our involvement. That was why we also put so much investment in places that it took a long time, a long fuse to actually pay off. </p><p>So immediately after California: Arizona, New Mexico, and some of these sunnier western states, then really invested in a lot of the east coast policy as well. We opened an office in New York in 2008. Then, gradually, a couple of the midwestern and southeastern states. It was the Turner Foundation that brought us into Florida and Georgia, where there wasn't much going on at the time. But we sent one of our best, smartest advocates down to scope out a plan for how we could help catalyze something in Georgia. That campaign was completely different from what we did and what we looked like in California, but in collaboration with some awesome local advocates, we were able to help move the needle there as well. </p><p>We are now 40 people working in about 26 states across the country; over 20 years, that's been a lot of growth for a very different organization than we started. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>To focus in on these early years: Were you 100 percent about advocating for policies? Was there any communications campaigns or, god forbid, awareness campaigns? Or were you a strictly policy advocacy shop?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>I think you've written beautifully about “change doesn't happen just because you're right.” So there's a huge power-building component to this. I can't overemphasize how much collaboration and partnership with local place-based, community-based organizations in everywhere we've worked has been absolutely crucial to success. </p><p>Vote Solar as an organization brings pretty deep sophistication around solar policy and then brings some campaigning expertise, as well. So our model has typically been this inside-outside game, where if you're doing legislation, passing bills, you really need to power map who can actually get something done, what kind of campaigns are they going to be receptive to, building all the information necessary in order to get it passed, and then, of course, following the lead of the local organizations that have the relationships, that have the local voice, that have the power as to how that actually happens. </p><p>Similarly, for the regulatory campaigns, these are legalistic processes in public utility commissions. You have to have a lawyer intervene, have standing, create a docket full of math, full of actual demonstration of facts. You never win just because you're right. You also, at the same time, have to build an outside game, a parade that these policymakers can jump in front of and be responsive to. You need to make sure that policymakers know what the public wants and that they feel accountable to answer to them. That takes a lot of communications work, a lot of grassroots organizing work, a lot of partnership with community-based organizations. </p><p>Increasingly for us, this has been also about environmental-justice communities. Over the past five years, everything that we have done has been with equity groups and environmental-justice campaigners, listening to them, establishing partnerships with them, and following their lead on these campaigns.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Over 20 years, you’ve run a lot of different campaigns in different places with different people you're targeting. If you had to generalize, what is it that makes a campaign successful? What are the markers that distinguish your successful campaigns from the unsuccessful ones? What needs to be in place?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>Winning, for one. But that's a little too flip. </p><p>I actually love campaigning, and the parts of it I like are finding creative ways to get people engaged. So much of environmentalism has been about no, and not about, but what do we say yes to. So an organizing ethos of Vote Solar was centered on, this is something that people want. In fact, we poll around the country, and this has been consistent over the past 20 years with some fluctuation in the numbers, but directionally, supermajorities of people in this country on both sides of the aisle want to see this transition.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>This is something that is utterly remarkable about solar, and, especially in 2021, almost unique: It polls through the roof. It always has. Were you ever surprised by how resilient and broad that support is? It seems to defy political gravity in a way almost no other issue I can think of does.</p><p><strong>Adam Browning: </strong> </p><p>It is remarkable, and we always tried to lean into that by letting people bring their own reasons for why they should go solar to the campaign and not defining it for them. In places with different political outlooks, different hues, the words that we used were different. Some places, this is about freedom; some places, it's about jobs; other places, it's about climate. You need to be very thoughtful as to how you talk about the rationale behind it, but we generally tried to leave a space where people could bring their own rationale. They like solar, we're not going to tell them why they like solar. Let them bring that to the campaign itself. </p><p>To further reflect on your initial question around what distinguishes a good campaign, I think a good campaign engages people. Positive messaging, giving people that positive alternative, what we want to do, a bright outlook — people want to be a part of something larger than themselves. I think that is a core insight into the human psyche. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I've heard a lot of people around campaigning and the activist world say some version of: it's easier to make people angry than it is to get them to support something. It's easier when you have a clear thing you're saying no to. Do you think that's wrong? Or does solar just have some sort of magic fairy dust that switches that over? </p><p><strong>Adam Browning: </strong> </p><p>What you describe certainly powers most of my political giving and my presidential election campaigning on my personal side, so I definitely feel you, I get that. I'm not immune to that. We definitely articulate, ”Why aren’t we seeing more solar? Who's blocking it?” and it definitely creates the accurate picture of why we're not seeing more. You can campaign against that. </p><p>That said, we've done things like had billboards outside of the Capitol that had the tagline, right after the Gulf oil spill, “When there's a huge spill of solar energy, it's just called a nice day. Yes on bill X.” That got in the paper and had ripple effects. We had airplanes pulling sky banners that said, “This is the prescription for oil addiction” at the same time that we had large rallies with people dressed up in doctor outfits. I guess you had to be there, but it was funny at the time. </p><p>We tried to work in Texas; Texas is a hard place to work. But we were sponsoring a bill and did analysis that showed how many jobs there would be if this bill passed, and then we ran ads in the Midland newspaper saying, “Help Wanted: 10,000 workers for the solar economy. Call the legislature and tell them to pass X.” Again, that then turned into a press piece on witty campaigns that had a much larger impact than the $230 for that help-wanted ad in the <em>Midland Tribune</em>. So those were parts of the campaigns that I really enjoyed.</p><p>The thing about nonprofit campaigning is, you are always going to be outspent. You are always going to be out-lobbied. You need to figure out how to bring people-power to it. That is the part that I have enjoyed the most: solar in so many ways is democracy in energy and environmental decisionmaking. We’ve tried to make that true.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>I have been gritting my teeth waiting for polarization to swallow solar’s popularity too, as it has swallowed everything else in our public life. But as far as I can tell, it's mostly held up. I’m wondering if you’ve seen any movement in that direction; are you seeing it start to polarize? Are you seeing it associated more now with democratic socialism whatever, or is it still defying political gravity?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>I don't think solar is immune, per se, to being attacked, to politicization. Look at Solyndra, which was an absolutely manufactured scare-quotes scandal of an entirely successful program that made money for the American people. That wasn’t organic, that was — as many things in our politicized culture — advocacy-driven, cynically so. </p><p>But I have not yet seen this. Right before the 2016 election, in September, there was a Pew poll that showed that 87 percent of would-be Trump voters supported solar and 92 percent of would-be Clinton voters supported solar, despite the obvious division between the two. </p><p>I do think that solar needs to continue to earn and hold its social capital and abandons that at its own peril. I do think part of the pathway forward is trying to recapture manufacturing for just that reason; we cannot offshore our supply chain if we expect solar to supply nearly half the power of this country going forward, which is why I think passing <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ossoff.senate.gov/press-releases/sen-ossoff-introduces-legislation-to-rapidly-boost-american-solar-manufacturing/">the Ossoff bill</a> is absolutely critical. It's our last hope for reshoring the manufacturing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>That's a great segue to my next question. The solar campaigns focused heavily on state-level policies: net metering to encourage rooftop solar, renewable portfolio standards to ramp up the percentage of solar. Those have been wildly successful; as you say, something close to half the population lives in a state now with these requirements. You have the policy pull for solar in place. So what's the next frontier for solar advocacy? Is it a turn to manufacturing and materials? Where do you see it going?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning: </strong> </p><p>There are three main things, and I could keep adding on, I could go to 10. But let's just stick with these three right now. </p><p>One is: the original premise behind my thinking around Vote Solar is, once you made it cheap, it would just continue under the gravitational pull of economics. Solar PPAs right now in sunny spots are like 2 cents per kilowatt hour. They're just crazy, it's awesome. Yet you still see places where they are trying to build ginormous new fossil fuel. Duke Energy, for example, largest utility in this country, knows very well how cheap solar is. It's made these public commitments to net zero by 2050. Their press announcements are wonderful; their plans that they file with regulators tell a very different story. They're trying to build massive amounts of new gas plants. It is still necessary for advocacy to have a seat at the table and drive deployments. </p><p>We just saw the DOE come out with their solar roadmap for 40 percent by 2035. That will require, according to their numbers, 30 gigawatts a year of solar deployment through 2025 and then 60 gigawatts a year through the next decade after that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>For reference, it's about 15 GW a year now. So we have to double that for the next five years, and then double <em>that</em> for the next 15 years to get to that target. It's pretty big.</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>It's all totally doable, but it won't just happen because it's cheaper and cleaner. There are still entrenched interests that want to continue to profit from the fossil-fuel infrastructure and legacy that we have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>When I say to people that it’s cleaner and cheaper, their natural first question is, well then why isn’t everybody already doing it? In a market, it's capitalism, economics ought to be dictating things; at least that's people's intuitive sense of it. So what are those forces now causing utilities or states to still push for fossil fuels, even if it is true that they could get cheaper, renewable energy?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>I think there are two things here. One is, in much of this country we have vertically integrated utilities. That is to say that you have a monopoly: they own the wires, they own the generation, and they in essence get paid based upon how much capital they deploy. There are regulators that are there to approve their investments as prudent and in the customers’ best interest, but there is a real capital bias towards getting a return on equity for how much money they spend. So that's a big part of it. </p><p>The other part of it also leans into ease, or laziness. When we go into an integrated resource plan, this is when a utility says, “We want to build X,” and if it's gas we'll say, “Well, renewables are cheaper.” First they say they want to do it for economic concerns; then, when we show them renewables are cheaper, they next say, well, we need it to keep the lights on, we need it for reliability. So the moat we have to cross here is cost, but that's the real castle keep: reliability. Because for policymakers, this is a career-ending thing to get wrong. It's a big trump card they play. </p><p>I was going to lay out the three things that we need to work on: We can run a system nationally with majority renewables in terms of variable generation, and we need to make some changes to make that work. We need to introduce a lot more flexibility into the system. Partly that's batteries; partly that is a focus on demand flexibility, essentially paying people to change when they charge or give them incentives to be good grid citizens. We can talk more about that if you’d like. It is also to some degree some transmission that helps expand balancing areas, interconnects the load centers with the best generating profile. </p><p>So the reasons why we don't see this happen just because it's cheaper and cleaner and better for everybody have to do mostly with economics, in terms of perverse incentives inside of utilities. It is a lot easier to have a gas plant; you just flip a switch on rather than transforming the system to be more flexible and resilient.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>OK, so you said three areas for solar advocacy these days.</p><p><strong>Adam Browning: </strong> </p><p>The last — I should have led with it as the number one — is inclusivity. As we make this transition from fossils to renewables, we absolutely have to make sure that it benefits and includes everybody. We cannot continue to replicate some of the inequities of our fossil fuel system. </p><p>Over the past five-plus years at Vote Solar, we've completely changed how we go about planning our campaigns, how we go about the policies that we work on, and it has really benefited everybody by making this transformation. When we look at some of these largest, most comprehensive climate bills, none of these would have happened if it weren't for the leadership of the environmental justice community. This goes from California’s SB100 to the New York Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act, to, as of this week, the Climate and Equitable Jobs Act in Illinois. </p><p>Across the board, beginning with developing partnerships with the communities that we wish to serve, co-creating the policies to make sure that they include benefits for everybody that everybody can participate in, just builds these much stronger, much more powerful coalitions that can get big things done. </p><p>I firmly believe that this is the path we need to double down on as we continue to move forward in getting that further deployment of solar. Broadly speaking, the more beneficiaries, the more power building you have in order to make big changes happen.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Solar is everybody's favorite success story. It's one of the few things that give me any hope at all. The tech and the economics and the advocacy all worked together really well for solar, in such a way as to really turbocharge it, and it's been amazing these last 20 years. </p><p>But of course, solar is not the only thing we need for climate mitigation. So how much of solar’s success is unique to solar? This adaptability to different values, this image of wholesomeness that is seemingly undentable: how much of what has made solar advocacy work can be transferred to other pieces of the puzzle that we need for clean energy, like home power management and storage? Is solar's mojo transferable?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>Yes — and, that's a two-part question. One of the things that's been awesome about solar is these monumental cost declines, from something that was 10 times more expensive than the alternative to something that is quite a bit cheaper than the fossil alternative. </p><p>Can you see similar cost declines in other climate-necessary technologies? I would argue, absolutely. I would also argue that longtime readers of Dave Roberts will know that the path forward for success is to electrify everything and run it all on renewables. So having this cheap renewable energy is a foundation for our hopes in other sectors as well. </p><p>But if you're looking at mobility, batteries have come down 87 percent in the last decade, and they are far from done yet, both with the battery technologies that are currently extant and the new ones that are all being worked on. I think you could make a similar argument for the electrification of buildings, for heat pumps, which are nascent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>Make heat pumps as sexy as solar, Adam. That's your next goal.</p><p><strong>Adam Browning: </strong> </p><p>Sexy is one thing, but the first question is, can the technology get cheaper through scale? Absolutely. Both the hardware as well as all the soft costs associated with the workforce knowing what the heck it is and then being able to efficiently install it, removing all the bugs and the permitting and etc. So there's a ton of work that can be done to reduce those costs. </p><p>The other part of this — and I think the key to sexiness — is, does it make your life better? Tell me, what's Tesla's advertising budget?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Right. Zero.</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>They shoot a car into space and they go on Twitter, and that's it. It has zero advertising budget because it is absolutely compelling. All the reservation lines for the Rivian trucks; the F150, when they went electric and you could charge your house with it, their reservation lines were absolutely huge. </p><p>I went to the launch of the Tesla Model 3, and nobody had ever seen a picture of it, no one knew how many wheels it had, and Elon got over a billion dollars worth of free money in terms of $1,000 down payments on reservations. Before anyone had even seen a picture of it! So yes, at least in vehicles, it's definitely sexy. </p><p>When it comes to home automation: I'm a customer of OhmConnect, which is this company that's trying to help reduce grid costs when the grid needs it most. First it was just by changing behavior, sending people a text and asking them to turn off lights. But now, all my major loads are on wifi-enabled plugs, and when the grid needs it, it automatically turns off my freezer, turns off my fridge. </p><p>Now, when my kindergartener daughter opens the fridge door and the lights don't go on, she's like, “hey, Daddy, it's an Ohm hour.” We all know every time that happens, for every 15-minute increment, we're making a quarter. Every time they touch our Nest, we're making 75 cents. So you can expect to make somewhere around $300-$400 a year. You don't lift a finger, it's all automated. </p><p>So, is getting paid to do nothing sexy? For some people, it is. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Yeah, that's my dream. </p><p>Have you changed your mind at all about the state focus? If anything, it seems even more apt now than it was when you settled on it. Is that still your primary hope for climate progress?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>We do have a generational opportunity right now to get something done with this Congress, especially if we were to get rid of the filibuster, as longtime listeners and readers of your insight well know. </p><p>I do think there is a way to get to what would effectively be an iteration of what has worked so well in the states: a federal standard for clean energy. You could make that happen. The entire Biden administration has surprised me with their ambition, and it is just rife with superstar leaders. I'm a committed west coaster, but I definitely have some FOMO; working with those people would be awesome. So this is the best scenario that we're going to see on the federal level that we could possibly imagine for quite some time. </p><p>We've had a longstanding rule of thumb that if your plan involves the federal government, or if your plan involves Congress, you're gonna need another plan. That has always stood us in good stead. But with Jigar Shah over at the Loan Program Office, they're doing some really cool and innovative financing that will create some durable models that will exist beyond his tenure there. The federal government has a lot of money and a lot of power and can do a lot of good; getting stuff through Congress is just another matter entirely. So let's hope we can get something through, but then double down on the states. </p><p>We're going to continue to have to have state-level advocacy going forward, and we have proven time and time again that you can make big things happen that will have additional impacts elsewhere: by bringing down costs; by bringing the jobs that will, again, impact places where you're not doing it directly; by advocacy; with solar, solar is cheap. There are utilities in Indiana right now that are going ahead and doing their own math and really digging deep on solar, and you just love to see it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>I want to ask about your experience founding an organization and then running it for 20 years as it grows from two people to 40. Navigating that shift, from “we're a tiny band of people who all know each other and are good friends” to an actual organization that’s something like a bureaucracy with levels and managers, is a very difficult transition no matter what you're doing, but especially in the nonprofit world, which is difficult to survive in the best of circumstances. What do you feel like you've learned about how to build an organization? What have you taken away in terms of managerial wisdom?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>That is a great question, and we could do another hour podcast on just that. I don't think that this is something unique to the nonprofit side; there's a literature replete with founders that are good at starting things and less good at scale. For me, I didn't have many models of what a good boss looked like, what successful management structures look like. That was exactly it: we began as a couple of passion-driven, like-minded people, and then grew. </p><p>There were three, maybe four, big step changes of complexity, where what worked before broke and I had to either learn something new or get out. I tried to take that seriously, to continuously ask myself, am I the best person to run this organization right now? I had to grow a lot. I had to learn a lot of new skills. I had to learn a theory and practice of management that I was not born with. It has been far from a smooth road, but it's been a lovely road full of a lot of those learnings that we've all grown from.</p><p>But you’ve got to fundraise all the time, and you have to show success in order to be a successful fundraiser all the time. It’s part of what it means to run a nonprofit. Some of the historical regrets I've had were, frankly, being so far attuned to looking at all the external opportunities and wanting to have impact and knowing that I could make change if I hired another campaigner here, or regulatory person there. I wish throughout I had invested a lot more on infrastructure, on the human resources side. We had so many lovely, idealistic, mission-driven people that were constantly overextended and overachieving under budget. There's just a lot more foundational work to a larger organization that I wished I'd invested in earlier. </p><p>As I step down from Vote Solar, I want to put in this plug: as we look back over this history of success and achievement, this is not my success and achievement. There is such a legacy of awesome alumni and current team members that have made all of this happen. So the extent that I was able to do this was my ability to provide the resources and then to get out of the way of wonderful people doing wonderful things. Trust your people, give them the resources they need, figure out what is blocking them and what their problems are, and then focus your effort on fixing those. That would be my best lessons learned.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>What is it from all this experience that you would like to jump back into and do again? Or, what is it that you are looking to do differently now that this 20-year chapter is over?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>That's a great question. For me, the time is ripe right now for me to step aside for a couple of reasons. One is, I do want some new adventures, some new experiences. I am so grateful for this experience, it has been a labor of love every step of the way. Yet I also have a feeling that I want to take on some new challenges. </p><p>The flip side of this is, it is time for some new perspectives, some new voices, someone with radically different life experiences that looks at the world in a different way to have a chance at running what I think is an incredibly impactful organization. I am encouraged by that type of change. I think it's healthy. As I've shared my decision internally, it's been like a jolt of adrenaline running through the entire org as we've seen everybody step up, step in, and step forward with their individual ways of leadership. It's just lovely to see. </p><p>I think this is going to be healthy for this organization that I will continue to support for the rest of my life, and I encourage everybody else to do so, because it is a necessary organization going forward; I'm just not necessary to it, is what I came to the conclusion. </p><p>For me, I’d like a little rest for a bit. This fall isn't in the end turning out to be like I thought it would be, travel isn't in the cards for me right now. But that's OK. I also find I am invigorated by the challenges of climate, I am going to stay in the climate space. I am definitely mission-driven on this front. Look at what we did collectively around solar: there was something that needed to exist but didn't yet, and with a global campaign, we made that happen. There are a lot of other similar blank spaces in the climate sphere, things that we know need to exist, but don't yet. That's where I'd like to focus my efforts. </p><p>I feel like I'm an entrepreneur at heart. I am kicking around some private sector ideas that I’m going to look to pursue. My entire life has been on the public service side, and I think I would like to try the private side. But in my heart of hearts, I'm a campaigner, I'm an advocate, I love the rush of going out against all odds with the plucky band of joyful solo warriors and winning.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>If listeners are looking to get into this the same way you did 20 years ago, where are those blank spaces where they could make a real impact?</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>There's a lot of people that will have their own list of these, depending on how far you pull back the lens. </p><p>I'm on the board of this awesome organization called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.powerforall.org">Power for All</a>, which is in many ways Vote Solar but for the billion people on this planet that don't have any access to electricity at all. There is the ability and the potential to bring decentralized renewables to provide electricity and electrified services in many different business models. It's just an incredibly dynamic space. That is a passion project of mine. </p><p>When I look closer to home here, the challenge of introducing flexibility into the grid, whether it be through storage or demand response, it does feel nascent compared to where it needs to be. If you read the RMI reports on clean energy portfolios, I'm absolutely convinced that demand response is a gas killer. We need to have it. The policy models for it feel like solar 2007: there's competing different business models, we do not have good transactional space for the value that it can bring. That's a policy problem that needs to be solved. The opportunity for huge scale is there, but there's a lot of roadblocks in the way. </p><p>I look at electrification of transportation. I'm not a super car guy, but I do think that this premise of interconnecting tons of really large batteries onto the grid provides an opportunity for solving so many other problems, through managed charging as well as potentially, in the future, vehicle-to-grid charging, and a couple of other things besides. That is an enormous opportunity for bringing in efficiencies and bringing down costs for participants and nonparticipants alike that needs a lot further exploration. </p><p>I could go on and on. But those are some of the ones that are top of mind for me right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Well, thanks for that perspective, that's really interesting. Maybe in 20 years, there'll be another Adam at the end of another 20-year career and we'll find that demand response is sexy and ubiquitous.</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>You know, here's hoping.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Thanks so much, Adam, for taking the time, and thanks for your 20 years of work.</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:  </strong></p><p>Both this hour and the past 20 years have definitely been my pleasure. David, thank you for being such an incisive and insightful reporter in this space. No one does it better than you. I've enjoyed reading your stuff for the last 20 years as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Well, I'll get you that check later. Thank you for that. Thanks a lot, Adam. Goodbye.</p><p><strong>Adam Browning:</strong></p><p>Take care. Bye.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-20-years-of-solar-advocacy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:41245557</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 17 Sep 2021 16:00:49 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/41245557/0f8d999da91dc07b51f26ea962b1625c.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3728</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/41245557/ff1963fc01eedb7882b5f3e0f554f5f7.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A close look at the clean energy legislation offered by House Democrats]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>After months of anticipation, Democrats have begun to reveal pieces of their upcoming Build Back Better Act (aka the budget reconciliation bill), including the key clean energy provisions. </p><p>On Monday, the House Energy and Commerce Committee began markup of its <a target="_blank" href="https://energycommerce.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/pallone-announces-full-committee-markup-of-build-back-better-act">full set of recommendations for the bill</a>. Meanwhile, the House Ways and Means Committee released its <a target="_blank" href="https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/Section%20by%20Section%20Subtitle%20F%2C%20G%2C%20H%2C%20%26%20J.pdf">draft tax package</a> for the bill, including the clean energy tax credits.</p><p>As negotiations around the reconciliation bill move forward, I’ll have more to say about the politics, economics, and larger implications of all this Democratic energy policy. For now, I just want to get the specifics on the record. </p><p>For one thing, there’s a lot of policy here, and it will take some time to think it through. For another, it will be important to track what gets added and (more likely) cut when the bill goes to the Senate, so this post can serve as our baseline for comparison.</p><p>Let’s start with Energy and Commerce and its Clean Electricity Performance Program (CEPP), arguably the most important single piece of energy policy on offer.</p><p>E&C: the CEPP and some other good spending </p><p>(For a quick introduction to the CEPP, see <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/politics/sen-tina-smith-on-the-democratic-plan-to-clean-up-the-u-s-electricity-sector">highlights from my interview with Sen. Tina Smith</a>.)</p><p>The $150 billion CEPP would offer grants to utilities that increase their year-on-year share of clean energy by at least 4 percentage points; it would charge fines to utilities that fall short of that goal. (“Utilities” here includes any and all end-use electricity providers: vertically integrated utilities, investor-owned utilities, co-ops and munis, etc.)</p><p>For the purposes of the bill, “clean energy” is energy that emits no more than 0.1 tons of CO2-equivalent per megawatt-hour of electricity generated. This 0.1t/MWh threshold is notably stringent — it would exclude all fossil fuels and biomass unless they are equipped with carbon capture and storage.</p><p>The grants are based on a somewhat complicated formula: $150/MWh x (YoY percentage point increase in clean share - 1.5 percentage point) x total retail sales.</p><p>Say a utility boosted its year-on-year clean share by 5 percentage points. Five percentage points minus 1.5 percentage points is 3.5 percentage points. So the utility would get a one-time grant of $150/MWh for 3.5 percent of it retail sales that year.</p><p>The formula for the fines is: $40/MWh x (4 percentage points - YoY percentage point increase in clean share) x total retail sales.</p><p>Say a utility grew its share 3 percentage points. Four percentage points minus 3 percentage points is 1 percentage point, so it would pay a one-time fine of $40/MWh for 1 percent of its retail sales. (The exception here is utilities with a clean share at 85 percent or above; they are exempt from fines, but still eligible for grants.)</p><p>A utility is not allowed to fall steadily behind; any shortfall is added to the following year’s target. If it only hits 3 percentage points growth one year, the next year a utility must hit 5 percentage points growth. </p><p>Utilities can choose to tally up their performance over a two- or three-year period, to smooth over year-to-year spikes or valleys; for instance, if a utility hits 3 percentage points in year one and 3 percentage points in year two but 6 percentage points in year three, it averages out to 4 percentage points a year and it receives the grants.</p><p>This is all a bit convoluted; it would definitely keep accountants and lawyers busy. There are five things worth noting about the CEPP at this point.</p><p>First, $150/MWh is real money. Spread out over a 10-year power purchase agreement (PPA), it’s about $15/MWh/year, not that different from (but additive to) the clean-energy tax credits. That, coupled with the tight definition of clean energy, makes this a relatively strong offering, design-wise. </p><p>Second, a lot of details would be left up to the Department of Energy, which would administer the program, such as how distributed and behind-the-meter resources will be counted, how much compliance can be done through renewable energy credits (RECs), and so forth. There are lots of devils in those details.</p><p>Third, it is not accurate to say that the CEPP targets, much less guarantees, 80 percent emission reductions in the electricity sector by 2030. That is Biden’s goal, and the aspiration for the full suite of policies Dems are trying to pass, but the CEPP, by design, does not guarantee any particular outcome. How would utilities respond to this level of incentives and fines? We hope to find out! It’s a new program; it’s never been tried before. (It would kick off in 2023.)</p><p>Fourth, a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.evergreenaction.com/press/new-analysis-finds-cepp-would-expand-workforce-by-nearly-8-million-jobs-over-the-next-decade">study by the independent firm Analysis Group</a> found that, through 2031, the CEPP would expand the US workforce by 7.7 million new jobs, add $907 billion to the national economy, raise $154 billion in tax revenue, and lead to over 600 gigawatts of new clean energy. It’s not a cost, it’s an investment.</p><p>Fifth, there’s no guarantee Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV) will let this pass unmolested, or let it pass at all. He chairs the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, which will be marking up the energy parts of the bill. He could kill the CEPP. He could weaken the carbon-intensity requirements to allow for dirtier energy; he could lower the required rate of clean energy growth; he could reduce the incentives or the fines. Nobody knows what Manchin will do, or why, so we’ll just have to wait and see.</p><p>Also! Other items worth noting in the E&C package. </p><p>* There is <strong>$9 billion for home energy retrofits</strong> — $2,000 rebates for projects that save 20 percent relative to average energy use, or $4,000 for 35 percent. (Both numbers are doubled for low-income projects.)</p><p>* There’s another <strong>$9 billion for home electrification</strong> — $3,000 per heat pump with greater than 27,500 BTU-per-hour capacity and $4,000 if it's cold-climate rated; $6,000/$7,000 for low-income projects. For heat pumps under 27,500 BTU/hour, it’s $1,500/$2,000; $3,000/$3,500 for low-income projects. In that same section are rebates of $1,250 per heat-pump water heater, $3,000 per smart electric panel, and other, smaller grants for electric stoves and dryers.</p><p>* <strong>$13.5 billion for electric vehicle infrastructure</strong>, focused on underserved areas.</p><p>* <strong>$5 billion to replace heavy-duty vehicles</strong> like fire trucks and school buses with zero-emission vehicles.</p><p>* <strong>$9 billion for electricity transmission</strong>, including funds for DOE’s transmission planning and modeling capabilities and for state transmission planning processes.</p><p>* <strong>$17.5 billion for decarbonizing federal buildings and fleets</strong> (including, one hopes, the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/4/22/21229132/usps-coronavirus-electrify-postal-trucks">Postal Service fleet</a>).</p><p>* <strong>$27.5 billion for a </strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-the-immense-promise"><strong>green bank</strong></a>, which we’re not supposed to call a green bank, but rather “nonprofit, state, and local climate finance institutions that support the rapid deployment of low- and zero-emission technologies.” (40 percent goes to vulnerable communities.)</p><p>* <strong>$2.5 billion for low-income solar</strong>.</p><p>* <strong>$5 billion for community-led environmental and climate justice programs</strong>.</p><p>* An unspecified <strong>methane fee on leaked methane</strong> (which the industry is furiously lobbying against).</p><p>All these numbers are, based on the need, too small — especially the retrofit and electrification numbers. The heat pump money, for instance, is likely to be used up after a year or two.</p><p>Nonetheless, with a limited pot of money, E&C Dems have managed to cover quite a few bases. </p><p>Let’s move on to the Ways and Means tax package.</p><p>W&M: a bonanza of clean-energy tax credits</p><p>The tax package, which itself only covers a limited subset of policy areas, is a monster; even the <a target="_blank" href="https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/Section%20by%20Section%20Subtitle%20F%2C%20G%2C%20H%2C%20%26%20J.pdf">section-by-section summary</a> is 41 pages long. The green energy part (subtitle G) starts on page 9. It is basically a long list of technologies and practices that will receive tax credits.</p><p>Before getting to individual items, it’s worth noting three intriguing provisions that apply to all the credits.</p><p>First, there are now strong prevailing wage standards built in. To receive the full value of the credit, a project must show that it is paying prevailing wages and using qualified apprentices; without doing so, it can receive only a fifth of the credit value (called the “base rate”).  </p><p>Second, projects that use domestic content — defined as 55 percent of total project cost from made-in-USA components and services — can get another 10 percent on top of the value of the credit.</p><p>These are important policies for the domestic workforce, drawn from successful states (like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/washington-state-now-has-the-nations">Washington</a>), and will increase the amount of credit value that goes to good US jobs and supply chains. </p><p>Third, the energy tax credits are now “direct pay,” which means projects can get the full value without having to offset it against taxes owed. This opens up the credits to many more projects and eliminates a lot of wasteful lawyerly games around tax equity financing. (Note: the percentage available for direct pay declines over time for projects not using domestic content.)</p><p>On to some of the individual credits:</p><p>* The <strong>production tax credit</strong> (PTC) would be extended through the decade. It would go to qualifying clean electricity sources — wind, solar, geothermal, landfill gas, methane gas with CCS — based on MWhs produced: $25/MWh ($5/MWh base rate). </p><p>* The <strong>investment tax credit</strong> (ITC) would also be extended; it would be available to solar and geothermal, and now, as of this bill, energy storage, biogas, microgrid controllers, and, uh, “<a target="_blank" href="https://drawdown.org/solutions/dynamic-glass">dynamic glass</a>.” It would cover 30 percent (6 percent base rate) of the cost of a project. (A solar project could choose the PTC or ITC, but couldn’t get both.)</p><p>* A <strong>bonus ITC</strong> would be available to projects that locate in a low-income area (additional 10 percent) or are themselves low-income benefit or housing projects (additional 20 percent). This is an excellent way of building environmental justice into the tax system.</p><p><strong>Note:</strong> both the PTC and ITC would be restored to their full original value, higher than any current credit, and extended through the decade. This is a very big deal.</p><p>* The <strong>electric vehicle (EV) tax credit</strong> has been revived and expanded. It would now be fully refundable and no longer limited by manufacturer. It starts at $4,000 per vehicle; for vehicles that go into service before 2027, there’s an additional $3,500 (that’s $7,500); for vehicles built at a US assembly plant with a union-negotiated collective bargaining agreement, there’s an additional $4,500 (that’s $12,000); for vehicles assembled at plants that use at least 50 percent domestic content, there’s an additional $500. So, for a domestically manufactured, domestically sourced EV purchased next year, the total available credit is $12,500 (limited to half the vehicle purchase price). That’s huge!</p><p><strong>Note:</strong> The EV tax credit would be available only for vehicles under specific price limits: $55,000 for sedans, $64,000 for vans, $69,000 for SUVs, and $74,000 for pickup trucks. Also, the amount of available credit phases out quickly for joint households above $800,000 income, or single households above $600,000. In short, the credit is meant to be available primarily to middle-class voters buying mid-range EVs.</p><p><strong>Note 2:</strong> Automakers that use non-unionized workforces, like Toyota, Honda, and Tesla, are <a target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/toyota-says-it-will-fight-us-house-electric-vehicle-tax-plan-2021-09-11/">furious about the union provisions</a>. The awkward truth is that some of the best automakers on EVs have been non-union, while union shops like Ford and GM have been among the worst. It’s a bit of a dilemma for progressives. </p><p>* There is also a <strong>credit for commercial EVs</strong>, worth up to 30 percent of vehicle cost.</p><p>* Happily, there’s a <strong>credit for used EVs</strong>, ranging from $1,250 to $2,500, depending on battery capacity; the credit would be capped at 30 percent of the sale price, for vehicles costing no more than $25,000 and at least two years old.</p><p>* Even more happily, there’s a new <strong>electric bicycle credit</strong>, worth 15 percent of the purchase price. The max available credit is $1,500 (joint filers can use it toward two bikes). The credit starts phasing out at incomes above $75,000; the maximum total price of a qualifying bike is $8,000. </p><p><strong>Note:</strong> Folks are grousing on Twitter about how much more generous the EV credit is than the bicycle credit, and how the bicycle credit should be bigger, and how absurd it is to means-test a friggin’ bicycle credit, and they’re right about all of it. Still, it’s nice e-bikes at least got a nod.</p><p>* The <strong>45Q tax credit for </strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/9/4/20829431/climate-change-carbon-capture-utilization-sequestration-ccu-ccs"><strong>carbon capture, utilization, and storage</strong></a> has been extended through the decade: $50 per ton for sequestered carbon dioxide; $35 per ton for use of CO2 in products or enhanced oil recovery. </p><p>* Added to 45Q is a new $180-per-ton <strong>credit for </strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/6/14/17445622/direct-air-capture-air-to-fuels-carbon-dioxide-engineering"><strong>direct air capture</strong></a> of CO2.</p><p>* Hooray, a new <strong>investment tax credit for transmission lines</strong>! Lines of at least 275 kilovolts, capable of carrying at least 500 megawatts, placed in service before 2032, receive a credit worth 30 percent of project costs. (Read my <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-everything-in">transmission series</a> to understand why this is a good thing.)</p><p>* Also worth cheering, though more controversial: a <strong>production tax credit for existing nuclear power plants</strong>, calculated via a formula I do not pretend to understand.</p><p>* A new <strong>sustainable aviation fuel credit</strong> would offer $1.25 per gallon for aviation fuels that cut lifetime GHG emissions (vs. jet fuel) at least 50 percent, with another penny per gallon available for each percentage point above 50. </p><p>* A new <strong>clean hydrogen production tax credit</strong> would offer $3 per kilogram to hydrogen with 95 percent fewer lifecycle GHG emissions than hydrogen made through the currently dominant method, steam reforming. That could include hydrogen made through electrolysis driven by renewable energy or through biomass gasification with CCS. Credits of $0.60 to $1.02 would be available to hydrogen with between 40 and 95 percent fewer GHGs, which could include “blue hydrogen” made by steam reforming with CCS. </p><p>* There are <strong>credits for energy-efficient homes</strong>, up to $2,500, with a bonus tier of $5,000 for certified zero-energy homes.</p><p>* The <strong>clean manufacturing tax credit</strong> (48C) has been extended. It would offer up to 30 percent of the value of investments in clean manufacturing facilities, i.e., facilities manufacturing solar panels, wind turbines, EVs, batteries, etc. $400 million a year of the credit money would be reserved for projects in “automotive communities.”</p><p>* A <strong>credit for environmental justice programs</strong> would distribute $1 billion a year, on a competitive basis, to institutions of higher learning that gather data to help improve environmental justice outcomes.  </p><p>Notably missing from this list is any reduction in fossil fuel subsidies. This is frustrating, since less than 24 hours before the package was released, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer was saying, “we need to take away all the subsidies for oil, gas, and coal. We will have that in our bill.” (It’s at minute 26 of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.instagram.com/p/CTuzPZiFWhT">this video</a>.) Where did the subsidy cuts go? Who took them out? </p><p>Anyway, all told, the Joint Committee on Taxation <a target="_blank" href="https://www.jct.gov/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=80ba493b-d6cd-4a00-846b-0289376a7dd7">estimates</a> that the Ways and Means tax package would cost $1.2 trillion over 10 years; the “green energy” subtitle would account for $235 billion. Of course, that’s just an estimate — it could be lower or higher in practice, depending on the uptake of the credits and the growth they spur. </p><p>Now let’s see how much survives the Senate</p><p>Like I said, there will be more to talk about as the bill is negotiated. For now, I’ll leave you with three observations.</p><p>First, is this enough? Ha ha, no. No climate policy is ever enough. This is far short of the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sunrisemovement.org/theory-of-change/10-trillion-over-10-years/">$10 trillion that would be needed</a> for a true Green New Deal. It’s far short of the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/us/politics/democrats-infrastructure-deal-congress.html">$6 trillion bill Sen. Bernie Sanders first proposed</a>, back in June. It is, from a climate perspective, a ludicrously low level of investment and mobilization. </p><p>Nonetheless, this is what the lamentably small group of climate-focused legislators were able to squeeze from a chaotic process. This is a reflection of the relative weight climate carries in the House. </p><p>Second, this is the high-water mark, so enjoy it while it lasts. Sens. Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ) are going to try to hack down the overall level of spending, and Manchin has already <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/14/politics/joe-manchin-reconciliation-climate-change/index.html">signaled his intention</a> to go after some of the energy provisions, including the CEPP. I have no idea what will happen in the Senate — my brain is tired from trying to predict — but given that Manchin is involved, it’s likely to be unpleasant.</p><p>Third, I know this isn’t helpful right now, but damn is it stupid for a wealthy democracy to make policy the way we do. Because every policy of any size has to be crammed through the budget reconciliation process, it all ends up in the tax code, a complicated skein of credits and loopholes that encourages rent-seeking and keep armies of lawyers employed. </p><p>This is not how any energy wonk, including the energy wonks on Democratic congressional staffs, would write policy if offered a blank sheet of paper. It is kludge upon kludge, a Rube Goldberg mechanism reverse-engineered to conform to anachronistic budget rules administered by a parliamentarian-<em>cum</em>-shaman. </p><p>But it is what’s possible now. American democracy is staggering, barely upright, and people of good will are scrambling to do the best they can under the circumstances. There’s no time left for infighting. Let’s just get this thing over the finish line.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-close-look-at-the-clean-energy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:41214094</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 15 Sep 2021 16:00:36 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/41214094/7fc94500eace9067f9d17745cd32a0fe.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1407</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/41214094/8655187670e1417fc5f1154b202dedb4.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts (guest) podcast: an episode of Know Your Enemy on living with climate change]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>As a dog walker and kitchen cleaner, I listen to a lot of podcasts. One that I’ve been enjoying quite a bit lately is <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/knowyrenemypod?lang=en">Know Your Enemy</a>, which bills itself as “a leftist's guide to the conservative movement.” Sponsored by Dissent Magazine and hosted by <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/matthewsitman">Matthew Sitman</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/samadlerbell">Sam Adler-Bell</a>, it typically interviews experts, analysts, and activists about the current (lamentable) state of the US conservative movement. It is unusually smart and thoughtful, offering more illumination than rage bait.</p><p>Recently it had a different kind of episode: a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/know-your-enemy-living-at-the-end-of-our-world-with-daniel-sherrell-and-dorothy-fortenberry">pod on climate change</a>. The guests were Daniel Sherrell, an activist and organizer who just released a book called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/670357/warmth-by-daniel-sherrell/"><em>Warmth: Coming of Age at the End of the World</em></a>, and Dorothy Fortenberry, a playwright and television writer currently working on <em>Extrapolations</em>, an upcoming limited series for Apple TV+ that focuses on climate change.</p><p>I’ll be honest: I don’t typically enjoy climate change content. It’s mostly a bunch stuff I already know, arguments I already agree with, and exhortations I don’t need. But this one was different. Rather than focusing on politics, policy, or science, it’s about, well, <em>living</em> with climate change. How to think about it. How to acknowledge its horror and weight without being crushed and immobilized. How to make fiction about it. How to imagine a future in its shadow. Lots of philosophical and even spiritual stuff that I haven’t focused on much here at Volts.</p><p>Anyway, I asked Matthew and Sam if I could share it with Volts listeners and they were kind enough to say yes. It is long, but rich and full of interesting ideas. I hope you enjoy it. Don’t forget to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.dissentmagazine.org/blog/know-your-enemy-living-at-the-end-of-our-world-with-daniel-sherrell-and-dorothy-fortenberry">support Know Your Enemy on Patreon</a>!</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-guest-podcast-an-episode-of</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:41139646</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 10 Sep 2021 16:00:31 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/41139646/18a050da5bf3eed8899dc39d681cc006.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5631</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/41139646/3e9047e43d3a21f94dada027b4700491.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Sen. Tina Smith on the promise of a Clean Electricity Payment Program]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Sen. Tina Smith (D-MN) discusses a policy that she has proposed in the Senate and is working to get included in the upcoming reconciliation bill: a Clean Electricity Payment Program (CEPP), which would aim to reduce carbon emissions in the US electricity sector 80 percent by 2030. She also shares some excellent thoughts on the filibuster!</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Sen. Tina Smith (D-MN), September 1, 2021</p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/3kzhj8kcdnyvkay/volts21.09.01%28tina.smith%29.pdf?dl=0">PDF version</a>)</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>There are lots and lots of policies being discussed for inclusion in the Democrats’ upcoming budget reconciliation bill, from a childcare tax credit to universal pre-K to a wide range of climate and clean-energy measures.</p><p>According to the office of Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), the climate provisions in the bill would collectively reduce total US greenhouse gas emissions 45 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 — getting us close to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-sets-2030-greenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-union-jobs-and-securing-u-s-leadership-on-clean-energy-technologies/">America’s Paris agreement pledge</a>. </p><p>Schumer’s numbers have not yet been backed up by outside analysts, so they should be taken with a grain of salt for now. But what’s clear, and unlikely to change, is that the bulk of the emission reductions will come from the electricity sector — specifically, from the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/crunch-time-this-is-americas-last">clean-energy tax credits and the Clean Electricity Payment Program</a>. </p><p>As <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/on-climate-policy-theres-one-main">regular Volts readers know</a>, the Clean Electricity Payment Program is a version of the more familiar <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscast-how-to-decarbonize-the">Clean Energy Standard</a> that has been modified to fit within <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/5/28/18636759/climate-change-budget-reconciliation-democrats">the rules of budget reconciliation</a>. It would set up a federal program that would offer utilities financial incentives to increase their proportion of clean energy and levy fines on those that failed to do so. Its goal would be to reduce emissions from the US electricity sector 80 percent by 2030.</p><p>As Schumer’s graph shows, the Clean Electricity Payment Program, in combination with the extension and expansion of the clean-energy tax credits, would be responsible for almost 42 percent of the bill’s total reductions. </p><p>To hear more about the program and how it will work, I talked with Minnesota Senator Tina Smith (D), the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.npr.org/2021/08/11/1026831067/proposed-clean-energy-standard-could-end-power-plant-greenhouse-gas-emissions-by">policy’s sponsor</a> and its greatest champion in the Senate. Smith is one of the handful of senators with in-depth knowledge of the dynamics in the US electricity sector, and she’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.smith.senate.gov/us-senator-tina-smith-recognized-key-senator-working-close-budget-deal">deeply involved in budget negotiations</a>, so I was excited to ask her about how the program would work, what kinds of jobs and projects it might produce, how it might affect coal states, and of course, because I am me, what she thinks about the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-adam-jentleson-on-the">filibuster</a>. </p><p>Senator Tina Smith, thank you so much for coming on Volts. </p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>Well, thank you, David. It is terrific to be with you. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>We're going to talk today about clean electricity policy and the politics of getting it passed, which are two of my very favorite subjects in the world, so let's just dive right in. </p><p>Senator Smith, I’m pretty confident that Volts listeners are familiar with state-level policies, renewable portfolio standards or clean energy standards at the state level, that mandate that utilities in the state increase their proportion of clean energy. It’s a regulatory mandate passed by the state government; these are familiar, there are <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-portfolio-standards.aspx">dozens of them across the country</a>. </p><p>The Clean Electricity Payment Program that you have proposed is not quite that. So why don't you start by telling us what it is and how it is similar and different to these more familiar state policies? </p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith: </strong></p><p>Well, the basic goal is the same. We want to move the power generating sector so that it is adding clean energy. One way of doing that is to have a regulatory framework that says, you will add clean energy, and if you don't, you'll pay a penalty. But another way of achieving that goal of adding clean power is to do what we're doing with the Clean Electricity Payment Program. </p><p>This is a plan that says: We will provide financial incentives to utilities to add clean power; there'll be a fee if you fail to add clean power; and our goal is to get, on a national average, 80 percent of our power generation from clean energy sources by 2030. </p><p>So the goal is the same: adding clean power. The mechanism is a little bit different. </p><p>I think this mechanism has some real advantages, because under a regulatory framework, adding that clean power costs money in the short term (though it saves money in the long term) and often those costs are passed on to ratepayers. With the clean electricity plan that we're proposing, this federal incentive would defray the costs that utility ratepayers would normally pay. That's the real advantage of this approach.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>It’s worth pointing out something I've heard from a couple of the architects: costs on ratepayers tend to be regressive, whereas federal money comes from more progressive income taxes. So you get a progressivity advantage by drawing the money from the federal pot.</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith: </strong></p><p>Absolutely. That's exactly right. </p><p>We need to be on this path to a clean energy transition, but what you don't want to have happen is for the cost of that transition to be disproportionately borne by people who can least afford it. This is especially important to me, because the costs of the fossil fuel economy have been disproportionately borne — in bad health outcomes and in all sorts of other external costs — by poor people, Black and brown people, people who are sited right next to freeways or right next to that coal-burning power plant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>The details of this thing obviously matter. I'm curious, to what extent are the details of the program fixed and in place vs. being negotiated right now? Do we know the size of the payments? Are we sure that the target is going to stay the same through negotiations? What's in place and what's still up in the air?</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith: </strong></p><p>Well, of course, everything is in the midst of being negotiated all the time, as you well know. Negotiations will be finalized when the budget reconciliation bill is completed. </p><p>But for me, there are a couple of key aspects of this. One, the goal of achieving 80 percent clean power in the power sector nationally, on average, is set in stone. That was described in the Democratic budget resolutions that we passed at the end of the last session. That is described as the goal of the president. So to me, that's the starting point. </p><p>Then there are a couple of other things that are crucial to this. One is that this clean electricity plan is technology neutral, which means we don't say this kind of clean energy is better than that kind of clean energy, or it must be renewables vs. carbon capture, for example. That technology neutrality is clear. </p><p>Also clear is the core idea that each utility starts from where they are, and they improve from there. This is a big deal, because some utilities and regions are already well along the path of adding clean power, and others are just starting. You don't want to unfairly penalize that utility that maybe is only at 10 percent clean power. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Can you expand on that a little bit? Utilities are at very different places — financially, in terms of power mix, etc. How is the plan customized on a per-utility basis? If I'm a coal-heavy utility, what does it look like to me?</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>If you are a coal-heavy utility, this is very much in your favor, because you need to figure out how to add clean while you have a lot of assets in coal power. Rather than having your utility ratepayers end up having higher rates in the short term because you're adding new, clean power capital infrastructure, this would help you to add clean. </p><p>You may be a utility that's only 10 to 20 percent clean; so under our plan, we would still ask you to add clean power every year at a percentage level yet to be negotiated, at a pace that is moving you strongly and speedily in the right direction. </p><p>But there's no expectation that a utility that starts at, say, a 10 percent clean power percentage must catch up with a utility in the Pacific Northwest that relies heavily on hydropower and may easily get to 85 or 90 percent clean within a 10-year period. </p><p>At the end of that 10-year period, you're going to have some utilities that are over 80 percent, and some that are below 80 percent. The utilities I speak to that are farther along will probably argue that it's harder for them to add that incremental 20 percent of clean, whereas the utility that’s starting with ample, untapped renewable resources, you could argue that they could add quicker.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>So there's a national average target, but it's not that each utility has to hit that same target.</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>That is exactly right. That's the flexibility. It makes it much more appealing to utilities that are not as far along the curve. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>This brings up another question. You're trying to figure out from our present vantage point what level of payments and what pace of change would yield 80 percent by 2030. It seems like it's hard to know right now exactly what those numbers are. </p><p>So if the program is put in place, and payments are at a certain level, and the pace of change is set at a certain level, and it turns out in 2024 we find out we're not on track to hit the national target, are there provisions in place to adjust those numbers as we go?</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith: </strong></p><p>That is a great and interesting question. I'm now going to get really wonky into the details about Senate process, because what we're using here is a process called budget reconciliation, which is a budget-driven process. What that means in practical terms is that much of the implementation and the rules around how this plan gets implemented will be left to the Department of Energy. They are writing the rules, because this is a budget process, it's not a regular process. </p><p>But let me see if I can answer your question a little bit at least. One thing I would point out is that historically, the cost curve of clean power has gone down more quickly than we anticipated. So it seems to me that, particularly for solar, for which we know the cost is going down really dramatically, we are just as likely to see power added more quickly than we originally anticipated as taking longer than we anticipated. </p><p>The overall question about how the Department of Energy would write the rules to accomplish this would probably end up being addressed in rulemaking. It gets to the question of: what do you anticipate? What do you think is going to happen? The way that we've designed this is based on a ton of modeling from the Department of Energy, and also from outside groups who have expertise in modeling. </p><p>That gives us a good framework for making some assumptions about how this is going to pan out in the real world.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>You've said before that you don't actually expect utilities to be fined very often, since they'd be dumb not to take incentives that are on the table. But are there protections written in about where the fines come from? And how the incentive payments are used? How closely is that specified in the bill?</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>This gets at a real strength of the policy. First of all, the answer is yes, we want to write into this what are allowable uses for the incentive payments. It could be building out clean resources. It could be deploying carbon capture technology. It could be adding energy efficiency resources to a system, because if you think about it, if you are reducing electricity demand at the same time that you're adding clean, the percentage of clean of your overall system goes up faster. So that would be an allowable use. </p><p>I speak to utilities and power generators that have coal power plants or natural gas plants that they want to phase out, but they have a stranded asset; you could potentially use these resources to help to retire those resources more quickly. </p><p>Then, similarly, we need to have rules around who bears the cost of the penalties, in order to protect ratepayers as much as possible. </p><p>But as I said, this isn't like the old cap-and-trade mentality, where a utility is looking at this and saying, my cost of paying the fee is lower than making the investment — this just isn't set up that way. That's a strength.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>It's a little bit more transparent than cap-and-trade; the money is more in the headline and less something you have to deduce. </p><p>How do you pitch this program to a person — say, for instance, a friend of yours named Joe — in a coal-heavy state, with a lot of coal-related jobs? Fossil fuel-heavy states have traditionally been resistant to things like this because they feel like they're starting on the back foot. In terms of both the power mix and the job mix, how do you pitch this program to a coal state?</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>It's interesting. I think about answering that question from the perspective of a place in Minnesota that is similar in many ways to parts of West Virginia, which is Minnesota’s Iron Range. This is a part of my state where the bread and butter of the economy, and historically the culture and the source of pride, has been mining iron, and then taconite, and producing the iron that has driven the economy of the United States. </p><p>There is a real sense in that part of Minnesota, just as I think there is in West Virginia — though Joe Manchin knows way more about West Virginia than anybody — that this economy is getting passed by. There are new opportunities out there, but is it ever going to come to me, to my community, to my world? </p><p>That is one of the real strengths of this idea. First of all, clean power, including renewable energy, is rural energy. That's where it is most likely developed. In fact, West Virginia has abundant renewable energy assets that are waiting to be developed. If you care about wanting to be a part of this clean-energy transition — which is, by the way, going to happen — the question is: Do you want to lead? Do you want to be in the forefront of that? Or do you want to be behind?</p><p>The opportunities for West Virginia, and other states that are part of the traditional fossil fuel economy, to seize this moment, to move forward with the kinds of proposals that Joe Manchin has put forward, like the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.manchin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/AJEM%20one-pager_NATIONAL_final.pdf?cb">American Jobs in Energy Manufacturing Act</a>, and deploying carbon capture and storage technology, and taking advantage of the skills and expertise of the working folks in West Virginia to drive those innovations — to me, that's all about being in the forefront.</p><p>In fact, the West Virginia University Law School just put out a really excellent summary of what moving to this clean energy future could mean for West Virginia in terms of increase in employment, growth, and state GDP, opportunity for new investment that creates new jobs. It demonstrates where the opportunity is, in West Virginia and other places.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>As a matter of fact, I just <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/west-virginia-needs-the-biden-energy">posted a piece yesterday</a> about West Virginia and that study. One of the interesting things about that study is it shows pretty substantial benefits for West Virginia, but the analysis was done before the Clean Electricity Payment Program was on the table. So the Clean Electricity Payment Program would more than double all those benefits; the amount of money that could flow into the state from federal coffers just through the Clean Electricity Payment Program is pretty enormous.</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>It is. It's such a perfect case study of how, the way that this is structured, along with the other clean and renewable energy tax credits, is actually a giant boost to employment and jobs, and not a gloom and doom, “we're going to all have to sacrifice because the climate is warming” mindset that has too often been the way that these issues have been approached.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>Of course, the question for West Virginia is: compared to what? What is the alternative? Coal is on its way out, according to the markets, so it’s now or never. </p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>That's exactly right. Coal demand has gone down substantially, and as I said, this transition is occurring. A lot of times people will point to, why should we make sacrifices in the United States when we see China increasingly being a source of carbon pollution? What I like to point out is that China added substantially more wind and solar resources than the United States over the last 10 years or so. They are making significant investments in wind and solar, not to mention electric vehicles and other new energy technologies. So, let's lead on this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>How much of a sacrifice is it, really, to get more GDP and more jobs and less air pollution and better health outcomes? Pretty nice sacrifice as sacrifices go.</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>But I think we also can acknowledge that, as a very dear friend always loved to say, everybody loves change as long as it happens to somebody else. You could understand why Minnesotans who live on the Iron Range, or coal miners that live in Wyoming or West Virginia, are questioning whether at the end of the day these benefits are actually going to come to them and their communities. So it is incumbent upon us to make sure that we're putting in place the policies that make sure that happens. </p><p>I've spoken with Secretary Granholm about this a lot. She gets this, not only from being head of the Department of Energy, but being a former governor. You have to have a real place-based strategy for making sure that these benefits don't just happen anywhere, but they happen specifically where they need to. It’s the same issue as the environmental justice needs we have as well.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>A couple of broader questions about the politics of this. One of the vexations about US policy these days is that it seems to swing back and forth wildly depending on who's in charge. We saw Obama pass a bunch of stuff, and then Trump take over and spend four years frantically undoing it all, and now it's being redone. Is there anything about the Clean Electricity Payment Program that will make it resilient, even if Republicans take back over Congress and/or the presidency?</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>What you just said makes the strong argument for why it is so important to make these kinds of policy and budgetary decisions legislatively, rather than through executive action. You're absolutely right. When Obama was so tired of being stymied by a recalcitrant Congress, he took steps through his executive power with the Clean Power Plan, for example; that and other steps that he took around renewable fuel standards and so forth are relatively easy to wind back. </p><p>But I think there's another lesson here, which is when you legislatively pass budget bills that are not only smart policy but are broadly approved of by the public, it becomes very difficult to unwind them. I look at the case of the Affordable Care Act — the Republican Party opposed that, spent how many years, over and over and over again, tried to unwind it, with no policy to replace it, because they really didn't know what their other idea was — that became more and more popular. Ultimately, they failed in unwinding it because people liked it. </p><p>The same can be said of this clean electricity plan, because polling data shows that this is the direction people want. Businesses know this too. This is why businesses like Walmart, and Kroger, and others, are saying, oh, our customers want more clean power. This is what they want. There's a lot of public pressure to move in this direction. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Notably, both large employers in the state of West Virginia.</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>Yes. It's interesting, I was just looking at this: The percentage of people in West Virginia that are employed in coal is 2 percent. So again, similar to Minnesota's Iron Range, it looms large in the history and the economic foundation of the state, but it's a relatively small percentage.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>In some ways this is the energy analogue of Medicaid expansion, in that it is the federal government saying: you need to do this; let us pay for it. Some states have resisted Medicaid expansion, but none who have accepted it have reversed it. Once you're getting it, you don't want to stop getting it.</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>That's right. To further that analogy: We could conceivably have designed a plan that would have been state-based rather than power generator-based, and I think that your point is one of the reasons why it's good that this is power generator-based. They're going to be making investment decisions and economic decisions that will support advancing this. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Right, and it’ll be hard to unwind those. </p><p>On a broader level, some people in the Senate have raised worries about spending too much money and running up the deficit and exacerbating inflation. One, do you worry about that at all? What's your take on the worry about deficit spending? And two, if the overall spending number gets haggled down, how safe do you feel that the energy money is in those negotiations? Is it going to be on the chopping block if there are cuts to be made? </p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>Well, not if I can help it. </p><p>Broadly speaking, when we are looking at the overall size of the Build Back Better budget, I don't hear people in Minnesota saying, “Oh, Tina, this amount of money is too much, $3.5 trillion is too much, but $3.1 trillion would be OK.” I don't think that that's how people are thinking about it. They're thinking about, how is this going to affect me and my family? That's sort of the cliche of talking about legislative policy, but I actually think that it's real. </p><p>Certainly, as we go through this negotiation, and we have to come up with a plan that is agreeable to all 50 Democratic senators, there's going to be some haggling and some back-and-forth. To me, the most important thing is that we don't give really strong policy and budget proposals like this a haircut so that they don't work anymore. We’ve got to make sure we don't do that. </p><p>But the other question you asked is an interesting one too, about budgets and deficit spending and so forth. I would just point out that when we write this bill, at whatever size it is, it's going to be paid for. So that's a good thing. In fact, when you look at how Americans feel about the Democrats’ budget bill, one of the things that they like the most is that it is paid for by asking the wealthiest Americans and big corporations to pay their fair share. That seems fair to them, and it seems right. It generates resources in order to do these things that are going to build up our economy and lift up our communities in powerful ways.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I have been somewhat confused that the deficit concern seems to come up again and again, even in the context of a bill that is explicitly paid for. It seems like something people say almost by instinct now in DC.</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith: </strong></p><p>That's right. In Washington, David, maybe you've noticed, there is sometimes a disconnect between rhetoric and reality. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>What?! Yes, I'm skeptical that there is any human being that has genuine concern about the deficit as a primary motive in their heart. That always sounds like an excuse to get at something else.</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith: </strong></p><p>Right. The bipartisan infrastructure bill that is moving through Congress, that passed the Senate with 69 votes, is about investing in infrastructure, including some important strategies for advancing this clean energy transition with electric vehicles and charging stations — that was bipartisan, and probably not completely paid for. I would say, shoot, you're investing in roads and bridges and broadband infrastructure that's going to be around for 60 or 70 years; that's what states do all the time, is borrow to pay for long-term assets. So to me, that's not a big deal.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Right, and putting in place long-term assets drives economic growth, which is the best thing for wiping out a deficit. OK, we won’t get stuck ranting about deficits, I could do this all day. </p><p>Also on the broader politics of this: energy and climate people are watching this unfold from the outside with white knuckles. There's this two-track strategy: you’ve got the bipartisan infrastructure bill, and then you’ve got the reconciliation bill, which together are supposed to be the full agenda, the full package. </p><p>But there's been a lot of fights and strains lately about whether to keep those two bills linked; there was a fight in the House about it just last week. Do you think that linking those two bills is the right way to go, and do you think that you're going to be able to keep them linked?</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith: </strong></p><p>It is absolutely right to link these two bills. To me, they're rafted together. My support for the infrastructure bill, which I think is a good bill, is contingent on understanding that we have all agreed that we're going to move forward the reconciliation bill together. The two-track process divided up a broad agenda into two chunks, but we still need to pass that broad agenda for the good of the American people and for the good of people in my state. </p><p>One of the things that I've learned about legislating in the relatively short time that I've been in the Senate is that you have to have a clear idea of where you're heading. In this case, the Democrats are heading towards passing these two big bills. Then you have to be flexible and incremental about how that happens as you move through the process. </p><p>And then there's just a pileup at the end, and then you get it done. I'm not looking forward to the pileup, but I expect that it’ll happen. That is the reality of working in a democratic process, where there's 100 people in the Senate and 435 people in the House that all have very clear ideas about how they want to get things done.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>In my political lifetime, I’ve never seen a situation quite like this, where there are 50 Democrats and every single one of them has to agree.</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith</strong></p><p>I know. It's kind of terrifying.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>It gives every single one of them the ability to blow the whole thing up. People are focusing on Manchin and Sinema, but really, <em>every</em> senator could blow it up. But at the same time, if they blow it up, they all go down together. There's going to be a game theory study about this some day. </p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>That’s right. But at the end of the day, this broad agenda is broadly popular. It is what Joe Biden ran on; it’s not like it got pulled out of thin air. It's what he talks about, and what so many of us talked about during our campaigns in 2020. So you're right: the price of taking this down because you didn't get absolutely everything you wanted, because it's a little bit more money than you wanted to spend, that seems to me to be a heavy price.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>There's no half failure here. It's all success or all failure.</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith: </strong></p><p>One for all and all for one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Along the lines of unity, and the question of how to legislate in today's politically dysfunctional atmosphere: What is your take on the filibuster? This is not directly related to the reconciliation bill, but in a sense, Democrats are forced now to basically run the vast majority of their agenda through the reconciliation process because of the filibuster. That shapes what policies they're capable of doing and excludes some policies that people would like to see, like voting reform, potentially immigration reform, etc. So what's your take on the filibuster personally, and the attitude of the Democratic caucus about the filibuster? Do you see that changing at all or shifting?</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>Personally, I believe that the filibuster rule ought to be thrown out, and I didn't come to that easily. I believed for a long time that it was important that hard-won rights couldn't be taken away by a simple majority in the Senate. I cared about that one, because I spent a lot of my life working on women's reproductive rights, and I imagined a world where a majority of the Senate could strip away those incredibly precious rights. </p><p>But my perspective on this has really changed. I came to understand how fundamentally undemocratic it is to require a supermajority to get anything done. I also came to see that the filibuster, which is the right, basically, to debate or to talk as long as you want to — that that isn't really happening in the Senate these days. It's not as if Mr. Smith is going to Washington and making impassioned speeches on the floor of the Senate. Mr. Smith is sending his staff member down to say, “I’m putting a hold on that piece of legislation.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>Right. It's a memo.</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>Exactly. Truth be told, the Senate already structurally leans towards giving strong power to less than a majority of the voices, because the 50 Republicans in the United States Senate represent only about 43 percent of the American public. So what do we do because of the unwillingness of some to change these rules that also have an ignominious history? We develop workarounds like the reconciliation package, that allows us to pass significant and important legislation with a simple majority at the end of the day. It doesn't make any sense.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>It's not what you would write out if you were sitting down to write out a coherent legislative process. How common do you think that opinion is in your caucus? It’s either got to be done in the next two years or not at all. Do you think there's any chance of opinion thawing or shifting within that timeframe? Or is this just something people should write off?</p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>It’s hard for me to see a world where people just change their minds on the filibuster. However, I would look for other ways that Senate rules could be reformed so that they make more sense, so that the Senate can function better, and maybe, possibly, changing the rules around ending debate for particular pieces of policy — though that's maybe more my wishful thinking than anything else. We have to seize this moment that we have to take action on climate, a moment that I don't think will be replicated for many years. We don't have time to waste. There is an urgency of seizing this moment, and that's what a lot of us are working really hard to do.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Well, on that note, thank you for your work. Thank you for pushing so hard for this, and thank you for taking the time today. </p><p><strong>Sen. Tina Smith:</strong></p><p>It's great to talk with you. Thanks a lot.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-sen-tina-smith-on-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:40540067</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 01 Sep 2021 17:00:35 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/40540067/957d8bbc739cbd1bfcca577b40f8ece9.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2204</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/40540067/ab2d248a50a30102049e68e92e817c2c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: the challenges of building transmission in the US, and how to overcome them, with Liza Reed]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>The US is nowhere close to being able to build the amount of long-distance power lines it will need for a clean energy transition. In this episode, electricity transmission expert Liza Reed breaks down the many problems with the current dysfunctional system, and what it will take to build up the needed infrastructure.</em> </p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/sh/wopt2ypfwmzneeu/AADmI9cNNSw5zE9j3F2bZ-4Ia/volts21.08.27%28liza.reed%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-the-challenges-of-building-transmission-in-the-us-and-how-to-overcome-them-with-liza-reed"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Electricity transmission has been having a moment lately, getting more attention from analysts and policymakers than it has in … well, at least in my lifetime. </p><p>There's good reason for this: every single model of deep decarbonization shows that, to get there, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-why-we-need-more">the US will need lots, lots more long-distance high-voltage power lines</a>, to carry renewable energy from the remote areas where it is concentrated to the urban load centers where it is needed. </p><p>The problem is, the current system for planning and building those long-distance power lines is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-how-to-start-building">utterly dysfunctional</a>, at every level, which means they aren't getting built. The US will not decarbonize on time or on budget unless it can figure this out.</p><p>It's a thorny, complicated subject — not just understanding all the flaws in the current process, but figuring out how to move forward with solutions. Loyal Volts subscribers will recall that I wrote a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-everything-in">five-part series</a> on these issues earlier this year, but if you're looking for a more compact & polished version, I highly recommend a newly released report, jointly produced by the Niskanen Center & the Clean Air Task Force, called, "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.niskanencenter.org/report-how-are-we-going-to-build-all-that-clean-energy-infrastructure/">How are we going to build all that clean energy infrastructure</a>?" </p><p>The report emerged from a workshop held with a variety of professionals across the industry and serves as a plain-language summary of the problems facing transmission in the US today and the candidate solutions. It's remarkably readable, even for non-nerds — I recommend checking it out.</p><p>To walk through those problems and possible solutions, I'm excited to have as my guest today <a target="_blank" href="https://www.niskanencenter.org/author/lreed/">Liza Reed</a>, the Research Manager for Low Carbon Technology Policy at Niskanen. Reed completed and defended a dissertation on these issues just a few years ago and has been a crucial help to me in parsing through them, so I'm thrilled she's joining me today, so that Volts listeners can also benefit. Liza Reed, welcome to Volts.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Thank you so much. It's wonderful to be here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So the Niskanen Center has just come out with this report about transmission and its many challenges. So I thought the best way to structure the conversation would be to kind of walk through the report a little bit. But first, sort of by way of context, tell us, what is the transmission challenge in the United States? What are the decarbonization models telling us about what we need?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>The challenge is that we don't have enough transmission and that we need more transmission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Pretty simple.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Yep, it's that simple.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>And we don't have the right mechanisms in place to get the kind of transmission that we need.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But when we say need more relative to what we have, are we talking like a 20% increase, doubling, tripling? Give us a ballpark figure.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>There's sort of a range of estimates that come out of reports, but generally in the double to triple in the capacity is what we're seeing coming out of these decarbonization reports. So that's in the gigawatt miles, is sort of the metric.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And we're not building anywhere close to that pace.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Exactly. Not at the speed we need and particularly not at the type that we need because transmission is being built. And this is one of the challenges when we talk about this decarbonization challenge, is that there is transmission being built. But transmission is generally defined as anything over 100 kilovolts. And the type of transmission that is going to move a lot of power quickly and over long distances is 500 kilovolts on that high range. So there's a ton of gigawatt miles being built between 100 kilovolts and sort of 345 kilovolts compared to what we're getting at these higher voltages that can transfer a lot more power, go a lot longer distances that provide a different kind of resilience and access to different power in different geographic regions.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So the ones that are getting built are generally, I guess local is not quite the right word, but sort of like a utility will build a line within its territory to connect or strengthen two of it's —</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And what we need are these longer ones between territories, between regions, possibly national. So we're nowhere close on track. And so let's go through — the way you structure the report is around the five P's of transmission. So I thought we would walk through the P's. And what's going wrong with them currently. The first one is planning. So as I understand it, basically utilities have their own planning processes and that's basically what they use to decide on transmission.</p><p>But then there are other entities also planning and then there are other entities jumping into the system without planning at all. So tell us what's going on with planning right now.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Yeah, absolutely.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>So there is planning at different scales. You're correct. And the largest scale on which planning occurs is within what's called a regional transmission organization. An RTO or an ISO. An Independent System operator.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Let me pause you there because just in case there are a few people listening who are not yet total energy nerds, we need to start with a quick distinction. There are two sort of general kinds of utility areas. One is with the fully vertically integrated utility is what it's called. They own the generation, the transmission, the interface with the households. They own everything. And then there are these other areas which I think cover about two thirds of customers where the generation has been broken off into an independent business. The utilities are just there to deliver the power to the households.</p><p>And then you have these regional transmission organizations that kind of oversee these areas and try to coordinate them. That's a little bit of basic boring background for anybody who's not clued into that.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>That's absolutely perfect. And they are member organizations, which I think is also important. Right. They are organizations of utilities for the most part.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. As opposed to outside authorities that might have contrary interests or be able to impose contrary interests.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Right. And they're not building it themselves. Right. I mean, they are bringing those stakeholders together in pursuit of particular goals, which are largely established by FERC about what these regional RTOs or ISOs should be doing. But they are member organizations, right. So they are conveners and collaborators and they are managing this transmission planning process. But at the end of the day, it is still those members and those utilities who have to build the transmission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So is it the case that then the RTO brings all its member utilities together and makes something like a regional transmission plan, but then all the individual utilities also have their individual plans?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>I think that's right. It's sort of challenging when we talk about transmission. And why I say I think that's right is that if you and I each put our finger on different points in the United States, the system would be different there.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>And I'm jumping ahead to the P for process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's the overriding P, so it applies to all of these.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>That's correct. That's correct, but right. For the most part that's true. And that's where what you mentioned earlier, these local reliability projects, which is often what they're called, that is often more of an internal to a utility approach. And then these larger planning approaches, again required by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission are about how the utilities plan on how they work together and what they might need across the system. But that still has a boundary. Right. So we have utility boundaries. We have these RTO boundaries. And then inter-RTO planning or inter-ISO planning happens in theory and I mean technically happens in reality.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it happens by the two RTOs getting together in a room somewhere.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>There was actually a great post just earlier this week about two RTOs. I believe it was Mid-Continent ISO, I believe it was MISO and PJM. And it's a single slide that says: Interregional planning approach. This year we decided we don't need anything. There's really nothing that we both need.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>We're good.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>So we're moving on. But that's the problem. If you have to plan everything within your footprint and they do, right? They do all this planning within their footprint with their own set of metrics and their own priorities. Yeah, I can imagine that you get together and you're like, "Well, I figured myself out and you figured yourself out," right. Like you and your neighbor have a fence between your yards. You're not co-planting a tree.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So you have planning taking place at regional transmission organizations, which in theory should at least get you to regional planning. Right. I mean, at least it's bigger than a single utility territory, but it doesn't seem to actually result in regional lines.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Because there's a lot of barriers to regional planning and there's the technical aspect of regional planning and then there's the what do we call it implementation aspect where the entire electricity system is an engineering solution. Right? And one of the most important facets, I think, of engineering is that there's lots of ways to get to the end state that you need. And so you can do it with large interregional lines. Interutility lines. I mean, this is, again, what the studies have shown that is currently projected to be the least expensive way to reach the ends that we need. There are more expensive ways to reach the ends that we need. And some of those are more attractive to certain stakeholders because there's an onus of control there. There's a clarity. Right.</p><p>I know that every dollar I invest is resulting in benefits to my system. And when we have to share a project, do I feel like I'm getting proportionally the benefits that I'm paying for? And that's where a lot of these lines fall apart before they can be completed or even before the plan can be finished, right. You look at the system, you identify potential areas, but then you also identify potential solutions. And then you've got to pick amongst those solutions about what member organizations are interested in. And it can be very difficult to get these projects agreed upon if member entities feel like they have to pay for something that they're not getting a benefit from.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. In a curveball and all this. There are what are called merchant lines, which are not planned or built by utilities, but are being planned and built by sort of external market participants, which then aren't part of the utility planning or the RTO planning. As I understand it, they just kind of get bolted on if they can pass the test. So how does that work? I guess two questions here, sort of for my own background. What sort of percentage of transmission lines are merchant lines? Like, how big of a presence are independent transmission builders in this whole process?</p><p>And then B, like, how do they fit in the planning?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's a great question. And when we think about these independent lines that aren't part of the process, because there are some transmission organizations, there are some developers that build transmission, but they are within the process. It's part of sort of a competitive bidding process. But outside of the process of that traditional planning process, merchant lines are an incredibly small, I mean, approaching zero.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, really?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Well, because it's so difficult to get these lines built, right? Because of all of these barriers to being outside of the process. You said bolted on. That's actually quite a barrier. Getting bolted onto the system is no small piece of the puzzle.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? So you got planning. The term you used in the report is balkanized. You got sort of multiple entities planning. It's sort of like two problems. One, there's a bunch of different entities planning. But then two, there's no sort of integrative process that brings all these plans together and makes sense of them. So you end up with balkanized planning, but then also balkanized building. You just get these sort of little regional or even like local lines, but very few of the longer ones we need.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Right. And the boundaries are also a challenge because utility boundaries often do not fall within a state. Right. They are often crossing state lines. And so the utility's perspective versus the state regulator's perspective on what the benefits are —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So you could see something that would be benefiting a state but not the utility, and vice versa in some cases. So planning is a mess. That's the first P. The second P is even more of a mess. It's permitting. And then here also, this is like I struggle to describe this to people because it's so crazy, but basically any jurisdiction you cross over, or any entity you cross over, if you're proposing building a line, you need to get a permit. And that can be true at the state level, the county level, there could be private landowners level.</p><p>There's just a million levels of permits. So describe the thicket to us. Sort of like who all do I have to get a permit from if I want to go across like three states and whatever, 100 theoretically privately owned pieces of land.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>So in some states it's at the state level. You go to the State Commission and they give you the certificate and has the Siting Board and those together, the certificate of CPCN is the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity. And then the Siting is what determines the line. Right. The Siting is where the line is actually going to go. The certificate is essentially the right to build and with the certificate comes the ability to exercise eminent domain if necessary. Right. If that route that is selected, if the developer is not able to enter into private agreements with the landowners along that route, then they can exercise eminent domain through holding this certificate from —</p><p>And just pausing here, let's explain imminent domain. It basically just means you can take it the land and they can't stop you, right? Is it that simple?</p><p>Just compensation. Right. You have to give them some just compensation, but the land can be taken by the state for this purpose.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But then there are other entities involved in permitting it in other states.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>So state level is the best case scenario. And even that is if every state you cross needs to — so your best case scenario right now is that you are crossing two states where both states have state level siting and state level permitting. And both states are getting enough benefit from this line that it passes their metrics for allowing the line to be built.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Because each of them are thinking, when they're making their permitting decision, are just thinking about what does it do for our state? Statutorily, I think they're sort of often that confined to thinking about specifically what does this do for our state?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Exactly. And there are a few states where regional interests is actually in the statute, but few. And how do you show that? Right. Like, what's the metric for demonstrating that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. Is there anything like a common — I mean, when these states are making decisions about does this transmission line benefit our state enough to warrant a permit? If I'm a line developer, do I know what to expect, or are there common criteria for what counts as benefit or metrics or anything like that?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>There are not. Generally speaking, you expect reliability to be a metric and cost to be a metric, where reliability is actually explicitly defined by the North American Electric Reliability. Oh, shoot, I forget the C.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's probably a council or a commission. It's one of those. Definitely one of those.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>So reliability is often defined by NERC, and so that is a common metric. Are we adding reliability to the system? But then there's a cost question as well. And again, depending on what state you're in or how the process goes and depending on what the utility-state relationship is, how that cost gets considered is very interesting, whether it gets evaluated at the front end or evaluated at the back end, where some utilities rely on cost recovery from their state commissions. Right. So you put in the capital expenditure and then after the fact do a rate case and say, here's the money that we spent, here's how we benefited our rate payers and our consumers, but here's why we now need to raise the rate to pay ourselves back for this risk that we took in this capital expenditure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>But a lot of times those conversations actually get pulled forward too. Right. Though technically it's not approving the rate case before it gets built. There's still that discussion of, well, what are the benefits? Is this going to lower cost? Who is it going to lower cost for?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And one thing you point out in the report is if you want to build a really long line, you're going to, at least in some cases, be crossing a state where you're just crossing the state, there's not direct benefit to the state other than the sort of larger regional or national benefit of having this line. And so do we have examples of states sort of permitting lines that are like that that just come through them, or is that just like, "You're screwed if you need a state to let you do that?"</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Well, this is one of the challenges that high voltage direct current has because it is more expensive to build what's called a tap off station, right, or a substation that's more expensive in HVDC systems. And so you're more likely to try to get by with just a cut through. If you have an AC line, a substation is proportionally pretty low cost, so you can just tap off some power.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So an AC line you can dump power into the state and then create that benefit. But with a high voltage direct current line, creating an off ramp where you can dump some of your energy off the line into that state is actually a big chunk of capital cost.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Indeed, that off ramp can even be important for meeting the state guidelines to even be in the conversation in the first place. One of the Clean Line — so Clean Line Energy Partners was trying to develop a couple of different high voltage direct current lines. And one of the issues that they ran into was that in one of the states, they were trying to cut through initially. But if transmission lines are being built in the state, they have to be approved by the state commission. But the state commission only recognizes utilities that serve the state as an eligible entity to come before them to build transmission. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>It's a catch 22.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Sure. Not exactly a catch 22. Right. But yes, it's tricky for sure and certainly more tricky for HVDC.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is that what ended up killing some of those Clean Line projects, the cut through states?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>I find it difficult to point to one thing that killed the Clean Line projects because often those projects are great examples of just how fraught it is. Right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>So many pieces that slow you down. There's patient capital and then there's "I don't even know what we're asking for." When you're ten years down the road and you haven't broken ground on anything.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah. No capital is that patient. What is the alternative? What are the other levels of permits that sometimes you have to deal with?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>In Georgia, siting goes county by county.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yikes.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that means you're literally like, what does it mean to get a permit from a county? Are you sending a representative to a county board? Or how big of a hassle is a process for getting a county?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Likely that I mean, you are putting this case before the county and there's so much more uncertainty about where the line can go. Right. Because if there's objection in one county that requires a line to be moved and where it crosses a county line now might impact that siting opportunity in the adjacent county.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And if you think if the state is sort of insular and only looking at its own interests, I imagine that's doubly so for a county. Do you have to prove that you're going to benefit each county you go through? I'm not even sure how that would work.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>I'll be honest. I don't know either. We would have to talk to a developer who's gone through the process to know what that looks like.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then also, aren't private landowners, don't they get involved somehow around these processes?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Sure. So if your land is being potentially taken under eminent domain, if you can't come to an agreement with the developer on a private agreement on the access or use of your land or agreement on an easement or purchase, but the siting is approved. Then there's the eminent domain process. Prior to that, private landowners and community members and local interests get involved at the point of siting decision at community meetings with siting boards regarding their concerns about the line, for their property values, their concerns about the use of the line. Some of them are quite legitimate.</p><p>This line is you've misunderstood where the well is on my property and you can't be this close to the well, right. Or this is cutting through my farm and if we can move it over here to the edge of my farm, this is better for everyone involved. Others are I've read a number of dockets and inevitably people are concerned about being close to high voltage power lines.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, it's going to mess up their 5G chips in their head, or stuff like that. Are there similar —</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Yes. There are a host of, I believe, firmly held but inaccurate beliefs about the health impacts. Now, typically those do not sway a in fact, I have never seen those sway a docket in front of a public commission. But all of these sort of different voices are coming to the fore about where this line should go, if it should go there at all. Often arguments about where the power is coming from, where the power is going, shouldn't we all do this locally? I have a lot of sympathy for that perspective because I think one thing that transmission —</p><p>Transmission is not in the common lexicon when everybody's talking about energy, right. And as community members, you think about local solar and rooftop solar and those are the things that are relevant often to individual landowners and the recognition that those are part of the solution but cannot serve the entire need, that's a hard sell in many cases.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And if you're a developer trying to plow across whatever multiple states, multiple counties, multiple private pieces of land, that means educating each one of those individual entities about that, which I imagine can be time consuming, exhausting. So that's the second P permitting, which is, if we could summarize the problem, we're talking about interregional high voltage, long distance lines that would benefit the nation, but there's no national permitting. All the entities that are permitting are looking at their own narrower interests and just are creating basically one hurdle after another.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Exactly.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And then the third P is paying, which is always, of course, a problem in any sort of project development of any kind. But tell us a little bit about how these things get paid for. It's somewhat different if you're a vertically integrated utility; obviously, you just build the line and then charge your ratepayers to pay for it. And that at least seems straightforward. But then once again, once you are going between utilities or between states, that's where things get complicated. How does that work?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>So the challenge here in the business is called cost allocation. That's the difficulty and it's sort of self-defining. Cost allocation is how you are allocating costs. And FERC requires that costs be allocated among beneficiaries. And non-beneficiaries are not forced to pay to participate in allocating the cost for a line that does not do them any benefit. So there are two challenges here, right? On the one hand, you've got to decide how to share the costs among the people who are beneficiaries, but you also have to agree on how to define the beneficiaries.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was going to ask who counts as a beneficiary and who decides that?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Right. Great question. And everybody has a different answer, right? Every RTO has a different answer. And then utilities and developers have different perspectives. Is a generator a beneficiary of transmission? Because without transmission, they're not getting their power onto the grid, right. Is the next-door utility — maybe that substation isn't in their footprint, but what level of reliability improvement do they get before it becomes something that they should participate in supporting?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>The geographic footprint of these systems is actually quite large because for the most part, our electricity system is integrated. It is all touching each other, and so that power is flowing in lots of places.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And you get into these sort of like second-order benefits, third-order benefits in some attenuated sense, everyone in the country benefits from easing regional congestion and stuff like that and just reducing the cost of wholesale power. Those benefits cascade out.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>And they're not static.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>When you add a new generation somewhere on the system, the benefit of that transmission line to the system is now altered. When you add another transmission line somewhere else, the benefit of an earlier transmission line is altered.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so once you make this determination about cost allocation and who pays for what, it's fixed. Can you go back and revise it when things like that happen and kind of change the equation?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>So my understanding is that different RTOs have different approaches to this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That seems like a common theme here.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>That is correct. We haven't even discussed that. Not the entire country is covered by RTOs, right. Most of the west is not even covered by an RTO and they have a completely different system that please don't ask me about. But in some of them, there is sort of a medium-term cost allocation and then a revisiting. I'm not familiar enough to dive into the details of how that process is worked out and managed, but that's certainly another financial risk for everyone.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So just kind of summarizing. The basic problem here is FERC has sort of said you got to allocate costs among all the beneficiaries, even if we're talking multiple utilities, multiple states, but it has not specified in any very concrete way what the hell that means or who counts as a beneficiary or how you go through that process of cost allocation. So everyone's kind of winging it on their own. And often when multiple utilities have to get together and figure these things out, it just kind of grinds out in disagreements and no one can come to an agreement.</p><p>And so once again, you see the incentives pushing utilities to just build stuff within their own territory. So paying is our third P, our third mess. It's worth saying those are sort of the traditional three P's that people have thought about planning, permitting and paying. You add a couple more. One is participation. And I have some serious questions about this that I want to get to later when we start talking about solutions. But just tell me sort of like, are there any rules and guidelines now for participation or what passes as participation now? Or what exactly do you mean by participation?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Right. So I'm going to pause here, Dave. I'm not sure how to answer this question. I'll come up with an answer shortly, but I'm about to not make friends with the answer to this question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Good. It's a podcast about transmission. We need some controversy.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>All right. Okay, here we go: Participation. If you talk to folks in the business in transmission, many of them will tell you that participation is already part of this, that there's participation in transmission planning, that there's participation in permitting. And it is often the permitting where people talk about participation because they think about those community meetings and the landowner engagement and things like that. The planning process also requires stakeholder engagement. They are not connected. Right. The planning and the permitting are two very different processes, as we've already discussed, at very different scales. The stakeholders are not consistent, and as often is the case, who gets to decide who a stakeholder is?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Once again.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>And there's arguments for, I think a lot of strong arguments for broadening who is considered a stakeholder, and that participation should be inclusive and consistent throughout. If you are bringing in someone five years down the line when it's just time to take their land or a community or even local governments, right. The later you bring anyone into the process, the more they feel they are being strong-armed or likely are being strong-armed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>And I think it's important to note here that this report is not suggesting that there is going to be some consensus view that just by talking to more people, suddenly everyone's going to agree on where a transmission line is going to go. But it does say, let's really be frank, let's take an outside perspective on, particularly at the scale that we need for decarbonization on what these impacts are going to be and if we need to reach scale and speed and we already know what some of the pushback is going to be. What are ways that you include people, include local governments, include local authorities, include all of these impacted groups more actively and clearly in a process — which is our last P, I keep running into process — instead of this. Again, it's not even bifurcated, right? Because it's more than two.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, whatever. I don't know what the word is. Multipurcated.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Yeah, there we go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So that's participation. When we talk about solutions, I want to come back to this because it vexes me, but let's just get through the fifth P, which is this process which is sort of meant as like a meta P gathering up the other ones. And the point of the report here on this fifth P on process is just that there really isn't one. That the process is so fragmented and so different from place to place, even sometimes within places, that it makes for an environment where people trying to develop power lines don't and really can't know what to expect or how long it might take or what they might need or how they should go about it.</p><p>Is there more to say about process other than like, there should be one?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>There should be one. Well, it's clarity so that folks enter the system, right? So that you get private capital interested in it because it's not even high risk. It's just wild uncertainty because capital is not necessarily afraid of high risk, right? You can find high-risk capital, but risk and uncertainty are very different issues. But then the other thing about process is that it can create scale. If nothing is ever repeatable, then you can never get to scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So at the very least, you want a process where people endeavoring to enter it can have some sense of what's going to happen, what the steps are, right? Like what are the criteria for getting through it.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Because you can also get better.</p><p>Right. So those are the five P's. And when you talk about this is a mess, a mess at multiple levels, a mess at basically every stage. I mean, I think people listening by now should have gotten the basic idea that if you're trying to build a transmission line, you're in a foggy planning process and then a foggy multi-part capricious permitting process, and then all the while you're trying to pay for it. And the people you're trying to get to pay for it don't necessarily agree that they're getting benefits or don't have the patience to sit around waiting for the other parts of the process to work out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So it's really a wonder that any of these things get built at all. And they really kind of don't. As you said at the beginning, this is why they're not getting built even though we desperately need them. So we got to talk about solutions to these things. The way the report sort of frames solutions is solutions that are more on the kind of private sector, private actor side of the spectrum versus public. And I wanted to sort of interrogate that, get into that a little bit, but just let's go through some of the private, sort of more private sector-oriented solutions that come up here because I have questions about some of them.</p><p>Like for instance, you say permitting reforms. I guess this would be a good place to bring up my question about participation, I guess because this is sort of framing the rest of the discussion. Because what I've heard so far is there's just so many steps and so much of a mess and so many delays that it's killing all these projects. When I hear participation, what that brings to mind for me is more process, more delays, more difficulties. Because what I have in my head is I'm really into urbanism and all these sort of density issues and all this kind of thing.</p><p>And when you talk to urbanists about participation, what they hear is all these siting boards and historical preservation boards and all this just endless, endless delays. And so two things about participation from that angle one is just more delay and more time and more difficulty. But two, it's also the people who participate in the participation venues are not representative of the full range of beneficiaries. You know what I mean? Like if you're trying to build an apartment building near a single-family neighborhood, it's the homeowners that end up participating in the process and they all want to block it.</p><p>And the people who might benefit from the apartment building don't exist yet or don't know about it yet and can't show up at these meetings. So participation is just very fraught. So I guess I wonder when you talk about a lot of these solutions, like, for instance, permitting reform, that sounds to me like a gentle way of saying overriding some of these local barriers, basically just being able to come in and say no. Like, enough discussion. We're doing this. Which pulls in the opposite way, opposite direction of more participation. Do you know what I'm saying? So I guess I wonder how you reconcile this in your head, more participation versus the need for speed and cutting through some of these things.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Absolutely. What you've described is a pretty common perspective that folks have about what participation means. And I'll counter that participation doesn't mean everybody gets a vote. We are not sending every transmission line to the ballot box. Right? It is just about when we pull out participation to be separate from permitting and separate from planning. It is about ensuring that consistency of communication, giving people information, also identifying who is encouraged to participate. Right. In the examples that you are giving people who have the time and financial resources to participate —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>are the people who are participating. Right. And so being clear on who should be involved and what it takes to get those folks involved and that includes right, that's not just landowners within states, that's also tribes. Right. And there's lots of different stakeholders here that should be considered. The other piece, I think what's helpful is I'll give you an example. I'll give you a permitting example that's been proposed that I think speaks to this without just sounding like some magical dream. We'll just allow more people a voice, and all of a sudden it'll work out.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it will be faster.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Right? It'll be fine. Just trust us. So Senator Whitehouse introduced what's called the SITE Act. It's streamlining interstate transmission of electricity. Oh, gosh, I don't remember the date. I think it was two weeks ago. So, Senator Whitehouse and Representative Quigley both introduced the SITE Act to their respective bodies. And the Site Act proposes that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, that FERC, have siting authority on lines that touch two states or more and have a thousand megawatts or more of capacity. So, on the one hand, this speaks to what you were saying about overriding. Now, I would argue it is not overriding.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Specifically that's taking permitting authority away from states and giving it to FERC.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>I would specify that it is identifying that authority, which is appropriate for the federal government to have because it is a federal benefit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>It is aggregating benefits across diffuse benefits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, totally. Totally.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>So is it overriding or is it reassessing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Appropriately identifying, let's say.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Discuss in the comments. So that's the one piece. But the other part of that bill is that it says folks with — often landowners impacted or it's 100 foot within the right of way. So it expands it. It says more people can consider themselves impacted than just within 100ft of this right of way. It's a wider width of impact. It also has specifics on how much notice they get. Right. What the process is for being heard, and that they get essentially their day in court. Right. And that's the piece that is really informed by some of the efforts we've seen in response to pipelines under the National Gas Act. And this is — so this is, I think, a helpful example of how you can create solutions that streamline while still including and even broadening participation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Ah. So FERC gets the permitting power under the bill. FERC would get the permitting power. But FERC would also be obliged by statute to have a sort of formal participation process running up to that.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Right. So under the Natural Gas Act, when natural gas lines are permitted, landowners do have to get notice. You always have to give landowners notice before you condemn their land, right. Through eminent domain.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, yeah. Let's just pause and note, just in case people don't remember this or know this, but when it comes to natural gas pipelines, unlike with transmission lines, FERC already has that authority. FERC has the authority to use imminent domain and override, sort of —</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>That's correct.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>states and locals. But there is a participation process on that end, too.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Well, it would be nice if there was.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>There should be.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>It's not statutorily defined. And so, FERC tells the developers to give notice to the landowners. I'm sure you can imagine that developers aren't running out the door to tell people that this is happening and FERC doesn't follow up to ensure that it happened. So, one of the things that the SITE Act proposes is FERC can delegate that responsibility to someone, but it cannot be someone whose financial interest is getting that pipeline built.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Ah, right. And I suppose the positive gloss on this would be to say by bringing in people earlier, by creating this sort of formal system where people know how to participate and can participate earlier, you might forestall some of these objections from landowners or counties and thereby speed things up.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>One of the things discussed in the report is that participation is a two-way conversation, right. It's not just listening to people complain and saying, "Yes, but the models say that the line has to go here, I'm sorry, you don't have an electrical engineering degree and ten years of power systems experience." It is saying, "What do we need? What will support this community? What do the local authorities need? What can we work out to make this work?" And that goes back to process, too, right.</p><p>Like creating this as a relationship and as replicable and as sort of establishing standards, potentially. Right. That's one of the things that's proposed, is do you establish sort of minimum standards on not only what participation looks like from a timing perspective, but what benefits can be expected to communities who are hosting a transmission line?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And how does this tie into consent-based siting, which is another sort of private sector-ish solution that's been thrown out?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Sure. So, consent-based siting is an example of this. I don't know if it would work for transmission, I'll be honest, but it's an interesting thing to think about, where consent-based siting is usually discussed in the form of nuclear power plants or nuclear waste, where the community comes to an agreement on hosting a waste facility, for example. But they have a strong voice in setting those rules, right. On what they are willing to accept, on what it means for safety, on what it means for job training, on what it means for all those different pieces.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And what about regional — this is a mouthful — regional transmission anchored economic development clusters. Somebody's going to have to work out a good acronym for that one.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Yeah. So this is an example of how we think about what rural economic development actually means. Right. And one of the points we make in this paper is if we want to pursue some of these ideas, we've got to get past this five-word phrase or this acronym that we can fit on a slide. What does that mean? Right. If you're willing to create, if you want to make this anchor in this cluster, does that mean that other state or federal entities are also participating beyond electricity, does it become an investment and what type of investment and how does that become sustained so that we're actually creating long-term economic development.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So that would be sort of transmission as part of a larger vision of how to spark economic development in these particular regions. And so then we look on the public side, the public sector side solutions. It's worth saying that there have been attempts to give Doe and FERC more power over this stuff, more role in the planning to encourage regional planning, but they haven't really gone anywhere. So why did those previous efforts, if you look back at sort of FERC rulings, there's like a dozen that are saying in one way or another, please do some regional planning, but it never seems to work.</p><p>So why have these sort of public sector solutions not taken off yet? Why aren't they getting any traction?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Well, they're pretty tepid, as you said, right. Interregional transmission planning should happen. And so we get a slide that says, well, we thought about it, right. We talked about it and that's not going to work for us this year. Thank you for trying. So that's one of the issues. And there's also this authority question. Who has the authority? And currently the answer is nobody. Who has the authority to actually compel certain actions to be taken. RTOs and ISOs are member organizations. They are voluntary member organizations. Right. And I'm not saying that they should be required membership organizations, but that is one of the discussions that folks are having about RTOs and ISOs, right.</p><p>And what makes things compelling?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And just to pause there, I mean the reason for that is RTOs are hesitant to make decisions that overrule or override any of their utility members because the utility members always have the option of just saying, "Well, screw you, we're not going to be part of the RTO anymore." Right. So it's sort of like a definition of capture, really.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>That is a consideration. I mean, there's a counterpoint to that that says maybe it's not that easy to leave an RTO or an ISO, right. If you are currently in cost allocation contracts, you might not be able to extricate yourself from them. So now you are paying for something you're not even getting a benefit from. But that is certainly a concern, right? Is that impacting things?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Easy to threaten to do it.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>For sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I don't want to keep you forever. So I want to kind of get to the final thing I want to grapple with. Toward the end of the report, you say here are sort of two sets of recommendations. One that focuses more on the private sector and one that focuses more on the public sector. The one that focuses on the private sector is sort of tweak this incentive and tweak this process. You're trying to change the incentive structure to channel private activity more profitably and honestly, when I read through that recommendation, my reaction was, this just sounds like a bunch of incremental, marginal muddle.</p><p>It just does not speak to me about the sort of speed and clarity we need. And then, so the other set of recommendations are more focused on the public sector. And that's where you discuss the creation of a National Transmission Authority, or NTA, which would take hold of this whole thing about interregional lines. About national lines. I mean, we're talking about interregional lines, but there's all these proposals also in the background for a macro grid, for a whole regional like a national grid, not just interregional, but a grid that sort of sprawls across the entire nation, which, given our current process, just seems like an impossible dream.</p><p>So you create this National Transmission Authority and you give it like you're doing the planning, you're running the participation process. You have authority, eminent domain authority, to override in some cases when you need to. It just seems I mean, these are obviously my personal policy biases coming out here, but it just seems like if you need something so big and so fast and it's so clear what you need, wouldn't it be better just to nationalize this and grab hold of it and just have one accountable entity that you can use to cut through this Gordian knot?</p><p>I mean, I'm asking you to reveal your own preferences here, but does that speak to you?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>I'm so excited to dive into this question, Dave, because I do think this is the meat of the report, and I'm kicking myself for spending so much time talking about other things. That reaction, I think, again, is pretty common because the National Transmission Authority is something clear, right? It is quite, as you said, it is different. It's like, oh, if this isn't working, let's do something different. And again, what the report is saying is we are sketching out a possibility, but the next part of the conversation is, okay, what is that? How are you going to do that?</p><p>How many policies do you need? How are you writing those policies? Because you cannot build that accidentally. You have to build that intentionally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, that's part of the beauty of it to me. Right. I mean, the system we've built now is we just backed into it piecemeal. It makes no sense. No one did it on purpose.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>The electrical engineer in me says it is a great engineering marvel that we back into it. That is amazing how some of the best engineering happens is you just figure out what you need. So a national transition authority is not easy to define. And I'm not saying we shouldn't try to pursue defining it. I actually think it's incredibly important to try to pursue fully defining what a solution is. Right. This whole report is about another P, which is paradigms, right? Are we going with a National Transmission Authority because people say it right? I'm sure you have heard about National Transmission Authority idea before, right?</p><p>This report couldn't have been the first time you heard it. People talk.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, yeah, I've been wanting to nationalize the electricity grid for a long time.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Yeah. But we need to pursue what the implications of that are because electricity is interconnected in a way that the highway system is not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>And a car crash in New York does not affect traffic in Texas. These are very big questions. Do we want to build a macro grid? Niskanen is a member of the Macro Grid Initiative. There are clear benefits to a macro grid. How do we design that macro grid? If we have the federal government create a National Transmission Authority today that is tasked with building a macro grid, how are we updating those plans to respond to the real challenges of building transmission lines, even under an NTA, how are we updating those plans to respond to how generation is being built in different places?</p><p>Right. We can't have a plan today and then finish it in 20 years, the entire system is going to look different. So you're asking a lot of the federal government and you're asking them to do it with speed. You're asking them to do it with flexibility. Feel free to reference Operation Warp Speed now. And I will reply that we still haven't gotten vaccines in all the arms. Right? I mean, this is a major undertaking and it's building. Right. It is not research. It's creating a physical system. It's a lot to ask. Those authorities need to be explicitly defined.</p><p>They're still going to, I think, come under legislative and court challenges, right? So they've got to be able to take that. We've got to be able to respond to them and we have to find a way to fund it. And we all want it to be — so I guess I am a little bit defined on my bias, but I'm about to explain my bias in the other direction as well. I'm very good at straddling the fence here. Where is it going to sit? Is it in the Department of Energy? Is it in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which I just need to call it FERC? Is it in FERC, which is technically under DOE?</p><p>Does it make sense to have a regulator also be a planner and an implementer? Or is that really going to mess up their regulatory authority? If it's in the Department of Energy, what is the way that it gets funded so that it is not so susceptible to the whims of budget cycles? And if it is being funded through, for example, a postage stamp rate. A transmission bill to every user. Whose business model is that messing up and what are you going to do about it?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? And also, while we're throwing in complications, there are reasons utilities don't build these interregional lines. And it's often from a utility's point of view, especially if I'm a vertically integrated utility and my power is relatively expensive and if I built interregional lines connecting me to cheaper power sources, it would reduce the cost of my power, which is great for my ratepayers, but not necessarily something I want. So you're not only overriding or intention necessarily with landowners and counties or whatever, but the utilities themselves are probably not going to be enthusiastic participants in a nationalization like this.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>That's right. And when I say whose business plan is it interrupting? I don't mean it like I have some emotional attachment to someone else's bank account. It's more that those business models impact choices that are made in supporting the transmission in their footprint, right. In ensuring the actual reliable electricity delivery to your house. Because it isn't transmission that connects to your house, it is distribution that connects to your house. All these systems are integrated and so the impacts of an NTA are significant. It will take time and I think all of this needs to be grappled with very clearly before we just say this should happen.</p><p>Because if this is done, I'm not suggesting that we can come up with a perfect policy. That doesn't exist, but we need to come up with an intentional policy right. And be continuing to have this conversation and not just sort of slap something together.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I don't know, we're podcasters. I feel like it's our right to wave our hands vaguely at a giant policy and move on.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>I want to touch very briefly on the private enterprise piece because I do think the report does make it seem very incremental and I'm actually in discussions with a couple of folks on how to write an example that will spell out the private enterprise piece. So that's clearer because again, if we want to build a macro grid, it doesn't seem like something that private enterprise can accomplish. Right. Do you want a private company deciding if they are sending power to Texas in a crisis or if they are willing to take a cut in prices because it's an emergency?</p><p>Right. So you have to send the power, but you're not allowed to charge for it. Right. Well, maybe you do. If there are rules, there are ways that you can establish collaborations and partnerships and RTOs and ISOs are an example. Maybe we can improve upon that example. But private investment can move faster than government capital in many cases, can move more flexibly than government capital in many cases, and can see opportunities in ways that the government can't. There's very likely a hybrid solution that is going to be the ultimate solution. But it really should be a thoughtful one that understands these questions and considers implications and not just we were able to get backstop strengthened, let's see what happens.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, but this idea that private capital is kind of smarter and flexible and so on is part of what motivated previous reforms. I mean, we're talking about how merchant power lines are a tiny fraction of the total. But FERC's idea was, let's create an analogous market, analogous to wholesale power markets, where you can actually have competitive — you can have private capital coming in and competing to do the best, fastest, most efficient job, and it just completely hasn't. So you need some pretty substantial reforms because clearly whatever's happening is not working.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, I completely agree with that. That is a point well taken. So it is a big question to ask is, can this be done? And then what would the gaps be?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. And so, I mean, when I think about a national transmission authority and all the sort of cascade of questions that you raise about where does it sit, how does it work, who's it accountable to, how does it pay for itself, how does it interact with DOE and FERC? How does it interact with states? I rapidly grow overwhelmed and want to throw my hands up. So if national policymakers read this report, took it to heart, said the system we have is clearly not working. We're clearly not building transmission fast enough. We're clearly specifically not building interregional and national power lines as fast as every single model says we need to if we want to hit these goals we have.</p><p>What would you like them to do? What is the right process to put in place, to start working toward? Because the easiest thing in the world reports come and go all the time. People are constantly waving their hands at grandiose solutions to this and that. But what is the incremental next steps? Who should take hold of this? And what is the process by which we could put some kind of meat on the bones?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Right, so the primary takeaway is that we should just build nuclear. I'm kidding.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Don't trigger — trying to trigger me.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>So the primary takeaway is that these are big conversations and that they need to be ongoing. When it comes to policymakers, I think there's a real opportunity to have a hearing about national planning. That is actually one of the takeaways of this report, right, is we need national planning because that establishes clear metrics, that establishes clear definitions. It gets everyone on the same page. Then do you implement that national plan through a national transmission authority or implement it through motivating private capital? But let's have some hearings on a national plan and how to make that happen and where it should sit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Everyone seems excited about that step. No matter what report on transmission you read, everyone recommends we've got to have a national plan. But when I look at all the challenges, those smaller scale challenges, I can easily imagine a national plan being drawn up and then sitting somewhere. It seems like the most likely outcome.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>There's a lot of threads that need to move forward here. That's a great call. It is not just a national plan. But I do think hearings on a national plan and how to define a national plan and where a national plan should sit is an incredibly important next step. The other one is to give me a couple of million dollars to figure out the answer to this question.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Excellent. Excellent idea for all my wealthy listeners.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Yes, I'll take them $5 at a time. We'll put them in a little. But it is that we need to be engaging in these conversations, right. That I want policymakers to have a sense of what questions they should be asking. Right? That this is a business model question, that this is a speed question, that we need to be having these difficult conversations and then figuring out what the path forward is. And I don't think those difficult conversations are happening.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right? And just sort of as a final question, obviously, to take any action on a national plan is going to require law. It's going to require statutes. This is something that's too big and comprehensive to be achieved through executive level, like executive action, just tweaking agency rules. You're going to need Congress to take hold of this and run it. And I don't know if you've met Congress, but it's not distinguished by its —</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, I invited them to my last birthday party, and they were pretty dull.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not super sharp, not super fast, and unable to come to agreement on almost anything. So what is your sense of the partisan valence of this? Is this one of those rare, rare issues that you might actually see some productive bipartisan discussion on, or is this just going to ground out in some stupid culture war whatever?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>I do think there's a real opportunity for bipartisan efforts here. We already have some transmission in the bipartisan infrastructure bill. Those discussions recognize transmission as infrastructure. Identified permitting — they worked on permitting through strengthening backstop authority. There's a paying piece in there, the transmission facilitation program. So there is clearly — that is a signal that there's a bipartisan opportunity here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Can I pause there? What's the steps they've taken in the bipartisan infrastructure bill? There's money, but money is just one thing. In terms of those other reforms relative to all the things we need, how far down the line have they gotten? Are you impressed with what's in the bipartisan infrastructure bill? Or is this sort of like barely a first step kind of thing?</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Can I say both? Since we have taken no steps in 15 years, the first step is the biggest, but it has to keep moving, right. We can't wait another 15 years. Right. So this has to be the beginning of that recognition, right? We had this bipartisan agreement. We recognize that transmission needs more attention. And this is where I know, in fact, that we at Niskanen and Clean Air Task Force see this as a call to action to be continuing to engage in these conversations. Clean Air Task Force and Niskanen do not come at this problem from the same perspective.</p><p>But we both see the need here. We both have folks that we are trying to talk to and folks that we are trying to learn from and there is real opportunity for bipartisan, attractive solutions here, right? We are talking low cost power, we are talking rural economic development, we are talking reliability and resilience in cities. I used to live — I just moved to DC but prior to that I was in Cleveland, Ohio where reliable power was a real challenge.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I mean this is frustrating in so many areas of climate policy, right? I mean you can sort of envision big things happening that are absolutely of benefit to almost everyone. This is what's so frustrating. No one is, but maybe like a few utilities, is benefiting from the sort of current constipated system but it's just like trying to get everyone to look past their immediate proximate interests to this larger interest is always the policy challenge.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Indeed. It is not a small issue and you're right to point that out. But this report hopefully raises — god, raises awareness. Yeah, raises awareness.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The dread phrase.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>I know. I hate myself. I take it back.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well in this case it's true. I mean I will say normally I hate the phrase raises awareness but in terms of transmission's role in decarbonization I feel like the past several months, even past year maybe, really has seen a huge leap in awareness about this. When I first started writing about it on Volts, not even a year ago, even then it felt pretty obscure. But even since then it's just like it's become a front burner topic. So this might be one of those rare areas where you can say raise awareness without —</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>without shame.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>I think I've used this phrase before, and now I'm going to get it on the record here. I agree with you. Transmission is having a moment, but it needs to turn into momentum.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Turning a moment into momentum. Oh, that's pretty good. That's a good slogan.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Thank you. Yes, thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>That's why you deserve these millions of dollars to move this forward.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>I think one of the barriers that transmission has also had in the past is that it is very easy to get pulled down into the technical. And one of the things that this report I think does really well is keeps it up at the policy, right? That we can move forward with policy while figuring out the technical. We don't need to have them so bound together that it essentially becomes gatekeeping about who's allowed to talk about transmission.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I meant to say that earlier, actually. I read this report and it's really for being about such a technical area it's remarkably readable like I encourage if you're listening, just go read the report. It's not that long, and it's all pretty plain language, and it really gives you a global sense of what a mess this all is and what the need for reform is.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Thanks, Dave. I really appreciate that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, thanks for coming on and taking all this time, Liza. I appreciate it.</p><p><strong>Liza Reed</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, this is great, Dave. Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Thank you for listening to the Volts podcast. It is ad-free, powered entirely by listeners like you. If you value conversation like this, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber at Volts.wtf. Yes, that's Volts.wtf so that I can continue doing this work. Thank you so much, and I'll see you next time.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-the-challenges-of-building</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:40539753</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 10 Aug 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/40539753/773ac3ea60325f37ab9236eee88b4b93.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4072</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/40539753/c68a467bc03dcfdb5281d45d841fa994.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[West Virginia needs the Biden energy agenda]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>As we speak, Democrats in Congress are hashing out the details of the budget reconciliation bill that will contain the vast bulk of President Joe Biden’s domestic agenda. It is meant to be passed alongside the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.npr.org/2021/08/10/1026081880/senate-passes-bipartisan-infrastructure-bill">recent bipartisan infrastructure package</a> that came out of the Senate. </p><p>One of the unique features of this political moment is that virtually every individual Democrat has the power to sink the whole enterprise — there are zero Dem votes to spare in the Senate and only a handful in the House — but if any of them sink it, it <em>all</em> goes down. If progressive Dems kill the bipartisan infrastructure bill, conservative Dems will kill the reconciliation bill, and vice versa. (House Speaker Nancy Pelosi <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/amid-turmoil-democrats-delay-house-vote-infrastructure-budget-bills-n1277516">recently agreed</a> to hold a vote on the bipartisan bill on Sep. 27, but progressives have <a target="_blank" href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/aoc-stresses-progressive-democrats-wont-back-bipartisan-infrastructure-bill-without-3-5-trillion-package-11627923806">pledged not to vote for it</a> unless reconciliation also gets a vote.)</p><p>They either all succeed together or all fail together. And if they fail, the party will get crushed in 2022 and 2024. None of them will escape unscathed. They’ve got to make it work.</p><p>For obvious reasons, there’s an enormous amount of speculation about how various Democrats will play their hands in these negotiations. I can’t claim to understand the motivations of everyone involved. The <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/moderate-house-democrats-in-standoff-with-pelosi-over-infrastructure-2021-8">recalcitrant House “moderates”</a> are some mix of <a target="_blank" href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/08/house-suicide-squad-democrats-biden-infrastructure-gottheimer.html">irrational and malicious</a>. Sen. Kyrsten Sinema is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/08/23/sinema-35t-spending-bill-506583">utterly opaque</a>.</p><p>But Sen. Joe Manchin makes sense to me, for the simple reason that I believe he has West Virginia’s best interests at heart. And that’s why I’m confident he’s going to find his way to supporting an ambitious reconciliation bill. He knows West Virginia needs it.</p><p>The simple fact is, West Virginia’s energy economy is not on a sustainable course. <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=44115">US coal is on the way out</a>.</p><p>This is true across the country and it’s true in West Virginia. One of the state’s two big utilities, American Electric Power (AEP), will <a target="_blank" href="https://wfpl.org/these-coal-plants-need-upgrades-three-states-will-decide-their-fate/">shut down 5,574 megawatts</a> of WV coal generation by 2030, and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/energy_and_environment/wv-public-service-commission-approves-keeping-mitchell-plant-operational-through-2040-electric-rate-hike/article_14da3378-33f0-5fe8-82a5-52a7230d32f6.html">the rest of it by 2040</a>. The other, First Energy, has pledged <a target="_blank" href="https://apnews.com/article/technology-climate-change-chuck-jones-legislation-ohio-90baf5b9254006f8d44743baf84504e4">carbon neutrality by 2050</a>. The number of US coal mines <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=48936">continues to fall</a>.</p><p>Many of the states biggest private sector employers, like <a target="_blank" href="https://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/sustainability/planet/climate-change">Walmart</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.encycle.com/blog/special-report-where-the-largest-u-s-companies-stand-with-their-sustainability-efforts/">Kroger</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://corporate.lowes.com/sites/lowes-corp/files/2020-07/Lowes_2019_FINAL_optimized.pdf">Lowe’s</a>, and <a target="_blank" href="https://us.pg.com/blogs/pg-announces-new-climate-commitment/">Proctor & Gamble</a>, have set aggressive emission-reduction goals and are looking for clean electricity (which they must currently purchase out of state). </p><p>The people of West Virginia largely understand that an inexorable energy transition is underway. They are scared it will leave them and their communities behind. </p><p>West Virginia needs new investment and new jobs. They need leadership. Passing some version of Joe Biden’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/">American Jobs Plan</a> (AJP) would be an enormous boon to the state and a political win for Joe Manchin.</p><p>The American Jobs Plan would invest in West Virginia</p><p>Last week, the Center for Energy and Sustainable Development at the WVU law school released a <a target="_blank" href="https://energy.law.wvu.edu/files/d/3ba79f26-3d25-4c5e-a016-b7966c092ff7/wvef-built-back-better-2021.pdf">new analysis</a> showing what a few key provisions of AJP would do for West Virginia’s economy. (It builds on a <a target="_blank" href="https://energy.law.wvu.edu/west-virginias-energy-future">previous analysis</a> demonstrating the feasibility of rapid decarbonization in the state.) </p><p>Specifically, it models a “Clean Innovation Pathway” that would reduce carbon emissions from the state’s electricity system roughly 80 percent by 2030, taking into account two key policies from the AJP: extension/expansion of the clean-energy tax credits and the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.thirdway.org/memo/manufacturing-the-future-of-clean-energy-with-48c">48C Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit</a>, which invests in clean-energy manufacturing projects. </p><p>Through 2040, the Clean Innovation Pathway reduces the cost of electricity by $855 million and increases employment by the equivalent of 3,500 full-time jobs, while pulling in $20.9 billion in investment in new solar, wind, energy storage, and other clean-energy projects. </p><p>If Manchin’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.manchin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/manchin-stabenow-unveil-bill-to-incentivize-domestic-manufacturing-and-reinvestment-in-rural-america">American Jobs in Energy Manufacturing Act</a> (which would expand 48C) were passed as part of the AJP, it would draw an additional $1.7 billion in manufacturing investments and create an additional 3,250-4,350 manufacturing jobs (plus 9,300-12,400 jobs created indirectly). </p><p>Importantly, these numbers capture only a fraction of the AJP’s benefits to West Virginia. There are other investments in Biden’s plan that would land in the state.</p><p>Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) would get money for demonstration projects; money for a series of “pioneer projects” applying CCUS to steel, cement, and other heavy industrial plants; and a tax credit for carbon capture and storage.</p><p>There’s money for economic development in coal country, reclamation of mines and wells, weatherization of buildings, regional innovation hubs, and much else that would channel investment into the WV energy sector. </p><p>Perhaps most importantly: the analysis, done back in April, does <em>not</em> take into account the effects of a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.catf.us/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/CATF_CEPP_2Pager_08.05.21.pdf">Clean Energy Payment Program</a> (CEPP), which would offer federal payments to utilities that increase their deployment of clean energy — whether it’s solar, wind, geothermal, hydrogen fuels, or natural gas with carbon capture — and levy fines on those that fell short. </p><p>In effect, federal revenue would pay for West Virginia’s transition to clean energy, rather than the bill falling on state ratepayers. By doing so, it would generate vast in-state benefits — in air quality and other health improvements, in jobs, in innovation and entrepreneurship — that would dwarf those of the other policies, at little cost to the state. (Precisely quantifying the benefits will have to wait on analysis of the final proposal, which I’m told is forthcoming.) </p><p>If you add it all up, the AJP offers West Virginia tens of billions of dollars in federal investment to help kickstart an energy transition in the state. It’s an opportunity that won’t come along again any time soon. </p><p>Manchin knows an energy transition is necessary, and that it’s underway elsewhere. He doesn’t want his state to get left behind.</p><p>That’s what his constituents fear: being left behind. If they’re going to embrace an energy transition, they need to hear from leaders they trust, like Manchin, that it’s possible.</p><p>West Virginians are nervous about the energy transition</p><p>In national political circles, West Virginia is thought of as a red fossil-fuel state, which everyone takes to mean that the WV public supports fossil fuels and will fight any policy that hurts them.</p><p>Polling shows things are not that simple. </p><p>Recently the Nature Conservancy and the West Virginia Chamber of Commerce sponsored some detailed polling of West Virginians’ views on their energy future. (The polling, conducted by Research America, deliberately oversampled voters in coal country.) The results are fascinating.  </p><p>WV voters know that the state currently depends on coal and that it is being hurt by a broader national shift to clean energy. Quoting from <a target="_blank" href="https://www.weirtondailytimes.com/news/local-news/2021/08/polling-shows-west-virginians-open-to-energy-transition/">the local Weirton Daily Times</a>:</p><p>When asked if respondents agree with the statement that coal is the backbone of the state and that renewable energy is hurting mining jobs, 59% of statewide respondents and 59% of coal country respondents agreed. But when asked whether they agree that the economy is shifting away from coal and fossil fuels towards clean and renewable energy sources, 69% of statewide respondents and 73% of coal country respondents agreed.</p><p>They know (67 percent) that coal is not clean. And they are not wedded to it: 90 percent see benefits in shifting the state’s energy system toward clean energy like renewables and carbon capture, 68 percent support federal investments in clean energy jobs, and 68 percent support federal investment in clean manufacturing.  </p><p>What WV voters are wedded to is <em>jobs</em>. The poll asked about the most important thing politicians could do to help WV communities. Only 12 percent urged support of clean energy and only 14 percent urged support of coal. The overwhelmingly favorite answer, with 70 percent, was to bring more jobs. </p><p>It’s not difficult to pull a coherent narrative out of these results. The people of West Virginia know their state relies on coal, they know the nation in trending away from coal and toward clean energy, and they want to be a part of the transition, but they fear losing more jobs and economic development.</p><p>They need a trusted leader — Joe Manchin, for instance — to show them that the energy transition can bring them those jobs.</p><p>Data for Progress has also done <a target="_blank" href="https://www.filesforprogress.org/memos/wv_voters_support_ces.pdf">polling in West Virginia</a> which backs up these findings. While the answers reflect a predictable partisan split, clear majorities of WV voters support transitioning to a decarbonized energy grid, offering incentives for the purchase of low-pollution technologies, supporting displaced fossil fuel workers, and leading in a clean energy economy. </p><p>The latter two of these even draw support from a majority of Republicans. And even where there’s more opposition from Republicans, they are fairly evenly split.</p><p>The political term for this is “wedge issue” — Manchin has the support of virtually all of his party on an issue that splits the opposition party. The AJP is his chance to take advantage.</p><p>Manchin’s overwhelming interest, and West Virginia’s, lies in bringing federal investment to the state</p><p>Manchin has been using his position in the majority to do right by West Virginia. In the bipartisan infrastructure bill, he steered money toward big investments that will benefit his state, in clean manufacturing and industrial decarbonization, the Appalachian Regional Commission, broadband expansion, and more. </p><p>He has focused federal attention on WV coal communities, drawing state visits from <a target="_blank" href="https://www.manchin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/manchin-energy-secretary-granholm-tour-three-west-virginia-energy-facilities">Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wvnews.com/news/wvnews/u-s-labor-secretary-marty-walsh-tours-west-virginia-mine-with-sen-joe-manchin/article_88981564-01df-11ec-86c9-436efe4b776e.html">Labor Secretary Marty Walsh</a>. He was instrumental in Biden creating a new <a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/23/fact-sheet-biden-administration-outlines-key-resources-to-invest-in-coal-and-power-plant-community-economic-revitalization/">White House Interagency Working Group on Coal and Power Plant Communities and Economic Revitalization</a> and appointing West Virginia native Brian Anderson, director of the National Energy Technology Laboratory, to run it (and direct an initial $109.5 million in new investments).  </p><p>But now, as I have <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/crunch-time-this-is-americas-last">written before</a>, the national Democrats have reached what is likely their last chance to do anything big for a decade or more, and it is far and away the biggest thing they will do. Manchin has it within his reach to sign a bill that will draw tens of billion of dollars to his state, to help it kickstart an energy transition that both he and a majority of his voters recognize is necessary. </p><p>The alternative is … nothing. Republicans will never pass a bill like this. A Republican president might do more of what Trump did — <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks-list.html">rig the rules</a> to allow fossil fuel companies to pollute a little more and draw a few more subsidies before they go under — but no Republican Congress is going to spend billions of dollars on West Virginia’s energy transition. It’s now or never.</p><p>Manchin can be a hero to his state or he can allow the work of his political career to flame out in a burst of recrimination and failure. I am confident he’ll make the right decision, for himself and for West Virginia.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/west-virginia-needs-the-biden-energy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:40322916</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 25 Aug 2021 16:00:12 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/40322916/3b6338f50334372bfdef7701262a73e6.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>762</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/40322916/b379c0de1e0d63179bffb68ca522aee1.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Economists have quantified the economic risks of climate "tipping points." It's grim.]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>A trickle of transcripts!</p><p>First up, an administrative note: many, many people have requested written transcripts of the Volts podcasts. And I want to provide them. But it’s going to take a while.</p><p>I could produce the transcripts in a few hours if I were willing to simply send the sound files through a robot transcriber like <a target="_blank" href="https://otter.ai">Otter</a> and accept the somewhat choppy results (which are generally around 85 percent accurate).</p><p>However, I’m way too anal retentive to do that. And Volts readers deserve better! I want to clean the transcripts up — remove all the “sort of’s” and “kind of’s,” delete aborted or repeated sentences, polish up the grammar — so that they are as pleasant to read as they are to hear. (I’m not that precious about preserving the exact original words; I’m more interested in clearly capturing meaning in readable form.)</p><p>That means closely copyediting these files, some of which are more than 10,000 words. So far, with a little help, I’ve gotten through … one. And it took about 10 people-hours of work. Sigh.</p><p>Here’s the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-rep-sean-casten-on">full transcript of my podcast with Rep. Sean Casten</a> on “Hot FERC Summer” (and here’s a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/qovefbquv8v7bn8/volts21.07.28%28sean.casten%29.pdf?dl=0">PDF version</a>). For those who’d like a more compact version, here’s a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/rep-sean-casten-on-hot-ferc-summer-and-how-to-prepare-our-electricity-grid-for-climate-change/">highlight reel running on Canary</a>.</p><p>Hopefully these will get somewhat faster and easier going forward. I will let you know as they come out. Now, on to the main event.</p><p>Pulling tipping points into climate economics</p><p>Just about everyone familiar with climate change has heard about “tipping points.” Famed climate scientist Wallace Broecker first raised the possibility <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/328123a0">way back in 1987</a>, and ever since then, they’ve loomed large in the climate discussion.</p><p>The idea behind tipping points is fairly simple and familiar: as heat accumulates in the atmosphere, Earth’s geophysical systems may not simply adjust in linear fashion, alongside the incrementally rising temperature; in some cases, they may “tip over” some unpredictable threshold and enter a fundamentally new state, sometimes called a “phase shift.” Think of ice that has slowly cracked suddenly shattering, or “the straw that broke the camel’s back.” </p><p>The commonly cited examples of potential tipping points are the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets. As warming has progressed, they have been shedding water and developing deep fissures. It is possible that at some (unpredictable) point, one or both will lose integrity and begin breaking apart altogether, irreversibly, raising global sea level dozens of feet in relatively short order.</p><p>Because the consequences of some oft-discussed tipping points are rather apocalyptic, they have been used and misused for a long time in climate communications. It has somewhat annoyed climate scientists, because not only are these tipping points not a sure thing, each one is, in its own right, relatively unlikely.</p><p>Civilization-ending changes are not likely, but they’re not zero probability either. Legendary Harvard economist Martin Weitzman called these low-probability, high-impact possibilities “tail risks” and was famous for warning that economists are not taking them into account — and are thus underestimating the need for rapid decarbonization. </p><p>In his book <a target="_blank" href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0691159475/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&#38;camp=1789&#38;creative=9325&#38;creativeASIN=0691159475&#38;linkCode=as2&#38;tag=volts09-20&#38;linkId=f0607df956f7e74dcfb93919adfb6dd3"><em>Climate Shock</em></a>, co-authored with his protégé, New York University’s Gernot Wagner, he argued that the right way to think about climate mitigation is not through a cost-benefit lens, as though particular levels of spending avoid specific levels of damages, but instead as a kind of insurance. We purchase insurance to cover against tail risks all the time, not because we think they’re likely to happen, but because the consequences would be so dire if they did. </p><p>Weitzman has <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/business/energy-environment/martin-weitzman-dead.html">passed away</a>, but Wagner and others have carried on this argument long enough that it has begun to break through in mainstream climate economics. However, it leaves a key question unanswered: yes, the risk of tipping points raises the value of mitigation, but how much? It has never been quantified.</p><p>Into that breach comes a new paper in the <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</em> (PNAS), from Wagner and a group of colleagues: Simon Dietz and Thomas Stoerk of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change, and James Rising of the University of Delaware. </p><p>“<a target="_blank" href="https://www.pnas.org/content/118/34/e2103081118">Economic impacts of tipping points in the climate system</a>” represents the first formal attempt to quantify the economic impacts of tipping point risks. The results are startling: the economic impact of carbon emissions is much higher than appreciated, as is the value of reducing emissions. </p><p>Not that we needed much more evidence, but this study makes it clear that there is virtually no way we could overdo it on decarbonization. As Wagner told me when I called him to discuss the results, “I don't see a downside to doing too much too quickly.”</p><p>The devilishly difficult task of quantifying risks</p><p>The PNAS authors adopt a common definition of tipping points: “subsystems of the Earth system that are at least subcontinental in scale and can be switched—under certain circumstances—into a qualitatively different state by small perturbations.” </p><p>They included the eight that have been studied by the IPCC:</p><p>Thawing of permafrost leading to carbon feedback resulting in additional carbon dioxide and methane emissions, which flow back into the carbon dioxide and methane cycles.</p><p>Dissociation of ocean methane hydrates resulting in additional methane emissions, which flow back into the methane cycle.</p><p>Arctic sea ice loss (also known as “the surface albedo feedback”) resulting in changes in radiative forcing, which directly affects warming.</p><p>Dieback of the Amazon rainforest releasing carbon dioxide, which flows back into the carbon dioxide cycle.</p><p>Disintegration of the Greenland Ice Sheet increasing sea-level rise.</p><p>Disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet increasing sea-level rise.</p><p>Slowdown of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation modulating the relationship between global mean surface temperature and national mean surface temperature.</p><p>Variability of the Indian summer monsoon directly affecting GDP per capita in India.</p><p>It’s important to note that these are not all possible tipping points, just the ones that have been studied, so the PNAS study’s results are, as the authors emphasize, a “probable underestimate, given the literature we synthesize has yet to cover some tipping points and misses possible impact channels and interactions even for those it does cover.”</p><p>In their survey of existing literature, the authors found 52 papers that quantified the economic impacts of one or more tipping points, but over half of those were based, not on geophysical data or analysis, but on highly stylized adjustments to model parameters. The authors put those aside. In the end, they focused on 21 papers that actually linked the geophysical mechanisms of tipping points to economic damages.</p><p>The whizbang procedural move of the paper is to pull these different studies — many using different models with different assumptions — into a single “meta-model,” with replicas of each studied tipping point combined in a single framework. (There is a great deal of discussion of this methodology in the paper, and more in an extended appendix, if you’re interested.)</p><p>The result is an ability to directly compare, and to sum up, the possible economic damages of tipping points. From there, applying a few conventional assumptions about <a target="_blank" href="https://grist.org/article/discount-rates-a-boring-thing-you-should-know-about-with-otters/">discount rates</a> and risk aversion, a model can spit out a number for the <em>present-day</em> costs of those future risks.</p><p>Obviously, any estimate like this going to be somewhat faux-precise, involving all kinds of assumptions and probability ranges piled atop one another, so it must be taken as provisional and tentative, subject to further research. But still, it’s better than having no estimate at all.</p><p>We are underestimating climate risks and overestimating the costs of action</p><p>As its principal metric, the study uses the “social cost of carbon” (SCC), meant to capture the total social and environmental damage done by the emission of a ton of carbon dioxide. </p><p>For convenience, it uses the current US government SCC figure, which is about $51. There’s a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cost-of-carbon-pollution-pegged-at-51-a-ton/">history behind this</a>: Obama originally convened the working group that put the figure at around $50 during his administration. Under Trump, it dropped to about $1. Biden has bumped it back up to $51.</p><p>“They undid the Trump damage and went back to decade-old assumptions,” says Wagner. Now, there is <a target="_blank" href="https://gwagner.com/risky-climate-scc-8/">work underway to update the US government SCC</a> with better numbers. “If you go to the most modern estimates and turn on the stuff that we think ought to be turned on — we know that there are tipping points, we need risk aversion, we need reasonable discount rates, and so on — you don't get to $50,” he says, “you get $250.” (For the true climate modeling nerds: that’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-020-0833-x">true even in DICE</a>, William Nordhaus’s model.) </p><p>I don’t know if the new number will be $250, but I’d be shocked if it were under $150. Anyway, that’s a subject for another post, because the PNAS study quantifies the <em>relative</em> increase in SCC when tipping points are incorporated rather than ignored. </p><p>The headline result: “When modelled separately and then summed together, the individual tipping points increase the expected SCC by 24.5%.”</p><p>The details:</p><p>As you can see, the most costly tipping points are the release of ocean methane hydrates and permafrost carbon. A couple, like the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, average out to <em>reduce</em> the SCC. (A change in the AMOC might shelter some parts of Europe from the worst effects of climate for a while — though this effect might be overwhelmed as the damages are better understood.)</p><p>The main thing to note is that 25 percent is not a small number. If we’re systematically underestimating the cost of carbon emissions by a quarter, we’re probably giving bad policy advice — badly underplaying the urgency of action.</p><p>But another important note is that 25 percent is the <em>median</em> estimate of the effect of tipping points on SCC. Just as with estimates of the physical damages of climate change, estimates of the economic costs of tipping points have a long right tail.</p><p>These are the tail risks Weitzman warned about, translated into economic terms. SCC could be higher if climate sensitivity is higher than estimated, if people are more risk averse, if discount rates are lower, if tipping points arrive sooner, or any number of other variables go the wrong way. </p><p>What it means is, there’s a small-but-not-negligible chance that we are currently underestimating the cost of carbon emissions by as much as 250 percent or more. (Look at that “More” blob!) If that is true, we’re <em>really</em> giving bad policy advice, as in, “market mechanisms” vs. “wartime footing.”</p><p>The policy implications of tipping points</p><p>Let’s take a step back and review what we can learn from this study. </p><p>First, economists have more or less been ignoring tipping points, which means they have systematically been underestimating the SCC. Best estimates put the amount of that underestimation around 25 percent. </p><p>But that 25 percent is almost certainly a lower bound. The authors have built a framework that can plug in new data and analysis of tipping points as it comes along. It is almost certain that as more tipping points are studied and the interactions among them are better modeled, the estimate of their potential damages will rise. </p><p>And again, remember that long tail. 25 percent is the median estimate, but the <em>average</em> estimate is 43 percent, and there’s at least a 10 percent chance of 100 percent — in other words, “there's a one in 10 chance that doing the calculation doubles the SCC,” says Wagner. “Holy s**t, right?”</p><p></p><p>“So if you start with $150,” he says, “there's a 10 percent chance you'll end up with $300, just because of tipping points.”</p><p>One in ten is not that small a chance. If the chances of a plane going down were one in ten, you probably wouldn’t board it. It probably wouldn’t be allowed to fly.</p><p>This is the significance of tipping points: we are playing with fire, pushing Earth systems to the point that there is a small-but-real chance that some of them will break down entirely, entering phase shifts and becoming something permanently less stable and hospitable. </p><p>If that happens, we will have consigned all future generations of human beings to inexorably and irreversibly deteriorating conditions. It is a crime worse than any genocide, worse than any atrocity conceived or conceivable, and even if there is only a small chance that we might stumble into committing it, we should be hyper-cautious. We should spend a lot of money to reduce that risk, to insure against it. </p><p>You might notice that we are not, as a global community or within the US, expending $50/ton worth of effort to reduce emissions, much less $300/ton. In that sense, this study is just one more voice in the chorus urging policymakers to go bigger and faster on decarbonization. </p><p>But it does put a fine point on the fact that there is effectively no way for policymakers anywhere to do too much, or to go too fast, on decarbonization. The risk of overdoing it is vanishingly small, all but impossible. </p><p>We are currently underdoing it. We will be underdoing it even when we’re doing five times what we’re doing now. We will almost certainly be underdoing it for the rest of the lives of everyone reading this. That’s daunting, but it’s also clarifying. </p><p>There’s only one direction to push: more and faster, forever and ever, amen. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/economists-have-quantified-the-economic</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:39959048</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 18 Aug 2021 16:00:05 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/39959048/948f8f8a26b2e77708a0f87a58e0b244.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>965</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/39959048/f495d22d48a2c4f2ffcc95873ddb6ebc.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: the immense promise of a federal green bank, with Reed Hundt]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Reed Hundt, the CEO of the Coalition for Green Capital, discusses the merits of green banks, quasi-public or nonprofit institutions that provide seed capital to accelerate the growth of clean energy. There are more than 20 active green banks at the state level. Now Biden has proposed a federal green bank. Hundt explains how it could help.</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Reed Hundt, August 13, 2021</p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/uwepcky589hgbyy/volts21.08.13%28reed.hundt%29.pdf?dl=0"><strong>PDF version</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-the-immense-promise-of-a-federal-green-bank-with-reed-hundt"><strong>Active version</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>As we speak, Democrats in Congress are at work putting together a budget reconciliation bill that will include enormous swathes of President Biden’s agenda, including his climate agenda.</p><p>One of the policies being discussed for inclusion is the creation of a “<a target="_blank" href="https://coalitionforgreencapital.com/accelerator/">Clean Energy & Sustainability Accelerator</a>,” more commonly known as a green bank.</p><p>The idea of a federal green bank has been floating around forever. There was one in the ill-fated Waxman-Markey climate bill of 2009 (which never made it through the Senate) and there’s been one introduced in Congress virtually every year since. </p><p>But this time it might happen! So it’s time to brush up on what a green bank is and what it does.</p><p>It would <em>not</em>, contrary to some popular misconceptions, be an agency of the federal government, nor would it finance projects purely with federal money. Rather, it would be an independent, nonprofit entity that uses an initial grant of federal money to pull private capital off the sidelines and into climate-related projects. After the initial grant, the bank would be self-sustaining.</p><p>The model has been tested: there are green banks in more than a dozen states, which have generated $5.3 billion in clean energy investment since 2011, including $1.5 billion in 2019 alone. And there are more than 20 states where the process of establishing a green bank has begun.</p><p>These state- and city-level green banks are popular and successful, but because states and cities tend to be short on funds, they too often lack the capital needed to fund worthy projects. Right now there are more than $20 billion worth of projects that are eligible for green bank funding and are now waiting. One of the roles of a federal green bank would be to capitalize all those local banks, to get all those projects rolling.</p><p>To learn more about green banks, I was happy to talk to their greatest champion: <a target="_blank" href="https://coalitionforgreencapital.com/team-member/reed-hundt/">Reed Hundt</a>, the co-founder and CEO of the <a target="_blank" href="https://coalitionforgreencapital.com">Coalition for Green Capital</a>. Hundt has been advocating for green banks for over a decade — including seven years on the board of the Connecticut Green Bank — and it is largely through the coalition’s work that the network of state and local green banks has been established.</p><p>I was eager to talk with Hundt about how a national green bank would work, the kinds of projects it would fund, how it would account for equity, and the potential if it’s done right, for a green bank to accelerate the clean energy transition. </p><p>Reed Hundt, welcome to Volts, thank you for coming.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Thank you very much. I was talking to a friend of mine in Tennessee and he told me that you're from Tennessee. He said that you were the best analyst and commentator about energy issues in the whole state of Tennessee.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I don't know whether that's damning by faint praise?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Well then I said to my friend, “No, no, the two of you are,” because the person I was talking to was my high school classmate Al Gore.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Oh, funny! Yes, he and I have bonded over our Tennessee roots before. </p><p>I want to talk about green banks with you, but real quick, by way of setting context before that, let’s talk history. Obama faced a similar situation [to the one Biden faces] — different in a lot of ways, similar in some ways. But you wrote a book about Obama's response to the crises he faced that was extremely critical of Obama. </p><p>So as we contemplate what Biden should be doing in this similar situation, let's review real quickly, what did Obama do wrong and what does that tell us about how Biden should be approaching this mess?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>You're in a very small club, which is the club of people that know about the book called <a target="_blank" href="https://amzn.to/3D7C051"><em>A Crisis Wasted</em></a>, and as a founding member of the club, I’m very happy to have a new member. </p><p>So the problem in 2008-09 was that, as Rahm Emanuel said at the time, a crisis is too good to waste. But all of the advice to the President-elect was small where it should have been big, constrained where it should have been bold, and was short range rather than long range. The people were not badly motivated, but in retrospect and at the time, their counsel was insufficient to meet the needs, not only of the moment, but of the next 10 years. The big difference for the Biden administration, and indeed for the entire Democratic Party in the current year, is the decision from the very beginning of this presidency and of this particular Congress to follow what Larry Summers himself said in 2008: the risks of doing too little are much much worse than the risks of doing too much. </p><p>Larry didn't follow his own advice then, but the entire Democratic Party is taking it to heart now. </p><p>The second learning that the Biden people took from the past was not to do just one thing at a time, in sequence, and then run out of time, but to do everything on every front as fast as possible, pressing on every single topic: the democracy agenda, childcare, the COVID relief, climate change, infrastructure. All topics are being pursued in parallel, simultaneously.  </p><p>The tactical decision of the Obama administration was to do one thing at a time, in sequence. The problem with that is that it played into the hands of opponents who correctly felt that, if they could delay action, ultimately inaction would triumph — entropy would take over. </p><p>So the decision made by President-Elect Obama was to do climate change and energy legislation after healthcare, instead of simultaneously. The decision made by this President was to do them together, to do all things together. That's why the reconciliation package includes climate change measures as well as childcare. </p><p>So there's two different things: one is go big, and the second is do everything in parallel.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>That strategy is coming to a head with the reconciliation bill, which, indeed, is gigantic and contains just about everything you could think of. It'll be a real interesting historical A-B test if this new strategy does in fact work better.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>And it's a test that has to be passed, right? In terms of the role of government in the United States to stop a climate catastrophe, this is the last chance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Among the things being proposed for inclusion in the reconciliation bill is a green bank. I've been following this area for a long time and I have heard about green banks, in the background or on the periphery, over and over again. It seems like an evergreen idea that never seems to get over the finish line. </p><p>By way of framing this discussion, maybe you can just tell us in the simplest terms, what is a green bank?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>A green bank is a publicly funded institution that aims to combine public and private investment to build something. You have to believe that public-private investment is a good thing, or you won't like a green bank. </p><p>Public-private investment is how we build all infrastructure, actually, so it shouldn't be too challenging to say, “Let's have public-private investment to build the clean-power platform.” </p><p>Let me give you an example of the way that a road is built. A state government or a county government issues a bond; the bond is purchased by the private sector; the private sector then, through the mechanism of the bond, provides the money. And then, overwhelmingly, the state contracts out to the private sector to actually build the road. That's a public-private investment.</p><p>The road might not be owned by the private sector, or it could be owned by the private sector, but the ownership is not the point — the point is that it was private money that was pushed through a municipal bond that created a form of financing that built the road. </p><p>There are five major infrastructure platforms: sewage, water, transportation, communications, and power. For all five, there is some version of public-private investment. </p><p>So point one is, we're talking about public-private investment. Point two is, to contribute the public side of it, let's have a national bank with a network of state and local banks. That's what the green bank idea is.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>One intuitive reaction to this is, if these projects are profitable for private funding and private financiers, what is the role of the public side of this public-private partnership? What is the state doing?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>The role is to cause the projects that wouldn’t otherwise happen to occur. They basically fall into three categories, which I call clean up, clear out, and catalyze. </p><p>So here's clean up: invest public-private money in neighborhoods and communities where one, carbon energy is not affordable, and two, the byproducts of creating carbon energy are not breathable. That's investment in renovating homes so that they are using rooftop solar or community solar, so that they're insulated effectively. If you do that, in the low- to medium-income households in the United States, the cost of that investment per home will be greater than the income of the household. So somebody else has to provide the money; it has to be the contractor that says, “I'll put up the money and you'll pay me back over time.” That's the shared-savings model. </p><p>Well, the private sector does not jump enthusiastically into that activity; it has made almost no headway into that particular market. That market’s potential size in West Virginia alone is more than $40 billion of investment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Let's pause here, because I think this confuses some people. There's a big pot of profit, there's a profitable market, there's money to be made. Why isn't private finance already flooding into these areas if there's so much money to be made? What’s the barrier?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>In the case of investing in low to medium households, our number one barrier is private sector investors don't know the space. Typically, even though the capital investment per household is twice the median income, that means it's only $80,000. So $80,000 - $90,000 financing, that's beneath the purview of major commercial financiers across the country. So that's the “too small” problem. </p><p>Number two, there's the “don't understand” problem, meaning most private sector financiers don't know whether an individual household is a credit risk or not, and because they don't know they don't take the credit risk. </p><p>Number three, they have more lucrative activities to engage in, many other more lucrative activities. So they say, “why put the money into an $80,000 upgrade of a household in Marshall County, West Virginia, where the return over time might be in the neighborhood of 4 percent or 5 percent a year. Why do that?” </p><p>So it's not that it isn't profitable, it's that it isn't as profitable as investing in Microsoft or a data center or some other high growth activity. Therefore, the role of public investment is to catalyze the private investment to take a little more risk, to aggregate the small financing projects so that they can be sold as a package, to fund small businesses that will actually knock on doors and get people to agree to have the small business do the upgrade. </p><p>Those are the primary roles the public part of the investment can play and then the private sector money is pulled in — the goal is to pull the private sector money in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Right. So the green bank is in a lot of ways taking on the transaction costs.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's exactly right. That's probably the core point, you just made it. </p><p>The “clear out” problem is to clear out the obstacles to massive private sector investment. As you know, a major obstacle in the electricity market is stranded costs, meaning the amount of money that a utility has invested in the old carbon power platform — they need to recover it somehow. </p><p>The regulator of the utility says, “well, I have to recover what I invested in the old before I can invest in the new,” but we need them to invest in the new at an accelerated rate in order to stop climate calamity. </p><p>So how do you get rid of the stranded cost problem? You have the green bank step in and say, “I'll help you out on the stranded cost,” and then the utility — which in 80-85 percent of the country is a private entity, not a public entity — goes, “oh, well fine, if the stranded cost problem is solved, I'll accelerate the move into the clean-power platform.” That's “clear out” obstacles.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>That sounds more like public grants, just giving them money so that they can clear their plate. Is there some way that that those kinds of things pay themselves back?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Yeah, the technique is called securitization. You basically securitize the stranded cost, and the public entity gets paid back at a slow rate over a fairly long period of time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Right. So in this sense, the green bank is providing patience that private capital wouldn't.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Yes, right. You clean up the hard-hit areas, you clear out the obstacles, and then that's how you catalyze the private sector investment. And the net result is that over a 10 year period the accelerator, which is the congressional name for a national climate bank, will pay for itself.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Right. So this whole idea of a green bank is premised on the idea that markets are not, in fact, perfectly rational, and are, in fact, leaving all sorts of profitable opportunities on the table that they need to be nudged into.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Or you can say that markets are not perfectly efficient. You would think the financial crisis of 2007-2009 proved that point for everybody, right? You’d think that the volatility of Robin Hood would be proving the point to anybody right now, but it's not really disputable that markets are not perfectly efficient at all times in all segments. </p><p>The problem, when we talk about the transition from carbon power to clean power, is we can't wait for the markets to figure out how to achieve efficiency, because we've got to get rid of the emissions basically yesterday.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>So we would not be jumping into a national green bank without experience; you and the coalition that you lead have been helping to establish green banks in states and cities for years now. Tell us a little bit about what you've learned from that experience and how they are performing at that level. Are they doing better or worse than you expected?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Better in all respects except one: we haven't been able to attract massive public sector capital.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>That’s because states don't have any right?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>That’s the why. Ben Franklin said, “experience keeps a dear school, but a fool will learn in no other,” so I'm the fool. </p><p>We presented the idea of a green bank to Larry Summers, Tim Geithner, and Peter Orszag in the 2008-2009 transition, and they said they didn't want to do it, because they prioritized recapitalizing the big Wall Street banks. They didn't want to create a green bank. And also, the economists were suspicious of public-private investment.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>It seems like capitalizing a green bank, relative to the amount of money involved in recapitalizing the big banks, would have been kind of a rounding error. It's not really that much we're talking about, is it?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>As it ended up, the money for capitalizing Wall Street, which was appropriated by Congress, was $700 billion, and the Treasury Department did not even use $400 billion of that. They did not even use it.</p><p><strong>Davird Roberts:</strong></p><p>That would have been a nice green bank seed.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>They could have used, I don't know, a fourth of it, an eighth of it, to create a national bank. Or they could have said to one of the big commercial banks, “we'll give you extra capital for you to set up a national climate bank.” They didn't do these things, I think because there was a failure of imagination of disaster. </p><p>That's a phrase from Henry James, the novelist. He said, “you need to make sure you have the imagination of disaster.” Not putting too fine a point on it, but disaster is what the IPCC said we are now experiencing with the climate. They just said it. But in 2008, the imagination that would enable anyone to know that by 2021 we would have irreversibly committed to a staggering increase in temperature by human causes … you know, it should have been knowable, but it wasn't knowable. Or if it was knowable, it wasn't acted upon. </p><p>However, I would say the idea of the green bank was popular and bipartisan even then. It was passed in the House Energy and Commerce Committee by a 51 to 6 vote, and that means a lot of Republicans voted for it. It was passed out of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on a bipartisan vote. Senators Bingaman, a Democrat, and Murkowski of Alaska endorsed it. They also endorsed a clean electricity standard. </p><p>Neither the green bank nor the clean electricity standard ever got to the floor of the Senate. Had they gotten to the floor of the Senate, they would have passed rather easily. There probably would have been 65 votes. The Democrats accounted for, depending on the week, either 58, 59, or 60 of those votes. </p><p>Both those things would have been law. They didn't become law because the Democrats made the perfect the enemy of the good and waited for the cap-and-trade bill that never emerged from committee.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Oh, I remember. I remember. We couldn't get a federal one back in 2008, so then you dispersed your minions out to the states and cities. Where are the green banks now and what are they doing?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Well, there are 21 of them in 15 states. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Wait, how's that? Are there multiple ones in some states?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Yeah, Maryland, for example, has three, because the governor vetoed the idea of creating one at the state level. So there's a nonprofit that operates across the state, and then a county-sponsored green bank, and a Baltimore green bank. That's all because Larry Hogan, the governor, wouldn't create a statewide green bank. </p><p>In New York, there's two, and kind of on and on it goes through 15 different states. And then there's 22 more states where people are raising their hands saying, “help us create a green bank.” If the Senate budget resolution passes, and if the reconciliation language matches the resolution, then at last we will have the accelerator funded. The very first thing that the accelerator should and would do would be to capitalize green banks in every single state.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>That means establishing them even in states where there currently isn’t one. Is that correct?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>We’d go to the governor of Tennessee, we would say, “do you want to create one? Well here's the capital from the federal government, here's the mission that's defined in the statute.” And if the governor said no, we'd ask the legislature. And if the legislature said no, we'd find a nonprofit that would do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>So you don't need a government to be involved.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>We’d ask them, but if they refused, if they treated it like the vaccine, we then would move to a nonprofit, because look, at the risk of really being simple-minded here, we are all breathing the same air and the same emissions, not just nationally, but globally, and so we can't leave any state out of the conversion from carbon to clean.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Would the primary function of the federal accelerator be to funnel money through these state entities?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>The primary function is to accelerate the transition from carbon to clean, and do it in a way that helps low-income households and creates a lot of jobs and lowers instead of increases prices to the consumer. That’s the mission, and the mission would be pursued primarily through the network of state and local green banks, because most of the solutions would have to be local. Not all, but most. </p><p>Here's an example: it would be great to find the incentives that cause heavily driven vehicles to be driven by electric motors. In a national fleet of 200 million plus vehicles, at the most 20 million are truly heavily driven. </p><p>The average mileage per year is 15,000 miles — a total of 3 trillion miles for the country. But the heavily driven vehicles are driven 70,000 miles a year, 100,000 miles a year, 150,000 miles a year. You'd want to have an incentive system that would cause them to go electric as soon as possible, because they're relatively small in number and they account for a huge fraction of the emissions. </p><p>How would you implement that? You would do that locally. You'd look for the small business person in Memphis, or the fleet that’s operating in Nashville, or the delivery trucks in Knoxville, and you would say, “what does it take to convert you to electric?” You do it locally; you wouldn't say one size fits all. </p><p>FedEx is a great example, because they're headquartered in Tennessee, so you would talk to FedEx locally.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>So the federal money would be funneled through the Tennessee-based green bank.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>But with a unified mission, not like everybody does whatever they like.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Are there examples on the non-local side, things that only a federal bank could manage?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>We would call them “special strategic situations.” An example would be catalyzing transmission. First of all, almost by definition, transmission always crosses state borders. Consequently, it's not going to be productive to have multiple state green banks cooperate to solve a transmission problem.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>That process is already complicated enough.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>It’s complicated enough. A typical obstacle that you'd want to solve in transmission is to be the anchor tenant, the entity that says, “I'll take the product, and I'll pay for the product.” Then all these other people that connect to the transmission line, all the local distribution networks, they all say, “if there's somebody that's guaranteeing the first slice of payment, then I’ll join in and sign up too.” </p><p>That's the anchor tenant problem that holds up transmission, and is a fundamental problem for every big infrastructure project of any kind at all. Who's the first user? That's the kind of thing where you'd want to see the national green bank step in and say, “I’ll guarantee that.” </p><p>Another example would be a major sea-coast resiliency project that might cross state lines, like between South Carolina and North Carolina. A third example could be (going back to heavily driven vehicles) national fleets, like a rental-car fleet. </p><p>Where you have a national or interstate problem, you want the centralized entity to act. And lastly, you want the central entity to be aggregating all of the loans, selling them into the commercial market, and raising new money to recycle the original government investment. </p><p>This is important: the way to fund this green bank is one-time. Give it all the money and then never appropriate any money again. Let it recycle that money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Is it going to make money, enough to churn more out? How does it fund itself?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>If you were an investor, you'd be better off investing in Microsoft or JP Morgan, but the goal, in the aggregate, is to have all the investments be positive. And in fact, over the last 10 years, 99.38 percent of all green bank loans have been profitable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Oh, wow!</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Not very profitable, but profitable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>No Solyndra? No failure that gets tied around their necks? Nothing to demagogue here?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Except for 0.62 percent.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I saw you mention in a different interview that these green banks are not technically banks — they're “mission-driven loan funds.”</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>They're not deposit-taking banks. Why are they called green banks? I sat in Congressman Van Hollen’s office in January of 2009 and said, “this is what we what we want to do.” He said, “it's a great idea.” I said, “what do you want to call it?” He said, “I want to call it a green bank.” I said, “Congressman, ‘green’ and ‘bank’ are the two most unpopular words you can come up with.” He said, “people will get used to it.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Well, “mission-driven loan fund” doesn't exactly trip off the tongue either. </p><p>One more technical point about the loans. You make a point of emphasizing that these are not guaranteed. This is not like the DOE loan program, where the loans are backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. What's that distinction?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Really, really important. This idea of a nonprofit institution is not new. It is the way the government has chosen to achieve goals. In the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the government chose to have non-commercial broadcast by funding a corporation for public broadcasting. But it didn't want to control it, because it didn't want Sesame Street to become a propaganda agency, right? </p><p>The government gives money to the World Bank to accomplish international purposes, but it doesn't guarantee the World Bank's obligations on the US government's balance sheet. There are many other examples of using nonprofits precisely to avoid government control and avoid the government guaranteeing the debt. </p><p>A counterexample is Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, where everybody always knew that in a crisis, the government would guarantee the debt. When the crisis occurred in the summer of 2008, George Bush signed a bill called HERA (wife of Job), saying the government would guarantee the debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. That's what this isn't.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>This avoids the moral hazard that comes along with that.  </p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Precisely. By not having the federal government guarantee, it means that the form of financing can be very flexible. It can be convertible debentures, it can be equity, it can be a secondary debt, it can be primary obligations, it can be deferred payments — you can have all kinds of flexibility. </p><p>Most importantly, you can have the deposit in the nonprofit be the basis for borrowing and lending, which is exactly what a commercial bank does with its deposits. That's how you get leverage and the reason the accelerator would pay for itself over a decade. It would borrow and re-lend on its on its deposit, which is the public funding. </p><p>It would be able to do that enough times over ten years that it would generate enough profit for the private sector that in turn there would be enough tax revenue to pay for the initial deposit.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>A related question: if I'm a listener out there of a conservative bent and I hear about a giant, federally funded institution meant to shovel money out the door, obviously my first concern is, how do you prevent it from becoming a slush fund where politically favored projects get money? What sort of oversight and assurances can we have that this will be independent, and not end up captured?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Well, the uses of the money are defined by the statute that conveys the money. It can't spend on what it isn't authorized to spend on. </p><p>Secondly, to have suspenders as well as a belt, the charter of the nonprofit defines what it can do. </p><p>Third, it would be more transparent than anything, meaning every quarter — for all the world to see, and everybody in Congress to see, and every reporter to see — all the uses of the money would be disclosed. </p><p>Ultimately, as is the case whether you're talking about the Department of Defense or the University of Tennessee or the green bank, you have to trust the people. Nobody should ever think the people don't matter.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I'm going to get back to that later, but one thing I want to hit before we go on too much longer: you mentioned a couple of times that this is about directing money to low-income projects. For this federal accelerator, would there be some sort of equity screen or equity set-aside? How will it address equity?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>The bill that’s been passed in the House of Representatives this year …</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Wait, can we pause there? The bill that was passed in the House — is that the one that’s on the table for reconciliation, as far as you know?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Yes. The drafters of the reconciliation package in the Senate — and they're going to begin work momentarily — will look at the bill that was enacted in the House a few months ago and translate it into reconcilable language. </p><p>That language requires that 40 percent of the money benefit low- to medium-income households.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Got it.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Similarly, any state or local green bank would be obliged to adhere to that requirement.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Obliged in order to get federal money? Are equity screens built into state banks already? Is that a common thing?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Not already, but if the accelerator is funded, then the accelerator would have a contract with the green bank in Tennessee that said, “this is what you’ve got to do.” So low- to medium-income households — which in Tennessee are all over the state — would necessarily benefit from a minimum of 40 percent of the money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Interesting. The obvious example there is upgrading low-income homes with insulation and solar panels. Are there other examples? Do you have favorites?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>That's a big example. Another would be: low- to medium-income households, in many cases, have people that use heavily driven vehicles for work. Maybe in a rural area they drive far to find gainful employment. Maybe they're a small business operating out of the house and driving the truck around to work on contracts. That's a good place to replace a heavily driven vehicle with an electric car. And the electric car is going to be cheaper. </p><p>The third example is, if you're able to clean up a neighborhood, and the people aren't breathing emissions, the health benefits are real and immediate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>This is a side topic, but it's one of my personal obsessions: what about the whole cluster of issues around transit and zoning and density? This is a climate topic a lot of people I know are infuriated doesn't get more attention. Is there any way of funneling some of this money to, say, a public transit system or something like that?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>I hope and believe the accelerator would complement all the other programs that are going to be in the reconciliation package, or in the bipartisan deal the Senate voted on today. The Department of Transportation, in both of these instruments, is going to have a lot of programs to put into effect that involve public transit. Where there's a missing piece, something the accelerator could pay for to liberate the Department of Transportation's money, that would be a complimentary role to play. </p><p>But we have to wait for the legislative smoke to clear to know exactly what has been passed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>We're all on the edge of our seats over here. When you’re advocating for green banks before legislatures, is there a favorite success story that couldn't have happened without green banks?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>There are many. I was on the board of the Connecticut green bank for six years. In the important and interesting category, we electrified a dam in Connecticut. There are thousands of dams that don't generate electricity that could generate electricity. But they're all relatively small-scale. The commercial financiers don't want to get involved; it's a great role for a state and local green bank.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>The coalition requested $100 billion from federal lawmakers as seed funding. As you've emphasized, this would be a one-time grant that gets the thing going. It would be self-sustaining from then on. </p><p>I believe in Biden's jobs bill, he proposed $27 billion.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's right.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Is that enough? Could a bank leverage that up and make it bigger? What’s your take on the level?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>You know the story about, if you chained 1,000 lawyers together and threw them to the bottom of the sea, what you would call that?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Ha, yes, I'm familiar.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>A good start. $27 billion would be a good start. $100 billion would be a better start. But we've got to start. We've got to catalyze public-private investment and prove that private sector money can flow into these activities at a far greater rate, quite safely and prudently. That's the goal. </p><p>If it's $27 billion, or if it's $100 billion, it'll be enough. We've got to get these green banks going in every state; we can't leave anybody out. More is better, but $27 billion would be a good start.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>This might be a silly question, but is there any upper end? Do you have any sense of the limits of a bank, or limits of the economy to absorb it, or anything like that? How much money could you deal with?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>The way to look at this at the macro level is, what is private savings and what is private investment? Ever since the crisis of 2008-09, private savings in the United States have been much higher than private investment. Whether they are pension funds, commercial banks, or high-net-worth individuals, people are sitting on large amounts of cash that is not invested in productive and useful infrastructure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>What's the reason for that? Are there just not enough investment opportunities?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Yes. Economists sometimes call it “secular stagnation.” They sometimes call it a “savings glut.” Basically, it's fear of the future. Many investors are paid to be fearful, because fearful can be prudent. </p><p>We simply have to clear away the obstacles, to mitigate the fear and unlock that private-sector investing. How much? Quite literally, if private investment had equaled private savings since 2009 — which is normally the case in a healthy economy — the economy would be about $5 to $7 trillion bigger.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Whew.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>The carbon-to-clean transition could be and should be the biggest investment opportunity of the century. The increase of wind and solar power from the current market share to the necessary market share is about a 4 to 5X increase in market share. That alone is about a $3 trillion business opportunity. </p><p>There's no way public investment should need to or ever would invest that much money. The goal is to catalyze it and to have almost all of it be private money.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>So theoretically, it would be easy to deploy $100 billion.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Oh, very easy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>A helpful way to think about a green bank is: you've got this giant pool of savings, sitting there with fearful investors, and the role of the green bank is to go before the investors and ease some of these transition costs, set up some of the structures, basically prepare things so that it's easier for private capital to flow into these projects.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>And it has to happen quickly, because we don't have a moment to lose in terms of reducing emissions. If we had all the patience in the world, if we had “world enough in time” as the poem says, then 30, 40, 50 years from now the whole world would be based on wind and solar and maybe a little bit of nuclear — because it's cheaper. But we don't have 30, 40, 50 years. </p><p>I've been part of this before. When I was FCC Chairman for the Clinton administration in the ‘90s, the question was, how was private investment going to make it possible for you and me to talk via the internet and all these other communications devices that didn't exist then? How were we going to go from wire-line to wireless? How were we going to go from analog to digital? How were we going to go from a long distance phone call to what we're doing now? </p><p>The answer is, the government needed to clear out regulatory obstacles, catalyze private sector investment, and encourage the transition, which is what we did. About the same amount of money was spent over 15 years to have the communications industry be completely transformed as we now need to completely transform the energy sector.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Just a couple of additional political questions. You mentioned that there's transparency, there's oversight, but in the end, you have to trust the people involved in managing this. </p><p>As Republicans and Democrats trade control, we've seen policy wildly swing back and forth. We've seen Trump roll back or degrade all kinds of Obama initiatives — green initiatives, regulatory initiatives. </p><p>Is there anything you could do to make a green bank resistant to Republicans trying to screw it over or twist it in some way? In Australia, when the conservatives took over, they tried to appropriate green-bank money for fossil fuel projects. Is there any structural or regulatory way to prevent that, or is that just the nature of democratic government?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>You have to not put your trust in regulation. Political change changes regulations. You have to trust the integrity and viability of a nonprofit institution. You have to have a bipartisan or nonpartisan board. Let's have the charter and the conditions of funding clearly defined, but then let's trust the people. Let’s say, not that it's more important than politics, but that the vagaries of politics from election to election can't change the purpose. The purpose has to be executed on or we’re cooked. That's why you have to do this. </p><p>The idea that there can and should be trustworthy institutions — that's a belief you have to hold to have any success. You have to believe in that, whether they are religious institutions, nonprofits, or other examples of civil society. You have to believe in that and you have to try this one.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Republicans are all over the place on climate change right now. You think they could be brought around to affirmatively supporting?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>State and local green banks, where they exist, draw bipartisan support. As I said, the idea was bipartisan in 2009. The House bill that was passed had Republican co-sponsors. It should be the case that this mission is nonpartisan or bipartisan. </p><p>It’s a big country and there's always somebody that doesn't want to do anything, but we don't really have a choice here. We’ve got to try every institutional technique, every technology, every method, because we can't lose the battle against climate catastrophe.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>The green bank is your baby; I assume that's what you’re making calls about and lobbying for. But if that's your number one, what's your number two and three for reconciliation?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>For me, this is number one, two, and three. The shoemaker should stick to his last. </p><p>I've been doing this for 12 years. The main thing I need to do is summon all of my energy to focus on this one thing and not be distracted. </p><p>But I'm not alone. This is a big movement now. We have hundreds of people employed in state green banks already. We run a consortium of green banks; we meet every two weeks and have been for years. We've raised more than $5 billion of private sector money into different projects. We have more than 100 environmental organizations supporting this, we have the president supporting it, the House of Representatives voted for it. I'm not trying to say I'm not involved, I’m trying to say, it ain’t just me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>As a final question, we started with a little history of how Obama, in your estimation, went too small, thought too small, hedged his bets too much. By way of wrapping up, I'm curious, what is your assessment of Biden and Democrats so far? Does it seem to you like they've taken those lessons to heart? Are they doing what you want them to be doing so far?</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Absolutely. The bipartisan bill is an amazing accomplishment. Amazing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I don't know why it exists; I can’t explain it.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>It can't be gainsayed. What did they get, 19 Republicans or something like that to vote for it?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>It is amazing. The president had the patience, the Democratic leadership had the patience, Republicans were helping and willing. The previous president said “don't vote for it” and 19 of them voted for it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>And the COVID relief bill, they didn’t go small on that either.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>This is a great country. We try pretty much everything else and then we usually get it right. It's just that, right now, we don't have a moment to lose with respect to the climate. That's the reason this thing is called the accelerator.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>All right. Well, thank you for taking so much time.</p><p><strong>Reed Hundt:</strong></p><p>Thank you, I really admire your work and thanks for talking to me.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-the-immense-promise</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:39847539</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 11 Sep 2023 16:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/39847539/9a836755096b16b5cecd5996701408ca.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3059</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/39847539/0eabea4a9a4be0006743b00d10b4b329.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Crunch time: this is America's last chance at serious climate policy for a decade]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>This is it, folks! The home stretch. It’s time to pay attention, call your members of Congress, and mobilize your networks. </p><p>Congress is working on what is likely to be its last big shot at climate change policy for a decade or more. If things go well, the legislation will include a clean energy standard (CES) and clean energy tax credits, which together would revolutionize the US electricity system. If things don’t go well, there will be no substantial climate legislation for many years to come.</p><p>That’s the only question being decided: Will we get a CES and tax credits, or will we get nothing that will tackle fossil fuels this decade? That’s the binary. It’s time to focus.</p><p>Looking around, it doesn’t seem like clean energy supporters, climate hawks, or the left more broadly really get that. So let’s talk about why this is such an important moment and what’s at stake. </p><p>The reconciliation bill is likely the last chance for big federal climate legislation</p><p>The Democratic approach for a while now has been to proceed along dual tracks. On one track, there’s the bipartisan infrastructure bill, hammered out by a group of just over 20 senators from both parties. On the other track, there’s the budget reconciliation bill, which is meant to contain … everything else in Biden’s agenda. The former needs 60 votes; the latter can pass with 50 Democratic votes.</p><p>This has always been a fraught and delicate strategy. It could crash and burn in any number of ways. But so far, at least, it is hanging together.</p><p>The bipartisan group <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cbsnews.com/news/infrastructure-bill-1-trillion-bipartisan/">unveiled its bill this week</a>; it is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/08/04/senate-infrastructure-vote-schumer-tries-to-pass-bipartisan-bill.html">slowly inching toward a vote</a>, though Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) is <a target="_blank" href="https://news.yahoo.com/senate-plods-along-infrastructure-bill-215417770.html">doing everything he can to slow it down</a> and gum it up. </p><p>It contains decent chunks of money for things that will indirectly help clean energy — transmission, demonstration projects, R&D — but it lacks anything that will directly confront fossil fuels in the coming decade, the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/on-climate-policy-theres-one-main">sine qua non of adequate climate policy</a>. As Robinson Meyer argues in The Atlantic, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2021/08/bipartisan-infrastructure-deal-kind-climate-bill/619654/">it is not a climate bill</a>, not really. </p><p>There’s no guarantee the bipartisan bill will pass, and there’s no way to know how the Senate’s bipartisanship fetishists, Sens. Joe Manchin (D-W.V.) and Kyrsten Sinema (D-Ariz.), will react if it doesn’t.</p><p>But whether it passes or not, when it comes to decent climate policy, it’s all about the reconciliation bill. There won’t be another bill this big while Democrats control Congress, and they won’t control Congress for long. What Democrats are able to get through in the reconciliation bill is likely to be the last big federal climate legislation for a decade at least. </p><p>This is the key thing to understand, so I’m going to repeat it: <em>What Democrats are able to get through in the reconciliation bill is likely to be the last big federal climate legislation for a decade at least.</em></p><p>(You may be thinking: can’t Democrats do another reconciliation bill next year? Yes, they can, but the midterms will be in full swing, moderates will be feeling even more cowardly than usual, political appetite for big spending will have dried up in the face of a recovering economy, and focus will have turned, hopefully, to voting reform. This one is it.)</p><p>Absent substantial federal voting reform — which is looking <a target="_blank" href="https://www.npr.org/2021/06/17/1007493906/sweeping-voting-rights-reform-looks-unlikely-to-pass-at-the-federal-level">less and less likely</a>, certainly nothing anyone should bet on — all signs point toward <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/06/14/house-republicans-have-two-critical-advantages-2022/">Republicans taking back the House in 2022</a>. It’s unclear what will happen in the Senate, but regardless, if the GOP controls either house, no climate legislation will pass (and no voting reform). </p><p>Republican presidential candidates can <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/17/20868790/republicans-lose-popular-vote-win-electoral-college">win despite larger and larger losses in the popular vote</a>. And the chances of Democrats controlling both houses of Congress again are only getting dimmer. The <a target="_blank" href="https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/advantage-gop/">structural advantages that favor the GOP</a> in the US system are only tilting further in its favor, while the party is actively extending those advantages with a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-july-2021">wave of voter-suppression laws at the state level</a> and an accompanying <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jul/27/gerrymandering-republicans-electoral-maps-political-heist">wave of gerrymandering</a>, which <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jun/28/republicans-gerrymandering-congress-elections"><em>alone</em></a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/jun/28/republicans-gerrymandering-congress-elections"> could win the GOP the House</a> in 2022, even absent any Dem seats being lost. The GOP is protected in this endeavor by a hyper-conservative Supreme Court (which, by the way, could get even more conservative if the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-27/high-court-s-breyer-leaves-democrats-in-suspense-on-retirement">disastrously vain Stephen Breyer</a> hangs on until there’s a Republican president again).</p><p>The conservative movement in the US is attempting to engineer one-party control of US government (along the lines of <a target="_blank" href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/08/tucker-carlson-has-seen-the-future-and-it-is-fascist.html">their new hero, Hungarian autocrat Viktor Orban</a>). There’s no way to know how successful the endeavor will ultimately be, but it’s a pretty good bet, given current trends, that Democrats won’t control the presidency and both houses of Congress at the same time again for a long while. Last time they lost full control (just before a wave of gerrymandering in 2010), it was a decade until they got it back.</p><p>That all begins in January 2023 — which makes this year’s reconciliation bill the Democrats’ last big shot at climate and clean energy policy. </p><p>There are two key clean-energy policies on the table</p><p>Climate folk are prone to endless policy arguments; everyone has their favorites. But most of those arguments are immaterial right now. Democrats have lined up behind a menu of clean energy policies in line with <a target="_blank" href="https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/">Biden’s climate plan</a>. What’s on that menu is what might get in the bill. <em>Might.</em> </p><p>If it’s not on that menu, it’s not going to get in. There’s no carbon tax. There’s no cap-and-dividend. There’s no prohibition on new fossil fuel infrastructure. You may support any and all of those policies, but they are not live options in the reconciliation bill. </p><p>Right now, political pressure is best aligned behind options that actually are on the menu. Two in particular are immensely important — together, they would be transformative. </p><p>The first is a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscast-how-to-decarbonize-the">Clean Energy Standard</a> that would reduce electricity sector greenhouse gas emissions 80 percent by 2030. (Biden’s plan calls for 100 percent by 2035, but a reconciliation bill can only extend 10 years out.)</p><p>It’s not actually going to be a standard, per se, because you <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscast-how-to-decarbonize-the">can’t pass regulatory standards through reconciliation</a>. Instead, it’s going to be a system of fines and payments that will incentivize utilities to increase their proportion of renewable energy to meet the targets. It’s called a clean electricity payment program (CEPP). </p><p>A CEPP actually has some advantages over the traditional CES’s and renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) commonly seen in states. For one thing, it’s more progressive: the money to drive the transition comes from federal coffers (via taxes on corporations and the wealthy) rather than from electricity rates, which are regressive. </p><p>If you’re interested in the details of how a reconciliation-friendly CEPP will be structured, see <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eenews.net/articles/payments-or-fines-how-dems-ces-would-affect-utilities/">this piece from Ben Storrow and Scott Waldman</a> of E&E, or this thread from Princeton professor Jesse Jenkins:</p><p>The end result will be the same as a conventional CES: the US electricity grid will reach 80 percent decarbonization by 2030, which is an achievable but still incredibly ambitious target. As I’ve said so many times, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/on-climate-policy-theres-one-main">nothing is more important</a> to deep decarbonization than cleaning up the electricity grid. It’s the core of the “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12938086/electrify-everything">electrify everything</a>” strategy. </p><p>The second is boosted and expanded clean energy tax credits. The investment tax credit (ITC) and production tax credit (PTC), for solar and wind respectively, would be renewed, but various forms of tax credits would also be extended to energy storage, hydrogen, carbon capture, and other key clean energy technologies. (The details are in flux; for a blueprint, see the Senate Finance Committee’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/-wyden-colleagues-introduce-legislation-to-overhaul-energy-tax-code-create-jobs-combat-climate-crisis">Clean Energy for America Act</a> or the House Ways and Means’ <a target="_blank" href="https://mikethompson.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/chairman-thompson-ways-and-means-democrats-introduce-green-act">GREEN Act</a>.)</p><p>Tax credits will provide the supply push; the CEPP will provide the demand pull. The result will be an enormous surge of clean energy projects and jobs. </p><p>This is the core of good climate policy: pushing fossil fuels off the grid over the next decade and replacing them with zero-carbon energy. </p><p>There are other good climate provisions on the Democrats’ menu for reconciliation as well. I would love to see a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sunrisemovement.org/theory-of-change/the-ccc-explained/">Civilian Climate Corps</a>. I’d love to see more money for public transportation and an electrified postal service fleet. Lots of smaller climate provisions might make it through just by virtue of not drawing much notice, which would be great.</p><p>But the CEPP and the tax credits are the one-two punch needed to make a real short-term difference in the energy system. And they are on the menu.</p><p>Manchin is likely to be skeptical of the CEPP. Although carbon capture counts as clean energy under the program, every analyst understands that the practical effect is going to be to ramp up renewables and ramp down fossil fuels on the grid. Manchin doesn’t actually want that.</p><p>I have no idea if public pressure will have any effect at all on Manchin, but it couldn’t hurt. Might as well try it.</p><p>The perilous path ahead for reconciliation</p><p>Everyone on the left is aware that the reconciliation bill is the last big legislative train leaving the station, and every interest group wants a seat on it. Climate policy will be competing with other Democratic priorities. Especially as Sinema and Manchin arbitrarily reduce the total size of the bill, as they surely will, the factions of the party will be fighting it out over a shrinking pie.</p><p>It is far from a sure thing that the CEPP and tax credits will survive negotiations. It’s all being decided right now. Everyone who cares about US climate progress should put aside their personal projects and preferences for a few weeks and speak in a unified voice. Call your representatives. Push the groups you’re involved with to make noise about it. </p><p>It’s going to be the CEPP and tax credits or nothing big for climate. If both those policies are put in place, it could set the US power system on a new course and strengthen American credibility at the upcoming COP26 international climate meeting. If they slip through the cracks, climate will have to settle for scraps and the US will surrender all hope of meeting its climate targets or influencing others to do the same.</p><p>For the next few months, this is all that matters. If you’ve ever considered getting involved, now is the time.</p><p>Bonus dog</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/crunch-time-this-is-americas-last</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:39625170</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 07 Aug 2021 17:00:40 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/39625170/ea3927cdc3188acaf492827930f102cf.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>700</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/39625170/2100719b10ebf6fd5a2702bca7537f26.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[There's real long-duration energy storage now. Can it find a market?]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>(If you prefer listening to reading, just click Play above.)</em></p><p>I’ve spent a lot of time on Volts discussing energy storage. As those who read <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/battery-week-everything-in-one-place">my battery series</a> know, lithium-ion batteries (LIB) currently dominate short-duration storage — in devices, cars, and buildings — and the durations they are able to economically provide are creeping up, from two to four to eight hours and beyond. </p><p>However, as I explained in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/long-duration-storage-can-help-clean">a separate post</a>, the grid of the future, run primarily on renewable energy, will also need <em>long</em>-duration energy storage (LDES), capable of discharging energy for days or weeks. </p><p>As that post covered, there are two basic challenges facing LDES. The first is technological: what sort of materials and processes can hold large amounts of energy for cheap?</p><p>The second is economic: how can an LDES company make money? Currently, the role they propose to play on the grid (“firming” renewable energy) is being played by natural gas power plants. In a theoretical future clean-energy grid, those plants will be gone, or at least they will be saddled with the additional costs of carbon capture, but for now, they exist, and they are quite cheap. Consequently, there just isn’t much of a market for LDES, as battery industry veteran Cody Hill points out:</p><p>A hot new startup called Form Energy believes it can overcome both challenges.</p><p>Form Energy has the technology; now it needs customers</p><p>I mentioned Form Energy in a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/battery-week-competitors-to-lithium">previous post</a>. The company — a kind of battery dream team, with Mateo Jaramillo (who built Tesla’s energy storage business), MIT’s Yet-Ming Chiang, and other veterans of previous battery companies — has finally revealed the battery it has been working on lo these many years. </p><p>It uses iron as a cathode and air as an anode, in a process called “reversible rusting.” </p><p>The best place to catch up on the news is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/stealthy-storage-contender-form-energy-reveals-secret-formula/">Julian Spector’s piece</a>. (Canary is doing amazing coverage of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/tag/energy-storage/">energy storage</a>.) See also <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/startup-claims-breakthrough-in-long-duration-batteries-11626946330">Russell Gold’s piece in the Wall Street Journal</a> for deeper background on the company and its technology. </p><p>Neither piece, however, gets deeply into the subject that most interests me, which is the second challenge: where to find markets. So I called Jaramillo to find out more. </p><p>Not surprisingly, he sees a clear pathway to profitability. “We see a very compelling business environment for us over the next 10, 20, 30 years,” he says. “It's as much as we can go after, frankly.”</p><p>Early markets for clean firming</p><p>In terms of its function on the grid, the best way to think of Form’s battery is not as storage, but as the equivalent of a carbon-free natural gas plant. Rather than methane, it runs on renewable energy as fuel, but from the grid’s perspective, it provides basically the same service, which is reliable, dispatchable generation that can run for 100 hours or more when needed. </p><p>The problem, as I said, is that natural gas is quite cheap. According to conventional wisdom, natural gas plants will dominate the firming game until policy begins driving them out of the system (or forcing them to install carbon capture). That’s what the models show: when decarbonization of the electricity grid (using mostly renewables and LIBs) goes past about 80 percent, costs begin to spike and more expensive clean firm options like LDES and nuclear become competitive. </p><p>That conventional wisdom may be correct at the 30,000 foot level, but closer to the ground, things are much more complicated and varied. As Jaramillo notes, “there's no time at which the country will uniformly be at 80 percent renewables.” In fact, some nodes on the grid are close to that already. More to the point, Jaramillo says, there are a variety of situations in which grid operators need the services a natural gas plant provides but are leery about (or prohibited from) investing in gas.</p><p>“Every single US coal plant in the system today has a retirement date on it,” he says, “and all of those dates are sooner than they were five years ago, and they will probably be sooner in two years than they are today.” That means lots of utilities around the country need to replace large chunks of power capacity.</p><p>To date, they’ve been doing so with natural gas, but that may be changing. Remember, Form is not talking about entering the market in earnest until 2025. Between now and then, Jaramillo expects two macro trends to continue: first, renewables will keep getting cheaper and cheaper, and second, utilities will grow more wary of natural gas. </p><p>“It's not full steam ahead to replace coal with natural gas,” he says. “Indiana [utility regulators] recently <a target="_blank" href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/indiana-regulators-reject-vectren-gas-plant-over-stranded-asset-concerns/553456/">rejected a 850-megawatt combined-cycle gas plant</a> and they specifically cited the risk of stranded assets.” Similar rejections of natural gas have taken place recently in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/minnesota-rejects-xcels-720-mw-mankato-gas-plant-purchase-over-stranded-as/564029/">Minnesota</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sierraclub.org/press-releases/2021/02/state-commission-rejects-dominion-s-expensive-dirty-unreasonable-irp">Virginia</a>. </p><p>Great River Energy, a Minnesota-based electricity co-op, is hosting <a target="_blank" href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/form-energy-announces-pilot-with-great-river-energy-to-enable-the-utilitys-transition-to-an-affordable-reliable-and-renewable-electricity-grid-301054251.html">Form’s first demonstration project</a>, a one-megawatt system capable of discharging for 150 hours continuously. Great River needs to replace lost coal capacity, but while they are under no statutory mandate to phase out natural gas, they “know how to read what direction the wind is blowing,” Jaramillo says. </p><p>They don’t want to build a natural gas plant with a 30-year rated lifespan only to face a carbon price or a clean electricity standard (CES) forcing its retirement in 10 or 20. In the long term, gas is on the way out, and every natural gas plant built from here on out is a gamble that could very well come up stranded. That will only be more true in 2025.</p><p>There are other reasons utilities might be trending away from natural gas. In California, of course, they are forced by laws mandating rapid decarbonization — and more states, like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/washington-state-now-has-the-nations">Washington</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/colorados-climate-change-compromise-bill-sets-emissions-mandates-for-electricity-industry-and-oil-and-gas/">Colorado</a>, and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/oregon-bill-adds-labor-and-environmental-justice-provisions-to-100-clean-energy-by-2040-mandate/">Oregon</a>, are joining it in rapidly decarbonizing electricity. </p><p>In the New England grid, they’re having trouble importing enough natural gas through the pipelines in times of peak demand; LDES could be the easiest way to ease grid congestion. In grids like Texas’s, natural gas has proven an extremely unreliable hedge against extreme cold snaps; LDES could help improve reliability margins for ERCOT, Texas’s grid operator.</p><p>To achieve clean energy targets, many jurisdictions will have to overbuild renewables, increasing <a target="_blank" href="https://www.caiso.com/documents/curtailmentfastfacts.pdf">curtailment</a>, or wasting of renewable energy. LDES could reduce or eliminate curtailment, allowing renewables to produce at full capacity whenever the weather is aligned. That would have the effect of further boosting the value of existing renewables — something else natural gas plants can’t do.</p><p>Finally, there are commercial and industrial (C&I) entities who want to race down the decarbonization curve faster than the jurisdictions they are located in. Both Google and Microsoft have committed not just to running on 100 percent clean energy, but to running on 100 percent clean energy <em>24/7</em>, throughout the year. Accomplishing that feat will require them to procure their own clean firm generation. C&I customers are the fastest growing segment of market demand for renewables and could prove a key early market for LDES. </p><p>There’s no <em>mass</em> market for LDES yet — nothing like the hundreds of gigawatts we may eventually need — but there are several localized markets, adding up to several gigawatts of needed capacity, which is more than enough to keep Form busy from 2025 forward. </p><p>Natural gas is as weak as people believe it to be</p><p>So that’s Form’s case that it can find a market foothold. It sounds plausible to me, but then, I’ve heard lots of plausible-sounding stories from startups over the years … only to read about dead startups a few years later. Time will tell, etc.</p><p>Two things give me some hope that Form might make it. The first is that the capacity price point it now claims (<a target="_blank" href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/form-energys-20kwh-100-hour-iron-air-battery-could-be-a-substantial-br/603877/">$20/kWh</a>) is extremely low, already close to the price range it will need to start cutting into firm generation. And that’s just the beginning. If it can find a market and start scaling up, it should be able to bring down costs substantially. (It is basically building its demonstration project by hand; standardization and scale will bring enormous savings.)</p><p>“We see, in a reasonable timeframe, being able to get to $10/kWh, all in, at the system level,” says Jaramillo. If it can pull that off, Form can start substantially cutting into gas markets. And “we are far from being done thinking about how we might displace ourselves,” he adds. “One characteristic of the team we built is that it's phenomenally creative.”</p><p>So Form will be getting cheaper alongside renewables. </p><p>The second thing is the sociology of the transition away from gas. Up until fairly recently, gas was seen as a “clean fuel,” reducing coal pollution. Elite opinion is currently lurching in the other direction. None other than Democratic Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer has publicly acknowledged that <a target="_blank" href="https://newrepublic.com/article/162944/chuck-schumer-gas-clean-energy">natural gas does not qualify as clean energy</a>. </p><p>Gas is the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/electricity-in-the-us.php">dominant fuel</a> on US energy grids, and still growing, which has given it an aura of inevitability. Adding to that aura is a belief among many utilities that renewables and LIBs can not provide a reliable alternative to gas. They believe they need lots of dispatchable power. </p><p>Those fears are likely overblown, especially at this early stage in the energy transition, but they are real. So the turn away from natural gas is tentative and scattered for now. If, in the latter half of the 2020s, alternatives like Form emerge, which allow utilities to build more of the cheapest generation available (renewables), the turn against gas could become more precipitous. Just as fear is contagious, so is FOMO. </p><p>It’s one of the most important questions in clean energy right now: whether the shift in US electricity away from natural gas will be slow and steady or whether it will happen the way <a target="_blank" href="https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/102579-how-did-you-go-bankrupt-two-ways-gradually-then-suddenly">Hemingway’s character famously went bankrupt</a>: gradually, then suddenly. </p><p>It depends, in part, on psychology. The weaker gas looks, the more utilities will shy away from it. If Form — or other LDES — proves viable, it will represent the last piece of the puzzle, the key to a reliable, fully decarbonized grid. That could push US utilities closer to the point of a decisive break with gas. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/theres-real-long-duration-energy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:39251973</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 04 Aug 2021 16:00:25 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/39251973/f5b99f705d827a340ec1bda3ce8957b4.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>725</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/39251973/611f60aa6156c4522104535d219422c6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Subsidies really do matter to the US oil & gas industry -- one in particular]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Fossil fuel subsidies are a vexed and peculiar topic. On one hand, everyone seems to agree they’re bad and should be eliminated (<a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/22363539/oil-gas-subsidies-biden-solar-wind-tax-reform-infrastructure-bill">it’s in Biden’s jobs bill</a>, for instance). On the other hand, they never go anywhere. </p><p>In part, it’s because we lack a clear understanding of what constitutes a subsidy and what impact they have. Analysts are forever <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2015/5/20/8630913/IMf-fossil-fuel-subsidies">arguing over exactly what counts</a>, trying to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/10/6/16428458/us-energy-coal-oil-subsidies">tally up the total subsidies fossil fuels receive</a>, but there are very few bottom-up attempts to document the concrete effects of subsidies on the economics of oil and gas projects.</p><p>That’s why I was interested in this <a target="_blank" href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/ac0a10">new paper</a> in <em>Environmental Research Letters</em>, by Ploy Achakulwisut and Peter Erickson of the Stockholm Environment Institute and Doug Koplow of Earth Track. It breaks down the effect of 16 specific, direct US fossil fuel subsidies on the profitability and emissions of US oil and gas production. </p><p>As for those subsidies, there are three basic categories: “forgone government revenues through tax exemptions and preferences; transfer of financial liability to the public; and below-market provision of government goods or services.” (Note that this study does <em>not</em> get into unpriced environmental externalities like air pollution and greenhouse gases, which are themselves a kind of subsidy.)</p><p>Subsidies either enrich oil & gas investors or spur new oil & gas projects</p><p>One reason there aren’t many bottom-up analyses like this is that it’s devilishly difficult to pin down the economic effect of a subsidy. Doing so always involves a counterfactual baseline — what would have happened absent the subsidy. Anytime counterfactuals are involved, there lots of assumptions to make and variables to account for.</p><p>To take just a couple of examples, the effect a subsidy will have on the decision whether to invest in a new oil and gas project will depend on oil and gas prices and the hurdle rate. (The hurdle rate is the rate of return investors require to fully cover risks; more aggressive decarbonization efforts will presumably mean more risk and thus a higher hurdle rate.) The study actually runs several different scenarios based on different values for those variables, producing a cost curve for each region of the US. It gets complicated.</p><p>For clarity, they chose to highlight two scenarios: 2019’s higher oil and gas prices with a 10 percent hurdle rate and 2020’s lower prices with a 20 percent hurdle rate. Here are the results:</p><p>We find that, at 2019 average market prices of oil and gas, the 16 subsidies could increase the average rates of return of yet-to-be-developed oil and gas fields by 55% and 68% over unsubsidized levels, respectively, with over 96% of subsidy value flowing to excess profits under a 10% hurdle rate. At lower 2020 prices, the subsidies could increase the average rates of return of new oil and gas fields by 63% and 78% over unsubsidized levels, respectively, with more than 60% of oil and gas resources being dependent on subsidies to be profitable under a 20% hurdle rate. </p><p>The way to think about this is, subsidies can have one of two negative effects, depending on market circumstances. </p><p>With higher prices and a lower hurdle rate, “only 4 percent of new oil and 22 percent of new gas resources would be subsidy-dependent, pushed into making profits,” Achakulwisut told me. That means most of the projects didn’t really need subsidies and the extra money is all going to bigger profit margins for oil and gas investors.</p><p>With lower prices and a higher hurdle rate, “subsidies would matter a lot,” she says, “and 61 percent of new oil and 74 percent of new gas would be subsidy-dependent.” The subsidies would directly lead to more production. </p><p>Achakulwisut summarizes: “In one case, it's going to profit, amplifying the incumbent status of the oil and gas industry. In another, under more aggressive decarbonization policy and low oil and gas prices, it's actively working against the climate goal by spurring additional production.”</p><p>Either of those effects is bad. In 2021, we don’t want bigger profit margins for oil and gas companies and we don’t want more oil and gas production.</p><p>One subsidy to rule them all</p><p>What’s interesting is that the benefits to oil and gas are not spread evenly over different subsidies. In fact, one in particular dwarfs the others: the expensing of intangible exploration and development costs (“intangible drilling costs,” or IDC), a policy that’s been around for over a century.</p><p>The chart below shows the “average effect of each subsidy on the internal rate of return (IRR) of new, not-yet-producing oil and gas fields, at average 2019 prices of USD2019 64/barrel of oil and USD2019 2.6/mmbtu of gas.”</p><p>As you can see, in every region, the IDC deduction is the dominant subsidy. It “increases US-wide average IRR by 11 and 8 percentage points for oil and gas fields respectively.”</p><p>The IDC deduction has been the subject of controversy for ages. The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) has a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.crfb.org/blogs/tax-break-down-intangible-drilling-costs">good breakdown here</a>. A definition: </p><p>Intangible drilling costs are defined as costs related to drilling and necessary for the preparation of wells for production, but that have no salvageable value. These include costs for wages, fuel, supplies, repairs, survey work, and ground clearing. They <a target="_blank" href="http://www.api.org/policy-and-issues/policy-items/taxes/~/media/Files/Policy/Taxes/13-April/API-IDC-April-2013.pdf">compose</a> roughly 60 to 80 percent of total drilling costs. </p><p>Since the dawn of the federal income tax code in 1912, US law has allowed oil and gas companies to deduct all these costs up front, rather than as they are incurred. The idea is to defray the risk that an exploration project will come up dry; in practice, it’s a fat financial reward at the front end of every project. </p><p>The industry and its defenders offer an array of arguments in favor of the deduction, which CRFB adeptly summarizes:</p><p>Supporters of the deduction <a target="_blank" href="http://anga.us/blog/2013/7/11/study-highlights-the-need-to-maintain-intangible-drilling-cost-deductions">argue</a> that oil and gas and exploration and development is a high-cost industry, and allowing expenses to be recovered immediately encourages companies to invest. They <a target="_blank" href="http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/washington/api-says-intangible-drilling-costs-tax-deduction-26095337">explain</a> that altering the deduction could result in job losses, since wages are included in the deduction.</p><p>More broadly, supporters <a target="_blank" href="http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/03/americas-most-obvious-tax-reform-idea-kill-the-oil-and-gas-subsidies/274121/">point out</a> that the oil and gas industry receives the same treatment that other manufacturing or extractive industries receive, and are merely a target because of the now-controversial nature of reliance on fossil fuels. Finally, supporters of <a target="_blank" href="http://www.api.org/policy/tax/apikeytaxissues/upload/repeal_expensing_of_intangible_drilling_cost.pdf">energy independence</a> often <a target="_blank" href="http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/american_exploration_and_production_council_2.pdf">support</a> the IDC deduction, as it promotes further exploration and development of wells within the United States.</p><p>The thing is, all those arguments are true. But the subsidy is still bad.</p><p>Yes, deducting IDCs encourages investment in new oil and gas projects and creates new jobs. That’s what subsidies do! It just happens that we no longer want to encourage investment in oil and gas. </p><p>Yes, other manufacturing and extractive industries get similar deductions. The difference is that we want to encourage investment in those other industries and we no longer want to encourage investment in oil and gas. That’s the whole point.</p><p>The issue is not whether the subsidy does what it’s designed to do. It does. The question is whether we still want to do the thing it does. We do not. </p><p>People have been calling for removal of this subsidy for <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/03/americas-most-obvious-tax-reform-idea-kill-the-oil-and-gas-subsidies/274121/">decades</a>. It’s still a good idea.</p><p>Oil and gas also benefits from offloading its environmental regulatory costs onto the public</p><p>The other subsidies that substantially boost oil and gas profit margins are “regulatory exemptions that lower [oil and gas] production costs at the expense of the health and safety of workers and the public.” Two such exemptions shift financial liability for well closure and reclamation from companies to state governments, which saddles places with lots of abandoned wells — Texas, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma, for example — with an average of $10 billion a piece in remediation costs, which well exceeds what those states have set aside in cleanup funds.</p><p>Another allows oil and gas to treat solid wastes from extraction as non-hazardous, despite the fact that they frequently contain toxic chemicals or radioactive materials. This reduces per-well operational costs an average of $60,000.</p><p>Keep in mind, this study didn’t try to tally up the public health benefits of removing these subsidies. Others have done so, like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.pnas.org/content/118/14/e2011969118">a recent study from Yale’s Matthew Kotchen</a> that tried to tally up the “implicit subsidies” to US fossil fuel producers represented by “externalized environmental damages, public health effects, and transportation-related costs.” His conclusion:</p><p>The producer benefits of the existing policy regime in the United States are estimated at $62 billion annually during normal economic conditions. This translates into large amounts for individual companies due to the relatively small number of fossil fuel producers. </p><p>Those implicit subsidies are far larger than any direct subsidies. In 2017, the International Monetary Fund tried to tally up implicit subsidies across the globe and came up with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2019/5/17/18624740/fossil-fuel-subsidies-climate-imf">an eye-popping $5.2 </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2019/5/17/18624740/fossil-fuel-subsidies-climate-imf"><em>trillion</em></a>. </p><p>Like much climate policy, removing fossil fuel subsidies requires directly confronting fossil fuels</p><p>I take three things from this research. One, fossil fuel subsidies really do strengthen the economics of US oil and gas companies and accelerate investment and exploration. That’s what they’re designed to do, and they do it. Two, the oil and gas industry really does materially benefit from being allowed to offload its environmental risks onto the public. </p><p>And three, the deduction for intangible drilling costs is the main fight. It is the big subsidy, the one that’s actually pushing new oil and gas projects over the line into profitability, and it is a much more specific target than “fossil fuel subsidies.” It seems like something some clever group ought to be able to build a campaign around. </p><p>It’s worth noting that Joe Biden’s proposed 2021 budget would eliminate the IDC deduction, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nrdc.org/experts/sujatha-bergen/market-warping-oilgas-subsidies-way-out-biden-budget">along with a host of other fossil fuel subsidies</a>. Then again, Obama <a target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-obama-budget-oil/obama-budget-seeks-to-end-oil-gas-subsidies-idUSTRE6103RM20100201">included the same kinds of provisions</a> in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.powermag.com/obamas-budget-proposal-eliminates-fossil-fuel-subsidies-and-cuts-epa-funding/">virtually every one of his budgets</a>, and Congress never complied. Like I said, fossil fuel subsidies just hang around.</p><p>In this way, they represent the sad reality of federal climate policy in the US, which involves a lot of heady talk and future targets, but very little that would confront fossil fuel industries head-on over the next decade. (I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/on-climate-policy-theres-one-main">wrote about this</a> the other day.)</p><p>The problem is that the benefits of fossil fuel exploration and production are concentrated in a few regions and communities and the members of Congress who represent those communities are hyper-motivated to preserve existing advantages. In contrast, the benefits of ramping down fossil fuel production are spread out, geographically and temporally, so few members of Congress will champion it with the same vigor. </p><p>That’s how climate policy runs aground in the US — in the translation from high-flown rhetoric to policies that will materially affect the bottom lines of fossil fuel companies.</p><p>This study offers us a marker of serious commitment: repealing the deduction for IDCs. When Congress actually gets around to addressing that age-old subsidy, we’ll know we’re finally getting somewhere. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/subsidies-really-do-matter-to-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:39292774</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 30 Jul 2021 16:30:06 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/39292774/fa262a398eb925eb68b4c028975e8263.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>794</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/39292774/4f4fa04d24439b027f904d944dd8d532.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Rep. Sean Casten on Hot FERC Summer]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Rep. Sean Casten (D-Il.), the House Democrats’ resident clean-energy expert, discusses the importance of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the influence it has over US decarbonization, and the urgent need for Biden to appoint a new commissioner. We also get into our favorite FERC orders!</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Rep. Sean Casten, July 28, 2021 </p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/4xhg87m0z4dvjx2/volts21.07.28%28sean.casten%29.pdf?dl=0">PDF version</a>)</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Greetings. Welcome to the Volts Podcast. I am your host, David Roberts. </p><p>As Volts subscribers are well aware, the fastest way to decarbonize the US economy is through clean electrification — decarbonizing the electricity sector and shifting energy use in other sectors like transportation and buildings over to electricity.</p><p>How can the federal government help that process along? Most control over power utilities and markets lies at the state level. There's only one federal agency with real jurisdiction over electricity: the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC.</p><p>FERC is not an agency people many people follow, or even know about — in fact, in the Volts household, it has become a kind of jokey shorthand for "the boring stuff dad writes about."</p><p>But it could play a key role in implementing Biden's climate agenda. And it has come to a crucial crossroads. </p><p>FERC has five commissioners. Currently, three are Republicans, but one of them, Neil Chatterjee, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.fosterreport.com/featured-stories/chatterjee-eyeing-options-with-term-ending-no-white-house-nomination-forthcoming/">came to the end of his term</a> on June 30. He has agreed to stay on temporarily because Biden, somewhat inexplicably, has yet to formally nominate anyone to replace him. Until he does, and the Senate confirms, the commission will not have a Democratic majority and won’t be able to get anything big done.  </p><p>That’s unfortunate, because FERC has lots of big decisions to make — about transmission, electricity rates, and markets — with potentially transformative consequences. But the agency moves slowly, with rulemakings taking months or years, and it only has three and a half years to get everything done. Biden needs to get someone in that seat.</p><p>Enter Rep. Sean Casten. The Democrat from Illinois' 6th District, which includes wide swaths of the western suburbs of Chicago, is trying to draw attention to FERC and the importance of a bold and climate-minded new commissioner. He’s leading a communications campaign called "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/democrats-hot-ferc-summer-campaign-aims-to-boost-fercs-visibility-on-ca/603664/">Hot FERC Summer</a>," a twist on Megan Thee Stallion's "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbcLcSY2au4">Hot Girl Summer</a>." (Hey, nobody said getting eyes on FERC was easy.) </p><p>Casten, a member of the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, recently <a target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4XySD1e_-M">delivered a floor speech</a> filled with Stallion-related puns of varying cheesiness, calling on Biden and Dems to nominate and approve a new commissioner quickly. He has also co-authored bills on transmission siting and ratemaking that clarify and reinforce FERC's obligation to take climate change into account in its decisions.</p><p>I have known Sean since the 2010s, when he was the CEO of a waste heat recovery company called Recycled Energy Development. His long experience in the clean energy industry informed some sharp analysis, and he occasionally <a target="_blank" href="https://grist.org/author/sean-casten/">wrote guest posts for my blog at Grist</a>, the environmental news site I worked for at the time. </p><p>As you can imagine, it was a delight to see him <a target="_blank" href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/elections/ct-met-illinois-6th-district-peter-roskam-sean-casten-20181106-story.html">win a seat in Congress in 2018</a>, bringing his deep energy expertise to a body that has often lacked it. I was excited to geek out with him about FERC and the state of congressional energy politics.</p><p>Rep. Sean Casten, welcome to Volts! </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten: </strong></p><p>So happy to be here, David. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Sean, I knew you back when you reached the pinnacle of your career: I'm talking, of course, about when you were writing <a target="_blank" href="https://grist.org/author/sean-casten/">guest blog posts for me at Grist</a>. </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Really, it's been downhill for both of us since we left Grist. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Suffice to say, you know more about energy than the average bear; probably considerably more, I would say, than the average congressperson. So before we get to FERC: When you got to Congress, would you say that the average clean-energy literacy of your colleagues in Congress was higher or lower than you expected going in? </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Oh, that's the kind of question that could get me in trouble for throwing people under the bus, but let me maybe offer one of the best pieces of wisdom I got on getting sworn in. Jamie Raskin, who of course everybody knows now because of his work on impeachment, is just a wonderfully kind and decent person. And he said to me, when I was just sworn in and trying to figure out the ropes of this place, he said, “This is a job that makes you very broad, but it's very hard to have the time to get deep. And if you want to know how to get things done, ask people why they first ran, because that's a really good shorthand way to find out where people are deep. If you really want to do something on healthcare policy or criminal justice, it'll help to know who those are.” </p><p>So I've tried to follow that policy. I've asked around, and I will tell you that I have not met a lot of people who said, “I ran because I care about energy policy” — which is not a criticism, because they did run for other reasons, and they have depth in other areas. But historically, energy policy is not the kind of thing that pollsters say, “the voters demand somebody who really appreciates the nuances of obligation-to-serve and ratemaking proceedings,” right? </p><p>So yes, it's lonely. It's just not a way that people typically get into Congress.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Well, all of the sudden, these issues are on the front burner, and everybody in Congress is expected to know a bunch of stuff about them. Have you found that people are open to being educated? Is there a crash education process happening?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>There is and there isn’t. It's interesting, I find that energy policy is a lot like foreign policy in the sense that most voters don't care, but we [Congressfolk] make decisions that are really impactful. So it becomes an area where members are very deferential to staff. </p><p>I am as well; I don't claim to be an expert on, you know, the situation going on in Afghanistan right now. But I trust that there are staff on the Foreign Affairs Committee, and their job is to understand that.</p><p>So yes, members are receptive. But what's hard on issues like energy policy is that the job of a congressional staff person is to figure out how to get done what is politically possible; the job of a staff person is not to move the Overton window. It’s hard to get members who are confident enough in their own skills to really try to push the envelope on energy policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Let's talk about FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Whenever I tell people I'm writing about FERC, the eye glaze is almost instant. So maybe just tell us, why should ordinary people care about FERC?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>The way you stop people's eyes from glazing over with FERC is you <a target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4XySD1e_-M&#38;t=19s">couple your conversation with a picture of Megan Thee Stallion and some hip-hop lyrics</a>. I've found this week that is a very effective way to keep people engaged.</p><p>We can get to that, but look, stipulate a couple things. Number one, we have to get to zero carbon way faster than anybody is even talking about in the most ambitious world right now. Number two, as you've so eloquently explained, it's really hard to see how we do that without “electrifying everything.” </p><p>If that's going to happen … let's just talk about the transportation sector: the transportation sector uses about as much primary energy as the electric sector uses today. So if we were just going to electrify the entire transportation sector, we need to build about as much electricity generation as we already have, and then build a whole lot of wires to connect that new generation that's going to be in different places — because it's going to be where the sun and the wind and the renewable resources are, not where the coal seams are — up to loads in new places along highways and homes and apartment buildings. And that's just for the transportation sector. </p><p>The Department of Energy has no meaningful jurisdiction over those questions of generator siting, generator installation, generator permitting, transmission siting, the markets that regulate and give people an incentive to deploy capital. The EPA doesn't really have a lot of jurisdiction over that; they have some on the environmental side. Department of Transportation doesn't really have much jurisdiction over that. </p><p>FERC does. And so, if we are going to do what's necessary on climate, FERC is really the only agency that has the tools necessary to do what is environmentally necessary, even though it's not an environmental agency. That's why you should care.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's the only piece of the federal government that gets directly at electrification. I'm not sure people really understand that. </p><p>Before we jump into some of the substantive issues FERC is wrestling with, the big thing going on with FERC right now has to do with commissioners. There are five commissioners on FERC; by statute, two of them have to be from the minority party, and three can be from the majority party. It's been a long time since there were three Democrats, but it might happen soon. What's the state of play there?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Yeah, hugely important. McConnell largely stonewalled Obama's [FERC] appointments, so it's been not as effective as it could be for a long time (like most things McConnell touches). </p><p>Chairman Chatterjee — well, I should say former Chairman Chatterjee, now Chairman Glick; he was the chairman before Glick was elevated — his term expired in June. So technically he's off; he is agreeing to stick around until the new nominee comes in. I actually get along pretty well with Chatterjee; he and I have spent a fair amount of time together, in spite of the fact that he started his career as an energy aide to Mr. McConnell and comes from the coal belt. I think he's been more forward-thinking than a lot of people thought he would. But he still is not, by his nature, going to lean in on some of the transformational issues in the power sector. </p><p>So with him gone, the president has the opportunity to appoint someone; there are several names being thrown out that have been vetted. I'm very long on rumors of the status of that process. But what I can say factually is that the Biden administration, as we talk right now, has not affirmatively put one of those names forward. And therefore the Senate has not started confirmation hearings. </p><p>That really needs to accelerate, because until they've got a 3-2 majority, they can't initiate the hearings; until they've initiated the hearings, they can't do the ANOPRs — the announcements of proposed rulemakings — for public comment; until they do those, they can't do the orders; and until they do the orders, the markets are not going to start responding to the ways that they might change these structures. We don't have a lot of time.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Yes, those things take a lot of time.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Yeah. So it just needs to go right away. I'm quite certain that if the White House wanted to, they could twist arms and put some pressure to make that process move a little faster. I'm also quite aware that they have a lot of things on their plate, and they can't do all of them. So I'm hoping it'll come quick. But it's already not as quick as I'd like it to be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Well, speaking of rumors, do you have any theories about the lack of urgency here? Because presumably there are staffers up there who appreciate that FERC is the only route to a lot of President Biden’s goals. Do you think they're just not paying attention? Or do you think something else is going on? </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten: </strong></p><p>I'd be purely speculating, but I think it’s probably not unreasonable to conclude that it's related to how this conversation started. It is not just your listeners whose eyes glaze over when we talk about the importance of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. </p><p>So there's not been a tremendous amount of political pressure to expedite this, as much as there has with, say: we need to get new FTC staff appointed so that we can talk about what we're going to do with social media companies and antitrust; we need to get an attorney general to reconcile with the issues of the Trump administration and the horrible things going on with white supremacy in this country. </p><p>Those are really important issues too. But those have tended to attract a bit more political attention than this particular agency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I have also heard rumors that there's some talk of the FERC nominee being used as a kind of bargaining chip to get centrist or moderate Senate votes for this reconciliation bill. Do you know anything about what's going on in the Senate behind the scenes on that?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten: </strong></p><p>I am not familiar with that specific rumor; that doesn't sound implausible. I think it is safe to say that anything meaningful we are going to do on climate is not going to be done in a bipartisan basis. I wish that wasn't true. It's tragic. But the way that our Democratic and Republican seats in Congress are distributed right now more or less tracks to the way that the energy-producing regions and energy-consuming regions of the country are distributed. And so anything that a functioning FERC would do to accelerate the deployment of lower-cost technologies — which also, by the way, is the deployment of cleaner technologies — implicitly is going to create a huge wealth transfer from energy producers to energy consumers, and therefore, from the empty, depopulated red parts of the country to the concentrated, populated blue parts of the country. </p><p>I don't think it's intentional that the parties have aligned that way. But it means that it's very hard to … you know, I've said to some of my colleagues across the aisle that if your district loses $100, and mine gains $1,000, I can understand why we're both not going to yell, “Kumbaya, we've created $900 of value for the American people!” </p><p>So yes, I think those who would prioritize bipartisanship in this moment — you can insert any name you would like into that box — do not overlap very well with those who prioritize the urgency of climate action.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Well said. OK, speaking of the issues that FERC has its hands on, let's start with transmission. Transmission used to be a rather sleepy topic that not a lot of people cared about, but all of the sudden it's hot, it's in the news, everybody's talking about it. FERC has an open docket on transmission right now that they're getting ready to launch into, which everyone's very excited about … for some values of “everyone” …</p><p><strong>Rep: Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Once a philosopher, always a philosopher. I can hear you describing those Venn diagrams. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>So what is wrong with transmission and what can FERC do to fix it? I know you have a bill specifically about FERC and transmission, but I'm also interested in what FERC can do on transmission <em>without</em> a clarifying bill, and what it really needs a bill from Congress for.</p><p><strong>Rep: Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Let me take them in reverse order, because I think there's two problems with transmission. The first is that it is really, really hard to get a transmission project permitted in a timely fashion. And that is the result of the fact that there is no controlling agency for a transmission project. If you want to build a wire to connect the wind in Iowa to the electric loads in Chicago, every time that wire crosses a town line, a county line, a state line, you've got a different group of people who can object — as compared to natural gas, where you can have a single controlling agency, where everybody who might object can still weigh in, but they can only weigh in to one agency, and you adjudicate these all at once. </p><p>That has made transmission virtually impossible to site in this country and is why for the last 20 years, the way that we've built power plants — pre the broad deployment of renewables — was to find where there was an existing interconnection and then run a gas pipe to that point to build a combined cycle plant at that node. Because it was easier to permit the gas. </p><p>FERC can't really fix that; that needs to be fixed statutorily. The Biden White House and a number of us in Congress have been talking about creating a single Office of Transmission Planning that would have that authority. It’s really important, because then you would give certainty to people who want to build either generation projects that need transmission or the transmission to bring it to load. </p><p>Like I said, FERC can’t solve that; we can and should, legislatively.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's the Federal Power Act, I think it was? Back in the 20s, 1920 I think —</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>1935, I think, was the Federal Power Act.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Specifically gave FERC that oversight of natural gas pipelines, and just through its silence, didn't give it control over transmission. So the idea here would just be an addition to the Federal Power Act saying FERC also has control over this, right? I mean, is it that simple?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I think so, although I'm just an engineer, so I'm not going to quote you on the legal ways to solve that. I'll defer to smart energy staff on that one. But yes, conceptually, you're exactly right. </p><p>The second problem is one that I think FERC does have the authority to address. And it's the classic problem of regulatory capture. There's a huge governance problem at all the regional independent system operators [ISOs] and regional transmission organizations [RTOs], which is that their membership is a function of their market participants. So wherever you live, think of the big utilities in your state, the big transmission companies: they're the members of those organizations. </p><p>And those entities, more often than not, make most of their money during a few hours of the year when there's a real congestion situation. Electric markets are actually extremely efficient most of the time, which means that it's really hard to make a profit most of the time. And when you get congestion on nodes, that's where the big money comes in. And so they have a very strong economic disinterest in market efficiency. </p><p>So that has historically made it really hard to connect transmission that would have the practical effect of taking excess generation out of one part of the grid that's got too much load and moving it to a place that's congested on a little node down below. You look around the country, Maine has always had way too much generation, southeast Connecticut has always been way too constrained. No matter how long we try to fix that, it's like, why are we not getting that fixed? In California, you've got times … well, where you are David, up in the Northwest, BPA is dumping excess power, because they have more wind and hydro than they know what to do with, even while California is short, but you can't get a wire that's run down there. </p><p>And those are solved by making sure that we bolster the interregional connections on the grid, which is what this bill — that's really Senator Heinrich, I should give all credit, has been really leading this, I'm carrying it in the House — but to make sure that we fix some of those interregional issues, and really direct FERC to do it, because the pressure from the RTOs and ISOs is going to be to resist that. </p><p>I think they have that authority. I think there's some debate over whether they have enough authority to deal with some of the cost-allocation questions. If your utility was to build a transmission wire to bring power down to northern California, should you pay for that or should northern California pay for that or how should you divide that? Those are tricky issues. So some of the cost allocation comes in, but I think FERC has the ability to do that. </p><p>But the problems derive from the governance issues, which is more an issue of, are you willing to flex the authority you have? If not, do you need authority that you haven't currently been provided?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>So what would that authority look like? If you have RTOs that are benefiting from congestion and you propose a line that's going to reduce congestion, the RTO is going to push back against you. What exactly does it mean for FERC to exercise authority there? Just to insist that someone build it? </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Well, at the risk of having an overly naive view of politics, I don't see any problem with utilities advocating for their interests. And I don't see any problem with the regulator listening to those interests. The challenge is, what do you do when another set of interests is not in the room, or not as strong, and how do you make sure that their voice is heard? And that's just as true for, in our example, the beneficiaries in California vs. Seattle as it is for the beneficiaries who are not yet born and who are going to benefit in the future. </p><p>I think a good, enlightened, public-prioritizing regulator is going to do that. And there are certainly plenty of examples of people who fit that description. I think of someone like Louis Brandeis on the Supreme Court. You can have the other kind of regulator as well. </p><p>So I think some of what Congress can do is essentially mandate good behavior — which I wish, in some philosophical sense, we didn't have to do. But by mandating good behavior, we will ensure that good behavior happens. </p><p>I do think, having said that, that if we get a good new commissioner to take this third spot, we will have a majority of well-behaving commissioners.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>One of the big problems is cost allocation. Right now, costs get allocated to the power generators who want to use the new line, despite benefits being spread out widely over the whole area that the transmission line covers. How do you see cutting that Gordian knot? Does your bill address cost allocation?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>We do address some of it. Kathy Castor has a bill that more explicitly addresses cost allocation. Ours is more getting FERC to acknowledge that when they do those cost-allocation formulas, there's also a benefit allocation. There are benefits that go beyond things that are thought of in a very strict Milton Friedman “all that matters is the price of power in the next hour” kind of conversation. </p><p>For example, we had a power plant in northern Indiana recently —  it was a coal plant that was totally uneconomic, didn't make any sense to run as a source of energy, but was providing some really critical power-factor stabilization roles. That's one of these ancillary services that's not very well factored into retail markets, but the grid needs. </p><p>So they came up with this really interesting approach of saying OK, we'll shut down the boiler, we'll turn the generator into a motor spinning backwards, and we'll use that motor just to do power-factor correction. And that will spread that benefit around the grid, so that we still get the benefit of this thing providing reactive power, even though it's not providing power. </p><p>But that was a really interesting, creative solution that was done because the people involved were pretty smart and pretty innovative. But you wouldn't necessarily get there in a normal FERC proceeding, even if you had a transmission line that was providing some of those benefits.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>That's an extremely expensive way to provide spinning mass, isn’t it.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Well, actually, like in that particular case, the whole plant was already built. So it was actually kind of neat that you took this thing and said, instead of shutting down this coal plant and losing the jobs, we're still going to get the benefit from a pollution perspective of shutting down the coal plant, but we're gonna keep this existing asset running and keep some of the talent here. So it was probably a much cheaper way to provide that service than anybody else could. At any rate, I'm getting way down in the details now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>FERC, by statute, is supposed to ensure just and reasonable electricity rates. So these big IOUs have to come to FERC and justify their rates. And one of the fights going back years now is whether climate damages should be taken into consideration when considering what counts as just and reasonable rates. You have a piece of legislation that explicitly tells FERC to do that. Can FERC do a little bit of that without legislation? And what exactly does your legislation specify that it do?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I would argue that FERC absolutely has this authority, and again, it's a question of, “let's make sure they also have an obligation to do it” stapled to it. </p><p>There's two pieces of why this bill is necessary. The bill is the <a target="_blank" href="https://casten.house.gov/media/press-releases/casten-introduces-bill-ensure-energy-prices-reflect-full-cost-greenhouse-gas">Energy PRICE Act</a>. PRICE is an acronym that stands for something; I forget what it is [Prices Require Including Climate Externalities]. But what it does is remind FERC that, number one, the 1935 Federal Power Act said rates must be just and reasonable; number two, in <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Power_Commission_v._Sierra_Pacific_Power_Co.">FPC (the name of FERC at the time) vs. Sierra Pacific</a> in 1956, the Supreme Court ruled that the commission must ensure the protection of public interests; and number three, in 2009, the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/endangerment-and-cause-or-contribute-findings-greenhouse-gases-under-section-202a-clean">EPA endangerment finding</a> — that I know is one of your favorite rulings — said that rates must take into account current and future generations. </p><p>So with those three decisions in tandem, you have an affirmative obligation on FERC to set rates that take into account the costs and consequences of climate change and effectively set up markets that for all practical purposes build in a carbon price in some fashion. </p><p>Now, that's the negative reason, protecting from a cost. There is an even more urgent positive reason for this, which is that every clean electricity generator effectively eats its investment thesis. By that I mean, you build these generators — whether it's a nuclear plant, a solar plant, geothermal, whatever you want — because you think you are going to make money, because you operate at a lower cost than the grid currently sits. You then put a source of power into those markets that is lowering the cost in those markets, because you've knocked off whatever was the higher marginal cost generator that would have operated but for you being there. </p><p>So over time, particularly in the markets that have really embraced deregulation, you've seen electric markets get cleaner and cheaper, to the point that you now have — and again, it's what I alluded to in the Pacific Northwest — a lot of hours where the power price is negative, because there's so much hydro and wind on the system, and they don't know how to turn it off. That then creates a circumstance where, as clean energy succeeds, you lose the incentive to build <em>any</em> generator, because the value of electricity gets to be too low. </p><p>I mean, think about how awesome that is, right? The whole theory that it's too expensive to care about the environment is exactly wrong. It's too <em>cheap</em>. </p><p>Now what happens with FERC, who is tasked with an obligation to maintain consistent, reliable power? What do you do in response to that? I think the legislative and judicial history is pretty clear. What you do is provide a differential incentive to bring on the generation that is cleaner. </p><p>So you get there through the same means, but you get there because you have to prevent these technologies from eating their investment thesis. It’s a strange thing to talk about with the solar and wind industry that seems to be booming right now, but that's what the nuclear industry is already going through. Those plants were built, and now they're not making enough money to justify their five-year refueling cost. They're having to shut down because they can't make enough money.</p><p>Now we're having a political conversation: Should the taxpayers provide a subsidy to these nuclear plants to keep running because FERC failed to fix a problem that, I would submit, you could see coming?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>There's been a lot written about this lately, the declining marginal value of new clean energy as it comes online. So your idea is, instead of taxpayers subsidizing clean generators, FERC should in some way penalize dirty generators with a price, by forcing them to pay for their carbon emissions?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Oh, I prefer to call it a carrot to the good guys than a stick to the bad guys. But yes, they should ensure that there are incentives to build new generation that are consistent with nondiscriminatory pricing that does not adversely affect current or future generations. Will that be bad for coal? You betcha.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>This might be getting slightly too much in the weeds, but this issue of declining marginal value: you're chasing a receding target, right? You can do differential rates, and that will punt the problem down the road a little bit, but doesn't it just come back unless you're constantly escalating?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I guess it's a question that's much bigger than the energy industry. We've regulated all of our markets in this country for 30, 40 years on the assumption that as long as consumer price is falling, everything else must be good. So we outsourced huge swaths of manufacturing, because if we could have a country that is cool with child labor manufacture our dishwasher, as long as the cost of the dishwasher is cheaper, we'll do it. We've hit the limits of that as an operating philosophy, I think. </p><p>I don't mean to duck your question; I think it's a valid question. But there are a broader set of societal values that are not always encapsulated in consumer price, and it just so happens that in electricity markets, we're on the verge  of hitting the limit, where if we don't answer that right, we're gonna lose our access to power. But it's the same dynamic playing out in a lot of other sectors.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>So what you're delicately trying to say is that maybe pushing electricity rates lower and lower and lower and lower is not the north star here; there might even be good public reasons to raise rates to pay for those benefits.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I’d put it slightly differently: if I can build an asset that is going to clean the air and create wealth for society, let's make sure we have a regulatory structure that ensures that that wealth is equitably allocated between consumers, investors, and the public at large, and doesn't disproportionately accrue to one of those groups. We are making the pie bigger. We just have to make sure we divide the pie appropriately.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>A lot of people involved in clean energy have a lot of complaints about IOUs [investor owned utilities]: the way they make rates, the way they plan. Could FERC, under this “just and reasonable” banner, force IOUs to — instead of using planning models based on the last 10 years, which is standard practice — use forward-looking models, since things are changing very fast now? </p><p>Or, second part of the question, could FERC force them to consider resilience — which is a big thing now, people are losing power because of wildfires, because of cold snaps —  in rates? What's the limit of FERC being able to kind of kick IOUs in the butt and make them move into the 21st century?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I don't know that I have a precise answer, just because IOUs are so different in one part of the country than another. Some states have embraced deregulation, where the IOU is really just the last-mile distribution company; other states still have fully vertically integrated monopolies, that own everything from the power plant through the transmission to the wire. And in all cases, you have some very clear jurisdictional limits between what FERC can do and what the states can do. Generally speaking, the monopoly franchise is issued by the state. And so FERC can impact markets, can impact interstate transmission of power, which the courts have deemed a federally germane conversation. But a lot of the IOU regulation planning is really more at the state PUC level. </p><p>My all-time favorite FERC order — I'm sure you have yours — is 888. 888 was the one that really started to deregulate the power sector back in the early 90s. The reason I like it so much is because for the first time in the history of our country, we told the electric sector that you could make money by building the lowest marginal cost asset, instead of saying you make money by building capital that will be built into rate base. </p><p>Within 10 years, the nuclear fleet went from 60 percent to 90 percent capacity factor, because all of a sudden, every utility said, “I've got this asset that's really cheap to run, I should run that asset more often.” We built a ton of combined cycle generation, natural gas, that was almost twice as efficient as the generation it replaced, because utilities said, wait a minute, if I can make money by having an asset that burns less fuel per megawatt hour, let me build more of those. Within about 15 years, the grid went from emitting 1,300 pounds of CO2 per megawatt hour to 900. All while rates were falling. </p><p>I tell that long story because that order was implemented very differently in different parts of the country, much like many issues of our day. If you live in the Southeast, you effectively operate under a very different set of federal rules than if you live in the Northeast. </p><p>The question you're asking, about how they could enforce more holistic planning tools on the IOUs — wouldn't it be nice to have a FERC hearing that asks, what are the lessons learned now from this 25-year-old order? How can we take the best practices that were implemented in some parts of the country and accelerate their movement into other parts of the country that were resistant at the time because they feared something that didn't come to pass?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>This segues perfectly into one of my other questions. The Southeast famously did not deregulate its electricity markets, and is still very much run by vertically integrated monopoly utilities, which own the power plants and the power lines and deliver the power. Now there's what I would characterize as a half-assed movement proposing a regional quasi-market called SEEM. I forget what it stands for [Southeast Energy Exchange Market]. Do you think FERC can or should force the Southeast to deregulate, form a wholesale market, form a regional transmission organization, and follow the rest of the country in restructuring? Is that something it can do? And do you think it should do so?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten: </strong></p><p>As someone who cares deeply about climate change and thinks that a properly designed market is the single best tool to address it: absolutely, yes. I also think it's entirely possible and not uncommon to do an improperly designed market. So the details matter, but yes, directionally, I'd love to see them do it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Speaking of intransigent regions of the country, one hot topic of conversation lately is about Texas-based ERCOT: they famously have created an RTO, a regional transmission organization, that only applies to Texas, thereby escaping FERC jurisdiction, because they don't ship power over state lines. And they are not shy about saying that's why they did it. </p><p>But they had this cold snap, a bunch of people died, a bunch of people lost power. And now we've just had <a target="_blank" href="https://acore.org/more-interregional-transmission-could-have-saved-nearly-1-billion-preserved-power-for-200000-homes-during-texas-freeze/">a study</a> a couple of days ago that said ERCOT could have, among other things, saved about a billion dollars during that cold snap if it had just been interconnected with  surrounding states. Is there any way for the federal government to force ERCOT to interconnect? Or will Texas basically have to make that decision on its own?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>It's worth pointing out: we use ERCOT and Texas as synonymous, but El Paso is a part of Texas, it just isn't a part of ERCOT. And El Paso had the same weather, they had the same utilities, they had the same generator maintenance — and they didn't lose power, because they were connected elsewhere. Oklahoma is also a lot like Texas: they had the same weather, they didn’t lose power. </p><p>When I said to one of my colleagues, who shall remain nameless, from the allegedly great state of Texas, “will you be advocating to interconnect to the grid?” there was a pause and the response was, “Well, we still are Texas.” </p><p>You've got the perennial discussion about state vs. federal rights, and as you and I have had many conversations about, how much of our frontier mythology is based on … I want you to build the railroad, build the electricity, build the broadband, and then get out of here, because I'm just an independent cowboy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>“Thanks for all that, but don't try to tell me how to use it.” </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Yes, exactly. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Well, I try these days to think, what would Republicans do? And they don't seem to particularly care about these divisions of jurisdiction or whatever; they just care about their goals, and whatever tools they have to achieve their goals. So do you want FERC to try to browbeat Texas into this, or pass some rules that would penalize Texas for not doing it? </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I guess I'm not smart enough to know exactly what those tools are and how sharp they are. I do think, and part of the reason why I'm so bullish on FERC, is that there's this huge tension between being pro-market and being pro-business. And FERC at its best, in setting up these markets, has been pro-market. </p><p>In all that story I told you about FERC order 888, most of the companies that built those gas plants went bankrupt; the plants are still running, but they designed the market so efficiently that people actually didn't make the money they thought they were going to make because the benefit flowed to the consumers. That's a very pro-market approach. </p><p>As long as FERC does that — subject to what I said before about, let's make sure that we allocate the wealth through the system so that people aren’t choosing between consumer prices and bankruptcy — we're going to have good outcomes. </p><p>But your comment about where are the Republicans on this: the Republicans — this isn't every Republican, but by and large — are a pro-business but anti-market party.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Yes. I love that way of putting it. I don't think that's widely appreciated, the distinction you're making.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>And to be fair, a lot of Democrats are not really pro-market either, right?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Not many entities or people in the world are pro-market when the rubber meets the roads. They are pro their own interests. And markets are devastating to business interests, quite often.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I've yet to meet the person who comes into my office and says, “Hey, Mr. Congressman, I've got this problem: it's too hard for my competitors to succeed.”</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>“We need to open this playing field. I need more competitors.” Yes, exactly.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>“What can I do to make more transparency of information and lower the barriers to entry and exit, consistent with the principles of Adam Smith?” You never hear that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Yeah, not a lot of lobbyists for that perspective. </p><p>While we're still in the states-rights things — and this may also be slightly too nerdy for anyone to care about — this question of where FERC jurisdiction ends and where state jurisdiction begins has been a hot topic among FERC nerds lately. Because some of the things FERC did with its regional markets via the MOPR, which I'm not even going to attempt to explain here, basically had the effect of setting regional market prices such that they cancel out state climate policies. </p><p>That obviously is outrageous to clean-energy advocates, and it also seems like a real imposition on states’ power of movement and jurisdiction. Do you have any general thoughts on where the right line is between FERC and the states? It seems a little arbitrary these days, with electricity markets being so regionalized and so national even.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>At the risk of sounding like a cop-out: I think, at some level, the blessing and the curse of our form of government is that we're not very precise about that answer. And it moves around a bit from time to time. And there are times when we think to ourselves, boy, thank goodness we have these state laboratories of democracy to lean in where the federal government isn't: witness California emission standards. </p><p>There are other times where it's hugely regrettable that we don't have the federal government with some authority to step in: witness voting rights. </p><p>And, yes, there's a big issue. Because I've spoken to him, I know that Chairman Glick is thinking a lot about how to structure markets to not step on state renewable-energy standards and other incentives they may have had in place, and to factor those in. But those standards exist in no small part because the federal government failed to act and the states stepped up. </p><p>This is moving into a totally different realm, but if we were by some magical event to come to agreement on a federal economy-wide carbon-pricing structure tomorrow, we'd have this huge problem that the states have already done it in a bunch of places. You've got AB32 in California, RGGI, and you have a bunch of private players that have entered into long-term contracts with an expectation that those contracts would be honored to the terms of those agreements. </p><p>So for all practical purposes, it is impossible right now to write a federal carbon-pricing structure that doesn't have tons of carve outs around the country. Which means a disharmonious standard when you cross the border from, let's say, California into Nevada, where, by the way, trucks and cars and powerlines cross all the time. We’d have these inter-state border-adjustment agreements or something to figure out. </p><p>It's a cop out on your answer, because I think, on balance, I like our federal system of government. But it's a very issue-by-issue answer.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Much like you rarely meet people who advocate for markets as such, you rarely meet people with a strictly principled answer to this question. It very much depends on, well, what's the issue? I mostly care about my issue, not these abstract questions.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>As an interesting aside, when we first put NAFTA together, Mexico was essentially forced to come into compliance with our electric regulatory structure. But Mexico doesn't have nearly as strong a culture of states rights. So in Mexico, you can do things that seem completely magical and dreamy, where you can build a power plant in one part of Mexico that's optimized to the local resource — maybe it's a waste heat recovery project, like I was doing in a prior life, or a solar plant — but if that power source exceeds the local load, you can just dump it onto the grid and then enter into a purely financial agreement with someone on the other side of the country, who would happily take your excess power, and just agree to financially settle with them as long as there's a transmission corridor that connects. </p><p>That's actually fairly consistent with FERC-level rules, but inconsistent with the ways that different states and regions have interpreted those rules within the United States. So the degrees of freedom and flexibility you have to optimize the system — so that locally you're saying, how do I make the maximum amount of valuable energy from this resource at this location, and then just figure out how to deal with the financial matters separately — we have those tools, just our states’ rights get in the way. </p><p>So we have a model to our south of what we might be with a stronger federal structure, but for the fact that they don't quite have as robust a legal system as we have.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Here's another puzzler for you: Some recent studies have shown that in aggregate, distributed energy resources — generators or energy storage that's on the distribution system, not on the transmission system — have huge effects on the national economy and electricity system, but are sort of intrinsically local. So I wonder, is there anything FERC can do regarding distributed energy resources? It seems like an awkward interface.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Well, by recent studies, I assume you mean ones from 1992 or so, because this was true as long as I was … </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Right, you were in the business of distributed energy resources!</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Yeah, and it drove me crazy. I've lost track of how many times we optimized a generator to a local load, knowing full well that that was not optimized to the region, but we couldn't get paid to optimize for the region. So we were leaving value on the table, and in some cases, working against value because of the way that the rules were wrong. </p><p>As long as we're going with cool FERC orders, there’s FERC 2222. (FERC has this interesting thing where they always pick very memorable numbers for their most impactful rules.)</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Are they totally arbitrary? Are they just picking those numbers out of the air for funsies?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I actually don't know the process, but I have been told that they do reserve palindromic or interesting numbers for good orders. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>And people call them boring.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Bringin’ sexy back. </p><p>But 2222 is a fairly recent order that says you can sell demand services [in wholesale energy markets]. In other words, if I'm a generator, I provide energy, which is the megawatt hours that you get out of your socket. And then I provide capacity, which is the ability to be there on a moment's notice if you need me, even if I'm not running. </p><p>What 2222 said was, there's a whole lot of capacity value created by these local distributed resources. If you enter into an agreement that says, sure, I can tolerate an extra five degrees — if you pay me for it, I'll shut my air conditioner off; to, let me install more efficient light bulbs that will cut the load down; to, let me put a generator on my premises that will displace load. </p><p>All those things in aggregate are not only as valuable as the generator that's sitting there, able to suddenly provide new load, but objectively <em>more</em> valuable, because the generator that's 100 miles out of town may lose 20-40 percent of its output on a hot peak day by the time it gets into your house. If you can curtail load at your house, a megawatt of load reduction might be worth 1.2, 1.4 megawatts of capacity on the system. </p><p>So 2222 provides a way, not so much for you as a homeowner to participate, but for so-called “load aggregators” to say, let me put together a whole network of people, and I can now participate equally with the big generators in these markets, with these values that I can aggregate from this collection of distributed resources. It's really cool.</p><p>I think we've barely scratched the potential of what we could do within those markets. It's not a complete set of all the values that distributed resources can create, but it's certainly a heck of a first step.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I wonder, though: 2222 opened up demand-side aggregators to play in these wholesale markets. But I wonder, as DERs proliferate, if that's going to be computationally nightmarish. You're going to go from wholesale markets that have a dozen participants to wholesale markets that have thousands or tens of thousands. I wonder if that's the right level of administration, if we don't need something more like a distribution system operator [DSO], like they have in the UK, to manage that local complexity and simplify it before it moves up to the wholesale level. </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>You might be right. I haven't thought about that level. </p><p>I mean, we do have distribution system managers in the sense that every region has a load-serving entity. When I ran a utility in Rochester, NY, I had load-serving entity responsibilities over that particular node, where I had to know all those things and manage it. And in your distribution utility, Seattle City Light, they are a load-serving entity that has those responsibilities. </p><p>To some degree, the DERs are already there. The question is, do we know about them. There's so many people doing what I was doing a decade ago: building the systems out, but not optimizing them for the grid, optimizing them for the local load. </p><p>Every factory that makes a decision to put in a more efficient motor is having a meaningful effect, in aggregate, on their grid, but the utility doesn't necessarily know they're there or know that they have the ability to dispatch in response to a variable price signal. They don't find that out until they institute a variable price signal.  </p><p>I haven't looked at the latest database, but last time I looked, there was something like 83,000 megawatts of cogeneration installed on the [US] grid. The median generator is two megawatts, and almost none of them are speaking in any kind of a data or dispatchability to the grid managers. They just turn on and off in response to local loads. </p><p>What that looks like from the perspective of FERC at the highest level, or the distribution companies at the lowest level, is just normal variability — not much different from a bunch of people turning their lights on and off. But because they don't have the data, they also aren't going out and saying, this would be really valuable, could I pay them to dispatch according to some larger value?</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I guess when I envision that kind of detailed local management, where you're trying to coordinate things so they work at the local and regional level … I’m just trying to imagine RTOs doing that, for five different regions they're overseeing, with thousands of DERs in each of the regions. I'm inclined to think we need more robust management closer to the distribution level to keep track. </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>The AI robots will take care of it. We’re just going to teach them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I used to have such faith in that. And then I was researching this article about that, and everybody I talked to said, no, the robots are not going to do this. There's not going to be the robots. I was so psyched about the robots. </p><p>We've mostly been talking about electricity, because of course it is the most important thing in the world and everybody should know more about it. But FERC also has jurisdiction over [natural gas] pipelines, and has been quite profligate in the past in approving pipelines. There's been this heated battle between Glick, the Democratic commissioner, and Chatterjee, the Republican commissioner, about whether FERC should take climate change into account when approving or not approving pipelines. </p><p>Are you involved in any legislation regarding that, or do you have any opinions about what to do about FERC and pipelines?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I'm not hugely involved. Obviously, I feel strongly that FERC does have the authority and obligation to take climate change into account in what they approve. What gets a little bit harder about pipelines vs. electricity, at least to my small brain, are conversations around, “Should we provide incentives for the market to meet people's energy needs as cheaply as possible?” Those easy, black and white, absolutely yes-every-time questions. Conversations around, “Should we limit people's ability to access energy in exchange for considerations about other moral issues?” are a lot grayer. </p><p>That's not to say categorically yes or no, but it's harder when you're saying, if we don't build this pipeline, will you still be able to keep your house warm in the next cold snap? That’s different from, when did we get the incentives right to provide you resources? A lot of times this conversation about pipelines is those two arguments sailing past each other.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>But if you talk to activists, they'll say these pipeline companies are not making very plausible cases that they're necessary, that a lot of these are fly-by-night, debt-heavy fracking companies that are profiting and not being held to very tight account. </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I'm not saying those arguments are not sometimes true, I'm just saying they’re not always true. At some level, energy’s like sex and drugs: if you want to curtail supply, you've got to curtail demand. You can't curtail demand by limiting supply, that just criminalizes supply. So let's invest in efficiency, let's invest in conservation, let's make homes tighter. But if you say you can't build a pipeline across the Canadian border, you better be happy with a lot more port traffic and rail traffic, because as long as people still want that energy, they're going to find a way to get it. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Enough about FERC. I've kept you a long time, and we probably talked about FERC more than any two people have a right to.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>A fraction of what the planet deserves.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>A fraction of what the planet deserves. Oh, actually, you had a third bill about FERC; let's mention real quick what that was.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>The third one is probably the least interesting. This was a right to timely rehearings. Frankly, this is what we were saying before, about how it is appropriate for the IOUs to argue their case before FERC, but it is not appropriate for the other side not to be heard. In every utility regulator, state and federal level, one of the ways you control the process is by limiting the other side's access to the process. So this is basically just making sure that when people have disputes, they have some sort of a cost-effective, time-effective way to make sure that their case is heard.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>So, to summarize the foregoing: it sounds like you think FERC already has a lot of the statutory power it needs to implement a lot of these things, and a lot of it just comes down to kicking them in the butt to do it — a lot of which sounds like it could be solved with a sufficiently committed commissioner. In some sense, that might solve a lot of these problems, just getting three commissioners on the board who are aimed in the right direction.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Sing it from the rooftops. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Passing bills in Congress has basically become impossible because of the filibuster, so what do you anticipate happening to these bills? Do you want to sneak them into the reconciliation bill? Do you think there is real prospect of getting 10 Republican senators to care about FERC and vote for a FERC bill? Where do you see this legislation going?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I wish I had a clear answer. I was chatting with Secretary Granholm earlier this week and I told her that I feel like us members of the House spend most of our time peeking out the door, looking at the other side of the Capitol, waiting to see if the parliamentarian is going to issue a white or black puff of smoke.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Just doing your chanting, sacrificing a goat. </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Exactly. </p><p>Let's be really clear: get rid of the damn filibuster, it gums up everything and it stops us from doing our job. It's not what the founders intended. It's just something you do if you think the best way to resolve debates is to defer to the will of the minority, because that's what the filibuster does. </p><p>Having said all that, as long as it exists, the way that you pass things that are supported by bipartisan majorities of the American people, but are not supported by bipartisan majorities of the United States Senate, is by jamming them into huge bills in corners where people aren't paying attention.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Yes, like the energy bill that passed at the very end of the previous congressional session, which miraculously had all kinds of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/congress-might-pass-a-huge-energy">good energy stuff tucked away in it</a>, which survived, as far as I can tell, entirely because no one was paying attention.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>And because it was jammed in with a bunch of other things that people did like, and said, I'll take a little bit of this with that. I don't remember that speech by our founders ...</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>“Thou shalt jam everything together and hope no one’s paying attention.”</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Exactly. Climate is hard to predict, but let's start with the positive: we have a White House that is absolutely committed to doing what's necessary. We have House and Senate leadership that is committed to doing what's necessary, and therefore is committed to saying until we have everything we have nothing. So we will get whatever we can into the bipartisan package, and then we will look at what's left and try to find a procedural way to get that into the reconciliation package, so we can generate them together. </p><p>That process, at least in theory, has the potential to do a whole lot of good things. What's hard in practice is that, because of the arcane rules of parliamentarian and the reconciliation process and the Byrd rule, the things we can do that are subject to reconciliation are by and large limited to things that require the expenditure of federal money. And almost everything we're talking about at FERC is a policy change to unleash private markets. </p><p>So we're in this bizarre case, where if we insist that Republicans must be at the table, then we are insisting we do not embrace capitalist free market principles — that we have to prioritize spending federal dollars to fix these problems.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>That's why all policy these days gets crammed through the tax code. It’s not because that's the best way to do things, it’s just the only way to pass things anymore.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I don’t know that I’d be quite that explicit, but that is certainly part of it. </p><p>Secretary Granholm has said that if we're going to electrify everything, as we must, we need to build 1,100 gigawatts of new generation. I think she might be a little low. For context, we currently have 1,000 gigawatts of generation total installed in the country. Jesse Jenkins over at Princeton has said that once we build that out, we'll need to spend at least $350 billion in transmission to connect it up to the grid. </p><p>If you figure that the generation is going to cost $1,500-$2,000 a kilowatt, and Jesse's right on the transmission side, that means we need something like $2-3 trillion just for the electric sector. We haven't gotten to roads and bridges and ports and EV charging stations and all the other stuff in the infrastructure package. </p><p>That's not to say that we can't do it, just that, if we are going to do what's necessary, we should be working with the private sector. They have a lot of cash too! They’ve got more than we do, in fact. So the more we lean on reconciliation, the less we have the ability to lever private markets and all of that entrepreneurial zeal that we love in our country, which means we're not going to do as much as we should.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Okay, final question, speaking of the reconciliation bill. Clean-energy wise, climate-wise, what do you think are the top two or three things that should be prioritized in that bill?</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>How do I pick my favorites? </p><p>At core, making the clean-energy transition we need depends on building assets, not operating assets, because the assets we will build will run all the time, because they’re so much more competitive. The coal industry is dying because it can't compete economically — and no one ever woke up in the morning and said, “Given the price of power today, I'm gonna turn off my solar panel,” right? You just have to get them built. </p><p>So I'm focused on those things that will accelerate the construction of those assets: a well-designed CES. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>A clean electricity standard, requiring utilities to boost their percentage of clean energy.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Yeah. Senator Smith has a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.smith.senate.gov/us-sen-tina-smith-says-her-clean-electricity-standard-ces-included-budget-deal-shares-primer-how">great CES</a>. Designing that well provides a huge carrot to clean generators — when you're sitting down saying, “Can I justify this investment?” it goes from “No” to “Holy smokes, I sure can, because I'm getting paid for this societal value that I'm creating.” It's going to be key to watch how that evolves, because it’s being tweaked right now to fit into a reconciliation process.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Designing well means, one, to achieve your goals, and two, to please the parliamentarian wizard — which are not necessarily the same design constraints.</p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>I'm not even sure they're in the same room. But a well-designed CES is really important. I'd love to see a proper market for carbon. But if I have to choose between carrots and sticks, give me a carrot, and a CES is a carrot. </p><p>Also, for obvious reasons, we’re focused on anything we can do to accelerate the deployment of transmission. We've got a pretty strong infrastructure bill from the House, the <a target="_blank" href="https://transportation.house.gov/invest-in-america">Invest Act</a>, that has a whole lot of money in it to build out EV charging, to make sure that EV charging is done equitably, so it's not only available to people who own their homes and have a garage that they can put a charger in. </p><p>But if you go through and build all that out, we need to make sure that we've got the wires and generation to meet that expanded electric load. So transmission and CES would be my big two.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I've heard transmission’s having a rough time of it in the Senate, that there's pushback from Republican senators about some of the language around transmission in the bill. Do you know anything about that? </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>The subtext behind all of that is energy producers vs. energy consumers. If you build out transmission, you will make it easier for more cost-effective sources of power to find a home for their product.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Right. Oh, what a system we've built.</p><p>Anyway, thank you so much for taking all this time. </p><p><strong>Rep. Sean Casten:</strong></p><p>Always a pleasure, David. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-rep-sean-casten-on</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:39145403</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 28 Jul 2021 16:00:11 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/39145403/5a6517557da6a989a20f44ea5c03bbf7.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4325</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/39145403/9179b4191b723854eb5b71aae5143757.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: rampant environmental rule-breaking and how to fix it, with Cynthia Giles]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, career environmental regulator Cynthia Giles discusses the rampant rule-breaking common in environmental rule and regulations and how to solve the problem — not with greater enforcement, but with smarter rule design.</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Cynthia Giles, July 14, 2021</p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/qf1kyjd8fla3efs/volts21.07.14%28cynthia.giles%29.pdf?dl=0">PDF Version</a>)</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>The US has hundreds of environmental rules and regulations on the books, meant to achieve various environmental goals — clean up coal plants, reduce toxins in consumer products, limit agricultural waste, and so on.</p><p>Once these rules and regulations are put in place, most people don’t give them a lot of thought. To the extent they do, they tend to believe two things: one, that environmental rules are generally followed (maybe, what, 3-5 percent break the rules?), and two, that the answer to noncompliance is increased enforcement.</p><p>According to Cynthia Giles, both those assumptions are dead wrong. </p><p>Giles was head of EPA’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/about-office-enforcement-and-compliance-assurance-oeca">Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance</a> for all eight years of Obama’s presidency — and had a long career in environmental enforcement before that — so she knows something about rules and enforcing them. Through the Harvard Environmental & Energy Law Program, where she is a guest fellow, Giles has been writing a series of pieces (which will be issued as a book in 2022) on “<a target="_blank" href="https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/next-generation-compliance-environmental-regulation-for-the-modern-era/">Next Generation Compliance: Environmental Regulation for the Modern Era</a>.” </p><p>In those pieces, she reveals that environmental rule-breaking is absolutely rampant — and that there’s surprisingly little increased enforcement can do about it. Instead, the key is to design rules better, such that compliance is the default choice.</p><p>I’m a sucker for policy design, so I was eager to talk to Giles about what she’s learned, how to design rules well (or poorly), and most of all, the best way to design climate rules. </p><p>With no further ado, welcome to Volts, Cynthia.</p><p>I really enjoyed your articles. As I was saying on Twitter earlier, I love it when I discover an expert who's making a well-argued, well-cited argument in favor of something I believe already but didn't have the chops to defend myself. I feel vindication. </p><p>There's a number of mind-blowing things in here, but one of the initial mind-blowing things that people don't understand very well is just how common violations and rule-breaking are. You spent eight years as head of EPA enforcement for Obama. I'm curious: before going into that position, did you know this about environmental rules? </p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>This is certainly something I had strongly suspected for a long time. I've worked in the environmental enforcement arena for a long time and I persistently saw a mismatch between what I was seeing in the field and what I was hearing so many people say — that compliance with environmental rules was good. </p><p>After I started in my position in the Obama administration, I asked folks to pull together everything we know about how compliance is with environmental rules. And I discovered that the evidence supported what I had suspected all along, which is that the rate of violations is substantially higher than most people think.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>What do we mean by substantially higher? Give us a sense of the scale here.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>I'll give you the contrast between what's popularly believed and what the facts are. As I mentioned, I have spent most of my professional career in environmental and compliance-related work. During that time, including during the Obama administration, I've asked a lot of people what they think the rate of non-compliance with environmental law is. The most common answer I get, including from people who have also spent their entire professional careers working in this area, is 5 to 10 percent. That's what people think.</p><p>It's nowhere near that. Not close. The rate of serious violations, the ones we care about the most, is 25 percent in most programs. And there are plenty of programs, I'm sorry to tell you, with rates substantially worse than that. It's not rare to find serious violation rates in the 70 percent and higher range. </p><p>I want to make sure I'm clear: when I'm saying someone has serious violations, I'm not saying they're violating every single thing, every day, 24/7 — but they are having a lot of violations we care about, in terms of protecting people's health. </p><p>So the rate is substantially worse than most people think. And that's just the ones we know about. There's plenty where the data is thin — indications are bad, but the data is not there to say anything definitive about it.   </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>There are all sorts of bad things about common violations, but the central bad thing is that we're not achieving the goals of these rules and regulations. If violations are 50 percent, you're getting 50 percent of what you think you're getting out of the rule, right?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>There's a lot of areas where we know there are environmental problems — over 130 million people in the United States live in areas that don't meet the health standards for air quality, and almost half of the waters in the United States are designated as poor quality. There's a lot of evidence about serious issues that affect people's health that are widespread, and certainly this incredibly high rate of violations is a significant contributor to that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>You come into EPA in this enforcement position and inherit a bunch of rules that you have to enforce, but you didn’t have a hand in designing. The other intuitive belief people have about this is, insofar as there are violations, insofar as people are breaking the rules, the solution to that is better enforcement. </p><p>From your experience at EPA, how much can you do with additional enforcement? Can you substantially increase compliance? What's the range of effect you can have?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>That very much depends on the problem. For some of the most serious and high-rate violations — coal-fired power plants are one example; for many, many years, they were by far the highest-polluting sector and the rates of violation were stunning — EPA decided, correctly in my view, that the health risk was so substantial, and the violation rate was so serious and egregious, that EPA would just sue all the coal fired power plants. One at a time, they’d go after them. </p><p>It was essential for public health that they be made to comply and install modern pollution controls — which by the way, reduce pollution by 95 percent. I mean, we're not talking about minor differences. It was really, really big. </p><p>Some of these problems — coal-fired power was one, cities that were discharging raw sewage into surface waters around the country was another — were so serious from a public health perspective that EPA decided to go after them individually. </p><p>That is not a strategy that can work for the vast array of programs that EPA administers. Some sectors have a million or more regulated entities, or it's hard to tell who's violating. For those kinds of problems, enforcement as your first line of defense is obviously not going to be able to do it. You don't have the resources to do it. But you couldn't do it even if you did nothing else but that one thing. </p><p>So for many problems, enforcement can never be the principal way of solving noncompliance.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>And even in cases where enforcement can force broad compliance, it is raising the cost of the regulation. Every one of those lawsuits costs money and time.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>Coal-fired power is a terrific example. The work to address air pollution from coal-fired power plants has been going on now for more than 20 years, and every one of those years has consumed a lot of people, millions of dollars of money for investigators, enforcement staff, etc. So that kind of approach is really expensive. </p><p>Sometimes it's worth it, like it was for that sector, and like it was for cities and raw sewage, but most of the time, it's not a feasible strategy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>It's hard not to look back at our history with coal-fired power plants and think that some heavy-handed, super-simple mandate back in the ‘70s, however economically inefficient it was, was definitely not going to be so inefficient that it costs as much as as suing every coal plant for for 20 years.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>Yeah, I don't think anyone would sit down and say, here's our plan, we're gonna just do them all individually. Beyond the expense, you don't get the benefits until the cases are over and the company installs. You have a 5, 10, 15 year delay in the public health benefits. </p><p>For both of those reasons, it is not a sensible strategy. Plus, if you take another example that's top-of-mind today, oil and gas wells and pollution, there's over a million wells in the United States. That kind of strategy is hopeless for that. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>The key insight at the heart of all your work is that the difference between a rule that is generally complied with and a rule that is generally not complied with does not come down to enforcement — the degree of enforcement, or the strength of enforcement. It's much more to do with the <em>design</em> of the regulation. </p><p>So let's start with an example of a rule that is poorly designed, such that it renders non-compliance inevitable and fails to meet its goals. What's a good example of doing it badly?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>The perfect storm of a bad-compliance design was a program called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.epa.gov/nsr">New Source Review</a> that Congress started and EPA was charged with implementing, that had a goal of cleaning up the largest sources of air pollution as they modernize. </p><p>They exempted existing sources from the tougher controls, but said, you'll have to install them as you modernize your plant. That was Congress's theory, that over time, the largest sources of air pollution, including but not limited to coal-fired power, would gradually clean up their act.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>And the presumption was that of course they're all going to modernize at some point. </p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>And they did modernize. But they took advantage of — and manipulated, frankly — the rule to modernize but avoid having to install the pollution controls. </p><p>The New Source Review program was set up so that every determination of when are you modernizing enough such that you trigger the obligation to install pollution controls was a very fact-intensive site-specific decision. There was no general rule; every inch of ground was fiercely fought over. </p><p>Then there was almost no reporting required, so the companies held the information that was necessary to determine if they had crossed that threshold, and they weren't going to give it to EPA without a fight. </p><p>It was quite expensive to install these modern controls. It was totally worth it, because of the huge public health gains — well worth it from a regulatory perspective; the benefits far outweigh the costs. But it gave the companies a lot of incentive to fight. </p><p>So what happened after that rule was put in place was exactly what somebody who's looking at rules through the next-generation compliance lens would predict, which is they look for ways around, they obfuscate, they withhold evidence, they fight, and they litigate. Every case takes years and years and years to get done. They lose in the end, in almost all cases, but they've gained some time. </p><p>All the economic incentives lined up behind not complying. So that's an example of a disastrous design.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>That's a rule where, inadvertently, you've created a massive financial incentive for cheating. It is in the rational self-interests of some of these coal plants to fight and delay. It makes absolute sense for them. You could even argue, insofar as they're beholden to shareholders, that it's their obligation to fight. </p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>Their obligation is to comply with the law, and they weren’t complying. They knew it. So I wouldn't take it that far, but I would agree that it was not only predictable that this would happen, it was inevitable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Was it predicted? Were there voices at the time saying, “this grandfathering idea is a disaster in the making”?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>I wasn't there when this was set up, so I couldn't speak to what the conversations were internally. I would say that it occurred at a time when no one was really challenging this fundamental belief structure, which I think is demonstrably wrong, that most will comply and enforcement will take care of the rest. That was certainly the dominant view about how this structure should work. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>That's an example of where the design of the rule makes rule violations inevitable. You point out in your work that you can design a rule such that breaking the rule is more of a hassle than it's worth, or more expensive than it's worth. What's a good example of a rule that pulled that off?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>The best example of a completed rule is in the acid rain program, which is particularly interesting for proving the thesis of next-gen, because it covers the same sector. Coal-fired power was the regulated entity, and unlike the compliance catastrophe that happened with New Source Review, the acid rain program had 99 percent compliance. </p><p>How did they do it? A couple key interlocking features. No one of these does it by itself, but together they make for a robust compliance structure. </p><p>One was continuous emission monitoring — don't estimate, know in real time how much pollution you have. This program was designed to reduce sulfur dioxide pollution from power plants that was causing acidic rain in big parts of the country and devastating ecosystems. Continuous, real-time measurement of sulfur dioxide was coupled with an incentive to use the monitoring by saying, “if your monitor is not working, or you don't pass quality control, we're going to assume you had a lot of pollution.” </p><p>You'd think that seems like a no-brainer, but there are still programs that don't have that today — electronic reporting to a central system, which allows monitoring in real time and data analytics, which are important for spotting anomalies and fixing problems. </p><p>And then simplicity is an under-appreciated value for getting compliance. Even though it's a complicated program, and monitoring is complicated, there's hundreds of pages of guidance on how to run these monitors and what to do, it all boiled down to a very simple thing: a ton of emissions and one allowance. Do you have enough allowances to cover your tons, yes or no? It’s impossible to miss a violation. </p><p>The coup de grâs at the end is automatic penalties. If you don't have enough allowances to cover your emissions at the end of the year, you will be penalized automatically. You don't have to wait to be sued, you owe it right now. And by the way, your penalty is more than it would cost you to go out and buy an allowance. </p><p>So this combination of strategies together made it hard to violate. There was really no way to manipulate the situation; everyone was going to know what was going on. There was only one pathway forward, and that was to comply. It was more hassle, more expensive, to violate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Trying to cheat on that, you'd have to rig your monitor, or lie on your electronic reports, at risk of much greater expense. So it just becomes easy to comply?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>Yeah. The whole idea is to try to make compliance the path of least resistance. If you're not paying attention, or you have people that make mistakes — if you make it so that those kinds of things are addressed within your rule, you're not waiting to catch people afterward. It's brought to their attention through the design of the rule itself. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Was the acid rain program notably cheaper for EPA? Is there a way of measuring how expensive it is in terms of enforcement and monitoring and compliance for the agency itself?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>There is no perfect way of doing that, and I would say here's part of the rub. We're not measuring what a next-gen strategy would cost versus getting to the same result through enforcement. Because that's not going to happen, there isn't the resources to get to the same result through enforcement. So what you're measuring is a next-gen strategy that gets to your public health endpoint at reasonable cost against not getting there. Those are really the choices. </p><p>The enforcement work that was done for coal-fired power is really the exception that proves the rule. This was a one-off that you could do it that way, normally you can't.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Right, you'd have to have a galactic-sized enforcement agency with unlimited funds, which we definitely do not have in the EPA. </p><p>Insofar as ordinary people do think about rule design, the in-vogue opinion these days is that market-based is great, flexible is great, performance-based is great; you want to specify the end-goal, not the means, and leave it open to entities how they comply. Ty doing that, you will get the cheapest possible outcome. </p><p>This is something close to religion these days in environmental circles, maybe even beyond environmental circles, along with endless bashing of so-called command-and-control regulations, which dare to specify things and dare to impose mandates. </p><p>You have a great discussion of this sort of fight. One of the points you make is that these terms have become almost meaningless, they're more identity-based now than referring to any particular features of programs. Could you explain to your average listener who has been generally convinced by the argument that markets are great, they're flexible, and they use the acid rain program as an example of this. Your point is not that market programs are bad, just that the features that make a rule good or bad are orthogonal to this distinction between markets and command-and-control. </p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>I totally agree that performance-based and markets have become their own orthodoxy, comparable in power and breadth to the beliefs that drive the problem, that gave rise to next gen, which is, everyone complies — performance-based and markets are a similar type of orthodoxy. </p><p>Both of those strategies have potential in the right circumstance. Markets are primarily about saving money for compliance, not about driving compliance; they're about more efficiency, and they have power to do that. </p><p>Two things I would say is that, first, markets happen because of command-and-control. The market doesn't just spring from the earth fully-formed, a market is created, because a regulatory agency decides to create a market, that's what happened with acid rain. By imposing a regulation that says you can only have so much pollution, and you have to report in this way, and you need to have monitors, etc. those are traditional command-and-control type things. But the mechanism for efficiency was a market mechanism. </p><p>At the end of the day, the market mechanism has nothing to do with the compliance result. It saved some money, but it did not drive compliance. The thing that drove compliance was this design structure that I described to you, all of which were standard command-and-control things, how you report, how you monitor, what your obligations are, penalties, that kind of thing. </p><p>I get that economists love markets, and they really do, because they look great on paper — this idea that you can have individual flexibility and that everyone is so efficient seems great. Next gen is focused on the practical, what’s actually going to happen in the real world, not how it seems in theory. </p><p>What I discovered in researching the book is that there’s actually very little data and evidence that supports the idea that markets are more effective than command-and-control in achieving environmental results. The record is just stunningly thin, and it's more an ideology that drives it. </p><p>Here's an illustration of some evidence about the market and flexible performance, as opposed to the one-size-fits-all that most people are thinking when they think of command-and-control. So at the beginning of the Clean Water Act, way back when there was a huge problem of water pollution around the country and Congress was like, “okay, that's got to stop. States, you're in charge, go out there and do your monitoring and impose permanent limits and fix this problem; go get them.” </p><p>And it didn't happen. It did not happen. The reason is that the states were, as it turned out, unable to surmount the technical and political challenges of imposing the necessary obligations on the sources in the flexible- and ambient-monitoring based way that everybody talks about as being so desirable. </p><p>So Congress came back years later and said, “okay, guess what, you blew it. It's not working, states, forget it. Nevermind, we're not doing that. What we are going to do now is, every sewage treatment plant in America is going to meet the following standard. EPA, you write the standard, everyone's gonna meet it. No exceptions.” That's it, period, the end, the classic command-and-control thing. And guess what, the rivers got cleaned up. </p><p>So when we look at what the record shows, yes, markets can work when they are accompanied by thoughtful design that looks at all these questions, and there's adequate monitoring, and there's good structure around it, but just saying we're going to get out there and be flexible is a recipe for disaster.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>One of the points you make in this respect — which was a little bit of a mind blower for me, too, because I never thought about it in quite this way — is that flexibility for the regulated entities is the mirror image of increased costs for the regulator. All that flexibility for the regulated means that more work for the regulator. People don't take that into account when they're thinking about these market-based rules.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>There's all different types. Markets are one way, but there's also plenty of rules that say, “well, people should try to do A, but if you can't do A, then you could consider B, C or D.” And by the way, maybe some people have E, and maybe you're exempt. </p><p>By the time you get to the end of this regulatory structure, nobody can figure out who has to do what, and it is very tough from a compliance-driving perspective, nevermind enforcement. If you can't be sure exactly who's supposed to do what, if every determination is very fact-specific, and you have to actually get all the records from the company to figure out why they chose C and not A, to figure out if they're doing anything wrong, you've created a situation where government can't know who's complying and who isn't. </p><p>That degree of fog and gray and ambiguity provides lots of places to hide for companies. Some companies are legitimately operating in that zone that they're allowed, and some are hiding there. From the government's perspective, it's almost impossible to tell the difference without a huge investment of resources.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>This is another thing you point out. It's easy for lawmakers to say, “oh, we're gonna give all this flexibility to the regulated entities. Sure, that will require more from the regulators, more enforcement, more monitoring, more time and money. But that's fine. We'll just spend the time and money.” But they do not then boost the EPA budget to accommodate that; you don't get the additional resources. And the result is just violations, as you say — just a whole lot of cheating.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>That leads to a lot of violations, and just as concerning, it leads to the government being unable to even know how it is going. They don't know whether the facilities are meeting what's required or not. So if there's a lot of monitoring violations, a lot of reporting violations, a lot of ambiguity about the pollution obligations, the government can't really say whether we're achieving the objectives or not. </p><p>This is a really bad place to be for the government, when you have obligations that are important for protecting public health and you don't know whether you're getting there or not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Also, they're in statute, so you're supposed to know.  </p><p>Are there generalizations you can make about when markets and flexibility are promising solutions, when they're a good fit, and when they're not? </p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>I would say the most important and essential thing for a market to work is a good measurement strategy. If you cannot measure reliably and have a lot of confidence in the thing being traded being actually worth what it claims to be worth, then your market program will not work. There's going to be a lot of mess and confusion, and you will have zero idea whether you're actually getting there. </p><p>I would say that’s essential, and all the experts say this too. Deep in the papers of economists favoring markets, they have throwaway lines saying, “of course this only works if you have good monitoring.” Well, okay, yeah. But that's a pretty big point, because there isn't good monitoring.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>I just want to emphasize this, because this is a point you made that has also stuck in my head: insofar as you’re specifically mandating facility-level reductions, and measuring performance at the end, that <em>really</em> raises the importance of being able to measure. If you’re not doing these facility-specific measurements, you really need to be able to measure the end-goal precisely, because that’s all you’re doing. </p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>Imagine the acid rain program with no monitoring. “Okay, just get out there and trade your sulfur dioxide emissions. How much did you have? Well, you tell us how much you had and we'll see how it goes.” We would not have achieved the actual reduction to sulfur dioxide and acid rain with a system like that; it’s impossible.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>You'd still have all the market features and all the flexibility, but without the measurement, the whole thing falls apart.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>You'd have no compliance, and you wouldn't really know how you're doing. You could measure the rain and see, well, we're not getting there. But you wouldn't know why. </p><p>So yes, you absolutely have to have measurement. The other thing you need is a group of fairly sophisticated participants. they need to be able to report electronically with a high degree of precision and consistency, and you can't have a huge amount of variability across source types. </p><p>Certain types of problems will be good for that, and some problems are impossible for that. It's important that the people who are designing policy recognize that. I would prefer if the ideologues who push markets for every problem would live by what their own colleagues say: you can't do it without monitoring. So don't even talk to me about your market until you show me your monitoring strategy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Measuring sulfur dioxide is fairly straightforward and possible. There's a limited number of coal plants there, they tend to be owned by big businesses that are relatively sophisticated and have this relationship with EPA already with reporting and monitoring of stuff. So it's a perfect area. </p><p>What's an example of a problem where you look at it and say, “a market will never work there?” Where do you need a heavier hand? </p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>We have an example in front of us in the Renewable Fuel Standard, also sometimes known as Low-Carbon Fuel Standard. It's a program designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and reduce dependence on foreign oil — from plants, essentially, is the part we're concerned about here. Carbon is recycled by plants. You create carbon when you burn the fuel in your tank in your car, but in theory, carbon is taken up by the plants when they grow. So the great theoretical construct here is that you would have recycling of carbon, so you would reduce the climate impact.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>This was about ethanol back in the day; it came about a long time ago and it predated a lot of other climate programs.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>So the market-like situation in the Renewable Fuel Standard — the renewable energy credit that’s created was separated from the actual fuel itself. So companies were buying these credits, but they weren't necessarily buying the actual fuel that was made. It’s a market-like system, because it's trading pieces of paper, essentially, that people are trusting, hoping, believing, actually reflect a gallon of actual fuel. </p><p>What we've discovered is that they don’t. There was a huge amount of fraud in that program. I shouldn't use the past tense: there is a huge amount of fraud in that program. So substantial that you can't know when you buy one of these credits on paper if it actually reflects either renewable fuel gallon. It is impossible to know. </p><p>RFS has a ton of other big problems, which I could talk about, but this market-based element was doomed to failure, because there was no mechanism to be sure that a credit was actually worth what it claimed to be worth. That's why the market can't achieve the endpoint.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>And there are ambiguities in the chain here. You have to have the land, and if you plant biofuel crops in the land, maybe you're displacing the farming crops, which will then use fresh land. Maybe the fresh land use gets attributed to the biofuels, maybe not.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>You're pointing out the reason why conventional biofuels are not climate enhancers, which is itself an interesting topic, and also has a significant compliance dimension. The narrower point I was raising was just about fraud in the market, because no one could be sure that there was actually a gallon of fuel produced; it was possible for companies to go in and just manipulate a bunch of paperwork and computer stuff, and voilà, they produced credits without fuel. There wasn't really a mechanism to prevent that from happening. </p><p>One thing we've observed and learned from real-life experiences is that, if you create a market where people can make a lot of money and you have no controls, there's going to be a lot of fraud. That's just the reality of life. </p><p>Rather than bemoan that reality and say, “oh no, there's fraud” — yeah, there's fraudsters, of course — you need to design a program that prevents that. Don’t complain about it and whine about it afterwards. Don't allow it to happen!</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Let's use our remaining time to think about how these principles of good regulatory design might apply to climate rules, which are very much in the news now. A lot of the discussion takes the form of, “let's use markets and flexibility, let's not be heavy handed, let's not use command-and-control.” That argument is replicating itself all over the place, to my frustration, and I assume yours. </p><p>Let’s look at some specific examples. Your example from electricity was very gratifying to me, as a huge fan of renewable portfolio standards — state-based rules on utilities that say you have to increase the percentage of your total power provided by renewables over time. You say that these things can work, with one big caveat, so tell us about that. </p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>It is not simple, but you can design something that looks like a renewable portfolio standard, where utilities have to buy some percentage of their power from solar, wind, and other forms of renewable energy. That's easy to measure, we know how to do that, we're already measuring that now. That system can be designed to function very well — you know you're getting the carbon reductions you're expecting to get. That's very possible to do. </p><p>One that is talked about a lot, that doesn't fit into that structure, is energy efficiency. That goes directly back to the point we were talking about earlier, about measurement. Energy efficiency is how much energy you use to do something versus what you would have used for the counterfactual. </p><p>You can already see it's not measurable; there's no way to go out in the world and take a sample that measures what would have happened if you did not do your energy efficiency program. That's one of the first weaknesses. </p><p>Another significant weakness is that, because it's not possible to do a big giant modeling that figures out what the impacts of your energy efficiency project are, people have to have a shortcut. Administratively, you can't expect people to do this gigantic measuring thing every time you do a project, so people have developed this shorthand for what energy efficiency usually saves. If I have insulation in my ceiling, I can assume I save X amount of energy, and you can take that to the bank and have it considered as a credit.</p><p>The robust research that's been done about those says that they greatly overstate the savings. What we've all been assuming we get in energy savings is not really what we get. </p><p>One of my favorite illustrations of how the real world interjects into your theoretical construct is that the least effective energy efficiency is energy efficiency installed on a Friday. Somebody did a study showing that if your energy efficiency is installed on a Friday, it probably doesn't work as well as if it's installed on a Thursday. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>I'm just gonna pause for a minute and contemplate why. Everybody should take a moment to guess why that might be, before we get the answer.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>On Fridays, people are incentivized to cut corners. You got to get that job done today, because you're not coming back tomorrow, and you don't want to come back on Monday. </p><p>This is just one of many studies that have been done saying that the assumptions that we've all been making about what energy savings, and thus carbon reductions, we get from energy efficiency are not right. </p><p>The last thing, which is common to every time, every rule, every structure, is: how did the incentives line up? All the incentives [in existing energy-efficiency programs] line up for people to overstate savings — the people who install it, the regulators, the public. Everyone wants to believe this is working well. </p><p>Whenever you have a system where everybody benefits if you overstate something, then guess what? They're going to overstate it. And that's what the studies show. There have been some robust studies — including in California, which is one of the most rigorous programs anywhere — showing that because of these incentive structures, people overstate savings. </p><p>This is relevant to carbon, and whether a clean electricity standard can achieve carbon reductions. If you include energy efficiency, you have the inherent uncertainty, the inaccuracy of the deemed savings, the incentive structure, all those things aligned to say, when you are trying to sell your energy efficiency credit, you don't know what you have there.</p><p>Why is that a big problem? First, we can't solve that through enforcement — that should probably be self-evident. The reason it's a big problem is that if the utility buys energy efficiency credits instead of solar or wind credits, they are going to be emitting more carbon. If you include this hard-to-measure element in your market, you're going to reduce the chances that you achieve your carbon reduction goal. </p><p>Which is not to say that energy efficiency isn't good. We gotta have it as much as you can, as fast as you can, everywhere. That's absolutely essential. What I argue is that you need to do that through something like an energy efficiency research standard. You have to mandate energy efficiency as fast as you can. </p><p>What you shouldn't do is combine it with the utility’s obligation to achieve a clean electricity standard, because that will undercut your carbon reduction goals.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>You keep those separate, basically.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>Yes, don't put it into the market, put it into a command-and-control program mandating that people do energy efficiency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>On the energy efficiency side, rather than trying to measure and make the rewards based on reduction in energy use — which is difficult, if not impossible to closely track — you just tell people to insulate buildings. You just require it. </p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>There's ways to design programs of that type that provide incentives and efficiency. The whole idea of an energy efficiency resource standard is not as simple-minded as just telling everybody exactly what to do. But it decouples it from the market. What you can't do is put something that's not measurable, essentially, into a market setting, because you're going to distort that whole market. You will undercut the ability of the market to do what it's supposed to be doing. You need to do it a different way. And there are other ways to get energy efficiency.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>As I was reading this section of your paper, it occurred to me that there's an analogous situation in terms of cap-and-trade systems and offsets, which are legendarily entirely based on counterfactuals — what would have happened if X had not happened. You're taking those counterfactual-based credits and sticking them directly into a market where they are doing just what your theory would predict. </p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>Totally. Carbon offset programs have all the same problems we just talked about with energy efficiency, plus some more. All the studies that I've seen have said that offset programs are not delivering anywhere close, not in the same solar system, as what's being claimed. You've got all these incentives for people to over-claim, and of course that's what they're going to do. It's impossible to check up on that. There's been a huge amount of fraud and other significant problems with carbon offsets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>What about cap-and-trade generally? Say you could take offsets off the table, what are your thoughts on trying to marketize carbon dioxide emissions?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>From a compliance lens it is totally doable if you have a measurement strategy for every participant. But you have to have something that you can take to the bank, and say, “yep, that's a ton of carbon, I'm sure about it.” If you have that, then a market strategy is a feasible way to drive innovation and reduce costs. </p><p>It has potential, but where it runs aground is by allowing in things that are not measurable. The more unmeasurable they are, the more the market will seek those out, because those are going to be cheaper, because they're not real! </p><p>That's where you invite disaster, is by allowing the unmeasurable things into your market. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>On transportation, one of your other three climate-related examples, we talked about the RFS, the biofuels program, and what a disaster it is. You're a little bit kinder to low-carbon fuel standards of the kind that are now in place all along the West Coast, California and Oregon and Washington, and you're also pretty friendly toward fuel economy standards, i.e., old school CAFE standards. Explain why those work, in contrast to the RFS.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>Fuel economy standards, or emission standards for vehicles, are possible to design for strong compliance, Volkswagen notwithstanding. And by the way, Volkswagen’s not the only one. I think the EPA’s eyes were opened to the possibility of cheating and fraud at scale. I felt like saying, “see, see this what I've been telling you.” </p><p>People's eyes were opened to that and the adjustments have been made in the vehicles program at EPA to address that. That has now become very, very tough to get away with — and you know, eventually, passenger vehicles are going to shift to electric. That's just a whole different animal in terms of compliance strategy; that seems very doable.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Let me ask you about that, because, from a regulatory point of view, this has always struck me as a little bit of a dilemma. It's one thing to regulate internal combustion engine vehicles, such that they become more efficient and emit less over time. But when you're trying to engineer a mode-switch to a different kind of engine, it seems like just ratcheting up fuel economy standards is a bank-shot approach. </p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>The near-term thing, of course, is to make the vehicles as efficient as they can be and reduce pollution as much as possible — carbon is not the only thing we care about from the roads, there's a lot of health problems associated with vehicles, and huge environmental justice issues, too. </p><p>So yes, you can do better than where we are now on efficiency and pollution from vehicles. But on the shift to electric vehicles, that's very manageable, to ensure that people are doing what they claim to be doing — that's a manageable thing in terms of the manufacture of those vehicles.</p><p>I just want to be clear, I am not saying that low-carbon fuel programs don't have the same problems that the Renewable Fuel Standard has, in terms of climate impacts. It's a little bit better of a design, because it doesn't have a cliff-like drop off in the obligations like the RFS has. It's a more gradual and market-type system, so it has those benefits. They both depend on trying to figure out how much carbon comes from land use changes. They have the identical problem for that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Anything that involves biofuels is gonna run into that problem.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>If I could throw in another topic on climate: a late breaker that I think is particularly encouraging and interesting is EPA’s proposed rule for hydrofluorocarbons, HFCs, which are massively intensive climate-forcing, I mean, hundreds to 1000s of times more climate-forcing than carbon.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Typically in refrigerants.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>Usually, yes. </p><p>This is a next-gen type story in Europe, where they first started regulating HFCs, as they are called. There's been a huge amount of fraud and illegal activity and illegal smuggling, and they got problems out the wazoo over there — they’re more than 30 percent over the standard, already, and that's before they've even gotten into where it's tight. They're in a bad way over there. </p><p>And the same thing could have happened in the US. Congress passed the law, in December 2020, telling EPA to regulate HFCs and telling them in general how to do that. In May, EPA put out a proposed rule which is the most forward-thinking next-gen type proposal since acid rain.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Oh, really? Can we pause and ask why? Is it just good people at the EPA or what?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>I think it is good people who are open to innovation and who looked at the situation in Europe and thought, “oh, my God.” It's a situation where non-compliance will sink you. It's not around the edges, it could be better — no, you will never get there. You're gonna have mostly illegal activity.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>So necessity is the mother of invention.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>And they're a great bunch of people over there in the air office at EPA, innovators and thoughtful and very open to trying new things. </p><p>The rule they proposed in May has a whole bunch of terrific ideas to try to prevent that kind of disastrous thing from happening in the United States. Let me just give you a couple examples of things that they've included, that Europe doesn't have. </p><p>In Europe, the products just come in and the countries hope to track them down if they were unlawful later. Good luck with that, okay; that that's not gonna happen. So what they're proposing is that there'll be a real-time check at the border. You cannot bring a product, customs will not allow it in, unless they connect to the data system and show that A), you’re legitimate, and B), you have enough credits to cover this import. If you don't, then sorry, you can’t come in. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Isn't that expensive? </p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>No, it's not hugely expensive. Customs has, over the years, developed electronic programs to enable it to take advantage of today's IT. EPA can develop its side of that and plug it into the Customs system. Real-time monitoring at the border is a very doable thing in today's IT environment, and it makes total sense that you would try to stop things at the border. </p><p>Another thing they included in here is a QR code, like the barcode that you have on just about every product you buy now, on every container, which also links to EPA’s data system. It is possible for anyone with a phone to determine, is this company that's trying to sell me this product legitimate? It is possible to do that today. </p><p>There's lots of other things, but those two things illustrate that EPA has designed a very tight system to block things at the border and then to reduce the demand for those unlawful products by making it possible to know in real time if every single container is legal or not.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>And thereby make it a huge pain in the ass to try to smuggle stuff in — to try to cheat.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>A huge, huge pain. Your chances of getting caught are very high, the consequences are severe, and your market is substantially reduced, because EPA is working on the demand side too. It's a structure that is thoughtfully designed to prevent illegal activity. </p><p>This is one of the toughest kinds of compliance problems: how to keep illegal products from coming in across the border. Very hard. But this is a thoughtful and quite groundbreaking proposal from the EPA.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>This raises a side question. When people talk about carbon taxes, there's a lot of discussion of border adjustments, which would amount to trying to do roughly the same thing — make public the amount of carbon embedded in every product that comes in over the border. That strikes me intuitively as much trickier than measuring HFC content. Have you given some thought to that?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>That gets to the heart of the measurement issue we've been talking about: what is the embedded carbon in your product? There's a jillion judgments that go into that question. The Renewable Fuel Standard is one illustration of that, where the recent science is showing that actually, when you produce the conventional renewable fuel, you end up disturbing a lot of land, and you're arguably making the climate situation worse, not better. </p><p>Every product that you attempt to put a carbon stamp on is a gigantic measurement question, and very, very challenging. Imposing a tax once you have a carbon measurement is comparatively quite simple. The tax is not the point. The point is, who puts the carbon label on there, and how confident are you that that reflects real life?</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>I'm just imagining that every link in the supply chain has the incentive to downplay the amount of carbon involved — literally every entity involved in all of this wants to cheat. And there you are, the regulator with thousands and thousands of these products in front of you.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>Whenever you have an incentive system that's lined up to push in one direction — where it's obvious what the regulated parties would prefer the outcome to be, and you have essentially no real way to check — that's where you get these kinds of compliance disasters.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>As a final subject, let's talk about oil and gas production. That's your third example — specifically, you're talking about methane. Notoriously, the oil and gas production process leaks methane at more or less every stage, and methane is a very active short-term greenhouse gas, which is a problem. There's been arguments going on for years now about measuring and enforcing this. Industry has been claiming they're doing it on their own, and asking to report their own measurements of what they do. </p><p>How do you tackle methane, which is manifestly difficult from a monitoring perspective?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>On the one hand, the methane problem, at least from a technical perspective, is fairly straightforward. People know what to do, how to reduce the methane that comes from the wells. People know how to do that. They're not doing it, but they know how to do it. The technical answers are well understood. </p><p>The compliance problem is more complicated, because of this point that you've put your finger on, measuring what's going on is so difficult. It's even more difficult than it may appear, because the amount of methane released is intermittent. It could be a huge amount and then it drops off. </p><p>It's intermittent and unpredictable as to which wells are going to be the so-called super emitters. Some of them are quite stunningly high numbers for at least some period of time. Until a monitoring solution is figured out — and a lot of people are working on that.  Satellites might be part of the answer, there's aerial monitoring strategies, there's some ground-based ones, there's a lot of people applying themselves to this problem. Having a monitoring strategy would be a game-changer for this industry, figuring this problem out and getting it fixed. </p><p>But in the meantime, there are things that can be done. I can give you two small examples, but it shows the mind shift that's needed in thinking about these problems. </p><p>One is automating what you can. One of the problems is, people leave the hatches open on the tanks at the well pad. Sometimes that happens accidentally, but you got a million well pads, those numbers add up. If you had an automatic closing … that's just an illustration of thinking about your problem differently. See if there's a technical fix. </p><p>The other one is a more conceptual fix, which is shifting the burden of proof. There's no way the government can bind your wells; that's not gonna happen. Maybe someday, through satellite imagery, it is possible to get closer, but we're nowhere near that right now. Shifting the burden of proof says, if there's credible evidence that you have a pollution problem, it's on you, the company, to prove it isn't, and to fix it. </p><p>The data shows that if you're doing everything right, you shouldn't have that kind of a problem at your site. If you're seeing a huge amount of emissions, something is up — you own it, you control it, you have access to it, it should be on you to go figure that out. You shouldn't be counting on a handful of government inspectors to get out to these million sites around the country to try to figure that out. You own the equipment, you have the inspection records, you have access to the people, you are in the best position to solve this problem. </p><p>And you should, because not only does methane have climate change impacts, but along with that are VOCs and other pollutants that neighbors are being exposed to. You have to take care of that problem. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>If we know what steps reduce that problem, if the technical problem is solved, why not just go full command-and-control say: all operators of all wells have to take steps one, two, and three, and prove to us that you did it.</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>That's certainly a sensible way of going. </p><p>What I'm talking about is, how do you handle the compliance problem of, did you do it? Let's say you were required to do it, but you didn't do it. EPA finds in the field lots of companies that are at oil and gas wells that are not doing what's required today. It's a big compliance problem, because there's more than a million wells, and methane is intermittent, it's not visible to the naked eye, you gotta have specialized equipment to see the leaks, it's unpredictable. </p><p>If you got a lot of companies out there that are, accidentally or on purpose, not doing what they're supposed to be doing, how are you going to find them and get that fixed? </p><p>Shifting the burden of proof is one illustration of how you could change the framework under which everybody's operating. You might even be able to, by doing that, bring in the possibility of citizen science. If there are citizens who can meet the threshold for credible evidence, that provides some additional incentive and pressure for companies to do what they're supposed to be doing.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Oh, interesting. </p><p>Well, I've kept you too long, but you have now anticipated my final question a couple of times, so clearly you've been thinking about it. One of the trends I've been following is new ways of measuring these things, specifically, satellites that claim to track real-time methane emissions down to the square mile. They're saying the same thing about CO2, with satellites that pinpoint real-time CO2 emissions down to the square mile, all over the Earth. Then there are these other programs where you measure pollutants at the ground level, on a block-by-block basis. You can now get sensors that you can plug into your phone. Anybody can do this. </p><p>My point being, insofar as the difficulty of measurement is a huge impediment to good regulation, this trend towards more and more different ways of measuring, which don't rely on regulated entities, do you see that opening up new avenues for regulation? Do you think regulation could get better on the back of monitoring getting better?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles:</strong></p><p>I absolutely do. The technological innovation that's going on in monitoring is a huge, huge potential gamechanger for many pollution problems. </p><p>There's no silver bullet, though. For example, satellite imagery is great for some types of pollutants, but the resolution isn't that terrific, and it's not so good when it's cloudy. Every type of monitoring system has its own issues. </p><p>But also, lots of important environmental problems are not just straight ahead pollution-monitoring type problems. Lead paint is an example. Industrial agriculture. Renewable Fuels Standard. Energy efficiency. There's a lot of important things that are not subject to just being monitored. </p><p>Having said that, I do think that the revolution in monitoring, where it's getting cheaper, smaller, more mobile, better, provides a huge amount of opportunity, and is terrific news. </p><p>If I could just add one thing. Sometimes, when I talk about next gen, people misunderstand me, and I just want to make sure that I'm leaving no ambiguity. Sometimes people think I'm saying we don't need enforcement. No, no, no, no, I am not saying that. Enforcement is essential, required, and must-have. You cannot have an effective compliance program without it. </p><p>My point is that enforcement alone cannot fix the big compliance holes created by bad regulatory compliance design. </p><p>I just want to make sure no one's confused. Enforcement is essential, but stronger regulations are going to get much farther down the road than relying on enforcement alone.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>You're pushing back against trends in thinking around environmental regulation that have been building for decades now — this obsession with markets and flexibility, this ignoring of enforcement, or this assumption that if you throw more enforcement at it, you can get any rule enforced. </p><p>How lonely are you in this fight? In terms of the people running EPA now, how are your ideas catching on? What's the state of thinking in the field?</p><p><strong>Cynthia Giles: </strong></p><p>The assumption that compliance is pretty good and enforcement will take care of the rest is still the entrenched thinking. But there is some traction for these ideas, maybe in part because I've been such a giant pain in the neck. </p><p>Compliance is not usually talked about as part of the policy discussion, but it should be, because compliance is about what's going to happen in the real world. That's the place that matters; that's what counts. The people involved in policy discussions do care about what happens in the real world. </p><p>I'm out there raising a ruckus, and I'm hoping that we will get compliance at the table at these policy discussions, so that people do not continue blindly along, adopting rules that will not achieve what they're intended to achieve. </p><p>And nowhere is that more important than climate. There's no time. We cannot make mistakes and hope to fix them later. It's got to be right. It's got to happen the first time out of the gate. It's essential these ideas get baked in.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Awesome. Well thank you for fighting the good fight, and for taking all this time to talk. </p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-rampant-environmental</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:38016552</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 14 Jul 2021 17:00:47 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/38016552/7a2557bbad6c99b3961cf61aab14671f.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4530</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/38016552/88eb9009dec2c6810d73c524b10f1bf2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[On climate policy, there's one main thing and then there's everything else]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Last week, I wrote that <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/there-is-no-moderate-position-on">there is no “moderate” position on climate change</a>. Either we act rapidly and at massive scale to avoid the worst consequences … or we suffer the worst consequences. Either outcome involves radical change. There’s no avoiding radicalism. </p><p>Lots of activists, politicians, and ordinary citizens understand this need for ambitious action — they are convinced by the scale and severity of the problem — but there is less clarity about what <em>qualifies</em> as ambitious. </p><p>In an atmosphere of legislative scarcity, when tough decisions are being made and policies are being prioritized, what exactly should climate advocates be pushing for? What’s a simple way to distinguish between climate policy and <em>good</em> climate policy? </p><p>In the great climate policy feast, what is the entrée and what are the side dishes?</p><p>We lack a common framework for judging climate policy, which creates a fog in which dedicated advocates can lose focus and malefactors can get up to shenanigans. Within the fog, people tend to pick their favorite markers of climate commitment based on instinct and affective affiliation (shut down pipelines! ramp up nuclear power! impose a carbon tax!). What counts as good policy becomes a matter of identity rather than what would most effectively ratchet down carbon emissions. </p><p>The fog allows weak and marginal policies to be branded as moderate, or, other times, to masquerade as radical. It leads activists to diffuse their energy, while core policies often don’t receive the coordinated support they need.</p><p>We need to clear away the fog, fast. Policy decisions <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/there-is-no-moderate-position-on">are being made over the next few weeks</a> that will reverberate for decades. This is crunch time on climate policy and everyone who wants serious action needs to be (at least roughly) aligned.</p><p>So I want to spend a few minutes laying out a simple framework to help people think about how to prioritize climate policies. It doesn’t cover everything, but it’s a pretty good rough-and-ready guide.</p><p>Clean electrification is the entrée. Everything else is a side.</p><p>How can the US hit net-zero emissions by or before 2050, a goal shared by almost every Democrat and, at least rhetorically, by some Republicans?</p><p>The key is to immediately begin reducing emissions and maintain a rapid pace of reduction for the coming three decades. That is the only way we have a shot. If we wait another decade to start rapid reductions, the curve will simply be too steep. It has to start now. </p><p>So we can think of the work in two parts. Job One is to rapidly push fossil fuels out of the system <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21349200/climate-change-fossil-fuels-rewiring-america-electrify">using technologies and strategies that we have on hand</a>, such that we reduce carbon emissions by around 50 percent by 2030. Job Two is to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/7/14/21319678/climate-change-renewable-energy-technology-innovation-net-zero-emissions">research and develop the technologies and strategies we will need</a> to continue rapidly reducing emissions from 2030 onward, such that we hit net-zero on or before 2050. </p><p>Job Two is important. But Job One is the main thing. Job One is the entrée. Without it, you don’t have a meal. </p><p>What does Job One consist of? This is important: while different <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscast-jesse-jenkins-on-energy">climate models</a> disagree about which policies and technologies will be needed to clean up remaining emissions after 2030, virtually all of them agree on what’s needed over the next decade. It’s <em>clean electrification</em>: </p><p>* clean up the electricity grid by replacing fossil fuel power plants with renewable energy, batteries, and other zero-carbon resources;</p><p>* clean up transportation by replacing gasoline and diesel vehicles — passenger vehicles, delivery trucks and vans, semi-trucks, small planes, agricultural and mining equipment, etc. — with electric vehicles; and</p><p>* clean up buildings by replacing furnaces and other appliances that run on fossil fuels with electric equivalents.</p><p>Or as I summarize it: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12938086/electrify-everything">electrify everything</a>!</p><p>Clean electrification is the entrée. If you decarbonize electricity, transportation, and buildings, you’ve taken out the three biggest sources of emissions in virtually every country. The technologies and policies we need to do it exist today, ready to deploy. </p><p>Exactly how much of the US economy can be decarbonized through clean electrification is an open question. Saul Griffith of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rewiringamerica.org">Rewiring America</a> is an optimist. He thinks electrification can reduce <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21349200/climate-change-fossil-fuels-rewiring-america-electrify">between 70 and 80 percent of US emissions by 2035</a>, and probably in the 90s eventually. (Listen to my <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-saul-griffith-and-arch">podcast with Griffith</a>.)</p><p>We’ll see. Today, there are all sorts of edge cases that are difficult to electrify — bigger trucks, airplanes, trains, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/24/magazine/cargo-ships-emissions.html">ships</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/green-steel-is-coming-sooner-than-you-think/">steel</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/california-considers-ambitious-bills-to-rein-in-carbon-emissions-from-concrete/">concrete</a>, a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/10/10/20904213/climate-change-steel-cement-industrial-heat-hydrogen-ccs">variety of high-heat industrial applications</a> — that might be easier with cheaper zero-carbon electricity and a decade of innovation. There’s no way to know in advance how far electrification can get, though it’s worth noting that critics have underestimated it at every stage thus far. </p><p>Regardless, whether it can ultimately get at 60 or 90 percent, clean electrification will do the bulk of the work reducing emissions over the next decade. It is the entrée.</p><p>None of this is to diminish the scale and difficulty of Job Two — all the side dishes. We need those too. We’ll need lots of zero-carbon liquid fuels for industry, ships, and airplanes, so we need to work on developing <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/los-angeles-seeks-to-jump-start-a-green-hydrogen-market-in-the-u-s/">clean hydrogen</a>. We’ll need to figure out some sustainable biomass options, along with a variety of ways to capture and store carbon dioxide. We’ll need focused innovation in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/10/21/21515461/renewable-energy-geothermal-egs-ags-supercritical">geothermal energy</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/long-duration-storage-can-help-clean">long-term energy storage</a>, energy management software, and all sorts of other things. Much work remains to be done.</p><p>Nonetheless, clean electrification — done in a way that honors and protects frontline and vulnerable communities — needs to be the top item on every list of climate demands. It would be fatal for climate activists to take it for granted or assume it’s taking care of itself. It is not.</p><p>Climate policy that’s all side dishes is not “moderate”</p><p>As I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/there-is-no-moderate-position-on">wrote last week</a>, the danger is that weak and insufficient climate policy gains a reputation as moderate. </p><p>But the danger is more specific than that: it’s that moderate policy will be all side dishes and no entrée. It will be all policies that prepare to phase out fossil fuels a decade hence … and none of the policies that phase them out today. </p><p>This type of approach is on particularly clear display these days from Republicans and their nascent “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/23/climate/climate-change-republicans.html">climate caucus</a>.” Republicans in the House recently introduced a <a target="_blank" href="https://schweikert.house.gov/media-center/in-the-news/us-house-gop-starts-roll-out-broad-climate-plan">package of climate policies</a> centered around carbon capture (helpful to fossil fuels), nuclear power (no threat to fossil fuels in the coming decade), and tree planting (irrelevant to fossil fuels). </p><p>But it’s also what’s passing for “bipartisan” climate policy. A particularly on-the-nose example is the <a target="_blank" href="https://mckinley.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=2958">Clean Energy Future through Innovation Act of 2020</a>, introduced in the House by Reps. David McKinley (R-WV) and Kurt Schrader (D-OR). It would establish a clean energy standard to decarbonize the electricity sector … in 2030. Until then, we’ll have a “decade of innovation,” whee!</p><p>Needless to say, “start reducing emissions in 2030” is the very definition of a climate policy meal with no entrée.</p><p>Our beloved West Virginia Sen. Joe Manchin (D) recently produced an even more elaborate version of an all-side-dishes climate package, in the form of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy.senate.gov/services/files/B09CFA1F-623B-433E-9D0B-39C752062D94">a 423-page bill</a> he released, somewhat out of the blue, earlier this month. It was unclear if the bill was meant to be part of the bipartisan infrastructure package or something else. Mainly it reads like a Manchin wish list.</p><p>It’s a fascinating document. It’s got a <em>lot</em> of policies in it. Here’s one page of the bill’s 3.5-page table of contents:</p><p>And not just policies, but <em>good</em> policies. There’s virtually nothing in it I would disagree with on the merits. Clean electricity will need new <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-everything-in">grid infrastructure</a> and more robust supply chains and better cybersecurity. <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/5/31/18646906/climate-change-california-energy-efficiency">Energy efficiency is great</a>; so is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/4/5/17196676/nuclear-power-plants-climate-change-renewables">keeping existing nuclear power plants open</a>. I’m even down with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/9/4/20829431/climate-change-carbon-capture-utilization-sequestration-ccu-ccs">carbon capture and utilization research</a>. </p><p>But it’s all side dishes and no entrée. It’s all preparation for pushing fossil fuels out with none of the actual pushing. It’s all kinds of stuff that will supplement clean electrification without the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21349200/climate-change-fossil-fuels-rewiring-america-electrify">clean electrification itself</a>.</p><p>This is the kind of climate policy that is in danger of being branded “moderate” — the kind that does everything but rapidly push fossil fuels out of the energy system in the coming decade. </p><p>Progressives need to demand an entrée</p><p>Clean electrification is the core of any ambitious climate policy. Without it, we’re still spinning our wheels, innovating without deploying what we’ve already innovated.</p><p>There is very little for clean electrification in the bipartisan infrastructure package <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/24/infrastructure-deal-talks-biden-invites-bipartisan-senators-to-white-house.html">recently unveiled</a> by Manchin’s gang of ten in the Senate, save some money for transmission lines and electric buses.</p><p>So far, progressive Democrats aren’t making a fuss about the bipartisan package because they have assurances from both Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) that alongside the bipartisan bill there will be a reconciliation bill, which can get through the Senate with only Democratic votes. </p><p>Pelosi is under no illusions that anything that directly challenges fossil fuels will get any Republican votes. "I don't think there's any question that the more bipartisan a bill is, the less green it is," she <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063735335">said</a> last month, because Republicans "are in the pocket of the fossil fuel industry."</p><p>So progressives are looking to reconciliation to pass the rest of President Biden’s climate agenda. </p><p>The <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/22242572/biden-climate-change-plan-explained">climate plan Biden campaigned on</a>, the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/17/fact-sheet-biden-administration-accelerates-efforts-to-create-jobs-making-american-buildings-more-affordable-cleaner-and-resilient/">infrastructure plan he released</a> as president, and the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/6/30/21305891/aoc-climate-change-house-democrats-select-committee-report">plans released by Democrats in Congress</a> all contain extensive clean-electrification measures, including a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/house-democrats-introduce-pathway-to-100-clean-energy-by-2035-bill/596018/">clean energy standard</a> to decarbonize the grid by 2035, tax and point-of-purchase incentives for electric vehicles, and programs to electrify buildings. Those — implemented with a strong focus on environmental justice — are the key climate pieces that need to be included in the reconciliation bill. They are the entrée.</p><p>The question around reconciliation will not be Republican support, but support from Manchin and his crew of self-styled moderates. They will push for compromises that go easy on fossil fuels. Progressives need to hold the line: only by pushing fossil fuels out the system, beginning immediately, can Democrats meet the challenge of the moment.</p><p>That means clean electrification: the policy that makes climate legislation a meal.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/on-climate-policy-theres-one-main</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:38419644</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 09 Jul 2021 16:00:08 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/38419644/69b7844bea152c99e8917b0ae92fef0f.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>750</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/38419644/b8c47a0716dbb22af87fcda01570106c.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: treating fossil fuels like nuclear weapons, with Tzeporah Berman]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, longtime activist Tzeporah Berman discusses the need to track and reduce fossil fuel production (not just consumption) and the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty that she and other activists created to help coordinate those efforts.  </em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Tzeporah Berman, July 7, 2021</p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/yltfoc1r51e4lef/volts21.07.07%28tzep.berman%29.pdf?dl=0">PDF version</a>)</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>For as long as I've been covering climate change, it's been conventional wisdom among economists — and the kind of people who aspire to please economists — that the proper focus of climate policy is on demand. We must reduce demand for fossil fuels, the argument goes, otherwise any supply we shut down will just pop up somewhere else.</p><p>Activists have always disagreed with this logic. For many of them, the fight against climate change is a fight for places — specific places, with histories, peoples, and ecosystems — and every fossil fuel project is, in some way or another, an assault on a place. Over the last decade, more economists and policy wonks have come around to their way of thinking, questioning both the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/4/3/17187606/fossil-fuel-supply">economics</a> and the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2015/11/8/9690654/keystone-climate-activism">sociology</a> of the demand-focused conventional wisdom. As things stand now, wealthy fossil fuel–producing countries are making grand emission reduction commitments while continuing to ramp up production. All that fossil fuel has to go somewhere. It creates its own set of commitments and investments, its own momentum.</p><p>My guest today, Canadian activist Tzeporah Berman, has been fighting for places since grunge and flannel were big. There is no way to do her resume justice in a short intro, or else I would never get to the podcast, but here are some highlights.</p><p>In the 1990s, she fought clear-cutting projects with blockades and civil disobedience. In 2000, she co-founded ForestEthics, which uses clever communications campaigns to shame companies into using less old-growth wood. </p><p>In 2004, she turned to climate change, founding her own nonprofit advocacy group, PowerUp, to defend BC’s carbon tax; in 2010 she became co-director of Greenpeace International's 40-country climate and energy program, where she led its storied Arctic and Volkswagen campaigns; in 2015, she was appointed to the BC government’s Climate Leadership Team to advise on climate policy; in 2016, she was appointed as co-chair of the Alberta government’s Oil Sands Advisory Group. She also led the effort to secure the Great Bear Rainforest agreement, which protects more than 40 million hectares of old growth forest. </p><p>Her activism continues today — she was just <a target="_blank" href="https://www.stand.earth/latest/forest-conservation/primary-forests/tzeporah-berman-arrested-fairy-creek-today">arrested in May</a> defending old growth forests on unceded Pacheedaht and Ditidaht Territories on Vancouver Island, BC.</p><p>Anyway! In 2019, Berman received the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.climatebreakthroughproject.org">Climate Breakthrough Project Award</a> from a coalition of foundations, which came with $2 million to create “breakthrough global strategies” on climate change. She used the money on a project she’s been thinking about for a while: the <a target="_blank" href="https://fossilfueltreaty.org/home">Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty</a>. </p><p>The IPCC is clear: there are already enough fossil fuels in known reserves to blow the world past its 1.5°C temperature limit. Yet fossil fuel production continues to increase.</p><p>Fossil fuels have become a threat to all of humanity, as nuclear weapons are, and just as with nuclear weapons, Berman believes we need a global agreement to cap their growth and ramp them down. The Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to be a template for such an agreement.</p><p>Though the treaty is relatively new, it has already been signed by nine cities and subnational governments, more than 480 organizations, and over 12,000 individuals, including a wide array of academics, researchers, and scientists.</p><p>I called Berman to hear more about the need to address fossil fuel supply, the motivations behind the treaty, and where it might go in the future. </p><p>Tzeporah, welcome to Volts.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:</strong></p><p>Thank you. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I'm so happy to have you here. It seems like the last time we talked was either a few years ago or 100 years ago.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>It definitely feels like a very long time ago, but so does last week. Time is fungible right now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Time is meaningless. OK, so I want to talk to you about many things, including the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty. But before that, I'd like to just hear a little bit about what pulled you into all of this. You were born into a middle class Jewish family in London, Ontario, and went to school originally for fashion design, yes? </p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>You’ve been digging far back!</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>And you were even lauded, even won some fashion-y awards -- then took a sharp left turn. So what in your youth pulled you toward environmental activism?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>Like a lot of my privileged generation, I took a trip to Europe, with a <em>Let’s Go Europe</em> in my hand and a train ticket, in my first year of university, in the summer, and at the time my dream was to go to the Acropolis. I was studying Art and Art History and Fashion Arts Design because I had to have a career and all I wanted to do was art. </p><p>That year, in the late ‘80s, pollution was so bad — in a lot of cities in Europe, but in Athens in particular — that the Acropolis was melting. I can remember hiking up to the top, and this is before all the restoration, and you could just see the pollution on it. It was all crumbling. I looked down on the city, and it was just covered in this yellow haze. I got back to my youth hostel and I remember rubbing my face and leaving a white streak across it and coughing up black goo. </p><p>And I was like, I have got to get out of here. I mean, I'm Canadian, I'm used to a lot of space, a lot of air. And my sister and I, who I was traveling with, we were like, we’ve got to go to nature. We just picked a spot on the map and went to Germany: we're going to hike in the Harz Mountains and drink beer! And we went to the Harz Mountains. I didn't know that most of the Harz Mountains is dead, left standing as a testimony to acid rain. So we get off this train and start hiking through a standing dead forest, not a bird sound, not anything. </p><p>Those two days rocked my world. I remember coming back to Canada and thinking, we are so lucky. And being really scared. I think environmental consciousness is one of those things where there's a new lens and then you can't see anything else. I, at least, went through that phase, and I seem to have never gotten out of it. So I started working on environmental issues, I dropped out of Fashion Arts Design, and I enrolled in Political Science and Environmental Theory and Environmental Studies at university. That was the beginning for me.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>And it's been a long road since. You spend a lot of your time organizing and fighting against forest exploitation, clear cutting, and fossil fuel exploitation. In the climate wonk community, it’s conventional wisdom that the only way to really solve the fossil fuel problem is to go after demand.</p><p>If people want fossil fuels, they're going to find them and burn them; if you shut down demand, it doesn't matter if people are supplying fossil fuels, they won't get bought. But if you shut down a supply project, and there still is demand, supply will just pop up elsewhere. </p><p>I'm sure you've heard variations on this a kajillion times. Why do you think that's wrong?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>I think the theory for a long time, now almost 30 years, has been that we're going to constrain demand -- which is happening, obviously: more electric cars, zero emission buildings, zero emission vehicles, etc. -- demand is going to go down, price is going to go up, a higher price on carbon, and the markets are going to constrain supply. That's what I often get from the Canadian government: “We're not responsible for who produces or how much fossil fuels are produced, we're just responsible for emissions.” And the thing about that market theory around demand is that it's not working. I mean, it's not working fast enough to keep us safe, that much is clear. </p><p>I still actually kind of like it as a theory, but the fact is that there are two big problems with it. One is that the markets are completely distorted by fossil fuel subsidies and now by governments out-and-out buying projects that the industry runs away from. So renewables are cheap, cheaper than fossil fuels in a lot of places now; oil and gas companies are operating at the bottom of the SMP, more bankruptcies in that sector than any other; but these projects are still surviving. </p><p>Like the Trans Mountain Pipeline in Canada: it's surviving because investors ran away from it and the government bought it for $12 billion. That's because of the political influence of the fossil fuel industry, and because governments are only just starting to really grapple with the fact that they're going to actually need to deal with supply as well as demand. The fact is, there are very few issues, if any — intransigent issues, where governments have had to step in — that we haven't had to deal with both the supply and the demand side of the equation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>Another thing that I think is germane, especially to your case, is: “demand” is abstract. But fossil fuel supply fights take place on the ground, in particular places, and pull people in for a wider variety of reasons. So tell me about a supply fight that you won. What brings people into it?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>I will, but I want to say one thing about places and policies. As a forest activist, when I first started working in the climate movement and on climate issues, the thing that I really noticed is: in the forest and conservation movement, we fight for places. We campaign about places. The climate movement — especially 15, 20 years ago, when I really started engaging — talks about not places, but policies.</p><p>I'll never forget, at a briefing with this great, brilliant pollster, Angus McAllister, he said to me, “Why is it that the climate movement is always trying to sell the airplane ride to the vacation? Sell the beach! Sell where you're trying to get to! Not the complicated, annoying journey to get to it.” </p><p>I think that's relevant here. I have three university degrees, and I spent years trying to figure out, what am I <em>for</em> on climate change? It's like, “no cap-and-trade, no cap-and-trade and auction, and then is it carbon tax, but from this benchmark date, and not this.” And we wonder why millions of people are not getting involved. </p><p>Then when the pipeline, and the coal plant, or even the Heathrow Airport — when these tangible fights start arising, people can see them in their backyard, they can see that they're bad. The problem with climate change for years has been that carbon emissions are invisible. Oil spills are not. This pipeline, right now, they're starting to drill under Burnaby Mountain and under the Fraser River to put this pipeline in. Well, that's very tangible to people. </p><p>I've been working on pipelines and oil sands issues for a little more than 10 years, and in that time, I would say we've won almost every fight. We've either stopped or delayed every single pipeline that the industry has proposed, other than the existing pipeline fights, which are Trans Mountain and Line 3. </p><p>Enbridge Northern Gateway: dead. Keystone: dead. Energy East: dead. These pipelines have been stopped because of citizen action, which delays the project, raises the concerns, and draws both investor action and government policy action.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>People’s involvement and passion for a particular place, protecting a particular landscape, is hard to generate for “the atmosphere,” which is everywhere and nowhere. Do people build momentum from these fights to go on to bigger things?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:</strong></p><p>Oh, entirely. Yes. The momentum builds. But also, what I've noticed and witnessed is, people go through a personal journey. The climate movement is growing and diversifying because of these fights. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>You think they pull in young people, specifically?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>They definitely pull in young people. But what I was thinking of in the back of my head was indigenous leaders that I have worked with in Canada, on Northern Gateway for example, who started these fights because this is a human rights issue. It's issues to do with their trap lines, their concern for water. As we work together, as we're having discussions, as they're learning, it's a journey. Now many of those same leaders are giving some of the most passionate climate speeches I've ever heard. </p><p>Nebraska farmers that I worked with on Keystone, they started this because of eminent-domain issues. I watched some of those individuals become passionate about working on climate change. Because it's a journey — they start to be introduced to the other aspects of the issues. It's a mistake that we make in all of our communications work: we keep talking about the message box and the narratives. Well, we need a narrative that brings people with us, and that's what's happened through the site fights.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>This might sound like a weird parallel, but when people talk about music, lyrics that are very specific — ”Jane broke my heart at the high school dance” — can resonate in a universal way, even more universal than if you try to write something more generic and broad. The specificity of it is a gateway to the universal. I think of land fights and exploitation fights the same way. Like the Nebraska farmers: “Oh, this fight is happening all over the place.” </p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>Right, and they motivate people, because they're not about information and data and statistics. Of course there has to be a foundation of knowledge, but what resonates with people are the <em>values</em>: this isn't fair, this isn't right that this is happening to this local community, that they face the dangers or the cleanup from the oil development, or the toxins. Then there's a journey around to, “Well, wait a minute, why do these oil and gas companies get to profit off this when we know that it's killing us?” — not just at the local site level, but because of the contribution to climate change. </p><p>What we know from decades of social movement theory and psychological research is that what motivates people is triggering values, but also an opportunity to do something. Education doesn't motivate; opportunity motivates.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Agency. Having some sense of control. </p><p>So what happens when the indigenous people of northern Canada meet the Nebraska farmers, meet people in the Congo fighting oil projects — unlike demand fights, which tend to be fought by wonks and wonky NGOs, these supply fights bring in a really wide diversity of people. What does it look like when those people hook up with one another? What’s it like to watch them try to work things out?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:</strong></p><p>It's fascinating. It's joyful. It is also painful. One of the things I did when I was working predominantly on tar sands and pipelines is start to bring people together. I realized, whether you're in Nebraska or northern British Columbia, you're often fighting the same oil companies, the same pipeline companies — same strategy, same messaging, struggling with the same or similar regulatory issues. But they weren’t talking to each other; the movement wasn't learning from each other. It was very disparate. </p><p>So I started convening these gatherings, 100 people at a time; first domestically in the US and Canada, and then eventually internationally through a network I helped create called the <a target="_blank" href="http://ggon.org">Global Gas and Oil Network</a>. I have memories of sitting at a retreat center, watching an indigenous chief from a remote community engage with a Nebraska farmer, and a union leader, and then a climate policy wonk from NRDC, and then we've just finished dinner and they're all getting into the hot tub. I'm like, “Oh my god, what's gonna happen?”</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>You’re over there chewing your fingernails.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:</strong></p><p>Some great and fascinating collaborations happened because of that. We all learned from each other. And there were huge blowouts!</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>The Nebraska farmer is about private property rights; that's their lens. The indigenous leader is coming at it from a completely different viewpoint. What is the Venn diagram overlap where they can work together? It’s so fraught.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>Oh yeah. In some ways it was a microcosm of all the debates. We were fiercely debating which issues are most important, how do you talk about this issue, who talks about the issue, what are we asking for, what if the government says yes to this but says no to this indigenous rights issue? As a movement, we are grappling with all those questions.</p><p>It's almost like we were testing it out before we went public. We were learning from each other and, quite frankly, unlearning our own biases, doing the deep work of decolonization and understanding our own privilege and trying to figure that out. </p><p>In the process of doing all of that, we reached some pretty important agreements, which you see in the campaigns over the last many years: a commitment to step back for a lot of white folks and help raise indigenous voices and indigenous perspectives. A commitment to try and find resources for grassroots groups on the ground, instead of it just being “the big group” saying what the issues were. All of those things.</p><p>I think the movement has strengthened and diversified as a result of the site fights.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Do you think there is something like a global movement against fossil fuel exploitation forming, or possible? As you say, every site fight is different, every place is different, in many senses the values that people bring to these things are very different. What is the connecting thread that might make a global movement? What would it look like?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>It’s, what <em>does</em> it look like? Because we are creating it. A whole bunch of us have been, for the past five or six years, consciously trying to connect the threads and figure out how to have global conversations that bring people together; to bring indigenous groups in the heart of the Amazon into a strategy conversation around what should we be doing at the United Nations relative to fossil fuels? What about the subsidies campaigns? How do we do finance strategies? </p><p>It used to be there were just some environmental groups, maybe grassroots groups, having these conversations. Now you see more and more voices coming in, people from different countries connecting to it through the Global Gas and Oil Network, but also now through the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty initiative and campaign that we've been developing. </p><p>We realized we had to stop playing whack-a-mole — this pipeline, this project in Argentina, this offshore drilling in Norway — and we had to say, “No.” We had to say, “the science is really clear, we have to stop fossil fuel expansion.” </p><p>This was hard. This was a fight inside the climate movement, especially with climate policy wonks and philanthropic foundations. During the Keystone campaign, we had philanthropic foundations and other NGOs coming to us and saying, you have to stop this campaign, because it's not a climate campaign. It's diverting attention from the important climate issues.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>I heard many, many wonks make similar arguments.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>That was happening all over the world. What we did is, we found our peers. A number of us — Steve Kretzmann and Hannah McKinnon from <a target="_blank" href="http://priceofoil.org">Oil Change International</a>, myself, a bunch of others — made a list of the 100 people we knew who are at the forefront of oil and gas fights around the world, then added to that list a bunch of academics that we knew were thinking about supply-side policy, and indigenous leaders. </p><p>At the time, there was a huge battle going on around the Lofoten offshore drilling in Norway. So we cast about and said, who wants to host this big strategy retreat? And the groups in Norway did. So we facilitated a five-day retreat for 100 people in Lofoten, Norway. That was the beginning of this international network. </p><p>That's where we released the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.lofotendeclaration.org">Lofoten Declaration</a>, which is the first global declaration calling for an end to fossil fuel expansion everywhere, and a global just transition. </p><p>In my mind, that's the moment when things changed — when we started really looking at supply-side pathways and the need for international cooperation and more work on constraining fossil fuels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>That's a great segue into the treaty. It blew my mind a little bit, when you were first thinking about this and putting it together — I assumed people were keeping track of fossil fuels in the world, where they're being dug up, how much, and who's doing it. But it turns out, not! Can you tell us about the registry idea, and the state of knowledge about global fossil fuel production?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>We started thinking, OK, so if the scientists and even Mark Carney [Governor of the Bank of England] is out there saying we have to keep two-thirds of fossil fuels in the ground, how much are we currently planning on producing? I also thought it would be an easy question to answer. </p><p>What we now know is, countries are responsible for submitting emissions data into the UN, and domestically. That's all easy to find. But if you want to count up today who's producing what [fossil fuels] and how much, you have to buy the data from Rystad and Wood Mackenzie. That’s exactly what Oil Change International has been doing for years, producing its <a target="_blank" href="http://priceofoil.org/2016/09/22/the-skys-limit-report/">Sky's Limit</a> reports. That's what Stockholm Environment Institute is doing in producing the <a target="_blank" href="https://productiongap.org">Production Gap</a> report. </p><p>Most governments themselves don't even know, or don't have anywhere that they count up, what's being produced and how much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>So these private databases are the only places where that information exists.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>If you dig deep at a national government level, you can find it. There are great experts out there, like Pete Erickson from Stockholm Environment Institute and others, who can do this. If you're an average person — or even, as I've discussed in several countries, a minister — you can't find it and you don't know what's being produced. </p><p>Intransigent global issues like this — nuclear weapons, landmines, etc. — the first piece in a global reckoning is accountability and transparency. In fact, that would be the first piece at a national level as well. And we don't have transparency or accountability. We don't even have a comprehensive database of how much coal, oil, and gas reserves, resources, and production is happening globally at any given time. It's not even accessible to decision-makers, let alone publicly accessible. </p><p>That’s the basis of this idea which we're now producing a prototype for, called the <a target="_blank" href="https://fossilfueltreaty.org/registry">Global Registry of Fossil Fuel Production</a>: that we can't count up the carbon budget, we can't assess the potential lock-in of fossil fuel infrastructure and fossil fuels, if we don't know how much is being produced or who's producing it. We can't hold anyone accountable on that side of the ledger.</p><p>So the first critical piece in this puzzle was the <a target="_blank" href="https://productiongap.org/">Production Gap report</a> that the Stockholm Environment Institute produced with the United Nation Environment Program, ISD, and others. It's that report that started crunching the global numbers and said for the first time that we're currently on track to produce 120 percent more fossil fuels than the world can ever safely burn under a 1.5 degrees scenario. In fact, we already have enough oil, gas, and coal, either above ground or under production, to take us past 2 degrees. </p><p>So the majority of the world's financial, political, and intellectual capital at this moment in history is going to produce three products — oil, gas, and coal — which are responsible for 80 percent of the emissions trapped in our atmosphere. Three products which we can't use if we want to have a stable climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>So you put out this request for proposals on the registry, because I imagine there's quite a few logistical and technical issues to work out. What's the state of the registry now? Did somebody win that? Is somebody out there working on it?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, they did. What was really exciting is, we had a lot of submissions from some of the biggest energy agencies and analysts from around the world. None of them alone could really do it properly, because it's really hard to do. </p><p>So what we ended up doing is starting negotiations between <a target="_blank" href="https://globalenergymonitor.org">Global Energy Monitor</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://carbontracker.org">Carbon Tracker Initiative</a>, because they both harvest data in totally different ways. This needs to be tested: what you need to do is to scrape data from industry, scrape data from governments. Originally we thought, oh, it's OK, Rystad and Wood McKenzie already do this. But we can't use their data — you have to be very careful, because they’re a company. </p><p>I actually think they're probably not very happy with us, because we're really having a go at their business model here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>If you succeed in this, it's gonna take a whack off some big revenue streams for some big companies.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:</strong></p><p>Yes. When we launch it, which will be the prototype at COP 26, it will be the first open-source, comprehensive, detailed database of coal, oil, and gas reserves, resources, and production globally, that is both publicly accessible and is starting to have some buy-in from governments and other major institutions. </p><p>It will be quite a sophisticated, but interactive and publicly accessible, database. And it's on its way, currently being produced.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>With some of the poorer fossil fuel producing countries that maybe don't have governments interested in transparency, is there any way to enforce this? Is there any data that are off limits, that you have to fight to get, or is all the data out there somewhere and this is mostly about gathering it? Like if Congo, for instance, wanted to hide how much fossil fuel it's producing or obscure it in some way, could they? </p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>Considering the majority of oil, for example, is from national companies: maybe. Honestly, I would have to talk to Carbon Tracker and Global Energy Monitor and see how they're doing on that front. But they were pretty confident that with what industry releases, combined with the data scrapes they're doing from government, they could provide a pretty significant picture. And we'll know, with the prototype. It's the first time that anyone has ever tried to build it and to make it available to the public. </p><p>What we're finding with both the registry and the fossil fuel treaty is that governments in the global south are pretty interested in this type of transparency, once we show them the data that shows that the majority, well over 70 percent, of the expansion planned for fossil fuels in the next five years is in the global north. It's in wealthy countries. </p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>The very countries that are most vocal about climate change, right? </p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>That’s right. In fact, the majority of what is planned globally on oil and gas is in the US and Canada.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Let's talk then about the <a target="_blank" href="https://fossilfueltreaty.org">Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty</a>. Conceptually, where did this idea come from and what's it based on? What's the necessity for it? What do you want it to do or say?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>The idea emerged from some of those conversations we were having in Norway and other places. What we realized is that every country was responding in the same way to this question of, how do we keep two-thirds of fossil fuels in the ground? Pretty much every nation-state, whether it was Norway, the UK, Canada, or Argentina, they were all saying: It’s not our problem. We don't deal with production, and obviously we couldn't, because then we wouldn't be competitive, and there would be leakage. If we don't produce it, someone else will. So these are all the answers of why they couldn't. </p><p>Yet everyone's saying: we know we have to. Meanwhile, we are locking in all of this production. And all of this money and time is going to either fighting these projects or producing these projects that we can't use. The clock is ticking on electrification and the infrastructure that we actually need to be spending money on. </p><p>So we started looking at what we could learn from other big, intransigent problems like this: the Montreal Protocol, the landmine treaty, the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, nuclear weapons agreements. The idea started emerging, well, if one country can't do it alone, if it really is this kind of dilemma that no one will do it without the other countries, then that's the point where you need international agreements. That's what treaties are for. It’s a great analogy, the nuclear weapons treaty. </p><p>Some academics started studying it. I think the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2019.1636759">first peer-reviewed paper</a> to come out proposing a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty was from Peter Newell and Andrew Simms out of the UK. They are now on the steering committee of our initiative. I read their paper and I thought, yes, this is what we've been talking about for ages. </p><p>So I just called them up. I didn't know them yet. We’d been to some of the same conferences. And I said, Look, let's create an initiative and a working group and start talking about whether this is really real, and what we need to learn? What do we need to study? And we pulled together a group of former diplomats and academics and activists from around the world and started talking about it. </p><p>Then that summer, out of the blue pretty much, I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.climatebreakthroughproject.org/awardee/tzeporah-berman/">won the Climate Breakthrough award</a>, where they give you $2 million to form global climate solutions that no one has ever tried before.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Well that was helpful.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>Yeah, good timing — and, you know, no pressure, just solve climate change. </p><p>This is the first time in well over a decade that I've worked on anything which is commensurate with the scale of the problem. Sure, it's bold, audacious; and you know what, we need bold, audacious right now. We're racing against the clock and we keep not meeting our targets. Every COP, every UN negotiation I've ever been to or heard about, at the end of every one, there's a press release that comes out that says, well, we've done this, but we've failed to address climate change and the world is still burning. </p><p>I just thought, let's try this. And then it took off. I mean, it's been a little bit over two years since that. It's just taken off. It's grown so fast. </p><p>Now with the IEA coming out last month with the 1.5 net zero scenario, acknowledging that if we are trying to meet net zero we have to stop fossil fuel expansion, we're actually the kid on the block that for years has been studying <em>how</em> to stop fossil fuel expansion. We all know that we need to do it now. </p><p>There's evidence showing that we need to do it, but I think everyone is now going to start looking for a pathway to <em>how</em>. Part of it is finance, the divestment campaigns; a huge part of it is finance. But again, we can't leave it up to the markets, not just because the markets are distorted, but because the markets aren't going to address equity and justice.</p><p>The basis of the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty initiative is that we are going to need international cooperation in order to stop fossil fuel expansion everywhere. And that if we're going to do it in a way that is equitable, that addresses injustice, we have to have the hard conversations like debt forgiveness. </p><p>I do a lot of work with Ecuadorian indigenous nations in the Amazon. They're facing new oil drilling entirely to feed Ecuador's debt. A lot of it is debt-for-oil swaps with China. There's a number of countries like that: Argentina, Ecuador, many countries that are starting new fossil fuel expansion not because they're going to use the products; they're just doing it to feed their debt. So equity and justice is a huge part of this. </p><p>I think one of the reasons we need a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty is that some countries, especially wealthy countries, can put in place policies at a national or subnational level to constrain fossil fuel expansion. But if we are going to constrain fossil fuel expansion fast enough, in the time that we have to support actually moving to zero and beyond, we're going to need international cooperation. Right now, the Paris agreement does not provide the mechanisms for the conversations that we need.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>There are estimates that for some, for example, African countries, a successful green energy transition would devastate their oil and gas revenues and hurt their economies. That's a large chunk of their national income in some cases. So we can be conscious of equity, and conscious of the disparate effects, but what would an international treaty or organization do about that, exactly? </p><p>It's the same dilemma Canada or the US has internally: there are some parts of the US where the economy is extremely dependent on fossil fuels and would demonstrably be hurt if they went away. Internationally, it seems like that's even trickier. So what do you do? What's the solution to that?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>Part of what we're doing right now is starting to pull apart, what are the barriers in the global south, and really starting to do deep dives and understand the situations in particular countries. The treaty initiative is made up of organizations from around the world and we have core partners in each region. So <a target="_blank" href="https://powershiftafrica.org">Power Shift Africa</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.twn.my">Third World Network</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.apmdd.org">Asian People Movement on Debt and Development</a>: these are groups that are now doing deep analysis and case studies of, for example, in Malaysia, PETRONAS and its influence. We're also working with Sivan Kartha and Greg Muttitt, who have written a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2020.1763900">seminal paper</a> on equity and fossil fuel production. They basically look at a whole bunch of countries: What is their GDP? What are their jobs? What is their dependency right now, and so what are their barriers going to be? </p><p>So we're doing the analysis, pulling apart the barriers. But what a treaty would do is, first of all, if countries agreed to the end of expansion, it provides a roadmap. So right now — it's really strange and in fact, when I first started looking at this stuff, I thought I was kind of crazy, because we're all talking about phasing out fossil fuels and everyone's talking about 100 percent renewable, and so I started doing the research to find out, what is my country's own plan for production? We don't have one. We don't actually plan for the production of fossil fuels to go down.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Canada you mean, specifically, or anyone?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>Canada specifically, but pretty much any country other than Denmark, who has now announced no new expansion and planning for managed ramp-down and phaseout of production. So if you go and look at the NDCs of what countries file in the Paris agreement and look at any major producing country — US, UK, Canada — they are saying we're going to go 100 percent renewable, and they're saying, we commit to these emissions targets. But they're not actually saying that their fossil fuel production will go down. </p><p>And that's because the fossil fuel industry has been working for decades to try and convince governments that they're going to separate production from emissions, that we are going to eventually have the technology competitive at scale (CCS, CCUS etc.) so that we can keep producing and reduce emissions. I mean, the evidence doesn't show that, and we've run out of time for that in a lot of ways. But we don't actually plan right now to end expansion. </p><p>So the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty is designed on the pillars of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. First of all, end the expansion. Second of all, manage a global phaseout of fossil fuel production. The third pillar is, ensure peaceful and just and equitable transition. Right now we have research, diplomatic efforts, and discussions going on under each of those three pillars, and our vision is for a world where vulnerable communities are offered an alternative pathway. That we actually planned for this, instead of just leaving it up to the markets. </p><p>Poor countries will have to be supported by wealthier countries to transition away from fossil fuels. And right now, in all of those countries, they're under heavy pressure with capital coming in still from fossil fuel companies to do more fossil fuel expansion. And they're under heavy pressure, many of them, to continue feeding their debt. So it's this really strange disconnect we have right now in the climate debate, with energy and infrastructure and fossil fuel discussions are over here, and climate targets over here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>I wanted to ask about that last point. Even if you take supply out of the picture and just look at the traditional discussion around climate change and traditional treaties, Paris and everything else: even through that lens, it's clear that if we don't want them to emit so much that we shoot past our targets, wealthy countries are going to have to send money to poorer countries. It's been part of the COP talks forever, always super contentious. We allegedly set up this <a target="_blank" href="https://www.greenclimate.fund">Green Climate Fund</a>, but if you've been following the reporting on that, we're not doing it. The rich countries are not putting money into that fund. </p><p>That’s the part where I look around in vain for signs of optimism. Because if we're trying to pay them to emit less and to produce less fossil fuels, that's just a lot of money. It would be a huge wealth transfer to get that going. </p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>It is a lot of money. But there's a cascading series of impacts at the point that a country acknowledges that it's going to stop fossil fuel expansion. If you are going to stop the production of fossil fuels, then that also means that the tax breaks and the subsidies that are going to the fossil fuel industry don't make sense. The reason they need them right now is their margins are so small; it costs so much to produce those fossil fuels and to expand those productions. But for Canada, for example, a fracking project that has a declining field, it doesn't need a lot of money in support. It's the infrastructure that is the issue. </p><p>So that's billions, if not over a trillion dollars. In Canada alone, it's at least $2.7 billion a year just in direct and indirect subsidies, and that doesn't even include doing things like buying a $12 billion pipeline that will likely become a stranded asset. So there is money. There is quite a lot of money. And that's just on subsidies, let alone what we're spending in cleanup — cleanup of both spills, billions of dollars, and cleanup of liability and dead wells and leaking wells and methane, and billions of dollars that governments are spending right now into CCS research and pilot projects around the world. </p><p>And we haven't even started talking about health costs. We know from the data that's coming out that fossil fuel development, especially in the global south, is costing millions, if not billions in health costs. Because it's toxic. We've always known that. </p><p>Sure, we've benefited from this industry, lots of nice people work in this industry. Now we know, like nuclear weapons, that the expansion of it is killing us. That's the parallel, and that's the beauty of the treaty that we haven't really talked about, is that the climate movement hasn't had a global demand to government since well before Paris — except for increased ambition and complicated things that actually don't mean anything to the average person. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>Higher targets! It's always targets.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>What does that even mean? And what the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty does is start to shift the norm around fossil fuels, because we've all grown up with the idea that fossil fuels are prosperity. They were keeping the lights on. And in places like Texas or Alberta, where we see production, it's also what keeps your hospitals open and your roads paved. </p><p>In fact, that's not true anymore, because in both jurisdictions — and this is a trend in most wealthy countries — they’re spending more money for fossil fuel production than fossil fuel production provides to a subnational or to a nation state. Because of the liability costs, because of the royalties going down, subsidies going up, etc. We're paying them to extract and pollute now, that's what's happening. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>So are people and NGOs and academic organizations endorsing this or signing on to it? I guess the idea, eventually, is that countries sign, right?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>We decided to start at cities. And the reason we decided to start at cities is because cities are not as influenced politically by the fossil fuel industry. Also, historically, that's where treaties start. Look at nuclear. I'm old enough to remember driving into a city, there'd be a sign: nuclear-free city. That was part of the campaign for a nuclear weapons ban.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>And cities are where the left is, where progressive-minded people live.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>It’s taken off like wildfire. We launched the idea of the fossil fuel treaty at Climate Week, last year in September, and by October, November, Vancouver became the first city in the world to unanimously pass a motion to endorse the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty. And the council and the mayor sent a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau, asking him to start to work on the treaty and international cooperation on stopping all fossil fuel expansion. </p><p>Vancouver was followed, less than a month later I think, by Barcelona. It just goes on and on. There were three cities in Australia this week, there were two cities in the UK last week, now LA and Hayward, California; there's a motion already tabled in New York. </p><p>So the cities work is really taking off, and I keep hearing about new campaigns that have started. We created a campaign hub that has all the information that we could produce around what the treaty is, and now groups around the world are starting to make it theirs. So I know that Friends of the Earth Sweden is campaigning in Swedish on the fossil fuel treaty in 17 cities. Youth groups around the world are taking it up. We now have <a target="_blank" href="https://www.climatealliance.org/indigenous-partners/coica.html">COICA</a>, the association of all indigenous nations in the Amazon, who have endorsed and who are starting to work on the fossil fuel treaty. </p><p>It's really starting to become a movement — 400+ organizations now endorsing and starting to campaign on the fossil fuel treaty. It brings together those issues we were talking about at the beginning; it's tangible. People can say, yeah, I don't want Line 3, but I also don't want drilling in the heart of the Amazon, so enough already. Let's start focusing on the good stuff, instead of always focusing on the bad stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>So who will be the first country? And when?</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>It's hard to know. I do think it will likely be more vulnerable nations, because the meetings that I've been in, when you talk to countries in the global south and show them the data —that the majority of the new expansion of oil, gas, and coal is in wealthy countries, and the science of the Production Gap report, and how we're producing 120 percent more than we can burn — they're angry. </p><p>Some people say it could take 10 years to get a treaty; we may never get a treaty. I think the journey matters here. If you look at other treaties — nuclear waste, nuclear weapons, etc. — the journey mattered. We're creating a new conversation. </p><p>Imagine the point when some vulnerable country stands up on the UN floor and says, “What do you mean, Norway? I saw it here in this global registry that you’re about to produce this.” I think what we're going to start to see is bilateral negotiations on fossil fuel production, some multilateral agreements on pieces of it, debt forgiveness, etc., working its way up towards a treaty. It's already started.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>It's slightly disheartening that so much of the production is in the US. The US has traditionally not been super jazzed about international treaties, especially lately.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>But that's OK. The <a target="_blank" href="https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/">TPNW</a> was a nuclear weapons treaty that was led by non-nuclear-armed states, and it stigmatized and banned nuclear weapons. It changed the narrative about nuclear weapons, and every country started being held accountable to what they were stockpiling and how they were going to reduce it. </p><p>It's likely that's how the treaty will emerge here as well, by marking out a legal pathway, by identifying the barriers, starting to create political will. Let's not forget that it was Kamala Harris on the campaign trail that talked about an <a target="_blank" href="https://www.climatechangenews.com/2020/09/18/inverse-opec-kamala-harris-plan-wind-oil-production-awaits-moment/">inverse OPEC</a>; that's essentially what a Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty would be. It was Biden that talked publicly during the debates about needing to phase out oil. </p><p>There are tipping point moments in history when the technology, the finance, the political ideas come together, being pushed by social movements, and I think on fossil fuels, we're living that tipping point now.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>The future is so opaque to me these days, but it's not hard to envision the US becoming a pariah on this, if enough momentum builds and enough countries sign on. I can't envision the US signing on, but I can envision it becoming isolated. </p><p>I'm trying to imagine, how would we here in the US respond to that? With grace and generosity? Hmm.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>California just became the first subnational in the world with major fossil fuel development to announce an end date to fracking and new oil development. That's huge. </p><p>That's the beginning of recognizing that constraining and managing how much fossil fuels we produce, and for how long, is part of the climate debate. We have to start creating policy roadmaps for both supply and demand. That's the seed for the conversation in the US. </p><p>Given the immense opposition in Texas and New Mexico to what's happening in the Permian Basin, and how bad the financial outlook is in the long term … I don't know.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>These unpaid-for cleanups are popping up more and more often. It’s brutal out there on those Texas natural gas fields. That's going to be billions of dollars. And of course it's not fracking companies who are going to pay that.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>No, it's taxpayers. People are also waking up to the fact that there are alternatives. I'm starting to see them right here. Look, there's an electric car, I can see it now. Maybe we don't have to be using all these fossil fuels. It'd be cheaper if my house was using better efficiency, and then I didn't need to buy so much.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>Maybe I wouldn't have to burn my back fence to stay warm during a cold snap if we had more renewables.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>The solutions clearly are more reliable, even at the moment when we need them to be more reliable, because they're distributed and safer and healthier. Again, new data came out this year from the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/c-change/news/fossil-fuel-air-pollution-responsible-for-1-in-5-deaths-worldwide/">Harvard study</a> that fossil fuels are killing millions of people every year because they're toxic. </p><p>There's a lot of good reasons to start thinking about fossil fuels in a different way, and to address that anxiety that we have: are we going to freeze in the dark? We're not going to freeze in the dark. </p><p>We have enough fossil fuels already above ground or under production to meet the world's needs while we transition to a cleaner future. That’s the part we're just starting to understand. That’s the point where people start getting excited about what that beach looks like.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Let's talk briefly about the beach. You've said before: the fossil fuel model, in terms of social and economic organization, is very centralized. It lends itself to concentrations of power, which of course then lend themselves to graft and bribery and all the rest, and the little people getting screwed, getting the ass end of all these cleanups, and not benefiting. I can't tell you how many stories I've read now about, this North Dakota town thought they were going to be rich forever … and then fracking left and now they’re all super poor.</p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>Turns out now their water is poisoned, they have higher cancer rates, and, yeah, they don't have any more money. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong></p><p>None of the wealth stayed behind. So what's your vision of what comes next after that, and why is it better? Obviously there’s not dying of inhaling poison — that's a bonus. But how else do you see clean energy reshaping some of those social and economic structures? </p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman:  </strong></p><p>Reducing our dependence on fossil fuels, not just the use of them, but the production of them, changes everything. It changes the daily lives of millions of people. We're no longer fighting asthma. We're no longer fighting what should be rare cancers, which are now massive in downstream communities, especially communities of color, near refineries, and indigenous communities who are in the heart of the production in remote areas, from the Amazon to Canada. </p><p>Having spent a bunch of time in some of those incredibly visionary communities in the heart of Amazon, and in northern Alberta, in Canada, where they are saying no to the oil extraction that is killing their communities — they show me the fish with lesions, I get introduced to people in their communities who are dying of cancer. And then they show me the renewable energy facilities that they're building, and they're so excited about them. The whole community is working on them, and they're plugging in their cell phones to their solar panels. They're doing traditional dances, circling the solar panels in the Beaver Lake Cree community. In the heart of the Amazon, I watched a shaman fire up his laptop after he plugged it into his new solar panel, and the beaming look on his face.</p><p>People get to control the power that fuels their daily lives. They know that it's not going to have the direct health impacts on them. It's safer, it's cleaner. That’s the thing about a solar spill: it’s just a sunny day. That's the best image I can leave you with about what the future looks like. </p><p>The work we're doing now on the fossil fuel treaty is, we're not going to get there just by the local efforts. We're not going to get there in time to have a planet stable enough where we're not just dealing with constant disasters. If we're going to do that, we need international cooperation. That's why we have to call on our governments to do this.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Thanks so much for taking the time. </p><p><strong>Tzeporah Berman: </strong></p><p>This has been really fun. Thanks, Dave.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-treating-fossil-fuels</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:37925523</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 07 Jul 2021 16:00:10 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/37925523/95dcb5d19251d98d118f0b866a7dffaa.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3621</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/37925523/99e845c0c0631f1f49e75cc301682606.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[There is no "moderate" position on climate change]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Perhaps the most politically difficult aspect of climate change is that, after decades of denial and delay, there is no longer any coherent “moderate” position to be had. </p><p>To allow temperatures to rise past 1.5° or 2°C this century is to accept <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/">unthinkable disruption</a> to agriculture, trade, immigration, public health, and basic social cohesion. To hold temperature rise to less than 1.5° or 2°C this century will require enormous, heroic decarbonization efforts on the part of every wealthy country. </p><p>Either of those outcomes is, in its own way, radical. There is no non-radical future available for the US in decades to come. Our only choice is the proportions of the mix: action vs. impacts. The less action we and other countries take to address the threat, the more impacts we will all suffer. </p><p>Politicians who hamper the effort to decarbonize and increase resilience are not moderates. They are effectively choosing a mix of low action and high impacts — ever-worsening heat waves, droughts, floods, and hurricanes. There is nothing moderate about that, certainly nothing <em>conservative</em>. </p><p>For years, climate scientists, advocates, and activists have been trying to get politicians to understand this about climate change: that indifference and inaction are not neutral. Every day that goes by, more damages are baked in and getting the problem under control is more difficult. The cost of preventing future impacts is tiny relative to the cost, in lives and money, of adapting to them. </p><p>The only way to conserve what Americans love in this country is to act aggressively to limit carbon emissions, commercialize clean-energy technologies, and wind down fossil fuel production — and help other countries to do the same. To do less means to conserve less, to accept more loss. </p><p>Has the Democratic Party taken this message to heart? We’re going to find out in coming weeks. </p><p>I’m going to describe some political forces that threaten to limit or constrain Democrats’ climate ambitions in favor of “moderation” and then take a closer look at the political drama going on in DC these days around infrastructure. We’re about to get an unusually clear test case of Democrats’ commitment to climate policy.</p><p>The right is creating a new “other side” in the climate debate</p><p>Pretty much <a target="_blank" href="https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/06/23/two-thirds-of-americans-think-government-should-do-more-on-climate/">every demographic outside of hard-core conservatives</a> is concerned about climate change and wants to address it — most notably young people, who aren’t exactly flocking to the GOP these days. A few people on the right are belatedly and begrudgingly recognizing this fact and its electoral implications.</p><p>Lisa Friedman of <em>The New York Times</em> brings news of a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/23/climate/climate-change-republicans.html">budding Republican climate caucus</a>. The story is hilarious and sad and worth reading, but here is the nut of it:</p><p>“There is a recognition within the G.O.P. that if the party is going to be competitive in national elections, in purple states and purple districts, there needs to be some type of credible position on climate change,” said George David Banks, a former adviser to President Trump …</p><p>So, at least some Republicans think science denialism is no longer working and the party needs “some type of credible position on climate change.” The question is, what is the minimum viable position? What’s the least they can do while appearing to do something?</p><p>Here is the party’s opening gambit:</p><p>A package of bills [House Minority Leader Kevin] McCarthy [R-CA] introduced on Earth Day championed carbon capture, a nascent and expensive technology that catches carbon emissions generated by power plants or factories and stores them before they escape into the atmosphere. It also promoted tree planting and expansion of nuclear energy, a carbon-free power source that many Republicans prefer over wind or solar energy.</p><p>Friedman rightly notes that these policies would do very little to reduce emissions. But she also calls them “limited government, free-market policies,” which is a bit of right-wing spin we ought to reject. Carbon capture is entirely dependent on government subsidies and regulatory support. So is nuclear power. So is large-scale reforestation. These are all the very opposite of limited government.</p><p>What unites these proposals is that they can plausibly be said to address climate change in some way or another, but they do nothing to limit or otherwise inconvenience GOP donors, especially fossil fuel companies. In fact, carbon capture can be viewed — and likely is viewed by Republicans — explicitly as a bid to protect fossil fuels from climate policy.</p><p>Remember, the problem for which Republicans are solving is not climate change but the need to be seen as having “some type of credible position” on climate change, enough for suburban voters to reassure themselves that the GOP is not unreasonable on the issue — that there are once again two legitimate sides. </p><p>Science denial looks ugly and extreme. But rhetoric about “small-government solutions” that are more sensible than the “tax and spend” Democratic alternatives? Well, that’s as soothing and familiar as warm milk. </p><p>It might be possible for Democrats, if they were united in their message, to properly expose this Republican climate PR as the fraud it is … but they are not united in their message. </p><p>Manchin is helping position fossil-friendly policy as “the center”</p><p>The majority of the Democratic Party, both voters and legislators, is on board with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21252892/climate-change-democrats-joe-biden-renewable-energy-unions-environmental-justice">an ambitious (if still insufficient) climate plan</a>. But on this issue, as on all others, Democrats need total unanimity — it’s all 50 senators voting together, or nothing passes. </p><p>So attention tends to focus on the most conservative Dems, the swing votes, and their words carry added weight. </p><p>Republicans want to pretend that climate change is just another pollution problem and the solution is for fossil fuels to clean up a little bit. They want to pretend that “innovation” can keep fossil fuels going forever.</p><p>Democrats need to expose that as nonsense, but they can’t, because Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV) is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy/energy-chairman-manchin-warns-democrats-against-climate-mandates">out there saying</a>, “You cannot eliminate your way to a cleaner environment. You can innovate your way.”</p><p>Republicans want to pretend that <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eenews.net/stories/1063732197">coal can be saved</a>, that it can somehow find a way to compete in a decarbonizing world. </p><p>Democrats need to expose that as nonsense, but they’ve got Manchin out there whining that his fellow Democrats are “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/manchin-defends-coal-fired-plants-expresses-concern-over-aggressive-bide/601707/">unfairly targeting</a>” coal.</p><p>Republicans want to pretend that decarbonizing the electricity sector by 2035 (Biden’s timeline) is impossible. </p><p>Democrats need to expose that as nonsense, but they’ve got Manchin out there “concerned” about Biden’s “aggressive” timeline. </p><p>Republicans want to pretend that climate isn’t a threat to the financial system. </p><p>Democrats need to expose that as nonsense, but they’ve got Manchin out there <a target="_blank" href="https://thehill.com/policy/finance/550487-manchin-rips-big-banks-for-net-zero-carbon-goals">scolding big banks</a> for adopting zero-carbon goals. </p><p>Democratic leadership has to tiptoe around all this stuff, because everyone needs to keep Prince Manchin happy. </p><p>The result, though, is that in the eyes of the media, the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21252892/climate-change-democrats-joe-biden-renewable-energy-unions-environmental-justice">majority Democratic Party consensus</a> on climate change (as reflected in Biden’s climate plan!) becomes “the left” in a debate with Manchin in “the center.” </p><p>Are Democrats going to allow that to happen? The dynamic is going to come to a head around the infrastructure bill. Let’s take a look at the maneuvering taking place right now.</p><p>The bipartisan infrastructure plan is not a climate strategy</p><p>For weeks, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) has been open about the fact that Democrats are pursuing a two-track strategy on infrastructure legislation. A bipartisan Senate “gang of ten,” including Manchin, is working on a bipartisan bill; whatever doesn’t make it into that bill will go into a bill meant to pass through budget reconciliation (which only requires 50 votes). </p><p>This has always been a tenuous strategy, but it was apparently unavoidable, because Manchin and his crew of centrists refused to proceed straight to reconciliation. They were determined to do the bipartisan dance that has eaten up the past few weeks. </p><p>Last week, the bipartisan group <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/24/infrastructure-deal-talks-biden-invites-bipartisan-senators-to-white-house.html">presented an outline of a plan</a>. It would involve $1.2 trillion total spending — about half of the $2.25 trillion in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/">Biden’s infrastructure plan</a> — and just $579 billion in new spending. Democrats fought off Republican efforts to impose a special fee on electric vehicles and raise the gas tax to pay for the bill. Republicans fought off Democratic efforts to pay for it by rolling back Trump tax cuts. They’re still not sure how they’re going to pay for it. </p><p>As for climate, the plan has … some stuff. There’s $73 billion for power system infrastructure (<a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-why-we-need-more">HVDC lines</a>!), which is, the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/24/fact-sheet-president-biden-announces-support-for-the-bipartisan-infrastructure-framework/">White House claims</a>, “the single largest investment in clean energy transmission in American history.” There’s $49 billion for public transit, $66 billion for rail, $7.5 billion for electric vehicle chargers, and another $7.5 billion for electric buses. </p><p>It’s better than nothing, and more than a Republican Congress would offer. It’s a small down payment on the investments in clean energy infrastructure that will be needed in the future. </p><p>But it’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/22549410/infrastructure-deal-biden-climate-senate-bipartisan-jobs">not a climate plan</a>. Not even in the ballpark. </p><p>A real climate plan will include a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscast-how-to-decarbonize-the">reconciliation-friendly clean energy standard</a> (CES), <a target="_blank" href="https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2021/06/11/500429/clean-energy-tax-incentives-will-help-fight-climate-crisis/">clean energy tax credits</a>, a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ccc_one_pager.pdf">civilian climate corps</a>, investments in frontline communities, and the rest of the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-coolest-parts-of-bidens-expansive">climate commitments in Biden’s jobs plan</a>. That’s where the reconciliation bill comes in. </p><p>Of course, climate isn’t the only issue competing for inclusion in that bill. At this point, every Democratic interest group is <a target="_blank" href="https://progressives.house.gov/press-releases?ID=FE986C03-49A1-4100-82E9-C76BC73A33EB">lining up to have its priorities included</a>. Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) has <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/bernie-sanders-drafts-6-trillion-nfrastructure-plan-democrats-gop-reconciliation-2021-6">put together a $6 trillion bill</a> as an opening gambit. </p><p>Politico <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/17/senate-democrats-infrastructure-reconciliation-494977">captures the conventional wisdom</a>: “The dollar amount … is likely to shrink as moderates weigh in. At the moment, it appears impossible that all 50 Democrats would get on board with such a large figure.”</p><p>Manchin and Sen. Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ) are typically seen as the ones with leverage, since their votes will be needed for any reconciliation bill. And they are already making noise that the Democratic plan is too big. Something blah blah deficit something. </p><p>But there’s a twist. </p><p>Progressives throw their weight around</p><p>Progressives have been trying to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/15/liberal-rebellion-senate-infrastrucutre-494585">exercise a little leverage of their own</a>. They are insisting that the bipartisan bill not be passed on its own, without being linked to the reconciliation bill. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) said, “It has to be one deal and not two deals.” Sanders <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/manchin-open-biden-s-human-infrastructure-plans-undoing-some-trump-n1272057">said</a>, “It's going to be either both or nothing.”</p><p>They want an “ironclad” pledge from Schumer that both bills will get a vote before they commit to the first. And so far, Schumer has said he is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/manchin-open-biden-s-human-infrastructure-plans-undoing-some-trump-n1272057">committed to doing both</a>. "One can't be done without the other,” he said.</p><p>House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) has been similarly categorical:</p><p>No, really.</p><p>This message extended all the way to the top. Even as he introduced the bipartisan package, <a target="_blank" href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/560103-biden-says-he-wont-sign-bipartisan-bill-without-reconciliation-bill">Biden said</a>:</p><p>I expect that in the coming months this summer, before the fiscal year is over, that we will have voted on this bill, the infrastructure bill, as well as voted on the budget resolution. But if only one comes to me, [if] this is the only one that comes to me, I’m not signing it. It’s in tandem.</p><p>Republicans immediately <a target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-meet-with-bipartisan-senators-discuss-infrastructure-plan-2021-06-24/">pretended to be surprised and outraged</a> by Biden’s commitment to pass both bills. Some of them <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/gop-infrastructure-biden-extortion-congress-republicans-democrats-deal-2021-6">threatened to bail</a> on the bipartisan package. </p><p>In response to the faux outrage, Biden <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnbc.com/2021/06/26/biden-reiterates-support-for-bipartisan-infrastructure-plan-did-not-threaten-veto.html">clarified</a> that he was not threatening a veto or linking the bills. </p><p>It is entirely possible — some might even say thuddingly predictable — that Republicans were never negotiating in good faith and that the whole point of the exercise was to waste time and foster division among Democrats. </p><p>Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) wants to prevent a reconciliation bill. The bipartisan process was a way to blunt Democrats’ momentum and slow things down. I expect he will be perfectly willing to blow up the deal if it no longer serves that purpose. </p><p>The question is what Manchin and Sinema will do if their bipartisan deal falls apart. At that point, both they and the progressives on the other side of the coalition will face the same stark choice: find a reconciliation bill that can get 50 votes … or get nothing, and be known forever as the people who tanked Biden’s presidency and denied Democrats their only chance for structural change in a decade. </p><p>The stakes are incredibly high. Schumer is promising a “unity budget” that will bring Democrats together, but <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democrats-split-biden-infrastructure/2021/06/10/f1f95a8e-c91f-11eb-afd0-9726f7ec0ba6_story.html">strains are showing already</a>. </p><p>Exactly what and how much climate policy will be in the reconciliation bill will be hashed out in coming weeks. </p><p>A campaign (from the Sunrise Movement and Evergreen Action) called “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.evergreenaction.com/blog/no-climate-no-deal">No Climate, No Deal</a>” has been endorsed by a dozen Democratic senators and 38 reps. But it’s not clear what minimum threshold counts as enough climate to get their vote. </p><p>This is where the battle between climate “moderation” and climate realism is going to be fought. Manchin will be angling to blunt the parts of Biden’s climate plan that directly displace fossil fuels. But those are the most important parts.</p><p>It will be up to progressives to walk a tightrope, rejecting false moderation and insisting on an appropriately ambitious climate plan without tanking the deal entirely. Finding unity and holding it together against what is certain to be a full-on right-wing assault is a fraught undertaking, to say the least.</p><p>The pressure in DC to do less, to compromise and scale back, is insidious and inexorable. But this is the moment of truth for climate change in US politics. If big stuff doesn’t happen now, it’s not going to happen for a long, long time. </p><p>No climate, no deal. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/there-is-no-moderate-position-on</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:37965817</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 30 Jun 2021 16:00:01 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/37965817/f2596d0d50c95384404ef3b3f5a45fb3.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1014</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/37965817/e885dbc4c80e7380938effe80f3dc695.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Saul Griffith and Arch Rao on electrifying your house]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Saul Griffith (co-founder of </em><a target="_blank" href="https://www.rewiringamerica.org/"><em>Rewiring America</em></a><em>) and Arch Rao (founder and CEO of </em><a target="_blank" href="https://www.span.io"><em>Span</em></a><em>, which makes smart electrical panels) discuss the need to electrify US homes, the challenges standing in the way, the kinds of solutions that will ease the process, and much more.</em></p><p>Full transcript of Volts podcast featuring Saul Griffith and Arch Rao, June 28, 2021 </p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/s/wn88jn7p1q3tdf0/volts21.07628%28saul.griffith.arch.rao%29.pdf?dl=0">PDF version</a>)</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p>Those of you who have been reading or listening to Volts for a while know that I am fairly obsessed with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12938086/electrify-everything">clean electrification</a>, which involves shifting all the things we do now with fossil fuels over to electric equivalents (while cleaning up electricity supply).</p><p>One important nexus of electrification is the residential sector. US homeowners are in a position to electrify their power supply (with solar panels), their heating and cooling (with heat pumps), and their transportation (with electric vehicles). How can we induce millions of them to make the decision to electrify, starting today? How can we make it cheaper and easier for them? </p><p>To discuss that and related issues, I was excited to connect with two of the smartest people working in this space. The first is analyst, inventor, tinkerer, and entrepreneur <a target="_blank" href="https://www.saulgriffith.com">Saul Griffith</a>, who will be familiar to longtime readers — I've cited his work numerous times, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21349200/climate-change-fossil-fuels-rewiring-america-electrify">especially his most recent work with Rewiring America</a>, which advocates for rapid electrification. There is probably no one on earth with a better understanding of the US energy system. (He’s got a <a target="_blank" href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/contributors/saul-griffith">book on electrification</a> coming out in October.)</p><p>Griffith is a backer of and investor in a startup called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.span.io">Span</a>, which makes smart electrical panels that offer homeowners fine-grained control over all their individual appliances, lights, and devices (via an app on their phones, of course). The founder and CEO of Span, my other guest, is Arch Rao. Rao was the project lead for Tesla's Powerwall home battery before leaving to start Span, so it goes without saying that he is intimately familiar with the technical and economic challenges of home electrification.</p><p>Welcome to Volts, Saul and Arch! Saul, I want to start with you. We're going to talk about home electrification today, and just by way of setting context — it's pretty easy to make the case that home electrification is fun, it's cool. But what is the case that it is necessary, and not only necessary, but necessary <em>quickly</em>? Set the bigger picture for us.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith: </strong></p><p>There's a few components to that. Let's start with the climate component: the urgency. </p><p>There's a concept called committed emissions — that is the emissions that a machine that exists today will emit while it lives out its lifetime. So if you bought a petrol or gasoline car last year, it'll keep burning gasoline for another 20 years; if you bought a natural gas furnace last year, it'll keep burning natural gas for 25 years; a hot water heater, 15 years; an oven burning natural gas, another 12 years. So those are committed emissions, the same as a new coal plant opening last year would go on operating for another 50 years. We now know that if all of the machines that exist on the planet today live out their natural life, the committed emissions of those machines take us to about <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1364-3">1.8 degrees Celsius</a>, over three degrees Fahrenheit of warming. So the practical reality is every time any of our machines fails or needs to be replaced, we need to upgrade it with a zero-carbon option. And the only real zero-carbon option that has emerged is electrification, and that's electrification of our heat with heat pumps, of our vehicles with electric vehicles, and then tying that all together and balancing the grid.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Right. And what chunk of emissions comes from residential? </p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>Historically, we put emissions into sectors: residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation. The residential sector is responsible for 10 or 15 percent of total emissions, by that measure, but it's actually much higher than that because in reality, you make the decision about your car and your home. And when we electrify our cars, they're going to be charged at home. And then today, as it stands, a huge amount of our economy in the U.S. — close to 10% — is used to find, mine and refine fossil fuels, so that's the pipelines and the trains moving coal. And that's all filed under industrial emissions. So if you wrap up your pro rata share of that in your household, you wrap up the electrification of your vehicles, the decisions you make around your kitchen table are actually about 40 or 42 percent of our total emissions. In our small businesses and offices, what's traditionally known as the commercial sector, it's about another 20 percent. </p><p>As I like to say now, there's two types of emissions. There's a small number of big machines, and there's a large number of small machines. The small number of big machines is a few hundred coal plants and a few hundred LNG terminals and a few hundred oil tankers, but the real game in town is the 200 million vehicles, the 128 million households, the 70 million natural gas furnaces, etc. That's the large number of small machines, which is what we need to electrify when we electrify the household.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>And it’s individuals in charge of those decisions. </p><p>One objection I hear to home electrification is that, from an household point of view, the boring stuff like insulation and weather-sealing is a better value. What's your general response to that? </p><p><strong>Saul Griffith: </strong></p><p>I don't think that's true. It’s empirically wrong. Retrofits like the envelope and ceiling can be very, very expensive, because you have to remove walls, you have to stuff new insulation in those walls. </p><p>I just got a quote on doing that for my house, which is in a mild climate but is nevertheless freezing. It was about $28,000. That would give me a small efficiency win in this house, of maybe 20 percent less energy use, whereas buying the heat pumps to heat the house is about a $2,500 project. They will lower my energy for heating the house by two-thirds compared to how it's currently heated. </p><p>So the big efficiency win in this house is the heat pump.  </p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>Just to expand on that, we have to be looking at technologies that change the outlook for us, not just looking back, but looking ahead. Things like fundamentally changing how we heat our homes or how we think about cooking and heating our water supply are the big game changer here.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Following up on that: Span makes these smart electrical panels. What's the pitch that intelligence is important, or a necessary component of this, versus just dumb-appliance replacement?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>That's a very good question. Often people have to be walked through the second-order effects that a solution like the Span panel can have for your home and your carbon footprint.</p><p> A very useful analog, perhaps, is: in order to enable faster adoption of electric vehicles, we have to think about building charging networks, where we are working to deploy a large number of charges around the country and around the world. It's kind of similar. </p><p>The electrical panel has a critical place in the electrical grid infrastructure, especially for your home. Without thinking about data controls and intelligence flowing in and out of it, it is very hard to envision a future state where switching over to electric appliances is practical or inexpensive. </p><p>Anecdotally, when you think about replacing your water heater or your home heating system, it doesn't happen outside of an event. You have equipment failing, then you think about upgrading it, and when that decision point arrives, the cost and the timeline for upgrading your electrical system is often not compelling. It’s too much for any homeowner to take on, so they end up adopting the easiest solution, which is often calling somebody on Yelp and saying, “Hey, please replace the water heater with another natural gas water heater.” They're then locked into those committed emissions, like Saul said, for the next decade or more. So that's one part of the problem. </p><p>The other part of the problem is, when you think about the continued adoption of electric appliances — be it electric vehicles, electric induction cooktops, or self-generation storage solutions like solar and batteries — the electrical panel, which is what everything connects into, is insufficient from a capacity standpoint. </p><p>What we're allowing for is a smarter electrical panel that gives you controls and visibility down to every appliance and makes it easier to lock in these electric appliances and also potentially avoid the cost of upgrading your incoming service.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>The idea is that Span will juggle the loads and the timing, to smooth out the demand curve so you don't have these spikes where you might need bigger hardware.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith: </strong></p><p>So the average US household today has two cars in the garage that burn petrol or gasoline or diesel, and it has natural gas heating, and it uses about 25 kilowatt-hours per day of electrical energy. If you electrify both of the vehicles in that household, you'll add about another 25 kilowatt-hours per day to the load of that house. And if you electrify the heat, you'll add about another 20 kilowatt-hours. </p><p>For the majority of U.S. homes — and this is true around the world, when we electrify for purposes of decarbonizing, or for purposes of having a quieter, cleaner car, or because you're trying to improve the respiratory health of your children, because you don't want to burn fossil fuels inside your house — you're going to double or triple the loads in that house. </p><p>The other phenomenon that is happening — and where I'm dialing in from today, in Australia, is an incredible example of this — rooftop solar is now providing 5 cent per kilowatt-hour electricity in Australia. Australia got the right mix of regulatory environment, politics, financing, that there is no way the grid will ever provide electricity to you as cheaply as solar. </p><p>That will be true in the US — it is starting to be true, but it's going to be very, very true by 2022 or 2023. And then you're going to want to run your hot tub when the sun is shining, and you're going to want to charge your car battery when the sun is shining. That needs coordination, and it needs a computer, and a brain. </p><p>What we're trying to avoid is having both cars on a type-two charger running at the same time as your oven, at the same time as your stove, at the same time as your hot tub. And with a small amount of intelligence coordinating those loads, there's actually quite a big economic win — it means that the total retrofit that we need to do is much smaller.</p><p><strong>Arch Rao:</strong> </p><p>Thinking about it from the bottom up as well, the home electrical grid is built very much like traditional electrical infrastructure. You think about the worst case scenario, you try to build out capacity to support a very low likelihood scenario of these EV chargers, the heat pumps, your induction cooktop, and all of the different appliances in your home being powered on at the same time. </p><p>That rarely ever happens, or in fact never happens, right? To be able to manage these, you need a solution that sits at the nerve center of your electrical system. That's really what Span does.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>It’s quite analogous on the household level to the larger grid: you're just peak shaving. You're installing some intelligence to avoid big peaks and valleys, right?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>There’s an elegant comparison to be made here with fractals. We're moving into systems where your edge of grid looks more and more like the grid — you have generation, storage, you have different types of loads. </p><p>So all these things we talked about, in terms of energy efficiency — reducing your consumption, which is a concept that's existed for decades now — is just not going to buck the curve quickly enough. If people want to continue to have the conveniences they have today, the solution is to electrify, to power it with known, available, increasingly lower-cost renewables.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>A lot of the promise of intelligence or software in buildings is that grid managers will be able to interface with the grid edge and coordinate and co-optimize it with central generation, so that everything works well together. </p><p>A lot of what Span offers is: here's what you the owner can do; you can set this, or if this happens, you can turn this down, and turn this up. Over the years, I have picked up a real skepticism about how much we can expect people to do. Even if it's directly in their self-interest and super easy, people generally, as a behavioral matter, will not do things. </p><p>In thinking about Span, what's the balance of user control versus what’s automated? Do you think about that a lot? </p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>We do think about that a lot, actually. At the homeowner level, what we've zeroed in on is, monitoring without controls is not valuable. We're not just offering customers information and hoping that they'll change. </p><p>Alongside that, controls without intelligence is not scalable. Ao we have to work toward solutions that take the human out of the loop, which means doing nuanced but subtle things within a home that don't impact your everyday life, but at the same time, are the right thing to do in terms of power flow management. </p><p>So the solution is at the home level, but you want to take the homeowner out of the everyday decision-making process. </p><p>The second part of it is, as we deploy more and more of our systems, we are seeing the benefit of the fleet level. In fact, we've already signed on a few utility partners that are looking to give this away to their customers or significantly rebate it, because the panel, given where it sits, is the natural intersection point between the grid operator and the home. Everything that you source power from, sink power into and store power in, all naturally connects, which means you can have a single gateway, so to speak, that can monitor and control everything at a fleet level as well. </p><p>Whether it's an EV charger, from any brand, make, model, or company, or whether it's a smart thermostat, all of these can be monitored and controlled to a single gateway.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>To what extent are grid managers controlling things through Span now? Or does that need some sort of extra signoff from the homeowner?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao:</strong> </p><p>Te're thinking about this as an opt-out model. We recently announced a program with Green Mountain Power, and another one with Silicon Valley Clean Energy here in California, where the customers are by design enrolled into some form of load monitoring and demand management. This doesn't preclude them from overriding those requests, but now the utility is given access to a piece of technology that allows them to control water heaters and EV chargers and space heaters, etc.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong></p><p>Is Green Mountain giving them away? </p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>That's right, the first part of their program is, they're offering 100 systems to customers in their territory — some that have batteries, some that have EV chargers, some that are just getting a panel up because they're getting an electric appliance — to understand what the benefit will be. The plan is, as we demonstrate successfully that this has value to both the homeowner and the grid operator, to scale this up. They have around 200,000 homeowners. </p><p>There's another interesting benefit to this, which is that there are still a number of utilities in the US that are filing for rate cases to adopt smart meters — but frankly, smart meters are not really that smart. They’re communication radios. Our panel gives the energy company or the utility a lot more visibility at the whole home level and at the circuit level. </p><p>So imagine by design being able to monitor the consumption of EVs, the production of solar, the major appliances, etc. and the controls. There's a very strong case for how this can be offered nationally through existing utility companies and potentially even being rebated by the government to enable electrification. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>So just slotting these in where smart meters are now? It sounds like a better technology, but for the same general purposes.</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>That's right, this takes the place of an existing smart meter. Our product is revenue-grade metering at the home level and at the circuit level.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>There’s another complaint I often hear about home electrification, and I'm curious what both of you have to say about this. Whenever I bring it up online, one thing I hear is that electrification would raise homeowners’ costs quite a bit. And it's true, probably, in places where electricity is more expensive than natural gas per therm — which is, I think, a lot of places. </p><p>So I'm curious what percentage of homeowners can save money by doing this now, by virtue of existing economics, versus those who need some sort of incentive?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>I’ve spent my whole year answering this question, with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rewiringamerica.org">Rewiring America</a>, which is an organization founded not only to answer that question, but to make the economics better and better and better. </p><p>One thing we looked at was, at what point in the future the household economics will be positive for everyone. That point is when the US achieves Australia's cost of solar installation, at $1 per watt on the roof, when we've electrified our heat, when we get batteries installed for under $200 per kilowatt-hour at the household, and when we get EVs to cost parity with gasoline. </p><p>That moment is about 2024. At that point, every American household saves more than $2,000 per year on their energy bills. </p><p>We're actually getting closer and closer on EVs — a lot of the savings are driven by EVs. Just for perspective: 10 cent per kilowatt-hour electric vehicle versus $3 gallon gasoline; three or four cents a mile for the electric versus 20-plus cents per mile for the gasoline. <a target="_blank" href="https://www.carrier.com/carrier/en/worldwide/">Carrier</a>, an American heating and cooling company, just created a variable-speed heat pump that's got a <a target="_blank" href="https://learnmetrics.com/coefficient-of-performance/">COP of 4</a>. </p><p>So the technology is there. If you can install these things in the household without too much headache, then households will realize savings. </p><p>I admit we're not quite there today. One of the reasons is that we haven't trained enough HVAC technicians, we don't have enough electricians, there's a lot of excess permitting that needs to be done, there's just challenges to the practical reality on the ground. But they're falling day by day, and there's more and more contractors that will do a heat pump and not recommend a natural gas heater. </p><p>The economics are flipping right now. But I do agree that the challenge is, we've got to design and build for the future that's going to happen in 2024, and have to sell it in 2021. </p><p>That means there are ZIP codes where it works. We just did a study trying to help the White House on how many low- and middle-income households would already save by flipping off natural gas, and it's tens of millions of homes. You can pick the ZIP codes in the country where it's most favorable, where it's a reality already.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>What's the differentiating feature of those areas?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>For heating specifically, it's either because there's high natural gas prices or because there's low retail electricity prices in that location, or because the climate is mild. So across the South and Southeast, there's a lot of homes in the money, across the Southwest and the West Coast there's a lot of homes in the money. It gets a little bit harder in the middle and up at the top of the country, but honestly, every year we're gaining 5 degrees of latitude in heat pump performance. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Arch, you must have to deal with the question of upfront costs.</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>Saul provides a really useful macro perspective, through the longer-term horizon, for us to enable this for every home. Expanding on one of the points he made: how do you get to that dollar-per-watt solar? How do you get to the sub-$200-a-kilowatt-hour storage?</p><p> I think we're coming at it from an inside-out perspective of affordability. That's what's driving our product design and innovation. When you think about the cost of delivered, behind-the-meter solar today, to homeowners here in the US, a lot of the cost is operational costs, installation cost that stem from design complexity and customization on site. </p><p>That's part of what we're trying to solve here: there is too much design complexity, and there's too much design customization, for this to get to a low enough cost to become affordable for every household. </p><p>If you don't have to worry about relocating nodes, if you don't have to worry about changing the ideal size of the solar that goes on your roof, because you're not as constrained by how much capacity the service has, it makes it that much easier for us to reach more customers at a lower dollar per watt. That's what we're solving. </p><p>When we think about storage — and this is actually a very debated topic for us internally — resiliency is arguably more of a need for low- and medium-income households than it is for larger, more affluent households. But in order to get your whole home backed up, or your essential loads backed up, most folks cannot afford to have two or three batteries. Part of what we can offer is to combine a single small battery with the Span panel, and effectively you can manage everything in your home.</p><p>Again, it goes back to the same point of affordability: lower capex, lower opex. That's how we're going to move closer to a smaller carbon footprint, but also closer to enabling these customers to take that next step towards electrifying their appliances. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Spell that out a little bit, why a Span panel plus a small battery can do the same work as two or three big batteries. What exactly is the magic there?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>There's two pieces to it. One is, when you think about backing up an entire home, you're having to place a large bank of batteries to meet what your maximum load could be. And you have to wire it up such that you're placing this bank of batteries upstream of all of your circuits, or all of your loads. </p><p>In some places, like California, that requires quite a bit of installation labor, because you're having to disconnect the meter, move all your circuits and loads into a separate critical-loads panel, etc. </p><p>With the Span panel, we are a one-for-one replacement for your panel — or it can also serve as a sub-panel or critical-loads panel. And it takes in all the circuits that you already have in your home, with all of the existing breakers, so there is no on-site customization required. </p><p>Once installed, we are able to see and manage your load such that you can get more outage protection with a single battery than you can with two batteries, because you're aware of what's consuming power during an outage. One surprisingly common piece of feedback we got from customers when installing home batteries for Tesla was that they inadvertently discharged their home battery into their car during an outage, because they didn't know any better. They didn't know they were experiencing an outage. </p><p>We can solve the problem for some people by giving them more batteries, but I think we can solve the problem for all people by giving them a more controllable and dynamically managed load-control panel. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>So in the event of a brownout or a blackout, your Span panel can turn off or turn down inessential loads. It can prioritize.</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>Yeah. Today, the interface is very simple. It is designed for anybody to use, where it says, here are my must-have loads, here are my nice-to-have loads, and here my non-essential loads. It all goes to the Span app. </p><p>Depending on the state of charge of your battery, or more importantly, how many hours and minutes of backup you have left, based on your load profile, we will shed those non-essential loads first. When you approach, let's say, half of the capacity of the battery, it will shed those low-priority or nice-to-have loads and send you a notification saying, “Hey, David, so you know you have another five hours of battery remaining, would you like to share anything else?” </p><p>That's what we can do today. Where we are headed, because of the massive amount of compute and communication we have built into our panel, is the ability to talk to your appliances. We will change the set-point of your thermostat; we will change the frequency of your compressor turning on or off inside your refrigerator. We can get a lot more out of the same number of kilowatt-hours than you would if you were just blindly discharging it into your home.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Explain that a little bit. Today, it can basically turn up or down the amount of power going to the appliance. You're saying it'll have more fine-grained control over appliances in the future?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>That's right. Today we turn off circuits — which is a harsh sort of customer experience. Very soon, we will have the ability to interfere, to change, let's say, the rate of charge of your EV, or change the set-point of your thermostat. And in the future, we're working towards capabilities where we can control most if not all the devices in your home. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Is that going to require any change in the devices, or is it more intelligence on the Span side?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>It’s just more over-the-air software updates that we can release. And as long as your device is “smart,” meaning it has WiFi, we should be able to talk to it. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Is this also true of fossil fuel appliances, like if my Span is connected to my natural gas furnace? Or is this an all-electric type of thing?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>It works with any appliance that has a digital interface. So if you had a fossil-based heating system for your home, but if it was controlled through a Nest thermostat, then we will soon be able to talk to the Nest thermostat and ask it to turn off or go to a higher setpoint. So that's possible today, but directionally, where we of course want to get to is a place where the heating device itself is electric, and we're talking directly to it.  </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Let's turn to another big topic, which I know Saul has burned a lot of brain cycles on. We need to do all of this home electrification quickly, and the main thing we need to do to make that happen is to fund it. That's always the choke point — funding and financing by the customer. There are the appliances, there's the smart management software, there's the rewiring of the home electrical system to be ready for 220-volt appliances, and all of that costs money. </p><p>With customers, we know it's legendarily true that even if the lifetime cost of ownership of something is much lower, the upfront costs scare people off. Basically, people don't like upfront costs. So what are the right new mechanisms or tools to fund these things such that we can get them going, quickly, at scale?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>It's a great question. It matters a lot which part of the market you're in. The good news is, we have historically low global interest rates. So the set of goodies that we're describing are things that people buy every decade, and there's a lot of evidence to show that most likely, you're doing any one of these things either because you just moved house, or you're refinancing your house, or you've just bought a car, or, the new entrant in this game is, you've just put solar on your roof. </p><p>At any one of these interventions in your life, most households typically will do a couple of things at the same time, and at those points we need mechanisms that tie the financing of these things to the refinancing of your mortgage, and do it at the lowest possible interest rate. Certainly if you could apply mortgage-level interest rates to all of these items, that helps enormously with the financing of it. </p><p>There are about eight things we're talking about — the heat-pump water heater, the heat-pump space heater, the two electric vehicles in the garage, the two vehicle chargers in your garage, the Span load center that connects all of them and has the brain, and the induction stove and induction oven in your kitchen. </p><p>There is a good argument that we should declare this national infrastructure, because there will be a date in the future where my solar panel is running your cooktop, because I'm out of the house, and there'll be a time where your home battery is supplying my car with some electrons, because that's the nature of electricity — how this is all going to get connected together and balanced. </p><p>There's actually precedent for financing the suburbs and homes as infrastructure. FDR created Fannie Mae in 1936 under the Federal Housing Authority, and the government stepped in and provided guaranteed infrastructure-quality financing to build out the American suburbs. We will make this project collectively cheaper for the nation if we do something similar for this bag of goodies. </p><p>And if we recognize that if you install any two of these things at the same time, it's cheaper than installing two of them individually. So there's a discount if we're smart about how we do it. </p><p>That's a pretty good story for people who are homeowners, in the top 50 percent of homes. </p><p>The other thing we really need to recognize is that half of American homes are struggling to find $800 and have credit rating problems. This was before COVID, in the economic disaster that was 2020. So I think we've got to be more honest with ourselves, providing tax write-offs for building these things is not enough — we need point-of-purchase rebates. We know that when people buy hot water heaters or air conditioners, more than half of the time it's under financial duress — your wife is pregnant, your partner is ill, if the water heater fails, you need a hot shower tomorrow, right? You go to the store and they say, well, the natural gas one will cost you $100 less, and I've got a contractor ready to go. That's why people make that decision. </p><p>So we need to think about this, not as tax incentives for the top households, but point-of-purchase rebates for all households to do it? How do we do clever on-bill financing? How does the utility play a role in building out this infrastructure? Quite frankly, given the time frame required, every single possible mechanism that lowers the cost and lowers the brain damage of doing it at that point of purchase is what we have to do.</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>Mechanisms like the investment tax credit already exist and products like Span already qualify for it, because when you install a solar system or a battery system, the new measure allows for standalone storage to also take incentives with the 26 percent tax credit. They are good and they are in place now. </p><p>But I agree with Saul 100 percent that moving toward a model where we think about products like Span, home-electrification products, EV charging, as part of your home infrastructure and potentially part of the grid infrastructure, allows us to go a lot farther in terms of what types of financing we offer. </p><p>Even before we brought Saul on board as an advisor to Span, he and I were independently thinking about the idea of mortgage-based financing for improvements to your home. We see a path towards offering solutions like this to every home through mortgage lenders and insurance providers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>And is there anything interesting to say about renters and landlords? This is another thing I hear whenever I talk about this online: “I'm a renter, I have such limited control.” What kind of problems does that raise?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>I don't think any of us, if we're honest, have a satisfying answer to that question yet. Somebody will figure out the business model innovation or the piece of policy that will help. I think what we can do is describe the world we'd like to get to. </p><p>That $2,000 or $3,000 per household in savings is $300 billion a year in the US, and there's a lot of options of where that money could go. Those savings could go to the bank that wants to finance you and make it in the interest rate, it could go to a company like Tesla or Sunrun who'd like to somehow benefit from selling the grid services, it could go to the utility. </p><p>I think we should go with a guiding principle that we should always choose regulations where we return as much of that money as possible to the household, then try to figure out how to make that happen. In this case, you'd like to figure out the mechanisms and the regulatory environment that would motivate the renter or the landlord to both do these things and to pass some portion of those savings along to the household.</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>There's a combination of thinking about this problem from a technology standpoint, which is primarily what we're doing, and thinking about the regulatory policy standpoint, which is a big part of what Saul and his team are doing. The alignment with the economic incentives, be it the landlord, the homeowner, the bank, the solar installer, etc. — I think there isn't one form that fits all here. </p><p>Going back to your original question, David, about funding, there's one piece I think deserves just as much attention as the rest, which is building out the workforce that can scale this up, by offering vocational training to a larger number of Americans so that we can actually get these deployed at a scale and pace that will have an impact. There's about 60,000 licensed electricians in the US now, and that's woefully inadequate if you want to electrify every home in the next decade.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Right. I was gonna return to that in just a sec. </p><p>One more thing about the barriers for homeowners: it's pretty well known at this point that, the closer you get to home and hearth, the less you're talking about economics, the less rational interest maximizing you have, and the more time constraints and psychological constraints come in — which is to say that electrifying a whole home today is, aside from the cost, a huge pain in the ass. </p><p>So even in places like California, which you’d think would be cutting edge on this, I hear, “I had to talk to six different contractors and their permitting boards, and there's different vendors, trying to coordinate, trying to figure out which piece to do first, and how to finance one piece with another piece…” So the transaction costs seem enormous right now. And I can say from my own point of view, I would pay a lot of money to have to think about this s**t less. </p><p>So how do you reduce those transaction costs? Is there a future where I can just call somebody and say, here's my check, please do all my stuff, and then that's the last I have to think about it? </p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>I think you've led yourself to the correct answer here. That's already emerging, and it is one business model innovation away from being able to do it. </p><p>There's a company in Australia called <a target="_blank" href="https://brighte.com.au/">Brighte</a> that has similarities to a company in the US called <a target="_blank" href="https://mosaic.us/">Mosaic</a>. They offer the financing; they have contractor networks. There's a whole lot of companies starting to do that. They’ll be able to afford to pay full-time lobbyists to help change the laws and the regulations. </p><p>Rewiring America is focused on this, because we've got to fix the rooftop-solar regulations in America. In Australia, there’s suburbs with greater than 50 percent solar on their roof, all enjoying electricity that's a third the price that the grid can offer. Yet in America, we still have less than 2 percent of homes with solar on their roof, because it's still too expensive. And we have a prevailing wage of $35 an hour in Australia, so it's not because of minimum wage. </p><p>This is red tape. We've red-taped the future out of existence. There's been 120 years for fossil fuels to build regulations and nurture workforces that work for it. </p><p>So I think it will need some combination of regulatory change and organizations lobbying for those changes, with some business-model innovation. This is going to be true not just in one affluent ZIP code, but every ZIP code. </p><p>We're really at the inflection point. There's a famous photograph of New York City with 200 horse-drawn carriages in the foreground and one car, in like 1908, and then they show you a photograph taken from the same point 10 years later and there's 199 cars and one horse. We’re at that 1908 moment, with one electric house and 200 non-electric houses, and it's all going to change this decade. It will take a lot of contributions, like what Span is doing, to enable that. No one exactly knows the answer, we're all feeling our way forward here, but we're doing that with a fair amount of intelligence about what needs to happen. </p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>I recently <a target="_blank" href="https://www.span.io/our-decade-to-decarbonize">wrote a blog</a> about this being our decade to decarbonize. If you think about the growth in the adoption of solar over the last decade and a half, if you look at just the rate at which EV adoption has grown in the last half a decade, I'm strongly a believer and a proponent of the fact that this decade is going to be about electrifying many things in your home. </p><p>To your question about home electrification companies, I don't think there's going to be one — there's going to be many companies offering a combination of products that allow you to choose electric over gas, to the point where it truly does become as easy to adopt these as it is to get a home appliance. </p><p>If you compare the shopping experience between getting a washer/dryer installed in your home versus getting an EV charger or a battery system installed, the latter is an order of magnitude more complex, because of all the red tape we just talked about. The path to simplifying that is from the top down — improving regulation, simplifying standards, moving toward policies like we have in California, where we have solar mandates and EV mandates and soon hopefully an electrification mandate — but also from the bottom up, which is how do you build pieces of technology that become the new standard for every home, that truly make it as easy to adopt a home battery or an electric appliance as it is to get a refrigerator delivered to your home from Home Depot. </p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>Just think about the events of the last month: Joe Biden driving an electric F-150, which in and of itself is amazing. The F-150 is the most produced car in the history of mankind — 42 million F-150s have been built so far, double second place, which was the ubiquitous Volkswagen Beetle. So this really matters. </p><p>What was not nearly as much in the headline, but I thought was fascinating and really interesting, is that Sunrun is partnering with Ford. So they might say, “You can make the installation easier, while you're financing your car, let us just suggest that it might be a great time to finance the solar installation and this battery and this upgrade as well.” These things are happening and they are about to happen at lightning speed and enormous scale.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong></p><p><a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-sunrun-ceo-lynn-jurich">I did a podcast with Lynn Jurich</a>, the CEO of Sunrun, a couple of weeks ago in which she discussed that, among other things. </p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>Sunrun is a good example of a company that grows up to become a home electrification company — much like I think many other companies will. Tthey have to, because just being a solar installer or a solar financier is not going to cut it.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Are you thinking a lot about, not just the technology of the Span box and how to make it better, but business models and partnerships? How to package things and ease the transaction costs?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>Absolutely. We're thinking about three pieces. </p><p>We're thinking about how we generate demand through channels that haven't been the primary focus. So today, I think most green energy solutions start with a conversation around the coffee table about solar. That's a missed opportunity, because you can be thinking about a panel upgrade along with adopting an electric heater or an EV charger, or even just a battery without a solar system for your home. That's what we're seeing happen more and more often. </p><p>These are all technologies that can be installed with any electrical contractor, so we're seeing electrical contractors as a key channel. We're working with mortgage lenders and financiers to make it as easy as giving away a Span solution as part of your refi, because that now makes your home that much closer to being a clean energy home, and an entry point to offering better products or more products in the future.</p><p>The second pillar for us is the fulfillment side, how do we build a network of qualified service providers like electricians that can install the system for us, but at the same time, provide ongoing service to the customers. </p><p>The third is technology partners — thinking about any product that we're going to build ourselves or we're going to partner with OEMs. That's where we're headed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>On the regulatory front, Lynn said this as well, about Sunrun, that her mantra now is soft costs, dumb regulations, red tape. It's close to being conventional wisdom now in the US, at least in energy circles, that this is <em>the</em> big barrier at this point. So is Span getting involved at all in lobbying for specific regulatory changes or laws? What's your top priority there?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>Well, there are a couple of things. There are big-picture opportunities, like the work that we're doing around Rewiring [America], asking for or setting up programs that can rebate the adoption of upgraded electrical panels. Then there are more nuanced but specific things like helping define standards with NFC or UL, that really help us rethink our arcane model of distributed electricity grids. We think about building electric conductors and circuit panels with oversized capacity for that larger load to come on. </p><p>So it's across that whole gamut, but I think the biggest levers for us are going to be better financing and, like Saul talked about, upfront rebates. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Saul, do you have any particular regulatory targets that are top of your list?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>This is how extraordinary the soft-cost problem is for solar: your cost of solar modules now is 25 cents per watt, yet the cost of installed solar on an American rooftop is $3 a watt. So let's just dispense with the belief that this has anything to do with the cost of the solar [panels]. </p><p>Of that $3 in the US, about 75 cents is the cost of the sale. Because American rooftop solar is slightly more expensive than the grid, you gotta spend a lot of money to sell it — it's as much for the cost of the sale as the cost of the hardware. It’s crazy. </p><p>There's another 50 cents to $1 in the costs of permitting inspection and those regulatory soft costs. So we’ve just got to get to the binary flip where you get over that, getting rid of that sale cost because you lower the cost of electricity. That's huge. </p><p>Pretty much in every ZIP code, when it gets to $2 a watt installed, it's cheaper than the grid. That's the rule of thumb. Just making bigger systems, so that the people that are putting it on your roof can install eight kilowatts instead of four kilowatts, is enough to pretty much get you to $2. </p><p>We're really on the cusp of a very exciting moment. A wonderful guy called Andrew Birch has done a lot of work to do a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.opensolar.com/our-story">solar app</a>, which is an online portal that's going to make the application for the permits much more streamlined and easy. That's important. Every utility in every state has a slightly dysfunctional relationship with time-of-use billing and reverse metering. </p><p>We need a future of what I would call grid neutrality, meaning any generation resource is treated equally, any storage resource is treated equally, any opportunity for demand response is treated equally — so that homeowners are motivated to put the maximum amount of solar and the maximum amount of [electric] vehicles in their garage, and benefit from participating in all of these transactions to balance the grid. </p><p>The utilities traditionally resist this because they also sell natural gas, but the reality is, we're going to double or triple the load in every household and rooftops aren't big enough to meet all of that so the electric utilities are going to see load growth. They win no matter how they play here, and we just have to kill off the protection of the natural gas part of the business component and move towards grid neutrality, which will be hard-fought regulatory changes.  </p><p>The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is debating a bunch of issues right now that are super important, that will determine the future. We know where the North Star is, it is grid neutrality, where everyone gets to play and benefit from the resources that they install, and that is also going to bring down the cost and maximize the savings.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>What country is farthest along the pathway toward grid neutrality?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao:</strong></p><p>The countries that I've seen as the most forward-leaning when it comes to understanding the need for and supporting the adoption of distributed energy and grid neutrality are Germany, the Netherlands, and Australia. Now, this is a blanket statement, they each have their own deficiencies in terms of how these programs are implemented, but I think they're certainly farther along than the U.S. right now, where red tape is really delivering a crushing blow to the rate at which we can and should be adopting rooftop solar, batteries, electric vehicles, etc.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>I’m going to give you two different answers, both of which might be funny. I think the unregulated markets in Africa and Malaysia and smaller countries in Southeast Asia are being very innovative precisely because they have so little infrastructure, they can write new rules as they go. I wouldn't look to any Western nation to be perfect here.</p><p>Australia is having to face up to this reality first, and that is because they got to very cheap rooftop solar first, they go to very high penetrations — 50-plus percent — first, but Australia is dysfunctional in its own unique way. </p><p>What you really want is a country that has Australian rooftop solar policy, Californian or Norwegian electric vehicle policy, and South Korean or German heat-pump adoption. That's the country where the economics are very positive for the household. So we know how to do this, we just don't know how to do it in one place.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Are there, in the US or in the world, places that are too hot or too cold to fully electrify a home?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>Very cold places are difficult, although heat pumps are getting better and better. But places that are cold enough generally are also quite wooded so there is a good opportunity for wood pellets or just traditional wood stoves. So there are places in the world where a wood stove is still going to be the cheapest way to heat your house, and it can be renewable. </p><p>In Australia, there are states like Tasmania, where that wood-fired heat supplements the electrification of the rest of the house. They're already a 100 percent renewable grid with hydro. There are other places in the world, such as Arizona, or Queensland in Australia, where the biggest mismatch between electricity generation and load is the peak summertime air-conditioning hours. So the solar peak is at two o'clock in the afternoon and the afternoon peak is at 6 pm, and we've got to match that. </p><p>The ones where that is the case for heat, you know, small amounts of storage, whether it's thermal storage or electrical storage, can bridge that four-hour gap and you're in good stead. There are technologies that we're working on, thermal storage technology that can bridge the 16-hour gap between the solid generation periods and when you want heat at 4 am. So that's the heating problem. </p><p>There will always be a few small ZIP codes where there are exceptions, but I think now everyone can squint and see that we have answers for nearly all of these cases.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Arch, you're selling all over the country?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>We are selling nationally,, across the US. We've now deployed, I want to say, in over 18 states across the country, and the efficiency of heating or cooling hasn't been a barrier to adoption of Span panels or adjacent technologies for an electric home.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>And are Span customers saving money now? Are you tracking usage or trying to get data on usage and finding out what actual results on the ground are?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>We certainly are. The metrics we are most closely tracking are, are they getting empirically this benefit of going with fewer batteries? We're seeing that with a Span panel you get roughly 1.65 to 1.7x value per kilowatt-hour available, because of how we can manage the loads. That's quantifiable value. </p><p>The other metric that we often look for is, what is the reduced time to install and cost of installation labor? That then directly translates into a lower dollar per watt or dollar per kilowatt-hour to customer, and we're seeing that play out more and more significantly, especially right now, for a couple of reasons. </p><p>The electric panel as we have it designed is a Ul 67 box. What that means is, it's an over-the-counter permit, so the permitting for a product like Span is, by design, a lot shorter than the permitting for a rooftop solar system or battery system. We're able to help our installation partners get projects going very quickly. </p><p>Right now, because of global supply-chain constraints, we're seeing that there's a significant supply shortage of lithium-ion batteries. especially in those cases, as we approach summer here in the Northern Hemisphere, we have installers that are able to go back to their customers and offer them a Span panel plus, say, one battery, as opposed to the previously designed two- or three-battery solution, and help them move to a more self-sustainable lifestyle.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Air-source heat pumps versus ground-source — how far do you think ground-source is going to get? Or do you think air-source heat pumps are going to get good enough to do everything?  </p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>So ground-source heat pumps, for everyone's benefit, are where you <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/11/13/21537801/climate-change-renewable-energy-geothermal-heat-gshp-district-heating">use the temperature of the ground as the input to your heat pump</a>. The ground about four feet down, around the country, is about 55 degrees Fahrenheit all year round. An air-source heat pump just takes the outside air. </p><p>Ground-source heat pumps require something like an enema for your front yard or your back yard. It's a lot of drilling equipment; it's a very high capital item. If you're doing a new-build home in New England, or you have large acreage in New England, it's a no-brainer to go with ground-source. For any milder climate, the ease of installation of air-source looks like it will be the answer. </p><p>As with nearly everything on climate, electrification, and energy, these are giant markets where there's room for both players, and the details will be around local regulations, local geography, local climate, so the answer is yes and/or both. </p><p>If I was picking the market share in 2036, I'd say 80 percent air-source, 20 percent ground-source is ambitious for ground-source. Unless we get robots that can drill holes really well and take all the headache out. But you still need the physical space to drill the hole, and most people don't have enough land under their house to sink the heat.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Especially if you're building new developments — if you're doing a common ground-source heat pump for multiple buildings, that's probably the most efficient way.</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>This is the decade for change, so don't rule out unexpected solutions. We've got to do something with the 4.4 million miles of natural gas pipelines in the country. Why don't we use that as a collective ground source? It's not impossible to think there might be a solution in lane three that helps solve this, but I think ease of installation and low cost of capital certainly favors air.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>I recently found out that the battery in the new Ford pickup is bigger than a Powerwall, bigger than a home battery. So in terms of home power backup, what percentage, in 10 years, will come from home batteries versus connected EV batteries?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>Overwhelmingly electric vehicles. Any electric vehicle is going to do 250-plus miles, which is basically where real range anxiety just goes away. The battery in a sedan that does that is going to be 60-plus kilowatt-hours and for a truck it's going to be 100-plus kilowatt-hours. So that's four days of your current electrical load in your house. There's 1.88 cars in every driveway in America, so that's like a week's backup. </p><p>The Powerwalls and LG batteries that people bring in the side of the house, they're like five to ten kilowatt hours. That's a very, very small fraction. I'm working on thermal storage technology, as are other people — being able to turn your space heating, your water heat, and your vehicles into storage is a big opportunity. </p><p>Those two batteries dwarf any other battery that will be on the grid 10 years from now.  </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>So what's the case for home batteries then? </p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>Well occasionally, both cars are out of the house and you still want to play your Xbox.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>So, backup for the backup.</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>Actually, I quite disagree. I think that the vehicle-to-home concept is a powerful one. The size of the battery in your car is roughly 10x or at least 5x the size of a home stationary storage battery, but the emotional choice for a homeowner to say, I'm going to take the energy available in my car's battery to power my home, I think it's a difficult one. It's kind of analogous to saying I have a large power generator in my car with my petrol engine, and I'm going to use that as a genset for my home, right? </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>But if you're in the middle of a blackout?</p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>Honestly, we're not even disagreeing. It's just that this is a huge battery. There are so few time periods in the year where you're gonna want these things. This is not even an argument. There's a huge number of reasons to have a small battery in the home. But you really just need to understand that our car batteries are enormous. Even if we put those batteries in 200 million cars, the whole grid for the whole U.S. can run off our cars for days at a time. But that never happens, because you still have solar, you still have wind, you still have all of these things happening. But the anxiety we have about storage goes away as we deploy batteries in vehicles, batteries in homes and batteries in our thermal systems.</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>And the cost of stationary batteries comes down as we continue to adopt more electric vehicles and batteries in your home as well, which makes room for not just thinking about storage as being a backup to a backup type of solution, but instead a device that can provide you with energy management — being able to charge when you have excess solar, etc., benefits to it that aren't provided by vehicles, where the primary use is actually to get around. </p><p>The second part of it that I think has spun up a lot of conversation since the F-150 announcement is, how does it actually power your loads, because it's a giant battery, but you still need a whole host of electronics and grid-connect and grid-disconnect devices.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>That's what Sunrun is trying to sell alongside the pickup truck; that’s the piece they're trying to provide.</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>Yes, they're going to be installing those solutions. But to generalize the problem statement, there are going to be millions of electric vehicles, not just F-150s, so what is the ideal solution for being able to “island” your home and power it off of your vehicle battery? I think those are the kinds of products and solutions that we're thinking about here at Span — within our panel, we already have a grid-disconnect built in. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>So you can island if you have a Span panel?</p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>That's right. Our main breaker has its own control system built into it, where it's monitoring the health of the grid, and if it determines the grid is sagging, or it's out of spec from a frequency or voltage standpoint, we automatically, safely disconnect and bring up your battery as the main power source for the home. </p><p>It can then orchestrate your solar and your loads as needed, to then manage that “off-grid” home. And then when it's safe, it rejoins the grid, making sure it doesn't cause issues on the grid — you want to be careful about frequency when you rejoin the grid, you want to be careful about how much power you push back into the grid, etc. </p><p>That's all built into our current generation product. But as we think about future products, the types of things we spend a lot of time thinking about are exactly the question that you're asking, David, which is: can cars provide power, not just when off-grid, but even when your on power from the grid? Does it make sense for us to use vehicles as a day-to-day thing? </p><p>And what are the types of technologies you need built into the nerve center of your home, i.e., a load panel or an EV charger, that allow you to do this in a seamless way, without having to go through a complex design process and having a smorgasbord of stuff on your garage wall just to be able to use that expensive battery in your car?  </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>If you could create this theoretical country with all the best distributed energy policies together, do you guys seriously think that we can decarbonize 100 percent of US homes by 2035, which is the 100 percent clean grid target year? </p><p>I think people get daunted because it's so distributed, the work itself is so distributed, the use cases are so distributed and so various, and there are so many different kinds of homes and owners. It just seems so daunting. </p><p><strong>Arch Rao: </strong></p><p>Yes. The alternative scenario is a bleak one. We have to align products and policies and people to move toward at least decarbonized homes (decarbonizing industry is a whole other can of worms). I would say, yes, it's possible, and we need to be working toward doing that. </p><p><strong>Saul Griffith:</strong> </p><p>We need to make it possible. It is physically and technically possible, and the more things you electrify, the easier you make it to electrify everything. We will electrify steel making, we will electrify the manufacturing of aluminum, we will electrify a huge amount of industry. Then you dial industry up and down, there’s huge inertia in those machines, and so they will be a great asset, just like your car batteries and just like our home heating systems, they will be critical to balancing the grid. People really don't appreciate that. </p><p>It'll be about the same amount of wire that's distributing electricity to the grid, but three times as much electricity will go over it. More than half of your utility bill cost is the cost of that distribution network. So if we're putting two or three times as much electricity over it, the price of that distribution cost is going to come down. The more we electrify, the cheaper it gets to electrify everything, the easier it gets to electrify everything. </p><p>So this is possible. Yes, it is heroic. Yes, the timeline is now. A good climate outcome is, we do this in 15 to 20 years, a terrible climate outcome is, we drag our feet and we take 40 or 50. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong> </p><p>Well, there's an appropriate call to arms to end with. Thanks, guys, for taking all this time. Appreciate it. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-saul-griffith-and-arch</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:38013791</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 28 Jun 2021 16:00:03 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/38013791/01155372c8b8cdb369c3d60b0ae96422.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4334</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/38013791/29624a11f48f0267ba8d7a1077058eb5.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Will Toor on Colorado's burst of clean energy policy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>In this episode, Will Toor of the Colorado Energy Office shares about the state’s ambitious climate agenda and the array of energy policies they’ve been passing under a Democratic political trifecta.</em></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/go4ddl3toasn9ri5e3g9j/volts21.06.23-will.toor.pdf?rlkey=gs003158fecg62fhgfoc050iw&#38;dl=0"><strong>PDF transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p><strong>(</strong><a target="_blank" href="https://transcripts.volts.wtf/volts-podcast-will-toor-on-colorado-s-burst-of-clean-energy-policy"><strong>Active transcript</strong></a><strong>)</strong></p><p>Washington, DC, is a slow-motion nightmare right now, but out in the states — at least the states that Democrats control — climate and clean energy policy is still happening. A few weeks ago, I covered the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/washington-state-now-has-the-nations">fantastic policies</a> recently passed in my home state of Washington (see also <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-washington-rep-joe">my podcast with Washington legislator Joe Fitzgibbon</a>). </p><p>Today, we turn our gaze to Colorado.</p><p>In 2018, Democrats gained a trifecta in the state — the governorship and both houses of the legislature — for the first time since 2013. They promptly got busy passing a vast array of clean energy policies: reform of electric utilities, support for electric vehicles and charging infrastructure, new restrictions on oil and gas production. </p><p>During this year’s legislative session, Gov. Jared Polis released a <a target="_blank" href="https://energyoffice.colorado.gov/climate-energy/ghg-pollution-reduction-roadmap">comprehensive roadmap</a> to 90 percent statewide reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and the state legislature <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/colorados-climate-change-compromise-bill-sets-emissions-mandates-for-electricity-industry-and-oil-and-gas/">tackled</a> clean buildings, industry, environmental justice, reform of state transportation agencies, reform of natural gas utilities, and on and on. </p><p>To discuss this flurry of activity, I turned to a man who has been involved in Colorado politics since the previous century: Will Toor.</p><p>Toor was mayor of Boulder from 1998 to 2004. From 2005 to 2012, he was Boulder County Commissioner. During all that time he was also board chair at the Denver Regional Council of Governments, where he led efforts on climate policy. He then became director of the transportation program at the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.swenergy.org/">Southwest Energy Efficiency Project</a>, until 2019, when the newly elected Polis appointed him to run the <a target="_blank" href="https://energyoffice.colorado.gov/climate-energy/ghg-pollution-reduction-roadmap">Colorado Energy Office</a>.</p><p>Toor has had a hand in shaping Polis’s energy agenda from the beginning, and he has been closely involved in negotiating bills through the legislature. He helped walk me through Colorado's sector-by-sector approach to emissions, what the state has accomplished so far, and what might be next for it.</p><p>Listen, enjoy, and if you appreciate work like this, please consider becoming a paid subscriber to Volts.</p><p>As a bonus, here’s a picture of Toor in 2003, as mayor of Boulder, hosting visiting scholar Noam Chomsky.</p><p>Text transcript:</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, with no further ado, Will, welcome to Volts.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Thank you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So I've been following states and climate policy for a long time, and it seemed like a few years ago, Colorado just kind of burst out of the gate at a full gallop and has been going really strong now for two sessions of the legislature. So maybe just by way of starting, tell us some about the political developments of Colorado over the last five years that put all the pieces in place that allowed this burst of activity.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah, really, I think what happened was that in 2018, we both elected a new governor, Jared Polis got elected governor on a platform of, among other things, 100% renewable electricity by 2040 and bold climate action, and we elected a Democratic Senate. We had had a Democratic House, but had not had a Democratic Senate since 2014. And so the combination of having a governor who was committed to climate action and a House and a Senate that were aligned and the fact that there was just kind of a pent-up demand for action on climate and clean energy really set the stage for a kind of monumental legislative session in 2019.</p><p>So that year we had, depending exactly how you count it, something like 15 major bills on setting climate targets, modernizing our utility regulation to set our utilities on a pathway to at least 80% greenhouse gas reductions by 2030. A bunch of bills on electric vehicles, a bunch of bills on energy efficiency. We had a major oil and gas reform bill. One of the things that's a little unusual is that Colorado is a major oil and gas producer that is actually acting on climate and clean energy. And Senate Bill 181 completely rewrote the regulatory structure for oil and gas in Colorado.</p><p>Then last year was a little bit quieter because of the pandemic that kind of shut down our legislative session partway through, although there was still lots of action at the Public Utilities Commission and the Air Quality Control Commission. But then this year has really shaped up to be another year where that kind of pent-up demand for action really came out at the legislature.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I want to get into some of the specifics of the legislation, but just as a background political question, because I'm curious. Do you have a supermajority of Democrats or does Colorado — do you need a supermajority to sort of override Republican objections or sort of like, what's the disposition of the state Republican Party on all of this? Are they just irrelevantly sitting on the sidelines, or is there some engagement? What's the degree of Democratic domination, I guess, is what I'm asking.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So, there's a large Democratic majority in the House. In the Senate, it's a much narrower majority. For 2019 and 2020, it was actually a one-vote margin, 18-17. After the 2020 elections, it's now a 19-16 margin. I would say that some of the issues have been bipartisan, but the vast majority of votes on clean energy have been primarily Democrats. There is one Republican in the Senate who is a very strong advocate for clean energy and climate action, Senator Kevin Priola, who has actually been a sponsor of many of the pieces of legislation. Where the Republican Party, I think, has had an impact has been often helping to shape some of the pieces of legislation in ways that may make them work better for their communities.</p><p>They often represent rural parts of the state, and there's been a lot of interest in trying to make sure that we're moving forward on climate action in ways that can work for rural Colorado in addition to the urban part of the state. We had one major bill this year on funding our just transition effort for coal communities, and that was a very bipartisan bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right, I bet.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>So one thing that happened this year, I think prior to most of the big bills, is the governor issued his roadmap. This is a sort of roadmap whereby Colorado can reach its goals. So tell us what the targets are and sort of what is the roadmap, what was the purpose of the roadmap?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah. So this really came out of that 2019 legislative session. One of the pieces of legislation that moved forward for the first time created legislatively adopted GHG targets for the state of a 50% reduction below 2005 levels by 2030 and a 90% reduction by 2050. And the governor asked the energy office to convene the other major state agencies that were engaged on this — our Department of Public Health and Environment and Transportation and AG and Natural Resources — and do both a technical analysis and a stakeholder process to basically develop the strategic plan for how are we actually going to achieve the targets that we had adopted?</p><p>We worked with Energy and Environmental Economics, E3, a consulting firm that's done scoping plans for a number of states over the years, and really developed a plan that was very much focused on what was achievable in each one of the major emitting sectors in the state. So transportation, electricity generation, the oil and gas industry, residential and commercial fuel use, and industrial fuel use and process emissions. Those really dominate our emissions as a state. And we developed sectoral targets and near-term action steps for each one of those areas.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Maybe it would be helpful, I think, to tell listeners what is the share of each of those, like, what are the big categories to the little categories of emissions sector-wise.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So, interestingly, if you look at transportation, electricity generation, the oil and gas industry, and then fuel use sort of combined in buildings and industry, each one of those is fairly similar. They're each around a quarter of our emissions. Transportation is the largest single source, but by a pretty small margin.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And it just edged ahead recently. Right. Which is the same thing that happened nationally.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah, basically, electricity has been decarbonizing faster than any other sector, so it used to be our largest, especially because Colorado has traditionally been a heavy coal state. Oil and gas, it depends a little bit on how you count things. So the way that we count it, the emissions of methane from the upstream oil and gas industry are one category, and then the combustion emissions that they have from the processing of oil and gas actually fit within our industrial sector. If you put those together, oil and gas would actually be the largest single source. So there's different ways that you can parse it.</p><p>But the way that we generally parse it is transportation is the biggest, followed by electricity, followed by oil and gas, and then industrial and buildings.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, well, let's start with electricity, because in some ways it's kind of the most straightforward. I think the policy instruments are sort of the most well understood. The road ahead is well understood. So what are the big things Colorado is doing on electricity? I know. Obviously getting rid of coal has got to be step one, right? Or at least phasing it down.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah. So essentially, again, coming out of 2019, we had an interesting sort of legal and regulatory structure where our largest single utility, Xcel Energy, which accounts for more than half of the generation in the state, had a voluntary commitment to achieve 80% by 2030. And we worked with them to write it into statute. So, they were legally required to submit a plan to the Public Utilities Commission to achieve 80%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Just them or all utilities?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Well, the way that we structured it, they were legally required. Other utilities weren't technically required, but we gave a broad grant of authority to the state Air Commission to regulate them, but said that if they submitted a plan to the Public Utilities Commission that would achieve 80% by 2030, then they would have a safe harbor from additional air regulation until 2030. We then went out to every utility and said, "wouldn't you rather just do this on your own terms rather than us have to create a mini clean power plan for the state?" And essentially all of the utilities said, well "yeah, that works for us."</p><p>And so we're in a place where for other utilities, they have all voluntarily come forward with plans. We've since passed legislation that actually puts an additional regulatory piece in place. And so there's now legislation that says that if any utility did not come forward with a plan, the Air Commission within nine months would have to adopt rules requiring them to get to 80%. But we're in a place where all these plans are just moving forward and it's been pretty remarkable to see our second largest utility, Tri-State Generation and Transmission is a G&T cooperative who provide the electricity for most of the rural co-ops in the state.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>They are historically very coal heavy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, I was going to ask. They're legendarily problematic in all states.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah. They not only owned multiple coal power plants, they actually, in some ways, were a vertically integrated coal company in the northwestern Colorado. They owned a coal mine and had mine mouth power plants. And in the past, you know they were funders of climate denial at the national level. Their prior CEO was kind of legendary for a conference where he stated that, to sort of pull from the NRA, "you'll pry our coal plants out of my cold dead fingers." That completely changed in 2019. So that CEO was still the CEO when I started this job. When I came in with Governor Polis in January of 2019, by April they had new leadership.</p><p>That new leadership came in to meet with me to talk about "how can I work with the Governor's office to help meet his clean energy goals." And by January of the next year, Tri-State had adopted a plan to close every coal power plant they have in Colorado and New Mexico to reduce in-state emissions 90% by 2030. And they have since submitted a plan to our public utilities Commission that would achieve 80% reduction in emissions serving retail loads. So, including the electricity they're importing from Wyoming and Arizona. Xcel recently filed their clean energy plan, and they're exceeding the minimum requirement.</p><p>They're proposing approximately an 85% reduction. Our municipal utilities, one of them adopted a plan to get to 80%, another a plan to get to 90%.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>How much of all this is just going to be shutting down coal plants? I mean, I guess it's kind of the low hanging fruit. Is that the bulk of where most of this is coming from?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah, it's basically shutting down coal plants, adding a whole bunch of utility scale wind and solar, and a fair amount of distributed generation, adding a fair amount of battery storage, and backing it up with gas combustion turbines. There is a little bit — we have one utility, somewhat smaller, rural utility, but it's very progressive, Holy Cross Energy, who are committed to 100% carbon free by 2030. And they're doing a lot that's focused on demand flexibility, and a lot more on storage. But at the large scale, it's really shutting down coal, replacing it with renewables.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And renewables have gotten crazy cheap in Colorado specifically. Right? I mean, cheapest I think.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah, we're lucky in that we have both a good solar resource and a good wind resource. Back in 2018, a whole lot of heads turned when Xcel did their all-sources solicitation, and they were getting back bids for wind that were coming in at under two cents a kilowatt hour. And they were getting solar with storage for under three cents a kilowatt hour. And that's a lot of what's enabled this transition, is the fact that you have all these legacy coal plants that cost four, four and a half cents a kilowatt hour for operations and maintenance.</p><p>It becomes a pretty easy decision to replace that with two cent a kilowatt hour wind.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, this actually raises another thing that happened to utilities in Colorado, I think it was this year, but they're all going to join organized markets, RTOs. What's the story there?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yes, so there was legislation this session, Senate Bill 72, that is really going to push the state towards an organized market. It both creates a transmission authority and encourages a larger buildout of transmission, not only within the state but also connecting to larger markets. It effectively requires that by 2030, our utilities join organized regional markets. It's not an absolute requirement if our public utilities commission were to find that it wasn't in the public interest or that it would somehow get in the way of meeting our clean energy goals. So it's not a 100% requirement, but given the fact that it should give us greater access to wind to the east and solar to the west, and more of an ability to average renewables over a larger area, it certainly seems very likely that it will move forward.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What RTO would they be joining?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So the bill does not specify. You can look east towards the SPP market or you could look west towards ultimately Cal-ISO.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Do you know if there are, I don't want to get on a diversion, but if there are other western states that are — because this has been talked about for ages, trying to get a western market started, do you know if other states are as close as Colorado to kind of making that jump?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So I think that there is a strong movement across the western states. You know, I don't know that people are quite ready to make the jump. There's a multi-state study that Colorado is part of that Utah is actually sort of coordinating that's looking at options. There's legislation that I think is being proposed in other states very similar to the legislation in Colorado. So I think there's a lot of interest and there's certainly a lot of discussions taking place but there's a lot of complications in getting from here to there and doing so in a way that works financially for customers and for the utilities and that ensures that the clean energy goals of the different states are honored.</p><p>One of the issues that we face is there's some pretty different politics among the western states.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes. Both of which are leery about the politics of the other.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>As a sort of interesting digression. One of the pieces of legislation that got a fair amount of play in the Colorado press from our fellow state, Wyoming, this year was when they created a fund of $1.2 million to sue other states for not buying —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I heard about that. I'm just going to assume that that has very little legal merit.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yes, I don't think that I would be very concerned with it. And the truth is we have a fine relationship with Wyoming and I don't anticipate there will be any litigation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You don't anticipate being forced by the Supreme Court to burn Wyoming coal? Okay, so electricity is awesome but in some sense kind of straightforward. You're going to close down the coal plants, you're going to ramp up your renewables, you're going to build a bunch more transmission, you're going to get utilities oriented in the right direction, get them in a market that seems all sort of tidy. And doable other sectors are more complicated. Let's talk about then industry. Sort of industry is known as one of the difficult to decarbonize sectors or at least less certain how to decarbonize.</p><p>What's the Colorado approach to industry? And it's kind of a side question how much of what counts as industry in Colorado is just the fossil fuel industry such that it will disappear when fossil fuels disappear?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So if you look at our kind of industrial inventory, I think right now it's about 15 million tons a year, and I think about half of that is really the combustion emissions associated with the midstream oil and gas industry. The other half are a refinery that provides a lot of the liquid transportation fuels on the Front Range, the Suncor refinery, it's the steel mills or the steel mill in Pueblo, although that steel mill now has a 250 megawatt onsite solar plant providing a large part of their electricity. Cement facilities; we've got a couple of large cement plants.</p><p>We also have semiconductor like chip factories and then a lot of smaller industry that contributes also. And I would say there's a couple of different pieces that are moving there. So one is on the regulatory front; the target that we adopted in industry for 2030 is not nearly as aggressive as it is for electricity. So we're going 80% in electricity. We're headed for a 20% reduction in industry and that's a 20% below 2005 level. So it's a larger reduction from today because emissions have grown over time. But it's certainly what we see as being possible in the industrial sector is not as deep as the technology and economics allow on the electricity side.</p><p>There are a series of rulemakings that are moving forward at our State Air Commission. There's one happening right now that's focused on our trade exposed, energy intensive industries, basically steel and cement. And then there will be other follow up ones over the next two years. Under legislation that just passed, there's a statutory requirement that by the — I believe it's the end of 2023 — rules need to be in place that assure will get to that 20% by 2030. The other piece that's moving forward is we're seeing a lot of activity on the carbon capture and sequestration front, which is interesting because this was something that we did not pay a lot of attention to in our first draft of the roadmap.</p><p>Basically our analysis said, "okay, this is something that may be important post 2030, but we don't think we're going to see a lot of it in the near term." But then we started hearing from all of these industrial players who were working on developing projects, and we ended up not setting any target in the roadmap for what we needed in carbon capture by 2030, but instead putting together a carbon capture task force that's meeting this year and is going to come back to the governor and legislature by the end of the year with recommendations about what we should be doing on carbon capture. The big project that has a lot of momentum right now is actually at one of our cement plants, the Holcim cement plant or Holcim-Lafarge cement plant in southern Colorado. The town of Florence is working with Oxy Low Carbon Solutions on a carbon capture project for that cement plant. And they've done an initial feasibility study, they're now in a more detailed engineering study —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>To do what with the captured carbon though? What's to be done with the carbon? Are they going to bury it or are they going to try to use it somehow, or do they know?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So I think it's a little bit of an open question. One of the things that we have in Colorado are a lot of saline formations that are actually geologically good places for sequestering carbon. There's also a carbon pipeline that crosses southern Colorado. So they would potentially have the option of using it for something like enhanced oil recovery, which is probably not — from a state perspective, we're probably a lot more interested in seeing it sequestered than seeing it used for something like EOR. We're also seeing a number of other projects that are smaller scale that are also in their sort of feasibility analysis side.</p><p>So I think it's fairly likely that we're going to see some meaningful scale carbon capture projects move forward. And as a state over the next year, we're going to need to figure out what role do we see this playing in meeting our targets. How do we look at something like EOR versus true sequestration?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's so tricky. That's so tricky from an accounting perspective, political perspective, you name it.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>One of the things that's interesting is in terms of scale, if you think about the 20% reduction that we need in the industrial sector, so we're talking there something like a 3 million ton reduction. I think that the scale of capture that they're talking about in just that Holcim project could be on the order of a million tons a year. We're potentially talking a significant role there. We're early in our task force process. We won't have recommendations to the governor until the end of the year. But at the very least, it's intriguing to really start understanding what some of the opportunities may be there.</p><p>There's also, I have to say, a really interesting project that is moving forward sort of independently of the state in southern Colorado. The Southern Utes are historically producers of methane, kind of coal bed methane. They've got a natural gas industry and they are working on a proposed project that would be an Allam Cycle gas plant.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh yeah, yeah, yeah.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>With, I think, saline storage and saline formations on the reservation. And they're looking at a fairly large — like their proposed plant, I think is a 350 megawatt plant. And we weren't really anticipating that that type of low carbon firm generation might be coming during this decade. But again, we're seeing independently a project moving forward that is very interesting.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's such an interesting X factor. The Allam Cycle would be a great thing for Colorado to stake a claim on.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay. That's industry next is the source of a lot of action and excitement. This particular section, which is buildings, this is, again, a much less straightforward area in terms of mechanics about how to get at these emissions than electricity or something like that. Review a little bit about I mean, there were multiple pieces of the buildings pushed this session. What all did you guys do?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah, no, this one is really exciting, and this is one that I would say has been really interesting because some of the advocates have argued that we need to focus on sort of enforceable air regulations that somehow would decarbonize buildings, and we really couldn't figure out what that looked like. But what we did come up with was a series of strategies in the roadmap that all of which amazingly moved through the legislature this year. We had, I would say, four major bills that moved forward. Three of them are sort of tools, and then one is the overall organizing principle that allows those tools to be applied.</p><p>The tools were first, a beneficial electrification bill that requires our electric utilities to create electrification programs that are analogous to their energy efficiency demand side management programs, requires the Public Utilities Commission to set targets for those programs based upon all cost effective electrification. And it builds into that cost test the social cost of both carbon dioxide and methane emissions avoided, and requires the use of a discount rate of under two and a half percent. So it pushes you to the higher number from that 2016 interagency study, the same one basically that State of Washington used. So it starts at about $70 a ton for carbon dioxide in 2020 and, I forget, I think around 1400 a ton for methane.</p><p>We think that that will drive significant investment in electrification.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>And when you say electrification programs at utilities, you just mean sort of like incentives for heat pumps and things like that?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah. So on the residential commercial side, we think it would be primarily heat pumps and heat pump water heaters, and then they could also be doing things on the industrial side, where there's a wider variety. It also allows them to create programs to support new all electric construction. So that's one piece. Another piece focuses on the gas utilities and it basically expands existing gas utility energy efficiency programs. Right now we've got pretty large electric utility programs and quite a bit smaller gas utility programs. And what this does is it takes that same social cost of carbon and methane, builds it into the cost test, and then requires the PUC to set targets based upon all cost effective energy efficiency measures.</p><p>So we think that will drive substantial additional investment in upgrading existing buildings. Third thing: piece of legislation focused on commercial buildings. Again, this may sound a little bit familiar from Washington state. We looked at some of the successful efforts there two years ago, and it requires both benchmarking of energy use by those buildings, and then it sets rulemaking at our State Air Commission to adopt performance standards for existing buildings that require that the sector as a whole needs to achieve at least 20% reduction in emissions below 2005 levels by 2030. And so that's including all of the growth in the number of buildings since then, the entire sector has to get to that 20%.</p><p>And amazingly, on that one, it actually ended up being something approaching a consensus bill. It wasn't just the environmental community —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I thought real estate and builders hate that stuff, what you pull on them?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So we just worked in good faith with all the parties. We agreed to create a task force that has significant representation from building owners of various sorts in developing the proposed performance standards. But the legislation specifies what the performance standards have to achieve, and so we need to certify that those standards will achieve the 20% by 2030. But it was endorsed by the Building Owners and Managers Association and by NIOP.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Wow.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>And labor was on board with it. That's one thing that's been very important to us is to make sure that we're moving this forward in a way that helps provide good jobs. We're making sure that any utility funded programs or high labor standards — I think it's very important to us, both substantively and in terms of holding a broad coalition together to do this in a way that works for labor and that assures that we're helping to create good jobs as we go forward. We also really wanted to avoid the kind of sort of existential battle over building electrification we've seen in some places, that we saw tank legislation this year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Breaking out all over. There's running battles all over the country now on that stuff.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>And that sort of feeds into then the fourth big bill that sort of pulls us all together, and which is, I think, the real innovation here. Senate Bill 264 that we refer to as the Clean Heap Standard Bill, sets carbon reduction requirements for our gas distribution utilities. And it includes in their carbon emissions, the emissions from combustion of gas by their customers. It again is aligned with our roadmap targets in that sector. So it's a 22% reduction by 2030. They're allowed to use multiple measures so they can do more energy efficiency, they can do more electrification, they can inject hydrogen into their gas lines, they can reduce leaks on their distribution system.</p><p>And we allowed limited use of what some people call renewable natural gas. We refer to it as biomethane and recovered methane.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Does that mostly come from agriculture in Colorado, or landfills or what? Where does that come from?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So, there will be landfills, sewage treatment plants, agriculture, especially some of our dairy farms. The other place where I think there is an opportunity is there are abandoned coal mines in western Colorado that are just pouring methane into the atmosphere. And as of now, there is only one project in the state that is capturing and using that methane. So there's a number of opportunities there. The way it's structured out of the target, they can reach about a quarter of the target through the use of recovered methane or biomethane. And the rest of it has to happen from sort of on-system reduction.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, I have a question about this. For utilities that are electric and gas, this seems kind of straightforward. Like you just shift from the one to the other, right? Shift from natural gas to electricity would be your main tool and you're fine with that. But for natural gas utilities that are just natural gas utilities, I see the road to these 20%, 22% reductions through these kind of bricolage efforts: efficiency here, reducing leaking there. But you don't get to zero with natural gas. If you're a natural gas utility, the end of this story is you going out of business, is it not? Or how are natural gas utilities viewing all this?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So a couple of things I'd say there. So we did structure this around there's the near term target of the 22% by 2030. The legislation also has the 90% by 2050. Sets future rulemaking proceedings for setting targets for 2035, 45 on that road to 50. So at one level, I would say people are focused on the next decade. And the way that we've framed it is that none of us really know what the ultimate solution is going to be. Some people think they know. There are certainly folks who argue that the solution is obviously full building electrification and maybe they're right.</p><p>There are others who argue that we're going to figure out a way to do air capture of carbon induced synthetic methane and it will be using that or that we're going to get to a point where we can use higher percentages of carbon or of hydrogen than we think we do in the pipes. We're not trying to answer that question today because a) we don't feel like we have enough information to really answer it. The truth is, nobody has really done the level of analysis that would be required in Colorado as a cold climate state to answer: What would it really mean for us to fully electrify, what would it mean for our electric grid?</p><p>Nobody really knows how some of these other technologies are going to pan out and we don't need to answer that today. So we intentionally structured something that allows us to use multiple measures today. It allows the utilities and customers to gain experience with all of these things. It's going to, I think, lead to a big increase in the use of heat pumps in Colorado and allow us to get real experience with using cold climate heat pumps and working out all the kinks and figuring out how do you get high levels of customer uptake. It will allow utilities to see what they can do in terms of making recovered methane and biomethane affordable at scale.</p><p>And then over the next decade, I think we will need to answer some bigger questions about, "okay, what does it really look like post 2030?" We're not trying to prejudge those answers. And because of that, we were able to have a broad coalition that supported this legislation. Our largest gas utility, Xcel Energy, is a dual fuel utility. They actually supported the legislation other utilities were not necessarily actively supporting. But I believe in the end there were no utilities that were actively lobbying against the legislation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>And, you know, I think that we had all had the opportunity to watch what happened in the Nevada legislature this year where there was a sort of similar effort, but one that I think perhaps was not as focused on building consensus among multiple parties. Our sense is that we're a lot better off trying to do it the Colorado way and get as many people as possible on board, learn from it, and then we'll figure out what the next steps are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. So for buildings, then you have an overall greenhouse gas reduction, target-specific boosts for energy efficiency and electrification specific targets for reducing gas, specifically gas emissions and energy performance standards. The one thing that seems to be missing is building codes. Have you tackled those or addressed those yet or what's the deal with that?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So that's very much on our agenda for the next big thing we need to do. And we did some work on this in 2019. Colorado is a state that's traditionally a local control state on building codes. But we were able to do legislation in 2019 that put certain minimum standards on local energy codes. But it needs to be updated. It's not aligned with where we need to be to achieve our 2050 targets. And so this is something we called out in the roadmap. We didn't have the bandwidth to do that in addition to everything else this year.</p><p>But I'm certainly hoping that we are going to have some vigorous stakeholder conversations over the next year and come back to how do we move forward on building codes in a way that aligns with where we need to be if we're going to have decarbonized buildings that get us to 90% or more by 2050.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right. Well, let's then hit the last one, the biggest one in Colorado and probably the biggest source of controversy and the biggest source of angst in climate policy generally, namely transporation.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Oh, just before we jump to that, could I throw one other, which is oil and gas? In other places, may not be so big, but for us a really big part of our emissions is methane leaking from the oil and gas upstream operations. And that's one where the stars are kind of aligned, where there's real opportunities to reduce those emissions. Some of it is driven by sensing technology. There's just much better ability to actually monitor emissions than there used to be. And that means that you can actually regulate them and you can reduce them. And so we've got a target in the roadmap of at least a 60% reduction in methane emissions and that is moving forward in a rulemaking process at the Air Commission that the stakeholding is happening right now.</p><p>It will be go to the Air Commission for adoption later this year and legislation that was just passed puts that into statute. So the Air Commission rules have to achieve a 60% reduction. It also requires every two years an inventory process to make sure that we're on track and requires additional rulemakings to get there if we find that sort of the real world emissions aren't on the trajectory that we think they're going to be.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Is part of the thinking behind this. I mean, this is a national problem and it's a long standing national problem, these leaks. And the industry has traditionally not been very helpful. They've demanded voluntary standards and et cetera. Is part of the goal here to sort of kick start this work and figure things out in such a way that they can be kind of exported like these sensing technologies and just ways of doing this or is it that we already know how to do it pretty well and they're just not doing it well?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>The way that I would describe it is, back in 2014, I think, Colorado adopted our first round of methane regulations, and those did become the model for the national rates that the Obama administration adopted. The Trump administration unadopted them, and they are being reconsidered. So, you know, we certainly would hope that what we're doing here could help to inform a national standard in the future. To some extent the way that we arrived at our targets was we looked at what sort of the leading oil producers with ESG commitments were saying they could do, and we said, "Well, great, just like we worked with Xcel to take their voluntary commitment and put it into the statute. We take you at your word."</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Call your bluff might be another way to put it.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>No, I would say we take you at your word and we agree that the technology has evolved to the point where this is possible. And we are going to work with you to come up with a workable set of regulations to ensure that we achieve those targets and that all of the industry achieves the targets that those with ESG commitments have made.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, so oil and gas leakage, a huge problem in Colorado and some other states, is being legislated as well. So we can't avoid it anymore.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Transportation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Let's talk about transportation. The thing that grumpy environmentalists say in response to almost every state sort of climate action plan or set of legislation — they said the same thing in Washington. It's fine and dandy to do all this, but you're also spending a bunch of money on roads, you're also widening a bunch of highways. We all know, everybody knows now it's been proven a trillion times that widening roads doesn't help anything, doesn't reduce congestion.</p><p>It just leads to more cars on the road and more pollution. So maybe say a little bit about the broader transportation context and how you think about that relative to steps you've taken. And then let's hear about the steps.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So transportation, as we noted, is now the largest single source of emissions in the state. Just barely, but it's definitely a big one. And we face the same issues that, as you noted, kind of every state that is working on this does. Transportation is a really challenging sector to work on because it involves the decisions of millions of people about how they're going to get around. It is very much influenced by land use decisions that are made by local governments that include both the decisions to build very dispersed development that puts housing very far away from jobs, and the decisions by other communities to enact exclusionary zoning that doesn't allow housing near the jobs.</p><p>We have a tradition of local governments having a lot of flexibility to make those decisions. And even more than building highways, that's the big thing that really drives the vehicle miles traveled.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I was going to address that later, but let's talk about that now because this is the big missing piece in all climate plans. Right? And it's like — we know from research that density, walkability, transit is one of the best and necessary ways to reduce transportation emissions. You can switch out cars for electric vehicles, but you still are left with a bunch of the problems of cars, a bunch of the long commutes, the other kinds of pollution, just the general unpleasantness. So do state governments have any instruments or tools whereby to impose some sort of reason or some sort of positive direction on those local decisions? How do you think about that?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>In the Colorado context, I think the way that I would frame it is: One big step is that as a state, we're acknowledging we have a problem. And so in the GHD Roadmap, really for the first time, we identified exclusionary zoning as an issue that we need to address as part of our attempts to address transportation emissions. And this year for the first time, we actually had two pieces of legislation that are just sort of the initial front of starting to act on this and they're incentive bills. One of them is a bill that created a new fund for affordable housing.</p><p>And in order for a city to get access to the funding, they need to do at least one thing from a menu of options. And that includes making duplexes and triplexes by right in residential zoning districts. And it includes getting rid of occupancy restrictions and it includes getting rid of maximum parking requirements in at least parts of the community. There was another bill that offered something that cities have wanted for quite a while, which is greater flexibility to do inclusionary zoning requirements for rental housing. But again, in order to get permission to do that, you had to pick from one of these things that would help to increase housing opportunities and density within the community.</p><p>I think there's a lot of interest in thinking about how do we continue down that pathway?</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You're surely watching California where they're trying to impose some state rules and the blowback is predictably nasty.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>I think that what is going to be politically viable in Colorado, at least in the near term, will really focus on creating incentives and it may be figuring out how do we bring more money to the table and create really meaningful incentives for local governments. I don't think that the politics here would make it possible to do a Senator Wiener-like legislation from California. That's not on the table here. It's not politically viable. But we are certainly interested in starting to incentivize those local governments that are on the verge of being willing to go in this direction because in actual fact, there's a lot of benefits for the local communities.</p><p>It's not just about those broad climate benefits, it's about creating communities that people can afford to live in and they can get places by walking. And there's really strong reasons why this is good for the communities, not just good for the state and where it works —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yes, but not always good for the homeowners who show up for the meetings though. That's the thing with local control.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah, I was a mayor for a number of years and I lived that.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>You poor man. What about transit though? Does the state have a little bit more influence over transit or is that mostly local too?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So certainly our big transit provider in Colorado is in the Denver metro area and they are primarily funded by local sales taxes and they're controlled by an independent board. We did have a large transportation funding bill this year that I think was pretty important for starting to change the direction on transportation in Colorado. It did a number of things, and it certainly provides money for our State Transportation Department's ten year plan. That does include major highway expansions, but it also does a major investment in transportation electrification. Nearly three quarters of a billion dollars over the next decade that we think is going to be very important to achieving our EV targets both in the light duty space and in the truck and bus world.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What's that money go to specifically? Is it like point of sale rebates or charging stations or do you know yet?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Well, it does a number of things, and I would say we already have an existing assignable, refundable tax credit for light-duty vehicles, and actually for larger vehicles, but it's pretty small for the larger vehicles as a percentage of their cost. Because it is assignable, you can actually assign it to the car financing company at the point of sale. So for the companies that engage in that, which so far is Nissan and GM, it acts like a point-of-sale rebate. We also have existing law requiring utilities to invest and Xcel just got a plan approved to spend $100 million over the next three years, mainly in infrastructure, but it also includes enhanced point-of-sale rebates for low-income customers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, cool.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>But this $730 million approximately is divided into three buckets. One bucket will go to our Department of Transportation, where it will be used to help transit agencies buy electric buses.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>My favorite.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Another bucket goes to our Department of Public Health and Environment, where it'll be a clean fleet enterprise that will be spent on electric school buses, public vehicles, helping Uber and Lyft drivers switch to electric — and that part is actually funded by a fee on Uber and Lyft rides. And the fee is one level if you're in an ICE vehicle and a single passenger, and it's half as much if you're in an electric vehicle or have two or more passengers.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Funny.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>And then it also will go to helping fleet transition for medium and heavy-duty trucks. And then the other bucket that lives here at the Energy Office goes to EV charging infrastructure, and it goes to supporting low- and moderate-income EV adoption. And the structure that we're looking at is kind of cribbed from what we've seen in some other states. And it's sort of like a cash for clunkers, but where we will work with you on both converting to an electric vehicle or to an electric bike, if that works better for you.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Electric bikes, that's going to make some people happy.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah. We started an e-bike pilot last year, and people have loved it. And we're going to use this money to grow it substantially because. It doesn't take that much money to do some pretty significant things with e-bikes. Senate Bill 260 — also this new transportation funding bill both really ramped up the state investment in things other than roads. Like historically, most of our state transportation dollars were, largely by constitution, were directed towards highways. We did manage to change that for the local government share of gas tax revenues. A few years ago, we were able to change it so that's now flexible dollars, it can be used for transit roads or bikeped.</p><p>And so this new bill puts a billion dollars into that local share that can be used for whatever locals want. It puts a bunch of money into a multimodal options fund that is basically money that local governments can apply for for transit or bikeped projects. They have to match it for one for one. So it kind of doubles the amount that goes into that multimodal. They created a new air quality mitigation fund that's kind of focused on our areas that are in non-attainment with federal ozone standards and on environmental justice communities. And then it makes a bunch of changes to the planning process that will have an impact going forward.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>I wanted to ask about that. Where the State Department of Transportation, you had some new planning requirements there that they include greenhouse gases in their planning, that they incorporate induced demand in road planning, which you'd think like how could any professional transportation agency not be incorporating induced demand by now? But I'm curious, I mean, maybe you can't really answer this, but sort of notoriously, this is true in Washington, like, state departments of transportation are like dinosaur agencies. They're like the caboose of the sustainable transportation thinking. I don't know why they all ended up like that, but do you have that same problem in Colorado, like, what's the level of sort of wokeness of your Department of Transportation?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So our DOT has really changed in the last two and a half years. When Governor Polis came in, he brought in as our DOT director a woman named Shoshana Lew, who had been in the Obama DOT, where her role had actually been helping to, among other things, develop the light-duty vehicle, GHG standards and CAFE standards. And so she was the first state DOT director who I know, who really comes from a background of caring about climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>And it was certainly a large cultural transition for the agency. Among other things, it was the first time that there was a young woman running that agency. And one of the things that is really striking, that is very different from other DOTs, is the extent to which many of the leadership positions there are now women from a climate background. In planning in the new Office of Innovative Mobility where they created to focus on electrification and transit and actually hired somebody away from the Energy Office who was leading our climate and transportation efforts. So the culture there has really changed.</p><p>They've actually, over the last two years, really begun to do things like incorporate induced demand into their modeling and to really start thinking much more broadly about the role of transportation. Shoshana created a new program coming along with COVID to provide state funding to help with local street conversions from car-only streets to streets that could be used for walking, biking, transit, or sort of retail and restaurant use — that was super popular. People love it. We now have $115 million coming out of this transportation bill to expand that program. And so we're already seeing, I think, a much more progressive vision on transportation in Colorado than you saw in the past.</p><p>But this legislation really builds in a focus both on environmental justice, creates a new division of environmental justice, requires much more modeling and mitigation of things like particulate emissions near highways, and it builds in an ongoing requirement that the DOT incorporate into its planning, helping to achieve the state greenhouse gas targets. So there's actually a rulemaking that is about to start at our State Transportation Commission to create greenhouse gas budgets for transportation plans, and future plans will have to show how they can achieve those targets.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Will any of that apply to the current highway widening plans that are set for the next ten years, or is this just for future?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So it will certainly apply over the next ten years. It does not apply to the existing plan. Even though you describe them as ten-year plans, they get updated every few years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>And so the legislation explicitly requires that the next time the plan is updated, the new requirements around greenhouse gas mitigation and whatever new rules are adopted by the Transportation Commission and the Air Commission would apply both to the DOT and to our Metropolitan Planning Organizations. And it also tied some of the new funding to a requirement that in order to access that new funding, plans would need to be updated within the next three years.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Oh, interesting. So there's at least a chance then that not all of the highway widening that's currently in the plan ends up happening.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So, there are some projects that are certainly going to happen, the projects that are very far along, and the ones that most people think probably make sense. We have a highway through Denver, Highway 270, that is extremely congested, where they are planning on adding some high-occupancy toll lanes to them that is going to move forward. There are reasonable arguments as to why it should move forward and it's going to move forward. There's a project on Interstate 70 up into the mountains where the road is three lanes, and then it's two lanes for a while and then it's three lanes again where they're going to make it continuous three lanes.</p><p>They're very close to starting construction. That's going to happen. But projects that are further out in the plan will certainly need to be reevaluated under the new planning rules.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right. Okay, let's move on to the last big thing I wanted to hit before maybe the last two things. I want to talk about environmental justice quickly because there's environmental justice kind of sprinkled throughout. So what's the big story on environmental justice and sort of where are you most proud of it showing up in legislation?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah. So this is an issue that I think in Colorado, as in many places and as in the national conversation, this has really become a much larger part of the conversation over the last year. There's much more community engagement and organizing around this, and there's a lot of elements in legislation. The climate legislation that just passed creates a new environmental justice ombudsperson at our Public Health and Environment Department. It creates a new Environmental Justice Advisory Board and gives them some real authority over money because it's going to take environmental fines that companies pay and transition those out of our state general fund into a new fund for mitigation in EJ communities.</p><p>And the Environmental Justice Advisory Board will have a huge role in how that money gets allocated. There was the creation of this new environmental justice office at CDOT to make sure that as CDOT is planning transportation projects, they're really engaging and thinking about some of those historical injustices and what the impacts of those projects will be. And then there are multiple places where various utility programs are being structured so that significant portions of the investment have to go to benefit either low-income communities or individual low-income residents. The other place that I think is going to be a significant focus is as we move forward with these new transportation electrification investments, we're really going to have a focus on deploying especially heavy-duty electrification in those communities that are most impacted by pollution.</p><p>So we have an area, for example, in north Denver, where there are three major highways, tons of trucks and trucking fleets that are headquartered around there, the Suncor refinery and multiple other industrial facilities. When you think about the areas that are most polluted and where people are really being very much impacted by localized air pollution, that's not the only place in the state, but it's really a prime example. And it's a place where, when we think about fleet investments and where we're going to deploy charging, I think there will be a major focus on assuring that that's one of the areas that we focus on early.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>The one final thing I had a question about that is the advisory board — I guess when the EJ people hear about something like that, they're naturally, I think, suspicious a little bit, given history. So, what teeth does it have? Can it grind things to a halt? Can it really what are the legal mechanisms around it?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So again, the place where it will have the strongest authority is over how those new mitigation funds are spent in EJ communities. But it will also certainly have a voice in the operations of the Department of Public Health and Environment and will have a voice in a rulemaking process. But as you said, it will certainly be an evolving process as we see exactly how it brings the EJ voice to bear in his rulemakings.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Okay, just by way of wrapping up, I've kept you long enough, now you've done so much stuff, we could just do a laundry list for 2 hours. There was some controversy along the way, some of the state environmental groups got upset. And I think, insofar as I understand it, the idea was that the roadmap that the governor released doesn't have legally enforceable caps in these sectors. It relies on sort of the sectoral policies and incentives and voluntary agreements. And so they tried to put forward a bill, Senate Bill 200, that I guess basically would have created a cap and trade system, or at least caps on all these sectors.</p><p>And then there was some negotiation and now there are caps on some sectors and not others. Tell me the capsule version of that story.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yeah, I will do my best, and I think you framed it fairly well. There was certainly a narrative that was out there that the roadmap was a purely voluntary and aspirational document. I never quite understood that when we were moving forward in clean energy, plans at the Public Utilities Commission and rulemakings on oil and gas at the Air Commission had already adopted low and zero emission vehicle standards. Have a 2022 hold for medium- and heavy-duty emissions and looking at fleet rules and indirect source standards. Like, there's lots of individual sectoral policies that were enforceable. But what we did not have was an overall cap or cap and trade program.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>An economy wide program. I guess that was the source of sort of like the complaint, right? They wanted some sort of enforceable economy wide cap, right?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>That's right. And I think there were a couple of issues that we saw. One is that all of the work that we had done was sort of focused on this sectoral approach. And we had a set of strategies that we believe will get us where we need to go, with transportation certainly being the most challenging sector. And for a variety of reasons, the administration doesn't believe that a cap and trade program is right for Colorado and certainly not right for Colorado today. We also felt like the approach in SB 200 was such that it was going to take many stakeholders, including labor stakeholders and many stakeholders from different areas of the state and different industries who have been pretty willing to work with the state on implementing the roadmap.</p><p>And it was going to turn them into determined opponents of climate action in Colorado.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>But if the targets are there, why would making them legally enforceable turn these people against them unless they weren't planning on meeting them? Do you know what I mean? I mean, that's the suspicion.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>I think part of the problem was that you were looking at making things enforceable in sectors where it didn't work very well. So ultimately what the administration said was there were big parts of that bill that we liked. We liked the environmental justice provisions, we liked the small fees on GHG emissions to better fund the climate division within our public health and environment. We liked the social cost of carbon language, which broadened the use of social cost carbon for air regulatory purposes. And we were fine with having the statutory caps in areas where it aligned with strategies that made sense to us.</p><p>So, we were already doing the rulemaking on oil and gas that's now statutory, and we're fine with having the legislature say "you have to achieve what we were planning on achieving anyhow." They did the same thing on the industrial sector and it added additional regulatory teeth on the electric side. That doesn't really change much because all the utilities were headed there anyhow and we already had the authority to act if we needed to if a utility didn't move forward. But it does strengthen that. So all of those we were fine with. Where we had issues were saying that the Air Commission had to adopt a cap on buildings because who are you capping?</p><p>Like, we have the clean heat plans on the gas utilities. We think that that's a really creative approach to doing sort of the closest you can get to an overall regulatory requirement on buildings that makes sense. The way that it was written, we believe, would have required us to create a cap and trade program on buildings that would likely have imposed significant costs on consumers. Whereas the way we've structured it, we have a program that lives primarily at the Public Utilities Commission that requires them to work with utilities to develop the most cost-effective programs possible. That's not what we would have gotten out of a cap on the enforced through the air side.</p><p>Similarly, on transportation, we know that, yes, there are models out there like TCI (Transportation Climate Initiative) in the northeastern states. But when we looked at TCI, which I think we would have been forced to do something like that, what we looked at was what, seven years now of debate over how to implement it. Most of the states —</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Not implemented by any of the states yet, right? I mean, it's still —</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Not implemented anywhere. And when you look at the projections of what it would actually do, it would generate revenue to invest in electrification and multimodal transportation. When you look at the amount for the four states that are talking about going forward, you look at the amount that would be invested per state. And we are getting more money invested in electrification and multimodal transportation by passing our transportation bill this year than we would if we were a TCI state. So we sort of looked at it and said, why would we do this incredibly complicated and controversial transportation cap approach when we can just work with a wide variety of stakeholders, have support from the business community and from local governments and from the environmental community on these new transportation fees and just move forward in a much more straightforward and less controversial way?</p><p>It just seems like common sense to us. And ultimately we were able to get to a place with the legislative sponsors and advocates where we moved forward with the legislatively adopted emissions caps in those sectors where it works, move forward on the whole suite of buildings bills that we think is the most elegant approach to having as close as you can get to an assured approach on the building side. And we're able to take significant steps on transportation and we will continue as a state to move forward in multiple ways on transportation. We know after this greenhouse gas budget rule's adopted, we need to think about medium and heavy-duty vehicles.</p><p>We then need to think about post-2025 light-duty vehicle rules, and there will be more work to do in the future.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>They're not here to defend themselves. So maybe this is not fair, but I feel like some of the people in the environmental community have an exaggerated sense of the significance of statutory caps. I mean, people are passing statutory caps all over the place that are getting violated and thrown out and — it's not magic; just because you make it statutory that it's definitely going to happen. You have to do the sort of ground-level work, the sort of detailed sector by sector work regardless even if you have the cap.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>And the caps make more sense when you have a handful of industrial operations that you can work with — traditional regulatory approach makes great sense. When you're talking about millions of individual buildings and vehicles. You have to focus on a broader suite of strategies that get you market transformation.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>What about a clean fuel standard like in Washington? Well, it's on the whole west coast now I guess. Did you think about that?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>So we did and it's not on our near-term agenda. We took a look at it. We did a feasibility study a year ago and the thing that gave us significant pause was when we did the analysis and looked at different scenarios for how you would comply. What we saw was a combination of both a fair amount of cost passed on to consumers but most of the money going into biofuels. And from our perspective, we think that the future is really about electrification. There may be an important role for hydrogen in the long haul heavy-duty space but at least based on our analysis to date we don't see the future as being largely about biofuels in the transportation sector.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Right.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>And we were a little put off by an approach in which we were going to drive a lot of costs with most of the compliance happening through biofuels.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, that's sort of the danger of kind of the tax approach or the incremental rising cost approach is you get the cheapest proximate solutions, right, but they might not be the ultimate solutions. And if you know the ultimate solutions why not just skip straight there instead of trying this sort of bank shot, ratchet attempt? Well, this has been very illuminating and excellent. Last question then is: I understand you don't have authorization yet from the governor's office to give specifics about your next term agenda but what in your mind are kind of the big climate wise and clean energy wise what are the big pieces left for Colorado to tackle?</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Also two of them I've already touched on and that is we really do need to take the next steps on building codes. We really do need to figure out how the state can work with local governments to help move towards better approaches to land use that will tend to reduce VMT and greenhouse gas as instead of driving higher levels of driving and actually in many cases higher levels of building energy use also.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, it's amazing what happens when you elect a bunch of Democrats, I got to say.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>You know, Governor Polis has been a real visionary in this stuff. I know I realized that the environmental community hasn't necessarily framed him as a climate champion in a way that we've seen in some other states. But, boy, working in the administration, I have seen the kind of all of government approach where he is building a focus on climate into every relevant department in the state and is giving us a real free hand to move creative policy.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Yeah, I mean, I got to say, even though we've spent now almost an hour and a half talking about it, we've only hit kind of the big items. There's all these I mean, this is the kind of stuff I love reading about. Just this sort of really small bore, very specific stuff. Just tweaking this agency or this department or this budget. Just little things. But those are the things that add up. It's like hundreds and hundreds of those things that really add up in the end.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Yep.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>Well, thanks so much, Will, and maybe we'll see what y'all do next session and have you back on.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Sounds good. Thank you, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts</strong></p><p>All right, thanks a lot. Bye.</p><p><strong>Will Toor</strong></p><p>Bye.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-will-toor-on-colorados</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:37921120</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2024 17:00:00 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/37921120/f8d4f39a945b66b9fa709a6435b160f4.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4753</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/37921120/9353978262d7737156bd0b8e6ffc9696.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Long-duration storage can help clean up the electricity grid, but only if it's super cheap]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Here at Volts, I recently spent a week … OK, a month writing about batteries, which store energy for electronic devices, electric vehicles, and, at least for short periods of time (four to six hours), the power grid.</p><p>Lithium-ion batteries are extremely good at those tasks — and they’re getting better, and cheaper, all the time.</p><p>But here’s the thing: a net-zero-carbon grid is going to need storage that lasts a lot longer than six hours. It’s going to need durations of up to 100, 300, 500 hours or more, and it’s going to need them cheap. Lithium-ion batteries just aren’t going to work for that. </p><p>What will work? Good question! No one really knows yet. </p><p>Whatever it is will require substantial research, development, and scaling, and possibly some good geographical luck. We can’t know yet what technology or technologies might win that race, but we do have a good sense of what they need to accomplish, thanks to some <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-021-00796-8.epdf?sharing_token=jwq1iNS_6a45CB1D-xlzCNRgN0jAjWel9jnR3ZoTv0PQ56eGJGJ7s_SkYveWyTg2ufVdTIoiyQA0-KuiIMXx5-zdR2biCq3o7MEIpVadhqZZR61_rJOppzbl0CdvGrS57J9PL2RfabTRdo28MsMXlS2O9KVVY3-N9ONQJE511Pk=">new research in </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-021-00796-8.epdf?sharing_token=jwq1iNS_6a45CB1D-xlzCNRgN0jAjWel9jnR3ZoTv0PQ56eGJGJ7s_SkYveWyTg2ufVdTIoiyQA0-KuiIMXx5-zdR2biCq3o7MEIpVadhqZZR61_rJOppzbl0CdvGrS57J9PL2RfabTRdo28MsMXlS2O9KVVY3-N9ONQJE511Pk="><em>Nature Energy</em></a> from a team at MIT (along with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscast-jesse-jenkins-on-energy">Jesse Jenkins</a>, who used to be at MIT but is now at Princeton).  </p><p>Their findings on long-duration energy storage (LDES) are daunting and somewhat deflationary. In a nutshell: LDES needs to get <em>extremely</em> cheap before it will play a substantial role in a clean grid — cheaper than almost any candidate technology today, and cheaper than any geographically unconstrained technology is likely to get any time soon. </p><p>Let’s start with some background on the need for LDES.</p><p>Renewables on the grid need firming</p><p>The cheapest large-scale renewable energy sources are wind and solar, but wind and solar are <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2015/6/19/8808545/wind-solar-grid-integration">variable</a>. They come and go with the sun and the wind, and as you may have heard, the sun is not always shining and the wind is not always blowing. We cannot turn them on or off, up or down.</p><p>The supply of wind and solar energy will not always match the “demand curve,” i.e., the level of electricity demand throughout the day. As more and more wind and solar are added to the grid, there’s more and more need for flexible resources that can fill the gaps when supply doesn’t match demand.</p><p>Today, those gaps are overwhelmingly filled by natural gas power plants, which are 100 percent “firm” in that they can be turned on at will and run as long as necessary. As the grid is decarbonized, however, fossil fuel plants (at least those without carbon capture) will be phased out of the electricity system and wind and solar penetration will increase. As that happens, other resources will be needed to firm the system. </p><p>There are four basic options.</p><p>* <strong>Transmission:</strong> connecting larger geographical areas raises the chances that sun or wind will be available somewhere within them.</p><p>* <strong>Low-carbon (“clean”) firm generation:</strong> the MIT team’s paper lists “nuclear, fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage (CCS), bioenergy, geothermal, or hydrogen and other fuels produced from low-carbon processes.” (The first three items are anathema to some climate activists, but they may end up being necessary.)</p><p>* <strong>Negative emissions technologies (NETs):</strong> technologies that permanently bury carbon dioxide can offset emissions from firm fossil fuel plants. </p><p>* <strong>Long-duration energy storage (LDES):</strong> technologies that can store enough energy, for long enough, to displace firm generation. </p><p>(Note: natural gas power plants are much cheaper than any of these options, save perhaps some transmission. There will be no market or pressure for any of them unless there are policies that require reduced greenhouse gases.)</p><p>NETs are likely to stay expensive and transmission can only do so much, so the real fight is likely to be between clean firm generation and LDES. </p><p>The new research is an extremely detailed modeling look at the role LDES might play in a decarbonized energy grid — how much clean firm generation it might displace and how much it might reduce energy system costs.</p><p>The LDES “design space”</p><p>The researchers took an interesting and (to me at least) somewhat novel approach. The problem with trying to study LDES is that a bunch of incredibly heterogenous technologies are claiming that mantle, with different mechanisms and different performance characteristics, at different levels of development and commercialization, competing for different market niches. It can be difficult to compare them or to say anything meaningful about them as a class. </p><p>So instead of focusing on particular technologies, the researchers modeled different combinations of performance characteristics. Specifically, they used a high-resolution model to represent five separate LDES technology parameters:</p><p>1) energy storage capacity cost (using a bathtub as an analogy, think of the cost of increasing the size of the tub); 2) charge power capacity cost (cost of enlarging the faucet); 3) discharge power capacity cost (cost of enlarging the drain); 4) charge efficiency (how much water is lost when filling the tub), and 5) discharge efficiency (how much water is lost when draining the tub).</p><p>Here’s how they went about it:</p><p>We modelled a total of 1,280 discrete combinations of these cost and efficiency parameters encompassing performance levels that are consistent with projections for existing LDES technologies found in academic peer-reviewed studies as well as domains that are currently infeasible but that could be the focus of technology development efforts in the future. Furthermore, we evaluated the technology design space for LDES in multiple power system contexts encompassing different wind, solar and demand characteristics and different assumptions regarding the availability of firm low-carbon technologies.</p><p>They present the results in two basic contexts: a Northern Grid representing average New England conditions and a Southern Grid representing Texas. </p><p>The methodology was complex but the goal was simple: to determine which LDES performance characteristics would do the most to displace clean firm generation and reduce system costs for a net-zero-carbon grid.  </p><p>First we’ll look at which parameters made the biggest difference and the aggregate impact they could have. Then we’ll take a quick tour through current LDES techs to see which might make the cut.</p><p>What LDES needs to be able to do</p><p>The basic question is how much clean firm generation LDES can displace in a model optimizing for total system costs. Here are a few basic findings:</p><p><strong>1.</strong> Of the five modeled technology parameters, the two that enable LDES to have the biggest impact are energy storage capacity costs (the cost of increasing the size of the tub) and discharge efficiency (how much water is lost draining the tub). The other three parameters don’t matter nearly as much. </p><p>A good benchmark for energy storage capacity costs are lithium-ion batteries (LIBs). Last year, <a target="_blank" href="https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-pack-prices-cited-below-100-kwh-for-the-first-time-in-2020-while-market-average-sits-at-137-kwh/">BNEF’s annual battery price report</a> had the average capacity costs of LIB battery packs at $137 per kilowatt-hour (down 89 percent from 2010), projected to hit $100 by 2023. Dan Steingart, a materials scientist and co-director of Columbia University’s Electrochemical Energy Center, told me he thinks LIBs are eventually going to get down “somewhere between $45 and $60 per kilowatt-hour.” (To be clear: that’s extremely aggressive and optimistic.)</p><p><strong>2.</strong> That gives some context to the next finding: not until it hits $50/kWh will LDES even begin to see meaningful deployment or declining costs. Not until $20/kWh will they reduce system costs by 10 percent. And “to deliver more significant savings in electricity costs (>10%), storage technologies must exhibit costs in the $1-10/kWh range and discharge efficiencies greater than 60%.”</p><p>That pretty much rules out LIBs. It also, as we’ll see later, rules out quite a few of the technologies currently claiming the mantle of LDES.</p><p><strong>3.</strong> What’s more, across the full design space modeled, the very best LDES could hope for is to reduce system costs 50 percent; the best existing LDES techs could do is 40 percent. And in a system with more clean firm options available, the max is 20 to 30 percent.</p><p><strong>4.</strong> What’s even more, not until LDES capacity costs get down to $10/kWh could it displace all firm generation — if firm generation includes only nuclear. If it includes other clean firm generation with lower capital costs and higher operating costs (like natural gas with CCS or hydrogen combustion turbines), then LDES would have to get down to $1/kWh to displace it all. </p><p><strong>5.</strong> What’s even <em>more</em> more, the modeled cases where LDES displaces the most clean firm generation involve storage durations of 100 hours or more, up as high as 650 hours (concentrated in 100 to 400 hours). </p><p><strong>6.</strong> As No. 4 suggests, aside from energy capacity costs, the single factor that most influences LDES’ ultimate deployment has nothing to do with LDES tech at all — it’s the cost and availability of other clean firm options. If only or mainly nuclear is available, LDES has a much better shot. If other forms mature and get cheaper and more widely available, LDES will have a harder time. </p><p><strong>7.</strong> LDES has a harder time on the Northern Grid, and an even harder time on the Northern Grid under scenarios of high electrification. (Electrification in the cold northern winters means a huge winter demand peak, which renewables struggle to meet.)</p><p>So, what have we learned? LDES needs to store huge amounts of energy for cheap. Though it will run only intermittently, it needs to discharge energy efficiently. And it needs to be capable of durations of well over 100 hours. Even if it meets those requirements, it will likely displace less than half the clean firm generation required to run a clean grid. </p><p>That said, reducing systems costs by even 10 percent represents billions of dollars in savings, so it’s nothing to sniff at.</p><p>Let’s take a quick tour through the technologies competing in the LDES space.</p><p>The varieties of LDES and their chances of success</p><p>Energy wonks are aware of the need for more and better options in the LDES space. ARPA-E has a <a target="_blank" href="https://arpa-e.energy.gov/technologies/programs/days">DAYS (Duration Addition to electricitY Storage)</a> program intended to spur development of energy storage technologies capable of anywhere from 10 to approximately 100 hours duration. </p><p>But this new research reveals that LDES will need to run much longer than that, and for dirt cheap. Can any of today’s technologies measure up? Let’s run through the four broad categories of competitors. </p><p>Electrochemical storage</p><p>There are two big electrochemical contenders. The first is flow batteries, which I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/battery-week-competitors-to-lithium">wrote about in a previous post</a>. They have the advantage of being able to scale energy storage and power capacity separately, which theoretically opens the door to very high energy capacity for fairly cheap. </p><p>Unfortunately, the most common varieties of flow batteries (vanadium redox and zinc bromine) have energy storage capacity costs in the hundreds of dollars per kWh, which means they probably won’t cut it as LDES. (As I wrote, flow batteries are aiming for that awkward mid-duration storage space and getting squeezed on both sides.)</p><p>Another electrochemical option (an alternative flow battery tech) is liquid metal batteries, which I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/battery-week-competitors-to-lithium">also wrote about previously</a>. A company called Ambri is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rgj.com/story/news/money/business/2020/12/08/energos-project-reno-largest-renewable-green-powered-site-us/6495088002/">building a 250 MWh demonstration project</a> with liquid metal batteries in Reno, Nevada. In <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2542435117300326">this paper</a>, researchers demonstrated an “air-breathing aqueous sulfur flow battery” with $10-$20/kWh energy capacity costs at 100+ hours duration. That wouldn’t entirely displace firm generation, but it could theoretically get to 10 or 20 percent system cost reductions, which is no small thing. </p><p>Chemical storage</p><p>Chemical candidates mainly include hydrogen and hydrogen-derived fuels like ammonia and syngas (e.g., synthetic methane). This is something of an odd category, since the result of all these processes is a fuel, which operates just like natural gas, as firm generation. You can see chemical storage as a direct substitute for, or a form of, clean firm generation.</p><p>The cheapest forms of chemical storage rely on specific geological features for storage, like compressed hydrogen in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0360319917306109">caverns</a> and porous rock formations. Energy capacity costs range from $1 to $5/kWh for hard rock caverns all the way down to around $0.5/kWh for some depleted gas or oil fields. </p><p>The problem with chemical storage is that, while energy capacity costs are low, there’s lots of infrastructure and conversion processes involved in making hydrogen, storing it, capturing CO2, combining hydrogen and CO2, and then burning the resulting fuel in combustion turbines. This gives chemical storage high power capacity costs and low round-trip efficiency. Lots of work needs to be done to bring down costs, particularly of electrolysis and fuel cells, for making and burning hydrogen respectively. </p><p>Mechanical storage</p><p>The oldest and still most common form of large-scale energy storage is pumped hydroelectric energy storage (PHES), whereby water is pumped from a lower reservoir to a higher one and then run back down through turbines to recapture the energy. (PHES accounts for about 99 percent of the US grid energy storage market.)</p><p>Most PHES installations today are built for diurnal cycling (every six to 24 hours) and have energy capacity costs in the hundreds of dollars per kWh, which makes them unsuitable for LDES.</p><p>Some PHES projects with particularly large reservoirs can get over 100 hours of duration at energy capacity costs in the $20 to $30/kWh range, which combined with their relatively high round-trip efficiency means they can probably eat into some clean firm generation at the margins. But those sites are even more geographically limited than PHES generally.</p><p>The other viable mechanical LDES technology is compressed air energy storage (CAES), which is just what it sounds like — use energy to compress air, then use the pressure of the compressed air to run a turbine and generate electricity. In the best locations, with access to large <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-018-0311-0">saline aquifers</a>, CAES can get down in the $1/kWh range with hundreds of hours of capacity; costs rise in less ideal sites (e.g. salt caverns). Like PHES, CAES is geographically limited (and might compete in some sites with compressed hydrogen storage).</p><p>There are many other forms of mechanical energy storage out there, everything from <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11524958/energy-storage-rail">pushing rocks uphill on a train</a> to <a target="_blank" href="https://qz.com/1355672/stacking-concrete-blocks-is-a-surprisingly-efficient-way-to-store-energy/">lifting rocks with a crane</a> to <a target="_blank" href="https://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/batteries-storage/superconducting-flywheel-grid-energy-storage">spinning a flywheel</a>, but none of them yet have energy capacity costs low enough to make them eligible as true LDES.</p><p>Thermal storage</p><p>There are numerous ways to store electricity as heat. The most familiar is <a target="_blank" href="https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16012018/csp-concentrated-solar-molten-salt-storage-24-hour-renewable-energy-crescent-dunes-nevada/">concentrated solar power using molten salt</a>, but capacity costs for that technology remain prohibitively high and round-trip efficiency prohibitively low for it to serve as LDES.</p><p>There are also (less developed) <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0306261919305082">proposals</a> to store heat in ceramic “firebricks” for electricity or heat applications, with energy capacity costs potentially as low as $5 to $10/kWh and round-trip efficiency over 50 percent. A process called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenrg.2020.00160/full">pumped thermal energy storage</a> using reciprocating heat pumps also shows great promise. Thermal storage remains an intriguing area of study, in part due to its usefulness as both direct heat and electricity.</p><p>Here’s a roundup from the MIT team’s paper of all the LDES technologies and their projected future costs:</p><p>The ultimate potential of LDES</p><p>As I said, the research is not explicitly framed this way, but the results strike me as fairly deflationary toward LDES. The low costs and long durations required rule out several existing technologies and set incredibly ambitious targets for others. And even if LDES meets those targets, it won’t erase the need for clean firm generation — at best it will take a good chunk out of it and reduce overall system costs a few dozen percent. That’s not nothing, but it’s not a silver bullet either. </p><p>Here’s a visual from a <a target="_blank" href="https://t.co/DZrwlnJ09f?amp=1">seminar Jenkins gave at Stanford</a>:</p><p>Just a few things to note about this graph. The colored boxes are different LDES technologies — the solid lines indicate geographically unconstrained options and dotted lines indicate those that are geographically constrained. You’ll notice that all the options in the $1/kWh box have dotted lines, and aside from CAES, they’re all chemical. There are currently no geographically unconstrained LDES technologies that have even the potential to knock out clean firm generation.</p><p>Labels identify a few of the technologies. CAES and hydrogen have huge potential; some thermal technologies and metal-air batteries are intriguing; PHES and reciprocating heat pumps can trim a little off the top. </p><p>In reality, there will likely be a mix of LDES technologies in the market, targeting various performance or geographical niches. If I were a betting man — which I emphatically am not — my money would be on hydrogen over the mid- to long-term. It has an advantage similar to LIBs’ advantage in the short-duration market: it can draft off of other, bigger markets. </p><p>LIBs for energy storage can draft off of the much larger electric-vehicle market, which is driving their costs down. Similarly, hydrogen and hydrogen-derived fuels for energy storage can draft off of much larger hydrogen markets: industrial applications, possibly airplane or shipping fuel, possibly mixing with natural gas in existing pipelines. Relative to those markets, the market for hydrogen as LDES is likely to be marginal, but it will benefit from the cost reductions driven by scale in those other markets. </p><p>Thermal storage might also benefit from being of use in both heat or electricity applications. As I’ve written before, there’s a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/11/13/21537801/climate-change-renewable-energy-geothermal-heat-gshp-district-heating">huge potential market for clean heat</a>. </p><p>The practical implication of this modeling is that research and development in LDES needs to focus primarily on driving energy capacity costs as low as possible, while targeting durations of 100 hours or more (beyond the 10 to 100 hours the DAYS program targets) and discharge efficiencies of at least 60 percent. </p><p>It’s a tough set of aspirations and there’s no guarantee any technology will get there any time soon, so another practical implication of the research is that we need to start thinking hard about where to find lots of clean firm generation. We probably can’t store enough energy to get around it. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/long-duration-storage-can-help-clean</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:37059457</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 09 Jun 2021 16:00:28 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/37059457/31aedb3eef980022e2803b02079057cd.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1541</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/37059457/ce7a37e6dc45722b364ca3aeab0e17ba.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Adam Jentleson on how to make the US Senate work]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Long-time readers know that I am a veteran hater of the US Senate, the graveyard of good ideas and progressive policies. America’s upper chamber is one of the world’s least productive and most ridiculous legislative bodies, its dysfunctions matched only by its boundless self-regard. Don’t get me started.</p><p>Instead, get <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/AJentleson">Adam Jentleson</a> started! Now there’s a guy who has earned his ire at the Senate. As a senior aide to Democratic leader Harry Reid from 2011 to 2016, Jentleson saw up close and personal how the institution’s antiquated rules (especially the filibuster) can be weaponized against reformers. </p><p>He shared what he learned in a book that came out earlier this year: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1631497774/ref=as_li_tl?ie=UTF8&#38;camp=1789&#38;creative=9325&#38;creativeASIN=1631497774&#38;linkCode=as2&#38;tag=volts09-20&#38;linkId=f72d5c76c0b469c19f7c7afadafb09f5"><em>Kill Switch: The Rise of the Modern Senate and the Crippling of American Democracy</em></a>. </p><p>I didn’t want to have Jentleson rehash the book — it has been <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/04/books/review-kill-switch-modern-senate-adam-jentleson.html">favorably reviewed</a> and he has been on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.google.com/search?q=jentleson%20podcast">every podcast under the sun</a> to discuss it — but I was quite interested in his thoughts on the current Senate standoff. </p><p>Are Democrats going to let the filibuster prevent them from keeping their promises, improving people’s lives, and getting reelected … <em>again</em>? Are they going to allow a small handful of conservative Democratic senators to squelch a once-in-a-decade chance at legislating … <em>again</em>? Can that still be prevented, and if so, how?</p><p>Basically, I asked him to explain Joe Manchin to me. Enjoy.</p><p></p><p></p><p>(Anthony Cheng)</p><p></p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Hey there, welcome to Volts. I'm your host, David Roberts. </p><p>Lots of people these days feel a deep scorn and antipathy toward the US Senate, one of the most dysfunctional and ridiculous legislative bodies in the world. I very much include myself in that number. But few people have done as much to earn their antipathy as Adam Jentleson, who worked in the bowels of the Senate as a Deputy Chief of Staff for Democratic Majority Leader Harry Reid from 2011 to 2016 – the fateful final years of Obama's two terms. </p><p>Jentleson got an up close and personal look at all the ways that the rules of the Senate are stacked against reformers, especially the filibuster. He shared what he learned in a new book that came out earlier this year: <em>Kill Switch: The Rise of the Modern Senate and the Crippling of American Democracy</em>. </p><p>I know that this newsletter is supposed to be about clean energy; I have not forgotten that, I promise. But US democracy is falling apart around us, and it's got me rather preoccupied. So I thought it would be nice to talk to Jentleson, not so much about this in its ugly past, although we will touch on that a little bit, as much as its current politics. What's going on there today, and what can we expect? Basically, I want him to explain Joe Manchin to me. </p><p>So with that, welcome to Volts, Adam.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Thank you so much. It's great to be here.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>So as we speak, just a few minutes ago, we found out that the Senate Republicans are in fact expected to filibuster the creation of a commission to investigate the January 6th insurrection. This seems like a straightforwardly reactionary move. You know, as I look back on the last few uses of the filibuster, they seem straightforwardly reactionary. You go back a little further to the 60s and 70s, and it was used in pretty straightforwardly reactionary purposes then. Has the filibuster always been a straightforwardly reactionary tool? Or is there anything that a Democrat could point to and say, “Look, it works for us too!” or “Look, there are reasons for us to support it going forwards.” Has it ever worked for Democrats?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Well, I’m going to give you a yes and no answer there. I think the filibuster was reactionary from the very beginning. It was conceived of as a reactionary tool. It was not supposed to exist – it didn't exist for the first half century or so of the Senate's existence. It came into existence largely to empower, not vulnerable minorities to protect them from being trampled by the mob, but rather to increase the power of already powerful minorities, who wanted to have even more power, and in most cases, to stop the marching progress of the majority.</p><p>The number one powerful minority that the filibuster was invented to protect was slaveholders in the antebellum period. We could talk about this more, but it was first just this talking filibuster, and there was no super majority threshold. I think something that's really important to understand, that is easy to get lost because of our bias towards the new, is that the Senate was a majority rule body for most of its existence for 200 plus years. It was really only recently that the super majority threshold, this idea that things need 60 votes to pass, started to become frequently used at all. So all that is to say, that it was reactionary in its invention.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>So is it fair to say that all this stuff about protecting the rights of the minority and ensuring the small states have a voice and all that is sort of reverse engineered? The original Senate preceded those rationales?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>That's right. I mean, a lot of it is just straight up b******t, but some of it is linked to a grain of truth. It is true that the framers wanted the Senate to be one of the checks that they put in place to protect from untrammeled majority rule. But it was the existence of the Senate that was supposed to be a protection against untrammeled majorities.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>It’s already minoritarian in its very structure.</p><p>Adam Jentleson </p><p>Exactly. First of all, the decision to have a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral legislature was one of these checks. Having three branches of government that act as checks on each other was another one of the checks. And then the Senate itself in its entire democratic structure, having every state get the same number of senators was another check. And then other ones, like having senators be elected to longer terms – six years instead of two, having a higher age requirement, and having to be responsive to a broader statewide constituency, instead of just a district. These were all the ways in which the Senate was supposed to play this role as what people talk about as a cooling saucer. </p><p>So when people talk about protecting the minority, you know, they're linking back to this, this grain of truth. But, you know, as you say, it was never supposed to be as anti democratic as it is now. And what people are talking about today is an entirely different vision of this Senate. And it is a vision where the minority has a veto over the majority, which is not what the framers intended at all. </p><p>So I just wanted to say, this is the way in which it's reactionary. It hass been used for these purposes, it has primarily been a weapon to preserve white supremacy. It has occasionally come into use for progressives and for Democrats – one of the most famous filibusters was an anti war filibuster in 1917. That actually led to the creation of the rule that is now the rule that imposes a supermajority threshold. But if you look at it on balance, there's just no comparison. It has always been a tool that is far more powerful, and has had far more effect, for the right than for the left. That’s just the nature of the thing.</p><p>David Roberts </p><p>I sometimes hear Democrats say, “Well, there was that one time George W. Bush wanted to drill in Anwar,” and the Democratic Senate filibustered that. So really, it helps everyone?</p><p>Adam Jentleson </p><p>You can pick out a few examples over several dozen years. Sometimes, an article pops up by someone defending the filibuster, and they all go the same way, which is, you know, the Democrats should remember that the filibuster helped them. Here's one example. And there are many others. Are there?</p><p>David Roberts </p><p>Yeah, name three more!</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Yeah, exactly. You know, they usually can't even get to three to make a pattern. I mean, it's just there's no question that it’s the case. The other thing is, if you pull that thread, and you start talking looking at it from a structural perspective, some of these things don't even pan out. For instance, in 1969 and 1970, there was an actual real effort to get rid of the electoral college that was very nearly successful. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>For the same reasons that we hate it today or for different reasons?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>I mean, it was slightly different. Between 1888 and 2000, no president ever got elected by winning the Electoral College without winning the popular vote. And then in 1968, they sort of had a brush with the dangerous potential of the Electoral College. So all through the 20th century, the Electoral College was basically an afterthought, because whoever won the popular vote always won the Electoral College. And it was like, “Oh, you know, what's the margin? It's interesting,” but it didn't really factor into people's calculations as much as it does today. Landslide elections were a lot more common back then, because partisanship was looser, all these things. </p><p>So in 1968, George Wallace ran as an Independent, and he got a surprisingly large share of the vote. He came very close to denying either Nixon or Humphrey an electoral college majority. So, after the 1960 election, both Republicans and Democrats were like, “Well, s**t, we shouldn't do that, again. We need to make sure that Wallace can't get momentum.” And so there was a bipartisan effort to get rid of the electoral college. I mean, people forget, but you know, Nixon beat Humphrey by I think it was 0.7 percentage points. It was a very close election and Wallace almost spoiled it. </p><p>So Birch Bayh led an effort to pass a constitutional amendment to get rid of the electoral college, and this was at a time when constitutional amendments actually used to pass. They just passed the 25th amendment a few years earlier, and Birch Bayh had led that effort. So this was actually a thing that happened. He had about 30 states that were ready to ratify it if it had passed. It passed the house, overwhelmingly. It came to the Senate, and he appeared to have the votes to pass the amendment on a two thirds basis, but it was filibustered. It's a little complicated because you already needed two thirds to pass this because it was a constitutional amendment. So the filibuster didn't necessarily raise the threshold for the number of votes that it required to pass this constitution amendment to get rid of the electoral college, but it did complicate the situation and sort of threw a monkey wrench into it. That eventually managed to be the thing that denied Bayh the number of votes he needed. </p><p>So all that is to say, if the filibuster hadn't existed, you talk about George Bush and Anwar in the early aughts, we probably would have gotten rid of the Electoral College in 1970, and George Bush would never have been president. So I know that was a long lead up, but there's your punch line. This is the point, right, is that structurally, it is a tool that advantages conservatives over liberals and progressives: it is a tool that makes it easier to stop things. And we are the side that by and large is the side that is more invested in passing big changes. And so that's why it benefits them more than us.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>I'd love to talk more about the history sometime, especially some of the stories you tell about, blocking civil rights bills. One of the things you say in the book that I think is not popularly appreciated, is that the US people – Americans – were ready for Civil Rights way before any laws got passed, because they kept getting filibustered. Like, there was majority support in America to move ahead on civil rights. Long before politically, we were capable of actually doing it. I think people look to things that happen in history, more than they look at things that didn't happen. But if you put on the lens of things that didn't happen and look through American history, it is a tragedy after tragedy, and many of them have the filibuster at the root of it.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>That's exactly right. We like to tell ourselves this narrative that, perhaps there was a reason we didn't pass civil rights until 1964 – maybe the country wasn't ready for it. Everett Dirksen, the Republican leader at the time, gave this famous speech paraphrasing Victor Hugo, saying “stronger than any army is an idea whose time has come”. </p><p>But the thing was, America was ready to pass Civil Rights decades before they did. Gallup had anti poll tax bills and anti lynching laws polling in the 60 and 70% range as early as the 1930s and 1940s. There were actual bills that were passing the House that came over to the Senate that had majority support in the Senate; they had presidents of both parties ready to sign them in the 1920s, 30s, and 40s. And the only reason the Civil Rights bills didn't pass in the 1920s, and 30s and 40s was because of the filibuster. So if you step back and contemplate the amount of human suffering that was caused by this 30 year delay, it's staggering to think about it. And it makes you a little bit less sanguine about the delay that the filibuster has imposed.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>No kidding. </p><p>Well, let's talk about the current mess. So, you know, those of us who lived through the Obama years, have it seared on our memory, that, that he sort of legendarily had a couple of years, not even really two full years, of majorities in both houses of Congress, and then lost the Senate. And then, Mitch McConnell decided before he ever took office, as a matter of course, just to filibuster everything. </p><p>Obama came into office on this wave of hope, and it's a new world and we're turning the page, we're going to do big things, and he wanted to be a historic Reagan-esque President and etc, etc, etc. Instead, he was pretty effectively bottled up, pretty effectively contained to a pretty modest presidency. And Democrats got punished, got their asses kicked at the ballot box, because as Mitch McConnell cannily perceived, if they can't get anything done, the public doesn't know it's the filibuster. They don't know what's going on. They barely know anything. All they see is a bunch of fighting, and finger pointing and nothing happening, and they blame whoever is in charge, and so they blame Dems. </p><p>So basically, McConnell pulled off what is, if you can overlook the evil of it, a really incredibly savvy and effective strategy against Obama. When, last year, Biden came in with majorities in both houses, every Democrat who took to a microphone assured us “We remember what happened to Obama. We are not going to let that happen again, we cannot waste time. We know that the only reason people will vote for us in 2022, or 2024, is if we do things for them, and they're not going to care about the process.” So we're not going to let this happen again. </p><p>Then they sort of passed the COVID relief bill through reconciliation, and Manchin voted for it. And it kind of seemed like, “Oh my god, maybe they did learn the lesson, maybe they are just gonna start doing stuff.” Then we drove into the mud pit. And here we are in the mud pit, doing exactly to a first approximation what happened last time, which is Republicans wasting time on bad faith negotiations, just running out the clock, and then in the end, blocking everything anyway. </p><p>So did Democrats learn that lesson? Are we replaying this whole thing all over again? I mean, I've heard Schumer say so many times now, “We won't let that happen,” but it seems to be happening. So how do we square that circle? Is it happening all over again, or am I being too pessimistic?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>I think the jury's out. It's hard to unlearn lessons, and there's reasons that the time ran out on Democrats in 2009 and that they got played the way that they did. It's hard to change some of the fundamental things about the way business is done in Washington. It's hard to reorient senators away from the desire to try to work with Republicans. It's partially for noble reasons, and partially because they're scared, and they like having bipartisan cover. It makes it easier for them to do stuff, and they're often willing to trade away a lot of good policy for that political cover. </p><p>So I think you're right. And look, if you look at the metrics, you could argue that we're behind the pace of 2009 right now. Sorry – it's true. I mean, Biden's approval rating is a lot lower than Obama's was at this time in 2009: Obama was in the 60s, and Biden is somewhere in the low 50s. That's not Biden's fault, necessarily, we're in a more polarized time. He's certainly higher than Trump was. But that's not super great territory to be in, and you can easily see how that would slip into the 40s by the time the midterms rolled around. </p><p>They passed the American rescue plan. But by this time in 2009, they had already passed the Stimulus bill, and the Lilly Ledbetter Act and a bunch of other bills, they passed more bills by this time in 2009, then Democrats have now. So I think there's reason to be concerned. </p><p>You could see a very rapid ramp up in the next month. It looks like Senate Democrats are setting up June to be a decisive month, or at least a very eventful month when it comes to democracy reform and the filibuster.</p><p>David Roberts </p><p>Yeah, Schumer just put SB1 [Senate Bill 1] on the schedule, didn't he, just right after this happened?</p><p>Adam Jentleson </p><p>Yeah. He said that he's gonna bring it to the floor in the last week in June, and then set up what looks like votes on the Equality Act and background checks, and maybe some other things that might get blocked before then. So it looks like after spending April and May sort of pursuing bipartisanship on some of these smaller-bore bills, that June is going to be the month where things come to a head. </p><p>The reason I say the jury's out is that by the end of June, we could have passed SB1 and reformed the filibuster to do so. And in that case, I would say Democrats would definitely be ahead of the pace of 2009 and do seem to be learning the lessons. Then they would still have the reconciliation process and infrastructure to go in the fall. The other big thing that's coming in the fall is that there's going to be a debt ceiling showdown. There's going to be a government funding fight, which could be a disaster, or could be an opportunity to do big things as well. So there's a lot of variables out there. </p><p>But it is harder to learn the lessons than people think. It's like you're playing baseball, and you see a curveball, and you're like, “Okay, I know what that curveball looks like, I've totally learned my lesson, I'm going to hit it next time.” And then it comes again, and even though you know what it looks like, and you know what you should do, you still can't quite do it. It's harder than it seems to learn the lessons, even if you know you should be learning them. And so I think the jury is still out there for Democrats. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>You have said before publicly several times now that you're sort of a determined optimist. You have said the quest to reform or get rid of the filibuster is happening in phases. And everybody's got this idea basically that Joe Manchin loves bipartisanship, or says he does. So we have to basically go through this bit of theater where Democrats put things forward, and Republicans demonstrate that they're not going to cooperate. They demonstrate it publicly and clearly enough that Joe Manchin sees it, and recognizes it, and realizes that there's no progress possible with the filibuster. So he decides he wants progress more than he wants the filibuster and budges on this. That's kind of the theory of the case. But it's this weird situation where everybody's talking about that being the theory of the case. Manchin himself has surely read in a dozen articles that that's the theory of the case, and that he's going to learn that lesson, and that's what's gonna happen. So it just all seems so surreal from the outside. </p><p>Does Manchin genuinely doubt that Republicans are gonna bottle everything up? And now, they're filibustering the January 6 Commission, which Manchin specifically said is inexcusable. So, insofar as that is the theory of the case, and that the fate of the filibuster is this phased approach to reform or remove it, it seems like this is the phase where Republicans demonstrate that they're not going to cooperate. We demonstrated that. So do we see signs of the next phase?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Well, yes, and no. I'm sorry I keep giving these equivocal answers, but it's part of the nature of the beast when you're dealing with the Senate. I think that we've started that phase of seeing obstruction happen. Manchin has said that this filibuster alone against the January 6 commission bill wasn't enough for him to decide to reform the filibuster. I think that what you're gonna see in June is additional filibusters. Manchin came out in <a target="_blank" href="https://thehill.com/policy/finance/549004-manchin-throws-support-behind-union-backed-pro-act">support of the PRO Act</a>, the big pro-union bill, and maybe that will be one of the things that gets blocked. </p><p>So I think we are now firmly in this phase. And the reason it's necessary is that filibuster reform is a momentous change. I obviously think it needs to happen, you think it needs to happen, a lot of your listeners do. But it is a big, big change–it would be the biggest change to the Senate rules, arguably ever, but definitely since 1917. And so you know, to get to a level where members are comfortable making a change of that magnitude, they do need to feel like they have exhausted all other options. </p><p>Now, obviously, that runs up against the fact that we don't have much time; we need to pass these things very quickly. And so that's the delicate balancing act that someone like Senator Schumer has to pull off. And that is, how do you do enough? It's an educational process, so how  do you help Democratic senators go through these life experiences of having Republicans block legislation – it’s like an after school special for senators. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>I've been watching that after school special for a f*****g decade now like. This is what's baffling – this month is going to teach them what the past decade didn't? It just seems so arbitrary.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Here's the additional ingredient you have to throw into the mix, which is that you have to you have to throw in a healthy dose of vanity here, which means that like senators actually think that they can be the ones to overcome this polarized era that we find ourselves in and break through the polarization and be the ones to craft these big bipartisan deals. I don't think very many senators still think that, but I think to a certain extent, Joe Manchin still does. He gave this one interview to CNN about the lesson that he took away from January 6, and he seemed very sincerely to believe that the lesson for him to take away was that he needed to do bipartisanship to show the country that it was still possible for Republicans and Democrats to come together. My takeaway was that the Republicans are an irretrievably Radical Party and that it is incumbent on Democrats to do everything we can to save our democracy before they take back the majority in 2022, but Manchin had a different conclusion. I think he sincerely believes that.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>This is one of the big ongoing debates – “What's in Manchin’s head?” You think he is sincere about these things he's saying about bipartisanship, that it's possible that he thinks he can pull it off, that he thinks it's still a possibility. You think like at night, when he's looking at himself in the mirror, brushing his teeth, he really sincerely believes those things.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>I think he's the hero of his own narrative, and I think he genuinely believes that he can pull this off. When Harry Reid was in the Senate and I was working for him, Manchin was very critical of Reid and thought he was too hard on Republicans – if Reid hadn't been such a mean guy to Mitch McConnell a bunch of times, there were opportunities for bipartisanship that Manchin could have helped forge. I think this is something he has long believed. But here's the thing: nobody likes to look like a fool. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>He's setting himself up! Every time he says, I can do bipartisanship, and then Republicans kick sand in his face, and he looks like a fool. He seems like he's purposefully setting himself up to look like a fool.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Absolutely, and then the question is, “What does he do at that point?”</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>“How do you back out?” </p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>And that's what we don't quite know yet. Exactly. And so, he's made some pretty definitive statements.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>If this is the game, and he's, in some sense, aware of it, why does he seem to be going out of his way to make these categorical statements? He seems to be making it very, very difficult for himself to back out of this ever. Why is he doing that?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Well, they're not quite categorical. Even in his Op-Ed, he sort of said to Republicans, you have a responsibility to come forward and engage here. So if they don't, he can put the blame on them. I think the reason you do it is that you want to demonstrate that you really, really, really didn't want to make the change. I don't think this is going to go down as a flip flop. I think this is going to go down as an evolution that will be applauded, not just by the left, but by a broad range of centrist and never Trump commentators who have come to embrace the need for filibuster reform. I mean, you have David Frum, in the Atlantic writing about the need for it. You've got David Brooks talking about it, you’ve got Jennifer Rubin. So it's not who's gonna be mad when he flip flops, I guess, is the question. It's Republicans who yell and scream about it. But you know, he will be hailed, as being in the category of a thoughtful evolution of somebody who really was committed to the Senate and the filibuster, and did everything he could to resist it. But, you know, simply Republicans made it impossible for him. And so I think that's the path there.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>While we're peering into people's minds, again, this strategy, and all these dynamics, are being discussed very publicly. So it's not like Manchin’s not aware of them, it’s not like McConnell is unaware of them. So why, if Mitch McConnell knows that Manchin really wants bipartisanship, and it would hardly take anything to keep him on the hook, why is McConnell just demonstrating as clearly as possible to Manchin that he's not going to help? You know what I mean? It just seems like it wouldn't take much for McConnell to keep Manchin, sort of baited on the hook, and he's not even making the mildest effort to do so.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>There's a lot of thinking about McConnell that tends to be a little bit too theoretical, because McConnell could do a lot of things that theoretically would be smart for him in the long game. He prides himself on playing the long game – his memoir was titled <em>The Long Game</em>. But the thing is that actually, when you look at it, and look at the record, McConnell really hasn't done anything that has gone against what the Republican base wanted since 2010. </p><p>In 2010, he endorsed a centrist Republican candidate in Kentucky's republican senate primary, a guy named Trey Grayson, and went all in for Grayson and then got humiliated when Rand Paul beat McConnell's favorite candidate in the 2010 Kentucky senate primary. And since that point, McConnell has hewed to whatever the base wants to do at every major juncture. This is clouded by the fact that there's always a wave of coverage and speculation that talks about maybe this is when McConnell is going to, you know, break from Trump or this or that.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>He made a sort of gesture that way, right after the insurrection.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>He did, yeah, that's right. There was a New York Times story that said McConnell is talking about getting rid of Trump, but then what did he do? He voted to protect Trump in the impeachment. So it's sort of a parlor game. </p><p>But if you want to know where I put my money, it's always on McConnell doing what the base wants. In this case, the base wants there to be no commission. Trump wants there to be no commission. You know, from a cold, political perspective, you could even argue that it's better for McConnell's chance of taking back the majority in 2022 for there to be no commission. </p><p>I think it's not super smart strategically. It certainly does seem to have just set Manchin off since the vote. But I think that McConnell first of all just really doesn't like to get any distance between himself in the base. And maybe he really just thinks that this is better for them in 2022, to not have a commission.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>It just seems like the only thing that ever saves Democrats, is Republicans overreaching and stepping on themselves. That's it – that's the one that you can rely on. So Manchin, in some world, I guess I kind of get. He's from a red state. He sort of prides himself on being a negotiator and all this kind of stuff. He's got his own kind of Manchin mythology in his head, and I guess I kind of get all that, as much as it frustrates me, but what is going on with Kyrsten Sinema?</p><p>Explain Kyrsten Sinema to our listeners. I guess I've never heard or read an even remotely plausible explanation for what her whole deal is. Do you have a sense of it?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>I actually think that hers may just simply be a case of having miscalculated a little bit. Look, I think that prior to this year, a pretty reliable way to get the Garlands and plaudits of the centrist beltway crowd and the love of the Sunday show circuit, was to oppose filibuster reform. And so I think that, if her overriding strategic goal was to try to position herself in the John McCain maverick legacy, being from Arizona and all that, she is a person who used to be a member of the Green Party. So it is always a little bit of a stretch to accept that this is sincere, but let's, for the sake of argument, assume that somewhere in recent years, she had an ideological conversion that makes her now want to be a centrist.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Converted to centrism – highly implausible. But yeah, sure.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>But for the sake of argument, let's say it's sincere. Let’s say she wants to do that, and she wants to be hailed as an institutionalist by the Chuck Todds of the world. But I think it was a miscalculation, because the centrist brain just isn't there anymore.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Yeah, who are you playing to anymore?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Exactly - there’s no constituency for filibuster defense anymore. I think that's largely a function of how radical the Republican party has become – I think McConnell has lost a lot of his shine. He used to do a really good job of sort of dressing up as obstruction in these institutional myths, and I think that's come off a lot since the Trump era. But there's no constituency for what she's selling right now. You've seen her approval rating drop in Arizona. A lot of that may be due to her vote against the minimum wage that got a lot of attention. But I can tell you one thing, which is that it is not a senator's goal to spend the first year of a new administration having their approval rating tank in their home state. So whatever she's doing is not good.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>I guess you could just say she misread the room badly, but she seems, having done so now, to just be kind of doubling down on it, curtseying while she kills things. She seems to be going out of her way to be antagonistic.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>She could lose a primary in Arizona – there are credible primary challenge challenges in Arizona who could both be in a primary and then when the state – someone like Ruben Gayego, in Congress. No one could beat Manchin in a primary in West Virginia, or if they did, they would absolutely lose the seat. So that's a different story. But you know, Sinema can't claim to be the only Democrat who can hold that seat. There are viable Democrats; there's a relatively deep bench in Arizona. So she's putting herself at risk of actually alienating her allies and inviting a primary challenge. She's not up until 2024, so it's not a super imminent prospect, but that's just another way in which I think she really did just kind of miscalculate here and is going to have to find a way to climb down off this limb.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Yeah, I mean, that's pretty historic, a pretty historic misreading of the room. You get elected for one term as a Democrat and your legacy is “Oh, I ensured that democracy would fall apart and then got booted. That was me in the Senate.” </p><p>One thing that I feel like you'll have some unique insight–and it's an ongoing fight, and it's a fight on Twitter every day–is on people who say, Schumer needs to get Manchin on board, Schumer needs to bust some heads, or make some speeches or threaten some pork or threaten committee assignments or be LBJ–how many times have you heard this–be LBJ toward toward these recalcitrant senators and get them on board. And the fact that he's not doing that is evidence that Democrats actually don't want anything to happen and they're all bought and sold by corporations, whatever, whatever. </p><p>So what leverage does Schumer have over Manchin? I know we talked about this on Twitter and we're like “It's not our job,” but I feel like this is something people want to know. Is it true that Schumer could be twisting his arm if he could? My sense is that Manchin’s ego is so huge, his vanity is so all consuming, that if you go up directly against him and try to sort of punish him or smack him into behaving, that is precisely what will trigger that guy's vanity, and he will take great pride in defying it. And that would just trigger all the wrong dynamics. But I don't know, I'm not up there; I don't see into either of their heads. So what's your take on this? Could Schumer be going harder on Manchin than he is? </p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>We were having this discussion on Twitter the other day, this is like the Green Lantern theory of politics. As Matt Yglesias introduced to Brendan Nyhan, who I think turned it into the Green Lantern Theory of the Presidency, it’s the idea that individuals can rise up against and defy the structural or forces of the universe to make great things happen. And as you pointed out, there's something that people said with Obama all the time, “Why can't he, you know, deliver all these big things that he's promised?” </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Why can’t he make Joe Lieberman be a less horrible person?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Right. So here's the thing, as you pointed out, it is unfalsifiable as an argument. You could always just say, “Well, if they'd only tried harder, and they pushed harder, they did this, done this or that.” And so it's a difficult thing to deal with. But I think that, given the stakes of this issue, it is really important to sort of surround it with as many facts as you can to try to get an answer there. </p><p>I would say a real example of Green Lantern-ism was Joe Biden on the campaign trail, saying he was going to cause Republicans to have an epiphany, and deliver all these Republican votes and usher in a new era of bipartisan dealmaking. That was really interesting because that was going up against structural forces that are causing Republicans to be polarized and not want to deal; they're larger than any individual can deal with. I would argue, on the flip side, that expecting leaders and a president to be able to deliver a small handful of votes from their own party, for bills that are broadly popular with the American people, is not Green Lantern-ism and as a more reasonable expectation of leaders. </p><p>And so then, you say, so what's the leverage? This is where I don't want to be evasive, but the thing is, that's just sort of what a leader figures out. I worked for Harry Reid, but I wasn't Harry Reid, you know what I mean? Reid's unique skill as a leader was to figure out what it was that could get a person to Yes, and sometimes that is twisting arms and sometimes it’s just persuasion.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>They don't have earmarks anymore, right? That was a huge tool for that purpose.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Right. But one of the things they have is the massive public pressure, of the fact that you have commentators across the political spectrum begging senators to save our democracy here, and advocating for filibuster reform. So what I would stipulate is that under these conditions, it is possible for a very skilled leader to find a way to get Joe Manchin and Kyrsten Sinema to Yes. </p><p>And we may not be able to say, well, you should call this donor in West Virginia or this interest group and they'll be the ones to twist his arm and get him to Yes, or, this friend of his from childhood, who will be the one to persuade him, you know what I mean? We don't know what these things are, but what is the marginal value of a leader if they don't have more insight into what can move Manchin than you and me talking here on this podcast, or people on Twitter?</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Well he's not running again also, right? He's not running for the Senate again, do we know that?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Well, I think a lot of people speculate that he won't. The reason is, you know, he barely won in 2018 by something like barely 3 points</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>He doesn’t particularly seem to like the Senate either.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Yeah, exactly. But that was sort of cut, I think, in favor of being willing to do reform because why not? You know, why sort of be the guy to kill Biden's agenda on your way out the door, and then just peace out? You know what I mean? Like why not to say YOLO. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>“He might run for governor” is one thing I hear, and if you're gonna run for governor of West Virginia, you need that Maverick-y whatever.</p><p>Adam Jentleson </p><p>Yeah, sure. But, you know, I think that the same reason he might not win as governor is the same as why he might not win in the Senate because it's a statewide election. His state is Trump-y by 30 points, and he barely squeaked by in 2018. So all that is to say, I don't think that I'm arguing that this is an easy thing to do. But you know, Lyndon Johnson, when they brought the 1964 Civil Rights Act to the floor, they didn't have the votes for it. It was filibustered for three months. Through a consistent process of working with members, listening to what they wanted, and applying pressures to strategic points, they got the votes for it. </p><p>I mean, Reid got the 60 votes for the Health Care bill. The last vote was Ben Nelson of Nebraska. Reid didn't have his vote until after he brought the bill to the floor; the famous “Cornhusker Kickback” was a deal that was cut while the bill was on the floor. So you find a way. And I think that right now, Schumer is doing a good job. I think this filibuster on the 1/6 commission, setting a clear deadline for S1 in June: he's sort of setting boundaries, and sort of creating a cauldron of pressure around Manchin. So I would argue that I think he's doing a good job, but we're gonna have to see how this comes out. But between a president in Biden who ran on being a dealmaker and bragging about all the deals you could cut, and Schumer who wants to be LBJ, the two of them working together, really should be able to find a way to get Manchin to Yes.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Well, the weird thing is, if you're a vain person–I mean, Manchin is the pivot point now–he could single handedly save US democracy. What better way to flatter one's own vanity than to literally be a hero?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>That’s right. And it's not just the left that will congratulate him. Yeah. I mean, it will be David Brooks writing in his column. I mean, this is a very big opportunity to be a hero who will go down in history as having done a good thing. This is going to stand up well, to history, if he shifts in favor of reform to help these democracy reforms to pass.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>One of the more cynical takes on all this is that one of the reasons Democrats–some Democratic senators–like the filibuster, is that they probably don't have 50 votes for a lot of these things, and they don't want the awkwardness; they don't want that to be known. They don't want that to be recorded. How much of this sort of big bold agenda that we're talking about would happen? Like people say, you get rid of the filibuster and then it's the PRO Act, and SB 1, and this and that. How much of that bold agenda do you think really, when the rubber hits the road, has all 50 Democratic votes?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>I think a fair amount of it will. There's a lot of talk that's like, “Oh, what has 50 votes,” but I think that's the wrong metric. I think you should look at what has like 46-ish votes, because bills too often don't have the votes until they get to the floor. I would also look at what bills have like 46, but no hard No-s against them. And so I would throw the PRO Act into that category. I think it actually has 46 votes, and of the outstanding Democrats, nobody's come out and said, “Absolutely, I'm not for it.” So that to me says, that is a situation that’s ripe for when you get that bill to the floor and you make whatever deals you need to make to get those last four Democrats. That's a bill that's gonna pass. I would put S1 in that category, you've got 49 co sponsors out of 50; Manchin has said he has problems with it, but he also co-sponsored that exact same bill the previous Congress, so I don't think there's any showstopper there that prevents him from getting to Yes. So I would look at the range of things that are maybe 45 plus, with nobody like campaigning against them. I would say all of those things are possible: the DREAM Act, which probably already has 40 or 50; I'd say some version of background checks. Obviously, the voting rights preclearance, and those things, a lot of big important stuff. </p><p>I think on energy and climate, the question is what's going to fall out of reconciliation, what will be deemed that it can't comply with the rules by the parliamentarian. I think you'll have a fair amount of droppings––they call them Byrd droppings because it's the Byrd rule that causes them to fall out of the package. So you'll probably have a fair amount of Byrd droppings to sweep up on climate change that you'll want to get through. It's a lot of stuff and I think voting rights alone: that to me is enough reason to do it. But I think that there's a lot of other stuff–paid family leave, which got ruled out of last reconciliation bill, maybe a compromise on the minimum wage–there's a lot of stuff that you can get through if if they go nuclear relatively soon and in a way that allows them to have time to pass all those things. DC statehood, by the way, is another critically important bill that has an uphill climb to be sure, but also is in the mid to high 40s already and given the stakes, I think it would have a decent chance of passage as well.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Here's one of the overarching questions that I and I think a bunch of people have. It's probably unanswerable on some level, but, it really seems like US senators, particularly Democratic senators, are in a bubble that is nigh impenetrable. Like, there are things that among sort of your generally politically engaged lefty, have now become sort of bog obvious conventional wisdom, like that the Republicans are all about obstruction, and that the filibuster is reactionary, just on and on, that just don't seem to penetrate the US Senate. I guess I'm just sort of curious about the life world of a Democratic senator. Who are they talking to, and where are they getting the reinforcement for the sort of antiquated views that they cling to? If they turn tune into  progressive websites, or cable channels or anything, they're gonna see arguments against themselves; they're gonna be pelted by arguments against themselves. So somehow they're remaining immune? And I guess I'm just wondering, like, what is the kind of epistemic bubble that they've created, and how are they maintaining it in the face of such a torrent of criticism?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>The answer is the Senate. You know, it's its own self protecting entity. And it actually sort of takes a very active role in self protection. As soon as Senators start orientation, they're sort of told a lot of these myths about the institution, and a lot of them come over from the House. It's sort of defined to them in contrast to the House and it’s said, “This is a place where we're supposed to be slow, we're supposed to be frustrating. This is the whole purpose of the institution. And in fact, this is what makes it great,” is what they're told. So it creates this perverse dynamic, where arguments from outside only reinforce their sort of defensiveness about the Senate, because they immediately become almost brainwashed into believing that the outside world doesn't understand this complex and beautiful institution. And if the President is arguing against them, well, that's the executive branch and the whole point of the Senate is to be a check on the executive. So we shouldn't let them determine what we do as senators. There's a grain of truth to that, like we were talking about before, but it's become vastly exaggerated. The Senate is supposed to be thoughtful, and craft thoughtful solutions, but it's not supposed to just not pass any solutions.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>It’s not supposed to not do anything. There's no exactly theory of government that results in that being the conclusion</p><p>Adam Jentleson </p><p>What you do see, though, is that a lot of the younger senators, I think, are less susceptible to that.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Brian Schatz, came into the Senate and heard the myths like everybody else, but he just looked around, and he's like, oh, we're not doing anything. We're not getting anything done. It's possible for them to realize.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>That's right, because the big difference with the younger crowd is that they haven't experienced any success in the Senate. All they've seen is an institution that's failed. And so it's the older folks who can recall an era where they did actually get things done on a bipartisan basis. There aren't that many of them left. And that's why the caucus quickly got to like 45, 46, 47, in support of filibuster reform, because it is much younger and much more composed of folks who are ready for change. But it is still folks, who can sort of recall an era where they did cut this deal, and they did overcome a filibuster and yada yada, that still are sometimes susceptible to thismythmaking. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>There's a certain view out there, which I hold onto every other day or so, which says that the GOP has become so homogenous illogically, racially, etc., and so radicalized against the Democratic Party and democracy. There's just a notion that there is no rule based system that can continue working if one of two parties has decided it doesn't favor democracy anymore and feels it's just not restrained at all by the rules, especially by unspoken, sort of unwritten norms. If you just break free of those entirely, and become sort of the purely nihilistic party that's purely about power, is there any set of rules that can make that work? Is it possible to sort of reform our way past this? Or, do you think that we're sort of headed for some sort of reckoning regardless?</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Yeah, look, not to end on a depressing note, but the answer is, I'm not sure. I mean, I don't know, and I'm not gonna sit here and tell your listeners that I think filibuster reform is going to solve all of our problems, and especially these larger structural problems that you're talking about. However, I will say that I think it is sort of the necessary, if not sufficient condition, to solve our problems. I think that you can't solve any of them, if you don't reform the filibuster, because you're not going to be able to pass things like S1, and Voting Rights, and all these other bills that I think could pass if we got rid of the filibuster. It is a step in the right direction. And it's, and we're certainly not going to solve them if we don't do it. </p><p>I come back to DC statehood; I think DC status is a critically important reform that if we are able to get rid of the filibuster, we should put all our effort into passing, because that will address some of the deeper structural inequities of the Senate, especially when it comes to how underrepresented non white Americans are in the Senate. So I think it opens the door to the possibility that we can pass the reforms we need to fix these deeper structural issues. And I don't think we have a lot of hope of solving them if we don't do it. But it's gonna be a long, uphill fight, and I think that it's going to be a struggle. </p><p>But like you look at the vote today on the January 6 Commission, it was a bipartisan vote. You know, you had seven Republicans join with Democrats to support the commission, but it failed, because you didn't get to 60. So if you're gonna sort of start to draw this party back into the norm of legislating, and actually start to have at least a little bit of bipartisanship, the only way you're going to do it is if you get rid of the filibuster, because you're just not going to get to 60 in today's Senate at any time in the foreseeable future. But you could get to 52, 53, 54 on a lot of different things. And so if we're going to draw this party back into the arena, and get them to not be completely off in crazy land, you have to make it easier to pass things and make it easier, you know, for the gears of legislating to actually turn again. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>It's ironic that the filibuster, which Manchin says is preserving bipartisanship, is arguably preventing it, preventing the Republican Party from stepping down off this ledge. Thank you so much for coming on, and helping me plumb the mysteries of this very worst of the world's legislative institutions.</p><p>Adam Jentleson</p><p>Absolutely man, it was really fun to talk. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-adam-jentleson-on-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:37106043</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 04 Jun 2021 16:00:10 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/37106043/5d399b0711216efcdc31dd578225a9e5.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3188</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/37106043/d2f68a7521b0b3b137d7ffcfe1476c47.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Rooftop solar and home batteries make a clean grid vastly more affordable]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>(If you’d rather listen than read, just click Play above.)</em></p><p>Energy nerds love arguing over the value of distributed energy resources (DERs), the rooftop solar panels and customer-owned batteries that are growing more popular by the day. There’s a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/californias-net-metering-3-0-battle-energy-equity-and-the-future-of-rooftop-solar/">fight in California right now</a> over the value of energy from rooftop solar, just the latest skirmish in a long war that has <a target="_blank" href="https://insideclimatenews.org/news/08042021/inside-clean-energy-the-coast-to-coast-battle-over-rooftop-solar/">ranged over numerous states</a>. </p><p>The conventional wisdom in wonk circles is that the value provided by DERs is not sufficient to overcome the fact that the energy they produce is, on a per-kWh basis, much more expensive than that produced by utility-scale solar, wind, and batteries (residential solar is roughly 2.5 times as expensive as utility-scale solar, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nrel.gov/solar/solar-installed-system-cost.html">according to NREL</a>).</p><p>For that reason, many wonks view DERs as a kind of boutique energy and argue that public funds are better spent on utility-scale energy. </p><p>Turns out: no, that’s wrong. Some groundbreaking new modeling demonstrates that the value of DERs to the overall electricity system is far greater than has typically been appreciated. </p><p>The work didn’t get the attention it deserved when it came out in late December, so I want to spend some time with it. First, though, let’s get clear on what we’re talking about.</p><p>The misguided battle between centralized and distributed energy</p><p>To understand the difference between centralized and distributed energy, it’s important to understand the distinction between transmission grids, the high-voltage power lines that carry electricity over longer distances, and distribution grids, the nests of low-voltage power lines (strung from the familiar brown poles) that carry electricity to local consumers. If the transmission grid is the interstate highway system of electricity, distribution grids are the local road systems that branch off those main trunks. </p><p>Centralized energy generally refers to utility-scale power generators (or energy storage) hooked up directly to the transmission grid: coal or natural gas plants, wind farms, solar fields, grid-scale battery stacks, what have you. The big stuff.</p><p>Distributed energy consists of anything that generates, stores, or manages electricity on distribution grids: rooftop solar panels, ground-mounted “community solar” arrays, consumer batteries, electric vehicles, building energy management software, and the like. (And then there’s truly distributed energy, in the form of off-grid installations that don’t connect to any larger grid. We won’t be getting into that today.)</p><p>To paint in broad and somewhat crude strokes, advocates for centralized renewable energy tend to view advocates for distributed energy as crunchy pastoral proto-hippies who can’t handle modernity. They note that utility-scale energy is cheaper and capable of powering highly energy-dense modern economies, whereas distributed energy is expensive and diffuse. </p><p>Advocates for distributed energy tend to view advocates for centralized energy as corporate capitalists in thrall to perpetual growth. They note that distributed energy brings a range of benefits, from resilience and independence to savings on avoided infrastructure, whereas utility-scale energy tends to do greater damage to landscapes and concentrate economic power.</p><p>Like many disputes in the energy world, this one has hardened into an identity battle, which is annoying and unproductive, since the answer, like with so many other disputes, is <em>both-and</em>.</p><p>Nonetheless, it’s worth noting that advocates for distributed energy have been at something of a disadvantage to date. It can be devilishly difficult to quantify the benefits of DERs, so a lot of the discussion gets into hand-wavey intangibles.</p><p>It can be especially difficult to quantify the benefits of DERs to larger grid systems, because energy modeling to date has effectively ignored distribution grids (which represent about a third of US spending on electricity). It has treated them purely as load, as demand to be satisfied, rather than as active, flexible participants in grid management. </p><p>Until now! </p><p>Or, until a few months ago anyway. In December, energy modeler Christopher Clack (a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-why-we-need-more">familiar name</a> to Volts readers) and his team at Vibrant Clean Energy (VCE) debuted a new way to model the energy system that takes into account DERs and the services they provide. They used it to study the effect of DERs on the electricity system and the results are summarized in “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.vibrantcleanenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/WhyDERs_ES_Final.pdf">A New Roadmap for the Lowest Cost Grid</a>.” (Full technical report <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vibrantcleanenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/WhyDERs_TR_Final.pdf">here</a>; slideshow presentation <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vibrantcleanenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/LocalSolarRoadmap_FINAL.pdf">here</a>.)</p><p>Spoiler: the cheapest possible carbon-free US grid involves vastly more centralized renewable energy, but it also involves vastly more distributed energy. What’s more, far from being alternatives, they are complements: the more DERs you put in place, the more centralized renewables you can put on the system. DERs are a utility-scale renewable accelerant. </p><p>The practical implication is that going all out on DERs is to everyone’s benefit, up and down the electricity supply chain, from utilities to consumers. </p><p>It is difficult to exaggerate just what a revolutionary change this represents in energy modeling and how much it turns conventional wisdom on its head. By making distribution grids visible to their model and co-optimizing those grids with the transmission system, the team at VCE uncovered a source of grid flexibility that could save a decarbonizing electricity system some half a trillion dollars through 2050. That’s real money. </p><p>(If you want to take a deep dive into the material, check out <a target="_blank" href="https://xenetwork.org/ets/episodes/episode-146-why-local-solar-costs-less/">this interview with Clack on Chris Nelder’s Energy Transition Show</a>. It is gleefully nerdy; I cannot recommend it highly enough.)</p><p>The cheapest energy scenario is clean and distributed</p><p>At the heart of VCE’s work is Clack’s state-of-the-art modeling tool: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vibrantcleanenergy.com/products/wisdom-p/">Weather-Informed energy Systems: for design, operations and markets planning (WIS:dom)</a>. It allows resolution down to two-mile square areas and makes dispatch decisions every five minutes. It takes into account granular weather data stretching over decades, climate impacts, policy, all forms of generation, storage, transmission, and on and on. VCE boasts that it “leverages 10,000 times more data points than traditional models.”</p><p>For this study, WIS:dom was augmented to better understand and represent distribution grids, so that it could bring transmission and distribution systems together in one system and co-optimize them. It was given better information about the costs and capabilities of DERs and more options; for example, instead of spinning up a new generator to meet peak demand, it could draw on distributed solar and batteries. </p><p>No one to Clack’s knowledge has done this before, so there was a lot of experimenting to get it right. “I had to spend a lot of money and time and resources upgrading the model to include this, with a lot of failures along the way,” says Clack. “That's why I'm confident that we did it first, because I spent a lot of time trying to find someone else that had done it, so I didn’t have to do the hard work.”</p><p>The modeling question was: if a high-resolution optimization tool is given DERs as an option, will it choose to deploy them? If so, how much?</p><p>The broader social question was: can DERs help lower the overall costs of a clean electricity system? If so, by how much?</p><p>The paper presents four core scenarios (which were run across a range of geographies):</p><p>* <strong>BAU</strong> (business as usual), which includes existing policies and mandates but otherwise lets economics drive dispatch decisions; it deploys WIS:dom in a way that mimics traditional models;</p><p>* <strong>BAU-DER</strong>, which does the same but uses the augmented form of WIS:dom, with greater visibility into distribution systems;</p><p>* <strong>CE</strong> (clean energy), which models a system that reduces power sector carbon emissions 95 percent from 1990 levels by 2050; WIS:dom mimics traditional models;</p><p>* <strong>CE-DER</strong>, which models a 95 percent reduction but uses the augmented form of WIS:dom.</p><p>To skip straight to the results: if you make DERs an option for the model, it deploys an absolute boatload of them (spending about $10 billion extra over the first 10 years), and by doing so substantially reduces overall system costs. </p><p>BAU-DER is $301 billion cheaper than BAU (the blue line above), which means we would save money from day one by deploying more DERs even if we didn’t care about climate change. </p><p>CE-DER is $473 billion cheaper than CE (the green line), which means DERs will make the decarbonization of electricity much less expensive than doing it all with centralized renewables and storage. </p><p>And here’s the kicker: CE-DER is $88 billion cheaper than BAU (the red line), which means, economically speaking, we’d be better off reducing electricity emissions by 95 percent using DERs than continuing with the status quo. </p><p>(And this is all just the pure economics — it leaves out the enormous health savings and environmental justice benefits of reduced point-source pollution.)</p><p>Whether you’re concerned about climate change or not, whether you want to reduce emissions or not, whether you care about the health and resilience of local communities or not, deploying DERs brings down system costs. It’s the fiscally responsible thing to do.</p><p>Now, note the shape of the red line above (and to a lesser extent, the green line). Scenarios that decarbonize using DERs are a smidgen more expensive for the first 10 years or so because they use those early years to deploy an enormous quantity of DERs. </p><p>The US currently has about <a target="_blank" href="https://www.seia.org/us-solar-market-insight#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20installed%2019.2%20gigawatts,power%2017.7%20million%20American%20homes.">98 gigawatts of rooftop solar</a> and less than a gigawatt of distributed energy storage installed. Through 2025, CE-DER deploys an additional 75 gigawatts of distributed solar and 27 gigawatts of distributed storage; by 2035, it is 200 and 90, respectively. (By 2050, it is 247 and 160.) </p><p>That is an absolute DER building binge, starting now.</p><p>After that early period of heightened investment, though, savings begin to skyrocket as DERs pay off in system benefits. </p><p>DERs make everything else on the grid work better</p><p>For the entire history of electricity up until about five minutes ago, grid operators viewed electricity demand as an exogenous variable, a set figure they had to meet with supply, not something they had much control over.</p><p>The key to the value of DERs is that they make electricity demand more controllable. With energy generation and storage scattered throughout distribution grids, grid operators have a way to move energy around, both geographically and temporally, without firing up more power plants. They can absorb extra energy if there’s a dip in demand or produce extra energy if there’s a spike. The overall effect is to smooth out the “demand curve.” </p><p>Look at the thick black line on the top right graph below — that’s the distribution demand curve throughout a representative year:</p><p>Now note the same black line on the bottom right graph. By satisfying the little demand peaks with distributed solar and storage, the demand for utility-scale energy is leveled off. </p><p>Here’s a graph that shows a “load duration curve,” which reveals how high demand is, for how often in the year, and how DERs affect it:</p><p>As you can see by the sharp spike on the left, there are relatively rare periods of extremely high demand (peaks). The problem is that the current electricity system has to be sized to meet those peaks, even if that means many power plants end up idle most of the time. Clack says that today, roughly 20 to 25 percent of generation capacity on the grid — some 300-350 gigawatts — covers around 3 percent of the energy load each year. (This, in a nutshell, is why electricity systems everywhere are so overbuilt.) </p><p>The light blue-shaded area on the curve shows the reduction in demand that DERs can provide (the dark blue on the right is the increase in demand). Not only can DERs “shave the peak” by an average of 17 percent nationwide, they can reduce the demand for utility-scale energy for 80 percent of the hours of the year. They make the load duration curve more level as well. </p><p>These demand-leveling effects bring four big benefits:</p><p>* First, if you don’t have those big peaks in demand for utility-scale energy, then you don’t need that 20 to 25 percent of capacity that only runs during peaks. Not building those plants, or shutting them down early, saves lots of money.</p><p>* Second, a more level demand curve means that all generators on the system will run more consistently, with fewer ramps up and down, at closer to their full capacity, helping to maximize their value. </p><p>* Third, a more level demand curve means that transmission congestion will be reduced and transmission assets will be more efficiently utilized. (In <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-two-more-ideas">one of my Transmission Month posts</a>, I discussed “energy storage as a transmission asset.” This is the same idea, on a broader scale.)</p><p>* Fourth, DERs offer the system the option to shift demand to meet variable supply, rather than always forcing it to shift supply to meet demand. Shifting demand is often <em>much</em> cheaper. </p><p>These benefits explain why CE-DER is so much cheaper than CE, and even than BAU. They explain why, even though rooftop solar may cost more than centralized solar on a per-kWh basis, its value is greater.</p><p>Infusing distribution systems with DERs allows grid operators more stability and more options — including more renewables. </p><p>DERs enable more utility-scale renewables</p><p>Wind and solar are cheap, but they are variable. They come and go on their own schedule, outside of our control. There will be times — seconds, minutes, hours, sometimes weeks and months — when wind and solar dip and something else is needed to fill the gaps. </p><p>Conventionally, this role is played by dispatchable generators that can be turned up and down at will — these days, mostly natural gas plants. Given that most natural gas plants, at least those without carbon capture, will have to be phased out in a decarbonized system, there’s a hunt on for “firm” zero-carbon alternatives — think nuclear, hydro, natural gas or biomass with carbon capture, or geothermal. </p><p>But VCE’s modeling shows that a big chunk of that role can be played by DERs, which Clack calls a “firming agent on the load.” </p><p>By bringing demand more under grid operators’ control, DERs virtually eliminate curtailment, or discarding of renewable energy due to temporary oversupply, through 2045. Just as they allow transmission to be used more effectively, they allow us to consume more of the energy generated by existing utility-scale renewables.</p><p>They also prevent the familiar problem of “value deflation” — more wind and solar energy at particular times and places competes with existing wind and solar energy from the same times and places — by giving grid operators a whole series of time- and location-specific demand knobs that they can turn up or down at will to better accommodate renewables. </p><p>By preventing value deflation, DERs will allow for more new renewables on the system (and the retirement of more thermal and fossil generation). That’s why the CE-DER scenario builds <em>more</em> utility-scale wind and solar than the CE scenario. CE-DER builds 800 gigawatts of utility wind, 800 of utility solar, and 200 of utility storage, whereas CE builds 60 gigawatts less wind and 50 less solar (though slightly more batteries). </p><p>By enabling renewable energy to be moved around, DERs unlock more of it — with, again, enormous public health benefits that are not captured in the model. </p><p>Put technically, as Clack told Nelder, “the model says that distributed [solar] and storage in some combination ends up being higher value than the differential in the [levelized] cost of utility-scale solar and distributed solar.”</p><p>Put more colloquially, though it will require enormous upfront investment in the coming decade, laying a quilt of DERs over the nation’s distribution systems is the best thing we can possibly do to enable the rapid emission reductions we will need in the decade after. </p><p>DERs are not a boutique version of, or a distraction from, utility-scale renewables; they are a necessary complement, an enabler and accelerator. </p><p>DERs will mean more jobs</p><p>VCE did some analysis estimating that the DER-enhanced scenarios would add an additional million jobs per year relative to conventional scenarios. </p><p>It stands to reason that a huge deployment of DERs would create lots of jobs. These are very hands-on, labor-intensive projects. And since distribution systems are ubiquitous in the US, it would create jobs in every part of the country (though not uniformly). </p><p>I’m generally suspicious of employment projections, so I don’t know how much stake to put in the particular figure, but we can be confident that more DERs = more jobs. </p><p>DERs could hasten the collapse of existing power markets</p><p>VCE’s modeling shows that current electricity markets, if they are not reformed, basically collapse in the next 10 to 20 years. DERs will hasten that collapse in two ways. </p><p>First, they will reduce demand peaks, which produce a great deal of value in current markets. Lots of peaker plants will get cancelled or shut down and peaker money will dry up. </p><p>Second, DERs will enable more utility-scale wind and solar, which have zero marginal costs. They are all upfront capital costs; once a solar panel is in place, it doesn’t cost it anything more to produce the next kW. It can bid into markets at $0. Pretty soon, so much of the market’s power will come from zero-marginal-cost sources that prices will be $0 most of the year, and $0 means zero profit for participating generators. </p><p>Electricity markets were built for fossil fuel generators. They need reform — but that’s a topic for a different post. (<a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/6/29/12038074/power-utilities-suck">This</a> is a good start.)</p><p>Clean electrification boosts the value of DERs</p><p>An intriguing note: Clack says that if WIS:dom is told not just to decarbonize electricity but to decarbonize the whole economy (i.e., <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12938086/electrify-everything">electrify everything</a>), the value of DERs to the grid effectively doubles. </p><p>An economy-wide decarbonization scenario that makes use of DERs saves a <em>trillion dollars</em> relative to one that doesn’t. VCE will have a new report on economy-wide decarbonization coming out soon.</p><p>DERs also provide a range of co-benefits</p><p>VCE’s modeling only captures DERs’ contribution to overall grid performance and cost. It does not capture many of the benefits that have long attracted customers to them: resilience against brownouts and blackouts, the capacity to go off-grid temporarily (or permanently), independence from the whims of utilities and state regulators, reduced personal greenhouse gas emissions, and most of all, lower electricity bills. </p><p>All of those benefits will help drive early adoption of DERs as their value to the grid ramps up (though they should be boosted by utility, state, and federal incentives). </p><p>The value of DERs should be visible in all models and states</p><p>Clack says that it’s just four paragraphs of code that open WIS:dom up to distribution grids — other models, including the models that utilities use in planning, could easily replicate this. </p><p>“One of the reasons I was so keen on having it be relatively simplistic is, it should be able to be adopted by other models,” he says. “Maybe they wouldn't show as much savings as we do, because of different model logic, but I'm pretty confident they will show similar trajectories.”</p><p>This is just one more area where outdated utility models and practices are keeping costs too high and the clean-energy transition too slow. Utilities have traditionally been hostile to DERs, viewing them as competitors or net costs, but VCE’s modeling demonstrates what should have been obvious: having flexible generation and storage infused throughout distribution grids offers a fantastic tool to help stabilize a grid with growing renewables and increasing electric loads and bring costs down for all ratepayers. </p><p>VCE’s work is obviously germane to the many fights going on across the country over net metering. (See <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/californias-net-metering-3-0-battle-energy-equity-and-the-future-of-rooftop-solar/">California in particular</a>.) Utilities want to pay solar homeowners less for the energy they produce, but VCE’s modeling shows that, if anything, they should be paid <em>more</em>. They can help reduce rates for all ratepayers. It makes fiscal sense for utilities and states to incentivize as much DER growth as humanly possible. </p><p>Utilities need to stop viewing DERs as an intrusion, a disruption, or a distraction. They are not simply smaller, more expensive versions of utility-scale energy. They are a firming foundation that will help utilities build stable, reliable decarbonized electricity systems.</p><p>DERs are good for everyone</p><p>It’s not often you come across an energy solution that’s truly win-win, but DERs, if they are properly understood and deployed, are good for just about everyone.</p><p>They save building owners money, increase individual and community resilience, create local jobs, reduce peak demand, level the demand curve, get more out of existing power generators and transmission lines, unlock more utility-scale wind and solar, boost reliability, and reduce system costs. </p><p>We should build lots of them, everywhere, starting now. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/rooftop-solar-and-home-batteries</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:36736376</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 28 May 2021 16:00:27 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/36736376/af8b68ec37b5100ddce2309448a8c200.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1601</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/36736376/83a47ebb09d8137d0cfb44f23136e6c6.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Will Wilkinson on libertarianism, pluralism, and America's political crisis]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>I have been reading Will Wilkinson’s writing since I was a baby blogger, way back in the early 2000s. By then, I had already left behind the libertarianism that gripped me in college, but Will was still a professional libertarian at the Cato Institute. I disagreed with him about many things, but I always found him rigorous and engaging.</p><p>Over the years, I’ve followed as he’s moved from Cato to the center-right Niskanen Center (where he <a target="_blank" href="https://reason.com/2021/01/22/niskanen-center-will-wilkinson-lynch-mike-pence-tweet-cancel-culture/">got canceled</a>) to, now, the Progressive Policy Institute, where he is a senior fellow. In the process he left behind libertarianism for “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.cato.org/commentary/liberaltarians">liberaltarianism</a>” and now some some kind of synthesis that doesn’t quite have a name but lands in the vicinity of social democrat, with an emphasis on small-d democracy.</p><p>And of course, like everyone who’s anyone, he has his own newsletter: <a target="_blank" href="https://modelcitizen.substack.com">Model Citizen</a>.</p><p>There’s something nice about following a mind you admire as it tries to work its way toward higher and better understanding — it is so rare these days to witness anyone change their minds about anything — and there’s something especially nice when it ends up converging with your own thinking. I feel much more confident about things I believe when Will articulates them.</p><p>Both Will and I have come to spend less time thinking about what might be the correct or optimal political philosophy and more time thinking about the workaday challenges of pluralism and democracy: how people of different cultures, ethnicities, genders, beliefs, and personalities, whose disagreements and conflicts are unlikely ever to be entirely resolved, can live together in relative peace.</p><p>All of which is to say, I’ve wanted to talk politics with Will forever. We got around to it a few weeks ago and now I’ve finally got the thing produced. If you're in the mood for almost two hours of nerdy talk about Ayn Rand, rationalism, freedom, social insurance, the relationship between markets and government, and the perils of pluralism, strap on those headphones and travel along. </p><p><em>(Note: several times in the pod I say “non-zero” when I mean “non–zero sum,” which bugs me now, but what can you do.)</em></p><p></p><p>VOLTS</p><p>D: Hello, welcome to volts. I am your host, David Roberts. Today I'm excited, as I have as a guest Will Wilkinson who is currently a senior scholar at the Progressive Policy Institute, which is sure to be of some amusement to those who have followed Will's career which began at the extremely different Cato Institute. So rather than try to explain Will’s whole history, which we're going to get into, I'll just say that I've been reading Will’s work for years now, and have been following his intellectual and political journey that he's been on, which has paralleled my own in a lot of ways. And so I thought I would talk with him about that journey, and about where he's ended up, and how we move forward in American politics from now. So we're taking on all the big questions today. So thanks for coming, Will, we appreciate you being on. </p><p>WW: Thanks, Dave. I'm ready. </p><p>DR: So before getting into the meat of things, just start by telling us a little bit about where you're from and how the story of Will Wilkinson that ended with you being a young, teenage Ayn Rand enthusiast, what's the what's the origin story?</p><p>WW: Well, I was born the child of a poor sharecropper. Just kidding. That's, yeah, that's The Jerk. which describes me pretty well.</p><p>I grew up in a little town in the middle of Iowa - Marshall town - it’s a small city of about 27,000 people. It's the county seat. So that makes it locally important. And it's exactly the same size as it was when I grew up there, which is interesting, because the composition of the population is very different today, but I moved there when I was five, because my dad had taken a job as the chief of police. So my entire childhood my dad was the chief of police in my hometown. My mother was a nurse for a large part of my childhood, she stayed at home, but she also worked as an obstetrics nurse and a home health nurse when I was a little bit older. I’ve got two older sisters. You know, go Bobcats. I don't know, what do you want to know about?</p><p>DR: It's so American. Well, it's a small town, the chief police dad, the nurse Mom, it's, you know,</p><p>WW: It's like, I really liked encyclopedia brown books because his dad was a police chief and his mom was a nurse. I grew up in a John Cougar Mellencamp song, I even would suck down chili dogs outside the Tasty Freeze, for real. So, one of the things that I find interesting, and I've been working for a long time on a book proposal of a version of this density divide paper that I wrote a couple of years ago. And I've been using my hometown as a model of things that have changed in the economy and how that's affected where people settle. And I didn't know when I was a kid that I was enjoying peak Marshalltown, Iowa; it was as good as it ever was in its existence. And it was as good as it was ever going to be. You know, it was a really healthy, vital little town with small manufacturers. The schools were great, you know, just like an incredibly active civic life - great little league, flag football, all of that stuff. And, you know, most of it's gone now.</p><p>DR: All things that seem to be sort of dying out.</p><p>WW: Not the Little League Baseball, that's not gone. But I mean most of the manufacturing is gone, and the average level of education in the town has gone down. One of the main employers was a place called Fisher Controls, which makes governors and valves. They employed a lot of engineers and a lot of lawyers, people like that. And they really downscaled their presence in Marshalltown. We also used to have a big Maytag air conditioning plant, a bunch of different stuff, which employed executives and hired lawyers and employed accountants and people with college degrees. Most of that stuff has gone, along with the good manufacturing jobs for, for people without college degrees. And so we've got mostly shitty manufacturing jobs in food processing.</p><p>drvolts   5:11  </p><p>It's gone from a 90s John Cougar Mellencamp song to like a 2010s John Cougar Mellencamp song.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  5:18  </p><p>Yeah, it's gotten a little, it's getting a little darker. But it was, it was a lovely place to grow up. Really. And, it was a conservative place. You know, my dad is a cop, which is a conservative-ish profession. My mother was actually a more political person and she was very conservative. For some time, she subscribed to the Phyllis Schlafly Eagle Forum newsletter, and that was just kind of background in my childhood. It's not like our family was very political. My dad was one of those old fashioned public servants who thought it was extremely untoward to ever express a political opinion. Because his job was to look after the safety and security of the whole town, and everybody needs to believe that you're working for them. And you can't take sides, right, so he wouldn't even tell us what his political opinions were at the kitchen table.</p><p>DR: Funny. </p><p>WW: Yeah, yeah. And I think that kind of ethos really has changed in law enforcement.</p><p>drvolts   6:23  </p><p>To say the least. Well, let's start with both of us. You have told this story of before you were sort of an enthusiastic libertarian as a teen and ended up entering the professional, libertarian world. I also had a brief period of enthusiastic Ayn Rand enthusiasm, and libertarianism. And we're going to talk about how you move past that, but I want to just take a moment to take seriously what it is about libertarianism that attracts a certain type of young man, like we were. Mostly men, mostly white - not exclusively. Let's take a moment to take the attraction seriously; what was it about it that clicked so hard for you and made such sense for you at that moment?</p><p>Will Wilkinson  7:29  </p><p>You know, it's really hard to say exactly what it is. And I'm very wary about the fidelity of memory. But what I remember, it's actually kind of weird, how I ended up being a libertarian. I grew up a member of the reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, which is a sect of Mormonism. I won't explain that unless you want it explained. And I went to church camp every summer for several weeks. And I've always been a weird person. I mean, I've always been a bit of a free thinker. And one day, at a campfire,  you know you'd sing all the campfire songs, these silly songs at first, and then you get into the more serious songs, Kumbaya and all that s**t. And then campers are invited to get up and give testimonies, and mostly you get up and talk about how God is awesome and how your life has been touched and blessed and so on and so forth. You know, the RLDS, they're now known as the Community Christ, they're not they're not Community of Christ. They're not evangelical. You know, praise Jesus, speaking in tongues sort of things, it's actually pretty sedate. People would give their testimonies and I love singing with a bunch of people. I feel like that's what I miss most about church,</p><p>drvolts   9:02  </p><p>It's the best part of church.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  9:04  </p><p>I love it, I find it so nourishing to the soul. That is probably one of the reasons why I'm desiccated and bitter. We'd sung all the sweet campfire songs and I was filled with the spirit of love and community and I got up and I really wanted to tell people how much I loved them and I got up and said, you know, I don't really know about this God stuff. But I love all you guys. I think this is great.</p><p>drvolts   9:40  </p><p>The secular humanist credo!</p><p>Will Wilkinson  9:44  </p><p>Yeah, my mother was my Sunday school teacher and I don't know what it is in my personality. I've got a weird combination of just rigorous logic, this kind of relentless rationality about “does this make sense”? And also this drive to please and to be a good trooper for the cause. And so I legitimately wanted to be like the best, you know, quasi-Mormon that I could possibly be. And my mother would be teaching me the Bible or the Book of Mormon. And I would just relentlessly cross examine her about, “okay, so if this happened…” and then things don't make sense. And I would end up cornering her by accident, because I was just inquiring, like, well, how does this make sense? And she'd end up crying, because we're good. And then I would feel so terrible, because that wasn't my intention. But that kind of instinct came out in that campfire. And the funny thing that came to that was like, after, you know, the next day, one of the counselors, some middle aged dude wearing sandals with socks, came up to me and said, “Hey, you know, Bill”, I went by Bill. And he says “I think there's this book you'd really like”, and I said “yeah?”, and he's like, “yeah, it's called Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand”.</p><p>drvolts   11:19  </p><p>Mike, your quasi Mormon camp counselors turned you on to Ayn Rand.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  11:23  </p><p>Yeah, and he was kind of conspiratorial and I didn't really know why. But I was like, “okay”! So that summer I was maybe 15 or 16. I picked up Atlas Shrugged. And, you know, it's the fattest book, it’s 1200 pages or something like that. Anyway I dipped into it. And I was like, “this is a slog”, and just set it aside. Fast forward a couple years, after my freshman year in college at the University of Northern Iowa, I ended up being a tour guide at the Joseph Smith historic center in Nauvoo, Illinois, giving tours of Joseph Smith's house. And, I thought “Oh, this is gonna be a long summer”. There's nothing in Nauvoo, Illinois. It's not really a town. It's this abandoned kind of ghost town. All the Mormons lived there, and they left. There's this big historic site. And I was like, this is gonna be boring, so I need to bring the biggest book I've got. So I brought Atlas Shrugged, and it while giving tours of Joseph Smith's house. And I spent all summer reading it. You know, when you're a tour guide, you'd get the first shift and you'd open up the visitor center, and you'd kick back at the desk, and might be an hour, two hours before anybody comes in. So you'd sit back and read your novel. And I was riveted by it, I totally got into it. I decided I didn't believe in God, by the end of the book, and the thing is, I was clearly never going to really believe in God - I just don't have the god gene. I went back to college, for my sophomore year, and ended up reading The Fountainhead, and it really resonated with me. The thing that was really captivating to me was the critique of altruism, believe it or not. My church is this sweet-hearted, cosmopolitan, internationalist, “all humans are one”, vaguely social justice-y, even when I was a kid. It’s a really liberal form of Mormonism (comparatively). But everything is about service. Everything is about doing things for other people. And in my Midwestern milieu, and that overall service Christianity you're not supposed to stick your head up, you don't want to look like you've got a big head or you're better than other people. My dad would always say, “don't don't get too big for your britches”, that kind of thing. What I found in Ayn Rand was permission to be awesome. That's really what excited me down to the core of my being. This argument, this justification for just f*****g going for it. Be the best version of yourself that you can be and you don't have to f*****g apologize to anybody. You don't have to justify it to anybody. You just be awesome.</p><p>drvolts   14:56  </p><p>Right? It was the Uberman aspect you saw in yourself. Nobody who reads these things is like, “Oh, I suddenly realized my cousin is extraordinary” it's always “Oh wait, I'm extraordinary, at last I can tell the world”. </p><p>WW: Yeah, it's never, “I'm Eddie Willers” - that kind of pathetic viewpoint character, who's supposed to typify the average guy. We're all John Galt. Everybody who reads The Fountainhead is Howard Roark. But it was really transformative for me and I don't think in a bad way, because it's not really the Ubermensch stuff because I was never interested in lording power over others or crushing people under foot on my ascent to the peaks of Promethean glory or whatever. I just thought it was amazing that it was okay. That if I wanted to just do it for myself - if I had aspirations, if I wanted to be a great artist, I should try to be a great artist, right?</p><p>drvolts   16:11  </p><p>Well, that's a much more noble set of motivations and residences than I can claim. I was about the same age and it was one of the few times I was in my college library, literally just browsing the philosophy section, because I had sort of like a young man's interest in philosophy. Where did you stumble upon this? It's called Marable College in some small town, Tennessee. It had 800 students when I went there, so there's no reason anyone ever would have heard of it. But I stumbled across this book called The Virtue of Selfishness. And I was like, oh, tell me more. Tell me more. So I ended up reading all of Ayn’s non-fiction, and even in my peak Rand enthusiasm I could never abide her fiction. I still can't read a paragraph of it. It's so bad, but, but for me, it was less “I can be extraordinary, I can do what I want. I don't have to apologize to him.” For me, it's just like, “I can be left alone and don’t have to mess with anybody else.” Nobody messes with me, nobody owes me anything. I don't owe anybody else anything. I think a certain kind of young man, especially with that rationalist streak that you're talking about is often coupled with a certain degree of emotional illiteracy. Or let's say the way young men are socialized in the US, particularly young men who are good at school, work, rationalist stuff are often raised a certain way - not necessarily trained in emotional literacy. So the idea that there's these two languages, there's the language of propositions and reason and deduction, which is very clean and makes sense and is all transparent and right there. And then there's this other language of human emotion and interaction that is conducted in body language and implication and glances and girl stuff, right? And I just didn't speak that language. I wasn't good at it. I felt insecure when it was around like I never quite knew what was going on. And what Ayn Rand will tell you is just that that stuff literally doesn't matter. There is only the clear, rational meaning of the word on the page, the deduction. It's all very clean, and there's nothing hiding behind you. There's nothing you're not getting, right? All right there in the open. It's right angles and clean lines. And that's what drew me in is this perfect clarity. And it's a perfect clarity that tells me “Yes, you can relax, you're not missing a bunch of stuff. You're not failing to discharge a bunch of obligations that you're only vaguely aware of, right, you're not failing on an emotional level all the time. That stuff is a distraction for weaker people.” You need to become of clear, sharp diamond-like mind. And of course, you know, the young libertarian applies this diamond-like rationalism, generally to other people's words and actions. And maybe not quite so rigorously to their own. It's comfortable but yeah, I had no ambitions. My only ambition was to be left alone. And this is permission to be left alone. I still remember like, reading all these non-fiction books getting totally zealous like only an 18 year old college student can get zealous, and then going and writing this Religion final term paper, going into talk to my Professor, just explaining to him with this super intense earnestness, like why Ayn Rand was right and everything he had devoted his life to studying in practice, was not only wrong, but wrong and obvious, in trivially obvious ways. It's just ridiculous, right? It was all just ridiculous man. I feel it's so embarrassing in retrospect.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  20:56  </p><p>Yeah. And you know, when I think back on it, one of the things that I think is b******t that people do, when they ask “what's your intellectual journey?” is that they'll tell you about arguments, but if you know anything about how people come to have beliefs, that doesn't have anything to do with arguments, it's all identity. It's all what resonates with you, emotionally, and so there's a special irony in getting attracted to kind of rationalist stuff for purely emotional identity based reasons that you are completely blind to yourself.</p><p>drvolts   21:34  </p><p>Yes, of course, and the promises that you don't have to ever become aware of them, because A equals A at the root of it all. You don't have to examine your own motivations. It's all very clear.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  21:49  </p><p>You do have to examine your own motivations, David, because your emotions are the output of sort of premises that you've accepted, right? So you're responsible for your emotional reactions to things, you have to make sure that you only believe rational things so that you have the right emotions. If you are having a wrong emotion, that means you believe something wrong. And so you have to figure out what it is.</p><p>drvolts   22:11  </p><p>Imagine just Ayn Rand having these unwelcome emotions and just thinking like I've got to extirpate these by reasoning harder, I've got to reason harder!</p><p>Will Wilkinson  22:25  </p><p>She's a fascinating kind of tragic person. I will stand up for Ayn Rand's literary quality. I don't think anybody knows how to judge her because she is a genre unto herself. Like, clearly, there's something going on there that people find incredibly riveting and persuasive. She nails exactly what she says she's trying to do. She's trying to write didactic moral fiction that makes you believe something different. And she just crushes it, by her own standards. But aesthetically, I think they're great. They're great in a way that nobody can recognize because one, she's Russian, you know, raised in Russia, educated in Russia, she grew up in the same block as Vladimir Nabokov. Right? It's sort of an upper middle class Jewish milieu in Leningrad, or St. Petersburg. And really well educated, comes to the US, wants to be a writer, writes for Cecil Mill, writes a bunch of movie scripts, and they completely internalize a bunch of Hollywood standards, including a certain kind of melodrama and kitsch.</p><p>drvolts   23:52  </p><p>Yes, capital R romanticism. I think that's what never really resonated with me, that sort of romantic melodrama, I can't.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  24:04 </p><p>So it's a weird combination of Russian philosophical fiction. There's a lot of Dostoevsky in her DNA but it's filtered through Hollywood and the 1920s and 30s old right politics, like anti New Deal politics. You throw all that stuff together and it's just going to be a stew that's going to be repugnant to people with fine literary standards of the time or even now. I think they're amazing, weird books. They're a kind of experimental fiction,  and I think they're just incredibly successful. And I think people just don't give you know Ayn Rand enough credit as an artist. Because they just don't want to judge her on the criteria that she ought to be judged on, but I think she's amazing.</p><p>drvolts   25:08  </p><p>Well, that's sweet. I'm such a Philistine. I read stuff like that and I'm just like, “just tell me what you want to tell me.” Get rid of the trains and the melodrama, I don't need a love story, just tell me what you want to tell me. So that's why I went for nonfiction. Of course, I have the same reaction anytime I read almost any poetry or fiction.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  25:30  </p><p>I'm a huge dummy, right? Because all I really wanted was the trains in the end, and the rape scenes. That's all. That's all. Well, that's all I was really into. And somehow I got seduced into a comprehensive philosophy, which is what she was trying to do. Clearly I needed something else to believe in. I didn't want to be a certain kind of really lame Mormon, who doesn't even believe in the cool Mormon stuff, right? Like we didn't have the “you get your own planet” and we didn't have the special underwear, any of that stuff like that.</p><p>drvolts   26:11  </p><p>So I was raised Presbyterian, which is like, if you can name a thing about Presbyterianism ahead of 99% of most people, </p><p>WW: Just by faith, I guess.</p><p>DR: I guess it's not the dictionary definition, like generic Methodist. So we could talk about Ayn Rand all day. But we're falling behind. So let's move along. You were like a full on Ayn Rand enthusiast, went into the kind of libertarian world, started working at Cato, which is, you know, certainly at the time was sort of like the commanding heights of libertarianism, and then over time, I don't know exactly how long it took, but you have described the process as basically, you arguing against all these critiques of libertarianism over and over again, and eventually just started thinking, you know what, these are pretty good critiques. Describe for us the intellectual process by which you were rationally persuaded against a view, which seems like a vanishingly rare thing these days. It's like an exotic animal. I want to hear all about it.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  27:34  </p><p>I guess it doesn't happen a lot like me. The backstory is, I got super into Ayn Rand. I decided that being a philosopher was the most important thing you could be because making sure that people have correct premises is the only thing that's gonna save our society - A equals A dammit. I wouldn't mind if people would get around to being like “A equals A” I mean, that would be nice. Because there's such a weird thing right now we're going through, over the pandemic. It made some of my Randian instincts came back in this weird way, where I'm just like, reality is what it f*****g is, dude. You can't decide whether or not a virus is contagious. It drove me crazy. I think there is something healthy about that orientation toward them, you know, the existence of a reality that's external to you that can't be changed by what you think or say about it. Science needs that, we have to think that we're looking at something that's not us. It is helpful. But I wanted to be a philosopher. So I was an art major, I went to the University of Northern Iowa on a full tuition art scholarship. And I mean, I was the president of the thespian club, and I was an arts kid. I was the you know, artsiest kid in my school and won all those awards and Ayn Rand drew me away from it. Which is tragic. I think it ruined my life. I should be a painter. I would be a happier person if I lived in  rural Vermont and painted giant paintings in a barn. I would be living my best life. Instead, I just argue with a******s all day long on Twitter. And I'm like, this is terrible. How did I get myself into it? And Ayn Rand is how I got it. So I decided I am going to have to go to grad school. So I applied, but I was a terrible student. I had like a 2.9 GPA at the university, the third best public university in Iowa. I couldn't get it, I couldn't get into the University of Iowa. And I heard at the time, there was this dude. Brian Leiter was writing these rankings of philosophy programs. And I learned that one of the best terminal MA programs was in DeKalb, Illinois at Northern Illinois University. So I applied there .</p><p>DR: Ah funny, I got a terminal MA too. </p><p>WW: I also didn't get into there. But I just decided, like, f**k it, man, I'm just doing this, and so I just moved to DeKalb, Illinois, enrolled at NIU as a, they'll take your money if you just want to be like, as a graduate student at large or whatever. And, I just took philosophy classes as if I was a grad student. And, that worked, like, the next year, I got accepted to the program, with full funding and everything like that. And it was a great program, I did well, and then ended up going to the University of Maryland for my Ph. D. program. And over all this time, you know, I was like, you know, just a really zealous, libertarian objectivist. You know, I had developed this big social network of objectivist friends, early days of the internet, I was on a bunch of, you know, email lists from Jimmy Wales, of Wikipedia fame, the guys who started Wikipedia, you know, Jimbo Wales, and then Larry Sanger, were just part of this milieu, I would meet them at the Summer seminars for the Institute for Objective Studies. And me, and all my friends were like, friends from the internet, and they were like, objective friends, and a lot of them are still my friends. Like, some of my best friends are those people who are also not objectivist anymore, but so that's where my heart was socially. But like, you know, I'm all of a sudden in real philosophy grad school. And I'm, you know, getting hit with stuff left. And right. Now, the thing is, like, philosophy, moral philosophy, and political philosophy wasn't what I was interested in, you know, I was doing like philosophy of mind and language and metaphysics and epistemology, the hard stuff that smart people do, not like this, like sissy, you know, moral stuff. But like, you know, I had to encounter all these arguments. And when I got to Maryland, you know, kind of leveled up a level, at how difficult and sophisticated things were. And at a certain point, I dropped out to go work at a startup because I wanted to make it big, you know, people giving stock options out. And this was like, right before the internet bubble burst. So that lasted like, eight months. But then I got a job at the Institute for Humane Studies, which is like, you know, Libertarian Educational Foundation, and got really deeply into the DC libertarian politics, scene, public policy scene. And when I went back to Maryland, and I decided to do political philosophy, and, you know, we had to read John Rawls, and all this, narrow the standard stuff, and you had to grapple with a lot of arguments against what I was doing. And I was kind of dogmatically ideological, but because my self conception was as a superbly rational person who could give you a satisfying justification for my beliefs, I felt it was incumbent upon me to be able to defend my views. And when somebody had an argument that kind of made me come up short, you know, I took that really seriously. Like, I was sure that I was right. And then if I thought about it hard enough, I would figure out what was wrong with what they're saying. And I always did that. I'm very clever at shoring up my own flanks, right? Like, I always did come up with an argument that would push it off, that would find a way to, to just steal their argument of its intended force. But after you do that, with 20, 30, 40 different arguments, right, like, you have to make some tiny concessions. Right, you have to be like, okay, I can give away this premise that normally I would defend, but if I don't give this away, I'm gonna have to give something much bigger away. But after you start giving away a lot of these little premises, right, like it adds up to something bigger, which is why like dogmatists are really dogmatic, right, like, they're not going to give up any of the little premises because, you know, they see where it's going slippery slope. Yeah. And so over time, you know, like I dropped out of grad school, got a job at Cato. And then at Cato, my job was to be a professional libertarian apologist. That's what I did. And so then I encountered a whole other level of people, the public intellectual cohort. And I think this is really significant because I think people's views change. This is something people will say to you as a criticism, which is that you wanted some other group of people to like you. You wanted to go to cocktail parties. Right? You know, you hear the cocktail party one?</p><p>drvolts   35:36  </p><p>Of course, yes. But this is, I mean, it's not as you say, It's not wrong. And there's a reason that I actually think, especially in that era, the libertarians were quite, you know, sort of the money-ed libertarians were quite savvy about, creating not just an intellectual superstructure, but a social superstructure that people could be involved in and find friendships and find a life find those cocktail parties, like they were very savvy about, about playing that aspect of it.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  36:11  </p><p>So I was really deeply embedded in, you know, first I was deeply embedded in this sort of objectivist community that I’d become a part of online. But that is kind of a fringe of the broader libertarian community. You know, they're considered kind of, a little bit crazy. They're always around. When I got to Cato, you know, I kind of mainstreamed a little bit. And in part, and that was because of grad school, I, you know, started shifting my views to kind of a more respectable form of classical liberalism, but also to the more acceptable forms of libertarianism. And I was, you know, embedded in these big libertarian institutions and social networks. But I wasn't just embedded in those right, and this, I think, makes a huge difference. Like at the same time, this was the early days of blogging and the early aughts. So how I got my job at Cato is how I came to know Brink Lindsay, we both had blogs at the same time. But there would always be these meetups with people just like what you had in common is that you all had a blog. And so we'd meet up and you'd meet </p><p>DR: That’s a decently reliable indicator of an interesting personality. Yeah, at the time I would go to a party of bloggers, especially at the time.</p><p>WW: Yeah, the early adopters were a certain kind of person. And, and I really enjoyed those but like, but you just became socially interested in other people who were doing similar things as you'd like. So when, I had moved into DC and you know, I got to know Matt Iglesias and Ezra Klein and Chris Hayes and all those people really well, they were part of my social milieu too, you know, there was a weekly poker game that would go back and forth between Julian Sanchez house and the group house that I had with a bunch of friends. That was a very mixed liberal and libertarian affair, you know, and we just, like, shoot the s**t, right? I really think that, Julian Sanchez, and me and, you know, a couple of other people really had, you know, had a big influence on say, like, Matt's views on on housing, or occupational licensing,</p><p>drvolts   38:32  </p><p>Occupational licensing.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  38:34  </p><p>I think that just the fact that he was socially connected with libertarians where he was like, these are actually good persuasive arguments. He wasn't convinced by libertarianism. But there were some things that libertarians thought that he became aware of, at a deeper level, and, you know, some similar things with with Ezra, and they influenced me in turn, right, like, you know, we’d argue cogently about things, and if you actually like somebody, if you're part of their social circle, part of their social network. It just makes you take what they say seriously.</p><p>drvolts   39:15  </p><p>Yeah, it's such a fundamentally different relationship than encountering some schmo online who you then proceed to argue with on Twitter, right? I mean, emotionally, it's such a hugely different relationship.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  39:28  </p><p>Totally, totally. And so it really mattered to me that I, I didn't know at the time, right, because, like, in a way I saw Matt and Ezra as frenemies. Because they were kind of rivals. And, I'm not a very comparative person, right, in the Oh, you know, “they’ve got something that I want”, but I am very comparative in that this person is my benchmark. I think I'm a smart guy. I’m as talented as this person, and so if they're doing better than me, that means I'm f*****g something up. Which is like why Ezra always makes me feel like I'm f*****g up my life.</p><p>drvolts   40:11  </p><p>Try writing at early Vox just surrounded by wonder kins plodding along.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  40:18  </p><p>Yeah. And with stuff like that my view started to suddenly change. And when I was at Cato I had been working on my dissertation proposal, I'd gotten really deeply into Rawls, because I was like, this is what the core of analytic political philosophy is, you have to be conversant in Rawls, or else you just can't be part of the conversation. You know, even if you're talking about something else, you have to talk about it. There's a certain jargon, you know, that because all of Rawls’ Harvard students controlled all of the journals, and so they only wanted to talk about stuff in their language. It's like any field. So I said okay, I gotta become fluent in Rawlsian. And I got really deep into Rawls actually, was super persuaded by a lot of stuff. And, you know, and so I came on this project like, you know, what, he's right about how to think about a lot of these issues, you know, about what it means for society to be good. But it just misses a ton, right? And I, over this time, I'd become like a huge, FA Hayek fan, who I think is just an absolutely brilliant person. And that had a huge influence me, he's a much deeper thinker than people sometimes give him credit for, because he gets used as a kind of cartoon figure as the bad right, but he's, legitimately one of the most brilliant social theorists of the 20th century - got a lot wrong, but there's a lot that's really deep in his stuff about cultural evolution, why it is that ideas persist and stuff like that. That is really profound. But so I was like, Okay, I'm gonna marry you know, I'm gonna make John Rawls and Friedrich Hayek have babies.</p><p>drvolts   42:07  </p><p>Synthesis, right, this is the first, like, insofar as there's a retreat from ideology, right, it begins there. Right. Okay. Other people have some good points, I'll synthesize them and make them better.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  42:20  </p><p>Yeah, yeah, exactly. And around the same time I was into this, you know, we're kind of mutually influencing each other. Brink Lindsay, you know, wrote this essay about left leaning libertarianism for the New Republic that got titled Liberal-tarianism. Because, like, you know, working at Cato, or being libertarian, libertarians always say, you know, we're not really left or right, you know, like, they want to claim this kind of neutral ground sort of thing. And I was like, really into that. And, and I took it seriously, which made me dumb.</p><p>drvolts   42:56  </p><p>Right? Well, if you just look at the words on the page, right, if you just look at the ideas and the deductions and the implications of the words themselves, it makes sense right? If you're just ignoring all the social undercurrents and, you know, psychological and emotional and political undercurrents beneath it, you can continue believing them.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  43:15  </p><p>I came to see, pretty clearly - when you work at the Cato Institute, you can't miss it. Then there's a broader social world, as part of this organization called America's Future Foundation, which is a youth club, young adults club for libertarians and fusion-ist conservatives. And you know, it's libertarian and fused with conservatives and I'm socially constantly around Republicans, just constantly and so I was like, okay, it's pretty clear to me that, I would go to other libertarian things to the, you know, the Marijuana Policy Project or whatever it was called, the weed legalization people who probably did a better job than just anybody that was ever around. They've had tremendous success, right? They were kind of hippie-ish left wing libertarians, but that's just not what most of it was right? And even a lot of those people were right wing. And so I was like, I understand why this is the case sociologically that, you know, republicans and conservatives and libertarians were part of this cold war anti-communist coalition. But man, as you know, the mid aughts. The Cold War has been over for 15 years. Can we get past these contingent alignments, right? So Brink and I are like we need to make good on this thing we like if there can be libertarian conservative fusion-ism there can be a libertarian-liberal fusion, and we pursued that. </p><p>drvolts   45:05  </p><p>Did you have dreams at that point? Or did Brink have dreams? Or maybe both of you have dreamed of making that into a bonafide thing that was going to end up, you know, having its own whatever, think tanks and yeah, in political presence, like, did you think it could become that?</p><p>Will Wilkinson  45:24  </p><p>I'm not a very strategic person. So, so, yeah, I think that was the fantasy that it would catch on and have influence. I think at some point, maybe we could, you know, take over Cato, which was short sighted. But, yeah, we had these monthly dinners that Brink organized with Steve Tellus, a political theorist at Johns Hopkins, that we just called them the liberal-tarianism dinners. And it would be a bunch of, you know, people from Cato and other libertarian ish people from around DC. For some reason people, you know, Megan McArdle, visit some people who worked at The Economist, and then just like liberal, you know, wonks people from Brookings, people from cap, people from just, you know, wherever, from the nation, from the New Republic. And so we, through that process, Brink, and I got ourselves embedded in the left of center, DC journalist, in a wonk, in public policy circles, and a lot of those people became our friends. And that changes you too, a lot of these people are just like smart people who are really impressive. And I even feel like we were really successful in pulling them in our direction. But the way it works is that they pull you in their direction, as well. And the Tea Party happened.</p><p>drvolts   47:08  </p><p>And yeah, I was gonna say part of this, part of this seems to me - and this is what puzzles me about all the other libertarians - is that among these other things going on, around them around the kind of (well, I mean, you could see the undercurrents for decades but it's we're busted out in the open is Tea Party) it's just the Republican Party evolving in a way that is diametrically opposed to whatever libertarian instincts remain in the party. You know what I mean? Like exactly heading in the direction of sort of irrational identitarianism and cultural resentment and all that stuff like that, this is what I don't get is how you can still be a professional libertarian and still be attached to that party. I mean, it was plausible, I guess, you know, the early aughts, certainly in like the 90s, or something like that. But at this point, like, what is left of libertarianism in the actual Republican party? </p><p>Will Wilkinson  48:01  </p><p>I mean we've been having this completely hilarious discourse about vaccine passports. And people opposing them on libertarian grounds. And it's just incoherent. It's just completely incoherent. Right? Like, we have to get the state to ban private organizations from requiring proof of vaccinations. They've completely lost their moorings, and to the extent that the right doesn't have libertarian impulses, it has impulses that it sees as libertarian, because they're things that they inherited from the conservative fusionists like Ron Paul, who emphasized all of the liberal aspects of libertarianism, right? Like Rand Paul was still against the Civil Rights Act and things like that. Freedom of association is so important, that it's just completely legitimate for the law to do anything to rectify 400 years of the enslavement and apartheid and brutal oppression, like, “no freedom, no, freedom of association is too important”. But everybody understands, and this is one of the things that took me a while, but I did start to understand and this was because of reading so much political philosophy and countering these arguments over and over again, that we don't get to start from Day Zero and the allocation of goods and resources that people get, isn't a function of their individual initiative. Everything has a history, and the history is broken, and actually one of the people who convinced me of this the most was Robert Nozick. Who says very radical things in Anarchy, State and Utopia. He's very clear that his argument doesn't apply to the actual world, his theory. He's, I mean, he's very frank about it. Right? Like, if we had a just initial acquisition, you know, there's an initially just distribution of goods, if we started from a point of perfect equality, and then people made these voluntary exchanges that led to inequalities emerging, then there would be no justification for redistributing it, right? That's what he's saying. But he's definitely not saying that he explicitly says that the distribution that we have doesn't reflect a bunch of just exchanges, it reflects a bunch of people stealing stuff from other people, and taking that sort of thing really seriously after a while, and seeing how irrelevant that is to actual libertarians, </p><p>DR: I was gonna say, so what? Like, what would happen if we all started from square one and had you know, an initial just exchange of resources and went from there like, so what, like, who cares? What applies in that situation? It's not a human situation that's ever happened or ever will happen? I would summarize the arguments that led me away from libertarianism in two ways, and you're sort of referencing the second one here a little bit. One is on a personal level, this notion that I'm responsible for what I do, you're responsible for it, I should be able to do whatever I want to do unless it harms you. Right? That's kind of the libertarian. And so you look a little closer at, well, what are they? What do I mean to harm you? It's clear enough? If I punch you, right, but what if I smoke a cigarette and your kid is in the same room? Or what if I drive to work? I emit some greenhouse gases, which in some incremental, very distant, attenuated way, harms everybody on Earth. So then the question then becomes, well, where do you draw the line of harm, what counts as harm? And then the more you think about that, the more you realize, all the philosophical work is being done, by your definition of what counts as harm, which does not follow from any of the libertarian  premises, it's just a moral decision. It's, you know, it's a moral decision, what am I going to count as negative harm and then what's too attenuated to count, and where do you draw that line? Everything falls out of that, and what you sort of realize that, this is what I realized, is the basic sort of like John Muir, you know - you pull on one thing, and you find it attached to everything - sentiment, like everything I do, literally everything I do, affects other people in some way or another. So what ought to apply were I an atomic unit is irrelevant, because I'm not and no one ever is, or can be in politics. You know, you want to maximize freedom, which, in a clean world, where we're starting fresh, might be purely negative freedom, right? You just don't impede people, don't mess with people, don't prevent them from doing things. But in the world we live in to truly secure freedom, if freedom means anything, if freedom has any substantive content, it requires intervention by the government, it requires active intervention by government. And then again, you're just drawing a line of like, well, what increment of last freedom in the past, justifies government intervention today. And again, it's more or less an arbitrary line where you draw like everything falls out of where you draw that line. And it turns out the clean slate is totally mythological. We're all always already meshed in all these historical obligations and responsibilities and histories. And so just the cleanness and clarity, which is what attracted me, as a teen, I realized as I got older is like, in so far as that's attractive and clean, it's because it's wrong and has no application to the actual world and is not going to make me happy and it's not going to make a good society. And you're sort of like you referenced that in, you know, the clean slate stuff. And so this brings you, I think, to libertarianism, which is, as I understand it, this notion that yes, we want to maximize freedom, right like the libertarians, but we acknowledge that merely refraining right from mistreating people will not have the intended outcome. Right? Right. You have to, you have to purposefully create the conditions of freedom. So then you were there for a while and liberaltarianism in it kind of never really seemed to catch on. And you also say that you've kind of moved past it, or would no longer use that term or sort of like, I don't know, moved beyond it. So where was the fault in this synthesis? Like, why did you end up sort of becoming dissatisfied with it in the end?</p><p>Will Wilkinson  55:39  </p><p>Well, you know, that's hard, because I stopped calling myself a libertarian when I still saw myself as libertarian, right, like, it was a deeply embedded, deeply internalized aspect of my identity. But at a certain point, I saw that the things that I thought were so heterodox, I was kind of abusing the term if I was applying it to myself, because, because a lot of people would think that I wasn't if they knew what I thought, even though I still felt that I was just interpreting liberty correctly. And similarly with with liberal-tarianism, one of the main components of that is something that I've called the free market welfare state, which you want, markets that are innovative, not onerously regulated, so that markets can be dynamic, prices can move freely, you want the right regulations, you need to take care of externalities and public goods and things like that. But we ought to be aiming for a dynamic, innovative high growth economy, because the humanitarian upshot of economic growth is immense. And so that's something we ought to be going for and markets that are competitive, and innovative and dynamic are a huge part of that. But it seems clear to me from the political science literature, that people will only tolerate that kind of dynamism, that disruptive innovation that drives growth, if they are insulated from the downside risks of all of this dislocation and creative destruction. People aren't gonna tolerate having their jobs offshored, you know, like having a new technology just completely put your business out of business. Like if they don't know what they're gonna do. Right? How am I going to feed my kids? People want social insurance, it's the most freakin popular thing in the world. You can't get around it, the richer people get, the more government they demand. You know, it's almost a law. And I forget what the name of it is, Wagner's law? It's not really a law, but like, it's Wagner's consistent regularity. That, as you know, GDP per capita goes up, demand for government goes up. And a lot of that is that people want social insurance. That's the most expensive.</p><p>drvolts   58:42  </p><p>This is part of something you've been writing about a lot lately. This is part of what explains the deep strain of anti-democratic sentiment within libertarianism is that if you give people the choice, they do not choose libertarianism.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  58:59  </p><p>Yep. I mean, it really does come down to that. But it's interesting, that's the view of basically anybody with a dogmatic ideological theory exactly like you said, because people don't choose it, you won't choose it right? So we need to have the revolution, and, you know, install the party, because democracy is gonna end up being counter revolutionary, right? Everybody has the same problem, unless you're just going to be a consistent, small d Democrat, where you just get to be like, “Hey, you know what, I'm going to just freakin live with people disagreeing and I think that people ought to get what they vote for”.</p><p>DR:Well, we'll, we'll return to that later, too. </p><p>WW: Yeah. So if you stop fighting that, I mean, it's not just that right. It's not just that people overwhelmingly demand unemployment insurance and some kind of health insurance. That has some like public backstop all of that old age insurance, Social Security, Medicare, they want it bad, and they get it (except for health care in the United States). But we're not communists and it's not just that that stuff actually does enable the economy to be dynamic, it's just really, really clear that people are much more tolerant of market liberalisation, when they're insulated from the shocks, So if you leave people comfortable, you know, if I lose my job, I'm going to get unemployment for however long, my kids are going to have public education, even if I lose my job, my kids are going to have health care, even if I lose my job, right, people stop worrying so much about having dynamic markets is going to make them lose their job, right? It's kind of obvious why it would.</p><p>drvolts   1:01:02  </p><p>This seems so common sense to me, I guess, looking back, now, it's just any system, any living system, really any sort of, self-maintaining system, you know, like in biology, look at computer programs, it needs some degree of openness, and some degree of structure and stability, right, and you want to balance too much openness and you get dissolution, too much structure, and you get decay, and rot. So you want a balance of structure and dynamism and that seems trivially obvious when you think about living systems in biology or even social systems. It's only an ideologue who could ever sort of imagine like, going all the way in one of those directions, is some sort of skeleton key.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:01:57  </p><p>But why it is that ideas of spontaneous order and emergent order are so important to libertarians in a certain kind of conservative because you have to believe that a certain structure is going to emerge out of all these individual acts of exchange, trade, and blah, blah, blah, you know, and to a large extent it does, but the thing is, politics is just endogenous to all of it all the time anyway, and the big fallacy is, you know, thinking that there's some, that there's the market on the one hand and the state on the other hand, and that they're antagonistic. And this is another thing that just had a big effect on me, like I started getting some economic history when I worked at the Mercatus Center and other Kochtopus, libertarian organizations, I ran a series of seminars that were led by Douglas North, who is a wonderful - he died a few years back, he was in his 90s - but a Nobel Prize winning economic historian, and I don't know why exactly Mercatus was financing junkets on his behalf because he wasn't really remotely libertarian, but, it was a prestige thing for us. And, these seminars were amazing. It had some of the world's best economic historians, a bunch of economic theorists, amazing political scientists, you know, and I had to organize these things and take notes. And it was a huge education, and I learned a lot of economic history, and you start to see that, oh, markets exist, because governments create them, right? Like, yeah, they form a lot, you know, trade is always gonna happen, right? Like, you can't stop human beings from being like “you got a KitKat, you know, I'll give you a Reese's”. Right? Like, people are gonna trade. And people are going to trade in complicated ways. But a lot of forms of trade just aren't possible without somebody creating a kind of infrastructure that makes sure that, you know, contracts get enforced. </p><p>drvolts   1:04:06  </p><p>Yeah, this is so fundamental to me, I wanted to stop and focus on this point for a minute, because I've been thinking about this a lot lately. You will have trade, you always have trade, trade is just part of what humans do. If you want to scale it beyond tribal trades with other tribes, if you want to do it on any scale, you're gonna end up trading with people you don't know, and don't have any social or historical connection to. You don't have any of these sort of emotional or social bonds that might help enforce rules or honesty or whatever. So if you want to scale it up at all, you need rules that are separate from either tribe, and that both tribes agree to subsume their immediate interests to, right I mean, that's just like the basic structure of non-zero cooperation. We're going to, together, submit to this third party, this independent third party authority that consists of a set of rules and some mechanism to enforce those rules. And then you've got government. And to me this is the process by which humanity is improving itself and building up and becoming more complex and building up and outward, through these mechanisms of non-zero cooperation, all of which involve the same basic structure. And, to me, what's interesting about the US is it’s the closest thing a country came to being founded explicitly on that notion, right, we are not a tribe, or even a set of tribes, we are just a set of rules and procedures through which tribes can cooperate in a non-zero way. And to me, this is sort of the key. The central tension in politics is that I think if you look back over history, you'll see almost every advance in human welfare came out of that, came out of that system of non-zero cooperation and agreement to third party rules. You can see it in science, you know, where I'm not right because I'm more influential, or have this or that degree, we all submit to the same rules of third party examination and peer review, and whatever else. These rule-based systems have produced everything that we love and is good, but they are always in tension with tribal imperatives and tribal instincts and the sort of instinct that if the rules tell me that I must sacrifice my tribes best interests, then f**k the rules, my tribe’s best interests are my are my thing, are my primary thing and any rules are secondary. And that's sort of all of human history, the buildup of non-zero cooperation, and then the periodic collapse of non-zero cooperation, because of these tribal instincts. And that to me, among other things, sort of renders this libertarian idea ridiculous in that it is only these rules and these structures and needs-enforcement mechanisms, which we call government, in some cases, that enable what we call markets, sophisticated, modern markets at all, or exchange of ideas or art or name it, it's all everything good comes out of that.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:07:43  </p><p>On my podcast I recently had Virginia Postrel who is the former editor-in-chief of Reason magazine. She’s just written this absolutely riveting book on the history of textiles. It kind of gets into the Political Economy of how we come to have the fabrics that we wear, it's called The Fabric of Civilization, it's a really good book. And, you know, you just look at textiles, and just, you know, it's one of the most fundamental things, every single culture in the world weaves, you know, in some way. So, how does that scale up into trade and Nike, if you follow that story, there's a certain point at which it's just face to face exchange, and then extending trade routes, and then there's a certain point at which you just can't do the non-zero sum exchanges, they get too complicated, the assurance problems get too hard How do you know that the other side is going to hold up their end of the deal? How do you retrieve lost resources when the other people screw you over? And immediately people come up with institutions to solve those problems. And those institutions are the law. States didn't exist to do this, right? States exist, because, you know, people are tyrants and want to lord over other people, and you know, princes fought over land and s**t like that, but they ended up having to play this role, or somebody else would, and they'd get richer and drive them out of business. So all these, you know, principalities sooner or later had to start providing these state services, and they all do because you can't get out of it. And the funny thing is people, libertarians and conservatives like to think of the United States as a specially libertarian place, but in a way, it's especially not because, I mean, the American state provides the the backstop currency for the entire world like we provide the light, clear shipping lanes is a global public good, that is mainly enforced by the incredible threat of American naval hegemony. Right? The American state is incredibly powerful. And the modern economy, the modern global economy, not just the modern American economy, depends critically on the American state, doing things, you know, the Federal Reserve doing things, the Treasury doing things, the US military doing things. The status quo is just, you know, not even remotely libertarian, and a lot of this stuff that libertarians, conservatives for some reason, a lot of like, the military, or whatever are in the business of providing these global public goods, but they tend to see market structure as being something that's emergent and evolved rather than politically chosen and implemented and sustained. I do find that incredibly naive, and it's important to see just how political all of our markets are, because one of the things that drives me crazy is intellectual property law, you know, copyrights, patents, they're just outright theft, right? They're state enforced monopolies, they probably put a damper on innovation. And they make us poorer. And they're obviously just fake, you know, it's just the state is there, right? It’s just made up out of thin air. And it makes a lot of sense. You want to incentivize people to discover stuff, and you want them to be able to internalize that portion of the overall gains as a certain kind of compensation for their intrepid productivity and discovery. But they don't have to be long, they don't have to be restrictive. But the American economy is structured soup-to-nuts by intellectual property law. Just absolutely. I can get arrested for fixing my computer, it's just crazy.</p><p>And so once you understand that markets are political, just in that very simple way that markets are structured by the legal definition of property rights. And that we can be actively involved in structuring them in different ways. Once you realize that you can actually be more constructive about trying to build the dynamic markets, you have to build them. Markets don't stay competitive by themselves, for instance, they just don't,</p><p>drvolts   1:12:47  </p><p>Yes, there's no final structure that gets things right. That's like, set it and forget it, right, which is another thing that is an attraction, I think of libertarianism, especially to sort of young left brain males is like, “get this system in place, and then we're good”. At least to me this is pretty fundamental to my philosophical development, there is no end to that, right. This is what you mean by politics never goes away, there is no end to the process of negotiation and amendment and updating and fighting and contestation. And this is what pluralism means. It is like that process of haggling things out with one another, is not an interim state on the way to something else. It just is. It just is human affairs. What’s the quote, “One must imagine Sisyphus Happy”. Right. The longer I've sat with that the more profound I think it is, and I think it has to do with this getting comfortable with the ambiguity, and frustrations and half measures that come with pluralism. And this I sort of like, I'll skip a few steps since I definitely want to get to this. And this gets to my central question about America these days. But, you know, as I've thought about it and gone through philosophies of everything, I'm very attracted to philosophies of everything. I've just started thinking more and more lately, like, here's the kind of thought experiment I run in my head, like, what if God came down and said, “Hey, I'm real. I am in fact omniscient. And like, your, your philosophy is correct. You got it, right. Like all the other ones are wrong, objectively, metaphysically. You are correct.” And I just think, well, what would change in the world if that happened? If it turned out I not just thought I was right, but I actually was right. And I actually did know the right system. And the more I think about it, just nothing would change. Like fake news, see that was changing the world. It would be indistinguishable from me just thinking I'm right. And so I would still end up having to negotiate with people who believe differently than me, and find some way for us all to live together, peacefully. So that process of politics, of pluralism, of figuring out a way for people who believe different things to live together peacefully, is the meat of the real thing. And it's not some frustrating shadow on the wall of a true political philosophy that we could someday reach. Right? It's like that is the meat and potatoes of politics, the final state of politics is haggling and fighting, just never quite knowing and never quite getting the perfect measure. This philosophical pragmatism led me to write in, in a similar way, sort of like Rorty’s whole point, that he kind of thought himself out of analytic philosophy. I sort of feel the same way. Like, at the end of the day, whatever these truths are, you're still stuck in a world full of people who believe different truths. So we've got to figure out how to live together. And so figuring out how to live together as the whole thing, it's not a frustrating distraction from the real thing.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:16:44  </p><p>I agree with that completely like, and then that has been a big shift in my overall outlook once that sunk in. You know, I've written a lot about why libertarians are skeptical of democracy. And it comes down to what you said before, the problem with it is that people won't vote for libertarianism. But I, for a long, long time, have had this kind of general skepticism about democracy. You know people aren't really that smart. You know, people are poorly informed. It's amazing what people don't know, about politics. I love the factoid that, that this huge realignment of working class whites came about just because Barack Obama was black. And it's not just like that they were racist. It's just they didn't know which party was the party for like white people.</p><p>drvolts   1:17:43  </p><p>It's amazing how much poor analysis happens in political circles by people who just cannot really conceive or internalize the depth of public ignorance. So they have to create these other explanations for things that happen.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:17:57  </p><p>I mean, I just find it amazing that just having a black guy as president made a lot of union members be like, “Oh, that's the party of civil rights, and the party for white people's interest is the other party” like, people didn’t know. But if that's the way it is, if there is such endemic public ignorance, you know it's reasonable to be a bit wary of what democratic publics are going to do. But in the end there's just no way to get around people disagreeing. If you want to say that “oh, people have these rights, or people have those rights” they're politically effective, they're real, if enough people agree that you're right, yes. Right. Like you're saying, it doesn't matter who's right. Because you're not going to convince everybody that so and so is right. So the whole thing, and that's the kind of the Rortian point is that if people all just kind of agree that this is a right and the courts agree, and the legislators agree and people don't relentlessly campaign against the recognition of this right and try to install judges who won't, then it's a right, that's what it is for something to be a right, it has a social reality, it's exactly the same as why our money's worth anything. It's because everybody thinks it's worth something and that's good.</p><p>drvolts   1:19:30  </p><p>Yes, but much like people don't understand money for partially psychological reasons, like something about that terrifies people, or just unsettles people on a deep, deep level. You see this, you know, with traditionalists or religious people or even sort of philosophical realists or whatever, just this idea that like, wait a minute, if it's only real to the extent we agree it's real, we're just marshmallows, we're in mush. There's nothing to push off. There's no foundation, there's no sort of hard thing to put your back up against to get the friction. It's this ambiguous mush forever, that I think terrifies people. This is why people want God or whatever, there's a ground somewhere that we can find and get our bearings.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:20:29  </p><p>I mean, there's some fundamental psychological differences between people who are tolerant of ambiguity and people who find it very, very uncomfortable. I seriously think that the main foundational, ultimate reason why I have been able to change my mind a lot over time is that I'm extremely comfortable with ambiguity in the end. I’m okay in a suspended state and I feel that discomfort right now. I recently lost my last job, where I was supposed to be a kind of proponent for a certain kind of liberal-tarian-ism. And I was relieved to get out of it because I don't like having to be the champion or a representative. I just want to try to figure out what's right. I don't want to be constrained.</p><p>drvolts   1:21:28  </p><p>Ergo [???]</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:21:29  </p><p>Yeah, [???]. In one of my favorite essays, by the novelist, Donald Barthelemy, who is the kind of patron saint of the MFA program I went to at the University of Houston, it's a beautiful essay called <em>Not Knowing</em> and this is about writing fiction but it applies to just about everything; that art comes out of a certain comfort with not knowing with being in this uncomfortable suspended state of ambiguity. There's a similar thing as this term from Keats, like negative capacity [sic]. It's one of my favorite ideas.</p><p>drvolts   1:22:18  </p><p>Can we acknowledge that this is an unusual psychological feature?</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:22:28  </p><p>I don't think it's unusual for a certain kind of person, like Ayn Rand, fucked up my life. I'm supposed to be an artist, right? Like this is how artists are.</p><p>drvolts   1:22:39  </p><p>For a certain kind of person, it’s more usual in like, art, or poetry or writing or acting or something like that, right, which is about humans and therefore must wrestle with ambiguity. I think it's more unusual for that kind of person to go into politics, right? Because people tend to be attracted to politics through some theory that they think is correct and right.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:23:04  </p><p>Politics will just absolutely repel people with a great deal of negative capacity [sic].</p><p>drvolts   1:23:10  </p><p>And fear, you know, I think we both acknowledge that these personality traits are not fixed quantities, right? They're variable based on circumstance, social circumstance, and things like that. And of course, as we know, fear sends people in the other direction, fear pulls people away from ambiguity and makes them more desirous of clarity, more desirous of clear in and out rules. I think this tolerance of ambiguity is sort of crucial for humanity's healthy future but it's just so defeasible, it's so easy. You have to engage your frontal cortex to do that, which means your amygdala has to be a little bit quiet, you have to calm these fight or flight systems in order to be able to exercise the kind of frontal cortex thinking that can allow you to see sort of the virtues of ambiguity and non-zero cooperation, all these things, but it's just so easy to get people scared. I don't know how good things ever happened in politics. I've talked myself into a position where I think everything good is miraculous. </p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:24:25  </p><p>I mean, we've done the very common thing of seeing why our own personality type is awesome. The height of the very high openness, very low conscientiousness is the negative capacity [sic]. That's the art style, that's the free associative, like “try it out, you don't really care”, right?</p><p>drvolts   1:24:52  </p><p>I have that. But I also have that rationalist. The person who craves clarity, the person who is attracted to libertarianism in the first place, I also have that person inside me. And those two people do not necessarily cohere.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:25:09  </p><p>They do, I mean this is something I've thought a lot about like why are some of my best friends people that I met at the objectivist camp when I was an undergraduate? And the thing is because it turns out, they were like me, like, everything depends on where you start. Right? In people, it's not people's fault. If you started out reading Marx or you started out reading Ayn Rand you'll get on a different track, but where you end up is going to depend on what kind of person you are. And a lot of the people who I’m still friends with from objectivist camp are people who are really high openness. They're incredibly intellectual and curious and they were really curious about Ayn Rand and objectivism at the same time that I was, but that wasn't going to be the end of their curiosity, it was the beginning. And then they move on. But there's nothing inconsistent with having a logical rationalist disposition and this all consuming curiosity about different views and different cultures and things like that. And if you've got that kind of personality you're going to have a hard time sticking with a dogmatic tribe. But once you figured out that they're doing something that doesn't make sense. It's going to bug you.</p><p>drvolts   1:26:31  </p><p>So let me skip to what I think is the key, the central question about America before we're done, because I really wanted to grapple with this, and we sort of laid some groundwork. </p><p>WW: Cancel culture?</p><p>DR:</p><p>Exactly, exactly. I'm talking about Dr. Seuss. No, you know, as we said earlier, the US in its founding documents, and theorizing, is a nation founded not on any tribe or class of people, but on ideas - all people have dignity, all people have rights, rule of law, not of man - which as I grow older think is more and more important, more and more central to everything, this idea that we're all governed by these procedures, these objective third party arbiters. And that's how we make pluralism work, right, we all submit to this shared set of principles and values and rules. And within that, we can have our own whatever culture, our own cultural ideas, our own religion, religious freedom, our own freedom of philosophy and association, right? So pluralism is going to live by virtue of these rules. And then there's this other America, you might call it, the actual America, which is very much founded by a particular tribe and class of people, and in practice, has always violated its principles and rules to elevate and maintain the dominance of those people. You know, there's white money, property owning, whatever, on and on. So there's this core tension in America. And I have just started wondering, is that resolvable? So if you come to America, with what they call thick cultural commitments, right, you believe in Christianity, say, if you really believe in Christianity, then it sort of follows that you should want everybody else to be Christian. Right? It's sort of like it is inherently totalizing, as most sort of like hardcore fundamentalist philosophies or religions tend to be. And so can you genuinely hold on to those thick commitments and also submit to this thinner commitment to procedural-ism? Right? I mean, that's kind of what America is, that's what pluralism is. You can keep your thick commitments as long as you abide by these procedures, these rules, these institutions, right. And that's an inherent tension. And it's been resolved in the past, by hypocrisy, right. It's basically through white men, running things while saying words about procedural neutrality, and waving their hands at procedural neutrality, but now demographics are changing and people are starting to notice that and demand their own piece of the pie. And so that test of those procedural commitments is happening now. And I guess what I'm trying to ask is, is it really possible for those thin commitments to procedural neutrality, to a common set of laws and rules and institutions, is it possible for that to be enough to sustain human beings, psychologically and socially? Or do they need thick commitments to particular tribes, particular Gods what have you, particular histories. If they do need thick commitments, can they then live together under these thin commitments? In other words, I guess what I'm asking is, is true pluralism actually possible, psychologically? Is it something that humans can genuinely do?</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:30:57  </p><p>I think so. I think it's hard. This thick/thin tension isn't ever going to go away, people do need thick identities. Very few people are, you know, deracinated, cosmopolitan liberals with, you know, a high tolerance for ambiguity who just think negative capacities [sic] are the greatest thing in the world, right…</p><p>drvolts   1:31:18  </p><p>People like us could live within that world but I think we established we’re freaks.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:31:21  </p><p>…ideologically relish contestatory democracy and pluralism. But I think that is always going to be a minority view. What we're going through right now, I don't really think it's a battle between thick, white Christian identity and thin American proceduralism. It's just the most normal thing in politics, that politics is always distributively hot, right? It's distributively high stakes, and the composition of our population has changed a great deal and the relative power of a certain kind of white person, white Christians, has precipitously declined. And they're terrified about loss of control over the culture, and the economy and their sense of status. And I don't think it's about maintaining a thick Christian lifestyle, because religious participation has fallen off a cliff and there are tons of Trumpist conservatives who don't go to church, who will say that they're Christian, but actually have no religious practice in their life. So they'd probably be better off if they were animated by a thick conception of the good and religion. I think there's something nihilistic about this kind of person, just, you know, getting on board.</p><p>drvolts   1:32:54  </p><p>It's a culture, though. I mean, it's a specific culture, right? Pickup trucks, Arby's, owning the libs, yeah, yeah. You know.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:33:01  </p><p>Yeah cultural politics has replaced a lot of religion stuff, but I think we're just going through a lot of turmoil because we're at this inflection point where white Christians are already in the minority, you know, population is going to be majority non-white by 2042 or so, or just barely more than 20 years. And the current coalition that is the Republican Party isn't going to survive in a pluralistic democratic society that is as diverse and multicultural as the one we are coming to have. And these are death throes and they're dangerous places. This happens over and over and over and over again, in history, where the dominant men are the dominant group, where a majority falls into the minority, and then they get nasty. Right, it happens again and again.</p><p>drvolts   1:34:06  </p><p>Yes, that is politics. </p><p>WW:</p><p>Yeah, basically. And so I think it's gonna stay nasty for a while. </p><p>DR:</p><p>But the question I'm trying to get at is, I think there are people who would argue, America worked, because there was a dominant identity and culture. And it was defined at least in part by openness to other cultures and by allowing other cultures and colors and ethnicities and languages to come and sort of hang out as long as they didn't get too uppity. But I think there are people who would argue democracy really only works if there is a primary culture, and if a primary culture falls and loses its hegemony, it's going to be replaced by another one. There's no such thing as a stable state with multiple, equally non-dominant cultures. That's what I mean by true pluralism. I think there are people who would argue that true pluralism just can't survive and the throes are gonna end up in the replacement of one culture by another.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:35:21  </p><p>I think you’re making a point that we went through in a different guise, that a lot depends on social agreement. Facts with social ontologies depend on the agreement and one of those facts is the authority of the state, the legitimacy of a democratic system. And people have to agree about it to have it. Agree enough about it, for us to have it. And right now, we've got a lot of disagreement, basically that the Republican Party is against democracy, its theory is that the other party isn't fully American, that they're citizens only in a technical sense, but not in a moral sense.</p><p>drvolts   1:36:08  </p><p>The US is their culture, not the procedural, not the laws and procedures, it's their culture, that is the essence of the United States. And if their culture is dethroned, even if you have the laws and procedures still in place, you don't have America.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:36:24  </p><p>Right? And so they're contesting the legitimacy of the laws and procedures for this other reason, right? It's not like they have some philosophical problem with majoritarian institutions. They have a tribal problem with majoritarian institutions. And I think it's true that in the long run, if you're going to sustain liberal democratic institutions, there does need to be a common narrative about what the country is and what it means. But I don't think…</p><p>drvolts   1:37:01  </p><p>How thick that needs to be, I guess, is what I'm trying…</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:37:03  </p><p>Yeah, but I'm skeptical of the thick/thin dichotomy. Because I know what you mean by thickness in some daily practice sort of way. If I'm really religious, and I've got to pray five times a day and face Mecca, I think most people need that kind of thickness in their life, but I don't think it's necessarily political. Because the reasons those identities are political, it's either people are threatened because they're in the minority, and the majority is trying to stomp on their identity, or what's happening now is you've got a majority that's dwindling into a minority, and they're panicked and trying to hold on. But I don't think there's a problem for most American-Muslims or most American-Buddhists or most American-Jews in living a thick religious life, for example. That's consistent with their allegiance to a certain conception of America, like what you said before, that there being this inherent tension between America's ideals and America's history, I think is the story, right? That is the story that everybody can accept, that thing that we can all agree on, and that we can be proud of is that we have these ideals that are beautiful. And that who we are, are people who have struggled over time to make good on our ideals, so that they apply to everyone. And everybody can buy into that in theory.</p><p>drvolts   1:38:48  </p><p>I just don't know. I mean, I guess everybody. I guess my cynical suspicion is that if you're a minority culture or minority ethnicity or whatever, obviously, that conception of procedural fairness and pluralism is to your advantage. So in a system like ours, it's natural that all kind of subaltern populations and factions are going to proclaim allegiance to that set of values, right, but then if they gain some power and dominance, if one of them say, were to gain some special privileges or whatever it just seems like those commitments would go overboard and they would become committed to their continued power, you know. I mean, it's only like a tool for subaltern populations trying to get a piece of the pie. And I just wonder if it's enough, if it's a stable thing.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:39:54  </p><p>It's not stable but this is just what we were talking about, that of Sisyphus being happy. Right. That's just it, people are going to disagree, they're going to get mad about it, they're going to try to undermine the system when it's against their faction’s interests. And you have to try to do whatever you can to have systems where the coalition of the rest of everybody who has an interest in maintaining the rules that some faction is trying to undermine is sufficient to hold them up. The system will never fall into a steady state equilibrium where we don't have to worry about it spinning out of control, every system is sooner or later going to spin out of control. The American system is weird in the sense that it has persisted for so long, despite so many internal tensions.</p><p>drvolts   1:40:51  </p><p>Yeah baffling, the more you learn about history, the more baffling that fact becomes</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:40:56  </p><p>…this government's collapse. Something I just wrote was that constitutions don't survive because the framers were brilliant, they survive, because they're always fucked up, they're always inadequate, we can never anticipate how people are going to bend the rules, how they're going to exploit them. But Hayek is right about spontaneous orders, we don't know what order will emerge on top of a set of fundamental rules when you first put them in place. You don't know what factions are going to realign around those rules and what their dynamics are going to be. So the system is always going to tend toward some kind of destabilization. And it is always about being creative and flexible, about figuring out how to shore up the system. And that's one thing Americans have been good at, we're good at kludges. That's one of the things that annoys me about conservatives these days is there's so much worship of the framers and this originalist conception of the Constitution, when seriously the fact that our country survives at all is because we're pragmatic, we're we're arbitrary, we would just change the rules. By definition, every constitution is living, they survive by being changed so that they're not incompatible with the order that is emerging. And so we've got this crazy kludgy patched system, that somehow it's this jalopy that is flying and who knows how it stays up?</p><p>drvolts   1:42:43  </p><p>Doesn't that terrify you though, doesn’t that terrify the mechanic. Like, I don't know how this thing's running, but I'm gonna get in there and f**k with the engine anyway?</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:42:52  </p><p>I've become Zen about it, right. Of course, I'm terrified of the plane crashing. And especially since right now, about 40% of the country is just straightforwardly trying to crash it. So that is alarming. But I just think that this is it. This is what life is, this is politics and life is political. There's not a way out of it, there's not a better place to go that's gonna be better permanently. It's just what it is. And my parents, my grandparents were alive with the worst war in the history of the world. Everything f*****g fell apart, right? And there's nothing that's gonna stop that from happening again, it will happen again and you just have to try to be a finger in the dam and hope that enough other people get their fingers in there. And sometimes it's just gonna fail. You're just not going to get enough fingers in the f*****g dam and it's gonna break and you're all gonna die. And there's nothing we can do about it. Except try to put your finger in the dam and try to convince other people to do it.</p><p>drvolts   1:44:05  </p><p>Right, right. Another thing that makes me uncomfortable about that, but I guess I just have to get used to it, is for me that vision of kludgy jalopy being held together by our patches as we go forward, that's never done. This never fixed that. We're all constantly fighting over that contested pluralism that never resolves into any clean one system or another. I can get behind that as that's life, as good as it gets. It's better than the many tyrannical alternatives. Right? But I just don't envision that idea or that vision, inspiring that many people. I mean, it's terrifying. It's just inherently terrifying. </p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:45:07  </p><p>Well I don’t think people have to think that's what it is. It's not important that people see the system for what it is. Because that's internal to this view, that people are going to disagree about what the system is, and people aren't going to see it the same way. And people are going to have fanatical absolutist ideologies that they're going to try to ram through. And that's just, we just have to live with it. People don't need to believe that that's the way things are. I'm not making some Straussian point that…</p><p>drvolts   1:45:39  </p><p>Yeah, I was gonna say we're tiptoeing up to Strauss.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:45:41  </p><p>No, because I'm not saying that there's something that people need to believe to survive, and that we need to tell people to mobilize. I'm going to just tell people what's true, this is how the system is, this is how democracy is, don't worry about the fact that our disagreements aren't ever going to resolve, that's not a bad thing. It's a great way to live in a society where we can hash it out, keep it within the rails of the political system, rather than having it spill over into violence. If we're yelling at each other and screaming at each other and </p><p>we're not actually forming mobs and attacking the Capitol during the validation of election results, then we're doing okay. If we start f*****g attacking the Capitol while the elections being certified, then that's bad. And the system will f*****g crash if people keep doing it. And I think you can just tell people that.</p><p>drvolts   1:46:41  </p><p>Can you though because one of the things that polls are always finding (well, this is interesting, it's not actually true across parties) but you know, legendarily one of the things that Democrats or Democratic voters in particular on surveys and polls will tell you “Oh, I hate all the fighting” and I hear this from normie friends too, non-political friends, just all the fighting and squabbling, something about it bugs people and they wish people could just be more cooperative and get along better. So telling people that fighting and squabbling is like fingernails on a chalkboard. That's just it forever. That's our life. Can you really tell people that it makes them happy? I don't know that people like that state of affairs.</p><p>Will Wilkinson  1:47:28  </p><p>I don't think people like it. But here's the thing. We're talking about political ignorance before like most people aren't going to listen. They're going to watch ESPN. They're going to watch Ohio State like, you know, and get really depressed when they lose or something. But like they're so they're not going to hear us. And that's fine. That's part of it too.</p><p>drvolts   1:47:47  </p><p>All right. Well, thanks for coming on. Thanks for this discussion </p><p>WW:</p><p>It was a delight. Thank you. Yeah, let's do it again. Awesome.</p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-will-wilkinson-on-libertarianism</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:36848083</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 26 May 2021 16:00:47 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/36848083/7c137150c43b0cbc9743c3ba859019f8.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>6486</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/36848083/56a3034091f3ffc19f98c7922f836e35.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Sunrun CEO Lynn Jurich on the promise of electrification]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>It is now widely agreed among energy wonks that the fastest, cheapest way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is to, as I like to put it, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12938086/electrify-everything">electrify everything</a>. That means cleaning up the electricity system while shifting other energy uses — especially transportation and buildings — off of fossil fuels, onto electricity.</p><p>When it comes to electrification, one technology in particular sits at the nexus, helping to decarbonize the electricity system, vehicles, and buildings all at once. I'm speaking, of course, of the humble solar photovoltaic panel, a technology that has defied predictions for decades, getting <a target="_blank" href="https://news.mit.edu/2018/explaining-dropping-solar-cost-1120">cheaper and cheaper</a>, spreading <a target="_blank" href="https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-2020/solar-pv">faster and faster</a>.</p><p>But the spread of solar panels is just the leading edge of a much larger, more important shift to electrified homes and communities. As I've followed electrification and all its implications, one of the people I've learned the most from, in conversation and through her writing, is Lynn Jurich. </p><p>In addition to being an insightful observer of the US energy system, Jurich also happens to be the co-founder and CEO of America's largest residential solar company. Sunrun has been around since 2007 and seen some ups and downs, but lately it has been all ups. The company adapted relatively quickly to the pandemic shutdown, invested heavily, and had a banner year in 2020. </p><p>Then, to top it off, it <a target="_blank" href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/sunrun-announces-acquisition-of-vivint-solar">bought Vivint, its leading competitor, for $3.2 billion</a>. It is now sitting at the top of a burgeoning residential solar market, with a valuation of some $22 billion.</p><p>I talked with Jurich about <a target="_blank" href="https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2021/05/20/2232935/0/en/Sunrun-Partners-with-Ford-to-Provide-Seamless-Installation-of-80-amp-Ford-Charge-Station-Pro-and-Home-Integration-System-for-the-All-Electric-Ford-F-150-Lightning.html">her new deal with Ford</a>, the reason US residential solar costs twice what it costs in Germany, the ways distributed energy can help the grid, and the next steps for electrification. </p><p>Thanks to her for coming on and to you for listening. If you value this kind of work, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber. </p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-sunrun-ceo-lynn-jurich</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:36625272</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 21 May 2021 16:00:19 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/36625272/256ebff25c75a356684edea3e3f92b79.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4527</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/36625272/97b6d9acc4480d00877b2de29ca49345.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Battery Week: everything in one place]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>As you might have gathered from the name, when Battery Week began … a month ago, I did not anticipate it going on quite so long. Since it has dragged out a bit, I thought it might be helpful to pull everything together in one place.</p><p>If you click play above, you will find a lithium-ion battery megapod: all the battery pieces read aloud, plus the podcast with Chloe Holzinger, strung together into one three-hour-long beast.</p><p>Links to all the pieces:</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/its-time-to-get-charged-up-for-battery">Why lithium-ion batteries are so important</a></p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-primer-on-lithium-ion-batteries">A primer on lithium-ion batteries: how they work and how they are changing</a></p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-ongoing-battle-among-lithium">The many varieties of lithium-ion batteries battling for market share</a></p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/battery-week-competitors-to-lithium">Competitors to lithium-ion batteries in the grid storage market</a></p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-battery-analyst-chloe">Volts podcast: battery analyst Chloe Holzinger on possible futures for lithium-ion</a></p><p>As always, thank you for reading and listening. If you value this kind of work, please consider becoming a paid subscriber to Volts. </p><p>Forest says Happy Spring!</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/battery-week-everything-in-one-place</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:36540708</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 19 May 2021 16:00:31 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/36540708/abfd0e2e9968c49bc0ccf687e698fad6.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>11431</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/36540708/d4b728b908e000a072e0d6d5db7f1790.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: battery analyst Chloe Holzinger on the possible futures for lithium-ion]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Welcome back, my Volts friends, to the Battery Week that never ends. (Just kidding — this is the last of it.)  </p><p>For several weeks now, I have had my head buried in batteries, specifically, lithium-ion batteries: how they work, why they have taken over so fast, what different varieties are competing for which markets, and where innovation will take them in the future.</p><p>Even with as many PDFs as I’ve read, I'm still learning every day just how much I don't know. I'm not going to lie: I still have the Wikipedia page for lithium-ion batteries open in a tab.</p><p>So I thought it would be nice to round out battery week with someone who actually knows what they're talking about. To that end, I was happy to chat with Chloe Holzinger, a battery analyst at IHS Markit. (At least, that’s what she was when I spoke with her, and how I introduce her on the pod; since then, she’s become an Investment Associate with <a target="_blank" href="https://www.engine.xyz">The Engine</a>, a venture capital firm spun out of MIT.)</p><p>Chloe keeps up with lithium ion batteries for a living, so I was eager to talk with her about the growing market, the raw materials that make up batteries and their possible supply problems, the coolest new innovations in batteries, from solid state to liquid metal, and much more. She was generous with her time and I learned a ton. Enjoy.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Hello, everyone, this is Volts and I am your host, David Roberts. For several weeks now, I have had my head buried in batteries, specifically, lithium ion batteries: how they work, why they have taken over so fast, what different varieties are competing for which markets, and where innovation will take them in the future. Even with as many PDFs as I have under my belt now, I'm still learning every day just how much I don't know. I'm not going to lie, listeners, I still have the Wikipedia page for lithium ion batteries open in a tab. </p><p>So I thought it would be nice to round out battery week with someone who actually does know what they're talking about. To that end, I am joined today by Chloe Holzinger, a battery analyst with the clean energy technology and renewables team at IHS Market, a research and analysis firm. Chloe keeps up with lithium ion batteries for a living. So I was eager to talk with her about the growing market, the raw materials that make up batteries and their possible supply problems, the coolest new innovations in batteries, from solid state to liquid metal and much more. She was generous with our time and I learned a ton. So without further ado, let's get to the conversation.</p><p>Welcome, Chloe. Thanks for coming on Volts.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Thanks, David. Thanks for having me.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>All right, let's start maybe just a little bit by telling us how you ended up in the battery area studying batteries, analyzing batteries in the battery market. It's a strange niche field; how'd you end up there?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah, I sort of fell into it by accident, as so many people do. I got my undergraduate degree in Marine Chemistry and my master's degree in Mechanical Engineering, and happened to find the one startup in the Boston area that was developing batteries for underwater applications. So I joined them as employee number six, got a patent, and worked for them until they got acquired by a defense contractor. I then hopped over to the market intelligence field, where I've been covering the broader next generation battery technology area, and the various end applications for batteries. And I've been here ever since.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>How long has that been? How long have you been immersed in batteries? </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Total, including the startup experience, is probably about five years.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>It's been an active time in that field! Let's just briefly talk about what lithium ion batteries are and where they came from. I think everybody's heard of them. At this point, they've kind of gotten a lot of hype, but maybe tell us when they entered the market, their market development and why they're kind of reaching this crescendo of hype right now. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Sure. So I can provide a very brief history here. Lithium ion batteries were kind of invented separately at different stages by different companies. If I remember correctly, Kodak did some innovation on actual tape casting, which is the process that's used to actually make lithium ion batteries. Some of the core lithium ion battery technology itself was actually developed at Exxon way back when; they just kind of sat on that. Then some other different key breakthroughs were also developed at different corporations; I think Sony was one of them as well. I may apologize if I got any of that wrong. But they really were initially commercialized for the consumer electronics industry. </p><p>Then smartphones and computing power got much better, laptops became more commonplace, they were able to eventually make the jump from consumer electronics and these small applications, to electric vehicles, whether you're talking about a Tesla or Toyota hybrid, lithium ion batteries have been pretty crucial. And now we're seeing them used in all these different kinds of electric mobility applications, as well as the grid storage space.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>What was the first time they showed up in an electric vehicle? Because, just intuitively, the leap from a laptop to electric vehicle seems like a pretty far leap. Who had that idea and made that happen the first time? </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>You know, I don't actually know the exact history, but various people have been trying to make electric vehicles for a really long time. It's just before they were trying with lead acid batteries. So there were a few electric vehicle prototypes in Jimmy Carter's time, and they obviously didn't really go anywhere. As much as people have lots of lots of opinions – and I certainly do as well – about Elon Musk, you got to credit Tesla for really making the electric vehicle really sexy and popular again. </p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Is it fair to say that Tesla, back in the Roadster era, which I guess was like 2008 or 2009, that that's kind of what kicked off the current frenzy of development? Or do you think it was inevitable?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>I think both. I think Tesla was really there. Right place, right time, right idea, which is a pretty tough combination to come up with. I think regardless, you're seeing electric vehicles really rise in all different parts of the world and different companies really leading the charge. And it's such an integral part of decarbonizing transportation and industry. You know, if it wasn't for Tesla, I'm sure it would have been some other company. But it happens to be this particular American company that really got it started here in the States at least.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>So, what's so great about lithium ion batteries? Let's just, just briefly kind of look at the chemistry in the materials. We had lead acid batteries, we had nickel metal hydride, nickel cadmium batteries; batteries have been around. So, at the sort of the chemistry level, what is it about lithium ion batteries, that's so great, that has allowed them to colonize these markets?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>I could wax poetic about lithium ion batteries. A lot of what I do in my various market roles is talk about all these other non lithium chemistries that people are trying to develop. And there really isn't a better alternative to lithium ion batteries for electric vehicles. Lithium ion batteries are exactly the right combination of energy density, it has good enough cycle life, which means that it has a fairly good battery life, it has great power density, it's able to charge in a reasonable amount of time, you know, all of these different factors. There are certainly some safety issues, but they're pretty safe. All of the other different kinds of battery chemistries out there, they have various strengths and weaknesses, but they're really unable to compete on all of those fronts for a vehicle application. </p><p>You have these various different grid alternatives like flow batteries, some of which use vanadium or zinc. Those are really big and heavy; they are not light enough, simply, for a vehicle application. Lead acid batteries –  you replace your lead acid battery every few years or so in your car. It doesn't have a great cycle life; it certainly doesn't have a strong enough energy density in order to fully electrify a car with a reasonable all electric range. There's really just no competition with lithium ion batteries for mobility applications.</p><p>David Roberts  </p><p>Does that have something to do with lithium itself, just as a material? I mean, is lithium itself the secret sauce?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>In some ways, yeah. If you'd whip out your handy dandy periodic table that I know everybody carries around with them, lithium is towards the top [left] of the periodic table, which means that it's one of the lightest elements.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>So it's top left, I'm checking here. It looks like it's the [third] lightest material. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>It is, and right below lithium should be sodium. I haven't completely disappointed my chemistry teachers. Even if you go to that one row below lithium, that's a much bigger atom, and that bigger atom means that the energy density of that battery system is going to be smaller: you're going to have less ion exchange per kilogram of material. So the lightness of the lithium atom or element or ion is definitely a part of what makes lithium ion batteries superior to so many other different battery technologies. </p><p>There are a few other different arguments here–there are some batteries that are multi-valence, in that they exchange a couple electrons instead of one electron, but those are still extremely early on in their development.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Well, let's talk about the lithium ion battery market then. So you said, they sort of grew and completely ate consumer electronics, and then have jumped up and basically now dominate  EV's, I think. So what's the sort of lay of the land on lithium ion – where they're being used, what's driving all of this development and innovation?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>It's really the electric mobility space. Lithium ion batteries today are definitely good enough for an all electric vehicle, as we're clearly seeing. There are a few different factors that are driving further innovation in this area. So first is that automakers really want to be able to rely on this lithium ion battery value chain for the long term. There are a variety of different questions; whether or not they're valid is another point, but there are a lot of doubts about whether or not various key metals are able to scale up their production to meet some of these astronomical projections that automakers have around electric vehicles. Some of the crucial ones are nickel, cobalt, and lithium. There's a lot of innovation right now around developing technologies that are more robust against some of those fluctuations in key metals’ supply, demand, and pricing.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>I know they're expected to grow; every chart you see has the line shooting up into the right. But in terms of scale, compared to current nickel or cobalt demand for batteries, are we looking down the road at 2x, 10x, or 100x? When people are daunted about the scale of these metals, what do we mean by scale exactly? What are these projections?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>I think right now, for scale, all electric vehicles are 2 to 3% of annual new car sales. Automakers are saying that they're going to go all electric by 2035 or something, and California wants to ban ICE [internal combustion engine] vehicles by 2050.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Washington actually just said no new ICE vehicles sold after 2030.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger </p><p>Yeah, I mean, that's even more aggressive. And so to even meet that kind of target, you're talking some pretty dramatic scale ups of these upstream industries. In the lithium industry, lithium ion batteries were something about 30% of the total lithium market before electric vehicles took off, when it was really just consumer electronics. Today, 65%-67% of all lithium products go into lithium ion batteries, with the remainder being like glass and pharmaceuticals and all of these other kinds of niche applications. The lithium industry is really being driven by the lithium ion battery market. The nickel and cobalt industries are a bit different. But that's just [?????]</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Is this driving prices up? I mean, with all this new demand for lithium, has price become a problem yet, just for the raw material?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>No, not for any of the raw materials really. But right now, cobalt is really both the most expensive battery raw material, and the most well known to be sustainably problematic, whether you're talking about the human rights issues or the mines themselves. There's been a lot of coverage on the issues with cobalt mining.</p><p>So there's been this effort over the past several years to move away from cobalt, because of these primarily price and sustainability reasons, but also because there are simply better technologies out there than some of these high cobalt chemistries. There are a ton of different battery chemistries and a ton of different lithium ion battery chemistries. And there are strong advantages to battery chemistries that don't use cobalt on the energy density front, on the cycle life front for some chemistries; there's just a wide diversity of chemistries out there that really make it possible for automakers to pick and choose what types of lithium ion batteries they really want to use for which models.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Let's get into some of those variations and I'm curious about the sort of variations in chemistry and also sort of like what performance sort of advantages and disadvantages come with us with these different chemistries. </p><p>So, the two sort of dominant chemistries, right now, or what have been for a while are NMC and NCA. NMC has nickel, manganese, and cobalt with its lithium, and NCA has got cobalt and aluminum. Both those notably involve cobalt. I know there's been some effort just within those categories to sort of change the proportions and shrink cobalt. Who's doing that, and what does that involve? What do you lose by losing cobalt, and what do you need to compensate?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Pretty much everybody's working to reduce the amount of cobalt in these batteries. The NCA technology is really almost exclusive to Panasonic and Tesla, and they're currently really the only NCA mass producers. So NCA batteries are therefore used predominantly by Tesla for its electric vehicles, and they're not used at all in grid energy storage systems.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>And that's because they're extremely high energy density right? Is it something to do with the aluminum?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yes, they are very high energy density, and the Tesla Giga factories have been struggling to keep up with Tesla demand for a few years now. So even if there was demand for NCA batteries and energy storage systems, there just isn't supply for that. For Tesla in the NCA chemistry, they've been able to reduce the amount of cobalt in their batteries from 20% to 10% now. So they've been able to significantly reduce the amount of cobalt in those systems. </p><p>For NMC, you know, this is the most commonly used cathode formulation in lithium ion batteries today. And as you noted, there are many, many different NMC formulations with varying ratios of those key nickel, manganese and cobalt components. This is where, to your question, it gets very interesting, in terms of varying the amount of cobalt. The early versions of NMC had equal amounts of nickel to manganese, cobalt, or NMC111. And the technology has since progressed to now, where there's a lot of talk and support for high nickel cathodes, which would be eight parts nickel to one part manganese to one part cobalt. So that's, again, if you're thinking about the ratios, dramatically reducing the amount of cobalt there, and the benefit is that these high nickel cathodes enable much greater energy densities. But the converse, the trade off here, as you noted, is that these high nickel cathodes are a bit less thermally stable than the lower cobalt cathodes, and that can impact cycle life and safety. So some of the reason why it's been a bit more difficult to commercialize these high nickel cathodes for mass produced electric vehicles, outside of China, is that some of these batteries need extra safety features at the pack level in order to counteract some of that increased thermal instability.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Right. And when you add cooling systems and whatnot, you add weight and thus, lose a little bit of your energy density advantage.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Right, exactly. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>But the NMC 811 chemistry, that's the thing now, right? It was a GM that just sort of debuted that fairly recently. I thought it's all it's all the rage. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah, it's definitely a thing. It's been used in various electric vehicles in China for a year or two now, maybe a bit longer. And as you noted, it's definitely made its way outside of China as well. Even Volkswagen says that they are planning on using high nickel cathodes in their luxury vehicles. </p><p>But, at the same time, you've also seen the rise of this other chemistry called LFP which is lithium iron phosphate, which has the lowest energy density compared to NMC and NCA, but it doesn't have cobalt and its core feedstocks, Iron and phosphate, are much easier to procure and much less vulnerable to price spikes than nickel, manganese or cobalt.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Right. And the loss of energy density for these LFP batteries–is that mainly because of the loss of nickel, just because iron and phosphate just won't hold as many ions as nickel? Is it that simple?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>It's a little bit more complex than that. It has to do partially with the cathode crystal formulations and really the cathode structure, which I really don't think I could explain at an intelligent level. You know, suffice it to say that LFP is structured entirely differently from NMC and NCA, and that different structure isn't able to hold as many lithium ions in a small enough space as NMC and NCA. And, iron’s heavy. These are not necessarily light batteries. </p><p>But there have been innovations in pack design. With LFP, one of its advantages is that it does have better cycle life and it does have higher safety performance than NMC and NCA. We saw last June that BYD released a new battery pack architecture that removed a bunch of the safety features that were in there for NMC and NCA, and this pack architecture is specifically for LFP batteries in electric vehicles. At the pack level, these LFP batteries do achieve very competitive energy densities such that Tesla can use an LFP battery pack in its vehicles in China, and have those vehicles really achieve very competitive ranges and energy densities, compared to its NCA batteries back here.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Right. I think in the Tesla battery day presentation, I believe the way they put it was that LFP–just the chemistry–has 50% of the energy density of their high nickel chemistry. But at the pack level, you get 75% of the range, because of the lack of safety and cooling, and everything. VW actually said something similar with that–they're going to use LFP in their lower end, sort of workaday cars where you don't need energy density. </p><p>Let's just pause here and talk about energy density for a minute. Energy density – tell us what energy density is, and why it's so prized in these applications.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah, so energy density is basically, very simply, the amount of energy you can cram into a particular kilogram or volume of space. So there's gravimetric energy density and volumetric energy density. You want more energy in that set unit, because then that extends the vehicle’s range, if you're talking about a vehicle application. So higher energy density batteries are able to go further, drive further between charges. And range anxiety is really one of the key things that particularly Americans cite as one of the reasons why they're not interested in buying an electric vehicle. They're concerned about not being able to easily drive to visit family or friends, or their annual trip to their favorite vacation spots, or go skiing. You know, there are so many different things to do in this country, and some of them are pretty far away. EV charging station networks are continuing to be built out, but people are still citing range anxiety as one of the key inhibitors for them to actually commit to an electric vehicle.</p><p>David Roberts </p><p>Right. So when we talk about energy density, we're mostly talking about range. We're just talking about how much energy you can cram into the battery in the same space. </p><p>I had this in a separate section, but we're into it now. Let's distinguish that quickly from power density, which is a slightly different thing. Can you tell us what power density is?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yes. Energy and power are like two sides of the same coin. So, energy is basically the total amount of, let's say, electrons in a given volume in a battery, for example. So your battery pack will have a very specific energy capacity. Power is the rate at which those electrons leave that battery to go do other things. So power density really refers to how quickly can you get that energy out of the battery, how fast those electrons leave.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Oomph Is the word I use. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yes, exactly. With lithium ion batteries, they do have their own particular variations in power density. But a lot of that ends up being irrelevant when you put it into a pack. You're seeing a lot of different pack architectures; there's some high voltage pack architectures that are more efficient now. And so, the power density isn't really something that folks are optimizing for at the moment.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Isn't that, though, what gives you your zero to 60 in two seconds, or whatever it is they're saying now? </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>That really doesn't really have to do with the battery chemistry so much. Just like you can fast charge your car, you can definitely discharge your battery pretty quickly if you want to. It's just whether or not that harms your battery system. So there has been some research on better enabling fast charging for electric vehicles.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Right. So fast charging, it's just for the flip side of power density, right? It's like how quickly you can release the energy and how quickly you can accept it. Is that sort of together? Those are kind of the same thing?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah, yeah. The flip side is that if you discharge your batteries super quickly, you can, A) harm the lifetime of your battery, and B) then that impacts your range, because there's fewer electrons in your battery then. So that's why your hybrid, or I guess my little Honda Insight, has an Eco Mode, where it controls how fast you can accelerate and things like that.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Oh, interesting. And how is that Eco? Is it just Eco because it makes the battery last longer?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Sure, I’m pretty sure that's the only thing it does. It does seem to impact my air conditioning, too. But I'm not entirely sure what good Eco Mode does, except I get five stars if I do well.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>So, obviously, energy density is dominating in the EV space, since most of what people want out of an EV these days is greater range, and that's kind of what people are pushing toward. So I'm sort of curious, EVs are by far the biggest market for these batteries, so my sort of assumption is that whatever the EV market wants, that's what's going to drive innovation. And sort of whatever the EV market ends up choosing is just going to scale up so big and get so cheap that it's going to be cheaper for other applications too. </p><p>So I guess what I'm asking is, outside the EV space, what are the other applications for lithium ion batteries, maybe where energy density is not the prime consideration? Are there other factors that developers and researchers will be chasing, sort of other performance characteristics other than energy density?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah. So I think what's important to clarify is that, range and energy density, those are what consumers want. But what automakers want is a reduction in costs. And really, that's what every sector wants. They don't want to pay too much for the battery. So some of these high energy density technologies that are really cutting edge and technologically incredible, some of them are really expensive, and it's hard to see how those costs can come down. And so there will likely always be some kind of market for those extremely high energy density technologies, but it's still a huge open question on whether or not those technologies will even be used in electric vehicles beyond the luxury vehicle segment. You even really see those different chemistries in an economy car. And I think from the past couple battery power day announcements by Tesla and Volkswagen, they're not planning on those high energy density batteries being used in most of their vehicles. They're looking at tailoring their vehicle battery strategy to some of these cheaper chemistries that are more robust to price bikes. </p><p>And, to answer the other half of your question, when you're thinking about the impact of these automotive trends on other end uses for batteries, whether that's consumer electronics or energy storage, you see a couple different things. So for consumer electronics, that's a market that pretty much at this point scales with population growth. Everybody has a laptop, cell phone, some people have multiple, and the battery technologies for those systems are pretty stable. Those are not really where a lot of the cutting edge innovation really is at this point in the battery world. </p><p>For the energy storage market, the energy storage market has fluctuated in what battery technologies it will use, depending on what's available, and how much they cost. And so this recent increase in LFP demand in the automotive industry, for example, has actually caused a shortage of LFP battery availability in the stationary storage sector. And this is definitely temporary. I don't really want to scare anybody –</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>It's just manufacturing capacity, right?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Right. I mean, if you think about it, electric vehicles are like 90% of the battery market. So if you are a battery manufacturer, and an automaker comes up to you and says I want you know, this huge amount of LFP batteries, are you going to go fulfill that order? Or are you going to go, “No, I'm committed to these other orders that are much smaller for these other particular applications.” Sometimes they'll commit to the energy storage contracts that they have, and sometimes they'll say, “Well, actually, this is really tempting, I'm just going to go with this much, much bigger order.” </p><p>And there are a lot of efforts to increase manufacturing capacity for LFP batteries at the moment. But for the short term, first half 2021, it's been basically impossible for stationary energy storage companies in the US to order new LFP batteries for systems this year.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Interesting. Let's talk about storage briefly. In EVs, obviously, energy density is a big thing, because you want to go a long way. What are the sort of performance characteristics that you're selecting for, in say, a home storage battery–a Powerwall or some variant? What do you want out of that battery?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>The fascinating thing with the grid storage sector is that, unlike electric vehicles, every application is really different. Comparing an economy car to a luxury car, you might say, one person does city driving, and the other person likes to do long treks or whatever. But comparing a home energy storage system to a utility-scale solar plus storage system that's a gigawatt in scale, those are completely different systems, with completely different demands and needs. That utility scale system is probably going to want to cycle once a day, twice a day, maybe. And that's a lot more often than you would charge your car; that's a pretty heavy use case. And, in the US, we have a lot of land here, so footprint isn't really a huge issue. </p><p>Whereas, in your home, you really want a small system that’s very safe because it's in your house, and you want to make sure, ideally, it's paired with a solar roof. I think Tesla right now has just said that they aren't selling any home batteries without solar. But that's probably not going to charge and discharge as deeply as a commercial, industrial, or utility scale battery.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>So for a big grid battery, then, maybe you don't care so much about energy density, because space is not as prized like volume is. It's okay to be a little bigger, and it's okay to be a little heavier as long as you're very resilient, or have a high cycle life, right? So, if I'm going shopping for a battery purely on cycle life, where do I look? Who's the leader there?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Yeah! Some of it's also just discharge rates. Really the only two battery chemistries right now that are really used in stationary storage applications are LFP chemistries and NMC chemistries, and not necessarily high nickel NMC like 811 formulations – it's like NMC 532 or 111. They're not the ultra high density, lower cycle life chemistries. </p><p>Among those three chemistries, if you're talking the two different NMC formulations and the LFP, that pretty much covers the vast majority of stationary storage systems. There's much less diversity in chemistries in the stationary energy storage market, in part, because there's different needs than the mobility market, and a lot of the efforts to make new technologies for lithium ion batteries are focused on the needs of the mobility sector and not necessarily the needs of the stationary energy storage sector. </p><p>And so you see that these non-lithium alternative batteries are almost exclusively targeting the stationary energy storage sector because there are so many discrete niche applications that maybe lithium ion isn’t best suited for. In an ideal world, one of these non lithium alternatives, would be able to find a place in it. So an example is some of this long duration seasonal storage that people are talking a lot about now. California, in particular, has been supporting these through grants, and various Community Choice Aggregators are supporting these through RFPs. Those types of seasonal duration, really, really low discharge systems, enormous systems for meeting those various occasional needs, [lithium batteries] are not appropriate.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Enormous systems, that may only charge and discharge like, once a season - once every couple of months.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah. And so for those systems, lithium ion batteries are way too expensive. You could hypothetically, still do it with a lithium ion battery; it's technically feasible. But you would never want to – it would be extraordinarily expensive. And so you are seeing a bunch of different technology developers developing entirely different systems for long duration storage specifically, that are using various different kinds of low cost feedstocks. And they're claiming we'll be able to meet those types of needs at reasonable capital expenditures.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Right, let's return to EVs real quick and look at a few of the sort of more hyped, cutting-edge technologies that are coming along, see if we can figure out if any of them are really going to change the game, as they say. </p><p>Let's talk about one that I think everybody's heard about at this point, which is solid state batteries. Maybe just tell us, what is a solid state battery and why would you want to make one? And is it in fact going to [make a huge difference?] I mean, I've been immersed in batteries for weeks here and I have read an enormous array of very strong opinions about the future of solid state batteries, all of which are mutually contradictory. So maybe you can just give us your sense of sort of, what is solid state, why is it so hyped, and will it revolutionize batteries all over again?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah, yeah, definitely, there's definitely a variety of opinions here. And really what solid state refers to really just means that the electrolyte and separator in an all solid state battery are replaced with one solid material that you know, is non flammable, that doesn't use the same materials as today's incumbent electrolytes and separators do.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>We should just pause and note that most of the incumbent electrolytes are liquid, some form of goop– </p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Liquid or gel.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>–which tend to be flammable, among other things, which is part of the problem.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yes. That’s really where the safety concerns around lithium ion batteries come from. It's because of these flammable electrolytes.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>So you replace the electrolyte with a solid material that obviously gets you safety, since the solid material won't catch fire. But what else? What else does it do? </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>That's really it. That's the definition of a solid state battery. </p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>But don't they also improve energy density, though?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>So this is where it gets tricky. Because for a long time, people thought that in order to use a lithium metal anode, which is really a much higher energy density than today's incumbent, graphite anodes, you really need a solid electrolyte, because when lithium metal anodes charge and discharge, lithium plates back onto the anode. And so there's a risk of the lithium plating unevenly on that anode.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Dendrites!</p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Yep. And these branch-like dendrites can short the system and cause the battery fires; you really don't want dendrites. </p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>This was an interesting fact, I just learned in my research, which I'll insert here, is that using solid lithium metal as an anode actually preceded lithium ion batteries. And it was these problems, namely, the formation of dendrites and such, that actually led researchers to say, well, let's put graphite on top of the lithium. And that way the ions can nestle in the graphite or intercalate in the graphite. They won't be able to hold as many, but they'll be stable, and it won't have these problems of dendrites and etc. So it's sort of interesting that the solid metal anodes are coming back. Like, they were around in the 1970s, and they're coming back; it seems like everything comes back eventually in the battery world. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yes. And lithium metal anodes are really the key to maximizing energy density in lithium ion batteries. And for a long time, a lot of people thought that you could only use them with a solid electrolyte. What we're finding now is that that's not necessarily true. You're starting to see a lot of other startups that are using lithium metal anodes with liquid electrolytes – Scion power has been doing it for a long time. And Cuberg, which was just acquired by Northvolt. These battery developers aren't using a solid electrolyte and are still achieving the same types of cell level energy density that the solid state battery developers using lithium metal anodes are also achieving.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Well, why wouldn't you want to use a solid electrolyte though? Are there considerations governing why you choose one electrolyte or the other? </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>So the solid electrolyte benefit is that added safety, right? You're not going to get that added safety with any kind of liquid electrolyte.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Right. I guess I'm just wondering, why isn't everybody sort of herding to solid electrolytes if they're safer? Is there is there a drawback of some kind?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger </p><p>Yes, there are a few. The first electrolytes were made of this polymer called polyethylene oxides, I think PEO electrolytes, and these are solid. They're actually in use in vehicles today and have been for a while, in a few ride sharing vehicles, I think in Paris. But they need to be heated up in order to actually achieve the kinds of ionic conductivities, in order to basically allow the battery to charge and discharge efficiently. And that external heater impacts the total battery efficiency. If you have to use part of the battery output to heat itself, you're having less battery to drive the vehicle. That's one main issue with electrolytes is that room temperature ionic conductivity is difficult to achieve. It's difficult to make a solid state battery that can charge and discharge at reasonable rates at room temperature without an external heater.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Interesting. Is there such a thing in the world yet? I assume some researchers are on that.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yes. So that's really one of the first things that a lot of these solid state battery developers that you're seeing today have been focused on and working on, since they were founded. That was really their first starting goal. And so companies like Solid Power and Ionic Materials, they both claim to be able to have very competitive charge-discharge rates at room temperature. The other factor is, with any new battery technology, it's going to have a lower cycle life than one of these incumbents. And this is a case for solid state batteries, for lithium metal anodes, for some of these high manganese cathode chemistries that you're hearing about now. These are all new materials that are still in their development stages. And so because of that, they're not 100% optimized for full functionality yet.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>And that's just a matter of learning by doing right–just making a bunch of them and figuring out incremental improvements.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Exactly. Science is a slow process. And, some of these batteries are only able to achieve 500 cycles, for example, which is much less than, you know, the 1000 cycles plus that you would really need to be qualified for use in an Electric Vehicle. All these companies have been getting much better over time, Bbt that's still a weak area for solid state batteries.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>So it sounds like a lot of the hype around solid state is less about the solid electrolyte in particular, and more about the combination of a solid electrolyte with lithium metal as an anode. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Exactly.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>That's what people think is going to be the next revolution, or whatever.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Right. So if you take a look at QuantumScape, for example, QuantumScape uses this lithium metal anode. And it claims that it has spent these past many years of its development really optimizing and solving the dendrite issue. But QuantumScape uses a solid ceramic separator, yet also uses some liquid electrolyte at the cathode. So it's not what I would call an all-solid state battery. It is a lithium metal anode battery, but not all solid state. And it's because it uses a solid ceramic separator, it can be lumped into some of the semi-solid batteries. These different terms kind of get conflated. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Semi-solid state.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Yeah, yeah, I mean, really. So, the lithium metal anode, that is the part that enables this huge energy density increase that QuantumScape has been able to show through its data that it’s shared.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>It's a little weird to me, then that solid state gets all the hype, since it's really the lithium metal, it's the metal anode that's really giving you the sexy kind of performance boosts that you want in the solid state. The electrolyte is a little bit of a footnote to that. Why did things work out that way? Is it just people not being careful with their terminology?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah, it's a little bit of an artifact from when people thought that you needed an all-solid electrolyte for a lithium metal anode. And so “solid state battery” really referred to the combination “lithium metal anode” and “solid electrolyte”. But you're seeing companies now that are developing lithium metal anode batteries without solid electrolytes, and you're seeing solid electrolyte developers developing batteries with a graphite anode. So it's not really the uniform term that people assumed it would be when it started becoming part of the lexicon two to three years ago, </p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>I'm just gonna clarify this for readers who are confused. You have a lithium metal anodes, which can be coupled with either solid or liquid electrolytes. And then you have solid electrolytes, which can be coupled with either lithium metal anodes or traditional graphite. And so they're sort of separate in that you got a matrix of possibilities. But the solid state that everybody's excited about, the one that's supposedly setting off this whole new round of innovation and everything, that's mostly about the lithium metal metal anode involved. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Yes, yes. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>And so the lithium metal anode holds more lithium ions. And if you can overcome the dendrite formation problem, you just get a ton more – they're saying double the energy density, which would mean theoretically, double the range for an electric vehicle. And there's a bunch of these that are supposedly, just over the horizon, right, like mid 2020s? Is all the really sexy hype stuff still out a few years? Are any of these in use yet?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah. A lot of these different battery technologies are still pretty far away from commercialization. So, probably the most aggressive companies are saying that they'll be able to use solid state batteries in an electric vehicle by 2025. And that's pretty aggressive when you're thinking about how long it takes to get a battery qualified for use in a vehicle by an automaker. And also, when you're thinking about the scale in production, if you're going from a pilot plant to a mass produced vehicle, that's a huge jump in production capacity. And that's a whole different hard part of this whole equation. You can make the best battery in the world at lab scale, but that doesn't really mean anything if you can't make it in a cell that can integrate into a pack for an electric vehicle, and then produce the same high quality battery over and over and over again for many vehicles. That's a huge stretch.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Yeah. One of the sorts of considerations I keep stumbling into is, you've got, at this point, a pretty enormous manufacturing capacity built up for conventional lithium ion batteries, which means just a lot of learning by doing a lot of scale, and just a lot of built infrastructure. And so one of the things I see a lot is, if you're going to get a competitor to conventional lithium ion batteries, it's probably going to have to be able to make use of existing manufacturing capacity. In other words, like, you can't just require a whole new set of factories, whole new kinds of factories. So I'm wondering, of these kinds of solid state batteries, are any of them going to require new factories? Or are they going to be able to make use of existing manufacturing techniques?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>The startups are really pursuing mostly one of two different strategies. So the first strategy is really becoming a material supplier for incumbent cell manufacturers and producing their solid state batteries on today's manufacturing lines. And as you said, that really is able to leverage existing infrastructure, which is phenomenal; you can really access that very quickly if you can integrate yourself into or integrate your technology into these manufacturing lines. That's a great way to be able to make a lot of your batteries quickly. Also, some of these manufacturing lines – these costs quite a lot of money to build. So many factories and automakers aren't going to want to pay for new factories that require new facilities. When you have governments really throwing billions of dollars at a single factory, if you consider all the amounts of money that the European Union and various European countries have given to sell manufacturers to build factories within Europe, it's incredible. So that's one strategy. </p><p>The other strategy is, if the battery company is unable to integrate its technology with today's manufacturing lines, there's really no other option except for that company to become a cell manufacturer themselves, and build the relevant manufacturing lines using whatever specialized equipment that they need. They're going to have to do that themselves.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>And that, to me, just sounds daunting. I mean, to me, it almost sounds more challenging than the sort of scientific work of developing a new chemistry, just the nuts and bolts work of becoming a large scale manufacturer. This other manufacturing process has been around for decades, and it's been coming down at cost for decades. I mean do you see any of those possibly getting anywhere or succeeding?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah, I mean, I don't want to pick favorites, or say that anybody's absolutely not going to succeed, because I could absolutely be wrong, and I don't want to insult anybody. But I think one of the factors that is supporting groups in the second category that want to make batteries themselves – because you're right, this is in a lot of ways even more difficult than the actual battery development in the first place. But there are huge amounts of money out there looking to support solid state battery development, whether you're talking about automakers, or cell manufacturers, or chemicals suppliers, or now, financial institutions. SPACs are here for at least the near term, and the amount of money available to companies looking to go public by merging with a special purpose acquisition company, or SPAC is just phenomenal. You have a valuation of a billion dollars, which used to be a lot of money for a startup. And suddenly, overnight, go to a $10 billion valuation.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Yeah, it's got a bit of a bubble feeling, as I read around solid state. Do you think that's right? Do you think there's gonna be some high profile crash and burns happening at some point?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>I mean, I think it really depends on the company. Not all the SPACs, the companies in the electric mobility space that have chosen to go public this way, they're not all equal. There are some companies that are already making revenue, and that haven’t really changed their business plan at all since going public. They're just continuing ahead and saw an opportunity to make a lot of money really quickly, and who am I to blame them for that? I actually support some of that strategy in part because there has been a lot of government support for electric mobility technologies in a lot of countries but not really in the United States over the past four years, since 2016. So a lot of these developers and these companies that are operating in this space, if they're targeting a market that they're expecting will grow with these kinds of exponential rates that automakers are expecting, they want to grow quickly in order to meet that demand. And going public via SPAC is a quick way to make that money to scale your process and go get that market. And you don't want to miss that opportunity.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>There's a lot of money floating out there. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Yeah.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Let's talk about one or two more of the areas of innovation. We hit solid lithium metal anodes, which gets you a bunch more energy density. We talked about solid electrolytes, which gets you safety – no more fires. One of the other ones I see come up a lot that Tesla is leaning heavily on, and that I know some people are very excited about, is using silicon as an anode. Can you tell us a little bit about about who's doing that and why?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah! So Silicon is a little bit different from these other different technologies, in that it is much closer to commercialization than either solid electrolytes or lithium metal anodes.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>You mean silicon anodes specifically? </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yes. And really when I say silicon anodes, for the most part, I’m meaning silicon graphite composites. These won't really be pure silicon anodes. I’ve really yet to see a pure silicon anode battery that is cost competitive with lithium ion batteries. </p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Why is the graphite still in there? What goes wrong when you add more and more silicon? Like, why is it difficult? </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>It’s not necessarily that it's more difficult, because all silicon batteries have existed for a while; it's just that graphite’s way cheaper. If you can use some percent silicon to increase the energy capacity of your anode, and, the more silicon you put in your anode the faster you are able to charge your battery, if you're able to use a relatively high percentage of silicon in your anode, but still have some graphite in there, you can get some of the benefits of using a silicon anode without necessarily the extremely high costs.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>And silicon as an anode – does it work the same way lithium metal as an anode does, in the sense that the ions plate onto it, or is it intercalation?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>No, it's intercalation for these silicon anodes. And I kind of skipped over it, but there are some technical difficulties with silicon. With that intercalation, the silicon anodes do tend to swell, and that swelling can crack certain parts of the battery. It can impede and change different coatings that you might have on the silicon anode particles, and swelling isn't good. These silicon developers for batteries, all of them claim to have addressed the swelling in some regard, whether they're doing all silicon, pure silicon anodes, or silicon-graphite composites, they're all looking to address that main issue. But really, all of these developers have their own particular kind of material. There isn't really one dominant silicon-graphite material that's in use out there. There are a wide variety of companies using silicon metal, and some using silicon oxide, and others using silicon nanoparticles. It's just a very diverse field of a lot of different technologies.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>And didn’t Tesla just announce something kind of new and fancy in its 2020 battery day? It's going to use just unprocessed metallurgical silicon, right? So you cut out the processing step, just use raw silicon and instead of trying to mix all these chemicals in to prevent swelling, it’s just going to design the cell – of course, you know, I have this 101 level understanding of all this so I could be getting all this wrong – but it's basically going to design the cell to accommodate swelling, instead of trying to prevent swelling. It's just going to design around it and allow it, and even in some ways get benefits out of swelling. I don't know if you know any of the details of what they're doing. That could be a horrendous summary.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>I mean, I don't think really anybody outside of Tesla knows exactly what Tesla's working on. Tesla has a knack for making these large announcements with very sparse technical details. And so I also am looking forward to seeing what they are talking about. I would assume that the combination of all of the different technologies that Tesla discussed at its battery day – I think Elon Musk said something along the lines of he's expecting this to be a three year plan until these technologies are in use. That seems unnecessarily aggressive. I mean, I wouldn't consider it a failure of Tesla, that Tesla was disappointing me in some way if they took a few extra years to do these things. And I think that we'll probably end up seeing that on a more of a 2025 or 2026 timeframe. </p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Right. So just to summarize, then on the silicon, you get more silicon on your anode, you get higher energy density because you’re housing more ions basically, but silicon’s expensive, and graphite is cheap. So the effort here is to figure out a way to use more silicon, thus increasing energy density, without unduly increasing costs. Is that a fair summary? </p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Yeah, yeah I think I can agree with that. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>These are, to my mind, the big ones within the lithium ion family that we've hit here: the sort of lithium metal anode, solid state electrolytes silicon anode, high nickel cathodes, LFP with iron rather than the manganese and the cobalt. Those are, to my mind, the big sort of competitive or maybe competitive ones within the lithium family, but there are, as you say, these other chemistries that if you talk to people working on them, they say have advantages. </p><p>One of them is zinc, sort of just using zinc. As I understand it, just substituting zinc for lithium, and using zinc ions rather than lithium ions. Do you have any thoughts about zinc batteries, whether they're going anywhere, zinc ions specifically?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah, so zinc batteries. From my understanding, there are a lot of zinc battery companies out there. So it's possible that you know, I might not be speaking exactly to the same type of market that your contact is. But, you know, most zinc batteries are being developed for stationary energy storage applications. And similar to what I said about silicon anodes, every zinc battery company has their own particular technology. There isn't one zinc technology that's outstripping all of the others. Eos – another company that went public via SPAC – they're developing a zinc battery for stationary storage applications. I think they're using some kind of air cathode? I could be getting that wrong. </p><p>And then there are others in battery companies that are using a flow battery architecture, which is usually more common for vanadium batteries. There are just so many different zinc chemistries out there. I would be interested to see how these different systems perform in the field. A lot of these different technologies are still lab scale, and Eos obviously isn't. But, how these perform in the field – if they're able to increase manufacturing scale, and compete on costs with lithium ion batteries. That’s another area – a lot of these zinc batteries do use much cheaper chemical feedstocks than lithium ion batteries, but because they don't have the same kinds of manufacturing economy of scale as lithium ion batteries, it's still more expensive as a system to deploy right now.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>One of the zinc guys I talked to, his company’s big scheme is, he says, he can slipstream into a lead acid manufacturing plant and just use the same machinery as a lead acid manufacturing plant. And he wants to go after lead acid batteries, which are still a $45 billion global market; they're not gone by any stretch of the imagination. He wants to scale up that way: first, eat up the rest of the lead acid batteries and then start competing against lithium ion after that. So yeah, there's just a huge variety of ways you could go about that. And also sodium. I don't know if this is even worth saying anything about but I've also read that you can substitute sodium, which is basically salt, substitute those for lithium compounds and make sodium ion batteries. Have any of those poked up onto the actual market yet?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah, you know, I think there's really one leading sodium battery startup for electric mobility applications called Faradion, based out of the UK. They're targeting both grid storage applications – a lot of that lead acid replacements – as well as low cost e-mobility applications, like two wheelers, for example. And, again, I think that this is a really interesting and compelling kind of technology. But going back, even to the QuantumScape example, the hard part is really the commercialization in some regards. It's not really the hard part, but it's a different problem and it's a different way of thinking about the same technology. And sometimes, it takes one group of people to develop the technology, and another group of people to commercialize it. There are two very different problems that are both incredibly difficult. </p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Well this brings me to a sort of an overarching question. In some sense, this was sort of the question that ended up motivating my whole dive into batteries in the first place. Which is, you can find a lot of people in this space, who will say, yes, there's all these interesting new technologies out there innovating out there on the cutting edge, finding little tiny niches. And there are plenty of batteries that can outperform lithium ion on a particular metric, this metric or that metric, or that can have some performance advantages. </p><p>But it's that second part, it's commercializing and scaling up, and conventional lithium ion batteries with conventional lithium ion manufacturing capacity, have just gotten such a head of steam, have gotten so big, scaled up so much and are falling in cost, all the time, as manufacturing capacity, doubles and doubles again, that it's that lead – not sort of the scientific lead – but the commercialization head start, this just unbridgeable.Like, there's no new battery technology that's going to perform so much better, that it can just sort of magically do that scale, especially when you're chasing a receding target, right? Because the lithium ion batteries are forever getting cheaper and cheaper. </p><p>And as I say in my posts, this is somewhat of a parallel to the PV in solar. There's all these other solar technologies that can outperform conventional solar PV on this or that metric. But just the amount of scale and manufacturing scale that PV has at its back is just giving it an unbridgeable head start. On that big question like, and I guess it just comes down to how much you rate the difficulty of this commercialization, so any of these sort of innovations we've talked about – your solid state, your different kinds of anodes – what's your sense of whether they have a chance? Or do you think that your sort of standard lithium ion batteries would just have that scale advantage that's unbeatable at this point?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>No, I definitely think that there is absolutely room for improvement. The technologies that are likely to succeed and be implemented on those commercial scales and compete at those costs will be the technologies that enable cost reductions in other ways. Whether it's because they're using cheaper feedstocks, or able to integrate into incumbent manufacturing lines, whether that's lead acid or lithium ion, leveraging the existing infrastructure is huge. And, reducing the cost of batteries is going to be critical for enabling some of these EV adoption rates that these automakers are expecting. The battery makes up, I think, 50%, roughly, of total costs for an electric vehicle.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Oh wow, that’s crazy.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>And so in order to really make electric vehicles affordable for everybody, and not just people who want to go buy Tesla's, you really need to bring those costs down. You also need to be able to scale the supply chains for lithium too. Lithium batteries have these current great economies of scale, but those are going to need to increase even further. And are our current processes really robust enough to accommodate some of that demand that we're forecasting for 2030, 2040, 2050? There are definitely open questions out here that some of these non-lithium battery alternatives could be able to take advantage of.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>So there's at least the possibility then, there's at least an open possibility, that some of these supply mccammon materials, supply constraints could inhibit lithium ion growth enough to open a market – a possibility in the market – for these other chemistries.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Sure. I do think that whatever slowdown in the lithium ion supply chain, if there is one, would only be temporary. Lithium ion batteries are just so good at what they do, and there's already so much money in here that it makes sense to simply fix the problem rather than pivot to an entirely different technology. But I mean, for alternative technology developers, it's really critical to make sure that you're competing with the lithium ion battery technology that you plan to compete within 2025 or 2030, or whatever you plan to enter the market, and not today's lithium ion battery technologies or yesterday's lithium ion battery technologies. </p><p>As these alternatives keep developing, lithium ion batteries are gonna keep getting better. We're seeing new pack architectures, new cell architectures, new battery management systems that are able to increase the usable battery capacity of an incumbent lithium ion battery without really any changes to chemistry, you just make the–</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Oh, just a software that’s new and better–Interesting. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>So there are just all of these other technologies that are surrounding the lithium ion battery industry that, you know, are making lithium ion batteries even more competitive and even more cost effective, and lowering, you know, pack costs and sell costs to levels that are useful for economy cars. We're just seeing improvements really all around.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>I was gonna ask this later, but this is a good segue into this. I read one of these reports, and the first thing I would say is, I've never looked into a market that is so – I don't know what the word is – dynamic, uncertain? Like, if you're trying to compete against the lithium ion batteries of 2025, who in God's name knows what’s that’s going to be? Who knows what you're competing with? It's just such an incredible state, there's so much flailing around in the dark here. There's so little consensus about what's going to happen. It's a little crazy. </p><p>But, in terms of lithium supply, I wanted to hit on that again before we go. We mentioned that cobalt needs to go. I think everybody agrees that the battery makers agree that over time, cobalt needs to be shrunk and eliminated. But what about the lithium supply itself? My sort of vague sense from what reading around is, there's plenty of lithium in the world. Absolute supply is not the constraint, but digging it up is pretty gross, the way we currently do it, and pretty limited. So what's underway to sort of address those possible supply constraints?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>So you're right. There's tons of lithium in the world, we're not really at risk of a lithium shortage by any means. In terms of pure natural resources, it's really about being able to get that lithium out of those natural resources in a cost competitive way, and in a way that you're producing a battery quality lithium product. Lithium ion batteries require an insanely high quality kind of lithium. There have been a lot of junior lithium companies looking to try to tap into the growing lithium ion battery market, who have struggled in one way or another to produce a product that is acceptable to the lithium ion battery industry. Whether or not it's low purity, or it has certain impurities that are really toxic to lithium ion batteries, it's hard to produce a high quality lithium product for lithium ion batteries. There are really only a handful of companies out there that do it. </p><p>Making sure that those companies are able to scale their production in a manner that they can address some of these lithium ion battery demands of 2025, that's definitely a huge concern, especially since lithium prices were so low for so long, really, for the past year or two. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Are they rising now? </p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Yes, they are coming back now. Which is great because it was really getting impossible to imagine how they could go lower. But they are coming back and that added capital for the lithium companies will be really crucial for funding these capacity expansions. A lot of these expansions take a long time to build, and even once they're built, they can take a really long time to actually have the lithium go through the whole process. These brine ponds in South America – the way that these ponds work, is that you, very simply, slowly evaporate the water off of the brine.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Yeah, really slowly! That's a crazy industrial process where there's just weeks of stuff sitting there.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah, yeah, and it's really sensitive, it's really hard to get that right! Those evaporation ponds are extremely, you know, they sound really basic and really simple – you just evaporate the water. But, it's not so simple. It's a very delicate balance. And it's just incredible that you know, your smartphone or your fancy electric vehicle, whatever. The lithium in there, there's a high probability that came from 18 months of evaporating in South America.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>It's hard to adjust the supply, remotely, on a timely basis if 18 months of evaporation!</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah! So then the other side of this is that, in Australia is where a lot of the other lithium comes from, that comes from hard rock mining. That doesn't rely on evaporation at all, but it does have significantly higher carbon dioxide emissions than the brine process. So there is a trade off: you can go faster, but that requires a lot more energy much faster, you can't just use solar power. So it’s a lot of carbon emissions.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>It just seems like, I mean, this is my liberal arts major’s, untutored, gut response to all this, but this just seems like an area that like surely science can do better than that. At least, it just seems like something that we haven't put a lot of a ton of research into yet. And surely, we're going to come up with something better in the long term. If we need this, like, 10x, 50x of lithium supply, surely we're gonna figure out something better than 18 months of evaporating? </p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Absolutely. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Is there anything on the horizon that's more sophisticated?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Totally. And, I think the reason why we haven't seen a lot of those technologies being used commercially yet, is because there wasn't really a need until, like five years ago. So, again, science takes a long time, and it takes a while to develop an entirely new technology. But there are quite a few different options out there right now – these technology developers that are targeting the lithium industry, and looking to really extract lithium from these natural resources at a lower energy capacity and reduced water consumption, and in a shorter timeframe, with low CO2 emissions. Those are all crucial factors for these next generation lithium extraction technologies. But there are quite a few out there.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>And just quickly on Nickel–what's the story on nickel? Is it roughly the same, like there's enough in the world, it's just capacity could be higher?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Nickel is a bit of a different story, because the nickel industry is much, much larger than the lithium industry, and lithium ion batteries make up a very small part of that nickel demand. Nickel’s used in a lot of alloys. I think it's used in steel manufacturing, for example. Making sure that there's enough nickel also for the lithium ion batteries, it's a tough situation to really think about. </p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Because it sounds like Elon Musk is borderline desperate to find Nickel. He's out there saying on calls, like, please start a nickel company. I will give you a guaranteed 30 year contract; someone please give me nickel.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah. And I honestly don't entirely know what he's talking about there. It may be that he wants somebody to mine nickel specifically for him, and that's really where he's coming from, rather than necessarily for the steel industry, which is much bigger than the lithium ion battery industry.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Maybe it will just – with Tesla's march towards vertical integration – maybe it will just open a nickel mine.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah. So I think, with regards to really all of these different technologies, one of the ways that companies like Tesla are looking to address some of these long term needs is through battery recycling, because you can recover a lot of these metals through those processes.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>What a great segue, this was my next question! This is something I feel guilty about, that I'm not actually writing much about in my series. And this is, environmentally, a huge part of the story. So let's, let's talk about recycling, then. Right now, the sort of amount of lithium ion batteries that need to be recycled right now, is relatively low, because a lot of the ones that were in the first EVs are still going. So the problem we're facing now for lithium ion battery disposal is just a fraction of what's going to happen once EV's are 50% or 100% of cars, rather than 2%. So what is the current state of lithium ion battery recycling? Is it done, and what can and can't be recovered from them? And like how environmentally gross is all of this, I guess I'm asking.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Yeah. There are some battery recycling facilities that are operational today for lithium ion batteries. But what most of them are doing right now are basically making some of the scrap materials for manufacturing back into a usable feedstock for lithium ion batteries. So that scrap recycling is where a lot of battery recycling is today. And that's great, but it's very different from the processes required for breaking down a fully realized lithium ion battery into its constituent components. Exactly what you said – there really aren't too many lithium ion batteries that have reached their end of life right now. So we haven't really seen any of these major lithium ion battery recycling facilities really be profitable yet because of that very small total volume of end of life batteries. But, if you can extract nickel, manganese, cobalt, lithium from these batteries today, and recycle them into the value chain, that would be an incredible feedstock for lithium ion batteries. And some have argued that that could even be a higher quality feedstock than virgin materials, because you know exactly all of the inputs going into that system, as opposed to a rock you dug up from the ground.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>But my sense is that one of the difficulties is that these are compounds, right? These are not sort of discrete metals on different parts of the battery, they're compounds. So there's some chemistry involved in pulling that apart. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>There is. I think the leading process that I am not technical enough to go into too much detail about is called hydrometallurgical. That's very energy intensive, and does require quite a bit of sulfuric acid to break down those components. But I think the two areas, to my mind, that are most pressing right now about better recycling processes, is that half the cost of battery recycling comes from the logistics of getting the battery out of the car and to the recycling facility and then getting the recycled material to the cathode producer or to whoever the customer is. Those logistics costs are hugely expensive, and definitely going to come down.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>That's the kind of problem we know how to solve, right? I mean, those are solvable.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>They are solvable problems. They require cooperation. *Laughs*</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>*Laughs*. Uh oh, maybe we don't know how to do that. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Say, for example, some European countries qualify used lithium ion batteries as hazardous waste, versus some other kind of category, and that creates paperwork. And I had no idea paperwork could be so expensive, but apparently it is. And, I guess, aside from logistics, the other part is that lithium ion batteries today are not designed for recycling. They're not designed yet to be taken out of a car very easily – it's really difficult to get it out of a car.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Right? So yeah, I was gonna ask whether the recycling concerns are sufficiently large or pressing enough to actually be feeding back into the kind of innovation and design of batteries. Is anyone trying to make these batteries more recyclable? Is that a real effort yet?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Not that I have particularly heard of. Although, I think, from a theoretical perspective, I would assume that swappable batteries, like those that NIO is working on, would be easier to recycle simply because you can get it out of the car very easily. But, with regards to – glue is really hard for a recycler to get around. I haven't really heard of any cell maker or automaker talking about using less glue in a battery.</p><p>David Roberts </p><p>The zinc guys are quick to say they don't use these compounds. Lead acid batteries are pretty easy to recycle – you just strip them apart – and they say zinc batteries are the same, you can just strip them apart and get almost 100% of your materials back. That's one of the advantages of the zinc people boast. I just don't have a sense of whether the market cares about it yet or whether the market will care about it. </p><p>This is, I guess, a vague question, but just do you worry about the environmental impact? Every time I bring up batteries on the internet, without fail, there's a person who comes along and says, “Oh, yes, but we're mining horrible things and polluting horrible things. And the whole thing's an environmental disaster that everybody's ignoring and glossing over because everyone loves EVs.” I would love for that to be wrong, but I'm not super confident that it's wrong. What's your general sense of the environmental impact of this? Is that a big top of mind concern for you or for the industry?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>So it's definitely a huge growing interest for the industry, especially the upstream mining sector, because that's really where a lot of these concerns really come from. Cathode production can be electrified, which means that if you use solar or wind power, you don't have carbon emissions. The cell production facilities, those also require quite a bit of energy, but you can use clean energy resources for that as well. </p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>It’s really less about energy than the materials really, that I'm talking about. Just this mining and disposal of materials.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>So the recycling bit, and the upstream mining bit – those are the two parts that when somebody is talking about sustainability in the lithium ion battery value chain, those are the parts that I would think that they're talking about. Recycling, we're seeing a lot of government support for this, as well as automaker support, because if you can get higher quality material through a process that maybe you own –</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Right, so you're mining your own waste, basically.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>– that's super attractive. And, from the upstream part, we were talking about some of these lithium extraction technologies, there are a lot of efforts there to make that a lot more transparent and a lot more sustainable as well. So I wouldn't necessarily throw out some of these concerns offhand, but I don't really think that they're super relevant to the conversation. Since there's the idea of sustainability and lifecycle analysis and carbon emissions in the lithium ion battery value chain, ESG concerns, these are all things that the lithium ion battery industry is taking, actually very seriously.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>And you think they're solvable on some on some timescale? There's no problem for you?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah, I mean, it's hard to talk your way around Cobalt. So, the solution there is just to get rid of the cobalt, or wait for recycling. But aside from that, there's no part of the lithium ion battery supply chain that is going to lead to the kind of disaster like the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico or the Exxon Valdez, or any one of these major oil spills that have had all these kinds of ecological long term consequences.</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Yeah, I guess when you're calculating the environmental impact, you do have to sort of “minus” all the oil and gas impacts that you are avoiding, right, which is huge?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>I wouldn't necessarily say minus? I don't want to say that the lithium ion battery industry is perfect, and that they don't really have to do anything in order to satisfy that criteria. I think there are changes that need to be addressed. But I think that the conversation around “lithium ion batteries and electric vehicles are just as bad as ICEs (Internal combustion engine vehicles)”, I think that's kind of a disingenuous argument.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Okay, I don't want to keep you all day. So just as a final topic, then, this relates to the supply chain too. Sort of notoriously, even though more or less everyone agrees at this point that we are on the front end of a giant explosion of EVs and the EV industry, the US notoriously has virtually no domestic EV supply chain. We have virtually no EVs manufactured here; the metals are imported, almost all the parts are imported, almost the whole supply chain is imported at this point. And this is something that lots of people are concerned about. They think in terms of the whole competing with China, and jobs and a new growing industry, all that kind of stuff. So part of what Joe Biden's infrastructure proposal is about, is trying to goose the creation of a US EV supply chain, both for kind of materials and parts and for the EVs themselves. What's your take on that? Is that a doable thing? Is that something that we could stand up really quick? Or are there structural reasons why it's particularly difficult or why it hasn't happened?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>I don't think there are really any structural reasons. I think it's really about – oh, maybe this is a structural reason, but, I think it's more about making sure that our policies around clean energy technologies and electrification are well aligned at the local, state, and federal levels, and that  those aren't going to change anytime soon. Part of the reason why we haven't seen some of these is that industry players fled the US market. While they do have all of these facilities under construction in Europe, it’s because the US has gone back and forth a few times on its EV policies. President Trump did have a lot of support, actually, for the upstream minerals supply chains, and did sign some executive orders, looking at the battery minerals supply chains, and the possibility of bringing some of those here.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Because there is lithium and nickel here, right?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yep. But some of those efforts were pretty undercut by his administration's attitude against electric vehicles. And so that leads to some confusing signals for the industry. And I think having a well aligned cohesive electric vehicle and clean energy industry policy would definitely increase the confidence of both investors as well as industry players that the US market can be relied upon. So that's one main aspect. </p><p>The other main aspect is that if you take a look at where these battery industries are, and wherever the minerals operations are, those companies have all received huge amounts of government support. I don't necessarily know if the US is really ready to commit that kind of government funding to battery manufacturing. I guess we'll see what the Loan Programs Office does at the Department of Energy (DOE) now. But, in the latter Obama years and in the Trump times, there was a lot of fear around being guilty of the next Solyndra. </p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Really...</p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>You're not gonna ever get anywhere if you're always going to be afraid of that kind of pretty minor failure. And, in some ways expected, you're gonna have some failures, it's not all going to be winners.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>I know, the point of the program was to take risks as a whole. And that's how it was designed and sold. That was the whole point...</p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Yeah, yeah!</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Oh, don’t get me started on that... There's definitely going to be a new Solyndra. I mean, there's definitely going to be a bunch of failed EV companies and failed battery companies and the like.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Oh absolutely. And that's not necessarily a bad thing. This is kind of what the US is supposed to be very good at – wildly committing to insane ideas, and some of them panning out. But not all of them. And that's, you know, there's a reason why we have such a healthy startup culture in the US, and why a lot of these US battery startups are being acquired and attracting attention internationally from Europe and Asia. There's a lot of intellectual capital here. It's really just about making sure that there's a reliable steady market.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Right. And that requires industrial policy of a size and scale that this country hasn't really has been kind of trending away from ever since Reagan. That's kind of one of the more interesting, broader political stories going on right now: is Biden trying to revive industrial policy, old school industrial policy of the kind that like China and Germany used to dominate solar PV? It will be interesting to see whether we're willing to do that. </p><p>Well, thank you so much for this. There was one final question I had. And you may not have anything to say to it, but it's on my mind, because I like to speculate about future utopias. Some of the reports I've read about lithium ion batteries, about the innovations possible once you get your solid state, your lithium metal and your various other advances people are talking about, like right now, prices are approaching $100 per kilowatt hour. People are saying we're going to hit that by 2023 or whatever, which used to be, as I understand it, considered basically impossible. And now it's on the way, and I'm seeing reports talking about those numbers, eventually getting down to like $50 per kilowatt hour or 40, or even 30, which is mind boggling to me. And one of the things that makes me think about it is, mostly we think about existing applications and sort of like, how do we make batteries for those, but I'm just wondering if you have a battery that is $30 a kilowatt hour, what could you do with that, that we're not even doing with batteries yet? In other words, like, what are other applications for energy storage that might open up if we end up with super, super cheap storage?</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Sure. Yes. First, I'd be very curious to see what kinds of assumptions are made on those $30 per kilowatt hour batteries.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>I can tell you, it has to do with fluorides, and conversion rather than intercalation, and a bunch of other speculative stuff. That is, I doubt it will hit 40 or 30. But even 50, or even like 70, even 100 is crazy, but like, once you're getting lower than that, I'm just wondering, what other worlds of energy storage maybe just haven't occurred to us yet because we haven't had batteries cheaply? </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think one application that we're seeing quite a lot of momentum for is marine vessels, and electrifying the propulsion systems for marine vessels; particularly, ferries are good. In the same way that electric buses make a lot of sense pretty much everywhere: you can predict where the vessel is going to go, you know exactly what it's going to get there, and you can charge it at reliable times. So that's one area. </p><p>I think, another area for some of these next generation batteries, maybe solid state lithium metal anode isn't appropriate for an economy car – I don't know – but it would definitely be appropriate for electric aviation and those types of applications where weight and energy density mean even more than the mobility sector, or the automotive sector.</p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Talk about energy density being prized up in the air - that's when you need it most.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yes, exactly. Some of these electric aircraft could definitely benefit from solid state batteries, both from a safety benefit, because you super do not want that battery to catch fire – you want to make sure triple share that that battery is very safe – </p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Thermal runaway has a whole different valence when you're thousands of feet up.</p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Safety matters a lot more to the aviation sector than then even to the automotive sector – and energy density as well, as we both talked about. </p><p>So those are really some of the key markets that I would be most interested in for lithium ion batteries moving forward. There is a lot of talk about medical devices and going the other way and, and looking at smaller and smaller –</p><p>David Roberts</p><p>Yeah, right, right. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger</p><p>Those applications are not really a cohesive group. They all have different requirements. And that could be a way for some of these non-lithium, potentially zinc batteries. There are a lot of different battery options for those different kinds of devices. </p><p>David Roberts   </p><p>Well, so interesting. I've kept you, sorry, longer than I said I would! I feel like we've only scratched the surface. Thank you so much for taking all this time and for talking to me. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger  </p><p>Yeah no problem! It was a pleasure. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-battery-analyst-chloe</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:36494349</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 17 May 2021 17:15:53 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/36494349/6e0b9ff79955a884232b2f398d6eb323.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>6427</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/36494349/c4c13ae9c8156f984cb16136ca2b1bdd.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Competitors to lithium-ion batteries in the grid storage market]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>(If you don’t want to read, you can listen! Just click play above.)</em></p><p>Hello! Welcome back to Battery Week here at Volts … where we use the term “week” somewhat loosely.</p><p>Up to now, we’ve been focusing on lithium-on batteries (LIBs) — <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/its-time-to-get-charged-up-for-battery">why they are so important</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-primer-on-lithium-ion-batteries">how they work</a>, and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-ongoing-battle-among-lithium">the varieties of LIBs that are battling it out for the biggest battery market</a>, electric vehicles (EVs). </p><p>It’s fairly clear from that discussion that LIBs, in some incarnation, are going to dominate EVs for a long while to come. There is no other commercial battery that can pack as much power into as small a space and lightweight a package. Plus, LIBs have built up a large manufacturing base, driving down prices with scale and learning. Their lock on the EV market is likely unbreakable, at least for the foreseeable future. </p><p>But there’s another battery market where some competitors hope to get a foothold: grid storage. They think there’s space in that market waiting to be claimed.</p><p>Currently, there’s a robust and growing short-duration grid storage market, offering storage of anywhere from seconds (to provide grid services like voltage and frequency regulation) to four hours. LIBs have about 99 percent of that market locked up; in some areas, projects with solar power coupled with four hours of storage are <a target="_blank" href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/solar-plus-storage-poised-to-become-more-financially-attractive-but-season/589857/">bidding in competitively with natural gas</a>. </p><p>Most energy wonks believe that, to fully shift the grid to zero-carbon energy, we will eventually need long-duration storage as well, to the tune of weeks, months, or even seasons. LIBs are almost certainly not going to cut it for that purpose, so it will be some combination of other technologies. (I’ll write about long-duration storage some other time.)</p><p>In between short and long, there’s something that might be called <em>mid</em>-duration storage, covering the range between four and 24 hours. What technologies will cover that range? LIBs <em>can</em> do it, of course — theoretically they can cover any duration; you just stack more and more batteries — but the economics get extremely difficult. Mid-duration projects will require lots of capacity but might run comparatively rarely. As duration gets to four hours and above, the cost of LIBs, at least today’s LIBs, starts to get prohibitive.</p><p>This is where other batteries come in, challengers to LIBs that hope to beat them at longer durations — though they aren’t quite there yet. “There really aren't competitive technologies in the battery electric vehicle space aside from all these different lithium ion batteries,” says Chloe Holzinger, an energy storage analyst at IHS Markit, but “there's a ton of different battery technologies for grid storage. They just tend to be significantly more expensive than lithium ion batteries.”</p><p>These challengers believe they are better suited to the needs of the mid-duration grid storage market, where energy density matters less than capacity, calendar and cycle life, and safety. They think they can bring costs down to competitive levels at those durations. (Some of them think they can find other niches as well, but it’s grid storage that offers the most realistic shot.)</p><p>Flow batteries</p><p>Flow batteries operate on a fundamentally different principle than the batteries we’ve looked at so far. Rather than storing energy in metals on the electrodes, energy is stored as a dissolved metal in an aqueous electrolyte. </p><p>The anolyte is stored in one tank; the catholyte is stored in another; pumps circulate the fluids past electrodes (sometimes in a fuel cell), where they don’t quite mix, thanks to a thin separator, but they exchange ions and electrons, generating electricity.</p><p>The key conceptual difference is that flow batteries separate energy (the amount stored) from power (the rate at which it can be released). If you want more power, you make the electrodes bigger. If you want to store more energy, you make the tanks of electrolytes bigger. And electrolytes are fairly cheap, so it’s cheap to increase capacity. </p><p>This is in contrast to LIBs, which double in cost with each doubling of energy capacity. </p><p>In theory, flow batteries can scale up to almost any size, relatively cheaply. So as the demands for storage get bigger — six hours, eight hours, 12 hours — the economics of flow batteries look better and better relative to LIBs. </p><p>A variety of different metals can be used in the electrolyte. For a long while, vanadium was expected to be the breakout candidate, but materials costs remain stubbornly high. Companies have tried with zinc (like the late <a target="_blank" href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/distressed-vizn-seeks-lifeline-following-staff-layoffs">ViZn</a>, and also see below) and iron (like <a target="_blank" href="https://essinc.com">ESS</a>, which is still going strong). Recent history is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/flow-batteries-struggle-in-2019-as-lithium-ion-marches-on">littered with failed flow battery companies</a>.</p><p>“Flow batteries have been the next big thing for a really long time,” says Purdue University assistant professor and battery expert Rebecca Ciez, “but they've never quite gotten there.”</p><p>The problem, as ever, is the steady march of LIBs down the cost curve. “For a three-or four-hour system, a lithium ion battery outperforms any flow battery now,” says Dan Steingart, a materials scientist and co-director of Columbia University’s Electrochemical Energy Center. “Fifteen years ago, that was not predicted.”</p><p>Flow batteries can theoretically expand their energy capacity indefinitely, for little more than the cost of the electrolyte goop to fill the tanks (though pumps and other accoutrement add to the cost a bit). But “when we're below $100 per kilowatt-hour on the cost of [LIBs],” says Steingart, “you're really close to the cost of the goop.”</p><p>And flow batteries, like all challengers, face the fact that LIBs are well-established and well-understood. “It's easier to finance a lithium-ion battery,” says Steingart, “because of all the existence proofs and their inherent reliability. I can predict the fate and the failure.” That makes the operating and maintenance costs of LIBs incredibly low, on the order of 1 percent of the cost of capital, whereas for flow batteries it is 2.5 percent at best.</p><p>There are still flow battery challengers in the field, like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.largocleanenergy.com">Largo Clean Energy</a> (which bought VionX),  which is commercializing vanadium flow batteries; <a target="_blank" href="http://www.primuspower.com/en/">Primus Power</a>, which has a zinc bromide battery; <a target="_blank" href="https://essinc.com">ESS</a>, which is selling an iron flow battery; and the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy-storage.news/news/form-energys-mystery-battery-chemistry-to-be-used-in-150-hour-duration-pilo">mysterious Form Energy</a>, which counts an aqueous-sulfur flow battery among its offerings. </p><p>But there is a growing sense in the field that flow batteries aren’t going to be able to catch up to LIBs, at least not any time soon, without government help.</p><p><strong>Zinc batteries</strong></p><p>Several companies are working on batteries that exchange zinc ions instead of lithium ions — it’s the second-most-popular metal for batteries.</p><p>Zinc has the particular advantage of being light and energy dense like lithium, so with relatively modest adjustments, it can <a target="_blank" href="https://www.powermag.com/zinc-ion-batteries-are-a-scalable-alternative-to-lithium-ion/">slipstream into the lithium-ion manufacturing process</a>. </p><p>Zinc is plentiful, cheaper than lithium, largely benign, and makes batteries that are easier to recycle. Like other lithium alternatives, zinc sacrifices energy density, but makes some of it back up in savings on safety systems at the battery-pack level, thanks to the lack of any need for fire suppression. This puts it in the same markets as LFP: smaller commuter/city vehicles, robo-taxies, scooters, e-bikes — and energy storage.</p><p>Some in the zinc crew have larger designs: “We think we can coexist with lithium-ion and replace lead acid,” says Michael Burz, president and CEO of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.enzinc.com/about-us.html">EnZinc</a>, which has developed a new zinc anode it says can come close to LIBs on energy density. Remember, lead-acid batteries are still ubiquitous. “Forklifts use them. Airplanes. Snowmobiles.“ says Burz. “Data centers have huge banks of lead-acid batteries they use for switchover power.” It’s still a $45 billion global market.</p><p>EnZinc thinks it can hit a sweet spot: close to the energy density of LIBs, close to the low cost of lead-acid, safer than either, and good enough to substitute for a big chunk of both. </p><p>Zinc anodes are “cathode agnostic,” so Burz envisions, rather than becoming a battery manufacturer, becoming an anode supplier — “Zinc Inside,” modeled on “Intel Inside” processors. Research is underway on a number of cathodes, from manganese and nickel to, just as with lithium, air. A zinc-air battery “has a system-level specific energy of anywhere between 250 to 350 watt-hours per kilogram,” says Burz, well above most LIBs. The trick is making it controllable and rechargeable. There are zinc-air battery companies offering commercial products that believe they’ve solved those problems, like <a target="_blank" href="https://nantenergy.com">NantEnergy</a> (formerly Fluidic), which is targeting its zinc-air batteries at off-grid markets in developing countries. </p><p>There are other zinc-based technologies as well. A company called <a target="_blank" href="https://eosenergystorage.com/products-technology/">EOS</a> is making a “zinc-hybrid cathode” that it says is safe and long-lasting. The <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rechargenews.com/transition/new-zinc-air-battery-is-cheaper-safer-and-far-longer-lasting-than-lithium-ion/2-1-812068">much-hyped</a> <a target="_blank" href="https://www.zinc8energy.com/technology">Zinc8</a> has developed a zinc-air hybrid flow battery that it claims can beat LIB costs at higher storage durations. </p><p>Most of these batteries make the same basic claims: they are less energy dense than LIBs, but they are safer (no fires), they are made with benign and plentiful materials (no supply problems), and they are cheaper at high capacities/durations. It’s just that last part that’s tricky, since the price and capabilities of LIBs are a moving target. </p><p>Zinc backers are confident that as the 100-percent-clean-energy pledges being made by cities and companies start to bite and the market for grid storage expands, demand for longer duration storage will expand with it. (California, for instance, is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2020/10/06/california-shifts-attention-from-lithium-ion-to-zinc-energy-storage/?sh=1bf3fd921875">putting lots of money toward zinc battery demonstration projects</a>, with an eye toward diversifying its storage options.)</p><p>Sodium-ion batteries</p><p>Lithium, nickel, and cobalt all have their issues. You know what material doesn’t? Salt. </p><p>Sodium compounds can be substituted for lithium compounds to create <a target="_blank" href="https://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/batteries-storage/sodium-ion-batteries-poised-to-pick-off-large-scale-lithium-applications">sodium-ion batteries</a> (NIBs), which have been the source of considerable hype for at least five years now. The basic idea and manufacturing process is the same for NIBs as LIBs — “you could use existing gigafactory structures to produce a sodium-ion battery,” says Steingart — but unlike the latter, the former can’t use graphite for the anode, because it can’t capture enough of the relatively bigger sodium ions, so something called “hard carbon” is typically used instead. </p><p>Research is underway to find more energy-dense sodium compounds for the cathode and cheaper materials for the anode. “Sodium-ion has a lower energy density than lithium-ion,” says Tim Gretjak, an innovation analyst with Con Edison, “so all the materials that go into it have to be correspondingly that much cheaper.”</p><p>There have also been some high-profile NIB failures. A promising startup called Aquion, backed by Bill Gates and showered with awards, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/aquion-the-bill-gates-and-kleiner-perkins-funded-advanced-battery-startup">declared bankruptcy in 2017</a>. </p><p>But here, too, there are surviving challengers. A company called <a target="_blank" href="https://natron.energy/about-us/">Natron Energy</a> is currently selling a NIB that uses Prussian Blue (a dark blue synthetic pigment) as the anode and a sodium-ion electrolyte. It has received “a total of more than $50 million in venture funding and more than $5 million in ARPA-E and DOE funding,” <a target="_blank" href="https://pv-magazine-usa.com/2020/07/14/update-on-natron/">reports Eric Wesoff</a>, and has a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200924005296/en/Natron-Energy-Announces-First-Ever-UL-Listed-Sodium-Ion-Battery">product currently on the market</a>. Like enZinc, it is going after some lead-acid applications (data centers and forklifts) and some LIB applications (stationary storage), hoping its long life and safety can carve out a niche.</p><p>To my eye, NIBs appear to be stuck in the same spot as the previous two batteries: better than LIBs on some metrics, for some applications, but so far behind on manufacturing and bankability that scaling them up is a Sisyphean task.</p><p>Liquid metal batteries</p><p>A company called <a target="_blank" href="https://ambri.com/">Ambri</a> was spun out of MIT back in 2010 and has been threatening ever since to commercialize a battery for low-cost, long-lifetime grid storage. It too has received money from Bill Gates. </p><p>It ran into problems with its initial battery in 2015, laid off a quarter of its workforce, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/ambri-returns-to-the-energy-storage-hunt-with-liquid-metal-battery-redesign#gs.StEExmY">started over</a>, and now produces a calcium-antimony battery with (according to Ambri’s website) “a liquid calcium alloy anode, a molten salt electrolyte, and a cathode comprised of solid particles of antimony.”</p><p>The liquids and suspended particles are contained in a positively charged stainless steel box with a negatively charged electrode plug on top. </p><p>The battery will pass no current at room temperature, but on site, the contents of the boxes are super-heated (to 500°C), which activates the materials; the metals alloy and de-alloy, with the cathode being entirely consumed and then reformed, as the batteries charge and discharge. </p><p>Because the contents are liquids, the battery has no “memory” — it is not affected or degraded by absorbing or releasing ions. This means it suffers virtually no loss of capacity over its lifetime; in fact, it works better if completely charged and discharged every few days. </p><p>From the time they are first activated, liquid metal batteries require no outside heating or cooling for the lifetime of the system, eliminating a ton of system costs, and they can operate in a wide range of temperatures and conditions. Ambri claims the batteries contain materials less than half the cost of LIB materials, can be manufactured for less than half the cost of LIBs, and will run for 20 years at a “fraction of the cost” of LIBs. </p><p>After a decade of hype, promises, and false starts, Ambri is currently <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rgj.com/story/news/money/business/2020/12/08/energos-project-reno-largest-renewable-green-powered-site-us/6495088002/">building a 250 MWh project</a> on the 3,700-acre <a target="_blank" href="https://c212.net/c/link/?t=0&#38;l=en&#38;o=2991494-1&#38;h=2681161388&#38;u=https%3A%2F%2Fterrascale.org%2Fprojectenergos&#38;a=Energos+Reno+project">Energos Reno project</a> in Reno, Nevada. It will be, finally, a field test of the technology. If it pans out, it could establish a foothold in grid storage. </p><p>Should we worry about lithium-ion’s headlock on grid storage?</p><p>LIBs worked their way up from consumer electronics to appliances to cars to trucks to stationary storage, building momentum and scale. At this point, they have locked up the EV market and the short-duration grid storage market. </p><p>At this point, there isn’t much demand for mid-duration storage. The question is, as the grid integrates more renewables and that mid-duration market develops, whether LIBs will simply continue their march to dominance. </p><p>Right now, a few LIB competitors can claim lower kWh costs over longer (20+ hour) durations, but Steingart thinks that some variant of the basic LIB architecture is “going to get to somewhere between $45 and $60 per kilowatt hour” eventually. That’s just an incredibly difficult trajectory to keep pace with.  </p><p>Is it going to make LIBs uncatchable, even in the grid storage space? “I co-wrote <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2542435120300349">a paper last year</a> that basically says, up to eight to 10 hours, the answer is probably <em>yes,</em>” Steingart says, “at least for the foreseeable future.”</p><p>Even if they weren’t still sprinting ahead on costs, simply by virtue of their ubiquity and familiarity, LIBs have gained an enormous institutional advantage. When it comes to grid storage projects, says Lou Schick, director of investments at Clean Energy Ventures, “the installed cost is so high that the chemistry of the battery doesn't really affect the cost.” </p><p>He explains: “The soft costs of applications engineering, designing the contract, getting permission to do it, satisfying all the building codes, and so forth — by the time I'm done with all that crap, the battery itself is 20 to 30 percent of the installed cost, at most.”</p><p>In that context, the differences in performance among different chemistries are less important than simpler criteria, Schick says: “Is it bankable? Can I get insurance for it? Is it standard consumer product?”</p><p>This, even more than total long-term costs, is the biggest barrier to LIB competitors: LIBs are bankable. They are familiar. Their performance and failure modes are well-understood. Any competitor has to solve the chicken-and-egg problem of convincing the first several investors to take on greater risks. </p><p>This gets us back to an argument I raised in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/its-time-to-get-charged-up-for-battery">my introductory post</a>: if it is true that a) we will soon need more and longer-duration storage than LIBs can provide, and b) LIBs currently have an unbreakable hold on the market, then perhaps the federal government should proactively take steps to encourage competitors to LIBs.</p><p>Recently, the research outfit ITIF released an <a target="_blank" href="https://itif.org/publications/2021/04/07/federal-policy-accelerate-innovation-long-duration-energy-storage-case-flow">excellent paper by Anna Goldstein</a> making just this argument, in the context of flow batteries: “in the absence of ‘first markets’ that can rapidly pull flow battery innovation, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) should push it forward with investments in research, development, testing, and demonstration.”</p><p>The same argument could be made on behalf of any of the battery chemistries discussed above. The market probably isn’t going to mature them fast enough; the feds should help.</p><p>After all the time I’ve spent thinking about batteries, I am of two minds about this argument. On one hand, Goldstein makes a good case that the storage needs of the electricity system will soon push past what LIBs can provide. If that’s true, it does seem like it would be better to innovate alternatives now, to be prepared. </p><p>On the other hand, analysts have been wrong about the ultimate capabilities of LIBs again and again. LIBs weren’t going to be able to handle cars, then they weren’t going to be able to handle short-duration storage, then they weren’t going to be able to hit $100/kWh, but they’re doing all those things. </p><p>If LIBs follow a steadily declining cost curve down to $40-60/kWh, it’s difficult to imagine any competitor that could catch up. The only markets where competitors might have a shot is 20+ hours of storage, and it’s not even clear how much of that will ultimately be needed.</p><p>Nonetheless, I think I come down in the “better safe than sorry” camp — there’s no harm in making multiple bets when the stakes are so high. Researching and innovating medium- and long-duration storage technologies will bring all sorts of learning and networking benefits that we can’t predict now. </p><p>And if LIBs continue to defy all predictions and get so cheap nothing can compete, well, that will be a nice problem to have.</p><p>Guest pup! My darling niece and her family got a darling new puppy. His name is Oscar.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/battery-week-competitors-to-lithium</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:35310937</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 14 May 2021 16:30:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/35310937/dcc5b0623bec8a68b632704811f524a5.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1345</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/35310937/04dca2dedbcdf081162f9afa80183699.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Volts podcast: Washington Rep. Joe Fitzgibbon on the Evergreen State's excellent new climate laws]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Greetings! Last week, I wrote about <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/washington-state-now-has-the-nations">the ambitious slate of climate and energy policies</a> that the state of Washington has put in place over the last two years — culminating, a few weeks ago, with the passage of the Climate Commitment Act, which would cap the state’s emissions and reduce them 95 percent by 2050. </p><p>It’s a dizzying amount of progress in a short period of time. </p><p>As I talked to those involved about how it happened, one name came up again and again: Rep. Joe Fitzgibbon (D) of the 34th District, which encompasses West Seattle and areas southwest of the city. </p><p>Fawn Sharp, president of the National Congress of American Indians, had <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/PresFawnSharp/status/1386175594031845385">this to say</a>: “Representative Joe Fitzgibbon is now a living legend for his miraculous legislative diplomacy and pure, selfless heart; he deserves to win every legislator of the year award in existence.” </p><p>This is not the kind of thing one typically hears about legislators after years of difficult negotiations, but in this case, it was a fairly typical sentiment. So I knew I needed to talk to Fitzgibbon — about his entry into politics, his approach, and what enabled this burst of progress. </p><p>Please enjoy our conversation. And please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber, so that I can continue to do this work. </p><p></p><p></p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Hello, welcome to Volts. I am your host, David Roberts. </p><p>As longtime listeners know, Volts is headquartered in Seattle, in the great state of Washington, on the superior of America's two coasts. As it turns out, this is the place to be for climate policy. Over the last few years, the Democratic legislature in Washington has been engaged in a veritable frenzy of activity, cranking out climate and energy bills, a 100 percent clean electricity bill, bills on hydrofluorocarbons, bills to decarbonize buildings and boost electric vehicles – bills, bills, bills. </p><p>Most recently, the legislature passed what are arguably the two key remaining pieces of the carbon policy puzzle. The first is a clean fuel standard, or CFS, like the one in place in California, Oregon, and BC, which will slowly ratchet down the carbon content of liquid fuels in the state. The second, the big kahuna, is the Climate Commitment Act, or CCA, which puts in place a cap and invest system that will ratchet down economy-wide greenhouse-gas emissions from 1990 levels 45 percent by 2030, 70 percent by 2040, and 95 percent by 2050. With the passage of the CCA, Washington now has, in my opinion, the most comprehensive and ambitious climate policy plan in the country – and yes, I have heard of California. </p><p>I just got done writing a big story on this, and according to everyone I talked to, one legislator was particularly important in shepherding the CCA and some of the other bills in question through the House, while ensuring that they remained ambitious: Representative Joe Fitzgibbon of the 34th Legislative District containing West Seattle and Vashon Island.</p><p>Fitzgibbon was elected to the legislature in 2010, when he was just 24 years old. Yes, he's a bona fide millennial. But instead of moping around his parents’ basement and eating avocados, which is what I'm told millennials do, he has been immersing himself in the wonky details of climate policy, and pushing his state into the future. So I'm happy to have him with me today to discuss climate policy and state progress. Representative Fitzgibbon, welcome to Volts.</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>Thanks for having me, David.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Let's start with a little bit of your history. I was thinking back on what I was doing when I was 24. I was in grad school, snowboarding a lot, smoking a bunch of pot, definitely not fit for running anything. What drew you to politics at such a young age? Is it the people aspects or the policy aspects?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>To your credit, you went to grad school. I'm a grad school dropout.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Oh, I dropped out eventually. But I just stayed longer.</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>I've always been really motivated by environmental issues, and that included a general concern for the direction things were going. I don't know how much of that can be attributed to Captain Planet and media when I was a kid. But as the climate crisis came into focus for me, probably in college, I realized, whatever I'm going to do with myself, whether that's nonprofit work or government work or something else, I want it to be about doing the most I can to make progress on the climate crisis. </p><p>When I got out of college and looked around to figure out where I could do the most, state or local government seemed much more appealing to me than going to DC and being a really, really small fish in an enormous ocean. I had enough friends who had gone and done that and become disillusioned that I thought state seemed more exciting to me, so I'm happy that's where I landed. </p><p>I started out as a staffer; I worked in the legislature for my predecessor in the House. She went on to serve in the Senate as Senate Majority Leader, and when she ran for the Senate, I ran for her seat in the House in 2010. It definitely was not part of some ambitious long-term plan that I was going to run for office when I was 24, but it turned out that was when the seat opened up, and I had just enough experience by that point that I thought I could make a case that I was a credible candidate. It was clear to me at that point that we weren't going to be making climate progress or other environmental progress at the state level unless we had more people in office for whom that was their motivating thing. </p><p>The good news for me was there were few enough other legislators at that time for whom that was their main issue that I got to carve out a space for myself as one of the experts – not that I was or am an expert, but in the legislative context, the bar is grading on a curve. The downside was nobody else cared about those issues, so we didn't make a lot of progress for those first couple years. For five of the 11 years I've been in office, we had a Republican Senate, and we had absolutely no climate progress during that time. But it did mean I had the time to become a committee chair and become what counts in the legislature as an expert, so that when the time was right for us to strike with some climate legislation, I was ready to go.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>You were around from 2010 to 2018, which were pretty bleak years in Washington climate-wise; there are long-standing complaints about the Washington legislature and climate during those years. Then you were here from 2018 to 2021, which has been a veritable renaissance of activity and motion. What explains this? What happened in the legislature that uncorked this burst of activity?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>The most important thing happened in November of 2018, when we gained a substantial number of seats for the Democrats in both chambers of the legislature. Washington has 98 House members and 49 senators, so a majority in the House is 50, and a majority in the Senate is 25. We have a comfortable working majority, more in the House than in the Senate, but increasingly in the Senate as well. We don't quite have a supermajority, so we can't pass a constitutional amendment, for example, with Democratic votes alone. </p><p>But we went into the 2018 election with a one-seat majority in each chamber; we had 50 in the House, 25 in the Senate exactly. So we couldn't get a lot done then, but we weren't negotiating bad budgets with Republican senators anymore. In 2018, we picked up seven seats in the House and we picked up three seats in the Senate. That broke a logjam and meant that we had enough breathing room in both chambers that things that seemed like pipe dreams just a short time before, like our 100 percent clean electricity law, were actually within reach. </p><p>There's nothing that changed in the wider political environment. Governor Inslee obviously has elevated climate to a central role in our discourse, but the thing that mattered the most was picking up those seats for the Democrats in both chambers. I rue the day that climate became this partisan of an issue, but it is, and that's made me a very partisan legislator, because it feels like climate progress is more correlated to the size of our majorities than to just about anything else.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Has all that the legislature has done over the last two years – on climate and energy, but also prison reform, capital gains tax, a million other things – been an entirely partisan affair? At any stage, did you get help from any Republicans? Or have they just opted out? </p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>On climate, the answer is no. There have been good bipartisan working relationships on issues like behavioral health funding, some of the things that I don't work on as much. Land use is an area where there are some unusual alliances with Republicans. On climate, it's not that way. </p><p>In 2019, we passed four big climate bills. We passed the 100% Clean Electricity bill, we passed the Clean Buildings bill, we passed my hydrofluorocarbon bill, and we passed an appliance energy-efficiency bill, which is honestly the most no-brainer of all of them. No Republicans in the House voted for any of those bills. One Republican in the Senate voted for the HFC bill. Then that, again, was true this year. The Clean Fuel Standard, which has been my baby that I worked on for years and finally got over the finish line this year, never got a Republican vote in either chamber, any of the times we passed it. The Climate Commitment Act got no Republican votes, with one asterisk: the Democratic senator who caucuses with and normally votes with the Republicans ended up voting yes on the bill. On the HFC bill, again, the same one Republican senator who voted for it two years ago voted for it this time. </p><p>So these are Democratic achievements. We don't hear as much straight-up climate denial in the Washington State legislature as you hear in DC; there are some fringe Republican legislators who will deny climate science, but their leads on these issues say different things. They say things like, Washington's only 0.2 percent of global emissions; you're going to hurt our economy; this isn't going to do any good, you should focus on more cost-effective solutions like buying carbon offsets – just things that we would never do. So it's essentially a partisan exercise as much as anything. As much as taxes. There's not really an issue that I could say is more partisan in the Washington legislature than climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>You might think that once Democrats have a sufficient majority that these things become inevitable that Republicans might want to get at the table to affect the outcome, to have some say at all. But just to be saying no, and then be shut out of the negotiations, doesn't seem even particularly smart on a self-interested basis.</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>I keep waiting for that to happen. You see this in legislatures, and Congress as well: when the Democratic majorities grow, the Republicans we’re beating are the ones in the most moderate districts, so the ones who stick around are not the ones who are most motivated to come to the table. When California reauthorized their cap and trade bill in 2017, I think it was, either the Assembly or the Senate Minority Leader for the Republicans ended up supporting the compromise, and the next day, there were RNC people flying out from DC to California to find his primary challenger. There's not a lot of breathing room, especially if you're in one of those dark red districts, to be collaborating with Democrats on climate.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>It's not as though having a Democratic majority is entirely the key to the kingdom, either. Even this time around, the CFS and the CCA were arguably weakened in the Senate by Democrats. Presumably there are not climate denialists among the Democratic caucus, but there are issues that cause tensions, areas they push back, and things they tried to take out of the CFS and CCA. What are the internal tensions to the Democratic caucus? What are the issues that surface disagreements?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>In both the House Democratic Caucus and the Senate Democratic Caucus, we lost votes on the Climate Commitment Act on both the left and the middle. We had two House Democrats from pretty moderate districts vote no, and one very progressive member from South Seattle vote no. Then the bill passed the House with 54 yes votes, which is a lot for a bill like this. In the Senate, they lost two votes from more progressive senators and one vote from a more moderate senator. </p><p>On that bill in particular, the dynamics were multifaceted, because you have opposition from some of the environmental justice organizations like Front and Centered or Puget Sound Sage, and you also had, of course, opposition from the Chamber of Commerce, the Association of Washington Business, the Farm Bureau, and organizations like that. So it's taking fire from both directions, which is part of what makes it feel miraculous that it passed.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Let's focus for now on the fire coming from the right. For the Chamber, is it just, “This will cost a lot of money and we don't like stuff that costs a lot of money?” Or is there something more specific than that?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>The fire from the right is stronger in the Senate, generally. The Senate has an organized caucus of moderate Senate Democrats who tend to stick together if they think that the progressive Senate Democratic center of gravity is overreaching. The Clean Fuel Standard did not have opposition on the left; all the opposition was coming from the middle and the right and from the oil industry. Their argument on that was all about costs: How much is this going to make a gallon of gas more expensive? Every argument they had stemmed from that. </p><p>The hard thing about that critique is there's not a crystal clear answer. It's a speculative answer based on a lot of factors that go into how much gas costs. It tends to be that the price of gas is much more influenced by the political situation in Venezuela or Saudi Arabia than it is by what kinds of emission standards are in place for gas and diesel. So that was the main one there. </p><p>The criticisms mostly revolve around energy-intensive, trade-exposed manufacturing. I've always felt like in carbon pricing debates, it's about 10 percent of the emissions and about 90 percent of the pain.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Which is why so many systems exempt them just to avoid that. But you didn't exempt them. They're getting free allowances that ramp down over time to nothing, is my understanding. Is that a compromise? Was that hard-fought?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>It was hard-fought, and it was hard-fought in the sense that we actually don't want them to leave. It is a legitimately economic and environmental failure for the steel mill in my district to close and us to import all the steel from China or Ohio instead. That will also serve as a political failure, because every future climate bill will be critiqued based on the closure of the steel mill. </p><p>The pulp and paper industry in particular in Washington is politically influential, because it’s a legacy industry. They're not new high-tech mills; they're operating on fairly old, fairly inefficient technology, and they tend to be located in parts of the state that are economically struggling more than the Seattle area is. Losing 500 pulp mill jobs in Longview or Port Angeles would be a huge blow to those communities. So there's a lot of political sensitivity around those folks in particular. I would say it was a victory to have them covered at all. The last couple carbon pricing efforts, including the cap and trade bill I sponsored in 2015 and the carbon tax initiative that the progressive left, including labor and environmental justice and environmental organizations, rallied around in 2018, Initiative 1631 – both of those efforts totally exempted EITE manufacturing. So the fact that we were able to keep them under the cap was a big deal that they weren't thrilled about. They accepted that they were going to be under the cap, but they essentially wanted free allowances that didn't decline in perpetuity. So getting allowances to decline at all was the compromise that the EITEs grudgingly accepted toward the end. </p><p>This is somewhere where actually playing industry against each other was impactful, and that's because most of the rest of the coverage under the cap – essentially electric utilities, gas utilities, and oil refiners – felt that EITEs were getting too good of a deal and that the EITEs were getting a treatment that was more generous than they really deserve. They recognized that as the cap comes down, if the EITEs are still getting free allowances, that means there's that many fewer, and it's going to be that much more expensive for those who have to buy allowances, essentially oil refiners, to have to go to the market and buy theirs. So that was somewhere where it was useful to be able to say, well, every other industry thinks that they should maybe not complain quite so much.</p><p>The other element of that, and I know that linkage with California is a controversial prospect for this program in the future, but if we don't cover the same sectors that California covers, California won't link with us. So BP, our largest oil refiner, Puget Sound Energy, our largest electric utility: their worst-case scenario, as they said many times, would be a cap and trade program that cannot link with California. If we exempted the EITEs entirely, we'd be looking at a program that was an island, where allowance prices actually probably would get more expensive than we could really bear. That is where being able to play some of the direct emitters against the EITE manufacturers came in really handy. </p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>To clarify, EITE industries are industries that are thought to be particularly sensitive to changes in energy prices, and particularly mobile, such that a boost in energy prices in Washington could either shut them down or send them to a different state. So if we exempted them entirely, we couldn't link with California because California doesn't exempt them entirely? Is that what you're saying?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>Pretty much. California doesn't have really clear rules about this, but probably the most important consideration that they would take into account when evaluating whether linkage was practical is, are you covering the same sectors as us? They don't have pulp mills in California, so there maybe is a question of whether we could have exempted pulp mills, but by and large, aerospace, steel, aluminum, cement, which are the other main sectors besides pulp and paper, California would almost certainly have said, we can't link markets if you exempt them.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>So for them, the loss of having to pay for allowances is more than offset by the benefits of linkage. </p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>Yes, particularly for BP and Shell, who were the oil majors who were in a largely supportive position.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>You mentioned that fire came from both right and left within the Democratic caucus. Let's talk a little bit about the left and the pushback you got from them. I’m curious how productive you felt the climate movement was throughout this process. There are a lot of discussions within climate circles about the demand for ideological purity that comes from some quarters, and whether that's appropriate, whether that’s activists’ role, and whether it actually helps politicians. What was your relationship with the climate left as all this came together?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon: </strong> </p><p>Big question. To start with, you learn very quickly with a bill this expansive and this controversial how much the climate movement is not monolithic. That seems self-evident, but it was really true in this case. Part of our task in the House was to take a bill that came over from the Senate in a more business-friendly posture, and the Sierra Club was one step away from coming out in opposition to the bill. The Washington Environmental Council, which is like the center of gravity of the environmental movement in Washington, was not willing to say that they supported it, but they weren't opposed to it, they were just asking for some specific changes. So part of our challenge was to try to reel those folks back in, keep the Sierra Club from coming out in opposition.</p><p>The most troubling piece, to them, that came out of the Senate was provisions exempting from environmental review law any ability for local governments or state agencies to deny a project a permit based on its greenhouse-gas emissions. The theory there was, if we're covering greenhouse-gas emissions under cap and trade, then we shouldn't also be evaluating it on a project-by-project basis. Now – and they were somewhat right, I largely agree – some of this concern was that not all emissions are covered under the cap. What if they're exporting fuel to China? That's not going to be covered by our cap. For example, the methanol plant, which is very controversial and is strongly opposed by the environmental movement, would have had to be cited under the bill that came out of the Senate, even though all of the methanol they were going to export to China was not going to be under our cap. So that, in particular, was something that we had to work a lot in order to rein in that provision, and in doing so, keep Sierra Club, Washington Environmental Council, tribal nations comfortable with the bill. </p><p>The other part was, there's a fundamental rejection of cap and trade from environmental justice organizations, particularly if they have close ties with environmental justice organizations out of California. I think a lot of this comes from the fact that when cap and trade passed in California, it was oversold as, “This is going to solve air pollution. We're going to see huge improvements in air quality in the most polluted parts of our state.” That isn't actually what it is designed to do. It's designed to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. If I can cut emissions by 5 million tons over here, but then they grow by 2 million tons over here, that's a win for the climate, but it's not a win for the co-pollutants that are emitted in the place that the 2 million tons are increasing, and the neighbors of that plant. </p><p>So the people focused on protecting environmental justice as a part of this bill decided, we need a separate policy for air quality. We need a policy that says, here's how Department of Ecology is going to focus its Clean Air Act authority, monitoring, enforcement tools on the communities that are most overburdened with pollution. That's on top of cap and trade, that's not a part of it. It was in the same bill, but it's not doing justice to environmental health disparities to just claim, trust us, it's all going to get better over time. I do think it actually will, in the long term, get better over time as the cap comes down, but that's not a satisfying explanation to a community that's currently experiencing much worse fine particulate matter than a wealthy community down the road.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>California's cap and trade system doesn’t have anything like this in it, right? They have air quality regulations elsewhere in law, but nothing meant to integrate with the cap and trade system.</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>That's my understanding. California also just has much dirtier air than Washington, and that's a baseline problem. Washington, other than one tiny little community next to an oil refinery, is in attainment with the national ambient air quality standards everywhere in the state. Los Angeles County is in non-attainment for all six criteria air pollutants. So we have a little different context there already. But the California experience colors how everybody showed up to this debate, whether from the oil industry saying, “This actually worked better than we thought it would,” to EITE manufacturers on the right and environmental justice proponents on the left saying, “This did not work as well as we thought it would.” From beginning to end, we had to be asking, how are we going to do better than California on this particular question?</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>It ended up with air quality standards that say to air regulators that every community either has to be in accordance with NAAQS or equal to the best air quality of neighboring communities, whichever is more protective. As you say, all of Washington more or less meets NAAQS standards, which means that a lot of these communities, even if they meet NAAQS standards, are going to get help getting better air if they are close by other communities with better air than them. It really seems like it's specifically targeting racial and class disparities in air quality. That's the first I've heard of that kind of policy, and it struck me as pretty bold. Were you involved in that particular bit?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>I wasn't involved in coming up with the idea, but I was involved in trying to make sure it was worked in the best way possible, that communities worried about health disparities were going to see some benefit there. One of the things that some of our community-based environmental justice groups have been asking for for a long time is more monitoring. They just want to know, what are the air pollutants that are harming our community? Where are they coming from, so that we can then think about, what do we do about them? That was where this provision started: Let's get more resources into monitoring in communities that we know are experiencing heavier pollution burdens, but what are those pollution burdens? </p><p>What I think we're going to find there is that the pollutant that we can improve people's health the most by targeting is fine particulate matter, because that's one for which there's no safe level. Many of the NAAQS standards are probably too high, for ozone, and others, but fine particulate matter is the one that there's no amount that you can breathe that doesn't harm your health. That's also one where the communities that are experiencing the greatest pollution burdens tend to be in proximity to transportation infrastructure. This is not, largely, in Washington, coming from large stationary sources. It's highways, seaports, airports, diesel-burning trucks. So I think that's part of what we're going to find. There was a lot of fear about this provision from the same EITE manufacturers, until they understood that this was not really about, how are we going to ratchet down on you stationary sources even more than we already do. They're largely not producing a lot of fine particulate matter. The pollutants that they're most regulated for are NOx, SOx, ozone to some degree. </p><p>We're going to have to watch how Ecology and the local area authorities implement this to make sure that this is not just a cosmetic thing, not just new data that goes into a hole somewhere, but actually guides some policymaking. I do think it was really critical in taking some of the intensity down from the environmental justice standpoint, even if those same organizations didn't necessarily get to a neutral or supportive posture.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I read the Front and Centered essay against this bill, and it was a little weird, because it would say, cap and trade harms local air quality – but there's a specific provision in the bill addressing that. Then it would say, environmental justice communities have traditionally been locked out of these processes and not been at the table when these things are decided – the bill has a specific provision saying environmental justice communities have to be at the table when these things are decided. It seemed to me as though all their specific objections had been answered directly by the bill, and yet it hadn't seemed to change their orientation toward the bill at all. The overwhelming impression I got from that is that I must be missing something, or there must be history, or something going on here that's not clear on the surface. Do you have any understanding of why they have stuck to their position despite efforts to address those things?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>I would not presume to speak for Front and Centered, their coalition members, or their steering committee members. I had a lot of conversations with Front and Centered in the runup to session about, what would it take to get you guys to feel good about this policy? Their answer was basically, “Nothing.” It was a respectful conversation. It was like, “We have very clear directions from our board that this is not a policy that we are engaging on, but thanks for asking,” essentially. </p><p>So the approach that I took there – recognizing that they had legitimate concerns, not all of which I agreed with – was a similar outlook to how I thought about some of the business groups: How do we address as many of their specific objections as are addressable? Knowing that they're still not going to get to yes, and they're not going to get to neutral, but that to the legislators who are responsive to those concerns, we can say: if you are anxious about allowance trading with California, or if you are anxious about air quality getting worse in disproportionately overburdened communities, here's what I can point you to in the bill that we've done to address that. But to be clear, that doesn't mean Front and Centered is okay with this bill. Ultimately, the legislators are the ones who are making those decisions, and we answered those questions to the satisfaction of enough legislators that were motivated by environmental justice that we got the bill.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Another thing that has seemed weird to me is they seem to really view carbon taxes as fundamentally different in some way than cap and trade. But all the same dynamics are there: you're still paying to pollute, you still have to do something with the revenue, you're still exempting some businesses and not others. </p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>I can’t fully explain that one. That was a frustration of mine as well. Does a cap and trade allow polluters to continue to pollute? Well, carbon tax does that even more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I've been in dialogue with far-left activists for 15 years now, and there's this tension between being productive and helpful and being the loyal opposition always pushing further. I’ve talked to a lot of people who think, it's our job to say, “This isn't good enough” and to demand more, no matter what. Often I talk to legislators who say, “When you complain about X,Y, and Z, and we respond by doing stuff that addresses those complaints, it would be nice to hear a kind word, or get some support occasionally from the movement, instead of just an immediate pivot to ‘this isn't good enough’ and demanding more.” Is that resolvable? Is it healthy, the net effect the climate left loyal-opposition approach is having on the legislative process?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>At a problem of this magnitude, the answer always has to include “and you need to do more.” We're not close to having solved the problem. I do think it is helpful to creating a positive feedback loop to take a breath and say, “It's good that we're moving this direction.” That's what has happened with the passage of the Climate Commitment Act; 350 Seattle was very strongly opposed to this bill, and I think some of that was out of fidelity to environmental justice values and Front and Centered’s position, but some of it was an anticapitalist, “We don’t trust this program.” I had a lot of conversations with constituents who were activists with 350, and said, “I'm sorry, I disagree with you about this. But I think we share an intensity of feeling around climate.” Since the bill’s passage, I haven't seen that much in the way of, “You all are sellouts. Why did you pass a market-based system?” I did expect a little more of that, so that's good. I think that it is important for people who care about climate change to take a minute to say, this is good progress – and we have to do more. That's largely what I've been seeing around this. </p><p>It's my experience that the most successful social movements are the ones that know how to declare victory sometimes. I'd see this in the labor world: the unions who are able to go to their members and say, “You won this victory through your hard work,” create an empowering feeling of “we can change things and let's do this again.” That’s the lesson that I think the climate left should internalize: If we never declare victory on anything, we're going to lose momentum, and we're going to lose followers. It’s not actually the goal with climate change to feel good about how pure we are.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Another conventionally problematic constituency in climate and energy matters is labor. This is subject to some anguish among various people in the Democratic Party, because, of course, the Democratic Party wants to be, and is, pro-labor, and wants to be, and is, pro-climate. But then there are some elements of labor that are, to put it frankly, big impediments to action on this; specifically the building trades, especially in California, and here, too. How do you navigate that tension? Do you think that tension is resolvable; going to be resolved; on its way to being resolved? What's your forecast for how that plays out?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>The tension is maybe not resolvable, but I think it's manageable. On each of these individual issues there's going to be some suspicion, particularly among the building trades, around, what's this going to do to our jobs? What's this going to do to our cost of gas, in particular? Not all, but many of the building trades unions remained opposed to the Clean Fuel Standard right up until the end. That was too bad. There was not the same intensity among labor around the Climate Commitment Act, and that, I think, was largely because so much of the revenue was booked for transportation purposes. For them, more investment in transportation, which is good-paying jobs for their members, superseded any concern, at least as far as I could tell, about what this was going to do for the cost of gasoline or the cost of natural gas or so forth. </p><p>It's a good tradeoff, because legislators also want to see investments in transportation. One of the big changes we made to the bill when it moved from the Senate to the House was the Senate allowed the transportation dollars to be spent on anything; we amended it so they had to be spent on transportation stuff that reduces emissions, like transit, or electrification. It's a huge bucket of money. This is maybe underappreciated on some parts of the climate left: we essentially have cracked the code on being able to use gas tax for transit, which is prohibited under the Washington Constitution to use the motor vehicle fuel tax for anything other than highway purposes. By some measures, this is a 14- or 15-cent gas tax that's going to be required to go to transit or electrification; that's an enormous thing. I'm just waiting for that to sink in for folks a little bit. </p><p>Anyway, with labor, I think building trades cared more about seeing those dollars invested than they did other things. They were opposed to Clean Fuels until the end, in part because “clean fuels,” they interpret that as going to raise the price of gas, and it's not generating money for the state, actually, it's generating money to lower the cost of other fuels. That was what they were reacting to there. </p><p>The other thing, which is probably more true in Washington than in a lot of states, is the bigger part of our labor movement is not building trades, it's service employees, public sector workers. So SEIU, AFCSME, were resolutely in support of this throughout, and that largely comes from their members saying, “We want this to be part of our union's legislative agenda this year.” Those are the unions that have the most clout in Olympia. So it wasn't possible for anybody to say, “Labor doesn't support this.” Some building trades labor was skeptical to varying degrees about either bill; the unions with the most membership and the most political clout, like the nurses and the teachers and the public sector workers, were resolutely in support of these bills.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>In the clean energy transition, one of the things that unions have said, generally speaking, is, “We have these good, high-paying, union jobs. We'll acknowledge that transitioning our entire energy infrastructure will create a lot of jobs; we just think it's going to create a bunch of crappy jobs.” If you look around at the clean energy industries today, across the country, it's true: they pay, on average, less than the jobs they're replacing, and are less unionized. So how important is this labor standards piece? I know it was a big part of the Clean Energy Transformation Act, and it's in here too. Is that something that unions trust, and should trust? How confident are we that those things are going to work to really create good jobs?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon: </strong> </p><p>That was a big part of it, too. I probably should have emphasized that at the outset, that having provisions to say that the new stuff that's funded by all the dollars that are going to be generated from this program is not going to be spent on projects that don't provide health care or pensions to their workforce. In actual experience, many renewable energy developers are not signing project labor agreements, do not have unionized workforces. I think it is highly, if not motivating, at least comforting to know the clear direction that those dollars be spent in ways that maximize economic benefits for local workers and diverse businesses, and have paid sick leave and pay practices in relation to living wage indicators. Those belts and suspenders, which very closely parallel the things that we included in the 100% Clean Electricity law two years ago, went a long way toward alleviating the legitimate fears from some of the construction trades.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Does the business community push back against that? Because it's them who will have to raise their labor standards, which will, of course, raise labor costs, etc.</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>Yes, they do push back against that, but it's not in their top five list of concerns. So we're able to say no.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>The theme that I noticed as I'm reading through the bill and reading the coverage is, “Let's do California's thing, but better than California.” So what were the specific features of the California system that y'all consciously designed around, or designed differently?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>So, we talked about the air quality monitoring and air quality improvement piece. Within the framework of the cap itself, a couple of key things: One, our cap is going to decline quite steeply relative to California’s. We're on a trajectory toward net zero by 2050; that's going to be a steep decline. I do think a legitimate criticism of California's program is that the cap was set high enough in the early years that it didn't do that much, and it generated an oversupply of allowances that could then be used for compliance in later years. Other policies in California were doing the heavy lifting, like their RPS and their low carbon fuel standard, and so forth. As the cap has come down in the last couple years, it's pulling its own weight more, but it took a while. Ours is going to be pulling its weight from the start. </p><p>Another important lesson was the inclusion of offsets under the cap. I know that you wrote about this. This is a critical piece in the legitimate fear around offsets and what offsets are going to do, particularly if there are bogus offsets. There was reporting this week about questionable offset verification protocols in California, which is timely, because Ecology hasn't adopted any of those protocols yet for our law, so they can learn from some of those mistakes. But including offsets under the cap is critical. </p><p>The regularity of the reviews that Ecology is required to do to ensure that the allowance budget is set in the right place to achieve the statutory limits gives not just an opportunity, but a directive to Ecology to course correct if we do find that the allowance budget is too generous. Those are probably the things that are most, but none of them are more impactful than the steep decline that the cap is going to experience.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>The California system places really an enormous amount of discretion on the California Air Resources Board (CARB), the regulators behind the scenes. I don't think the Washington bill puts quite as much discretion in the Department of Ecology, but it does put a lot: the Department of Ecology is supposed to be evaluating whether the environmental justice targets are being met, whether the offset protocols are good. A lot of the quality of the system presumes good decisions on the part of the Department of Ecology for the coming decades. Should that make us nervous? I go back and forth about this all the time, whether it's better as a general matter for more decisions to be made democratically through the legislature, or by purported experts behind the scenes. Do you have a position on that? How much confidence do you have in the Department of Ecology to maintain quality?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>This is an example of where it's good to have Jay Inslee as governor. Jay Inslee’s Department of Ecology is not going to be making a more generous decision around offset protocols or allowance budgets than the Washington State Legislature would. They are more insulated from the political pressure that we the legislature would be under to keep allowance prices low and to allow the broadest ranges of offsets possible. I also think, as it is, the bill pushed the limits of our expertise; the more layers of detail we get into, the less confidence I have that I know enough to make an informed decision about these things. </p><p>We're also up against an extremely tight clock. The Senate passed the bill out two and a half weeks before the end of session; we had two and a half weeks to get it through two committees and off the floor of the House, and then it had to go back to the Senate for a final concurrence vote. We didn't have time to make really well-informed decisions; this is just a function of a part-time legislature and the very strict clock that we operate under. Ecology is going to have 18 months under the Administrative Procedure Act to undergo their full rulemaking process. That's going to lead to a little bit better decisionmaking than we were really capable of. </p><p>Now, do I have any fear that a potential future Republican governor’s Department of Ecology might make bad decisions? Well, that would be bad. We're lucky in Washington; we have the longest run of Democratic control of the governorship in the nation. In my entire life, we’ve only had Democratic governors. Our last Republican governor lost reelection in 1984. It helps that we elect our governors in presidential years; most states do not. But if something changed, and we elected a Republican governor in a future year, then I would be nervous about the Department of Ecology’s latitude in making decisions around this program, and you'd probably see an intensification of legislative oversight about some of these key decisions. We're certainly going to be conducting a lot of oversight into this, but there's just a degree of trust with the expertise that Ecology has to make a rational decision about, say, offset protocols.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Something of passionate interest to many in Washington, particularly in Seattle, is the connection between land use and climate. Lots of people on the left these days are saying, electric vehicles are great and all, but what we really need is more public transit, better urban design, more density, more livability, walkability; we need to get people out of their cars. There isn't really a ton in the CCA along those lines. There was a Growth Management Act floating around Congress this session, but it died in the Senate. So I'm curious: What killed it in the Senate? Having talked to a bunch of your fellow legislators about this now, what's your sense of whether they connect those issues? Do you think the Growth Management Act has a chance if it comes back? What would you like to see done on these lines? </p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>I think that legislators are certainly understanding that connection better than they used to, that land use decisions are very impactful in emissions – generally on a longer time horizon, though. Land use policy is important because you're building a built environment that's going to look that way for a lot of decades. But it doesn't reduce emissions a lot in the near term, and we need to be doing both. So I don't see the land use stuff as a silver bullet, because it just doesn't change the urban form fast enough. Also, it doesn't matter how much you increase density if you're not also increasing access to non-polluting modes of transportation, like transit and walking and biking, which the CCA does help do by providing new dollars for that. </p><p>The bill this year was an awesome effort, and it's amazing, actually, that it made it as far as it did. We have the existing state Growth Management Act, Washington's 30-year-old planning framework, which requires cities and counties to have a very robust set of things that they think about when they adopt their zoning and development regulations and all that. It includes protection for forest lands and wetlands and critical areas and housing supply and transportation; think about your capital facilities; restrict urban sprawl; if you're a county draw an urban growth boundary, etc. Very fundamental to how local governments have to do things in our state. </p><p>This bill would have required that climate considerations be a part of that planning: that when a local government is doing their zoning updates, require that they use that process to reduce their emissions, and also that they increase their resiliency to changing climate, whether that's increased wildfire risk or rising sea levels or more floods or whatever. It didn't say this super explicitly, but it was clearly the intent that the regulations that the Department of Commerce was going to adopt – that cities would have to at least look at as part of their inclusion of this consideration – were probably going to include things like more density around transit. </p><p>The bill made it out of the House. That was one of our livelier floor debates this year, because the Republicans don't just hate climate policy: they really hate the Growth Management Act.</p><p>The bill seemed to be doing well in the Senate. Unfortunately, after it passed out of two Senate committees, it was referred to a third committee, which is unusual. It was referred to the Senate Transportation Committee, which is often where climate things go to die. It's where the Clean Fuel Standard died in 2019 and 2020, because the chair there is our most moderate, least constructive on climate and environment, Democratic senator, and he killed the bill. </p><p>The good news, though, is that we got into the state budget a provision directing the Department of Commerce to do the same things that they were going to have to do under the bill. We're going to try to come back and pass it first thing next session, and hopefully with a little bit more coordination with the Senate about how to stay one step ahead of that problem in the Senate Transportation Committee. But it would have been a big step forward. </p><p>The other good news, particularly for folks in Seattle, is that the central Puget Sound counties are already doing this; maybe not at quite the level of detail that the bill would have required, but King, Pierce, Snohomish, and Kitsap have already agreed as part of the multi-county planning process that climate is something that they look at in their comp plan. So it's not like the work isn't happening. It's just not going to be mandated everywhere in the state until we get that bill passed, hopefully next year.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>Wasn’t that a key part of the way the CCA passed this year, by not getting referred to the Transportation Committee?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>It did help. That senator, Senator Hobbs, did vote for the bill; part of his price was all the money for transportation stuff. I don't want to speculate too much about the internal workings of the Senate, but I do think it would have been a scarier prospect if it had had to go to that committee. </p><p>More broadly, on land use: A lot of legislators used to be city council members or county commissioners, so the tension that we have on the Democratic side is people who want to see density and housing supply and climate incorporated into big giant upzones around light rail stations, and people who either came from local government or just really sympathize with their local governments who say, “Don't tell us what to do.” That's our problem. On the Republican side, we try to make common cause with the Republicans from a property rights standpoint, saying, “Wouldn't you like to deny your city the big government telling me I can't build a duplex, because that's big government?” Sometimes we can get somewhere with that. But then there's also the base Republican “you're trying to make everybody live in a townhouse” suspicion too. So both parties have a little different dynamic around this one than on the other issues. We've gotten some good land use stuff through from time to time, but it's a much less linear debate than you see on the other climate stuff.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>The clean fuel standard and the CCA have passed, but their implementation is contingent upon the passage of a transportation package that has to contain a gas tax of at least 5 cents a gallon. Some Seattle urbanists are upset about this because they think the transportation package is full of highway spending and highway expansions. As someone who hates highway expansions, what is the proper level of freakout for me about this? Should I worry about this transportation package? How much can it change before it passes? Does this bother you at all, that this contingency got stuck on?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>Yes, I don't like the contingency, for more than one reason. I just think it's bad lawmaking to say this law only goes into effect if this unrelated law also passes. I think it's questionable whether it's even allowed under the state constitution. But it's what we had to accept in order to get the votes in the Senate. </p><p>I don't think a 5 cent gas tax increase is a bad thing, though. We have enough transportation needs, even highway needs, that we could spend 5 cents easily without adding a new lane anywhere. We're supposed to spend $4 billion fixing fish passage barriers on state highways between now and 2030; you could spend all 5 cents on culverts alone and not expand a single lane mile anywhere. We're also significantly behind on maintenance and preservation of the existing road system.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>The bill could theoretically boost the gas tax more than that, though, right?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon: </strong> </p><p>Absolutely. We probably will have to. I think a lot of people look at Senator Hobbs’ transportation package in the Senate, which is the one that made it the furthest, and think, that must be the template for what you guys are going to do. We're a long way away from what that package is going to look like, and there are a lot of opportunities for people to weigh in along the way to say, this project is bad, and please don't pass a transportation package that builds a new 12-lane highway in East Snohomish County; that, we're also not going to do. </p><p>Sometimes a highway project is actually a safety project. Sometimes there are actually dangerous roadways that it does cost a couple hundred million dollars to make a highway safer, and in some parts of that roadway that might involve adding a lane. But that's not the same as, we're going to go now open up huge swaths of farmland to suburban sprawl with a giant new freeway. So it's a legitimate thing for urbanist climate champions to keep their eyes on, but also, it's not something that I would say that folks should feel like they need to freak out about quite yet. Because we actually do need a lot more money for transportation in the state, even if we don't expand highways, and if we are going to expand highways anywhere, just look at that contextually, look at that actual project, and if it's actually the thing that you're most worried about.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>I have to say, even as someone who hates highways and wants to ban cars, it would take a lot of new highway lanes to offset the benefits of 95 percent carbon reductions locked in through 2050.</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>Even if we were going to spend it all on giant new highways, there's still a cap. If a bunch of people were going to try to move to rural places and drive a bunch more, well, then transportation emissions would presumably eat up all the remaining allowances and all the other pollution would have to decline in an even greater amount. Or maybe there's a shortage of allowances and the allowance prices get so high that people in those rural areas actually just have to carpool or drive electric cars. That's not a likely outcome, but even if it were, it doesn't change the fact that the cap isn't going up.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>You mentioned earlier that this being climate change, the work is never done. It's never good enough. But on the flip side, right now, Washington is specifically regulating electricity, transportation, and buildings, and there’s this economy-wide cap in the background, reducing emissions. So what are the pieces left? When you come back next session, in terms of climate and energy, is there a next big thing, or is it just mostly little things filling in gaps at this point?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>We're going to have to do more big things. I don't know that the crystal ball is quite clear enough this soon after the end of session to know what all the next big things are, but the biggest thing that we didn't get done this session is a law around residential buildings. The buildings law that we passed two years ago was really awesome; it was the first of its kind in the country regulating the energy performance of large commercial buildings. We don't really have a policy in place for residential heating, particularly water heating and space heating. I think a lot of people worry we're going to come for their gas stoves.</p><p>But the bill that was introduced this year – it passed out of my committee, it died in the Appropriations Committee – would have tried to put the state on track toward decarbonizing space heat and water heat in residential buildings. As often with an ambitious bill, it didn't make it the first session; we're going to have to do more work on that. That one ran into a hot storm of opposition from both building trades and gas utilities. </p><p>We did get some pieces of it incorporated into other bills: one piece of it into the operating budget, one piece of it into a different bill about utility ratemaking. But we have to think more about what policies we need in order to accelerate the decarbonization of residential buildings, recognizing that that's not going to change the cap either. Essentially, if you're going to lower carbon emissions from residential buildings, that just means that many more allowances for other sectors. But it's still something that, of course, the faster we do it, also probably provides some breathing room for Ecology to lower the cap more.</p><p><strong>David Roberts: </strong>  </p><p>Are you worried about backlash to this? Because when you talk about people being forced to do things about the way they heat their home, it's very personal, and people have very strong feelings. Do you feel like the climate movement, or politicians, or anyone has done the education work to prepare people for this? Are you worried about citizen backlash, if a regulator in the end comes to your home and tells you to get rid of your furnace, which is not totally implausible?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>I don't think that is something the public is ready for, even in Seattle. I don't think that Seattle homeowners more than anyone else want to have someone come say, “Turn off your gas.” The bill that we considered this year wouldn't have done that. But I think that we need to learn from how it was communicated. Most of the proposals that I've seen, both at the local level and at the state level, involve stopping new gas hookups, not forcing current gas users to turn off their gas. We need to be really good about talking about that aspect, so everybody knows, nobody is going to be told you have to go get rid of your furnace and buy a heat pump. </p><p>At some point in the future – our energy codes probably are going to require this already, without new legislation – new construction is probably going to have to be electric only. How do we ensure that we're ready for that? How do we ensure that utilities are ready for that? How do we ensure that the gas utilities are not building new gas lines that are going to be obsolete in 10 years? Those are the policy choices we have to make, and we have to be really, really clear about what we're doing and what we're not doing. Because that is a recipe for backlash, if people do think we're going to be coming in and telling them to have cold houses.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:  </strong> </p><p>What about your personal political plans? Are you happy doing your work in the House, or do you have your eye on other things?</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:</strong>  </p><p>I don't see myself running for office at a different level of government. I feel good about the work where I am in the House right now. I don't see the federal government as a really rewarding or productive place for me to be; I'm glad that good people are there doing what they're doing. I had an open Senate seat in my district three years ago that I chose not to run for because I felt like I was just getting the hang of things in the House, and I was committee chair – and I think that turned out to be the right decision. So I plan on doing this until I get a little more burned out on it, and that's as far into the future as I can see.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:</strong>   </p><p>Well, you're passing bills and seeing actual changes made – why anyone on Earth would want to go from that situation to the US Senate is utterly mysterious to me. I don't even know why it's viewed as up anymore. It's more like lateral or downward.</p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:  </strong></p><p>That's a more clear way of saying that, for sure.</p><p><strong>David Roberts:   </strong></p><p>Thanks so much for taking all this time, and thanks for all the work you're doing. </p><p><strong>Joe Fitzgibbon:</strong></p><p>Thanks, David. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-washington-rep-joe</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:36224218</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 10 May 2021 16:00:54 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/36224218/fa603dc6c06d1832e01f758f976eaf95.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4180</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/36224218/a016eb76ad83beb9aa6627c7ec3d3d8f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Washington state now has the nation's most ambitious climate policy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>In May 2019, I wrote in Vox that “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/5/15/18624294/renewable-energy-policy-cities-states">one weird trick can help any state or city pass clean energy policy</a>.” Spoiler: the one weird trick is electing Democrats. </p><p>My home state of Washington elected a whole mess of Democrats over the last several cycles and it is paying off handsomely. Without much national attention, the last few years have seen Washington quietly put into place the most comprehensive and ambitious slate of climate and energy policies of any US state. Yes, I’m talking to you, California.</p><p>The legislature just passed a carbon cap that will reduce economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions 95 percent by 2050 (it awaits Gov. Jay Inslee’s signature). I want to talk about that bill, but first, to understand its significance, we need to quickly review all the other stuff the Washington legislature has been up to lately. </p><p>Let’s run through the last three years. It’s a lot. (And this is only the climate stuff; there’s <a target="_blank" href="https://crosscut.com/politics/2021/04/eight-big-things-washington-state-legislature-passed-2021">much more</a>: police reform, a capital gains tax, reduction in penalties for drug possession, etc.)</p><p>In 2019, the legislature passed:</p><p>* the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.commerce.wa.gov/growing-the-economy/energy/ceta/">Clean Energy Transformation Act</a> (CETA), the most significant energy bill in state history, which will require state utilities to reach carbon neutrality by 2030 and 100 percent self-generated carbon-free electricity by 2045; it also contains a bunch of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/4/18/18363292/washington-clean-energy-bill">sexy utility business-model reforms</a>;</p><p>* the <a target="_blank" href="https://nwenergy.org/featured/12903/">Clean Buildings bill</a>, a first-in-the-nation program that requires large commercial building owners to address the energy efficiency of their existing buildings;</p><p>* a bill on hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which will phase out dangerous ozone-depleting (and climate-warming) aerosols, foams, and refrigerants (making Washington the second state, after California, to do so); and</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://forthmobility.org/news/hb-2042-passes-washington-legislature">HB 2042</a>, which puts about $170 million toward transportation electrification, through tax incentives for mid-market EVs, money for charging stations, and money to transit agencies to electrify buses. </p><p>In 2020, it passed:</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nbcrightnow.com/news/governor-approves-legislation-to-increase-availability-of-zevs/article_c68d64ce-6f90-11ea-b89f-bf6ffa8e0804.html">SB 5811</a>, which adopts <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/what-zev">California’s Zero-Emissions Vehicle (ZEV) program</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nrdc.org/experts/patricio-portillo/ca-takes-step-forward-new-clean-truck-proposal">California’s Advanced Clean Truck Rule</a>, requiring rising sales of ZEV passenger vehicles and heavy- and medium-duty trucks, respectively; and</p><p>* an update of the state’s greenhouse gas emission goals: 45 percent reduction from 1990 levels by 2030, 70 percent by 2040, and 95 percent/net-zero by 2050. </p><p>In 2021 so far, it has passed:</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://columbiabasinherald.com/news/2021/feb/24/bill-greenhouse-gas-emissions-passes/">HB 1050</a>, another HFC bill that goes beyond <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/congress-might-pass-a-huge-energy">recently adopted federal standards</a>;</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/washington-state-proposes-legislation-to-phase-out-natural-gas-utility-service-61819435">HB 1084</a>, the <a target="_blank" href="https://rmi.org/washington-clean-buildings-bill-raises-the-bar-for-every-state/">Healthy Homes and Clean Buildings Act</a>, which would take a number of steps to gradually phase out natural gas utility service and boost building electrification <strong>[Correction: 1084 did not actually pass; it died in the Appropriations Committee, but several of its provisions passed via the state budget]</strong>; and</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.kuow.org/stories/washington-joins-oregon-california-british-columbia-in-passing-low-carbon-fuel-standard">HB 1091</a>, which would establish a <a target="_blank" href="https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/low-carbon-fuel-standard/about">clean fuels standard</a> (CFS) that gradually reduces the carbon content of liquid fuels in the state, similar to laws already in place in California, Oregon, and British Columbia (making a declining carbon standard for fuels the law of the land from the Mexican border to the Yukon). This has been a long fight in Washington — the CFS is one of Big Oil’s least-favorite policies — and this is the third attempt to pass it, so victory is sweet.</p><p>So, the legislature has already passed laws specific to electricity, transportation, buildings, and fuels. All of this activity sets the context for <a target="_blank" href="https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/washington-legislature-passes-carbon-pricing-bill-giving-big-win-to-inslee-environmentalists/">last week’s finale</a>: SB 5126, the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cleanprosperouswa.com/climate-commitment-act-sb-5126-bill-summary/">Climate Commitment Act</a> (CCA — here’s the <a target="_blank" href="http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2021-22/Htm/Bills/Senate%20Passed%20Legislature/5126-S2.PL.htm?q=20210428101316">bill text</a>). </p><p>I wrote last year that carbon pricing has been dethroned in left-leaning carbon policy circles, in favor of industrial policy — sector-specific <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21252892/climate-change-democrats-joe-biden-renewable-energy-unions-environmental-justice">standards, investments, and justice</a> (SIJ). But the dream of carbon pricing never died in the hearts of Jay Inslee and Washington legislators. The CCA is a “cap-and-invest” program that would impose a declining cap on emissions and distribute allowances under the cap, thereby placing an escalating price on carbon. </p><p>There’s lots to say about this, but the first thing to note is that this is not carbon pricing <em>instead of</em> SIJ — note all the sector-specific policies passed before and alongside it. It is carbon pricing as a complement, part of a comprehensive suite of carbon policies.</p><p>Note also that this bill comes at the tail end of a long record of failure on carbon pricing in Washington, including two citizen-led ballot initiatives, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/10/18/13012394/i-732-carbon-tax-washington">one based on economists’ recommendations</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/9/28/17899804/washington-1631-results-carbon-fee-green-new-deal">one based on the environmental left’s recommendations</a>, both of which were defeated. There’s a lot of history here. </p><p>Politically, there are two salient facts bounding the bill. </p><p>On the downside, implementation of both the CFS and the CCA is contingent on the passage of a transportation package containing a boost in the gas tax of at least five cents per gallon. Many state climate activists are angry about this, because in its current condition, the transportation package is highway-heavy. (I’ll get into this more later.)</p><p>On the upside, once it is in effect, the CCA is authorized to stay in effect until its emission goals are reached. This is a really big deal: there won’t be a big legislative fight over re-authorization like there was in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/7/15/15955756/california-climate-brown-ab398-cap-and-trade">California in 2017</a>, which <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/12/12/18090844/california-climate-cap-and-trade-jerry-brown">weakened that state’s program</a>. There is no sunset or time limit on the CCA. It stays in place until the state is net-zero. A declining cap is now the status quo, and it’s always more difficult to pass a new bill to change the status quo than it is to keep it in place.</p><p>Before we get too deep in the politics, though, let’s look at what the CCA does. It adopts the same broad outlines as California’s cap-and-trade system, but with this guiding principle, as <a target="_blank" href="https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/washington-states-carbon-pricing-bill-could-be-most-far-reaching-in-nation-so-how-will-it-work/">articulated to the Seattle Times</a> by state Sen. Reuven Carlyle (D-Seattle), the bill’s key Senate architect: “I had a check list, and I made sure in my own head that we addressed these criticisms and weaknesses of the California bill, and not just danced around them.” </p><p>Cap-and-invest will issue a declining number of allowances</p><p>The CCA is a program to achieve the state’s carbon targets, as updated last year: 45 percent reduction from 1990 levels by 2030, 70 percent by 2040, and 95 percent/net-zero by 2050. </p><p>Keep in mind: this is not just the electricity sector. It’s electricity and transportation and oil and gas and more — somewhere between 75 and 80 percent of the state’s total greenhouse gas emissions. Only California has comparable economy-wide aspirations, but Washington’s rate of reductions will need to be much more rapid than California’s to reach its targets. In terms of the sheer pace of change to which a state has committed, Washington has taken the lead.</p><p>With a few exceptions, the cap will cover all entities that emit at least 25,000 tons of energy, process, or landfill emissions a year — around 100 entities total. Each year, a declining number of allowances will be issued. Most of them will be distributed via auction (sold to raise revenue for the state), with a few exceptions. </p><p>Electric utilities are already covered by CETA, so they get their allowances free. They can use their allowances for compliance and, if they reduce emissions ahead of schedule, auction off the remainder. Any benefits from those auctions are to be used “for the benefit of ratepayers, with the first priority the mitigation of any rate impacts to low-income customers.” </p><p>Natural gas utilities get free allowances equal to their emissions the first year, with that number declining by about 6.5 percent a year through 2030, commensurate with the cap. Starting in 2023, natgas utilities must auction 65 percent of those free allowances, with the number by rising by 5 percent a year up to 100 percent. The auction proceeds must be returned to customers “by providing nonvolumetric [equal for each customer] credits on ratepayer utility bills, prioritizing low-income customers, or used to minimize cost impacts on low-income, residential, and small business customers through actions that include, but are not limited to, weatherization, decarbonization, conservation and efficiency services, and bill assistance.” But there’s a twist: excepting low-income households, only households that are already connected to the natural gas system when the bill goes into effect can receive these rebates. Subsequent hookups do not, a significant disincentive California doesn’t have. </p><p>Finally, so-called energy-intensive trade-exposed (EITE) entities — industries where marginal increases in energy costs could prove a competitive disadvantage and potentially push them out of state — are not exempt from the cap. They will receive a steadily declining share of free allowances through 2035, based on their output. </p><p>Note: some environmental-justice activists have criticized this provision, but a) the carbon-tax bill the EJ community supported earlier this session, <a target="_blank" href="https://fanwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/WashingtonSTRONG-Fact-Sheet.pdf">Washington STRONG</a>, would exempt <em>all</em> EITE entities from its cap, forever, b) EITE entities can have their access to offsets cut off if they are harming local air quality, and c) the air-quality regulations in the CCA serve as a backstop for local air quality. This is about as good as you’ll find any state doing on EITE businesses.</p><p>The price of allowances will have a floor and a ceiling</p><p>The price of allowances, as established by auctions, will have a “collar,” meaning it will have a rising floor (to ensure the program produces reliable revenue) and a rising ceiling (to make sure it doesn’t get too expensive). The ceiling will take the form of an allowance price containment reserve, which basically means that if the price hits the ceiling, unlimited allowances at that price can be released from the reserve until prices go back down.</p><p>The price collar will effectively cause the system to behave a little more like a carbon tax, with price fluctuations confined to a predictable range. </p><p>There will also be an “emissions containment reserve,” set to a trigger price, that will allow the department to withdraw subsets of allowances from the system if the targets are not being met. (For more on emissions containment reserves, see <a target="_blank" href="https://www.resources.org/archives/the-next-big-thing-in-carbon-markets-rggi-to-implement-an-emissions-containment-reserve/">this post</a> from Resources for the Future.)</p><p>The state Department of Ecology will set the floor, ceiling, and trigger prices through rulemakings involving public and stakeholder input. In 2027, 2035, 2040, and 2050 — and whenever else it elects to — the department will review whether the program is on track to meet its targets and take any corrective action necessary. For instance, in the event of oversupply of allowances, a problem that <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/12/12/18090844/california-climate-cap-and-trade-jerry-brown">bedevils the California system</a>, the department can withdraw allowances from the system to push the price as high as necessary to get on the right trajectory.</p><p>Offsets will come in under the cap</p><p>Regulated entities may meet 8 percent of their compliance obligations through carbon offsets in the first compliance period (2023-2026); from then on, it is 6 percent. Of those offsets, 3 and then 2 percent respectively must go to projects on tribal lands; 50 and then 75 percent of the benefits, respectively, must be within Washington state. </p><p>Offsets are a huge source of controversy, in this system as in all systems where they play a role. A recent <a target="_blank" href="https://www.propublica.org/article/the-climate-solution-actually-adding-millions-of-tons-of-co2-into-the-atmosphere">blockbuster investigation by ProPublica</a> revealed that California’s biggest forestry offset programs are basically bogus — failing to reduce emissions and blowing the state’s carbon budget.</p><p>The dangers of offsets — explained in more detail in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/carbon-offsets-arent-working-and">my interview with energy analysts Danny Cullenward and David Victor</a> — are very real, but the bill contains a few key provisions that reduce those risks.</p><p>First and most importantly, unlike in California, offsets in Washington’s system are beneath the cap. This is a tricky concept to get your head around, so let me walk through some idealized examples.</p><p>Say, in a California-style system, the state’s emissions limit for the year is 1,000 tons. It allows 8 percent of compliance via offsets, so in addition to issuing 1,000 allowances, it allows 80 offset credits. </p><p>Note: there are now 1,080 tons worth of compliance instruments on the market (allowances + offsets). However, California believes that each offset represents a ton of carbon reduced elsewhere, outside the covered sectors. So 1,080 tons of compliance instruments - 80 tons of carbon reduced elsewhere = 1,000 tons, the state emissions limit. So far so good.</p><p>However! If the 80 offsets turn out to be bogus — if they <em>don’t</em> represent real carbon reductions elsewhere in the economy — then the system will net out at 1,080 tons of emissions, blowing past the state’s purported limit.</p><p>That, basically, is what critics say has been happening in California: because so many of the millions and millions of tons of offsets in the system are bogus, the state is actually permitting emissions well above its stated limits.</p><p>Washington legislators learned from California’s example and designed their system differently. </p><p>Say Washington’s emissions limit for the year is 1,000 tons. It also allows 8 percent compliance via offsets. However, its offsets are beneath the cap, meaning the state will issue 920 allowances and allow 80 offsets — a total of 1,000 tons worth of compliance instruments.</p><p>If all 80 offsets are bogus, then the state comes in at its limit: 1,000 tons. If the 80 offsets are valid, if they represent actual emission reductions outside the covered sectors, then they push emissions <em>below</em> the statutory cap. The system will actually have netted out at 920 tons of emissions, well under the state limit. </p><p>This is worth repeating: in the Washington system, insofar as offsets represent valid emission reductions, they are effectively a bonus, over and above the reductions required by statute. (This could help push the system to net-zero eventually.) Because the Washington system doesn’t rely on the validity of offsets to hit its caps, some of the political pressure is taken off of them.</p><p>That’s the first thing. The second thing is that the CCA directly addresses the long-standing concern over “hot spots.” The concern is that some heavily polluting facilities, often located in low-income or minority neighborhoods, will buy tons of cheap offsets and continue to pollute. The CCA — in addition to setting up a whole apparatus to measure local air quality and screen for vulnerable communities — says that if the state determines a particular facility is harming an “overburdened community,” it can restrict the facility’s access to offsets (a provision also absent in California).</p><p>Third, the Department of Ecology will be charged with determining which of California’s offset protocols to accept; it is not required to accept them all. </p><p>Critics of offsets have long said that the incentives are inevitably skewed in these systems: offset providers want lax standards so they can sell in bulk, regulated entities want lax standards because cheap offsets bring down the overall cost of compliance; politicians want lax standards because they also benefit from the optics of cheap compliance. Regulators, the only participants with an interest in maintaining standards, are under constant pressure. </p><p>It’s definitely true that the success of Washington’s program, on offsets and elsewhere, will depend on judicious action from future regulators. But that’s true of any system.</p><p>The revenue will go to climate mitigation and adaptation</p><p>Auctioning allowances every year will bring in billions of dollars in state revenue, the exact level depending on the price they bring. The state estimates that, if allowances sell at the California floor price, they will raise around $500 million a year, rising up to the high 600s over time — about $8 billion total through 2037. In reality, the Department of Ecology will set its own floor and in practice the price is likely to exceed it, given Washington’s ambitions.</p><p>Here’s how the revenue is allocated.</p><p>First, between the start of the cap-and-invest program and 2037, $5.2 billion of CCA revenue will go to transportation projects that reduce carbon emissions, mostly transit but also electrification, including <a target="_blank" href="https://insideevs.com/news/427007/washington-state-ferries-electrified/">electrification of Washington ferries</a> (a huge win for local air quality). </p><p>We will get into the controversy over Washington’s transportation package later — remember, implementation of the CCA is contingent on its passage — but it is worth emphasizing that the CCA itself will spend roughly five times what the last transportation package allocated for transportation decarbonization projects. From 2037 on, 50 percent of CCA revenue will go to such projects. None of these funds can go to roads. </p><p>Second, every two years, $20 million will go to the Air Quality and Health Disparities Improvement Account (see below).</p><p>Third, the remaining funds — around $3 billion, assuming California’s floor price — will go to the Climate Investment Account, which will divide it as follows:</p><p>* 75 percent to the Climate Commitment Account, which will fund climate mitigation and some adaptation projects; it will also set aside $250 million to help relocate tribal communities threatened by sea-level rise; and</p><p>* 25 percent to the Natural Climate Solutions Account, which is dedicated to natural resources management and resilience.</p><p>All of the Climate Investment Account spending is subject to high labor standards, like the money spent in CETA (more on that <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/4/18/18363292/washington-clean-energy-bill">here</a>). The intent is to use the investments to create high-quality in-state union jobs. </p><p>Air-quality standards and targeted investments will address environmental justice</p><p>There are provisions throughout the CCA related to environmental justice. </p><p>First, one of the objections EJ communities often have to cap-and-trade is that it doesn’t guarantee improvement in local air quality, especially in overburdened communities. The CCA addresses this in Section 3, which sets up a system for local air-quality monitoring and regulation. </p><p>The state will identify overburdened communities using a tool like the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.doh.wa.gov/DataandStatisticalReports/WashingtonTrackingNetworkWTN/InformationbyLocation/WashingtonEnvironmentalHealthDisparitiesMap">Washington Environmental Health Disparities Map</a> (which grades communities on over a dozen metrics) and deploy air-monitoring systems in the identified communities — something Washington, like many states, now lacks. </p><p>It will direct state and local air agencies to adopt new standards and regulations such that the overburdened communities either meet federal National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) or have air quality equal to nearby communities, <em>whichever is more protective</em>. Since all of Washington complies with NAAQS, these standards will go beyond federal air quality standards to specifically identify and eliminate wide disparities often based on class and race. </p><p>Every two years, the Department of Ecology will review the state’s progress to ensure that criteria pollutants in overburdened communities are declining on schedule.</p><p>Second, all the investments made with CCA revenue must target:</p><p>* at least 35 percent to overburdened communities, with a target of 40 percent, and</p><p>* and additional 10 percent to projects sponsored by tribal nations.</p><p>In California, a similar provision has meant roughly <a target="_blank" href="https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/sites/default/files/classic/cc/capandtrade/auctionproceeds/2020_cci_annual_report.pdf">$3 billion</a> invested in that state’s overburdened communities since 2014. Now Washington’s overburdened communities will receive a steady stream of investment as well. </p><p>Third, Washington’s Environmental Justice Council — created by the Healthy Environment for All (HEAL) Act, also passed this year — will provide oversight on the design of the program, the revenue, and any plans to link the system to California’s. (The council is a 12-member group, appointed by the governor and approved by the Senate, drawn from affected communities and state agencies.) </p><p>The state is also instructed to create a tribal consultation framework and ensure that tribes are involved in all Climate Investment Account spending decisions that affect tribal lands. (Tribes can halt projects if such consultation hasn’t taken place.)</p><p>So, the bill contains a combination of specific air-quality standards for overburdened communities, revenue for overburdened communities, and formal environmental-justice oversight of design and revenue decisions. We’ll touch more on the politics around this below. </p><p>Linking to California could be sketchy</p><p>Washington may eventually want to link its system to California’s, which is a politically dicey prospect, given familiar criticisms of that state’s system. To do so, the two states would have to agree on mutual exchange of allowances, align their price floors and ceilings, and integrate their auction systems, among other things.</p><p>Section 24 of the CCA instructs the Department of Ecology to analyze whether a link would do any harm to Washington’s system. Any linkage must not only integrate the systems properly, it must ensure that:</p><p>* the jurisdiction being linked to has environmental-justice provisions in place to get revenue to overburdened communities, </p><p>* the linkage will not harm overburdened communities in either jurisdiction,</p><p>* the linkage will not harm Washington’s ability to hit its targets, and</p><p>* Washington retains “all legal and policymaking authority over its program design and enforcement.”</p><p>That’s a pretty stiff set of requirements, and it’s an open question whether a linkage with California can meet them any time soon, given that state’s problems with oversupply and local air-quality concentrations. (More on that below.)</p><p>The politics around the CCA are pretty good, but there are objections</p><p>The nature of the news cycle these days is that stories come and go and are forgotten in a matter of hours. The passage of these landmark climate and energy bills is probably going to see the same fate — it will be gone from the headlines long before you read this, insofar as it got any headlines at all. (This should teach Democratic lawmakers something: they can pass big ambitious policies and people will barely register that it happened. Might as well let loose and pass more!)</p><p>Most people, if they noticed the bill passing at all, felt happy that something was getting done. Climate action is, after all, extremely popular. Among those engaged with the process, however, there has been some pushback, falling into three buckets.</p><p><strong>1. Some urbanists hate the transportation linkage.</strong></p><p>As I said in the intro, the CFS and the CCA have both passed, but their implementation is contingent on the passage of a transportation package (containing a gas tax of at least five cents a gallon). </p><p>Some Seattle urbanists are upset about the state of that transportation package; they believe it spends too much on highways, undercutting the CCA’s goals. They are therefore opposed to the linkage, and want Gov. Jay Inslee — who has a line-item veto — to strike it from the bill and allow the CCA to be implemented without restrictions. (That would severely piss off several moderate Democrats in the Senate.) </p><p>One thing to note on this is that all highway spending is not equal. Big chunks of the Washington highway budget will be taken up by court-mandated repair of culverts (to help fish). And there are lots of projects — like the new <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theurbanist.org/2020/11/30/columbia-river-crossing-freeway-project-is-back/">Columbia River Crossing bridge</a>, which will include light rail — that most everyone agrees are necessary. </p><p>More importantly, through a twist of Washington law, the CFS and CCA will likely <em>prevent</em> billions of dollars in road spending. The use of bonding to borrow money for road spending requires a 60 percent majority in the Washington legislature, which means it will require several Republican votes. And Republicans are absolutely not going to vote for a transportation package that triggers the CFS and the CCA, two policies they passionately hate. That means no Republican votes and no bonding, which will sharply curtail, by several billion, the amount of money the transportation package can devote to roads. </p><p>And finally, remember, the CCA will put $5.2 billion toward transportation decarbonization, five times what the last transportation package spent on that, none of which can go to roads. </p><p>It seems to me that the benefits of the bill, in transportation alone, vastly outweigh the harms of a few highway-widening projects, irksome as they are. </p><p><strong>2. Some environmental justice groups oppose cap-and-trade.</strong></p><p>The state environmental justice community is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.invw.org/2021/03/12/washington-climate-activists-disagree-about-how-to-cut-carbon/">divided</a> on the CCA. Groups like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.pugetsoundsage.org/opposing-cap-and-trade/">Puget Sound Sage</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://frontandcentered.org/we-will-keep-our-promise-cap-and-trade-will-not/">Front and Centered</a> have spoken out against it, but it has received support from 20 state tribes, El Centro de la Raza, the Washington Black Lives Matter Alliance, and Washington Build Back Black Alliance.</p><p>The opposition arises mainly from opposition to cap-and-trade itself, which some EJ activists believe is inherently inferior to a carbon tax like the 2018 state ballot initiative (1631) or <a target="_blank" href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=5373&#38;Year=2021&#38;Initiative=false">Washington STRONG</a>.  To my mind, most of their critiques — especially around local air quality and participation — are directly answered by provisions in the bill. And some, like the idea that cap-and-invest allows companies to “pay to pollute,” are more true of the carbon taxes they support (which contain no mandatory emission reductions). </p><p>But make up your own mind: the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.pugetsoundsage.org/opposing-cap-and-trade/">Sage</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://frontandcentered.org/we-will-keep-our-promise-cap-and-trade-will-not/">F&C</a> essays make the case against; Vlad Gutman-Britten of Climate Solutions addresses the objections at length <a target="_blank" href="https://www.climatesolutions.org/article/2021-01/why-cap-and-invest-one-strategy-carbon-reduction">here</a>.</p><p><strong>3. Some wonks worry about hooking up with California.</strong></p><p>There’s long been a strain of thought in Washington that hitching up to the much larger California carbon market will effectively put California in charge of Washington policy. That critique used to come from the right, but lately there have been versions of it on the left as well.</p><p>There are two basic worries. The first is that California’s offset protocols are garbage and if Washington adopts them it will flood its system with bogus carbon reductions. The second is that <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/12/12/18090844/california-climate-cap-and-trade-jerry-brown">California’s system suffers from chronic oversupply</a> of allowances. The oversupply suppresses prices, and a governor <a target="_blank" href="https://abc7.com/governor-newsom-recall-update-gavin-california-election-why-is-being-recalled/10559972/">facing a recall election</a> and needing the support of the building trades is not going to support reform that raises prices any time soon. That could drag down Washington’s prices.</p><p>To some extent, these objections are answered in the bill. Offsets are below the cap, so the risks are lower; the Department of Ecology is not required to adopt all of California’s offset protocols, it can independently assess them; and the criteria for linkage specifically include that it not suppress prices.</p><p>Nonetheless, there is some tension here. There will be pressure to link the systems, to hold prices down in Washington. (Unlinked systems are, by <a target="_blank" href="https://thelens.news/app/uploads/2021/04/Assessing-Value-of-Adding-Flexibility-to-the-Cap-and-Invest-Proposal-of-Washington-State-4_18_2021.pdf">some analyses</a>, three times the cost of linked systems.) But it’s not totally clear how, once linked, Washington can enforce its own standards. </p><p>Since linkage won’t happen until the middle of the decade at the soonest, the best-case scenario is that California wrings some of the oversupply out of its system by then. And Washington linking could actually help lift prices in California — Washington will represent a lot of demand, given the steepness of its proposed emissions trajectory. </p><p>Washington is kicking ass</p><p>All of these objections are worth taking seriously, but in my judgment, on balance, Washington’s new bill — or more broadly, the comprehensive suite of policies the state has constructed — is overwhelmingly worth celebrating. Among other things, the CCA will bring <a target="_blank" href="https://www.lowcarbonprosperity.org/2021/03/15/technical-memo-the-climate-commitment-act-delivers-jobs-and-reduces-pollution/">billions in investment and new economic growth to the state</a>, along with hundreds of thousands of new jobs. </p><p>Given all the scorn heaped on Washington legislators over the last decade, especially by climate advocates (including me), it is worth noting that credit for the CCA goes largely to legislators, negotiating directly with one another. They finally got sick of Washington f*****g around on climate pricing, pulled together the lessons of previous attempts (and California’s example), hashed out a bill enough Democrats could agree to, and passed it. And they did a good job: the wonky i’s are dotted and t’s crossed.</p><p>Every success has many parents, and this one is no different, but special credit goes to Representative Joe Fitzgibbon in the House and Senator Reuven Carlyle in the Senate, who by all accounts (and I mean all accounts — one or both were praised by everyone I contacted, even some bill opponents) were central to coalition-building around these bills and improving them as they moved through the process. </p><p>Once Inslee signs the CFS and the CCA and a transportation package passes, both of which most observers expect in relatively short order, Washington will have the full suite: legally enforceable programs and standards in place to decarbonize electricity, transportation, and buildings, and in <em>addition</em> to that — as a complement, not an alternative — a declining cap that ensures the rapid emission reductions the state needs to meet its targets. </p><p>The Washington legislature is showing Democrats across the country that climate politics are good politics, that voters respond to big climate ambition. Now it’s up to Washington to show other states that reducing carbon emissions is good for the economy and good for the health and welfare of state residents. </p><p>The fight goes on for effective implementation and enforcement, but for now, Washington residents are justified in popping some champagne corks. The state has finally charted a clear path to a healthier climate future.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/washington-state-now-has-the-nations</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:35758896</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 05 May 2021 16:00:30 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/35758896/72a8b83f8a4a9ec660ad23ecec9a73c1.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>2171</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/35758896/48ced90285f7262577cc25a593bf9a22.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[US electricity emissions are halfway to zero]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>(Hey Volties! The following was going to be a column on Vox, but they decided they wanted something newsier, so I’ll be doing something about Biden’s pledge over there, soon. In the meantime, enjoy this writeup of a fun new paper, or listen by clicking play above. We’ll get back to Battery Week next week.)</em></p><p>Climate change can sometimes seem like an intractable problem, so it is useful to remember periodically that progress is possible — indeed, that we are making progress, and know how to make more.</p><p>This is especially true of the electricity sector.</p><p>Electricity is the focus of some of our biggest ambitions. Climate policy analysts (and Joe Biden) agree that we need to decarbonize the electricity sector entirely by 2035 — that’s what <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-coolest-parts-of-bidens-expansive">Biden’s Energy Efficiency and Clean Energy Standard</a> aims for, if he’s able to pass it. </p><p>That’s an incredibly ambitious target for the next 15 years, but a look at the last 15 years shows that rapid change is possible.</p><p>The US electricity sector is decarbonizing faster than expected</p><p>To illustrate the point, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory senior researcher Ryan Wiser undertook a <a target="_blank" href="https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/halfway-zero-progress-towards-carbon">simple project</a>. He went back 15 years and looked at the US Energy Information Administration’s 2005 projections for the electricity sector, to compare them with what actually happened. </p><p>Specifically, he looked at the EIA’s business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, its projection of what would happen if 2005 policy were frozen in place. (He also looked at other projections, to make sure EIA wasn’t an outlier.) Here’s the top-line conclusion:</p><p>Fifteen years ago, many business-as-usual projections anticipated that annual carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from power supply in the United States would reach 3,000 million metric tons (MMT) in 2020. In fact, direct power-sector CO2 emissions in 2020 were 1,450 MMT — roughly 50% below the earlier projections. <strong>By this metric, in only 15 years the country’s power sector has gone halfway to zero emissions.</strong> [my emphasis]</p><p>Not bad!</p><p>Of course, as Wiser acknowledges, this is about the rosiest possible lens through which to look at this data.</p><p>2020 was an unusual year; the pandemic drove demand (and emissions) down. Using 2019 numbers instead, the decline from BAU is 46 percent.</p><p>If you measure how much power sector emissions fell from 2005 to 2020 in absolute terms — rather than relative to expectations — the decline is 40 percent. Measuring absolute decline with 2019 numbers gets you 33 percent. </p><p>If you look at total energy-related emissions — not just electricity but all energy — they are down 39 percent relative to BAU. It’s evident that electricity is making the fastest progress.</p><p>Nonetheless, no matter how you look at it, in terms of emissions, we’re doing much better than BAU in the electricity sector. </p><p>Here’s a breakdown of emission declines in the electricity sector (and its component subsectors), relative to BAU projections and absolute levels, for both 2020 and 2019.</p><p>(Look how much difference 2020 made in transportation — that’s the pandemic talking.)</p><p>That’s how electricity GHG emissions did. Let’s look at a few other metrics.</p><p>Coal died while natural gas and renewables grew</p><p>Four big trends in the sources that power the electricity sector helped push emissions below BAU. </p><p>First, coal died — just absolutely plunged relative to expectations. Second, natural gas boomed, thanks to the shale revolution, and stayed much cheaper than expected. Third, renewables boomed, thanks to policy support that drove rapid cost declines. And fourth, demand stagnated, thanks to declining manufacturing and energy efficiency.</p><p>Here’s a graph that shows, on top, how supply and demand sources came in relative to EIA’s 2005 BAU, and on bottom, how they performed in absolute terms.</p><p>You can see the four stories plain as day: coal plunged, natural gas and renewables boomed, and demand stagnated. </p><p>Here’s another way of looking at the data:</p><p>Electricity bills have not increased …</p><p>The dynamic in electricity prices is interesting. </p><p>EIA’s 2005 BAU projection had electricity retail prices falling slightly by 2020, but average consumer electricity bills rising substantially, thanks to increased demand. What happened instead: retail prices stayed about the same, and so did average bills.</p><p>With all the cheap natural gas and renewables flooding the system, why didn’t prices go down? Wiser cites research uncovering the primary culprit: “declining power production costs due to decreasing prices for natural gas, wind, and solar have been offset by increases in sector-wide transmission and distribution costs.”</p><p>Curses, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-everything-in">transmission again</a>! (Time to spend some <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-coolest-parts-of-bidens-expansive">infrastructure money</a>.)</p><p>… but pollution has plunged</p><p>Coal is the dirtiest electricity source, so the unexpected plunge in coal means a commensurate plunge in local air pollutants and greenhouse gases. </p><p>Wiser calculates both the climate damages (by using the government’s social cost of carbon) and the air pollution damages avoided by sectoral changes over the last 15 years. They are stunning.</p><p>Even these numbers probably understate the benefits, since every new round of science reveals that <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/8/12/21361498/climate-change-air-pollution-us-india-china-deaths">the impact of air pollution is greater than previously understood</a>. </p><p>Employment grew thanks to renewables</p><p>“The renewable energy sector is job-intensive, requiring more jobs per unit output than natural gas and coal,” Wiser writes. “As a result, though jobs in the coal sector are considerably lower than might have been the case, natural gas and especially renewable energy jobs boost the overall total to 920,000.”</p><p>Measuring employment impacts is a little trickier — Wiser only measures a limited set of job categories, and calls these “rough first-order approximations” — but it’s clear enough that domestic renewable energy also involves lots of new domestic jobs. </p><p>What to learn from our unanticipated success in electricity</p><p>What’s happened over the past 15 years in US electricity is remarkable: for no added cost to consumers, we have radically reduced the social cost of power. Hundreds of thousands of people, maybe millions, will be healthier in the future for it.</p><p>In part that came through a few strokes of luck. The fracking boom was responsible for somewhere around half the reductions. But a great deal came through organized activist and public-policy effort, to push coal out of the system, expand renewables, and hold demand down through energy efficiency. (Given how much research and public policy was devoted to expanding natural gas, even that could be seen as largely intentional.)</p><p>When I asked Wiser how much credit he would give to deliberate policy, here’s what he told me:</p><p>Policy has driven growth in wind, solar, and energy efficiency. For wind and solar, state RPSs, federal tax incentives, net metering, R&D. For efficiency, efficiency standards for equipment and buildings and utility energy-efficiency incentives. As it relates to renewables and efficiency, the glory goes to policymakers, and also to innovators in many cases directly or indirectly supported by policy. </p><p>For coal to gas switching, the story is more nuanced. Surely fracking was developed in part with federal government assistance. Aswell, pressure campaigns by many advocates have supported the retirement of coal assets. But one also has to accept that this story line is not one that solely relates to policy intervention. </p><p>So, I can't give you a precise percentage (I'd love to have one), but the role of policy has surely been decisive.</p><p>“In the end,” he says, “I strongly believe that our fate is in our hands.”</p><p>Given the mix of purposeful policy and happy fate in the outcome of the last 15 years, the paper itself draws two lessons:</p><p>First, policy and technology advancement are imperative to achieving significant emissions reductions. Second, our ability to predict the future is limited, and so it will be crucial to adapt as we gain policy experience and as technologies advance in unexpected ways.</p><p>Push on policy and technology and be open to experimentation and revision: not bad guidelines in any area of politics.</p><p>One thing the last 15 years in the electricity sector does <em>not</em> teach us is that getting the rest of the way to net-zero by 2035 will be easy. For one thing, there will be a rebound in demand as the economy recovers from Covid-19. For another, many of the easiest low-hanging fruit have been picked; subsequent reductions are likely to be more difficult. And finally, the pace of reduction will need to substantially increase.</p><p>We will have to beat the EIA’s BAU case again. Here’s what the agency projected this year, relative to a net-zero pathway.</p><p>Getting the rest of the way to net-zero</p><p>“Past success does not trivialize the challenges that remain for further decarbonization in the power sector and beyond,” Wiser writes. “Nor does it offer a specific roadmap for how best to achieve those additional reductions.”</p><p>The final section of the paper is a brief review of the scientific literature on net-zero power. Obviously, coal-to-gas switching, a major engine of past reductions, can not be a long-term strategy, unless carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) scales up. </p><p>So the next 15 years will primarily be about scaling up solar, wind, and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/its-time-to-get-charged-up-for-battery">battery storage</a>, which are rapidly falling in cost. They can build on “existing low-carbon resources (nuclear, hydropower, geothermal, and other renewables) and energy efficiency,” Wiser writes, and research shows that “collectively, these low-carbon resources could reliably meet as much as 70% to 90% of power supply needs at low incremental cost.”</p><p>Getting there means overcoming numerous challenges: preparing the grid for it, in part by adding more transmission; scaling up batteries and other sources of flexibility; improving the operation of wholesale markets; aggressively pursuing energy efficiency and demand response; and more. </p><p>It won’t be easy, but the path to 90 percent electricity sector reductions is relatively clear. After that — wringing out that last 10 to 20 percent of emissions — things get a little trickier. Doing it only with today’s clean resources, especially relying on batteries to provide all the flexibility, gets rapidly more expensive as zero approaches. </p><p>We will need more backup from “clean firm resources” — Wiser cites “longer-duration storage, hydrogen or synthetic fuels, biofuels, fossil or biomass with CO2 capture and sequestration or use, nuclear, geothermal, and concentrating solar-thermal power with storage.”</p><p>The cheapest option for that additional flexibility, at least from what we can perceive today, is just keeping open a bunch of natural gas plants, but running them only rarely. That won’t get us to net-zero, but it will get us close. When I pressed Wiser on which clean-firm resources he would bet on eventually replacing those plants, he cited “using hydrogen in existing retrofitted gas plants, and new longer duration storage techs.”</p><p>It will be important, over the coming years, to research and innovate on those clean-firm sources, even as we rapidly scale up the clean tech we already have.</p><p>It’s a daunting task. But recent history shows we can make rapid progress, even with a patchwork of uncoordinated state policy efforts. Imagine what we could do with a concerted, well-funded federal effort. </p><p>We could beat expectations again. </p><p>A Mabel blep for your weekend:</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/us-electricity-emissions-are-halfway</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:35510732</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 23 Apr 2021 16:01:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/35510732/2a4b563039732424aa5f69e17a4d5303.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>975</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/35510732/08fb76f18affd36ac33a6b4f84981306.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The many varieties of lithium-ion batteries battling for market share]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>(If you would rather listen than read, just click play above.)</em></p><p>Hello, everyone, and welcome back to Battery Week! </p><p>We’ve talked about <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/its-time-to-get-charged-up-for-battery">why lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) are so important</a> and we went through a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-primer-on-lithium-ion-batteries">basic primer on how they work</a>. Today, we’re going to get into the competition within the broad lithium battery family, among all the different kinds of batteries that use lithium and exchange charged lithium ions. (See the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-primer-on-lithium-ion-batteries">previous post</a> for a full list.)</p><p>There are a few clear leaders — lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC), lithium nickel cobalt aluminum (NCA), and lithium ferro phosphate (LFP) — that have achieved mass market scale and several others looking to get in on the action. </p><p>The market prize is likely to exceed a trillion dollars within the next decade, so if any of these competitors can even carve out a substantial niche, it could be worth billions. Let’s look at the players. </p><p>Better NMC and NCA</p><p>The bulk of LIB research these days is going to improve the dominant batteries on the market, mainly by reducing the amount of cobalt (the most toxic and expensive ingredient). </p><p>Most EV makers use NMC batteries; Tesla uses NCA. In the past, it’s been difficult to push down the amount of cobalt in these batteries (it plays an important balancing role), but manufacturer LG recently <a target="_blank" href="https://marker.medium.com/a-new-battery-breakthrough-that-could-save-electric-vehicles-during-a-recession-c193ebdd3a5d">introduced an NMC 811 battery</a>: 80 percent nickel, 10 percent manganese, 10 percent cobalt. GM will use them in its new line, including in the Hummer, and Tesla will put them in some of its Model 3s in China.</p><p>Most big battery manufacturers, including Panasonic (which supplies many of Tesla's batteries), have <a target="_blank" href="https://observer.com/2021/01/electric-vehicle-battery-cobalt-free-gm-panasonic/">vowed to gradually reduce and eventually eliminate cobalt</a>. </p><p>Nickel is the key to energy density. Tesla, VW, and others are working on special high-nickel battery varieties that will be used for specialty vehicles that require extra-high energy density, like larger SUVs and trucks.</p><p>But not every vehicle needs that, and nickel supply constraints are looming, so work is also being done to further boost manganese — a much more stable, abundant material — and reduce cobalt.</p><p>Silicon anodes</p><p>Many LIB developers are experimenting with silicon as an anode coating, partially or completely replacing graphite. Tesla has been working to increase the proportion of silicon in its anode since at least 2015.</p><p>Silicon holds on to nine times more lithium ions than graphite, so energy density improves (range expands by 20 percent), and a silicon battery can charge and discharge much more quickly than graphite batteries, so power density improves as well. But silicon expands when it absorbs ions, so it breaks down quickly; cycle life is still much lower than graphite. If engineers can overcome that problem (and Tesla has vowed it can), LIBs could take a leap forward soon. </p><p>SILA Nanotechnologies, in its <a target="_blank" href="https://silanano.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/The-Future-of-Energy-Storage.pdf">brief on the future of LIBs</a>, considers silicon anodes the biggest potential near-term market-shifting breakthrough in the space. It summarizes:</p><p>[T]here are no high-volume commercial Li-ion batteries (yet!) in which a silicon anode entirely replaces the graphite one. When it does arrive, the reward will have been worth the wait. We expect automotive cells with NCA or NCM cathodes paired with Si-dominant anodes will increase energy density by up to 50%, thereby dropping the $/kWh cost by 30-40% in less than a decade. </p><p>That is a mind-boggling prize, if any manufacturer can unlock it. (Read <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/startup-sionic-promises-next-gen-battery-benefits-without-the-wait/">Canary’s Julian Spector on Sionic</a>, a battery company that has recently debuted a silicon anode that it says can fit into existing LIB manufacturing.) </p><p>Silicon anodes are technically “cathode agnostic,” though most testing so far has used NMC cathodes. If engineers can crack the code and make silicon anodes with high cycle life, it could benefit any and all cathodes (e.g., see LFP below).</p><p>Fluorides as cathodes</p><p>One thing I didn’t mention about silicon-as-anode: it doesn’t operate via intercalation. Instead of nestling into the anode, ions react with the silicon and bond with it, a process called “conversion.” That makes it more difficult to peel the ions off without damage, but it can hold way more ions.</p><p>With anodes (which are the limiting factor on most batteries now) improving, there’s more room for cathode improvement. SILA is big on research into fluorides — it cites metal fluoride-based cathodes (like iron fluoride or copper fluoride) and sulfur-based cathodes — which also operate via conversion rather than intercalation and can also store more ions. <a target="_blank" href="https://silanano.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/The-Future-of-Energy-Storage.pdf">It writes</a>:</p><p>It’s plausible that with a conversion cathode and an engineered low-swell silicon anode, the cycle life of Li-ion can be extended all the way to 10,000 full cycles while also having the highest energy density in the market — thus breaking the [power vs. energy] compromise.</p><p>SILA believes it’s only that combination — a conversion-based anode and a conversion-based cathode — that can bring LIB prices down to “~$50/kWh by 2030 and ~$30/kWh by 2040.” If it happened, that would be absolutely wild and almost certainly crush all competitors.</p><p>Lithium ferro phosphate (LFP)</p><p>LFPs, which use a lithium-iron compound as cathode, were among the first LIBs to commercialize. They are already standard in China, used in its ubiquitous scooters and small EVs. “The big Chinese battery makers — BYD and CATL and Lishen — each one of those is larger by itself than any other battery company that's not in China,” says Lou Schick, director of investments at Clean Energy Ventures, “and they have been making lithium iron phosphate cells for 10 years.”</p><p>A few years ago, it <a target="_blank" href="https://www.luxresearchinc.com/blog/li-ion-battery-innovation-roadmap">looked</a> like LFPs were going to be displaced by NMCs and NCAs, but lately they’ve made a comeback and now have a decent case that they could take the lead in the EV and stationary storage markets. They have already captured <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musk-likes-this-ev-battery-and-it-costs-lessbut-the-u-s-isnt-sold-on-it-11616929201">almost half of the Chinese EV market</a>.</p><p>LFPs use lithium ferrophosphate (LiFePO4) as the cathode, replacing nickel, manganese, and/or aluminum. The advantages relative to nickel-based competitors:</p><p>* cheaper on a materials basis (though not yet on $/kWh);</p><p>* higher cycle life (Matt Roberts, previously executive director of the Energy Storage Association, now working at battery company Simpliphi, says his company’s LFP batteries are warrantied for 10,000 cycles, compared to 2,500 to 5,000 for cobalt batteries.);</p><p>* higher power density;</p><p>* high safety and low toxicity (“They're almost literally bulletproof, in that they can't catch fire,” says Schick.);</p><p>* replaces problematic and/or rare metals with iron, which is safe and abundant.</p><p>In exchange for these advantages, LFPs offer lower energy density (there are fewer spaces for ions to intercalate). However, because they are so safe, LFPs do not require the same protective packaging as NMCs and NCAs, so they can gain some of that efficiency back at the pack level. Tesla says that, while LFPs have 50 percent of the energy density of their high-nickel competitors, an LFP-based vehicle can still get 75 percent of the range. </p><p>VW <a target="_blank" href="https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/metals/031721-volkswagens-plan-on-lfp-use-shifts-hydroxide-dominance-narrative-in-ev-sector">announced last month</a> that, starting in 2023, it would be “employing lithium iron phosphate, or LFP, in entry models; nickel-manganese in volume models; and nickel-rich NCM in high-end models.” </p><p>Tesla said more or less the same thing at its Battery Day event in 2020. It plans to use LFPs for an upcoming cheap (under $25,000) vehicle, the Model 3, and commercial energy storage.</p><p>Current LFPs are not going to feature in high-performance vehicles, but most vehicles aren’t that. They are “good enough, essentially, for any kind of commuter car,” Schick says. “I think you're going to see a whole bunch of economy cars that are LFP.” LFP will be used in taxis, ride-share vehicles, and fleet vehicles, along with scooters and rickshaws and motorcycles. It will be the cheap, reliable, everyday option.</p><p>And if LFPs can make use of silicon anodes, they could potentially nudge up into the over-300-mile range category. </p><p><strong>LFP in energy storage markets</strong></p><p>Energy density is also less important in the energy-storage market, where price, capacity, and safety rule. </p><p>LFP’s high cycle life and low costs make them attractive in the grid-storage market. As Julian Spector wrote in February at <a target="_blank" href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/safer-batteries-residential-energy-storage-market">GTM</a>:</p><p>In 2015, LFP batteries only served 10 percent of the grid storage market, according to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/lfp-will-overtake-nmc-for-stationary-storage">research</a> from Wood Mackenzie. NMC dominated, with more than 70 percent market share. But since then, NMC's market share has trended down while LFP's rose. Analysts predict LFP will become the leading chemistry for grid batteries by 2030, capturing 30 percent of an increasingly diversified market.</p><p>As for distributed, <a target="_blank" href="https://robfreeman.com/what-behind-the-meter-mean/#:~:text=The%20term%20%E2%80%9Cbehind%20the%20meter%E2%80%9D%20(BTM)%20is%20used,because%20it%20increases%20energy%20resilience.">behind-the-meter</a> storage, in some markets like California and New York City, Tesla home batteries (still NMC) are not allowed inside garages, thanks to the risk of thermal runaway, which can lead to fires. LFPs have passed an extensive regimen of safety tests and will be available everywhere; that gives them a tangible market advantage.</p><p>Roberts is convinced the safety issue is going to rise in salience, thanks to the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.retailconsumerproductslaw.com/2020/11/recalls-in-review-lithium-ion-batteries/">repeated recalls</a> from manufacturers like LG Chem. (The latest <a target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hyundai-motor-electric-recall/hyundai-motor-to-replace-battery-systems-in-900-million-electric-car-recall-idUSKBN2AO0JS">is going to cost Hyundai a cool $900 million</a>.) </p><p>“What's your levelized cost of energy?” Roberts asks. “You're out there quoting, ‘I can do $100 a kilowatt-hour for a battery pack.’ If in two years, though, you have to do a billion-dollar recall, when does that get factored into the LCOE?” </p><p>With sufficient manufacturing scale, the price of any battery approaches the price of its materials, and LFP uses incredibly cheap materials. If it scales sufficiently, it could potentially get cheap enough to dominate the storage market, fighting off other LIBs in the home-storage market and other chemistries and form factors (which we’ll look at in the next post) in the bulk-storage market. </p><p>“Of all the lithium-ion chemistries, LFP may play the largest role in accelerating the world’s transition to sustainable energy,” says Jordan Giesige, who makes battery explanatory videos under the moniker <a target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCIFn7ONIJHyC-lMnb7Fm_jw/videos">The Limiting Factor</a>. (They are superb; I cannot recommend them highly enough.)</p><p>Lithium manganese oxide (LMO) and lithium manganese nickel oxide (LMNO)</p><p>Manganese is abundant, safe, and stable at a wide variety of temperatures, though its energy density is lower than cobalt or nickel. Because LMOs don’t contain cobalt and avoid the threat of thermal runaway, they are used in medical equipment, as well as power tools, electric bikes, and EVs.</p><p>“The original Nissan LEAF was a lithium manganese oxide cathode,” says Dan Steingart, a materials scientist and co-director of Columbia University’s Electrochemical Energy Center, “and the Nissan LEAF has never had a battery that that initiated a fire.” </p><p>The LEAF also didn’t go very far on a charge, though — LMO may have trouble escaping its niche.</p><p>LMNO (“high-voltage spinel”) batteries try to retain some of the energy density of nickel while replacing cobalt. According to a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.greencarcongress.com/2020/07/20200724-li.html">2020 study in the </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.greencarcongress.com/2020/07/20200724-li.html"><em>Journal of Power Sources</em></a>, in the search for “novel cathode materials with high energy density, low cost, and improved safety,” LMNO is “one of the most promising candidates yet to be commercialized.” </p><p>LMNO batteries will need to boost their still-struggling cycle life before they can compete with more-established chemistries.</p><p>The next three batteries use lithium or lithium compounds as the anode rather than the cathode.</p><p>Lithium sulfur (Li-S)</p><p>Li-S burst on the scene to some excitement in the late ‘00s, demonstrating that a cell with lithium as the anode and sulfur as the cathode — two elements with extremely low atomic weight — could double the specific energy of conventional LIBs. Plus sulfur is incredibly cheap.</p><p>One problem is that sulfur has very low conductivity, so something (usually carbon) has to be added to pull in the ions. More importantly, Li-S batteries degrade quite quickly and have low cycle life. To date, they remain commercially unavailable. (<a target="_blank" href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenrg.2019.00123/full">This paper</a> reviews the remaining challenges.)</p><p>Lithium metal anodes</p><p>Simple, solid lithium metal makes for a great anode, in that it is highly prone to releasing electrons and ions. Use of lithium metal as an anode actually <a target="_blank" href="https://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/the-smarter-grid/the-return-of-the-lithiummetal-battery">dates back to the 1970s</a>, preceding LIB development. In a lithium-metal battery, charged lithium ions “plate” on (attach themselves directly to) the metal anode. </p><p>The problem is that lithium is highly reactive and ions tend to form “dendrites,” or tree-like formations, that reduce energy density and cycle life and increase the chances of a short or fire. It was problems with lithium’s reactivity that originally led to the addition of graphite to the anode, so the ions could intercalate rather than plating. That was the birth of LIBs. </p><p>But researchers and developers have recently returned to lithium-metal, figuring out new ways to prevent dendrite formation. Losing the graphite on the anode drops weight and up to <em>doubles</em> energy density. </p><p>To date, lithium metal has typically been paired with a standard NMC cathode. US startup Lavle is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rechargenews.com/transition/double-the-energy-density-us-gigafactory-to-make-lithium-metal-batteries-to-beat-li-ion/2-1-895936">building a gigafactory to produce just such batteries</a>, expected to open in 2023. It is aiming first at markets where energy density is prized, like shipping and aviation.</p><p>Technically, though, lithium-metal is cathode agnostic. It could potentially work to enable rechargeability and better performance from cheaper cathode materials like zinc, aluminum, and sulfur. Based on pure materials costs, “the true least-cost system for a lithium-based, rechargeable battery is lithium metal and a sulfur cathode,” says Purdue University’s Rebecca Ciez.</p><p>Much of the R&D action, though, is around electrolytes. Lithium-metal batteries with liquid electrolytes are around (and still being <a target="_blank" href="https://news.mit.edu/2021/lithium-metal-batteries-nickel-oxide-0325">researched</a>), but it’s the <em>solid</em> electrolytes generating the most excitement.</p><p>Solid electrolytes (solid-state)</p><p>The liquid electrolytes used in most LIBs limit the kinds of electrodes that can be used and the shape of the battery cell; plus, they are often flammable, a safety hazard. Tons of research is underway on solid electrolytes that enable much higher energy density and can’t catch fire.  </p><p>Many researchers expect solid-state batteries to set off a whole new round of innovation. <a target="_blank" href="https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/rmi_breakthrough_batteries.pdf">RMI writes</a>, “several solid-state companies are targeting 2024–2025 for initial EV commercial lines, but demonstrations would likely happen before then.” Companies with lithium-metal, solid-state batteries — like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/solid-powers-high-energy-automotive-scale-all-solid-state-batteries-surpass-commercial-lithium-ion-energy-densities-301190450.html">Solid Power</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.canarymedia.com/articles/quantumscapes-billion-dollar-battery-experiment/">QuantumScape</a> — have received huge investments from automakers and investors like Bill Gates. </p><p>Nonetheless, for all the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.torquenews.com/8113/3-ways-solid-state-battery-technology-will-change-automotive-industry">hype</a>, there is a considerable strain of skepticism about solid-state. The EV company Fisker, after years of big promises, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/26/22279995/fisker-inc-electric-vehicle-interview-solid-state-batteries-ocean-suv-spac">abandoned solid-state entirely</a> earlier this year. “It’s the kind of technology where, when you feel like you’re 90 percent there, you’re almost there,” founder Henrik Fisker <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/26/22279995/fisker-inc-electric-vehicle-interview-solid-state-batteries-ocean-suv-spac">told the Verge</a>, “until you realize the last 10 percent is much more difficult than the first 90.”</p><p>“The cost and safety of current lithium-ion tech is improving so rapidly that a technology that's 10 years away, in [Fisker’s] estimation, is just not worthy of pursuit,” says Roberts. “At the end of the day, energy density is just not critical in a lot of applications.”</p><p>Schick is blunt: “None of the solid-state lithium batteries are on track to do anything that anybody cares about.”</p><p>“While there are technical reasons why this technology appears to be the holy grail of batteries,” <a target="_blank" href="https://silanano.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/The-Future-of-Energy-Storage.pdf">writes SILA Nanotechnologies</a>, “the reality is that even if the technology works (and that is a big ‘if’ after 40 years of development) it is unlikely to find more than niche opportunities in the market.” (Read <a target="_blank" href="https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/us-storage-companies-quietly-grow-bets-on-solid-state-batteries">Jason Deign on the current solid-state market</a>.)</p><p>Let’s call this one an important Maybe.</p><p>Lithium titanium oxide (LTO) </p><p>LTO batteries have lithium-titanate nanocrystals coating the anode, which increases surface area and allows for many more electrons to be released much faster than graphite. Consequently, they have incredibly high power density (they can release energy quickly) and can recharge faster than any other LIB. They also have high cycle life and high recharging efficiency.</p><p>They are lower voltage than conventional LIBs and thus have lower energy density, but because of this they are also extremely safe to operate. </p><p>“The performance characteristics are amazing,” says Roberts, “but it's just crazy expensive.”</p><p>For now, LTOs are used in some EVs and smaller applications like e-bikes. If they come down in price, they could find other niches where power density is important, like industrial machinery.</p><p>Lithium-air (Li-air)</p><p>Out toward the research frontier is Li-air, which uses lithium metal as the anode, a variety of materials as the electrolyte (that’s where research is most intensive), and as the cathode … air. Yes, air. Lithium exchanges electrons and ions with the air, through the electrolyte. Wacky.</p><p>Because it jettisons the entire weight of the cathode — air is quite light — Li-air has incredibly high specific energy (energy per unit of weight), theoretically as high as the specific energy of gasoline. In practice, only a fraction of that potential has been demonstrated, but even that fraction is about five times the specific energy of conventional LIBs.</p><p>All sorts of improvements in electrolytes, cycle life, and scalability will be needed before Li-air will become practical, but in terms of 2030 dark horses, this is one to watch.</p><p>So that’s a review of the lithium-based battery chemistries jockeying for position in a trillion-plus-dollar market. </p><p>In my next post, I’ll look at a few non-lithium-based chemistries that are hoping to capture some of these niches — zinc and flow and liquid metal, oh my. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-ongoing-battle-among-lithium</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:35019451</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 2021 16:00:52 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/35019451/ca4a251c3c5550a9bef233ce31e45687.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1447</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/35019451/675af05ed2fb949e30b1ca322f8d92f2.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A primer on lithium-ion batteries: how they work and how they are changing]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>(If you don’t want to read, you can listen. Just click play above.)</em></p><p>Greetings! Welcome back to Battery Week here at Volts. In my last post, I went over <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/its-time-to-get-charged-up-for-battery">why lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) are so important</a> to decarbonizing both transportation and the electricity sector. </p><p>Next week, we’re going to get into the nuts and bolts of different kinds of LIBs, to see how different chemistries offer different kinds of performance and are competing for different market niches.</p><p>Before that, though, it’s worth the time to do a little review of battery basics. If you’re like me-a-month-ago, you probably have a hazy understanding at best of the structure of batteries and the processes involved in running them.</p><p>I’m not going to get into any complicated chemistry — believe me, no one wants that — but I thought it would be helpful later, when we get into the competition within battery markets, to have some rudimentary terms and concepts clear in our heads.</p><p>Batteries 101</p><p>F’ing batteries, how do they work?</p><p>As the name suggests, electrochemical batteries store energy via chemical reaction. Discharging the battery involves a chemical reaction that produces electrons; recharging the battery involves a chemical reaction that stores electrons.</p><p>The basic unit of the electrochemical battery is the cell. In the cell, two electrodes — negative (anode) and positive (cathode) — are separated by an electrolyte. </p><p>When the anode and cathode are connected in a circuit, two things happen.</p><p>1. Negatively charged electrons flow from the former to the latter, generating <em>power</em>. The amount of power is determined by two factors: </p><p>* <em>current</em>, the number of electrons traveling in a given circuit, and</p><p>* <em>voltage</em>, the force with which the electrons are traveling.</p><p>Power = current X voltage. It’s like a river: the force exerted by the water will depend on how much there is and how fast it’s moving. You can get the same force with less water if it moves faster, or with slower water if there’s more of it. Similarly, you can get the same power with less current if you have more voltage, and vice versa.</p><p>2. The anode releases positively charged ions into the electrolyte, to balance the reaction, and the cathode absorbs a commensurate amount. (Some batteries have a thin semi-permeable barrier within the electrolyte to regulate the flow of ions.) </p><p>Recharging a battery basically involves reversing the reaction, returning the electrons and the ions to the anode.</p><p>The anode will be a material that gives up electrons easily in chemical reaction with the electrolyte. The cathode will be a material eager to absorb them. The propensity to shed/absorb electrons is known as <em>standard potential</em>, and the difference in standard potential between the anode and cathode will determine the battery’s total electrical potential. The bigger the difference, the more potential.</p><p>The whole game of battery design and development is to find a combination of anode, cathode, and electrolyte that performs well along a broad set of criteria — holds a lot of energy, releases energy quickly, operates safely, lasts a long time, is cheap, etc. </p><p>The tragedy of battery development is that there are always trade-offs. High performance on one criterion generally means lower performance on another. Optimize for holding more energy and you limit how quickly energy can be released; optimize for safety and you limit energy density; and so on. </p><p>Battery development has seen dozens of chemistries come and go, but four have stuck and scaled to mass-market size: lead acid, nickel cadmium (Ni-Cd), nickel metal hydride (NiMH), and lithium-ion (Li-ion).</p><p>LIBs have hit on a combination of anode, cathode, and electrolyte that performs well enough along several criteria (especially cost) to work for most short-duration applications today. They dominate consumer electronics, electric passenger vehicles, and short-duration grid-scale storage, and are expanding in other markets as well (though lead-acid batteries remain a $45 billion global market). They have gotten very cheap and a large-scale manufacturing capacity has grown up around them.</p><p>Let’s take a closer look at LIBs.</p><p>Lithium-ion batteries 101</p><p>LIBs have been around in commercial form since the early 1990s, though obviously they’ve improved quite a bit since then. </p><p>Today’s most common and popular LIBs use graphite (carbon) as the anode, a lithium compound as the cathode, and some organic goo as an electrolyte. They boast two key advantages over prior battery chemistries.</p><p>First, they need very little electrolyte. LIBs are what’s known as “intercalation” batteries, which means the same lithium ions nestled (intercalated) in the structure of the anode transfer to be intercalated in the cathode during discharge. The electrolyte only has to serve as a conduit; it doesn’t have to store many ions. Consequently, the cell doesn’t need much of it. Saving on electrolyte saves space and weight. (Bonus: the process is almost perfectly reversible, which gives LIBs their high cycle life.) </p><p>Second, LIBs squeeze lots of energy into a small space. Lithium is the lightest metal (at the upper left corner of the periodic table) and extremely energy-dense, so LIB cells can work with electrodes 0.1 millimeters thick. (Compare lead-acid electrodes, which are several millimeters thick.) This also makes LIBs smaller and lighter. </p><p>Because they are lightweight and high energy density, LIBs got their initial foothold in small electronic devices, phones and laptops and the like. They scaled up quickly to run handheld power tools and lawnmowers and then completely took over electric vehicles. Recently they’ve scaled up further to create home storage batteries and giant stationary battery arrays for grid storage. </p><p>It’s worth noting that even the biggest LIB installation is just stacks upon stacks of cells, like Legos. LIBs are extremely modular — they can be scaled precisely to need.</p><p>LIB manufacturing</p><p>There are <a target="_blank" href="https://batteryuniversity.com/learn/article/types_of_battery_cells">a number of ways of manufacturing LIB cells</a> — button cells, pouch cells, prismatic cells — but the most common for portable and EV applications is the cylindrical cell. Think of it like a jelly roll. A super-thin metal anode is coated with a film (usually graphite). Then a super-thin separator is laid on top. Then a super-thin metal cathode coated with a film (usually some lithium compound) is laid on top of that. Several layers are stacked this way, and then the whole thing is rolled up and packed into a cylinder. Before the cylinder is capped, electrolyte goop is injected to infuse between the layers.</p><p>Cells are then clustered together into modules, which are in turn clustered together into packs.</p><p>There’s a whole active area of LIB innovation around cell design. Tesla recently debuted a <a target="_blank" href="https://electrek.co/2020/12/27/tesla-tsla-4680-battery-cell-produced-panasonic-report/">new, bigger cylindrical cell</a>, the 4680 (46 millimeters wide, 80 mm tall), with improved … everything — energy, range, and power. </p><p>Tesla is also putting these cells together into <a target="_blank" href="https://electrek.co/2021/01/19/tesla-structural-battery-pack-first-picture/">packs that form part of the structure of their vehicles</a>, which will reduce overall weight and complexity. </p><p>I’m not going to get into LIB manufacturing innovation too much, other than to note there’s a lot going on there. </p><p>The manufacturing techniques that produce LIBs are being continuously refined, a process that is accelerated by scale. <a target="_blank" href="https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/rmi_breakthrough_batteries.pdf">According to RMI</a>, “lithium-ion battery suppliers are poised to reach at least 1,330 GWh of combined annual manufacturing capacity by 2023.” According to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/blog/top-electric-vehicle-markets-dominate-lithium-ion-battery-capacity-growth">S&P Global</a>, “global LIB capacity is set to increase 218% between 2020 and 2025.” That’s a lot of scale. </p><p>The main thing to take from the boom in LIB manufacturing is that any competitor to LIBs will need to take advantage of existing manufacturing processes. “The way these battery factories are building up now,” says Dan Steingart, a materials scientist and co-director of Columbia University’s Electrochemical Energy Center, “they’re so capital-intensive that whatever chemistries come next will be produced and manufactured in such a way that they leverage existing infrastructure if at all possible.”</p><p>This will be important later; some LIB competitors can slipstream into existing manufacturing and some can’t.</p><p>For Battery Week, I’m going to focus less on manufacturing (and disposal) and more on the battery chemistries themselves — which ones are dominating and which have a chance of catching on.</p><p>Li-ion is a family of battery chemistries</p><p>LIBs are not a singular thing, but a family. They have in common that they use lithium in either the cathode or anode and exchange charged lithium ions.</p><p>This leaves quite a bit of room for different chemistries. There are many types of lithium compounds, many choices of anode or cathode materials to pair with them, and many choices of electrolytes. </p><p>That yields a very large matrix of possible combinations and chemistries, each with its different performance characteristics (and, sigh, acronym). We’re not going to cover all of them, though —  even I have my limits. We’ll just hit some of the most-discussed alternatives. </p><p>The most common LIB chemistries used today are lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC) and lithium nickel cobalt aluminum (NCA), which use compounds of those metals as the cathode. Lithium and nickel turn out to be a knockout combo — incredibly light and energy-dense. Nonetheless, there are others. </p><p>Here’s a list of the LIB chemistries we will at least touch on starting in my next post:</p><p>* lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NMC cathode)</p><p>* lithium nickel cobalt aluminum (NCA cathode)</p><p>* lithium ferro phosphate (LFP cathode)</p><p>* lithium manganese oxide (LMO cathode) and lithium manganese nickel oxide (LMNO cathode)</p><p>* lithium sulfur (Li-S, sulfur cathode)</p><p>* lithium metal (anode) and solid state</p><p>* lithium titanate (LTO anode)</p><p>* lithium air (Li-air, lithium anode)</p><p>Why bother with any of these alternatives? Why not just stick to NMC and NCA? </p><p>There are two sources of pressure on the industry to diversify. </p><p>LIBs face pressure to diversify performance </p><p>The first is performance. Most LIB innovation to date has focused on energy density, for passenger EVs. In some applications, though, like home energy storage or fleet vehicles, energy density matters less than safety and cost. As use cases diversify, so do performance demands. </p><p>With that in mind, let’s take a quick look at the various metrics used to judge battery performance. <a target="_blank" href="https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/rmi_breakthrough_batteries.pdf">RMI uses eight</a>:</p><p>* <strong>energy density (Wh/L):</strong> energy per unit of volume, or more prosaically, energy relative to space occupied, sometimes called “volumetric energy density”;</p><p>* <strong>specific energy (Wh/kg):</strong> energy per unit of weight, sometimes called “gravimetric energy density”;</p><p>* <strong>power cost ($/kW):</strong> cost per unit of power output (to return to our river analogy: cost per unit of force the river is capable of exerting at its peak);</p><p>* <strong>energy cost ($/kWh):</strong> cost per unit of energy output (the amount of force exerted by the river over an hour);</p><p>* <strong>cycle life:</strong> the number of times a battery can discharge and recharge before it falls below some threshold of capacity (usually set at 80 percent) due to degradation;</p><p>* <strong>fast charge:</strong> how fast the battery can charge, i.e., how fast it can accept power;</p><p>* <strong>safety:</strong> some batteries, particularly those with cobalt, suffer from “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/chemistry/thermal-runaway">thermal runaway</a>,” which means if one cell goes haywire and heats up, it heats up the next one, and so on in a self-reinforcing cycle that results in fires and battery recalls;</p><p>* <strong>temperature range:</strong> the range of temperatures in which a battery can effectively operate. </p><p>As I said, it’s possible to optimize for one or a small set of these, but doing so inevitably involves trade-offs in others. </p><p>This graphic from RMI compares some LIB chemistries along all these axes. The dark green lines are current performance and the light green is highest theoretically achievable level:</p><p>As you can see, different chemistries excel on different metrics and will target different applications.</p><p>LIBs face pressure to diversify materials</p><p>Cobalt, used in standard NMC and NCA chemistries, is highly toxic, comes almost entirely from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and is mined amidst <a target="_blank" href="https://ensia.com/features/cobalt-sustainability-batteries/">terrible human rights abuses</a>. <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/lithium-batteries-environment-impact">Lithium</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.mining.com/as-demand-for-nickel-grows-so-do-environmental-concerns-report/">nickel</a> are fairly nasty too, and may run into supply constraints as the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43246-020-00095-x">market grows</a> (nickel, in particular, is a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.bbc.com/news/business-56288781">source of current stress</a>). </p><p>There’s lots of innovation underway to reduce the social and environmental impacts of materials mining, and increase supply, but, as we will see next week, there are also competing battery chemistries that eschew these problematic materials entirely.</p><p>Smart manufacturers like Tesla are diversifying their battery lines in anticipation of supply issues, trying to evolve away from cobalt and secure a steady domestic supply of lithium and nickel. (<a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-coolest-parts-of-bidens-expansive">Biden’s infrastructure plan</a>, which aims to kickstart a domestic EV supply chain, could help.)</p><p>Some battery diversity will happen, the question is how much</p><p>You can find people in the battery field who stress that conventional LIBs have too great a head start for anything else to catch up. In its <a target="_blank" href="https://silanano.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/The-Future-of-Energy-Storage.pdf">white paper on the future of LIBs</a>, SILA Nanotechnologies writes:</p><p>Technologies that claim they will replace Li-ion often grab headlines, but scale limitations make that impractical within a generation. It is for this reason that by 2050, while Li-ion will not constitute all of energy storage, it will be the most dominant chemistry by far, with most everything else relegated to niche applications. </p><p>Lou Schick, director of investments at Clean Energy Ventures, a venture capital firm that invests in clean technology projects, stressed to me the importance of scale and familiarity:</p><p>The only selection criteria for any project is, is it bankable? Can I get insurance for it? Is it consumer product? Any insurgent that wants to get to that state and is in a lab right now is 10 years away from being bankable, if they are very successful. So you're never catching up. And it has nothing to do with chemistry or physics.</p><p>You can find others who believe diversity is inevitable. “It's not like the Lord of the Rings, one ring to rule them all,” says Michael Burz, an engineer who founded and runs battery company EnZinc. “There will be different chemistries for different applications.”</p><p>Among the analysts more bullish on diversity are those at RMI, who wrote a report in 2019 called “<a target="_blank" href="https://rmi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/rmi_breakthrough_batteries.pdf">Breakthrough Batteries</a>” that surveyed possible competitors to conventional LIBs. They write:</p><p>Unlike the market development pathway for solar photovoltaic (PV) technology, battery R&D and manufacturing investment continue to pursue a wide range of chemistries, configurations, and battery types with performance attributes that are better suited to specific use cases.</p><p>RMI is convinced that other battery chemistries with other performance attributes will begin to find markets and scale up by the mid-2020s. </p><p>Chloe Holzinger, an energy storage analyst at the research firm IHS Markit, told me that diversity will be a market asset:</p><p>What we're going to see in the future is increasing diversity in all three of those areas [anode, cathode, and electrolyte]. Automakers will be able to take advantage of this diversity to make their portfolios robust against commodity price spikes and distinguish themselves from other automakers — “we're the only ones that provide this kind of battery.”</p><p>It’s possible that this disagreement amounts to less than it appears. Even skeptics agree that some competitors might find niches; the main disagreement seems to be over how fast that might happen and how big the niches will be. </p><p>After all, says Schick, in trillion-dollar markets, “if the market fragments by use case, the individual use cases can be quite enormous.”</p><p>Conventional LIBs have a huge head start, but the pressure to diversify may offer some hope to innovators both within the LIB family and outside it. </p><p>In my next post, I’ll get into some of that intra-family competition within LIBs, a space rife with ongoing innovation. </p><p>Mabel wishes everyone a Happy Spring. </p><p></p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-primer-on-lithium-ion-batteries</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:34016088</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 16 Apr 2021 16:00:27 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/34016088/32c806d49d9a01a32e5a0af4d162e2c5.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1320</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/34016088/243244cf8bae265cd70112c3edcbfa50.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why lithium-ion batteries are so important]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>People of Volts! At long last, Battery Week is here. It is time to get into batteries. Waaay into batteries.</p><p>Over the next few posts, I’m going to cover how lithium-ion batteries (LIBs) work and the different chemistries that are competing for market share, but I thought I would start off with a post about why I’m doing this — why batteries are important and why it’s worth understanding the variety and competition within the space.</p><p>Lithium-ion batteries are crucial to decarbonization in two important sectors</p><p>We know that the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21349200/climate-change-fossil-fuels-rewiring-america-electrify">fastest, cheapest way to decarbonize</a>, especially over the next 10 years, is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12938086/electrify-everything">clean electrification</a>: shifting the grid to carbon-free sources and shifting other sectors and energy services onto the grid. </p><p>LIBs are accelerating clean electrification in the two biggest-emitting sectors of the US economy, transportation and electricity. (Each is between a quarter and a third of emissions.)</p><p>First, they are colonizing the EV market and enabling ever-higher performance and range. The global EV market is on the front end of explosive growth:</p><p>Researchers at Deloitte <a target="_blank" href="https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/focus/future-of-mobility/electric-vehicle-trends-2030.html">expect growth to accelerate through 2030</a>:</p><p>As BloombergNEF analysts show in their “<a target="_blank" href="https://bnef.turtl.co/story/evo-2020/page/1?teaser=yes">Electric Vehicle Outlook 2030</a>,” it’s not just passenger EVs, either. The fastest growing EV segment will be buses, followed by scooters. </p><p>The global market for EV batteries alone is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rootsanalysis.com/reports/view_document/automotive-li-ion-batteries-market/273.html">expected to hit almost a trillion dollars by 2030</a>. Sustaining that growth is going to require lots and lots of new batteries. The more energy-dense, cheap, and safe LIBs can get, the faster the electrification of transportation will happen.</p><p>Second, LIBs are being used both for distributed, building-level energy storage and for large, grid-scale storage installations. As the grid shifts from firm, dispatchable sources of energy like coal and gas to variable, weather-dependent sources like sun and wind, it will need more storage to balance things out and stay stable. Batteries can help at the grid level (they can even <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-two-more-ideas">serve as transmission assets</a>) and they can serve local resilience at the building and community level.  </p><p>Overall, the research firm <a target="_blank" href="https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/global-energy-storage-capacity-to-grow-at-cagr-of-31-to-2030/">Wood Mackenzie expects</a> the global storage market to grow at an average of 31 percent a year over the coming decade, reaching 741 gigawatt-hours of cumulative capacity by 2030.</p><p>The more energy-dense, cheap, and safe LIBs can get, the faster storage will be infused throughout the grid and the more renewable energy the grid will be able to integrate. </p><p>All together, here’s what the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2020/12/f81/Energy%20Storage%20Market%20Report%202020_0.pdf">Department of Energy projects</a> for the global energy storage market through 2030:</p><p>As this graph shows, the vast bulk of the demand for batteries is going to come from transportation, meaning EVs of various kinds. Whatever is used for EVs is probably going to end up getting so cheap, just from scale, that it dominates energy storage as well.</p><p>There’s one other cool aspect of batteries that gets too little attention. Storing substantial amounts of electricity for cheap is a relatively new thing in human affairs. We are only just now beginning to explore what can be done with it. What’s happened in the relatively short history of lithium-ion batteries is that, as they get cheaper and more powerful, <em>we find new uses for them</em>. </p><p>Way back in 2015, energy analyst Ramez Naam called this the “<a target="_blank" href="https://rameznaam.com/2015/04/14/energy-storage-about-to-get-big-and-cheap/">energy storage virtuous cycle</a>.” </p><p>Lithium-ion batteries can do more and more stuff</p><p>There’s a reason why, in 2019, the three chemists behind the initial development of lithium-ion technology <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/chemistry/2019/press-release/">won the Nobel Prize in chemistry</a>. LIBs boast incredibly high energy density and specific energy, which is to say, they cram lots of oomph into a small, lightweight package, and they are capable of cycling many more times than their predecessors. </p><p>The first LIBs, commercially introduced in the early 1990s, were expensive, but found a market foothold in small electronic devices — phones, laptops, camcorders — where energy density is at a premium. They have since all but completely taken over the consumer electronics market. </p><p>As manufacturing scale grew, prices fell and more uses opened up: power tools, lawnmowers, scooters. Scale grew more, prices fell more, and LIBs <a target="_blank" href="https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acsenergylett.0c02584">displaced other chemistries as the top choice for EVs</a>. </p><p>Especially in recent years, the growth (and anticipated growth) in the EV market has driven an enormous surge of public and private investment to LIBs, with dramatic effects on prices. According to <a target="_blank" href="https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-pack-prices-cited-below-100-kwh-for-the-first-time-in-2020-while-market-average-sits-at-137-kwh/">recent research</a> by BNEF, “lithium-ion battery pack prices, which were above $1,100 per kilowatt-hour in 2010, have fallen 89% in real terms to $137/kWh in 2020. By 2023, average prices will be close to $100/kWh.” (It wasn’t that long ago that most experts agreed $100/kWh was an impossible target.)</p><p>And so the cycle continues. Prices fall and <a target="_blank" href="https://relionbattery.com/blog/the-seven-top-uses-for-rechargeable-lithium-ion-batteries">more new uses open up</a>: big trucks, buses, airplanes, data centers, distributed energy storage, and large-scale grid-storage installations. From BNEF:</p><p>BNEF’s analysis suggests that cheaper batteries can be used in more and more applications. These include energy shifting (moving in time the dispatch of electricity to the grid, often from times of excess solar and wind generation), peaking in the bulk power system (to deal with demand spikes), as well as for customers looking to save on their energy bills by buying electricity at cheap hours and using it later.</p><p>Experts generally agree that LIBs are going to hit limits, even if it’s just the base price of raw materials, before they become economical for long-duration grid storage. They are being installed for 4-6 hour storage, sometimes 8-hour, and may some day even aspire to 12-hour, but beyond that — the weekly or even seasonal storage a renewables-based grid will need — some other technology or technologies will have to step in. (I’ll likely do a separate post on long-duration storage.)</p><p>Nonetheless, continued scaling will ensure that LIBs get even cheaper. <a target="_blank" href="https://silanano.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/The-Future-of-Energy-Storage.pdf">Some analysts</a> believe that, with foreseeable improvements in LIB chemistry, prices could hit $40 or even $30/kWh in coming decades. We simply don’t know yet what can be done with storage that cheap. </p><p>To take one example, if energy storage gets cheap enough to become an economically trivial addition to building construction/renovations, it will eventually be ubiquitous at the local level, and the benefits of ubiquitous, networked local energy are … well, hard to predict. We know that it would protect vulnerable populations through blackouts like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/lessons-from-the-texas-mess">those in Texas</a> or <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/10/16/20910947/climate-change-wildfires-california-2019-blackouts">California</a> over the last year. But it could do much more.</p><p>Cheap batteries could open up uses we haven’t even envisioned yet. What sorts of urban mobility vehicles, drones, planes, or research outposts could we power? What kinds of ships or trains could we electrify? How could increasingly cheap, ubiquitous storage be coupled with increasingly cheap, ubiquitous solar energy? </p><p>We don’t know yet. But we’re going to see some cool s**t over the next few years. Batteries have the potential to change our ordinary lived experience in myriad ways. It’s worth the time to understand what’s driving their development and where they might go.</p><p>So here’s the question that is driving Battery Week: are LIBs going to be to energy storage what solar PV panels are to solar electricity?</p><p>By way of concluding, let me briefly explain what I mean by that.</p><p>Solar panels got so cheap, so fast, they swamped all competitors</p><p>By “solar panels,” I’m referring to the standard kind — boring old crystalline silicon photovoltaic panels, the kind you see on roofs these days, which I will henceforth just call “PV.” </p><p>Thanks to key early US research and development, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.futurepolicy.org/climate-stability/renewable-energies/the-german-feed-in-tariff/">German feed-in tariffs</a> (which subsidized homeowners to put panels on their roofs), and a massive Chinese manufacturing boom, PV has received an enormous, extended push in the last several decades. As the scale has grown, the price has dropped — a whopping 99 percent in the last 40 years.</p><p>PV got so cheap that it has simply steamrolled all competitors. Back in the ‘00s, even after Obama won and was putting together his stimulus bill, multiple solar technologies were in vigorous development: thin-film solar, concentrated solar power (CSP), building-integrated solar, multi-junction solar, all sorts of exotic stuff … there was even this one cool company called Solyndra that made cylindrical solar PV tubes.</p><p>There were boosters of all these technologies who could tell you chapter and verse about their advantages over plain old PV. They pulled in a lot of venture capital (and some government loan guarantees) making those pitches. But in the end, they and their funders underestimated PV’s one great advantage: it is dirt cheap and getting cheaper all the time. It’s virtually impossible for anything else to catch up.  </p><p>PV’s domination of the solar market has some energy analysts concerned, thinking that government ought to step in and encourage innovation and tech diversity in this area, in preparation for the day that PV reaches its limits and plateaus. (Varun Sivaram — a researcher at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy who was <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/dr-varun-sivaram-joins-biden-harris-administration-senior-adviser-special-presidential-envoy-climate">recently made</a> senior adviser to presidential climate envoy John Kerry — has a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cfr.org/book/taming-sun">whole book on this subject</a>.) </p><p>Some researchers disagree and think super-cheap PV will be good enough to get us where we need to go. Either way, it’s clear that without concerted government intervention, PV is going to dominate for the foreseeable future.</p><p>Is the same true of LIBs? Are they going to dominate in storage markets the way PV has dominated in solar electricity? </p><p>They already largely own both the EV and storage markets and have a substantial head start in manufacturing capacity and know-how. That head start is only going to get more daunting over the next decade. This is from a <a target="_blank" href="https://silanano.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/The-Future-of-Energy-Storage.pdf">brief on the future of LIBs</a> by a company called SILA Nanotechnologies:</p><p>Before Tesla was founded, Li-ion batteries were almost exclusively used in consumer electronics — mainly laptops and cell phones. At the time of the launch of the Tesla Roadster in 2008, the total global Li-ion manufacturing capacity was approximately 20 GWh per year. By 2030, we expect over 2,000 GWh of annual production capacity based on already announced plans by cell manufacturers.</p><p>That would be 100X growth in 22 years and a hell of a head of steam for any competitor to take on. </p><p>“It would be unwise to assume ‘conventional’ LIBs are approaching the end of their era,” concluded a recent <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-19991-4">comprehensive review in </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-19991-4"><em>Nature Communications</em></a><em>.</em> “[M]any engineering and chemistry approaches are still available to improve their performance.”</p><p>Nonetheless, LIBs do face restraining pressures, especially materials and safety concerns, which we’ll get into later. They could hit speed bumps. And when you’re talking about trillion-plus-dollar markets, even a niche could be worth billions. Will competitors be able to get a foothold? It’s an enormous prize with more researchers and entrepreneurs chasing it every day. </p><p>That’s what we’ll be exploring during Battery Week. Next up: a primer on how lithium-ion batteries work!</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/its-time-to-get-charged-up-for-battery</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:34857455</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 14 Apr 2021 16:00:42 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/34857455/4333056a59dd987615efe6448337eca8.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>892</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/34857455/a97e9026565f65343d33154e8c3da286.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Biden's tax plan goes after the little fossil fuel subsidies, but not the big ones]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>(If you’d rather listen than read, just click play above.)</em></p><p>President Joe Biden has released <a target="_blank" href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/MadeInAmericaTaxPlan_Report.pdf">the tax plan</a> that is meant to pay for his <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-coolest-parts-of-bidens-expansive">$2+ trillion infrastructure plan</a>. </p><p>You can read <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/07/business/economy/tax-plan-biden.html?action=click&#38;module=RelatedLinks&#38;pgtype=Article">the New York Times</a> for a full breakdown. The bulk of the revenue will come from a set of changes to corporate tax law, raising the corporate tax rate from 21 to 28 percent, imposing a minimum tax on global profits, and discouraging offshore tax havens.</p><p>All that stuff is great. I just want to say a few quick things about one of the provisions, which would <a target="_blank" href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-treasury-tax-energy/biden-tax-plan-replaces-u-s-fossil-fuel-subsidies-with-clean-energy-incentives-idUSKBN2BU2HL">roll back various fossil fuel subsidies in the tax code</a>. </p><p>In one sense, this is cool, and a big deal insofar as Democrats can actually do it — they’ve been trying for years, to no end. </p><p>But in another sense, it reveals that the hue and cry over fossil fuel subsidies in the US is somewhat of a tempest in a teapot, more a political symbol than a real source of revenue or decarbonization.</p><p>Direct US fossil fuel subsidies aren’t that big in the grand scheme of things</p><p>The administration projects that closing oil and gas tax loopholes will raise $35 billion over the coming decade.</p><p>That’s 1.4 percent of Biden’s $2.5 trillion in tax-plan revenue. </p><p>A <a target="_blank" href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/MadeInAmericaTaxPlan_Report.pdf">Treasury Department report</a> from the administration says: “The main impact would be on oil and gas company profits. Research suggests little impact on gasoline or energy prices for U.S. consumers and little impact on our energy security.” (It cites <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w22537">this study</a>.)</p><p>There are two reasons the changes would have “little impact on gasoline or energy prices.” The first is that oil is a globally traded commodity, with prices set globally — a US company can’t raise its prices without losing out on the global market. So it eats any extra cost as slightly lower profits.</p><p>But the second is that $35 billion over 10 years just isn’t that much money. Even in 2020, a truly shitty year for US oil companies, Exxon made <a target="_blank" href="https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/news/2021/02/02/exxon-mobil-cuts-spending-2020-earnings.html">revenues of $181 billion</a>. That was down 31.5 percent from $265 billion in 2019. For companies with revenues in the hundreds of billions, experiencing market swings of $85 billion a year, an extra $3.5 billion a year spread out over the whole sector just isn’t going to register much.</p><p>Last year, Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.) and Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) introduced the “<a target="_blank" href="https://omar.house.gov/media/press-releases/omar-sanders-merkley-markey-barrag-n-introduce-bill-end-corporate-handouts">End Polluter Welfare Act</a>,” which takes a much more expansive view of what counts as a fossil fuel subsidy and pulls together $15 billion a year in tax changes. That would be $150 billion over the next 10 years — 6 percent of the revenue Biden’s plan will raise. </p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/10/6/16428458/us-energy-coal-oil-subsidies">This even-more-aggressive study from Oil Change International</a> found $20 billion a year in subsidies, though the oil and gas industry hotly contests some of the choices it made.)</p><p>The point is, to get to real revenue, you have to bring in indirect fossil fuel subsidies.</p><p>The big fossil fuel subsidies are the externalities</p><p>When Greenpeace <a target="_blank" href="https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/news/bidens-tax-plan-comes-up-short-on-fossil-fuel-subsidies-greenpeace-response/">says</a> that US fossil fuel companies get $62 billion a year in subsidies, it refers to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.pnas.org/content/118/14/e2011969118">this study</a>, which examines what it would take to “correct market failures brought about by climate change, adverse health effects from local pollution, and inefficient transportation.”</p><p>In other words, the study tallies up the oil and gas industry’s externalities, the costs it imposes on society that are not reflected in market prices. (And it doesn’t even include <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/9/21/17885832/oil-subsidies-military-protection-supplies-safe">the costs of defending global oil supply</a>, which are substantial.)</p><p>Whether it is fair or accurate to call these unpaid costs “subsidies” is largely a matter of semantics, or, worse, metaphysics, but it doesn’t really matter. Fossil fuel companies don’t pay the costs; other people do. </p><p>A <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2019/5/17/18624740/fossil-fuel-subsidies-climate-imf">2017 International Monetary Fund study</a> pegged the global value of direct and indirect fossil fuel subsidies at $5.2 trillion — that’s 6.4 percent of global GDP.</p><p>Of course, making fossil fuel companies pay those costs would involve more than modest tax code tweaks. It would involve a new carbon tax. </p><p>How much could that raise? A <a target="_blank" href="https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/WP-115.pdf">2017 study by the Treasury Department</a> modeled a carbon tax that starts at $49 per metric ton in 2019 and rises to $70 per metric ton in 2028 (not far out of line with some popular carbon tax proposals). Over the course of that 10 years, the tax would raise $2.2 trillion in revenue — just about enough to fund Biden’s infrastructure plan!</p><p>It’s a perfect match. It’s notable, then, that no one on either side of the aisle has proposed it, despite an ongoing hunt for revenue. Carbon tax people are always saying it has bipartisan appeal, but in practice, it seems bipartisan in that both parties want nothing to do with it.</p><p>Anyway, Biden’s run at fossil fuel subsidies (the latest in a long line from Dems) isn’t really about revenue.</p><p>This story is mostly about political power and social license</p><p>In every article you read about the portion of Biden’s plan that goes after fossil fuel subsidies, you will see some version of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/08/business/dealbook/biden-corporate-taxes.html">this</a>: “Previous attempts to eliminate subsidies on oil and gas met with stiff industry and congressional opposition.”</p><p>Despite the fact that $35 billion over 10 years is relative chump change to the oil and gas industry, it fights any attempt to roll back these subsidies like a cornered polecat. It wants to protect its profits, but it also wants to establish that it still has clout in Congress. It has enjoyed these tax benefits for a long, long time, and giving them up would be a signal of its declining influence.</p><p>It’s good for Democratic presidents to keep thrusting this issue into the debate, if only to put Congress on record. It will probably fall out of this bill too, if the bill passes at all, but it will serve as something of a barometer on the pressure fossil fuel companies can mount, even in their battered state.</p><p>In the meantime, on this question as on all others, we await the judgment of our emperor and benefactor <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/22337863/joe-manchin-biden-climate-change-senate-clean-energy-standard">Joe Manchin</a>, long may He reign. </p><p>How it started:</p><p>How it’s going:</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/bidens-tax-plan-goes-after-direct</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:34934930</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 09 Apr 2021 16:00:08 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/34934930/a7d85e1bebe636714f1693c2ae9fdc39.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>502</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/34934930/011d6e90f57238059b22024ea34da5ac.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The coolest parts of Biden's expansive infrastructure plan]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Hey, everybody! President Joe Biden has unveiled his first infrastructure proposal and … hot damn. </p><p>The eight-year "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/">American Jobs Plan</a>" would spend $2.25 trillion on a huge range of  initiatives, from highways to the energy grid, water systems, airports, transit systems, broadband, energy R&D, and — paging a Sen. Joe Manchin — abandoned coal mine clean-up. </p><p>This is an amazing document. Yes, there’s stuff in it that I would take out (some highway spending) and stuff I would add (more transit spending). Yes, a serious transition to sustainability would probably take closer to $10 trillion. Yes, there’s a very good chance the plan gets cut or compromised on the way to passage, if it passes at all, which is far from certain. </p><p>Still. As <a target="_blank" href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/">presented by the Biden team</a>, it represents not only an enormous <em>total</em> investment, but some really <em>smart</em> investments, in areas where the positive knock-on effects for the clean energy transition could be enormous. There were some true-blue energy wonks involved in writing this thing.</p><p>I’ll just quickly go over the parts that are most exciting to me and then mention a couple of benefits that are getting underplayed.</p><p>Transportation</p><p>The plan would put $174 billion toward a plan to “win the EV market,” which is on the verge of enormous growth. Biden wants to create a domestic supply chain for batteries and EVs (something that is virtually nonexistent today) and domestic manufacturing capacity to make the EVs, all of which will create domestic jobs. </p><p>It would offer point-of-sale rebates to purchasers of domestic-made EVs, “while ensuring that these vehicles are affordable for all families and manufactured by workers with good jobs.” </p><p>It would offer grants and incentives to state and local governments and private businesses to install EV charging stations, with the goal of 500,000 up and running by 2030.</p><p>And I love this, though I wish it were much bigger: “Replace 50,000 diesel transit vehicles and electrify at least 20 percent of our yellow school bus fleet through a new Clean Buses for Kids Program at the Environmental Protection Agency, with support from the Department of Energy.” This will put us on “a path to 100 percent clean buses.”</p><p>I have sung the praises of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/10/24/16519364/electric-buses">electric city buses</a>; see Vox’s Kelsey Piper on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/8/23/20828842/bernie-sanders-electric-school-buses?fbclid=IwAR1VXIu5kMxnAxWXNjl1olMeGpdF-sg_0g7NLDuCiMDGJ4QKVg6r1kKbOsU">electric school buses</a>. Not only do they save money over time, but they generate immediate air quality benefits for some of the most vulnerable populations — kids and low-income and POC communities, who bear the brunt of diesel pollution. The benefits wildly outweigh the costs. (On the campaign trail, Bernie Sanders proposed $407 billion <em>just for electric buses</em>, which is more like it.)</p><p>Finally, oh, by the way: the plan “will utilize the vast tools of federal procurement to electrify the federal fleet, including the United States Postal Service.” Whaaat? </p><p>As Sarah Kaplan <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-solutions/2021/01/28/biden-federal-fleet-electric/">reported in The Washington Post</a> in January:</p><p>There are some 645,000 vehicles in the federal fleet. They include roughly 200,000 passenger vehicles, 78,517 heavy-duty trucks, 47,369 vans, 847 ambulances and three limousines.</p><p>That’s a lot of vehicles.</p><p>As for electrifying the 225,000 Postal Service vehicles, I have <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/4/22/21229132/usps-coronavirus-electrify-postal-trucks">written at great length</a> about what a fantastic idea that is. This part of the plan is honestly like a present to me. Thank you, Joe Biden.</p><p>It’s not all about cars and trucks, though. The plan also has $85 billion for public transit (“to modernize existing transit and help agencies expand their systems to meet rider demand”), which would double existing federal investment in transit, and at least $80 billion for rail (“to address Amtrak’s repair backlog; modernize the high traffic Northeast Corridor; improve existing corridors and connect new city pairs; and  enhance grant and loan programs that support passenger and freight rail safety, efficiency, and electrification.”)</p><p>As for transportation infrastructure, there’s $20 billion for “a new program that will reconnect neighborhoods cut off by historic investments and ensure new projects increase opportunity, advance racial equity and environmental justice, and promote affordable access” and $25 billion “for a dedicated fund to support ambitious projects that have tangible benefits to the regional or national economy but are too large or complex for existing funding programs.”</p><p>In my dream world I would spend much more on transit and rail, but this is a huge improvement over previous infrastructure bills, even from Democrats. </p><p>Transmission</p><p>Readers of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-everything-in">Transmission Month</a> know that long-distance transmission is very much needed for national decarbonization and currently very difficult to build. </p><p>The big news in the plan is that Sen. Martin Heinrich’s <a target="_blank" href="https://cleanenergygrid.org/aceg-commends-senator-heinrich-for-the-introduction-of-the-transmission-investment-tax-credit/">federal transmission investment tax credit</a> (ITC) made it in. The fact sheet doesn’t specify the size of the ITC, but Heinrich’s proposal is 30 percent. The idea is to spur “the buildout of at least 20 gigawatts of high-voltage capacity power lines and mobilize tens of billions in private capital off the sidelines.”</p><p>And remember my post on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-fortnight-burying-power">using existing rail and road rights-of-way to site long-distance transmission</a>? Get this: “President Biden’s plan will establish a new Grid Deployment Authority at the Department of Energy that allows for better leverage of existing rights-of-way – along roads and railways – and supports creative financing tools to spur additional high priority, high-voltage transmission lines.”</p><p>Hell yes. </p><p>Innovation</p><p>I have also <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21426920/climate-change-renewable-energy-solar-wind-innovation-green-new-deal">written a great deal</a> about the importance of concerted, well-funded clean-energy innovation policy. The US currently spends about $150 billion a year on R&D, of which about half goes to the Department of Defense and a paltry $8 billion goes to energy research. Biden’s plan calls for $180 billion of research money for the “technologies of the future.”</p><p>It would spend $50 billion on the National Science Foundation (NSF) to create a technology directorate that would coordinate advanced-tech research across agencies, $30 billion on R&D to spur job creation in rural areas, and $40 billion on upgrading research labs across the country. Half of that lab money would go to “Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) and other Minority Serving Institutions, including the creation of a new national lab focused on climate that will be affiliated with an HBCU.”</p><p>A climate lab in an HBCU is a nice touch. Good stuff.</p><p>Speaking of climate change, the plan would put $35 billion specifically toward tech research and innovation focused on the climate crisis, in part by creating an ARPA-C (modeled on <a target="_blank" href="https://arpa-e.energy.gov/">ARPA-E</a> and, before it, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.darpa.mil/">DARPA</a>) “to develop new methods for reducing emissions and building climate resilience.”</p><p>And the plan contains something for which every innovation scholar and expert has been advocating for years: funding for demonstration projects.</p><p>In addition to a $5 billion increase in funding for other climate-focused research, his plan will invest $15 billion in demonstration projects for climate R&D priorities, including utility-scale energy storage, carbon capture and storage, hydrogen, advanced nuclear, rare earth element separations, floating offshore wind, biofuel/bioproducts, quantum computing, and electric vehicles, as well as strengthening U.S. technological leadership in these areas in global markets.</p><p>And there are some other bits scattered throughout, like “ten pioneer facilities that demonstrate carbon capture retrofits for large steel, cement, and chemical production facilities, all while ensuring that overburdened communities are protected from increases in cumulative pollution.”</p><p>This investment in clean-energy innovation is long, long overdue, and something that every Democrat, including Manchin, at least claims to support. </p><p>Clean energy standard</p><p>Midway through one of the bullet points, almost as an aside, we get this:</p><p>President Biden will establish an Energy Efficiency and Clean Electricity Standard (EECES) aimed at cutting electricity bills and electricity pollution, increasing competition in the market, incentivizing more efficient use of existing infrastructure, and continuing to leverage the carbon pollution-free energy provided by existing sources like nuclear and hydropower.</p><p>This is rather cryptic given that <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/22337863/joe-manchin-biden-climate-change-senate-clean-energy-standard">a CES is a central part of Biden’s climate plan</a>. I’ve heard of clean electricity standards and efficiency standards, but I’ve never heard of an EECES and there’s not much here on how it would work or its targets. (The mention of nuclear and hydropower seems like a signal to lawmakers in, say, the Upper Midwest that they don’t need to be nervous.)</p><p>It’s good that this made it into the plan, but the lack of detail does cause one to wonder how much faith the administration has that it will survive the coming <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/22337863/joe-manchin-biden-climate-change-senate-clean-energy-standard">Manchin Bath</a>. </p><p>(Listen to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscast-how-to-decarbonize-the">my podcast with Dr. Leah Stokes and Sam Ricketts</a> on how to get a CES through reconciliation.)</p><p>Buildings and distributed energy</p><p>I have also written on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/3/20/18269356/green-new-deal-building-electrification-states-cities">the importance of decarbonizing buildings</a>. (I am old and have written about everything.) Biden’s plan would drop a whopping $213 billion on upgrading buildings.</p><p>The plan would “produce, preserve, and retrofit more than a million affordable, resilient, accessible, energy efficient, and electrified housing units” and “build and rehabilitate more than 500,000 homes for low- and middle-income homebuyers.”</p><p>It would also — my heart sings — create a competitive grant program to reward local jurisdictions that take steps to eliminate exclusionary zoning. (Read Sightline’s Dan Bertolet for more on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sightline.org/2016/04/20/how-exclusionary-zoning-robs-our-cities-of-their-best-qualities/">the evils of exclusionary zoning</a>.)</p><p>The plan has $27 billion for a Clean Energy and Sustainability Accelerator “to mobilize private investment into distributed energy resources; retrofits of residential, commercial and municipal buildings; and clean transportation.”</p><p>There’s $40 billion to improve public-housing infrastructure. There’s money to upgrade, modernize, and reduce the greenhouse gas emissions of schools ($100 billion), community colleges ($12 billion), child-care facilities ($25 billion), VA hospitals ($18 billion), and federal buildings ($10 billion). </p><p>All of that work on buildings creates lots and lots of high-skill domestic jobs that can’t be outsourced, while reducing energy bills for consumers.</p><p>So much more</p><p>I’ve only highlighted a handful of the dozens and dozens of provisions in the proposal. It extends the federal clean-energy tax credits by 10 years, aims for 100 percent broadband access, invests in resilience for vulnerable communities and ecosystems, creates hundreds of thousands of union jobs plugging orphan oil and gas wells, and on and on. </p><p>Much like the Covid recovery bill passed last month, the plan contains dozens of provisions and programs that, were they passed on their own, would count as major milestones. If even a substantial number of them make it through, this will be a historic achievement.</p><p>Biden’s job plan would have seismic direct effects on the US economy and people, but a couple of its less-discussed second-order effects are worth highlighting.</p><p>Reducing air pollution produces enormous progressive benefits</p><p>First, if Biden can kick-start a domestic EV industry the way Obama’s stimulus bill kick-started solar — if he can electrify the federal fleet, get hundreds of thousands of charging stations built, and put the electricity sector on a path to net-zero — he will have indirectly set in motion the greatest and most rapid reduction of US air pollution in generations.</p><p>As I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/8/12/21361498/climate-change-air-pollution-us-india-china-deaths">wrote last year on Vox</a>, all the recent science points in the same direction: air pollution, particularly smog, does much worse damage to health, at much lower exposure, than previously appreciated. The upshot of this new research is that a transition away from fossil fuels to clean energy <em>will pay for itself in proximate health benefits alone</em>, even setting aside reductions in future warming. </p><p>Similarly, though it will take some professional modeling to determine the exact level of pollution reductions Biden’s plan would produce, there’s a very good chance that it too would more than pay for itself in health benefits. </p><p>And, again, the impacts of air pollution are not equitably distributed. Low-income and minority communities are more likely to be located along highways or near polluting facilities. Children, the elderly, and those with disabilities are hardest hit. Reducing air pollution, especially from vehicles, is progressive, in both the economic and political senses of the term.</p><p>Cheap batteries will have spillover effects</p><p>Second, by pushing the shift to EVs and scaling up a domestic supply chain and manufacturing base, Biden’s plan will further accelerate the already vertiginous plunge in battery prices. </p><p>A recent <a target="_blank" href="https://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/articlelanding/2021/EE/D0EE02681F#!divAbstract">comprehensive study</a> found that lithium-ion batteries have fallen in price by 97 percent since their commercial introduction in 1991. As co-author Jessika Trancik of MIT <a target="_blank" href="https://news.mit.edu/2021/lithium-ion-battery-costs-0323">put it</a>: “lithium-ion battery technologies have improved in terms of their costs at rates that are comparable to solar energy technology, and specifically photovoltaic modules, which are often held up as the gold standard in clean energy innovation.”</p><p>Batteries’ movement down the cost curve can be accelerated by public policy, just as happened so many times for solar PV. Biden’s plan would put Americans to work making batteries cheaper. </p><p>The cheaper batteries get, the more uses they find for themselves: as home energy storage, reliable backup power for data centers, or large-scale grid storage. The more storage is distributed throughout the grid, the more stable the grid is. </p><p>Cheap storage is good for everyone. It’s difficult to predict all the knock-on effects, but I think it’s going to generate some cool surprises. </p><p>Biden’s plan faces a long, uncertain road</p><p>What Biden and the Democrats <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2021/3/10/22320350/stimulus-bill-covid-19-passes-house">pulled off with the Covid recovery bill</a> was something of a miracle. They held together and got a huge bill through Congress with remarkably little fuss, which never happens any more. </p><p>That moment, with its particular sense of urgency and necessity, has passed. Congress will inevitably spend a lot more time on this infrastructure bill. </p><p>Generally speaking, time is Democrats’ enemy. Every day that passes is a chance for right-wing media to fully polarize the issue and make the negotiations look ugly and contentious to the public. </p><p>Dems have to go through the motions of negotiating with Republicans, not because there’s any prospect of Republican cooperation (there isn’t), but because Joe Manchin’s political brand-building requires it, and nothing can pass without Manchin. </p><p>At some point (one hopes) it will become clear to everyone that Republicans are a lost cause and Dems must pass the bill through <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/5/28/18636759/climate-change-budget-reconciliation-democrats">reconciliation</a>, for which they only need 50 votes. </p><p>Then the only problem will be getting every single Democratic senator on board. Who knows what that will look like.</p><p>Pelosi says <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/03/31/us/biden-news-today/infrastructure-july-4-republicans-democrats">she wants to pass the bill by July 4</a>, but who knows how firm that deadline will prove. There are many twists and turns and setbacks ahead. </p><p>The very best-case scenario is that Manchin (perhaps with some group of “moderates”) picks a fight over a particular item — the exact structure of the taxes that will pay for the bill, or one of the spending areas — and theatrically wins it, getting some changes made. </p><p>Meanwhile … the rest of the enormous bill passes largely unremarked. That’s basically what happened with the Covid recovery bill.</p><p>If the bill passes at all, it won’t be exactly what Biden has proposed. Nonetheless, no matter what happens, it’s worth celebrating what Biden has done here. Within this expansive infrastructure package is a mini-Green New Deal, with large-scale spending targeted at just the areas energy wonks say could accelerate the transition to clean energy — all with a focus on equity and justice for vulnerable communities on the front lines of that transition.</p><p>If it passes in anything like its current form, it will be the most significant climate and energy legislation of my lifetime, by a wide margin. I’m going to allow myself a moment of excitement and hope. Don’t worry, I’m sure it will pass. </p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-coolest-parts-of-bidens-expansive</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:34577689</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 02 Apr 2021 16:00:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/34577689/684f05b18786ee76d3bc3f1b9d0881fc.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1358</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/34577689/82867f9029d0f88a0176a78550e7c006.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The most important job ahead for Democrats]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>(If you don’t want to read the post, click play above and I’ll read it to you.)</em></p><p>Hello, beloved readers and listeners! Today I’m going to make an argument that is very important to me: <strong>Democrats must pass substantial democracy reform before the 2022 elections</strong>. If Dems don’t get this done, the US is in for a long period of political darkness. Democracy in America could very well perish. Climate change will become unsolvable. Every goal progressives seek — taxing the rich, funding infrastructure, fixing immigration, boosting unions, you name it — will move out of reach. It is, I say with some risk of understatement, the most important thing in the world.</p><p>Let me try to explain why.</p><p>Biden’s 2020 victory temporarily arrested, but did not stop, the US slide toward minority rule</p><p>When Biden was elected in November, I felt a conflicting mass of emotions. Most of all, of course, was relief. It is no exaggeration to say that a second Trump term would have meant the end of the American experiment with democracy. </p><p>But alongside that relief was a persistent sense of dread. The larger context of the 2020 election is an ongoing process whereby America’s mostly white, rural, and suburban conservative minority — which hasn’t won the popular vote in a presidential election since 2004 — is gaining <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/1/30/20997046/constitution-electoral-college-senate-popular-vote-trump">greater and greater structural political advantages</a> each passing year. Republicans are <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/12/17/21011079/senate-bias-2020-data-for-progress">overrepresented in the Senate</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2021/1/11/22224700/electoral-college-joe-biden-donald-trump-bias-four-points-one-chart">overrepresented by the Electoral College</a>, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/videos/2019/10/17/20917852/gerrymander-hofeller-election-map">gerrymandered into safe House seats</a>, and busy <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/22307937/voting-rights-georgia-arizona-voting-by-mail-republican-absentee-donald-trump">passing voter suppression bills at the state level</a>. </p><p>What Dems needed in 2020 was commanding majorities in both houses and a few key state legislatures, enough to stop the next round of GOP gerrymandering and pass substantial democracy reform through Congress.</p><p>They got majorities, but, far from commanding, they are whisker thin, smaller in the House than in 2018. And Republicans maintained control of all the state governments <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/15/gerrymandering-republicans-map-charts-states">key to redistricting</a>. That makes Democrats’ job much, much more difficult.</p><p>Nonetheless, it remains the job. Getting Trump out of office was the first step, but it won’t mean anything in the mid- to long-term if Dems don’t repair democracy. Absent substantial structural reform, the most likely outcome remains the one that Matt Yglesias <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2015/3/2/8120063/american-democracy-doomed">predicted in 2015</a>: “America’s constitutional democracy is going to collapse.”</p><p>I would put it this way: <strong>Democrats either pass substantial democracy reform (including statehood for DC) through Congress in the next 18 months or they will lose one or both houses in 2022 and remain locked out of congressional majorities for a decade if not longer.</strong> </p><p>Without voting system reform, Dems are screwed in 2022</p><p>The most likely outcome of the 2022 elections is that Democrats lose their House majority. To keep it, they would have to defy both history and Republican gerrymandering.</p><p>Historically, midterm elections are a “shellacking” for the president’s party, as Obama (whose party lost 63 House seats in 2010) put it. With only two exceptions — Clinton Democrats in 1998 and Bush Republicans in 2002 — this has held true <a target="_blank" href="https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/data/seats-congress-gainedlost-the-presidents-party-mid-term-elections">all the way back to 1934</a>. </p><p>Even if they defy that historical trend, Democrats won’t be fighting on a level playing field. Because they retained control of the key state legislatures involved in redistricting, Republicans could win a House majority in 2022 <a target="_blank" href="https://cookpolitical.com/analysis/national/national-politics/will-redistricting-be-determinative-2022"><em>purely with new seats created by redistricting</em></a>, even if they don’t flip a single blue seat red. </p><p>To buck these trends and keep the House in 2022, Democrats will need not just the historic turnout that elected Biden, but more. It would take something of a miracle. </p><p>“If we replicate the GOP’s post-9/11, 2002 midterm performance, we have a chance,” political analyst David Shor <a target="_blank" href="https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/03/david-shor-2020-democrats-autopsy-hispanic-vote-midterms-trump-gop.html">told New York magazine’s Eric Levitz</a>.  “If we replicate the second-best presidential-party midterm from the past 40 years, we lose.”</p><p>The Senate will be <a target="_blank" href="https://news.ballotpedia.org/2021/02/11/the-daily-brew-an-early-look-at-the-2022-senate-elections/">more competitive in 2022</a>: out of 34 races, Republicans are defending 20 seats and Democrats 14. Nine of those races are considered competitive, roughly evenly divided between parties. </p><p>But it almost doesn’t matter: if Democrats lose the House, legislation of any substance will become impossible. And odds are getting increasingly stacked against Democrats in both houses, so it could be a long-ass time before they have Congress again. </p><p>Perhaps there’s some path to bipartisan democracy reform? Ha ha, no.</p><p>Republicans will fight democracy reform to the death</p><p>If either house of Congress goes to Republicans, any kind of positive voting reform becomes impossible. If they get unified control again, they are much more likely to pass national versions of the kind of targeted voter restrictions they are passing at the state level. </p><p>Democrats will never get a scrap of help from Republicans on democracy reform, only implacable, relentless opposition. Conservatives will fight it with everything they’ve got, for the same reason they fought it during Reconstruction or the Civil Rights era: to the extent voting in the US becomes easier, fairer, and more representative, they lose power. </p><p>The right has a congenial and enduring Supreme Court majority and a growing network of militias willing to use intimidation and the threat of violence against legislative activity they dislike, as they have in <a target="_blank" href="https://apnews.com/article/f320309a26ff4e36b0945954b03201e5">Oregon</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/apr/30/michigan-protests-coronavirus-lockdown-armed-capitol">Michigan</a> (oh, and the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2021/1/6/22217307/thousands-trump-supporters-stormed-us-capitol-evacuate">US Capitol</a>). They have shown no hesitation in using either.</p><p>Dems need to understand that Republicans will escalate the war over voting reform as far as they are able, full stop. It’s existential for them. </p><p>Passing democracy reform means doing the Manchin dance</p><p>With the current dysfunctional and distorted electoral system in place, this could be the last time Democrats hold the presidency and both houses of Congress for a decade or longer. That’s why it’s now or never on democracy reform.</p><p>Getting there will require a delicate dance. A lot of things have to line up.</p><p>My hopes for Democrats were dim going into 2021, but thus far Biden has been astonishingly effective. He led with a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/biden-is-blitzing">blitz of executive actions</a>, may get <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2021/3/11/22326478/biden-speech-covid-19-vaccine-may-adults">everyone vaccinated by May</a> (!), got most of his cabinet nominations approved, turbo-charged a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/recode/22311708/amazon-union-alabama-vote-explained">unionization drive in Alabama</a>, and just got a stimulus bill almost exactly the size he wanted — $1.9 trillion — <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2021/3/10/22320350/stimulus-bill-covid-19-passes-house">through Congress</a>. That bill contains state and local aid, extended (tax-free) unemployment benefits, a child allowance that could halve US child poverty, and loads more.</p><p>It’s a lot of concrete aid to a lot of people in a short period of time (exactly what I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/21724758/biden-transition-trump-polarized-climate-change-health-immigration">advised/hoped</a>). Biden has done all this while maintaining a low personal profile, giving Americans the peace from politics they needed. He remains resolutely boring as a public figure — no provocative tweets, no inserting himself in passing culture-war battles, no unnecessary theatrics. </p><p>A democracy-reform bill, though, can’t pass through <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-the-georgia-senate-wins-do-and">reconciliation</a> with a bare majority the way the Covid relief bill did. To pass it, Democrats will need to either scrap, reform, or otherwise bypass the filibuster. </p><p>The major figure in that drama is West Virginia Sen. Joe Manchin, who has also, I must begrudgingly admit, outperformed my expectations thus far. He kicked up a fuss around the stimulus bill — a fuss that sounds like it was <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/05/manchin-biden-covid-aid-plan-473963">almost entirely about personal pique</a> — but ultimately he signed on without fundamental changes. </p><p>More importantly, after saying nothing but harshly negative things about filibuster reform for months, Manchin threw a curveball last Sunday, when <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2021/3/7/22318145/joe-manchin-filibuster-reform">he expressed openness, not to killing the filibuster, but reforming it</a>. “If you want to make [filibustering] a little bit more painful — make them stand there and talk — I’m willing to look at any way we can,” he <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/MeetThePress/status/1368585404648144896">told</a><strong> </strong><em>Meet the Press</em> host Chuck Todd.</p><p>That’s only one small step toward filibuster reform — <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/08/politics/filibuster-democratic-reaction/index.html">many problems and challenges remain</a> — but it’s an important one. </p><p>Let’s say you wanted to interpret Manchin’s actions charitably. Perhaps he’s doing a dance, making loud noises about moderation and blocking Democrats and working across the aisle in order to play to his conservative constituents in West Virginia, while ultimately running cover for Biden’s extraordinarily ambitious agenda. </p><p>Voters, especially Democratic voters, love the optics of negotiation and compromise. Republicans have been incredibly effective at denying them those optics by refusing to compromise — it’s a way to ensure the Democratic agenda fails even as Democrats take the blame for not trying hard enough to be bipartisan.</p><p>In a sense, fighting and negotiating with conservative Dems like Manchin and Arizona Sen. Kyrsten Sinema provides voters (and political journalists) some of those optics, making it look like Biden has to shepherd his priorities past the watchful eye of skeptical moderates. It gives the public more confidence in the resulting legislation. (The Covid relief bill is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/10/politics/cnn-poll-biden-covid-relief-bill/index.html">enormously popular</a>.)</p><p>Perhaps Manchin knows all that and is supplying those optics on purpose. Perhaps he’s accumulating “moderate” credibility that he plans to spend on filibuster reform when the time is right. </p><p>I still don’t quite believe that — I’m suspicious of 12-dimensional-chess explanations in politics — but let’s just say there’s been no disconfirming evidence yet. The theory still fits the facts.</p><p>Manchin is now saying that he doesn’t want to use reconciliation for the big upcoming infrastructure bill. <a target="_blank" href="https://www.axios.com/joe-manchin-infrastructure-bill-c8408e99-17f3-4477-b5df-8e3d537c0bd9.html">Over on Axios</a>:</p><p>Asked if he believes it's possible to get 10 Republicans on the infrastructure package, which could yield the 60 votes needed under normal Senate rules, Manchin said: "I sure do."</p><p>Again, there’s no way to know if he actually believes this or if he’s just setting himself up to look like he tried, but … it’s definitely wrong. There is no world in which 10 Republican senators vote for a major Democratic bill, infrastructure or otherwise. The question is what Manchin will do when Republican support for Biden’s “Build Back Better” agenda doesn’t materialize. </p><p>Is there some demonstration of Republican obstinance that will drive Manchin to filibuster reform? If so, which bill might prompt it?</p><p>Every Democratic constituency, if it gets wind of the possibility of filibuster reform — or even one-time exemptions from the filibuster — will want its issue to be the test case. Key unions are even now <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/09/house-pro-act-labor-unions-474941">calling for filibuster reform</a> in order for the Senate to pass the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act that the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/22319838/house-passes-pro-act-unions">House just passed</a>. </p><p>The filibuster must fall for a democracy reform bill</p><p>But if the filibuster is to fall — or waver, or reform — it must do so in service of the bill <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/03/politics/house-democrats-hr1-vote/index.html">passed by the House earlier this month</a>: HR1, which would implement nationwide automatic voter registration, mandate that nonpartisan commissions handle all redistricting, mandate early voting and no-excuses absentee ballots, institute campaign finance and ethics reforms, and restore felon voting rights, among other things. </p><p>Yes, it would help Democrats electorally. According to Shor, comprehensive election reform would raise Dems’ chances of keeping the House in 2022 <em>threefold</em>.</p><p>But it would help Democrats because it would allow more people to vote, in a fairer and more equitable way. No Democrat should be apologetic about backing it. </p><p>I hope that wiser heads in the Democratic congressional caucus will be able to convince their colleagues, most notably Manchin and other Senate nostalgists, that <strong>democracy reform must get a vote</strong>. Even if Republicans want to filibuster it, the filibuster has to <em>end</em> at some point; debate must come to a close and there must be a real, old-fashioned, majority-wins vote. Democracy is too important to let arcane Senate procedure stand in the way. </p><p>There are other things Democrats should do on democracy reform as well, including statehood for DC and Puerto Rico (if the people of PR want it) and expanding the Supreme Court, but HR1 is the core.</p><p>“Basically, we have this small window right now to pass redistricting reform and create states,” Shor told Levitz. “And if we don’t use this window, we will almost certainly lose control of the federal government and not be in a position to pass laws again potentially for a decade.”</p><p>Let’s not forget that Republicans, led by the president, tried to overturn the results of the 2020 presidential election. They were prevented from doing so by a few key state Republican officials and judges with integrity. </p><p>Democrats should think about what will happen in the next presidential election, with the House in Republican hands and state parties having purged all their non-Trump loyalists. There’s no reason to think they won’t try to cheat again and their odds are likely to be improved. </p><p>As they say over on Vote Save America: “<a target="_blank" href="https://votesaveamerica.com/forthepeople/">HR1 or We’re Fucked</a>.” </p><p>It’s a narrow path, with dangers on all sides, and it will take a great deal of trust, cooperation, and coordination among Democrats to stay on it. But if democracy reform doesn’t happen, the US will be gridlocked, unable to address any of its problems with legislation, trapped in a self-reinforcing anti-democratic cycle through which an increasingly nationalistic minority exercises control over a growing, younger, more diverse majority. That can not end well. </p><p>I am not particularly hopeful that Dems can, after passing this giant relief bill, hold on to their unity to a) pass a second giant reconciliation bill devoted to “building back better,” then b) push HR1 to the Senate floor and respond to the inevitable filibuster by c) convincing Manchin and other Senate holdouts to support filibuster reform, d) actually passing filibuster reform, and then e) passing HR1 into law. Oh, and then f) making DC a state.</p><p>But I wasn’t particularly hopeful about Biden from the very beginning of his presidential campaign, and at every juncture, he’s done better than I expected. It’s the same since he took office. The aura of low-drama competence he and his team have maintained so far is pretty close to my best-case scenario for a Biden administration.</p><p>So perhaps they know what they’re doing and will go to the mat for democracy reform when the time comes. Perhaps they can pull recalcitrant senators along with them. I suppose they’ve earned a little hope. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-most-important-job-ahead-for</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:33536031</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 12 Mar 2021 17:00:27 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/33536031/0f7e20613d48ae3c16320a86d7547a12.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1167</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/33536031/61aaef5452dd14c2a33750bb4ea7ac3d.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Voltscast: Jesse Jenkins on energy modeling]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Hello, People of Volts! </p><p>Today I’ve got a special treat for you: a podcast with <a target="_blank" href="https://mae.princeton.edu/people/faculty/jenkins">Jesse Jenkins</a>, energy modeler and assistant professor at Princeton.</p><p>Those of you on <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23EnergyTwitter&#38;src=typed_query">#EnergyTwitter</a> already know <a target="_blank" href="https://twitter.com/JesseJenkins?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor">Jesse</a>. He’s been doing this as long as I have, working his way up from take-haver to think tanker to graduate researcher at MIT to Princeton prof. Along the way he’s developed a reputation not only as one of the sharpest, most empirically informed energy analysts in the country, but as a scrupulously nice guy, always willing to share what he knows and engage in good faith with questions and arguments. As a journalist, I’ve found him indispensable.</p><p>So it was a real treat to sit with Jesse for an in-depth conversation on energy system modeling. What exactly is it? How does it work? What does it tell us about the kinds of energy technologies we will need to decarbonize, and their relative scale? How do politicians use — and misuse — models?</p><p>We get into all of it (as you will hear, I kept Jesse talking so long that I started worrying I might be violating the Geneva Conventions). I hope you enjoy it as much as I did. </p><p>Here are a few links either mentioned in, or relevant to, the discussion:</p><p>* A <a target="_blank" href="https://grist.org/energy-efficiency/whats-the-deal-with-the-rebound-effect/">three-part series</a> on the “rebound effect,” whereby energy efficiency reduces the price of a service, which then increases demand for the service, which then wipes out some of the energy and environmental gains of the efficiency. I wrote it in 2012 for Grist.</p><p>* Jesse’s old blog <a target="_blank" href="http://www.watthead.org/">Watthead</a>, with posts going all the way back to 2005.</p><p>* A <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2015/10/12/9510879/iea-underestimate-renewables">2015 post of mine</a> about how the International Energy Agency (IEA) consistently overestimates the cost of renewable energy.</p><p>* The Princeton University <a target="_blank" href="https://acee.princeton.edu/rapidswitch/projects/net-zero-america-project/">Net-Zero America project</a>, an effort to model a variety of pathways to deep decarbonization in the US. </p><p>* A <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cesa.org/event/net-zero-america/">presentation on the Net-Zero project</a> with Jesse and Princeton’s Eric Larson.</p><p>Question for the type of folks who read to the bottom: would you be interested in a written transcription of this episode? It would be some work, but if enough people want it I’d be up for doing it, perhaps as a bonus for community members. Let me know in comments or at david@volts.wtf.</p><p>Thanks for reading. If you value work like this, please consider becoming a paid subscriber. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscast-jesse-jenkins-on-energy</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:33290682</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 05 Mar 2021 17:00:27 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/33290682/60073d0ad919a3b3fc10e92726267a8d.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>5899</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/33290682/be44cc98d0e828d19d0b7bedad7033c3.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Lessons from the Texas mess]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Hello there, Voltron! It’s been an interesting week, hasn’t it? A guy writes a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-everything-in">tediously long and wonky series on energy transmission</a> and, next thing you know, transmission grids are dominating the news. </p><p>By now, the story of what happened in Texas last week is familiar: an extraordinary cold snap simultaneously a) raised demand on the grid to well higher than the grid operator’s worst-case winter projections, and b) knocked out more than 30 gigawatts worth of energy generators. </p><p>Supply and demand must be kept in perfect balance on a self-contained grid like Texas’, so when demand spiked and supply plunged, something had to give — thus the not-so-rolling blackouts.</p><p>Most of that lost generation was natural gas and coal. Freezing afflicted not only the water used in power plants but the mining, distribution, and storage of fossil fuels. And, yes, some wind turbines froze, though wind actually performed better than the modest expectations set by ERCOT, Texas’ grid operator.</p><p>I’m not going to go through the story in detail. I just want to talk a bit about what it means and what we can learn from it. To learn more about what happened, those affected, and the role Texas’s grid and regulations played in events, I recommend reading the following:</p><p>* The Houston Chronicle had a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/energy/article/Wholesale-power-prices-spiking-across-Texas-15951684.php">great story on the events as they unfolded</a> and is, in general, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Houston-rallies-to-repair-homes-help-families-15968159.php">all over it</a>. </p><p>* In The New Republic, Kate Aronoff has a <a target="_blank" href="https://newrepublic.com/article/161434/texas-energy-crisis-green-new-deal">great overview</a>, with crucial historical context for why the Texas grid is isolated and why it has an energy-only power market.</p><p>* In the Atlantic, Rob Meyer has <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2021/02/what-went-wrong-texas/618104/">great coverage of the Texas planning failures</a>. </p><p>* The team at ProPublica has a piece on how Texas regulators “have repeatedly ignored, dismissed or watered down efforts to address weaknesses in the state’s sprawling electric grid.”</p><p>* In the Los Angeles Times, Sammy Roth has <a target="_blank" href="https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2021-02-16/texas-blackouts-california-climate-change">another great wrap-up</a>, with a focus on grid vulnerability.</p><p>* In the New York Times, a team of journalists pulls together a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/21/us/texas-electricity-ercot-blackouts.html">great backgrounder on Texas’s unique power market structure and grid independence</a>. </p><p>* In the New York Times, Princeton energy analyst Jesse Jenkins has a piece on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/18/opinion/future-proof-texas-grid.html">the crucial failure of Texas utilities to future-proof their assets</a>. </p><p>* In the Wall Street Journal, Katherine Blunt and Russell Gold have a story on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/texas-freeze-power-grid-failure-electricity-market-incentives-11613777856">the implications of the disaster for the energy-only market</a>.</p><p>* In Utility Dive, Alex Gilbert and Morgan Bazilian write on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-texas-electricity-crisis-and-the-energy-transition/595315/">what happened and what it means for Texas grid regulation</a>.</p><p>* The New York Times’ Brad Plumer explains <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/16/climate/texas-power-grid-failures.html">what climate impacts will mean for the nation’s power grids</a>.</p><p>* At Gizmodo, Molly Taft reports on <a target="_blank" href="https://earther.gizmodo.com/how-much-the-oil-and-gas-industry-paid-texas-republican-1846288505">how much the oil and gas industry is paying Republicans to lie about what happened</a>.</p><p>* And here’s the Wall Street Journal editorial board <a target="_blank" href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-deep-green-freeze-11613411002">lying about what happened</a>.</p><p>Any handful of those stories (save the last) will fill you in on what happened and why. Now let’s talk about what we can learn from it.</p><p>It was going to be bad in Texas regardless</p><p>One thing worth emphasizing up front is that Texas just faced an <em>extremely</em> unusual event. It got much colder, much faster, and dumped more snow and ice, for longer, and took out more energy infrastructure than even the grimmest forecasts predicted. </p><p>Yes, the state has had cold snaps before — including in 2011 and 2014, producing a set of recommendations and guidelines that state regulators made voluntary and state utilities largely ignored — but this was extreme even in context. </p><p>We’re going to touch on better planning, helpful technologies, and reformed regulatory structures, but the grim truth is that there is probably no alternative set of planners or regulations that would have adequately prepared for what took place last week. They certainly could have done better, but this event was fated to be rough.</p><p>If we’re going to start seriously preparing the electricity system for long-tail, low-probability events — the kind climate change is making more likely — it will be a new thing, not something that’s been mastered by any current entity or regulatory body.</p><p>Small picture: Texas electricity and natural gas systems need to be weatherized </p><p>The Texas mess is being characterized as a grid crisis, but it was actually a generation crisis. Two-thirds of the state’s power comes from natural gas, and a) natural gas wells and pipelines froze (cutting normal production by about 20 percent), b) commercial and residential heating got priority access to natural gas, per state policy, and c) natural gas power plants froze. </p><p>[Clarification: national natural gas production fell by 20 percent; Texas production fell by <em>50</em> percent.]</p><p>Some coal plants and wind turbines also froze up, and one of the state’s nuclear plants went offline for unrelated reasons, but the bulk of the 30+ gigawatts of energy generation that went offline was natural gas power plants (many were also down for scheduled winter maintenance).</p><p>Natural gas production and distribution falls under the purview of the Railroad Commission of Texas, so it is the RRC that will need to update regulations to make sure this doesn’t happen again on the production side. Given the RRC, that seems … unlikely.</p><p>As for power plants, after the 2011 rolling blackouts, Texas should have required all generators to weatherize. It’s perfectly possible for natural gas plants and wind turbines to operate in the cold — there are <a target="_blank" href="https://www.newsweek.com/texas-wind-turbines-frozen-power-why-arctic-1570173">wind farms in the Arctic</a>. But the weatherization recommendations released in the wake of the blackouts were made voluntary and very few generators followed them.</p><p>Some have argued that this failure to prepare can be laid at the feet of Texas’ energy-only market — the only such market in the US.</p><p>In other restructured areas (like PJM in the Mid-Atlantic), alongside energy markets there are capacity markets, through which generators can get paid to maintain generation capacity in reserve, in the name of reliability. </p><p>Texas has no capacity market. The incentive to maintain reserve capacity is supposed to come from the fact that the price of energy is allowed to swing with supply and demand. In times of high demand and/or constrained supply, prices rise, sometimes to many multiples of their normal level. Generating energy during those times can be incredibly lucrative. That’s supposed to induce generators to set aside (and weatherize) some capacity, to take advantage of those rare moments. </p><p>It’s not a “free” market — no electricity market is — but it is more lightly regulated than its regional neighbors.</p><p>For the past 10 years, the Texas grid has generally maintained lower reserves than, say, PJM, but it has performed quite well, despite persistent predictions to the contrary. During that time, Texas ratepayers saved quite a bit of money with their lean system. </p><p>It’s not clear that if Texas had a capacity market, it would have avoided what happened last week. If a generator is set aside as reserve but it freezes, it doesn’t help. Capacity markets could impose regulations or mandates requiring generators to weatherize, but then again, so could regulators in an energy-only market. It is perfectly within the power of the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) to require weatherization. It just didn’t.</p><p>Any regulatory system is going to need conscientious regulators and good planning. The larger lesson of the cold snap is that Texas, like the rest of the country, needs to plan its grid around resilience and redundancy rather than optimization, market or otherwise.</p><p>Big picture: the Texas grid needs resilience in three directions</p><p>The basic climate forecast for Texas is that it’s going to get warmer on average, but there’s a decent chance these freak cold snaps will get more frequent and nastier. (Like all climate science trying to pin down temporally and geographically narrow effects, this is provisional and there is disagreement within the science community.)</p><p>That is a brutally wide range of conditions for which to plan and prepare. And the same basic problem will face grids in every region of the country. Climate change means a less predictable, less stable set of futures. </p><p>Texas needs to work toward resilience at three levels.</p><p>Improving the existing energy system</p><p>Even assuming it eventually wants to, or is forced to, it will take Texas a while to decarbonize its grid, working its way free of natural gas. In the meantime, it needs to take steps to ensure the security of supply, including weatherproofing major wells and pipelines and bulking up reserves.</p><p>Clearly all power plants need to be weatherproofed, something that falls entirely within the jurisdiction of the Texas PUC. </p><p>The Texas grid needs to be better and more finely segmented, so power outages can be more targeted, rather than akin to a lottery (homeowners who happened to be on a circuit with a hospital retained power). </p><p>And ERCOT, like all transmission grid operators, could investigate the many ways of increasing the capacity and performance of existing transmission lines (see: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-everything-in">transmission month</a>). </p><p>Improving local resilience</p><p>One thing this crisis highlighted is the desperate need for demand-side resources on the Texas grid (measures the PUC and utilities have traditionally resisted). The state is way behind on “demand response,” whereby large groups of customers can be coordinated to reduce demand at times of grid stress. (FERC recently gave demand response access to capacity markets in areas under its jurisdiction, a decision <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/1/26/10835042/supreme-court-energy">the Supreme Court backed</a>.)</p><p>Perhaps the most basic step would be to better weatherize and insulate Texas’ homes and buildings, so they don’t require as much energy to heat and cool and they don’t lose heat as fast if the power goes out. </p><p>Solar panels wouldn’t do much good in a snowstorm, but other distributed energy resources like batteries and electric vehicles can provide emergency power. At the community level, larger battery or other storage installations (perhaps fuel cells or flow batteries) located within distribution systems could help run community resilience centers, where at least people could congregate to stay warm.</p><p>And <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/12/15/16714146/greener-more-reliable-more-resilient-grid-microgrids">microgrids</a> that could island off from the larger grid and run on stored emergency power in the event of a blackout would have helped many Texans through the worst of the cold. </p><p>I recommended the same set of local resilience and distributed energy solutions for California — which has had its own grid woes, despite not having an energy-only market — in a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/10/28/20926446/california-grid-distributed-energy">much more detailed piece</a>, if you want to dig in.</p><p>Improving interconnection</p><p>Texas, notoriously, runs its own grid, an island between the Western and Eastern Interconnections.</p><p>There’s a long history behind why this is so (read <a target="_blank" href="https://newrepublic.com/article/161434/texas-energy-crisis-green-new-deal">Aronoff’s piece</a>, and also <a target="_blank" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/40923434?seq=1">this</a>), but the gist is that, by not transporting electricity across state lines, the Texas electricity system escapes federal jurisdiction, in the form of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). </p><p>Texas has long been, and remains, ornery about federal authority. </p><p>Because its grid is an island, Texas could not import power from, say, nearby Southeast states, where conditions were somewhat better. It could only cut power to customers.</p><p>(Notably, El Paso — which for quirky historical reasons isn’t on the ERCOT grid, but rather on the larger Western Interconnection — <a target="_blank" href="https://www.texasmonthly.com/news/el-paso-electric-winter-storm-2021/">survived the storm just fine</a>, because it could import power from neighboring states.)</p><p>It’s difficult to envision Texas allowing this arrangement to change. A transmission developer would have to propose an interstate line and ERCOT would have to approve it, at which point FERC could reasonably assert authority. But Texas has fought off such attempts in the past and shows little appetite, even in the face of this crisis, for submitting to the feds. It might bring the dread Green New Deal to the state!</p><p>A few years back, a project called <a target="_blank" href="http://www.tresamigasllc.com/index.php">Tres Amigas</a> proposed to connect the three US interconnections with HVDC lines. Even though it argued that it wouldn’t trigger federal jurisdiction over Texas, the project ended up dying.</p><p>Nonetheless, it’s at least worth noting that it would be to Texas’ benefit to build HVDC lines to the other interconnections. Among other things, it could import power when 30 GW of generation goes offline. Building a few HVDC connections would probably be cheaper in the long run than trying to up-armor the state’s entire natural gas infrastructure and all its wind turbines against once-a-decade cold conditions. </p><p>That’s the beauty of a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-why-we-need-more">national transmission grid</a>: no region has to prepare for every conceivable weather pattern. When extreme or unusual conditions strike, any region can draw power from elsewhere in the country. All things being equal, interconnection boosts resilience and reduces prices. </p><p>Perhaps ERCOT and FERC could work out some sort of deal, whereby the feds promise not to impose a capacity market or other dramatic market changes on the state as long as it meets basic North American Electric Reliability Organization (NERC) reliability standards and takes steps to interconnect with the rest of the country. Everybody wins. </p><p>Resilience costs money</p><p>All the recommendations for Texas above apply equally to every state and regional grid. They all need to quit planning based on past conditions and instead plan for <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/20/climate/united-states-infrastructure-storms.html?smid=tw-share">a future of wider variation, less predictability, and more frequent extremes</a>. </p><p>That calls for resilience: improving the performance of existing infrastructure, improving local resilience through efficiency, weatherization, and distributed energy resources, and improving interconnection with neighbors through HVDC lines. </p><p>All of that costs money. </p><p>Texas has been demonstrating for a decade that it’s possible to operate with slimmer reserves, closer to a just-in-time delivery model, and save quite a bit of money for ratepayers. It works pretty well most of the time, except for once a decade or so, when it catastrophically fails.</p><p>In the wake of such failures, with the human costs evident, it’s easy to blame regulators and demand more resilience. But imagine if, five years ago, Texas legislators and regulators had approached the Texas public and proposed to substantially raise its electricity rates in order to weatherproof its electricity system against once-a-decade (or in this case, maybe once-a-century) conditions. It would not have been popular.</p><p>It’s just difficult to spend money wisely, with an eye on long-term resilience. The short-term incentives align against it — not just the market incentives, but the political incentives. It’s difficult for Texas, it’s difficult for California, it’s difficult everywhere.</p><p>And it’s especially difficult in the US thanks to the fundamental misalignment between our current social and environmental goals — lower carbon, better performance and efficiency, increased resilience and security — and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2015/9/9/9287719/utilities-monopoly">the regulatory incentive structure within which US power utilities operate</a>. </p><p>They make money by investing in capital projects. They don’t want to do more with less; they make money by doing more with more.</p><p>The US utility regime is designed for expansion, for building out electricity infrastructure to a country without it. Now that the electricity system is built out, now that it needs to be ruggedized and fine-tuned, now that <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/11/30/17868620/renewable-energy-power-grid-architecture">local distribution systems need more autonomy and intelligence</a>, that regime is no longer serving us. We end up, again and again, working against utilities, trying to kludge together artificial incentive structures to persuade them to do stuff they simply aren’t designed to do.</p><p>Getting to resilience and national interconnection by fighting through 50 public utility commissions is going to take forever. What’s needed are some federal performance standards and a large-scale program of public investment into electricity infrastructure. Congress needs to step up and act like climate change is a national emergency.</p><p>Texas may lose some of its treasured autonomy in the process, but it will gain a more effective and resilient electricity system.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/lessons-from-the-texas-mess</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:32882695</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 24 Feb 2021 17:00:05 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/32882695/973e2164e1b0684aa66b263b82624bdd.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1145</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/32882695/62c366385e8b05bff4d7acbb4f18cc82.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Transmission month: everything in one place]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Greetings, People of Volts! We have come at last to the end of Transmission Month, <em>née</em> Week. It’s been quite a journey.</p><p>Below are links to and summaries of all the transmission posts. Above is a mega-podcast — all the posts, read by me, strung together, for when you have a couple of hours free. </p><p>* The subscriber-only <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/improving-long-distance-energy-transmission">discussion post</a> that started everything. Thanks for all the ideas!</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-why-we-need-more"><strong>Why we need more big power lines</strong></a>An explanation for why the US needs more big, long-distance power lines to decarbonize, relieve grid congestion, and reduce the cost of power. </p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-how-to-start-building"><strong>How to start building more big power lines</strong></a>Building new power lines in the US is absurdly difficult, a kaleidoscope of dysfunction from planning to financing to permitting to siting. Local resistance ends up killing anything ambitious. The federal government needs to step in.</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-fortnight-burying-power"><strong>Burying power lines next to rail & roads to make a national transmission grid</strong></a>One way to avoid siting hassles and local battles is to bury new transmission lines alongside existing rail and road infrastructure. One big line doing this, connecting Iowa wind to the Chicago area, is underway now. </p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-how-to-make-the"><strong>How to make the existing grid work better</strong></a>A set of “grid-enhancing technologies” stand ready to increase the capacity and improve the performance of the existing transmission grid, from “dynamic line ratings” to “topology optimization.” Utilities just need incentives to install them.</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-two-more-ideas"><strong>Two more ideas to quickly boost the transmission grid</strong></a>A couple of final proposals to improve existing transmission. One is using energy storage to supplement transmission; the other is replacing existing AC lines with HVDC lines.</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/volts-podcast-the-challenges-of-building"><strong>Volts podcast: the challenges of building transmission in the US, and how to overcome them, with Liza Reed</strong></a>A discussion with clean-energy researcher about the obstacles facing long-distances transmission lines and some policies that might help clear them away. </p><p>If you value this kind of deep-dive explanatory journalism, please consider becoming a paid Volts subscriber. I don’t have any advertisers or sponsors; the only way I can do this is with your support. </p><p>Thanks for reading and listening. </p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-everything-in</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:32590224</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2021 17:00:38 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/32590224/a9569a6b07c33d899b9b3f8b422619a3.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>6635</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/32590224/3a75720a3f31e24cd65e4cbbe105dc06.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Transmission month: two more ideas to quickly boost the transmission grid]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Greetings, faithful Volts readers! Welcome back to the Transmission Week that never ends. </p><p>The news these last few days has been filled with talk about electricity grids. Texas is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.texastribune.org/2021/02/15/rolling-blackouts-texas/">suffering from an unprecedented cold snap</a> that has left more than four million people without power for days. It’s a terrible situation. There’s a lot to say about it, what can and can’t be learned, and perhaps I’ll get to it next week.</p><p>But you didn’t sign up for a breaking-news email, you signed up for Volts! So today brings what I believe what I believe will be my last big transmission post, though I may do a wrap-up after this. Thank you for traveling with me on this longer-than-expected journey.</p><p>Today, we’re going to look at a couple of final ideas to make the transmission grid work better, short of building new lines — a remainder bin of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-how-to-make-the">grid-enhancing technologies</a>, if you will. </p><p>Idea #1: Using energy storage as a transmission asset</p><p>At least since the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-109publ58/html/PLAW-109publ58.htm">Energy Policy Act of 2005</a>, the US government has acknowledged that energy storage technologies can be used to ease grid congestion and increase the reliability and flexibility of energy transmission. In recent years, there has been increasing interest in “<a target="_blank" href="https://energystorage.org/storage-as-a-transmission-alternative-is-gaining-traction-in-many-rtos-isos/">storage as a transmission asset</a>” (SATA), which refers to energy storage installations that are treated as transmission assets — meaning utilities can “rate base” them and receive a guaranteed rate of return plus any tariffs or incentives for transmission assets. </p><p>Basically, it means allowing some storage to be treated — legally, financially, and operationally — like a piece of the transmission system.</p><p>SATA projects — sometimes known as “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2020/Jul/IRENA_Virtual_power_lines_2020.pdf?la=en&#38;hash=C58043124D596D1CF75395066817C38B55AC1983">virtual power lines</a>” — offer a <a target="_blank" href="https://info.fluenceenergy.com/hubfs/Collateral/Storage%20as%20Transmission%20White%20Paper.pdf?hsLang=en">range of benefits</a> to regional energy grids. </p><p>When a line is congested, it can offload some power to storage. At times of lower congestion, stored power can be injected to maintain high line utilization. Storage can thus relieve congestion and make the grid more reliable. It is much cheaper and quicker to deploy than new transmission, its footprint is much smaller, and it faces a much less onerous regulatory process. It is extremely modular and scalable, which means it can start small and be scaled up precisely to need, and even relocated as grid needs change.</p><p>Congestion on a power line often causes “inefficient dispatch,” meaning grid operators must ask generators on one side of the line to curtail their output and generators on the other side of the line to ramp theirs up, even if that isn’t the most cost-effective option. Storage on either side of the line can help reduce inefficient dispatch.</p><p>Another key service storage can provide is to free up unused line capacity. A grid capacity standard called “N-1” holds that the grid must maintain safe operation if a “contingency event” takes out one of the lines. This means all lines must maintain some reserve capacity to absorb energy in the event of an N-1 situation. </p><p>But storage can serve that purpose — rapidly injecting energy into, or absorbing energy from, the grid in the case of a contingency event — even better than power lines. Adding SATA projects can free up some of that reserve line capacity to carry more power. </p><p>As with most things transmission, Europe is way ahead of the US on this. Most notably, Germany is developing 1,300 MW worth of SATA in a project known as <a target="_blank" href="https://www.transnetbw.de/de/unternehmen/portraet/innovation/netzbooster">Netzbooster</a> (grid booster) to free up line capacity otherwise reserved for an N-1 contingency. (Germany has notorious congestion between the wind-heavy north and load centers in the south.) </p><p>The US has nothing at the GW scale like that, but a few RTOs are moving forward. In August 2020, FERC <a target="_blank" href="https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/OpenNat.asp?fileID=15599930">approved MISO’s proposal</a> for the rules and processes by which it would integrate storage into its planning and project selection.</p><p>One twist: FERC has indicated that it is “permissible as a matter of policy” in the US for a storage project to be “dual use,” to serve as a transmission asset and receive fixed returns and simultaneously to participate in wholesale energy markets and receive market returns.</p><p>This move has drawn some criticism, since it seems to blur the canonical separation between energy market participants and the “wires companies” that are supposed to offer them non-discriminatory access to the grid. If a wires company owns a storage asset that is drawing market returns, it has every reason to give that asset privileged grid access.</p><p>FERC has said dual use is subject to the following four principles:</p><p>* must be cost-competitive with transmission,</p><p>* must avoid double recovery for providing the same service,</p><p>* cannot suppress market bids, and</p><p>* cannot jeopardize ISO/RTO independence.</p><p>It’s not entirely clear how dual use storage could, in practice, avoid bumping up against those principles. So far as I know, none of the big RTOs/ISOs has yet hashed out exactly how to make the dual-use thing work. (Here’s an issue paper in which <a target="_blank" href="http://www.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/IssuePaper-StorageasaTransmissionAsset.pdf">California ISO wrestles with the problem</a>.)</p><p>There are reasons to remain skeptical of SATA projects. Batteries are still relatively expensive compared to other types of assets. “Many areas of congestion are better served by a new power plant, fuel cell, or demand response asset than a big single-purpose battery,” says Cody Hill, who analyzes and deploys storage projects for <a target="_blank" href="https://www.lspower.com/">LS Power</a>. </p><p>The California ISO has been skeptical too. It reported in 2018: “Over the past several years, the ISO has studied 27 battery storage proposals and one pumped hydro storage proposal as potential transmission assets. To date only two proposals have resulted in storage projects moving forward, both in the most recent 2017-2018 Transmission Plan.”</p><p>But utilities are allowed to rate-base SATA projects — receive a guaranteed rate of return on them — and they love rate-basing stuff, whether it’s cost-effective or not. They make money by spending money. (See: Texas utility <a target="_blank" href="https://www.powermag.com/oncor-wants-to-spend-5-2-billion-on-energy-storage/">Oncor’s $5.2 billion SATA proposal</a>, which was never approved. I wonder if grid regulators regret that in light of current news!)</p><p>“A company that gets a SATA project approved gets a guaranteed profit on every dollar spent,” says Hill, “so utilities have an obvious incentive to get lots of these projects approved and put into the rate base, and not much of an incentive to keep the costs down.”</p><p>Hill warns that utilities are working in regulatory proceedings “to guarantee that they will have a monopoly on new SATA projects going forward” — sheltering them from competition under FERC Order 1000, the same way they’ve been sheltering transmission lines from competition (see <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-how-to-start-building">this post</a> for more on that). “Now that storage is getting cheap enough to pencil in more locations,” Hill says, “this would be a terrible outcome for storage developers and utility customers alike.”</p><p>Hopefully FERC will take steps to implement performance-based incentives for utilities and force true competitive bidding in both transmission and SATA, allowing merchant projects to compete on a level playing field. Here’s what the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2020/Jul/IRENA_Virtual_power_lines_2020.pdf?la=en&#38;hash=C58043124D596D1CF75395066817C38B55AC1983">International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) says is needed</a> (quoting its report):</p><p>* Clear rules on the ownership and operation of the Virtual Power Line (VPL).</p><p>* Compensation structures that reflect the costs of the VPL.</p><p>* Regulations enabling a multi-service business case, so that the social welfare benefits provided by the ESS is maximised.</p><p>* Regulations that enable network operators to consider battery storage systems in network planning, together with conventional investments in network infrastructure.</p><p>The Energy Storage Association has laid out <a target="_blank" href="https://energystorage.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/2019-Policy-Position-Storage-as-Transmission.pdf">a set of positions and policy recommendations</a> that get into more policy weeds, explaining how FERC could meet those conditions. </p><p>In the meantime, a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0306261920309028?casa_token=UTkMkRJUyGEAAAAA:WHLK6an8x6zdmAkliQ0CHUdlPG6EsjgBSl8y1aVpOOorDCwpVg5TKOc1hZi4JnPS9eu8lTnS5Q">2020 study</a> found that, in a system with high renewable energy penetration, “storage value originates primarily from deferring investments in generation capacity (VRE, natural gas) and transmission.” SATA can do that — make the existing transmission system work better, thus cutting down the need for new lines.</p><p>Anyway: storage as transmission! It’s all part of the process of making transmission grids more networked, dispatchable, and intelligent.</p><p>Idea #2: Converting AC lines to HVDC lines</p><p>Finally, here at the very end, let’s quickly look at a proposal that I probably should have put very first, since it may be the quickest and easiest way to boost transmission grid performance.</p><p>Here’s the idea: existing AC (alternating current) lines have already fought all the siting battles. The land has already been claimed. In some cases, it is possible to convert AC lines to HVDC (high-voltage direct currect) lines. </p><p>It turns out the actual wire used is the same — it just needs to be reconfigured. “If you are using an existing corridor, you can use the existing lines and just change the bundles,” says Dr. Liza Reed, research manager for low carbon technology policy at the Niskanen Center. “So if you have three phases of four lines each, you've got 12 lines, and you can turn that into six lines on either side of the DC bipole.”</p><p>In some cases that will mean slightly extending the height of the tower.</p><p>But the costliest part is replacing AC substations with converters to shift the AC power to DC and vice versa (and in some cases, boosting the capacity of nearby substations to handle the additional power). Ideally, the new converters will be Voltage Source Converters (VSCs) using solid-state electronics. (This <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-fortnight-burying-power">this post</a> for more on VSCs, which Reed thinks are close to being the default choice for HVDC developers.)</p><p>Even with that cost, converting lines “is surprisingly cost-effective, even over relatively short distances, and, in some cases, may be the only way to achieve dramatic increases in the capacity of existing corridors.” That’s the conclusion of a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.pnas.org/content/116/28/13879">2019 study</a> on which Reed — who did her PhD dissertation on converting lines at Carnegie Mellon — was the lead author. </p><p>In <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1040619020300622">another study</a>, Reed and colleagues looked at five options for expanding transmission capacity: reconductoring (replacing conductors) to increase current, increasing voltage, installing a FACTS (see <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-how-to-make-the">previous post</a>), converting to HVDC, and building a new line.</p><p>“In the normal course of operations, utilities have to replace lines as they age anyway,” Reed told me. “Replacing lines with high-temperature low-sag options can increase capacity quickly and at low cost compared to other solutions. The capacity increase is limited, but often still has substantial benefits to power flow.”</p><p>Converting lines has been a subject of discussion among power engineers and scholars for decades (see <a target="_blank" href="https://library.e.abb.com/public/8345ed00181dda7bc1256ecc0034c069/04-11%20ENG%209703.pdf">this 1997 paper</a>), but as with previous technologies we’ve discussed, things are finally now beginning to come together: costs are falling even as grid congestion and the need for relief rise. </p><p>Reed says it’s difficult to pin down the total national potential of replacing lines, since projects are so dependent on specific line conditions, which in many cases have not been analyzed.</p><p>The most promising lines for conversion are double-circuit 345kV lines. The map below shows the roughly 25 percent of US transmission circuit-miles that are over 300kV. About two-thirds of those, something like 16 percent of total US transmission, is suitable, at least in theory, for conversion. </p><p>That’s not going to solve US grid woes, but it does represent a crucial opportunity to quickly expand the existing grid and relieve congestion while other solutions are being developed. </p><p>And that’s it, folks! Transmission! I can’t guarantee I won’t return to the subject in the future, but I think I pretty much covered the waterfront. I hope it was helpful.</p><p>Later this week, I’ll send a transmission wrap-up post, linking to all the previous posts in one place and summarizing what we’ve learned.</p><p>As a reward for sticking with me this far, here’s Mabel with a bloop of snow on her nose:</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-two-more-ideas</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:32430912</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 17 Feb 2021 17:00:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/32430912/511f9df5bd3460d335a3904ffcbacdc4.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>951</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/32430912/388b1008c97494eb3ae69eb070fbe822.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Transmission month: how to make the existing grid work better]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p><em>(If you’d rather listen to this post than read it, just click play above.)</em></p><p>Welcome back to Volts, where every week is Transmission Week!</p><p>In my <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-why-we-need-more">three</a> <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-how-to-start-building">transmission</a> <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-fortnight-burying-power">posts</a> so far, I have focused mostly on the challenges of building new long-distance energy transmission lines in the US — the poor planning, the inefficient financing, the permitting and siting hassles. </p><p>Today I’m going to turn to a different subject: the various ways that the performance of the <em>existing</em> transmission system could be upgraded and improved through so-called “grid-enhancing technologies” (GETs).</p><p>To be honest, I probably should have tackled this subject first. Though new lines are going to be needed regardless, it is faster and cheaper to upgrade the existing system, with fewer regulatory barriers. GETs can achieve short-term relief from grid congestion while new lines are being developed.</p><p>There are three techs that are typically classified as grid-enhancing technologies, and I will focus on them in this post. In my next post, I’ll cover a couple of extra options that I haven’t found any other way to fit in.  </p><p>Let’s jump in. </p><p>(I should note here up top that I will be drawing heavily from a <a target="_blank" href="https://brattlefiles.blob.core.windows.net/files/16634_improving_transmission_operating_with_advanced_technologies.pdf">2019 report</a> on GETs from the Brattle Group and Grid Strategies.)</p><p>Closer monitoring to improve line performance</p><p>When electricity passes through transmission lines, they heat up. As they heat up, they sag. If too much electricity is run through a line, it can exceed its maximum operating temperature or sag to the point that it brushes up against trees or other structures, potentially sparking fires.</p><p>Grid operators want to avoid that, so they do not load lines to their full rated capacity. They set an operational limit well below theoretical capacity, to create a safety margin. </p><p>But <em>how far</em> below capacity should the limit be set? That is the question.</p><p>The heat and sag of a given line are changing in subtle ways all the time. They vary with the ambient temperature, humidity, barometric pressure, and wind speed. If it’s warmer, the line will heat up faster; if there’s a breeze, it will heat more slowly. Because the heat and sag are in constant flux, so too is the maximum safe capacity of the line.</p><p>“The number we love to quote is, an increase in wind blowing across a power line of three feet per second results in a 44 percent increase in the capacity of that power line,” says Jonathan Marmillo, co-founder of LineVision, a company that makes equipment for monitoring lines. “That's the equivalent of a light breeze.” </p><p>(Note: this means that the capacity of transmission lines increases as the production of wind energy increases. Handy!)</p><p>But transmission system operators do not generally have that kind of real-time information about the heat and sag of their lines. They are forced to estimate, to use an average. In some cases, they assign a line a single “static rating,” well below full capacity. In some cases, they assign the lines seasonal ratings, adjusting for seasonal conditions. These estimates are, necessarily, conservative.</p><p>As a result, “most transmission lines are loaded at 40 or even 30 percent of their rated capacity,” says Marmillo. That’s an enormous amount of usable capacity going unused, to hedge against the lack of information.</p><p>That has changed with the development of “dynamic line ratings” (DLRs), whereby lines are continuously monitored and their capacity continuously updated.</p><p>DLRs have been around for a couple of decades, but the first generations of devices were cumbersome. They were installed directly on the power lines (which involved taking the lines out of commission) and proved unreliable in operation.</p><p>Technology marches on, though, and the latest generation of DLRs is vastly improved. LineVision’s DLR devices, for instance, have “no-contact” installation, which means no messing with the lines; they attach to the transmission tower. They are topped with <a target="_blank" href="https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lidar.html">LIDAR</a> — the same technology used by autonomous vehicles — which gathers fine-grained data that is then crunched to determine the “net effective perpendicular windspeed,” the most important variable for determining line temperature. “We essentially use the conductor as a giant hot wire anemometer,” says Marmillo.</p><p>Of course, if you abandon averages in favor of real-time measurement, sometimes capacity will be below what the static average would have indicated. But “we see capacity above static [ratings] about <a target="_blank" href="https://watttransmission.files.wordpress.com/2018/10/cigre-gotf-2018-ngn-pjm-aep-linevision-final.pdf">97 percent of the time</a>,” says Marmillo. It turns out those static ratings are <em>extremely</em> conservative. </p><p>Allowing more power to travel through lines relieves grid congestion, which is valuable to grid operators. Marmillo says a recent installation of LineVision’s device on a PJM line paid itself back in three months.</p><p>DLRs are particularly cheap if you compare them to more dramatic solutions to grid congestion. “The cost of deploying a DLR system on a transmission line,” says Marmillo, “is less than 5 percent the unit cost of reconstructing or rebuilding the line.”</p><p>(Note: there’s an <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ferc.gov/media/rm20-16-000">open FERC proposal</a> on the subject of line ratings, in which the commission plans to require seasonal line ratings within two years, and for RTOs and ISOs to put in place systems that are prepared for DLRs within a year.)</p><p>So that’s technology one: DLRs to better understand and exploit the real-time capacity of existing lines.</p><p>Controlling the flow of electricity to ease congestion</p><p>The Brattle report says: “Power flow through an AC line is proportional to the sine of the difference in the phase angle of the voltage between the transmitting end and the receiving end of the line,” and I’ll just go ahead and trust them on that.</p><p>Left uncontrolled, power will simply cascade through the system according to <a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kirchhoff%27s_circuit_laws">Kirchhoff's laws</a>. But it is useful for grid operators to be able to route power away from congested areas and toward less congested areas. To do that, they need flow control devices.</p><p>The first kind are special transformers called “Phase Angle Regulators” (PARs) that directly manipulate the phase angle to control the flow of power. They are well-known and accepted in the industry, but they are expensive, to the tune of millions of dollars a year, which has limited their deployment to a select few high-traffic lines. Plus, the accelerating pace of change in the electricity system has made their size and inflexibility more problematic. “These are 40-plus-year fixed assets,” says Jenny Erwin, marketing director for Smart Wires Inc., a company that makes flow control devices, and these days, “it's just much harder to plan out what you need 40 years from now.”</p><p>The other family of flow control devices are Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems (FACTS), which are generally power-electronics devices that control the flow of power through a line or voltage on a system by, for example, increasing or decreasing reactance on a line. </p><p>Older versions of FACTS were also quite large and expensive, but due to advances in electronics and control software, they have been made much smaller and more modular. “What used to be done with copper and steel,” Erwin says, “we are able to do with silicon and software.”</p><p>Now, reports Brattle, FACTS “typically cost significantly less than PARs, can be manufactured and installed in a shorter time, are scalable, and in many cases, are available in mobile form that can be easily redeployed.” (Smart Wires, a California company that’s been around since 2010, is currently the only company making these modular FACTS.)</p><p>Several studies have found that FACTS create value by easing grid congestion and deferring transmission system investments. For example, Brattle summarizes the results of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.epri.com/research/products/3002013930">a 2018 study</a> from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI): “simulating the 2016 PJM system with 13 power flow control devices placed in optimal locations to reduce thermal overloads indicated annual production cost savings of $67 million. Considering the initial investment cost of $137 million, the payback period is roughly 2 years.”</p><p>The possibilities opened up by modular FACTS have only just begun being explored. Most deployments and studies have focused on individual lines, but as more and more lines become dispatchable, it stands to reason that there will be emergent system effects. It’s one thing to have a dispatchable line; it’s another to have a dispatchable grid.</p><p>Erwin acknowledges that this is, in fact, Smart Wires’ long-term vision. “We like to think about it as crawl, walk, and run,” she says, and implementing a fully dispatchable grid “would be running.” The company is taking small steps in that direction in the UK, installing FACTS on several lines across a wide swath of territory and linking them up so that they communicate with one another.</p><p>But she stresses that the comprehensive vision “is not required to unlock value. You can extract meaningful value today, because every new FACTS adds a degree of control and efficiency.” For much more on this, see <a target="_blank" href="https://www.epri.com/research/products/000000003002019771">this technical report</a> from EPRI and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.smartwires.com/papers/">many other reports</a> compiled by Smart Wires. </p><p>So that’s technology two: power electronics to control the flow of power across the grid.</p><p>Reconfiguring the grid to route around congestion</p><p>The flow of energy through an electricity system is determined by the level of output of the generators, the level of consumption of the loads, and the “topology” (physical configuration) of the transmission lines connecting them. </p><p>There is already hardware deployed across the grid, in the form of circuit breakers and communications systems, that can, by switching open or closed, change that topology. Grid operators have long had switching procedures in place to reconfigure the grid as necessary to maintain reliability. </p><p>But “finding good reconfigurations is computationally challenging,” says electrical engineer Pablo Ruiz, a consultant at Brattle, associate research professor at Boston University, and co-founder of NewGrid, Inc., a grid software company spun off from <a target="_blank" href="https://arpa-e.energy.gov/technologies/projects/decision-support-software-grid-operators">an ARPA-E project</a>. Traditionally, reconfigurations have been implemented on a limited, ad hoc basis, guided by operator experience.</p><p>Recently, however, engineers have learned to calculate reconfigurations more quickly using software. Thus the budding field of “topology optimization.” </p><p>Ruiz draws an analogy with transportation. The old way of handling congestion was to raise tolls on the main roads, convincing drivers to stay home (or in the case of power, generators to curtail their output). Topology control software, Ruiz says, is like the navigation app <a target="_blank" href="https://www.waze.com/">Waze</a>, showing drivers how they can route around congestion. That will mean less curtailment and less congestion.</p><p>The software doesn’t do the reconfiguring itself — that’s still for the grid operator. “The analogy with Waze is actually pretty accurate,” Ruiz says. “It's a decision-support tool. This is not about self-driving cars; the operator is still the driver.”</p><p>Naturally, though, it makes me wonder about the possibility of self-driving grids — grids that route power optimally and automatically. Ruiz thinks something like that will eventually happen, but expects a long road of incremental advances in automation before then.</p><p>Anyway, in the meantime, recent deployments of topology control software in the UK have shown that “just by optimizing the configuration of the grid, you can increase grid capacity by, depending on system conditions, between 4 and 12 percent,” Ruiz says. “These are very large transfers, so if you can get 10 percent more with existing infrastructure, without any new capital investment, that's a big deal.”</p><p>Studies by <a target="_blank" href="http://newgridinc.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Topology-Optimization_Ruiz-Caspary-Butler_FERC_20200624.pdf">Brattle</a> in the US and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.smarternetworks.org/project/nia_nget0169/documents">National Grid</a> in the UK have confirmed that topology optimization can relieve transmission constraints and save power consumers tens of millions of dollars annually. “Broad application of the technology for real-time and day-ahead congestion management support would reduce the cost of congestion by about 50 percent,” he says.</p><p>Even with the misaligned incentives of today’s utilities (software investments, unlike infrastructure investments, do not receive a guaranteed rate of return), Ruiz thinks topology control will pencil out for them. It might reduce the need for some smaller transmission-expansion projects, but it will relieve congestion on lower capacity lines by routing power to (currently underutilized) high-capacity lines — thus improving the economics of those larger, more expensive projects.</p><p>Topology control will also improve the business case for a national macrogrid, since it can help ensure that every high-voltage trunk line is fully utilized.</p><p>So that’s technology three: software to map out the best and most efficient configuration of the grid, from day to day and hour to hour.</p><p>The extensive benefits of GETs </p><p>The <a target="_blank" href="https://brattlefiles.blob.core.windows.net/files/16634_improving_transmission_operating_with_advanced_technologies.pdf">Brattle report</a> I mentioned at the top of the post recounts several examples of successful deployments of GETs. It estimates that wide deployment would produce benefits that rival the value of creating regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and competitive power markets. The benefits of GETs include not only relieving grid congestion, deferring new capital investments, and saving ratepayers money, but also boosting reliability and resilience and generally improving system performance.</p><p>The most interesting attempt to assess the full benefits of GETs comes in a forthcoming report prepared by Brattle for the WATT (Working for Advanced Transmission Technologies) Coalition, a group of companies developing GETs. </p><p>The study won’t be released until February 24, and unfortunately, the folks at the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.watt-transmission.org/">WATT Coalition</a> are too short-sighted to allow me to share the results in advance (grumble). </p><p>I can say, though, that it is a detailed engineering analysis focused on a single (wind-rich, increasingly congested) transmission region. It examines the effects of a full deployment of GETs across the region.</p><p>Long story short, GETs <em>double</em> the amount of new renewables the regional grid is able to accommodate through 2025. Building enough new power lines to do that would be wildly expensive and take decades; GETs do it almost immediately, with an investment that pays itself back in about six months. It also creates jobs, reduces carbon emissions, and saves the region money.</p><p>In terms of the clean-energy transition, GETs are an easy win, a quick way to bring more renewables online and reduce emissions while also, helpfully, saving money. Utilities just need to do it.</p><p>Making utilities want to get GETs</p><p>The core problem for GETs is the same problem I have been <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/6/29/12038074/power-utilities-suck">identifying for years</a>: the incentive system in which US energy utilities operate. They do not make money by selling electricity or by providing superior service. They make money by receiving a guaranteed rate of return on capital investments. </p><p>Naturally, they want to make more capital investments. </p><p>If a technology comes along — energy efficiency, distributed energy resources (DERs), or GETs — that promises to defer or even head off the need to make new capital investments, the utility’s profits are directly threatened. All those technologies may serve the public’s social, economic, and environmental goals, but they do not serve the utilities’ financial interests. </p><p>Even when utilities do not face a disincentive to improve their operational performance, they have no positive incentive, no reason to set aside money and resources. The costs of congestion and interconnection backups are simply passed along to ratepayers. </p><p>Everyone in clean energy is aware of this basic incentives mismatch. “It's really an incentives issue,” says Erwin. “Clearly there is a misalignment in incentives,” says Ruiz. “There's no question about it.” </p><p>Consequently, deployment of GETs remains confined to a few demonstration projects. Brattle summarizes:</p><p>The slow pace of adoption of these new technology options may largely be driven by two factors. First, the technology options by themselves are not being recognized enough for their capabilities. … Second, there is insufficient incentive for either the transmission operators or owners—the two market players who are best suited to adopt these technologies—to innovate and change their operations, which requires a concerted effort.</p><p>Reforming US utilities is a mountainous task, and nobody has time to wait around on it. In the meantime, the best that can be done is to create incentives where they are now lacking.</p><p>FERC can do so by mandating that utilities and RTOs examine alternatives to new transmission — upgrades to the existing system — in transmission and operational planning processes. It can implement new rules that reward utilities for meeting performance metrics, so-called “performance-based regulation” (as is common in the UK and Australia). It can encourage benefit-sharing (and cost-sharing) among transmission owners and other market participants, both sharing congestion costs and spreading out the benefits of new GETs. And FERC could push utilities to subject new GETs projects to competitive bidding. </p><p>A group of 13 senators recently wrote <a target="_blank" href="https://watttransmission.files.wordpress.com/2020/08/letter-from-13-senators-to-ferc-on-incentives-for-gets.pdf">a letter to FERC</a> asking that it take these steps to encourage GETs. </p><p>Congress could help by offering tax credits or other financial incentives to utilities to improve existing transmission systems with GETs. Money is the best incentive of all.</p><p>And maybe, some day, we could think about reforming utilities root and branch, to once and for all align their incentives with pro-social behavior. A fella can dream.</p><p>GETs are part of the digitization of energy</p><p>One of my pet theories — which I first <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/6/15/11923832/energy-transitions-software">wrote about in 2016</a> — is that <a target="_blank" href="http://vaclavsmil.com/">Vaclav Smil</a> is wrong. Smil is a venerable energy analyst famous for throwing cold water on all the talk of a rapid transition to clean energy; he points out that previous energy transitions have taken more like a century than a decade.</p><p>One reason I think the clean energy transition will move faster is that it is not merely a transition from one set of physical energy sources to another (though it is that too). It is also in part a transition from the physical to the digital. </p><p>Where physical commodities generally get more expensive over time, computing power is consistently getting cheaper and cheaper. In area after area, engineers are figuring out how to substitute “intelligence for stuff” — i.e. computing power for commodities. </p><p>Think, for instance, about solar trackers. Solar panel manufacturers used to experiment with a variety of shapes for panels, to try to catch more of the sun’s energy as it passes overhead; that manufacturing is expensive. Now panels can be mounted on trackers that automatically sense and follow the sun — so manufacturers mainly just make flat panels. The intelligence of the trackers has substituted for the stuff of the panels. (See also: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/11/25/20975591/climate-change-solar-panels-circuit-breaker-digital-electricity-atom-power">digital circuit breakers</a> that allow building owners to get more out of their existing electrical systems.)</p><p>(I had to mention digital circuit breakers as an excuse to show this amazing video.)</p><p>GETs are another great example. The same physical grid can virtually double its capacity through the combined application of GETs: better sensing, better calculating, and better control. Rather than make twice as much grid, we can make a grid twice as smart. Intelligence for stuff.</p><p>Inevitably, as the costs of sensors, chips, and computing power continue to decline, we are going to infuse them into all our infrastructure: transportation, buildings, and power. We are going to get more performance out of our existing capital stock through the application of intelligence.</p><p>Once progress is hitched to computing power, the clean energy transition will no longer be limited by the slow innovation and turnover cycles of physical commodities and machines. Things move much more quickly in the digital space. </p><p>Consequently, the transmission grid we’ve already got may have much more potential than we’ve given it credit for. But fulfilling that potential will involve pushing utilities to value getting more out of the transmission assets they already own. It’s a fairly easy fix, for a large impact. Biden should get on it.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-month-how-to-make-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:32281466</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 12 Feb 2021 18:15:50 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/32281466/6437ddf0919f3d0e106768c0bf819a79.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1629</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/32281466/140fb308a5cf713ebe2ba85faf940975.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Transmission fortnight: burying power lines next to rail & roads to make a national transmission grid]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Happy Monday! Welcome back to Transmission Fortnight here at Volts. Today’s a fun one.</p><p>In my <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-how-to-start-building">previous post</a>, I described the many difficulties facing new high-voltage, long-distance transmission projects, from planning to financing to permitting and siting. It’s a bureaucratic slog.</p><p>Today we’re going to look at a clever idea for bypassing many of those problems, namely, stitching together a national power grid by burying power lines along existing rail and road infrastructure, where rights-of-way are already established, thus eliminating the endless haggling with local governments and landowners.  </p><p>The idea has been gaining steam in the policy community for the last few years. FERC issued <a target="_blank" href="https://cleanenergygrid.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Report-to-Congress-on-High-Voltage-Transmission_17June2020-002.pdf">a report</a> in June on challenges to transmission; siting along existing infrastructure was cited as a promising solution. In his <a target="_blank" href="https://joebiden.com/build-back-better/">Build Back Better plan</a>, Biden promised to “take advantage of existing rights-of-way — along roads and railways — and cut red-tape to promote faster and easier [transmission] permitting.” <a target="_blank" href="https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/531793-a-transportation-infrastructure-and-climate-priority">This op-ed in The Hill</a> sums up the benefits quite nicely, both of a national grid and of building it without siting battles. </p><p>The vision is taking hold. And at least one small piece of that vision has gone beyond speculation into an actual permitting process. </p><p>The SOO Green line will carry Iowa wind power to Chicago</p><p>A company called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.soogreenrr.com/direct-connect-development-company/">Direct Connect</a> is currently in the development and permitting phase of a privately financed, $2.5 billion project called the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.soogreenrr.com/">SOO Green HVDC Link</a>, a proposed 349-mile, 2.1-gigawatt (!), 525-kilovolt transmission line to run underground along existing railroad from Mason City, Iowa, to the Chicago, Illinois, area. It aims to go into operation in 2024.</p><p>Going underground will allow the line to minimize environmental and visual impact. It will be much more resilient than an overhead line against weather, temperature shifts, sabotage, or <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/01/12/a-terrifying-and-hilarious-map-of-squirrel-attacks/">squirrels</a>. </p><p>Two side-by-side cables will run through tubes of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.performancewire.com/benefits-of-cross-linked-polyethylene/">Cross-Linked Polyethylene</a> (XLPE) and will be self-contained, lightweight, and easy to handle. They won’t get hot, interfere with signaling equipment (unlike AC lines), or affect rail operations. There are fiber-optic sensors along the lines to monitor sound and heat for any problems. </p><p>(<a target="_blank" href="https://www.nemolink.co.uk/">Nemo Link</a>, the world’s first 400 kilovolt line using XLPE, runs undersea between the UK and Belgium; it began operation in January 2019.)</p><p>Running alongside the railroad means SOO Green will have no need to claim land via eminent domain. Almost all of that railroad is owned by Canadian Pacific (one of seven large “class one” railroads in the US), so there are a tractable number of parties to deal with. </p><p>A deal like this offers railroads a new passive revenue stream; royalty fees well exceed what they get from similarly buried fiber-optic lines, of which there are more than 100,000 miles along US railroads. And it’s also a chance for railroads to be part of a positive sustainability story. </p><p>The project is privately funded, so there will be no need for any complicated cost-allocation formulas. The financiers (including Siemens, which very rarely puts direct capital in transmission projects) will make their money back from those who use the line — the suppliers that put power on it, the shippers that sell power across it, and the buyers that consume the power — through competitive bidding for capacity. SOO Green is holding an <a target="_blank" href="https://soogreenhvdclink-os.com/">open solicitation</a> right now to allocate its 2,100 megawatts among them.  </p><p>The aim is to create a more robust energy market by, for the first time, connecting the MISO and PJM territories. (MISO and PJM are regional transmission organizations; see <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-how-to-start-building">previous post</a> for details.) Wind power projects are backed up in MISO, waiting to connect, stymied by grid congestion. Meanwhile, nextdoor neighbor PJM is the largest liquid energy market in the world. </p><p>The idea is that SOO Green will unlock renewable energy development in MISO; Direct Connect projects four to six new gigawatts. That energy will be transported to population centers in PJM, easing grid congestion, reducing the carbon intensity of the East Coast energy mix, and lowering power prices. </p><p>The connection will also allow MISO and PJM to share reserves for the first time, which could reduce the need for reserve capacity, increase reliability, and save consumers money. </p><p>Because the MISO side will be drawing from such a geographically broad region, it is likely to be in use almost continuously. “When the wind isn't blowing in North Dakota, it likely is in Minnesota,” Trey Ward, the CEO of Direct Connect, told me. “We anticipate upwards of 90 percent line utilization.”</p><p>“It's as if we teleported a 2,100-megawatt wind turbine with a 90 percent capacity factor from Iowa into suburban Chicago,” he says. In fact, the converter station in PJM has applied to be treated as a capacity source in that market. (That will require some updating of regulations, just as power market regulations had to be updated to accommodate batteries.) </p><p>The converter stations at each end of the line are worth looking at more closely. They will use the latest generation of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.entsoe.eu/Technopedia/techsheets/voltage-source-converters-vsc">Voltage Source Converters</a> (VSCs) to exchange power between the HVDC line and the regional high-voltage alternating current (HVAC) systems already in place. </p><p>VSC technology has been <a target="_blank" href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1876610212011320">around since the late 1990s</a>, but it has only recently gotten efficient, compact, and cheap enough to compete against the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.abb-conversations.com/2015/11/thyristors-the-heart-of-hvdc/#:~:text=High%20voltage%20direct%20current%20(HVDC,converts%20AC%20and%20DC%20current.">thyristors (solid-state valves) in common use today</a> on HVDC lines. </p><p>VSCs boast several important advantages. Thyristors need strong AC systems on both sides of the line, they require power filtering, and they have limited control over reactive power. (Do not ask me, or anyone else, what “reactive power” is. That way lies madness.)</p><p>VSCs, on the other hand, are “self-commutated converters,” which means they can generate AC voltages (using <a target="_blank" href="https://passive-components.eu/igbt-snubber-capacitors-selection-guide/">IGBT capacitors</a>) without relying on an AC system. They can control power independently, even with a weak AC system or no AC current at all; they can “black start” a grid from a blackout automatically, without any workers out throwing switches.</p><p>VSCs allow precise and instantaneous, bi-directional control of both active and reactive power. They can provide services to the grid other than just energy — things like voltage and frequency regulation or “synthetic inertia” to support grid stability.</p><p>“You can go from zero to 2,100 megawatts in 1/100 of a second, and back down again just as fast,” says Ward. “It will be the fastest, most dynamic resource on the North American grid.”</p><p>Power electronics experts have been <a target="_blank" href="https://www.tdworld.com/digital-innovations/hvdc/article/20970224/a-short-history-the-voltage-source-converter">claiming for years</a> that VSCs would eventually replace thyristors in HVDC projects. (“We’re in a race with Germany,” Ward says.) If built, SOO Green would be a big step toward making it finally happen — the first deployment of VSCs at this scale in the world. </p><p>The main thing these VSC stations will do is serve as regional energy hubs, accepting gigawatts of energy from, or dispensing it to, existing HVAC grids.</p><p>Energy users that require a large, reliable supply of high-quality electricity, like data centers or technology parks (perhaps ensconced in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/12/15/16714146/greener-more-reliable-more-resilient-grid-microgrids">microgrids</a>), can co-locate with the hubs to take advantage of their high-quality power control, thus spurring economic development. </p><p>Direct Connect estimates that the SOO Green project will create 2,000 temporary construction jobs, unlock more than 4,000 jobs in renewable energy development, generate more than $2.7 billion in economic development in the two states, and yield more than $3.75 billion in ratepayer savings over 20 years. </p><p>We shouldn’t exaggerate how easy things will be for SOO Green. It won’t be completely free of siting hassles, and there are costs outside its control. (The X factor is the cost of copper for the lines themselves — if it spikes for some reason, SOO Green will be in trouble.) But its costs will be much more predictable than a typical overhead line’s. It knows its exact route from the beginning and, because digging ditches is a pretty cheap and well-established technology, 80 percent of its construction costs will be for equipment. </p><p>Things might be trickier for the next rail-transmission project. SOO Green is exploiting ideal conditions: a low-use railroad with well-characterized geology, connecting an energy-producing region with an energy-consuming one. Future projects could face more physical and economic challenges. At some point, there will be projects that don’t pencil out for private capital, but are needed to link the lines together into a national grid; then public money will have to step in.</p><p>But private capital can do a lot. Ward mentions two federal policies that could help. One is a federal investment tax credit (ITC) like the one renewable energy receives, to defray the cost of investment, especially for early and pioneering projects. (More details on that in the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-how-to-start-building">previous post</a>.)</p><p>The other is some kind of manufacturing tax credit to spur more US companies to manufacture the XLPE line that Direct Connect is currently buying overseas. </p><p>Even without those policies, though, things are more or less on track (har har) for SOO Green. </p><p>If things go well for the project — no sure thing, given America’s history with transmission — it could serve as a template for new HVDC backbones along other sections of the elaborate US rail network. Ward estimates that as few as a half-dozen such lines would completely transform the US electricity system and spark billions of dollars of renewable energy development. (Direct Connect is in talks with all the class one railroads.) </p><p>An aside: as long as we’re talking about electricity and railroads, you should check out <a target="_blank" href="https://www.solutionaryrail.org/">Solutionary Rail</a>, a plan to run (<a target="_blank" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overhead_line">overhead catenary</a>) electricity lines along the nation’s rail lines and electrify rail freight in the process.</p><p>Anyway, to date there are no HVDC lines being planned along roads or highways, in part because state Departments of Transportation are always thinking about adding lanes, in which case the lines would have to be moved. </p><p>But it’s also because developers still have an inflated sense of the cost of undergrounding lines. The news hasn’t widely spread that modern lines require less conducting metal, horizontal drilling has been perfected by natural gas frackers, and inverter stations are as little as 25 percent the size they used to be.</p><p>Here’s what Dr. Christopher Clack, an energy modeler at <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vibrantcleanenergy.com/">Vibrant Clean Energy</a> (VCE), told me:</p><p>Data that I was provided from Tier 1 transmission vendors shows that the cost of underground HVDC transmission has a similar price point to the same overhead capacity of HVAC when the transmission line is over approximately 250 miles. This includes the cost to build inverter and rectifier stations at each end. </p><p>And of course the sticker price of building overhead lines does not include the unpredictable expenses of regulatory hassles and intransigent landowners. A line can not be cheap if it never gets built. </p><p>In terms of long-distance transmission, underground HVDC is now the smart choice. </p><p>But there’s one other step planners and developers can take to bypass conventional transmission hassles.</p><p>A national grid made of two-state pieces</p><p>VCE is currently working on a detailed modeling exercise showing how the US can decarbonize by 2050. (You can see a preview <a target="_blank" href="https://zero2050usa.com/">here</a>.)</p><p>The modeling (like much other modeling before it) shows that a national HVDC network is desperately needed for decarbonization. But VCE is aware of the difficulty of siting lines that cross multiple states. So it came up with a way to create a national network that is comprised entirely of lines that only bridge two states — each one originates in one state and terminates in a neighboring state. And every one of the major HVDC trunk lines is underground, running along rail or road infrastructure.</p><p>Here it is (a fancier map with more precise routes will be coming with the final release): </p><p>The two-state pieces are like Legos from which a national grid can be built. “You can get [energy] from Colorado to Chicago,” Clack told me, “but you have to go through five rectifier stations. It is the same as having one line.”</p><p>Building the system this way does come at some additional cost, since the VSC stations at the terminus of each line are expensive, and this would involve building more of them. And since each conversion of energy loses a little bit, all the additional conversions would add up to about 0.5 percent more “line loss.” </p><p>But the advantage of this approach is that “each line is just a contract between two states,” Clack says. “You would never have a flyover state and you would never have a state that wouldn't get access to the market.” Each participating state would have one or more energy hubs and all the advantages — economic development, less grid congestion, lower power prices — they bring. The end result would be a functioning national energy grid. Clever! </p><p>(When VCE’s modeling is officially released I’ll take a closer look at how the national grid operates and what it accomplishes.)</p><p>Let’s do this</p><p>A national energy grid composed of underground HVDC lines running along existing rail and road infrastructure, with VSC stations in every state, is an absolute home run of an idea. It ticks every conceivable box: it’s economic development, jobs, clean energy, lower prices, and most of all, an ambitious national project that we can accomplish, red and blue states together, to regain some of America’s lost mojo.</p><p>What’s more, transmission hasn’t yet fallen under the shadow of partisanship, unlike … everything else. There is bipartisan appetite for infrastructure spending and for unlocking the domestic renewable energy that is often concentrated in red states and needed in blue ones. </p><p>An underground national HVDC network would create thousands of jobs and bring hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars of new economic development to every single US state. It would save every American money on their power bills. It would bring national decarbonization within reach.   </p><p>It would literally do what Biden promised: bring people together. We should build it!</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-fortnight-burying-power</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:31918428</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 01 Feb 2021 17:00:05 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/31918428/e0ab6de4efa8e9729fd486d929d17726.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1039</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/31918428/755bcc6f89104b859be31241b84e5685.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Transmission week: how to start building more big power lines ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Welcome back to Transmission Week here at Volts!</p><p>In my <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-why-we-need-more">previous post</a>, I explained why the US needs lots of new high-voltage power lines. They will help stitch together America’s balkanized grids, connect remote renewable energy to urban load centers, prepare the country for the coming wave of electrification, and relieve grid congestion. And oh yeah — we won’t be able to decarbonize the country without them. </p><p>Nonetheless, they are not getting built! It’s a problem.</p><p>Today, we’re going to walk step by step through the process and show <em>why</em> they’re not getting built. At each stage, we’ll look at what Congress can do — and what Biden can do without Congress’ help — to get the process moving. This is some wonky stuff, but I’ve tried to keep it as simple as possible.</p><p>Before we start …</p><p>Transmission-related acronyms</p><p>This post will involve numerous acronyms, so to make things easier, I’ve put together a little acronym guide here at the beginning for you to check as needed. If you’re already an electricity system wonk, you can skip this.</p><p>* <strong>DOE:</strong> The Department of Energy. The federal agency responsible for, among many other things, energy research.</p><p>* <strong>FERC:</strong> The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The federal agency that regulates interstate transmission of, and bulk sale of, electricity and natural gas. </p><p>* <strong>IOU:</strong> Investor-owned utility. Privately owned companies acting as public utilities. Excepting some federally owned and municipal utilities, most utilities in the US are IOUs. </p><p>* <strong>ISO:</strong> Independent System Operator. For our purposes here, you can think of these as the same as RTOs (see below). This is why you constantly hear people in this field using the unwieldy phrase “RTOs and ISOs.” </p><p>* <strong>NIETC:</strong> A National Interest Electric Transmission Corridor, designated by DOE as an area in particular need of new transmission to ease costs or congestion.  </p><p>* <strong>NREL:</strong> The National Renewable Energy Laboratory, a DOE-run research lab.</p><p>* <strong>PMA:</strong> Power Marketing Administration. Federal agencies that operate electric systems and sell the electrical output of federally owned hydroelectric dams in 33 states. They are: Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA), and Southwestern Power Administration (SWPA).</p><p>* <strong>RTO:</strong> Regional Transmission Organization. Non-governmental organizations (which nonetheless have government-like powers) that oversee transmission planning and wholesale energy markets in areas of the country that have been “restructured,” i.e., where generation, transmission, and distribution are owned by separate utilities. RTO membership is composed of the utilities in a particular region. </p><p>Here are the US RTOs and ISOs: CAISO, ERCOT, SPP, MISO, PJM, NYISO, and ISO-NE.</p><p>All right, let’s get to it! </p><p>There’s still not much inter-regional (much less national) transmission planning</p><p>For most of the history of the US electricity system, up to the 1990s, almost all utilities were “vertically integrated,” meaning they owned the whole electricity value chain in a given territory, from generators to transmission and distribution. They built large central-station power plants close by to population centers and then ran transmission lines out to them. There was neither much need nor much appetite for building longer regional or inter-regional lines. </p><p>Over all that time, states developed a persistently parochial lens and tight control over transmission planning. </p><p>Two things have changed in recent decades. </p><p>One, renewable energy expanded rapidly and got really cheap, which is why solar and wind are the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.smart-energy.com/renewable-energy/us-renewables-outpace-coal-and-nuclear-says-eia-renewables/">fastest growing sources of new electricity capacity</a>. However, as we saw in the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-why-we-need-more">previous post</a>, the most intense sun and wind in the US are distant from population centers. This suggests the need for a wider scope of planning.</p><p>Two, a wave of reforms in the 1990s and 2000s led to “restructuring” in regions containing around half the nation’s electricity ratepayers. Vertically integrated utilities were broken up: generation owners were separated from transmission owners and both were separated from distribution-system operators (i.e., the local utility that sends you a power bill). Transmission planning in these restructured regions was given over to RTOs and ISOs. </p><p>This suggests there ought to be capacity for a wider scope of planning.</p><p>Indeed, FERC has acknowledged the need for larger-scale, regional and inter-regional transmission planning for decades, and attempted to make it happen through orders <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/electric/industry-activities/open-access-transmission-tariff-oatt-reform/history-oatt-reform/order-no-888">888</a> (1996), <a target="_blank" href="https://www.utilitydive.com/news/happy-birthday-and-thank-you-o2k-thats-order-2000/569134/">2000</a> (1999), <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/E-1_14.pdf">890</a> (2007), and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/electric/electric-transmission/order-no-1000-transmission-planning-and-cost">1000</a> (2011). </p><p>I won’t get into all those orders other than to note that order 2000 created RTOs (membership in which was voluntary for utilities) and was explicitly meant to encourage (though not mandate) broader regional transmission planning. Part of the idea was to create competitive regional markets for transmission, similar to wholesale markets for generation, in which merchant (non-utility) projects would compete on a level playing field with IOU projects. </p><p>As Ari Peskoe of the Harvard Electricity Law Initiative writes in a <a target="_blank" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3770740">recent paper</a>, “FERC was optimistic that [the IOUs’] central-planning development model would be replaced by ‘well-defined transmission rights and efficient price signals’ that would facilitate market-driven expansion.” </p><p>When it didn’t quite work out that way, once again, in order 1000, “FERC employed several mechanisms to pry control over regional transmission development from IOUs and break the IOU-by-IOU planning model,” Peskoe writes.</p><p>The general consensus is that, despite its best efforts, FERC has failed to bring IOUs to heel and produce truly regional transmission planning and markets. Local IOU transmission plans still serve as the foundation of regional planning. There is still virtually no transmission built through competitive bidding. In practice, IOUs still build virtually all the lines in and between their territories and have deliberately made it difficult for merchant projects to get sited and financed. </p><p>IOUs have engaged in a “shift away from regional projects, which must be developed competitively, to smaller or supposedly time-sensitive projects that IOUs build with little oversight and without competitive pressures,” Peskoe writes, and RTOs have implicitly or explicitly supported them in this shift.</p><p>These local IOU processes are often opaque, closed to journalists and public interest groups, but the broad shift is clear. Utilities in PJM, for instance, tripled spending on local transmission projects since order 1000 was issued. In MISO, spending on regional projects shrank from nearly $6 billion to just $300 million from 2014 to 2019. Not a single transmission project in NYISO has been built on the basis of regional benefits since FERC established the process in 2008. </p><p>A <a target="_blank" href="https://brattlefiles.blob.core.windows.net/files/15987_brattle_competitive_transmission_report_final_with_data_tables_04-09-2019.pdf">Brattle Group analysis</a> found that between 2013 and 2017, 97 percent of the transmission approved by RTOs was not subject to a competitive process. Local transmission and reconstruction of aging facilities still receive the bulk of investment. </p><p>One problem is, IOUs are not mandated to be part of RTOs, so they can threaten to withdraw their assets from RTOs at any point. That gives them undue leverage; RTOs are loathe to cross them.</p><p>And so most transmission planning remains largely parochial. RTOs remain dominated by their members and predisposed to accept plans driven by local benefits. There are virtually no planning processes that take into account the changing energy mix or public purposes like integrating renewables and reducing greenhouse gases, and virtually no lines are being planned between regions.</p><p>What Biden can do</p><p>Biden’s FERC will start off with a 3-2 Republican majority. Current Democratic commissioner <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/5/22/18631994/climate-change-renewable-energy-ferc">Richard Glick</a>, a solid supporter of decarbonization, has been made head of the commission, and Democrat Allison Clements (who is also extraordinary) was sworn in in December. </p><p>In June, an additional vacancy will open up, which Biden will be able to fill, giving Democrats a majority, which will be significant on a commission <a target="_blank" href="https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/podcast/the-rise-of-partisan-politics-in-energy-regulation/">increasingly issuing partisan split rulings</a> on things like oil and gas pipelines and, er, the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/12/23/21031112/trump-coal-ferc-energy-subsidy-mopr">MOPR</a> (don’t ask).  </p><p>With a climate hawk majority, FERC could issue a stronger order mandating membership in RTOs and participation in regional planning. It could instruct RTOs and states to take into account the changing resource mix, the need for decarbonization, rising (and shifting) demand from electrification, and the benefits of inter-regional transmission. (MISO’s “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.misoenergy.org/planning/planning/multi-value-projects-mvps/#t=10&#38;p=0&#38;s=&#38;sd=">multi-value project</a>” process is often cited as a model here.)</p><p>FERC could also mandate that transmission planning take a broader view of reliability, resilience, and cost-effectiveness, to replace the siloed way they are assessed today. </p><p>It could also work with DOE and other agencies to develop a true national transmission plan, with an eye toward national policy goals, from which regional organizations could take their cue. </p><p>And, as Peskoe advocates, FERC could more closely scrutinize the local transmission planning processes now run — parochially and with very little supervision — by IOUs. Specifically, it could “reverse its longstanding policy of presuming that all transmission expenses are prudent, and replace it with a presumption that only capital expenditures committed pursuant to an independently administered planning process are presumed prudent.” In other words, shift the burden of proof to IOUs. </p><p>Doing so would push IOUs to put more transmission planning in independent hands. And FERC could take additional steps to force IOUs to regularly divulge key information necessary for independent planning. </p><p>“In transmission operations, separating ownership from operational control allowed the industry to capture benefits of both coordination and competition,” Peskoe writes. “Separating ownership from control over planning could have similarly significant benefits by untethering planning from maintaining any IOU’s state-granted advantages.”</p><p>One way or another, FERC has to wrestle control over transmission planning from IOUs and give it to independent organizations that can assess the full range of benefits.</p><p>What Congress can do</p><p>Congress could pass legislation clarifying that it intends for FERC to fully regionalize (and to some extent nationalize) transmission planning by taking the steps above. The Democrats’ <a target="_blank" href="https://energycommerce.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/ec-leaders-release-draft-clean-future-act-legislative-text-to-achieve-a-100">Climate Leadership and Environmental Action for our Nation’s (CLEAN) Future Act</a>, passed through the House last summer, contained language that would instruct FERC to issue a rulemaking to that effect. </p><p>Congress could also allocate funding to DOE to ramp up its research on a macrogrid, including resuming NREL’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/8/3/17638246/national-energy-grid-renewables-transmission">Interconnections Seam Study</a>. It could also fund DOE to assist state and regional organizations in studying and implementing inter-regional planning, and work out a transmission plan for offshore wind in the Northeast (which is currently beset by NIMBYs). </p><p>Basically, the federal government needs to study and develop best practices for inter-regional planning and then require that IOUs, RTOs, and states actually use them. Much of that legislative legwork has already been done in the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.heinrich.senate.gov/press-releases/heinrich-unveils-bill-to-recharge-electric-transmission-planning-">Interregional Transmission Planning Improvement Act of 2019</a>, introduced by Sen. Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.); it was included in the House-passed <a target="_blank" href="https://transportation.house.gov/news/press-releases/house-democrats-release-text-of-hr-2-a-transformational-infrastructure-bill-to-create-jobs-and-rebuild-america">infrastructure bill</a>, HR-2, but not in the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/congress-might-pass-a-huge-energy">year-end package</a> that passed both houses.</p><p>All right, that’s planning! Up next is financing, but first, we need a cuteness break. Here’s my cute niece:</p><p>Financing transmission is unnecessarily difficult</p><p>The interconnection process — the process of connecting a new generator to the transmission network — is currently run by RTOs on a “participant funding” model, which means the project developer must pay for any grid upgrades or new lines required. This despite the fact that new lines create benefits (in reliability, efficiency, and regulatory compliance) that are spread state-wide, even regionally. A <a target="_blank" href="https://cleanenergygrid.org/new-report-finds-current-transmission-interconnection-process-unworkable-inefficient-raising-energy-costs-customers-stifling-job-creation/">recent report</a> from Americans for a Clean Energy Grid (ACEG) compared participant funding to “charging the next car to enter a congested highway for the cost of building a new lane.”</p><p>The process is currently a disaster. First, there’s the free-rider problem: no developer particularly wants to shoulder the costs for broadly distributed benefits. Second, no renewable energy project developer knows in advance whether their interconnection will require grid upgrades; when it does, they often drop out, which means the whole interconnection study and approval process starts all over again for the next project in the queue. </p><p>Third, it’s impossible to predict the location and size of power demand in five years, which is how long it takes to build transmission. And fourth, the one-at-a-time process foregoes opportunities to plan larger scale, multi-line regional projects. </p><p>The financing barriers, coupled with the risk and uncertainty of a long, multi-stage regulatory process, serve to deter investment and keep costs unnecessarily high. </p><p>What Biden can do</p><p>What’s needed is for the costs of new transmission to be spread out more evenly among the beneficiaries, beyond the members of the particular RTO in which the line is proposed. That’s a highly technical undertaking in practice, so FERC could begin by soliciting solutions to this problem from RTOs and ISOs. But the process should result in a rule that forces cost-allocation reforms.</p><p>To speed things up, a FERC rule could also permit portfolio-based cost allocation, which allows RTOs to group projects together instead of running individual cost-allocation studies for each.</p><p>FERC could also apply more scrutiny and higher standards to local transmission investments, weighing them relative to regional projects that could provide the same benefits and more.</p><p>What Congress can do</p><p>Congress could pass legislation instructing FERC to prohibit the participant-funding model and spread costs out more equitably. </p><p>It could also implement tax incentives for transmission investment, along the lines of the tax credits for solar and wind. They could be tailored to encourage long-distance, inter-regional lines. (There are Democratic bills in both the House and Senate that contain provisions to this effect; ACEG has its own proposal. There’s a whole wonky post to be written about how best to design these credits, but I will spare you.)</p><p>And there are other ways Congress could pump money into transmission: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energy.gov/oe/information-center/recovery-act-smart-grid-investment-grant-sgig-program">investment grants</a>, direct funding for inter-regional projects, support for states involved in regional and inter-regional planning, and money to compensate communities affected by new transmission projects.</p><p>The Department of Transportation issues what are called Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) loans, targeted at surface transportation infrastructure projects that are of regional or national significance. A similar loan program could be set up for transmission projects.</p><p>Finally, Congress could reinvigorate America’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=11651">Power Marketing Administrations</a> (PMAs), which operate in 33 states (primarily to market and sell power from government-owned hydroelectric dams). As part of their operations, PMAs build and operate transmission. Congress could give them some money and a kick in the ass to get moving on more regional transmission. </p><p>OK, that’s financing. Onward to permitting and siting!</p><p>Permitting and siting are valleys of death for transmission</p><p>The Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) at Columbia University and the Institute for Policy Integrity (IPI) recently put out a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/research/report/building-new-grid-without-new-legislation-path-revitalizing-federal-transmission-authorities">report</a> (forthwith, the “CGEP report”) on what Biden can do to boost transmission without help from Congress. It serves as a good backgrounder on the barriers to siting transmission projects.</p><p>The key background condition is that the 1935 Federal Power Act gave FERC authority over transmission rates and facilities, but <em>not</em> over transmission siting. That authority remained, and remains, with states. </p><p>Consequently, a power line that runs through more than one state must be approved by each state’s public utility commission to act as a utility in that state. And it must secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) from each state siting authority. Notably, the report says, “state law often directs state commissions to consider only the interests of <em>in-state</em> residents and businesses” — in other words, the states that approve these projects are often <em>prohibited</em> from considering their broader benefits.</p><p>It is a difficult and unpredictable process, fraught with veto points. CGEP elaborates:</p><p>Several factors make long-distance transmission projects fragile to opposition—and there is always opposition. Their long length means that these projects inevitably encounter numerous stakeholders, potentially including federal, state, tribal, and local government agencies from which they must seek authorization, as well as private property owners from whom they must acquire property rights. And like all linear projects, they are subject to holdups, meaning that a single stakeholder can prevent assembly of a complete right-of-way.  </p><p>Each state (in some cases, each county or even each landowner) has veto power over the project. Each is thinking about the benefits to itself and has no incentive to consider broader regional or national benefits. Endless lawsuits and delays drive up the cost of capital and drive away even the most determined financiers. It’s a virtually impassable set of barriers to long-distance transmission.</p><p>It is worth noting again that total state control over transmission permitting and siting stands in stark contrast to the way natural gas lines are permitted and sited in the US. The Natural Gas Act grants the federal government exclusive authority to permit and site interstate natural gas pipelines and the power to use eminent domain to acquire rights-of-way.</p><p>That streamlined federal approval process — especially the profligate way in which FERC has applied it under a Republican majority — has been a boon to natural gas pipeline developers. “FERC coordinates the process as a whole, has seldom rejected a pipeline proposal, and has generally managed to overcome state efforts to prevent pipeline development,” CGEP writes.</p><p>The situation is woefully inverted for interstate and inter-regional transmission projects, which can be blocked by any and every local interest and have no backstop federal authority. </p><p>What Biden can do</p><p>In section 216 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress granted FERC limited authority to site transmission projects within “National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors” (NIETCs) designated by DOE. If (and only if) a state has unfairly refused to permit a project within one of these corridors, FERC can step in and provide backstop permitting and siting authority, including eminent domain. </p><p>DOE’s initial effort to designate these corridors identified huge swathes of land, which freaked out local lawmakers and landowners. And the first attempts to exercise FERC’s siting authority were shot down by federal courts, leading <a target="_blank" href="https://www.powermag.com/is-ferc-backstop-siting-authority-still-alive/">many observers to speculate that the authority will never be used</a> — and indeed, since then, it has remained notional. No new NIETCs have been designated or lines built on their basis. </p><p>The CGEP report argues that the authority still exists and that the specific rulings in the two court cases are not an insuperable barrier to action. Trump’s DOE issued a preliminary ruling in September saying that no new NIETCs are needed, but it relied on the Trump administration’s characteristically shoddy reasoning. Above all, it ignored <em>future</em> electricity demand.</p><p>The comment period on that ruling is still open; Biden’s DOE could revise the study to take in a broader interpretation of grid needs and constraints. It could quickly designate some NIETCs, to get the ball rolling, but it could be more deft about it by working with FERC to target designations narrowly, to support specific projects, reducing duplicative study and analysis and freaking out fewer landowners. It could even delegate to FERC the authority to designate NIETCs, as recommended by the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis and others.</p><p>And FERC could clarify its interpretation of its own backstop siting authority and when it plans to use it. Specifically, it could clarify that transmission projects that connect renewables to loads meet the criteria to receive a federal permit — and that it will take a dim view of other state-imposed obstacles.</p><p>Separately, section 1222 of the Energy Policy Act authorizes federal-private partnerships on transmission projects. In theory, writes CGEP, federal involvement “both frees the transmission project from the requirements of state siting and public utility laws and provides a basis for the exercise of federal eminent domain authority.” </p><p>This is another case where there have been very few attempts to use the authority. Biden’s DOE could deploy it by reinvigorating the PMAs, which could use section 1222 authority to build transmission anywhere it’s needed within their territories. </p><p>What Congress can do</p><p>All of this would be easier if Congress would pass legislation specifying the measures above: that DOE can delegate its authority over NIETCs to FERC, that access to renewables and future electrification should be criteria for designating NIETCs, that DOE and FERC should work together to create a single, streamlined federal permitting process, and that FERC has real backstop authority to site transmission within NIETCs.</p><p>Ideally, the federal exercise of eminent domain won’t be necessary. Congress could put money toward incentives for tribes, local governments, and states to revamp their permitting processes, perhaps accompanied by economic development grants, to ease the process. </p><p>“You really don't want to have to use the backstop siting authority,” says Fatima Ahmad, senior counsel with the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis. “You want to start by allowing the developer to develop good relationships with the community before they pitch the designation of the corridor, then you want to have some kind of economic incentives for the communities, and then the federal government can use its convening authority to bring the states together to work something out. So [eminent domain] really is a last resort.”</p><p>In that same vein, Congress could put some money toward states and regional planners that are working to streamline siting. Money always helps move things along.</p><p>Drawing some conclusions</p><p>All right! This has been a long, wonky journey, friends, and I appreciate and respect those of you who made it this far. Let’s try to sum things up.</p><p>The basic problem with transmission is that we need a lot more of it in the US if we want to electrify and decarbonize, but it remains prohibitively difficult and expensive to build. Mostly that’s because the process is dominated, at every stage, by narrow, parochial concerns. IOUs are looking inward, RTOs are looking inward, states are looking inward. The intense localism of the process produces dozens of opportunities for NIMBY opposition and few tools to overcome them. </p><p>Politically speaking, it would be vastly easier to solve these problems with some clear legislation from Congress. As discussed here on Volts many times, a big climate bill is almost certainly not going to pass as long as the filibuster is in place. But that leaves open the possibility that some of this policy could sneak its way either into a budget reconciliation bill or one of the must-pass end-of-year funding bills. </p><p>There’s some precedent for these kinds of reforms getting bipartisan support — a few were tucked away in <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/congress-might-pass-a-huge-energy">the energy bill that was tucked away in the spending bill</a> that just passed Congress a few weeks ago — so there’s some hope.</p><p>But in the meantime, as I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/21724758/biden-transition-trump-polarized-climate-change-health-immigration">keep saying</a>, Biden should use the powers of the executive branch aggressively. He should push the agencies to ease financing barriers, designate more corridors, permit more projects, and throw a little weight around on siting. </p><p>These reforms are somewhat obscure and technical, but there is nothing obscure about the jobs new transmission would create or the enormous economic, social, and environmental benefits it would generate. It’s right in Biden’s wheelhouse — he should go for it.</p><p>Coming up next in Transmission Week(s)</p><p>Remember how I said there would be four posts in Transmission Week? Turns out that was a lie. There are going to be five, and there might be two Transmission Weeks. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯</p><p>In my next post — shorter, easier, and more fun than this one, I promise! — I’ll have a look at two clever ideas for how to build a national transmission grid <em>without</em> the siting hassles. I don’t want to get all clickbaity on you, but … it will involve both trains and lasers. </p><p>See you then!</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-how-to-start-building</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:31925214</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 27 Jan 2021 17:00:48 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/31925214/4290191fca2c3718de992f9db49e1d1e.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1946</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/31925214/4bf0b7700141144d714953b2792a29d3.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Transmission week: why we need more big power lines]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>[<em>If you would rather listen to the post than read it, click play above.</em>]</p><p>Hello, Volties, and welcome to Transmission Week here at Volts! It’s been delayed almost as many times as Infrastructure Week, but it’s finally here. All week, we’re going to be digging into the US energy transmission system. </p><p>For those of you new to the subject, “transmission system” refers to the big, high-voltage power lines that carry electricity over long distances, usually perched along tall metal towers. To use a road analogy, transmission lines are like the interstate system, whereas lower-voltage “distribution systems” are like the nests of highways and streets that serve local populations.</p><p>I’ve always been <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/11/30/17868620/renewable-energy-power-grid-architecture">fascinated by distribution systems</a>, but I’ve never really taken a deep dive into the transmission side of things. Until now!</p><p>And now that I have, I understand better than ever why I put it off for so long. </p><p>It’s complicated, y’all. There are lots and lots of acronyms, agencies, and obscure policies involved. It’s not the sexiest stuff.</p><p>But it’s important. Transmission is one of the key tools to help decarbonize the country and also one of the biggest, most dangerous bottlenecks standing in the way. We (probably) can’t decarbonize at the scale and speed we need without more of it, but laws, rules, and systems designed for a different century and a different electricity system are slowing it to a snail’s pace. </p><p>The entire transmission process badly needs attention and reform. And there are signs it may finally be getting some. There’s bipartisan political support for it, along with support from big unions like the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. </p><p>“I'm excited about transmission,” says Fatima Ahmad, senior counsel for the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis. “I see jobs benefits, I see bipartisan interest, I see more and more climate policy advocates taking the time to get educated about these issues — all those things make me excited. This is just such a clear next step.”</p><p>So here’s what we’re going to do. Today, I’m going to try to convince you that transmission matters: we need more of it, we’re not building it, our decarbonization goals are at risk, but we’re at a moment when real reform is possible.</p><p>In the next post, we’ll get into the weeds. Getting a transmission line built requires planning, financing, permitting, and siting, and right now every single step of that process is dysfunctional and constipated. In each case, we’ll look at what Biden can do (through the agencies) and what Congress can do to expedite the process. Expect acronyms.</p><p>In the post after that, we’ll look at a related issue: not how to build new transmission lines, but how to improve the existing transmission system with “grid-enhancing technologies.” (Get excited about topology optimization algorithms!)</p><p>And finally, we’ll review what we’ve learned and contemplate the political landscape ahead.</p><p>It’s gonna be so much fun!</p><p>Why we need more transmission</p><p>I wrote about the need for more transmission <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/8/3/17638246/national-energy-grid-renewables-transmission">here</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2020/6/20/21293952/renewable-energy-power-national-grid-transmission-microgrids">here</a> for Vox, if you want to really dig in, but here’s a quick review of the top reasons.</p><p>We need more transmission to decarbonize</p><p>A group of researchers at Princeton recently did some <a target="_blank" href="https://acee.princeton.edu/acee-news/net-zero-america-report-release/">comprehensive modeling of US decarbonization scenarios</a>. Of the scenarios that achieved net-zero, the one with the <em>least</em> new transmission — the RE- scenario, which includes lots of nuclear power and natural gas with carbon capture and sequestration — doubles US transmission capacity by 2050. In the more renewables-heavy scenario, E+, transmission triples. </p><p><a target="_blank" href="https://zero2050usa.com/">Modeling from Dr. Christopher Clack at Vibrant Clean Energy</a> has produced similar results, as have many other studies.</p><p>If the US wants to decarbonize at all, it’s going to have to build the sh*t out of some new transmission.</p><p>We need a national energy grid anyway</p><p>Despite my road analogy above, the US transmission system is different from its interstate system in one important way: we have a true national interstate network. No matter where you are in the system, you can drive to anywhere else in the system. </p><p>The US does <em>not</em> have a true national energy network. Instead, functionally speaking, it has three transmission grids: the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and ERCOT (a Texas grid, basically). Though there are a few small ties between them, very little energy is exchanged. They mostly operate in isolation.</p><p>(As you can see from all the labels below, the Eastern Interconnection is divided up among several functional transmission regions, but they are all connected to a common physical grid.)</p><p>This is goofy. Linking them together with high-voltage direct current (HVDC) lines — i.e., creating a true national energy network — would allow them to share, exporting energy when they have oversupply or importing it when supply is stretched. Early morning solar in Arizona could go to New York at the peak of its afternoon demand. Evening wind power in North Dakota could go to California when everyone is turning on their big screen TVs.</p><p>Generally, with grids, the bigger and more interconnected they are, the more efficient, reliable, and cost-effective they are. To wit: a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vibrantcleanenergy.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Future_cost-competitive_electricity_syst.pdf">2016 study by scientists at NOAA</a> found that a national HVDC network would save US consumers $47 billion annually. The <a target="_blank" href="https://cleanenergygrid.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NREL-seams-transgridx-2018.pdf">Interconnections Seam Study</a> by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) — a study the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/08/how-trump-appointees-short-circuited-grid-modernization/615433/">Trump administration tried to squash</a> — found that every $1 invested in a national HVDC grid would return $2.50 in economic, environmental, and social benefits. </p><p>A national grid (with the appropriate cybersecurity and resilience measures) would allow the US to make the best possible use of its domestic clean-energy resources. It’s a no-brainer.</p><p>(By the by, China is in the midst of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.power-technology.com/comment/china-26bn-uhv-grids/">plowing $26 billion into a national network of </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.power-technology.com/comment/china-26bn-uhv-grids/"><em>ultra</em></a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.power-technology.com/comment/china-26bn-uhv-grids/">-high voltage lines</a> — UHVDC — to carry renewable energy across the country.)</p><p>We need to connect remote renewables to population centers</p><p>The areas in the US where sunlight and wind are most intense (the desert Southwest and the Midwest corridor, respectively) are distant from the metropolitan areas (mostly along the coasts) where there is most demand. </p><p>To make use of that remote renewable energy, we need transmission lines much longer than most that were built in the age of fossil fuel electricity, when plants could be built close by. Those long HVDC lines will require sophisticated new technologies and unfamiliar planning processes. Right now, we’re stuck in a chicken-and-egg problem: renewable energy developers are hesitant to build, not knowing whether they’ll be forced to pay for expensive new lines; transmission developers are hesitant to build, not knowing whether there will be generators to fill their lines. </p><p>Someone (spoiler: the federal government) needs to come in and break up the logjam to get things moving. There’s a huge pool of clean, domestic American energy waiting to be tapped.</p><p>We need to prepare for clean electrification</p><p>Among today’s US energy wonks, it is now fairly widely agreed that <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21349200/climate-change-fossil-fuels-rewiring-america-electrify">the fastest, cheapest, and possibly only route to large-scale, near-term decarbonization is through clean electrification</a>. That means, first and foremost, transitioning to a net-zero-carbon electricity grid. But it also means <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12938086/electrify-everything">shifting most transportation and heating/cooling off of liquid fossil fuels and onto electricity</a>.</p><p>Large-scale electrification will dramatically increase demand for electricity — close to 40% by 2050, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/71500.pdf">by some estimates</a>. </p><p>It will also change the location and timing of energy demand, in ways that will change where and when the grid is stressed. </p><p>A plan to decarbonize the US must involve looking forward, anticipating those changes, and planning the transmission system around them. </p><p>We need to relieve grid congestion</p><p>Even transmission wires of modest length can help relieve congestion in regional grids and make them more efficient and cost-effective. </p><p>Currently, congestion is a major problem, and it’s creating a nightmare for new renewable energy projects in some regions. A <a target="_blank" href="https://cleanenergygrid.org/new-report-finds-current-transmission-interconnection-process-unworkable-inefficient-raising-energy-costs-customers-stifling-job-creation/">recent report</a> from Americans for a Clean Energy Grid (ACEG) found that, “at the end of 2019, 734 gigawatts of proposed generation — 90 percent of which are new wind, solar, and storage projects — were waiting in interconnection queues nationwide.” Not all that proposed generation would be built, even in the best of circumstances, but it’s still an enormous backlog of projects waiting to connect.</p><p>Here’s a map of grid congestion in the territory covered by the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO). The areas in orange and red are already overloaded (as of 2018).</p><p>A recent analysis by the Natural Resources Defense Council’s <a target="_blank" href="https://sustainableferc.org/">Sustainable FERC Project</a> — <a target="_blank" href="https://energynews.us/2020/09/29/midwest/grid-congestion-a-growing-barrier-for-wind-solar-developers-in-miso-territory/">well-covered by Kari Lydersen for Midwest Energy News</a> — found that “245 clean energy projects that had reached advanced stages of development were withdrawn between January 2016 and July 2020,” mainly due to grid congestion and the resulting high costs of grid upgrades. That’s an enormous amount of clean energy — and work on the part of renewable energy developers — down the drain.</p><p>The graph below shows the amount of different kinds of energy waiting in interconnection queues from 2014 to 2019 — as you can see, both solar and wind are spiking. We’ve got more and more clean energy just waiting around to start sending electrons.</p><p>Unclogging those queues requires, among other things, building more transmission. </p><p>Remember that study by the NOAA scientists? It also found that a national energy grid would allow the integration of 523 gigawatts of new wind and 371 gigawatts of new solar. (US total electrical capacity is around 1,200 gigawatts, so those are not small amounts.)</p><p>So: new transmission would help integrate renewable energy, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, reduce electricity costs, and relieve congestion. It’s national infrastructure that creates jobs and repays upfront investment many times over. We can’t hit our national decarbonization goals without it. </p><p>It is good. We should build more of it.</p><p>State and local resistance is constipating the national energy grid</p><p>I’ll go into this in more detail in the next post, but the root of the problem for transmission in the US is local resistance. </p><p>For natural gas, the federal government can step in, permit a pipeline, and seize land via eminent domain. It does not have that authority when it comes to transmission lines (except in some special cases). In the US, transmission siting is controlled by states. The process is a bureaucratic marathon subject to parochial objections and ridden with veto points at every stage. </p><p>That’s why, even as the consensus around the need for new national transmission has been strengthening for decades, the US has continued … not building much. We have been under-investing in transmission for decades. Check out how electricity demand outran transmission expansion from 1988 to 2009:</p><p>Texas broke the mold by building a bunch of transmission to connect renewables through its <a target="_blank" href="https://cleanenergygrid.org/texas-national-model-bringing-clean-energy-grid/">Competitive Renewable Energy Zones (CREZ) program</a> in the 2010s, but the rest of the country hasn’t followed suit. Some shorter local lines are getting built, some lines that are underwater (and thus free of local landowners), but in terms of long-distance, high-voltage lines, there’s been basically bupkis. </p><p>(In his book <a target="_blank" href="https://smile.amazon.com/Superpower-Quest-Transform-American-Energy/dp/1501163582"><em>Superpower</em></a>, journalist Russell Gold tells the story of Houston entrepreneur Michael Skelly and his company Clean Line Energy Partners, which had grand plans to build a national network of HVDC transmission lines — plans that were largely frustrated.)</p><p>And so, overall, the US transmission system is as janky and outdated as the rest of its infrastructure.</p><p>There are some positive signs, though. Biden is choosing smart people to lead the agencies that will have a hand in transmission, there’s broad public and political appetite for Green New Deal-style infrastructure spending, and advocates have begun a coordinated push to get the issue some attention — see, for example, the <a target="_blank" href="https://acore.org/macro-grid-initiative/">Macro Grid Initiative</a>, a co-production of the American Council on Renewable Energy (ACORE) and ACEG. In its recent <a target="_blank" href="https://climatecrisis.house.gov/news/press-releases/climate-plan-press-release">comprehensive report</a>, the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis included a whole detailed section on “moving toward a national Supergrid.”</p><p>The top recommendation in all the reports I’ve read is simply that transmission be made a national priority. The president needs to affirm via executive order — and preferably Congress by legislation — that federal agencies will cooperate to develop and implement a comprehensive plan for a national transmission grid.</p><p>That’s the big picture. On our next episode of Volts, we’ll dig into the specifics of what Congress can do, and what Biden can do without Congress, to get the process of building a national energy grid unconstipated. </p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/transmission-week-why-we-need-more</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:31765505</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 25 Jan 2021 17:00:58 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/31765505/dcaeeca772c0403cc1b79420ccfa1a45.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1069</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/31765505/f315827534844d50e6b7af01dd0cb13f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[A few interesting bits of news]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>[<em>If you don’t feel like reading this post, just click Play above and I’ll read it to you.</em>]</p><p>Happy Inauguration Day, Voltsians! </p><p>I know it’s getting somewhat tedious to keep saying this, but yes, I’m still working on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/improving-long-distance-energy-transmission">that transmission post</a>. I swore when I started my own publication that I was not going to rush anymore — that I would research and work on stuff until I was happy with it. But I never swore not to be neurotic and apologetic about it! </p><p>Anyway, it’s in the works. Until then, let’s look at a few interesting news developments from this eventful past week. </p><p>Biden administration pledges to come out of the gate swinging</p><p>A few weeks ago, I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/21724758/biden-transition-trump-polarized-climate-change-health-immigration">shared some simple advice with the Biden administration</a>: blitz. Do everything within your power, as fast as possible, and don’t get tripped up trying to finesse the media narrative or secure chimerical congressional cooperation.</p><p>In what is clearly a direct response to my piece (I mean probably), the administration recently leaked plans for its first term, to be kicked off with a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/america-votes/joe-biden-s-hefty-to-do-list-starts-with-a-flurry-of-orders-1.5272531?cache=yes%3FcontactForm%3Dtrue">10-day spree of executive actions</a> — roughly a dozen on Day One alone. CTV News got the scoop from a memo by incoming Biden Chief of Staff Ron Klain, which Politico subsequently <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/17/biden-executive-actions-day-one-460146">confirmed</a>.</p><p>I really encourage you to click over and read the list — it’s the best I’ve felt in ages. So many lives will be immediately improved through health, immigration, and Covid relief measures. Elections really do matter.</p><p>But we’re here to talk about climate and energy, so I went through and picked out the relevant stuff:</p><p>Wednesday, after inauguration</p><p>Declaration that the U.S. is rejoining Paris climate accord.</p><p>Start of a process to restore 100 public health and environmental rules that the Obama administration created and President Donald Trump eliminated or weakened.</p><p>Not included in the memo but confirmed by <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/19/politics/keystone-xl-pipeline-biden/index.html">CNN reporting</a>: rescind the permit for the Keystone XL pipeline. </p><p>By February 1</p><p>Executive actions to address climate change.</p><p>Beyond</p><p>Win passage of a $2 trillion climate package to get the U.S. to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050.</p><p>Win passage of a plan to spend $700 billion boosting manufacturing and research and development.</p><p>The list suggests that the administration is going to move aggressively on multiple fronts, but it doesn’t reveal much about what direction it will go on climate. </p><p>The last two items are going to be pure messaging efforts — as long as the filibuster remains in place, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-the-georgia-senate-wins-do-and">neither has a chance of passage</a> in Congress.</p><p>The first item, getting back in the Paris agreement, is low-hanging fruit, more symbolic than impactful. Ultimately, a Paris pledge is simply a pledge to pass domestic carbon policy, so it’s the domestic carbon policy that really matters. </p><p>The second item, cleaning up Trump’s regulatory mess, is extremely important, but it’s a matter of restoration, not building. The third item, Keystone XL, is a genuinely nice-to-see nod to climate activists, but not that big a deal in carbon terms.</p><p>So everything rides on that vague fourth item: “Executive actions to address climate change.” Will Biden’s EPA launch work on new rules to tackle fuel economy? A new plan to decarbonize the electricity sector? More stringent rules on air pollution? Rules that encourage building electrification? </p><p>My fear is that the administration will put off that work, thinking that being gentle will make legislation easier. It won’t. Just do the rules!</p><p>Court strikes down Trump’s plan to (not) regulate power plants</p><p>Tuesday brought a bit of good fortune that will make Biden’s work easier: a federal court struck down one of Trump’s most important climate rollbacks, and not only that, repudiated the legal argument it was based on.</p><p>Some background: </p><p>The Obama administration’s plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from power plants — the Clean Power Plan — was stuck in legal limbo, waiting on a federal court ruling, when Trump came into power and squashed it for good. It never got the ruling or went into effect.</p><p>The <a target="_blank" href="https://grist.org/climate-energy/obamas-carbon-rule-hangs-on-this-one-legal-question/">argument before the court</a> was over whether the Clean Air Act grants EPA the authority to regulate air pollutants “beyond the fenceline.” The Clean Power Plan was extremely flexible, allowing states to meet their reduction targets through a portfolio of compliance strategies, many of which (like building new renewables or increasing energy efficiency) took place outside of the regulated power plants themselves — beyond the fenceline. </p><p>Republican lawyers argued that EPA regulations can only mandate changes “within the fenceline,” which, when it comes to something like a coal plant, amounts to some modest efficiency improvements.</p><p>When the rule and the lawsuit were scrapped, Trump’s EPA developed a replacement plan based on that legal interpretation: the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule. </p><p>Now, pretty much all the rules that came out of the Trump administration were shoddy and ridiculous, but ACE was something special. <a target="_blank" href="https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aafe25/meta">Studies found</a> that the rule would lead to an increase in carbon emissions, because it would enable some coal plants to run more often. <a target="_blank" href="https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-08/documents/utilities_ria_proposed_ace_2018-08.pdf">EPA’s own regulatory impact analysis</a> found the rule would lead to as many as 1,400 additional deaths per year by 2030. </p><p>Yes, you read that right: it was a pollution rule that would have led to more pollution and more deaths than passing no rule at all. </p><p>It was super-dumb. Happily, a key federal court agrees: the DC Circuit Court of Appeals just <a target="_blank" href="https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/6356486C5963F49185258662005677F6/%24file/19-1140-1880546.pdf">struck ACE down</a>. The ruling said that the administration “fundamentally has misconceived the law” in restricting changes to within the fenceline, effectively endorsing the Obama administration’s much more expansive interpretation. </p><p>That means Biden’s EPA will not have to go through the laborious process of rolling back the ACE rule. Instead it can begin with a blank slate — “consider the question afresh,” as the court put it — and come up with a plan as flexible as Obama’s, but much more ambitious. It’s a fortuitous bit of news, fortuitously timed.</p><p>And we begin our course in advanced Manchin studies</p><p>West Virginia Sen. Joe Manchin (D-ish) — who incoming Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer has inexplicably made the chair of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee — recently <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/energy/energy-chairman-manchin-warns-democrats-against-climate-mandates">gave an interview</a> to the conservative <em>Washington Examiner</em> in which he said a bunch of ridiculous stuff like, “you cannot eliminate your way to a cleaner environment. You can innovate your way.”</p><p>Sigh. I was disheartened, and said so on Twitter.</p><p>I was subsequently assured by several people I trust that this is just Manchin being Manchin, saying the kinds of things that will appeal to whatever audience he happens to be speaking to. </p><p>In fact, I’m told, while Manchin is obliged by the Republican lean in his state to voice opposition to heavy-handed (read: any) regulation, he is in fact open to the kind of historic investments that would transform the energy landscape. He hasn’t ruled out DC statehood. He’s softer on the filibuster than it seems. He’ll be willing to bargain when it comes time for <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-the-georgia-senate-wins-do-and">budget</a> <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscast-how-to-decarbonize-the">reconciliation</a>. </p><p>Congressional insiders seem weirdly optimistic about the possibilities under Manchin. So maybe I’m wrong! Maybe he is more flexible than he’s making out and will come through when circumstances demand it. I hope so.</p><p>Either way, we’re all going to be studying this guy’s every word and expression for clues, for four years, so get used to it.</p><p>Feline representation matters</p><p>My dogs Forest and Mabel get most of the glory here at Volts, but I also have two cats, Anakin and Obi-Wan. They are old — my family got them when I was away attending Obama’s 2008 inauguration, ironically enough — and not particularly fond of sitting for pictures.</p><p>They do like a good cuddle, though, and are willing to look at you exactly like this until you comply. </p><p>Thanks for reading, everyone.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/a-few-interesting-bits-of-news</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:31700097</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 20 Jan 2021 17:00:37 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/31700097/b8f7ee13d699a8507cddfa9a1ed7a3bb.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>670</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/31700097/282a15c4bdc99cd0a2c61484e1b4bc48.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Voltscast: How to decarbonize the electricity sector through budget reconciliation]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Greetings, peoples of the Volts! I’ve got a special treat for you today. It’s not my <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-first-volts-podcast">first podcast</a>, exactly, but it’s my first Official Podcast, with music and fancy-pants guests and everything. </p><p>My guests are:</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.leahstokes.com/">Dr. Leah Stokes</a>, an assistant professor of political science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and author of the excellent recent book <a target="_blank" href="https://smile.amazon.com/Short-Circuiting-Policy-Political-Development-ebook/dp/B084T6Z1CW/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&#38;qid=&#38;sr="><em>Short Circuiting Policy: Interest Groups and the Battle Over Clean Energy and Climate Policy in the American States</em></a>; and</p><p>* <a target="_blank" href="https://www.americanprogress.org/person/ricketts-sam/">Sam Ricketts</a>, former climate director for the Jay Inslee presidential campaign, cofounder of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.evergreenaction.com/">Evergreen Action</a>, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, and general climate-political man about town. </p><p>Our subject? How to pass a national clean energy standard through budget reconciliation. </p><p>If those words mean nothing to you, I recommend reading my <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-the-georgia-senate-wins-do-and">previous post</a>, about the Georgia Senate wins and what they mean for clean-energy policy. But I’ll run through some quick background.</p><p>Biden may need to squeeze his signature climate plan through a budget bill</p><p>One of the most important elements of Joe Biden’s climate plan — arguably the centerpiece — is a national clean energy standard (CES) that would require the electricity sector to steadily decarbonize until it reaches net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2035. </p><p>This is important not just because the electricity sector is responsible for about a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/inventory-us-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-sinks">third of emissions</a>, but because a lot of other emitting sectors like transportation and heating are going to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12938086/electrify-everything">shift to electricity</a> in coming years, driving up demand. It’s important to have clean electricity for them to use.</p><p>While Biden does have a Democratic Congress, his majority in the Senate remains slim and the filibuster is likely to remain in place, which means a big climate bill is unlikely. Any big bill at all is unlikely. </p><p>Probably the only thing that will pass Congress is what’s called a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/5/28/18636759/climate-change-budget-reconciliation-democrats">budget reconciliation bill</a>, which can not be filibustered and thus can get by with a simple majority.</p><p>The only things allowed in a reconciliation bill are budget-relevant items, i.e., measures that raise or lower government revenue. Biden’s CES is a purely regulatory measure — it just changes the rules. It probably couldn’t get through reconciliation.</p><p>However! Could a CES be tweaked or modified or redesigned in some way so that it <em>is</em> budget relevant and <em>could</em> pass through reconciliation? Could Biden pass his top climate priority after all?</p><p>That is precisely what Leah and Sam have been working on, and that’s what we discuss, at some length, in today’s podcast. </p><p>It’s way more interesting than it sounds! (That may be my new tag line.)</p><p>Bonus Mabel</p><p>Life is a donut, y’all. Grab onto it with all your fearsome teeth.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/voltscast-how-to-decarbonize-the</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:31307154</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 13 Jan 2021 16:00:15 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/31307154/e30785c27b7c0986df87ba40d76d9f58.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>4608</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/31307154/f66c9f1e6d3823e4018bab5521a288f8.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[What the Georgia Senate wins do (and don't) mean for climate policy]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>[<em>If you do not feel like reading today’s post, you can listen to it. Just hit play above.</em>]</p><p>Y’all, before we get started today I have to share the funniest thing that’s ever happened. </p><p>You know how I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tq3mbXfE3Nk">went on MSNBC a few weeks ago</a> to talk about how <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/21724758/biden-transition-trump-polarized-climate-change-health-immigration">Joe Biden should do everything at once</a>? And you know how former Saturday Night Live comedienne and all-around awesome person Leslie Jones frequently tapes herself watching MSNBC and commenting on people and their rooms? Well get a load of this:</p><p>Lol. It’s even funnier to read the comment thread beneath the tweet. Apparently I look like all the white bearded guys rolled into one. </p><p>Anyway. Good times. On to business!</p><p>I’m working on a longer post about electricity transmission (join <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/improving-long-distance-energy-transmission">the preliminary discussion</a>), but the news cycle has intervened. To wit: on Tuesday, Democrats officially <a target="_blank" href="https://www.npr.org/2021/01/06/953712195/democrats-move-closer-to-senate-control-as-counting-continues-in-georgia">won both the Senate runoffs in Georgia</a>. Joe Biden will have a Democratic Senate!</p><p>This news has Forest shaking with excitement.</p><p>So before we get to transmission, let’s talk about what these Senate wins mean, in general and specifically for clean-energy policy. I’ll end with a little bit of advice for the Democratic Congress, which is the same advice I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/21724758/biden-transition-trump-polarized-climate-change-health-immigration">gave Biden</a>: go for it. </p><p>Control over the Senate matters</p><p>Democrats have 50 senators (well, 48 plus Independents Bernie Sanders and Angus King) and Vice President Harris casts the tie-breaking vote, so technically they have a majority in the Senate — albeit the slimmest possible majority.</p><p>But in the US Senate, the one-vote difference between being in the minority and being in the majority is a chasm. Just ask incoming Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell. </p><p>Most importantly, the Senate majority leader controls which bills come to the floor. McConnell was forever refusing to bring bills to a vote unless he had the entire GOP caucus behind him — even bills with enough bipartisan support to pass. It was an incredibly effective weapon to suppress and obscure the Democratic agenda. New Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer will be able to control the tempo and focus now. </p><p>Secondly, Senate committees will now be chaired by Dems, who can choose what to hold hearings on, and when. </p><p>Thirdly, this is going to make it much easier for Biden to get his appointments confirmed by the Senate, which is a huge relief — those fights would have drained his attention and political capital. The day after the election, Biden announced that he would <a target="_blank" href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/biden-to-name-judge-merrick-garland-as-attorney-general">nominate Merrick Garland for attorney general</a>. Ha ha, suck it, Mitch.</p><p>Fourthly, if Dems can maintain their unity (which is never a given), they can begin populating the federal bench with competent progressive judges to offset the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/6/republicans-keep-confirming-unqualified-judicial-nominees-law360">incompetent reactionaries</a> McConnell has been cranking out. And if Justice Stephen Breyer should <a target="_blank" href="https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/06/liberals-to-breyer-retire-455321">choose to retire</a> [makes the sign of the cross] they will have an opportunity to get a solid progressive on the Supreme Court.</p><p>Losing the Senate would have been a disaster for Dems. Congress would have passed nothing, leaving Biden virtually alone to accomplish everything his coalition needs to hang together in 2022 and 2024. </p><p>Instead they have a narrow majority in the Senate to match their increasingly narrow majority in the House. So it is a non-disaster. That said, it’s not going to lead to progressive legislation.</p><p>A 50-50 Senate will be owned & operated by Joe Manchin</p><p>Pre-November, Democrats were pretty high on election optimism — smoking some <a target="_blank" href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-polls-were-mostly-wrong/">bad polls</a>, as it turns out — and there was talk of a sweeping, New Deal-esque agenda, beginning with aggressive democracy reform and moving quickly into climate change. (Biden’s published plans constituted the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/21322478/joe-biden-overton-window-bidenism">most progressive agenda</a> any Democratic presidential candidate has run on in decades.)</p><p>That was all premised on the idea of Democrats winning 52 or 53 seats in the Senate. And if we’re being honest with ourselves, even that wouldn’t have been nearly enough of a margin for Dems to pass the kind of agenda Biden ran on.</p><p>But with only 50 seats, Democrats will need unanimity for every move they make. Republicans will be united in obstructionism. It is what they know best; it is where they shine. There are only a few Republican senators who even pretend to be “moderate” any more — Susan Collins (ME), Lisa Murkowski (AK), and Mitt Romney (UT), basically — and even if one or two Republicans can be picked off for a given vote, that’s not enough to fully offset losing conservative Dems like Joe Manchin (WV, now chair of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee), Kyrsten Sinema (AZ), and Jon Tester (MT), plus Independent Angus King (ME).</p><p>Basically, the rightmost handful of Dems in the Senate will be the narrow aperture through which all legislation must pass, and as such, they will have almost total veto power over every part of the agenda. They will decide what gets through.</p><p>Manchin does not want to pass Medicare for All or a Green New Deal. He doesn’t even want to pass Biden’s actual climate plan. He doesn’t want to do anything big at all, which he has made <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/us/politics/joe-manchin-interview.html">very clear</a>:</p><p>Senator Joe Manchin III of West Virginia, the most conservative member of his party in the Senate, has a message for fellow Democrats hoping to capture the majority and quickly begin muscling through legislation to bring about sweeping, liberal change: not on his watch.</p><p>Most importantly, Manchin doesn’t want to get rid of the filibuster, and he’s not alone in that. Without 50 votes to scrap it, the filibuster stays, which means no major legislation will pass. No more Covid relief bills. No democracy reform bill. No climate bill. No health care bill. Nothing, period, full stop. </p><p>(I cannot stress the point enough: there is no significant legislation in the universe for which 10 Republican senators will cross over to vote with Dems, save perhaps defense spending authorization. Keeping the filibuster means deliberately taking major legislation off the table.)</p><p>That doesn’t mean there’s no hope for clean energy in the new Congress, though.</p><p>Opportunities for climate progress</p><p>I’ve already written about <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/21724758/biden-transition-trump-polarized-climate-change-health-immigration">all the things Biden can do using executive authority alone</a>. All of that is still on the table, though as we will see below, it is somewhat complicated by the Georgia development.</p><p>But what about Congress? </p><p>There is at least one place where Dems could get substantial clean energy legislation passed.</p><p>Budget reconciliation</p><p>I wrote a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/5/28/18636759/climate-change-budget-reconciliation-democrats">long piece on reconciliation</a> last year, which I recommend. (Everyone needs to study up on this!) It’s a bit difficult to nail down, because the rules governing it are not statutory but adopted rules of the Senate, which can be changed — either at the beginning of the session or on a case-by-case basis. So reconciliation is, in many ways, whatever the Senate wants it to be.</p><p>Budget reconciliation was originally conceived of in modest terms, as a way for the Senate to finalize and work out any discrepancies in the federal budget for the year. Unlike normal legislation, it cannot be filibustered, so it requires only a majority vote.</p><p>As normal legislation has become more difficult, both parties have increasingly turned to reconciliation to pass their priorities. If I may quote my own story:</p><p>In an age of partisan gridlock, the boundaries of [reconciliation’s] use have been pushed by both parties. “As polarization has made it harder to legislate under regular order,” says Molly Reynolds, a congressional scholar at the Brookings Institution, “the pot of gold at the end of the reconciliation rainbow has become more and more valuable as a way to pursue party-defining achievements.”</p><p>But reconciliation is not a get-out-of-jail-free card. It can’t be used for just anything. Quoting myself again:</p><p>The big and most obvious limitations are that a budget reconciliation bill is typically only passed once a year, cannot create or change regulations, and cannot create or direct any discretionary spending (things like research, defense, and environmental protection). It can only mess with mandatory spending or the tax code.</p><p>Within that basic framework, the biggest limitations are imposed by the “Byrd Rule,” introduced by then-Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd in 1985 (and subsequently incorporated into the [Congressional Budget Act] in 1990). He wanted to prohibit “extraneous” measures in reconciliation bills. He defined as extraneous any measures that [quoting <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/23/13709518/budget-reconciliation-explained">Vox’s Dylan Matthews</a>]: “change Social Security; don’t change the overall level of spending or revenue, or where such a change is merely ‘incidental’; increase deficits outside the 10-year budget window, and/or are outside the jurisdiction of the committee recommending them.” All reconciliation bills receive a special analysis to see if they abide by these restrictions, a process known semi-affectionately as a “Byrd bath.”</p><p>This set of restrictions creates a kind of conceptual puzzle into which reconciliation policies must fit. They must materially affect spending or revenue, but they must balance out over the budget window (typically 10 years). Any new spending or tax expenditure must be paid for within that window.</p><p>So what kind of clean energy policy can fit through this reconciliation process? The most obvious place to look is at measures that directly affect the budget: a refunded carbon fee, clean-energy tax credits and RD&D investments, infrastructure investments, and the like. Anything that spends money or charges fees.</p><p>A variety of mandatory spending programs — think Medicare, Medicaid, food stamps, and unemployment benefits — could be tweaked to support a just transition away from fossil fuels. A Green Bank (or an infrastructure bank with a green focus) could be established to make ongoing clean-energy investments.</p><p>There’s also some thinking underway about how to tweak regulatory programs so that they work via the budget and thus could pass reconciliation. For instance, there are several ways that a national clean-energy standard to decarbonize the electricity sector by 2035 could be adapted to reconciliation. (More on that in a post coming soon.) But it’s a lot of work, translating regulations to budget measures, and there are a lot of regulations needed.</p><p>In theory, the Dem majority could vote to suspend or change reconciliation rules for particular measures like democracy reform. If challenged by the Senate parliamentarian who rules on these matters, they could simply vote to override. But it’s not clear why that bit of procedural radicalism would be any more congenial to Manchin than ditching the filibuster. </p><p>Total Democratic unity is almost certainly going to be required to get any ambitious reconciliation bill passed (remember, other Dem interest groups also want their priorities included; Republicans are going to hate these bills), so once again, Manchin will be the gatekeeper. That will mean, among other things, that carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) gets lots of money, along with a bunch of other stuff greens don’t like.</p><p>Nonetheless, budget reconciliation is likely the biggest bite Dems will get at the apple, and they’ll get at least two before the 2022 elections.</p><p>The Congressional Review Act</p><p>Trump did an <a target="_blank" href="https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-in-the-trump-era/">enormous amount of regulatory damage</a> in his four years and Biden’s administration could easily spend four years cleaning it all up. It could use some help.</p><p>Helpfully, there’s a law called the Congressional Review Act. I wrote <a target="_blank" href="https://grist.org/article/2011-01-10-republicans-hollow-threat-epa-and-congressional-review-act/">a piece about it</a> in (good lord) 2011 that has some background. Quoting myself yet again:</p><p>The CRA is a law Newt Gingrich got passed back in 1996. It says that within 60 days of a regulation being passed by the executive branch, a majority in both houses of Congress can vote to nullify it. (It can’t be filibustered, so you only need a majority in the Senate, not the usual 60.)</p><p>At the time, the law was rarely used, because the circumstances in which it could possibly work are narrow. Any bill has to be signed into law by a president, and presidents don’t want to nullify their own administration’s regulations, so a president is only likely to sign a CRA that nullifies what the previous president did in the last 60 days of their term in office. And that new president needs both houses of Congress to be controlled their party as well. </p><p>It doesn’t seem like it ought to happen much, and hadn’t until Hillary Clinton lost to Trump and Republicans took both houses in 2016. Republicans went on an immediate deregulatory bender, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/2/1/14459630/congressional-review-act-obama-regs">nixing</a> 16 rules Obama passed in his last 60 days.</p><p>Now it’s happened again: Trump lost to Biden and Democrats took both houses. So Dems can use the CRA to nullify everything Trump did in his last 60 days, with the stroke of a pen. </p><p>And Trump has done a <em>lot</em> in his last 60 days. <a target="_blank" href="https://projects.propublica.org/trump-midnight-regulations/">ProPublica has a special project</a> devoted to tracking all the last-minute regulatory changes Trump’s administration has pushed (and is pushing) through. There’s a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.natlawreview.com/article/recent-and-forthcoming-environmental-rules-and-guidance-could-be-reversed-under">short article in The National Law Review</a> about how best to use the CRA. Over at Morning Consult, Lisa Martine Jenkins has a <a target="_blank" href="https://morningconsult.com/2020/11/23/epa-rules-biden-administration/">nice chart</a> covering the various ways that Dems might overturn Trump regulations, including by using the CRA.</p><p>Among the CRA’s top targets: the EPA’s <a target="_blank" href="https://insideclimatenews.org/news/19052020/secret-science-epa-transparency-rule-wheeler-pollution-environment/">odious “secret science” rule</a>, which would prohibit the agency from considering a huge and pivotal body of studies on public health; the EPA’s <a target="_blank" href="https://blog.ucsusa.org/julie-mcnamara/the-epas-cost-benefit-proposal-is-corrupt-and-deeply-consequential-call-it-out">twisting of cost-benefit analysis</a> to ignore most of the benefits of air pollution rules; DOI’s recent <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/last-minute-white-house-decision-opens-arctic-land-oil-leasing-rcna217">leasing of Alaskan Arctic land for oil and gas drilling</a>;  the recent <a target="_blank" href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/climate/trump-migratory-bird-protections.html">assault on the Migratory Bird Treaty</a>; and many more. </p><p>Democratic wonks have been tracking the Trump administration closely and stand ready to write a comprehensive CRA bill. It should (and likely <a target="_blank" href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/01/congressional-repeal-act-trump-democrats.html">will</a>) be a top priority for the new Congress.</p><p>Uncertainties abound</p><p>Roughly 100% of my political prognostications in the last five years have proven <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/2016/1/30/10873476/donald-trump-never-president">laughably wrong</a>, so I’m not even going to pretend to predict what course the next few years will take. As the last few days have demonstrated yet again, anything can happen.</p><p>But there are a few particular strands I’ll be keeping my eye on.</p><p>There’s at least some chance that Manchin is just positioning himself on the filibuster. Other filibuster supporters like Ron Wyden (OR) have <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/21450891/mitch-mcconnell-ruth-bader-ginsburg-senate-congress-democrats-2020-supreme-court-filibuster">recently said</a> that, while they don’t want to get rid of it, they aren’t simply going to let Republicans block everything again. There’s some chance that, if Democrats lead with a democracy reform bill and Republicans block it, Wyden, Manchin, and other Dems could be persuaded to suspend the filibuster on a one-time basis, or reform it — say, so that senators once again have to conduct “<a target="_blank" href="https://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/in-the-news/jeff-merkley-circulates-talking-filibuster-reform-proposal">talking filibusters</a>,” appearing on the floor rather than simply vowing to filibuster through a press release.</p><p>Another wrinkle is that having a Democratic Congress might weaken Biden’s drive to maximize executive action. He might think that if he acts too aggressively, he’ll lose the cooperation of key Democratic moderates. I think that would be a huge mistake — executive action is something he knows he can do, while congressional cooperation, as Biden should have learned under Obama, can be a maddening ephemera.</p><p>There’s also the question of the 2022 elections. A president’s first midterms are <a target="_blank" href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch2_tbl4.pdf">typically a disaster</a> in which their party loses Congressional seats. (Think, if you can stand it, about 2010.) And in 2020, Republicans <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/15/gerrymandering-republicans-map-charts-states">won the key state houses that will allow them to gerrymander themselves more seats</a>, so there’s a very real chance Dems could lose the House in 2022. </p><p>The Senate landscape will be <a target="_blank" href="https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/senate-2022-an-early-look/">more congenial to Dems</a>; Republicans are defending 20 seats, Dems only 13. But Senate races are devilishly difficult to handicap.</p><p>So 2022 could see Dems keeping both houses, which would strengthen their mandate; losing the House and keeping the Senate, which would put a freeze on new legislation and open up the possibility of impeachment (Republicans will make up some reason); or losing both houses, which opens up the possibility of impeachment and removal from office. </p><p>And then there’s the question of Biden’s health and the Democratic presidential candidate in 2024, which is even more opaque and unpredictable.</p><p>We are cursed to live in interesting times. The Republican Party could implode. US democracy could crumble in the face of authoritarianism. A meteor could strike America. These are all open possibilities.</p><p>So in the end, my advice to the Democratic Congress is the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/21724758/biden-transition-trump-polarized-climate-change-health-immigration">same as it is to Biden</a>: blitz. Only two years are guaranteed. The only hope Democrats have of surviving the waves of white grievance and authoritarianism that are crashing against DC — strengthened by <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/1/30/20997046/constitution-electoral-college-senate-popular-vote-trump">deep structural deficiencies in the US constitutional system</a> — is to rapidly and visibly improve the lives of ordinary people. </p><p>Get the pandemic under control. Give Americans money to get through the recession. Give them access to affordable health care. Make it easier for them to vote. And invest in the clean-energy growth that will employ them and clean their air. Do it proudly and loudly and make sure everyone hears about it.</p><p>If you have to write a check to every citizen of West Virginia to get it done, well then, all hail our new overlord Joe Manchin, blessed be His beneficence.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/what-the-georgia-senate-wins-do-and</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:31144950</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 08 Jan 2021 17:11:45 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/31144950/b3cca14676ccf17b5bae96297eb37c5a.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1247</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/31144950/6f71f5209dae070c7409ebbe085e5c8f.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[Why I am a progressive]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Hey, Volts readers, guess what? Now you can be Volts listeners! If you would prefer to hear the post below read aloud, by me, just click play above. </p><p>And if you like having the posts read like this, let me know. If enough people are into it, I might see about getting some better equipment and actually learning how to edit a sound file.</p><p>Before we jump in, some housekeeping:</p><p>* Remember, as of Jan. 1, free subscribers will receive one post a week. The other posts, and the ability to comment on posts and discussion threads, will be reserved for members (paid subscribers). I’m somewhat loath to do this — in my perfect world, it would all be free — but I need to, like, live. And buy dog food. So please join! We’re gonna have fun. </p><p>* There are 20% subscription discounts for <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/a5e3862e">groups of four or more</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/fec4c590">students and educators</a>. If you’re an educator who wants Volts access for your class or group, let me know and we’ll figure something out. </p><p>* <strong>If you want to subscribe but can’t afford it right now, let me know and I’ll set you up.</strong> You can reply to this email and I’ll get it. </p><p>* The Covid-relief/omnibus megabill, containing an enormous energy bill that I <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/congress-might-pass-a-huge-energy">discussed last week</a>? Trump <a target="_blank" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/12/27/trump-stimulus-shutdown-congress/">signed it</a>. It’s law! (I also <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-first-volts-podcast">discussed it with Matt Yglesias</a> on the first Volts podcast.)</p><p>Anyway, on to business.</p><p>Today I’m going to do something a little different. It might seem like an odd digression into philosophy and ethics, but it comes back around to politics. In fact, it explains my core political orientation about as well as anything can.</p><p>I’m going to explain why I hate the Trolley Problem.</p><p>The Trolley Problem and its variants</p><p>The Trolley Problem is a famous “thought experiment” in ethics. It traces back to philosopher Philippa Foot, who first wrote about it in 1967, but in the years since there have been dozens upon dozens of variations, in both the philosophical literature and the popular press.</p><p>You’ve probably heard some version. The most basic goes like this: There’s an out-of-control railcar hurtling toward five people who are tied to the track. You’re next to a switch that could divert the car to another track, but on that track is a single worker who would be killed if you do. What do you do?</p><p>Variations are endless. What if the person on track two is your son? What if the choice is between five people you know to be murderers and one good person? What if the choice were made from a switch house where you couldn’t see any of the people? </p><p>The point of these thought experiments is to probe your intuitions and principles. Is it better to do nothing and allow five deaths or to take affirmative action that leads to one death? Does the difference between acting and refraining from acting matter? Does the number of lives matter? Etc. </p><p>The recent development of autonomous vehicles has brought the Trolly Problem back into <a target="_blank" href="https://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2016/dec/12/the-trolley-problem-would-you-kill-one-person-to-save-many-others">popular consciousness</a> yet again. If robots are going to be driving, how will <em>they</em> make these decisions? Will they be utilitarians, maximizing the number of lives saved at every juncture, or Kantians, refusing to knowingly sacrifice one life for another? Presumably however we program them. So maybe we have to decide after all.</p><p>The Trolley Problem served as the basis for a fan-favorite sequence on the show <em>The Good Place</em>:</p><p>And of course, times being what they are, it has inspired all manner of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.facebook.com/TrolleyProblemMemes/?ref=page_internal">memes</a>.</p><p></p><p>Despite its enduring appeal, the Trolley Problem is Bad. It is misleading about moral decision making and, more importantly, misleading about how to <em>improve</em> moral decision making.</p><p>It’s not moral principles but moral agents that matter most</p><p>Some of you know that I spent several years in the late 1990s getting an MA in philosophy and then starting on (but not finishing) a PhD. Anyone who studied analytic philosophy — as I did, at least at first — has spent lots of time with thought experiments. </p><p>I spent a semester reading the pinnacle of pure intellectual gymnastics, Derek Parfit’s <a target="_blank" href="https://www.amazon.com/Reasons-Persons-Derek-Parfit/dp/019824908X"><em>Reasons and Persons</em></a>, which is full of thought experiments moral, epistemic, metaphysical, and otherwise. The book is <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/1/3/14148208/derek-parfit-rip-obit">revered in the field</a>, considered one of the great philosophical works of the 20th century, and it completely turned me off. It’s one of many things that led me away from philosophy entirely. </p><p>As the Trolley Problem is structured, you, the moral agent, have an utter paucity of knowledge about the situation. You don’t know why you’re there, any of the people involved, any history, any detail. All you know is, one life or five lives. </p><p>The problem is designed to make the agent (the decider) invisible, to isolate the decision itself away from embedded, embodied experience. Which is fine, if you’re just having a think. But discussing the ideal ranking of moral principles is like discussing <a target="_blank" href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/noumenon">Kant’s </a><a target="_blank" href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/noumenon"><em>noumena</em></a>, the thing-in-itself. No human can directly perceive it and wouldn’t know if they had, so there’s an angels-on-the-head-of-a-pin aspect to it. </p><p>All we have are the perceptual and analytic tools available to us, so we should focus on improving them. If you want trolley-style decisions made better in the real world, in real societies, you’re much better off focusing on agents than on any set of final principles.</p><p>How to be a good trolley decider</p><p>Consider if you ended up in the Trolley Problem in real life. How would you make a good decision in that situation? </p><p>Ideally, you would be coming to it with a history; you’d know how you got there and something about how situation developed, who the other people are, why they hell they’re tied to the track, etc. You’d have a good sense of how fast the railcar is traveling and the force necessary to stop it. You’d have a good sense of the chances of success of various options: flagging down the car or the man working on the tracks, finding something to throw on the tracks, jumping on the track yourself. You’d know whether the people tied to the track are real or dummies, whether you’re being tricked.</p><p>You’d also need the ability to make a quick decision in extremely difficult circumstances. You couldn’t let your fear or over-analysis paralyze you (as happens to Chidi in <em>Good Place</em>). You’d need the ability to keep your cool, to maintain some emotional distance from the situation, to rapidly consider the options from different perspectives, to notice if there are other non-obvious alternatives. </p><p>You’d need to be alert, well-rested, well-fed, not distracted, attuned to circumstances — what the man on the tracks is doing, how securely the other people are attached to the tracks, whether the ground and tracks are wet and slippery, the speed of the railcar, the age of the equipment, etc. And finally, you would need to be motivated to do the right thing.</p><p>To make the best possible decision, you would need to be perfectly informed, acting based on prosocial motivations and a perfect temperament, in control of yourself and thinking with perfect clarity. </p><p>In other words, what we’d want operating in a real-world case of the Trolley Problem is not the perfect set of principles, but the perfect moral agent — the best possible decision-maker.</p><p>That’s my answer to the Trolley Problem and all similar thought experiments: the right decision is whatever decision the best possible moral decision-maker would make in the situation. </p><p>Of course, there is no such moral superagent. No one in this world, making real decisions in real circumstances, has a perfect temperament or is ever perfectly informed or thinking with perfect clarity. The default, in fact, is harried people making thoughtless decisions based on crude heuristics and mental models. </p><p>But the crucial point is that we can be <em>better or worse</em> decision-makers, closer or farther away from the ideal described above, and we have a pretty good idea what it takes to help people get closer. (More on that below.) </p><p>One thing that doesn’t seem to help is a well-developed set of ethical principles. A <a target="_blank" href="http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/BehEth-140123a.pdf">2014 research paper</a> surveyed the empirical evidence collected by studies of various moral behaviors and found “no statistically detectable difference between the behavior of ethicists and non-ethicists.”  </p><p>In any real-world situation, good decision-making is enabled less by abstract principles than by temperament and discernment, i.e., self-possession and wisdom. The person who takes in the most information, can see the situation through the appropriate lens, and can act on priorities amidst pressure and uncertainty will likely make the best decision. </p><p>Whether we’re seeking better real-world outcomes (as I am) or seeking better answers to longstanding moral questions (as the Trolley Problem is), the right strategy is the same: get help. Try to make society fertile for the development of better moral agents. They will have better answers than we do.</p><p>How to encourage the growth of better moral agents</p><p>In his seminal 2011 book <a target="_blank" href="https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374533557"><em>Thinking, Fast and Slow</em></a>, Princeton psychologist Daniel Kahneman made a distinction between system 1 (S1) thinking and system 2 (S2) thinking.</p><p>Kahneman describes S1 as “fast, automatic, frequent, emotional, stereotypic, and unconscious” — what are more colloquially known as “gut reactions.”</p><p>S2 is “slow, effortful, infrequent, logical, calculating, and conscious,” closer to what we tend to conceive of as <em>thinking</em> — taking a step back, slowing down, consciously assessing and reasoning.</p><p>Very crudely speaking, you can think of S1 engaging the amygdala, the brain’s basic pleasure/pain, attraction/revulsion centers, and S2 engaging the frontal cortex, the centers of symbol manipulation, self-reflection, and conscious calculation. </p><p>The amygdala is prior to the frontal cortex, both evolutionarily speaking and in biological priority. Long-term thinking requires a basic level of safety, an S1 system quiet enough to let S2 work. The more threat looms, the more we, like all biological creatures, prioritize the immediate security of our bodies, our families, our tribes, our borders. </p><p>We know that stress and privation make S2 thinking more difficult. For a superb introduction to this work, listen to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.stitcher.com/show/the-ezra-klein-show/episode/robert-sapolsky-on-the-toxic-intersection-of-poverty-and-stress-58359498">Ezra Klein’s podcast interview with Robert Sapolsky</a>, a Stanford neuroscientist and primatologist who has studied the intersection of stress and poverty. (Seriously, take an hour, it will change how you think.)</p><p>Sapolsky’s work is varied and fascinating, but the recurring theme is that, in modern human societies, it’s expensive to be poor — cognitively, emotionally, and physically. Poverty, hunger, and social marginalization lead to stress, exhaustion, anxiety, and ill health. </p><p>Stress is a biological emergency reaction, an elevated heart rate and flood of hormones designed for short-term anticipatory threat response. But it is now experienced as a constant background state in response to chronic threats that have no immediate solutions, to corrosive long-term effect. Sapolsky calls being on the lower end of America’s social and economic totem pole a “psychic sledgehammer.” Under those blows, it is difficult to undertake the “slow, effortful” cognitive processes necessary for long-term plans or Olympian moral decision-making.</p><p>And our vulnerability to circumstance traces all the way back to before our birth. Stress hormones and nutrition in pregnant mothers shape the neural pathways of the fetus in the womb. The <a target="_blank" href="https://www.unicef.org/earlychildhood/index_40748.html#:~:text=Early%20years%20of%20childhood%20form,non%2Dcommunicable%20diseases%20of%20adulthood.">crucial weeks, months, and years after birth</a> shape basic neural and hormonal response patterns that persist for life.</p><p>(I once wrote a long article on the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/8/21/17687402/kylie-jenner-luck-human-life-moral-privilege">centrality of luck to human life</a>. It’s a good one!)</p><p>From the womb on, everywhere is the same basic pattern: insofar as a person feels safe and nurtured, they can more easily develop higher order and longer term thinking. Conversely, hunger, stress, and privation cause heightened threat response and a shrinking of horizons. That’s true whether it’s a fetus bathed in stress hormones or an adult marginalized in a society with low trust. </p><p>Life is composed of dozens of small decisions every day, decisions in which conflicting interests and principles must be resolved, long-term benefits, personal and social, weighed against short-term desires. To maximize the net welfare of society, which ought to be our goal, we need to improve those decisions, incrementally, at the margins, bit by bit.</p><p>We do that by creating better moral agents, which we know how to do. We make sure that everyone has their basic needs cared for; that every family expecting a baby receives prenatal care and basic childcare training; that every family with a new child receives time off from work and regular nurse visits; that every child has access to quality public education, from pre-school through college; and that every adult receives adequate health care and housing. We create a compassionate, law-bound society that incentivizes prosocial behaviors. These are the kinds of things that create the necessary foundation for widespread S2 thinking. </p><p>Progressivism is about bringing more of humanity into service</p><p>And this, at a fundamental level, is why I’m a progressive. It’s not that I think I’ve figured out the perfect society or the correct way to live. It’s that I believe we can get better at it — better at living, better at society, better at peace and equitable, sustainable prosperity. </p><p>The best way to improve is to recruit as much help as possible, to get the maximum number of minds and hearts involved. The more we lift people up out of poverty, precarity, discrimination, and stress, the more we unleash their minds on longer term problems and non-zero-sum, cooperative solutions. </p><p>The more minds we have applying themselves to our collective trolley problems, the more likely we are to get good answers. </p><p>The Trolley Problem attempts to isolate moral intuitions from the messiness of human experience, but integrating those intuitions and principles into human practice is the whole ballgame. It’s what matters. Being good, acting for the greatest good of humanity and the biosphere, is a practical skill, not a fixed body of knowledge or set of rules. It’s something we do together, not as isolated moral agents next to rail switches. And it’s <em>difficult</em>. It involves building and defending a complex social and economic infrastructure. We accomplish it, if at all, by paying closer attention to human experience, not abstracting away from it.</p><p>Thinking about philosophy led me out of philosophy</p><p>Over the course of his career, one of my favorite philosophers, <a target="_blank" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rorty/">Richard Rorty</a>, basically thought his way out of philosophy. He started in analytic philosophy, moved to American pragmatism, and ended up doing something like social and political commentary. </p><p>I won’t try to summarize or speak for Rorty, who is a towering and complicated figure, but my intellectual arc was, in its own modest way, more or less the same.</p><p>What philosophical pragmatism captures is that, whether it’s ethics, metaphysics, consciousness, or personal identity, Ultimate Truth doesn’t and can’t matter to us. We can’t experience it directly. We wouldn’t know for certain if we had. All we can experience is one another and our endlessly varying, conflicting ideas about the right perspectives and frames through which to view evidence and events. Our only real metric for comparison is which perspectives and frames work better to navigate the world (“work better” being the heart of pragmatism). No god or revelation is going to come along and settle those endless arguments. </p><p>The real work is just figuring out how we can live together in something approximating peace and harmony, how we can improve our collective circumstances even in light of our inescapable differences. Abstract thought experiments can’t answer those questions; they are questions of practice, of incremental improvement, the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/70587-politics-is-a-strong-and-slow-boring-of-hard-boards">strong and slow boring of hard boards</a>. </p><p>I like to think that what I’m doing today is, in some small way, engaging with those real-world problems, helping to bore the boards. It is immeasurably more satisfying than sitting in a room contemplating imaginary dilemmas. </p><p>The only trolleys I care about these days are the ones that serve transit-oriented development.</p><p>Thanks for reading this far, y’all! That was long and nerdy. You deserve some dogs.</p><p>Here’s Forest, majestically/goofily surveying his grandfather’s back yard.</p><p>And here is Mabel engaged in her new favorite activity: staring contemplatively into the fire.</p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/why-i-am-a-progressive</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:30081902</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 30 Dec 2020 17:00:57 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/30081902/c659a1a7fe30bae17c9f89298e8fab40.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>1260</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/30081902/62367e6b4e2e6ebd2387666be2270056.jpg"/></item><item><title><![CDATA[The first Volts podcast! ]]></title><description><![CDATA[<p>Happy Christmas Eve, everyone. I hope you are somewhere safe and warm.</p><p>Here’s a little holiday treat for you: I recorded my first Voltscast.</p><p>Matt Yglesias runs a newsletter called <a target="_blank" href="https://www.slowboring.com/">Slow Boring</a>. He is interested in the energy bill that Congress passed this week. I just wrote a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.volts.wtf/p/congress-might-pass-a-huge-energy">long post about that energy bill</a>.</p><p>We wanted to chat about it. Starting a whole official podcast with professional editing and music and a name and all the rest sounded a bit daunting, so as an experiment, we decided, in the immortal words of Bill O’Reilly …</p><p>We talked, we recorded it, and we’re sending it to you, unedited. Fast and loose. Let me know what you think and if you’d like to see (er, hear) more like this. </p><p>I’d like to get into doing more audio in the future. Apparently some people don’t have time to read 3,000-word pieces, but they can listen to me read pieces while they wash the dishes or walk the dog, so I might try a bit of narration. And I’ve had a few early talks with people about doing something more professional and produced.</p><p>I’ll be honest: I don’t really want to launch an Actual Podcast and get tied to a particular format and schedule. I’m terrible at <a target="_blank" href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/satisficing.asp">satisficing</a> and I know if I did it I would obsess over it and it would eat up all my time, and I’d rather spend my time writing. </p><p>I’d like to do it on a less formal basis, though, at least if y’all are into it, so let me know.</p><p>In the meantime, stay cozy like Mabel and Forest.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p></p> <br/><br/>This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit <a href="https://www.volts.wtf/subscribe?utm_medium=podcast&#38;utm_campaign=CTA_2">www.volts.wtf/subscribe</a>]]></description><link>https://www.volts.wtf/p/the-first-volts-podcast</link><guid isPermaLink="false">substack:post:28180495</guid><dc:creator><![CDATA[David Roberts]]></dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 24 Dec 2020 14:00:23 GMT</pubDate><enclosure url="https://api.substack.com/feed/podcast/28180495/f2af2c1fcabef032aa3752140ed95408.mp3" length="33333333" type="audio/mpeg"/><itunes:author>David Roberts</itunes:author><itunes:explicit>No</itunes:explicit><itunes:duration>3116</itunes:duration><itunes:image href="https://substackcdn.com/feed/podcast/193024/post/28180495/b84e593f84bf698a8d19789f94a9b191.jpg"/></item></channel></rss>